HUNGARIAN NATIONALISM AND EFFECTS ON REFUGEE CRISIS

by

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Hungarian Nationalism and Effects on Refugee Crisis

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ABSTRACT

HUNGARIAN NATIONALISM AND EFFECTS ON REFUGEE CRISIS

Meredith Bailey King, MS

George Mason University, 2016

Thesis Chair, Dr. Karina Korostelina

The influx of refugees into Europe has placed a burden and created a schism among members of the European Union as to the best way to handle the crisis. Over a million people have flowed into Europe and are in desperate need of resources. While many European Union member states, such as Germany, accept these refugees with open arms, Hungary has stalled and fought back since the beginning of the refugee crisis in March 2015. There have been two internationally publicized incidents with Hungarian police forces clashing with refugees, and Hungary has built a 13 foot, 109 mile long, barbed wire fence along its borders to ensure the refugees cannot come into the country. The fact that Hungary has denied entry for the refugees while other European Union member states accept them, has created a problem among the European Union and created tension between the European Commission and Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. The main justifications that Hungary makes for not accepting the refugees are: security, and preservation of culture including their Christian heritage. While Hungary has faced international criticism for its refugee policies, I will analyze how the Hungarian citizens
feel about these policies. The two biggest political parties pushing for these policies of exclusion are Fidesz, which has the majority in Parliament and is also the party of Orbán, and Jobbik, which is the third largest party in Parliament, and has often been linked to extremist right-wing terroristic activities. I will examine the manifestos of both political parties to look for mentions of security, Christianity, and other keywords that would link and explain the exclusionist policies. Looking at various documents such as the Hungarian Constitution, written by Orbán in 2011, and public opinion polls about the policies to, I seek to determine how the public feels about the refugee crisis depending on what their political affiliation is. Using content analysis, I will search for keywords and determine themes that are common between the party manifestos and public discourse to determine what the future may look like in the fight between Hungary and the European Union. I will also bring in theories of conflict to explain the justification and finding of the policies.

Keywords: Christianity, Holy Crown, Trianon, October 1956, St. Stephen, Fidesz, Jobbik, Refugee
INTRODUCTION

The current refugee crisis in Europe has strained and concerned many European nations. While most European nations welcome the refugees with open arms, Hungary has closed its borders and not allowed any refugees or asylum seekers in. This response has left Hungary to face criticisms from the international community, and especially from other European Union member states. There are many layers to this conflict. The Hungarian government is no stranger to criticism from the international community. Since its accession into the Union in 2004, the Hungarian government has been accused of corruption and values that are contradictory to the values of the Union. While the European Union values human rights and Westernized values, some nations claim that they do not have the resources needed to deal with the high influx of refugees entering Europe every day. Hungary has stated concerns that the refugees will take much needed jobs away from Hungarian citizens (Novak, 2015). Although this is a rational fear, there is much more under the surface of Hungary’s policies. Hungary acknowledges the refugees have suffered, but has also stated that it is not their responsibility to pick up the pieces of broken governments. While the Hungarian government under the leadership of Viktor Orbán and his right-leanig Fidesz party justifies its actions as defending the state, as well as European borders, the European Union and the United Nations have condemned the actions and responses Hungary took towards the refugee crisis. This
discrepancy between what is morally right and what is right for the nation has caused tensions between the international community—in particular the European Union—a, and the Hungarian government. As of September 9, 2015, the European Union has created a quota for the number of refugees every member state should accept (EU, 2015). Most of the member states, such as Germany, France and Sweden, have accepted this proposal while Hungary was against it. As more European Union member states welcome refugees and Hungary continues to stall, many wonder why national security is such an issue for Hungary, and whether it would even be beneficial to enforce the quota in the state. The Hungarian response towards the refugee crisis should be no surprise to the European Union. The crisis merely placed a microscope on Hungarian policies that were already in place. Thus my research question is: How is the international disapproval toward Hungary’s response to the refugee crisis perceived by the Hungarian public? The thesis assumes that the international disapproval threatens the identity of Hungarians and Hungarian culture, and created more support for political extremist groups in the nation. To answer this question I will be using content analysis to analyze the Hungarian constitution, the manifestos of both Fidesz and Jobbik as well as public opinion polls to look for themes prevalent in all documents, which can determine the public and political mindset around these policies.
CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The Hungarian government has made many statements to justify the decision to close borders; the main reason being the preservation of the Hungarian state. To comprehend the conflict occurring in Hungary, it is important to understand how identity can lead to prejudice. The overarching theories supporting this research are nationalism, and xenophobia. To understand how nationalism and xenophobia have emerged in Hungary, and created prejudice against the refugees, theories of identity must be examined.

To understand how groups interact within themselves, and with other groups, the social identity theory will be analyzed. Social identity is defined as a, “feeling of belonging to a social group, as a strong connection with social category, and as an important part of our mind that affects our social perceptions and behavior, this process is socially constructed” (Korostelina, 2007; 15). Membership in social groups gives an individual a sense of belonging and protection against those whom are different. To further explain Tajfel states, “Together with personal identity, an individual has a social identity that is reflected in his or her membership in different groups. This identity is an important part of self-conception and influences the individual’s perception of himself or herself and of society as a whole” (Tajfel, 1978). Due to the benefits of group
membership, once a group is chosen, the social identities are relatively stable due to, “a structure of interaction with socially defined and available norms, customs, and expectations, among which one must choose, appropriate and reduce in order to gain identity” (Kellner, 1992). The individual will follow norms, and behavior of others in the group to gain acceptance. Once choosing a group, and following the norms, and behaviors of other members, an individual will move from trying to gain acceptance into recognizing themselves as a member of that group.

When an individual identifies as a member of a group, the identity becomes solidified and the individual becomes part of a collective identity. Identification of membership within a group is beneficial to the individuals for two reasons, “realization of the individual need to belong to a group that provides protection and confidence and, inclusion of a person into a system of social relationships” (Korostelina, 2007; 19). Once membership is acknowledged there is a hierarchical system, in which social identity will be competing with the individual’s other identities. Stryker states,

“Various identities exist in a hierarchy of salience, and one identity can be invoked over others not only because of its salience but also because of the level of commitment to that identity. One highly salient can prevail over another. Because of the hierarchy of salience, these identities may exhibit stable or situational characteristics” (Stryker, 1969).

As the quote mentions, salience of social group identity can be situational. There are many different types of groups an individual can relate to: ethnic, religious, and social among others, but the commitment to these groups does not always need to be prevalent. At times, individual identity will fulfill an individual whereas, other times high saliency for the social group will be needed. In times of crisis, or when a group believes they have
superiority or oppression, social identity within the threatened group will likely become salient. There are also three factors that will determine the saliency of social identities. They are: level of differences, prevalence of intergroup or interpersonal contact, and competition amongst groups (Korostelina, 2007; 73). If there is a high level of difference between groups or historical, or current conflict between the groups, the separation will be furthered. To further explain F. Barth states as,

“Social identity is a product of the process of border formation: it is articulated at the boundary and is defined and moderated by the contrast between “them” and “us”. It is only after the establishment of borders that the myths of a historical past and common ancestry appear, with the new social and political roots of identity thoroughly concealed under the cover of invented stories” (F. Barth, 1981).

Just by being a member of a group, an individual can determine who they do not identify with based on the groups they are not members of. Membership in social groups can strengthen the in-group and feelings of confidence and protection with individuals, as well as furthering the divide and tension among other groups. Group divisions, and the standing of groups in society, in favor of society or being the out-group, will become exaggerated in times of crisis. When social identity becomes highly salient, the groups can create narratives of threat and prejudice against the other groups.

When there is competition between groups, the groups will compare their status with that of the other groups. A disconnect can occur between what the outside group has versus the in-group, resulting in relative deprivation. The theory of relative deprivation is, “the perception discrepancy between their value expectation and their value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970; 24). In theory, Hungarians are looking at other European nations and the
quality of life of their citizens. Hungary is not on the same economic standing as other European Union nations such as Germany. Not only is this related to size, but Hungary is a new member to the Union and still working on civil issues. Hungary does not have enough resources as Germany and others to take care of their citizens, let alone refugees, who, as it has been argued by the Hungarian government, will not contribute to society (Orbán, 2016). It has been argued that it would be unfair to give the refugees state benefits and welfare if the Hungarian citizens need the same resources. Due to the competition over resources, dynamics emerge between the in-group (Hungarians), and the out-groups (the refugees, and those against Hungary). To further understand group dynamics, collective axiology can be explored.

The system of values and morals which guide group relationships within, and outside the group can be defined as collective axiology. There are three main components to this: mythic narratives, sacred icons and normative orders. Collective Axiology will be further explained at length, but it is important to understand that within Hungary, and those who consider themselves to be within the ‘in-group’, there are a set of rules that they must follow to stay within the group, therefore, staying in the group’s favor. Not following these rules would lead to ostracization. Similar to collective axiology, and to further explain group dynamics is favorable comparison.

Created by Leon Festinger, favorable comparison seeks to explain how people within groups form self-evaluations. In order to understand who you are, and who the group is, it needs to be established who you are not. The individuals, and groups compare
themselves to others to form better self-evaluations. The other group becomes associated with negative connotations while the in-group’s confidence gets boosted. In the Hungarian context, it becomes easy to identify as a westernized nation, a part of the European Union, who upholds laws and justice. Therefore it becomes easy to separate the identity of the Hungarians from the identity of the refugees, whom are seen as unfavorable, and unlawful. Further explaining this are the emergence of stereotypes and prejudice.

In order for the in-group to have higher esteem, the out-group must have lower social status and stereotypes and therefore prejudice, emerge to further lower the out-group from the status of the in-group. To explain,

“Prejudice is not a set of individual attitudes towards outgroup members, but it is the result of estimations of the outgroup’s position. For ethnic and national groups, the set of criteria can include: the relative size of the group; social statuses and economic and political power; cultural development; memories about group history and intergroup relations; and the interconnection of other groups” (Hagendoorn et al, 1996).

For the Hungarians, the massive amount of refugees who are trying to seek entry into Europe, as well as the unknown perceived intention of wanting to come to Europe has made many Hungarians support the policy of closing borders. It does not matter that there are women and children as well as doctors, and good people who happen to be refugees. The fact that there could be one person with bad intentions in the group is enough reason to close borders for the Hungarians. A public opinion poll shows just how deep the stereotypes and prejudices run.
A public opinion poll was conducted by the Median Institute in September and December 2015 to determine feelings of the refugee crisis in Hungary. While the poll results will be examined at length later, the most significant findings of the research are that:

“seventy-seven percent of respondents believe that refugees pose a serious health risk to the native population, seventy-seven percent of respondents think that allowing refugees into the country will lead to increased risk of terror attacks, and fifty-six percent of respondents believe that Muslims will be a majority in Europe who will force their religion and culture onto the native populations” (Balough, 2015).

