EFFECT OF ISLAM’S ROLE IN STATE NATIONALISM ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF GOVERNMENT: CASE STUDIES OF TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

by

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ABSTRACT

EFFECT OF ISLAM’S ROLE IN STATE NATIONALISM ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF GOVERNMENT: CASE STUDIES OF TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

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George Mason University, 2015
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Why are governments Islamizing in many Muslim-majority countries? Scholars have linked this phenomenon to the authoritarian regimes’ lack of legitimacy or the presence of powerful disruptive Islamist movements. These explanations, however, fail to explain the phenomenon. This dissertation, using comparative historical analysis of Turkey and Pakistan, argues that Islam's role in state nationalism is the primary reason for the Islamization of government. The indicators used to measure Islam’s role in state nationalism are constitutional provisions, national symbols, and banknote imagery while Islamization of government is estimated by focusing on religious education, religious basis of family law, and the ministry of religious affairs’ presence and functions.
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION
Defining Islam’s role in government is one of the most pressing political issues facing the Muslim majority countries (MMCs) today. Acerbic debates relating to the Islam’s relationship to laws, decrees and policies have polarized many of these countries, making social harmony and economic growth difficult to achieve. Mass media also increasingly focuses on Islamization, invariably linking it to human rights violations, religious discrimination, and terrorism. The ready explanations for the phenomenon are fundamentalism, misogyny, nativism, bigotry, or plain old hatred towards the West. This media frenzy has raised the specter of Islamization not only in the MMCs but also in the West. Many Westerners, despite living in countries where Muslims form a small share of the population and an even a smaller share of the political and economic elite, are worried and ready to support anti-Sharia, anti-hijab or anti-minaret laws.

Yet, despite many similarities, the degree of Islamization of government varies substantially across the MMCs. In some MMCs, government policies and laws show a strong influence of Islam but in others, they are secular or irreligious. Some scholars have argued that this variability is due to the differences in the popularity of the Islamic movements/parties in the MMCs. It is argued that these parties Islamize the government after coming to power or (as happens more often) pressure the rulers to Islamize. Others have countered these arguments by pointing out that a high level of Islamization of government has often been implemented under authoritarian regimes to increase their political legitimacy. These theories, individually or together, explain Islamization of government in some of the MMCs, but they do not explain its high variability across the
Muslim world. Due to the significance of this issue, not only for the people living in MMCs but also for others, it is important to study and explain why, in some MMCs, does Islam play a significant role in government affairs while in others it has only a minor influence? The working hypothesis of this study is that Islam’s role in the state nationalism of an MMC—that is, the degree to which Islam has become bound up with the identity of the country – provides a better explanation of the extent of Islamization of government than the success/strength of Islamist parties or the desire of an authoritarian regime to gain support.

Scholars have pointed out that the relationship of religion to nationalism1 and religion’s role in the government could be closely linked (Rubin 2013; Rieffer 2003; Barker 2008, 68-69, 107). Islam’s role in state nationalism is sometimes considered while explaining Islamization of government in individual countries but is often ignored when Islamization of government is more broadly discussed. Even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in the public sphere and in the government in countries where state nationalism is linked to a particular religion or sect. Religious leaders in countries such as Israel, Malta and Ireland have frequently influenced political issues and legitimized this intervention by religion’s special relationship with the state (Binder 1961; Weiss 1986; Yadgar 2010; Cohen 2012; House 2013; Lacroix 2011).

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1 Most of these scholars talk about nationalism in general and do not specify whether their arguments are about state nationalism or popular nationalism or both.
THE PUZZLE: Why Islamization of government?

Sacralization of politics is a phenomenon not limited to the MMCs. Religious issues, values and discourse influence politics in a large number of countries. Opinions of religious authorities, like Pope Francis, Archbishop of Canterbury, or Dalai Lama matter and politicians try to keep on their right side. Policies are presented as moral imperatives and emotional appeals to religion are common. The pious are frequently warned of the vanishing of their creed, if they do not mobilize or vote in a certain way. The relegation of religion to the private sphere, as predicted by many eminent sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s, has evidently not transpired. Even in countries, which are constitutionally secular and/or have a large number of religiously unaffiliated ‘nones’, there are regular instances of politicians passing laws or making new rules to appeal to the religious sentiments of the majority community. Whether it is the defunding of Plan Parenthood and usage of administrative procedures to shut down anti-abortion clinics in the US or meat bans in India, religions continue to display their relevance and resilience, even in secular countries.

For many MMCs, independence came after more than hundred years of bitter struggle against colonialism. People were, therefore, enthusiastic about gaining national sovereignty. Erwin Rosenthal (1965) argues that after achieving independence, the national goals were “self-expression and self-fulfillment” and the place of Islam/Sharia in the laws and constitutions became an important issue. Many groups wanted a prominent role for religion in government necessary and considered continuance of the Western laws, primarily imposed by the Christian colonial powers, as against Islam and a sacrilege,
inviting divine retribution. These groups were not large, but a significant segment of the population was sympathetic to their viewpoint. Most of the time, however, these new nations were led by people who were not very religious. These leaders were often educated in the West and were closer to their former colonial masters in their habits and lifestyle than to the majority of their countrymen. Most of them had a very low opinion of *ulema* and considered religion’s intrusion into government an obstacle to creating a modern nation and a modern economy. Therefore, under their rule Islamization of governments remained limited to a few changes in some laws, while the governments in MMCs remained largely secular. Criticisms by the ulema of the irreligiousness of the government were ignored for the most part. It was only in the 1970s, decades after independence, that national elites in many MMCs took serious steps to Islamize the laws and government policies and started to fashion a public sphere defined by religious motifs (Hibbard 2015, 297-8). The Iranian revolution, humiliating defeats in wars, disenchantment with other ideologies (Arabism, socialism, capitalism, etc.) and the rise of wealthy and religiously conservative Arab monarchies are some of the reasons given to explain this change at the global level. However, despite these international influences, Islamization of government was frequently a domestic affair and most of its motivations and repercussions were also domestic. Sinno's (2010) statement about use of Islam in Afghanistan is true for many MMCs:

---

2 Muhammad Ali Jinnah (of Pakistan), Leopold Senghor (of Senegal) and Habib Bourguiba (of Tunisia) are examples of such leadership.
The strategic use of religion plays an important role in the ability of some Afghan political actors to legitimate their actions, mobilize support, undermine rivals, attract foreign aid, and control populations.

Following are some the principal explanations given in the literature for the Islamization of the government in the MMCs:

- Lack of political legitimacy;
- Weak, heterogeneous state;
- Presence of popular Islamist parties/movements.

These explanations, it is argued, work individually or collectively, to cause Islamization of governments. There are also essentialist explanations that hold Islam as unique, monolithic, primitive, and/or state-centric, and influencing laws or policies as a singular characteristic of Islam. However, as these explanations are getting rarer in academic literature and have been appropriately critiqued, they are not being discussed here.

**Lack of political legitimacy**

In October 2013, several Saudi women buckled up and drove their cars themselves, instead of seeking the help of their male relatives or calling a cab. Some of them were arrested and detained as women are not issued driving licenses in Saudi Arabia. On both these occasions, Saudi regime was severely criticized not only by Western media but also by commentators in many MMCs. While Saudi government cited religious reasons for the
continuation of anachronistic policy, most experts blamed Saudi royals’ long-standing strategy of seeking political legitimacy through Islamization of government. Usage of Islamization to gain political legitimacy is, however, not limited to Saudi Arabia. Numerous other autocratic regimes in the MMCs have also tread the same path. Lacking electoral legitimacy, they use religion to justify their rule. Using the examples of Righteous Caliphate (considered by most Sunni Muslims as the golden age) or Shia Imams (considered by most Shia Muslims to be the only ones fit to rule), they claim that it is the prerogative of the righteous to rule, irrespective of their popularity. Examples of this phenomenon are numerous. In Sudan, General Abbud and later General Numayri used Islam to gain legitimacy (Fluehr-Lobban 1991; 71-89). Similarly, in Bangladesh, General Zia-ur-Rahman and General Ershad, introduced Islamization policies to legitimize their military takeovers and to prolong their rule (Raiz 2010). Colonel Qaddafi introduced Sharia to consolidate his power in the early 1970s and in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, a secular Baathist, put restrictions on alcohol and made religious education mandatory after the First Gulf War (1990-91) to shore up his diminishing legitimacy (Harris 1986; Sadi 2011, 27-8).

Like autocrats, democratic leaders in the MMCs have also Islamized the governments to buttress their rule. Electoral victories provided them legitimacy but the democratic experiment was new, institutions were weak, poverty widespread, bureaucracy corrupt, and difficulties enormous. So, many democratic leaders failed to fulfill their promises of social justice and economic development, and support for their rule dwindled. The religious right used this disillusionment to their advantage and criticized democratic leaders for their
westernization, immoral practices and lack of attachment to Islam. Many democratic leaders then resorted to Islamization of government to deflect criticism. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was not a practicing Muslim, introduced many Islamization policies to weaken public support for the religious right opposition (Saigol 1995, 470-1). In Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir initially based his political appeal on Malay ethnicity. However, faced with a strong opposition, he recruited Anwar Ibrahim (a popular Islamist activist and the leader of the Islamic Youth League) and increased Islamization of government to scuttle challenges from his own party rivals and to thwart the progress of the principal opposition party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Means 2009). Similarly in Iraq, Prime Minister Malaki also tried to use Islamization to prolong his rule. (Mamouri 2013).

**Weak, heterogeneous state**

Seyyed Vali Nasr (2001) contends that Islamization of government has also been used as a strategy for consolidating a weak state. Most post-colonial states had arbitrarily drawn borders that cut across linguistic, ethnic, religious and sectarian communities. Creating a unified state and a strong national identity out of diverse communities, which were cobbled together solely to serve colonial interests, was not an easy job (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 56-9). Therefore, post-independence leaders had to spend considerable time, energy and money trying to make their countrymen think as a nation. They used different strategies to achieve this objective. In at least some MMCs, centrifugal forces, threatening the weak post-colonial state, were countered by using Islam as a unifying element. Presenting
Pakistan and Malaysia as examples, Nasr demonstrates how rulers of these heterogeneous colonial states employed Islamization to counter separatists and to keep their states united.

**Presence of popular Islamist movements/parties**

Some Islamist movements/parties (hereafter parties) of the MMCs were proponents of Islamization of government, long before they came to power. Islamization was not a small part of their party’s platform but their party’s ideology, around which the party platform was built. The leaders of these parties pledged that they would Islamize the government once they achieved power and they fulfilled their promises. Khomeini vowed to increase Islam’s role in government and rejected the Westoxification (Gharbzadegi), toxic influences of the Western culture that were threatening Islam and local Persian culture. After the revolution, he delivered on his promises by Islamization of laws and policies. Recently, President Morsi also increased Islamization of the Egyptian government as given in his party’s manifesto (FJP 2011).

More often, however, popular Islamist parties help increase Islamization of government not by acquiring power but by threatening to acquire power. To prevent these parties from becoming more popular and taking control of the state, rulers tried to steal their thunder and Islamized the government themselves. Mubarak of Egypt, Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen all increased Islamization of government due to the threat of Islamist parties.
The foregoing reasons, however, fall short of giving a convincing explanation of the Islamization of government. The lack of legitimacy does not always lead to the Islamization of government. Most of the MMCs have been ruled by authoritarian regimes since independence, but Islamization of government has been a priority in only a few. Furthermore, the level of Islamization of government does not appear to relate to the level or length of autocracy. Some countries that have been under dictatorship for decades have a low level of Islamization of government while others that have been partially democratic have a higher level of Islamization of government. For example, Kazakhstan has been led by authoritarian President Nursultan Nazarbayev since independence in 1991. During the last twenty-four years, there have been elections but none of them was considered free and fair. In April 2015, Nazarbayev was elected for the fifth term in office with more than ninety percent of votes. However, despite his authoritarianism, Nazarbayev has never tried to Islamize the government. In fact, he has cracked down on Islamists (Rickleton 2015; Radio Free Europe 2015a). Similar is the case of Uzbekistan, where President Karimov suppressed Islamists and has ruled more ruthlessly than Nazarbayev for more than two decades (Dyomkin 2014; Radio Free Europe 2015b). Tunisian government did not become Islamized even after more than half a century of dictatorships of President Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Islamization of government is clearly less in these countries than in Malaysia, a longstanding democracy, and in Pakistan, which has been a democracy for considerable periods of time.
The presence of strong Islamist parties in the MMCs increases the probability of Islamization of government, but it is not a necessary or sufficient condition. Examples of countries in the Middle East demonstrate that Islamization of government does not require popular Islamist parties. Conversely, popular Islamist parties in an MMC does not necessarily mean high level of Islamization of government. Despite having no Islamist parties, governments in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman are more Islamized than governments of Egypt and Jordan, which have popular Islamist parties. As Oliver Roy explains, regimes deal with Islamist parties in contrasting ways, depending on how they (regimes) perceive they can best control Islam, and the result is not always Islamization (or re-Islamization as Roy calls it):

Either moderate Islamist parties are integrated into the political scene without any particular concessions being made to them (Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey), or integration is accompanied by a state-ordered re-Islamization (Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt), or else ideological concessions are made toward re-Islamization while Islamist political participation is blocked (the Maghreb), or, finally, no concessions are made, the contradiction being too great between the founding values of the state and Islamism (secularism for Iraq and Syria, Qaddafi’s philosophy for Libya). (Roy 1994, 124-6)

Finally, elite usage of Islamization of government as a way to consolidate a weak, heterogeneous state is also rare. High ethnic diversity and a weak state in an MMC does not often lead to Islamization of government. Many countries with low ethnic diversity,
like Saudi Arabia, have a high level of Islamization of government. Conversely, many highly heterogeneous MMCs, like Gambia and Sierra Leone, have a low level of Islamization of government. It is particularly interesting to compare three neighboring MMCs of South East Asia which show an inverse relationship between heterogeneity and Islamization of government. According to Nasr (2001), the Malaysian government was Islamized to strengthen a weak heterogeneous state. However, Indonesia, a vastly more heterogeneous state, was not Islamized. Meanwhile, Brunei, a tiny nation much less heterogeneous than Malaysia, became the most Islamized of the three, when it adopted Sharia as law in 2014 (Ozanick 2015).

Besides these reasons, geographical location also cannot explain high Islamization of government. Although most of the MMCs with high level of Islamization of government are in the Middle East, many others are not: Pakistan is in South Asia, Afghanistan in Central Asia, Libya in North Africa, and Mauritania in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Islamization of government does not seem to be linked with per capita income as high level of Islamization of government is found in low per capita income (such as Afghanistan and Mauritania), middle per capita income (such as Iran), and very high per capita income (such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) countries.

What, then, is primarily responsible for the Islamization of governments in MMCs? Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are considered the three most Islamized governments in the world (The ARDA 2015). Studying them, one could not help but notice the prominent
role of Islam in their nationalisms. All three have been called religious nationalist states and scholars have linked the Islamization of their governments to Islam’s role in their nationalisms. But this causal link of Islam's role in nationalism and the Islamization of government has not been pursued, particularly when the focus is on Islamization of government in multiple countries. This dissertation intends to fill the gap. It will study two very dissimilar cases, Turkey and Pakistan, and demonstrate that Islam’s role in nationalism is the key cause of the Islamization of government in both these states.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

At the conceptual level, this dissertation focuses on Islam’s role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalisms. Scholars focusing on nationalism have, until recently, ignored religion or considered it a competitor of nationalism. This emphasis on competition between nationalism and religion becomes stronger when the focus is on Islam and the MMCs. Unfortunately, many ‘experts’ on Islam in the media have joined in and – touting Islamic exceptionalism – make alarmist predictions about the rise of Islamism and the demise of nationalism in the MMCs. Islamists have also strengthened this logic by claiming that all divisions based on nationalism, ethnicity, language, etc. would disappear and the golden age of Islamism would arrive soon. This dissertation intends to show that nationalism and Islam have not always been opposing forces and that nationalism is still a very powerful force in both Pakistan and Turkey, two very dissimilar MMCs, and has influenced the Islamization of government in these two countries.
The next section provides a brief overview of the theoretical approaches in the field of nationalism and the treatment of religion and Islam in the field of nationalism. This is followed by a discussion on the standard historical narratives used to explain Islam’s role in Turkish and Pakistani nationalism. Finally, the operationalization of the two variables that are the focus of this dissertation, Islam’s role in nationalism and Islamization of government, will be discussed.

**Nationalism**

_The story of nationalism mirrors history and modern history mirrors the story of nationalism; since about the mid-nineteenth century no place in the world remained untouched by its impact._ (Harris 2009, 1)

Nationalism is one of the most powerful political forces, if not the most powerful force, for more than two centuries now. Josep Llobera (1994) called nationalism the ‘God of modernity’ and for Anthony Smith (2010) it is a central feature of modern society and politics, whose power and appeal is unrivaled. There had been debates about how or when nationalism originated, but few can deny its importance. Nationalism is powerful because people are socialized into it and it becomes an emotional part of them. Education and media are two vital forces of socialization but as Michael Billig (1995) argues, there are hundreds of unnoticed routine practices and occurrences that reinforce nationalism. An outsider may notice these small things, but local people do not. Color a piece of cloth one way and it
becomes something to die for and color it another way and it becomes a symbol of revulsion, deceit, and an intense hatred.

The following section looks at the four major theoretical approaches in the field of nationalism and the related field of ethnicity.

The traditional approaches to ethnicity/nationalism were divided into two groups, primordialism and constructivism. The primary difference between the two camps was that primordialism assumes ethnicity was ancient, fixed and immutable, while constructivism treats it as changing depending on leadership and the socio-cultural environment. At present, experts have identified four major theoretical approaches to study nationalism within these two groups.

**Primordialists**

As discussed above, primordialists broadly base their theories on a given, extended kinship. According to them, nationalism and ethnicity are based on human beings’ love for their own kind. Nepotism is natural and genetically programmed in the human race. Hence, the power that nationalism has over people is explained by nepotism and the theory of inclusive fitness. This theory postulates that there is a tendency in organisms to show altruistic behavior to close relatives in order to increase the possibility of successful propagation of their shared genes.
Primordialists are further divided into two camps, those who emphasize sociobiological ties and those who emphasize cultural ties. Scholars emphasizing sociobiological ties explain nationalism as the result of common or assumed common descent. Cultural primordialists, in addition to common descent, also give importance to a common culture that requires a long history of shared experiences. It is important to remember that there is no clear dividing line between the two groups. Further, primordialism is different from racism, as primordialists do not believe in the superiority of one nationalism or ethnicity over other. Clifford Geertz and Edwards Shils are considered the foremost exponents of primordialism.

The debate between primordialism and constructivism has lost some of its vigor due to two developments. First, in academic circles, few now believe in strict primordialism. Almost all scholars accept the role of social context in the formation of the ethnic identity. It has also been shown that the two seminal proponents of primordialism, Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz (1973), did not actually approve strict primordialism. The following quotation of Geertz\(^3\) has been cited by many to explain what primordialism is or how it originated. Talking about the problems new states face in becoming the primary object of loyalty, because of primordial attachments, he states:

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\(^3\) Geertz is considered by many as one of the early primordialists (see Smith (2010, 57) and Eller and Coughlan (1993))
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens”—or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” — of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly....These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves’. (Geertz 1973, 259)

The use of word ‘assumed’ with givens and ‘are seen to have’ in the last sentence shows that for Geertz, ethnicity is much more than primordialism. Similarly, scholars have argued that Shils was also not a believer in strict primordialism (Smith 2010, 57; Fenton 2010, 75-7).

Secondly, research has shown that ethnicity is neither purely primordial nor wholly constructed. The best way to use these approaches is not by using one to the exclusion of other but by using them both as required by the context.

**Perennialists**

Perennialists have a less essentialist position than primordialists and deemphasize the importance of sociobiological ties. They accept that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and do not consider nationalism and ethnicity as either natural or given. Nationalism is, however, not considered possible without shared identities developed over the course of history. Common myths, language, and metaphors are the basis of affinity that nationalism engenders.
Smith (1998, 223-24) argues that there are two kinds of perennialists-- continuous and recurring. Continuous perennialists argue that nations and ethnic communities have a long continuous history. This position is difficult to defend as most modern nations’ histories cannot be traced to the Middle Ages or earlier. Perennialists, who believe in recurring nationalism, argue that nations appear and disappear and then re-appear. For them, historical continuity is not necessary for viable nationalism. Major perennialist scholars are Adrian Hastings (1997), John Armstrong (1982), Joshua Fishman (1999) and Hugh Seton-Watson (1977).

Adrian Hastings linked modern nationalism to religion, which is relevant to this dissertation. He regarded religion as an important contributor to nationalisms and criticized the tendency of many modernists to ignore the role of religion in the development of nationalism of many European nations. He explains his perennialist views as follows:

If nationalism became theoretically central to western political thinking in the nineteenth century, it existed as a powerful reality in some places long before that. As something which can empower large numbers of ordinary people, nationalism is a movement which seeks to provide a state for a given ‘nation’ or further to advance the supposed interests of its own ‘nation-state’ regardless of other considerations...Religion is an integral element of many cultures, most ethnicities and some states. The Bible provided, for the Christian world at

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4 Smith is not a perennialist himself.
least, the original model of the nation. Without it and its Christian interpretation and implementation, it is arguable that nations and nationalism, as we know them, could never have existed. Moreover, religion has produced the dominant character of some state-shaped nations and of some nationalisms. Biblical Christianity both undergirds the cultural and political world out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed and in a number of important cases provided a crucial ingredient for the particular history of both nations and nationalisms. (Hastings 1997, 3-4)

**Modernists**

Modernists, in contrast to primordialists and perennialists, link nationalism with modernity. They deny that there were any nations before the modern era. Industrialization, public education, print journalism, bureaucracy, state and a host of other factors that only appeared in the wake of modernity assisted in creating nationalism. Modernists claim that blood ties or a shared history and culture, the basis of nationalism according to the primordialists and perennialists, are largely myths and ‘invented’ traditions.
Table 1: Attributes of Nation according to Perennialists and Modernists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perennialists</th>
<th>Modernists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Community</td>
<td>Political Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immemorial</td>
<td>Modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooted</td>
<td>Created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>Mechanical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamless</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Elite-Constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancestrally-based</td>
<td>Communication-based</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Smith (1998, 23)

Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson are the foremost exponents of Constructivist approach. Gellner defined nationalism the following way:

*Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.* (Gellner 2006, 1)
According to Gellner, nationalism was intrinsically related to industrialization, public education, and the state, so it could not exist before the modern era. For him, nations and nationalisms are not ‘natural’ as nationalists and many others believe. It was the state that was necessary condition for nationalism, not vice versa:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. (Gellner 2006, 47)

Anderson defines a nation as an imagined political community. Specifically:

It is an imagined political community -- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion… The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind…It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained,
hierarchical dynastic realm...Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings (Anderson 2006, 6-7).

Modernists have been criticized for their total rejection of any possibility of pre-modern nations and their claim that a tabula rasa is available to construct national myths, symbols, and histories by elites and others.

**Ethno-symbolism**

Ethno-symbolism, an approach developed by Anthony Smith, takes a middle position between primordialists/perennialists and Modernists. Ethno-symbolists accept that nationalism is a modern idea and there were no nations before the advent of modernity. They also recognize that nations are constructed and that no nation has existed for time immemorial. However, ethno-symbolists do not deny, like many Modernists, that the shared history is the essence of nationalism. They assert that national myths, traditions, symbols and histories can be chosen or re-discovered or re-interpreted but cannot be created ab initio. To discover why one group became a nation and another did not, one has to search pre-modern times for ‘ethnies,’ the precursor of nations. Ethnie is defined by Smith as a, ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity’ (Smith 1986, 32).
Smith defines nationalism in the following way:

An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute as actual or potential ‘nation.’

(Smith 2010, 9)

Although Smith has referred to a nation in the definition, this does not mean that he believes that there were nations before nationalism. Smith disagrees with Modernists on the past being a tabula rasa, but he is closer to modernists than to primordialists:

The definition I am proposing presupposes a concept of the ‘nation’, but it does not suggest that nations exist prior to ‘their’ nationalisms. The words ‘or potential “nation” ’ recognize that many situations in which a small minority of nationalists who possess a general concept of the abstract ‘nation’ seek to create particular nations’ on the ground.’

(Smith 2010, 10)

The Approach used in this Dissertation

Ethno-symbiosis is the approach employed in this dissertation. I agree with Smith that although nationalism is modern, it cannot be created de novo:

Nationalists have a vital role to play in the construction of nations, not as culinary artists or social engineers, but as political archaeologists rediscovering and reinterpreting the
communal past in order to regenerate the community. Their task is indeed selective - they forget as well as remember the past - but to succeed in their task they must meet certain criteria. Their interpretations must be consonant not only with the ideological demands of nationalism, but also with the scientific evidence, popular resonance and patterning of particular ethnohistories. Episodes like the recovery of Hatsor and Masada, of the tomb of Tutankhamun, the legends of the Kalevala, and the ruins of Teotihuacan, have met these criteria and in different ways have come to underpin and define the sense of modern nationality in Israel, Egypt, Finland and Mexico... In this continually renewed two-way relationship between ethnic past and nationalist present lies the secret of the nation's explosive energy and the awful power it exerts over its members. (Smith 1995)

It is important one moves beyond the binary positions of invented vs. ancient. Formation of a nation is a process as Dressler argues:

Similarly looking for a way to go beyond dichotomous construction verses continuity positions, van der Veer has put attention to the processual character of the formation of nationalism, which demands historical contextualization of the details at work in the “invention” of nation: “No doubt national traditions are invented, as Hobsbawm and Ranger argue, and nations are imagined, as Anderson argues, but that is not all there is to it. It is not a question of one monolithic imagination or invention, but of several contested versions. Moreover, the cultural material used for invention and imagination is historically produced and thus has to be understood historically. The process of invention and
“Imagination does not start with the rise of nationalist discourse; it is the process of history and culture itself.” (Dressler 2013, 82-3)

This dissertation, however, is not concerned with defining the Turkish and Pakistani ethnies and in tracing them in ancient or pre-modern history. Rather, it focuses on nationalism after the formation of the state and how nationalism has evolved since. The particular focus is further narrowed to only one part of nationalism i.e. Islam’s contribution to nationalism. Though it’s hard to separate the ethnic, civic and religious components of nationalism distinctly, an attempt will be made to focus on Islam’s role and delineate its rise and fall in the nationalisms of the modern Turkish and Pakistani states.

State Nationalism

In the previous discussion, nationalism has been used in a singular form. It might give rise to the idea that the Pakistani and Turkish nationalisms are two unique ideas and this dissertation will describe them and analyze Islam’s role in them. Nothing can be further from the truth. There is no unique or single Pakistani or Turkish nationalism or for that matter a unique French or Japanese nationalism. Every state has multiple versions of nationalism and these versions contest each other for acceptance and prominence. It is, therefore, important to clarify that this dissertation focuses on state nationalism in Turkey
and Pakistan – that is, the idea of the nation as promoted by the state and displayed in state symbols and official representations of state action and identity – and the varying role of Islam in this state-produced and presented version of nationalism.

States (or the state elite/decision-makers) promote a version of nationalism that suits them or supports the idea of the nation-state that they have. This particular version of nationalism varies over time and is always contested. However, it is important to emphasize that this version is not the same as the nationalism that exists at individual, group or societal level. State nationalism is often successful because of the resources available to it, though there are instances when popular nationalism has rejected state nationalism and forced the state nationalism to accommodate it or replaced it and became the new state nationalism.\(^5\) Thus, while emphasizing the distinction, it is acknowledged that state nationalism is constantly influenced by popular nationalism(s) and it is not something ‘out there,’ entirely separate.

State nationalism is defined as the nationalism propagated by the state to promote a singular unified identity. It is usually presented in contrast to the popular/cultural nationalism that exists at the popular level. Sometimes state nationalism is defined as elite nationalism and explained as the nationalism of groups ‘politically or administratively powerful, being rich

\(^5\) For example, as will be shown in the following chapters, Turkish state nationalism that was initially largely secular gradually changed to accommodate the popular (Anatolian) nationalism that accepted Islam as a part of Turkish nationalism.
or propertied, having a title or high of social rank, being well-educated, being a star, and so forth’ and popular nationalism is the nationalism of the non-elite (Whitmeyer 2002).

### Table 2: State and Popular Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State nationalism</th>
<th>Popular nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less factious</td>
<td>More factious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly influences public policy</td>
<td>Indirectly influences public policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/nation building</td>
<td>State/nation building or destroying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than popular nationalism, according to Modernists</td>
<td>Older than state nationalism, according to Primordialists and Perennialists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, as the state is also not a monolithic entity, choosing state nationalism as the focus entails answering the secondary question, which state nationalism? Decision-makers/elites in states are not monolithic or united and so do not always agree on which nationalism the state should promote. For example, the political and military elites of Turkey and Pakistan
have rarely agreed on what constitutes Turkish and Pakistani nationalism. To deal with this difficulty, this dissertation tries to measure state nationalism by focusing on the standard symbols of state nationalism such as currency, constitutions, flags or anthems and ignored the compromises and contestation that these accepted symbols are a result of.\(^6\)

Finally, this dissertation does not consider state nationalism as fixed and static – indeed the essence of this research is to treat state nationalism as an independent *variable*. Nationalisms propagated by states, like popular nationalisms, evolve in response to state’s internal and external environment. Furthermore, state nationalisms are influenced by the intra-elite power struggles. However, as state nationalism is the independent variable in this dissertation, the focus will not be these struggles or the internal/external environment affecting state nationalism, but rather on identifying and measuring the variation in state nationalism over time and across nations.\(^7\)

**Religion**

A proper definition should be universal and unambiguous while still not losing precision and parsimony. Religion has been defined innumerable times but coming up with a good definition acceptable to most, if not all, scholars has been a difficult proposition. For more than hundred years, scholars have been debating about the definition of religion. James Leuba listed more than fifty definitions of religion in 1912 (Cavanaugh 2009). Recent

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\(^6\) More discussion on these indicators in the next section.

\(^7\) These struggles and environment affecting state nationalism will not be totally ignored, but discussed sparsely.
scholarship admits that there is still no ‘single, accepted’ definition of the term religion and many scholars have stopped attempting to come up with one (Barnett 2012).

T. Jeremy Gunn (2003) argues that there are two methodological difficulties in defining religion. The first problem relates to the nature of religion which has three aspects: metaphysical, psychological, and social/cultural. Definitions usually focus on one or at the most two aspects of religion, leaving the reader unsatisfied. For example, Sigmund Freud’s defining religion as an illusion is a definition focusing on the psychological aspect of religion (Richter 2012, 59-70). The metaphysical and social aspects of religion are downgraded in this definition. Conversely, scholars who define religion as a moral code focus on the social/cultural and psychological aspects of religion and ignore or downgrade the metaphysical aspect of religion. Malcolm Hamilton (2012, 21-22) has divided theories of religion on a somewhat similar basis, albeit his focus is on human nature. He argues that there are three types of theories of religion: psychological intellectualist, psychological/emotionalist and sociological. Psychological intellectualist theories argue that religion is imagined because of man’s curiosity about his origins and his environment. Psychological emotionalist theories claim that religion satisfies, not the intellectual, but emotional/visceral needs of human beings. Finally, sociological theories focus on religion’s social functions.

The second difficulty in defining religion is based on the assumption that all religions have something in common i.e. there is something essential to being regarded as a religion and
this essential quality is shared by all religions. Others, who do not believe in this essentialist position, believe that religion is so broad a concept that there is nothing common across religions. What is common and shared by all religions are ‘family resemblances’. Definition based on family resemblances/shared characteristics are called polythetic definitions. In these type of definitions, a list of characteristics of religion is given and anything that agrees with a particular minimum number of the items in the list is accepted as a religion. One example of such a definition is by Ninian Smart, who argues that religion is ‘a seven-dimensional organism: ritual, doctrinal, mythical or narrative, experimental or emotional, ethical or legal, organizational or social, material or artistic’ (Crawford 2002, 3). The benefit of such approach is that one can make the list with characteristics relating to both the essence and functions of religion. Thus, advantages of both substantive and functional definitions can be attained by using this approach. The problem with this approach is that unless a minimum number of required characteristics are decided beforehand, there can be no agreement on what is a religion (Donovan 2003).

Unfortunately, scholars, who believe in the essentialist nature of the term, also define religion in many different ways. There are mainly two types of essentialist definitions of religion, substantive and functional. Substantive definitions focus on the content and inform one about religion. These definitions give characteristics or qualities that make something a religion. Functional definitions, on the other hand, try to define religion by what religion does. Most of the scholars employing functional definition find a substantial
definition of religion impossible to come up and define religion in terms of what it does in the real world.

The advantage of substantive definitions is that they are more specific and do not depend on social or psychological functions that can change. The disadvantage of such definitions is that they are either too narrow (and leave many religions out) or they are too broad (and include even concepts entirely different from religion under the rubric of religion). An example of a too narrow definition of religion is ‘voluntary subjection of oneself to God’ (Catholic Encyclopedia 2012). This definition will exclude Buddhism, Confucianism, and many tribal religions as they do not require a belief in God. An example of a too broad substantive definition of religion is E. B. Tylor’s definition that is that ‘religion is a belief in spiritual beings’ (Crawford 2002, 1). Due to the breadth of this definition, it will be difficult to exclude worldviews, philosophies or myths from being considered as religions.

Functional definitions are broader and hence accommodate different types of religion more easily. However, they can be accused of reductionism as religion is much more than the functions it performs (Kirkland 1976). Two examples of functional definitions are by Geertz and Robert Bellah (as quoted by Peter Berger) are reproduced below:

A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

A set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence. (Berger 1974).

The advantage of functional definitions is that usually they are observable and verifiable. The disadvantage of such definitions is that they seek to understand religion from outside and ignore the metaphysical aspect of religion. The sense of awe or wonder one feels is usually ignored in functional definitions as it is something that has to be understood ‘from within.’ Any scholar who ignores this important aspect of religion is guilty of reductionism (Berger 1974).

Another division of essentialist definitions, which somewhat relates to substantive and functional divide, is between emic and etic definitions. Generally, scholars analyze a religion in two ways. Their analysis is either based on observing/studying people, texts, myths, etc. of that religion (etic perspective) or based on asking adherents of the religion about it (emic perspective). So, etic definitions will focus on things that are observable and thus closely relate to functional perspective. Emic definitions will, however, be based on local myths, interviews of adherents, etc. It is clear etic definitions are better for empirical research as these definitions can be refuted and are generalizable. However, these definitions might be missing feelings and emotions that are a major part of the religious
experience but non-observable. Emic definitions have the benefit of focusing on feelings of adherents of a religion and give an inside perspective, but they cannot be refuted and hence are of not much use in scientific theory formation.

Many scholars argue that not only a universal definition is not possible, it is also not necessary as it is possible to do quality scientific work without such a definition (Machalek 1977). Therefore, these scholars argue that efforts and time should not be wasted in trying to come up with a real definition of religion, which is an impossible task. Instead, efforts should be focused on research on religion that will lead to much more useful research. Others argue that without a universal definition, we cannot be sure that we are all talking about the same thing. Berger has argued both sides of this argument. In the Sacred Canopy (Berger 1967, 175-80), he argued that as definitions are man-made ad hoc constructs, it is of little use fighting about them. But seven years later, he had second thoughts and contended that definitions are too important to ignore as they ‘focus intellectual attention’ and “slice-up” reality (Berger 1974).

Malory Nye (2012, 17) argues that one should not get ‘bogged down’ in defining religion and assume that one is studying/interpreting a field of cultural activity which is labeled religion in many different cultural contexts.

Religion’s role in politics has been controversial. Some scholars argue religion and politics have always been separate in most societies (Taras 2002); others contend they have always
been together and continue to do so; and still others think whatever their relationship in the past, it is not appropriate for them to be together in this democratic, liberal age. After Second World War, many social scientists had discarded religion as an explanatory variable for anything important in the developed world. Many believed that the developing countries would also follow the advanced Western Europe in modernizing, secularizing and in limiting religion to the private sphere. Even when religion was given importance, it was considered a problem to be solved (Wald et. al. 2005). However, since the 1970s, events around the world, like the Northern Ireland Troubles, the Iranian Revolution and the rise of the Moral Majority and liberation theology, forced scholars to reassess their views on religion. It was clear that religion still mattered. Since then there has been a resurgence in the study of religion in all its aspects, including its effects on politics (Philpott 2009).

Religion affects politics in a number of ways. Its primary effects are on political attitudes, political parties/groups, democratization, nationalism and political conflict/violence. As this study is focused on nationalism, the following section will only look at the relationship between religion and nationalism.

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8 Western governments, particularly the US, have, however, promoted and supported religious groups and dictatorships, allied with them, in the developing world in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The aim was to defeat communism and decrease the power of groups/governments that are against the control of international economy by the West. The US support for military juntas, allied with the Catholic Church, in Latin America, General Zia in Pakistan and of Saudi and Gulf monarchies are examples of this trend.
Religion and State Nationalism

The irrational emotional dimension and inherent divisiveness of nationalism frequently give rise to an uneasiness about nationalism. But if nationalism is not thought of in a positive light, misgivings about religion’s role in state nationalism are even more numerous. A mix of religion and nationalism is considered dangerous and explosive (Juergensmeyer 1993).

It’s hard to define the relationship between majority religions\(^9\) and state nationalisms as they have been bitter rivals as well as close friends, depending on the context. Two of the early nations, France and Great Britain, exemplify these contrasting trends. Catholicism, the majority religion in France, had a historically a difficult relationship with French state nationalism, due to conflicts between the Pope and King over control of Church positions and assets, and wars with other leading Catholic monarchies (Spain and Austria). In contrast, Anglican Christianity, the dominant religion in Great Britain, was an important part of British state nationalism.

Rogers Brubaker and Barbara-Ann Rieffer have made significant contributions regarding the relationship between religion and nationalism though they do not distinguish between state and popular nationalisms. Rogers Brubaker (2012) presents four ways to analyze the religion and nationalism connection that can also be considered four types of connections between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism contest each

\(^9\) Majority religion here means the religion of the majority population of a country.
other. Each tries to become the primary identity of the nation, to the exclusion of the other. Nationalism is the modern religion that is trying to replace the old one. In the second type, religion explains some elements of nationalism. Usually, these elements are linked with the origin and early development of the nation. This kind of relationship is quite common and religion is an implicit part of the nationalist ideology of a large number of countries.

In the third type, religion contributes to the nationalism. It is a visible part of the national identity and some national myths and symbols are also based on religion. Finally, Brubaker defines a much closer relationship between religion and nationalism. Nationalism is based on majority religion and it’s hard to separate the two. As William Safran (2005, 1) argues, in such cases, ‘state was, more often than not, a secular manifestation of the dominant faith.’ Brubaker is reluctant to name this type as nationalism as he considers nationalism a phenomenon related to a polity existing within a set of other polities. This definition of nationalism, he argues, cannot include a strong form of religious nationalism.

Barbara-Ann Rieffer (2003) argues that the relationship between religion and nationalism has not received sufficient attention. In the writings of most eminent scholars of nationalism, religion is ignored completely or receives only a perfunctory mention. Citing Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Anderson, Rieffer argues that although religion contributed significantly to the Western European nationalisms, religion’s contribution is deemphasized by presenting it as part of the national culture. She attributes this trend to the propensity of scholars to present nationalism as a recent, modern movement/concept, while the major religions date back over a thousand of years.
Rieffer contends that religious nationalism often results in a religion’s precepts becoming ‘institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.’ In the context of MMCs, this institutionalization of religion’s precepts in laws and procedures governing the nation can be called Islamization of government. So, she agrees that the role of religion in nationalism often leads to Islamization of government.

Rieffer also offers a categorization of the different types of interactions between religion and nationalism. The first category, religious nationalism, refers to the situation where religion and nationalism are inseparable.

*It is a community of religious people or the political movement of a group of people heavily influenced by religious beliefs who aspire to be politically self-determining.* (Reiffer 2003, 225)

The second category is ‘instrumental pious nationalism’ where religion is part of nationalism, but it is not the primary part. Mostly, in such cases, religion is used by the political elite to provide an additional layer of national cohesion to the core based on ethnicity, language, etc. The third category is ‘secular/anti-religion nationalism’ where religion does not contribute to nationalism or nationalism is defined by the struggle against the dominant/majority religion.
While Reiffer’s makes an important point about the link between religion’s role in nationalism and public policies, the three categories she defines are too broad and disagreements about whether a country belongs to one category or another are bound to surface. Reiffer, for example, puts post-1979 India, like post-revolutionary Iran and Pakistan, in religious nationalism category. Many scholars would object to this categorization.

**Islam and State Nationalism**

Popular scholarship on Islam and state nationalism after 1945 can be divided into two periods, the pre-1970 and the post-1970 periods. Before the 1970s, in most MMCs, the national elite, who were often non-religious, deemphasized Islam and tried to put emphasis on economic development and secular nationalism. Islam was considered passé, part of the medieval, pre-industrial age, related to the lost empires. However, not all history was depicted as unpromising and in many MMCs, myths of an even more distant pre-Islamic past were resurrected, created and promoted and Islam (and Arabs in non-Arab countries)

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10 Most of the academic literature often does not draw a distinction between state and popular nationalism. However, most of the time, authors are focusing on state nationalism when they are talking about nationalism as they are giving importance to the views of the state elite.

11 Prominent exceptions included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco.
was considered a corrupting influence that deviated the ‘nation’ from its true path. Leadership aimed to create modern, unified, powerful and industrial states, based on the Western model. Focusing on Islam went against both creating national unity and uniqueness. Most of these new states had significant non-Muslim populations and Islam was not unique to any of these states. Therefore, the national elite, to be more inclusive and to create more compact nation-states, emphasized other sources of national identity. They focused on ethnolinguistic (e.g. in Turkey) or dynastic (e.g. in Morocco, Jordan, Oman) or ideological (e.g. in Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq) or territorial/historical (Yemen, Lebanon) bonds and downplayed Islam.

Not surprisingly, in this political environment, Islam was considered weak and many scholars thought that it had lost its battle against the more powerful force, (secular) nationalism. 12 Sylvia Haim (1955) described (secular) nationalism as the most powerful trend in modern Muslim Arab political thought and Nikki Keddie (1969, 17) argued that popular loyalty in the Muslim world has transferred to the modern nation and Rosenthal (1965, xii) witnessed ‘a vulnerable Islam gradually giving way before a secular nationalism.’ Variants of Arab nationalism, Nasserism, and Baathism rose in the Arab world and many non-religious nationalist movements triumphed in other MMCs.

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12 This period overlaps with the broad agreement in social sciences of the growing acceptance of Secularization thesis and the gradual irrelevance of all religions in the modern world.
In the 1970s, the environment both inside and outside the MMCs changed. At the global level, the power of the West, mainly the US, declined due to the Vietnam War and end of post-World War II economic expansion. The two Arab-Israeli Wars made Muslim populations more aware of the West’s role in propping up Israel.\textsuperscript{13} Previously, being aligned with the West was considered a source of strength at the popular level, but after the 1970s it was an action/decision that had to be explained and rationalized. This was also the time of the rise of oil-rich religiously conservative monarchies that were ready to offer millions of dollars in aid to other MMCs. To benefit from these changes, governments in many MMCs, which were still led by mostly non-religious elites, decided to use Islam. Islam’s role in state nationalism was highlighted and Sharia became the source of constitutions and laws (Roy 1996, 26). Media, symbols, and education were also used to propagate Islam and to link Islam with the state and the government as Gregory Starrett described in \textit{Putting Islam to Work} (1998), based on his research on Egypt. Under President Sadat, as opposed to President Nasser, emphasis on Arab nationalism was reduced and Islam’s linkage with the Egyptian state increased. These actions of governments increased Islam’s role in nationalism further. Unlike previously, nationalism was no longer fighting with Islam but accommodating it.

After 9/11, while there is not much evidence to believe that Islam's role in state nationalism has increased in all or most MMCs, in a section of western media and academia, Islam's

\textsuperscript{13} Arab regimes also highlighted the Western support as they could not explain how a small country could defeat them.
role in the state nationalisms of the MMCs was exaggerated. It was argued that secular elements of state nationalism were weak and they were becoming weaker, while Islamism was gaining ground. The ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative was employed to de-emphasize and deny the potency of secular elements of state nationalisms and the nation-state itself in the MMCs. The specter of Islam, fundamentalism or Islamism was seen descending on the MMCs and the nominal and secular nation-state that was found in these countries was considered too weak to confront it (Tibi 2002). As David Donaldson (2012) points out, the nationalist undertones of many Islamist movements, such as Hamas, Taliban, and the Iranian Revolution, were ignored or belittled. This trend is also visible in recent writings that claim that the post-Arab Spring is a period of Islamists’ ascendancy and (secular state) nationalism has vanished (Krauthammer 2012; Rubin 2012).  

14 Some of these writings have apparently been influenced by the Islamists’ own denunciation of nationalism. Two of the most prominent ideologues of modern Islamist movements, Maulana Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, argued that territorial nationalism is anti-Islam as it destroys the unity of Ummah by promoting loyalty to land or ethnicity instead to Allah or Islam (Nasr 1995; Toth 2013). But is Islam’s role in state nationalism increasing in MMCs? Researchers have not been able to answer this conclusively as there are around fifty MMCs and in some MMCs, Islam's role in state nationalism is increasing but in others it is decreasing. A definite answer, as in the case of Christian, Hindu or Buddhist-majority countries, is only possible at the individual country level.

14 There are many scholars that have argued that Hezbollah and HAMAS can be more aptly described as nationalist movements than as Islamist movements. Arab Spring (2010-11) also undermined this narrative, as by most accounts, Islam and Islamists did not play a major part in the start of these uprisings.
Examples of the different relationships between religion and (state) nationalism, as defined by Brubaker (2012), can all be found in the MMCs. Sometimes, these relationships can be seen at different times in history in one country, thus exhibiting the fluid nature of Islam's role in state nationalism. For example, during the reign of Reza Shah\textsuperscript{15} in 1930s and 1940s, ethnolinguistic ties became the basis of Iranian state nationalism and it had an antagonistic relationship with Islam. However, since the 1980s, Iran can be presented as an example of a country where state nationalism is religious-based. Similarly, Bangladeshi state nationalism had initially a hostile relationship with Islam but later in the 1980s, Islam became an important part of Bangladeshi state nationalism.

**Islamization of Government**

Islamization, like nationalism, is not an easy concept to define. It is not always possible to distinguish Islamization from Arabization, Muslimization, Shariatization and more recently from Talibanization (Singh 2007; Shaikh 2008; Lindley-Highfield 2008; Korotayev 2000). Add to it, the secondary concepts of re-Islamization, de-Islamization and creeping Islamization and the difficulty to untangle the conceptual muddle increases.

\textsuperscript{15}Father of Mohammad Reza Shah, the last shah of Iran.
Following are some of the definitions of Islamization. Julian Lee acknowledges the elusiveness of the concept and links Islamization with ‘conservative, orthodox Islam:’

The perceived essence of any religious or otherwise ideological movement is seldom if ever without significant variation and contest among those who identify with it. By our referring to them as Islamists ... seem to be ascribed with the default or most essential figuration of what Islam is. But there is no entirely satisfactory way out of this quandary... “Islamization” refers in this book then to the process of instilling and creating that which is in ostensible accord with orthodox conservative Islam. (Lee 2010, 19)

Salim, in the following definition, links Islamization with Sharia. However, to use these definitions, one still has to precisely define ‘conservative, orthodox Islam’ and Sharia, which is not an easy task:

A process of certain measures and campaigns, regardless of the identity of the advocates and the motives behind the actions, that call for the establishment of what are regarded as Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political, and social systems16...It is clear that the proponents of the formal implementation of shari’a consider shari’a the foundation of Islamization...In sum, the assumption of the proponents of shari’a-based reform is that the more shari’a rules are incorporated into the state legal system, the deeper the Islamization

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16 Or define “Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political, and social systems”.
of a country. Under this scheme, moves toward Islamization ultimately lead to attempts at founding an Islamic state. (Salim 2008, 45)

Farzana Shaikh (2008) has distinguished between Islamization and Shariatization. She argues that both ‘share an uncompromising emphasis on the enforcement of Islamic law at the expense of the broader and vaguer commitment to the ethical principles of Islam.’ However, leaders and supporters of Islamization and Shariatization are dissimilar. The following table is based on Shaikh’s differentiation:

**Table 3: Shaikh’s Differentiation between Islamization, Shariatization and Popular Islam**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Islamization</th>
<th>Shariatization</th>
<th>Popular Islam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief Proponents</strong></td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Theologically-trained clerics</td>
<td>Local religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supporting Groups</strong></td>
<td>Modernizing/neo-liberal social groups</td>
<td>Non-Westernized social groups</td>
<td>Rural Poor groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Islam</strong></td>
<td>Developmental Islam</td>
<td>Sharia and Fiqah</td>
<td>Folk Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 This table is based on Sheikh (2008)’s categorization.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proponent’s aim</th>
<th>Legitimacy, authenticity</th>
<th>Piety or power, wealth &amp; prestige</th>
<th>Piety or (local) power, wealth &amp; prestige</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

However, Shaikh’s distinguishing characteristics does not help as it is still difficult to distinguish between Islamization and Shariatization as Islamization of government is always done with the help of clerics and Shariatization cannot be done without the assistance of the state.

The above discussion shows that there is no agreement on what is Islamization of government, except the linkage between Islam and the government. Due to the wide variety of ways in which Islam is interpreted, there can be and are many contending views of Islamization of government.

Therefore, in this dissertation (as in the case of Islam’s role in state nationalism), rather than focusing on precisely defining Islamization of government, Islamization of government is estimated using indicators that will be explained in the next section. As the emphasis on Islamization of government, in contrast to popular/societal Islamization, these indicators are related to laws, rule, regulations, and policies.
Operationalization of Variables

Like many other social science concepts, it’s hard to operationalize state nationalism and Islamization of government. Researchers have used a wide variety of methods to measure state nationalism and Islamization of government. As state nationalism is linked with elites, it has been measured by directly asking the state elite (using interviews or surveys) or indirectly by focusing on their speeches, books, and actions. Similarly, Islamization of government has been measured in a number of ways. Some scholars have looked at laws, others have studied constitutions, and still others have ignored the distinction between Islamization of government and societal Islamization and have conducted public opinion surveys.

Measuring Islam’s Role in State Nationalism

Measuring religion’s role in state nationalism is not easy. Nationalist struggles bring together a broad spectrum of ideas and groups. However, there is usually a distinct culture, religion, language, ethnicity (or a blend) that is prioritized, highlighted and so often mentioned that it becomes inscribed in the nation’s memory. Even primordialists, who believe in immemorial, unchanging nations, now agree that nationalists choose from tens, if not hundreds, of different folk tales, martyrs, and myths to assist the ‘awakening’ of the nation.

18 Many scholars have pointed to the elitist politics of Pakistan and Turkey, with a small group of people from privileged backgrounds controlling the state since its inception (e.g. Husain 1999; Alavi 1972; Frey 1975; and Arslan 1999).
It’s hard to quantify the role of Islam in a country’s state nationalism, but this dissertation will make an effort to devise criteria by which a reasonably fair assessment can be made and state nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan can be analyzed. Three criteria have been selected to assess Islam’s role in state nationalism: the featuring of Islam in general clauses of the Constitution that describe the nation; the presence of Islam-inspired national mottos, emblems, anthems, flags etc. that the state uses identify Islam with the nation; and Islamic themes on banknotes, which are the most common everyday symbols of the state that reach the hands of the people. As in this dissertation the focus is on Islam’s role, we will seek to identify and analyze those constitutional clauses, national symbols and banknote images that demonstrate an increase or decrease in Islam's role.

Constitutions are windows to the national identity and state nationalism. More than mere lists of legal principles, they inform us about the national narratives/beliefs. The constitution embodies the hopes and aspirations of the nation. Therefore, the Turkish and Pakistani constitutions are a good proxy for estimating Islam’s role in state nationalism. Clauses relating to religion or secularism can be identified and changes in their number and content will be studied. This will give a reasonable basis for estimating the changes in Islam's role in state nationalism.

Banknotes’ iconography has recently been accepted by many in academia as an instrument used by states to promote state nationalism. A national currency is intimately linked with the nation as it is ubiquitous in the nation and difficult to use outside the national territory.
The images chosen for banknotes are useful indicators of the character of state nationalism, as they have regularly been issued throughout the history of both countries (more than sixty unique images on Turkish banknotes and around forty unique images on Pakistani banknotes), allowing one to follow minutely the changes in the representation of the nation on state instruments. Again, it is reiterated that my focus is on demonstrating changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism so only images related to religion (or their absence) will be analyzed.

National symbols—flags, emblems, national holidays, etc.—are important markers of national identity. They evoke deep emotions, incite passions, identify nations and make them visible to citizens as well as foreigners. Perhaps the most obvious example of national symbols revealing the link between state nationalism and religion are national flags. Scores of national flags have either a cross or a crescent and star on them, signifying a country’s link to Christianity or Islam respectively. Therefore, national symbols are a good way to estimate Islam’s changing role in the state nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan. Again, it may be noted that the focus will not be on all national symbols but on national symbols that introduce or reduce religious content. Looking at the entire history of all national symbols even of one of these two countries would be worthy of a separate doctoral dissertation. Unlike constitutions and banknotes, national symbols also give rise to

19 It is acknowledged that any person, at least in case of Turkey, can very easily show that ethnic nationalism is increasing in a specific period when I may be claiming, in this dissertation, that Islam’s role in nationalism is increasing but these two statements are not contradictory as ethnic, religious and territorial nationalisms have all been supported by the Turkish state, sometimes in the same period. There is a difference between claiming that Islam’s role in nationalism is increasing and that Islam’s role in nationalism is dominant. There has never been a period in Turkish Republic history when Islam’s role in
definitional issues as once one gets past the national flag, national emblem, and few other national symbols, there is disagreement on what is a national symbol. Therefore, choices will be made. Due to the focus of this dissertation, symbols that help demonstrate an increase or decrease in Islam's role in state nationalism are chosen. These choices can be criticized, but it must be kept in mind that we are using state symbols as only one of the three indicators for measuring Islam's role in state nationalism.

**Measuring Islamization of Government**

Measuring Islamization of government is also difficult as scholars cannot, as discussed above, agree on how to define it. Measuring Islamization of government is part of the broader debate on how to approximate the role of religion in the government in all countries. Previously, scholars used to measure religion’s role in state affairs solely on the basis of constitutional provisions, embodying elements of religious practice, or laws. However, in the last two decades, research has expanded to include many diverse criteria. While most of the work on this subject has been qualitative case studies, there have been efforts to quantify and standardize this estimation. The Bar Ilan University (Israel)’s Religion and State Project, led by Jonathan Fox, is the most successful of these attempts (The ARDA 2015). Based on the work of Grim and Finke (2006) on the U.S. State Department's International Religious Freedom reports, the state-religion relationship in nearly two hundred countries has been quantified based on three indices and one variable nationalism was dominant as there never has been a period when ethnic nationalism was dominant in Pakistan, but scholars do discuss Punjabization of Pakistan or Islamization of Turkey, meaning an increase in the temporal sense.
(Government Regulation of Religion Index, Government Favoritism of Religion Index, Social Regulation of Religion Index and Religious Persecution). Unfortunately, this data on different aspects of the state-religion relationship is not available for either Turkey or Pakistan before the late 1990s. As this study intends to look at Islamization of government (or lack thereof) in Turkey and Pakistan since independence, this data cannot be used.

Islamization of government in this study is, therefore, estimated using the following three variables: clauses in the family/personal status laws based on Islamic law (Sharia): the government’s support for religious education in educational institutions; and the presence/functions of a ministry of religious affairs. These variables have been used by different scholars to measure religion’s role in the government or Islamization of government.\footnote{Each of these variables has a whole chapter focusing on it. References to some of these scholars would be given in these chapters.}

Family law consists of the rules related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, etc. Family law is important in gauging the extent of Islamization of government as the family is the center of Muslim culture and like other religious and traditional cultures, family and family life is considered sacrosanct and crucial to a pious existence. Moreover, family law was the only aspect of the laws that was left untouched by most colonial powers and thus it became a symbol of Muslim identity and is still considered by many as such. The degree to which the government patterns family law on secular or Western principles vs.
institutionalizes traditional Muslim practices can, therefore, be considered as an important indicator of Islamization of government.

Governmental institutions (ministries, departments, etc.) dealing specifically with religious practice are usually established to control/regulate religion(s) or to give preference to one or more religions. The presence of a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) demonstrates the importance of religion to the government. This importance might be due to the government considering religion as an ally or as a competitor. The presence and functions of MRA can thus be used as a proxy for the level of Islamization of government.

The importance of education in the socialization of next generation cannot be over-emphasized. In this dissertation, government’s support for religious education will be measured by regulations regarding religious instruction and veiling in the public schools, the presence of publically funded and managed religious schools, and state’s financial/legal support for private religious schools. All these measures demonstrate increasing Islamization of government.21

For both Turkey and Pakistan, therefore, many scholars fail to see the varying contribution of Islam to state nationalism and thus are unable to use this variable to explain the varying

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21 Increase of Islam in curricula is another way to measure government support for religious education and thereby a sign of Islamization of government. However, the time required to research changes even in only elementary school curricula in Turkey and Pakistan, from independence to present times, makes it an improbable option.
degree of Islamization of government. One of the reasons why the usual causes of Islamization of government are unable to explain this phenomenon is the overlapping of concepts of Islamization of government and Islam's role in state nationalism. Very few scholars clearly differentiate the two. Rieffer (2003) is one of them. She differentiates between the two by calling them religious identity and political religion. Religious identity, according to her, is religion’s role in nationalism while political religion is the institutionalization of religion in laws and regulations; what is considered Islamization of government in this dissertation.

Reiffer, however, does not develop her argument regarding types of (religious) nationalism and nature of public policies associated with them and her focus primarily remains on the categorization of nationalisms. She also discusses only four countries: Iran, UK, Russia, and France.

Though conflated by many scholars, the two concepts are clearly distinct. Islam's role in state nationalism's consists of elements that are symbolic, visible and emotional but not regulating daily lives.22 In contrast, Islamization of government's indicators are rules and regulations that are of a more functional/practical nature and often affect people’s lives immediately once they are promulgated.

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22 Many constitutional provisions do have immediate implications. More often, however, constitutional provisions need laws, rules and regulations to be clarified, implemented and enforced.
Islam’s Role in Turkish and Pakistani State Nationalisms

Before moving on to research design and methodology, it is worthwhile to take a look at the dominant narratives that explain Islam's role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalism. These narratives not interested in understanding the past and presenting it as it is understood after careful research and analysis, but paint and promote a picture of the past that strengthens a particular view, usually the view endorsed by the state. In developing these narratives, as Fatma Gocek (2006:85-103) has observed, events are selectively highlighted or ignored depending on their perceived usefulness for strengthening the narrative.

There are two dominant historical narratives in the literature about Turkish state nationalism. In the first type, it is argued that Turkish state nationalism is largely secular and always in contention with Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Lewis 1961, Berkes 1964). The origins of this narrative can be traced back to the nineteenth century. It gradually gained ascendancy and in the late 1920s and early 1930s it became the official state narrative. Sometimes, this dichotomous narrative is explained in terms of center-periphery or state-society conflict in Turkey, with the center/state representing Turkish state nationalism and the periphery/society representing Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Mardin 1973; Akcam 2004, 2). This narrative is based on an earlier trend in scholarship.

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23 As a result of a combination of factors, a section of Ottoman elite gradually embraced Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Initially, Turkish nationalism was not anti-Islamic (or anti-clerical) but it did emphasize the belief in Turkish nation over and above the belief in Muslim or Ottoman nation (Hanioglu 2002, 85-98).
that ‘juxtaposed Muslim societies against secular states as mutually exclusive or inherently antagonistic categories, albeit from different perspectives’ (Turam 2012, 3). The gradual rise of the Refah Party and the AKP are thus presented as the defeat of Turkish state nationalism.

In the other narrative, more popular after the 1970s, it is argued that Turkish state nationalism always had a major component of religion/Islam. The Greek-Turkish population exchange, varlık vergisi tax, mistrust of the (Christian) West and the discrimination against non-Muslims in Turkey is presented as evidence of this narrative, which Ilker Ayturk calls the ‘harmony thesis’ (Gurbey 2012, 42-3, Ayturk 2014). It is contended that even in the time of high Kemalism/secularism in the late 1920s and 1930s, when the Turkish state promoted ethnolinguistic nationalism and ostensibly rejected religion, Islam was an important component of Turkish state nationalism (Cagaptay 2006, 156-7). According to this narrative, Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism was always present and despite efforts by an authoritarian secular elite, it could not be eradicated.

Both these narratives are based on the assumption that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism congealed into permanence a century ago, at the foundation of modern Turkey. In the first narrative, Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism is negligible and will always remain so. There was an antagonistic relationship between the two for almost a century and this relationship will continue in future. In the second one, Islam’s contribution to Turkish
state nationalism was substantial since the formation of the Republic and will continue to be true in the future.

In this dissertation, however, I shall demonstrate that Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism varies. It is fluid, not static and fixed. It was very high in the war of independence and then it became minuscule in the 1930s, and since the 1940s it has been slowly increasing. This dynamic view of Islam’s role is more helpful in explaining the stages that Turkish state nationalism has passed through during the last hundred years than assuming that Turkish state nationalism was always secular or always had a strong religious component.

Another narrative that is gaining traction acknowledges Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism but claims that there are many isams, not one Islam, and that the Turkish state in each era chose an Islam that was apposite for its objectives. The early Turkish state selected an Islam that was modernist and rational and had an ethnic component. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the ethnic component was de-emphasized and rationalism was toned down. Since 1980, the state has chosen an Islam that is a mixture of conservative and neo-liberal values. Islam was thus not discarded or dis-established in any era, but differently established in each era. As Davison (2003) explains the events of the 1920s:

*The separation of religion from its previous position of influence constituted a shift in Islam's institutional and legitimation position, not its formal, full elimination. How to*
explain, for example, the new state religious establishment, the state religious educational interest, the marking of religious identity on state identity cards, and the like? Islam was not disestablished; it was differently established.

Laiklik (laicism as practiced in early Republican Turkey) was thus not anti-Islam, but another version of Islam (Davison 1998, 154). Westernized Young Turks were not against Islam; they were against obstructionist and medieval (Arabic) versions of Islam. They wanted to rediscover ‘true’ or Turkish Islam that was rational and compatible with modernity (Azak 2010, 5-6).

This narrative has an element of truth as Ataturk and other Turkish leaders in many of their statements praised Islam and claimed they were only against those who are using a false version of Islam, based Arab and Ottoman culture, for halting progress. For example, Ataturk said in 1923:

Our religion is a most reasonable and most natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last religion. In order for a religion to be natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our religion is totally compatible with these. (Azak 2010, 14)

The main difficulty a researcher confronts after accepting this narrative is that it becomes extremely difficult to ascertain whether the adoption of some symbol (or a constitutional
clause) increases or decreases Islam's role in state nationalism. For example, did removing all Islamic references from the 1924 Constitution in 1928 lead to an increase (or decrease) in Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism? According to traditional interpretations of Islam, it was evidence of a decrease in Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism but a believer in a modernist/secularist interpretation can argue, as many did, that it was evidence of an increasing role of ‘true Islam’ and a rejection of corrupt, traditional Islam that mixes Islam and politics and damages both.

In the case of Pakistan too, there are two dominant narratives. However, in contrast to the Turkish narratives, the difference between the Pakistani narratives is not about the presence or absence of Islam’s role in state nationalism. The major difference between the two narratives is whether Islam's role in state nationalism has always been dominant or whether it has only become dominant since the late 1970s. In the first narrative, Islam is represented as the key component of Pakistani state nationalism and it is argued that Jinnah wanted to establish an Islamic state, although opinions differ on whether the objective was a modern or traditional Islamic state (Mujahid 1999, Ali 1967, Zaman 1985). Since Pakistan was created on the basis of Muslim nationalism, denying or lessening Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism, according to this narrative, means denying Pakistani nationalism as General Zia argued in 1981:

Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse. (Tharoor 2014)
Nasim Jawed (2010, 15) calls believers of this narrative Islamic nationalists and argues:

To many Islamic nationalists it was not a matter of choice for the Pakistanis whether to build their nationhood on the foundation of Islam or on a common and truly secular cultural heritage: the latter in their view, simply did not exist.

When these Islamic nationalists are confronted with evidence that Jinnah did not want to make Pakistan an Islamic state, they respond that it is immaterial whether Jinnah or other leaders of Pakistan’s independence struggle were secularists or were using religion as a tool of mobilization or as a ploy as most of the Indian Muslims voted for an Islamic state when they voted for Pakistan. Some even go further and contend that it is the responsibility of Muslims, who are sovereign over a piece of land, to establish Sharia (Nadeem 2001, 13). Ian Talbot (2005, 152-3) has aptly described this narrative as ‘the two nation theory of Pakistani nationalism dealt in primordial certitudes’ that are fixed and monolithic. According to this narrative, all the problems Pakistan is facing today and has faced since independence are due to the fact that Pakistani elite have not embraced this paramount role of Islam and have often worked to reduce it. Though this narrative accepts that elite are now more accepting of Islam’s role than in the 1950s and 1960s, its proponents want to see a greater role.
Many experts, mainly outside Pakistan but some in Pakistan too, also accept this narrative and acknowledge Islam’s principal role in Pakistani state nationalism. However, for them, this defining role is considered a problem (or the source of most of Pakistan’s problems). Sectarianism, terrorism, the separation of East Pakistan, the rise of Taliban, etc. are all linked to the Islam’s role in state nationalism. This argument is sometimes supported by contending that Jinnah was using Islam and that an Islam-based Pakistan was not his aim. Thus secular, liberal Jinnah, in the end, was very disappointed and trying to decrease Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism and propagate a state nationalism that was secular.\(^{24}\) So, the Pakistani state is often advised to de-emphasize Islam's role in state nationalism for its own good and for the good of the world.

In the other narrative, the importance of Islam in the creation of Pakistan is acknowledged but its dominance and current (usually deemed pernicious) manifestation is considered the result of the mullah-military alliance in the late 1970s. Many Pakistani scholars and others, who subscribe to this narrative, reminisce about the halcyon period when General Ayub Khan, and later Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ruled Pakistan and Islam’s role in state nationalism was less dominant.\(^{25}\) The contrast is made between Jinnah’s Pakistan, which was tolerant, open and liberal, and Zia’s Pakistan, which is considered dogmatic, illiberal and xenophobic.

\(^{24}\) Most notably, Ayesha Jalal (1994) has argued that Pakistan was a bargaining trick and Jinnah only wanted a better deal for the Indian Muslims. The idea of Jinnah trying to build a more secular state had been supported by scholars such as Mohammad Munir in From Jinnah to Zia (1980), Ajeet Jawed in Secular and Nationalist Jinnah (2009) and Moonis Ahmar in Conflict Management & Vision for a Secular Pakistan (2014). Others have refuted these arguments, such as Waheed-uz-Zaman in Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality (1985) and Saleema Karim in Secular Jinnah and Pakistan (2010).

An example of this narrative is the following passage:

So, how do we contend with the legacy of Gen Zia ul Haq? Why was it possible for a villainous military dictator to subvert the very spirit of the nation and sow the seeds of religious militancy in a country founded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah? We can pose that question once again: is this Jinnah's Pakistan or is it Zia's? (Salahuddin 2010)

Similarly, Rasul B. Rais, one of the leading political scientists in Pakistan, writes in his article titled, ‘Is this Jinnah’s Pakistan?’

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of our nation, must be turning in his grave if angels were to carry the news and pictures of today’s Pakistan to him — targeted killings of Shias, persecution of Christians and public conversion of Hindus on live media. This is not the Pakistan he or other founders powered by a dream of an independent country envisioned. Were they around today, they would have launched another independent movement — this time, to liberate the country from three powerful influences that have taken the form of institutions and have, in many ways, established their control over the soul of the country. They are the mullahs, the military and the feudal elites. (Rais 2012)

In this narrative, Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism was stagnant or largely inconsequential for the first thirty years and then it started increasing in the late 1970s, with General Zia’s coup and the (first) Afghan war. Since then, due to the continuance of the
alliance between religious forces and a powerful military, Islam's role in state nationalism has been increasing.

The commonality between these two narratives is that Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism is seen as having been increasing since the 1980s. However, in this dissertation a careful examination of state nationalism demonstrates that Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism has been decreasing since the last sixteen years. Amid the rise of religious terrorism inside Pakistan and links of terrorism outside Pakistan to the country, this dramatic change in Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism has been happening under the radar and has not been noticed by many experts.

Research Design and Methodology

The comparative case study method has been chosen for this dissertation. The major benefit of the case study method is its focus and attention to detail. The researcher concentrates on a single case or a few cases and tries to understand all of their aspects/dimensions, leading to an explanation of the past and the present as well as predictions regarding the future. The major disadvantage of the case study method is that since the research is limited to, at the most, few cases, the results are often not generalizable. The case study method has, therefore, been considered less appropriate for discovering general laws and more suitable for answering the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and for investigating a ‘contemporary phenomenon in depth and within some real-life context’ (Yin 2009).
The choice of the case study method for this study is based on the research puzzle of why and how Islamization of government varies over time, which requires a comparative historical analysis of two countries’ politics over a long historical period. Many other scholars have used multiple case studies and comparative historical analysis for answering challenging political questions (Collier & Collier 2002; Mahoney 2001; Moore 1993; Rueschemeyer 1992; Goldstone 1991).

Table 4: Types of Historical and Comparative Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cross-Sectional</th>
<th>Longitudinal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single Case</strong></td>
<td>Historical Events Research</td>
<td>Historical Process Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multiple Cases</strong></td>
<td>Cross-Sectional Comparative Research</td>
<td>Comparative Historical Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schutt (2012, 388)

In order to explore the possibility of the causal link between Islam’s role in state nationalism and Islamization of government, this dissertation intends to fulfill the five requirements advanced by Schutt and others. Schutt (2012, 184-93) argues that there are
three requirements for drawing causal connections between variables. The absence of one or more of the criteria makes the connection doubtful. These three criteria are the following:

- **Empirical Association**: This criterion requires the correlation between the independent and dependent variable(s). Variation in one group may lead to variation in the other;
- **Appropriate Time Order**: This criterion requires the appearance of independent variable(s) before the dependent variable(s);
- **Non-Spuriousness**: This criterion requires that the association between the independent variable(s) and dependent variable(s) may not be because of other variable(s).