The stereotypes and the prejudice of the refugees have become so entrenched that many of the respondents cannot comprehend any reason for allowing refugees into Hungary. The stereotypes were created because the refugees were placed on the outside of society, and therefore, the motives and values of the refugees are considered to be different than that of the Hungarians. Expanding further on the idea of prejudice, a correlation has been found between education, political beliefs and nationalism to higher rates of prejudice.

A 1988 study looking at the correlation between national pride and prejudice in Western Europe conducted by Thomas Pettigrew found that, “the greatest prejudice is found among those who are very proud of their nation” (Pettigrew, 37). Therefore, the national identity and the process of nationalism in Hungary must be understood to understand the level of prejudice that is happening in Hungary. The study also explains that, “increasing age is related to greater prejudice against foreigners because the older respondents tend to be less educated and politically conservative and nationally
identified” (Pettigrew, 37). In Hungary, age is not a relevant factor, but those with low education, the politically conservative and those who identify more as Hungarian compared to identifying as European are the ones perpetuating the xenophobic rhetoric in Hungary. The idea of national identity, which has morphed into nationalism, has created a clear in-group of the Hungarians, and an out-group, consisting of the refugees and those who disagree with the policies of the state. To understand what Hungarian’s view as important to their identity, the theory of national identity will be analyzed.

National identity is very salient in this conflict. People join groups and form identities based on the feelings they get from those group memberships. Some of the feelings people seek when joining groups are having a sense of belonging and security. While people form groups and change their identities often in their personal lives, in some communities, national identity will remain salient. In some cases, national identity can give the community the sense of purpose they seek. To further explain, “If the new national identity begins to fulfill necessary functions, (providing self-esteem, bestowing social status, personal safety, group support/protection and recognition by the in group), it can lead to the quick disappearance of other social identities, such as ethnic or regional identities” (Korostelina, 2003). People will start to describe themselves first by their nationality, and then by other groups. There are several concepts of national identity, one of which is related to ethnicity. The ethnic concept of national identity is described as, “a nation that is built around a core ethnic community into which ethnic minorities should assimilate. They see their nation as monoethnic and monolingual. For them, people who have inherited or assimilated the values and attributes of the ethnic core should have
higher status within the nation” (Korostelina, 2007:186). Both Fidesz and Jobbik refer to Hungarians as the people of the Catharpin Basin, with unique language and culture. On top of having a national identity, there is also regional identity. Not only are people Hungarians but they are members of the European Union. Membership in the Union helps set up superiority over nations who are not in the Union. The refugees are not escaping from a European nation, they do not share the same language, ethnic background or religion and therefore can be seen as inferior to Hungarian society. Once favorable comparison, collective axiology and relative deprivation have been employed and the goals, and morals of the in-group are clearly defined, prejudice against others will follow. Whereas, in individual groups, competition over resources is a threat, once national identity is formed the out-group becomes a threat to the entire nation and the value system of that nation. This threat will make people fight harder against the out-group to preserve themselves. When national identity is intertwined with a superiority complex, nationalism occurs.

Nationalism differs from the concept of national identity by the perception of the groups. Feshbach explains, “Patriotism is connected to strong attachment and loyalty to one’s nation without the corresponding hostility toward other nations, while nationalism is seen as a positive feeling toward one’s nation with negative feelings towards others” (Feshbach, 1987). If a community has negative feelings towards another group, identifying with the national group could give people a sense of entitlement over the other group. In this case study, identifying as Hungarian and European can do this. Dr. Daniel Druckman explains, “at the level of the nation, the group fulfills the group’s
economic, sociocultural and political needs, giving individuals a sense of security, a feeling of belonging and prestige” (Druckman, 1994). People who are invested in the superiority of the national identity will fight if the idea of superiority is challenged. Druckman also suggests, “The constant threats and feelings of insecurity at a national level seep down to the individual, and since people draw self-esteem from their country, a common reaction is to lash out against feelings of inferiority by displaying a sense of superiority” (Kim, 2014). When a group feels they are superior over another group, they get a sense of entitlement, self-esteem and safety. These feelings can attract anyone in the nation, “nationalism can be remarkably satisfying across gender, class and political lines (Searle-White, 2001). Once a national group perceives themselves as superior to others, the chances of conflict and violence with an outgroup increases if that perception of superiority is challenged. Nationalist feelings often lead to xenophobia, which is the severe dislike of foreigners. Which can explain why the rhetoric used by the government and the general feeling among society is the dehumanization and inferiority of the refugees. This theory also explains why there is such support for the Fidesz policies, society does not want to become tainted by inferior people. Nationalism, especially when threatened by another group can become dangerous because there are very clear distinctions between the groups. The superiority complex that is tied in to nationalism makes tension worse because the in-group must assert their superiority; and resolution between groups becomes more difficult. To understand how nationalism has emerged and created prejudice against refugees in Hungary, the history of Hungary and the national identity need to be examined.
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY

2.1 HISTORY OF HUNGARY

The Kingdom of Hungary was established in the year 1000, but the Republic of Hungary has only been around for less than three decades, breaking away from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, and only creating their own Constitution in 2004. By the year 1000, The Kingdom of Hungary was starting to integrate into Western Europe. Under Saint Stephen, Hungary became a Christian nation and was known as a Catholic Apostolic Kingdom. Saint Stephen and Christian values are still prevalent today, especially when the current government is trying to overcome its communist past, when religion was more than discouraged. Due to Hungary’s long history, only issues of importance that are significant to the situation today will be discussed. The main historical periods will be: The founding of the Kingdom of Hungary; under Saint Stephen; integration into the Austro-Hungarian Empire; the Treaty of Trianon; communism, transition to democracy and the refugee crisis.

As mentioned previously, the Kingdom of Hungary was established in the year 1000 with Saint Stephen as King until 1038. Before St. Stephen, Hungary consisted of a series of tribes ruled by princes known under the House of Arpad. Prince Geza, Saint Stephen’s father, was the first prince to adopt Christianity in Hungary and helped forge
the path for his son’s reign (Roman, 2003; 146). During his reign, Saint Stephen established many monasteries and enforced the spread of Christianity and the ‘wholesale conversions’ of the people in his kingdom (Roman, 2003; 146). Due to Saint Stephen’s forced conversions and adoption of Christianity in Europe, he is seen as elevating Hungary in the region and raising Hungary into civility. To this day, Saint Stephen is viewed as a prototype for a perfect Hungarian and the values that all Hungarian citizens should have. After Saint Stephen’s death, Hungary continued to maintain its Christian identity, and the Kingdom used their beliefs as justifications for the power of the Kingdom. Centuries later, theologian Istvan Werboczy created his list of laws called the *Tripartitum*, which states the power of the Hungarian state lies within the Holy Crown, which was St. Stephen’s coronation crown. As Scholar Melinda Kovacs explains, “The Holy Crown came to mean the territorial integrity of the country and in the political fights of the seventeenth century Transylvania was recognized as part of the Crown” (Kovacs, 2015; 31). With this logic, all leaders including the previous St. Stephen were not powerful because of their title, but it was the Crown, with power from a Higher Power, that gave the leader power. The power of the nation and Christianity went hand and hand. The people did not believe the leader could be powerful without recognizing the Crown or being Christian. At this period in history, Europe was preparing for the Crusades, and many powerful nations enforced Christianity. Like other European states, Hungary continued supporting the values and importance of Christianity. Unlike other nations, Hungary was fighting others due to precarious geographic location rather than religious differences.
The Kingdom of Hungary was centrally located and surrounded by tribes and hostile forces to the east, but strong nations to the west. As historian Eric Roman explains, “Lying at the crossroads between East and West, North and South, and often appearing easy prey to outsiders because of internal rifts, Hungary, more specifically her strong willed and unbending high nobility, also had to fend off repeated attempts by neighbors, either to conquer the country or force it into some manner of dependency” (Roman, 2003; 146). During this time, Hungary was under constant attacks by the Ottoman Empire. Although the Empire was trying to spread Islam, the battles with Hungary were purely strategic. To get to France and the West, the Empire needed to go through Hungary. Tensions came to a head on August 29, 1526 during the Battle of Mohács. Ottoman forces approached the Sava River by the town of Mohács, but the Hungarian army was waiting on the other side completely undermanned and unprepared for the battle. The results were catastrophic for the Hungarian army. Many nobles died, including King Lajos II who fell off his horse and drowned in the river trying to escape. The Ottomans continued onto Buda where they seized and burned the city. (Roman, 2003; 527). The Battle of Mohács was a devastating loss for the Kingdom of Hungary. Not only did the Hungarians lose a young King, but they lost their security and independence as well. This historical grievance is still felt in society and created a sense of fervor to protect Hungary’s security from invading forces.

Losing King Lajos II in battle threw the kingdom into a tailspin, and another king was not crowned for several more decades. Due to the Ottoman victory, the kingdom was divided between areas controlled by the Ottomans and areas that were integrated into the
Habsburg Empire. Reevaluation of the political process became necessary when people began protesting in 1848, demanding more freedom under Habsburg rule. As Roman explains, “On March 15, 1848 the youth of Budapest spoke with the voice of the nation. Groups of university students and ardent spirits who joined them formulated a program of twelve points incorporating demands that went far beyond narrow nationalistic goals; they expressed universal aspirations pronounced in the accents of revolution. They called for free press and an end to censorship, yearly parliaments, equality before the law, the release of political prisoners, a national bank and the unification of Hungary with Transylvania, which was being governed by a separate province” (Roman, 2003; 188). At this point, Europe was already in a revolutionary phase. Many people across the continent were demanding more rights, and it was in this year that the Communist Manifesto was written and took Europe by storm. The Habsburg Empire was transformed into the Dual Monarchy, or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1867. The Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved in 1918 after the Axis powers were defeated in World War I. Hungary suffered a massive historical grievance in 1920 when Hungarian borders were redrawn due to the Treaty of Trianon. The treaty was in response to the Axis power’s aggression in the war and severely limited the power of Hungary. To explain the significance of the treaty, Hungarian author Paul Lendvai states, “The thousand-year history of the Apostolic Kingdom of Hungary came to an abrupt end in the summer palace of Trianon in the park of Versailles on June 4, 1920. Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territory and three-fifths of its population. More than a million Hungarians lived under foreign suzerainty, half of these in self-contained areas of settlement along
Border States. To this day, the word Trianon symbolizes for all Hungarians the greatest tragedy of their history “(Lendvai, 2002; 57). It was due to this treaty that Hungary lost Transylvania to Romania, which was a massive loss. This loss of territory and power is still felt in Hungarian society, and there are political parties and movements, such as the Truth, Justice and Life Party, that have grown with the intentions of returning Hungary to the size and power of the pre-Trianon period. The treaty also brought up the question of ethnicity, as many ethnic Hungarians were forced to live in bordering states. Fears that the ethnic Hungarians would lose their cultural integrity and contact with their motherland started to grow. The Treaty of Trianon forced Hungary to give up much of its territory, but also severely limited the power of the state, both economically and militarily. Hungary was once again placed in a weak position at risk of invasion and control by foreign forces.

Mourning the loss of power and in fear of weakness, Hungary once again clung to Christianity to unify the nation. During this interwar period, St. Stephen’s Day was created as a national holiday as a way for Hungarians to feel close to and embody the values of the prototype (Hanebrink, 2006; 110). Many citizens could neither comprehend the significance of the treaty nor come to terms with the loss of identity that had occurred. To mobilize the people, politicians began encouraging all Hungarians to look at the treaty in “eschatological, explicitly Christian terms” (Hanebrink, 2006; 111). Hungary had been through periods of invasion and occupation before, but this violation was different than anything that had happened previously in Hungarian history. Many politicians and church leaders began stating that, “Hungary was a crucified Christ whose
resurrection would come with the revision of the unjust borders” (Hanebrink, 2006; 111).

In these terms, people were given hope that Hungary would rise again and regain power.

Interweaving politics with religion also had another strategic advantage. Politicians could argue their agendas were simply in tradition with that of St. Stephen, therefore making it hard for people to argue against the policies (Hanebrink, 2006; 111). Christianity was also incorporated into schools. The “Magyar Credo,” a hymn that was written in 1920, and was expected to be read every morning before school started. As historian Paul Hanebrink explains, “Through countless recitations all over the country, the credo, along with many images of the crucified nation that accompanied it, firmly established in public discourse the vision of a Hungary redeemed amidst national death” (Hanebrink, 2006; 112). A major problem with this Christian narrative was that it alienated non-Christians. Jews and communists were targeted as enemies of the state, and used as scapegoats for the problems of the state.

Hungary was in a very precarious situation, and the politicians were trying to unify the nation and return to greatness. The attempt was short lived. There was large public discontent during this period. Soldiers returning from the war were disillusioned, and many aligned with the Bolshevik movements in other parts of Europe. Workers and soldiers participated in armed protests against the government, angry that the government gave into the terms of the treaty (Roman, 2003; 216). The protests were successful, and Hungary was briefly declared a Soviet republic. A battle then ensued between communists and the political right who were trying to push the Soviets out. The Soviets
were taken out of power, communists were arrested, and Miklos Horthy became regent of Hungary. There was a brief period of relative stability before World War II began.

Hungary was yet again on the wrong side of the war, and was swept up in the Nazi fervor. Premier Gyula Gömbös became the first head of government to visit Adolf Hitler; Gömbös had a plan for creating new economic and foreign policies as well as reversing the Treaty of Trianon, and saw Hitler as a formidable ally to help achieve his goals (Roman, 2003; 482). Once Gömbös died, several fascist, racist groups clamored to fill his spot and remain in Germany’s good graces. The largest of such groups was the Arrow Cross Party lead by Ferenc Szálasi, focused not only on anti-Semitism but also on Christianity, irredentism, and economic revisions that attracted both middle and lower class workers (Hanebrink, 2006; 140). Szálasi enjoyed his close ties with the Nazi party and was gaining popularity quickly. Szálasi was so popular, that he frequently befriended priests and successfully encouraged some to join the fascist party (Hanebrink, 2006; 154). Not only did this create a divide among the Catholic Church, but a divide between Catholics and Protestants, as well. Ideologically, the Christian churches were struggling to decide on political engagement. They could either support a policy and push society in one direction, or refrain from politics entirely. The churches chose to take a middle road: “Catholic leaders were careful to insist on the place of religious expression in civil society and were rigorously opposed to any political movement that sought to reduce their church to some kind of association charged with preaching pro-governmental ethics” (Hanebrink, 2006; 59). Regardless of the personal ideologies of the church leaders, it became evident that Szálasi was creating his own reality by twisting Christian
beliefs, and that the future of the churches and the country were in danger if he was not stopped. The church had to fight against Szálasi’s many supporters and the strength of the party. Realizing the real threat of the fascists, but also acknowledging the danger of being an enemy of the fascists, the churches decided on a policy of appeasement. The churches supported the First Jewish Law, created by the Arrow Cross Party, hoping that support for the law would stop the party from doing anything too destructive (Hanebrink, 2006; 161). There were clerics who openly spoke out against the Party. When the Arrow Cross Party took control, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty wrote a letter to Szálasi arguing the senselessness of continuing the Nazi practices in Hungary and stated that a chance of victory was bleak. Szálasi was offended by the letter and sent Mindszenty to a concentration camp (Roman, 2003; 524). Mindszenty was released from the camp when it was liberated by the Soviets, in 1956, but his goal of stopping the spread and implementation of fascist ideas in Hungary was unsuccessful. The spread of Nazi ideology expanded in Hungary, leading to the execution of thousands of Jews in Budapest in 1945.

The churches lost their power in the fight against fascism. The conclusion of the war resulted in the Red Army occupation of Hungary, and again being placed under Soviet control. Christianity was once again threatened, this time by the threat of communism. The church had to find a way to stay open. While religion did not align with communist ideology, shutting the churches down was also a strategic advantage for the Red Army. The churches were still powerful and influential to the Hungarian people; if people were listening to the church, they would not be enthralled by the teachings of the
Party. The church was too powerful to go after immediately, so the Red Army first targeted schools. As historian Paul Hanebrink explains, “In 1948, the Communist Party began a campaign to nationalize the country’s schools, a clearly anticlerical measure in a country where over half of all primary school students attended church-run schools and where some of the best high schools in the country were administered by one or another Christian confession” (Hanebrink, 2006; 234). Cardinal Mindszenty was greatly against this idea and spoke of his objection to anyone who would listen. Mindszenty’s objections did not go unnoticed. On December 23, 1948, Mindszenty and thirteen other clergymen were arrested on charges of “treason, espionage, and illegal currency trading”; after being tortured, the clergymen were given a mock trial in which Mindszenty was sentenced to life in prison (Roman, 2003; 526). This was a shocking and bold move by the Communist Party. The move was a strategic attempt to break Hungarian attachment to Christianity. Whenever there was a time of crisis or concern, politicians would bring Christianity to the forefront of public life. The Communist Party wanted to break that dependency and make the people dependent on communist ideology instead. The fight against the churches was far from over. If the Red Army had completely abolished Christianity and churches, there was a possibility of a citizen revolt. The Army needed the people to trust in the system so the abolishment of churches was not advantageous immediately, as many Hungarians identified with the churches. Further expanding on this idea Hanebrink states, “Although the Communist Party saw Hungary’s institutional Christian churches, and especially the Catholic Church, as significant obstacles to their long-term goal of creating a Soviet-style one-party state in Hungary, pragmatic considerations dictated that the party
proceed cautiously in removing those obstacles” (Hanebrink, 2006; 226). The Party successfully convicted Mindszenty and did not face any repercussions or demands for his release. This was seen as an opening for the regime to take more control of the state and continue chipping away at Hungary’s ties with Christianity. Hanebrink states, “In 1950, the regime liquidated all religious orders and established a State Office of Church Matters in 1951 to assist existing state security offices in the surveillance of religious life in Hungary.” (Hanebrink, 2006; 234). It was now nearly impossible for church leaders to openly speak out against the regime. At this point, the schools were nationalized, youth organizations were controlled by the state, and the churches were being watched and censored. Even Saint Stephen Day was changed to the ‘day of the new bread’ where Hungarians were encouraged to “celebrate their labor; the day was formally changed to Constitution Day” (Hanebrink, 2006; 227). The regime tried to remove all religious connotations from society. It should also be noted that the regime thought of the Catholic Church as more of a threat to communist ideology than the Protestant churches. This is not to say that the Protestant churches were given any more freedoms, but that clergymen in the Catholic Church carried more influence in society, and publicly spoke out against the regime more. The regime was gaining strength.

As the regime strengthened, some Hungarian politicians became weary about the Soviet domination of the nation. Imre Nagy was the founder of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party who quickly formed a working relationship with Stalin, and climbed up the ladder of the Hungarian Communist Party. As he was gaining more status in the party, Nagy began questioning the effectiveness and exploitative properties of some
communist policies. Nagy proposed his own policies, which would give the workers more freedom as well as limit governmental monopolization and disband concentration camps (Roman, 2006; 532). While the Soviet government was less than pleased with his critiques, Nagy was simply stating the general complaints of the people, and creating policies the Hungarian people wanted. As Nagy was increasingly excluded from the government, the Hungarian people had enough. On October 23, 1956 the people began protesting in Budapest. The people assembled in front of the Parliament building where they demanded the Soviets step down and hand over power to the Hungarian Communist Party; the Soviets responded by ordering police to fire upon the protesters (Roman, 2006; 534). This is still seen as a historical grievance in Hungary. The people stood up against an invasive force, tried to regain power and were, in essence, plowed down. However, the protests were not completely unsuccessful. The day after the protest, Nagy was named chairman of the Council of Members, where he negotiated a truce with the Soviets and declared that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and was to be neutral in the future (Roman, 2006; 534). The Soviet leadership in Moscow was not going to allow Hungary this amount of freedom, and forcibly entered Budapest to stop the revolution. Hearing the Soviets were coming, Nagy tried to find safety in Romania but was met by Soviet police at the border where he was arrested. On June 15, 1958, refusing to give into the demands of the Soviets, Nagy was convicted of “attempting to overthrow the people’s democracy and high treason,” was sentenced to death and was hanged the next day (Roman, 2006; 534). Nagy was seen as a patriot for standing up against the Soviets. He was fighting for the people, and wanted a Hungary ruled by Hungarians. For decades
after his death, people protested that his body should not have been placed in a cemetery for enemies of the state, but that he deserved a proper state funeral. This would be an ongoing grievance until the collapse of communism in 1989.

Nagy was replaced with Soviet chosen János Kádár, whose first objective was to find and arrest those involved in the uprising. Despite the fact many people were still upset that the Soviet Union had so much control in Hungary, if a person wanted to advance in society, they needed to play the game. Bayer states, “Some Hungarian small-business circles and entrepreneurs belonging to the ‘national bourgeoisie’ want to play a greater role in the Hungarian economy and politics and sympathize with and support right-wing radicalism in order to gain more influence” (Bayer, 2002; 307). Allegiances at this point were shaky, and aligning with the wrong politician or belief could lead to imprisonment or death. Many people followed the Moscow-controlled leader in power, because it was easier to follow than to fight. Kádár’s first months in office lead to a witch hunt of supporters of the 1956 attempt at revolution, but over time he relaxed the search. Kádár also implemented Stalinist-style terror campaigns but as international isolation increased, he relaxed on this as well. In 1964, Kádár also reconciled with the Catholic Church, decades after the church's power had been subdued. In a meeting with the Vatican, Kádár agreed the church had a right to fill positions in Hungary in return for the church acknowledging and legitimizing his power (Roman, 2006; 502). Although he began to relax his control, Kádár successfully remained in the Kremlin’s favor, and stayed in power until 1989, when the Iron Curtain began to fall.
Hungary was an integral piece of the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Many East Germans traveled to Hungary with the hopes of crossing into Austria to return to families in the West. Because Hungary opened its borders, people living in Soviet controlled areas could return to their families on the outside. Communism was collapsing regardless. Gorbachev was in power and recognized the regime was no longer sustainable. However, it was easier for the people to mobilize and get a glimpse into the outside world because Hungary opened its borders. In comparison to other Soviet satellites, Hungary had relative ‘freedom’ or space. The collapse of the system did not result in a bloody coup, or result in months of terror, such as the events that occurred in Romania. Although Hungary was a part of the communist bloc, it is not effective to look at the reasons for conflict in the past and now through a post-communism lens because there are many more dynamics that would be missed (Kovacs, 2015; 7). Communism was just a part of Hungary’s history, but the historical grievances and values of the nation go back much farther.