He then adds two other criteria that are not necessary but make the connection clearer and more obvious and hence more understandable. These two criteria are causal connection and identification of the conditions under which the causal connection occurs.

**Selection of Cases and Mill’s Methods**

Mill’s methods, though old, are still one of the best ways of systematically identifying causal relationships. I have used both Mill’s method of difference and the method of agreement to demonstrate the link between the role of Islam in state nationalism and Islamization of government. In the method of difference, similar cases with different outcomes are analyzed and the cause of the different outcome for the variable of interest is investigated. In this dissertation, the method of difference is used for both Pakistan and
Turkey for within case comparisons. Different eras in Pakistan and Turkey’s history are studied and analyzed. In some eras, Islamization of government increases and in others it does not. As other indicators linked to rival explanations of Islamization of government do not change, Islam’s role in state nationalism seems to be the reason for the change in Islamization of government in different eras in both countries.

Table 5: Pakistan: Method of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eras</th>
<th>Alternative Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Islam’s role in state Nationalism Increasing</th>
<th>Islamization of Government Increasing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian Governments(^{26})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Islamist Parties(^{27})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Ethnic Diversity(^{28})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-69</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-98</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999→</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{26}\) Even when Turkey and Pakistan had democratically elected governments, military chiefs had enormous power and they shared decision-making authority with the elected politicians.  
\(^{27}\) Strength is measured in terms of public support/electoral performance.  
\(^{28}\) Alesina et. al. (2003)
Table 6: Turkey: Method of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eras</th>
<th>Alternative Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Islam’s role in State Nationalism Increasing</th>
<th>Islamization of Government Increasing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian Governments</td>
<td>Popular Islamist Parties</td>
<td>High Ethnic Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-46</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-79</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-2009</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010→</td>
<td>Partly Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The method of agreement analyzes diverse cases with similar outcomes for the variable of interest. Turkey and Pakistan have been selected on the basis of most different cases. There are many differences between these two countries which make them contrasting cases. First, Turkey is a successor state of the Ottoman Empire and thus had been a colonizer while Pakistan was a British colony for at least a hundred years. Secondly, in terms of the state-Islam linkage, Turkey is the only Muslim-majority state in the world that adopted an anti-religion policy and then maintained the policy for decades. Secularism is one of the most cherished principles of the Kemalist state and is considered part of Turkish state.
nationalism. Pakistan’s creation, on the other hand, is directly linked to Islam and its state nationalism is viewed as an example of religious nationalism. Even after thirteen years of the AKP rule, there are vast differences in Islam’s role in state nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan. Finally, Turkey is the only country which has seen continued success of Islamic parties at the ballot box. Turkey’s Islamist party AKP has won four national elections. In contrast, despite Islamization of government, Islamic parties in Pakistan remain unpopular and unsuccessful. Therefore, Turkey and Pakistan have been chosen for comparison.

Table 7: Method of Agreement: Islamization of Government Decreasing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Differences Between Two Cases</th>
<th>Role of Islam in State Nationalism</th>
<th>Islamization of Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Colonized Region Middle East/Europe Middle-income Secular Decreasing Decreasing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1923-46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>Yes Middle East/Low income Low income Islamic Decreasing Decreasing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1999→ )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 In the June 2015 parliamentary elections, AKP, for the first time since 2002, was unable to win majority of seats in the Turkish Parliament. But in November 2015, it again won the majority of seats and formed government.
Table 8: Method of Agreement: Islamization of Government Increasing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Differences Between Two Cases</th>
<th>Role of Islam in State Nationalism</th>
<th>Islamization of Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Colonized Region Middle East/Europe</td>
<td>Secular Increasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1946→ )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Yes South Asia Low income Islamic</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1947-98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mill’s methods of difference and agreement, however, demonstrate only correlation and do not consider all variables of significance related to the problem. Therefore, causal mechanisms and the context in which they will be applicable will be identified in the concluding chapter to demonstrate the causal link between Islam’s role in state nationalism and Islamization of government.
Covariance of Variables?

The argument being made in this dissertation can be criticized based on the possibility of covariance of the two variables, Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government. It can be argued that Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government vary together in the MMCs as both are managed by the state elite. The need of legitimacy or mobilization can make state elite to increase or decrease both variables together. For example, state elite can adopt Islamic national symbols and increase religious instruction in public schools concurrently, thus (based on the indicators used in this dissertation) increasing Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government at the same time.

This criticism will be answered in the following chapters by showing that change in Islam's role in state nationalism often happened years before the Islamization of government. Moreover, the following examples from other MMCs show that the two variables do not always co-vary. For example, in Bangladesh, when recently, Islam’s role in state nationalism was decreased, the decrease of Islamization of government was largely absent. Bangladesh reinstated secularism in its constitution in 2010 and banknote images also started reminding people of the secular Bengali nationalism of the independence movement in the early 1970s. However, there was not much evidence of covariation as there were no concurrent changes in the family law or Ministry of religious affairs or state support for madrassas.
Covariance was also not seen in the Central Asian Republics in the early 1990s. These republics adopted Islamic national symbols (flags, heroes, etc.) after independence. They also issued banknotes with Islamic symbolism but Islamization of government remained largely absent. For example, religious education remained prohibited in public schools in Kazakhstan and Kazakh family code only changed in 1998 and even then religious influence was difficult to find in the new law. Azerbaijan family code also bans polygamy, gives equal inheritance rights to sons and daughters and generally gives equal rights to both spouses (Karagiannis 2010, 15; Podoprigora 2013, 195-6; OECD 2010, 62-72).

**Organization of the Dissertation**

There are eight chapters in this dissertation. After this chapter – which introduces the topic and the research problem, lays out the conceptual framework, and describes the research design and methodology – the next six chapters present research on the indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government. Each of these six chapters traces the history of an indicator from the inception of Turkish and Pakistani republics to the present era. The historical analysis challenges the dominant conventional narratives of Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms and lays out the permutations each indicator has gone through. After giving a brief introduction, each chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the indicator’s journey through Turkey’s history and the second part, through Pakistan’s history. The chapters end with a brief comparative analysis of the two journeys. The first three chapters (chapter two to chapter five) investigate the indicators of the explanatory variable, Islam’s role in state nationalism. Chapter two examines four
constitutions of Turkey and three constitutions of Pakistan, focusing on articles related to Islam or secularism. Chapter three and four highlight Islamic themes that inform national symbols and banknote images respectively. Chapters five, six and seven cover the three indicators of the response variable, Islamization of government. Chapter five analyzes family laws of Turkey and Pakistan and reveals their changing relationship with Islam. Chapter six focuses on Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) of Turkey and Ministry of Religious Affairs of Pakistan and explains how, paradoxically, Diyanet has grown into a huge institution in a secular republic while Ministry of Religious Affairs remains a small part of government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The policies regarding government support for private/public religious education are inspected in chapter seven. The concluding chapter will demonstrate the causal link between the rise and fall of Islam in state nationalism and the increase or decrease of Islamization of government. This chapter will also highlight the implications of this research beyond Turkey and Pakistan and identify further areas of research.

**Implications**

This study will contribute to two different areas of research. First, it will help in understanding the politics of Turkey and Pakistan. Both these countries have played a much larger role in international affairs than their respective sizes or their economies would suggest. As middle powers on the rise, it appears that these two countries will play an even more influential role in the 21st century than they played in the past century. Both countries are already among the twenty-five biggest economies in the world, based on gross domestic
product (purchasing power parity) data (World Bank 2015). Therefore, understanding their politics is important.

This study puts into perspective the current interactions between Islam and politics in both countries. According to many experts, Turkey, a secular republic, is moving toward Islamization of government, while Pakistan is being further Islamized even as it suffers from religious terrorism. Is this analysis an accurate picture of reality? What are the reasons for changing of course in Turkey and policy continuity in Pakistan? This study will attempt to shed some light on these issues.

Second, while the focus of the study is Turkey and Pakistan, its results may help explain events in other MMCs. These two countries also represent the opposite ends of the Islam-politics continuum. Turkish governments have tried to suppress Islam’s public role and Islam had a negligible role in the making of laws, rules, and policies until recently. In contrast, Pakistani governments have amplified Islam’s role in politics and the public sphere. Comparing and understanding these two countries, helps us understand a whole range of interactions that can happen between Islam and politics in an MMC.

For example, after the success of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, Islamization of government was considered unstoppable in both countries. However, in both these countries, Islamists are now out of power. The argument presented in this dissertation (at least) gives a partial explanation of what happened. It can be argued that in Tunisia and
Egypt, the Islamization of government was scuttled because Islam’s role in the state nationalism of Tunisia and Egypt – although present – was not sufficient for the kind of Islamization attempted by the Al-Nahda and Muslim Brotherhood-controlled governments. It would have been better for these parties to slow the pace of Islamization of government.

In sum, this study will demonstrate a causal link such that establishing a strong role for Islam in state nationalism is shown to be necessary for a strong Islamization of government. Conversely, if Islam is weak, absent or diminishing in state nationalism, Islamization of government will also falter.
Chapter II

CONSTITUTIONS
Introduction

Islam has been called a political religion, political ideology, political ideology that is not religion, both religion and political ideology, and political ideology in the garb of religion (Spengler 2004, Shakir 2006, and Cesari 2010). As the above titles show Islam is considered inherently political as compared to other religions, leading some people to even deny Islam is a religion (Martin 2014). Since September 11 attacks, the Islam-state relationship has been the subject of hundreds of articles and books and there is an appetite for more as events like the rise of Daesh (Islamic State) are far easier to explain in a thirty second sound bite by emphasizing and essentializing Islam or political Islam rather than focusing on the state (breakdown) or on (the complex political histories of) Iraq and Syria.

Islam-State relations have bedeviled the Republics of Turkey and Pakistan since their formation. While Turkey started with Islam as the state religion and gradually became a secular republic, Pakistan moved in the opposite direction. Islam was the basis of the creation of Pakistan, but constitution and laws did not change much after independence in the first few years. Gradually, however, Islam-state relationship changed. Pakistan now has Islam as the state religion, a Federal Shariat Court and numerous laws that are based on Islam. The issue of state-Islam relationship has not been settled, however, in both countries. The proponents of a secular state and those of a confessional state are fighting in the legislatures; on the streets; in the media; and in the cyberspace. Not surprisingly, these clashes have affected Islam’s contribution to state nationalism and the Islamization of government. Islam's role in state nationalism has evolved in both countries since
independence and the change is visible, among other things, in the anthems, state emblems, flags, etc.

Constitutions are another place where Islam’s contribution to state nationalism can be seen. The importance of a constitution in a nation’s life can hardly be exaggerated. Constitutions are supreme laws that provide frameworks for the nation’s existence and power-sharing arrangements not for one or two decades but for all times to come. Therefore, constitutions make sense of national history, shed light on the current political debates, and express national aspirations for the future.

**What is a constitution?**

Before discussing Turkish and Pakistani constitutions, it is important to clarify what is meant by a constitution in this paper. While a layman can define a constitution as a higher law prescribing methods to regulate power, political scientists give more precise definitions. They usually detail three necessary characteristics of constitutions:

- They are written;
- They are entrenched and hence difficult to change; and
- They inform how political power is regulated.

However, some scholars have defined constitution much more broadly. Larry and Perry (2001) include in the definition of the constitution not only the written constitution but also the norms/principles that the written constitution establishes. Chris Thornhill goes even

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30 A notable exception is Great Britain, which has an unwritten constitution.
further. With norms and the written constitution, he also includes broad unwritten societal rules relating to political power in the definition of a constitution. His definition of constitution is as follows:

*It is a legal order impacting on the exercise of political power that (a) contains an effectively established presumption of public rule in accordance with principles or conventions, expressed as law, that cannot easily (i.e. without societally unsettling controversy) be suspended; (b) is designed to constrain or restrict egregiously mandatory use of power in both public and private functions; (c) allocates powers within the state itself, and comprises some form of popular/political representation in respect of questions perceived as possessing importance for all politically relevant sectors of society; and (d) expresses a legal distinction between the forms of the state and those persons assuming authority to borrow and enforce the power stored within the state.* (Thornhill 2011, 10-11)

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss constitutions as defined by Thornhill or even Larry and Perry. In this dissertation, the focus will be on the written constitutions, with some explanation of the context to assist in a deeper understanding of the constitutional text.

**Constitution and Nation**

Constitutions are windows to the national identity and state nationalism as seen by the national elite. Constitutions may not be read by many citizens, but reveal which groups
constitute the nation and what is elite’s vision for the nation. They are not only a set of procedures and methods related to politics but also inform about national myths, narratives, and beliefs. These myths and narratives become particularly evident when one looks at the preambles of different constitutions. The following preambles demonstrate the differential focus.

The preamble of the U.S. Constitution is succinct:

*We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America’* (US Constitution)

Contrast it with the preamble of the Egyptian Constitution that was approved in 2014. It is a three-page long document and starts with the following sentences:

*In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. This is Our Constitution. Egypt is the gift of the Nile for Egyptians and the gift of Egyptians to humanity. With its unique location and history, Egypt is the Arab heart of the world. It is the meeting point of world civilizations and cultures and the crossroads of its maritime transportation and communications. It is the head of Africa on the Mediterranean and the estuary of its greatest river: the Nile. This is Egypt, an immortal homeland for Egyptians, and a message of peace and love to all peoples...* (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014)
And the preamble of the Constitution of Germany starts with the following paragraph:

Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law. Germans in the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. This Basic Law thus applies to the entire German people. (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany)

Each of these preambles talks about national dreams and hopes, but they are different. They do have some similar aspects, but each one is distinct and thus reveals something about these nations, their histories, and their aspirations. For example, the phrase ‘to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe’ in the preamble of Germany’s Basic Law is linked to the German framers’ desire to show their nation’s commitment to peace and their hopes of overcoming the pariah status Germany had acquired due to what happened in the first half of the twentieth century (Kommers and Miller 2012, 200 & 325).
Similarly, preamble of the American Constitution mentions ‘common defense’ which might point to the difficulties Second Continental Congress faced in getting states to pay for the War of Independence under the Articles of Confederation and the desire of the framers to allow the new federal government to collect taxes to pay existing war debts and to raise and maintain military forces in future (Conserva 2011, 9-10).

Further, constitutions also inform one about the values and goals of the nation. Both Egypt and Germany promote world peace in their constitutions, while the US Constitution focuses on domestic tranquility. Reading the histories of these countries can help one understand why these countries prioritize different kinds of peace.

Constitutions also enlighten about how the nation perceives itself. State nationalism is an exercise in creating boundaries, both territorial and psychological. There is always an in-group and an out-group. The above excerpts show that religion plays a much larger part in the Egyptian identity as compared to the German identity. The absence of God or gods in the US preamble points to a more territorial-based identity or a civic state nationalism. This fact is further underscored by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that ensures that there is no established religion. Similarly, the preamble to the Basic Law demonstrates that German ethnicity is crucial to how Germans define themselves. Egyptian Constitution preamble too shows the importance of Arab ethnicity (with its reference to Arab heart) for the Egyptian national identity but ethnicity is ignored in the American Constitution because of America’s heterogeneity.
Constitutions are, like flags and anthems, thus symbols of the national identity and ideals. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, one should be clear that the nationalism represented in/by the constitutions is often the nationalism that the elite want to project and promote. As discussed in the first chapter, this nationalism might be different from what the masses believe. Focusing on state-religion relationship, Hanna Lerner (2013) has come up with another useful distinction between permissive and restrictive constitutions. In permissive constitutions, Lerner explains, constitution makers do not take a clear position on state-religion relationship. The language used in the constitution is vague and the decision is left to the parliaments and the future generations to decide these issues as they deem fit. Permissive constitutions are thus more flexible and ambiguous on state-religion relationship. In contrast, restrictive constitutions take a clear position on religion’s role in nation’s life. Such constitutions either accept religion or reject it. There is not much flexibility that parliaments and future generations can use, without comprehensively amending the constitution. Constitution framers can choose to be permissive due to a variety of different reasons. For example, they can be permissive due to intra-elite disagreement on the role of religion or due to the insignificance of state-religion relationship. Similarly, different reasons can cause the elite to be restrictive regarding state-religion relationship. The elite can be restrictive to force the nation to accept their view on state-religion relationship or to assure the nation that they consider the role of religion vital and permanent.
In terms of being symbols of nationalism, both permissive and restrictive constitution have some positive and negative aspects. Restrictive constitutions show precisely what role religion plays in a state nationalism, but they tend to show a static picture of state-religion relations, which is usually not true. Conversely, permissive constitutions are more likely to change with the evolution of religion’s role in state nationalism but because of their ambiguity one can never be sure about religion’s role.

In the next part, Islam’s role in state nationalism is analyzed by first focusing on the Turkish constitutions and then on the Pakistani constitutions.
TURKISH CONSTITUTIONS

The Republic of Turkey is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire whose rule spanned three continents and continued for more than six hundred years. As is often the case, the early centuries were a period of expansion for the Empire, but the last one and half century were a chronicle of defeats, decline, and disintegration. After its downfall in the First World War, the future of Ottoman/Turkish state looked ominous. Constantinople was under the control of victorious Allies and the Ottoman Sultan was little more than a prisoner. The Treaty of Sevres officially marked the end of the Ottoman Empire but also distributed the Anatolian heartland between the Allies. This humiliation resulted in a strong sense of national pride and led by General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the people of Turkey fought the War of Independence (1919-1922) and managed to defeat and drive the Allies out of the Anatolian peninsula.

The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s

Ulema, 31 Islamic symbols, and religious rhetoric played a crucial role in the mobilization of Anatolian population under Ataturk to fight against the victorious allies of WWI. The Turkish nation was hardly mentioned, most references in founding charters of the new state were to the Muslim nation. Not surprisingly, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was still significant. Both 1921 and 1924 Constitutions declared Islam as the state religion.

31 Ulema mobilized Muslims both for Ataturk and for the Ottoman Sultan. The Sultan’s ulema, including Sheikh-ul-Islam Durrizade Efendi, issued fatwas against Ataturk and the his followers, sanctioning their killing.
However, once Ataturk’s hold was secure, things began to change. The state promoted a secular identity and Islam’s role in the public sphere was rejected (Yavuz 2003, 45-7). This secular state nationalism was clearly manifested when all Islamic references were eliminated from the 1924 Turkish constitution in 1928 and Turkey was declared a secular Republic in 1937.

Figure 1: Ataturk praying at the opening First Grand National Assembly (April 1920)

Source: Ozturk (2015)
1921 Constitution

As Caliph/Sultan was considered a prisoner of the allies and so unable to rule, a provisional government was declared in Ankara during the war of independence (İstiklal Harbi) in May 1920. It was this government that issued the first Turkish constitutional document in 1921. As it was promulgated when the war was still continuing, it was not a complete constitution and was limited in many respects. It had only twenty-three articles and did not deal with many issues that are considered a necessary part of a constitution (MFA 2014). For example, there were no provisions related to the judicial branch of the government and no separate section on fundamental rights. There was also no mention of Ottoman Sultan/Caliph, who was still regarded as the head of state of the new entity. However, despite its deficiencies, it was prepared in a democratic way. The framers of this constitution were more representative of the Turkish population than the framers of earlier Ottoman or later (three) Turkish constitutions (Eyes 2005).

Analyzing 1921 constitution with reference to state-Islam relationship, following conclusions can be drawn. First, the most significant change in this constitution was that divine sovereignty of the Sultan gave way to popular sovereignty. While the 1876 Ottoman Constitution declared:
The Ottoman sovereignty which is united in the person of the sovereign of the supreme Caliph of Islam belongs to the eldest of the princes of the dynasty of Osman. (Davison 1998, 162)

The Article 1 of 1921 Constitution stated:

Sovereignty is vested in the nation without condition. Governmental system is based on the principle of self-determination and government by people. (Government of Turkey 1921)

All the legislative and executive power were also given to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) that was popularly elected (Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009, 10). Moreover, there was no mention of Islam as the state religion, a change from the 1876 Ottoman Constitution that declared Islam as the state religion (Ardic 2012, 57). The role of religion in state affairs was mentioned at two places in the 1921 Constitution. Article 11 declared that religion was a federal subject and Article 7 (as reproduced below) explained that religion remained the basis of legislation:

The basic rights of the application of the ordinances of the sacred law; the promulgation, amendment and abrogation of all laws; the concluding of peace treaties; the promulgation of defense of the motherland belong to the Grand National Assembly. The preparation of laws and regulations will be guided by juridical and religious provisions, which best
conform to the modus operandi of the people and the needs of the times, as well as established customs… (Government of Turkey 1921)

However, the language of the article made clear that along with sacred law, people’s modus operandi, customs and needs of time would be given consideration and the decision-maker would be the GNA, not the Ottoman Sultan or Sheikh-ul-Islam.

Islam only became the state religion of the new state by a constitutional amendment passed on October 29, 1923, the day when the Turkish Republic was established in place of the Ottoman Empire. As the Ataturk-led government was against Islam’s role in state affairs, the declaration of Islam as the state religion was surprising. The fact that both decisions were announced on the same day leads one to think that announcement of state religion was done to placate the Turkish population as a declaration of Republic was bitterly opposed and criticized both inside and outside the GNA (Ardic 2012, 59; Feroze 1976, 84).

1924 Constitution

The 1924 Constitution was promulgated on 20th April 1924 and had 105 articles. It devised a unicameral parliament, with members elected on a territorial basis. A mixed system, partly presidential and partly parliamentary, was established. Independence of judiciary and fundamental rights were enshrined in the constitution.
During its lifetime, 1924 Constitution saw sweeping changes regarding religion-state relations, thereby demonstrating the drastic change in Islam’s role in the Turkish state nationalism. Initially, when the constitution was promulgated, Islam was the state religion and Islam was accepted as an important part of Turkish national identity. However, in the next fourteen years, Turkish society was subjected to an authoritarian top-down modernization process. The state changed itself and tried to transform the society. Islam was rejected as part of national identity and Turkey was declared a secular republic under Ataturk’s leadership.

The process of decreasing Islam’s role in public affairs started before the promulgation of the 1924 constitution. On March 3, 1924, the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs were abolished. Concurrently, the GNA also put all kinds of schools (public as well as religious) under the control of Ministry of Education. In early April, religious courts were also abolished, ending centuries of ulema’s role in the judiciary. So, acceptance of Islam as the state religion in the new constitution, promulgated on April 20, as Ataturk hinted later on, was a way to reassure the masses that despite these changes, the state was not rejecting Islam. The Article 2 stated:

*The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Ankara.*

---

32 The ministry was replaced by a department in the Prime Minister’s office (Diyanet) and a foundation. These changes will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.
Besides this article, there were other references to Islam in the constitution. Article 26 declared that GNA would execute the Sharia itself i.e. it will not allow religious scholars to interfere in the legislation. The oath of GNA members also started with ‘I swear to God’ (Article 16).

The 1924 Constitution demonstrated that although not as paramount as before, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was still significant: Islam was the state religion, GNA was to execute Sharia, and parliamentarian’s oath still had reference to God.

The constitution, however, did not stop the process of secularization of the Turkish state. In 1925, all Sufi/tariqah lodges and tombs of saints were closed to the public and all Sufi orders outlawed. The year ended with the replacement of Islamic lunar calendar with the Gregorian calendar. The next year was a year of legal reforms, delinking religious law from the Turkish society and introducing European laws. The new Civil Code and Code of Obligations were based on Swiss laws, new Penal Code on Italian law and the new Commercial Code on German law.

These legal reforms set the stage for a significant change in state-religion relationship. Islam's role in state nationalism was clearly decreasing and this became apparent in the constitutional amendments. In his famous six day speech (Nutuk) in GNA in 1927, Ataturk
advised the GNA to remove the clause terming Islam as state religion by declaring it a ‘meaningless phrase’ that he only allowed as a political maneuver:

After the founding of the Republic, while the new constitution was being made, with the purpose of not providing an opportunity for those who are inclined to interpret the phrase, “laic government,” as anti-religious and take advantage of such an interpretation, it has been allowed that a meaningless phrase be added to article two of the constitution.

Inevitably, in 1928, the constitutional amendment to remove the statement of Islam as state religion from Article 2 was passed. This amendment also discarded other references to Islam in the constitution, such as in Article 26 (execution of Holy law) and Article 16 (God in the mandatory oath of the GNA members). The Turkish Republic was now neutral regarding religion demonstrating that the ruling elite did not consider Islam as one of the markers of the Turkish nation. However, secularism was still not a principle of constitution and part of Turkish state nationalism yet. Many more steps of secularization had to be taken at the lower level before secularism was made part of state nationalism.

During the initial phase of the Republic, territorial state nationalism was emphasized as an antidote to religious state nationalism but in the late 1920s, Turkish elite started promoting Turkish ethnic state nationalism. Turkish civilization was proclaimed to be the mother of all civilizations and efforts were made to restore the Turkish language by rejecting words coming from other languages. There was also a state sponsored campaign, ‘Citizen speak
Turkish’. Quran’s language, Arabic, and Persian had great influence on Turkish language and literature. To counter this influence of Islam, in 1928, Arabic numerals and script were discarded and Turkey adopted European numeral and a modified Latin alphabet. This change severed the last connection between secular and religious literacy.\(^{33}\)

A campaign started to purge Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language and imams/prayer leaders were ordered to deliver Friday sermons in Turkish. In 1932, imams were instructed to further restrict usage of Arabic. Instead of the Arabic Quran, Turkish translations of Quran were to be read in mosques. Later, in the year, it was forbidden to make the call to prayer (Adhan) in Arabic.

The efforts of modernization/Europeanization continued with the surname law (1934), the abolition of titles law (1934), law to prohibit certain (religious) garments (1934) and changing of weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday (1935). It was only after all these reforms that Turkey was declared a secular republic in 1937. The Article 2 which, after 1928, made no reference to religion and just affirmed Turkish as national language and Ankara as national capital, was amended to be read as follows:

\(^{33}\) However, it should be clear that the Ottoman language was Turkish. It had lots of Arabic and Persian words and was written in Arabic script but it was Turkish. Not surprisingly, most Turks did not understand Quran even in the Ottoman times.
Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular and revolutionary. Its official language is Turkish. Its capital is the city of Ankara.\textsuperscript{34}

After the death of Ataturk, his loyal lieutenant, Ismet Inonu took over as President and secularization policies continued. Islam was suppressed and Turkish constitution and laws celebrated a secular state nationalism. The biggest change in constitution under Inonu was the adoption of a new version of 1924 Constitution in 1945 that eliminated Arabic and Persian words in the original constitution and replaced them with Turkish words. So, not only Islam but even words that showed Islamic influence were discarded from the constitution. Islam’s banishment from Turkish state nationalism was nearly complete.\textsuperscript{35}

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

Things began to change when single-party rule ended in the late 1940s and the first multi-party elections were held in 1946. As most Turkish people still lived in villages, mostly out of the reach of the state, the influence of Kemalist reforms was limited. Multi-party elections in 1946 made the Turkish elite realize the power of this silent religious majority. Critics of secularism in the ruling CHP gradually started voicing their objections as the popularity of the main opposition party, Democrat Party (DP),\textsuperscript{36} increased. Although the

\textsuperscript{34} A comparison of the articles relating to religion or secularism in different Turkish constitutions is given at the end of this section.
\textsuperscript{35} Islam role was not completely eliminated in the Turkish state nationalism as non-Muslims were still considered second-class Turkish citizens.
\textsuperscript{36} The DP was formed by a group of former CHP leaders. It was a center-right party. While the DP favored removing some restrictions on religious practice, its leaders Celal Bayar (a confidant of Ataturk who served under him under numerous positions, including as Prime Minister) and Adnan Menderes (a former
CHP had won the first election in 1946, it realized that it had to change its anti-religion/anti-Islam image, if it wanted to win the next election. So, a host of changes related to Islam were implemented before the next elections in 1950. These included relaxation of restrictions on religious education in schools, opening of a few tombs of Muslim saints, new educational courses for prayer leaders; establishment of Faculty of Theology at the University of Ankara; and expansion of the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). However, secularism remained part of Turkish state nationalism as there were no constitutional changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Democrat Party</th>
<th>Republican Party</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>% of total vote</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>397</td>
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<td>1950</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>503</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a No information is available about the percentage of votes for the 1946 elections.

Source: Eligur (2010, 72-75) and Jenkins (2008, 115-23)

*member of the CHP) did not change the secular nature of Turkey’s institutions. The difference between Menderes and the CHP leadership was that he was not anti-religion. Menderes ‘did not detest or fear religious practice, as many Kemalists did’ (Kinzer 2008, 61).
CHP’s reforms did not save it from defeat and the DP comfortably won the next elections in 1950. The religious groups celebrated the victory as ‘a day of deliverance from the “Godless People’s Party”’ (Feroze 1976, 121). The DP, however, was not an Islamic party and claimed to be committed to secularism, though in a less aggressive way. During its first tenure, it lifted more restrictions on religious actions/symbolism such as permitting *Adhan* in Arabic, allowing religious programming on state-run radio, making religious education compulsory in elementary schools (parents had the option to opt out), setting up of schools for prayer leaders, and increasing the funding for Diyanet. It also gave leeway to the banned religious orders, which had assisted in its electoral success (Eligur 2010, 57-59). However, there was no attempt to reverse the more significant Atatürk’s secularization reforms, such as bringing back Arabic script to write Turkish language or discarding civil and penal codes (based on European codes) or amending the constitution to remove secularism. As far as the constitution is concerned, the biggest change regarding Islam was bringing back the pre-1945 version of the 1924 Constitution. So, the Turkified version of the constitution was replaced by a version that had Arabic and Persian words in 1952. Secularism, as one of the main principles of the Republic, was still part of the constitution.

The DP won elections in 1954 and 1957, but its popularity gradually waned as economic growth slowed in the late 1950s. Prime Minister Menderes became more autocratic and
tried to scuttle all activities of the opposition. On 27th May 1960, the DP government was overthrown in a military coup. The coup leaders claimed that the DP had violated the constitution by establishing a single-party state and by exploiting religion. They promised to come up with a new constitution.

**1961 Constitution**

The 1961 Constitution was promulgated in July 1961 and had 157 articles. A parliamentary system was envisaged, with a bicameral parliament. Independence of judiciary was ensured and an expanded list of fundamental rights were enshrined in the constitution. The 1961 Constitution is regarded as the most liberal constitution of Turkey and can also be seen as a continuation of the movement, which started in the late 1940s, toward a less authoritarian and more progressive state. Though Menderes behaved like an autocrat in his later years, he was liberal in his economic and religious policies. He did not make state Islamic. He only gave religious Turk rights that the secular constitution guaranteed.

The new constitution was the most liberal of all Turkish constitutions but it still included many provisions, mainly related to religion, to thwart the popular will. If the 1924 Constitution was drafted under the watchful eye of and behind the scene guidance of General Mustafa Kemal, the 1961 Constitution was written with the formal input of Turkish military officers. The old elite that had ruled Turkey during the single-party period was dissatisfied with how easily the DP was able to capture the state and made sure to
reassert its dominance (and assertive secularism) and to restrict the power of popularly elected governments.

Two groups, the CHP and the military, which were heavily represented in the old guard, also led the constitution-making process in 1960-61. The law 157 issued in December 1960 conceived a bicameral constituent assembly. The upper house consisted of twenty-three military officers that participated in the coup. The lower chamber was civilian and had 272 members, most of which were selected or nominated by the military junta or their representatives. The elected members were also chosen in an election that was neither fair nor free. The selection of lower house was so lopsided that around eighty percent of the members were either member or partisans of the CHP. So, upper chamber represented military interests while the lower house represented the CHP interests and approval of constitution required the approval of both chambers. Members of the Democrat Party, which was dissolved by the junta in September 1961, was excluded from the constituent assembly.

The 1961 Constitution took months to complete and was promulgated after approval in a popular referendum in July 1961.\textsuperscript{37} It expanded the right of religious freedom significantly as compared to the 1924 Constitution. First, besides giving the right to every individual to choose and practice any religion like in the 1924 Constitution, it also directed that neither

\textsuperscript{37} However, the legitimacy of the referendum, which approved the constitution by around sixty percent of the votes cast, was open to question as military was in full control and it was not possible to openly campaign against the approval of the new constitution (Jenkins 2008, 125).
a person could be compelled to worship or participate in religious ceremony nor anyone could be forced to reveal (or be reproached) because of his/her beliefs. Second, it gave an individual, control over his own and his legal wards religious education (Article 19). This concession was the result of an anomaly (state-sponsored religious education in a secular Republic) that the constitution-makers decided to continue with, despite declaring secularism one of the main characteristics of the Republic in Article 2:

*The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state, governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.*

Another anomaly was making Diyanet a constitutional body (Article 154). Finally, exploitation or abuse of religion was forbidden for personal benefit or for gaining power and it was stated that those who violate this rule would be punished, including the political parties.

The principle of secularism was not only defining characteristics of the constitution but also included in the oaths of GNA members (Article 77, reproduced below) and political parties (Article 57) were required to adhere to it.

*I swear upon my honour that I will protect the independence of the State, the integrity of the homeland and the nation, that I will remain committed to unqualified and unconditional

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38 Diyanet-related changes will be discussed later in chapter 6.
sovereignty of the nation and to the principles of a democratic and secular republic, and that I will make every effort to promote the happiness of the people.

To secure secularism further, eight laws related to secularism, passed during Ataturk’s time, were made part of the constitution, thus making it very difficult to change them (Article 153).

Based on 1961 Constitution, secularism thus remained part of the Turkish state nationalism. Islam had no official role in the creation or sustenance of the Turkish nation. A distinguishing feature of the 1961 Constitution was liberalism, but this liberalism was not extended to religious sections of the society, who were not considered proper and full members of the Turkish nation. Islam/religion came back in the constitution through articles related to religious education and Diyanet but as the overall language of the constitution demonstrates, Islam was a threat that had to be contained and religious education and Diyanet were instruments of the state to control the threat. The purpose of religious education and Diyanet was also clarified in 1965 when a comprehensive law relating to Diyanet’s objectives and responsibilities was passed. It made it mandatory that Diyanet would only employ prayer leaders trained by the state as imams trained by non-state institutions were considered a threat to secular order.

As mentioned above, the Democrat Party was dissolved by the military junta. Most of the members of the Democrat Party formed a new party, called the Justice Party (AP: Adalet
Partisi). Despite the authoritarianism shown by Menderes in the last couple of years before the coup and the military junta’s action against the party and its leaders, the popularity of the Democrat Party platform, which was adopted by the AP, was still visible in the 1961 elections. The CHP, with all the state support, could not get a majority and the newly formed AP came a close second to the CHP. A coalition government of the CHP and the AP, with former President Inonu as Prime Minister, had to be formed and military junta transferred power to it. The political instability continued till 1965 when the AP won the elections comprehensively. The AP, led by Suleyman Demirel, again won the election in 1969.

Table 10: Turkish National Assembly Elections (1960-70) a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Justice Party</th>
<th>Republican Party</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>% of total vote</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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39 Including hanging Menderes and two of its ministers.
40 The party promoted itself as ‘champion of Islam’ and, like the DP, had support of religious orders (Eligur 2010, 59).
41 From 1961 to 1965, four different governments ruled Turkey.
In 1971, Turkey suffered its second military coup.\textsuperscript{42} The AP-led civilian government was forced to resign and a government of technocrats was established. Although 1961 Constitution survived the coup, it was the end of liberalism of the 1961 Constitution. Gradually, over a course of few years, rights given to universities, labor, media, etc. were taken back by amendments to the constitution under the tutelage of the military. The commitment to secularism, however, remained high till the end of the 1970s. Turkish military started cooperating with or ignoring the violence of right-wing militias, but it was all in shadows (Feroz 2002, 150-170).

Opinions are divided on the 1961 Constitution. Some scholars call it the most liberal Turkish constitution as it privileged human rights and declared that all citizens have numerous inviolable rights. Every Turkish citizen, for the first time after the promulgation of 1961 constitution, got the right of inviolability of her person and immunity from unusual

\textsuperscript{42} This coup was orchestrated by the high command of the Turkish military to stop a coup by their junior officers, who were more radical and leftist. These officers were frustrated by the AP’s policies and wanted to establish a long-term military regime. In contrast, military command had no intention of governing Turkey and were come concerned about the rising communist threat (Eligur 2010, 67-8).
punishment. New constitutional rights included freedom of travel and residence, freedom of communication, freedom of information, freedom of association and the privacy of the domicile. For the first time, the rights of workers, public servants, farmers, etc. were recognized. The constitution also recognized social justice as an important constitutional principle and strengthened the judiciary. (Szyliowicz 1963). The final argument given in praise of 1961 Constitution is that it was certainly better than the 1982 Constitution. The critics of 1961 Constitution recognize above-mentioned achievements but point to the start of some troubling traditions: formation of national security council (giving military permanent political role); granting other privileges to the military; respecting coup leaders by making them senators; use of Constitutional Court to ban political parties, etc. Moreover, giving of rights to all sections was disingenuous as military knew that it could always take away these rights. Their purpose was to limit the authority of elected governments as far as possible and use these rights to pressurize these governments. (Hurriyet Daily News 2010)

Two concluding points about the secularism in the 1961 Constitution are worth mentioning. First, there was no reversal to single-party era strict interpretation of secularism. Whatever changes were made by CHP and DP from 1946 to 1960 were retained. Second, the role of Diyanet was given constitutional legitimacy. Not surprisingly, state-sponsored religious education expanded and prayer leader (Imam Hatip) schools and mosques increased manifold from 1961 to 1982. Both these measures, though against secularism, were approved to save secularism by controlling Islam.
In sum, Turkish state nationalism retained its predominantly secular character. However, acceptance and expansion of religious education and Diyanet had some unintended consequences as educated Islamists came of age in large numbers and the Turkish elite decided to use them and Islam to deter left-wing radicalism and Kurdish nationalism.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

Increasing street violence, deteriorating economic conditions and political instability led to the third military coup in September 1980. The third coup resulted in the longest (1980-83) and the most authoritarian and brutal military government in the history of Turkey (Barkey and Kadioglu 2011).

Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism went through a critical transformation in the 1980s. This transformation was mainly due to change of Turkish military’s attitude about Islam.\(^{43}\) Previously, for Turkish generals, defending secularism and Ataturk’s reforms and legacy meant rejecting Islam. One of the common reasons given for all three coups was that the toppled elected government was straying from Ataturk’s legacy and exploiting religion for political purposes. After the 1980 coup, Turkish military recognized the utility of Islam and defending secularism and Ataturk’s reforms meant instrumentalizing Islam. Scholars have given many reasons for this change: perceived rising threat of

\(^{43}\) Since Turkish military was the most powerful supporter of secularism, change in its views removed the major obstacle against Islam’s contribution to the Turkish state nationalism.
communists/leftists/Kurd nationalists; military’s confidence in its own ability to control religion and religious leaders; the rise of loyal Islamist-nationalists, etc.

After the coup, military junta banned all political activity and political parties and nominated a select group to draft a new constitution. The new constitution, written under instructions of the junta, was approved in a referendum in November 1982. It had 177 articles, established a unicameral Parliament and a parliamentary system government (though initially President had extensive powers). This constitution is the most authoritarian of all Turkish constitutions. While constitutions are usually made to limit state’s power and to protect/extend people’s rights, the 1982 constitution was trying to protect the state from the people:

*Its primary aim was to restore the authority of the State and to maintain public order rather than to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens. As is commonly observed, the underlying philosophy of the 1982 Constitution was to protect the State from the actions of its citizens rather than to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizens from the State’s encroachment.* (Ozbudun 2007)

Regarding Turkish state nationalism, the 1982 Constitution added promotion of Ataturk’s cult to the emphasis on secularism. This change was one of the distinguishing features of the new constitution. Starting from the preamble of the constitution, importance of secularism and Ataturk’s reforms was highlighted. For the first time, the principle of
secularism was introduced in the President’s oath and made one of the Diyanet’s objectives. Similarly, loyalty to Ataturk’s reforms/ (secular) nationalism was made a part of the binding oath taken by the GNA members. This recourse to Ataturk was not limited to the constitution and in the 1980s and 1990s, the image of Ataturk was increasingly depicted – encouraged by the state – on badges, posters, stickers, etc., bordering to what a writer called ‘Ataturk fetishism’ (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 189).

However, despite loyalty to secularism, Islam made gains in the 1982 Constitution. For the first time since the early years of the Republic, religious education became compulsory in both primary and secondary schools:

*Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.* (Article 24).

Moreover, Diyanet’s significance was increased by making national solidarity and integrity one of its duties:

*The Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of*
secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity. (Article 136)

Military junta’s approach appeared contradictory. On one hand, its leaders publically read Quranic verses; increased religious education; expanded Diyanet; tried to reinvent Ataturk as a pious Muslim. On the other hand, they legalized abortion and banned headscarves in universities and public places. However, whatever the reasons for this approach, religion’s public role increased appreciably during the 1980s. Later civilian governments also continued these policies (Jenkins 2008, 146-64). Linking Islam with state nationalism helped the Milli Gorus movement of Erbakan. Although he and his party MSP were banned from politics in the wake of the 1980 coup, they re-emerged and attracted more supporters.
### Table 11: Milli Gorus (National View/Outlook) Parties, led/influenced by Erbakan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
<td>1972-80</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MSP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare (Refah) Party</td>
<td>1983-98</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16.9&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtue Party</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicity Party</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party</td>
<td>2002-</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AKP)&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> In alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Reformist Democracy Party.

Source: Eligur (2010, 72-75 and 255)

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<sup>44</sup> The AKP rejects the Milli Gorus movement, though many scholars consider it part of the same movement (Eligur 2010, 247).
Since its promulgation, 1982 Constitution has been amended many times. Of particular importance were amendments passed in 1995, 2001, 2004 and 2010. All of these amendments tried to decrease the authoritarian character of the constitution, but secularism still retained the pride of place. One of the most significant change was amending the Article 14 and it had implications for religion-state relations. The original Article 14 made all the fundamental rights, given in the constitution, suspect and doubtful. The original text was as follows:

None of the rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, destroying fundamental rights and liberties, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas.

After the 2001 Amendment, the new Article 14 not only protected fundamental rights but also re-emphasized the secular character of the Republic:

None of the rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, and
endangering the existence of the democratic and secular Republic based on human rights. No provision of the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that would enable the State or individuals to destroy the fundamental rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution or to engage in an activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively than is stated in the Constitution.

Other changes were made in the laws to limit the state from punishing perceived anti-secularism activities. In 1991, articles 141, 142, and 163 of the penal code that prescribe punishments for engaging in anti-secular and communist propaganda and organization were repealed and in 2002, a higher bar was set to convict people under penal code article 312 that punished incitement of hostility and hatred based on differences in social class, religion, sect, race, and region.

With the coming of power of the Islamic-oriented government of the AKP, the religious-right hoped and the secularists dreaded the diluting of strict secularism that was part of all Turkish constitutions since 1937. However, the AKP did not take any initiative to attack secularism enshrined in the constitution.

After winning three electoral contests in 2007 (constitutional referendum, the presidential election and the parliamentary election), AKP grew more confident. In 2008, the AKP-dominated GNA passed a constitutional amendment that was considered by some as giving Islam an entry into the Turkish state nationalism and disturbing religion-state relationship
in Turkey. The amendment, referred in the press as ‘Turban Amendment’, was about removing discrimination against headscarved women. Previously, as mentioned above, these women were debarred by the military government in the early 1980s from universities, civil service jobs, and government offices. The Turban amendment was, however, soon declared unconstitutional. Moreover, this amendment nearly resulted in the dissolution of the AKP by the constitutional court as proponents of secularism, CHP and many in military and judiciary, claimed that AKP had violated Turkish constitutional principle of laiklik (secularism) and was trying to establish an Islamist state. (Smith 2013; Gungor 2008; Axiarlis 2014, 57-64).

The above discussion shows that Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism increased during this period. For the first time since the early 1920s, constitutional framers accepted the utility of religion/Islam. Religion was not to be feared as before but used for national unity and to deter external/internal threats.

2010 Onwards

The 2010 referendum marks the advent of a new era is Turkish politics. Held on 12 September 2010, this constitutional referendum did not change the state-Islam relationship in the constitution, but it opened the possibilities for such changes in the future. This referendum marked the end of the hold of two institutions that were controlled by the secularists and had undermined democracy since 1961 as discussed above. The 2010 referendum reduced their powers and broke the power of secularists controlling them. In
the case of Constitutional Court, its composition was changed giving democratic governments more control over it. The waning power of Turkish military was further decreased by removing protection of the 1980 coup leaders; allowing civilian courts to try military personnel; and by reducing powers of Supreme Military Council (Today’s Zaman 2010a). Thus, these amendments made it possible for a future political party to introduce Islam in the constitution, if it has sufficient public support behind it.

Even before the constitutional referendum, all leading Turkish political parties agreed that a new constitution was required as the present 1982 constitution was not democratic. However, despite extensive discussions between parties, there was no agreement. Now that the 2015 parliamentary elections are over, the discussion has started again. However, no party has, till now, argued for taking secularism out of the new constitution. The most probable outcome at this time appears to be a less aggressive and more liberal US-style secularism. This probability was strengthened when Constitutional Court itself interpreted secularism in a liberal way while declaring discriminations against lawyers wearing headscarves illegal (Daily Sabah 2012b).

The AKP appears to be more interested in bringing a presidential system than bringing back Islam in the new constitution but it has used Islamic symbols and rhetoric to win the
2015 elections\textsuperscript{45} and this might force it to increase Islam in the constitution (Mert 2015; Sezgin 2015).

A table comparing provisions related to Islam/secularism in three Turkish constitutions (1924, 1961 and 1982) is given below.

\textsuperscript{45} Though it failed to maintain its majority in the parliament in the June 2015 elections, it was still the largest party. It reclaimed its majority in the November 2015 by increasing its vote share.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1924 Constitution</th>
<th>1961 Constitution</th>
<th>1982 Constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preamble</strong></td>
<td>No preamble</td>
<td>….With full dedication to the principle of &quot;peace at home, peace in the world&quot; and with full dedication to the spirit of national independence, and sovereignty and to the reforms of Atatürk; Guided by the desire to establish a democratic rule of law based on juridical and social foundations, which will ensure and guarantee human rights and liberties, national solidarity, social justice, and the welfare and prosperity of the individual and society;</td>
<td>…. The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Comparison of Religion-related clauses of Three Turkish Constitutions
Now, therefore, the Turkish Nation hereby enacts and proclaims this Constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly of the Turkish Republic… whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Ankara. (Article 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[In 1928, reference to Islam removed and in 1937, Turkey was declared a secular state]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state, governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble. (Article 2)

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble. (Article 2)
| **Holy law** | The Grand National Assembly itself executes the holy law; (Part of Article 26) |
| **Equality before Law** | All Turks are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden. (Article 69) |
| | All individuals are equal before the law, irrespective of language, race, sex, political opinion, philosophical views, religion or religious sect. No privileges shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class. (Article 12) |
| | All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations. No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class. State organs and administrative |

113
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right of Religious Freedom</th>
<th>No one may be molested on account of his religion, his sect, his religious order, or his philosophic convictions. All religious observances shall be free on condition that they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public decency or exist in violation of social norms.</th>
<th>authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings. (Article 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right of Religious Freedom</td>
<td>Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to choose his own religious faith and to have his own opinions. Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not in opposition to public order, or morals or laws enacted to uphold them. No person shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, or to</td>
<td>Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14. No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of Religious Freedom</td>
<td>Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to choose his own religious faith and to have his own opinions. Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not in opposition to public order, or morals or laws enacted to uphold them. No person shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, or to</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
115

Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual's own will and volition desire, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians.

No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.

Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the

conventions or the law. (Article 75) reveal religious faith and beliefs. No person shall be reproached because of his religious faith and belief.
fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition, or those who induce others to do so shall be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of associations and political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by orders of authorized courts and the latter by the orders of the Constitutional Court. (Article 19)

individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives.

No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets. (Article 24)
Oath of Assembly members

I swear before God that I will have no other aim but the happiness and safety of the fatherland and the absolutely unrestricted sovereignty of the nation and that I will never forsake republican principles. (Article 16)

I swear upon my honour that I will protect the independence of the State, the integrity of the homeland and the nation, that I will remain committed to unqualified and unconditional sovereignty of the nation and to the principles of a democratic and secular republic, and that I will make every effort to promote the happiness of the people. (Article 77)

I swear upon my honour and integrity, before the great Turkish Nation, to safeguard the existence and independence of the State, the indivisible integrity of the Country and the Nation, and the absolute sovereignty of the Nation; to remain loyal to the supremacy of law, to the democratic and secular Republic, and to Ataturk’s principles and reforms; not to deviate from the ideal according to which
everyone is entitled to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms under peace and prosperity in society, national solidarity and justice, and loyalty to the Constitution.
(Article 81)

| Political Parties | The statutes, programmes and the activities of political parties shall conform to the principles of the democratic and secular republic, based on human rights and liberties, and to the fundamental principle of state’s territorial and national integrity. Parties failing to conform to | The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of |
| Directorate of Religious Affairs | The office of Religious Affairs, which is incorporated in the general administration, shall discharge the functions prescribed by a special law. (Article 154) | The directorate of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. (Article 68) | these provisions shall be permanently dissolved. (Article 57) |
| Safeguard of the Reform Laws | No provision of this Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the following Reform Laws which aimed at raising Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization and at safeguarding the secular character of the republic, which were in effect on the date this Constitution was in effect. (Article 136) | No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to safeguard the secular principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity. (Article 136) |
was adopted by popular vote:

1. The Law on the Unification of Education
2. The Hat Law
3. The Law on the closing down of dervish convents
4. The conduct of the act of marriage
5. International numerals
6. Turkish alphabet
7. Abolitions of titles
8. Prohibition on wearing of certain garments. (Article 153)

count character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution by referendum:

1. The Unification of the Educational System law
2. The Wearing of Hats law
3. The Closure of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles law
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The principle of civil marriage according to which the marriage act shall be concluded in the presence of the competent official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The Adoption of International Numerals law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Adoption and Application of the Turkish Alphabet law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Abolition of Titles and Appellations law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Article 174)
| **Oath of the President** | As President of the Republic, I swear to dedicate myself exclusively to the respect, defense and execution of the laws of the Republic and of the principles of national sovereignty, to devote all my efforts loyally to assure the happiness of the Turkish nation, to contend with all my strength against every danger which may menace the Turkish state, to cherish and defend the glory and honor of Turkey, and in general to conduct | As President of the Republic, I swear upon my honour that I will fight any threat directed against the independence of the Turkish State or against the integrity of the fatherland and the Nation, that I will respect and defend the unqualified and unconditional sovereignty of the Nation, that I will not deviate from the principles of a democratic state based on the rule of law and human rights, that I will be free from all bias, and that I will do my utmost to protect and exalt the glory of the Turkish Republic | In my capacity as President of the Republic I swear upon my honour and integrity before the Turkish Grand National Assembly and before history to safeguard the existence and independence of the State, the indivisible integrity of the Country and the Nation and the absolute sovereignty of the Nation, to abide by the Constitution, the rule of law, democracy, the principles of the secular Republic, not |
| myself so that I may never fail in the performance of the duties with which I am entrusted. (Article 38) | and fulfil the task I have undertaken. (Article 96) to deviate from the ideal according to which everyone is entitled to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms under conditions of national peace and prosperity and in a spirit of national solidarity and justice, and do my utmost to preserve and exalt the glory and honour of the Republic of Turkey and perform without bias the functions that I have assumed. (Article 103) |
PAKISTANI CONSTITUTIONS

Looking at the sixty seven years of Pakistan’s history, one can see competing portraits of the Pakistani nation promoted by the elite through the country’s three constitutions and amendments made to them. The Turkish constitutions were promulgated decades apart, thus capturing the changing contribution of Islam to state nationalism through various periods of Turkish history. In contrast, the constitutions of Pakistan were promulgated in close proximity in 1956, 1962 and 1973. Two of the Pakistani constitutions are just six years apart and all three were promulgated within a span of seventeen years. To effectively understand the evolving state nationalism and contribution of Islam to Pakistan’s constitutional history this analysis has been divided into three distinct periods:

- The Late 1940s to Late 1960s;
- The Early 1970s to Late 1990s;
- 1999 Onwards.

The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

Two distinctive features of this period’s constitutional activity were the British legacy and Islamic symbolism. The British legacy was important as most of the ruling elite in this period had either served in the British Indian legislatures or were part of British Indian civil-military bureaucracy. Almost all prominent leaders of the Pakistani independence movement had been members of the British Indian legislatures. Founding father and first Governor General Jinnah of Pakistan remained a member of the Imperial Legislative
Council for more than a decade. Liaqat Ali Khan, his second-in-command and first Prime Minister of Pakistan\textsuperscript{46}, was a member of the United Provinces Legislative Council from 1926-40 and subsequently became a member of the Central Legislative Council. Khawaja Nazimuddin, the second Governor-General and second Prime Minister of Pakistan\textsuperscript{47}, was the chairman of the Dacca Municipality in the 1920s and later served as the Premier of Bengal. Before joining politics, all three of them studied in England and Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were called to the bar in England. Three bureaucrats – Ghulam Mohammad\textsuperscript{48}, Mohammad Ali Chaudhry\textsuperscript{49} and Iskandar Mirza\textsuperscript{50} – ruled Pakistan during the tumultuous period (1951-58) after Liaqat’s death and before the first martial law. The first two were members of British Indian accounts services while Mirza was a member of the British Indian political service. Similarly, General Ayub Khan, who ruled Pakistan from 1958-69, also had a long history working with the British. He was a British Indian Army officer for around twenty years before opting for Pakistan Army at the time of independence. Many other Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats were also influenced by the British. Although Pakistani (and Indian) elite fought for independence against the British but they shared the liberal ideals of the British aristocracy. As Fanon described, they were envious of British and were trying to take the place of colonizers:

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{46} Liaqat Ali Khan was Prime Minister from 1947-51.
\textsuperscript{47} Khawaja Nazimuddin was Governor General from 1948 to 51 before serving as Prime Minister from 1951-54.
\textsuperscript{48} Ghulam Mohammad was Governor General from 1951-55.
\textsuperscript{49} Mohammad Ali Chaudhry was Prime Minister from 1955-56.
\textsuperscript{50} Iskandar Mirza served as last Governor General from 1955-56 and then became the first President (1956-58) after the promulgation of Constitution of 1956.
The gaze that the colonized subject casts at the colonist’s sector is a look of lust, a look of envy. Dreams of possession. Every type of possession: of sitting at the colonist’s table and sleeping in his bed, preferably with his wife. The colonized man is an envious man. (Fanon 2007, 5)

It was, therefore, not surprising that once the British left, the ruling elite of Pakistan sat in their offices and chose to continue with British institutions, laws, and rules. To continue with the Fanon analogy, they didn’t want to destroy the colonist’s house, they only wanted to live in it as masters. For the first nine years of Pakistan’s existence, the constitution was a modified version of the British India Act of 1935. Pakistan’s penal code is still largely based on the (British) Indian Penal Code of 1860. During the 1947-1971, there were few changes to the adopted penal code, except those that were necessitated by the changes in the territory, titles, and inflation.

However, the predicament for the Pakistani ruling elite was that the country had been created on the basis of Muslim nationhood. Leaders of Pakistan movement, including Jinnah, had at various times emphasized the importance of Islam and the Quran as the basis of laws. Infighting within the ruling elite (e.g. political vs. civil/military-bureaucratic elite or Bengali vs. Punjabi elite) and the resulting failure in governance helped further increased support for religious elite’s demand for implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) in Pakistan. The ruling elite had no intention of implementing any real change in the governing system so under pressure from the religious right, they made some symbolic changes to increase
their legitimacy and authenticity. They thought these symbolic changes did not matter, but these changes did increase Islam's role in state nationalism. In terms of the constitution, the first such symbolic change was the passing of the Objectives Resolution.

Pakistan did not have its first constitution till 1956. The Objective Resolution, passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, stated the principles on which the first constitution of Pakistan would be established. The passage of the Objective Resolution was significant as it was the first constitutional document in Pakistan that gave Islam a prominent place and hence revealed the important role Islam played in the Pakistani state nationalism. It accepted Allah's sovereignty, made several references to Islamic precepts, and asked the state to enable Muslims to live in accordance with Quran and Sunnah.\footnote{However, to argue, as some scholars have done, that the Objectives Resolution started the slippery slope that led to extensive Islamization that Pakistan witnessed later is difficult to accept (Hasan 2010). Notwithstanding, its references to Islam and Islamic precepts, the ruling elite made sure that what they gave with one hand, they took it away with the other. According to the Objectives Resolution, sovereignty belonged to Allah alone but it stated that power had to be exercised by the people of Pakistan through their chosen representatives. There was no role of ulema in the Objectives Resolution. While Muslims were to be enabled to live their lives in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah, the state was also required to safeguard the interests of minorities and ensure that minorities could freely profess and practice their own religions and cultures. Moreover, the state guaranteed fundamental human rights including equality of status and of opportunity; equality before the law; freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association; and social, economic, and political justice. It is clear that Objective Resolution tried to meet the desires of both the liberal democrats and the Islamists (though nothing for secularists). Attributing the Islamization largely to the Objectives Resolution is also problematic as it was not legally enforceable and was based on the Preamble of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937 (Constitution of Ireland 1937; Mullally 2007; Binder 1961, 271). Like Ireland, Pakistan could have taken a different road and not become a confessional state. The Objectives Resolution did increase the Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism was important, but it did not make the later Islamization inevitable.}

51
1956 Constitution

The 1956 Constitution was promulgated on 23rd March 1956 and had 234 articles. It envisaged a federal polity and a unicameral parliament. It envisaged a parliamentary system and included sections of both fundamental rights and Islamic provisions.

The 1956 Constitution demonstrated the importance of Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. The Objectives Resolution (Preamble) and the Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 23-31) that contained Islamic references were made part of the constitution. Islamic Republic of Pakistan was chosen as the name of the country (Article 1(1)) and only Muslims could become President of the country (Article 32(2)). There was a separate section of the constitution, titled Islamic provisions that had two articles. One of the potentially most powerful article related to Islam stated:

No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam, and existing law shall be brought into conformity with such Injunctions. (Article 198)

Though the above provision showed the significance of Islam’s role in state nationalism, it also revealed the true intent of the ruling elite. Instead of writing that all future laws enacted would be based on Islam, the wording of the provision was ‘No law shall be enacted which

---

52 There was no mention of Islam in other sections of the Constitution, except in the clauses mentioned above (Name, Objectives Resolution and Directive Principles of State Policy).
is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah,' which gave the government large leeway to make all kinds of laws. The second part of the provision relating to changing existing laws had no timeframe and the recommendations had to come from a commission to be established by the President within a year after the promulgation of 1956 Constitution. The Constitution was promulgated on 23rd March 1956, but the Commission was never established in the next two and half years before Constitution was abrogated in October 1958 after a military coup. The coup leader General Ayub Khan promised a new constitution.

1962 Constitution
The 1962 Constitution was promulgated on the 8th of June 1962 and had 250 articles. It established a unicameral parliament and a presidential system, with few checks and balances. Independence of the judiciary, Islamic provisions, and fundamental rights were enshrined in the constitution.

The original 1962 Constitution, formulated under General Ayub Khan, tried to reduce Islam's role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. Some of the articles related to Islam in the 1962 Constitution were similar to the 1956 Constitution. Objectives Resolution and Directive Principles of Policy were also part of 1962 Constitution and President also had to be Muslim. However, there were also major differences that intended to reduce Islam’s role. The name of Pakistan was changed from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the Republic of Pakistan in the new constitution. Second, in the 1962 Constitution, there was no article
similar to the Article 198 of the 1956 Constitution. Ayub Khan, a modernist Muslim, did not find it necessary to bring laws in conformity with Quran and Sunnah. Third, in articles where the 1956 Constitution referred to the Quran and the Sunnah, the 1962 Constitution referred only to Islam to avoid specific commitments. These changes were criticized by the religious right, but Ayub remained committed to limit Islam in Pakistani constitution, thereby decreasing Islam's role in state nationalism. However, after democracy was restored in 1962 and elections were held, the legislators passed the First Amendment to the constitution in 1963, bringing back most of the Islamic articles of the 1956 Constitution. Pakistan again became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Islam was replaced by ‘Quran and Sunnah’ in many provisions.

One area where the original 1962 Constitution appeared to be more Islamic than the 1956 Constitution was the establishment of Islamic advisory institutions. While 1956 Constitution only envisaged an organization for Islamic research and instruction, two bodies related to Islam were established under the 1962 Constitution, Islamic research Institute (Article 207) and Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology (Article 199). However, Ayub Khan considered the purpose of these institutions advisory at best and didn’t think them important enough to even wait for their advice:

*It is the legislature and the President who will be elected by the people, and it is therefore they who must finally accept the responsibility for making laws and giving decisions. The function of the Council, backed by the Islamic Research Institute, is to produce considered,*
well-thought out, scientific advice… If they choose not to tender their advice within a given period, life cannot stop. Work must go on. (Government of Pakistan 1962)

He appointed Fazal-ur-Rehman, a modernist professor, as head of the Islamic Research Institute, indicating Ayub’s desire for a new interpretation of Islam that was closer to the modern world, instead of moving modern laws closer to the traditional religious laws as demanded by the religious right.

Islamic provisions of both the 1956 and the 1962 constitutions substantiated that Islam was an important part of Pakistan’s state nationalism. Pakistan was an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the head of state had to be Muslim. Moreover, Objectives Resolution and Directive Principle of State Policy, with their many references to Islam, were part of both constitutions. Finally, Islamic provisions were also part of both constitutions.

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

In March 1969, General Yahya Khan imposed martial law, abrogated the 1962 Constitution, and announced the holding of elections soon. After the 1970 elections, power was not handed over to Awami League, the party from East Pakistan that had won the elections. Instead, the military operation was launched in East Pakistan, which led to Indian military intervention and eventual dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971. The upheaval in the late 1960s and later separation of East Pakistan forced a review of Pakistan’s state nationalism. As the following discussion on constitutional changes shows,
Pakistani elite – both civilian and military – decided that increasing the contribution of Islam to state nationalism was the remedy for what happened earlier.

**Legal Framework Order, 1970**

The Legal Framework Order (LFO), issued by the military government after lengthy discussions with all stakeholders, was a road-map to return to civilian rule. It had many positive aspects, like the adoption of the universal adult franchise for coming elections and a more decentralized government structure. However, it also contained provisions that put restrictions on the future constituent assembly, revealing the desire of General Yahya’s regime to be the final arbiter of elections and clinging on to power (Government of Pakistan 1970).

The most important aspect of the LFO, as far as this dissertation is concerned, was the specific link that was established between Pakistan and Islamic ideology in this constitutional document. Under the heading of fundamental principles of the constitution, the clause 20 (b) stated:

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53 It ended the ‘One Unit’ experiment. One Unit was created in 1954 by merging all the provinces and territories of West Pakistan to balance the numerical superiority of Bengalis/East Pakistanis. After unifying West Pakistan under One Unit, parity between the East and West Pakistan became a constitutional principle. Under the parity principle, in both 1956 and 1962 constitutions, East and West Pakistan (One Unit) had equal members in the central legislature. The political leadership of all provinces in West Pakistan, except the biggest province Punjab that benefitted from this arrangement, protested against the One Unit throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.

54 For example, the nostrum assembly would stand dissolved, if it could not agree on a constitution in 120 days.
i. *Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan shall be preserved:*

    and

ii. *The Head of the State shall be a Muslim.*

The requirement of the head of Pakistani state being a Muslim was present in 1956 and 1962 constitutions, but the categorical statement that Islamic ideology was the basis of Pakistan was new. No such claim was made in the previous two constitutions. While Islam’s role was generally acknowledged, there were no provisions in the previous constitutions about an ‘Islamic ideology’ that was under threat and gave the state responsibility to preserve it.

**1972 Interim Constitution**

The 1972 Interim Constitution was promulgated after the separation of East Pakistan to serve as constitution till a new constitution was agreed upon and promulgated. It served as Pakistan’s constitution for sixteen months, from April 1972 to August 1973. It contained most of the Islamic provisions of the 1956 and 1962 constitutions: the preamble; the name of the republic; requirement of the head of state being Muslim; Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology. A new addition related to Islam was the change in oath that important appointment holders had to take before starting to work:

*That I will strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan...*
This requirement of preserving the Islamic ideology thus continued from the LFO to this interim constitution and soon became part of the 1973 Constitution.

1973 Constitution

The 1973 Constitution was promulgated on the 14th of August 1973 and had 280 articles. It reverted Pakistan back to a parliamentary system of government. For the first time, the parliament was bicameral, with the Senate representing federating units. It expanded the Islamic provisions and fundamental rights as compared to the previous two constitutions.

The subtle change that started with the LFO, 1970, matured in the new constitution. Pakistan became a confessional state, with nationality defined in terms of Islam. Though the new constitution promulgated in 1973 was based on the British model and laws were still mostly based on the colonial heritage, Islam’s influence became more than symbolic as it was acknowledged to be a major part of Pakistan’s national identity. One can also argue that it was a movement from the low, rural, folk Islam to Gellnerian high, scriptural, urban Islam, a step toward the development of an Islamic nationalism (Hassan 2013). The image of Muslim state projected in the constitutional documents after 1973 was part of the Ummah, the global Islamic community. This image became acceptable to both ruling classes and masses for the following reasons:

- It moved the focus away from the loss of half of the country after a humiliating defeat at the hands of the arch-rival India. The blow to the national pride could not
be harder. Envisioning Pakistan part of the global Islamic Ummah softened the blow. If all Muslims were one nation, then India was not successful in separating West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis (Bangladeshis) as they were still one nation. Moreover, if all Muslims were one nation, then the new Pakistan was bigger than India, despite being more than six times smaller.

- Bhutto, the new leader of Pakistan, promoted this image to benefit from the newly rich conservative Arab Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Pakistan was in dire economic straits because of war, loss of half the country, and the oil embargo that resulted in tripling the oil prices in the mid-seventies. Aligning with the Arab Muslim countries, not only resulted in economic aid but also jobs for thousands of Pakistanis in these countries.

- It also projected the East Pakistan loss as the result of the perennial Hindu-Muslim rivalry, instead of the direct consequence of the actions of the West Pakistan ruling elite during the 1950s and 1960s when they refused to share power with their East Pakistani counterparts.

The original 1973 Constitution had more Islamic provisions than the previous two constitutions. For example, Islam was declared state religion for the first time in Pakistan’s history. In Article 2, the Pakistani state proudly declared itself Islamic. Moreover, the 1973 Constitution also called for Islamic unity; directed the state to support the teaching of Arabic and Islamiat (Islamic Studies); and prevent printing and circulation of obscene literature. Ensuring the correct and exact printing of the Qur’an became a responsibility of
the state. All these directives became part of a Pakistani constitution for the first time. An article, similar to Article 198 of the 1956 Constitution, calling for making new and existing laws closer to Quran and Sunnah was also revived.\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, for the first time, almost all oaths given in the constitution contained the statement, ‘That I will strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology, which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan’ and ended with, ‘May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A’meen).’ Finally, along with the President, the Prime Minister was required to be a Muslim in the 1973 Constitution.

However, these changes were not considered enough and the amendments to the 1973 Constitution during this period further linked the national identity with Islam. The Second Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, passed in 1974, defined a Muslim and made Ahmadis or Ahmadiyyah, a deviant sect, non-Muslim.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{55} 1962 Constitution didn’t have such an article.
\textsuperscript{56} Though no other amendments related to Islam were made under Bhutto (1972-77), he did make Islam a more influential part of Pakistan’s legal regime by taking the following actions:

- Islam was promoted as the main reason of legal/policy actions. Bhutto used Islamic symbols extensively and framed his policies as ‘Islamic socialism’;
- Relations with Muslim countries became very important. Pakistan whole-heartedly supported Arab countries in their war against Israel in 1973 and an Islamic Conference, in which tens of Muslim heads of state/government participated, was held in Lahore in 1974;
- Pakistan military personnel/advisors were stationed in many Middle Eastern Muslim countries in 1970s and 1980s and Pakistani military academies trained hundreds of officers of these countries (Riedel 2008; Chengappa 2004,41-42 )
- Friday was declared as Sabbath, instead of Sunday;
- Banning of gambling, horse racing, and alcohol because they were considered unislamic activities;
- Quranic studies were made mandatory.
Bhutto’s actions to promote Islam and ties with Islamic countries, however, did not save him and he was ousted in a military coup in 1977 after a protest movement mainly led by the religious parties. General Zia, who led the coup, was an observant Muslim and decided to legitimize his rule using Islam. Hence, the blending of Pakistan state nationalism and Islam continued with an increased vigor. General Zia made extensive changes to the 1973 Constitution and forced the parliamentarians to accept these changes before ending the martial law and sharing some power with them in 1985. Most of these changes were included in the Constitution as the Eighth Amendment. Some of the most significant changes brought about by the Eighth Amendment are:

- The Objective Resolution added to the constitution and made a substantive part of the constitution (Article 2A);
- ‘Freely’ was omitted from the following Objectives Resolution sentence related to minorities, ‘Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures’ (Article 2A);
- Wherever the word ‘Parliament’ occurs in the constitution, it was substituted by ‘Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)’, linking Parliament with the Quranic concept of shura;  

57 Zia’s penchant for using Islam was evident even before he became Pakistan’s leader. After becoming Army chief, he changed the Army’s motto to ‘Iman, Taqwa, Jihad-e-fi-Sabilillah’ (Faith, fear of Allah, struggle/jihad for Allah), based on Quranic precepts. He also discouraged alcohol; encouraged prayers; and openly used Islamic rhetoric.