When the communist regime began to fall, many people began to express their opinions about Nagy’s grave site and started demanding a proper reburial. One of those people was Viktor Orbán, a bright college student who wanted to get involved with politics. Orbán was vocal about Nagy’s exhumation and reburial, as well as giving citizens hope of a brighter future.

2.2 VIKTOR ORBÁN AND HISTORY OF FIDESZ

Viktor Orbán was placed in the political spotlight in the late 1980’s when a political group he founded in university, Fidesz, spoke out against the communist regime
and urged the Hungarians to fight for a better Hungary. On June 16, 1989, Prime Minister Imre Nagy was reburied. It was during this reburial that Orbán, then twenty-six years old, became famous. He talked about the power of the people, ending communism and opening free elections (Ablonczy, 2003; 54). To help gain popularity, Orbán portrayed himself as a country boy who created his success. Hungarian author Tibor Fischer explains, “Orbán grew up in two villages outside of Budapest and worked the farms in which he learned an important lesson: ‘You have to hit the rats hard the first time, otherwise they run up the spade and bite you first” (Fischer, 2015; 39). The people view Orbán as a self-made man who grew up farming, and therefore understands the struggles of the average person. Orbán has also placed high value on Christianity and declares himself to be Calvinist, even though his wife and family are Catholic. Since entering office, Orbán has made a point to state that Christianity is significant and valued in Hungary. Why then did he make the distinction of choosing a sect that is outside of his family's beliefs? Many political analysts believe that Orbán’s affiliation with the Calvinist Church is strategic; that, “the Catholic Church has not recovered from the Communist era. Calvinism is seen as more strict and lacking of fear. The priest who took down Ceausescu in Romania was Calvinist. Orbán chose this religion to show he is strict and does not fear anything” (Fischer, 2015; 46). It makes sense when looking at how Orbán rose to power, that he wants to portray an image lacking in fear and standing up for what he feels is right. Orbán’s popularity can also be attributed to his successful efforts to transform the Hungarian narrative and reinvigorate historical memories.
After the fall of communism, many formerly communist nations struggled to find their identity. Instead of making the transition a divisive period, Orbán successfully brought the nation together with a narrative everyone could agree upon. As Kovacs explains, “Orbán’s powerful rhetoric is about the Hungarian nation as the martyr who saved ‘Europe’, about the ‘we’ that extends all the way back to the original ancestors who gave up nomadism upon arriving at the Catharpin basin” (Kovacs, 2015; 43). This narrative gave the Hungarians a sense of superiority. They were coming out of a rough spot in their history, but the story was that they have always been strong people and had always been a part of civilized Europe. This narrative was especially useful since Orbán was trying to get Hungary into the European Union. Some citizens were against the accession, but Orbán framed the situation in a way that made Hungarians see that Hungary has always been a useful nation in Europe, and accession was part of the natural progression. Orbán has also portrayed himself as fighting for the average Hungarian citizen, and has proven that he will fight any party or power that will jeopardize those citizens. Fidesz and Orbán have been fighting since they have been in power: “before 1990, it has fought against Communist rule; after the first free elections, it struggled against the lethal embrace of the liberal brother, SZDSZ. After 1994, for the leadership of the Right; between 1998 and 2002, against the post-communist networks that remained powerful. From 2002 to 2010 it carried on tirelessly chipping away at MSZP. Finally, having secured two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, Fidesz went on to tackle external foes including the IMF, the EU, and multinational corporations” (Ablonczy, 2015; 55). Orbán is unfamiliar what it is like to lack an enemy to fight. It should be noted that the
current Fidesz slogan is, “Magyarország nem hagyja magát!” which translates to “Hungary will not give in!” This is a fitting slogan for the current Fidesz government.

Since Orbán’s second term, 2010, he has created a reputation in the European Union of unwavering in his views. This is why his support has risen; he is seen as standing up to those whom others are afraid to stand up against, such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. Orbán helped guide Hungary into membership with the European Union in 2004 and successfully rewrote the Hungarian Constitution in 2011. However, after his first term, he lost his reelection in the 2002 elections to the MSZP candidate, Ferenc Gyurcsány.

Gyurcsány was Prime Minister of Hungary from 2002 to 2009, in which much of his term was filled with controversy. Not only was he suspected of plagiarizing a college thesis, he was also secretly recorded admitting lying to the public about the state of the Hungarian economy in a closed-door meeting (Kovacs, 2015; 64). Not only did this lie make citizens distrust the government, but Gyurcsány also directly quoted a reference during the 1956 uprisings. 2006 was the fiftieth anniversary of the uprisings in which Hungarian stood up to the communist government and were massacred by occupying Soviet forces because they were opposed governmental lies (Kovacs, 2015; 65). The lies also angered the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, which decided that in order for Hungary to get its public debt in check, it needed to be placed under austerity measures. This further infuriated the Hungarian public. The criticisms and nationwide protests became so great that Gyurcsány was forced to resign towards the end of 2009. This left Parliament scrambling for a replacement but Parliament decided to hold
off on replacing him until the 2010 elections. The public discontent with governmental lies greatly benefited Viktor Orbán and Fidesz.

Although Orbán was not Prime Minister during this period, it does not mean that he was not influential in Parliament. When Hungary was placed under austerity measures, Orbán fought to renegotiate the terms and eventually led the country out of crisis. Orbán was also influential in Hungary’s accession into the European Union, in 2004, and was frequently sent to meetings with the European Commission. He remained a very powerful figure. During this time, Fidesz still held a very large portion of Parliament, and the loss forced them to reevaluate their strategy for the next election. Orbán had such a great report during his first term that he struggled with accepting the defeat in 2002. To rationalize the loss, “Orbán came to the conclusion that his cabinet had suffered defeat because they had focused exclusively on the interests of the middle class. As a result, the Second Orbán government cabinet made great efforts to cast itself as a government for the entire nation, including marginalized groups” (Élő, 2015; 149). Orbán and Fidesz obsessed over how to regain the majority. When Orbán ran for Prime Minister during the 2010 election, he made great strides to not only focus on the middle class, but also emphasized programs to help citizens with lower-income, and created a push to integrate minorities, such as Roma, into society and politics. This strategy worked, and Orbán was reelected as Prime Minister in 2010. Since then, Orbán’s unrelenting stance and policies enforced by Fidesz have grown in popularity in Hungary, “Support for the ruling Fidesz coalition has risen five points in the past month to 34 percent, a level not seen for a year, according to the latest poll by the Nezopont Institute” (Fifield, 2015). Orbán also fought
to bring the importance of the Holy Crown and Christianity back into the forefront of Hungarian life.

Due to many foreign occupations, the Holy Crown of Hungary changed hands and locations several times throughout history. When Imre Nagy was going into exile, he took the crown with him, and when he was found, the Crown was then given to the United States. The crown was outside of Hungary for thirty-three years until January 6, 1978, when Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, returned to the crown to Hungary (Roman, 2006; 617). The significance of the crown was not publicly mentioned until Orbán came into power. In fact, as Orbán was in the process of rewriting the communist-era constitution, he decided to create a parade for the crown. Orbán sent the crown to be blessed by the Pope, as well as created a three day tour of the crown in which millions of RUFs (Hungarian Forints) were spent to ensure the crown would be taken from Budapest in a covered and climate controlled box to the birthplace of St. Stephen, in Esztergom, the religious capital of Hungary (Kovacs, 2015; 49). Tourists can visit the crown in the Parliament building, as it is considered the reason for the existence of the nation. The idea to keep the crown in the Parliament building began after the idea that the crown would give power to Parliament and its leaders. The country could not fail if the crown and the powers behind it were supporting the government. The people needed a reason to have hope in the transitional government, and Orbán smartly and strategically gave the citizens hope by placing the crown in the Parliament. However, outside of Hungary, Orbán had a less than stellar reputation.
In 2011, Orbán presided over the Council of the European Union. What was expected to be a way for Orbán to boost international support for his policies turned into failure. During his term, Orbán had the reputation of being, “simply deaf to constructive criticism……. He destroys democracy as it is now understood in most European countries and is making self-destructive moves in both terms of domestic and foreign policy” (Kovacs, 2015; 39). Overall, Orbán’s presidency over the Council of the European Union is described as an embarrassment, and he has not recovered his reputation, nor earned any new allies. The Hungarian citizens became filled with hope at the idea of a strong, Christian Hungary led by Orbán, but the European Union had already placed Orbán on their radar. However, Fidesz is not the only political party that relies on Christianity to strengthen its platform. A similar group that concerns the international community, and also uses Christianity in its platform is Jobbik.

2.3 JOBBIK HISTORY

Created in 2003, Jobbik is the third biggest party represented in Parliament. Jobbik can traces its origins back to the Hungarian Truth, Justice and Life Party created by right-wing journalist Istvan Csurka. The Truth, Justice and Life Party, also known as MIEP, was looking for a new form of government between socialism and capitalism that placed the preservation of the Hungarian race as the main objective (Bayer, 2009; 298). The Truth, Justice and Life Party is radical in its ideology but is not considered neo-fascist. However, the party “indiscriminately adopts ideas and usages from Nazi ideology… Csurka has referred to the Catharpin Basin as the ‘lebensraum’ of the Magyar people” (Bayer, 2009; 294). Due to its ideology, it would seem that this party would be a
minority group, but when they entered Parliament in 1998, they received much attention. Although there were blatant references to the Nazi regime, many political analysts argue the reason for the party's success was due to the fact that they addressed real social problems the country was facing, that no other party was discussing; the party also widely criticized the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as being agents of ‘interest slavery,’ and argued that it was not in the best interest of the Hungarian people to align with these groups (Bayer, 2009; 295). This attracted many followers in a time when the political future of Hungary was still uncertain. Since the preservation of the Magyar people was the main objective of the party, the preservation of Christianity and values seen as inherently Hungarian were also objectives of the party. Protecting Christianity attracted many middle-class followers who believed in the message the party portrayed. The Party also inspired many splinter groups to form, specifically Jobbik, which was created in 2003.

Jobbik has many of the same objectives as the Truth, Justice and Life Party where the preservation of the Magyar people and Christianity are paramount concerns. In order to gain more influence in Parliament, Jobbik began a partnership with the Truth, Justice and Life Party in 2006 to get all of their issues addressed and pull votes away from Fidesz, through which Orbán was running for reelection (Bayer, 2009; 296). The alliance did not work to Jobbik’s advantage, and Jobbik broke away after the election.

Gabor Vona leads the post-break Jobbik, and is still influenced by the vision of the Truth, Justice and Life Party. For example, Vona as well as Jobbik, “often expresses outrage against the new, unjust, neocapitalist system of the country, which brought about
impoverishment and social disparities and which is not regarded as homegrown Hungarian but an imposed order” (Bayer, 2009; 297). At this time, Hungary was already a member of the European Union and faced austerity measures from the European Commission. The Truth, Justice and Life Party inspired not only the anti-capitalist institutional movement, but the former party also heavily influenced Jobbik’s ideology in other areas as well. Just like Csurka used references to the Nazi regime, “Jobbik draws on ideological elements of traditional irredentist nationalism and has tacitly appropriated some ideas of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party of the prewar period, including its expression on social grievances” (Bayer, 2002; 297). One of the many criticisms against Jobbik is the installation of the paramilitary group, the Magyar Guarda.

The group wears uniforms that resemble the former Arrow Cross Party, uses the Arpad flag, and currently references the Arpad Kings, who were the first kings of Hungary who brought and enforced Christianity into the nation. The group has also been accused of wearing uniforms eerily similar to the uniforms of the Arrow Cross Militia, marching through Roma encampments, and terrorizing the citizens who live there. The target audience of Jobbik is middle class, Christian workers who are most prevalent in Western Hungary, which is more rural and subsequently has a high proportion of Roma communities. Despite the accusations against Jobbik, they are still prominent in Parliament and influence a large portion of society.

The last election in 2014, in which Fidesz came in third, surprised many political analysts. While Fidesz was expected to have a lead, the popularity of Jobbik rose. In fact, the majority of people who voted for Jobbik in the EU Parliamentary elections had
previously voted for Fidesz (Balough, 2009). The reason for this was surprising. The polling institute, Median determined that areas that had a Roma population over 5 percent increased their votes for Jobbik by twenty percent. Twenty-four percent of the people polled were first time voters who voted for Jobbik in this election. The high percentage of first-time voters reaffirms suspicions about the popularity of extreme right ideologies among the youth (Balough, 2009). This will be important when looking into the response to the refugee crisis.

Both Fidesz and Jobbik share the same target audience of middle class, Christian workers. The preservation of Hungarian culture and values is also of critical importance to both parties, and will be discussed at length later. It is important to keep in mind the key objectives of these parties when thinking of the refugee crisis in Hungary, and the subsequent governmental response and public perception.

Although the political climate in Hungary has been changing since the turn of the millennium, Hungary and the Fidesz government have been put in the international spotlight due to the response to and lack of support for the refugee crisis. As of August 2015, there has been physical conflict between the Hungarian government and the refugees attempting to enter the nation, and conflict between the Hungarian government and the leadership of the United Nations and European Union.

2.4 REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

In August 2015, an influx of refugees began flowing into Europe to escape the Syrian civil war that began in March 2011. As refugees were entering Hungary from the Southern borders, the Hungarian government was overwhelmed and shut down train
transportation, which left thousands of refugees stranded in a train depot in Budapest (UNHCR, 2015). Since Hungary would not allow the refugees onto the trains or to apply for asylum within the nation, many had no choice but to walk on foot from Budapest to Austria. After the first few waves of refugees were leaving on foot, the government started to provide buses to transport the refugees to Austria. The European Union was unsatisfied with Hungary shutting down train transportation, but the problem was getting worse. Since then, Hungary has placed fences along its southern borders with Serbia and Croatia. By creating a police patrolled fence, there was no way the refugees could enter Hungary, and would have to find alternate routes into Europe. However, tensions came to a head during the first week of September in the town of Roszke, on the border with Serbia. As the refugees tried to force their way past the fence, the Hungarian police forces shot tear gas and water cannons into the crowd, and injured twenty people, including police and children; a camera woman was also caught on film tripping a refugee family as they were running away from the riot (Al Hussein, 2015). The Hungarian government justified its actions by saying it was acting in matters of national security.

Fear of security inside Hungary as well as the European Union caused the Hungarian government to close its borders. The government fears that if they allow refugees, the way of life for Hungarian citizens will be threatened. The government, which is split between Lutheran and Roman Catholics, is concerned that allowing the predominantly Muslim refugees into the country, will not only threaten Christianity, but also jobs, healthcare, education, and daily life of Hungarian citizens (Novak, 2015). The
Hungarians have always been proud of their culture. They are proud of their Christian, monarchist roots, and want to preserve the homogeneity of Hungary as much as possible. By allowing immigrants into the country, many fear other cultural traditions will begin to overtake and morph Hungarian culture, until Hungarian culture no longer lasts.

Fear of the Other is a natural human reaction, and a group may project negative feelings of their group or fears onto the outside group further intensifying stereotypes (Volkan, 86). While that theory will be examined further, there is a fear of the refugees, and the government, in a desire to preserve their culture, is moving quickly into what other states accusingly call nationalism (Lendvai, 2012). Not allowing the refugees into Hungary can be seen as a nation security strategy compared to discrimination. However, there has also been discriminatory and xenophobic language used by the government. An example of this language is when the Fidesz government paid for four billboards to be placed around Budapest with slogans such as, “If you live in Hungary you must speak Hungarian” and, “If you come to Hungary, you should not take Hungarians’ jobs” (Nolan, 2015). This stunt has caused many to assert that the Fidesz government is trying to push public opinion in its favor so Hungary does not have to accept the refugees. This propaganda is concerning on many levels, because it affects Hungarian perception of the crisis. Both Fidesz and Jobbik, have expressed malignant nationalist goals and the desire to keep Hungarian culturally and ethnically Hungarian. If the leading parties are against the refugees, decisions could be made to mobilize the Hungarian citizens against the refugees as well.
The Hungarian government has also placed ads in newspapers throughout Lebanon and Jordan, urging asylum seekers stay away from Hungary. The ads are written in both English and Arabic and state, “Hungarians are hospitable, but the strongest possible action will be taken against those who attempt to enter Hungary illegally. The illegal crossing of the country’s border is punishable by imprisonment. Do not listen to people smugglers. Hungary will not allow illegal immigrants to cross its territory” (Onyanga-Omara, 2015). Refugees are fleeing a dangerous situation and therefore do not have time to fill out asylum forms, or wait to hear the government’s decision on the appeal. But the government demands that the refugees only enter the nation when they have filed the paperwork and received approval. This is unrealistic and has led to the European Commission filing a lawsuit against the government of Hungary.

The commission says that Hungary has broken European Union Asylum laws in three ways. The first supposed violation is, “Hungary is not automatically suspending decisions in case of appeals, forcing applicants to leave the territory before their appeal expires” (Novak, 2015). Other European Union member states acknowledge the extraordinary circumstances and waive the asylum application. They are allowing the refugees to settle and then fill out the documents. Hungary expects the refugees to fill the forms as soon as they enter the nation, but the refugees may not have the resources needed for the documents, and may be in need of critical health care before focusing on the form. The second supposed violation is, “the commission is concerned that the fast-paced criminal proceedings for illegal border crossings does not respect provisions on the right to interpretation and translation” (Novak, 2015). The courts are so overwhelmed
with the large number of people crossing the borders, that getting through
the cases quickly becomes a priority. The expedient process could lead to
unfair proceedings and ruling that could further traumatize the refugees,
so the commission is conducting an investigation. The last supposed
violation is, “Judicial decisions taken by court secretaries” (Novak,
2015). There is suspicion that the courts are so overwhelmed that
court secretaries, who have no judicial authority, make decisions on
whether to grant or deny asylum. The European commission is concerned
that Hungary is breezing over fundamental laws that could jeopardize
the democratic process of the union as a whole.

As shown above in the government billboard campaign, the government
is concerned not only of the motives of the refugees but also that they will
take the jobs of the citizens. The billboards also show that the
government does not think the refugees would assimilate into Hungarian
culture. The government could be using an issue that the public
is already concerned about the status of the economy, and use it to
mobilize the citizens against the refugees. There is an economic
benefit for immigrants, but Hungary is still resistant to allow them in,
despite the fact that all of Hungary’s neighbors have open
borders and accept the quota recommended by the European Union.
The threat of not having enough jobs has given the Hungarian
government the power to close borders. The actions taken by the
Hungarian government against the refugees has created international
condemnation by other member nations, as well as the United Nations.
Not only is membership in the European Union hard to acquire, but it
also grants economic assistance from other members. European Union
member states are also more attractive for tourism due to the seamless
flow between member borders and the universal currency,
the Euro, which most states use. In order to become a member of the European Union, a state must be able to bring in enough revenue to make it worthwhile for the Union.

Hungary is in a unique position. Budapest, is known as the “gem of Danube,” and is a major European tourist destination. Since tourism brings in almost a billion dollars a year, Hungary has stayed on its own currency, the Forint, as opposed to the traditional Euro, since the Forint is cheaper for tourists to convert (EU, 2015). European Union membership is beneficial to the other member states and Hungary but besides economic benefits, what are the values and obligations member states have?

The motto of the European Union is, “United in Diversity” (EU, 2015). They pride themselves on bringing together different cultures and melting them into an economic partnership. Due to the great economic status of the European Union, an annual budget is set for around 1 billion dollars to provide humanitarian assistance around the world, as well as working in major crisis areas (EU, 2015). Many member states argue that humanitarian assistance, to include welcoming refugees, is a moral obligation for member states. Others, such as Hungary, argue that because there is a humanitarian budget, and the Union does help in a humanitarian capacity, there should be no obligation to welcome refugees because the help has already been contributed through economic means. The question over whether the European Union means being involved in an economic partnership or a partnership of morals has been debated between members of the Union. Melinda Kovacs studied pamphlets sent out to Hungarian citizens before Hungary’s accession into the European Union. The pamphlets answered questions and concerns Hungarian citizens might have over what accession would mean. One such
pamphlet states, “Hungarian citizenship comes with rights and duties, but EU citizenship will bring only rights. There do not seem to be duties that would be attached to obtaining EU citizenship. In the discursive universe of this brochure, there are no costs to be weighed against the benefits of memberships. European Union citizenship is the good tout court, unmitigated, non-nuanced and simple” (Kovacs, 2015; 102). It is clear from this quotation, that Hungary has always seen European Union membership as strictly economic and with no other strings attached. Regardless of how Hungary views its responsibilities to the European Union, they are still a member and can vote against policies. With growing condemnation of the Hungarian government underway, the European Union held meetings with all Union members to discuss refugee quotas for each member nation; Hungary was one of the few nations to oppose the quotas (EU, 2015).