58 Shoora mean mutual consultation and it is considered an Islamic principle and often cited as an evidence of support of democracy in Quran. Quran (42:38) describes the qualities of good Muslims in a verse as follows:

\[And \ those \ who \ have \ responded \ to \ their \ Lord \ and \ established \ prayer \ and \ whose \ affair \ is \ [determined \ by] \ consultation \ among \ themselves, \ and \ from \ what \ We \ have \ provided \ them, \ they \ spend.\]

Quran (3:159) also called Prophet Muhammad to consult with other Muslims:
• The image of an ideal Islamic parliamentarian was made part of the constitution (Article 62 and 63);
• The State was to take steps to collect of ushr (an Islamic tax on agricultural produce), in addition to zakat, auqaf and mosques (Article 31);
• Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court were established (Article 203A to 203J).

The Eighth Amendment also legalized all Islam-inspired laws/ordinances that General Zia introduced from 1977 to 1985:

• Hudud Ordinance, 1979;
• Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980;
• Ehteram-e-Ramadan (Reverence of Ramadan) Ordinance, 1981;
• Amendments to various laws to enable interest-free banking system, the early 1980s;
• Qanun-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence) Order, 1984;
• Blasphemy laws made more stringent, with severe punishments, the 1980s;
• Legal discrimination against Ahmadiyyah increased.

So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely [upon Him].

By calling Parliament as Majlis-e-Shoora (meaning mutual consultation council), Zia tried to link Parliament with Islam.
After these changes, the 1973 Constitution unmistakably showed that Islam was the basis for Pakistan’s state nationalism. Two characteristics distinguished these constitutional and legal changes. First, these were all Islam-inspired. Secondly, almost all of the changes were based on Quran/Sunnah precepts and completely ignored the Indian Islamic culture that was a reality for close to a thousand years in Pakistan. Numerous administrative changes were also made to project this new national image. Thousands of prayer wardens were appointed to persuade people to say prayers (Nizam-e-Salat campaign in the early 1980s). This trend was also helped by the return of thousands of Pakistanis from the Gulf States, who were influenced by the puritanical Islam practiced in those states.

Despite Zia’s religious personality, the increased presence of Islam in the 1973 Constitution would not have been possible without the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan ‘jihad’. Millions of dollars were spent by the US and Saudi Arabia allowing the Pakistan Army to support hundreds of madrassas where religious and military training was provided to Muslims coming from all parts of the world. Islamic rhetoric, ideology, and culture were emphasized while local Muslim cultures, including Pakistani culture, were de- emphasized and considered unislamic. General Zia, being the one of the main beneficiaries of the war, wanted Pakistani society’s full support and thus wholeheartedly promoted this Islamic identity.

After Zia’s death in 1988, democracy returned and it became difficult to Islamize the constitution further. The consequences of the Zia’s Islamization drive and decade-old
Afghan war, which transformed into a civil war after the Soviet withdrawal (1989), were evident. The Pakistani state was unable to control the thousands of trained men, armed with advanced weapons and an exclusionist ideology, which considered rival groups infidels, from disturbing peace. Sectarian groups killed thousands of people in the 1990s.

Two constitutional amendments brought the constitution closer to Sharia failed. In the late 1980s, the Ninth Amendment to the constitution, attempting to make Sharia the supreme law of Pakistan, failed. In 1998, the Fifteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution tried to make the Holy Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of Pakistan but it also failed. However, the piecemeal inclusion of Sharia at a lower level continued to be sponsored by governments. In 1991, the Enforcement of Sharia Act was passed and the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance were passed by the Parliament in 1997.

The 1973 Constitution and the subsequent amendments demonstrate that Islam had become a major contributor to Pakistan’s state nationalism. The new identity prioritized the scriptural Islam over living Islam and global Islam over local, cultural Pakistani Islam. This trend was not limited to Pakistan and more or less all Muslim-majority countries were affected by the trend. In Pakistan, however, this global Islamic identity took a deeper hold than in other countries because of the prominent role played by Islam in the creation of Pakistan; the humiliating defeat of 1971; and the participation in Afghan War in the late 1970s and 1980s.
1999 Onwards

As compared to the 1956 and 1962 constitutions that survived for around two and a half and seven years respectively, the 1973 Constitution is still the supreme law of Pakistan after forty-two years. It was partly suspended or held in abeyance from 1977 to 1985 and from 1999 to 2002 during the martial laws but once the martial laws ended, it again became operational. It is still very popular and although some fringe groups have called for a new social contract (i.e. constitution), all the major political players publically avow their loyalty to it.

At the turn of the millennium, an important change happened in Pakistan. Since the early 1970s, as discussed above, the trend had been to Islamize the constitution, with more and more Islam-inspired amendments and laws. This trend changed after the October 1999 martial law. There were no more serious attempts to bring more Sharia in the constitution. If there was a trend, it was the gradual chipping away of Islam-inspired legislation introduced in the 1980s.

A brief look at the context is necessary to understand why the national elite stopped thinking of Islamization of the constitution (and laws) as a viable national strategy. The first change was the military coup of 1999 that brought General Musharraf to power. If General Zia, a practicing Muslim, personalized the increasingly Islamic Pakistani identity, General Musharraf, a Westernized Muslim who loved drinking, dancing and music, personalized the change in the opposite direction. If Zia’s ideal was the puritanical Saudi
Arabia, Musharraf wanted Pakistan to be more like secular Turkey and claimed Ataturk as his childhood hero and General Evren as his ideal (BBC 1999; Singh 2004). If Zia promoted Islamic identity and entangled Pakistan in foreign adventures, Musharraf developed the policy of ‘Pakistan First’. Addressing the Pakistani nation after September 11, he prioritized a Pakistani identity over a global Islamic identity and tried to dissuade Pakistanis from being concerned about others Muslims (i.e. Muslim-majority Afghanistan):

*Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary...Dear countrymen, at this moment, I am only concerned about Pakistan. As the commander-in-chief of Pakistan, I will defend Pakistan first of all...* (BBC 2001)

Another policy initiative was ‘Enlightened Moderation’ which as General Musharraf himself explained, was a two-pronged strategy:

*The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift. The second is for the West, and the United States in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim world...* (Musharraf 2004)

Musharraf started as an avowed modernist and took the following administrative measures to limit the Islamization of Pakistan and the global Islamic identity. Under his rule,
thousands of Taliban were killed or captured and military action was taken against militant groups that were fighting against the US and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. Some religious militant groups were banned and infiltration in Indian-controlled Kashmir was reduced. More madrassahs were registered and efforts were made to increase the state’s control over their curriculum.

However, in terms of the constitution, his legacy is mixed because of his alliance with the religious right. His personal desire to keep ruling as both President and Army Chief as long as he could and the military’s institutional needs made an alliance with democratic forces improbable. Therefore, to counter the opposition from mainstream democratic parties, he allied with religious parties and both his signature policies, Pakistan first and enlightened moderation, took a backseat. He indirectly supported religious parties in the 2002 elections by not allowing the two mainstream parties to participate in the elections freely. In return, by supporting the passage of the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment, religious parties not only indemnified all his illegal and unconstitutional actions during the martial law (1999-2002) but also allowed him to become president while still remaining Army Chief.

Despite this mullah-military alliance, Islam’s contribution to the Pakistan’s state nationalism decreased from around 2000 as is evident from the constitutional amendments. During the period from 2001 to 2015, five amendments were passed. The Nineteenth and

59 In 2002, the religious right won their largest share in votes cast in national elections in the history of Pakistan.
Twentieth Amendments are specifically focused on appointments of the superior judiciary and the conduct of free elections and were not related to the state-religion relationship. The following section will analyze the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments to the 1973 Constitution.

In the Seventeenth Amendment, hundreds of laws promulgated under Musharraf’s martial law were legalized. The ones dealing with Pakistan’s Muslim identity included the introduction of a joint electorate; an increase of seats reserved for women in the Parliament and provincial assemblies; and making of local government system, that gave one-third representation to women, part of the constitution. A joint electorate was a particularly important change as it integrated the electoral lists and allowed non-Muslims to vote for the same candidates that Muslims were voting for. Since 1985, under a separate electorate mechanism, non-Muslims voted for their own non-Muslim candidates, which prioritized Muslim identity over Pakistani identity. The change under the Seventeenth Amendment promoted and strengthened territorial state nationalism, instead of one based on religious identity.

After the Seventeenth Amendment, because of the strong presence of religious parties in the Parliament, no new constitutional amendment could be passed that decreased the role of Islam but Musharraf’s regime did pass some laws to undo the excesses of the 1980s. Women and minorities that had suffered during the last three decades were given more rights and discriminatory laws were discarded, making them feel a part of the Pakistani
nation. For example, in 2006, Women Protection Law was passed and the quota of women in the elite bureaucracy was increased from 5% to 10%. Minorities were given reserved seats in the local bodies. However, big changes could not be made. For example, Hudud or blasphemy laws remained on the books, despite Musharraf’s admission of their misuse (Musharraf 2006, 319, 336).

The same pattern continued after the restoration of democracy in 2008 as liberal parties won the election and formed the government. There were many small improvements and the government moved to protect human rights and accommodate women and minorities:

- Numerous pro-minorities measures/laws (Celebration of National Minorities Day 2009, reservation of 5% quota for minorities in public sector employment 2009, Supreme Court comprehensive judgment on minority rights 2014)

But major changes could not be made, however, as Islamist parties were still influential due to the support of military. These parties dubbed any deletion of Zia’s amendments as proof of subservience to the West. One of the biggest opportunity to change the constitutional character, which still bore the hallmarks of puritanical Zia, came in 2010.
The whole constitution was scrutinized in the run-up to the Eighteenth Amendment. Nothing was off the table. But while revolutionary steps were taken in other areas (e.g. center-province relations, parliamentary form of government, judicial appointments), few changes were made relating to state-Islam relations:

- ‘Freely’ was re-introduced in the following Objectives Resolution sentence related to the minorities, ‘Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures’;
- In Article 62, the mainly religious qualifications for a person to become a member of parliament or provincial assemblies were decreased or made circumscribed;
- Right to information, education and free trial were made fundamental constitutional rights (2010);
- In Article 63(h) that states the disqualification for a member parliament or provincial assembly were also narrowed down (Mir 2010).

Perhaps the biggest change in terms of the constitutional persona came after the December 26, 2014 Peshawar school attack in which the Taliban killed 132 school children. National outrage led to the revival of the death penalty and the Twenty-first Amendment to the constitution. This amendment has rightly been criticized as a return to quasi-military rule or a soft coup or militarization of the constitution (Yousaf 2015, Boone 2015, and Khan 2015). Pakistan, which has been ruled by generals for almost half of its history, can ill afford transferring more powers to the military no matter how exceptional the circumstances (Wolf 2015, Dawn 2015, Walsh 2015, and Parera 2015). The one saving
grace was the addition of a sunset clause that would make this amendment expire in two years.

However, the Twenty-first Amendment is also the first time Muslim extremism, terrorism, and militancy has been acknowledged in the constitution. Previously, it was anathema to link Muslims with extremism or terrorism. The Taliban’s savagery and declarations that they would do even more inhuman and barbaric acts made stopping this amendment impossible. The religious right’s hold on Pakistani identity was breached in a major way and religious parties were up in arms against it, but they failed (Hughes 2015, Express Tribune 2015, and Aabtak.tv 2015). The noticeable references to Muslim militancy and terrorism in the amendment acknowledged the separation of Pakistani Muslim identity and other Muslim identities, thus showing strength of the movement towards territorial nationalism that started under Musharraf.

Under the Twenty-first Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, it is clearly stated that the changes in the Article 175 were specifically meant for groups/individuals, ‘who claims, or is known, to belong to any terrorist group or organization using the name of religion or a sect.’ Moreover, the changes in the Pakistan Army Act also target religious militancy specifically. The two new sub-clauses added to Section 2(1)d clearly lay down that these amendments were only to be used against people ‘claiming or are known to belong to any terrorist group or organisation using the name of religion or a sect’ and only with the permission of the Federal Government (Government of Pakistan 2015a; 2015b).
The current period, as the above discussion shows, has resulted in a lessening of Islam’s contribution to Pakistan’s state nationalism. The trend of the last three decades of the 20th century when different governments were trying to increase Islamization of constitution ended at the dawn of the millennium. Losing more than fifty thousand Pakistanis to Muslim militant groups during the last decade has a lasting effect on Pakistani state nationalism and 1973 Constitution shows this change, particularly after the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment in 2015.

To end this section, a table showing a comparison of Islamic provisions in three Pakistani constitutions is given below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 13: Comparison of Religion-related clauses of Three Pakistani Constitutions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Republic and its Territories (and name)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1956 Constitution</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(1) Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and is hereinafter referred to as Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islam to be State religion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Objectives Resolution to form part of substantive provisions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safeguards</strong></td>
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as to educational institutions in respect of religion, etc.

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<tr>
<th>as to educational institutions in respect of religion, etc.</th>
<th>educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any educational institution</td>
<td>educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination against any community in the granting of exemption or concession in relation to taxation.</td>
<td>educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Subject to law, (a) no religious community or</td>
<td>educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.</td>
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<tr>
<td>maintained wholly by that community or denomination. (3) No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste, or place of birth: Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent any public authority from making provision for the advancement of any socially or educationally any educational institution maintained wholly by that community or denomination. (3) No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste, or place of birth. (4) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination against any community in the granting of exemption or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination; and (b) No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste or place of birth. (4) Nothing in this Article shall prevent any public authority from making provision</td>
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backward class of citizens.

(4) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination against any community in the granting of exemption or concession in relation to taxation.

(5) Every religious community or denomination shall have the right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its own choice, and the State shall not deny recognition to any such institution on the ground only that the management – of such institution vests in that community or denomination.

for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of citizens.
any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons.

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<tr>
<th>Non-discrimination</th>
<th>14(1) In respect of access to places of public entertainment or resort, not intended for religious purposes only, there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex or place of birth.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In respect of access to public places</td>
<td>16. In respect of access to places of public entertainment or resort, not intended for religious purposes only, there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>26. 1) In respect of access to places of public entertainment or resort not intended for religious purposes only, there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safeguard against discrimination in services</th>
<th>Special provision for women.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17(1) No citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth:</td>
<td>27 (1) No citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth:</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions.</th>
<th>18. Subject to law, public order and morality- (a) every citizen has the right to profess, practise and</th>
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<td></td>
<td>10. Subject to law, public order and morality- (a) every citizen has the right to profess, practice and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>20. Subject to law, public order and morality,- (a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particular religion</td>
<td>21. No person shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own.</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of Muslim unity and</td>
<td>24. The State shall endeavour to strengthen the bonds</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of Islamic principles</td>
<td>25(1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles of Islamic unity, to promote international peace and security, to foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations, and to encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The State shall endeavour, as respects the Muslims of Pakistan,-
(a) to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
(b) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran compulsory;
(c) to promote unity and the observance of Islamic moral standards; and

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Holy Quran and Sunnah.</th>
<th>fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam, and should be provided with facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to those principles and concepts.</th>
<th>principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah;</td>
<td>(a) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language and to secure correct and exact printing and publishing of the Holy Quran;</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
(d) to secure the proper organization of zakat, wakfs and mosques.

(b) to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards; and

(c) to secure the proper organisation of zakat, ushr, auqaf and mosques.

<p>| Parochial and other similar prejudices to be discouraged | 26. The State shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices amongst the citizens. | 2. Parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices amongst the citizens should be discouraged. | 33. The State shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens. |
| Protection of minorities | 27. The State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the minorities, including their due representation in the | 3. The legitimate rights and interests of the minorities should be safeguarded, and the members of minorities should be given due | 36. The State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Federal and Provincial Services</th>
<th>opportunity to enter the service of Pakistan.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles of social uplift</strong></td>
<td>28. The State shall endeavour to--- (f) prevent the consumption of alcoholic liquor otherwise than for medicinal and, in the case of non-Muslims, religious purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. The consumption of alcoholic liquor (except for medicinal purposes and, in the case of non-Muslims, for religious purposes) should be discouraged.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37. The State shall- (h) prevent the consumption of alcoholic liquor otherwise than for medicinal and, in the case of non-Muslims, religious purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion of social and economic well-being of the people</strong></td>
<td>29. The State shall endeavour to- (a) secure the well-being of the people, irrespective of caste, creed or race, by raising the standard of living of the common man;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. The well-being of the people, irrespective of caste, creed or race, should be secured- (a) by raising the standard of living of the common man;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38. The State shall- (a) secure the well-being of the people, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, by raising their standard of living, by preventing the concentration of wealth and means of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the common man, by 
preventing the 
concentration of 
wealth and means of 
production and 
distribution in the 
hands of a few to the 
detriment of the 
interest of the 
common man, and by 
ensuring equitable 
adjustment of rights 
between employers 
and employees, and 
landlords and tenants; 
(f) eliminate riba as early as possible.

(b) by preventing 
the undue 
concentration of 
wealth and means of 
production and 
distribution in the 
hands of a few, to 
the detriment of the 
interest of the 
common man; and 
(c) by ensuring an 
equitable 
adjustment of rights 
between employers 
and employees and 
between landlords 
and tenants.

18. Riba (Usury) should be 
eliminated
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The President</strong></th>
<th>32 (2)</th>
<th>10. A person shall not be elected as President unless-(a) he is a Muslim;</th>
<th>41(2) A person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim of not less than forty-five years of age and is qualified to be elected as member of the National Assembly.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notwithstanding anything in Part II, a person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim;</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Majlis-e-Shoora</strong> (Parliament)</td>
<td></td>
<td>42. Before entering upon office, the President shall make before the Chief Justice of Pakistan oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule.</td>
<td>50. There shall be a Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) of Pakistan consisting of the President and two Houses to be known respectively as the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Qualifications for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) | National Assembly and the Senate. | 62(1) A person shall not be qualified to be elected or chosen as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) unless—
(d) he is of good character and is not commonly known as one who violates Islamic Injunctions;
(e) he has adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings and practices obligatory duties prescribed by Islam as well as abstains from major sins;
2) The disqualifications specified in paragraphs |
(d) and (e) shall not apply to a person who is a non-Muslim, but such a person shall have good moral reputation;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Cabinet</th>
<th>91(3) After the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, the National Assembly shall, to the exclusion of any other business, proceed to elect without debate one of its Muslim members to be the Prime Minister.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Federal Shariat Court</td>
<td>203 (C) (1) There shall be constituted for the purposes of this Chapter a court to be called the Federal Shariat Court.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) The Court shall consist of not more than eight Muslim Judges, including the Chief Justice, to be appointed by the President in accordance with Article 175A.

(3) The Chief Justice shall be a person who is, or has been, or is qualified, to be, a Judge of the Supreme Court or who is or has been a permanent Judge of a High Court.

(3A) Of the Judges, not more than four shall be persons each one of whom is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of a High Court.
and not more than three shall be ulama having at least fifteen years’ experience in Islamic law, research or instruction.

| **Powers, Jurisdiction and Functions of the Court** |  | 203D (1) The Court may, either of its own motion or on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet |
(PBUH), hereinafter referred to as the Injunctions of Islam.

(2) If the Court decides that any law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, it shall set out in its decision:

(a) the reasons for its holding that opinion; and

(b) the extent to which such law or provision is so repugnant; and specify the day on which the decision shall take effect:

Provided that no such decision shall be deemed to take effect.
before the expiration of the period within which an appeal therefrom may be preferred to the Supreme Court or, where an appeal has been so preferred, before the disposal of such appeal.

(3) If any law or provision of law is held by the Court to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam,-

(a) the President in the case of a law with respect to a matter in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List, or the Governor in the case of a law with respect to a
matter not enumerated in either of those Lists, shall take steps to amend the law so as to bring such law or provision into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam; and
(b) such law or provision shall, to the extent to which it is held to be so repugnant, cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of the Court takes effect.

Powers and Procedure of the Court

203E. (4) A party to any proceedings before the Court under clause (1) of
Article 203D may be represented by a legal practitioner who is a Muslim and has been enrolled as an advocate of a High Court for a period of not less than five years or as an advocate of the Supreme Court or by a jurisconsult selected by the party from out of a panel of jurisconsults maintained by the Court for the purpose.

(5) For being eligible to have his name borne on the panel of jurisconsults referred to in clause (4), a person shall be an Aalim who, in the opinion of the
Court, is well-versed in Shariat.

(6) A legal practitioner or jurisconsult representing a party before the Court shall not plead for the party but shall state, expound and interpret the Injunctions of Islam relevant to the proceedings so far as may be known to him and submit to the Court a written statement of his interpretation of such Injunctions of Islam.

(7) The Court may invite any person in Pakistan or abroad whom the Court
considers to be well-versed in Islamic law to appear before it and render such assistance as may be required of him.

(8) No court fee shall be payable in respect of any petition or application made to the Court under Article 203D.

(9) The Court shall have power to review any decision given or order made by it.

| Appeal to Supreme Court | 203F (3) For the purpose of the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by this Article, there shall be constituted in the |
Supreme Court a Bench to be called the Shariat Appellate Bench and consisting of,
(a) three Muslim Judges of the Supreme Court; and 
(b) not more than two Ulema to be appointed by the President to attend sittings of the Bench as ad-hoc members thereof from amongst the Judges of the Federal Shariat Court or from out of a panel of Ulema to be drawn up by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization for Islamic research and instruction</th>
<th>197(1) The President shall set up an organization for Islamic research and instruction in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.</th>
<th>207(1) There shall be an organization to be known as Islamic Research Institute, which shall be established by the President. (2) The function of the Institute shall be to undertake Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisions relating to the Holy Quran and Sunnah</td>
<td>Constitution, form part of the Federal Consolidated Fund.</td>
<td>227(1) All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions. Explanation:- In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression &quot;Quran and Sunnah&quot; shall mean the</td>
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<tr>
<td>198.(1) No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam, and existing law shall be brought into conformity with such Injunctions. (2) Effect shall be given to the provisions of clause (1) only in the manner provided in clause (3).</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3) Within one year of the Constitution Day, the President shall appoint a Commission -
(a) to make recommendations -
(i) as to the measures for bringing existing law into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam, and
(ii) as to the stages by which such measures should be brought into effect; and
(b) to compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of the National and Provincial Assemblies, such Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.

(2) Effect shall be given to the provisions of clause (1) only in the manner provided in this Part.

(3) Nothing in this Part shall affect the personal laws of non-Muslim citizens or their status as citizens.
Injunctions of Islam as can be given legislative effect.

The Commission shall submit its final report within five years of its appointment, and may submit any interim report earlier. The report, whether interim or final, shall be laid before the National Assembly within six months of its receipt, and the Assembly after considering the report shall enact laws in respect thereof.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall affect the personal laws of non-Muslim citizens, or their status as citizens, or any provision of the Constitution.

Explanation.-In the application of this Article to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression "Quran and Sunnah" shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Council of Islamic</th>
<th>199. There shall be an Advisory</th>
<th>228(1) There shall be constituted within a period of ninety days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Ideology** | Council of Islamic Ideology.  
200. The Council shall consist of such number of members, being not less than five and not more than twelve, as the President may determine.  
201.- (1) Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President on such terms and conditions as the President may determine.  
(2) The Islamic Council shall consist of such members, being not less than eight and not more than twenty, as the President may appoint from amongst persons having knowledge of the principles and philosophy of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, or understanding of the economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Pakistan. |
201(2) The President shall, in selecting a person for appointment to the Council, have regard to the person's understanding and appreciation of Islam and of the economic, political, legal and administrative problems of Pakistan.

(3) While appointing members of the Islamic Council the President shall ensure that-

(a) so far as practicable various schools of thought are represented in the Council;

(b) not less than two of the members are persons each of whom is, or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court;

(c) not less than 158\[one-third]\ of the members are persons each of whom has been engaged, for a period of not less than fifteen years, in Islamic
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions of Council</th>
<th>204(1) The functions of the Council shall be-</th>
<th>230(1) The functions of the Islamic Council shall be-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (a) to make recommendations to the Central Government and the Provincial Governments as to means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam [research or instruction; and (d) at least one member is a woman.]
| (a) to make recommendations to Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam [research or instruction; and (d) at least one member is a woman.]
|
and to examine all laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963, with a view to bringing them into conformity with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah; 

(b) to advise a House, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any question referred to the Council as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam; 

(c) to make recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures should be brought into effect; and
the Council under Article 8, that is to say, a question as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.]

(d) to compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies, such Injunctions of Islam as can be given legislative effect.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rules of Procedure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>205 (2) The Council shall, not later than the fifteenth day of January in each year, prepare a report in regard to its proceedings during the year ending on the previous thirty-first day of December,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230(4) The Islamic Council shall submit its final report within seven years of its appointment, and shall submit an annual interim report. The report, whether interim or final, shall be laid for discussion before both Houses and each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and submit the same to the President, who shall cause it to be laid before the National Assembly.

| Province Assembly within six months of its receipt, and Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Assembly, after considering the report, shall enact laws in respect thereof within a period of two years of the final report. |
Conclusion

Constitutions are an important way to study state nationalisms and understand Islam's contribution to them. In the preceding discussion, in addition to some smaller constitutional documents, three constitutions each of Turkey and Pakistan were analyzed in terms of Islamic/secular provisions. Table 12 then presented the comparison of provisions related to religion or secularism in the three constitutions of Turkey (1924 Constitution, 1961 Constitution and 1982 Constitution) to demonstrate how these provisions changed across the eras. Table 13 presented a similar comparison of the provisions for the three constitutions of Pakistan (1956 Constitution, 1962 Constitution and 1973 Constitution). The variations in the number and type of constitutional provisions related to religion/secularism demonstrated the ebb and flow of Islam's role in the state nationalisms of these countries.

Table 14: Turkish Constitutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitution</th>
<th>Broad Outlook</th>
<th>State-Religion Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924 Constitution</td>
<td>Partially Liberal</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 Constitution</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Constitution</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Turkish constitutions. First, all Turkish constitutions were drafted and imposed by the elite without much popular input (Barkey and Kadioglu 2011). The first constitution was adopted under a single party regime, with military figures still dominant. The second constitution was crafted in 1960-1, again under the guidance of the Turkish military. Finally, the constitution-making process of the 1982 Constitution was also dominated by the military junta. The Turkish elite (mainly the military but also the higher levels of the judiciary, bureaucracy and intelligentsia) tried to use these constitutions to force the Turkish society to move closer to the West and away from its traditional ways and norms. Nothing explains the situation more clearly than the Kemalist slogan, ‘for the people, despite the people’ (Taspinar 2011).

Second, in matters of religion, each Turkish constitution became more restrictive than the one before it. The secular elite’s distrust of future legislators increased with time as they

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60 Each new constitution was more restrictive than the previous one with respect to protecting and entrenching secularism. The first hurdle was the amendment process. The amendment process in the 1923 Constitution was simple. Secularism could have been omitted from the constitution, if one-third of the GNA members had proposed an amendment (to that effect) and two-thirds of the legislators approved the amendment. In the 1961 Constitution, the amendment process was made more difficult. One-third of each house of the GNA could propose an amendment and had to obtain support from two-thirds of the membership of each house. This was difficult to achieve because the Senate was filled with people that were either part of the elite or identified with the elite, specifically:

- All members of National Unity Committee (military officers that led the 1960 coup) were made lifetime members;
- All former Presidents were also lifetime members; and
- Ten percent of the membership was nominated by the President.

In the 1982 Constitution, amending the secularism principle was made impossible by making it part of the irrevocable provisions under Article 4. No future parliament could amend the Constitution even if all the members of the Assembly want a specific amendment. The second hurdle was the Constitutional Court that was first established in the 1961 Constitution and retained in the 1982 Constitution. If these two
gradually realized that parties favoring secularism (mainly the CHP) were not always going to win elections. So, they opted for increasingly restrictive constitutions. The 1961 Constitution was more restrictive than the 1924 Constitution and the current 1982 Constitution is the most restrictive Turkish constitution. Therefore, enacting amendments was made extremely difficult, particularly amending constitutional provisions relating to secularism.

With each subsequent constitution, there was increasing emphasis on secularism in Turkey but paradoxically the role of the Diyanet and religious education also expanded. Islam had a large role in the Turkish state nationalism at the start of the Republic and this was visible in the 1924 Constitution where Islam was the state religion and there were also other references to Islam. Gradually, Ataturk and his close followers were able to decrease Islam’s role in state nationalism. By 1927, all references relating to Islam, including the clause making Islam the state religion, were removed from the Constitution. Islam’s role in state nationalism diminished further in 1937 when a constitutional amendment made Turkey a secular republic. The 1961 Constitution further entrenched secularism by declaring Turkey a secular republic and by making the amendment process difficult so that popular governments, even after winning elections, cannot bring Islam back into the constitution. Moreover, eight laws passed in the 1920s and 1930s, which were part of Ataturk’s secularizing reforms, were also made part of the constitution, thus making it hard

hurdles failed to save secularism, there was the unconstitutional hurdle of the threat of a military coup and this threat was used in 1997.
to change them. There were two exception to Islam’s diminishing role. First, Diyanet became a constitutional body in 1961, increasing its legitimacy and influence. Second, constitution allowed religious (Islamic) education in public schools. Under the 1982 Constitution, Turkey remained a secular republic and secularism was added to the duties of the Diyanet as well as to the oaths of President and the GNA members. But Islam’s contribution to state nationalism was also evident as the Constitution further increased Diyanet’s role and also made religious education mandatory in schools. Turkish state started supporting Islam publically, albeit while still claiming to be a secular state.

Since the 1980s, Islam's role in state nationalism has increased but there has not been many amendments in the constitution that are related to Islam. Perhaps, with the rise of the AKP, secularists had been especially watchful. Former President Ahmet Sezer (2000-07) and Constitutional Court both rejected many amendments proposed by the AKP. After 2010 referendum, the AKP could have amended the constitution but the interest shifted to drafting a new constitution.

There is currently an ardent desire across the political spectrum to come up with a new constitution that is manifestation of the popular will. All important political parties agree and have participated in discussions to come up with a new constitution but agreement has been difficult. It appears that after winning the November 2015 elections, the AKP will be able to increase Islam’s importance in the constitution, indicating Islam’s increasing role in Turkish state nationalism. However, it is difficult to predict as President Erdogan might
be ready to compromise on Islam to make his presidential system more palatable to the opposition parties and the secular sections of Turkish society.

In contrast to Turkey, Islam's role in state nationalism has increased for most part of Pakistan’s history. Each constitution was more Islamic than the previous one. The main reasons were Islam’s role in the creation of Pakistan; the constant tussle with (Hindu) India and its role in the loss of East Pakistan; the Afghan Liberation War (1979-89); and the alliance of the Pakistan military with the religious right. However, at the turn of the millennium, there was a change of course. Efforts to increase Islamic provisions in the constitution decreased significantly. Slowly, territorial state nationalism is gaining ground over religious state nationalism. Implementing Sharia lost its prominence as one of the viable policy options and many Islam-inspired constitutional clauses and laws were either restricted or removed. The legal discrimination against women and minorities, that was earlier increasing, is now decreasing.\(^{61}\) However, these changes might not be construed as an evidence of Islam not being an important part of Pakistani state nationalism. Islam's role in state nationalism is still important but it has shown some decline since 1999, particularly after 2014.

Moreover, as in the case of Turkey, constitutions imposed by elite were more common in Pakistan than constitutions that have a significant input from the people. During the initial period (the late 1940s to late 1960s), there was a mistrust between the elite and the

\(^{61}\) However, social discrimination has not decreased.
populace. Only 1973 Constitution, which was made by the first directly-elected legislature, without any voting restrictions, can be considered the outcome of popular will. Islamic provisions increased in both 1956 and 1973 Constitutions, demonstrating the increasing role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism. There was slight hiccup when the original 1962 Constitution was promulgated and the Islamic provisions were watered down and decreased. As discussed above, this change was short lived and, within a year, the Islamic provisions were restored.

Finally, in contrast to the Turkish constitutional history, in terms of the church-state relationship, Pakistani constitutions moved from being permissive to being restrictive. Although, the Objectives Resolution was the preamble of both 1956 and 1962 constitutions and there were many Islamic provisions, it was still possible to either increase or decrease Islam’s role in the constitution. One example of this permissiveness was the first amendment in the 1962 Constitution which restored most of the Islamic provisions. In the 1973 Constitution, Islam became the state religion and later on, the Objectives Resolution was made a substantive part of the Constitution, making the constitution restrictive in terms of the church-state relationship.

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62 Another evidence of this mistrust was the constant avoidance of direct elections by the ruling elite during the first two decades.
Table 15: Pakistani Constitutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitution</th>
<th>Broad Outlook</th>
<th>State-Religion Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956 Constitution</td>
<td>Partially Liberal</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 Constitution</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 Constitution</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main difference between the Pakistani and Turkish constitutional debates regarding state-religion relations is that in Turkey such debates discuss what kind of secularism the country should have. In the case of Pakistan, such debates revolve around the question of the kind of Islamic polity Pakistan should be. The objective of the debates in both countries is balancing Islam and secularism but Turkey and Pakistan are close to opposite ends of the Islam-secularism spectrum.

Turkey’s constitutional history demonstrates an entrenched state secularism. Islam’s role is increasing but it still low. Pakistan’s constitutional history an entrenched religious nationalism. There has been some movement to decrease Islam’s role during the last fifteen years but this movement is still in its infancy.

This concludes the analysis of one of the indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism i.e. constitutional provisions relating to religion. The next two chapters will continue our
examination of the indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism. Chapter III will analyze national symbols while chapter IV will focus on images on banknotes.
Chapter III

NATIONAL SYMBOLS
Introduction

National symbols are important markers of a nation. National anthems and national flags, two of the most important national symbols, evoke deep emotions and incite passions in the people who normally would not consider themselves very emotional or patriotic. Everyone has seen athletes and other sportsmen, usually the epitome of masculinity, cry on hearing their national anthem and seeing their national flag go up in the Olympic ceremonies. The recursive, subliminal indoctrination that these symbols provide makes them not only depictions of state nationalism but also creators of state nationalism (Geisler 2005).

National symbols define nations and make them visible. They are required because nations had to be personified and seen before they are loved (Walzer 1967). National symbols are primary reminders of national history, one’s national duties and obligations, and the primacy of national identity over other identities and, therefore, stimulate state nationalism. National symbols are thus not inferior to the real markers of national identity but are equally important, if not more, to the nation-building process (Elgenius 2011). Geisler explains why these symbols are significant part of state nationalism and nation-building effort.

Yet national symbols perform an important function not only as catalysts for the formation and maintenance of national identity. They take on a particularly crucial importance in fusing a nation to a state. For especially in those cases where the territorial boundaries of
the state do not correspond to the geographic outlines of the ancestral “homeland” claimed by a nation, or where a state is created without the ideological support structure of a nation, national symbols are charged with the difficult task of creating a nation. (Geisler 2005)

Flags, anthems and mottos are recognized as icons of a nation’s identity, both inside the nation and internationally. Flags and anthems stir emotions across nations as they are considered embodiment of nation’s history and pride. National mottos remind of long-standing national myths and also create new ones, keeping in view the requirements of the nation. Similarly, national holidays are important national symbols. If flags and anthems are visual and auditory symbols of a nation, national holidays are temporal symbols of state nationalism. The selection of these holidays, particularly new holidays, inform us how the state wants to influence how the nation views itself. As all these symbols are selected and controlled by the state, the nationalism they project is state nationalism. These symbols inform us who is part of the nation according to the state elite and what they think are the markers of the national identity. One of the main reasons of approval of a national holiday in honor of Martin Luther King, Jr. by the US national elite was certainly to reassure African-Americans that they are a valued part of the nation.

Since this dissertation is analyzing Islam's role in state nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan, there are perhaps few better ways than to examine and unpack the national symbols of these
countries. In this chapter, following symbols of Turkey and Pakistan would be evaluated for their religious content:

- National emblems and anthems;
- National languages and mottos of military;
- National and presidential flags;
- National mosques;
- National holidays and capitals, etc.

As this dissertation is about tracing the variation in Islam’s role in state nationalism, mostly those national symbols are chosen that have experienced some alterations so that the changes in state nationalism, in relation to Islam, becomes apparent. Of course, the absence of change in national symbols does not mean that state nationalism did not change. It is quite possible that the same symbol can denote different state nationalisms in different eras. American Star-Spangled Banner, French Tri-color and British Union Jack represent different types of state nationalisms now than what they represented in the 18th or 19th centuries. As discussed below, Turkish flag also represented different state nationalisms in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The following section will first analyze Turkish national symbols and then Pakistani national symbols to ascertain changes in Islam’s role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalisms respectively. But symbols can be interpreted in many different ways even in the same period. The same symbol can result in completely opposite emotions. As the focus
is on state nationalism, nationalism that the state elite want to promote, the changes in state symbols would be examined keeping in view the outlooks and opinions of the ruling elite in Turkey and Pakistan.
TURKISH NATIONAL SYMBOLS

This section is also divided into two parts. The first part is the tale of two Turkish anthems that is linked with Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism. The second part looks at other Turkish national symbols to evaluate Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism during the last hundred years.

The Two Turkish Anthems

The following discussion on two Turkish anthems shows the ebb and flow of Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism. The national anthem and the tenth anniversary anthem – because of their content, authors, and the year/era in which they were written – represent two extremes of Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism.

The Early 1920s to Late 1970s

A country's national anthem is one of the most important symbols of a nation. In 1921, Turkey adopted the Istiklal Marsi (IM) as its national anthem, even before it was formally established as a nation. It is still Turkey’s national anthem. There are three ways IM can be used to explore the changing relationship of Islam and Turkish state nationalism. First, as the IM has ten stanzas and the religious content is more prominent in the later stanzas, one can analyze on the importance given to these later stanzas in official events. Second, as the author of the IM was an Islamic intellectual/academic, one can investigate the
importance given to him to gauge the relationship between Islam and state nationalism. Finally, as another anthem, which is more secular and has a semi-official status, has contested or competed with the IM since 1933, one can examine how much importance this rival anthem is given. This rival anthem is called the Tenth Anniversary Anthem as it celebrates the first ten years of Turkey as a nation. The following discussion uses the above methods to tell the story of Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism.

The IM was written by Mehmet Ali Ersoy and approved by the Grand National Assembly as the Turkish national anthem on 12 March 1921. Ersoy (1873-1936) was a religious man and more a believer in Ummah (Islamic/Muslim nationalism) than in Turkish nationalism based on ethnolinguistic affinities. Nationalism for him was devil’s way of destroying Muslims. Following is a translated excerpt from one of the sermons he gave in a mosque towards the end of First World War:

*I do not understand how, instead of being firmly united by Islam, the idea of the separatism entered into your mind? Is it the devil that put the idea of nationalism in your mind? Nationalism is nothing but an earthquake that would undermine and destroy the Islamic*

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63 Tenth anniversary anthem was written in 1933, at the height of assertive secularism in Turkey. As compared to the national anthem, this anthem is devoid of any religious content so many secular Turks take it as a symbol of secularism as the later discussion would demonstrate.

64 Istiklal Marsi means independence march.

65 There was contest held to write the national anthem and a prize of five hundred pounds was announced. Ersoy refused to enter the contest because he felt that it was a patriotic duty and so monetary inducement was not right. However, on the insistence of the Education Minister Suphi, he wrote the IM and it was adopted amid applause and standing ovation by the GNA members. Later, Ersoy refused the prize and asked it to be used for the independence war veterans’ welfare.
unity which has kept together so many ethnicities and nations so different from each other. To forget this reality is an eternal mistake...The most recent policy, Turkism is also condemned to failure. The Creator made all of you members of a single family. If you continue with this mentality and nurture ethnic nationalism you will your country to foreigners. (Seyhun 2014, 25)

Ersoy wholeheartedly supported the Turkish War of Independence and the Turkish Republic. However, as Ataturk’s secularist and authoritarian policies increased, Ersoy found it difficult to live in Turkey. He became a fierce critic of these policies and went into exile in Egypt in the early 1920s, permanently settling in there in 1926. Before leaving Turkey, he even destroyed the manuscript of his translation of the Quran because he became afraid that Ataturk’s regime would use his Turkish translation to promote secularism (Seyhun 2014, 20; Arslanbenzer 2015). Ersoy came back to Turkey when he was very ill and died, a few month after his return, in December 1936. There was no official funeral and no higher official attended his funeral (Aymali 2014).

The IM clearly showed the Islamic inclinations of Ersoy. The IM is an Islamic, not a Turkish or a Turkic, battle cry. There are many words in the IM that use Islamic terminology. For instance, Ersoy utilizes the following religious terms in the IM: God-worshipping nation, thousands that lie beneath without shrouds,66 shaheed (Muslim

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66 According to Muslim traditions, all dead Muslims are to be washed up and covered in a shroud before funeral prayers and then buried. Only martyrs are exempt from these rules because of their exalted status. They are buried in the clothes they are wearing and no funeral prayers are offered.
martyr), cennet (name of paradise in the Quran), na-mehrim (stranger, outsider), etc. The eighth and ninth stanzas of the ten stanza anthem are filled with Islamic imaginary.

O Lord, the sole wish of my heart is that,
No infidel’s hand should touch the bosom of my temple.
These adhans, the shahadah of which is the base of the religion,
Shall sound loud over my eternal homeland.

Then my tombstone - if there is one - will a thousand times touch its forehead on earth\(^{67}\) in ecstasy,
O Lord, tears of blood flowing out of my every wound,
My corpse will gush out from the earth like a spirit,
And then, my head will perhaps rise and reach the heavens.

The ‘other’ – rival or enemy – in this battle-cry is the West as the fourth stanza demonstrates without any doubt:

The lands of the of the West may be armored with walls of steel,
But I have borders guarded by the mighty chest of a believer.
Recognize your innate strength! And think: how can this fiery faith ever be killed,
By that battered, single-toothed monster you call "civilization"?

\(^{67}\) Like in Islamic daily prayers.
A comparison of the IM with the tenth anniversary anthem, Onuncu Yi Marsi (OYM), highlights the religious/Islamic nationalism of the IM and the Turkish (secular) nationalism of the OYM. The OYM, which is often used in official and unofficial gatherings in place of/or with the national anthem, was written by Faruk Camlibel and Behcet Caglar. The first six lines of the OYM are reproduced below:

We ended every war proud in the last ten years
We created 15 million youth of all ages in ten years
The whole world respects our leader and commander-in-chief
We knitted all four corners of the motherland with railroad tracks

We are Turks of the Republic; our chest is a bronze shield
The Turk does not stop; the Turk is at the front. Forward Turk! (Ozyurek 2006, 168)

In contrast to the IM, the emphasis in the OYM is on Turks, on Ataturk, and on this world. The OYM refers to worldly achievements such as the railroad network, a large population and the creation of an egalitarian, united and classless society after Turkey became

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68 Onuncu Yi Marsi means tenth year march.
69 Camlibel was a teacher and later became a deputy of the Democrat Party. After serving for 14 years in GNA, he was imprisoned for around 15 month in the wake of 1960 coup. He left politics after that and died in 1973 (Turner 2006). Trained as an engineer, Caglar was sent to London by Ataturk to study after he became famous because of the tenth anniversary anthem. He also served in the GNA in the 1940s. He was a staunch Kemalist and resigned in 1949 when the Republican Party moved away from strict secularism. He later served as President of the Constituent Assembly in 1961 after the 1960 coup. He died in 1969 (ESA 2011). So, authors of Onuncu Yi Marsi showed opposite political leanings, one became a member of a center-right party and the other became a strict secularist.
independent. It rejoices in the fact that Ataturk and Turkishness is admired by the world. While the main theme of the IM national anthem is fighting and sacrificing, the OYM is mainly about growth, development and moving forward.\footnote{It is not totally devoid of militaristic content e.g. reference to Ataturk as the Commander-in-Chief and military command ‘Forward Turk’.} The refrain (last two lines above) refers to ‘Turk’ four times and is itself repeated four times, thus emphasizing the ethnolinguistic nature of the state.

Zurcher (2008) underscores the differences between the IM and the Ataturk’s tenth anniversary speech, which, like the OYM, was devoid of any religious content and also praised the Western civilization. It is clear from reading the following excerpt that although the IM was national anthem, it did not represent the Turkish state of the 1930s:

*Earlier we saw how Ataturk’s 1933 speech symbolized the ambition of the Turkish elite to become part of European civilization. It is not difficult, however, to come up with an equally important historical text that represents the image of the West as a threat...This text, perhaps surprisingly, is that of the national anthem of the Republic of Turkey...Ataturk’s exalted civilization, the West, is in Akif’s view simultaneously an aggressive force that had invaded the fatherland and a sham that is no match to the religious fervor of the Turks. The enormous difference can be attributed to the different circumstances in which the two texts came into being.* (Zurcher 2008, 98-100)
In this context, it is not difficult to understand why OYM soon became greatly loved and was sometimes sung along with the national anthem on national days and recognized as a Republican symbol (Yılmaz 2013, 189; Ozyurek 2006, 168). Meanwhile, only the first two stanzas of the IM were sung at state gatherings, probably because they did not have religious references and overtones.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

The tension between the two anthems continued through the 1950s to 1970s. The center-right democratic governments generally preferred the IM, as compared to the CHP or military-led governments. A major change came in the 1980s when the Turkish-Islamic synthesis became the state’s ideology and Turkish military accepted Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism. After the 1980 coup, the military junta ordered that every classroom should have Ataturk’s picture, his speech to the youth, and the IM and every student in the primary schools had to memorize the IM (Dede 2008, 96-120).71 This change was the symbolic representation of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Significantly, all ten stanzas of the national anthem were displayed in the classrooms and had to be memorized. Another sign of the rehabilitation of the (whole) IM and its religious imagery, was the choice of Ersoy’s portrait and the anthem to grace the 100 Lira banknote issued in 1983.

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71 Though the IM was full of Islamic references, a significant portion of right-wing voters considered it not Islamic enough. In September 1980, at a rally of Islamic-oriented party, the National Salvation Party (MSP), participants jeered when the IM was played.
In the 1990s, when the Refah Party became increasingly popular, it embraced the IM to show it accepted state’s symbols and ideology. As state prioritized the IM and other Islamic symbols and Islamic-oriented parties accepted them, the secularists revived the OYM. Singing and playing the OYM became fashionable in the urban areas and young people danced on its disco versions.

When the AKP won the election in November 2002, singing OYM in demonstrations again became popular among secularists. The OYM had become such a symbol of secularism and opposition to mixing of religion and politics that Prime Minister Erdogan did not take singing of the OYM as a neutral act. He criticized those who were singing the OYM and claimed that he is doing more to make Turkey modern, developed and connected through rail networks (as referred in the OYM) than them. Today’s Zaman reported this criticism in the following way. It is important to note that the newspaper refers to the OYM as the national anthem:

*Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan commented yesterday that modernism and becoming contemporary could not be achieved merely by singing the “10th Year Anthem.” Referring to a line from Turkey's national anthem, Erdogan said: “It cannot be achieved by the words ‘to weave iron nets all over the country.’ It was a goal. We are realizing that*

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72 An Islamic-oriented party of the 1990s, the successor of the MSP, also led by Necmettin Erbakan. In its 1996 party congress, the IM was sang by all participants (Hurriyet Daily News 1996).

73 During the protests against the Refah government (1997-8), the OYM was played regularly as a way to show aversion to political Islam and love of secularism. After Refah Party government was forced to resign and the party was banned, OYM lost its popularity (Ozyurek 2006, 168-175).
goal. We proved that with the subway [construction] in Istanbul. With God's help, we will do that in Turkey.” (Today’s Zaman 2003)

The AKP did not stop the OYM from being used in state events but its preference for IM was obvious. In 2007, the Erdogan government elevated the status of religious scholar and author of the IM to a major national hero by declaring March 12 as ‘the Mehmet Akif Ersoy commemoration and the acceptance of national anthem day.’ (Turfan and Micallef 2015). Since then, there has been a significant increase in the activities relating to the IM and Ersoy. There was potent upsurge in the importance and popularity of the IM due to another event. In 2007, a German private organization tried to acquire the copyright for the IM in Germany, claiming that the Turkish state had not acquired the international copyright for the Turkish national anthem. As the threat came from a European and a Western organization, this tapped into the deep-seated fear of the West in Turkish elite and the IM’s importance to the Turkish state nationalism increased (Today’s Zaman 2010b).

2010 Onwards

PM Erdogan further increased the status of anthem and its author by declaring 2011 as the Year of Mehmet Akif Ersoy as it was the 90th anniversary of the official adoption of the IM as the national anthem and the 75th anniversary of Ersoy’s death in 1936 (Today’s Zaman 2011a). The Gezi Park protest against Erdogan and the AKP again made the OYM popular. Protestors brought Ataturk’s’ pictures and sang the OYM.
No surprise, then, that the image on the wall at which the Gezi Park protesters silently stare is Atatürk’s. Moderates across Turkey have brought out images of Atatürk. In the prior, nosier demonstrations, the protesters sang the Republic’s unofficial anthem, the “Tenth Year March,” honoring the first decade of Atatürk’s rule. (Fradkin and Libby 2013)

Responding to his Gezi Park critics and those that criticized prayers at the opening of the Marmaray railway, Erdogan pointed out that prayers were part of the Turkish tradition. He reminded Turks that Turkey’s first Parliament was opened with prayers and that the national anthem also references prayer. Then, drawing a contrast between himself and the secularists (and perhaps also between the two anthems), he said:

While [the opposition] sings the Republic’s 10th anniversary anthem, we are offering Marmaray as part of the republic’s 90th anniversary and talking about the centenary goals. Those who have always sang the 10th anniversary anthem - how much railway have you built? None. (Hurriyet Daily News 2013b)

It is clear that the AKP’s rivals consider use of the OYM as a way to criticize the AKP policies and any policies linking religion and politics. They pledge their support to secularism or at least to the early Republican ideals and opposition to the AKP’s policies. It is also obvious that the AKP sees the OYM as the anthem of its rivals. A telling exchange happened in July 2013 in the Turkish Parliament. When a member of an opposition party
pointed out that some state officials did not stand for the national flag and OYM at a sport event, the AKP’s Minister of Justice replied that while state officials were obliged to stand for the national flag and national anthem, they were not obliged to stand up for the OYM. Mehmet Metiner, an AKP member, later called OYM a fascist anthem and despite the protests of opposition members, the AKP ministers present in the Parliament did not criticize Mr. Metiner (Gazete Vatan 2013). It is, therefore, quite possible that as the AKP further consolidates its hold on power, the OYM might gradually disappear from the state events and lose its status as the rival anthem.

The tussle between these two anthems dovetails with the larger debate about Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism. The IM was declared the national anthem but very soon its use was limited to the first two stanzas and the author went into exile. Though it never became the national anthem, the OYM was often sung at state events in the 1930s and 1940s. After 1950, the center-right governments started giving greater prominence to the IM but the major change came in 1980, when both the complete IM and its author were acknowledged and feted by the state, for the first time since the early 1920s. Since then, the IM’s prestige is on the rise and the OYM is rapidly becoming an opposition song to be sung in streets but less and less in the official state functions.

**Other National symbols**

In the following section, various national symbols are discussed to highlight Islam’s role in state nationalism.
The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s

The national symbols of this period generally show the prevalence of ethnic (Turk or Turkic) state nationalism. Islam or religious nationalism that were part of Ottoman emblems, logos, and flags was discarded within the first few years of the Republic. Ethnolinguistic state nationalism became especially dominant in the 1930s when glorifying Turkish ethnicity and Turkish language became a passion for Atatürk, forming the basis of state support for the ‘fantastic tales’ of Turkish magnificence from times immemorial (Mango 1999, 492-7).

National Flag

Starting from the mid-1920s, Turkish elite tried to break Turkey free from the Ottoman-Islamic culture of the past. Male dress code, Hat law, adoption of Latin script and Gregorian calendar, and other changes demonstrate their commitment to reduce Islam/Ottoman influence and introduce a new Western, European culture. Concurrently, Islam’s role in state nationalism was also reduced, as discussed in the previous chapter, by removing Islamic references from the 1924 Constitution. In these circumstances, it might seem strange that early Republican regime adopted the flag of the Ottoman Empire as the flag of the new state, with its conspicuous religious symbolism of crescent and star. However, the Republican regime interpreted the flag and its crescent and star as an Anatolian/Turkish
symbol and not as an Islamic symbol. It emphasized that crescent and star was not an Islamic symbol but a symbol of the Turks (Smith 2015). The choice of the crescent and star and red Ottoman flag was, therefore, a selection of a territorial/ethnic symbol over religious symbol that was represented by the other Ottoman (green) flag. In late Ottoman era, the caliphate was represented by the green flag and the sultanate by the red flag (see the Ottoman emblem below). The new Republic rejected the green flag and the affiliated religious symbolism. The state’s power of appropriating symbols was apparent as soon after the state adopted the red flag, the opposition – protesting against secular policies – used the green flag as its banner.

State Emblem

Religious state nationalism of the Ottoman Caliphate was evident in its emblem. There was a green flag with a crescent at the bottom and green crescent and circle on the top center. The Turkish rejected this emblem.

74 Historical evidence shows that crescent and star is an old Anatolian, and thus Turkish, symbol. Crescent was the symbol of the ancient city of Byzantium. The Emperor Constantine added star to the crescent as the symbol of the renamed city of Constantinople. Hence, the crescent and star was an Anatolian/Turkish symbol that later became an Islamic symbol.

75 Although red Ottoman flag was initially an Ottoman symbol, very soon because of state’s influence, it became a symbol of Turkish Republic and its opponents adopted the green Ottoman flag as their symbol. During the Sheikh Said’s rebellion (1925), which was against the ending of sultanate, caliphate and Hat Law (1925), a few years after the creation of republic, green flags were adopted by the rebels. Leaders of Progressive Republican Party (first opposition party, created in 1924) were also welcomed in many cities with green flags.

76 The Ottomans also used Sancak-i-Serif (literally holy banner, a banner believed to be Prophet Muhammad’s) as an imperial standard to rally troops or populace (Finkel 2007, 237-243; 435). After the establishment of Republic, this banner was never used.

77 Green color is widely associated with Islam even now. Most MMCs have green color in their flags.
In 1925, the Education Ministry organized a contest for a new state emblem. The contest was won by Namik Ismail. His proposed emblem had a strong ethnic nationalist flavor. It depicted a white asena and a crescent-star combination on a red background. The Asena is a mythological she-wolf, associated with the ancient Turks and Turkish empire built by the Ashina tribe in the 6th century (Findley 2004, 37-40). Though this emblem was not officially adopted as state emblem, the Ottoman emblem with religious motifs never came back.
Figure 3: Proposed State Emblem

Source: Hurriyet Daily News (2014f)

Presidential Emblem and Flag

Perhaps the state symbols most unmistakably demonstrating the preference of ethnic state nationalism in the new Republic were the presidential flag and emblem. The Ottoman imperial standard (flag) was rejected which showed Sultan’s tughra (sultan’s name, often with his father’s name and a prayer in beautiful Arabic script calligraphy) on a red
background. With its focus on Arabic (script) calligraphy and absence of any pictures, figures or images, the imperial standard followed the strict Islamic guidelines.

Figure 4: The Ottoman Imperial Standard


This new emblem was adopted even before the formal inauguration of the Republic. It was seen in 1922 as part of the presidential flag on Ataturk’s car and has been in continuous use. This description on presidential website acknowledges its ethnic content.

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78 Each Ottoman sultan had his own tughra. A particular tughra for Ataturk or a general tughra for presidents of Turkey could have been produced easily.
The new emblem has seventeen stars on a red background. In the middle of the emblem, there is a big star or sun depicted by a large sixteen-pointed star representing the Turkish Republic. Around the sun are sixteen smaller stars, representing the sixteen great Turkic states of the past. The focus is on Turks as an ethnic group and the Turkish Republic is represented as the continuation of all the great empires built by the Turks. This emblem is

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79 In the initial years of the Republic, the sixteen stars, according to some analysts, represented sixteen Anatolian beyliks (small Turkish states in the middle ages).
also part of the presidential flag. The presidential flag is the Turkish flag with the emblem depicted in the upper left corner in gold (Government of Turkey 2006; 2015).

Figure 6: Presidential Flag on Ataturk’s Car

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

The single-party era represented the triumph of ethnic/territorial facets of Turkish state nationalism. Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was negligible. This era demonstrated a revival of religious flavor, albeit minor, in Turkish state nationalism. Umet Uzer terms it as the rise of conservative state nationalism:
I define conservative nationalism as a form of nationalism in which the nation cannot be conceived except in terms of the religion to which the majority of the members of that nation belong... This form of nationalism became increasingly important in Turkish nationalism after the 1950s, with the triple processes of modernization, democratization, and Islamization of the society and their ramifications for the body politic. (Uzer 2011, 105)

Advent of multi-party politics meant that the political parties had to be cognizant of the sentiments of mostly conservative electorate for whom Islam was important. However, the secular elite still had power as it largely controlled military, judiciary and the media. Ruling political parties thus had to keep both the electorate and the non-elected secular elite satisfied. This was particularly difficult for the center-right parties which were always suspected of being disloyal to the Republic, secularism and the Ataturk legacy. Three military coups in twenty years show that keeping the balance was not easy (Yavuz 2009, 27-8). So, state, during this era, promoted a blend of ethnic and civil state nationalism. Islam had a very minor, if any, contribution to the state nationalism. Islam’s role in state nationalism, during this period, mostly did not appear independently but as part of veneration to Ottoman or Seljuk achievements, which could considered as Turkic as well as Islamic. Reappropriation of the victories of Turkish Islamic past, which were mostly ignored during the single party rule to focus on the more distant non-Islamic past of Turks, was the change witnessed during this period.
Ethnic state nationalism had lost its earlier strength but it was still not completely out of favor. For example, thousands of non-Turkic names of villages, towns and geographical landmarks were replaced by Turkic names (i.e. Turkification of the map). Another sign of strength of ethnic aspect in Turkish state nationalism was the choice of capital city Ankara’s emblem. In 1973, Mayor Vedat Dalokay chose the Hittite Sun as the city’s emblem and also placed a Hittite\textsuperscript{80} Sun sculpture in the city center.

**Kocatepe (National) Mosque**

The gradually expanding plans and the eventual construction of Kocatepe mosque in Ankara represents the rising contribution of Islam to Turkish state nationalism. There were no plans to build a national place of worship in Ankara before the 1940s. If there were any suggestion of building a mosque, they were limited to building a modest mosque in central Ankara. Starting from the mid-1940s, these plans gradually became more and more elaborate. From the time of the first competition for its design in 1947 to its completion in 1987, the mosque project faced many hurdles and construction didn’t start until 1967.\textsuperscript{81} However, the delays helped the project since as time passed, not only did the project expand but the proposed project site was changed to a more prominent place, a hill overlooking the whole city. The gigantic structure and the prominent location made it a rival to another

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\textsuperscript{80} Hittite civilization is one of the many ancient civilizations that are linked with Ankara. Hittites are considered the first settlers in Ankara province and sun symbolizes their culture and civilization (Hayden and Sevin 2012). The choice of Hittite Sun as emblem of the capital city was controversial at that time but nothing compared to what happened, as discussed below, when a later Ankara mayor decided to replace it in the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{81} Even after the construction started, it was interrupted many times.
place of worship, the Anitkabir (Mausoleum of Ataturk), something unthinkable at the start of the mosque project in the 1940s:

_The Ataturk Memorial Tomb and the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara are arguably the two most important monuments of the Turkish republic...The two Sites, one Kemalist and the other Islamist, represent the claims of two different "orders" of meanings and values to a dominant position in the public life of the Turkish republic...Moreover, standing at similar elevations and in open view of one another, the tomb and the mosque can appear to be in a relationship of challenge and response. (Meeker 1997)_

Figure 7: Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara
Three Anniversaries: Reappropriation of Islamic Past

Another evidence of the increase of Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism came in the form of celebration by Turkish state of events that were linked to its Muslim past. Two important anniversaries were celebrated at the state level, one linked to the Ottoman dynasty and the other linked to the Seljuk dynasty. Both were important Turkish Islamic military victories, the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul (1453) and the Seljuk victory in the Battle of Manzikert (1071), in which their opponents were not only non-Turks but also non-Muslims. Although these events were presented as achievements of Turks and not Muslims but it was still an important development as previously Turkey’s Muslim past, particularly Ottoman era, was presented as a period of decline and Ataturk presented Turkish Republic as a clear break from the immediate terrible past. These anniversaries did not change the secular nature of the Turkish state but Islam, by virtue of association with the Ottomans and the Seljuks, started becoming accepted as a part of state’s myth. As these two anniversaries were planned and celebrated by different governments twenty years apart, it cannot be argued that these celebrations were actions of a particular leader or government. Moreover, most of the important parties and other state institutions, like the Turkish military, at the time of these anniversaries agreed with the government that these anniversaries should be celebrated, making it a state level affair. The effect of these
anniversaries went beyond the time when they were celebrated as stamps and coins were issued and public monuments were built to commemorate them.

**Five hundredth anniversary celebrations of Istanbul Conquest**

An evidence of the acceptance of Islam as part of Turkish state nationalism by the state elite was the rehabilitation of the Ottomans. In the first three decades of the Republic, Ottomans were castigated and their achievements disparaged by the state elite, including Ataturk himself. But there was a change in the 1940s when at least some of the Ottoman sultans were no longer the enemies of the Turks and their conquests and achievements were to be celebrated at the state level. This was visible in the grand celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the Istanbul (Constantinople) conquest in 1453 by the Turkish government.

In June 1950, the Turkish Cabinet formed the Istanbul Conquest Society to organize the 500th anniversary.  

82 This committee organized a ten-day celebrations (May 29th - June 6th 1953) that emphasized the Islamic character of the conquest. There was sacrificial slaughter of animals, special prayers in the Sultan Fatih mosque,  

83 prayers on state radio and a specially prepared sermon by the Diyanet that was read in all mosques in Turkey, highlighting the importance of the Ottoman conquest for both Islam and Turks (Brockett 2011, 197-8).  

84 Soon thereafter, the 29th May celebrations became an annual event. The

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82 Constantinople was conquered by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (reign 1444-46 and 1451-81) in 1453. After the conquest, `Fatih’ (meaning conqueror) was added to his name. In Turkey, he is commonly remembered as Sultan Fatih.

83 Built on the orders of Sultan Fatih himself in Istanbul.

84 There were many non-religious celebrations too, such as a military parade, a ball etc.
Turkish government also issued a whole series of stamps to commemorate the Istanbul conquest.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{stamps.jpg}
\caption{Postage Stamps issued on the 500\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the Istanbul Conquest}
\end{figure}

Source: Government of Turkey (1953)

\textsuperscript{85} In 1963, the Turkish Army celebrated its six hundredth anniversary, linking itself to the Ottoman military. Claiming and celebrating Ottoman ancestry was a significant event as the Turkish military was one of the most secular Turkish institutions. However, after the 1980 coup, Turkish military linked itself to the ancient Turkic militaries and claimed its origin in 209 BC when the Hun Emperor Mete Khan’s ascended the throne. Ottomans still figured in the story but as one of the many Turkic militaries (KKK 2015).
Nine hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert

The Battle of Manzikert was fought between Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan and Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes in August 1071 in the Eastern Turkey. The decisive victory of Seljuks and the capture of the Byzantine Emperor opened the Anatolian peninsula to more Seljuk/Ottoman victories, spread of Islam and Turkification.

While Ottomans were disparaged by the early Turkish elite and even their achievements were rejected, Seljuks got a fairer treatment. Seljuks also became part of the national myth earlier than Ottomans as they were considered truer Turks, uncontaminated by outside (Islamic, Arabian, Persian, etc.) influences that later corrupted the Ottomans. The Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt in Turkish) was celebrated by many Turkish historians as a triumph of Turks over Greeks and few historians also made connections between Sultan Alp Arslan and Ataturk (Hillenbrand, 202-9).

The celebration of the nine hundredth anniversary of the battle in 1971 was preceded by the establishment of Institute of Seljuq History and Civilisation in Ankara in 1966, the start of publication of a journal on Seljuq studies in 1969 and erecting a statue of Alp Arslan in 1967. The foundation stone of the statue was laid by President Cevdet Sunay, demonstrating the fact that celebrating anniversary was not the decision of one government. The actual anniversary was celebrated in August 1971 after the 1971 coup, with fanfare
and fervor. Coins and stamps were also issued to commemorate the occasion and later two public monuments were also built (Hillenbrand, 210-2; Gurpinar 2013, 125).

Figure 9: Coins commemorating the 900th Anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert

Source: Government of Turkey (1971)
Figure 10: Postage Stamps issued on the 900th anniversary of Battle of Manzikert

Source: Government of Turkey (1971)

Figure 11: Gateway to Anatolia (Battle of Manzikert) Monument in Malazgirt, Turkey

Source: Malazgirtim (2015)
The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

This period saw further increase of Islam’s contribution to the Turkish state nationalism. As discussed before, Turkish-Islamic synthesis became the unofficial state ideology, linking Islam and Turkish nationalism:

*In an attempt to reduce social tension and focus on the main political danger, the military tried to placate Islamists with a policy of ‘‘controlled Islam.’’ Its goal was a ‘‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis,’’ a new nationalism that embraced the predominant interpretation of Sunnism in Turkey and thereby aimed to shield pious Turks from international Islamist movements.* (Baran 2010, 35-6)

Perhaps nothing shows the resurgence of Islam during this period better than the acceptance of exhibition of Islamic piety and religiousness at the highest level. During this era, for the first time since the early 1920s, it became acceptable for Turkish Presidents and Prime Ministers to show Islamic piety. It started with General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military junta that carried the military coup in 1980, who cited Islamic/Quranic references in his public pronouncements. Turgut Ozal (Prime Minister in the 1980s and President in the 1990s) carried it to a whole new level. He was the first Turkish Prime Minister to perform pilgrimage in office and pictures of that pilgrimage were shown on the state TV and he was called the hajji.86 Prime Minister.87 He was ready to be photographed praying in mosques, a sight uncommon in the Republican Turkey. After Ozal, the trend of giving

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86 Honorific title given to those who have performed pilgrimage (hajj in Arabic)
87 Many newspapers, however, took a very unfavorable view of this trip and considered it a political gimmick (Bianchi 2004, 143)
importance to religious symbolism continued. In terms of national symbols, though main national symbols (such as flag, anthem, presidential flag etc.) remained the same, conservative elite tried to create new symbols that highlighted Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism. For example, second Bosphorus Bridge was named as Fatih Sultan Bridge and capital city Ankara’s emblem depicted a mosque.

**Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge on Bosphorus (1988)**

The choice of Ottoman Sultan Fatih Mehmet as the name of second Bosphorus Bridge was significant. Not only Fatih Sultan was an Ottoman Sultan but he was also recipient of Prophet Muhammad’s direct praise and blessings, a distinction not shared by any other Turkish sultan or any other Muslim ruler.

It could be argued that a bridge over Bosphorus is not a national symbol. However, because of their size, cost and location, all three bridges over Bosphorus have been considered Turkish national icons or symbols and not thought as a concern of only those living in Istanbul. The first bridge built over Bosphorus, called Bosphorus (Bogazici) Bridge, was inaugurated on the 50th anniversary of Turkish Republic in 1973 as a symbol of progress and advancement of the country in the last fifty years. It was later depicted on banknotes, as discussed in the next chapter on stamps and coins. Even in other countries, it was

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88 The first bridge was criticized by the main opposition party, the CHP, the Turkish Worker’s Party and by many other organizations as useless and wasteful. Leader of the CHP Bulent Ecevit said, "Before you try to build a suspension bridge over Istanbul, we should be trying to provide employment and job opportunities for 38 percent of villagers." Turkish worker’s Party’s criticism was also in terms of whole Turkey and not focused on Istanbul. It distributed flyers in the streets, with the phrase, "30 million of us are starving, and the bridge won’t feed us" (Durukan 2008).
considered a national icon of Turkey. For example, an Iranian stamp on the 50th anniversary of Turkey depicted this bridge. More recently, this bridge was depicted on 50 kurus coins currently in circulation. The recent controversy generated over the name of the third bridge on Bosphorus also demonstrates the significance of names of Bosphorus bridges.  

The third bridge over Bosphorus was named as Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in May 2013 to honor Ottoman Sultan Selim I (reign: 1512-1520), who appropriated the Caliphate for Ottomans by conquering Egypt and Hijaz and becoming the protector of the two holy cities. The controversy started immediately after the name was announced by President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan as Sultan Selim was also reputed to have ordered the massacre of thousands of Alevi during his reign. Alevi protested immediately and did not consider it the naming of an ordinary bridge that could be ignored, neither did the political parties. The Republican Party (CHP) Vice President, Muharram Thin, strongly criticized the decision and asked why bridge cannot be named after Ataturk. Masum Turker, the leader of the Democratic Left Party, argued that the choice of Sultan Selim demonstrated that the AKP leadership wanted to change the character of the Turkish state, from a secular republic to a Sunni state (Haber 7 2013; Today’s Zaman 2013b). The head of the Alevi Cem Foundation, Izzettin Dogan, also protested and did not considered the naming as insignificant. He argued that Sultan Selim’s name should not be put on Bosphorus as it would make him an unforgettable and permanent part of the Turkish history (Today’s Zaman 2013b). Head of Gulen Movement, Fethullah Gulan also argued against naming the bridge after Sultan Selim and a collection of Alevi organizations requested President Gul to change the name as it would create conflict in Turkish nation (Miroglu 2013; Dogan News Agency 2013).
Figure 12: 50 kurus coin currently in circulation

Source: Government of Turkey (2009)

The fact that the bridge was named after Fatih Sultan in the mid-1980s is important. The coup leader General Kenan Evren was still the President of Turkey and the Turkish military was still the most important political player in Turkey so it appears the President did not object to name the bridge after Sultan Fatih, signifying the agreement of all state institutions on Ottoman/Muslim Sultan Fatih being a national hero. The Turkish government further showed that the Fatih Bridge was a national icon by issuing a stamp to honor its completion.
Islamizing the Capital City

Ankara, the capital of Turkey, because of its history, has always been linked to Ataturk, republicanism, modernization and secularism. The continuation of Ankara as a capital of the new state, even when Istanbul was free from foreign occupation, was itself a rejection of Ottomans and Turkey’s Islamic past. New Turkey would be a secular, modern nation and Ankara would represent it, in contrast to Istanbul, which was considered representative of the corrupt and decadent Ottoman/Islamic civilization.