Hungary is dependent on the economic assistance of the European Union, and will not go so far as to be isolated from the union. There have been protests surrounding personal liberties, but there have not been many in response to the incident in Roszke. Is the majority of Hungary in support of these laws and the governmental response taken in Roszke? Has the international judgment that the current government leadership has pushed Hungary away from democracy increased the amount of nationalist feelings in Hungary, shown by support for extreme nationalist political movements?

Many of the justifications that Hungary makes for refusing refugees stems from Hungary’s history, and many historic figures and events shape the Hungarian discourse. In order to understand Hungarian culture, and politics, one has to understand the history
and the major events that have shaped the way the Hungarian politicians and people see Hungary, and what it means to be a Hungarian under the umbrella of the European Union. Orbán stated in an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* the following: “The crisis could destabilize Europe easily. It’s not difficult to imagine that one or two years from now, the old political elite will be replaced by the radicals… Muslim culture is very strong. We don’t oppose it, but we haven’t had those parallel societies that are not integrated into European values” (Fifield, 2015). In essence, Orbán is saying that there is no way to mesh the culture and religion of the refugees with the culture and religion of Hungary. This again reiterates the idea of protecting Hungarian culture and Christianity.

With Hungary getting so much criticism and the international community looking on with disgust, will the Hungarian citizens stand up to change the policies to conform to the European Union, or will they rally around Orbán and other nationalist leaders? Could the criticism from the international community push Hungary to place other nations and ideas into the ‘Other’ category and make tension present in the European Union worse? Currently, Hungary’s membership in the European Union is a mutually beneficial one. While Germany and other members can state their disappointment with Hungary’s decisions, it is unlikely anything serious will occur from Hungary’s policies against refugees. However, it is no secret that the European Union leadership has had a grievance with Viktor Orbán and if his party or Jobbik gains more power, the European Union could intervene. Since Hungary has always seen itself as protecting Europe from invasion and therefore seeing their membership into the European Union as an obligation, the condemnation and disappointment expressed by the European Union towards Hungary’s
policies regarding refugees has deeply cut the Hungarian leadership. Protecting Christian values and European borders is of the Hungarian discourse. By the European Union threatening that discourse, Hungarian citizens can either protest the current Fidesz leadership, or rally around the Orbán to protect the Hungarian identity. There have been examples in history, such as in Cuba, when international pressure to change policies has had an adverse effect for the international community, and the citizen’s strengthen support of their leader. Analyzing the Hungarian Constitution, the manifestos of Fidesz and Jobbik, as well as public opinion polls, I will seek to determine whether the feelings of insecurity in relation to the refugees are felt among various levels of society, and whether the feelings change based on political affiliation.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH

3.1. METHODOLOGY

To understand the international disapproval of Hungarian policies, I first needed to understand the political situation in Hungary, and how the government came to the decision to close borders. First, I needed to establish a timeline of the refugee crisis in Hungary, and locate incidents where there have been clashes between the state and the refugees. I will be using documents from July 2, 2015 through March 1, 2016. From those incidents, I will seek to find text from Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speeches in regards to the clashes at Roszke but also explanation for policies, and responses to international criticism. Once I gained background information to the conflict in Hungary, I then began searching for sources to collect data.

Data Collection

While doing my preliminary research, I discovered and read articles from English- written, Hungarian newspapers such as The Budapest Sentinel, The Budapest Beacon, and The Hungarian Spectrum. I used these newspapers to gather information about the current situation in Hungary, as well as having access to documents that have been translated. The reason for the selection of these newspapers is that they are all written or translated in English, publish articles every day, and comment and translate comments from the Prime Minister and other state sponsored documents. All of the
newspapers have reporters based on the ground for accurate, timely information. I also use articles from international sources such as BBC and Reuters to gain the international perspective of the Hungarian decision to close borders. Once I gained background information for the conflict, I began to choose articles to code from the above sources. All of the articles chosen had to meet certain criteria: must be in written in English, the story must be able to be cross checked with other news sources to reduce bias, and the articles published must be in reference to a statement made by the Hungarian government or political parties, so that I can cross check the article with the original statement.

Articles were chosen from these sources if they referenced conflicts in Hungary, such as Roszke, and the Keleti train station incidents, public protests, actions of the Hungarian government, and reactions of the international community to the Hungarian response. All of these topics are widely reported on, and therefore easy to be cross-checked among many sources to reduce bias. Once the newspaper articles were chosen, printed and stored, I then moved toward the governmental and political documents.

To understand the identity and law of Hungary, I found the Hungarian Constitution. Along with the Constitution, I also looked at the websites for Fidesz, and Jobbik. Using information based on the research of Yale professor, Melinda Kovács, I analyzed the accessibility and amount of information on each website that is provided in English. Specifically looking at the web pages titled, “Who We Are”, where the parties describe their moral and political aims, as well as disputing myths that have been portrayed about them. I was also looking for references of the incidents at Roszke, and the Keleti train station, both of which involved conflicts between the state and the
refugees. I then analyzed the content on the front page of the websites and looked for the amount of information available and how easily accessible that information was, which could explain the target audience that the parties want to reach. Since a major concern for the Hungarian government is taking care of Hungarians abroad, I looked at which parties tried to reach out to outside audiences to gather further support. Were the documents only accessible in Hungarian, or did the original source provide translations? Further, the amount of information available in other languages shows the attempt to garner support for non-Hungarians in other nations to promote interests. I also chose to code both party manifests, to understand the goals, objectives and stance of the parties, to understand their influence and position on the refugee crisis.

To analyze public opinion I found Hungarian polling websites, which asked citizens questions and determined their political affiliation. The two polling sites I have used are: Publicus.hu, and Median.hu, which are both independent contracting organizations that conduct polls on social issues. These sources were also the only polls conducted regarding the public perception of the refugee crisis. I used both polling sites with the expectation that there would be some political influence on each site. The polls are also conducted during different times. This has helped me determine a range of feeling and see the evolution of the public perception over a period of time. The polls were chosen because they are both independent organizations, asked questions about the perception of the refugee crisis, used random sampling and broke the research down based on the political affiliation of the participants.

Methods of Data Analysis
To bring all of the data together and find commonalities among the research, I conducted content analysis. Due to the government referencing the reasons for closing borders as: security, economics, Christianity and the fact that Hungarian identity has changed from the previous communist regime; I looked for the frequency of these four themes. When going through each document I sought to answer these main questions: who is the target audience, what is the message, why and with what effect? I looked not only for the number of times a theme occurred, but what language was used when discussing the theme, and who the article was trying to reach. I did not specifically look for how many times the word ‘security’ was mentioned but rather counted the number of times security matters were mentioned. This included words such as: defense, state of emergency, refugees and protection, including protection of interests. I tied in values with security because it became clear in my preliminary research that the protection of Hungarian culture and values was considered a matter of national security. When coding for values I included words such as: rights, responsibilities, protection of values for Hungarians abroad, and future ideals. Next, I looked for any mentions of Christianity. This included mentions of St. Stephen, morals, Christian teachings and faith. This became a prevalent theme through use of Orbán, and the restructuring of Hungarian identity. When coding for economics I included: mentions of European Union accession, living standards, and interests of businesses. Finally, I looked for any mention of the previous communist regime, which included mentions of transition, instability and corruption. For further explanation of the process and search terms see table 1.1. below. Once I broke down what I was going to search for in each document I began the process.
Counting the number of times a theme occurs in a document can help me infer on the reason, but the language used in regards to these themes can also give me an insight to the political feelings of the nation.

Table 1.1. Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Search Terms</th>
<th>Color used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security and Values</td>
<td>“rights”, “responsibilities”, “protection of Hungarians abroad”,</td>
<td>Pink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“preservation of culture”, “self-determination”, “freedom”,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“security”, “crisis”, “defense of borders”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>“European Union”, “economy”, “taxes”, “work”, “public services”, “assistance”</td>
<td>Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Regime</td>
<td>“1956 Revolution”, “foreign occupations”, “communist”</td>
<td>Orange</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to the small size of the data set, all of analysis was conducted manually. I printed out all of the documents and searched for one theme at a time, using a different color highlighter for each theme. I went through each document three times, to ensure I caught everything, and searched for the themes listed above. Once I finished coding and reread through the documents, I started counting how many times each theme was mentioned. I again went through the document three times to ensure I had counted correctly. When coding the public opinion polls, I also went through the documents and divided the answers among political affiliation which was provided in the polls. After the research was counted, I then started the discussion around why the themes were so prevalent in the documents and how it can explain the Hungarian decision to close borders and help explain the Hungarian public reaction to the refugee crisis.

**Objectivity and Validity**

The goal of the research project is to prove my assumptions, while acknowledging that the findings may disprove those assumptions. The objective of conducting this research project is to bring awareness to the changes that are occurring in Hungarian politics and how the dynamics could escalate into further conflict with refugees and
minorities later on. The refugee crisis is a very hot topic right now and there could very easily be contested feelings and judgements made not only about the refugees but also the Hungarian government. I expect these perceptions to be prevalent in the public opinion polls, as well as international perception of the situation. However, I have stayed away from articles directly biased against either the refugees or the Hungarian government, unless mentioned in the public opinion polls, public protests, or made in official statements by either the Hungarian government or international governments. Above anything else, I want this research paper to be useful for analyzing and mapping the conflict, not as a way to trigger any negative feelings or escalate the conflict in any way. Rather to explain the evolution and reasoning for the Hungarian government’s response to the crisis.

As a researcher, I must remain ethical. I have cited authors whom I have quoted or gotten ideas from. Maintaining ethics is also important if I want my research to be published and released to the public. To be held accountable for my work, I have made sure that I follow a strict scientific process that can prove my findings, regardless of whether it supports my assumptions, and is free of biases. Confidentiality and protection of participants is not an issue since I will not be conducting any interviews. At this point, all of the researchers whom I reference are of Hungarian descent who live outside Hungary, or are American and protected by international and diplomatic laws. The ideas referenced will not put any of the researchers at risk of retribution of the government. This research is meant for scholarly purposes and I will not write anything that causes harm.
To maintain trustworthiness in my research I ensure the presence of: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To ensure credibility of my research I have cross checked all information against other sources as well as thoroughly observing different aspects of the conflict without biases. Observing different aspects of the conflict will also help me ensure that the theories and findings that come out of my research can be applied to other conflicts, where the same conditions are present. In order to make my research valid, the findings must be able to be replicated. Clearly stating the factors that are found in the conflict and how they relate to my findings will also help ensure the presence of dependability and confirmability. By using content analysis, I will have a scientific process to filter through the research and therefore limit biases, as well as giving proof of my findings. I went over my analysis three times but my work will also be audited by my thesis committee to ensure there is no mention of bias, or findings that were not proven through scientific research.