Capital cities are symbols of the nation. New nations give particular importance to their capitals to create an image and to foster a new identity.
It is obvious that there is a direct relationship between the building of a new state and its capital. According to (Professor Gonul) Tankut, the making of a capital should be perceived as a state-sponsored political operation. What is intended while planning a new capital is to create a symbol for a new political system and to realize different political and social operations. (Onge 2007, 73).

After consolidation of its power in early 1920s, the Republican regime started the building of a new model city. The main city planner chosen was a German Professor Hermann Jansen. Later, other European architects were invited who planned the main buildings, statues, monuments etc. Following the European modernist architectural trends, these architects often ignored the historical and cultural aspects of Ankara. It was an ideological project, a spatial modernity project running parallel to the social, cultural, administrative and economic modernization (Onge 2007, 77-88). Besides architecture, the naming of the areas and streets in Ankara also exposed the political disposition of the Republican regime. Names reminiscent of Islamic or Ottoman history were largely avoided. Most of the streets were named after events or leaders of Independence War. Moreover, many monuments and statues were erected to commemorate the events of Independence War and its leader, Ataturk. Ataturk, who chose Ankara as Turkey’s capital, is everywhere in Ankara in the form of street names, statues, monuments, buildings etc. The construction of Ataturk’s mausoleum further linked Ankara with Ataturk and his modernization project, an important component of which was secularization (Erdentug and Burcak 1998). The Kocatepe Mosque, as discussed above, was the first project Islamizing the Ankara’s urban space.
After the 1980s, the Kemalist-Republican image of Ankara started changing. In 1994, Melih Gokcek of Islamic-oriented Refah party won the election and became mayor of Ankara. If Ankara was the symbol of Turkey, the Islamists had reached the stage where they could Islamize this symbol.

In June 1995, Gokcek arranged a competition for a new emblem. The winning design, a mix of a Kocatepe mosque and Atakule, was approved and adopted as Ankara’s emblem.\(^90\) This started a long drawn-out battle in which the mayor wanted to retain the new emblem while his opponents, mainly Kemalists/secularists, wanted the Hittite Sun symbol.\(^91\) Neither of the two sides considered it a fight over the symbol of an urban municipality. As Ankara was Turkey’s capital, both sides considered it a fight over two different visions of Turkey. Mosque as an emblem of Turkey’s capital city and Ataturk’s city was particularly offensive to many Kemalist Turks.

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\(^{90}\) A high tower in Ankara. Ata refers to Ataturk and kule is tower in Turkish.

\(^{91}\) In this more than a decade long fight, mayor also proposed image of Angora cat’s eyes as a compromise.
Mayor Gokcek was ordered many times by courts, commissions, etc. to accept Hittite sun as Ankara’s logo but he did not. The fight only ended in 2012. The image combining Kocatepe mosque and Atakule, with some changes, remained Ankara’s emblem.

The change of emblem was only one of the changes that Mayor Gokcek did to Islamize Turkey’s capital city. Under Mayor Gokcek, for the first time, numerous streets were named after events and leaders relating to the Muslim history/world. He also removed nude statues from parks and constructed fountains and mosques reminiscent of Ottoman Sultans. Many housing schemes were given a neo-Ottoman façade and the city gates, based on a neo-Ottoman/Seljuk design, were also constructed. (Links 2014; Gurcan and Peker 2015, 66-70).
As Mayor Gokcek himself explained recently, he is changing what Ankara was previously known for. The new identity is distinctly Islamic:

*Insallah our gates, with their distinctive attributes and architecture, will become the symbols of Ankara. Our gates embody reminisces of Seljuk and Ottoman architecture, and, as a result, reflect our history.* (Tasdizen and Ulgen 2015)

Ataturk wanted Ankara to be a symbol of new Turkish state, a European capital, bereft of Islamic/Ottoman symbols. Since the early 1980s, this symbol of Turkish state has changed in many ways, reflecting the growing role of Islam in Turkish nationalism.
**2010 onwards**

One of the main reasons of Islam’s minor role in Turkish state nationalism was the secularists’ control of the judiciary, military and majority of mainstream media. Despite winning most elections since the 1950s, the center-right parties worked under the watchful eye of, and within the limits prescribed by the secularists in above-mentioned institutions. The threat of ban or dissolution was always hanging over these parties. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, the secularists now do not control judiciary and media and military have limited role in politics. There is some evidence of increasing Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism in this period but it’s not conclusive. Same party and leadership is governing Turkey from 2010 to the present so it can be argued that the evidence given below is related to a specific government and not to the Turkish state. Moreover, the recent setback suffered by the AKP in the parliamentary elections has made the future increase of Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism uncertain.

**Bestepe People’s Mosque in the new Presidential Palace**

Turkish President has constitutionally few powers but he is the head of the state and thus represents the state and the nation. Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, the presidential palace has been a bastion of secularism. The first six Presidents (five were retired generals) were strict secularists and not only avoided any action that linked presidency with Islam but also objected to and nullified attempts by the center-right governments to align Islam with the Turkish state. Ahmet Sezer, 10th Turkish President
(2000-2007), can also be included in this list. Although Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel
and Abdullah Gul cannot be termed as secularists, they were also mindful of Ataturk’s
legacy, constitutional provisions and the military’s stance on mixing religion with politics
and generally avoided directly linking Islam with the state or presidency.

With the elevation of Erdogan to presidency, however, this bastion of state secularism
stands breached. By building a new Presidential palace, based on Seljuk architecture, and
constructing one of the largest mosques in Ankara, inside the new Presidential palace,
President Erdogan has done something that has linked the presidency, the symbol of the
state, with Islam in a lasting way. This mosque, with a capacity to accommodate three
thousand worshippers, is visible from many parts of Ankara. The old Presidential
(Cankaya) palace, used by Ataturk and other presidents, did not have a big conspicuous
mosque.

President Erdogan also named the Presidential Palace as Cumhurbaskanlığı Kulliyesi,
meaning Presidential (Mosque) Complex. As explained below, the kulliye is not a neutral
word and has Islamic/Ottoman origins:

*The word “kulliye” is derived from the Arabic word "kull," which means all. Kulliye was
mostly used in the Ottoman times to refer to a complex of buildings around a mosque that
are generally run by a foundation for charitable purposes.* (Today’s Zaman 2015)
President Erdogan made no efforts to de-emphasize the construction of such a big mosque in the Presidential complex of a secular state. He inaugurated this mosque in July, 2015, along with the Prime Minister, several ministers and the head of the Diyanet. He called mosques a source of pride, promising more mosques in Ankara (Daily Sabah 2015, Hurriyet Daily News 2015).
Nation-building and fostering state nationalism also involves creating a national space that is unique and that can be used to imagine a nation in concrete:

An essential component of nationalist projects that seek to institute a new sense of nationhood and define a new national subject is the construction of national space...

Hence, cities, spaces, and places take the center stage in the construction of a new sense
of nationhood or in the emergence and advancement of alternative nationalist projects.
(Cinar 2005, 99)

After changing the landscape of Ankara, President Erdogan also plans to change the landscape and skyline of Istanbul, a city that has been considered the symbol of Turkey for centuries. A big mosque is being constructed on the Camlica hill. This permanent landmark will be difficult to ignore because of its location and size. Built on one of the highest hills in Istanbul and rivaling the Sultan Ahmet (Blue) and Suleymaniye mosques\(^{92}\) in size, Camlica mosque is not an ordinary mosque project. After construction it would be visible throughout Istanbul and is considered to be one of the biggest mosque projects in Turkey since 1923, symbolizing another move toward Muslim state nationalism. Erdogan is the main force behind the project and has proceeded to implement it, despite many objections and court cases against it. Critics have called it ‘the largest, newest and “most Ottoman” symbols of his rule.’ Started in 2013, after all his rivals were defeated, Erdogan also called it a selatin mosque, reminiscent of the mosques built by the Ottoman Sultans to commemorate their victories (Gursel 2014a; Robinson 2012; Sokollu 2013; Vardar 2013; Demirsar 2014).

\[^{92}\text{The two famous mosques in Istanbul built by Sultan Ahmet (1603-17) and Sultan Suleyman (reign 1520-66).}\]
Figure 18: Planned Camlica Mosque

Source: Vardar (2013)
PAKISTANI NATIONAL SYMBOLS

Like in case of Turkey, this section is also divided into two parts. The first part discusses the struggle to make Urdu the official language as a proxy for Islam’s role in Pakistani nationalism. The second part looks at other Pakistani national symbols to evaluate Islam’s role in Pakistani nationalism during the last sixty seven years.

Urdu: National Language but not Official Language

Urdu is the national language of Pakistan but despite constitutional commitments in all three constitutions and promises of many Presidents and Prime Ministers, Urdu is not the official language. As in many other former British colonies, the powerful role of English has not ended with the departure of British and sixty-seven years after independence, English continues to be the official language of Pakistan.93

Urdu and Islam are linked in the popular imagination in Pakistan. This link was first established before independence, when Hindus in the United Provinces supported revival of Hindi and Muslims started defending Urdu. Defense of Urdu became the defense of Islam and Muslim heritage. Urdu was thus linked with Islam and this Urdu-Hindi controversy became the precursor of Two-Nation theory94 and Pakistani nationalism. After

93 All the official work in upper echelons of federal and provincial government ministries, departments, and public sector enterprises is done exclusively in English. Urdu, despite being the national language, is used only as a spoken language. One would be hard-pressed to find anything written in Urdu in official documents unless it is to be shared with the public.

94 Two-Nation theory, in very broad terms, is that Indians are not one nation. India is populated by two nations, Hindu and Muslims.
Pakistani Independence, Urdu became the national language of Pakistan, not because it was widely spoken or understood\textsuperscript{95} but because it was one of the earliest symbols of Muslim/Pakistani nationalism:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{linguistic_demographics.png}
\caption{Linguistic Demographics of Pakistan (1951)}
\label{fig:linguistic_demographics}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Figure 19: Linguistic Demographics of Pakistan (1951)}

Source: Eriposte (2009)

\textit{The choice of Urdu as the national language for Pakistan (rather than any of the other languages that could have been selected and had wider presences as first languages) was}

\textsuperscript{95} Urdu was the mother tongue of less than five percent of Pakistanis. Though it was spoken by many more Pakistanis, its influence was still largely limited to the urban areas at the time of independence.
intimately related to a language ideology that posited Urdu as the bearer of high Muslim culture in the region—indeed, as the preferred bearer of religious identity, although Urdu has never been a language of religious text in the way that Arabic (for Islam) or Sanskrit (for Hinduism) could claim. This language ideology has exerted significant political impact in Pakistan. (Ayres 2008)

The state elite promoted Urdu as an antidote sub-national and ethnic nationalisms and to encourage a Pakistani nationalism, based on Muslim nationhood. Urdu was the ‘Muslim’ language of the Indian sub-continent so it was the most appropriate language for the Islamic Republic (Rafiq 2010, 73). However, despite promoting vociferously Urdu as national language, state elite have resisted making it official language in place of English. English was their preferred language of the elite and, therefore, the official language and remains so sixty-seven years later.

The major functions of English in Pakistan are the following. First, it is used in the Civil Administration and the bureaucracy, which includes both the federal and the four provincial governments i.e. the Panjab, Sind, the North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. In administration, English is the major language of contact. Second, English is used in the legal system of the federal and provincial governments. Whereas the Supreme Court and the four provincial High Courts conduct their proceedings in English, the situation of the provincial sessions courts is bilingual, sometimes even trilingual…Third, English is used by the Defense Forces. The design and training of all the three components
of the Armed Forces (i.e., the Army, Air Force, and Navy) primarily used the British model.

(Abbas 1993)

Following reasons make Urdu’s struggle to become official language of Pakistan as a symbol for Islam’s role in Pakistan’s nationalism:

- As discussed above, Urdu’s link with Islam and its perception as a ‘Muslim’ language is well-established in Pakistan;

- After independence, Pakistani elite had a complicated relationship with both Islam and Urdu. They were willing to promote them to keep Pakistan united but up to a point. Islam’s role in Pakistan’s nationalism was acknowledged regularly but most of the Pakistani elite were neither practicing Muslims nor were supporters of implementing Sharia in the Pakistan. They saw Pakistan’s as a modern Muslim nation. Similarly, most Pakistani elite recognize the importance of Urdu for Pakistani nationalism but Urdu is neither their mother tongue nor they considered it right to make Urdu the official language in place of English. The highpoint of both Islam’s role in nationalism and efforts to make Urdu the official language was under General Zia’s rule (1977-88);

- Urdu’s struggle to become the official language of Pakistan has been supported primarily by the same groups that wanted an increased role for Islam in Pakistan’s nationalism i.e. Islamist and right-of- center political parties and interest groups.\(^{96}\) Urdu is supported against English by the Islamic-oriented groups because it is the

\(^{96}\) Another group that supports Urdu now is Mohajirs because it is their mother tongue.
language that they primarily use and are most comfortable with. Members of these groups mostly study in the public schools or madrassas where the medium of instruction is Urdu.\textsuperscript{97} Hence, their fluency in English is nominal. Moreover, the religious literature is mostly available in Urdu.\textsuperscript{98} The left-of-the-center or ethnic parties (or interest groups) often do not support Urdu as official language. They support the sub-national or regional languages as for them the more important fight was between Urdu and regional languages, rather than between Urdu and English.

- Islam’s role in nationalism and replacement of English by Urdu as official language are opposed mostly by the same sections of the society. The generally more affluent, less religious and more Westernized sections of the society, who are fluent in English, generally neither want increased Islam in Pakistan’s nationalism nor do they want Urdu as official language. They point out to the benefits of knowing English that is the language of international business, academia, diplomacy etc. However, English language has also been their instrument of hegemony as they control the academia, judiciary, bureaucracy etc. despite being a small minority;

- The perceived hypocrisy of the state elite when they reaffirm regularly that Islam is the raison d’etre of Pakistan and Urdu is the national language and still refrain from the Islamization of Government or making Urdu the official language also binds these two ideas together.

\textsuperscript{97} In most private schools and elite public schools, the medium of instruction is English.
\textsuperscript{98} Only higher religious scholars know Arabic. Ordinary madrassa student or prayer leader in a mosque does not know Arabic
Increased acceptance of Urdu as official language can, therefore, be used as a symbol for increased role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism. In the following discussion, efforts of make Urdu the official language of Pakistan are analyzed.

Figure 20: Linguistic Diversity of Pakistan

Rahman (1996, 13-14) argues that this elitist attitude is common in all South Asian countries and in a scathing indictment of this attitude writes: To sum up, in South Asian countries, English is an elitist preserve and even if the national language (s) is supported by a minority, that support is weak. As for the state itself, its stated policy is to support the national language (s) but this support is only to keep up appearances. It is, at best, only rhetorical. Powerful sections of the Westernized, dominant, urban elite—corporate giants, upper bureaucracy, officer corps of the armed forces, higher judiciary, articulate and visible sections of the academia and the intelligentsia—are actually not at all resistant to English. Indeed, they are enthusiastically accepting towards it. The dominant language and education policy—which some of them have actively influenced—preserves English in elitist domains while promoting one (or more) vernaculars in the public educational system. This kills two birds with one stone: first, The Westernized elite which possesses the linguistic capital of English is facilitated in entering elitist domains of power in the country and abroad. And, second, the ruling elite preserves its credentials of nationalism on the pretext of supporting vernacular-medium education with public money. The reality, however, is that vernacular-medium schools are underfunded and, besides imparting poor English-language skills to their students, also subject them to other deprivations.
The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

During this initial period after independence, English remained the official language of Pakistan. Urdu, despite promises of the rulers, failed to make much progress in gaining this position.

Urdu-speaking Mohajirs were the most powerful ethnic group in Pakistan during the 1950s. As their mother tongue was Urdu, one might have expected them to support replacing English by Urdu as the official language of Pakistan. Mohajirs, no doubt, supported Urdu when it was in competition with the regional languages, like Bengali or Punjabi, but not when it competed with English.

In 1956, nine years after independence, it was obvious that the supremacy of English was not decreasing and Urdu only a minor role in the officialdom. The 1956 Constitution, therefore, tried to rectify this situation. During the constitutional debates, ulema supported Urdu and called for discouragement of ‘linguistic feelings’ (Binder 1961, 330). The reference was to the Urdu-Bengali issue but ulema’s preference for Urdu being the Muslim or Islamic language was clear. The 1956 Constitution not only declared both Urdu and
Bengali as national languages but also ordered the state to replace English with national languages in the next twenty years i.e. by 1976. The Article 214 of the 1956 Constitution also prescribed formation of a commission to recommend measures to complete this assignment in 1966:

214.- (1) The State languages of Pakistan shall be Urdu and Bengali: Provided that after the period of twenty years from the Constitution Day, English shall continue to be used for all official purposes for which it was used in Pakistan immediately before the Constitution Day, and Parliament may by Act provide for the use of English after the expiration of the said period of twenty years, for such purposes as may be specified in that Act.

(2) On the expiration of ten years from the Constitution Day, the President shall appoint a Commission to make recommendations for the replacement of English.

Nothing much was, however, done in the two and a half year life of the 1956 Constitution to replace English with Urdu as official language. General Ayub Khan, after the coup in 1958, moved further away from making Urdu the official language. Being a former officer of British Indian Army and exclusively focused on economic progress, he considered English necessary for Pakistan’s future:

Ayub Khan's own stance, and that of the officer corps of the army, was modernist and westernized. It was not that they accepted the liberal humanist values of the West and really

100 Bengali had been declared national language in 1954 (Walport 1993, 50).
believed in democracy but they did disapprove of values, traditions and attitudes of the past. Thus, for them, orthodox and revivalist interpretations of Islam; indigenous culture and language-based ethnicity were reactionary throwbacks to the past. English, on the other hand, was the language of modernization and progressive values. To combat the mullahs (as the ulema were pejoratively labelled) the army and the bureaucracy supported English medium instruction. (Rahman 1998, 5)

The Constitution of 1962, therefore, gave obligatory deference to the national languages but, in contrast to the 1956 Constitution, made no commitment to replace English. A commission was to be constituted, similar to the 1956 Constitution, but it would only examine the question of replacement of the English language:

215.- (1) The national languages of Pakistan are Bengali and Urdu, but this Article shall not be construed as preventing the use of any other language and, in particular, the English language may be used for official and other purposes until arrangements for its replacement are made.

(2) In the year One thousand nine hundred and seventy two, the President shall constitute a Commission to examine and report on the question of the replacement of the English language for official purposes.
Perhaps impressed by Ataturk, Ayub Khan also thought about changing the writing script of all languages in Pakistan from Arabic to Latin. The strongest evidence of the tilt of Ayub's administration towards English was the report of a government commission in 1966 that severely censured the public universities for changing their medium of instruction from English to Urdu (Nawaz 2008, 172; Rahman 1998, 6).

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

In this period, the national elite showed some commitment towards making Urdu the official language. During the 1970s and 1980s, several decisions were taken to introduce Urdu into government offices. This change can be related to the increased role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism.

At the start of this period, Urdu’s position was significantly strengthened with the separation of East Pakistan. Being the lingua franca of the rump country, it was accepted as the sole national language of Pakistan. While all other languages are linked with a specific ethnicity, Urdu is not considered linked to any one ethnic group by most Pakistanis.\(^{101}\) Parliamentarians elected in the first elections with universal suffrage in 1970 were also more responsive to the masses and ready to change some elitist policies. Keeping English, which was out of reach of more than two-thirds of the Pakistanis, as the official language was one of the most elitist policies and came under attack, especially by religious parties but also by others. However, while other major non-religious parties focused also

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\(^{101}\) Sindhi, however, do consider it linked to a specific ethnic group i.e. Mohajirs.
on economic issues, the religious parties tried to make the election a battle between Islam and secularism. Urdu and Islam were proclaimed as victims of Westernized, secular English-speaking elite that was ruling Pakistan since 1947. Urdu was part of the new Islamic order. Nasr (1994, 85-86)

Urdu, Islam and Pakistan became even more closely intertwined. However, it was still a long way to go for Urdu to become the national language in the corridors of power of the nation.

_It should, however, be mentioned that Urdu became more and more closely associated with Islam, Pakistani nationalism and support of the military as time went by._ (Rahman 1998, 8).

Though the religious and right-of-center parties were trounced in the 1970 election, the prestige and usage of Urdu at the elite level increased as the national leadership of non-religious parties had to use Urdu to communicate with massive crowds, something done rarely in (West) Pakistan before 1970. (Walport 1993, 151).

Even before the 1970 election, there was movement toward increasing the recognition of Urdu. A government commission on education in 1969 suggested that English be replaced by Urdu and Bengali as the medium of instruction by 1975 (Rahman 1997).
The new constitution also gave importance to making Urdu not only the national language but also the official language of Pakistan. The constitution-makers of 1972-3 demonstrated greater zest in achieving these aims than their predecessors. English was to be replaced by Urdu not in twenty years but in fifteen years i.e. by 1988. Article 251 of the 1973 Constitution stated:

*National language* (1) *The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.*

*Subject to clause (1), the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.*

However, unlike previously, there were some efforts to introduce Urdu in official business. Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) won a large number of seats and formed coalition governments with other parties in North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan in 1972. These governments made Urdu the official language and official business started to be written and communicated in Urdu for the first time in Pakistan’s history. These governments were, however, out of power soon because of their tussle with the federal government led by Bhutto.102

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102 The Balochistan government was dismissed by the federal government in February 1973 and the government of North West Frontier Province (current Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) resigned in protest of this action.
The 1979 National Educational Policy furthered Urdu’s cause by allowing the provincial governments to choose between Urdu and a major regional language as the medium of instruction at the elementary school level (Siddiqui and Irshadullah 2014).

There were also changes in the military. From 1947 to 1973, the military academies established to train officers used only English as a medium of oral and written communication. The field orders were also given in English. It was only in 1974 that Urdu was allowed to be used (Abbas 1993).

Zia posed himself as one of the masses. Islam and Urdu, more of the former and less of the later, were used instrumentally to demonstrate Zia’s authenticity in comparison to prior rulers of Pakistan. One of the most important actions to make Urdu official language was the creation of a new institution, the Muqtadra Qaumi Zaban (MQZ meaning National Language Authority). It was established in October 1979 to promote Urdu and make changes to the language to make it easier for the government to introduce it as the official language. Its functions were as follows:

- *To consider ways and means for the promotion of Urdu as the National Language of Pakistan and to make all necessary arrangements in this regard to submit recommendations to the Prime Minister for expediting the use of the National Language;*
• To facilitate introduction of Urdu as the Official language throughout the country by developing dictionaries and other reading materials for in-service training of the personnel working in Government/Semi-Government Offices, Courts and other Institutions;

• To coordinate the work of all Urdu Development Boards;

• To facilitate the adoption of Urdu as the language of competitive examinations in cooperation with the Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions;

• To carry out such other responsibilities as the Prime Minister may entrust to the Authority in regard to the promotion of the national language.

The MQZ has many accomplishments to its credit, including publishing many Urdu dictionaries, first Urdu thesaurus of Urdu, and glossaries for various professional terminologies. It also translated hundreds of books (Ministry of Information, Broadcasting & National Heritage 2015).

The military also saw changes and officially communicating in Urdu became more acceptable. Urdu battle cries and a martial song became more popular in the military:

*The Education Corps was hard pressed to keep up with instruction in English, the language needed for understanding foreign manuals and for communication at higher levels. One of the Zia’s priorities was the use of Urdu as the national language. English was to be downgraded. Regional languages were to be acknowledged, but Urdu was to be*
paramount. Remonstrations were useless so far as Zia was concerned. (Cloughley 2014, 281)

However, even after these achievements, English remained the official language. In the 1990s, due to the rapid change of governments, there were no new policy initiatives in this area.

1999 Onwards

During this period, the project of making Urdu the official language faltered. This can again be seen as an evidence of the declining role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism during this period.

The current period has seen the reversal of some of the policies of General Zia. It is true that General Zia did manage to make Urdu the official language of Pakistan but there was already a movement in that direction. During the current period the movement is in the opposite direction. Looking backwards, one could see the change coming in General Musharraf’s first speech, a few hours after his coup. Zia’s first speech was in Urdu and after the salutation had the following Arabic prayer:

*Nahmaduhu wa nusalli 'ala Rasulihīl Karīm (Translation: All our Praise is for Him (Allah), and we invoke His blessings on His Noble Prophetic Messenger (Muhammad))*
Musharraf’s short speech in contrast was in English and was devoid of Arabic prayers. A few days later, General Musharraf again spoke at length in English and focused on economic growth and strengthening the national federation. General Musharraf’s concerns and aims were closer to those of General Ayub than General Zia-ul-Haq (Nasr 2007, 37; Musharraf 1999a; 1999b).

General Musharraf’s regime announced in 2006 that the medium of instruction would revert to English. While students in private schools were already studying English beginning with grade I, under General Musharraf, the students in public schools now also started learning English from grade I. In 2009, Punjab’s provincial government also decided to make English the medium of instruction from Grade I (Masood 2007; Shaukat 2014).103

In 2012, the status of NLA was downgraded from an autonomous body to a department in the Ministry of Culture and named the National Language Promotion Department (NLPD). After the change, the NLPD had neither its own separate by-laws nor separate budget. It was now under the direct control of the ministry and had to get approval of all major decisions from the ministry (The News 2012).

103 In 2014, pressure from teachers forced the Punjab government to make Urdu medium of instruction for the first two grades.
In comparison, Islamist party governments have tended to favor adoption of Urdu. In 2003, Muthida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of Islamist parties, introduced Urdu as an official language in KP in 2003. It also introduced Urdu as the medium of instruction in the public schools. The secular Awami National Party government changed the official language and medium of instruction to regional language Pashto in 2008. In 2014, a coalition of Islamist and right-of-center party reverted to Urdu as medium of instruction in KP schools (Rahim 2014).

Other National Symbols

Similar to the Urdu-English struggle, the analysis of other Pakistani national symbols also shows an initial period where Islam’s role was largely symbolic. This period then gave way to a more puritanical Islam and then the final period starting 1999, where there was a reversal of what had been done under Z. A. Bhutto and General Zia in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

Three national symbols are discussed in this section: the state emblem; the head of state’s flag\(^{104}\); and the planning for a new national capital. Initially, the head of state’s flag showed not Islamic but Christian symbols and it was only in 1956, that the head of state’s flag adopted Pakistani/Islamic symbols. The head of state’s flag, the state emblem and the

\(^{104}\) From 1947 to 1956, Pakistan was a British dominion and so the head of state was British Monarch and his representative in Pakistan was Governor General. After the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, Pakistan became a republic and the head of state was the President of Pakistan.
planning for a national capital, all demonstrate the limited role religion played in the state nationalism in this period. The state elites wanted to make Pakistan a modern Muslim country, not an Islamic state. The pressure by the ulema to move the state towards an Islamic polity was rejected.

**State Emblem**

The first Pakistan emblem was adopted in 1947. It had a star and crescent on the top, with Pakistan written inside the crescent in Urdu. The writing style shows the influence of Arabic as a diacritic (madda) appears in the middle of the word ‘Pakistan’. While madda is common in the Persian language, it is generally used at the start of a word, not in the middle. Urdu follows the Persian style and a madda is not used in the middle of a word. Below the star and crescent are six gonfalons with a crescent and star on each. The banner beneath them shows ‘PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT’ written in English.

![State Emblem](image)

1947-54 | 1954-present
The new emblem adopted in 1954 shows several changes that can be associated with Pakistani nationalism:\(^{105}\)

- Foreign languages were eliminated: "PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT" was replaced by the Pakistan state’s motto ‘Eman, Ittehad, Nazm’ (meaning unity, faith, discipline) in Urdu. The Arabic diacritic was also omitted;
- The shapes of the star and crescent were changed and in the new emblem, the crescent opens towards the dexter side;
- The color was changed to green which is the main color of the Pakistani flag;
- Gonfalons were replaced by a quartered shield, with four crops shown in each of the quarters, demonstrating the contribution of agriculture to Pakistan economy. The crops shown were the main crops of Pakistan: cotton, jute, wheat and tea;
- A floral wreath was also part of the new emblem. It surrounds the quartered shield. The wreath is made of the flowers and leaves of Jasmine, the national flower of Pakistan.

\(^{105}\) In heraldry, right side of the shield according to the wearer perspective. It is considered a side of a greater honor as compared to the left (sinister) side.
The state emblem has not changed since 1954. This emblem is much more nationalistic than the prior one. However, Islam’s influence is visible in the star and crescent and the green color. Islamic influence has declined as there were seven star and crescent symbols on the old emblem, but the new emblem had only one. Rather than highlighting Islam, the new emblem focuses on territorial nationalism (four crops on the shield).

**Head of State’s Flag**

The flag of the Governor General of Pakistan adopted in 1947 was similar to the flags of Governor Generals of many other British dominions. It showed a lion crowned with the British imperial state crown\(^{106}\) standing on another imperial state crown on a royal blue ground. Beneath the larger crown, Pakistan was written in English. Each of the two crowns shown have two full cross pattee\(^{107}\) and two half cross pattee. So, there were four full crosses and four half crosses on the flag of the Governor General of Pakistan. Despite these crosses, nobody objected to this flag in Pakistan. This was especially significant as cross pattee is linked with the Crusaders.

\(^{106}\) The crown shown is not exactly the same as the real British imperial state crown.  
\(^{107}\) A type of cross whose arms narrow close to the center.
With the promulgation of its first constitution in 1956 establishing the new Pakistani republic, a new flag was introduced. It was a blue flag with a crescent and star in the middle with two wheat branches. Beneath the crescent, Pakistan was written in Urdu.

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108 A minor modification was introduced in 1953 when bold letters were used to write Pakistan on the flag.
In 1959, soon after taking power, General Ayub Khan announced that a national capital Islamabad would be built and the federal government would shift from Karachi to Islamabad. While there were many other practical and personal reasons (for Ayub Khan) to build a new capital city, a particular wish was to create a ‘purely Pakistani space’, truly representative of the whole nation:
Other than these ostensibly practical arguments, shifting the capital also fit with Ayub Khan's wider professed aim of building a stronger and more unified nation (an aim linked of course with his desire to strengthen and consolidate his own power). As Karachi disintegrated into a chaotic patchwork of competing groups, it hardly represented the ideal, unified nation of Pakistan that many had dreamed of. By moving the capital to a new location, Ayub Khan hoped to ‘start afresh’, to build a city in which the residents would all simply be Pakistanis, which would “become a symbol for the whole nation” (Dox-PA-127, 6) and which could prove Pakistan's potential to become a strong, modern nation. As Ayub said later, “the capital of a country is the focus and the centre of the people's ambitions and desires, and it is wrong to put them in an existing city. It must have a colour and character of its own....with the two provinces of Pakistan separated as they are from each other, you want to bring the people on a common platform. That thing to do was to take them to a new place altogether”. (Harper 2010, 92-3)

With this idea of a purely Pakistani space, symbolizing the entire nation, General Ayub Khan chose a Greek architect, Constantine Doxiadis, for imagining the Pakistani nation in concrete. Doxiadis was a Ford Foundation advisor. He was an exponent of modernist urbanism that emphasized universalism, scientific modernization, growth and progress. Clearly, Ayub and his advisors did not think that a detailed knowledge of Muslim history or architecture was necessary for an architect to make Pakistan’s new capital. Doxiadis was a modernist city planner and he was chosen to build a model modern and global city:
The contract was awarded to Doxiadis Associates, one of the world’s leading planning consultancies that had built its reputation on concepts such as ekistics (the science of human settlement) and dynapolis in the search for the “City of the Future” (Mahsud 2001, 2008). The idea of a replicable urban and housing model arose from Constantinos Doxiadis’s vision that a universal city system – what we would now call a global system – would fuse to form an urban network, the ecumenopolis, and all parts of the earth would thus interrelate. (Kreutzmann 2013)

Doxiadis was also clear what General Ayub Khan’s regime wanted. The past, whether Islamic or unislamic, had to give way to the future, symbolizing the new nation’s modernity and progress:

*Echoing the future-oriented nationalism of the new government, Doxiadis proclaimed that Islamabad was “to be created without any commitments to the past”*. (Hull 2012, 45)

After Doxiadis made the master plan, a group of British architects and others designed the important buildings (Harper 2010, 95-125). The master plan and the important buildings in Islamabad designed in the 1960s did not borrow much from the Muslim (Mughal) past or the local culture and the major influence was the modernist movement in architecture (Hull 2010).
Figure 24: Doxiadis Master Plan of Islamabad (1960)

Source: Dynametropolis (2010)
Figure 25: Pak Secretariat (Most of the Federal Ministries are in these Buildings)


Figure 26: President House, Islamabad

Source: Kureshi (2009)
The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

This period demonstrated an increase in the role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism. Four national symbols are discussed in this section. First, the modification of the presidential flag is discussed. Second, the change in the motto of the Pakistani Army is analyzed. Being the most powerful political player in the country, a change in the motto of the Pakistani Army is extremely important for gauging the role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism. Then, the construction of a national mosque in Islamabad is discussed. Despite not being a part of the master plan of Islamabad, it was considered necessary by decision-makers to construct a national mosque. Finally, the emergence of two new national holidays is examined.

Presidential Flag

After the separation of East Pakistan and the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, a new presidential flag was unveiled. It was different and more nationalistic than the prior flag in two significant ways. First, the color of the flag was changed from royal blue, which was a color associated with British colonial times, to green, which is the dominant color of the Pakistan’s national flag. Second, the direction of the crescent horns was changed and now they pointed to right side, like in Pakistan’s national flag. The star, wheat branches and Pakistan, written in Urdu, were not changed.
Green color is also associated with Islam. So, it can be argued that the presidential flag also became more Islamic with the adoption of the green color.

Figure 27: Presidential Flag (1974-1998)
Source: MacDonald (2013b)

Pakistan Army Motto

After the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the British were sensitive to the religious proclivities of the Indian soldiers. Priests of different religions were attached to the army regiments and
troops took oaths of loyalty to their regiment based on their religious tradition. After Pakistan came into existence, a number of factors increased Islam’s role in the military. As almost all of the military men were Muslim, Islam started being used more frequently to motivate the troops. Second, as the primary perceived enemy was India and most of the troops were from West Pakistan (the current Pakistan), it was easy to associate the Pakistan army to scores of Muslim armies that came from the North-West and successfully invaded the Indian subcontinent. Finally, the use of quotes relating to warfare from Islamic religious sources and traditions made motivating soldiers much easier. However, the military remained largely non-religious during the first two decades of Pakistan. Officers drank alcohol and related more to their British regimental traditions than to the tales of historic Muslim armies.

Things began to change in the late sixties and with the start of insurgency in the East Pakistan, the first serious attempts were made to change a Pakistani soldier into a Muslim soldier or (at least) to a Pakistani-Muslim soldier. One of the major changes came in the seventies when General Zia-ul-Haq changed the army motto to ‘Iman, Taqwa, Jihad-e-fisabilillah’ (meaning faith, self-restraint, struggle for the sake of Allah). Previously, the army’s motto was the same as the national/state motto ‘Eman, Ittehad, Nazm’ i.e. unity, faith, discipline (Ijaz 2011; Cohen 1998, 34-40; 86-104).

109 These armies were led by Ghaznavids, Ghoris, Tughlaqs, Khiljis, Afsharids, and Mughals etc.
Figure 28: New Pakistan Army Motto (in Urdu)

Source: Pakistan Army (2015)

National Mosque

In Doxiadis’s master plan of Islamabad, there was no large mosque that could be called a national mosque. Mosques were planned in all areas of the national capital as were schools, markets and playing grounds. The design dealt with the functional needs of the people. This was a departure from what is seen as an ideal Islamic city.:

*In one of many departures from the prevailing ideal-typical “Islamic City,” with its central mosque-market complex, no mosque was planned for the major commercial artery, the Blue Area...Planners saw Islamabad not as an Islamic city but as a city populated by Muslims, that is, a city not to be designed and administered according to Islamic principles but a modern city that would serve the needs of Muslims.* (Hull 2012, 215)
By 1969, however, a large national mosque was considered necessary for the national capital. King Faisal agreed to provide monetary assistance and after an international competition Vedat Dalokay, a Turkish architect was awarded the contract. By the time the construction of the mosque began in 1976, King Faisal had been assassinated. Due to the Saudi assistance of more than hundred million dollars for this project, the mosque was named Faisal mosque. Set in the Margalla foothills, the Faisal mosque symbolizes an increased role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism.

Figure 29: National (Faisal) Mosque, Islamabad

Source: Akram (2009)
Two New National Holidays: Eid Milad-un-Nabi and Youm-e-Takbir

National holidays are important national symbols. Their selection and the way they are observed provide keen insights into what is considered important by a nation. During this period, a new Islamic holiday became part of national calendar.

Eid Milad-un-Nabi (EMN)¹¹⁰ is the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. It is generally celebrated on 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal, the third month of Islamic calendar. The two main festivals of Islam, which can be traced back to the times of Prophet Muhammad, are Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Azha. The EMN might have been celebrated earlier but it was probably first officially celebrated by the Fatimid caliphate/dynasty of North Africa (909-1171). Fatimids claimed to be direct descendants of the Prophet¹¹¹ and used this fact in bolstering their legitimacy. So, officially celebrating the birth of the Prophet certainly helped them.¹¹² Starting with the Fatimids, this festival became increasingly popular and widespread. In 1588, the Ottoman Sultan Murad III declared it an official holiday in Ottoman Empire, making it an official holiday in much of the Middle East, which increased its observance (Shoup 2007, 35).¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Also known as Mawlid or Mevlid
¹¹¹ Through his daughter Fatima.
¹¹² It is argued that Fatimids might also have been influenced by the Egyptian Christian Copts’ celebrations of Christmas.
¹¹³ Saudi Salafis (Wahhabi sect) consider EMN unislamic and are strictly against this festival. Some other sects, such as the Hanafi Deobandis, do not consider it unislamic but discourage over-the-top celebrations. In the opposite camp are the Shias and the Hanafi Barelvis (the majority Muslim denomination in Pakistan) who enthusiastically celebrate this festival.
The EMN was celebrated in British India and then in early Pakistan but it was not a national holiday. It was Z. A. Bhutto that declared EMN a national holiday in the late 1970s. General Zia raised the profile of the EMN holiday by making it one of three holidays on which the day started with gun salute. The day started with a 31 gun salute in the federal capital and a 21 gun salute in each of the four provincial capitals. Under Zia, not only school and colleges but also many military units started officially organizing events on the EMN. (Haqqani 2005, 151; Crescent 2007). Zia also used the EMN holiday in February 1979 to link and legitimize his promulgation of puritanical Hudud Ordinances, discussed in the chapter on family law (Wasti 2009, 106). Zia was even ready to accept the anger his Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami allies who were not happy with his promotion of EMN celebrations (Nasr 1994, 193).114

Youm-e-Takbir (Day of greatness or Allah’s greatness) was declared a public holiday by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998. It was celebrated on 29th May to commemorate the nuclear tests that made Pakistan a nuclear power. The day had ostensibly nothing to do with Islam. But after a national competition, the day was given an Islamic veneer by naming it Youm-e-Takbir. Many celebrated this day as the inauguration of a Muslim nuclear power, along with the existing Christian, Jewish and Hindu nuclear powers. As Pakistan’s nuclear tests were done in reaction to the Indian nuclear tests, the connection between Islam and nationalism was readily made. Replicas of the missiles, Ghauri,

114 Although it claims to be above sectarian issues, Jamaat-i-Islami is closer to the Hanafi Deobandi sect in its interpretations of Quran and Sunnah. Like Deobandi sect, they also do not like the over-the-top celebrations of EMN.
Ghaznavi\textsuperscript{115} and Shaheen, were also placed at many city crossings, linking Islam, nationalism and militancy (Hoodbhoy 2008).

\textbf{1999 Onwards}

This period saw a movement away from linking Pakistan exclusively with Islam. There was also a symbolic rejection of militarism and extremism that the state promoted in the name of Islam during the 1980s and early 1990s. The presidential flag was changed at the start of this period to make it also representative of non-Muslim Pakistanis. The Youm-e-Takbir holiday was revoked and state celebrations of it were discontinued. Finally, the KP province, bordering Afghanistan, changed its motto and emblem to promote peace.

\textbf{Presidential Flag}

The presidential flag adopted in 1998 became representative of non-Muslim Pakistanis and more nationalistic. The change from the previous flag was the introduction of a white vertical bar near the mast, similar to the national flag. As the white bar in the national flag symbolized the religious minorities in Pakistan, the new presidential flag now also symbolically represents not only the majority Muslim population but also the non-Muslim minorities.

\textsuperscript{115} Ghauri and Ghaznavi were named after Muslim invaders of India, Sultan Muhammad Ghauri (reign 1173-1202) and Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (reign 998-1030). One of the Indian missiles is called Prithavi, named after Prithviraj Chohan (reign 1165-92), that last independent Hindu king to rule from Delhi. Prithviraj defeated Sultan Ghauri and was in turn defeated by him.


Figure 30: The Current Presidential Flag (1998 – 2015)

Source: MacDonald (2013b)

Youn-e-Takbir Holiday Discontinued

General Musharraf eliminated the public holiday on Youm-e-Takbir. One does not know whether it was done because of his personal enmity with Nawaz Sharif, whom he removed from power, or to show his love for peace. The national celebrations also ended and now the only recognition are some pronouncements and events organized by Nawaz Sharif’s
party, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)\textsuperscript{116} and some other organizations (Geo TV 2009).\textsuperscript{117} The replicas of the missiles in major cities were also removed in the early 2000s and now are being removed from smaller cities as well.

**Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Motto and Emblem**

The KP province, borders Afghanistan and has a majority population of the ethnic group Pashtuns. It has, borne the brunt of the almost four decades of civil war in Afghanistan. In the 1980s it was the province where most of the Afghan refugees settled and it faced terrorism perpetrated by the Afghan intelligence agency, Khad. Since 2002, it has faced terrorism at the hands of Taliban. In 2010, KP decided to change its emblem and motto. The new emblem and motto highlighted its estrangement from terrorism and militancy, Islamic or otherwise. This was especially important when one considers that in the ethnic Pashtun culture, as in many other tribal cultures, the warrior has been celebrated for centuries. When Pashtun accepted Islam, the local hero was a Muslim warrior fighting against non-Muslims. The Pakistani state, with the help of Saudi Arabia and the US promoted this Muslim Pashtun warrior hero during the 1980s to get the Pashtuns of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against the Soviets. In the 1990s, the Taliban were encouraged by depicting Pashtuns again as Islamic warriors. So, an emblem and logo promoting peace by the Pashtun-majority province, bordering Afghanistan, was clearly a radical change by the state elite.

\textsuperscript{116} There are more than one political parties named as Pakistan Muslim League.
\textsuperscript{117} In 2013, Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime Minister for the third time. Therefore, in 2014, there was an increase in celebrations on Youm-e-Takbir but it was not declared a public holiday.
The major changes in the emblem were as follows:

- The universal symbol of peace, the dove, was added to the emblem;
- The laurel wreath, also associated with peace, became part of the emblem.

The same message was given to the motto of the province which is ‘One message, one voice – PEACE’. On the official website of the KP government, one can see not only this motto but also a silhouette of a dove with an olive branch.
Conclusion

Geisler (2005, xv) argues there are two important functions of national symbols:

- They serve as catalyst for the creation and preservation of national identity;
- They align the nation to the state.

The second function is particularly important in new nations, where the imaginary boundaries of the ancestral homeland do not correspond to the actual boundaries of the new state. Both Turkey and Pakistan were new states. Their geographical boundaries were difficult to predict just six month before birth. For both Indian and Turkish Muslims, the ancestral homeland spanned much larger areas than the new states. National symbols,
therefore, had to not only create a new national identities in Turkey and Pakistan but also to delimit the boundaries of the nation to the boundaries of the state.

The early Republican elite in Turkey saw population’s affinity with Islam as a problem as it was a hindrance in delineating the national boundaries within the new state boundaries. New national symbols were, therefore, selected that had no religious/Ottoman content to break all linkages with the Ottoman Empire and its boundaries. In some cases, when national symbols, with religious content were selected/retained, their religious content was de-emphasized and efforts were made to completely erase the religious connotation. The example of the first type of symbols were the presidential emblem and presidential flag, which emphasized ethnic nationalism and had no link with Islam or the Ottomans. The tenth anniversary anthem can also be added to these two symbols. The examples of second type of symbols were Turkish flag and Turkish national anthem. Both these symbols had religious content but during the early period, this content was de-emphasized and they were re-imagined as secular symbols.

During the second period (the late 1940s to late 1970s), religious symbols were still not acceptable to the new state. However, some allowance was made for the Ottoman symbols which the aggressively secular promoted as Turkish symbols but for many ordinary Turks they had religious inferences. This change demonstrates a modest increase in Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism during this period. The best example of this change was the seven day official celebrations of 500th anniversary of the Istanbul conquest in 1952.
In the next period (the early 1980s to late 2000s), the state remained secular but, for the first time since the early 1920s, Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism was acknowledged by the Turkish state. Under the new ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, religious symbolism gradually made a comeback. Complete Turkish national anthem, with its Islamic undertones, was promoted and Turkish elite started showing religious piety by saying prayers, going to hajj and attending Ramadan iftars. However, due to continued resistance from secular components of the society, Islamic-oriented parties/governments had more success in creating new symbols rather than changing the old symbols. During the current period (2010 onwards), Islam’s reemergence as a significant part of Turkish nationalism has continued at an increasing speed. Resistance to Islamic symbols has been further eroded. So, even though only five years have passed, there have been some important changes, such as acceptance of headscarves in the Presidential Palace and the GNA and construction of a large mosque inside the new Presidential Palace.

One can see that the ebb and flow of Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism follows the same pattern as seen in the last chapter. There was initially a complete elimination of Islam’s role in nationalism and then slowly and gradually, Islam makes a comeback in the second and third period. In the fourth and current period, Islam's role in Turkish nationalism appears to be increasing until now and after the AKP’s win in the November 2015 elections, the trend might continue. However, it is too early to predict what will be the dominant trend in this period.
In Pakistan, early national elite had a more difficult task than their Turkish counterparts. They were largely non-religious like the Turkish elite and wanted to restrict Islam's role in Pakistani nationalism but could not do so without damaging the raison d’etre of Pakistani state. Hence, of necessity, Islam's role in nationalism increased after independence. National symbols were almost all linked to Islam, whether it was the national anthem, flag or state emblem. In the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), Islam’s role in nationalism further increased as the ruling elite, in contrast to the first period, actively started promoting it. Increased role of Islam can be seen in new motto of Pakistan’s military, the increased promotion of Urdu and Arabic, and a new national mosque. The current period, starting in 1999, shows a slow decrease in Islam's role in Pakistani nationalism. This reversal in policy can be seen in changes in presidential flag, the cancellation of Youm-e-Takbir holiday and disregard for the teaching of Arabic and promotion of English language. As indicators of Islam's role in nationalism, national symbols follow the pattern seen in the last chapter. Pakistani national symbols demonstrated an increase in Islam’s role after independence. In the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), religious symbolism became predominant in the state affairs showcasing a massive increase in Islam's role in nationalism. Finally, in the current period, post-1999, national symbols have become more secular, highlighting a slow decrease in Islam's role in nationalism.
In chapter IV, imagery on banknotes would be analyzed to examine the increase or decrease of Islam's role in nationalism in both Turkey and Pakistan. Following the banknotes chapter, the next three chapters will focus on three indicators of the Islamization of Government (family law, ministry of religious affairs and education).
Chapter IV

BANKNOTES
Introduction

Whether one considers nationalism primordial or modern, the importance of narratives and symbolism in the construction of nationalism cannot be denied. Narratives select, if necessary invent, events to authenticate the distinctiveness of the nation and symbols provide artifacts for worshiping at the national altar. National currencies mainly function as monetary medium of exchange. Through the imagery, however, they also help states both to invent/reinforce the national narratives and to strengthen the national distinctiveness by being the unique symbols of the nation. Not surprisingly, currencies have been used to develop ‘portraits of the nation’ (Schwarzenbach, 1999). Since all nationalisms are social constructs and most nations are heterogeneous, the ‘official’ portrait is always contested by diverse groups within the nation. Images on banknotes provide an easy way for state elites to promote their views widely, imperceptibly and without much cost. Banknotes iconography is, therefore, commonly used to authenticate and popularize state’s narratives over other competing narratives. Images of banknotes can, thus, provide scholars a window into the minds of state’s decision-makers. Deconstructing banknotes imagery can help identify which ideas about the nation and the national identity are preferred by the national elite.

Eric Helleiner (1998), one of the pioneers of currency iconography research, has argued that national currencies contribute to the national identity in five ways. National currency

118 A social mechanism, phenomenon, or category created and developed by society; a perception of an individual, group, or idea that is ‘constructed’ through cultural or social practice.
operates as a medium of social communication. National unity is strengthened because citizens go through a collective monetary experience when they use national currency. National currencies are also symbols of national sovereignty as other currencies cannot be used easily in their place. Moreover, national currencies require and instill trust and faith in the nation. Without faith, a national currency would fail as a monetary medium of exchange. Finally, the nationalist iconography on banknotes instills a sense of common, historic, and homogeneous identity in the populace.

Subsequently, many scholars have linked national currencies iconography with the national identities. Marcia Pointon (1998) has shown this linkage for three European countries: France, Germany and Great Britain. Andrian Tschoegl (2004) has analyzed Bulgarian currency; Harcourt Fuller (2008) has focused on Ghana; and T. Unwin and V. Hewitt (2001) and V. Hewitt and T. Unwin (2004) on Central and Eastern European countries.

Before starting the analysis of Turkish and Pakistani banknotes, it is important to emphasize the significance of the wide variety of choices available to the national leaders in terms of imagery on banknotes. Choices are not limited by either time and or space. Events that happened centuries ago and persons who have lived thousands of miles away from the state, both real and imaginary, can be used on banknotes.
TURKISH BANKNOTES

All seventy eight banknotes issued by the Turkish Republic since 1923 have been analyzed in the following discussion. There are nine series of Turkish banknotes. The first series was issued by the Turkish Ministry of Finance in 1927, while the later eight series were issued by the Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (TCMB), the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The number of banknotes in each series or emission (emisyon in Turkish) is different and range from only two banknotes in emission (E) 4 to fifteen in E7. The portrait of Ataturk has been a regular feature of Turkish banknotes, except for E3 and E4, when President Inonu’s portrait featured on Turkish banknotes (TCMB 2014).

119 The TCMB was established in 1930. Between 1923 and 1927, banknotes issued by the erstwhile Ottoman Empire remained legal tender.

120 During the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey suffered from high inflation, which led to the repeated issuance of banknotes of larger denominations. The highest denomination banknotes issued by the TCMB were 20 million lira banknotes, first issued in 2001.

121 President Inonu became President in 1938, after Ataturk’s death, and remained in office till 1950.
Table 16: Turkish Banknotes’ imagery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote Series</th>
<th>Banknotes</th>
<th>Unique Images a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 (Dec 1927)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 (Mar 38- Jun 44)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 (Jan 42- Mar 48)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4 (Feb 47 – Sep 48)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 (Dec 51-Apl 53)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6 (Jun 66- May 78)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7 (A) (Dec 79- May 89)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8 (Jan 05 - Dec 08)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9 (Jan 09)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Excluding portraits of Ataturk and President Inonu

Islam in banknotes’ imagery

For more than a century, Ottoman elite tried to come up and agree on a combination of din (religion) and devlet (state) that could stem the decline of their empire. After the empire disintegrated, the new Republican elite discarded the search for the golden mean and opted
for a secular state.\textsuperscript{122} Ataturk equated religion with backwardness and advised Turks to leave such superstitions behind to join the ‘contemporary civilization’ and become a modern nation. Turkey became a secular state in 1937. Not surprisingly, as shown in table 16, religious images were not chosen to appear on Turkish banknotes.

Table 17: Religion in Turkish Banknotes’ imagery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Unique Images</th>
<th>Islam Religions</th>
<th>Other Religions</th>
<th>All Images linked to Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1, E2 and E3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4, E5 and E6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7, E8 and E9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of sixty seven unique banknotes images in the history of the Turkish Republic, there were only eight that could be linked to religion. One of these images was related to Christianity (or ancient Roman religion) and the other seven were related to Islam. However, while looking for Islamic symbolism on banknotes, one also has to take into

\textsuperscript{122} As seen in chapter II on constitutions, despite elite’s pronouncements, Turkey was not a completely secular state.
account the fact that during the long history of Ottoman Empire/Caliphate, many Ottoman symbols were also perceived as Islamic symbols.

Therefore, along with purely religious images, the following analysis would also study Ottoman images on the Turkish banknotes. Based on religious images and changes in state nationalism, emissions have been divided into three eras. Each of the three eras has three emissions:

- The Early 1920s to mid-1940s (E1, E2, and E3);
- The Late 1940s to late 1970s (E4, E5, and E6);
- The Early 1980s to late 2000s (E7, E8, and E9).

**The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s**

Turkish leadership used Islamic symbols for mobilization during the war of independence but then forcibly tried to reduce the role of religion in state affairs. The Turkish Republic became aggressively secularist, clamping down on any public display of religion. Three emissions/series were issued and, not surprisingly, there was only one banknote displaying Islamic image out of twenty unique images. Even after including Ottoman images, there were only three images that could be related to Islam.
Table 18: Religion in Turkish Banknotes’ imagery (The Early 1920s to Late 1940s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote Emissions</th>
<th>Unique Images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Ottoman*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 (Dec 1927)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 (Mar 38- Jun 44)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 (Jan 42-March 47)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ottoman mosques, like mosques of other eras, are deemed Islamic symbol and are included in the third column.

The solitary Islamic image depicted in this era was that of Gok medrese (blue or sky madrasah/Islamic educational institution). It was issued on a 500 lira banknote in 1927 (figure 32). This medrese was built in the 13th-century, during the reign of Seljuk dynasty, in Sivas, Turkey. Although this medrese is one of the finest Islamic monuments in Anatolia, it seems paradoxical that an image of an Islamic institution was chosen at a time when Ataturk was trying to remove Islam from the public sphere (Lifchez, 1992: 3). Although the real reason might be different, there are two possible explanations. First, at that time, the Turkish state was not only trying to suppress Islam but also to degrade Ottomans who still had considerable support in the Turkish population. So, it might have been chosen

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123 This medrese, along with others, was closed by the Turkish government in 1925-6, and later it was turned into a museum (Şahin, 2006).
not as a religious institution but as an evidence of the magnificence of Turkish architecture before the Ottomans. Secondly, with the picture of medrese, on the same side of banknote, is a picture of Ataturk and on the opposite side, there is a picture of the town of Sivas (figure 33). Therefore, if one takes all of the imagery on the banknote into consideration, it is Sivas, not medrese, that is the focus of the banknote. Looking at this banknote, Turks were more likely to be reminded of the Sivas Congress and Ataturk’s prominent role in the Congress than of Islam.

Figure 33: Image of Gök medrese and Ataturk on 500 lira banknote (E1 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
In the second and third series, issued during the 1930s and 1940s, there is no Islamic-themed image on Turkish banknotes. However, one sees the appearance of Ottoman architecture on the banknotes. Ottoman-related images in this period are particularly significant as Ottoman period was regularly portrayed as dark ages and Ottoman Sultans as major enemies of the Turks by the state in textbooks of this era (Ince 2012, 84). Therefore, the appearance of the first Ottoman-related image (Rumelihisari) in 1939 can be taken as a retreat from the aggressive secularism that was the hallmark of Turkish state in the 1920s and 1930s as Ottomans were intricately linked with Islam.

There were two images in the second series that showed Ottoman fortress Rumelihisari in Istanbul. The Rumelihisarı was built by Sultan Mehmet Fatih on the European side of
Bosphorus as part of his preparation to conquer Constantinople/Istanbul in 1451-2 (Freely 2011, 11). Soon after building this fortress, Sultan Mehmet Fatih was able to conquer Istanbul in 1492. Besides being one of the greatest moments in Turkish history, this event also had religious significance. According to a hadith, Prophet Muhammad praised the conqueror of Constantinople and his soldiers. Sultan Fatih was, therefore, considered a Muslim hero as Prophet Muhammad himself praised him and Rumelihisari reminds everyone of his greatest military as well as religious achievement.

Figure 35: Image of Bosphorus and Rumelihisari on 1 lira banknote (E2 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
The increase in the Ottoman images in the E2 series did not lead to a further increase in Ottoman images in E3 series (1942-47). In fact, there were no Islamic or Ottoman images in the E3 series. This decrease in Islamic images, as well as in Ottoman images shows that Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism was marginal in this era.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1970s**

In this era, as in the last era, only one Islamic-themed image was chosen to appear on Turkish banknotes. However, images of Ottoman buildings became the dominant theme.
The first Islamic-themed image was issued by the Democrat Party regime in 1953. As discussed in the previous two chapters, the Democrat Party came into power after the end of single-party era. It supported a passive secularism and campaigned for an inclusive modernization. Since Islam was a big part of the Turkish culture/tradition, after coming to power in 1950, the Democratic Party relaxed many restrictions on Islam’s role in the public sphere. Some of these changes were restoration of the prayer call in Arabic, opening of many closed mosques/medreses/tombs etc. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Democrat Party regime chose Sultan Ahmet mosque to appear on the 500 lira banknote. It was the first mosque to appear on Turkish banknotes since Gok medrese in 1927.

Figure 37: Image of Sultan Ahmet Mosque, the Obelix and the Hippodrome on 500 lira banknote

Source: TCMB (2014)
One of the most magnificent and famous mosques in the world, Sultan Ahmet Mosque (the blue mosque) was built on the orders of Sultan Ahmet I between 1609 and 1616. However, the image (shown above) had not only the Sultan Ahmet Mosque but also the Obelix and the Hippodrome and the latter two are in the forefront while the mosque is in the background. Therefore, it does not appear to be an image of a mosque but an image of an Istanbul square replete with Turkish history, spanning more than a thousand years.

Table 19: Religion in Turkish Banknotes’ imagery (The Late 1940s to Late 1970s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote Series</th>
<th>Unique Images</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Ottoman*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4 (Feb 47-Sep 48)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 (Dec 51-Apl 53)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6 (Jun 66- May 78)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ottoman mosques, like mosques of other eras, are deemed Islamic symbol and are included in the third column.
As the table above shows, in contrast to Islamic-themed images, the number of Ottoman images increased. Both images of the E4 series showed Ottoman architecture, while almost half of the images of series E5 and E6 were also related to Ottomans.

In the E4 series (1947-48), there were two images and both were of Ottoman buildings. One image was of Sultan Ahmet fountain on 10 lira banknote. Situated near the imperial gate of Topkapi palace, this fountain was built on the orders of Sultan Ahmet III in 1728. It is one of the most beautiful fountains in Istanbul (Freely 2011, 386-7)

Figure 38: Image of Sultan Ahmet Fountain on 10 lira banknote (E4 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
The second image was again of Rumelihisari, the reminder of the conquest of Istanbul by Muslim Turks. Perhaps the popularity of the fortress had also increased because of the approaching 500th anniversary of the conquest in 1952.

Figure 40: Image of Rumelihisari on 100 lira banknote (E4 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

In the E5 series (1951-53), out of the total seven images besides portraits, three were illustrated with Ottoman buildings. One of the images, discussed in detail above, was that of the famous Istanbul square, with Sultan Ahmet mosque. The second image was that of Bridge of Meric, Edirne. One of the eight bridges in Edirne, it is also called new bridge. It
was started during the reign of Mehmet II and completed during the reign of Abdul Macet I in the nineteenth century. (Freely 2011, 87).

Figure 41: Image of Bridge of Meric in Edirne on 10 lira banknote (E5 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

The last image was of Bosphorus strait but a part of Rumelihisarı could also be seen in the foreground.
In the E6 series (1966-78), the last one of this era, the popularity of the Ottoman architecture/buildings continued. Out of the total seven images in this series, three were again related to the Ottomans. The beautiful ornate gate of the Istanbul University graced the banknote of 500 lira. The gate was built, on the order of the Sultan Abdul Aziz, who was impressed by the French monument Arc de Triomphe, on his trip to Paris.
Figure 42: Image of the Main Gate of Istanbul University on 500 lira banknote (E6 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

Figure 43: Istanbul University Gate after uncovering of Sultan Abdul Aziz’s Seal
The second Ottoman image was again of Rumeliisari and Bosphorus. The focus was, however, on the newly constructed (built in 1988) bridge connecting the European and Asian parts of Istanbul. The bridge was named Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the conqueror of Istanbul and the builder of Rumeliisari, thus strengthening the Ottoman connection.

Figure 44: Image of Bosphorus and Rumeliisari on 1000 lira banknote (E6 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

124 More recently, its Ottoman character was made visible after more than eight decades by uncovering of the Sultan Abdul Aziz’s seal (tughra). This seal was covered in 1933 during the heydays of assertive secularism (Daily Sabah 2014).
The third Ottoman image was of a marble fountain in Topkapi Palace. Topkapi Palace was the seat of power and residence of Ottoman sultans for four centuries. It is a symbol of Ottoman grandeur, and perhaps no other site represents ‘the values, tastes and aspirations of the Ottoman Empire’ as much as Topkapi Palace. Topkapi Palace has acquired religious significance in the 20th century as it was converted to a museum in 1920s and hold many religious relics, including Prophet Muhammad’s hair (Simons 1993). Choosing Topkapi image clearly meant that the Turkish state has accepted and took pride in its Ottoman past.

Figure 45: Image of Marble Fountain in Topkapi Palace on 50 lira banknote (E6 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
As seen in the last chapter on symbols, this era did not show increased depiction of Islamic symbols. Islam was visible indirectly as part of Ottoman symbols, which were increasingly chosen to represent Turkish state.

**The Early 1980s to Late 2000s**

This is the era of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a Turkish state nationalism with a generous addition of Islam, based on the foundations of family, mosque and barracks. Turkish state, for the first time since the early 1920s, enthusiastically used Islam to pacify and unify the society that had been marred by continuous ideological violence in the late 1970s. In this period, the number of Islamic images increased, demonstrating an increase in Islam's role in state nationalism. In this period, there were five images related to Islam. Four of these illustrated portraits of Mehmet Ersoy, Mevlana Rumi, Yunus Emre and Buhurizade Mustafa Effendi (Itri) and the fifth one depicted Mimar Sinan, with the Selimiye mosque.
Table 20: Religion in Turkish Banknotes’ imagery (The Late 1970s to Late 2000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote Series</th>
<th>Unique Images</th>
<th>Islamic Images</th>
<th>Ottoman*</th>
<th>Total Images</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E7 (Dec 79-Nov 01)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New E8 (Jan 05 - Dec 08)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9 (Jan 09)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ottoman mosques, like mosques of other eras, are deemed Islamic symbol and are included in the third column.

The first two Islamic-themed images appeared in quick succession in 1981-2. In November 1981, the Mevlana Rumi Mausoleum and a figure of Mevlana appeared on the 5000 lira banknote. Less than a year later, in October 1982, the image of the architect Mimar (architect) Sinan and his supreme architectural accomplishment, the Selimiye Mosque, appeared on the 10,000 lira banknotes.
Figure 46: Image on Mevlana Rumi on 5000 lira banknote (E7 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

Figure 47: Image of Mimar Sinan and the Selimiye mosque on 10000 lira banknote (E7 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
These two portraits were followed by a portrait of Mehmet Ersoy in 1983. As discussed in the last chapter, Ersoy, the author of national anthem, was an Islamic intellectual and rejected Atatürk’s drift toward secular ethnolinguistic nationalism. He even left his homeland, which he obviously loved, to live in exile in Egypt due to his differences with the Atatürk’s regime. The choice of his portrait clearly shows the acceptance of Islam’s contribution to Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism.

Figure 48: Image of Mehmet Ersoy, National Anthem, Ankara Fort and his house on 100 lira banknote (E7 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
The last two Islamic-themed images appeared in the current E9 series in 2009. Yunus Emre’s portrait was chosen along with his tomb and his famous verse ‘Let’s love and be loved’ which appeared on 200 lira banknotes in 2009. Like Mevlana, Emre was also a Muslim mystic and is famous for his poetry.

![Figure 49: Image of Yunus Emre on 200 lira banknote (E9 Series)](image)

Source: TCMB (2014)

The second Islamic-themed image was the portrait of Itri, with musical instruments and the figure of a mevlevi. Itri’s real name was Buhurizade Mustafa Efendi. He was an Ottoman musician, calligrapher and poet and lived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He
was affiliated with the Ottoman court. Although his fame is linked to his works as a musician and he is considered the founder of Turkish classical music, but he was also a mevlevi, belonging to a religious order, and wrote/composed many religious songs. He is sometimes called ‘Muslim Bach’ for his religiosity (Somel 2003, 142; Reinhard et.al. 2008, 868).

Figure 50: Image of Buhurizade Mustafa Itri on 100 lira banknote (E9 Series)
Source: TCMB (2014)

The number of Ottoman images decreased in this period as compared to the previous period. In the E7 series, besides the two Islamic-themed images discussed above, there
were two Ottoman images. One was the image of Izmir clock tower. It was built in 1901 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Sultan Abdul Hamid II by a French architect (Caskey and Caskey 2013, 97). The choice of something related to Sultan Abdul Hamid II was significant as he was considered to be a promoter of pan-Islamism or the Ottoman Muslim nationalism.

![Image of Clock Tower in Izmir on 500 lira banknote (E7 Series)](TCMB_2014)

**Figure 51: Image of Clock Tower in Izmir on 500 lira banknote (E7 Series)**

Source: TCMB (2014)

The second image was that of Sultan Mehmet Fatih. He was not only the first Ottoman sultan but also the first historic personality to be depicted on Turkish Republic banknotes. The portrait of sultan was another evidence that Republic has accepted the Ottomans in the
Turkish Republic’s official history. Choosing Sultan Fatih, instead of other Ottoman sultans, is linked with Istanbul’s conquest (old Istanbul skyline is depicted in the background), which was Sultan’s biggest military and religious achievement.

Figure 52: Image of Sultan Mehmet Fatih, with old Istanbul skyline, on 1000 lira banknote (E7 series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

The E8 series had six banknotes but four of them were copies of banknotes from E7 series. Only fifty and hundred lira banknotes were new. On the hundred lira banknote, Ishak Pasha
Palace was depicted. The magnificent palace in Eastern Turkey was built on the orders of the Ottoman governor Hasan Ishak Pasha in the 18th century (Sinclair 1989, 387).  

Figure 53: Image of Ishak Pasha Palace on 100 lira banknote (E8 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)

In the E9 series, there is only one image related to the Ottomans. Fatma Aliye has the distinction of being the first women depicted on the Turkish currency. She was also the first female novelist, humanitarian and the daughter of the prominent Ottoman intellectual, writer, reformer, and minister Ahmed Cevdet Pasha.

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125 It was the first Ottoman building to grace the banknotes that was not in Istanbul.
Figure 54: Portrait of Fatma Aliye on 50 lira banknote (E9 Series)

Source: TCMB (2014)
PAKISTAN BANKNOTES

The following discussion analyzes Islam's role in Pakistan’s state nationalism using images on all banknotes issued in Pakistan since 1947. Six banknote series have been issued in Pakistan since independence. Besides the five series issued by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), there was a 1948 provisional series issued by the Reserve Bank of India. For ease of analysis, the following decisions have been made:

- In Pakistan, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) also used to issue banknotes, along with the SBP. The lowest denomination banknote of one rupee was issued by the MOF until it was discontinued recently. As only three unique images have graced one rupee banknotes since 1947, these images are not analyzed separately and have been considered part of the SBP banknote series that was circulating at the time of their first issuance;

- As mentioned above, the 1948 provisional series was not issued by the SBP or the MOF but by the Reserve Bank of India. As these images were not been chosen by Pakistan’s state elite, this series was not included in the analysis;

- The third SBP banknote series, issued in 1972, was called the ‘emergency series’ by the SBP. It was issued after the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. The series reprinted four banknotes of the second series copying the images of the second series but in different colors. As the focus in this paper is on

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126 Issuance of one rupee banknotes has been discontinued recently. Now, there is only a one rupee coin.
127 This series was similar to the banknotes circulating in India. The only difference was the inscription of ‘Government of Pakistan’ on the Pakistani banknotes. The images on these banknotes were chosen by the British Indian authorities and the portrait of King George VI was displayed on all of them.
images, this series, a replica of the previous series, is also not included in the analysis;

- On the fiftieth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence in August 1997, SBP issued a commemorative five rupee (Rs. 5) banknote that was not part of a regular SBP series. This banknote has been included in the fifth (current) SBP series for the analysis.\footnote{The SBP also issued some hajj banknotes for the use of pilgrims going to Saudi Arabia to perform hajj. These banknotes were similar to the regular series, except for the color and the inscriptions, ‘For Hajj Pilgrims from Pakistan – For use in Saudi Arabia only’ in English and ‘hajj note’ in Urdu. As the images were similar to the regular banknotes, these hajj notes were considered to be the part of the same banknote series.}

Table 18 gives an overview of all banknote series that circulated in Pakistan since independence. Table 21 lists the total number of banknotes analyzed, after the addition of one rupee (Rs.1) and commemorative banknotes. It divides Pakistan’s history in three distinct eras, based on Islam's role in Pakistan’s state nationalism.
Table 21: Pakistani Banknote Series (1947-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote Series</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Banknotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 Provisional Series*</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 Regular Series</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First SBP Series</td>
<td>1949-53</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second SBP Series</td>
<td>1957-70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third SBP Series (Emergency issue)*</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth SBP Series</td>
<td>1976-87</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth SBP Series</td>
<td>2005-08</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not included

Table 22: Number of Banknotes Analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Banknotes issued by SBP as part of a series</th>
<th>Other banknotes a</th>
<th>Total banknotes</th>
<th>Unique Images b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-98</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Onwards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Banknotes issued by the Ministry of Finance and commemorative banknotes.

b Excluding Jinnah’s portrait and geometric patterns
The following section debates the importance of Islam to Pakistan’s state nationalism as demonstrated on Pakistan’s banknotes. But before analyzing Pakistan’s banknotes, a brief overview of the Islamic symbols on Pakistan’s banknotes is given.