The point of this research project is to use content analysis to determine public reaction to the refugee crisis in Hungary. I have entered into the project with assumptions of what I will find, but also understand that my findings can disprove my assumptions. Following a strict scientific process, I have tried to eliminate biases in my research by publishing the result of my findings as they are, even if they do not match my assumptions. To make sure my work will not create harm to anyone, and the findings can be replicated and accepted, I have ensured the presence of objectivity, ethics and trustworthiness in the project. This situation is changing every day and as a result, there
are new reports and developments every day. At some point I had to end my research and as a result my latest research result was from March 2016.

3.2 THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW: HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION

Table 1.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Times Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Regime</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the humiliation that occurred during the term of Gyurcsány and the reminders of the communist past, Orbán rewrote the Constitution in 2011 during his second term as Prime Minister. Since Hungary was previously occupied, whether by empires or invading forces, there has never been a Hungarian constitution that has been written when the nation was truly free. The main purpose of Orbán’s constitution was to denounce the previous communist regime, and declare Hungary as an independent and free nation. The Fundamental Law of Hungary was created to explain the workings of the states, definitions of threats and security, and values that the Hungarian people hold dear.
In order to understand those values, as well as how the Hungarian Constitution defines security and threats to security, I used content analysis to code the Constitution.

Of the fifty-seven pages, there are seventy-three mentions of Christianity and morals, including the right to life at conception and mentions of St. Stephen. The law states, “We are proud that our king St. Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago” (Kormany, 2011). From the beginning of the document, Christianity and family values are mentioned, and are prevalent throughout the document.

There were also thirty-one references to the previous communist regime. This makes sense, due to the fact that Fidesz gained strength and Orbán rose to popularity and as a student standing up against the communist regime. The main focus in the Constitution are economics, Hungarian accession to the European Union, and security and values that would strengthen the nation. Economics were mentioned one hundred and sixty-nine times with job creation, job training, and the strengthening of the European economy being referenced the most. Security and value-related issues were mentioned four hundred and eleven times throughout the document. Issues such as protection of culture and language, protection of Hungarian citizens living across borders, discreetly insinuating conditions of future generations by making prudent use of material, intellectual, a natural Trianon, meaning getting Hungary back to the pre-Trianon state, and internal security as well as security of European borders were most often referenced. The document states, “We commit to promoting and safeguarding our heritage, our unique language, Hungarian culture…. We bear responsibility for our descendants;
therefore we shall protect the living resources” (Kormany, 2011). This is extremely important to link to what is happening in Hungary currently.

The Hungarian Constitution shows that Hungary is struggling with having its own independent identity for the first time in its history. The document blatantly denounces the former regime, and strongly tries to separate the current government from the government of the past. The document also makes it known that Christianity and the values and morals that come along with the religion, are very important to Hungary. While the document does not have any derogatory language, references to ‘gypsy’ or anti-Semitism, it does frame the main values of the nation, which Fidesz and Jobbik reference.

3.3 FIDESZ MANIFESTO

Table 1.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Times Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Regime</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Fidesz Manifesto was written in 2007, which was when the MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) was in office with Ferenc Gyurcsány as the Prime Minister. Fidesz hoped to regain power in the new election, which is why this manifesto was written. The manifesto was found on the homepage of the Fidesz party, fidesz.hu, and lays out the goals of the party. The document is very long with forty-six pages of content, clearly labeled in sections. Out of forty-eight pages, references to the previous communist regime occurred ten times. References to Christianity and morals were found forty-one times. The most prevalent themes found in the manifesto were security and the strengthening the economy.

Security and the preservation of values were mentioned two hundred and forty-two times. The manifesto states, “In terms of national security, Hungary is not a bridge between West and East, but a strong bridgehead of the West” (Fidesz, 2007). The term *bridgehead* is interesting because the definition of a bridgehead is a strategic position held in enemy territory (Merriam-Webster, 2016). If this is the case, then Hungary sees itself as being one of the most eastern states to be considered European, which is not the case today. Considering Hungary’s history however, this discourse makes sense. The party is also concerned with the welfare and cultural integrity of Hungarians living across borders. While not specifically stated, the reference to Hungarians across borders is more than just expatriates, but rather a reminder of the Trianon Treaty, in which there is still a historical grievance. The party is also concerned about citizens feeling safe. The document also states, “In order for Hungary to stand on her own feet, the country must be turned into a safe place; the conditions of a fear-free life must be guaranteed” (Fidesz,
2007). While this seems idealistic, it is relevant to what is currently happening in Hungary. To ensure a fear-free life, Fidesz proposed to increase the training and budget for police forces, and increase the budget for welfare programs to take care of the elderly, youth, and minority groups (Fidesz, 2007). The document also talks heavily about strengthening the police and military forces for protection of national interests. The most referenced and important issue for Fidesz is the strengthening of the economy.

Economy was mentioned four hundred and forty-one times, with most of the references made about the accession into the European Union, strengthening the economic partnerships across Europe, and job creation. The document states, “The aims of Fidesz economic policies are to increase welfare and security, strengthen competitiveness, greatly reduce unemployment, restore the credibility of economic management, and generate economic growth that exceeds the regional average rate of growth” (Fidesz, 2007). At the time this document was written, Hungary had already been accepted into the European Union, but there were still many internal issues that needed to be resolved before Hungary could start fulfilling its responsibilities to the European Union, such as sending a defense force for peacekeeping or other missions. To fulfill the economic goals, Fidesz proposed the Szechenyi Plan, which has four components. They are: “cutting taxes and contributions payable by employers, developing the infrastructure; supporting small and medium enterprises; and introducing programs that directly create new jobs and expand employment” (Fidesz, 2007). The enforcement of the Szechenyi Plan was hoped to strengthen the economy enough, that
Hungary could have a smooth transition to the Euro. However, nine years have passed since this document has been written, and Hungary is still not on the Euro.

The Fidesz Manifesto clearly highlights the goals of the party, and for the most part the party has been successful in the implementation of these goals. Hungary still has a lot of internal economic issues to resolve before being an influential player in the European Union. Hungary is still a relatively new nation and the fears of security, including the fear of unemployment or inaccessibility of jobs, are very real. Fidesz portrays itself as a revolutionary party that was created by fighting against the previous communist regime, and therefore not only fights for the common people, but for Hungary as a whole. The plans and goals laid out in this manifesto were successful in getting Viktor Orbán back into power for his second term as Prime Minister in 2010.

### 3.4 JOBBIK SUMMARY AND MANIFESTO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Manifesto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist Regime</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There were two documents that I coded from Jobbik. The first was entitled, *A Short summary of Jobbik*, which details the party platform as well as attempting to dispute criticisms about the party; the most common criticism is its alleged ties to the Arrow Cross movement. It was easy to find the critiques of Jobbik, so I wanted to read from the source what the purpose and objectives of the party are. The summary, which was pulled from the Jobbik website, jobbik.hu, is very short at only seven paragraphs. Christianity and morals were mentioned once, as they consider themselves to be a Christian party. There were also two references to the former communist regime. Jobbik wants to set itself apart from the former regime, which is seen to only benefit the elite and corrupt. Instead, Jobbik wants to fight for the middle class, which is why the issue surrounding strengthening the economy was a major theme in the document, occurring eighteen times. The most referenced theme was security and protecting Hungarian values, specifically protecting the public from, ‘gypsy crimes’ (Jobbik, 2006). References to security occurred thirty-seven times. This is interesting considering one of the biggest criticisms against Jobbik is that they are racist towards the ‘gypsy’ community and many have alleged that the party sent out their paramilitary group, the Magyar Guarda, into ‘gypsy’ communities to terrorize the people. If Jobbik wanted to refute these claims, they had their chance in this document. Instead, they used language that is seen as offensive; the term ‘gypsy’ is a pejorative term for Roma, which is a term Fidesz uses, and inferred that all ‘gypsies’ are criminals that need to be reprimanded and assimilated into society. Not only does the language not refute the criticisms, it confirms the allegations against
the party, and illustrates the party’s priorities. The language was harsh in this summary of
the party, but I also coded the party Manifesto to determine and analyze the rhetoric and
if there were any differences.

The body of the Jobbik Manifesto is longer than its summary, but still a very short
document with only eleven paragraphs. The same themes of Christianity, security,
economics, and the former communist regime were present in this document. Christianity
and morals were mentioned twenty-seven times. References to the former communist
regime occurred nine times. Concerns over the economy—specifically the rejection of
Hungary’s accession into the European Union—and job creation, occurred twenty-five
times. Jobbik is completely against Hungary’s membership in the European Union and
states, “We cannot accept such a membership in a union that brings about a fatal
mutilation of our national sovereignty” (Jobbik, 2003). For members of Jobbik, the
European Union resembles an invading force that is imposing its views and policies on
the people of Hungary, and eliminating the Hungarian culture by immersing it into
globalization. The idea that people do not have a say about their economy strikes home
particularly with the middle class, and the farmers who feel they are underrepresented in
Parliament.

The biggest priority for Jobbik is state security and protection of values, which
was mentioned fifty times. This document was not as blatant about the ‘gypsies’ as the
summary, but a different tactic was used. The Manifesto states, “We cannot accept a
public discourse that sweeps under the carpet or veils by pseudo-debates such strategic
national issues such as population decline, the situation of the Gypsy community….as
well as the tragic conditions of our environment. We cannot accept laws that guarantee more and more legal security for criminals and provide less and less protection for honest citizens” (Jobbik, 2003). Instead of mentioning ways in which to help the ‘gypsy’ community, the document lumps the community into a national security issue that they feel is not being adequately dealt with.

The document was also divided among subtitles, with a different priority for each. The first headline states, “Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary aims to complete the change of the political system and create a more just society than the current one” (Jobbik, 2003). Jobbik aims to speak for the people and make things better for the middle class. The second headline states, “Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary is a value-centered conservative, patriotic Christian party with radical methodology” (Jobbik, 2003). This single sentence tells the reader everything they need to know about the party through the words chosen to describe the party and the methods it chooses to use. They use Christianity as an excuse to use radical, and sometimes violent measures to achieve their goals. The last headline states, “Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary wishes to represent the entire nation” (Jobbik, 2003). Jobbik believes it knows what the common people want, and will work to be a voice for the middle class.

As stated in the document, Jobbik has a radical view for the future of the country including the use of any force necessary to protect the nation, and ensuring the cultural integrity and Christian value system stay strong. Since Jobbik was created in 2003 and has been gaining popularity every year since, Jobbik is currently the third largest party in
Parliament. Although there are no figures to show membership rates, the refugee crisis has pushed more Hungarians towards the ideology of Jobbik (Median, 2015).