Islam is usually depicted on the MMCs’ banknotes in the form of images of mosques as seen in the case of Turkey. Other MMCs, with mosques depicted on their banknotes, are Tunisia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey, Morocco etc.

Besides mosques, Islam is also portrayed on Pakistani banknotes as a crescent moon and star or by Islamic inscriptions. The crescent moon and star is a common symbol of Islam and appears on many of the flags of the MMCs. The crescent and star was on the flag of the All India Muslim League, the political party that fought and won the battle of independence. In 1947, the Muslim League flag, with the crescent and star, became Pakistan’s flag with the addition of a white band.

Tombs of religious personalities have been used as an Islamic symbol. Countries often depict mausoleums of founding fathers or other national leaders on their banknotes. Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum frequently appeared on Chinese banknotes before the Chinese Revolution in 1949. Turkey also has depicted Anitkabir (Ataturk’s mausoleum) on its
banknotes regularly. Depiction of tombs of religious personalities is less frequent choice but not uncommon. Other MMCs also choose tombs of religious personalities to grace their banknotes. For example, Iran has frequently depicted mausoleums of religious personalities – such as that of biblical prophet Daniel and of eighth Shiite Imam Ali Reza – on its banknotes.

Another symbol of Islam on Pakistan’s banknotes is the Islamic inscription. Inscriptions are part of many nations’ currencies. Often, the banknote inscriptions are descriptions of the images beside them. Sometimes, the inscriptions are related to the overall theme of the banknote such as in the Canadian journey series banknotes (2001-06) in which each banknote of the series has, beside images, excerpts related to the overall theme of the banknote (Bank of Canada 2015). More rarely, a religious inscription is depicted on a banknote. The most famous inscription of this type is ‘In God we trust’ on the US banknotes and coins.

Finally, a symbol of Islam that is peculiar to Pakistan is Mughal era buildings. Like Ottomans in the case of Turkey, Mughals were the last Muslim dynasty and the highest pinnacle of Muslim power in the Indian sub-continent. Mughals ruled for almost four centuries and Islamic and Mughal symbols intertwined during this time.

One of the most common shared memories national elite create is that of the mythical golden age. It is a time period selected from the past, real or imaginary, when the nation
was perceived to be at its pinnacle. This mythical golden age not only makes the ‘nation’ unique and old but also holds a promise for future. It is the ‘paradise lost’ that can be regained, with effort, sacrifices and collective action.

Two reasons can be given for the choice of the Mughal era as the golden age. First, Mughals were the last and the greatest of Muslim Empires in the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, it was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. As Pakistani identity was also not based on common ethnicity or language, it helped to evoke memories of Mughals who were not only Muslims but had also successfully ruled a diverse set of people. Mughals were also mostly tolerant; something Pakistan’s national elite wanted to highlight as they were accused of creating a state that would be intolerant toward minorities.

*Like the British, the Mughals were colonizers in South Asia and brought with them a vibrant trade, economy, art, and theology. They are also remembered as the perpetuators of the great synthetic Mughal architectural style, the Indo-Islamic style. The collective remembrance of Mughal rule in Pakistan is a nostalgic review of the successful amalgamation of a large geographic region, subsequent economic prosperity, and Islamic rule of an empire, often (although not always) with tolerance for other religions. This is reflected in almost every history of Mughal-period architecture, art, and administration.*

(Campbell 2011, 317)
Second, as India was Pakistan’s rival since independence and it was many times bigger than Pakistan, evoking memories of the Mughal Empire was a convenient way of reminding Pakistanis of a time when a comparatively smaller number of Muslims ruled the whole of India for centuries.

*Pakistan was a state infused with a dominant migrant ethos, couched in an ideological framework of the Two-Nation Theory as the raison d’etre of Pakistan. The ruling elite took pride in the achievements of the Indo-Muslim civilisation over a thousand years and appropriated its symbols such as Urdu language, Moghul architectural monuments and the Indo-Iranian tradition of art.* (Waseem 1996)

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

The first collection of banknotes was issued by the SBP in 1948. In this series, there were three banknotes and the customary design of having a portrait of an important personality (usually founder, king or president) on the obverse/front side and another picture (usually landscape or a building) on the back/reverse side was not followed. On the obverse side, there were geometric designs and a crescent and star and on the reverse side, there were only geometric designs. So, there was Islamic symbolism on each of the three banknotes of the series.
In the next series, issued from 1949 to 1953, there were two images that were Islam-inspired, Badshahi mosque on Rs. 2 banknote and a crescent and star on Rs.1 banknote. In addition, there were three images that were related to Mughals:

- A minaret of Emperor Jahangir (reign: 1605-27)’s tomb was displayed on Rs. 2 banknote;
- Shalimar Gardens, built in the times of Emperor Shah Jahan (reign: 1627-58), was illustrated on Rs. Banknote 10; and
- Naulakha Pavilion, also built on the orders of Emperor Shah Jahan, was depicted on Rs. 1 banknote.
So, Islam and Mughal themed images increased from three in the 1948 series to five in this series.

Figure 56: Shalimar Gardens (Rs. 10 banknote first issued in 1953)

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)
The time period of the next banknote series spanned thirteen years, from 1957 to 1970. Badshahi Mosque was again selected and it was the only mosque selected to grace the banknotes in this series. Crescent and star symbol was absent. The only image on banknotes related to Mughals, besides Badshahi Mosque, was of Shalimar Gardens. Thus, the total number of images with Islam and Mughal symbolism decreased from five in the previous series to two in this series. One of the reasons of this decline was coming to power of General Ayub Khan in 1958 who, as discussed in previous chapters, was one of the few Pakistani rulers who took on the religious right and tried to steer Pakistan in a more secular direction.
Based on the images appearing on banknotes one can, therefore, argue that Islam's role in state nationalism increased in the first decade after independence and then decreased in the 1960s but overall Islam remained a very important of Pakistani state nationalism.

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

During this period only one series was issued by the SBP, having banknotes of seven different denominations. However, total banknotes analyzed are ten as two one rupee banknotes were issued by the Ministry of Finance (in 1974 and 1981) and one
commemorative banknote was issued by the SBP in 1997, on the fiftieth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence.

This period saw a significant increase in Islamic images, although number of mosques and crescent and star appearing on Pakistan’s banknotes declined. From ten in previous period, the number of Islamic images increased to seventeen because of a religious inscription that became part of every banknote issued by the SBP and the Ministry of Finance.

![Image of Rs. 1000 banknote]

**Figure 58: The Islamic inscription is inside the black rectangle in big letters (Rs. 1000 banknote first issued in 1987)**

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)
Two Mughal buildings, besides Badshahi mosque, were also chosen to appear on Pakistani banknotes. One was the image of Lahore Fort on Rs. 50 banknote. The origins of the fort are ancient but in its present place/form, fort was constructed by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (reign: 1556-1605) in the 16th century. The other image was of Emperor Jahangir’s tomb. In the 1949-53 series only one minaret of the tomb appeared on the Rs. 2 banknote but this time, picture of the whole tomb appeared on the Rs. 1000 banknote.
Two new categories of Islamic symbols were used for the first time during this era, mausoleums of religious personalities and Islamic inscriptions. As discussed, Emperor Jahangir mausoleum had appeared twice on Pakistani banknotes but mausoleum of a personality related to Islam first appeared on Pakistani banknotes in this era.

In this series, mausoleum of two persons linked with Islam appeared on Pakistani banknotes. First, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal’s mausoleum was chosen to appear on Rs. 1 banknote in 1981. Dr. Iqbal is the national poet of Pakistan and is credited with not only presenting the idea of Pakistan but also with popularizing the concept of Muslim
nationalism through his poetry. Second, in 1997, the image of mausoleum of Shah Rukn-e-Alam, a 13th century Muslim Sufi saint, was selected to appear on Pakistan’s 50th anniversary commemorative banknote.

Figure 60: Iqbal’s Mausoleum (Rs. 1 banknote, first issued in 1981)

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)
However, the biggest change in this period was the addition of a religious inscription to all banknotes in 1980. The religious inscription on Pakistani banknotes was introduced in the 1980s as part of the Islamization campaign of General Zia-ul-Haq, initiated to legitimize his coup and to prolong his rule, as discussed in previous chapters. The inscription was initially ‘Husool-e-Rizq-e-Halal Ibadat Hai’, which meant ‘Earning legal livelihood is akin to prayer’ but soon it was changed to ‘Rizq-e-Halal ain Ibadat Hai’, meaning ‘Legal livelihood is equivalent to prayer’.

Figure 61: Shah Rukn-e-Alam’s Mausoleum (Rs. 5 banknote, first issued in 1997)

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)
The above discussion and the Table 22 show that religiously inspired themes proliferated during this era, demonstrating a heavy increase in Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism.

1999 Onwards

Only one series has been issued during this era (2006-08) and banknotes of this series are currently in use in Pakistan. Images on the eight banknotes of this series show a decline in Islam's role in Pakistan’s state nationalism as Islamic images have decreased from sixteen in the last period to only five in the current period. This era also marks the end of Ministry of Finance’s role as a banknote issuer because Rs.1 banknote was discontinued due to inflation and only coins of Rs.1 are available now.

Table 25: Religion in Pakistani Banknotes’ Imagery (1999 Onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Unique Images</th>
<th>Islamic a</th>
<th>Mughal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Late 1940s to Late 1960s</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Early 1970s to Late 1990s</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Onwards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Includes images of mosques, crescent and star, mausoleums and religious inscriptions
A peculiarity of this series is that it is the first series in Pakistan that while not abandoning the past, looks towards the future. In the previous series, three mausoleums had been chosen to be depicted on Pakistani banknotes and in this series too, there are images of Moenjodaro\textsuperscript{129} and Badshahi mosque. But the images of the Gwadar port, Faisal mosque, and K-2 (Korakorum-2) point towards future. Gwadar is a seaport on Arabian Sea that was still being developed in 2006-07. K-2, although the second highest peak in the world, attracts few expeditions annually as it is highly dangerous\textsuperscript{130} and facilities around it have not been as developed as those around Mount Everest. So, like Gwadar as seaport, K-2 is still to realize its potential as top draw for mountaineers. And Faisal mosque was completed in the 1980s, comparatively new as compared to Badshahi mosque that was constructed in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{129} Moenjodaro is an archeological site where remains of the largest cities of ancient Indus valley civilization can be seen.
\textsuperscript{130} K-2 is called the ‘Savage Mountain’ and the ‘holy grail of mountaineering’ as it has the second highest fatality rate in the world (Heil 2010).
Figure 62: Gwadar Port (Rs. 5 banknote, first issued in 2006)

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)

Figure 63: Faisal Mosque (Rs. 5000 banknote, first issued in 2006)

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)
Coming to Islam's role in state nationalism, two mosques were depicted on the banknotes, the Badshahi mosque and the Faisal mosque. Faisal mosque built in the new capital Islamabad is considered the national mosque of Pakistan. So, as compared to the last series, more mosques were depicted in this banknotes series. The number of crescent and star remains the same as in the last series. However, crescent and star now appears as part of the picture of Pakistani flag.

![Image of a banknote](image)

**Figure 64: Crescent and star as a flag (Rs. 5000 banknote first issued in 2006)**

Source: Banknoteworld (2015)

There are fewer Mughal buildings. In the last series, there were two Mughal buildings besides Badshahi mosque. In the current series, Badshahi mosque is the only Mughal
building. The major change is related to the religious inscription that was introduced by General Zia was prominently displayed on every single banknote of the last series. In the current series, it has been depicted in such a way that it is almost invisible. It is hidden in a circle and appears more like an intricate design than something written in Urdu. The value of symbols is on their ability to evoke emotions. There is no value in symbols that one cannot recognize or understand. Since the circle visible on the Pakistani banknotes now is not recognizable as an Islamic inscription, it is not included in the table above. This change does not appear random or arbitrary as it was in alignment with General Musharraf’s government’s attempts of reducing or reversing some of General Zia’s policies relating to Islam’s role in state affairs.¹³¹

¹³¹ One might ask why General Musharraf did not delete the inscription. The reason might be the fear of backlash by the religious right. So, a ‘golden mean’ was chosen by not deleting the inscription but making it invisible, so its value as a symbol is lost.
Figure 65: The Islamic inscription is in the center in big letters (Rs. 1000 banknote first issued in 1987)
Source: Banknotes (2015)

Figure 66: Inscription is in the circle and almost invisible (Rs. 50 banknote first issued in 2008)
Source: Banknoteworld (2015)

Conclusion

Using images on banknotes to identify Islam's role in state nationalism may seem to be a novel idea but banknotes iconography has increasingly been accepted as a tool to analyze state nationalism and national identity (Hymans 2005, 316). The analysis above shows the
pattern of increase and decrease of Islam's role in state nationalism for both Turkey and Pakistan that was seen in the last two chapters, repeats in this chapter. In the early Republican period in Turkey, Islam’s role was reduced to a minimum. Of all banknotes issued in this period, only Gok madrassa’s image can be considered Islamic but looking at the entire banknote, it is apparent that the focus is on Sivas Congress and Ataturk. In the second period, starting in the late forties, there were dramatic changes. Similar to the first period, there is only one image that can be related to Islam, but Ottoman images increased manifold. In the first period, out of twenty-six unique images, there were two images related to the Ottomans. In the second period, out of sixteen unique images, almost half (seven) were related to the Ottomans. As argued previously, Ottoman images/symbols were not Islamic images/symbols, they were a close proxy. Hence, one can see a slight increase in Islam's role in state nationalism during the second period.

In the third period (the early 1980s to late 2000s), as in previous two chapters, there is an evidence of increased role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism. In the first two periods, there was only one image that can be related to Islam. In the third period, there were five such images, highlighting a significant increase.

The chapters on constitutions and national symbols have demonstrated a further increase in Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism since 2010. However, since this period only started five years ago, it is still too early to tell whether Islam's role in state nationalism will continue to increase or will there be backlash. Since no banknotes series has been
released since January 2009, one cannot analyze Islam's role in nationalism for the current period using banknotes iconography.

Based on the evidence and analysis done in chapter II, III and IV, it can be argued that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism decreased in the first period (the early 1920s to mid-1940s). It increased modestly in the second period (the late 1940s to late 1970s), mainly visible in the form of Ottoman symbols/images. In the next period, Islam was publically accepted and portrayed as an important part of Turkish state nationalism for the first time since the early 1920s. The current period (2010 onwards) until now continues the trend of increased role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism.

As in case of Turkey, Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism has fluctuated. As Pakistan’s creation was based on Muslim nationalism, Islam's role in state nationalism increased after independence.

In the first period (the late 1940s to late 1960s), out of sixteen unique images, there were six images related to Islam and four were related to the Mughals. In the next period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), there was a surge in Islamic images. The number of Islamic images increased to fifteen and there were only two images related to the Mughals. This clearly demonstrates a huge increase in Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism. This big leap was seen in the previous two chapters as well. In the current period, starting in 1999, Islamic images have not been chosen as frequently as before. The decrease in Islamic
images is significant, from thirteen in previous period to five in the current period. Moreover, for the first time, there are no Mughal images in this period.¹³²

Based on the discussion done in the last two chapters and this chapter, it can be contended that Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism increased during the first period after independence (the late 1940s to late 1960s). In the next period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), the increase in Islam's role represented a qualitative leap over the first period as is visible in the constitutional changes and in the national symbols. The current period (1999 onwards) shows a policy reversal and Islam's role in state nationalism appears to be decreasing.

This concludes the examination of indicators for the independent variable, Islam's role in state nationalism. The next three chapters examine indicators of the dependent variable, Islamization of government. Next chapter will focus on family laws in both countries while chapter VI and VII will study ministries of religious affairs and education respectively.

¹³² Besides Badshahi Mosque, which is counted as an Islamic image.
Chapter V

FAMILY LAW
Introduction

In the twentieth century, more than a hundred new nation states came into existence. Most of these nations had previously had been colonies and were not economically developed. One of the strategies national elite in these countries tried, in order to promote social, economic and political development, was to copy constitutions and laws from their former colonial masters or from other advanced countries. Constitutions and laws thus became nation-building instruments. The elite hoped that these legal instruments would force the nations to be united and accept modernity and thus become more like the advanced nations. Unfortunately, the power of laws and constitutions to unite or develop societies was greatly exaggerated. Tradition, culture, religious edicts and ethno-linguistic ties did not cease to exist just because a new law was passed by the Parliament. Just as drawing borders did not create homogeneous nation-states, adoption of Western style laws did not create societies that resembled the Western world.

For the new Muslim-majority countries, family law was one of the main areas of political contention. National elite wanted to change and modernize, or at least reform family law. Religious leaders and a large section of the population, who believed in the divine origins of family law, were generally not in favor of big changes. This chapter focuses on changes in the family laws that Pakistani and Turkish governments have promulgated since these states became independent and the extent to which Islamization of government is reflected in those changes. A caveat concerning the following analysis. Focusing on official family law does not mean that this law was followed by all or even by most of the people living
in these two countries. It is only a partial story of how family relations were regulated in Turkey and Pakistan. As Welchman (2007, 9) argued at the start of her book, a focus on official family law should not be construed as a claim that these laws tell the whole story.

*It is abundantly clear that statutory law tells either only part of the story of ‘the law’, or one story among many. That (part of the) story is still worth telling.*

The incomplete or partial story is important to analyze here because family law is particularly significant in the context of Islamization of government as the following discussion will demonstrate.

**Why focus on family law?**

Family law consists of the rules related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody etc. Sometimes family law is also equated with personal status laws as both are concerned with the personal life of an individual. Family law is important in gauging the extent of Islamization of government for the following reasons:

First, while the Quran is not a book of laws, clear rules about marriage, divorce, and inheritance are given in the Quran. Other important issues related to the family are based

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133 These laws deal with marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, and related issues.
on Sunnah of the Prophet. This is in contrast to other areas of human life, like the economic realm, where there are very few clear Islamic injunctions, making it easier to frame new laws or adopt laws from the Western world. Changing family law is, therefore, more difficult than changing other laws.

Second, the family is the center of Muslim culture. Like other religious and traditional cultures, family and family life is considered sacrosanct and crucial to a pious existence. As Mansoori (2006, vii) notes:

*Marriage institution occupies vital importance in Islamic legal system. Its importance can be judged from the fact that the Muslim jurists consider preservation of family unit among the five basic objectives of Shariah. Marriage in Islam is not an ordinary civil covenant, it is rather a firm covenant. In the words of Quran, it is mithaq ghaliz — a phrase that refers to the sacred nature of marriage contract. It is not only a worldly affair (mu’anlah) but also an act of worship (ibadah).*

The third reason for choosing family law as a focus of analysis is that these laws were often left untouched by most colonial powers or if changed, the change was limited. Hence, when Muslim-majority countries (MMCs) became independent, unlike other pre-colonial laws, Islamic family law was operational. Decisions about reforming, ignoring or replacing family law to keep pace with the modern times, still had to be made. One way to gauge the

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134 Sunnah is a historical record of the sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad.
extent of Islamization of government is, therefore, to look at family law reforms that happened in the MMCs during the course of the last century. As Esposito explains:

*Muslim family law provides primary example of Islamic reform in the twentieth century.*

*Islamic law (the Shariah) constitutes the ideal blueprint for Muslim society....Reflecting the centrality of the family in Islam, family law has been the heart of the Shariah and the major area of Islamic law that has remained in force.....While most areas of Islamic law have been replaced by modern Western legal codes, Muslim family law has provided the major area of Islamic reform...Changes in family law, then, is significant both as an index of social change and as an illustration of Islamic reform, its methodology, and problems.*

(Esposito 2001, xiv)

Today, despite reforms, family law is still most likely to exist in its pre-colonial traditional form, based largely on Quran and Sunnah, in comparison to other laws (such as penal law) that have long since been changed (Rehman 2012, 56).

Fourth, family law is the symbol of Muslim identity in the modern world. Due to its basis in the Quran, its primacy in Islam and its continuity for more than thirteen hundred years, it is no surprise that family law has become a symbol of Muslim identity and authenticity. In his comparative study of family laws, An-Na'im (2002, xi-xii) has written that for
Muslims, Islamic family law (IFL)\textsuperscript{135} is akin to religious identity, a precolonial authenticity:

\textit{In particular, one must appreciate that IFL has become for most Muslims the symbol of their Islamic identity, the hard irreducible core of what it means to be a Muslim today. This is precisely because IFL is the main aspect of Shariah that is believed to have successfully resisted displacement by European codes during the colonial period, and survived various degrees or forms of secularization of the state and its institutions in many Islamic countries.}

Finally, many Muslims argue that a strong family structure (based on Muslim family law) protected Muslim culture from the Western onslaught of three centuries. Moreover, family law is the one area where Muslims consider themselves superior to Westerners. The breakdown of the Western family structure is often cited as the justification for retaining Muslim family law and rejecting Westernization. Based on survey of opinions in scores of the MMCs, Esposito and Mogahed (2007, 22-23) concluded that the family is not only the center of Muslim community, but also a source of pride:

\textit{Family bonds are among the aspects of Islamic societies that Muslims say they most admire, signaling that family is not only something Muslim value, but an attribute of their}

\textsuperscript{135} I have not used the term Islamic family law as it conveys the idea that there is one Islamic family law. While the family law in most MMCs is based on Islamic sources, like Quran and Sunnah, each of the fifty MMCs has a different family law. Even in the past, Muslim schools of thought differed on specific points related to family law e.g. how much time, after the disappearance of the husband, can the wife apply for divorce.
society they take pride in...Family law is viewed as the ‘heart of the Shariah’ and the basis for a strong, Islamically-oriented family structure and society. In the 19th century, the family provided religious, cultural, and social protection from colonial and Western domination, as well as site for political resistance.

Generally, three approaches have been adopted for reforming traditional laws based on Islam, including Muslim family law, in the MMCs:

- Rejection in toto: These laws were considered obsolete and incompatible with the modern world. So, they were discarded;
- Literal application: Medieval tradition and interpretations were thought to be the reasons for making these laws ineffective. So, efforts were done to tap the original sources of Quran and Sunnah and apply what is written in them literally;
- Modern interpretation: It was argued that every age had the right to interpret the original sources according to its own times. So, new laws were promulgated based on new interpretations of original sources (Esposito p-x).

Total rejection has not been the preferred approach in most MMCs. More often, family law has been reformed. Welchman identifies three broad phases of family law reform in the twentieth century136 (2007, 42-43)

136 Welchman identifies these phases with respect to Arab countries, but these phases apply to other non-Arab MMCs too.
• Ottoman and Egyptian legislative interventions in the early 20th century: Ottomans and Egyptians were pioneers in reforming family law. \(^{137}\) Changes made by them later inspired others;

• National codifications in 1950s: Most of the newly independent MMCs tried to reform family law after becoming independent. Reform was partly Westernization and partly codification, but the basis of change was primarily religious edicts and precepts;

• Resurgence of Islam: After the 1970s, not only the national and international environment changed but the control of the modernizing elite, which had led the national struggles against colonial rule, declined. Islamists gained ground, but they were not the only group gaining traction and power. New national actors (such as women and human rights groups), international focus and pressure (international women movements, the UN, the EU, international human right movements etc.), and more opportunities for networking and mobilization have made family reform an area of contestation. In some countries, such as Iran, many changes made earlier in the twentieth century were rejected. In others, such as Egypt, there was more Westernization but after a bitter battle that is by no means finished (Mahmood 2012).

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\(^{137}\) There were two reasons why Ottomans and Egyptians were forerunners in this area. First, they were not under a direct colonial rule. Secondly, they were in close contact with the Western culture and legal traditions.
Due to its prominence in Islam and in the tussle between modernist/secularist and traditionalist/Islamist sections of the society in the MMCs, family law has been chosen as one of the indicators of the Islamization of government. In the following section, Turkish and Pakistani family law are analyzed.
TURKISH FAMILY LAW

The history of family law in Turkish Republic can be divided into four phases. The first phase covers the years after the formation of Republic till the end of single-party era. During this period, initially Islam was the basis of Turkish family law. However, after the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (SCC), Islam’s connection with the Turkish family law was severed for good. During the second phase, from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, there were few changes in Turkish family law. Hence, Islam’s contribution to the Turkish family law remained low. In the third phase, from the early 1980s to the late 2000s, there were initially changes in the Turkish family law that increased gender equality and protection of children rights. Later, in 2002, a new family law was promulgated. The new law continued the trend that started in the early 1980s, increased gender equality and more protection for children’s rights. The contribution of Islam to the new code (or to amendments) is negligible. Since 2010, a new phase has started. Due to the political power of the AKP, many people expected changes in the family law that will bring it closer to the traditional Muslim family law. There were some signs that these expectations would turn into reality soon but the 2015 parliamentary elections results have left the future wide open.

Before discussing these four phases, a brief background of family law under the Ottomans is provided.
Family Law under Ottomans

The Ottomans started as one of the many Turkic tribes fighting with each other and with outsiders in the Anatolian peninsula. Even after they embraced Islam, tribal customs and laws were more important for these tribes than canons of Sharia in matters related to the family. It was only after the conquest of Constantinople (1453) that Ottoman Sultans started considering themselves as defenders of the faith and torch-bearers of Islam. Concurrent with this change was the administrative development of the Ottoman Empire which became more complex and bureaucratic. Both these changes, increased the importance of the Islamic family law as it became the state family law applicable in all areas of the Ottoman realm.138 The law was administered by the qadis (judges) who had wide authority in applying the law, as it was not codified. However, outside the urban centers, the reach of the Ottoman state was limited and the official laws had a tenuous hold on society (Oguz 2005).

As the power of the Ottoman Empire declined in the eighteenth century and it started suffering defeats at the hands of Europeans, a long period of introspection commenced. At first, the introspection was limited to the military sphere but it gradually widened and other areas of society also came under intense scrutiny. This led to the start of the Westernization

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138 The chief religious communities of the Ottoman Empire were divided into millets, each governed by its own religious family law. Muslim family law was based on Hanafi school of thought and was administered by qadi courts. Besides qadi courts that dealt with cases relating to family law and some other areas, there were also other courts that administered qanun (secular laws made by Sultan for governing areas where traditional religious law was silent). Sultan Suleiman, the Magnificent (1494-1566) was called Suleiman Kanuni (lawgiver). His marble relief portrait in the US Capitol building is an acknowledgment of his accomplishments in the codification of the secular Ottoman laws.
campaign (Yilmaz 2011). The Ottoman elite were broadly divided between those wanting to discard the Ottoman and Islamic laws and adopt European laws and others wanting to adopt a mix of the Ottoman, Islamic and the European laws. In matters relating to family law, however, most of the elites agreed that there was no need to mix or replace existing family law with European laws.

Not surprisingly, under the Tanzimat reforms, started in 1839, European legal traditions influenced all areas of the law, except the family law. One of the major changes occurring in the last quarter of nineteenth century was codification of the Ottoman/Islamic laws, making application of the laws more consistent and efficient, but the family law was again the exception as it was not part of this modernization exercise. The resulting codified collection, Mecelle Ahkam-i-Adliye, organized the laws on business contracts, obligations and civil procedures but left the family law unchanged (Ozsu 2010).

The Tanzimat reforms led to an increase in female education. Ottoman girls from elite families were educated before the reforms, but primarily at home. The Tanzimat reforms led to the opening of girls’ schools. By the end of nineteenth century, women belonging to elite Ottoman families, and acting in a more open atmosphere, started organizing and demanded reductions in gender discrimination and patriarchy. Many of the patriarchal constructs were enshrined in the family law so the demands were actually an attack on the Ottoman family law. (Gunduz 2004)

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139 Those who did not want to change anything or those who want to revive past traditions were few.
The major change in the Ottoman family law came in 1917 when a new law was adopted. Scholars have presented several reasons for the adoption of a new Turkish family law in 1917. First, it is argued that the Young Turk’s regime was following Ziya Gokalp’s advice. They were rejecting the ‘Arabic’ Islam and trying to base family law on a more liberal ‘Turkic’ Islam\textsuperscript{140} to make it less discriminatory (Hanioglu 2011, 62). Second, it is contended that increased knowledge of other Islamic schools of thought had made it obvious that the Hanafi School, the basis of family law in the Ottoman Empire, was too severe in some areas.\textsuperscript{141} Third, some scholars maintain that Mecelle Ahkam-i-Adliye had made Turkish rulers realize that a codified family law was better as it standardized the adjudication and gave less power to judges to interpret the laws as they saw fit.\textsuperscript{142} Finally, a few scholars give credit of this change mainly to the growing women’s movement, which was pressing for reform of the Ottoman family law. (Filozof 2015).

The Law of Family Rights (Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi) passed in 1917 resulted in the following significant changes:

\textsuperscript{140} ‘Arabic’ Islam that was perceived as illiberal by Gokalp.
\textsuperscript{141} There are four main Sunni Schools of thought (Hanafi, Malaki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali) and one main Shia School of thought (Jafri). Hanafi School was the official school of thought in the Ottoman Empire. Almost all of the Islamic laws (including family law) were based on the Hanafi School.
\textsuperscript{142} There were also concerns about the deterioration in the quality of qadis (judges), who administered the family law, due to the destruction of madrassa system during the last decade of continuous warfare.
• For the first time, the religious courts, which dealt with family law cases, were put under the administrative control of the Ministry of Justice. Previously, these courts were under the control of the Sheikh-ul-Islam;\textsuperscript{143}
• For the first time, women were given the right to put add supplementary provisions to their marriage contracts, including provisions restricting polygamy;
• Women were given more liberal rights of divorce;
• For the first time, a minimum age for marriage was prescribed. The marriageable age was set at nine years for women and ten years for men.

Besides these changes, this law established two new principles relating to family law. It accepted the doctrine of \textit{supra-madhab}. According to this doctrine, state is free to choose rulings/fatwas of any of the four established Islamic schools of thought (madhhabs) and laws do not have to be based on a single school of thought as before. Provisions could be based on any of the four Sunni Islamic schools of thought. Second, it established that, like other laws, family law had to be codified.

\textbf{The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s}

As discussed in the previous chapters, Ataturk and other leaders of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-22) made extensive use of Islam to mobilize and inspire Muslim

\textsuperscript{143} Highest religious official/cleric in the Ottoman Empire.
Anatolians. Clerics and ulema were recruited and played a large part in mobilizing the people who had become wary of continuous wars. Nationalists spoke in mosques, got fatwas issued in support of their cause and called for jihad against allied forces. Early congresses and the Grand National Assembly (GNA) sessions opened with prayers and Ataturk himself participated in these prayers. Toward the end of war, he accepted the title of ‘Ghazi’ (Warrior of Islam) from the GNA. However, after the war ended and Ataturk consolidated his control, the sultanate and caliphate were abolished and Turkey became a republic. The new constitution, promulgated in 1924, somewhat reestablished Islam’s pre-eminence as the state religion of the Turkish Republic. However, the role of Islam in the state steadily decreased after 1924. (Jenkins 2008, 84-94)

The secularization of the legal system that had started almost a century earlier continued. Even before the promulgation of 1924 Constitution, the Turkish government, in 1923, formed several committees under the Ministry of Justice to devise new legal codes for various areas of human activity. However, the Turkish government thought that the reports of these committees were too influenced by religious law so these reports were rejected. It then decided to adopt European legal codes, with minor adjustments. Soon, the Italian Criminal Code, the Swiss Civil Code and the German Commercial Code were adopted. Changes in family law were particularly difficult to make as it was one of the ‘last strongholds of the Shariah’ and ‘one of the most resistant area of the legal system to secularization’ (Toprak 1981, 52-53).
The year 1926 was a particularly opportune moment to replace the millennium old Islamic family law tradition with a European code because Ataturk was in total control and had managed to remove all opposition to his rule. A Kurdish rebellion in 1925, provided the convenient excuse for enacting tough laws and silencing all opposition. The opposition Progressive Republican Party that Ataturk had himself helped establish was outlawed after only six and a half months. Its leader, General Kazim Karabekir, who was one of the earliest supporters of the nationalist struggle and had fought alongside Ataturk throughout the independence war, was imprisoned. (Zurcher 2004, 169-174)

Despite these harsh measures, the adoption of a European civil code in place of the Ottoman family law, inspired by Islam, was not easy. But Ataturk and his followers were convinced of the righteousness of their cause. Mahmut Esat, the Minister of Justice, did not mince words in stating that the religious laws had impeded progress in the past and if Turkey wanted to become ‘civilized’, it had to change:

_Not to change is a necessity for religions. For this reason, that religions should remain matters of conscience is one of the principles of the civilization of the present century and of the most important elements that distinguish the new civilization from the old. Laws that derive their principles from religions ... constitute one of the major factors and reasons impeding progress ... As a matter of fact, the stipulations of the religious Ottoman code are doubtlessly irreconcilable with contemporary civilization. But it is also obvious that_
the Ottoman code and similar other religious regulations are not reconcilable with Turkish national life. (Arat 2010)

The choice of the Swiss Civil Code (SCC), instead of French, German or other European civil codes, was based on a combination of pragmatic and personal reasons. Scholars generally give the following reasons for adopting the SCC:

- It was promulgated in Switzerland in December, 1907 so it was the newest and most modern of the European codes;
- It was more adaptable as it was made to adjust with laws/customs of Switzerland’s many cantons and many ethnic/linguistic communities;
- It was easy to understand;
- The Turkish minister of law had studied in Switzerland so he was more familiar with this code than other European codes.\(^{144}\)(Oguz 2005)

The adoption of the SCC, with some changes,\(^{145}\) is considered revolutionary because many of its provisions contradicted what most Turks thought were religious edicts:

\(^{144}\)Swiss Code was available in French, German and Italian languages. The French version was chosen because more Turkish jurists/lawyers knew French than German or Italian.

\(^{145}\)Changes were made at the time of adoption due to the following differences between Switzerland and Turkey:
- Differences in form of State: For example, provision related to Switzerland being a federation were not adopted;
- Differences in judicial system: For example, references to cantonal law were not adopted;
- Differences in secularization: For example, religious marriage not legally valid in Turkey
- Differences in two societies: For example, the age of legal majority was lowered at the time of adoption.
• Polygamy was outlawed;
• Civil marriage became the primary legal requirement, while religious marriage became optional;
• Freedom to choose one’s religion was granted;
• Women and men were given equal shares in inheritance;
• The acceptance of three times unilateral repudiation by a husband as a divorce was replaced by a court granted divorce;
• Both men and women could marry people from other religions;
• The minimum age of marriage was increased to 17 years for girls and 18 years for boys (Ozsu 2010; Yilmaz 2015, 59).

There is a debate amongst scholars as to whether the introduction of the SCC was revolutionary or not. Those, who consider it a revolutionary step, point to the above changes and consider it as the end of a millennium old tradition of religious family law (Oguz 2005). However, others consider it to be a continuation of the Westernization and Europeanization of laws that started under the Ottomans in the early nineteenth century. While it is true that adoption of European laws started in the early nineteenth century, the SCC was a revolutionary step for two reasons. First, European laws were introduced before but mostly in areas where there were no clear commandments of Quran and Sunnah. Introduction of SCC was different because clear Quranic commandments were being replaced by European civil laws. Second, earlier changes in family law, such as the 1917 family law, brought Turkish/Ottoman family law closer to the Western family laws but
justifications for those changes were found in the Islamic tradition. The introduction of the SCC was the first major change in the family law that was not justified on the basis of Islam.

The contribution of Islam to Turkish family law thus suffered in two ways after the introduction of the SCC in 1926. First, family law based on traditional Islamic edicts and principles was rejected. Second, and more importantly, Islam was no longer the criterion used to accept or reject changes in the family law. Thus, after 1926, there was no need to find a Quranic verse or a Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad or a fatwa of a traditional Islamic scholar to justify a change in the Turkish family law. As Yilmaz (2003) argues, after 1926, Islam was no longer the basis of Turkish family law:

*With this law, Islam was completely disregarded. Citizens could be Muslims in their private lives, yet they could not claim any room for Islam in the public arena. The Civil Code is applied in all parts of Turkey and all Turkish citizens and residents are subject to it.*

It is argued that some of the patriarchal provisions of the new Turkish civil code (TCC: Swiss civil code as adopted in Turkey after amendments) could be traced to the Islamic traditions. There were, however, two other reasons for the presence of such provisions in the new TCC. First, in the original SCC, there were many patriarchal provisions that were adopted without amendments by the Turkish government. For example, the original SCC accepted the husband as the head of family. This provision became part of the TCC and
was not modified. Secondly, many of the governing elite, including Atatürk himself, despite their rhetoric, had reservations about gender equality. They wanted to give women freedom, but within limits and, therefore, subscribed to the Turkish patriarchal culture. They were rejecting religion, but not the patriarchal tradition that was much older.

The revolutionary changes brought about by the new family law were not accepted by the populace, particularly in the rural areas. Most of the Turks continued to marry according to the religious tradition and did not perform civil marriages. Until the early 1970s, fifty years after the adoption of the TCC, more than one- fifth of all the marriages in villages were solely religious marriages. This made thousands of children illegitimate in the eyes of the law. Turkish elite knew of and accepted this widespread nonobservance of the new family law and regularly passed amnesty laws to legitimize children of these ‘illegal’ marriages. According to one estimate, by the 1990s, around three million children were made legitimate by the amnesty laws promulgated by the Turkish state (Toprak 1981, 54-5). Moreover, although marrying in a religious ceremony before a civil ceremony was an offense, very few people were actually punished for this offense. In fact, until recently, the Turkish state (almost eighty years after TCC promulgation) was organizing ceremonies to entice people to marry legally in a civil ceremony:

146 Before or without a civil ceremony. After the civil ceremony, there is no restriction on a religious marriage ceremony.
To that effect, in some parts of Turkey, the State organizes big official marriage ceremonies where many unofficially married couples get married with the help of the State. No one talks about the Criminal Code or any kind of punishment, let alone speaking about amnesty. In such a recent case, the Secretary of State Responsible for the Women and Family started a new campaign: ‘Resmi nikahsiz aile kalmasin’ (Let there be no family remaining without official marriage). In the first event of that legal literacy campaign, the minister and the director of religious affairs bore witness in a State-sponsored official marriage ceremony of 12,000 couples who were married with imam nikahi\textsuperscript{147} but not with official marriage. (Yilmaz 2003)

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

Very few amendments were made to the TCC in the sixty year period from 1920s to the late 1970s (Atamer 2008). It was not that the need for reform did not exist. Demands for TCC’s revision were being asserted more often since the late 1940s due to the introduction of multi-party democracy, changed socio-economic environment, and the disconnect between what most Turks practiced and what the TCC entailed.\textsuperscript{148} A commission to review the TCC was formed as early as 1951. However, reform was not possible because of the

\textsuperscript{147} Nikah is the religious marriage contract and it is usually performed by an imam (Muslim priest). In Turkey, Imam Nikahi marriages are those marriages that are performed by imams and are not registered with the state i.e. there is no corresponding civil ceremony.

\textsuperscript{148} Another reason was the TCC’s incomprehensibility. It was in a (Turkish) language that contained many words from Arabic and Persian languages. Some of these words were discarded in the 1930s and the 1940s in a state-sponsored drive to purify the Turkish language.
mistrust between the democratic leadership and the old Kemalist elites. The Kemalist elite considered the TCC their premier accomplishment, a necessary step taken by them to ‘civilize’ Turkey. They were not ready to change TCC for those who, many Kemalists thought, wanted to reverse all of the Atatürk’s major reforms and take Turkey back to the primitive Ottoman times.

Three review commissions were formed for the TCC revision during this era, but they were all unsuccessful:

- First review commission, 1951: Its report was presented in 1971 after two decades of work. However, its final recommendations were lambasted by critics and were rejected;
- Second review commission, 1971: It was established to only review the divorce laws. This limitation was not acceptable to the members of the commission. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice stopped convening the commission after a period of time;
- Third review commission, 1976: It worked for approximately two years. Before it could finish its work, it was disbanded (Ozsunay 2014).

Not surprisingly, only a few amendments were made in the TCC during this era. Some of important amendments are given below:

\[149\] Kemalist elites controlled military, judiciary, media and universities, even after they were rejected by the people in elections in 1950.
• In June 1938, the requirements of minimum marriage age was reduced for both genders. For men, the new minimum marriageable age was 17 years and for women, it was 15 years (Yilmaz 2015, 59); 
• In 1971, the right to petition for divorce was extended to both parties (instead of only the less guilty party);
• In 1971, the rights of illegitimate children were recognized;
• Modernization of the civil registration system that covered personal information and status (Ablak 2012).

These changes were compatible with the changes happening in other laws. For example, in 1976, the Child Law increased the legal protection of children. Moreover, a juvenile courts law was passed in 1979 and came into force in 1982.

Islam’s role in the TCC remained negligible. There was no significant attempt to bring Islam into the TCC. Furthermore, a part of the TCC was given constitutional protection in 1961, making it difficult change. The provision of the TCC, relating to the civil marriage, was safeguarded from any legal challenge under article 153 of the 1961 Constitution.

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\textsuperscript{150} The change might be an attempt to bring the law closer to reality. In the rural areas, the earlier increase in minimum age did not have much effect.
\textsuperscript{151} With the permission of judge, the minimum marriageable age could be reduced to 15 years for men and 14 years for women.
\textsuperscript{152} As discussed in chapter 2, a total of eight (reform) laws promulgated under Ataturk were made part of the 1961 Constitution. The civil marriage law was one of them.
The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

More amendments in the TCC were passed in this period than in the previous fifty years. There were several reasons for this increase in amendments. First, more than fifty years had passed since the promulgation of the TCC. Socially, demographically and economically, the Turkey of the 1980s had few similarities to the Turkey of the 1920s. Second, the ideological differences that plagued Turkey for more than two decades, and the ensuing violence, declined in the 1980s. Third, after the end of military rule, there was not only economic liberalization, but also social liberalization due to the increased literacy, advent of information and communication technologies, the ease of travel to and from Turkey, and a general desire to join the European Union. One example of this change was the creation of associations. From 1926 to 1980, around twenty five thousand associations were created, but in the next fifteen years more than forty thousand associations were established (Yuvuz 2003, 92-3). Finally, related to the increase in associational activity, was the maturing of the Turkish women's movement during the 1980s. It became much more powerful and organized as more women became educated and joined the labor force. Women protested against the policies of the elites that supported women’s liberalization within a framework based on the traditional patriarchal system. The women’s movement benefited from the Kemalist reforms, including the TCC, but the

153 The adult literacy rate was still less than 20% in 1935. By 1980, it was more than 70% (Turkish Statistical Institute 2012).
connotation of equality had changed over the sixty year period, so there was a demand for a revision of the TCC (Gunduz 2004).

The efforts of the women’s movement and others led to many amendments in the TCC that increased gender equality. Many of the following changes were the result of court cases that were brought by women challenging laws that they perceived as discriminatory:

- In 1983, abortion was made legal within the first ten weeks of conception. Under certain conditions, it was legal until twenty weeks after conception;
- In 1988, under certain circumstances, a divorced spouse was allowed to request alimony without a time limit;
- Also in 1988, an amendment was passed to make an ‘incompatibility’ divorce easier to obtain;
- In 1990, wives were allowed to freely choose their profession or to work outside home. They did not have to seek permission from their husbands as was necessary in the past;
- In July 1992, the law which bound the working of a woman to the permission of her husband, was abolished;
- In May 1997, an amendment was passed to allow women to keep their maiden surname as their middle name. However, they still had to use of the surname of the husband after marriage;
• In January 1998, the Law for the Protection of the Family was passed, providing legal measures for protections against domestic violence (Gunduz 2004; Ansay 2005, 117; Mathews 2012).

In the 1980s and 1990s, child protection became accepted as an important responsibility of the government. The Social Services and Child Protection Agency was established in May, 1983 and the first juvenile court was established in 1988. In September 1990, Turkey signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child and ratified it in December 1994. In 1997, a special unit of police for dealing with children was created (UNICEF 2000). Concurrent with these changes, amendments were made to the TCC making it more child-friendly. Examples of these changes are the lowering of the age of individuals, applying to adopt children, from 40 to 35 years in 1983 and the granting of equal status to legitimate and illegitimate children in 1990.

Some procedural changes were also enacted during this phase. In 1984, Law 3080 amended several articles related to the personal status officers who are responsible for the registration of changes in personal status such as marriage, death, birth etc. And in 2000, an eleven digit Turkish personal identification number was introduced.

Islam’s role in the TCC remained minimal, if any. Constitutional protection of the civil marriage part of the TCC continued in the new constitution. In the 1982 Constitution, under Article 174, the civil marriage part of the TCC was one of the eight laws that were
safeguarded from any legal challenge. Despite the rise of Islamists in the 1990s, there was no movement to bring Islam into the TCC.

The above-mentioned piecemeal revisions, often forced by the courts, further increased the pressure to reform the whole law. The fourth review commission to reform TCC was established by the military government in 1981. It finished its work in October, 1984 but its recommendations were never presented to the Parliament for discussion and enactment. Ten years later, in 1994, another review commission was formed. After length deliberations, it presented its report in September 1998. The Turkish GNA accepted most of the report’s recommendations and passed the new TCC on 22 November 2001. It came into force on 1st January 2002 (Ozsunay 2014).

The key differences between the old and the new law were related to gender equality and children rights. The new code increased gender equality in the several ways. Previously, the minimum age for marriage for men was 17 years and for women it was 15 years. In the 2002 code, it became 17 years for both sexes. In the past, judges could lower the minimum age to 15 years for men and 14 years for women. Under the new code, even judges cannot lower it below 16 years for both sexes. The most important change was the recognition that husbands were no longer the head of the family. Other changes followed from this recognition. For example, an application of marriage could be filed at the place of residence of either husband or wife, previously it was only at the place of residence of husband. Either spouse could now, under the new TCC, legally represent the marriage and choose
the (family) home. Husband’s role as the decision-maker, protector and provider of the family ended after 2002. Conversely, husbands could also request alimony and wives had to contribute to the expenses of the marriage and the family's expenses after 2002. Finally, a major change was that income/property acquired during marriage was assumed to be the property of both spouses and if the marriage ended in divorce, the property was to be divided equally.

Several changes in the new code were designed to benefit children. Some were related to the recognition of paternity. For example, after 2002, the law allowed the mother to prove that her husband was not the child’s father. A natural father could also request the courts to establish his paternity. In the case of divorce or separation, the new code asked the judge to consider the interest of the child when deciding custody or alimony cases. Both mother and father were responsible for child care and education. For the first time, a child could also file a case of support against a parent, provided he or she is mature enough. Moreover, single parents could adopt children under the new TCC.

The main reasons for the promulgation of the new code were the pressure from the women's movement and Turkey's desire to join the EU. Women rights activists would have forced the government to reform the civil code (and in the penal code) even without the EU, but the EU accession process probably made the Turkish ruling elite act sooner. The EU annual reports on the accession process, emphasizing the requirement of gender equality, were
crucial in forcing different political parties to come together and pass the new TCC. This unity would have been difficult in 2001-02, without the EU requirement (Gunduz 2004).

Islam’s role in the new TCC remained minimal. Interestingly, Islam became an issue in the debate on the proposed new code not because of provisions related to Islamic law, but because of the wording of the rationale for the code. Islam-inspired parties argued strongly not for an Islamic family law, but to exclude the (shortened) original 1926 rationale of the code because it dismissed and derided Islam. They pointed out that 1926 rationale contained the following excerpt:

*To be absolutely observant of custom and tradition is so dangerous a mission that it cannot move humanity one step ahead of its most primitive condition. In harmony with the demands of life, no civilized nation has remained within such a restrictive belief system and has not hesitated to undermine customs and traditions that restrain her. ... Confronted with realities, it is not a dictate of intelligence to be loyal to beliefs inherited from fathers and forefathers. ... The day the Turkish Civil Code is ratified our nation will have been saved from the sick beliefs and commotion of thirteenth century that is circumscribing her and it will close the doors of the old civilization and enter contemporary civilization that brings life and efficiency.* (As quoted in Arat 2010)

Islam-inspired parties thus only wanted to protect Islam as a symbol, not as a living idea. Others, including the Minister of Law, however, argued that nobody wanted to disrespect
Islam. He noted that neither the current supporters of the inclusion of the rationale, nor the founding fathers that introduced the rationale in the 1926 Code were against Islam. He claimed that only the archaic customs and traditions were rejected in the rationale and, therefore, it had to be included in the new TCC. (Arat 2010).

Soon after the passage of the new TCC, the AKP came to power. Many people were afraid that the AKP would increase Islamization of government as it had a commanding majority in the Parliament. These fears seemed to be coming true in 2004 when the AKP government decided to criminalize adultery. However, this change was shelved after strong reaction from both the inside Turkey and from the EU (Smith 2004). After this defeat, the AKP did not make much effort to Islamize the family law during this era.

2010 Onwards

Since defeating its domestic rivals and establishing its control over judiciary and military, the AKP is in a better place to bring laws of its own choice. The floundering of the EU project removed the external restriction on the AKP. Though there are no Islamization of the TCC yet, the following changes in other laws/regulations and statements by Prime Minister/President Erdogan and the AKP’s win in the November 2015 elections point toward a more conservative future. However, as mentioned before, it is too early to predict the dominant trend in this period.
The first largely symbolic change was the change of the name of the ‘Ministry of Women and Family Affairs’ to ‘Ministry of Family and Social Policies’ in 2011. Announcing this change, despite protests, Prime Minister Erdogan did not hide that this was not a normal administrative change:

*We are a conservative democratic party. The family is important to us.* (Belge 2011)

The change was considered a backward step by women group but the new minister, Fatma Sahin, decided to work with women NGOs and achieved a major victory for women. In March 2012, on International Women Day, the AKP-dominated assembly passed a comprehensive law relating to domestic violence in Turkey. Called a ‘historic step’ by women's rights activist and lawyer Nazan Moroglu, despite her misgivings, this law not only protected all women (regardless of their marital status), but also introduced a number new ways and regulations to protect women. Police were authorized to intervene earlier; less evidence was required to place restrictions on those that could use violence; past offenders could be asked to wear ankle bracelets and wrist bands to track their movements; those feeling threatened could be moved to secure places; and sentences were increased for offenders (Zeldin 2012; Hurriyet Daily News 2012).

While Erdogan’s bark is worse than his bite, after 2010, his statements have suggested a bias against working women. He has asked Turkish women to have at least three children, praised motherhood and called birth control a treason (AFP 2014b; Hurriyet Daily News
2013a; Today's Zaman 2013c; Binyon 2012). When criticized, he responded by saying that neither he had legally obligated everybody nor he had put a gun to anyone’s head to have three children. He was only recommending it and as the PM, he had the right to recommend what is good (Daloglu 2013). He has also suggested that women and men could not do the same jobs as they are equivalent, not equal (Sarhan 2014).

Abortion, however, is an area, where he has not only talked but also acted. Abortion has been legal since the early 1980s, as discussed above. In 2012, Prime Minister Erdogan stated his views about abortion publically:

There is no difference between killing a baby in its mother's stomach and killing a baby after birth... I consider abortion to be murder. No-one should have the right to allow this to happen. (Ahmadi 2012)

After this statement by the PM, the AKP government passed a law in 2012 that limited the abortions to ten weeks. Additionally, it proposed sentences for women who underwent abortions that were not medically necessary, after the first ten weeks of their pregnancy. More recently, in March 2014, it was reported that though abortion remains legal, government has effectively stopped the public hospitals from providing this service. According to Turkish Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, doctors in the public sector can no longer click and approve abortion services on their computers. The option has been removed. So, doctors either have to perform abortion under emergency services or ask the
patient to go to a private hospital. This means that although they remain legal, abortion services will be difficult to find and more costly in future (Tremblay 2014; Hurriyet Daily News 2014a).

The most noticeable evidence that Turkey’s family law is going to change is the rejection of requirement of civil marriage before religious marriage by the Constitutional Court in May 2015. Since the late 1920s, as discussed above, it was illegal to perform religious marriage ceremony before civil ceremony the bride, groom, and imam – who officiated the marriage – could be sent to jail for two to six months. However, this law was annulled. The majority opinion argued that since two persons living together without civil marriage is not illegal, it would be discrimination to punish two persons living together after imam-nikahi (religious) marriage, without civil marriage. Many see this as a liberal interpretation and a positive development as it reduces state’s interference in people’s lives and enhances individual rights. However, criminalization of religious marriage (that is performed without civil marriage) was an important component of Ataturk’s secularism. Moreover, requirement of civil marriage is seen by many as a bulwark against polygamy and under-age marriages, augmenting women and children rights (Akyol 2015). One commentator, afraid of the things to come after this decision, declared:

_In the history of this country, women have never been so denigrated, so patronized, so humiliated and left so unprotected._ (Arman 2015)
The authoritarian features of the family law are certainly being discarded, but are they being replaced by a liberal regime or by religious law? Looking at the broader atmosphere, the evidence of a liberal regime prospering under President Erdogan is weak. However, loss in the June parliamentary elections means Erdogan does not have the power to dictate.

Looking at the changes in Turkish family law since the establishment of the Republic, there are two things that clearly emerge. First, women benefitted from the changes in the family laws, although not as much as the Kemalists claim as the Kemalists were actually closet believers in tradition and patriarchy. The following excerpt from Ataturk’s speech to a female teacher’s college in 1925 demonstrates the mixture of tradition and modernity as he praises female enlightenment but also their purity and morality and reminds these (working and educated) women of their foremost duty as nation’s mothers:

*The Turkish woman ought to be the world’s most enlightened, most virtuous and most weighty woman. Weighty, not with burdens, but in morality and virtue, she ought to be a dignified woman. The duty of the Turkish woman is to rear generations that will conserve and safeguard the Turk’s intelligence, strength, and determination. As the source of the nation and the essence of social life, woman is capable of discharging this duty only insofar as she is virtuous. Woman ought to be held in high esteem under all conditions.* (Ozsu 2010)
Second, Islam has not been basis or part of the TCC since 1926. It is difficult to trace any provision in the TCC to Islamic sources or precepts.
FAMILY LAW IN PAKISTAN

The reform of family law in Pakistan can be divided into three distinct periods. The first period (1947-77) is marked by an effort to modernize and reform the family law and make it less gender discriminatory. During the second period (1978-99), the trend was reversed and traditional interpretations of Islam dominated the state and the amendments in family law were influenced by these traditional interpretations. The current period (2000-15), similar to the first period, is focused on removing gender discrimination and decreasing some of the more pronounced inequalities present in the family law. Each period can be defined by a quintessential law. The first period is defined by the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO), 1961. The hallmark of the second period is the Zina Ordinance, 1979. The third period is characterized by the Women Protection Act, 2006. Each period is described more fully below and its significance explained.

Family Law during the Colonial Era

Before independence, the British colonial administration had generally left the family law to the various religious communities. Muslims were governed by the Muslim family law and Hindus, Sikhs and Parsis were governed by their own family laws. The one caveat being that these laws were adjudicated by judges trained in the British common law tradition and since family law was not codified, the judges had some leeway in deciding family law cases. The resulting case law was thus a mixture of religious law and common law and was called Anglo-Mohammadan law by some scholars (Mehdi 1994, 4-5)
During the early twentieth century, there were a few areas where the British decided it was necessary to legislate, often under pressure from the religious communities, to decrease injustices brought about by traditional interpretations of the religious family law. One prominent example of such British legislation was the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 that established the minimum age of marriage for women (14 years) and men (18 years). This act was applicable to all Indians. It was supported by Jinnah and other political leaders and, not surprisingly, opposed by the both Hindu and Muslim religious leaders. (Jalal 2000, 457; Ahmed 1999)

For Muslims, a major piece of British Indian legislation relating to family law was passed in 1937. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act established inheritance based on Shariat law. This act increased the role of Islam in family law by legislating that most matters relating to inheritance by Muslims would be determined on the basis of Shariat. Hence, customary law that had been applicable before was replaced by Shariat (Agarwal 2005). However, there were two major exceptions given in the new law which generally resulted in the exclusion of female heirs from their inheritance. First, under the new law, Shariat was not applicable to inheritance of agricultural property and second, testate succession was also outside the purview of this law. Customary law was still applicable

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154 The pressure was from communities, not religious leaders, who were happy with the traditional interpretations.
155 Customary law was considered a source of law in British India and meant law based on customs, which were considered reasonable and had been in use continuously from times immemorial. (Ahmad 2013)
156 Testate succession is based on a valid will of the deceased, as opposed to intestate succession, where there is no valid will of the deceased.
in these two areas. The law highlights that although family law was generally based on religious law, there were some areas where religious law was not applied and customary law was followed instead.\textsuperscript{157}

Another law that addressed family matters was the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. This law broadened the grounds on which a wife could request the dissolution of a marriage. The law also accepted the \textit{takhayyar} principle of Islamic law that is close to the supra-madhhab doctrine explained above. According to this principle, while following predominantly one school of law, Muslims have the right to follow some rulings of another school of law i.e. Muslims do not have to follow one school of law completely.\textsuperscript{158} Thus, although most of the Muslims in British India followed the Hanafi School of law, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 used Malaki School of law interpretations. With some changes, this law is largely still applicable today in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

Following independence, although Pakistan’s legislative assembly was busy debating the constitution, some changes in family law were enacted. The trend of replacing the

\textsuperscript{157} This law was not applied in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) that had in 1935 passed its own law, the NWFP Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act.

\textsuperscript{158} They could follow the ruling of one school on one issue and of another school on a different issue. Many ulema (religious scholars) refuse to accept this eclecticism and consider it dangerous for a layman to pick and choose between different schools. (Yilmaz 2005; Sajaad 2014)
traditional interpretations with more recent/modern interpretations, which started with Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, continued.

In 1948, the exceptions to the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 were targeted by the women legislators in the Punjab province. These legislators, although few in number were able to extend the application of Shariat to inheritance of the agricultural lands. They were able to makes these changes despite strong resistance from powerful Punjabi landlords that dominated the legislature! Under the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1948, it became mandatory to give women their share of property as decided by the Sharia. In 1951, the other exception was also removed in Punjab and all matters related to inheritance, both testate and intestate, came under the Shariat/religious law.

However, since Pakistan was a federation, application of these provincial laws was limited to Punjab only and other provinces had to come up with their own laws. The NWFP had already applied Shariat laws to agricultural land inheritance before independence. Other provinces promulgated the following laws to bring agricultural land inheritance under Shariat: the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Sind Amendment) Act, 1950; the Bahawalpur State (Muslim Personal Law) Application Act, 1951 and the Khairpur State Muslim Female Inheritance (Removal of Customs) Act, 1952. The only major exception was in Balochistan province which was still under the control of tribal chiefs and customs
and did not have its own provincial legislature. However, less than two percent of Pakistani lived in the Balochistan province at that time.\footnote{One important point to be noted is that these laws did not explicitly define Shariat or even the Shariat’s principles of inheritance. It was left to the judge to decide what Shariat is and what the laws of inheritance in Shariat are.}

Another major development in the history of Pakistan family law was the formation of a government commission, chaired by the former Chief Justice Mian Abdul Rashid,\footnote{Rashid was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme (federal) Court of Pakistan from 1949 to 1954.} to study and recommend changes in the family law of Pakistan in August 1955 (Mehdi 1994, 155). This commission was the first in Pakistan established specifically to deal with women’s issues.\footnote{Although women had long demanded changes in family and other laws, the issue that led to the formation of this commission was the second marriage of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra to his secretary, while still married to his first wife.}

\footnote{Alim means Islamic religious scholar and ulema is the plural of alim. The term Ulema is now most often used to denote traditional religious leaders. They may or may not be scholars of Islamic law.}

The Rashid Commission had seven members, three women and four men, including the traditional religious scholar Maulana Ehtesham-ul-Haq Thanvi. After working for one year, the commission submitted its report, written by the Justice Abdur Rasheed, in 1956. Maulana Thanvi, a representative of the religious right, did not accept the report and added a dissenting note later. The commission recommended a non-traditional interpretation of Islam with respect to family law i.e. the gender discrimination rife in traditional interpretations was rejected. The report recommended, among other things, the registration of marriage and divorce and making divorce less discriminatory toward women. Despite following broad Islamic injunctions and justifying its recommendations on that basis, the commission’s report was rejected by most ulema.\footnote{Alim means Islamic religious scholar and ulema is the plural of alim. The term Ulema is now most often used to denote traditional religious leaders. They may or may not be scholars of Islamic law.}
(Ghosh 2012, 1961-2). The Commission’s report did not lead to any new legislation due to the strong opposition of ulema (Cheema 2013). In addition, the political instability also contributed to the lack of action on these recommendations.\footnote{From September 1956 to December 1957, Pakistan had four different Prime Ministers. This political instability, mainly due to unconstitutional political ambitions of General Ayub Khan and President Iskander Mirza, eventually resulted in martial law in October 1958.}

In October 1958, martial law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan. He was a military dictator who was also the architect of family law reform in Pakistan. The Muslim Law Family Ordinance (MFLO) of 1961, for which he was responsible, is still the main family law legislation in Pakistan. Bangladesh, also follows this law, even after separation from Pakistan.

Ayub Khan gave himself the task of making Pakistan a modern Muslim state. He had great confidence in his abilities and in his missionary zeal. He attempted to implement land reforms, agricultural reforms, educational reforms, economic reforms and political reforms amongst others. In this social engineering mission, he was supported not only by many parts of Pakistani society but also by many Western scholars. Samuel Huntington, for example, admiringly compared him to the great lawgivers Solon and Lycurgus (Haq 2005, 204)
General Ayub Khan had a very negative opinion of religious leaders and considered them obstacles in Pakistan’s socio-economic development. He considered most of the ulema not God-fearing scholars serving the people but power hungry political players.

*I knew that the ulema will not be satisfied with this arrangement. They claimed the exclusive right to interpret and decide matters pertaining to Islam ... The history of the ulema in the sub-continent has been one of the perpetual conflict with the educated classes...I wish to make clear that here I am referring to that class of ulema who are openly engaged in politics and not those God-fearing people who have served the community by teaching Quran and propagating the message of Islam in a selfless, humble, and devoted manner’* (Haq 2005, 204)

The MFLO of 1961 made the following changes to the family law of Pakistan.

- **Marriage:** Registration of marriage was made compulsory. A standard nikahnama (marriage contract) was introduced;
- **Divorce:** Registration of divorce was made a legal requirement. Divorce was made effective only after three months during which reconciliation was deemed possible;
- **Inheritance:** Children of a dead son/daughter were entitled to the deceased’s share of inheritance from his/her parents;
- **Polygamy:** Restrictions were placed on polygamy. Prior approval by the first wife was deemed a requirement;
• Dower and Maintenance: Dower and maintenance allowance payment to wives were made mandatory;

• Child marriage: The minimum age for marriage was increased from 14 to 16 years for women and from 18 to 21 years for men (Mehdi 1994, 194-5);

• Divorce by wife: The procedure to initiate a divorce were made easier for women.

In 1962, General Ayub Khan164 promulgated the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act which extended the application of Shariat for inheritance to the whole of current Pakistan, except for the tribal areas close to the NWFP.165 This brought uniformity to the law regarding inheritance. However, these changes did not prescribe any specific shares (for each type of heir) and only made application of Shariat mandatory.

There was strong opposition to MFLO and the religious right, both political and non-political, protested the law. To safeguard the law from challenges in the courts, Ayub made it part of the 4th Schedule166 of the 1962 Constitution.167

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164 He also got himself elected President in a controversial election and promoted himself to be field marshal.
165 Not to East Pakistan, the present Bangladesh.
166 Laws mentioned in this schedule could not be challenged in the courts.
167 In 1965, Ayub’s desire to build a modern Pakistan and ulema (religious leaders)’s commitment to tradition was, however, severely tested when Fatima Jinnah (sister of founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah) contested the presidential election against Ayub. Both Ayub and ulema failed the challenge. Ulema supported Fatima Jinnah despite claiming that a women could not be president and Ayub backtracked on his commitment to gender empowerment and used his supporter to argue that women could not become head of a Muslim state.
To facilitate the implementation of the MFLO and to increase its effectiveness, General Ayub Khan promulgated the West Pakistan Family Courts Act of 1964. Previously, in the civil courts, cases related to family law were delayed for years. The West Pakistan Family Courts Act was promulgated, ‘to make provision for the establishment of Family Courts for the expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith’. The law dealt with matters related to dissolution of marriage; dower; maintenance; restitution of conjugal rights; guardianship; and the custody of children. The law also specified time limits for different judicial procedures, making it mandatory for judges to decide cases expeditiously. Expeditious proceedings helped women more often than men because they (generally) could not afford to hire and interact with lawyers and be present at hearings that could potentially continue for years (West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964).

The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

After the separation of Bangladesh in December 1971 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over the control of Pakistan168. He was a Western-educated, non-religious man. From his rhetoric and behavior, it would not be incorrect to have assumed that he would reject traditional interpretations of Islam and make the MFLO more gender neutral. Bhutto did manage to introduce some clauses in the constitution related to gender equality, but during his five and half years rule, no major legislation on family law was enacted.

168 The military regime of General Yahya handed power to Bhutto after defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war as he had won most seats in what was the remaining Pakistan.
Perhaps the declaration of 1975 as International Women’s Year by the UN was the catalyst to remind him of his commitment to women. The first lady Nusrat Bhutto led a group of women to the first World Conference on Women in Mexico City. After the conference two laws (Dowry and Bridal Gifts Restriction Act, 1976 and Dowry and Bridal Gifts Restriction Rules, 1976) were passed giving permanent ownership of all gifts given to the wife by the husband before or after the marriage. These gifts were not required to be returned to the husband if the wife sought a divorce (khula). Another action that could have led to reform/change in family law occurred in January 1976. A thirteen member Women’s Rights Committee, with nine women members, was formed under the chairmanship of Yahya Bakhtiar, the Attorney General of Pakistan. This committee was, ‘to consider and formulate proposals for law reforms, with a view to improve the social, legal and economic conditions of the women of Pakistan and to provide for speedier legal remedies for obtaining relief in matters like maintenance, custody of children, etc.’ The committee presented its recommendations in July 1976, proposing changes in the MFLO, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act etc. to improve the position of women in matters relating to marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance, inheritance etc. No action, however, was taken on these recommendations until martial law was imposed in 1977 (NCSW 2015). Bhutto’s tenure was no doubt a disappointment for those women that supported him for his promises to decrease legal gender discrimination.
General Zia led a military coup in July 1977 and gave a solemn promise to Pakistanis that elections would be held in the next three months. However, as subsequent events showed, he had no intention of surrendering power anytime soon.\textsuperscript{169} Elections were postponed first to punish the wrongdoings of the Bhutto regime and then Islamization was added to the things to be done before elections. Political opponents of Bhutto, both non-religious and the religious parties, were enticed into government and the Islamization of laws was announced on the first Muharram 1399 Hijra, the start of a new Islamic century.\textsuperscript{170}

Six presidential ordinances related to Islamization were enacted on 10\textsuperscript{th} February 1979:

- Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1979: This law introduced taxes based on Islamic laws and legal traditions\textsuperscript{171};
- Offense against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed conviction requirements and punishments for theft and robbery. Punishments included amputation of one’s hand or foot and imprisonment;\textsuperscript{172}
- Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law described conviction process and punishments for zina (which included

\textsuperscript{169} He remained in power till his death in 1988.
\textsuperscript{170} However, the laws were not promulgated until the birthday of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in February 1979 to make it closer to Bhutto’s execution date in April 1979. Bhutto was hanged after he was awarded a death sentence in a controversial trial (Haqqani 2005, 130-40).
\textsuperscript{171} Zakat is a tax on valuables while ushr is a tax on agricultural produce.
\textsuperscript{172} The punishment by amputation of a hand or foot has never been carried out in the last 36 years, but it remains on the law books.
fornication, adultery and rape). Punishments included stoning to death\textsuperscript{173}, flogging\textsuperscript{174} and imprisonment;

- Offences of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed conviction process and punishments for false accusation of zina. Punishments included flogging and imprisonment

- Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed conviction process and punishments for production, possession, transport, selling and consuming alcohol. Punishments included flogging, fines and imprisonment

- Execution of Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed how the punishment of whipping should be carried out.

Looking at these ordinances, one might assume that General Zia wanted to replace the British Indian common law tradition with the traditional medieval Islamic system. Nothing can be further from the truth. ‘Islamic’ punishments and other acts of Islamization of government were tools for increasing Zia’s legitimacy:

\textit{Pakistan under Zia, therefore, moved a long way toward the Islamization of the country. Yet much of it remained symbolic in character, designed to demonstrate a commitment}

\textsuperscript{173} The punishment of stoning to death has never been carried out in the last 36 years but it remains on the law books.

\textsuperscript{174} Flogging was regularly carried out in the early days of Zia. Afterward, it was rarely applied. It was outlawed by the Abolition of Whipping Act passed by the second Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1996.
without fundamentally changing the character of national life and the basic social system. In this sense it did not represent a revolution in Pakistani life in the way that the Russian revolution changed the face of Russia, or the Islamic revolution in Iran (that) removed whole classes and value systems from power. The main change involved a major shift in outlook on the role of Islam in government. Because so much of the change also involves partisan politics and the character of Zia’s own rule, the Islamization process is highly controversial. (Fuller 1991)

In terms of family law legislation, the Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 (hereafter Zina Ordinance) is important. It did not directly affect the family law, but it directly affected the position of women inside the family. In a patriarchal environment, where corruption was prevalent, this ordinance was often used against women. There were examples of men accusing former wives of adultery under this law if they remarried and fathers accusing their daughters of fornication, if they married against the father's will (Patel 2006). Even more unfortunate, there were examples of women being charged with fornication or adultery if they reported being raped, but could not prove the offense. A woman’s filing a charge of a rape or a pregnancy were taken as an evidence that she had had sex outside of marriage. As crimes under this ordinance were non-bailable, influential persons (usually men) could get the weak (most often women) jailed just by accusing them of a crime. Moreover, these zina crimes were also non-compoundable, meaning the state can continue to investigate the complaint even when the complainant withdraws his or her complaint. This gave power to police (again usually men) to harass
and imprison the weak (most often women) in order to obtain a bribe. Legal gender discrimination increased while state protection for women decreased in Pakistan, after the promulgation of this law.

After introducing the Hadood Ordinance in 1979, General Zia through the President’s Order No.1 of 1980 established the Federal Shariat Court (FSC). It later became part of the Constitution of Pakistan in 1973 under Article 203. Hence the FSC, was a constitutional body but due to its power to hear cases challenging the validity of any law, it influenced the implementation and future direction of Pakistani family law. General Zia, however, was very pragmatic. While creating the FSC as a tool of Islamization, he also made sure that important political matters such as financial issues or the MFLO were not under its purview. Surprisingly, despite the fear of its initial detractors, the FSC has most often acted as a barrier against traditional patriarchal religious elements (Burki-Liebl 2007, 133).

This anomaly was the result of the composition of jurors on the FSC, illustrating that Islamization was more a political ploy for General Zia than a real article of faith on his part. Under General Zia the FSC composition allowed traditional Islamic clerics to enjoy the clout, attention and privileges of being members of the FSC, but prevented them from having real impact. This was achieved by insuring that the traditional Islamic clerics (ulema) were always in the minority on the FSC and the Chief Justice was always a judge of a High Court or Supreme Court, trained in British common law tradition. Moreover, the

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175 Both serving and retired judges could be appointed in the FSC.
composition of the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court that heard appeals of FSC decisions was also composed of a majority of judges trained in British common law tradition. (Constitution of Pakistan 1973).

The Islamization of Pakistani laws slowed, but did not end with Zia’s death in 1988. In 1989, the Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench’s decision\textsuperscript{176} declared that the sections of the penal code dealing with bodily injury crimes (including murder) were unislamic. Subsequently, the government introduced the Qisas and the Diyat Ordinance\textsuperscript{177} in 1991 that made bodily injury crimes a matter between the victim and the perpetrator and not crimes against society (to be prosecuted by the state). So, the victim or his/her heirs could decide to forgive the perpetrator. This ordinance was made a law in 1997. Both Pakistani and foreign critics of this law have objected to this law because it allows perpetrators, instigators and accomplices of the murder of women in the name of family honor to stand in the court and forgive each other. This law has also problematic repercussions in a society which has wide income and power inequalities, making it easier for the rich and powerful to entice or force the victim’s family to forgive the murderer (NCSW 2006, Palo 2009).

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, despite some efforts on her part, was not able to make any change in family law because she did not have a majority in both houses of the Parliament and the other parties were not ready to help her amend these laws. She did establish a

\textsuperscript{176} Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hassan
\textsuperscript{177} Qisas is translated as retribution and Diyat as compensation.
Commission of Inquiry for Women in 1994 charged with reviewing ‘all the existing laws which were discriminatory to women or affect their right of being equal citizens of Pakistan’. The commission’s report recommended several changes in the family law, but none of them were enacted. (Burki-Liebl 2007, 121-22). However, under Bhutto, Pakistan did sign the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), agreeing to be monitored by outsiders on all kinds of discrimination against women, including the legal discrimination that the family law was accused of perpetrating.

1999 Onwards

General Musharraf came into power claiming to be a modernist, liberal and criticized religious orthodoxy. These pronouncements led many to think that he would lessen the rampant gender discrimination in Pakistan. Though most of the initial hopes were dashed, there were few changes during his nine-year rule that did decrease gender discrimination. In terms of family law, the first, albeit minor, change was the establishment of a permanent National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) in July 2000. This commission was mandated to review any laws affecting women in Pakistan. The family law in Pakistan has always been the main focus of the NCSW with reports published on divorce, marriage, inheritance, domestic violence etc. The NCSW could not change laws that discriminate against women, but it could build pressure for change by collecting data; petitioning courts and the government; arranging conferences and seminars, contacting media and publishing reports on family law and their implementation (NCSW 2015).
The Family courts (Amendments) Ordinance of 2002 was the first change in family law brought about by the Musharraf government. It added more areas to be tried in family courts.\textsuperscript{178} It established strict time frames for judges to decide the cases. The case of dissolution of marriage on a wife’s request was to be decided within four months and an appeal against this order has also to be decided in four months.

One of the major achievements of the Musharraf regime was the enactment of Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Law in 2006. For the first time since 1979, the law distinguished between rape and consensual sex in terms of required evidence. Previously, women who could not prove rape allegations were prosecuted for adultery or fornication under the Zina Ordinance. After the passage of the 2006 law, women could pursue rapists, without being afraid of imprisonment if they could not prove the rape. Rape, after the enactment of this law, was not to be prosecuted under Zina Ordinance. It was prosecuted under a different penal code clause and there was no longer a need to get four male witnesses to prove the crime.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{178} Family courts are considered female-friendly, as compared to ordinary courts, due to their rules favoring women.

\textsuperscript{179} The religious right, not surprisingly, objected to these changes. Musharraf met with them and told them that he would refer the matter to the FSC, but ulema refused this offer (Burki 2013, 88). The refusal of ulema may seem strange to many but looking at the history of the FSC judgments, ulema knew that the FSC was not their ally.
In 2008, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) returned to power and formed coalition governments with its allies. Two laws related to marriage were passed by the new coalition governments. The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act of 2011 strengthened women rights in diverse areas. It criminalized forced marriages and attempts to stop women from inheriting property. It also plugged loopholes that could be used to reduce the punishment of persons accused of rape. It outlawed traditional customs like vani or swara. This legislation also outlawed marriage with the Quran that had no religious basis (Government of Pakistan 2011).

Another discriminatory custom related to marriage, which was prevalent in some areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), was Ghag. Under Ghag, a person declared his intention to marry a girl, usually from his own family, and after this declaration the girl, her parents, and other suitors were under threat of bodily harm, if there was any attempt to marry the girl to anybody else. In 2013, the KP provincial assembly passed the Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act unanimously. (Ashfaq 2013)

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180 In the summer of 2007, General Musharraf faced civil unrest and demonstrations in the major urban areas when he illegally and unconstitutionally sacked the Chief Justice of Pakistan. With the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, Musharraf also lost the support of the military. The military remained neutral in the 2008 elections, in contrast to 2002 elections. Largely free and fair elections resulted in the return to power of the Pakistan People’s Party, which formed coalitions with other parties at the national level and in the four provinces.

181 Under these tribal customs, if one family is aggrieved by the action of another family, it receives reparations in the form of a young girl’s hand in marriage. The young girl from the guilty family is married to someone from the aggrieved family.

182 According to this custom, girls are married to the Quran to keep the property from being distributed or going outside the immediate family.
The work of the NCSW was constrained by two limitations. It did not have financial autonomy and it could not legally force public officials and private organizations to cooperate. The National Commission on Status of Women Act 2012 dealt with both these problems. The new law made NCSW financially autonomous and gave it judicial powers, similar to parliamentary committees.

Women in Pakistan still did not have protection from domestic violence. Cases of domestic violence could be registered under the ordinary penal code provisions related to assault and bodily harm. However, societal norms did not consider it appropriate to file cases against family members, even when there was bodily harm involved. Further, the police ignored such complaints. Women decried this situation and campaigned for a domestic violence law. However, opposition from the religious right was also strong. The PPP government (2008-13) first tried to criminalize domestic violence at federal level but it failed. The Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Bill, 2009 was passed by the National Assembly but did not become a law as it was not passed by the Senate due to religious right opposition. Sometime later, it was the Senate that passed a bill on domestic violence (prevention and protection) but it was not passed by the National Assembly. After the passage of the 18th Amendment in the Constitution in 2010, the penal code became a provincial subject, so the federal government could not legislate on issues related to domestic violence.  

183 Each province had to pass its own domestic violence legislation and provinces are gradually passing their own domestic violence legislation. The Islamabad

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183 Criminalizing domestic violence would require amendments in the penal code.
Capital Territory was the first entity to have a domestic violence law. Sindh passed a domestic violence law in 2013 and Balochistan in 2014. In Punjab and KPK, bills have been presented but not passed. The religious right vociferously opposes these laws and calls them attempts by the rulers to westernize the society to please their foreign masters. (Wasim 2012; Ali 2014; Shah 2014).

Another development was the new legislation to prevent child marriages. Sindh was the first province to act on this issue. It promulgated the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act in April 2014, increasing punishment and fines for those who force children to marry and for nikah-khwans (officials/local imams who register marriages). In March 2015, Punjab Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed, again increasing fines and punishments to deter people from supporting/administering child marriages. The KP province had sent its proposed bill for restraining child marriages to the CII for review. Only in Balochistan, there has no action on this important issue (Tunio 2014; Mustafa 2015; Rehman 2015).

**Conclusion**

Prior to 1926, Islam was the basis of Turkish family law and if any amendments were proposed in the family law, they had to be justified on the basis of Islamic precepts and legal tradition. This justification was necessary, irrespective of whether the change was desired to follow the West, to decrease gender discrimination, or to discard medieval interpretations to rediscover the real, authentic Islam. Thus, prior to 1926, Turkey was like
Pakistan (and many other present day MMCs) where Islam is the foundation of family law.  

With the passage of the TCC in 1926, the role of Islam in the Turkish family law came to an end. Islam features neither as the source, nor the justification for any changes since 1926. As far as family law was concerned, Islamization of government was reduced to the minimum. Later, in the second period, due to the perceived importance of this change to Ataturk’s vision, Turkish secularists, supported by the powerful military, made sure there were not many changes in family law. It was only in the third period that the TCC was amended. However, the number of amendment to the TCC remained small.

While there was a significant increase in Islam's role in state nationalism in the third phase as was seen in the previous three chapters, this change is not reflected in the family law. The main reason for this anomaly was the desire by Turkey to join the EU. Most of the amendments in the family law, during this period, were related to the reduction of discrimination against women in the TCC. The ascending women’s movement in Turkey fought for these changes. The Turkish elite, most of them men, might have resisted these changes but EU reports and statements from Brussels kept up the pressure for change. The major change in family laws came in 2001-2 when instead of piecemeal changes, the whole code was revised based on the recommendations of the fifth review commission. Islam, as a source of change, was again absent.

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184 Family law is not static in these MMCs but changes have to be justified on the basis of Islam.
Since 2002, there have not been many changes to the new TCC. But the fear of Islam playing a role in the civil laws heightened after 2002 as an Islam-inspired party, the AKP, formed the government. However, despite making many statements and some attempts (like criminalizing adultery), Islamic precepts and injunctions did not form the basis of any changes to the TCC.

In the current phase, after 2010, one can see some changes that can be related to Islam. For example, women are being incentivized to have more children and abortion is being made difficult. But family law has not seen any changes that can be related to Islam.

The family law reform in Pakistan, as in the case of Islam's role in state nationalism, can be divided into three distinct periods. During the first period (the late 1940s to late 1960s), family law was initially Islamized but later there were changes to bring it closer to modern/Western practices. The religious right opposed these later reforms but could not stop or reverse the changes. In sum, however, family law was more Islamized than it was in 1947. During the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), Islamization of government reigned supreme. During this period, there were not many direct changes in the MFLO but other legal changes, such as Hadood Ordinances, decreased legal protections for women given in the constitution, MFLO, and other laws. The current period (1999 onwards) has resulted in reducing the discriminatory laws passed during the second period.
Passage of laws against forced marriages and domestic violence indicates that Islamization of government has lost its popularity.

Comparatively, as the above discussion shows, there is stark difference between how Turkish and Pakistani state dealt with the traditional family laws based on Islamic provisions. While Pakistani decision makers tried to reform and update the traditional law, Turkish decision makers rejected this approach and imported a completely new law. Pakistani decision makers adopted the strategy of splitting the difference between the demands of women and ulema and adopted a gradualist approach, Turkish decision makers discarded the traditional law and rejected any role of ulema in family law reform.185

In the next chapter, the second indicator of Islamization of government, presence and functions of ministry of religious affairs, will be discussed.

185 Abu-Odeh (2004) makes a similar distinction between the Muslim family law reform in Tunisia and Egypt.
Chapter VI

MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
Introduction

Governmental institutions (ministries, departments etc.) dealing specifically with religious practice are usually established to control/regulate religion(s) or to give preference to one or more religions. Very rarely, the establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) is linked with an atmosphere of greater freedom from religious persecution.¹⁸⁶

Presence of an MRA demonstrates the importance of religion to the government. This importance might be due to government considering religion as an ally or as a competitor. If government considers religion as useful, MRA is established to give preference to religious practice. This preference is usually for one religion but can be for more than one religion. Thus, in this case, the presence of MRA means preference for one or more religions and discrimination against all those who do not follow the preferred religion(s).

When government sees religion (s) as a competitor, presence of the MRA means religious persecution. This situation was quite common in Communist countries in the 20th century. As Communist philosophy considered religion a false consciousness and a tool to keep the capitalist class’s hold on workers and farmers etc., it was considered a duty of a true communist to ‘expose’ religion and wake up lower classes. Religious activity was thus strictly controlled and regulated in most Communist countries. The instruments for

¹⁸⁶ Chinese Bureau of Religious Affairs (BRA) is a rare example. Its disbandment in 1975, when Cultural Revolution was still in full swing, meant increase in religious persecution. The BRA’s revival in 1979, after Cultural Revolution ended, resulted in decrease in religious persecution and increased religious freedoms (Government of China 2015; Potter 2003; Cohen 1992).
regulation of religion were departments/bureaus making policy for all religions or departments dealing with a single religion. The departments dealing with all religions usually did not have representatives of different religions advising the government. However, departments dealing with a particular religion, usually had representatives of that religion but these representatives had little power and were more representative of the state policy than of the religion they represented.

The choice of MRA as an indicator of Islamization of government is, therefore, based on the knowledge that presence and functions of an MRA is an excellent indicator of state’s policies towards religion. There are usually three kinds of state’s policies towards religion (s) and these are demonstrated by the presence and functions of an MRA:

- Secular states or state that do not want to prefer or regulate religion usually do not have an MRA.
- States that want to prefer one or more religions usually have an MRA that implements the preference policies given in laws/administrative decisions. The MRA functions in such states enjoin discrimination against those who do not believe in the preferred religion(s).
- States that consider religion a competitor usually also have an MRA but its functions are different. It exists to discriminate against all religions and regulate their practice.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRA usually exists</th>
<th>Have State Religion</th>
<th>Prefer One Religion</th>
<th>Secular States</th>
<th>Anti-Religion States</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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**Main Function**
- **Introduce/execute policies that strongly favor the state religion**
- **Introduce/execute policies that favor the preferred religion**
- **Introduce/execute policies that discriminate against all religions**

**Examples**
- Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malta
- Greece, Israel, UK
- USA, Australia
- China, erstwhile USSR

Islamization of government in Turkey and Pakistan can, therefore, be analyzed by studying the MRAs and their functions over the course their existence in these two countries.
TURKISH PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

The Diyanet Isleri Baskanlari (Presidency of Religious Affairs) is the equivalent of a ministry of religious affairs in the Turkish political system. The Diyanet was one of the first Republican institutions in Turkey and it is still one of the main institutions of the Turkish Republic. It is also one of the most controversial of the Turkish state institutions. (Adanali 2008). Despite the passage of almost a century, the reasons for the existence of the Diyanet are still hotly debated. Support and opposition to the Diyanet cuts across party lines and the usual division of Turkish society between the Islamists and secularists. Paradoxically, it was established by secularists and mostly prospered under their rule:

The Diyanet was founded in the heyday of secularizing reforms by the same law that abolished the Caliphate and led to the closure of the religious schools. The institution was granted constitutional rank in the aftermath of the first coup d’etat in 1960 and in 1971, the year of the second putsch, the Directorate’s prayer leaders and preachers were made civil servants. Moreover, the law governing political parties that forbids expressing the demand for a change in the Directorate’s status, freezing the current situation, was passed in the aftermath of the last military takeover in 1980. (Seufert 2006, 136)
Secularists initially supported the Diyanet as a tool to control religion but now many decry its existence in a ‘secular’ Republic. Islamists are also divided on the Diyanet. Supporters of the Diyanet consider it a necessary institution in a Muslim-majority country, but many Islamists consider it an instrument in the hands of state to subdue Islam.

**Ottoman Period**

The Ottoman Empire was a Muslim state but not a theocracy. Sheikh-ul-Islam,\(^{187}\) the highest religious authority, was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan and served at the pleasure of Sultan. Sheikhs-ul-Islam were always subservient to the Sultan and were frequently dismissed by the Sultans.\(^{188}\) During the five centuries from 1424 to 1922, one hundred and thirty one scholars were appointed to this post, some serving more than once (Karaman 2008).

The first Sheikh-ul-Islam was Molla Fenari appointed in 1424. The Sheikh-ul-Islam initially did not have control over either the Justice system or the Islamic education system. Gradually, Sheikh-ul-Islam became very powerful, almost equivalent to the Grand Vizier (who was second only to Ottoman Sultan).

Ottoman laws were based on the Quranic law and Islamic tradition (Sharia) as well as on other sources. Religious judges were state employees and interpreted and administered

\(^{187}\) Or Seyhülislam

\(^{188}\) Sometimes Sheikhs-ul-Islam could not even serve a year and were dismissed. For example, during one decade in the 17\(^{th}\) century (1649 to 1659), Sheikh-ul-Islam was changed eleven times.
justice on the basis of Islamic tradition while secular public law (qanun) was adjudicated by other state functionaries. Both were controlled by the Sultan. Personal laws of major non-Muslim communities (called millets) were adjudicated by their own community (religious) leaders (Davison 1998, 138-141; Denli 2011, 89).

For Ottoman reformists and modernists, the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam was a symbol of anachronism and, therefore, the entire 19th century could be described as their battle to limit Sheikh-ul-Islam’s authority to religious affairs, if not further (Ersahin 2008). Their efforts did bear fruit and the authority of Sheikh-ul-Islam gradually declined, starting from the Tanzimat reforms in 1839. This decline of power accelerated under the Committee of Union and Progress rule (1913-18). In one of their last major acts in 1917, they put all religious courts under the Ministry of Justice, thus removing one of the primary powers of Sheikh-ul-Islam, and also took away the control of Muslim endowments (Bein 2011, 40-47).

Both Mustafa Kemal, leading the forces of the Republic, and the Ottoman Sultan/Caliph used Islamic rhetoric during the Turkish War of Independence. The Sultan’s Sheikh-ul-Islam gave fatwa against the Republican forces, and Mustafa Kemal’s appointed Sheikh-ul-Islam gave fatwa against the imperial forces. The Republican government in Ankara used the concept of jihad to mobilize people against foreign forces and to decrease internal

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189 For example, the Ottoman state started establishing public primary schools in the 1870’s, thus establishing an alternative to the medrese (madrassa) system, controlled by the Sheikh-ul-Islam (Baskan 2014, 38-39).
divisions between different Muslim communities. Ataturk himself used the power of Islam and ulema during the early years of war (Grigoriadis 2013, 62).

As the Republican regime gained strength, the state-Islam relationship began to change as discussed in the previous chapters. In April 1920, a new cabinet was formed, and one of the ministries was the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations. This ministry was headed by mufti of Karacabey, Mustafa Fehmi Effendi, and it performed some – but not all – of the functions of the Sheikh-ul-Islam (Karaman 2008). However, Islam and ulema still had a privileged status and the Ministry was considered as one of the most important ministries during the national liberation struggle (Bozan 2007, 50).

**Ataturk and Early Republican Elite**

To understand the Diyanet, one has to understand Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his fellow Republicans views about religion. They not only wanted to privatize religion but also to control and purify it. The peculiar type of Turkish secularism is the result of a desire to achieve all these goals:

*Laicism, as understood by the Republican elite, meant not only state dominance and control of religious institutions, but also implied regulating the lived Islamic tradition and expression of popular religiosity...*(Thus) *Despite the imposed restrictions, religion was never meant to be completely eliminated in the official discourse of national identity.* (Denli 2011, 91).
Baskan (2014, 64) argues that the early Republican elite’s view of Islam was based on three assertions. First, while politics was termed as dirty and profane, Islam was pure and sacred. Combining this thesis and anti-thesis, one comes to the synthesis that Islam should not be tainted with politics. Second, as Islam did not have a clergy, no person or group should try to represent Islam. Anybody, trying to do that would be punished. Finally, there was a pure Islam based on original sources but that had been lost. The State would help Turks find the true Islam. The fact that the second and third assertions were somewhat contradictory did not matter.

The ninety years of the Diyanet’s existence can be divided into four periods. The first period starts with the formation of the Diyanet in 1924 and ends in the mid-1940s. In this period, the Diyanet gradually declined in importance, particularly in the 1930s and early 1940s. The second period started in the late 1940s and ended in the late 1970s. During this period, the expansion of Diyanet was accepted by secular political players as a necessary condition to control Islam. The third period started in the early 1980s, the Diyanet became an instrument to promote state nationalism that now included a heavy dose of Islam. The final period has just started and it appears to be a period of further expansion of the influence of the Diyanet.

The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s
After abolishing the Ottoman Sultanate in November 1922 and securing Turkey from external attacks through the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, Ataturk moved to end the Caliphate in March 1924. However, to demonstrate that this was not an action against Islam, he took several steps. Friday was declared a holiday in January 1924 and it was agreed that in the new constitution, Islam would be the state religion. Finally, just two days before the GNA abolished the Caliphate, Ataturk showed his respect for Islam by talking about elevating religion to a status above politics.

With the Caliphate, the Religious Affairs and Charitable Foundations Ministry was also abolished on 3rd March 1924 and the two religious institutions were created to replace it, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (hereafter the Diyanet) and the Directorate of Pious Foundations. The Diyanet took over the responsibility of managing mosques and religious personnel while the Directorate of Pious Foundations administered religious endowments. Another law passed on 3rd March was the Law of Unification of Education that took away control of religious education from religious clerics. Thus, Madrassas’ administration, one of the functions of the abolished Ministry, was not transferred to the Diyanet or to the Directorate of Pious Foundations but to the Ministry of Education which promptly closed almost all of them. (Jenkins 2008, 91-4).

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190 Constitution was passed on 20th April 1924.
191 Full name in Turkish was ‘Diyanet Isleri Reisligi’.
The first article of the Act that created the Diyanet clarified the limited functions of the Diyanet in the new Republic:

_In the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the cabinet that is formed by it are responsible for the legislation and execution of provisions concerning the affairs of the people; and the Presidency of Religious Affairs will be formed as a part of the Republic for the implementation of all provisions concerning faith and worship of the religion of Islam, and the administration of religious organizations._

The Diyanet was to be limited to the implementation of matters related to ‘faith and worship’ while decisions in these matters, and all other matters, would be made by the GNA. Other articles of the Act put the Diyanet under the control of the Prime Minister (PM)’s office. The head of the Diyanet was to be appointed by the President of the Republic, on the advice of the PM.

This legislation was very significant as it demonstrated the type of state-religion relationship the new elites desired and were trying to create. First, the very fact that there was to be no ministry but only a presidency/directorate under the Prime Minister’s office showed that there was a deliberate attempt to decrease the importance of religion in the state affairs. Henceforth, there would be no minister giving the religious viewpoint in the cabinet. Secondly, by putting it under the PM office, it meant religion would be under direct and tight control, away from politics. Finally, the Act made clear in the first article that
from henceforth the cabinet would be the main decision-making body. The Diyanet would be limited to the implementation of specific functions relating to faith, worship and religious organizations (Gozaydin and Ozturk 2014).

Establishment of the Diyanet was somewhat modeled on the French Bureau Central des Cultes (Central Bureau of Religious Affairs) under the French Ministry of Interior. However, the centralization and organization of religious activity that Ataturk’s Diyanet was designed to do, was much extensive from its French counterpart. Under the new laws, any public religious activity that was not under the Diyanet was illegal (Sunier and Landman 2014).

In the 1920s, the Diyanet was considered important and was given funds to finance multi-year research projects. Examples of such projects were the translation and nine volume tafsir (interpretation) of the Quran by Muhammad Hamdi Yazir. 192 The translation of Sahih Bukhari (a revered collection of the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad) was also started (Bozan 2007, 52). The president of the Diyanet also authored books for religious education to be used in schools. In these books, he made himself useful to the national elite by promoting a more secular Turkish state nationalism (Taspinar 2001, 44).

The Act 429, which established the Diyanet, however, did not provide its administrative structure. It was in the 1927 Budget Act that the administrative structure of the central and

192 Some argue Ataturk was personally involved in the initiation of this project (Irsad20 2008)
provincial branches of the Diyanet was clarified. The next step was the publication of the permanent positions’ table of Diyanet. In an Act, promulgated on 30 June 1929, the permanent positions of the Diyanet were clarified and a legal basis for the positions was established. This change served as the organizational law for the Diyanet until 1935 (Gozaydin 2008).

The 1930s were the lowest point for the Islamization of government in around hundred years of Turkish history. The Diyanet was downgraded both in terms of personal and budget and the authority and functions of the Diyanet were curtailed. A major change in the Diyanet fortune occurred in 1931. In June 1931, again by the Budget Act, the management of mosques and control of the personnel of all mosques was removed from the Diyanet and transferred to the Directorate of Pious Foundations. Some of the projects started in the 1920s continued but there was no budget to start new projects. Hence, the Diyanet was largely non-functional.

Table 27: Diyanet’s Budget as Percentage of Total Turkish Budget (1924-1947)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Share of Diyanet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>0.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Cakir and Bozan (2005, 28), Sacmali (2013, 54) and (Valley 2011)

As discussed earlier, in the 1930s, Ataturk became enamored with ethnolinguistic nationalism and Turkey’s link with Islam became an issue. The pre-Islamic Turkish history
was glorified and efforts were made to ‘purify’ the Turkish language, eliminating the Arabic and Persian words from it. Even Arabic language used in the religious services became a target of attacks. Though there were attempts earlier to change prayer and the azan (call for prayer) into Turkish, these attempts did not have support from the top elite. The Diyanet was, therefore, able to oppose and reject such calls. However, in the 1930s, Ataturk himself led efforts to use Turkish language in religious services such as in azan. The Diyanet could not withstand this pressure and declared that the prayer calls in Turkish are kosher.

The project of nationalization in religion gained a new impetus in 1932, this time with the direct initiative of Mustafa Kemal. Neither the officials of the DRA had changed nor, probably, had their ideas about the unacceptability of prayer in Turkish. What became different in the 1930s was the Kemalist leadership’s belief and their decisiveness in reforming the Islamic practice by turkifying the ritual. This reform was in fact a part of the project of making Turkish dominant in all cultural fields. (Azak 2008)

The first law focused on the Diyanet was passed in June 1935 and was the first to specify its functions and organization. The Act specified the positions in both Ankara and the local level that were still left with the Diyanet after the 1931 re-organization. The law ordained

\[193\] Ziya Gokalp, the father of Turkish nationalism, and many others supported religious services in Turkish language (Azak 2008). Gokalp died in 1924.
that each city and district would have a mufti. It also created a ‘committee of consultation’ of Islamic scholars to support the Diyanet (Diyanet 2015, Adanali 2008).

In the next fifteen years, the Diyanet’s organization and work did not change much. There was not much interest in the Diyanet’s work and there were no major initiatives related to the Diyanet. Assertive secularism was the law and Islamization of government was nowhere to be seen.

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

In the late 1940s, Turkey became a multi-party democracy. As discussed in the previous chapters, though the Republican People’s Party, ruling since 1923, won the elections in 1946, the prospect of failure in the next elections forced the Party to relax its strict policies relating to Islam. In 1948, foreign exchange was provided to the people for pilgrimages to Makkah. In 1949, a faculty of theology was opened in the Ankara University and in 1950, people were also allowed to visit tombs and shrines that had been closed since the 1920s (Jenkins 2008, 114-5).

The change in political climate toward religion was bound to affect the Diyanet, the primary state institution dealing with religion. In March 1950, Act No. 5634 was passed which transformed the Diyanet. First, the name of the Diyanet was changed from ‘Diyanet

---

194 The change started happening after the 7th National Congress of Republican People’s Party in November 1947.
The coming to power of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950 led to the re-appearance of Islam in the public sphere. Arabic azan was allowed; religious education was made compulsory;\textsuperscript{195} religious programing on state radio started; and Imam-hatip schools were revived. The Diyanet also benefitted from increased interest during the DP regime. In the first year after it came to power, the Diyanet’s budget more than doubled from 2.9 million to 7.8 million Turkish Lira, tripling its share in total expenditure from 0.2\% to 0.61\%. The DP’s mosque-building program also increased the Diyanet’s influence as all mosques in Turkey were now administered by the Diyanet. During its tenure, the DP built 15000 mosques, more than four a day. The Diyanet built many of these mosques and also restored more than six hundred historical mosques (Jenkins 2008, 117-8).

When the DP was ousted from power in a coup in 1960, there was a possibility that the restrictive religious atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s might return under the secular military. However, the new military regime reaffirmed the importance of religion.

\textsuperscript{195}The parents were allowed to request that their children be excused from these classes.
President Gursel visited the Diyanet in October 1962 and, for the first time in decades, allowed relics of different Prophets to be displayed in the Topkapi Palace. He said to the critics of his policy:

Those who blame religion for our backwardness are wrong. The cause of our backwardness is not religion but those who have misinterpreted our religion to us by exploiting it for their own benefits. Islam is the most sacred, most constructive, most dynamic and powerful religion in the world. (Taspınar 2001, 196)

This attitude was similar to the early Republican era when the elites considered religion both good and useful, if kept under control. In the 1961 constitution, this attitude was exhibited by making the Diyanet a constitutional body for the first time in Turkish history. Article 154 stated of 1961 Constitution stated:

The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is incorporated in the general administration, discharges the function prescribed by a special law.

The budget of the Diyanet grew from 0.76% in 1961 to 0.90% of the total government expenditure in 1964 as the CHP-dominated coalition governments built mosques at the same pace as the DP (1500 a year) and opened new Imam-hatip schools (Bulut 2011a, Jenkins 2008, 126-7).
Table 28: Diyanet’s Budget as Percentage of Total Turkish Budget (1948-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Share of Diyanet</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Share of Diyanet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1977</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1963, legislation was proposed to change the Diyanet to the ‘Presidency of Religious Sects’ so as to move it away from only propagating Sunni Hanafi tradition and making it a representative institution of all Muslims belonging to Alevite, Shia and Sufi traditions, in addition to the other three Sunni Schools of thought. However, this proposal was rejected (Gozaydin 2008).

As required by the 1961 Constitution, in June 1965, a comprehensive law (Act No. 633) dealing with the Diyanet was passed by the coalition government of the CHP and the AP. It established the organization and duties of the Diyanet by replacing the 1950 Act. The objectives of the law were quite comprehensive and demonstrated that expansion of the Diyanet was now acceptable to the Kemalist Republican Party and the military. These objectives were:

- To determine the duties and responsibilities of the Diyanet in accordance with the principle of secularism and the freedom of religion and conscience indicated in the constitution;
- To bring under a unified law various regulative changes and amendments concerning the Diyanet;
• To provide financial support for the Diyanet and make the institution attractive for young people who are equipped in the moral and positive sciences;

• To increase the number of those who have competence in scholarly studies on various religious topics and use the results of their studies to serve and enlighten society, and thus solidify the unity and integrity of the nation in matters of faith and moral principles by removing bigotry and superstition, which were not permitted by the religion of Islam. (Adanali 2008)

The Act expanded the department and added new functions to it. One of the most important addition to its functions was management of moral principles. The Article 1 of the law stated:

The Directorate of Religious Affairs has been established subordinate to the Prime Ministry to manage all affairs related to beliefs, worship and moral principles of the religion of Islam, to enlighten society on the subject of religion and to administer places of worship. (Jenkins 2008, 127)

This extension was criticized by many as reference to ‘moral principles of Islam’ was considered incompatible to the principles of secularism and democracy. It was argued that a secular state should not be concerned with religious morals of the people. Others criticized it because it was a deviation from Ataturk’s principles. Finally, there was
criticism of this extension because managing or improving morals was not a part of the functions of a modern democratic state (Gozaydin 2008; Bozan 2007, 57-9; Adanali 2008).

Another important development for the Diyanet was the recognition of its usefulness for the ‘unity and integrity of the nation’. Thus, it graduated from an (negative) instrument of control to a (positive) instrument of national unity and nationalism. This role increased as Turkey moved into the 1980s. Finally, this law required all imams (clergy) employed by the Diyanet to be graduates of official educational institutions. The main reason for this change was to stop employment of graduates of the private Quran schools that Turkish secularists suspected of holding radical views. Due to these restrictions on graduates of the private institutions and the expansion of the Diyanet’s mandate to pursue ‘enlightening society on the subject of religion’, there was a significant growth in the number of courses administered by the Diyanet starting with the 1970s. There was also an increase in conferences, seminars and religious publications produced by the Diyanet (Jenkins 2008, 127; Citak et. al. 2015).

The question frequently asked is why secularists/Kemalists sought to increase the Diyanet’s role and protect it from attacks. This contradictory behavior of the secularists is because of a dilemma. They wanted to close the Diyanet but until society was secularized, they could not as Islam had to be controlled. Kuru explains:
Nonetheless, assertive secularists have regarded Diyanet and related institutions as temporary instruments, which were supposed to be marginalized when society became secularized. That is why they closed the only department of theology, all Imam-Hatip schools, and a majority of the Qur’an courses, in addition to trivializing the Diyanet from 1933 to 1949. However, since societal secularization—in terms of the decreasing ratio of religious participation and the declining public role of Islam—did not happen in Turkey, the state had to reopen and even multiply these institutions. This has been the assertive secularists’ dilemma in Turkey: they needed certain institutions to keep Islam under state control, but they also sought to minimize these institutions’ social impacts. (Kuru 2014, 156)

As discussed in Chapter II, in 1965, the AP, the right-of-center successor of the DP, won elections and independently assumed power. It continued to build mosques and increased the pace of opening of the Imam-hatip schools. This increase in mosques again necessitated a growth in the Diyanet personnel. However, by the early 1970s, Imam-Hatip schools were producing more graduates than were required by the Diyanet, showing the popularity of religious education, beyond its employment potential. In the 1970s, growth in the Diyanet’s personnel and budget continued. The Diyanet growth, however, has to be kept in perspective. Despite expansion, the Diyanet’s share in total governmental expenditure fell from 0.94% in 1972 to 0.58% in 1978 (Jenkins 2008, 126-7).
The most important development relating to the Diyanet during the 1970s was the challenge to its constitutionality raised in 1971. An Alevi party, Birlik Partisi, filed a petition against the Diyanet in the Constitutional Court. It argued that the Diyanet was unconstitutional because Turkey was a secular republic and the creation of group of people who provide religious services was against the Turkish Constitution, principles of Ataturk and Islamic faith.

The Constitutional Court, despite being staunchly secular, rejected the petition. The majority of the judges argued that the Diyanet was necessary and constitutional because secularism had to be understood in the context of the two over-arching aims of the Republic i.e. exaltation of the Turkish nation and the acquisition of the status of modern civilization. Freedom of religion was allowed in Turkey but because of the trends in national history this freedom had to be circumscribed. Similarly, separation of religion and state was important but judges decided that due to the comprehensiveness of Islam, Islam left alone could be abused, leading to problems. Therefore, the Diyanet was a constitutional body and its Diyanet personnel did not constitute a religious class but were civil servants whose work was necessary (Adanali 2008).

In 1975, a new law (No. 1893) related to the Diyanet was passed. It made some administrative changes and also introduced the concept of democratic principles to the selection of the Diyanet personnel. But these changes were objected by President Koruturk who first sent the law back to the assembly and then to the Constitutional Court for review.
The court annulled the law and asked the assembly to devise a new law within a year. However, the next Diyanet law was not passed until 2010. For thirty years the Diyanet remained in legal limbo as law no. 633 was rendered obsolete after the passage of law no. 1893 (Gozaydin 2008). These thirty years, however, might be considered the most productive years of the Diyanet.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

After the 1980 coup, there was a change in the secular Turkish elite’s perception of Islam. As mentioned before, this change came about under a movement/doctrine called Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Turk-Islam sentezi), which tried to blend Turkishness, Islam and the modernism. The movement started in the late 1960s and early 1970s but its origins can be traced back to Ziya Gokalp. Turkish-Islamic synthesis subordinated Islam to Turkish state nationalism by making it a necessary part of Turkish culture. By emphasizing the inseparability of Turkish state nationalism and Islam and by accepting the Westernization and Ataturk reforms, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis allowed the (mostly secular) national elite to use Islam as a tool for strengthening the Turkish state nationalism against communism and Kurdish nationalism; two ideologies they perceived as threats to the Turkish state. The doctrine also provided popular support to the 1980 coup and its authoritarian actions (Kurt 2010).

Due to this change, Islam moved from a predominantly negative influence to a source or symbol of national unity and strength. As the synthesis prioritized the Turkish state and
culture over Islam, it supported state’s control of Islam and its propagation by the organs of state. The Diyanet, therefore, benefitted from the rise of this movement.

The first major sign of this change was the increased importance of the Diyanet in the 1982 constitution. From a body administering duties relating to primarily with religion, it became a tool of ‘national solidarity and integrity’. Comparing the articles related to the Diyanet in the 1961 constitution and 1982 Constitution illustrates the change:

The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is incorporated in the general administration, discharges the function prescribed by a special law. (Article 154 of 1961 Constitution)

The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity. (Article 136 of 1982 Constitution)

Table 29: Diyanet’s Budget as Percentage of Total Turkish Budget (1980-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Share of Diyanet</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage Share of Diyanet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1999</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sources: Cakir and Bozan (2005, 28), Sacmali (2013, 54) and (Valley 2011)
Another characteristic of this era is international expansion by the Diyanet. During the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of Turks had moved to Europe as temporary workers. Temporary employment, however, gradually changed into permanent employment and permanent residence. In the early 1970s, to satisfy the need of religious services of these emigrants, the Diyanet started sending some of its personnel to Europe on a temporary basis, such as for the month of Ramadan. However, as private religious and Kurdish organizations started to grow in the Turkish diaspora, the Turkish elite decided to expand the role of the Diyanet beyond Turkey to counter Islamism and Kurdish nationalism. The European governments endorsed this decision for their own reasons. While the Turkish elite wanted to control the Turkish diaspora, host countries preferred Turkish imams because they were perceived to be less likely to be instruments of radicalization, being trained and controlled by an aggressively secular government. The first Turkish consulate of religious affairs was established in West Germany in 1978. After 1980, due to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, there was a large growth in the Diyanet’s work outside Turkey. In August 1984, a foreign relations department was established in the Diyanet by presidential decree (Bozan 2005, 69). The break-up of the Soviet Union and independence of six Turkic Republics further increased the demand for the services of the Diyanet as the new Republics had been cut off from the Islamic tradition for at least a hundred years. The secular leaders of these republics, like their West European counterparts, preferred Turkish Islam (taught by the Diyanet) to other Islamic influences because it was less likely to be
extremist and radical. The Turkish government expanded the external relations department (now named the foreign relations department) in November 1994 to deal with these new opportunities.

By 2008, the Diyanet’s reach outside Turkey had been extended to thirty four countries (Karaman 2008, Citak et. al. 2015, Dere 2008). Currently, the Diyanet has a separate Directorate General and has five subordinate departments to administer its affairs outside Turkey:

- Department of Turks Living Abroad;
- Department of Eurasian Countries;
- Department of Education and Counseling Abroad;
- Department of Muslim Countries and Communities;
- Department of Interreligious and Intercultural relations.
**Table 30: Diyanet Staff outside Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Staff Abroad</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Staff Abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1994</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cakir and Bozan (2005, 92)
This era was also marked by the employment of women preachers by the Diyanet. Traditionally, women are not allowed to be leaders or preachers in the Islamic religious circles, despite a rich history of learned Muslim women instructing men, starting from the wives of the Prophet Muhammad. The Diyanet has revived this tradition in Turkey. Though women are still not leading men in prayers, they are giving religious sermons, leading pilgrimages, monitoring local imams and teaching the Quranic courses (Schleifer 2005). According to the vice president of the Diyanet, it has introduced affirmative action/positive discrimination programs in favor of women applicants and this has resulted in more women being hired (Er 2008).

Table 31: Number of Women Preachers Employed by the Diyanet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Women Preachers in Diyanet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hassan 2011, Aysel 2014)
There have been allegations that the Diyanet has disproportionately expanded after the AKP came to power in 2002. The evidence given to support this claim is the increase in number of mosques or Diyanet’s personnel and the increase in the Diyanet’s budget. Fabbe (2015) has argued that the alarmist concerns about the increase in Diyanet budget and employees are not based on facts. Table 3 demonstrates that during the first eleven years of AKP rule (2002-13), the number of mosques increased by about ten thousand. Looking back at the eleven years before the AKP (1990-2001) came to power, the number of mosques increased by more than nine thousand. This is not significantly different from the increase in mosques under the AKP, keeping in mind the increased restrictions on public Islam after the post-modern coup in 1997. But the increase in mosques in the nine years from 1981 to 1990 was more than eighteen thousand so the allegation of the influence of the AKP is without merit. What is true beyond any doubt is that the Diyanet’s budget, personnel and influence has increased enormously in the last thirty years, signaling increasing Islamization of government in Turkey.
Table 33: Total Number of Mosques in Turkey (1979-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mosques</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mosques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>42744</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>73772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>45152</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>74356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>47645</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>54667</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>75369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>57060</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>75941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>59460</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>76445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>61532</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>77161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>62947</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>77777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>64675</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>78608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>66000</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>79096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>66674</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>80053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>68202</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>80636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>68675</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>81984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>69523</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>82693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>70213</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>84684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value 1</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>71293</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>85412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>72418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Cakir and Bozan (2005, 26) and Diyanet (2013)

2010 Onwards

The current era appears to continue the trend of increasing influence of the Diyanet in Turkey. Though during the last era (the early 1980s to late 2000s), the Diyanet saw rapid expansion and rise in influence, this era seems to be better. The AKP, after the defeat of its rivals, can implement its own agenda, without looking over its shoulder. Turkish President recently compared the President of the Diyanet to Pope and promised him a private jet. It might be electoral rhetoric or baiting to his supporters but it might also be signs of things to come.

Almost half a century after law no. 633, a new Diyanet law was passed and became operational in July 2010. One of the main reasons why it took so long to pass a new law is the controversial nature of the Diyanet. As is clear from the above discussion, beyond budget, personnel and purpose, even the existence of the Diyanet is controversial.
The law no. 6002 resulted in numerous significant changes. The status of the Diyanet was raised to the undersecretary level. The law also allowed the Diyanet to establish radio and television channels. The service conditions of Diyanet employees were also improved. The Diyanet’s mandate was expanded to provide religious services outside mosques, including institutions such as hospitals, prisons, retirement homes, women shelters etc. (Diyanet 2015, Yildirim 2011).

The Diyanet’s personnel and budget had been increasing since the 1950s but the increase after 2010 is unprecedented in terms of employees. If we look at the percentage share of the Diyanet’s budget in the total Turkish budget, it has gone beyond 1.2% only a few times in the Turkish history and in 2014, it was 1.24%. So, in terms of budget share, the Diyanet has attained one of the highest levels ever achieved. However, it is the unprecedented increase in the number of personnel that is astounding. From 1988 to 2010, for twenty-two years, Diyanet’s employees fluctuated between seventy thousand and eighty-five thousand but since 2010, the number has increased markedly to more than one hundred and forty thousand (Table 7).
Table 33: Total Number of Diyanet Employees (1971-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>25236</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>79685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30970</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>77795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>43197</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>44369</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>76037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>46665</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>74368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>49784</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>74114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>22380</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>71693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>61929</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>80299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>65361</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>79810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>70099</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>84195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>74930</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>83033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>74789</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>81851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>76232</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>84157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>75090</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>98555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>74772</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>105472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>75043</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>121845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>76087</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>142,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>81492</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bozdag (2012), Cakir and Bozan (2005, 74), and Korkmaz (2015)

Another interesting development was the statements of the newly-elected President Erdogan and the new PM Davutoglu about the Diyanet made in 2014. PM Davutoglu, after assuming his post, raised the status of the Diyanet by bringing it directly under him. Previously, the Diyanet was part of the PM’s office but was supervised by a minister of state. The PM also remarked that he aimed for an international mission for the Diyanet, wanted to raise the status of the institution, and was not happy with the perception that the Diyanet was only a bureaucratic institution.

*When I took office as the foreign minister [in 2009], the first instruction I gave was to apply the same protocol that I receive to both the head of the Diyanet and to the Fener Greek patriarch. Positioning the Diyanet as an institution that solely has a bureaucratic function was personally annoying me. This also applies to other religious authorities.* (Hurriyet Daily 2014c)
Shortly after this statement by PM Davutoglu, President Erdogan raised the status of the head of the Diyanet in the state protocol list above that of many of the cabinet ministers. (Hurriyet Daily 2014d). In 2012, then President Gul was the first President in more than thirty years to visit the Diyanet (Sunday’s Zaman 2013).

In the June 2015 parliamentary elections, the Diyanet became a significant issue as the three political parties had different stances about it. The CHP promised it to be equidistant from all religions and the HDP promised to abolish it. The AKP declared that it would promote the Diyanet further and highlighted the stance of the CHP and the HDP to consolidate its religious voters. President Erdogan said in a speech:

_They are now targeting the Diyanet. The main opposition party [CHP] has written in their election platform, 'The Diyanet will be at equal distance to all faiths.' The religion of this nation is clear. And the members of other religious communities have their own institutions, and those are clear. So why are they bringing the controversy to the doors of the Diyanet? And those who promise to abolish the Diyanet [HDP], it is clear what kind of a lesson our nation will teach them._

But one may ask why opposition parties are targeting the Diyanet, thereby distancing them from religious voters, who form a majority in Turkey. Opposition leaders, however, argue that it has become too big and a tool of the AKP (Tremblay 2015; Korkmaz 2015).
The increase of personnel, budget, high profile visits and status does seem to be the dawn of a new era in the role of the Diyanet. However, it is still too early to tell. If this trend continues, then it can be safely argued that the Diyanet has entered another expansionist phase of its history and Islamization of government in Turkey is in full swing.
MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, PAKISTAN

For the first quarter of century of Pakistan’s existence, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) did not exist. This was surprising for a state which was created in the name of religion. It was established in 1974 and since then, it has marched on, sometimes as an independent ministry and at other times as a part of larger ministry. Most often, it has been a part of the Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs. The following section analyzes the MRA’s journey through three era of Pakistan’s history, after a brief look at the circumstances before independence.

Before Independence

Muslims first conquered parts of Indian subcontinent in the 8th century and continued to mount successful invasions for the next five hundred years but their rule was intermittent. The invaders mostly conquered, sought tribute and appointed governors but returned to their homes in either the Middle East or Central Asia. It was only in 1206 when Sultan Qutb-ud-Din Aibak ascended the Delhi throne that a large Muslim state that was based in and focused on India was established. Sultan Aibak died in 1210 hence it was his successor Sultan Iltutmish that structured the administration of Delhi sultanate.196 Sultan Iltutmish

196 Delhi Sultanate period had five different dynasties (Slave/Mamluk, Khilji, Tughlaq, Sayyid, and Lodi) and continued from 1206 to 1526. Mughal Empire (1526-1707) is usually divided in two periods, the great Mughal period (1526-1707) and later Mughal period (1707-1857). In the first period, emperors were powerful and in control of their realm while in the second period, power was gradually lost to British and
(reign 1211-36) was the first sultan to appoint an alim as Sheikh-ul-Islam to look after religious affairs.\(^{197}\) His successors changed the name to Sadr-us-Sudur but the duties remained similar. Generally, this office was combined with the Qazi-ul-Quzat, the highest judicial officer in the realm. Religious authority was, however, always subservient to the Sultan (Reddy 2006, B-87). The Mughal emperors broadly maintained the same administration as Delhi Sultanate. Only two Mughal emperors tried to change the state’s relationship with Islam, Emperor Akbar (reign 1556-1605) and his great-grandson Emperor Aurengzeb (reign 1658-1707). Emperor Akbar adopted a more eclectic religious policy and tried to reduce Islam’s influence, while Emperor Aurengzeb moved in the opposite direction and attempted to establish a Sunni state by codifying and applying Hanafi Law more strictly. Both emperors largely failed in their attempts and their religious policies fizzled out after their deaths (Schimmel 2002).

British rule, under the East India Company, resulted in the gradual replacement of the customary law and the Muslim Hanafi law with British laws. Company administrators were generally tolerant of religious practices of the ‘natives’ and did not interfere in the personal status issues.\(^{198}\) After the 1820s, Governor General Lord Dalhousie adopted a more aggressive policy towards local rulers, religions and culture, which was disliked by many Indians. Anger against this policy eventually led to Indian mutiny (1857-8). Tellingly, the

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\(^{197}\) He also legitimized himself by receiving Caliph’s investiture from Baghdad.

\(^{198}\) Like marriage, divorce, inheritance etc.
triggering act of the mutiny was related to British disrespect for Indian religious sensibilities; the forced introduction of a rifle whose cartridges Indian sepoys (soldiers) had to bite before firing. Rumors spread that these cartridges were lubricated with cow or pig’s fat, thus biting it became a sacrilegious act for both Hindus and Muslims (Editors 2014). After the mutiny, British government took direct control of India. As mentioned previously, to end the disquiet, Queen Victoria issued a proclamation of religious freedom for all her subjects in 1858 and admonished those administering for her from interfering with local religious practices.

The new colonial policy allowed the locals, or their religious leaders, to administer issues relating to personal status. However, outside this small pocket of personal status issues, British government were the sole decision-makers and did not let religion or religious leaders interfere in making either policy or laws. Laws and policies were made in the interest of the colonial government and were not considered to be within the religious domain.

The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

Pakistan was created in 1947 as a state for Indian Muslims in order that they could live according to Islamic principles. However, there was no MRA in either the first Pakistani administration set-up after independence or subsequent administrations. There are four reasons that might explain why it was not considered necessary to have an MRA in the new state.
The first reason was the absence of a Ministry regulating religion or facilitating religion in British India. Most of the founding fathers of Pakistan had worked in/with the British Indian government and were influenced by its policies. The Pakistani leadership post-independence tried to continue with the colonial distinction between personal status issues and all other matters. Personal status issues were considered, as before, the domain of religion and the religious leadership and the state would not interfere in that domain. Correspondingly, all other affairs were the state’s domain and thus religion or religious leadership would not be allowed or expected to interfere in these areas. Creating an MRA was against this policy. An MRA could possibly incense religious leadership or religious sensibilities of the Muslim population and make things difficult for the mostly non-religious state elite.

The second reason for not creating an MRA was related to the landed gentry’s support for Pakistan in the crucial 1946 elections that led to creation of Pakistan.\(^{199}\) It is difficult to perceive the All India Muslim league winning the 1946 elections without their help and Pakistan would not have come into existence without winning the 1946 elections. After the formation of Pakistan, the central legislature had a hefty representation of the landed gentry and the provincial legislatures of West Pakistan were dominated by them.

\(^{199}\) All India Muslim League campaigned on the slogan of Pakistan and so if it had lost the 1946 elections, British would have been less inclined the demand of Pakistan.
The support of the landed elite, especially in elections in the decade preceding independence had been crucial to the Muslim League. The landed elite in Punjab, Bengal, and Sind supported the Pakistan movement, and in so doing guaranteed their influence on the future state. (Nasr 1996)

The establishment of the MRA did not suit the landed gentry as their control of the land and populace could have been jeopardized by the MRA. They were happy with the way things were and wanted to maintain the folk religion of the masses that had existed and often supported their control. They did not want high religion. The MRA could lead to consequences such as centralization, institutionalization, and codification of religion and the enhancement of religious education, leading to rise of a new religious elite that they would not be able to control.

Thirdly, even religious right did not consistently demand an MRA. Initially, ulema did make a public demand for a powerful MRA. In January 1948, a religious party, Jamiat-al-ulema-i-Islam passed a resolution that demanded that the government should appoint a religious scholar as Sheikh-ul-Islam, with executive powers nationwide over the qadis. (Binder 1961, 98). Then, there was meeting in summer that planned for a powerful MRA:

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200 High religion is defined in contrast to folk religion. High religion is scriptualist, based on theology, and is generally similar across cultures. Folk religion is about how religion is actually practiced and varies across cultures. Every culture has its own folk religions, which are adaptations of high religion to make it more in tune to local history and local culture (Dever 2005, ix).

201 Islamic judges. This meant, at the least, the establishment of a parallel judicial system with the prevailing judicial system, based on British colonial practice.
It was in the summer of 1948...that several ulema met at the residence of Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and worked out a plan for a semi-independent Ministry of religious affairs. The plan has never been published but it is said to have been complete and detailed even to the names of the secretaries and under-secretaries. According to some reports, the Minister of Religious Affairs would be under the Head of the State and not subject to ordinary votes of confidence in the legislature. The Ministry would not only control and supervise religious institutions, mosques, endowments and qadi courts, but it would act as general censor of all government activities, and exercise general supervision over the behavior of all government servants. (Binder 1961, 33)

But in 1950, in the twenty-two points covering the future constitution of Pakistan that were agreed and signed to by more than thirty prominent ulema from both East and West Pakistan, a demand for a separate MRA was not included. One might ask what happened between 1948 and 1950 that the demand for a powerful MRA was dropped. One cannot be sure whether it was recognition of the weakness\footnote{It would have been difficult for one (no matter how powerful) MRA to fight against the whole bureaucracy and political class, who were both largely non-religious, in official meetings behind closed doors. It was far easier to fight politicians and bureaucracy on the streets in a poor, conservative country.} of any potential MRA or change of strategy to focus on long-term. The result, however, was that ulema started requesting power to vet the legislation and dropped the demands of executive powers such as a separate MRA.
Finally, there was no love lost between the founding fathers, most of whom were non-religious, and the Muslim ulema who had opposed the creation of Pakistan and ridiculed the founding fathers, sometimes even calling them non-Muslim. Therefore, the founding fathers did not have a high opinion of ulema and did not want to share power with them.

With no one interested in creating an MRA, not surprisingly, none existed in the first two and a half decades of Pakistan’s history. Despite governments by different parties and two martial laws, no MRA was created.

However, during this period, some of the functions of the present MRA were performed by other ministries/institutions e.g. hajj (pilgrimage). The Hajj Directorate was established by the government in the early fifties to manage Hajj arrangements, relating to travel and stay in Saudi Arabia. It kept operating under the administrative control of different ministries at different times.

Efforts were also made to establish a zakat system but all of them failed. In 1950, a Zakat Committee was formed under the Ministry of Finance to propose a zakat system. Its 1952 report called for ijtihad and the development of a system that increased social welfare.

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203 Both Jinnah and Iqbal (national poet and considered the first person to have clearly articulated the idea of Pakistan) were called kafir (infidel) by the religious right.
204 Hajj is the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It happens annually on specific dates of the Islamic calendar. Every Muslim, with means, has to perform the pilgrimage once in life.
205 It remained part of Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as Ministry of Commerce.
206 It is the 2.5% tax on annual savings to be spent on specific religious purposes.
207 Ijtihad is an Islamic legal concept that refers to coming up with an original interpretation, using independent reasoning and utmost effort, to deal with an issue that is discussed in Quran and Sunnah.
Nothing resulted from this report. This issue was taken up by the ACII in the 1960s. In 1969, the ACII proposed that a separate Ministry be established for the collection and distribution of zakat. (Malik 1996, 85-7). This proposal was also not implemented.

As discussed in the chapter on constitutions, the 1956 Constitution called for the appointment of a commission within one year to advice legislatures how to ‘Islamize’ the existing laws and to recommend new laws based on Islamic injunctions. However, this Commission was never established.

After the imposition of martial law in October 1958 and abrogation of the 1956 Constitution, General Ayub came up with his own constitution. In the 1962 Constitution, an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology (ACII) was envisaged.\(^{208}\) Its functions were to make recommendations to enable Muslims to live in accordance with the principles of Islam; to examine all laws and bring them into conformity with the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah; and to advise the legislatures\(^ {209}\) on any question referred to the Council, such as whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the teachings of Islam.\(^ {210}\) General Ayub was a modernist and had no intention of implementing Islamization of either laws or the constitution. Therefore, an ACII, with all of members appointed by him, could not be

\(^{208}\) Articles 199-206 of the 1962 Constitution.
\(^{209}\) Both national and provincial legislatures.
\(^{210}\) Both the 1956 and the 1962 constitutions called for the establishment of an Islamic research institute but as the main purpose of that body was to do research, it will not be discussed here.
expected to perform its constitutional functions very diligently and it did not. Not surprisingly, it was criticized by the ulema (Malik 1996, 35-7).

The relationship between Islam and the state during this period was ‘an uneasy compromise’:

*Pakistan remained a nation state indebted to its British colonial legacy for its institutions and the orientation of its elites. Its Islamic character rested tenuously upon ad hoc Islamic trappings – its title as an “Islamic republic” and constitutional provisions declaring that Islam was the state religion and that there could be no law contrary to Islam.* (Weiss 1986, page x)

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

If one would have tried to guess which Pakistani ruler established the MRA, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto would be one of the more unlikely answers. He was not only non-religious but also westernized, something that distinguished him from previous Pakistani rulers,²¹¹ who were non-religious but had a more traditional lifestyle and viewpoint. However, it was Bhutto who first established the MRA in Pakistan. Another anomaly was that the MRA was established when he was at the peak of his powers in 1974:

²¹¹ Except perhaps Jinnah.
In August 1973, a new constitution was promulgated. It was the first constitution created by a popularly elected legislature that was ratified unanimously;

One of the largest international Islamic Summit Conferences was held in Lahore in February, 1974. Delegations from 38 MMCs debated issues concerning the Muslim world. Bhutto got pledges of support from many oil-rich Middle-eastern countries;

Bhutto used the occasion of the Islamic Summit Conference to recognize Bangladesh and Prime Minister Mujib-ur-Rehman attended the conference as head of the Bangladesh delegation. In June, Bhutto made a successful visit to Dacca, further ending the acrimony between the two countries;

In April 1974, a final agreement with India and Bangladesh about Pakistani prisoners was signed in New Delhi.

Perhaps Bhutto wanted to control religious right and thought an MRA would be the best way to do it.\textsuperscript{212} The anti-Qadiani riots in the summer of 1974 in Punjab no doubt triggered the creation of the MRA. These riots forced Bhutto to pass the second constitutional amendment on 7\textsuperscript{th} September, 1974\textsuperscript{213} and then on 22\textsuperscript{nd} October, 1974, the MRA was created. Bhutto’s minister of information, Maulana Kausar Niazi, himself a cleric, no doubt contributed to this decision (Walport 1993, 248-58). Haqqani (2005, 107-8) links the two

\textsuperscript{212} He established state control on economy and education by nationalizing banks, industries, and schools. The MRA could be thought of as a way to establish state control over religion.

\textsuperscript{213} This amendment proclaimed Qadianis/Ahmadis non-Muslim. Qadianis are considered a heretic sect by most Pakistanis (and by many in the Middle East) because of their belief that an Indian Muslim, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), was a prophet or a messiah or a reincarnation of Prophet Essa (Jesus). The acceptance of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet is one of the important tenets of islam.
events of Ahmadi’s constitutional excommunication and the creation of MRA and explains them as pragmatic decisions based on larger considerations:

_Bhutto’s tilt toward religious conservatism was connected to his economic and national security agendas. The Arab oil embargo in 1973 has caused higher prices of oil all around the world and boom in the economies of Persian Gulf Arab countries. Bhutto wanted Pakistan to benefit from the flow of petrodollars, which required emphasizing Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Pakistan hosted the Islamic summit conference in Lahore and, under the patronage of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal bin Abdel Aziz, took the lead in creating permanent structures for the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). The presence of heads of state and government from all Muslim-majority countries enabled Bhutto to invite President Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh and formally recognize Bangladesh. The Islamic Summit’s most tangible result was the recognition of Pakistan as a leading power in the Muslim world….When India tested a nuclear device the same year, Bhutto thought that he could raise money for Pakistan’s two-year-old covert nuclear-weapons program from the brotherly Muslim countries he had recently brought together at the Islamic summit._

Jones (2003, 15), however, thinks that it was exploitation of religion:

_Although he was one of the most modernist leaders Pakistan has ever had, Bhutto consistently gave in to radical demands. He was cynical in his exploitation of religion. A
man of broad intellectual horizons, he repeatedly pandered to the Islamic radicals in the hope of securing short-term political advantage.

The main functions given to the MRA in 1974 were administration of pilgrimages\textsuperscript{214}, error-free printing of the Quran, ruet-e-hilal\textsuperscript{215}, tabligh\textsuperscript{216}, training of ulema, organization of the zakat, Islamic studies and research, and liaison with international institutions on religious matters (Government of Pakistan 1974).

The Ministry was, however, small and when a major re-organization of the federal government took place in February 1976, the MRA was merged with the Ministry of Minority Affairs and Overseas Pakistanis. The new ministry was called the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Minority Affairs and Overseas Pakistanis.

It can be presumed that the most important era in the history of the MRA began with the 1977 military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq. Islamization was now a priority rather than rhetoric.

\textit{No doubt, a commitment to make Pakistan into an ideal polity infused with Islamic ideas of justice and progress, or more fundamentalist versions of it, had been part of the official}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{214} Not only to Saudi Arabia but also to other places such as Iran and Iraq.
\textsuperscript{215} Moon-sighting. It is considered an important function because Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar and dates of fasting, eids and hajj are based on moon-sighting.
\textsuperscript{216} Proselytization.
\end{footnotesize}
rhetoric of all governments. However, no previous government undertook the necessary and sufficient measures to construct a national identity that comprehensively reflected the ideology of an Islamist garrison state. (Ahmed 2013, 236)

Zia’s regime made three changes related to the MRA. First, in October 1977, responsibility for (welfare of) overseas Pakistanis was transferred to Manpower Division and the Ministry was re-designated as the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs, thus making it focused on religious affairs. Second, it made the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) the main policy think-tank of the government and, finally, it established a zakat system under the MRA. These three changes increased the significance of the MRA.

The CII was established under the 1973 constitution. According to article 230 of the constitution, the functions of the council were:

- To make recommendations to Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
- To advise a House, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any question referred to the Council as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam;
• To make recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures should be brought into effect; and

• To compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies, such Injunctions of Islam as can be given legislative effect.\textsuperscript{217}

Between 1973 and 1977, not much importance was given to the CII reports. It was only towards the end that the Bhutto government asked the CII to finalize its recommendations regarding Islamization of laws, probably to fend off protests of the religious right (Malik 1996 37-8). Just before the coup, the civilian government also transferred the administrative control of the CII from the Law Ministry to the MRA.

After the coup in 1977, the CII, now under the MRA, found itself in the thick of things. Its office was shifted from Lahore to Islamabad and a new chairman\textsuperscript{218} was appointed in September 1977. From then onwards, the CII was assigned significant new tasks such as the Islamization of penal laws; proposing a zakat system (discussed below); deciding whether the electoral system is Islamic or not; etc. (Wasti 2009, 103-4; CII 2015).

\textsuperscript{217} These functions were not very different from the ACII in the 1962 Constitution. The significant change was that at least some of the members must have experience in Islamic research or instruction rather than just ‘understanding and appreciation of Islam and of the economic, political, legal and administrative problems of Pakistan’ as required under the 1962 Constitution.

\textsuperscript{218} Interestingly, new chairman Justice Afzal Cheema was a sitting judge of the Supreme Court hearing a case against the General Zia’s coup. Not surprisingly, Justice Cheema declared that the coup was legitimate and even tried to justify coup on the basis of Islam.
Table 34: Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs Budget (1986-99)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Budget Allocated (In Thousand Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>74,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>88,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>82,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>114,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>119,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>155,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>160,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>231,525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From Government of Pakistan budget documents

The CII played a major role in the Islamization drive of General Zia from 1977-88. Zia did not change the functions of the CII, but he changed its composition to get recommendations closer to what he desired and started implementing those
recommendations. He started appointing more ulema\textsuperscript{219} to the CII, instead of modernist scholars who had studied Islam in universities. As the number of ulema increased, the output of the CII became more conservative. Gradually, the atmosphere within the CII became so puritanical that even traditional ulema, belonging to Barelvi and Shia schools, started to resign (Malik 1996, 39-48; Wasti 2009, 117-8).\textsuperscript{220}

The importance of the MRA also increased with the establishment of a zakat system. In November 1977, Zia asked the CII to form a committee of economists to implement a proper zakat system in Pakistan. The committee reported in April 1978 but there were many disagreements between the Ministry of Finance, the CII and the planning commission. In the end, government decided to deduct zakat from saving accounts was criticized by the CII as it put the burden on the middle class and exempted capitalists who maintained current accounts. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 established the system.\textsuperscript{221} The MRA had an important role in both the collection and distribution of zakat. It decided the nisab (amount above which zakat is obligatory) each year which is then conveyed to the financial institutions to make the deductions. MRA also acts as a secretariat for the Central Zakat Committee (CZC), the highest policy-making body of the zakat system. CZC makes the policies relating to the collection, management and distribution of zakat. The CZC has 19

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{219} Those who had studied Islam only at traditional madrassas. Within these ulema, he preferred Hanafi Deobandi ulema.

\textsuperscript{220} Barelvi and Shias are considered closer to folk/ rural Islam prevalent in Pakistan as opposed to Deobandi and Salafi (Wahhabi) tradition that is considered more strict and scriptualist (Bahadur 2009, 105).

\textsuperscript{221} The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1979 initially established the system but it had to be changed mainly because of the opposition of Shias who give their zakat to their ulema directly and are against the collection of zakat by the state.
members, headed by a retired or serving judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Provinces also have zakat committees but they follow the lead of the CZC. The MRA convenes the meetings of the CZC and monitors the implementation of its policies. It also recommends new members for the CZC when a vacancy occurs. (Ahmad 2004, 92-3). The MRA Secretary is also the Administrator General of zakat and makes administrative decisions under the overall supervision of the CZC.

The MRA also has a role in the distribution of zakat. Initially, the MRA used to annually distribute zakat funds to the provinces in two instalments. After receiving the funds, provinces were free to distribute the money as they seem fit, keeping in view the policy directions of the CZC. In 1994, the zakat system was federalized. The power of provinces were reduced and the CZC and the MRA controlled the actual distribution of zakat in provinces, besides making the policy. This change was not successful and in 1997, control of zakat distribution was returned to the provinces (KP Government 2014). The following table shows zakat deduction increased manifold from the early 1980s to late 1990s, increasing the importance of the MRA and the Islamization of government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Zakat Deduction (In Rs. millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>1027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>1521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>1659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>2070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>2279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>2574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>2792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>2770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>2658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>2844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>3073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>3261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>3806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>4088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>4061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1990s saw some loss of interest in the Islamization campaign. Few laws to Islamize Pakistan were enacted in the 1990s and these laws did not result in any increase in the powers or functions of the MRA. For example, in June 1991, the Enforcement of Shariah Act was passed. It called for the Islamization of education and economy, promotion of Islam through media, setting up of bait-ul-mal, 222 promotion of Islamic virtues and elimination of bribery and corruption. Under the act, two commissions were formed for Islamization of the economy (under the Ministry of Finance) and for Islamization of education (under the Ministry of Education) but the MRA was not recognized as having a role in these changes (Government of Pakistan 1991).

For the MRA, the loss of importance also meant many re-organizations and mergers. Being a small ministry, it was merged with or separated from other ministries each time an administrative re-organization was implemented in the federal government. For example, in October 1991, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs was divided into two ministries, the MRA and the Ministry of Minority Affairs. Soon these two ministries were merged again and then in 1999, the (combined) MRA was merged with the Ministry

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222 A kind of welfare fund.
of Culture and Sports. These changes clearly demonstrate the diminishing importance of the MRA in the minds of decision-makers (Gabriel 2008, 91).

The most important function for the MRA in the 1990s was the hajj operation. Hajj operation was controlled and conducted by the MRA and was the most important annual activity for the MRA. The hajj operation started as a small affair in the 1950s and 1960s but concurrently with the creation of the MRA, hajj expanded due to Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s close relationship with the Saudis and his need to counter the religious right and brush up his religious credentials. The expansion under Bhutto was unprecedented and in terms of hajjis (pilgrims) as a percentage of total population, it is still unmatched (Bianchi 2004, 77-112; Gabriel 2008, 90).

1999 Onwards

Supreme Court decision in March 1999 was the harbinger of things to come for the MRA. Supreme Court decided that any Muslim could submit a form and exempt himself/herself from compulsory deduction of Zakat from bank accounts and other saving instruments. Previously, this facility was only available to Shia Muslims. As trust in Pakistani government is usually low, people availed this opportunity and exempted themselves from

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223 The MRA became very important in this period, but it was not performing all the functions that it was assigned to as some experts would claim (Bahadur 2009, 102). Its prominence did not extend to all matters under its legal purview. Some of the MRA’s official responsibilities (such as the writing of sermons for Friday prayers, the training of ulema, and managing madrassa education and Islamic preaching) were either totally ignored or done arbitrarily.
mandatory deduction, leading to decrease in the growth of zakat deduction. Another reason for this decrease was the rise in gold prices.\textsuperscript{224} The contrast between increase in zakat deduction between 1980s and 1990s and after 2000 is striking. From 1980-81 to 1998-99, zakat deduction increased from Rs. 844 million to Rs. 4061 million, an increase by more than 380\% in nineteen years. During the next fifteen years, deduction has fluctuated and could only reach between Rs. 4720 million in 2013-14, an increase of only 16\% (SBP 2012; 2014). This increase does not equal the expected increase due to inflation (annual average inflation in Pakistan since 2000 is more than 8\%), so in real terms the growth is negative. The MRA’s operations and its importance suffered due to this slacking growth in zakat deduction.

\textsuperscript{224} As nisab (the minimum amount over which Zakat becomes mandatory and is deducted by the government) is based on gold price (and silver price), rise of gold price means increase in nisab and consequently decrease in deductions. However, gold prices crashed in 2011, without the corresponding increase in the zakat deductions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Deduction (In Rs. millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>4061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>4310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>4276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>3930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>3776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>4008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>4665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>4338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>4242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>4161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>4402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>4221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>3576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>3911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>3983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>4720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SBP (2010; 2014)
The CII’s importance also declined during this period as General Musharraf government was not interested in getting CII’s opinion on matters of importance. As discussed in previous chapters, Musharraf was a non-religious person and after 9/11 was interested in decreasing the Islamization of government, not increasing it. The CII itself acknowledges that most of its major achievements were in the 1980s and 1990s (as shown in the table below taken from the CII website). After 2000, the CII’s work did not result in many laws.

Table 37: Main Achievements of the Council of Islamic Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Achievements</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Offences against Property (Enforcement of Haddood) Ordinance</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Haddood) Ordinance</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Offence at Qazf (Enforcement at Hadd) Ordinance</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ehtram-e- Ramzan Ordinance</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Enforcement of Shariat Act</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1997(Qanun-e-Qisas and Diyat)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act (Marriage with the Qur'an Prohibition) 2011

Source: CII (2013)

Due to the decline in Zakat deduction and the CII importance, the main job of the MRA, 1999 onwards, is the administration of hajj operation. However, here too one can see decline in growth. The following figure shows that during the 1950s and 1960s, the total number of pilgrims annually remained below 30,000. However, from the early 1970s to late 1990s, despite fluctuations, the number of pilgrims increased to around 110,000 annually. After 1999, there was initially a decline in number of pilgrims which has since stopped (not visible in the figure) but the growth in nowhere near what was seen in 1970s and 1980s. One can argue that the main reason for the lack of growth is the maximum limit on number of pilgrims from every country, placed by the Organization of Islamic Countries/Saudi Arabian government 225 (Bianchi 2004, 51-2). However, this cap was adopted in 1988 and Pakistan’s population has increased from around 105 million in 1988 to around 185 million in 2015, without the corresponding increase in the number of pilgrims.

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225 It was decided that pilgrims allowed from a country will not exceed 0.1% of the total Muslim population.
Figure 67: The Growth of Pakistani Pilgrimage (1947-2004)

Source: Bianchi (2004, 85) with some modifications

Not surprisingly, the budget of the MRA also decreased during this period and has only gradually recovered.
A long-ignored function of the MRA, madrassa reform, was taken-up again in 2005. However, due to the opposition of madrassa administrators, progress was limited. Starting
with Ayub Khan, Pakistani rulers have tried, without success, to bring the madrassas into the mainstream. The latest endeavour to reform the madrassas (plural of madrassa) was started by General Musharraf. While many link his enthusiasm for this project with 9/11, he started the reform a few months earlier in 2001 when he promulgated the Modal Deeni Madrassa Ordinance on 10 August, 2001 to establish a model madrassas to demonstrate what a modern madrassa should look like. After 9/11, as focus turned to the Taliban, madrassas were declared by many in the West as jihadi factories and universities of militants. Responding to the pressure, General Musharraf promulgated a new ordinance to require that the madaris register. The government issued the Pakistan Madrassa Education Ordinance of 2002. Under this ordinance, a Pakistan Madaris Education Board was established to standardize the curricula and examination system of the madrassas. A five billion rupees project was also started to mainstream them. In October 2004, the government made another attempt to reform the madrassas and introduced the Government Madrassa Reforms Program in 2004. However, all these efforts failed because of resistance of Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris Pakistan (ITMP- an umbrella organization of madrassa groups) which objected to:

- The linking of madrassas to militancy;
- The heavy footprint of the West in the madrassa reform project. ITMP accepted the need of reform but argued that it should be based on Pakistan’s internal requirements;
- Government’s desire to control madrassas; and

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226 Plural of madrassa is madaris but madrassas is now commonly used.
• The capacity of the government of Pakistan to reform madrassas when public schools, which were under its own control, were highly ineffective and inefficient.\textsuperscript{227} (Zaidi 2013)

All these reform efforts were managed by either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Education. The ITMP objected to the involvement of Ministry of Interior\textsuperscript{228} in their reform as it strengthened the notion that they are somehow linked with the military. They also objected to the reform was being implemented by the Ministry of Education\textsuperscript{229} as the Minister of Education was a retired General who had spoken publically against madrassas. There was also distrust of Musharraf himself. ITMP preferred that the reform be led by the MRA as the Minister of Religious Affairs was Ejaz-ul-Haq the son of General Zia-ul-Haq. The MRA Secretary, the highest bureaucratic official, had also studied in a madrassa so madrassas were more comfortable with the MRA. So, the Madrassa Board was attached to the MRA in 2006 (Fair 2008, 82-3, Zaidi 2013, 24, Haq 2014). As Musharraf’s position deteriorated in 2007, madrassa reform languished for the next two years. Madrassa reform again took off in 2010, when an agreement was signed between ITMP and the government.

\textsuperscript{227} These arguments by the ITMP were some or less seconded by the Brooking Institution’s report on Pakistan’s Education system, \textit{Beyond Madrasas}. (Graff and Winthrop 2010)
\textsuperscript{228} Counterpart of the Department of Homeland Security. Primary functions of the Ministry of Interior are internal security, terrorism, penal law reform, citizenship, immigration, etc. Policing is, however, provincial subject.
\textsuperscript{229} The main function of Ministry of Education is curricula development and coordination, as education is a provincial subject. It also controls Higher Education Commission that thus influences tertiary education in the country. (Government of Pakistan 2005)
but it was not implemented as the religious affairs and education both became provincial subjects/functions after the eighteenth constitutional amendment (U.S. Department of State 2011).

There had been an effort to revive the MRA, particularly after the 2014 Peshawar massacre. The hallmark of this initiative appears to be increased state (MRA) involvement in controlling the religious narrative and societal Islamization in Pakistan. However, at this point, nothing concrete has been achieved.

In July 2014, the Supreme Court of Pakistan also gave a seminal judgment in favor of minority rights. It made several recommendations in its judgment to stop discrimination against minorities and decided to convene regularly to see whether its recommendations have been implemented. The main recommendations related to the MRA were the establishment of a National Commission for Minorities Rights to safeguard minority rights and setting quotas for minorities in public sector jobs. This Commission was formed under the MRA and the MRA instructed the provincial governments to implement the minority quota requirements (Iqbal 2014). The Commission held a meeting under the auspices of the Minister of Religious Affairs and decided to form a three-member committee to review a draft national policy on interfaith harmony (INP 2015). No further action has been taken.

As discussed earlier, after the Peshawar massacre in December 2014 in which Taliban killed 132 children, the Pakistani civil and military elite vowed to eliminate Taliban and
other religious extremists.\textsuperscript{230} The National Action Plan (NAP) announced by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif contains several points where the MRA can take lead. For example, NAP requires the government to control religious hate literature, regulate the madrassas, protect religious minorities, take steps to end religious extremism and sectarianism, etc. Many of these actions falls under the purview of the MRA.

The MRA did try to restart madrassa reform as decided under the NAP. The Minister of Religious Affairs said, ‘We want the Madaris to teach religious as well as secular subjects. No Madrassa will be allowed to teach or publish literature which promotes extremism or sectarianism’. There were some hopes of progress and reform. However, in February 2015, ITMP refused to attend a meeting convened by the government as they argued new regulations/agreements cannot be made unless the MRA and the Ministry of Interior implement previous agreements (Haq 2014, Gishkori 2015a, and Gishkori 2015b). The Minister of Religious Affairs tried to placate the ITMP, but the agreement seems difficult (NNI 2015).

The MRA has also begun to study and learn from the Diyanet. The current Minister of Religious Affairs visited Turkey, learned how the Diyanet works and requested help. It was decided that the DRA would establish model Imam-hatip schools in Pakistan. A team of

\textsuperscript{230} A military action against the Taliban, called Zarb-e-Azb, was earlier started in mid-2014. It involves 30,000 troops and also includes intelligence and police operations all over Pakistan to capture Taliban hiding/operating in other parts of the country. Zarb-e-Azb demonstrated a change of strategy of Pakistani military regarding Taliban and other religious extremists. It has weakened the mullah-military alliance, one of the major reasons why religious extremists could not be tackled head on for the last thirty years.
the Diyanet staff recently visited Pakistan in February 2015 to take stock of the situation (Daily Times 2015). There is also an attempt to set-up Nizam-e-Salah program in the mosques in Islamabad. Under this system, all mosques would have uniform azan timings and perform prayer at simultaneously, decided by the MRA in consultation with the religious leaders (Staff report 2015). However, this attempt was also unsuccessful.

In sum, in this period, the importance, budget, and main revenue source of the MRA decreased. The initiative to revive MRA is largely unsuccessful. According to this indicator, the Islamization of government has declined in the current era.

**Conclusion**

The Diyanet is a unique Turkish institution. It is hard to find a similar institution in any other Muslim-majority country, perhaps even in the world. It controls and discriminates but also supports and promotes religion in a secular republic. The Diyanet’s history is also unique as it is supported by Islamists, secularists, democrats, military dictators, socialists and nationalists at different points in Turkish history.

The Diyanet faces three types of criticism. First, it is criticized by the secularists who find its presence an anomaly in an avowed secular republic. Second, it is criticized by the non-Sunní Muslim communities, particularly the Alevis. These communities, who make up

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231 Islamabad, the federal capital, is the only major urban area where MRA has direct control over mosques. Other urban areas are administered by the provinces.
fifteen to twenty percent of the Turkish population, are forced by the Diyanet (or by the Turkish state) to learn about Sunni Islam and pay for Sunni Islam’s propagation. Alevi children learn about Sunni Islam in schools and their parents pay for the building of Sunni mosques while their Alevi places of worship (cemevis) receive no support from the state. Finally, even Islamists and religious Sunnis criticize the Diyanet because it is a tool of the state. They remember that once the Diyanet supported the Turkish azan. Therefore, these groups want a Diyanet that is independent of state, helping people to lead pious lives, without influenced by politics. Despite these varied criticisms, the Diyanet has flourished since the 1950's and has grown to be a very huge and powerful organization in Turkey.

As an indicator of the Islamization of government in Turkey, the Diyanet follows a pattern. In the period after independence, there was sharp decrease in the Islamization of government, followed by a slow increase from 1950s to 1970s and then an accelerated increase after 1980s. Finally, after 2010, pace of the Islamization of government increased further after 2010 (until 2015). This pattern can be related to what was seen in the case of indicators of Islam’s role in state nationalism discussed in chapters II, III and IV.

During the early decades of the Republic, the changes in the state administration of religious affairs indicate a sharp decrease in the Islamization of government. First, Ministry of Religious Affairs was abolished and the Diyanet was established. Then, the Diyanet’s influence decreased in the 1920s and in 1931 most of its personnel were transferred to another department and its budget decreased from more than one percent of the total
government expenditure to a third of one percent. The decline continued until the mid-1940s when its share in total expenditure of government fell to 0.15%. In the second period, starting in the late 1940s, there was a revival of the influence of the Diyanet, demonstrating an increase in the Islamization of government. The Diyanet’s budget increased and most of the personnel taken away in 1931 were transferred back to the Diyanet. In 1961, the Diyanet became a constitutional body and secularists also accepted its role. In the 1970s, the Diyanet kept increasing its personnel, budget and functions.

In the third era, the Diyanet rapidly expanded, indicating escalation in the Islamization of government. In the current (1982) Constitution, the Diyanet was given, for the first time, a constitutional role of assisting ‘national solidarity and integrity.’ From 1981 to 1991, in one decade, almost twenty thousand mosques were built. The largest increase in one decade in the history of Turkey. The Diyanet also expanded outside Turkey to Europe in the 1980s and later in the 1990s to the newly independent Central Asian Republics. Quran courses increased and women preachers were also inducted in the Diyanet.

In the current era, the pace of the Diyanet expansion has increased further, signifying an increase in the Islamization of government. The Diyanet’s budget is bigger than many ministries and has reached 1.24% of the total budget. The number of its personnel has increased to more than one hundred and forty thousand. Both the President and Prime Minister have strived to increase the Diyanet’s role and promised to make it an even more important institution in future. President Erdogan even drew a comparison between
Catholic Pope and President of Diyanet and argued that President of Diyanet should be respected a lot more than he is at present.

For a country which was created in the name of Islam, an MRA might seem to be a necessity to deal with the close links of religion and state. Pakistan, however, only established its MRA in 1974, more than quarter of century after independence. This demonstrates the comparatively slow pace of the Islamization of government during the first period, from the late 1940s to late 1960s. The main reasons for the non-existence of the MRA were the opposition of ulema, the national elite, and the landed elite. The ulema opposed the MRA because they feared state would control religion using the MRA. Elite did not establish the MRA because they wanted less interference of religion and ulema in governmental matters. The landed elite were concerned about the centralization of religion that they thought would result with the creation of the MRA. In the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), not only the MRA came into existence but it also prospered beyond imagination. It gained new functions, powers and a source of revenue, zakat. One of the autonomous organizations attached to it, the CII, became the main source of policies for Zia’s the Islamization of government drive, expanding the MRA’s influence to other ministries and provinces. The MRA/CII wrote, advised on, and vetted legislation on financial, social, and political matters.

In the current period, starting in 1999, the MRA’s influence has receded. First, the Supreme Court disallowed the mandatory deduction of zakat by the government from the accounts
of majority Sunni population. The Supreme Court decided that, like the Shiites, the Sunnis could also submit a simple affidavit and exempt themselves from mandatory deduction. This decision resulted in ending the fast growth in zakat collection. Under General Musharraf, the CII was out of favor and its budgetary allocations decreased. Its meetings and pronouncements were largely ignored. The MRA’s budget decreased from approximately two hundred and fifty thousand rupees in 1999-2000 to one hundred and seventy thousand rupees in 2000-01, a budget cut of more than thirty percent in one year. It has only slowly recovered from that budget cut. After 2014, there has been an effort to revive the MRA but it has been largely unsuccessful.

The rise and fall of Islamization of government in Pakistan as seen in this chapter follows that same pattern as observed in the previous chapters. There was an increase in Islamization of government in the initial period (the late 1940s to late 1960s). During the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), Islamization of government experienced rapid increase, mainly due to the policies of General Zia’s government (1977-88). In the current period (1999 onwards), Islamization of government is decreasing for the first time since the establishment of Pakistan.

After first analyzing three indicators of Islam's role in state nationalism (Chapter II to Chapter IV), two indicators of the Islamization of government have been discussed in Chapters V and the current chapter. The next chapter will discuss the last indicator of the
Islamization of government, religious education. It would be interesting to see whether religious education follows the same pattern as the previous five indicators.
Chapter VII

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
Introduction

Importance of education in socialization of next generation cannot be over-emphasized. K-12 education is one of the most important responsibilities of the modern state. It is also a great opportunity in the hands of the state to influence the population. Therefore, states prioritize and focus on what is taught in schools and both Islamists and liberals/secularists in MMCs try to control education.

There are tens of different indicators available, each capturing an important aspect of education. Since the objective here is to measure the Islamization of the Government, the education indicators chosen are related to religious education. Governments which want to Islamize or to show that they are Islamizing would increase religious education. Religious education can be increased in a number of ways. First, governments can start teaching religious education in public schools. If it is optional, they can make it mandatory on all students or increase the hours of religious education per week. Second, government can open and operate religious schools where the focus is on religious education, rather than on general education. This arrangement can cater for a situation where a minority wants to have religious education and government provides special religious school for such a minority, without forcing all students to study religion. Finally, government can support religious education, without administering such education itself. It can provide institutional, legal, and financial support to private religious schools. In this chapter, the above three indicators would be used to examine government’s support for religious education, thereby estimating the overall Islamization of the government. Since wearing of hijab has been a big issue in Turkey and critics have called allowing hijab as a sign of Islamization of the government, rules relating to wearing hijab in schools have also been selected as an additional measure.

Based on the above discussion, this chapter would analyze how the following four indicators have changed since the independence of Turkey and Pakistan:

- Religious Instruction in Public Schools;
• Public Religious Schools;
• Private Religious Education;
• Headscarf in Public Educational Institutions.

Kuru has used similar measures in his award-winning book on Turkey, France and the US. His comparative analysis of education systems of Turkey, France and the US concentrated on six areas in education system to analyze the role of religion/secularism:

• Student religious dress and religious symbols in public schools;
• Pledges recited in public schools;
• Private religious education;
• Religious instruction in public schools;
• Public funding of private religious schools; and
• Prayer in public schools.

---

Table 39: State Policies towards Religion in Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ban on Students’ Religious Symbols in Public Schools</th>
<th>Pledge Referring to God Recited in Public Schools</th>
<th>Ban on Religious Instruction in Public Schools</th>
<th>State Funding of Religious Private Schools</th>
<th>Ban on Prayer in Public Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kuru (2009, 8-9)

Since Kuru’s focus is secularization, his approach cannot be followed completely. In this chapter the four indicators discussed above will be used to see whether Islamization of government has increased or decreased in Turkey and Pakistan.
TURKISH RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Ataturk wanted to create a modern Turkey, a contemporary civilization, far different from the Ottoman society. To realize his dream, he knew he had to focus on the youth and their education, as it was difficult to change the people of his own generation. He argued that 300 million Muslims worldwide were under the control of other nations and disrespected because they had had the wrong kind of education. If Turkey were to modernize, it had to have a different education system (Mango 2002, 484). Public and scientific education were prominent parts of Ataturk’s modernizing project and religious education, the mainstay of the Ottoman education system, was not. President Erdogan also wants a new Turkey and, not surprisingly, he also emphasizes youth and their education. Religious education, however, is an important part of Erdogan’s project as he wants to raise a devout generation:

The reason Erdogan and his administration want to Islamize the education system was offered in the beginning: They want to raise a devout generation, a manifestation of “social engineering,” which they have so fervently criticized in the past. The “devout youth” is the carrier of Erdogan’s “New Turkey” paradigm. The generation to be raised under an Islamized education system is seen as the guarantor of the regime political Islam is building in Turkey. (Gursel 2014b)

The following section explores how religious education has fared in Turkey between these two projects.
Secular Education System under Ottomans

Under the Ottomans, all education was controlled by the ulema and there was no separate secular education system till the 19th century. Before the 1830s, Ottoman education constituted of two types of religious training, the Quran courses at the lower level and madrassa courses at the higher level (Atasoy 2005, 28). The movement toward a more secular public education system started after the Ottoman defeat in the Greek War of Independence (1831-2), when Western European style military schools were opened. Later, in 1840, the first non-ulema led, non-military, state-run school, called rusdiye233, was opened and soon more were added.234 During the Tanzimat period (1839-76), educational reforms accelerated. A Ministry of Education was created in 1847 and teacher training colleges were established soon thereafter. Higher secondary (idadiye), high (sultaniye) and elementary (ibtidaiye) schools were also added to the public education system235, which was completely separate from the madrassas controlled by the ulema (Jenkins 2008, 47-8 and 61). Though the new system was not controlled by ulema, religious instruction was part of the curricula. Even students in the military academies had to take classes on subjects related to Islam, as Ataturk himself did.

233 These were lower secondary schools.
234 However, religious instruction was still part of the curricula.
235 The education structure in the early 20th century was three-year elementary (ibtidaiye), three-year lower secondary (rusdiye), three-year higher secondary (idadiye) schools and three-year tertiary (sultaniye) (Landau 2004, 189).
The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s

This period represents the gradual secularization of the Turkish education system. In 1920, while discussing education program, the Minister of Education Riza Nur declared, ‘…in our program we put religious education above all else (as quoted in Bayar (2012, 22)). In 1921, new Minister of Education, Hamdullah Suphi presented his goals:

To return our children back to the roots of their nation, to make them loyal to their past.…. Today’s scholars should be men who know the sciences of the East and the West. [We] should order the Ministry of Religious Affairs to [protect] the conscience of our children against the currents coming from the West. (as quoted in Bayar (2012, 22))

However, soon decisions were taken to make education secular and Ministry of Religious Affairs (or its successor the Diyanet)’s role in public education was eliminated. After the passage of the Tevhid-Tedrisat Kanunu (Law of Unification of Educational Instruction) on 3rd March 1924, all educational institutions came under the purview of the Ministry of Education. As madrassas were closed, even religious education came under the control of the Ministry of Education, run by non-religious leadership. Later, in the 1930s, religious courses in public education were also prohibited and state-run religious schools (Imam-hatip schools) were closed, signifying a sharp decline in the Islamization of government.\footnote{The Quran courses, administered by the state, were not banned but their number was also sharply limited.}
The following section would discuss the Islamization of government in the following four areas related to education:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public religious institutions.

**Religious Instruction in Public Schools**

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, religious instruction continued to be provided in the public schools as it was under the Ottomans. The four level educational structure of the new republic was also part of the Ottoman legacy.

**Figure 68: Early Republican Education System**
However, gradually the number of hours of mandatory religious instruction in schools was reduced. By the mid-1930s, even optional religious courses were difficult to find in public schools. After 1938, there was no religious instruction in the public schools until 1949 (Adanali 2002).

The objective of the ban on religious education was partly civilizing/modernizing and partly nationalizing. Ataturk considered religious education useless and wanted Turks to acquire modern knowledge and scientific education in order to join the modern world. Speaking to a gathering of teachers in 1924, he said:

> For everything in the world – for civilization, for life, for success – the truest guide is knowledge and science. To seek a guide other than knowledge and science is [a mark of] heedlessness, ignorance and aberration.\(^{237}\) (Mango 2002, 484)

Prime Minister Inonu explained in more detail why a "national" education, and not a religious or international education, was necessary:

> We want national education. What do we mean by this? This idea is easier to understand if we define its opposite. The opposite is religious upbringing or international education.

\(^{237}\) This is a very famous statement of Ataturk and its first part is now engraved on the main building of Ankara University.
You teachers should not offer religious and international, but national education...

Religious education is in one sense international education. Our education, however, should be by ourselves, for ourselves. National education can be thought about as having two aspects: political and national... Unfortunately, however, our citizens do not yet form a true nation (community). But if this generation works consciously, venturing all it has in terms of life experience and higher learning then the Turkish polity (state), may also develop into a Turkish nation (community) marked by genuine cultural, educational, and social maturity. This national body cannot hold any other civilizations. (Ozdalga 1999)

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**Public Religious Schools**

When all private religious schools (madrassas) were banned, they were replaced by state-run religious schools, called Imam-hatip schools.\(^{238}\) These schools were set-up to placate

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\(^{238}\) Imam is the one who leads prayers. In Arabic, Khatib, from which hatip emerged, is the one who delivers the sermon, mostly Friday sermon. So, these schools were for leaders of prayers and preachers.
conservatives who were still part of the ruling elite in the early 1920s. Imam-hatip schools taught a mix curriculum approved by the state, including both religious and secular subjects. Initially, twenty-nine Imam-hatip schools were opened, catering to around two thousand two hundred and fifty students in 1924. These were mostly erstwhile madrassa students. A faculty of theology was also opened at Darulfunun (the former name of the Istanbul University) (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 40). However, gradually the number of schools was reduced and by 1928-9, there were only two schools with only hundred students left. By 1930, these remaining schools were closed. The faculty of theology at the Istanbul University was also closed in 1933. The government claimed that the Imam-hatip schools were closed since there was no demand for religious education. However, as later events demonstrated, the demand for religious education has remained strong throughout modern Turkish history. Imag-hatip schools were closed as part of the state policy to discourage religious education (Bozan 2007, 12).

239 The Turkish government had to open Imam-Hatip schools again in the 1950s due to popular demand.
Table 40: Imam-Hatip Schools in Early Republican Turkey (1923-1930)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Year</th>
<th>No. of Schools</th>
<th>No. of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923-4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cakir et. al. (2004, 58)

Private Religious Education

As already mentioned, after the passage of the Tevhid-Tedrisat Kanunu, it became illegal to provide private religious education. On 16th March 1924, the Education Minister reported that four hundred and seventy nine madrassas have been closed. These madrassas were educating around sixteen thousand students (Jenkins 2008, 93). Reforms had been introduced in Ottoman madrassas during the previous fifty years, such as the introduction of secular subjects. However, Ataturk considered them beyond redemption. He declared:
The medreses, established by the old Turks, are degenerated ruins, unable to be reformed in the light of a modern academic mentality. (Agai 2007)

Though the Turkish state tried to close all madrassas, many small madrassas in rural areas continued to provide religious education, primarily focusing on teaching children how to read the Quran. All private religious schools were illegal, but they still operated secretly. Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, a celebrated preacher/scholar of Sufi Naqshbandi order, was one of the many scholars providing religious education illegally at the local level. He taught everywhere, at homes, shops and barns (Atasoy 2005, 83).

**Headscarves in Public Educational Institutions**

When the Republic was established in 1923, there were no restrictions on religious clothing in the schools. In fact most of the leaders of the independence movement themselves wore a fez and many of the members of the first Grand National Assembly were religious leaders. After the passage of the Constitution in 1924, in a major package of ‘civilizing’ reforms, Ataturk banned the fez (through the Hat Law) and closed religious shrines and

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240 Later on, his students/ followers also started teaching the Quran and a big network of schools was born. These schools are referred as Suleymancilar schools.

241 Fez (brimless bonnet) was not really related to Islam. In fact, in 1829, Sultan Mahmud II mandated that all Ottoman elite to wear fez, instead of a turban, as part of his modernization or Westernization efforts. Ulema, at that time, considered fez against religion and protested against this change. Therefore, they were allowed to keep wearing turbans. But by the early 20th century, fez was considered Islamic and (European) hat, which Ataturk forced on Turks, was the sign of modernization and Westernization. As ulema ‘discovered’ that fez was a symbol of Islam, Ataturk ‘discovered’ that fez was a sign of fanaticism, ignorance, and hatred of progress and civilization.
dervish convents in November 1925. This was the start of a campaign that would go on for the next fourteen years. The modernizing project was all encompassing and included dress as Ataturk himself explained:

*Gentlemen, the Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic are civilized; they are civilized in history and in reality. But I tell you as your own brother, as your friend, as your father, that the people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must show and prove that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living. . . . My friends, international dress is worthy and appropriate for our nation, and we will wear it.* (Cinar 2008).

However, this change was restricted to men. Though Ataturk thought veiling as barbaric and uncivilized (as the following statement shows) he didn’t declare it illegal:

*In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a towel or something like it over their faces . . . when a man passes by. What is the meaning and sense of this behavior? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilised nation adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is a spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at once.* (Vojdik 2010)
Veiling and headscarves were strongly discouraged but not banned in public by the Turkish state. However, state employees and students were not allowed to veil. Co-education at all of levels of education became state policy in 1927. A law was proposed in 1935 to ban headscarves in public, like fez, but it was not passed. It was thought that gradually women would stop wearing headscarves by themselves (Smith 2013; Kavakci 2007, 208).

Female education was still very limited so ban on headscarves in schools was not an issue for majority of the population which was conservative. The total number of girls studying in high schools and vocational schools in Turkey in 1930-1 was less than five thousand and it was still less than sixteen thousand in 1949-50. The total number of girls studying in higher education institutions (universities, professional colleges, etc.) in Turkey in 1930-1 was less than six hundred and it was still less than five thousand in 1949-50 (Turkish Statistical Institute 2012).

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

As mentioned before, in the mid-1940s, the CHP had to end its single-party rule and introduce the multi-party system. Though the DP did not campaign on the basis of religion,

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242 Another law related to clothing was promulgated in 1928 which banned religious functionaries from wearing traditional religious clothing in public.

243 Focus is on high schools and vocational schools because it is after puberty that covering head becomes mandatory for girls according to many Muslim traditions.

244 The adult literacy rate was still less than 20% in 1935. Women’s literacy rate was around 8% while men’s literacy rate was around 31% (Turkish Statistical Institute 2012).
it quickly became popular by portraying the CHP as an elitist and anti-tradition party. In 1947, the CHP held its Seventh Party Congress. As the threat of electoral loss at the hands of the DP loomed large, many participants pleaded for a change of policy toward religion and religious education.

/Public pressure was mainly from the rural areas. Due to the ban on religious education, both public and private, there was a serious dearth of religious personnel in the 1940s. Most of the religious scholars of the late Ottoman period and early republican years were either executed, sequestered or exiled during the establishment of new Turkey or they passed away from natural causes. There were no religious authority left to guide the society at practical matters concerning rituals such as funerals, religious holidays etc. (Kavakci 2007, 211)

In the end, even President Inonu relented and said:

/We have to take national realities into account. We have to be responsive to the moral needs of the nation and relieve the people from a feeling of being neglected by the government. (Atasoy 2005, 72)/

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245 The DP, however, was not an Islamist party and its leader Adnan Menderes (a former member of the CHP) was a secularist and had no intention of changing the nature of Turkey’s institutions. The difference between him and the CHP leadership was that he was not anti-religion. Menderes ‘did not detest or fear religious practice, as many Kemalists did’. (Kinzer 2008, 61)

246 Around three-fourth of the Turkish population lived in rural areas.
The CHP gave a few concessions, such as allowing elective religious courses in public schools. These concessions were difficult to make for the CHP but compared to what happened in the next three decades, they were just the tip of the iceberg. Religious education expanded in all kind of ways and all parties, including the CHP, played their part. Islamization of government, as far as this indicator goes, had started.

![Diagram of education structure](image)

**Figure 70: Turkish Education Structure in the 1950s**

The following section would analyze the Islamization of government in these areas:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public religious institutions.
Religious Instruction in Public Schools

Feeling the popular pressure, the CHP agreed to optional religious education in public schools and in February 1949, religious education was allowed as an elective subject. In November 1950, the DP included religious instruction in elementary school curricula and religious instruction became compulsory, unless parents requested exemption. Very few parents actually exercised this option and almost all elementary school children started having religious education for the first time since the mid-1920s (Jenkins 2008, 115-117).

In 1956, religious education was introduced in secondary schools and in 1967, it became part of the curricula of high schools (Adanali 2002). There was a fear that after the 1960 coup, religious education would again be banned in public schools but this did not happen. In fact, the Article 19 of 1961 Constitution legitimized religious education:

..Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual's own will and volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians... (Islamic Studies 1963).

Public Religious Schools

State-sponsored religious schools were also revived in this era. In the 7th Congress of the CHP referred above, there were calls for re-opening of the Imam-hatip schools but the CHP leadership did not oblige. It only allowed the commencement of a ten month religious course in major cities and opened a faculty of theology at the University of Ankara in 1949 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 40).
In 1951, the DP, which had promised opening of Imam-hatip schools, opened the first seven schools in provincial capitals of Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri and Marash (Bozan 2007, 14). These schools replaced the Imam-hatip courses started by the CHP. Imam-hatip schools worked on a seven year course, four years focused on culture and three years focused on vocational skills. However, even after seven years of study, including secular subjects, graduates of Imam-hatip schools were only equivalent to graduates of regular secondary schools, not high school graduates.

There were nineteen Imam-hatip schools, with around three and a half thousand students, when the first batch of Imam-hatip schools graduated in 1958 (Jenkins 2008, 117-8). Next year, government opened the first Higher Institute of Islam or Higher Islamic Institute (Yüksek İslam Enstitüleri) in Istanbul for these graduates to continue their education beyond the secondary level (Ozgur 2012, 40-1).

The coup in 1960 did not stop the growth of Imam-hatip schools. The coalition of the CHP and Adalet Partisi247 (AP: Justice Party) that came into power in 1961 opened seven more Imam-hatip schools to keep up with the demand of the religious personnel (Jenkins 2008, 126).248

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247 The AP is considered the successor of the DP, which was banned after the 1960 coup.
248 Mosque building also continued with the same speed as under the DP i.e. 1500 per year. So, there was need of more religious personnel.
The AP won the election in 1965 and far outpaced the DP in the expansion of state-run religious education. Three Higher Institutes of Islam were opened by the AP in first three years and by 1972-3, there were more than two thousand students studying in five Higher Institutes of Islam (Landau 1984, 188). However, it was the increase in Imam-hatip schools that was phenomenal. Only twenty six Imam-hatip schools were opened in the last fifteen years (1950-65), AP opened forty-three new Imam-hatip schools in its first three years in power. The enrolment in these schools almost tripled, from 13,500 in 1965-66 to 41,300 in 1968-9. This massive expansion cleared the backlog of religious personal and it was obvious that all the new graduates would not be employed by the Diyanet. Parents were clearly not choosing these schools for making their sons imams. Parents’ choices were probably influenced by another change by the AP government. It removed restrictions on graduates of Imam-hatip schools from joining universities (Jenkins 2008, 128-9, Cakir and Bozan 2005, 40-1).
Table 41: Growth of Imam-Hatip Schools in the 1950s and 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Year</th>
<th>New Imam-Hatip schools</th>
<th>Total Imam-Hatip schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951-2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>1960-1</td>
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<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1971 coup caused a slight hiccup in the growth of Imam-hatip schools. It led to the closure of the middle school sections of the Imam-hatip schools but they were soon reopened and the expansion continued. Increase was particularly remarkable from 1974 to 1978. This increase was mainly due to the work of the Milli Salamet Partisi (MSP or National Salvation Party). This party was formed in 1972 by Necmettin Erbakan who was the first prominent political leader since 1923 to publically call for an increased role of Islam in Turkish state. His ideology was a mix of Turk nationalism and Islam and was called Milli Gorus (National View/Outlook). Erbakan first formed a party named Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP or National Order Party) in January 1970. It was dissolved in May 1971 after the military coup. The name Milli Gorus came from a small book he published outlining the party goals in 1975 (Jenkins 2008, 131-35).
Table 42: National Assembly Elections (1970-80)\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement/Action Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Turkish Parliament had two houses under 1961 Constitution (1961-80), Senate and National Assembly. These are only National Assembly election results.

\textsuperscript{b} The total number of seats remained 450

Source: Eligur (2010, 72-75) and Jenkins (2008, 132 - 29)

The MSP, despite winning only around 10\% of the popular vote, remained part of the ruling coalitions, first with the CHP and then with the AP, during the 1970s. Imam-hatip schools
benefited by two changes in the mid-1970s. First, as discussed above, middle sections of Imam-hatip schools were opened again. Second, the new education policy declared that Imam-hatip schools were not providers of vocational religious education only. They were accepted as providing general education, equivalent to regular high schools. So, discrimination against Imam-hatip schools students from entering social sciences and humanities faculties in universities were removed. Moreover, in 1976, girls were also allowed in the Imam-hatip schools (Cakir et. al. 2004, 40-1; Jenkins 2008, 130-7)

Table 43: Expansion of Imam-Hatip Schools in the 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Year</th>
<th>New Imam-Hatip schools</th>
<th>Total Imam-Hatip Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-4</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-8</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The changes in the 1960s and 1970s gradually established Imam-hatip schools as a viable alternative path to the university. Students and parents did not have to choose between religious education and a successful career. They could have it both ways; they could be religiously educated in the Imam-hatip schools and also become lawyers, bureaucrats, police officers, etc. Not surprisingly, the number of student in Imam-hatip schools increased from less than nine hundred in 1955 to two hundred thousand by 1981 (Landau 1984, 188; Cakir et. al. 2004, 41).

Although founded as vocational-religious institutions, imam-hatip schools were integrated into the secondary educational system in 1973 by the coalition government of the centre-left RPP and pro-Islamic NSP. This has transformed them into an alternative educational system that trains students to perform religious services and also prepares them for higher education. Most graduates continue their education in various university departments for careers in engineering, law, and medicine. They enter the job market as professionals and civil servants. In 1987, nearly 40 per cent of students in the Public Administration
Department of Ankara University’s prestigious Faculty of Political Science were graduates of imam-hatip lycées [high schools]. (Atasoy 2005, 156)

In the 1970s, the Turkish state also started provision of another type of religious education. It was obvious that there was a rising demand for a more basic level of religious education (i.e. reciting the Quran and understanding basic fundamentals) and this demand was being fulfilled by illegal private religious schools. To counter private religious schools, the Diyanet started its own Quranic courses. This was also the first time since 1924 that religious education was managed by the Diyanet and the principle set by the Law of Unification of Educational Instruction was ignored.

Private Religious Education

The ban on private religious education was also relaxed, after the DP took power in 1950. With fifteen thousand mosques constructed during the ten year rule of DP, it was not possible for Imam-hatip schools to keep up with the demand of religious personal. State, therefore, allowed them to register as private organizations and the Diyanet started hiring the graduates of these schools for administering new mosques. The increase in activity of these schools in this period could be gauged by the number of private organizations established by religious orders administering them. These organizations increased from

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250 The graduates of the private religious schools had to pass an exam prepared by the Diyanet to be employed by it.
less than hundred in 1949 to 251 in 1951 and more than five thousand by the time DP
government was toppled by the military coup in 1960 (Atasoy 2005, 74).

However, state was still afraid of traditional Islam. Teachers and students of the Quran
courses were still suspected of anti-state activities and frequently interrogated by the law
enforcement officers. This concern about private religious education was one of the reasons
why a new Diyanet law was passed in 1965. This law stopped the Diyanet from hiring of
religious personal, educated by the private religious schools. It decreed that anybody hired
as a state employee by the Diyanet had to be a graduate of state-run religious educational
institutions, such as Imam-hatip schools, higher institutes of Islam or theology faculties
attached with the universities (Jenkins 2008, 118-127). As in the case of other types of
religious education, after the 1970 coup, more restrictions were placed on private religious
schools and there was an attempt to reduce their growth, but when democracy was restored,
the growth resumed.

**Headscarves in Public Educational Institutions**

Headscarf ban in schools continued during this period. More women were being admitted
to schools and female education was no longer an urban phenomena. Rural women, who
were more likely to cover their heads, started to attend schools in large numbers in the late
1960s. In urban areas, many of the recent arrivals from countryside were religious and their
daughters wore headscarf to schools but took it off before entering schools. However,
headscarf in schools was not a big political issue as few conservative women remained in
the schools after reaching puberty as they were married early. The government data shows that the average age of marriage for women was above twenty-two years in the 1940s, which is difficult to accept as early marriage was still common in Turkey till the 1990s (Howe 2000, 113).\footnote{251}

As the following data shows, big increase in women enrolment only occurred in the 1970s. The increase in women in higher education institutions, many of them wearing headscarves, was what led to political controversy in the 1980s.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
Year & Women Enrolled in Higher Education Institutions \\
\hline
1954-55 & 4849 \\
1959-60 & 11097 \\
1964-65 & 17881 \\
1969-70 & 27454 \\
1974-75 & 57419 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Women Enrolled in Turkish Higher Education Institutions (1950s to 1970s)}
\end{table}

\footnote{251} Probably, as discussed in chapter 5, the reason of this high average age of marriage is that most of the marriages in villages were religious marriages (imam-nikahi marriages), which were not registered with the government.
The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

Military coup in September 1980 changed Turkish state relationship with Islam in a dramatic way. Islam became an accepted part of Turkish state nationalism and attempts were made to re-imagine Ataturk as an Islamic leader and hero. Trying to fight radical left and Kurdish nationalists and to counter decreasing social cohesion and increasing political instability, Turkish military let its fear of Islam take a back seat and decided to give Islam a much more public and expanded role. Military still claimed to be secularist and adopted some policies that were against traditional Islam (e.g. legalization of abortion up to ten weeks, headscarf ban etc.) but the break from the past and the state’s acceptance of Islam was too conspicuous.

National historiography was revised and Islam was presented as an outstanding national trait of the Turks, as well as being a source of social and moral stability. The curriculum of state schools was adapted to religious demands, obligatory religious courses were introduced, and the theory of evolution was banned from schoolbooks. This appears to be one of the reasons why important Islamic groups such as Fethullah Gulen gave their
support to the coup de `tat. The new state-promoted form of Islam became more visible than ever. (Agai 2007, 153)

All types of religious education grew exponentially during this period and the military regime fully integrated (Sunni) Islam into the Turkish education system (Ozgur 2012, 48). There was a brief interlude in the late 1990s. The success of Islamic-oriented Refah Party, led by Erbakan, in the mid-1990s made military take several measures to strengthen secularism in education. Imam-Hatip schools and the Quran courses were discouraged and ban on headscarf was strictly enforced. However, after the AKP won election in 2002, religious education resumed its gallop. Soon, it had recouped all its losses that it suffered in the aftermath of the 1997-8 post-modern coup and marched ahead. Islamization of government not only increased in this period but it also increased at a much faster pace.

The following section would discuss the Islamization of government in four areas:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public religious institutions.

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252 The MSP and Erbakan were banned from politics after the 1980 coup. In 1983, when restrictions on political activity were removed, Erbakan organized Refah (Welfare) Party. He assumed the leadership formally in 1987 when he was allowed to be politically active. Refah Party won the 1996 election and Erbakan became Prime Minister but was forced to resign in 1997 by the Turkish military.
Religious Instruction in Public Schools

Religious education was already part of primary, secondary and high schools’ curricula before 1980. As discussed in chapter 2, the 1982 Constitution, crafted by military junta, made it a constitutional requirement. Intellectuals’ Hearth, a right-wing association of scholars that also came up with the new unofficial state ideology – Turkish-Islamic synthesis – played a prominent role in bringing this change. Other individuals also contributed. In 1980, Professor Huseyin Atay, the dean of the Ankara University Divinity Faculty submitted a report to the military junta arguing that there is no contradiction between compulsory religious education and secularism:

*Education without religion, he argued, would not produce loyal citizens; even though the ideas of Ataturk and the Turkish Republic were being taught in public schools, he argued, the youth were still not loyal to the state, because of their lack of religious knowledge.* (Eligur 2010, 103)

Military leadership accepted the argument of right-wing scholars and Article 24 was included in the 1982 Constitution:

*Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools.* (Constitution of 1982)
Though constitution and Basic Law of National Education (1983) reaffirmed Turkish state’s commitment to secularism, it was difficult to foresee how increase in compulsory religious education would help state secularism, as Professor Atay argued. Article 12 of the Basic Law declared:

Secularism is the fundamental feature of the Turkish National Education. Religious Culture and Ethics Teaching is among the compulsory courses taught in the primary, secondary and high schools… (Selcuk 2009, 133)

In 2002, before the AKP started its long period in power, the religious education started in grade 4 and continued till the end of high school in grade 12. The course content included information on Islam, other religions and ethics (Adanali 2002). Since coming to power, AKP has tried to increase the religious content of the public education by offering more elective courses related to Islam and increasing hours of religious education. For example, in 2005, students were offered three new elective courses related to the Quran and Seerat (Daloglu 2014). In 2008, government increased funding of the theology faculties of the universities. There were also instances of celebration of religious functions in public schools, with headmasters asked by the government to attend the celebrations (Arat 2009).

Expansion in compulsory religious courses in public schools was a major issue for the Alevi population of Turkey. Although, these courses provided information about ethics and

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253 Seerat is the study of life of Prophet Muhammad.
other religions, their major portion consists of teachings of Sunni Islam.\textsuperscript{254} This was unacceptable to Alevi.\textsuperscript{255} On the plea of an Alevi father, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gave a judgment against Turkey in 2007 and advised the Turkish government to reform its religious education and make it more neutral or allow exemption to those who did not want their children to attend these classes (ECHR 2007).\textsuperscript{256} In 2008, the Turkish Court of Appeals also decided that these courses had to be reformed as they are based on the teachings of Sunni Islam. However, most of these courses were not reformed or removed from the curriculum even after these decisions (Ince 2012, 156-7).

Public Religious Schools

The leaders of military coup in 1980 also removed the last remaining restrictions on Imam-hatip school students. Imam-hatip school students could now enter all universities faculties, like any other high school graduate. They also attached all Higher Institutes of Islam to universities and declared them the faculties of theology, thus increasing their prominence, authority and acceptability.

\textsuperscript{254} Other sects or schools of thought of Islam are covered briefly or ignored. Alevi, who are between fifteen and twenty-five percent of Turkish Muslim population, are also forced to study Sunni Islam, which many of them deeply resent.

\textsuperscript{255} Alevi are a sect considered heterodox by many Sunni Turks.

\textsuperscript{256} Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey
Cakir et. al. (2004, 42) claims that the 1980 coup was ‘a critical turning point in the history of Turkey and also for the history of Imam-hatip high schools.’ The number of Imam-hatip schools did not increase much during the period from 1980 to 1997 but the number of students exploded from two hundred thousand in 1980-1 to more than five hundred thousand, making Imam-hatip school students around 13% of all Turkish high school students (Jenkins 2008, 159). Following reasons are cited for the increased popularity of and attendance at the Imam-hatip schools:

- Increase in demand of religious education;
- More opportunities for Imam-hatip school students for career advancement;
- Increase in dormitories, school buildings and scholarships coming from private sources;
- Increase in Female students. (Cakir et. al. 2004, 40-50)

After the 1997 coup, Imam-hatip schools were targeted as they were considered recruiting grounds of Refah and other Islamic-oriented parties. The reforms introduced disadvantaged Imam-hatip schools in two ways. First, changes were made in the universities’ admission process making it almost impossible for graduates of Imam-hatip schools to enter faculties, other than theology faculty. Second, compulsory education was extended from five to eight years, thus closing the middle section of all Imam-hatip schools.
The main argument for these changes was that since these schools are religious vocational schools, their graduates should be working in their own field. Military questioned the need of 53,500 graduates of Imam-hatip schools annually when the Diyanet, the main employer, could only absorb 2300 graduates. These changes decreased the number of schools and students drastically (Jenkins 2008, 162-3).
Table 45: Imam-Hatip Schools and their Students (1997-2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education year</th>
<th>Imam-Hatip schools</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982-3</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>219,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-8</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>511,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>91,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-3</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>64,534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jenkins (2008, 163) and Ozgur (2012, 50)

AKP’s election program included a commitment to remove the discrimination against Imam-hatip schools graduates in the university exams. It won the election comprehensively but was unable to remove the restriction due to the opposition from the President Sezer, military and judiciary. In the second half of 2003 first attempt by the AKP to end discrimination was vehemently and publically opposed by the military and the effort was abandoned. After winning local elections in March 2004 by 41% of the vote, AKP passed the law in May to end discrimination and other reforms despite opposition from military. It was vetoed by President Sezer and AKP backed down again. Due to this opposition, only two new Imam-hatip schools were opened from 2002-07.
After 2005, the headscarf ban in universities and coming presidential elections became the focus and AKP stopped taking any new initiative in order not to jeopardize its chances to put its own man in the presidential palace.

After winning another election and Presidency in 2007, AKP gradually increased the number of Imam-hatip schools. In 2009, the discrimination against Imam-hatip school graduates instituted in 1998 was removed. Imam-hatip graduates could now get admission in all university faculties. The enrolment that had been stagnant increased immediately after this decision. During the year 2009-10, it was around two-hundred thousand students. (Ozgur 2012, 137)

The Quran courses also kept increasing during this period. From sixty thousand students in 1980, the number increased to two hundred thousand by 2010. The increase might have been higher if the number of students had not been reduced to half of earlier enrolment, from 158446 in 1996 to 79836 in 2002, primarily due to the 1997 military coup.
Table 46: The Quran courses conducted by the Diyanet (1980-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>34293</td>
<td>25513</td>
<td>59806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>52934</td>
<td>30751</td>
<td>83685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>52934</td>
<td>36103</td>
<td>89037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>58156</td>
<td>42107</td>
<td>100263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>53211</td>
<td>34755</td>
<td>87966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>65184</td>
<td>38244</td>
<td>98828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>71580</td>
<td>44675</td>
<td>116255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>80206</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>128806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>82107</td>
<td>44418</td>
<td>126525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>95332</td>
<td>52047</td>
<td>147379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>94744</td>
<td>51852</td>
<td>146606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>96258</td>
<td>54558</td>
<td>150816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>102640</td>
<td>51546</td>
<td>154186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>107780</td>
<td>49533</td>
<td>157313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>113020</td>
<td>50424</td>
<td>163444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value 1</td>
<td>Value 2</td>
<td>Value 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>110433</td>
<td>49736</td>
<td>160169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>111155</td>
<td>47291</td>
<td>158446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>109718</td>
<td>46258</td>
<td>155976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>104215</td>
<td>34079</td>
<td>138294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>77604</td>
<td>11734</td>
<td>89338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>76340</td>
<td>8766</td>
<td>85106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>82011</td>
<td>14201</td>
<td>96212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70473</td>
<td>9363</td>
<td>79836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>95627</td>
<td>13497</td>
<td>109124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>116037</td>
<td>11680</td>
<td>127717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>144341</td>
<td>11590</td>
<td>155931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>171047</td>
<td>12356</td>
<td>183403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>179318</td>
<td>13550</td>
<td>192868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>187288</td>
<td>14080</td>
<td>201368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>190727</td>
<td>14826</td>
<td>205553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>281855</td>
<td>8963</td>
<td>290818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bozan (2007, 87) and Turkish Statistical Institute (2015)
Private Religious Education

The ban on religious private education continued during this period. There were private religious institutions providing religious instruction to people but they were illegal and so did not operate openly. The military junta expanded the Diyanet’s Quran courses and urged parents to use state-run programs, instead of giving religious education themselves or using private religious institutions. Coup leader General Kenan Evren said:

*Families should not give religious education to children. This would be improper since it may be taught incorrectly, incompletely, or through the family’s own point of view ... I ask you ... not to send your children to illegal Koran schools ... religion will be taught to our children by the state in state schools.* (Atasoy 2005, 155)

However, the private Quran courses continued to educate and increase, once military was back in barracks in 1983. New Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was himself a follower of Sufi Naqshbandi Order. After 1997 coup, there was a crackdown on the private Quran courses but after a gap, they re-emerged. The AKP’s coming to power resulted in a relaxation of atmosphere. In 2005, the AKP tried to reduce the punishment for setting-up the private Quran schools but it was vetoed by President Sezer (Today’s Zaman 2005). So, these
schools remained illegal, even when they continue to operate and mushroom. State funding or support for these schools was, however, out of question.

**Headscarves in Public Educational Institutions**

In this period, the ban on headscarves in the universities and other higher education institutions was reiterated. The military junta that took control in 1980 was willing to use religion but was still secular and afraid of religion in some ways. Increase in the number of headscarved women in universities was considered against the principle of secularism and headscarves were banned in universities and in all government offices. The ban on headscarves in schools continued to be observed, except in Imam-hatip schools for girls where girls wore hijab during religious courses. Some of these schools allowed/encouraged girls to wear headscarf all day.

After the ban on headscarves in universities in the early 1980s, some universities enforced the ban strictly, but many were lenient. Students used to play around this ban by wearing wigs over their headscarves. Political governments tried to annul the ban in the late 1980s and 1990s but were unsuccessful due to the constitutional court, which ruled such attempts as unconstitutional. It was only after 1997 coup that the ban was applied comprehensively and strictly (Amiraux 2007, 195). This led to fresh legal activity. First, this ban was again unsuccessfully challenged in Turkish courts. Later, European Court of Justice also heard a
case\textsuperscript{257} in 2004 about headscarf ban and declared it not impinging on human or individual rights (BBC 2005).

The opposition to lifting of ban increased after an ultra-nationalist and Islamist lawyer killed a high court judge and wounded four others in May 2006. He told the police that he did this to protest court’s decision not to lift headscarf ban (Jenkins 2008, 169-182). In February 2008, Erdogan, after winning the second consecutive election, decided to annul the ban. Parliament passed the annulment legislation, called the Turban amendment, by almost 80% majority but the constitutional court declared the legislation unconstitutional. As discussed in the chapter on constitutions, this led to filing of a case against the AKP by the public prosecutor in the constitutional court but the case was dismissed.\textsuperscript{258} Headscarf ban, however, remained operational.

### 2010 Onwards

This period starts with the success of AKP in the constitutional referendum in September 2010. In this referendum, many of the authoritarian aspects of the 1982 Constitution were rejected and changes enhancing democratization approved. As discussed in the chapter on constitutions, these changes decreased powers of military and judiciary, the two institutions defending secularism. Changes approved include removal of constitutional immunity of

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\textsuperscript{257} Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.
\textsuperscript{258} Dissolution required a minimum of seven of the eleven judges to decide in favor the AKP’s dissolution. However, the only six judges favored dissolution, so the AKP was not dissolved. It was, however, fined for its mistakes.
the 1980 coup leaders; increased social and political rights; and reform of judiciary. With the approval of these reforms, most checks on Prime Minister Erdogan’s power were also removed, allowing him to use his parliamentary majority to pass almost any law he liked (CNN wire staff 2010). This has led to expansion of religious education, indicating increase in the Islamization of government. As quoted at the start of this chapter, Erdogan has declared that he wants to raise a ‘pious generation’ of Turks and has also argued that religious education has helped in fight against violence, racism, terrorism, drug addiction, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (Hurriyet Daily News 2014e).

The following section would analyze the Islamization of government in these areas:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public religious institutions.

**Religious Instruction in Public Schools**

Religious instruction continues to be a part of school curricula at all three levels. In 2014, there were unsuccessful attempts to start teaching of values at the kindergarten level that critics called teaching religion to kids before they could think for themselves. President Erdogan did not help matters by questioning Turkish reforms of the last two centuries, an oblique reference to Westernization process started by Tanzimat in 1839:
We are going beyond the banalities taught to us for 200 years. We are finally asking the right questions. (Korkmaz 2014b)

As discussed in the last section, in 2007, ECHR decided that the Turkish government had to reform its religious education or allow exemption as it is neutral and promote Sunni Islam. As few changes were made, in September 2014, ECHR gave another judgment reiterating that religious education in public schools should be reformed. The case was again filed by Alevi who, unlike non-Muslim Turkish citizens, could not take exemption from religious classes. The ECHR ruled:

*Turkey has to remedy the situation without delay, in particular by introducing a system whereby pupils could be exempted from religion and ethics classes without their parents having to disclose their own religious or philosophical convictions.*

PM Davutoglu, while accepting the ruling, defended the necessity of religious education:

*This [having mandatory religious courses] is a must for Turkey, if you look at developments surrounding the country...If a solid religious education is not given [to children] through institutions, there will be no way to control the unorganized and unhealthy religious*

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259 After a Supreme Council for Education decision in July 1990, it was possible for children of Turkish Jews and Christians to be exempted from religious and ethics lessons. Children of Turks belonging to other religions (such as Buddhism) or those with no religion are not exempt from religious classes. (ECHR 2007)
information that is a source of the radicalization trend around us. (Daloglu 2014; Korkmaz 2014a)

Turkey appealed the ECHR ruling in in December 2014 but this appeal was rejected by the ECHR in February 2015 (Ozalp 2015).

Public Religious Schools

The AKP’s government has supported Imam-hatip schools since 2002. But after 2010, when AKP was successful in subjugating its opponents, future of Imam-hatip schools seems secure so there has been surge in Imam-hatip school enrolments, not seen since the 1970s. Prime Minister Erdogan showed his commitment to these schools by declaring in June 2011 (in response to the CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s speech against these schools) in a public rally:

Whether [Kilicdaroglu] wants or not, we opened, we are opening and will open Imam-hatip schools as long as you support us… My four children are graduates of Imam-hatip schools, and I am proud of them. (Ozgur 2012, 1)

Not only his children, he himself is an Imam-hatip school graduate and takes pride in them.

In 2014, after he had become President, he said:
These schools were unfairly branded as enemies of the state (in 1997)... We proved how unfair this treatment was, and now one of them is the president of this country. (Yeginsu 2014)

The number of imam-hatip secondary schools increased from 1099 in 2013 to 1,355 in 2014. The number of Imam-hatip high schools rose from 453 in 2004-5 to 493 in 2010-11 but it has reached 854 in 2014-15. Many of the normal high schools have also been converted to Imam-hatip schools. (Gursel 2014b; Yinanc 2014). Under Erdogan, enrolment in Imam-hatip schools has increased from 63000 to a million in 12 years.

In 2012, the AKP government introduced a new educational system (4+4+4 system). Critics argued that this change was politically motivated and was introduced to benefit Imam-hatip schools. By limiting the places at secular schools and expanding Imam-hatip schools, Erdogan was accused of trying to create a ‘pious generation’ as he claimed it to be his intention in 2012. However, supporters of Imam-hatip schools have argued that the increase was in response to parent’s demand who wanted their children to study in an environment which was safe from drugs and where good morals and values were taught (Cengiz 2014).
During this period, many Imam-hatip schools have also opened outside Turkey. Three international Imam-hatip schools inside Turkey – Istanbul, Kayseri and Konya – are educating students from seventy-two countries. (Canturk 2014)

The AKP also abolished the minimum age limit for the Quran courses under the Diyanet in 2011. This limit was imposed under the military pressure. In 1997, after the coup, parents could not send their children to mosques during summer holidays until the children were 12 years old (Today’s Zaman 2011b)

Resultantly, the Diyanet reported more than three million students attended its Quran courses and more than five million Qurans were distributed in 2013. These courses were offered at more than seventy thousand locations and more than hundred thousand trainers were used to provide students with basic knowledge of Islam. Ali Erbas, the head of the Religious Affairs Directorate’s Training Services branch said:
That the age and school grade restriction was lifted and that books were distributed free of charge to the students was received well both by the students and the parents. (OnIslam & News Agencies 2013)

Private Religious Education
The ban on private religious education continues during this period. However, like in the past, private religious institutions continued illegally providing religious instruction to people. As enforcement of laws remains relaxed under AKP, these institutions are operating easily. However, as state itself is increasingly providing religious instruction, there might be less people using these private institutions in future. As previously, there is no funding by the state to such schools. Most of their funds come from private donations.

Headscarves in Public Educational Institutions
Even before the winning of referendum, the AKP government had issued instructions for removal of ban in universities but it was not being followed. In March 2010, Yusuf Ozcan, president of Higher Education Council, which controls the universities, warned universities of legal action, if they continue to impose headscarf ban. After the constitutional referendum, most universities removed the ban on headscarves and women with headscarves were allowed to study freely in the universities. Even the opposition leader CHP’s Kemal Kilicdaroglu agreed that students should decide what they want to wear (Seibert 2010a; Today’s Zaman 2011c; Head 2010).
In November 2012, headscarf ban was also lifted in imam-hatip schools but it continued in other schools. Headscarf was only allowed in the middle and high schools during elective courses relating to the Quran (Gunes 2012).

In October 2013, AKP government removed headscarf ban on public servants, parliamentarians and in other state institutions. This allowed teachers, professors and educational administrators to perform their duties with headscarves. Removal of this ban was part of a large democratization package that also included removal of restrictions on Kurdish minority. Erdogan, at the time of removal of ban, said in the Parliament:

*We have now abolished an archaic provision which was against the spirit of the republic. It's a step toward normalization... A dark time eventually comes to an end....Headscarf-wearing women are full members of the republic, as well as those who do not wear it.*

(Aljazeera 2013)

In September 2014, government also removed ban on wearing headscarves in high schools. Again, while opposition accused AKP of imposing religion, Prime Minister Davutoglu and Minister of Education explained it as a process of democratization and freedom. Education Minister Nabi Avci said, ‘all initiatives in favour of freedoms are a good thing.’ And Prime Davutoglu explained:

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260 However, a limited ban remains and women judges, prosecutors and those in police and military cannot wear headscarves.
This should not only be seen as the lifting of the ban on the wearing of headscarf...There has been an effort for freedoms and democratization in every sphere...We decided to move to a more liberal approach in education on a problem that has aroused worries for some time. (AFP 2014a)

Remarkably, instead of women wearing headscarves, those stopping them found themselves on the wrong side of law. In November 2014, for the first time, a professor was imprisoned for not allowing a girl to enter university because she was wearing a headscarf (Sen 2014). More recently, in June 2015, a public high school in Konya went a step further and allowed female students to wear abayas (full length garments) over their uniforms (Ozkan 2015).
PAKISTAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The North-western lands that are now called Pakistan were the last to be conquered by the British in the Indian subcontinent. Sindh and Balochistan were conquered in 1839 and Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 1849. Soon after Punjab was conquered, the Indian Mutiny started and Punjab’s relationship with the British Empire changed. Punjabi feudals, both non-Muslim and Muslim, supported the British and helped the British re-establish their control over India. Impressed by their loyalty and fighting spirit, the British from then on, often preferred North-western Indians (Punjabis, Pathans, etc.) over other Indians and Punjab province became the major recruiting ground for the British Indian Army. This recruitment policy meant that the social and political power of the Punjabi feudals, in-charge of local recruitment drives, was to be maintained, making local education a low priority for the British. Late conquest and recruitment preference both contributed to very low literacy rate in Pakistan at the time of independence. It was less than 15% in 1947 (Mahmood 1978).

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261 In comparison, Bengal was conquered by the British in 1757.
262 Or the Indian War of Independence
263 Some British experts explained this preference on the basis of martial race theory. According to this theory, north-western Indians were better fighters being members of Aryan races or because of their closeness to Europeans either in appearance or in climate (Gardezi 2011, 61).
Since the independence of Pakistan, the educational opportunities have improved but the growth of literacy has been difficult and slow as is evident by figure 1. The history of the state’s role in education in Pakistan can be gauged by the following quote from a Pakistani scholar:

*The history of educational policy-making in Pakistan is one of laments, broken promises and tall claims. Each successive government has blamed the previous government of not being serious and committed to the educational cause of the nation. Each successive government has promised to raise literacy levels to new (often unattainable) heights. Each*
regime has promised to put in more money and allocate more resources for the education sector. And each successive policy has made loud claims of harmonizing education with the principles of Islam. Yet in real terms education in Pakistan has remained largely underdeveloped both in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms. (Naseem 2004, 20)

Religion was not part of the public school curricula before independence as the colonial government did not interfere in matters of religion following Queen Victoria’s 1858 proclamation, as discussed in the last chapter.\(^{264}\) There were missionary schools which were supported by the colonial officials but these schools were few in number. Despite absence of religion in the curricula, British education policies in India were socially conservative. For example, education for girls was not encouraged and if girls were educated, they were supposed not to work. In 1936, a British president of a university in India criticized the ‘lucky girls who get a higher education’ but then ‘utilize their education to escape… and do not even bring up their own children’ and argued:

> Would it not be possible to make the women’s education of a far more practical kind than it is now, so that no women can obtain any kind of degree or diploma without being really trained for what is bound to be the main occupation of 99% of her sex? (As quoted in Rouse 2006, 15)\(^{265}\)

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\(^{264}\) However, it did not mean religion, particularly religion of the rulers, was completely out of schools. British educators used literature and other subjects to teach the message of Christianity (Langohr 2005).

\(^{265}\) The evidence of conservative views of British colonial officials about women education is also available from the Middle East. In 1920, Gertrude Bell, a woman, who was oriental secretary to civil commissioner in Iraq, said in a speech at opening of a girl school in Baghdad that the aim of the school was not to produce politically or economically active women but to create proper mothers (Efrati 2012, 100).
The headscarf was not an issue in the colonial schools. Although schools did not make the headscarf mandatory, the use of the headscarf was nevertheless prevalent as the headscarf was part of the local culture. Most of the upper class Hindu, Muslim and Sikh women in Northern India covered their heads.266

Religious education was left to the individual communities to finance and administer by the colonial administration. Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and other religious communities managed their own religious education. Madrassas were the main source of Muslim religious education before the arrival of British but, with no official assistance and no prospects of paid employment, madrassas lost most of their earlier clientele and were largely marginalized (Malik 1996, 122).

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

During this initial era, the Pakistani founding fathers had to simultaneously build a state and a nation (Jalil 1996, 88-89). As Pakistan was not the seat of British Indian administration, the whole state structure had to be built from scratch. Pakistan was also ethno-linguistically and religiously diverse, so all its individual communities had to be molded into a nation.

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266 It was only the upper-class women who were going to schools. Poor urban women and rural women, who usually worked outside their homes and were less observant in veiling, were not being educated. Veiling was more a status symbol than a religious symbol as non-Muslim elite women also veiled.
Father of the nation and first Governor General Jinnah knew the importance of education for the progress of the new nation and inaugurating the first education conference, just three months after independence, said:

_The importance of education and the type of education cannot be over-emphasized ... There is no doubt that the future of our State will and must greatly depend upon the type of education we give to our children, and the way in which we bring them up as future. There is no doubt that the future of our State will and must greatly depend upon the type of education we give to our children and the way in which we bring them up as future citizens of Pakistan._ (Government of Pakistan 1957, 542)

Jinnah's concern about education did not begin in 1947. He was an advocate for education, especially primary education, since at least 1912 and was critical of the paucity of British efforts in this regard (Jalil 1996, 105-6).

As Pakistan had come into existence on the basis of Muslim nationalism, the importance of religion in public education was a topic discussed at Pakistan’s first educational conference. The Education Minister stressed the following three points in this conference:

- Education system should be inspired by Islamic ideology, emphasizing its characteristics of universal brotherhood, tolerance and justice, among other things.\(^{267}\)

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\(^{267}\) It’s important to note the qualities of Islam emphasized by the education minister.
• Primary education to be free and compulsory for five years and can be coeducational; and

• Technical education to be linked with the national economic needs and the genius of the people. (Government of Pakistan 1957, 542)

The education structure during this period followed the pattern set-up by the British colonial administration.

![Diagram of Pakistan Education Structure]

**Figure 74: Pakistan Education Structure**

During this period, religious education became mandatory in all public schools. Private religious schools (madrassas) also increased in number as more affluence allowed many

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268 Higher Secondary School was usually called Intermediate College.
Pakistani to support them through donations. Islamization of government, therefore, increased during this period.

The following section would debate the Islamization of government in these four areas:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public educational institutions.

**Religious Instruction in Public Schools**

The religious instruction in public schools started soon after independence but the emphasis was on developing good citizens, rather than good Muslims. Islamic education was an instrument to achieve a new generation which could take part in the development of the nation as the following excerpt on the objectives of the first Five Year Plan (1955-60) makes clear:

*The overall objectives of the first Five Year Plan for education sector included the enrichment of all education to make it pupil-centre and rooted in the spirit of Islam. However, with this emphasis, there was focus on preparing children for a democratic society and vibrant economy. The paragraphs on primary school curricula do not talk about Islam or religious education. In case of secondary school curricula the emphasis was on social and natural sciences and principles/history of Pakistani culture to develop*
individual character, righteous living and patriotic citizens who can assist in the economic development of the country. (Government of Pakistan 1957, 544-49).

General Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 with a reformist and modernist agenda. Like in other areas, he and his lieutenants were determined to impose their educational vision on the society.

General Ayub's rule was a classic case of the state-rules-the-society model, whereby the regime was consciously committed to providing good government to the people, in view of their perceived ignorance of what is good for them. (Waseem 1989, 152 as quoted in Jalil 1996, 129)

Along with many other government commissions, Ayub Khan also established the Commission on National Education (CNE) after coming to power.269 While announcing its formation, Ayub Khan said:

A sound system of education is a prerequisite to cementing the shattered fabric of the nation. In fact, proper education is a fundamental need of our own generation as well as of posterity. (As quoted in Jalil 1996, 159).

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269He established 33 different commissions and committees to recommend changes in different sectors (Jalil 1996, 119)
The CNE presented its report in August 1959. It recommended, among other things, compulsory religious education. This was the first time, a government commission recommended compulsory religious education in the primary and middle schools (from grade 1 to 8). For secondary education students, religious education was to be an optional subject and CNE recommended that state encouraged research related to religious studies at the university level. To bring religious madrassas into mainstream, the introduction of non-religious subjects and modern Arabic in their curricula was suggested. The Cabinet approved these recommendations and they became government policy (Malik 1996, 125-6).

The Second five year plan (1960-65) also emphasized religious education in the public schools but primary school education, where most religious education was being taught, was given the lowest priority. Primary education’s share of the total expenditure on education, despite being the base of education pyramid and large number of illiterates, was only 3.6% during the plan period (Jalil 1996, 166-7). Fixated on economic growth, General Ayub’s government ignored the primary education and prioritized secondary and higher education.

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270 Similar to what happened in Turkey; modernizing non-religious dictators emphasizing religious education.
General Ayub Khan’s regime was toppled by another military coup in 1969 led by General Yahya. Air Marshal (retd.) Nur Khan\textsuperscript{271}, the new educational minister, also tried to come up with education reforms. A new report on education were presented by the government in 1969. Among other things, the report recommended making religious education mandatory up to grade 10 and affiliating madrassas with normal schools. These proposals were not implemented due to general elections and civil war (Faizi et. al. 2012).

**Public Religious Schools**

There were no public religious schools during this period. During the Ayub era, it was thought that madrassas would gradually become public religious schools, after they implement the reforms recommended by the 1961 committee. The madrassas were also given some financial incentives to encourage them to implement the reforms. However, madrassas did not accept the government reforms and the financial assistance and remained outside state’s control.

**Private Religious Education**

From 1947 to 1958, the Pakistani governments ignored madrassas. General Ayub Khan, however, was conscious of the need for Pakistan to have a uniform national education system and wanted to bring madrassas into the mainstream. He considered ulema an obstruction in Pakistan’s economic, political and social progress and wanted to curtail their

\textsuperscript{271}Nur Khan was a former Pakistan Air Force Chief and was also a member of new President’s Council of Administration in 1969.
influence. Most ulema, for him, were not Islamic scholars but power-hungry men using Islam for their own sinister agendas. Madrassa reform was viewed by the government not only as a way to reduce power of ulema but also as the means of bringing madrassa students into the mainstream and making them part of the nationalizing/modernizing effort.

General Ayub’s pronouncements and the CNE recommendations, discussed above, made ulema realize their autonomy over madrassas was in danger and they united in umbrella organizations (wafaqs or federations) to counter government reforms. As suggested by the CNE, Ayub Khan’s government formed a committee in 1961 to reform the curriculum taught in the madrassas. This committee had representation of madrassa administrators but they were in the minority. The committee, therefore, supported the mainstreaming and nationalizing objectives of the state. It recommended that at the primary level, public school syllabus should be used in madrassas and religious subjects only should be taught at the middle and secondary levels. It also recommended that more non-religious subjects be taught at the secondary level and rejected some subjects taught at madrassas as anachronistic and not required. A Directorate of Religious Education was also proposed to monitor and evaluate standards. Most of these recommendations were never implemented due to a lack of interest by both the government and the madrassas (Malik 1996, 122-8).
Table 47: Formation of Madrassa Wafaqs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Madrassa Union (wafaq)</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>School of Thought</th>
<th>Year formed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Arabia  
  Pakistan                         | Sunni    | Hanafi Deobandi        | 1959        |
| Tanzeem-ul-Madaris               | Sunni    | Hanafi Barelvi         | 1960        |
| Wafaq-ul-Madaris-Shia            | Shia     | Jafaria                | 1959        |
| Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al Salafia      | Sunni    | Hanbali Wahhabi        | 1955        |
| Rabita-ul Madaris Al Islamia     | Sunni    | Jamaat-i-Islami        | 1983        |

Source: Fair (2008, 58)

Headscarves in Public Educational Institutions

There was no headscarf ban at the time of independence. In fact, during the entire history of Pakistan, there has not been a ban on the headscarf. Most of the time, women covered themselves with burqas, chadors or dupattas.²⁷²

²⁷² Burqa covers the whole body and face. Dupatta is a silk or muslin, transparent scarf that covers not only the head but also upper body. It is larger than headscarf. Most of the time, it is not put on the head and either used to cover the front upper body or just wrapped around the neck. The chador is similar to a dupatta (covering head and upper body) but it is not transparent. Both chador and dupatta do not cover the face. As is obvious, chador is a step down from burqa and dupatta is a step down from chador. Therefore, the prevalence of dupattas and chadors might be seen as an increase of conservatism, but for many women chadors and dupattas in the 1980s and 1990s were a step toward modernity.
During this era (1947-71), there was no formal obligation from the state for women to cover their heads, although there was social pressure. Most public schools had a dress code and it included a description of dupatta, which could be put on the head or spread on the shoulders. However, the number of women, above the primary and middle school levels, was minuscule.

Table 48: Educational Enrollment in Pakistan (1947-8) (Approx.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Middle Schools</td>
<td>870,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>1000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Secondary Schools</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jalil (1996, 107)
In the professional colleges and universities, there was no prescribed dress code. Most female students did use dupatta but many did not use it as headscarf as the following images shows.

Figure 75: Female Students at the Karachi University in the 1960s

Source: Tomlinson (2015)
The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

This period starts with the loss of half of the country due to the separation of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. As the Pakistani state tried to rise from the ashes of defeat, the aim of state education changed. In the previous era, the aim of the education system was to develop children’s capabilities to not only make them productive members of the society but also to nurture a unified Pakistani nation. However, after 1970s, the focus changed and priority of the education system became creating a Muslim Pakistani nation. For example, during the previous era, the policymakers were concerned about how to make the madrassa
students part of the Pakistani nation as these students were not studying the standard public school curricula. In this era, the main issue was that public school students were not receiving sufficient religious education. Ayub’s government recommended teaching secular subjects and modern Arabic to madrassa students to bring their education in line with the rest of the populace. Zia’s government recommended teaching Quranic Arabic to public school students to make them better Muslims and more like madrassa students.

Thus Ayub expected religious educators to have secular and modern knowledge, Zia expected teachers of secular subjects to infuse religion into their teaching at all levels. (Saigol 1995, 432)

Religious education thrived during this era and as the previous two chapters demonstrated Islamization of government was its height. There were several changes in public education from the 1970s to 1990s. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-77) nationalized all educational institutions in 1972 but General Zia (1977-88) reversed this policy in 1979 and returned most of the schools to the previous owners and encouraged private education. Zia’s policy and the general lack of investment by the government in public schools led to a mushrooming of private schools, first in the urban areas and later in the rural areas. Especially in the 1990s (as the following figure shows), the growth of private schools was unprecedented. This important development changed the educational landscape of Pakistan. In the developed world and many developing countries (like Turkey), almost all children go to public schools and private schools cater to a very small segment of school-
age population. This was not the case in Pakistan. By the end of the century, around one-fifth of the primary school-age children were attending private schools. Private schools had grown from approximately 3300 in 1983 to 32000 in 2000 (Andrab et. al. 2002).

Figure 77: Increase in new private schools established per year (1973-1999)

Source: Andrabi et.al. (2002)

From the perspective of this dissertation, this transformation of the educational scene meant that the government did not had full control over what was being taught to a significant portion of the school-aged population. Though private school generally followed the
government curricula, they were business ventures. So, changes that cost money but were not very important to their clientele (parents) were not implemented. One example of such a change was the mandatory introduction of Arabic required by the government during this era. Most of the private schools ignored the government’s instructions (Rahman 2000). However, changes that were valued by the parents and for which parent were willing to pay were introduced such as course books published by international publishers, such as Oxford University Press.

The following section would discuss the Islamization of government in these areas:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public educational institutions.

**Religious Instruction in Public Schools**

The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto era (1972-77) started with a big transformation in public education. He nationalized all private educational institutions in March 1972. Thousands of private educational institutions, including missionary schools and colleges, came under state control, only the madrassas were not nationalized. Even schools and colleges administered by the local governments were transferred to the provincial and federal governments. The stated aim was to end exploitation of the students and teachers\(^{273}\) and to provide affordable

\(^{273}\) These two groups predominantly supported and voted for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970 elections.
education to all. Nationalization greatly enhanced the reach of government policies as thousands of former private schools were now directly controlled by the federal and provincial governments. The effect of this nationalization was particularly significant at the post-secondary level where private institutions were educating a greater share of kids in schools. (Jimenez and Tan 1987).

*Common curriculum was adopted nationwide that created the national harmony and integrity and lessened the disruption and provincialism at least in the field of education. With the rise in the investment on education by the government the improvement in the literacy rate appeared. The parents and students who had to bear heavy dues could easily bear the expenditures of education. The uniform system of education was implemented where all students were acquiring same education.* (Hussain and Haroon 2014)

Bhutto made Islamiat (or Islamiyat)\(^{274}\) compulsory from grades one to ten. Thus, two additional years of mandatory religious instruction were added to the public school curricula. But this was not the most important change. The transformation that the New Education Policy, 1972 under Bhutto brought was adding Islam to the teaching of secular subjects.

\(^{274}\) The subject was also called deeniyat. Non-Muslim students could choose to study ethics, but teachers of ethics were usually not available and non-Muslims invariably had to study Islamiat.
It will also be ensured that the study of Islamiyat does not remain an isolated item in the school curriculum but that the values and the spirit of Islam are woven into the entire warp and woof of our educational fabric. (New Education Policy, 1972 as quoted in Saigol 1995, 471)

Under this policy, curricula were reorganized and history, civics and other subjects were also Islamized or altered in view of the (Islamic) ideology of Pakistan (Malik 1996, 129). Another change was the teaching of Arabic. The Constitution, promulgated in 1973, asked the state to facilitate learning of Arabic. Therefore, Arabic was introduced as an optional subject in the middle school (grade 6th to 8th) in 1975. The Government also signed agreements with Arab governments and organizations for assistance, in the form of both human and financial resources, for teaching Arabic. (Rahman 2000)

General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), who used Islam to legitimize his coup, went one step further and made Islamiat mandatory till graduate level. While for Bhutto, Islamization was a side dish, for Zia, it was the entree.

Soon after his coup in 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq called a national education conference, the goals and objectives of which were “to redefine the aims of education, choose basic strategies, ascertain the main problems in education confronting the nation, and to bring education in line with Pakistani faith and ideology”. The direction (given), again, was clear. General Zia said in his inaugural speech: “Our curriculum must ensure that our
children are brought up educated as good Pakistanis and good Muslims. They must imbibe the lofty ideals and principles of Islam. (Nayyar and Saleem 2005, 3)

Zia, however, was not a religious fanatic and used Islam as an instrument to achieve specific aims. Politically, Islamization was useful as a tool to legitimize his regime. It facilitated obtaining the support of the religious parties and conservative sections of the population. In economic terms, Islamization was also beneficial because using the façade of sanctity of private property in Islam, Bhutto’s nationalization was declared unislamic and Zia gave back hundreds of industrial concerns and educational institutions to the previous owners and also privatized many government businesses. By rewarding powerful industrialists, capitalists and educationists, Zia got the support of these influential groups who detested Bhutto as they had suffered because of Bhutto’s nationalization policies. These groups also supported Zia because he also used Islam to severely circumscribe labor, student and teacher rights. Islamization policies also helped secure aid from oil-rich Gulf States. In 1980, after the Afghan War started, Islamization policies got a global powerful ally, the US. (Chengappa 2004, 3-4; Saigol 1995, 482-3)

In 1978, Zia also made Arabic mandatory for middle school students and in 1982 for high school students (grade VI to VIII). The aim of the policy was to help Muslims understand basic texts of Islam better. Another change was to award extra marks to a student who had memorized the whole Quran, thus giving them an advantage over other students in
admission to universities and professional (medical and engineering) colleges. (Shah 2012; Rahman 2000)

After Zia, from 1988 to 1999, there was not much increase in religious instruction in public schools and colleges. Although the Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 called for further Islamization of education, it was largely ignored and did not have any tangible results.

By 1998, it was clear that while most private schools and many public schools were teaching Islamiat, they have simply disregarded the requirement of teaching Arabic imposed under Zia. Therefore, to force schools to start teaching Arabic, Nawaz Sharif’s government (1997-99) directed all schools to certify that children were being taught Arabic. However, before the implementation of this order, Sharif’s government was toppled by General Musharraf (Rahman 2000; Faizi et. al. 2012).

**Public Religious Schools**

There were no public religious schools from the 1970s to 1990s. However, an Islamic university was established in Islamabad with the assistance of Saudi Arabia in 1980. This university still gets funding from Saudi sources and always has a pro- chancellor nominated by Saudi Arabia.\(^{275}\) The education in this university is not limited to Islamic subjects and

\(^{275}\) The current president of the International Islamic University, Prof. Dr. Ahmed Yousif Ahmed Al Draiweesh, is a Saudi scholar.
the university has nine different faculties, including engineering, management and social science faculties (International Islamic University 2015).

In the early years of Zia, there was a suggestion to establish a model madrassas by the Council of Islamic Ideology, the premier constitutional body relating to Islamic laws. It requested that the federal government ask each of the four provincial governments to establish model madrassas in view of the intransigence of ulema and their aversion to madrassa reform (as will be shown in the next section). The Council passed a unanimous resolution and sent it to the government:

_The Council pays homage to the government for her efforts for bringing close the modern and classic religious educational institutions. The first example of such efforts is the setting up of international Islamic University at Islamabad ... The Council realizes the phenomena of shortage of qualified, trained and right for job persons as required for and the key reason for this shortage is the insistence of Madaris authorities on clinging to the centuries old version of curriculum and they do not seem to be cooperative in this regard. Therefore, the Council recommends that provincial governments should establish one Model Madrasah in their jurisdiction, where the system of education as well as syllabus, both should be exemplified through integration of Modern and Classic religious versions. These Madaris should serve as model to other Madaris in order to incite them to modify their system and syllabus as per requirements of present day._
However, no action on this request was taken by the government (Muhammad et. al. 2012).

**Private Religious Education**

When Bhutto’s government nationalized all education institutions, madrassas were the only institutions that escaped this policy as a group. Initially, the government’s policy toward madrassas was benign neglect. But after 1975, madrassas saw a policy change which was either an attempt to mainstream madrassas (as Ayub had tried before) or a way to placate and co-opt Islamists. First, the government asked the Council of Islamic Ideology to prepare a comprehensive report on Islamic education in Pakistan in 1975. Also in 1975, the National Assembly partially approved a long standing demand of madrassas to accept their academic certificates/degrees as equivalent to standard educational qualifications. Subsequently, in 1976, the Ministry of Education recognized registered madrassas’ Isnads (madrassa certificates/degrees) of fourteen years of education and made them equivalent to a graduate degree. However, lesser certificates (e.g. certificate of equivalence of high school for twelve years of madrassa education) were not recognized by the Ministry of Education (Malik 1996, 128-9).

Under General Zia-ul-Haq, the National Committee for Dini Madaris was established in 1979 to improve the madrassa education and to make them part of the national education system.

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276 Discussed in more detail below.

277 In Pakistan, until recently, graduation degree (except for engineering, law and medicine) required only fourteen years of schooling.

278 Deeni means religious and madaris is the plural of madrassa in Urdu.
system. It had a large representation of ulema. The report of this committee (called the Halepota Committee after its chairman) praised the role of madrassas in society and promised no state control. However, to mainstream madrassas, it also recommended more non-religious courses and a National Institute of Dini Madaris to conduct examinations of madrassa students to allow the government to equate their madrassa education with the regular education taught in public schools. It also advised the government to ameliorate the financial problems of madrassas, which provide free education and lodging to poor. The committee suggested endowment of property to madrassas as well as financial aid for buying books, furniture and teaching aids. However, the report was rejected by the madrassas as they did not want any interference of government in their affairs.

Despite this, during Zia’s rule, madrassas got two legal benefits that they are still enjoying. First, their isnad for sixteen-year education was accepted as equivalent to a Master's degree in Arabic or Islamic Studies. Second, with the Zakat system in place, madrassas became the recipient of government-collected Zakat funds. Quran is specific about who should receive Zakat funds and madrassas are not included in the list. This issue was resolved by giving Zakat funds to madrassas in the name of students, who were mostly needy and poor, and thus could be given Zakat (Malik 1996, 132-145).

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279 The only condition was that the madrassa issuing the isnad must be registered with a wafaq. For the degree to apply in any other profession, madrassa graduates had to pass two other graduate level subject examinations.

280 Zakat can only be spent for the following purposes: to help poor, to help needy, to pay Zakat administrators, to help whose hearts are to be reconciled (new Muslims etc.), to free the slaves and captives, to help those in debt, to assist the cause of Allah, and to help the needy traveler.
However, what really changed the life of madrassa owners/leaders, especially those in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Tribal Areas, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soon Pakistani, Saudi and the American decided to use madrassas to socialize and train Afghans, Pakistanis and other Muslims to fight the Soviets and the Afghan government. This decision gave madrassas access to millions of dollars coming from Saudi Arabia, Gulf States and the US as well as weapons and military training.

After Zia, political instability, one of whose causes was the mullah-military alliance that did not want the democratic governments to succeed, meant there were no new initiatives to mainstream madrassas. The state assistance to madrassas through Zakat funds continued. The increase in the number madrassas and student also continued. However, there are wide disagreements about the increase in the number of madrassas during this era. Estimates range from a few thousand to thirty thousand. Two of the more reliable estimates are given below. Fair (2008) considers six thousand seven hundred madrassas in 2000 as close to reality but Rehman (2004) estimates of around ten thousand madrassas in 2002.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>3153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azad Kashmir</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Areas</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>2861</td>
<td>6741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Usually called Tribal Areas)

Source: Fair (2008)
Table 50: Increase in Madrassas in Pakistan (1988-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deobandi</th>
<th>Barelvi</th>
<th>Salafi</th>
<th>Shia</th>
<th>Jamaat-i-Islami (Wahhabi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>1585</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Headscarf in Public Educational Institutions

In this era (the early 1970s to late 1990s), as earlier, educational policies did not address the issue of dress code. There were no government rules for headscarves during the Bhutto period (1972-77), except girls having dupattas. Even in Zia years (1977-88) when there was an increasing emphasis on purdah (covering oneself), chador (big scarf) and chardevari (four walls)\textsuperscript{281}, there were no new rules for headscarves in schools. The increasing prevalence of chadors or dupattas in educational institutions might have been due to the following:

- Girls from middle class and lower middle class were entering educational institutions for the first time and they were more religiously observant than the

\textsuperscript{281} Implying that women should stay within four walls (home) and/or be covered.
upper class women that had been the dominant group in colleges and universities in the 1960s and 1970s;

- Independent media was muzzled by General Zia and state media was educating and socializing the idea that a ‘good’ Pakistani women are always covered; and

- Student organizations linked with Islamist parties\(^{282}\) were increasingly dominant and aggressive because of the support they had from the state. These organizations enforced their own rules over others and in many cases, university/college administrations conceded to their illegal demands as Zia’s government supported these organizations.\(^{283}\)

After Zia (1988-2000), there were no changes related to headscarves rules and regulations in educational institutions. Overall the atmosphere in Pakistan, however, became more relaxed though not completely free from religious vigilantism.

**1999 Onwards**

This era started with a military takeover by the more secular General Musharraf. In the first few months in office, he showed his Westernization inclinations/sensibilities by praising Ataturk, posing with his dogs and criticizing General Zia-ul-Haq’s and former Prime

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\(^{282}\) The most prominent of these student organizations was Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba, affiliated with Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami.

\(^{283}\) Growing up under Zia, I myself know of many instances when music concerts (involving only male performers) were canceled because the Jamiat threatened violence. There was no rule against music concerts in college or universities (even involving female performers) but to avoid violence and disruption, university/college administration obliged.
Minister Sharif’s Islamization efforts. Two years later 9/11 happened and Pakistan became a frontline state in the War on Terror. Everything happening in Pakistan, especially related to Islam, came into sharper focus and became worthy of an international audience. Pakistan’s madrassas were particularly scrutinized because many of the Taliban leaders were known to have studied in these madrassas, a fact not denied by Pakistan. Many Pakistani experts also publicized the notion of madrassas as ‘universities of jihad’ (Haqqani 2002). Not surprisingly, the 9/11 Commission Report linked Pakistan education system to terrorism and declared it a ‘particular concern’ for the US:

*Poor education is a particular concern. Millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrassahs. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism.* (9/11 Commission 2004, 367)

However, this link between madrassa education and extremism/violence was not limited to Pakistan only. Though madrassa education in Pakistan was of specific interest, madrassa education worldwide was linked with violence as the 9/11 report quotes the Defense Secretary asking his advisors:

*Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?* (9/11 Commission 2004, 374)
The following section would analyze the Islamization of government in the following four areas during this period (1999 onwards):

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education;
- Headscarves in Public educational institutions.

**Religious Instruction in Public Schools**

After 9/11, implementing reforms relating to religious instruction in schools has been very difficult. Reforms are now seen not as reforms but as carrying forward West’s agenda that wants to keep Muslims away from Islam. Islamists are happy to link all changes to the West, thus delegitimizing these changes in the eyes of most Pakistanis. Successive Pakistani governments have tried to walk a fine line. They have not tried to decrease the number of hours of religious instruction as that has been more difficult to defend. They have, however, tried to change the curricula to make it more diversity-friendly and tolerant.

The National Education Policy, 2009 informed:

*Pakistan is currently engaged in the process of reviewing, updating and reforming school curriculum from Early Childhood Education up to Higher Secondary School levels keeping in view the Islamic teachings and ideology of Pakistan, cultural and religious sensitivities in the country and modern emerging trends to make the whole education purposeful and*
to create a just civil society that respects diversity of views, beliefs and faiths. (Ministry of Education 2009)

These efforts have, however, encountered strong resistance and have been only marginally successful.

Public Religious Schools

There was an attempt by General Musharraf to establish public religious schools (model madrassas) in 2001. Significantly, this attempt was conceived before 9/11, thus refuting the ulema’s claim that all efforts of the Musharraf’s government to implement madrassa reform were due to the Western pressure. An ordinance called the ‘Pakistan Madrassahs Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance’ was promulgated on August 18, 2001. Under this Ordinance, three model madrassa were to be established. Madrassas for boys were to be established in Karachi and Sukkur, while one madrassa for girls was to be established in Islamabad. There were also plans to establish model madrassas in each district of Pakistan and a madrassa board to oversee their curricula and examination. However, this plan was not implemented (Muhammad et. al. 2012). Later, in 2011, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government tried to establish a model madrassa in Peshawar but again the plan was not implemented (Express Tribune 2011).

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284 Districts are administrative and geographical sub-divisions of provinces. Pakistan has around 140 districts.
In April 2014, Minister of Religious Affairs Sardar Yousaf visited Turkey to study the Turkish Imam-hatip schools. Head of Diyanet, Dr. Mehmet Gormez, offered to open an Imam-hatip school in Pakistan. Minister Sardar Yousaf thanked him for the offer but did not immediately accept the offer. After the Peshawar school massacre, the national action plan emphasized madrassa reform so there has been a renewed interest. In February 2015, a team of the Diyanet came to Pakistan and it was agreed that Turkey would help Pakistan establish Imam-hatip schools and the first school would be built in Islamabad. Twenty-two Pakistani are already studying in Imam-Hatip schools in Turkey (Flare 2014, Daily Times 2015).

**Private Religious Education**

In Pakistan, number of madrassas have continued to increase – though more slowly than before – in the twenty first century, even when madrassas and their financial donors have come under scrutiny. According to the Zaidi (2013), more than 27000 madrassas have been registered with various wafaqs. This seems to be a big increase from around seven thousand in 2000 (Fair 2008, 50) or ten thousand in 2002 (Rahman 2004). These numbers showing a massive increase becomes even more questionable or controversial, if one considers that based on the latest educational census in 2005-6, the madrassa growth has tapered off (Khawaja 2009).
Table 51: Madrassa Growth in Pakistan (2002-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectarian Orientation</th>
<th>Madrassa Wafaq</th>
<th>No. of Madrassas (2002)(^a)</th>
<th>Number Registered (2013)</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>16800</td>
<td>140%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barelvi</td>
<td>Tanzeem-ul-Madaris</td>
<td>1585</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>405%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafi</td>
<td>Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Salafia</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>272%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Shia</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
<td>Rabita ul-Madaris al-Islamia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Date from Rahman (2004)

Source: Zaidi (2013)

To understand this anomaly, one has to understand the diverse incentives to different wafaqs about reporting number of madrassas registered with their wafaq. A common incentive to all wafaqs is to exaggerate the number of madrassas registered with them. A higher number increases their power vis-à-vis the state as well as vis-à-vis other wafaqs. With more madrassas a wafaq can demand more concessions and concede less to state or
to other wafqaqs. Moreover, with increasing restrictions on madrassa activity, it is better to register even small maktabs\textsuperscript{285} as madrassas to have the opportunity later to expand them.\textsuperscript{286}

\textsuperscript{285} Small irregular religious tuition centers, mostly attached with the local mosques, with few students.

\textsuperscript{286} Two extremes in Table 5 need some explanation. One extreme is the lack of increase in Shia madrassas. Apparently there is no attempt to inflate numbers of madrassa by Shia wafaq. This can be explained by a counter-incentive that is absent in the case of other madrassa wafqaqs. Shias are a minority in Pakistan and with sectarianism on the rise, they might not want to draw attention to their activities or institutions. At the other end of the spectrum, large exaggeration by Barelvi wafaq's might be fueled by a fear of losing influence to Deobandis, despite being the predominant Hanafi (sub) school in Pakistan. Both Barelvis and Deobandis belong to Hanafi school of thought. Deobandis are scriptualist, puritanical, while Barelvis are representative of folk Islam in Pakistan. During the last decade, Deobandi terrorists have targeted the tombs of saints that are venerated by the Barelvis but considered as hotbeds of unislamic practices by the Deobandis. The Barelvis, feeling threatened, have tried to hold on to their advantage by organizing and expanding:

According to Barelvi scholars, Deobandis have become so emboldened that the claim to represent “true Islam” is now being “stolen” by Deobandi ideologues who have “tried to impose their ideology on peaceful Pakistanis.” Increasingly sidelined, and frequently targets of attack, Barelvis have as a whole reacted by becoming more political themselves, and in recent times they have organized to counter puritan ideologies that have been linked to rising sectarianism and terrorism. (Khan 2011)
Figure 78: New Educational Institutions in Pakistan (1960-2010)

Source: Khawaja (2009)

The madrassa reform efforts by various governments have largely failed as explained in the chapter on Ministry of Religious Affairs. General Musharraf tried a number of different ordinances and incentives but he was mistrusted by the madrassa wafaqs. After him, democratic governments largely ignored madrassa reform, except for an accord in 2010 with madrassa wafaqs that was not implemented.287 The lack of interest in madrassa reform may be explained by:

287 According to the National Education Policy, 2009, a Madrassah Education Authority would be established by Ministry of Interior but it was never established (Ministry of Education 2009).
• Lack of external pressure: In 2011, US-Pakistan relations nose-dived and the relations did not recover until 2013. By then US withdrawal from Afghanistan was close, so pressure from the US for madrassa reform had gone down. Another reason for the decrease in Western pressure might be linked to a series of influential studies that exposed the madrassa myth i.e. madrasas are the main source of militancy and terrorism (Fair 2008, 4-6; Khawaja 2009; Bergen and Pandey 2006); and

• The fear of mullah-military alliance: The mullah-military alliance had conspired against democratic governments since the 1970s. It is, therefore, difficult for democratic governments to act against madrassas without thinking about the backlash from madrassas, supported, overtly or covertly, by the Pakistani military.

After the Peshawar school massacre, madrassa reform has again become important. It was a significant component of the National Action Plan, issued by the government after the massacre, to defeat terrorism. A committee was established under the Minister of Interior in January 2015 to renew efforts to register and regulate madrassas and to stop foreign funding to the madrassas. An interesting change was the recent criticism of Saudi Arabia for funding radical madrassas by a federal minister, probably the first such criticism. However, initial prospects of reform are not promising as madrassas have again rejected any control or interference of government in their affairs (Gishkori 2015c; Kohli 2015).

**Headscarf in Public Educational Institutions**
There were no instructions or policies about headscarves during this period. So, the students and administrators had to decide themselves. Dupatta was still the social norm and the unwritten rule (Page and Jyotsna 2009, 225). However, as compared to the 1980s and 1990s, the atmosphere became more relaxed. The explosion of media outlets, more legal protection and more influential civil society has made women lives easier, though by no means without discrimination (Butt and Shahid 2009). The atmosphere is more liberal in private schools where sometimes girls do not wear dupatta at all.

**Conclusion**

As is clear from the above discussion, the public education system in Turkey and Pakistan has not received equal focus and attention from the ruling elites. In Turkey, starting with Ataturk, public education was considered crucial for the survival of the Republican regime. Like many other national regimes that considered the gradual evolutionary societal progress unacceptable and wanted to revolutionize their societies and change their thinking, public K-12 education was a priority area for Ataturk. The immense focus on public education in Turkey was similar to what was seen in many communist countries; regimes in these countries wanted not simply to educate an individual but to create a new individual (King 2012, 1-20). This emphasis resulted in the development of a comprehensive public education system in Turkey. In contrast, the Pakistani elite did not have such grandiose aims and the Kashmir war and subsequent perceived threat from India meant that defense expenditures took the lion’s share of the budget, leaving little money for other areas. Education, particularly primary education, never became a priority and so
the public education system in Pakistan is still ineffective, with large inefficiencies. This is led to opening of thousands of private schools, which cater to the demands of different sections of the society.

As in the last two chapters, one can see evidence of a sharp decrease in the Islamization of government in the early Republican period in Turkey. Education was almost completely secularized as religious education was scrapped from the schools. By the early 1930s, all kinds of religious education was discontinued and all religious schools (both public and private) were abolished. Moreover, co-education was introduced at all levels and headscarves were banned. From the early 1950s, due to a number of reasons, as discussed above, there was a policy change and the religious education, and thereby Islamization of government, made a comeback. Religious education was made ‘virtually compulsory’ and gradually the number of hours of religious education was increased (Eligur 2010, 57). Private religious education also flourished despite a ban and by the 1970s, public religious (Imam-hatip) schools were educating thousands of students.

In the third phase, starting in 1980s, Islamization of education continued unabated, except for a brief period after the 1997 coup when the military unsuccessfully tried to undo the gains made in the previous four decades. Religious instruction in schools became a constitutional requirement in 1982 and gradually there was an increase in the number of hours of religious education, both at primary and secondary level. Imam-hatip schools and
the Quran Schools expanded and this period also saw the establishment of Imam-hatip schools for girls. Private religious schools increased their clientele. The only blip in this story was the enforcing of ban on headscarves.

The current period has started with the removal of headscarf ban in universities. Islamization of the education is increasing as the number of hours of religious education and availability of religious courses to students continues to rise. Imam-hatip schools have also seen unprecedented growth in the last few years. Although it might prove to be a false dawn later, the current era seems to be exceptional for Islamization of state in Turkey.

In Pakistan, the education system also followed the pattern of the Islamization of government as seen in the previous two chapters. In the first period, religious education was made mandatory. This formed the basis of a further massive increase in the second period. In the current period, there has been a policy reversal and the religious education and thereby Islamization of government is gradually decreasing.

One can observe an increase in the Islamization of government in the early period after independence as governments made religious education mandatory and later increased the number of hours of mandatory religious education in public schools. There was also an increase in the number of madrassas. There was no requirement of headscarves but dupatta was part of uniform for high schools.
In the second period starting with the 1970s, pace of the Islamization of government increased significantly. In terms of an increase in the number of madrassas as well as in hours of compulsory religious education and in state funding for religious education (public and private), this period saw an extraordinary increase in the Islamization of government. An international Islamic university was also established in this period.

The current period has seen some decrease in the Islamization of government. The increase in number of madrassas and their funding has decreased due to a decrease in available zakat funds and the government’s restrictions on foreign funding of these institutions. In public schools, there is also less emphasis on the study of Islamiat and Arabic, although Islamiat is still compulsory till graduation. Massive increase in the number of private schools, even for poor, has helped the trend of decreasing the Islamization of government. Private schools are usually co-educational and are less strict in requiring dupattas for female students. Moreover, they often use books, prepared by Western publishers or those used in more advanced countries (e.g. Singapore, United Kingdom) and follow state curricula only when required. These books present concepts in a secular way and thus millions of students receive less religious education than their counterparts in the preceding Pakistani generation.

In the previous two chapters and this chapter, three indicators of the Islamization of government (family law, ministry of religious affairs and education) were analyzed. Generally, the increase and decrease in the Islamization of government has followed the
same pattern of ebb and flow of Islam's role in state nationalism, as seen in the chapters on constitutions, symbols and banknotes. In the case of Turkey, the history was divided into four phases, with both Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government decreasing in the first phase and then increasing in the next three phases, with the pace intensifying in each subsequent phase. In the case of Pakistan, history was divided into three phases. Both Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government increased in the first phase. This increase was followed with an even bigger increase in both variables in the second phase. In the current phase, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, there has been a gradual decrease in both these variables.

In the next chapter, the argument and evidence presented in the last six chapters will be summarized and the causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and Islamization of government will be highlighted.

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288 Although Islam's role in Turkish state nationalism and Islamization of government has increased in the present period, it is only five-years old. Hence, jury is still out and future developments may change the observations made here about this period.
Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION
Introduction

The last six chapters gave a detailed examination of Islam's role in the state nationalism and the Islamization of government of Pakistan and Turkey. Two very different cases of Pakistan and Turkey were chosen to test the following hypothesis: Islam's role in state nationalism is one of the most important causes of the Islamization of government.

The Islamization of government is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Its multiple forms and aspects have made it difficult for scholars to agree on one definition. Not surprisingly, explaining or predicting the Islamization of government has also been challenging. As discussed in the introductory chapter, in the academic literature, the Islamization of government is mostly considered either the result of dictators’ need for legitimacy or the consequence of pressure by the Islamist movements. While these two causes are helpful to understand the phenomenon in some individual countries, once one moves to a higher level of abstraction, the explanations fall short. Some dictators in the MMCs do use the Islamization of government to increase their legitimacy but others do not. Similarly, the presence of strong Islamist movements/parties sometimes leads to more Islamization of government but many times, it does not. This dissertation intends to show that Islam's role in state nationalism is one of the main causes of the Islamization of government in Pakistan and Turkey.

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289 For example, Gulf monarchies have used Islamization of government for bolstering legitimacy but dictators in South Yemen, Eritrea, Chad, or Burkina Faso have not.
As explained in the first chapter, to demonstrate the causal inference, the following five requirements had to be fulfilled:

- Co-variation of the two variables;
- Granger causality condition;
- Non-spuriousness;
- Causal mechanism;
- Context in which the causal connection occurs.
REQUIREMENTS OF CAUSAL INFERENCE

To ascertain the causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government in Turkey and Pakistan, the following section examines all these requirements. The first two requirements will be discussed together.

1 and 2. Co-variation and Granger Causality Condition

The first two requirements to establish a causal inference between two variables are to establish a correlation and an appropriate time order i.e. changes in the independent variable must come prior to the correlating changes in the dependent variable. The following discussion shows that during different eras in both Turkish and Pakistani history, Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government increased and decreased together. Moreover, change in Islam's role in state nationalism often occurred before the change in the Islamization of government. Turkey’s case will be discussed first and Pakistan’s case will be examined later.

Turkey

Turkish history can be divided into four periods in terms of major changes in Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government:

- The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s;
- The Late-1940s to Late 1970s;
- The Early 1980s to Late 2000s; and
• 2010 onwards.

In all four periods, Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government co-vary and changes in Islam's role in state nationalism often happen before changes in the Islamization of government. Thus, fulfilling the first two requirements of causal inference between the two variables.

Table 52: Co-variation of Islam's role in State Nationalism and The Islamization of government in Turkish History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Islam's Role in State Nationalism</th>
<th>Islamization of government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The early 1920s to Mid-1940s</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Late 1940s to Late 1970s</td>
<td>Modest increase</td>
<td>Modest increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Early 1980s to Late 2000s</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Onwards</td>
<td>Increasing (until 2015)</td>
<td>Increasing (until 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s

During this period, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism declined sharply. The Ottoman state had claimed to be a caliphate, highlighting its Islamic foundations. The new Turkish Republic rejected the religious basis of the state and promoted mostly an ethnolinguistic state nationalism. The criticality of Turkish language and ethnicity to the Turkish nationhood was emphasized in a number of ways, including by promoting theories, which underscored the ancientness and magnificence of the Turkish language and ethnicity.²⁹⁰

In the chapter on constitutions, the decreasing role of Islam in state nationalism was seen in the finale of divine sovereignty and the minimal role that Islam played in the 1921 Constitution. After initially declaring Islam the state religion, the 1924 Constitution also went the same way. All religious references, including to Islam as the state religion, were eliminated from the constitution in 1928 and Turkey was declared a secular state in 1937.

Turkish national symbols also reflected the diminishing role of Islam in the state nationalism. The Ottoman flag, with its crescent and star, was retained but the red banner was idolized as a flag of Turks, not as an Islamic standard. The sixteen small stars on

²⁹⁰ Two such theories were Sun language theory and Turkish historical thesis. Sun language theory broadly claimed that a proto-Turkish language was the basis of all languages and Turkish historical thesis argued that Central Asia (the ancient homeland of the Turks) was the cradle of all major civilizations. The scientific evidence supporting these theories was weak.
presidential flag and seal, either representing medieval Anatolian beyliks or ancient great Turkish states, clearly prioritized ethnolinguistic nationalism.291

Images on banknotes, during this era, also depicted few religious buildings and symbols. The war of independence, Turkish ethnicity and Ankara were the most popular motifs on banknotes in this era. The grey wolf, a symbol of Turkish ethnicity, appeared twice and the Citadel of Ankara, a magnificent remnant of the pre-Islamic era, was chosen to appear on Turkish banknotes five times. The recurrent choice of Ankara on the banknotes, instead of Istanbul, the seat of the Caliphate and symbol of Islam’s strength and power for centuries, was itself evidence of the rejection of the Islamic-Ottoman past.292 These changes in Islam's role in state nationalism in Turkey often happened before the changes in the Islamization of government as figure 1 shows.

291 As discussed before, the total number of stars was seventeen, with the one big star in the center representing the Turkish Republic.
292 Ankara, a small town, was promoted at the expense of Istanbul, an imperial city for more than a thousand years, because it was very difficult to construct a new identity, especially a secular identity, with Istanbul as center. Istanbul was too full with Ottoman-Islamic images as Cinar (2005, 111) explains, ‘Ankara itself bore no significant marks of Islam and Ottoman times, but Istanbul was so full of such marks that it was impossible for them to be hidden or underemphasized in any way. Grand mosques standing tall as reigning monuments of Islam and glorious palaces and mansions testifying to the imperial authority of the Ottoman state were visible from all over the city. Laced with water fountains, tombs, small mosques, lodges, and monuments, every street, corner, and square of the old city was heavily laden with Ottoman and Islamic marks. The pronounced presence of symbols and marks of the Ottoman-Islamic reign made the articulation of the new national identity in the city difficult’.
Figure 80: Timeline: Decrease in Islam's role in state nationalism often precedes the decrease in the Islamization of government

With the decrease in Islam's role in state nationalism, a decrease in the Islamization of government was also witnessed. Family law based on Sharia was discarded and the Swiss family code was adopted, with minor changes, in 1926. The Unification of Education law (1924) banned private religious education and the later government ended all kind of religious education in schools. The Ministry of Religious Affairs lost influence. Initially, it was demoted and instead of a separate ministry, it became a directorate, the Diyanet.
Then, the Diyanet also gradually lost its limited influence. Its budget was decreased and most of its personnel were transferred to another department in 1931.

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

In this period, hostility toward Islam in official circles declined. There was a realization that the policy to suppress Islam had failed and focus shifted from ignoring or belittling it to controlling it. Turks had not rejected Islam despite an increase in education and modernization. The ruling elite decided to control Islam by teaching a republican, ‘enlightened’ Islam, rather than eliminating Islam (Agai 2007, 152). The main reason for this change was the opening of the political system as the single-party era came to an end. Multi-party elections meant that the opinions of the majority conservative population could no longer be ignored. Besides the threat of electoral loss, the state elite also felt threatened by Turkish communists, supported by Turkey’s traditional enemy — USSR/Russia. Islam seemed to be the ideal instrument to counter the communist threat.

During this era, therefore, Turkish elite saw Islam both as an object of fear and as an object of utility. Not surprisingly, Islam's role in state nationalism only saw a minimal increase. Most of the upsurge in Islam’s role was in the revival of the Ottoman heritage, which could be construed both as Turkish and Islamic. Ottoman and Islamic symbolism was so intertwined under the prior six centuries of Ottoman Empire/Caliphate that it was difficult to distinguish one from the other. The early Republican regime rejected them both.
Textbooks in early Republican era presented the Ottoman era as dark ages and Ottoman sultans as major enemies of the Turkish nation (Ince 2012, 84).

By the mid-1940s, however, the Republican elite began accepting Ottoman era as a part of the national (Turkish) golden age. Between the late 1940s and 1970s, the adoption of Ottoman personalities and history by the state, allowed the state elite to accept some religious symbolism, without damaging their hallowed principle of secularism (Deringil 1993). A renewed conflict with non-Muslims (Greeks Cypriots) brought Islam and state nationalism closer and non-Muslims loyalty to the state was increasingly doubted by the state (Ince 2012, 128-30). The appearance of Ottoman themes, however, and not purely Islamic themes,\(^{293}\) demonstrates that although Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was slowly growing, it was still not considered a completely legitimate feature.

In Turkish constitutional history, the first major change in this era was the rejection of the 1945 version of the constitution and the revival of the original version of the 1924 Constitution. By reverting back to the original version of the 1924 Constitution (which was in Ottoman Turkish, with many Persian and Arabic words) and rejecting the Turkified version, Turkish parliamentarians enacted a policy reversal and demonstrated a small revival of Ottoman/Islamic symbolism (Gurcaglar 2008, 87-88). In the 1961 Constitution, Turkey remained a secular republic and there was no mention of Islam, but there was (again) a slight upturn in Islam’s role. Alongwith Ataturk’s eight reform laws, the Diyanet

\(^{293}\) Such as related to Quran, mosques, Sharia, etc.
was considered important enough to be given constitution protection. It became a constitutional body. This small change became the basis for a further increase in the role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism in the 1980s.

Changes in the national symbols also indicated a minor increase in Islam's role in state nationalism in the form of the return of Ottoman symbols. A competition for the design of a prominent national mosque in Ankara was held in 1947. Moreover, the official celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the Istanbul conquest and the 900th anniversary of Battle of Manzikert demonstrated the increasing linkage between Islam and Turks. Unlike the last period, Turkish elite were not trying to find national glory in pre-Islamic history or by imagining ancient history, while ignoring the more recent triumphs.

In this period, for the first time since the establishment of the Republic, one could also see the appearance of images of Ottoman buildings on Turkish banknotes. Beginning in 1939, five images related to Ottomans were depicted on the banknotes. As in case of the prior period, the changes in Islam's role in state nationalism in Turkey often happened before the changes in the Islamization of government.

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294 Battle of Manzikert (1071) was fought between Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes and Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan. Alp Arslan defeated and captured Diogenes. This victory opened Anatolia to Turks and is considered the start of Turkification and Muslimization of Anatolia. Turkish Republic issued commemorative medallions and coins, besides officially celebrating Manzikert victory. A statue of Sultan Alp Arslan and a victory monument was also built in Manzikert (Hillenbrand 2007, 211-28). Manzikert and Dumlupinar battles are also compared as both were fought in August against Greeks, under the command of great Turks Alp Arslan and Ataturk, and resulted in Turkish victory and Anatolia’s occupation (Hillenbrand 2007, 207-9).
In education, there were many changes that showed increase in the Islamization of government. Not only religious education was revived in public schools but private religious education, although still legally banned, was allowed to flourish informally. Later, public religious schools were also revived and religious education was made effectively mandatory in public schools. Diyanet influence also increased during this era. In March 1950, a new Diyanet law was passed which returned the administration of mosques and
prayer leaders back to the Diyanet and expanded it to include new personnel and departments. A new program of mosque construction in 1950s meant a continuous rise in the number of Diyanet employees to manage these mosques. Diyanet budget and employees thus continued to rise in this era. In 1965, a new law made the Diyanet responsible for enlightening Turkish society and helping unify the nation. However, Turkish family law remained free of the Islamization of government during this era.

**The Early 1980s to Late 2000s**

During this period, the role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism surged appreciably and for the first time since the early years of the Republic, Islam became an accepted part of Turkish nationalism at the state level. Commonly called Turkish-Islamic synthesis, this combination of Turkish state nationalism and Islam can be seen in the 1982 Constitution which made religious education compulsory and declared ‘national solidarity and integrity’ as one of the responsibilities of the Diyanet, thereby sanctioning Islam’s role in state nationalism.

Changes in Turkish national symbols also illustrate this move towards a greater role for Islam. The entire national anthem,\(^{295}\) with all its Islamic symbolism, was put in every Turkish classroom and all children were required to learn it. For the first time, a national icon, the second bridge on Bosphorus was named after Fatih Sultan Mehmet. Later, the

\(^{295}\) Not the first two stanzas.
emblem of Ankara, the capital city and once a symbol and bastion of secularist state, displayed a mosque.

Banknotes also reflected Islam’s growing acceptability, with depictions of personalities linked with Islam and also a mosque. Mehmet Ersoy,296 Mevlana Rumi, and Fatih Sultan appeared on the banknotes in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 4 demonstrates that these changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism were usually before changes in the Islamization of government discussed below.

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296 Author of Turkish anthem and a critic of Kemalist reforms.
Figure 82: Timeline: Increase in Islam's role in state nationalism often precedes the increase in the Islamization of government

The pace of the Islamization of government also increased during this period. In education, private religious education flourished. Public religious schools continued to expand, except for a downturn in the late 1990s after the post-modern coup of 1997. There were also more mandatory hours of religious education in the public schools.

The Diyanet continued to expand its role, employees and budget. Large increase in mosques, built using private and public funding, lead to a massive increase in Diyanet’s budget in 1989. The Diyanet’s Quran courses became very popular and for the first time and it expanded its role to other countries. Turkish family law, however, showed no traces of Islamization. It was reformed comprehensively during this period and a new law was promulgated in 2002, but religious influence was absent as was the case in the previous law promulgated in 1926.

2010 Onwards

It appears that the trend towards a growing role for Islam in Turkish state nationalism will continue in the present era but it is too early to draw any definite conclusions. Most of the evidence earlier points towards more Islam in the next constitution as the AKP was the
majority party and it was gaining strength. This constitutional referendum of 2010 ended the stronghold of the secular judiciary on the Constitutional Court and reduced the power of the secular Turkish military (Hill 2010). Both these institutions had been instruments of assertive and aggressive secularism and authoritarianism. Later, Erdogan became president after gaining majority in the first round even when leading opposition parties not only got together but also nominated a pious Muslim as their presidential candidate. Though the AKP has attained majority in the November 2015 parliamentary elections, it does not have power to make constitutional changes itself,\textsuperscript{297} so making predictions about the future constitution is difficult. Another factor is President Erdogan’s ardent desire for a presidential system, which might force him to compromise on Islam’s role in the new constitution.

Changes in national symbols also show the emergent role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism. One major symbolic change was the building of a big prominent mosque in the new presidential palace. Camlica mosque in Istanbul, towering the city, and the biggest in Turkey is going to be another project symbolizing the change.

\textsuperscript{297} Or to submit its changes to a referendum, without the approval of the opposition parties.
Figure 83: Timeline: Increase in Islam's role in state nationalism precedes the increase in the Islamization of government

The pace of the Islamization of government has also increased as restrictions on AKP’s power have whittled away. The ban on private religious education has been relaxed. Imam-hatip schools have continued to expand and religious education in public schools has been increased. The Diyanet influence has expanded rapidly. It has now more than a hundred thousand employees and a budget that is larger than many of the other ministries. Its administrative stature has also been raised by the new Prime Minister Davutoglu.\textsuperscript{298} The

\textsuperscript{298} By not appointing a minister and bringing the Diyanet directly under his subordination and by raising the status of head of the Diyanet above many ministers, as discussed in chapter six.
2002 family law continues to be resistant to the dominant trend of Islamization of government, despite pronouncements of President Erdogan that could be seen as threats to this legislation and some administrative measures by the AKP government to deny abortion services in public hospitals. Will Islamization of government continue and next target will be family law? It’s too early to tell as it is the start of a new period. If Islam’s role in state nationalism continued to increase, family law may also be changed to be closer to traditional Islamic precepts.
Pakistan

Pakistan’s history can be divided into three periods in terms of major variations in Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government:

- The Late 1940s to Mid-1960s;
- The Late-1960s to Late 1990s; and
- 1999 onwards.

In all three periods, Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government co-vary and changes in Islam's role in state nationalism often happen before changes in the Islamization of government. Thus, fulfilling the first two conditions of determining a causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government.
Table 53: Co-variation of Islam's role in State Nationalism and the Islamization of government in Pakistan’s History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Islam's Role in State Nationalism</th>
<th>Islamization of Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Late 1940s to Late 1960s</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Early 1970s to Late 1990s</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Onwards</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

Pakistan came into existence on the basis of Muslim nationalism. The main identity marker was religion, not ethnicity or language as was the case for many other post-colonial nations. Therefore, the initial period of Pakistan’s history showed an increase in Islam's role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. However, due to the mostly a-religious elite’s opposition to the larger role for Islam, upsurge of Islam’s role in state nationalism was slow in the initial period.
In comparison to the British India Act, 1935 that served as Pakistan’s constitution for the first nine years, both the 1956 and 1962 constitutions were Islamic-oriented. The secular elite were forced to include many Islamic provisions. Objectives Resolution, with its many Islamic references, was passed in 1949 and has been since part of all three Pakistani constitutions. Constitution framers also decided that the name of the country was to be Islamic Republic of Pakistan and head of the state was to be a Muslim.

National symbols also demonstrated the religious aspect of the Pakistani state nationalism. The national flag had religious symbolism in the form of a crescent and star on a green background and the national anthem had religious undertones. Banknotes also showed the influence of Islam. The crescent and star appeared four times and mosques twice on a total of thirteen banknotes issued during this period. As in the case of Turkey, changes in Islam's role in state nationalism preceded changes in the Islamization of government.

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299 British India Act, 1935 was adopted as Pakistan’s constitution with minor amendments in 1947 and served as Pakistan’s constitution till 1956.
Figure 84: Timeline: Increase in Islam's role in state nationalism precedes the increase in the Islamization of government

The gradual Islamization of the Pakistani state started in this period. Religious education in public schools was made compulsory and the very first educational conference in the country called for more Islamic content. Private religious education in madrassas also expanded, although it was not supported by the state.

With respect to family law, in the late 1940s and 1950s, there was movement towards adopting Sharia law of inheritance.\textsuperscript{300} One after another most of the provinces adopted

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item As religious laws of inheritance were better for women. They gave women half the share of men while traditional laws denied women any inheritance.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Sharia law of inheritance. In 1961, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance was passed that tried to balance traditional Muslim family law with modern practices. It allowed restricted polygamy and tried to limit husband’s authority of divorce. There was no Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) in this period. However, the state gradually became involved in the administration of zakat and pilgrimages, the main functions performed by the current MRA.

The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

This period saw a large escalation in the role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism. The Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued by General Yahya in 1970 for the first time linked the creation of Pakistan to Islam in a constitutional document and made it a responsibility of the Pakistani state to preserve Islamic ideology. The Interim Constitution of 1972 and the 1973 Constitution continued this trend. When the 1973 Constitution was promulgated, it had more Islamic provisions than the previous two Pakistani constitutions, promulgated in 1956 and 1962. Amendments passed under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia added further religious provisions in the 1973 Constitution.301

National symbols also reflected the increasingly dominant role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism during this era. A national mosque was built in Islamabad and the flag of President of Pakistan became more Islamic. A new Islamic motto for the Pakistan Army was adopted and two new annual public holidays were announced, one directly related to

301 Such as creation of Federal Shariat Court.
Islam and the other with an Islam-inspired name. Images on Pakistani banknotes also reflected an upsurge in Islam’s role. Only one banknotes series was issued during this period and it had a total of three crescent and stars and one mosque depicted on it. But more importantly, in 1981, all banknotes carried an Islamic inscription. In most cases, changes in the independent variable, Islam's role in state nationalism, appeared before the changes in dependent variable, the Islamization of government (figure 7).

Figure 85: Timeline: Increase in Islam's role in state nationalism precedes the increase in The Islamization of Government
There was a sharp increase in the Islamization of government during this period. The decade of 1980 is remembered in Pakistan as the decade of Islamization. With respect to family law, the MFLO remained in force but the Hadood Ordinances, promulgated in 1979, restricted its application. These ordinances had a detrimental effect on women's rights in the family and in the larger society.

Prior to 1972, religious education was only taught in religious classes. The 1972 education policy allowed religious teachings to influence other subjects such as history and social studies. Thus, secular subjects became imbued with Islamic teachings. In the 1980s, as a result of the Afghan War against Soviets, hundreds of new madrassas were established and were provided state funding as well as military training and weapons. Religious education in the public schools also increased and religious studies (Islamiat) were made compulsory in all grades up to the graduation level.

The MRA was established in 1974 and its influence increased during the 1980s. The Council of Islamic Ideology, one of the institutions coming under the purview of the MRA, was very influential in the Islamization policy formulation under General Zia.

**1999 Onwards**

In this period, the role of Islam in state nationalism declined. After the 1980s, the growth in Islam's role in state nationalism had slowed as Pakistan became democratic and faced
repercussions of General Zia’s policies. After 9/11, international pressure made policy reversal more acceptable to the Pakistan military, the main decision makers and supporters of religious right. The Seventeenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution revived the joint electorates for minorities and increased the number of reserve seats for women and religious minorities. Further changes came in the Eighteenth Amendment. However, the most important shift came in 2015 with the passage of the Twenty-first Constitutional Amendment. This amendment explicitly linked Islamic extremism with terrorism.

The changes in the national symbols also indicated a decrease in Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. A white band was added to the previously all green presidential flag to make it representative of the Pakistani religious minorities.\(^{302}\) The Youm-e-Takbir holiday was canceled and the Pakistani state promoted policies like ‘Pakistan First’ and ‘Enlightened Moderation’, focusing on territorial nationalism and moderation respectively.

Banknotes also pointed towards a decreasing role of Islam in state nationalism. The Islamic inscription that had the pride of place on the reverse side of all Pakistani banknotes, was made completely invisible by making it part of the pattern on the banknotes. As before, changes in Islam's role in state nationalism most often came before changes in the Islamization of government.

\(^{302}\) Similar to the national flag; in which the white band represents the religious minorities, while the green portion represents the majority Muslims.
Corresponding to the decrease in Islam's role in state nationalism, there was also a decline in the Islamization of government. The Protection of Women law in 2006 restricted the role of the Hadood Ordinances. The role of family courts was also expanded. In education, the state support for madrassas decreased in this period while efforts were made to regulate them and to include more secular subjects in their syllabi. Religious education in public schools did not change but due to the popularity of private education, its role became more
limited. The MRA’s influence also diminished. Supreme Court decision decreased Zakat collection and its role is now largely limited to making pilgrimage arrangements.

3. Non-Spuriousness

The above discussion tried to establish that the two variables, Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government, co-vary and the changes in Islam's role in state nationalism often comes before the changes in the Islamization of government in both Turkey and Pakistan.

However, this co-variation might be because of a confounding variable, signifying a spurious relationship. If the research design was based on a single case, there would have been a long list of possible confounding variables but a comparative case-study design makes the presence of a confounding variable less likely. The possibility of confounding variables was further reduced by selecting cases that are very different. This is the logic on which Mill’s method of agreement is based. If very different cases, in which only one independent variable is common, result in same outcome, then the independent variable is probably the cause of the outcome.

As explained in the first chapter, Pakistan and Turkey were chosen because they are very different. Not only are Turkey and Pakistan polar opposites in terms of Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government but they are also very different in terms of history, socio-economic indicators and geography. Therefore, a confounding variable that
affects both of them in a similar way is very difficult to find. The following table underscores the differences between the two cases.

Table 54: Dissimilarities between Turkey and Pakistan (2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Colonizer</td>
<td>Colonized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Europe/Middle East</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Religious Minority</td>
<td>Alevi</td>
<td>Twelver Shias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Current US$ billion)</td>
<td>822.1</td>
<td>232.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (Constant 2005 US$)</td>
<td>8722.9</td>
<td>789.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth (Annual %)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (in million)</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>182.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth (Annual %)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ages 0-14 (% of total)</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total)</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population Growth (Annual %)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy (Years)</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Years of Schooling (2012)</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI Rank (Out of 187 countries)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Value-added (% of GDP)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (% of GDP)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty ratio at $2/day (% population) (2010)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (Per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>170.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Force (% of total labor force)</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the improbability of a confounding variable is apparent, the following table shows that despite marked differences between Pakistan and Turkey, the independent (Islam's role in state nationalism) and dependent variable (the Islamization of government) vary together
across decades. It can, thus, be argued that the relationship between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government is non-spurious based on the case studies of Turkey and Pakistan.

Table 56: Method of Agreement: Islamization of government Increasing

| Country                        | Islam's Role in State Nationalism | Islamization of Government |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------
| Turkey (The Late 1940s Onwards) | Increasing                       | Increasing                 |
| Pakistan (The Late 1940s to Late 1990s) | Increasing                       | Increasing                 |
| Turkey (The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s) | Decreasing                       | Decreasing                 |
| Pakistan (1999 Onwards)        | Decreasing                       | Decreasing                 |

4. Causal Mechanisms

The fourth requirement for proving a causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government is the identification of causal mechanisms
that link the independent variable to the dependent variable. Identifying causal mechanisms has increasingly been accepted as a significant condition for causal inference. Even scholars that primarily use quantitative methods and statistical causal inference recognize that their argument for causal inference would be stronger if a small-N study pinpoints the intervening mechanisms and variables that link their independent and dependent variables (Steinberg 2007). Sometimes identifying causal mechanisms is important even when causal inference is well-established:

*The relevant literature establishes a relationship between an explanatory variable* \((X_1)\) *and some outcome* \((Y)\), *controlling for other factors* \((X_2)\), *but researchers want to better understand how* \(X_1\) *generates* \(Y\). *The question of how* \(X_1\) *generates* \(Y\) *is critical because sometimes a broader normative question turns on the nature of the processes linking* \(X_1\) *and* \(Y\) *as in the case of the judicial behavior literature* or *at other times a key policy issue depends on it (as in the case of the literature of SES and health outcomes, which seeks to identify mechanisms that can be manipulated in an effective and politically viable manner.* (Weller and Barnes 2014, 1-3)
However, despite this acceptance, utility and wide usage, there is disagreement on what in fact are causal mechanisms. One of the disagreements is whether causal mechanisms are similar to or are different from intervening variables. For this study, causal mechanisms are assumed to be similar to intervening variables as defined by Imai et. al. (2011):

*We define a causal mechanism as a process in which a causal variable of interest, i.e., a treatment variable, influences an outcome. The identification of a causal mechanism requires the specification of an intermediate variable or a mediator that lies on the causal pathway between the treatment and outcome variables.*

**Causal Mechanisms from Islam's role in state nationalism to the Islamization of government**

There are three intervening variables that serve as the causal mechanisms between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government. As these intervening variables
are not confined to Pakistan and Turkey alone, the discussion below will provide examples from other MMCs as well. These variables are as follows:

- Need for legitimacy;
- Need for mobilization;
- Need for authenticity.

Religions, because they are a separate system of laws and beliefs, can provide legitimacy for actions that may be contrary to domestic or international law. Religions are also a potent source of mobilization and because many religions are centuries old and passed on from generation to generations, they are also frequently used as a criterion for establishing authenticity.

Colonialization, which brought modernity in its wake, resulted in a major transformation in the MMCs as the state and religion became clearly separated for the first time.\textsuperscript{303} The power of Islam as a source of legitimacy, mobilization and authenticity declined as it was increasingly questioned and challenged, not only by the colonial state, but also by many Muslim leaders. After independence, statehood increased the power of Islam in the MMCs as Muslims became decision-makers. But it was primarily the secular Muslim elites that

\textsuperscript{303} They had not been united since the advent of Islam, as implied by many experts. State elite and religious elite were separate within fifty years of Prophet Muhammad’s death and while they did cooperate, the religious and temporal authority was never united in one person, except for some brief episodes in some areas of the Muslim world. However, Muslim kings and caliphs, like non-Muslim kings, tried to project themselves as defenders/servants of the great religion and applied the religious law as long as it did not interfere with their rule. So, although religion and state were not united, they were also not discrete. Colonialization changed this arrangement.
led the independence movements and later governed the new states. Therefore, Islam’s role in the state remained minimal as elites tried to make the territorial or ethno-linguistic nationalism, not religion, the primary source of loyalty. Non-religious state nationalism, supported by all the resources of the state, became a strong competitor to Islam in many MMCs. It competed with Islam as the source of mobilization, legitimacy and authenticity.

Despite this competition, Islam remained a part of state nationalism as it was used as an easy mobilization mechanism by the founding fathers of the MMCs in order to unite and rally people against their colonial masters,\(^{304}\) who were invariably Christian. Even secular leaders, like Ataturk or Bourguiba,\(^{305}\) used Islam to unite and mobilize the population. By the 1970s, as the appeal of other ideologies (Arabism, socialism, capitalism etc.) declined due to the lack of economic development and defeats in wars, Islam’s role in state nationalism increased in the MMCs, often with the assistance of national leaders, who were still largely areligious, if not secular, themselves.

\(^{304}\) Or recent occupiers of their country as was the case with Turkey.  
\(^{305}\) Habib Bourguiba was the independence leader and first President of Tunisia.
This increased role of Islam in state nationalism made Islam a more powerful basis of legitimacy as people accepted that it was incumbent on them to follow Islam, not only because it was their religion but also because it was (at least partly) the basis of their nation. So, autocratic leaders, who did not have electoral legitimacy, and democratic leaders, who had lost their electoral legitimacy, found it convenient to justify their rule on the basis of Islam. However, to claim this legitimacy, leaders had to show that the state was Islamic or more Islamic than before and this led to the Islamization of government. Therefore, need of legitimacy of authoritarian leaders is an intervening variable and not the main reason of Islamization of government in the MMCs. Islamization can only be used for legitimization
in countries where Islam has a large role in state nationalism. Perhaps, that is why Indonesian dictator Suharto, having not much legitimacy, did not use Islamization of government to legitimize himself, while democratically-elected Mahathir found it necessary to use Islamization.

The power of Islam to mobilize people was never in doubt but it became stronger as the role of Islam in state nationalism increased. People were ready to fight national enemies but it became much easier to mobilize them if the national enemies were also designated as religious enemies. So, countries hostile to the MMCs were re-designated by the leaders/elite as enemies of Islam rather than the enemy of Egypt, Pakistan, the Arabs or the Turks. India, Israel and Soviet Union were easier to hate when they became Hindu India, Jewish Israel and Godless Communists. Even internal opposition was declared not sufficiently Muslim or working for the enemies of the state to mobilize Muslims against the internal opposition. But again to justifiably wear the mantle of Islam in the eyes of the people, leaders had to show that they were true to Islam and that the state was an Islamic state. And that required and led to the Islamization of government.

Finally, during the 1960s and 1970s, leadership in the MMCs lost the trust of the Muslim citizenry due to their corruption and inability to solve basic problems, such as reducing poverty and unemployment. Due to the support of such leadership by the US or the Soviet Union, it was perceived as lackey of the West and acting against the interests of ordinary

306 Or at least on the way to becoming an Islamic state.
Muslims. This lack of trust in the leadership was not limited to the MMCs. People in other developing countries felt the same way:

“All Authenticity” has begun to rival “development” as a key to understanding the political aspirations of the non-Western world. In the 1960s and 1970s, the new states of Africa and Asia wanted more capital, more schools, better communication facilities, more industry, more transfer of technology – more of those things deemed essential to an imitation of the Western pattern of economic development... (But) development became suspect for its origins in the West, its devastating consequences, its inability to deliver long-promised doses of well-being, and its indifference to cultural distinctions. (Lee 2008, 1)

Being authentic, true to oneself or to one’s core/past, became important as the unfairness of the international economic system and (thereby) the futility of following the Western prescriptions to achieving economic development became widely accepted. In the case of the MMCs, the West’s (perceived) unqualified support for Israel provided another evidence of the West’s bias against Islam and Muslims. In this atmosphere, Islamist parties gained ground and accused the rulers of being stooges of the West; following the West even when it gives nothing and takes everything. Islamists argued that Islam/Islamization is the solution. These accusations and the solution resonated because majority of ordinary Muslims had remained poor. Mandaville also refers to this search for authenticity (something of our own) in the MMCs:
As it became obvious that the various projects of decolonisation and national self-determination (premised on the almost sacrosanct model of the autonomous nation-state) which unfolded in the 1960s and 1970s were no panacea, and that, if anything, the new nation-states were simply once again trapped within a structurally determined system in which Western dictates – economic, political and cultural – reigned supreme, a new language was sought. One with no ties to the West, something ‘of our own making’, something beyond the Western matrix. Marxist experiments did not count for they were only local variations on yet another Western ideology. So Islam emerges as the most coherent, non-Western alternative. (Mandaville 2002, 68)

When rulers argued that application of centuries-old Islamic laws was impossible, the Islamist leaders pointed to Iran and the oil-rich Gulf kingdoms as models of successful Islamization of government in the modern world. As both the US and the Soviet Union/Russia are against Islamization of government in the MMCs, Islamization became the touchstone of authenticity. Authentic Muslims were supposed to reject both the US and the Soviet Union and do what God/Islam commanded. Islamists proudly claimed that they were authentic, while national elite were not.307 Facing this challenge, rulers had three choices. They could increase repression and continue to rule or they become selfless, hardworking and efficient, demonstrating to the people that they were authentic or they

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307 Imam Khomeini’s slogan ‘Neither East, nor West’, which is also written on the entrance of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is an example.
could Islamize the government, thus taking the sting out of Islamist’s accusations. Most leaders of MMCs opted for first or third choice.

The above discussion shows that although Islam was already a source of legitimacy, mobilization and authenticity before independence of MMCs, its influence increased manifold when it became part of state nationalism of these countries. Initially, the state elite did not use this resource in many MMCs but, after 1970s, they increasingly used Islam to gain legitimacy and authenticity and to mobilize people, irrespective of their own religiousness. However, to use Islam, it was necessary to prove to the people that the state and leadership were themselves Islamic and this required the Islamization of government. Initially, rhetoric and some clauses in the constitution were sufficient. Later, as elites were commonly perceived as insincere to Islam and Muslims and as the Islamist parties accused them of being Western or secular, the elites countered this perception by increasing the Islamization of government. In some countries, Islamists became part of the elite\(^{308}\) and increased the Islamization of government to prove their authenticity and to differentiate themselves from their secular predecessors.

\(^{308}\) As in Turkey.
5. Context

There appears to be at least three contextual requirements for the causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government to exist. These contexts that were common to both Turkey and Pakistan.

- Pre-dominant Muslim-majority;
- Pre-dominant Sunni-majority;
- Non-natural resource based economy.

The first contextual requirements of the causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government appears to be a pre-dominant Muslim majority. Both Pakistan and Turkey are more than 90% Muslim. It would be interesting to investigate this causal inference in MMCs which are not pre-dominantly Muslim-majority such as Nigeria or Malaysia. Another contextual requirement appears to be Sunni Muslim-majority as both Turkey and Pakistan have Sunni majorities. One cannot say whether this causal inference can be extended to countries that are pre-dominantly Muslim-majority but not Sunni-majority, such as Iran or Iraq. Another limitation of the applicability of the hypothesis is that both Pakistan and Turkey are not natural resource-based economies. Due to their peculiar properties, such as a very low tax rate with a large welfare system, natural resource-based economies have different social and political dynamics. It would be interesting to apply this dissertation’s hypothesis to resource-based economies such as the Gulf countries.
The discussion above completes the following five requirements of establishing the causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government:

- Co-variation of the two variables;
- Appropriate time order;
- Non-Spuriousness;
- Causal mechanism;
- Context in which the causal connection occurs.

Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government co-varied throughout the histories of Pakistan and Turkey. Additionally, Islam's role in state nationalism often preceded the Islamization of government. There were also no confounding variables influencing both Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government and so the relationship between these variables is non-spurious. Three intervening variables were identified as causal mechanisms that connect Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government: need for legitimacy, need for mobilization, and need for authenticity. Finally, the contextual requirements of the causal relationship were also recognized.

**The Importance of Initial Conditions**

While the detailed analysis of the two case studies has fulfilled the requirements of causal inference between Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government, it is difficult to understand the comparative level of the Islamization of government in
Pakistan and Turkey now. While the state of Pakistan, with only fifty years of Islamization (the late 1940s to late 1990s) is highly Islamized, the Turkish Republic even after seventy years (the late 1940s to 2015) of increasing the Islamization of government is comparatively not Islamized. This difference can be explained on the basis of the early period after independence. Pakistan started with a very significant role for Islam in its state nationalism, in fact Islam was the sole basis of its pre-independence nationalism. Turkey, on the other hand, started with a partly religious and partly ethno-linguistic nationalism. However, soon after independence, Islam’s role in state nationalism was forcibly expunged by the Turkish elite. Islam’s role in state nationalism was only partially accepted in the 1980s. Islam is still not the main marker of Turkish identity. In comparison, Islam continues to be the main marker of Pakistani identity, despite attempts in the last decade to move to a more territorial based state nationalism.

**Strengthening Granger’s Causality**

One of main problems in finding evidence for causal inference is the Granger causality criterion. This difficulty is also experienced in this dissertation. As both Islam's role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government affect each other, the direction of causal arrow can always be contested. The tests and techniques available to economists cannot be used on the two variables in focus in this dissertation. Therefore, although the above discussion has tried to show that changes in the Islam's role in state nationalism has often happened before the corresponding changes in the Islamization of government, the
evidence can be challenged and it can be argued that the direction of causal arrow is from the Islamization of government to Islam's role in state nationalism and not what is being argued in this dissertation.

To resolve this issue, it is necessary to review broader political science literature on nationalism and its relationship with public policies. The independent variable in this dissertation (i.e. Islam's role in state nationalism) is a subset of overall state nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan, while the dependent variable (i.e. the Islamization of government) is the subset of the universal set of Turkish and Pakistani public policies.

The relationship between nationalism and public policies has been extensively studied and it is generally accepted that both nationalism and public policies affect each other. However, on the question of bigger and stronger effect, most of the literature points the causal arrow from state nationalism to public policies, rather than the other way around.

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In the broader literature, nationalism and state nationalism are not clearly distinguished. However, often when nationalism is analyzed, the focus is on the dominant form of nationalism propagated by the state.
For example, Abdelal (2001) shows how state nationalisms of Eastern European countries affected their economic policies after the collapse of Soviet Union. He demonstrated that the remarkable diversities in economic outcomes in these countries could largely be explained by how these countries viewed themselves and their relationship with Russia. Similarly, Pickel (2003) talks about national economic cultures and how they affect decision-making. Béland and Lecours (2008) highlight the nationalism-social policy nexus and Mayar (2000) focuses on nationalism’s effects on state’s gender policies and how state nationalism becomes the language of control and a justification of discrimination and injustice. Moreover, there is a plethora of literature that studies and provides evidence of
how state nationalism affects foreign and defense policies of nations. For example, Prizel (1998, 14) argues in his book that national identity ‘is an extremely important, if not the driving force, behind the formation of its [nation’s] foreign policy.’ Zhimin (2005) studies Chinese foreign policy during the last hundred years and concludes that state nationalism has been one of the key driving forces shaping it. Anderson and Seitz (2006) explain that European Union’s Security and Defense Policy is based on their comparatively new European national identity.

The very brief literature review demonstrates that state nationalism affects public polices and the opposite effect is present but comparatively small. Therefore, the argument made in this dissertation is supported by the broader political science literature.
Figure 90: Islam’s Role in State Nationalism effect on the Islamization of government stronger than the reverse effect

Avenues of future research

It would be interesting to investigate this causal inference in Malaysia, where Muslims form only 56% of the population, but the Islamization of government in Malaysia is much higher than in Turkey (as shown in Table 6). There are two possibilities:

- Islam's role in Malaysian state nationalism is higher than its role in Turkish state nationalism – notwithstanding the small majority of Muslims in Malaysia – and it is causing the Islamization of government. The hypothesis, Islam's role in state
nationalism as the main cause of the Islamization of government, then would be more likely to be all the MMCs; or

- Islam's role in state nationalism in Malaysia is insignificant and the Islamization of government is driven by some other cause. The hypothesis would then likely be true only for countries where the Muslim majority is more than 90%.

Table 56: The Islamization of Government in Turkey, Malaysia and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Regulation of Religion Index (0-10)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Favoritism of Religion Index (0-10)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARDA (2015)

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310 Government regulation measures the restrictions placed on religion and government favoritism measures that special privileges given to one or more religions. Both these indices show government’s intervention in religious affairs, so they are used as a proxy for the Islamization of Government. As the table shows, Turkey is the least Islamized of the three and has both indices lower than Malaysia and Pakistan.
Another interesting avenue of research would be MMCs where Sunnis are not in majority. Iran would be particularly interesting to study as the state is highly Islamized in Iran but ethno-linguistic Persian nationalism is also strong.

Table 57: The Islamization of Government in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Regulation of Religion Index (0-10)</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Favoritism of Religion Index (0-10)</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARDA (2015)

Another interesting study would be to explore whether there is link between Saudi Arabia’s natural resource-based economy and its high level of Islamization of government.
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