It should be mentioned that of the top three political parties in Parliament, only Jobbik has a website in English that is easily accessible. While this could speak to wanting to preserve the culture, it could also show that the other parties want to distance themselves from outside powers. It can also be argued that Jobbik has its website in English to garner more support and try to refute the many criticisms against them. There is a page on their website entitled, ‘Commonly Refuted Lies’, which acknowledges that they face criticism from outside entities. Jobbik could be arguing that they are merely fighting for the interests of the Hungarians and other nations do not understand. Jobbik describes itself as a grassroots organization made up entirely of Hungarians, and this would support the argument of knowing what the Hungarian people want.

3.5 INTRODUCTION TO POLLS

I relied on the website, Hungarian Spectrum, which is an English-language website dedicated to the analysis of news in Hungary. The website is edited by Eva S. Balough, who is a former professor of Eastern European history at Yale University. The website is archived at the United States Library of Congress (HS, 2015). I used this resource to keep up on what was happening in Hungary, but also as a source to help interpret and translate the public opinion polls and surveys. The website has links to the original polls, so it was easy to translate the original to determine if the website was correct.
Before interpreting the public opinion polls and surveys, I first had to understand the agendas of the two main political parties that are pushing policies against the refugees: Fidesz and Jobbik. I went to both party websites and found their manifestos, and their main party objectives. Using content analysis, I coded both manifestos looking for themes such as: security, economy, and Christianity. Both parties are considered right wing, and target the middle class. To determine the reasoning behind the decisions made, I first needed to understand what the motives and target audience of the parties were. The refugee crisis is ongoing, but came to a head in Hungary in September 2015. As a result, the information is still new, and the public is still determining how they feel about the ordeal. Either because the conflict is too fresh, or because the government is focused on other issues, I could only find two public opinion polls that referenced the crisis. Publicus conducted one poll, the Median Institute conducted the other. Both entities are public, independent research organizations that consult on matters of public service and government.

3.6 PUBLICUS SURVEY

In a survey conducted over telephone, by Publicus Research between September 10 and September 14 2015, 1000 Hungarians aged 18 and up were polled on their opinions about the government’s handling of the refugee crisis. The results were representative of Hungarians by age, gender, education, region and types of settlements, showing the diversity of the participant group. Any sampling error has been weighed against the relevant data of the 2001 Hungarian Statistical Office census. The margin of error is +/-3.1 percent (Publicus, 2015). This margin error means that the organization has
about 95 percent confidence that if they were to conduct the survey again, they would get the same results. There were five questions asked, see appendix 1. The first question was, “Do you think the fence that is being built along the Serbian-Hungarian border is suitable for stopping refugees?” (Publicus, 2015) The first group, which was polled in July, showed that 46 percent of the respondents thought that it was not at all suitable, and that percentage rose by ten percent when respondents were asked in September (Publicus, 2015). As the crisis was escalating, the poll found the people were disillusioned with the fence, but still thought there needed to be a deterrent. The second question asked was, “If it had been up to you, would you have built a wall between Serbia and Hungary?” (Publicus, 2015). The results were similar to the first question. Thirty-four percent of the respondents in the July poll answered that they would not build the wall, whereas forty percent of the respondents decided the wall should not be built when asked in September. (Publicus, 2015). The third question does not ask about a proposed wall, but instead asks about Hungary’s reputation abroad. It asks, “Do you think Hungary’s international standing has deteriorated or improved as a result of the government’s handling of the refugee crisis?” (Publicus, 2015). The polls showed that sixty-six percent of respondents thought Hungary’s international reputation had somewhat deteriorated. This question also breaks down the results along party lines. The poll found that, “Fifty-eight percent of participants affiliated with Fidesz agreed that Hungary’s reputation has decreased, seventy-eight percent of participants affiliated with MZSP agreed, and sixty-five percent of participants affiliated with Jobbik agreed with this statement” (Publicus, 2015). It is clear that across party lines, even if the belief that the government’s actions were
justified, all major parties agree that the international community has condemned Hungary’s actions. The next question consisted of a series of questions in which the participants had to rate whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements. The results found that, “sixty-four percent of participants agreed that Hungary is obligated to help the refugees, fifty-two percent agreed that refugees should be treated humanely, thirty-seven percent of participants agreed that Hungary should allow a certain number of refugees within the state's capabilities, as opposed to fifty-five percent of participants who disagreed with the question. Eighty-seven percent of participants agreed that Europe will not be able to handle the influx of refugees. The last question was very close with forty-two percent of participants agreeing that Hungary should defend its borders from refugees with any means necessary including weapons, whereas fifty-two percent disagreed” (Publicus, 2015). This question showed that the demonization of refugees has not reached its climax in Hungary. The refugees are still seen as people who deserve to be treated humanely, but many Hungarians do not want to cohabitate or allow them into the country. The last question asked the participants to rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest grade, how the government handled the refugee crisis. The government was given an average grade of 3 (Publicus, 2015). The poll then analyzed those responses based on party preference. The poll found that participants affiliated with Fidesz scored the government’s response as higher than average at 3.8, whereas participants affiliated with MSZP and Jobbik scored the government as below average at 2.3 and 2.8 respectively. There was also a portion of participants who were unaffiliated with a certain political group, and rated the government at a 2.7 (Publicus, 2015). It is not surprising
that those affiliated with Fidesz viewed the government’s actions higher than the general population. The government is predominantly Fidesz, and to be a member of the party and admit that the government could have made changes would be embarrassing because the admission would suggest weakness within the party. It is a form of self-preservation of the party to overcompensate their successes, knowing the public would give a low score.

This was a very insightful poll that gave unique data on Hungarian perception towards the crisis. The poll showed that while Hungarians do not necessarily agree with the way the government handled the crisis, the acts and reasons behind it were justified. I also appreciated that the poll broke down the results into party affiliations, so it can be easier to explain the results based on the political agendas of the parties.

3.7 MEDIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Conducted by the Median Institute for Public Opinion, two opinion polls, which were completed via personal interviews, were taken to determine the extent people felt safe or threatened about the refugees. The first survey was conducted on September 10, 2015 and had 100 randomly selected participants. The second occurred on September 15, 2015 and had 1200 adult participants. With the data from both surveys combined, the sampling error is ±3 percent, with the Institute predicting a slightly higher than 95 percent degree of accuracy if the survey were to be conducted again. Similar to the Publicus survey, this survey was also weighed against a recent state census to confirm the diversity in age, gender, socioeconomic status, and educational level for all participants. (Median, 2015). Another survey was taken in November with the same demographics,
statistics, and questions to determine whether attitudes have changed. The survey and website were completely in Hungarian, and I rely on the translation from Hungarian Spectrum.

There were seventeen questions asked in this survey. The survey also took into account the participants political party affiliation, to give accurate data as to what the parties are trying to portray to their constituents, see appendix 2. The results are divided between the answers given in September and the answers given in December. The findings revealed that Hungarians have an increased aversion not only to immigrants, but also blacks, while the rates of anti-Semitism and homophobia have slightly decreased (Balough, 2015). The poll asked questions surrounding public attitudes towards the refugees and whether there is fear, and questions on the origins and reasoning behind the refugee crisis. When asked if the acceptance of refugees should be restricted, the responses rose from, “seventy-nine percent in September to eighty percent of respondents in November favoring the further restriction of refugees; the number of people who would restrict the number of ‘colored people’ from Africa has also risen from fifty-seven percent in September to sixty percent in November as a pose to forty-seven percent the previous year” (Balough, 2015). Certain answers were broken down by the responders’ political party affiliation. The polls showed that regardless of party lines, fear was prevalent and, “twenty-three percent of responders named terrorism as a bigger fear than illness, crime or poverty” (Balough, 2015). Acknowledging that security is a main threat for the responders, the poll then asked the respondents whether they agreed with the statement that the refugees are more aggressive and demanding than in September.
The results had increased since September with “eighty-three percent of respondents who are affiliated with Jobbik, sixty-eight percent affiliated with Fidesz, and sixty-five percent of undecided voters agreed with the statement” (Balough, 2015). This poll was taken shortly after the Paris terror attack, and questions were asked in reference to that attack. One question gave the respondents two scenarios, and they had to determine which they thought was true. The two scenarios were: “It is most likely the case that the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks came from the refugees arriving in Europe” and “One cannot claim this, there is no proof” (Balough, 2015). The results are unsettling. Fifty-six percent agreed with the first statement, forty percent with the second, and shockingly forty-six percent agreed with a statement made by Orbán that, “regardless of what anyone says, all terrorists are migrants” (Balough, 2015). Although the number of participants is small considering the size of the country, the results to this question are still disappointing and shocking. Other questions were asked about security to the nation in which the respondents had to answer on a scale of zero to one hundred, one hundred being the most accurate. The questions and corresponding results are: “seventy-seven percent agree that immigrants pose a health risk for the native population, seventy-seven percent agree that immigrants pose a risk for terrorist attacks, and fifty-six percent agree that Muslims will be the majority in Europe and force their religion in culture with the highest respondents coming from Jobbik, seventy-eight percent, and Fidesz, sixty-four percent” (Balough, 2015). Building of border fences was also a popular topic during the survey. The most shocking result of this poll—and proof of government propaganda at work—was the respondent’s perception of the origins of the refugee crisis. The survey provided
three reasons for the crisis, and the respondents chose the one they thought was most accurate. The prompts are: “Terror of the Islamic State and the civil war, growing poverty and hunger and lastly, certain unnamed outside moving forces are being the mass migration; with thirty-seven percent choosing prompt one and thirty-seven percent choosing option three” (Balough, 2015). Considering the amount who chose prompt three was higher than expected, more questions were asked to determine who the respondents think the outside moving forces are. There are a number of conspiracy theories mentioned to be outside forces, but many analysts such as Harvard professor Eva Balough think that a new Fidesz owned editorial with anti-American rhetoric is to blame for most of these theories (Balough, 2015). Regardless of how the respondents heard of the conspiracy theories, it is still an extremely high number of people who actually believe them.

The poll showed that anti-immigrant feelings have increased just in the time period between September and November 2015. The poll also showed that respondents with lower socioeconomic status and less education were found to vote against immigration, and “forty-three percent higher than respondents with higher socioeconomic status; only thirteen percent of university graduates reject immigration” (Balough, 2015). This should be no surprise considering the vast amount of literature on the relevance of socioeconomic status and voting trends. However, this is still a concern since there are sections of Hungary that have disproportionately lower levels of socioeconomic status, where this ideology has the potential to spread rapidly. The numbers also show that while most of the anti-immigrant rhetoric was in this demographic, the feelings, while not as
severe, are still felt among all levels of Hungarian society. The longer this crisis goes on, the more entrenched these xenophobic ideologies will become across society
CHAPTER FOUR: SIGNIFICANCE AND DISCUSSION

The phenomena happening is Hungary is chronic and complex. The government of Hungary is acting in one way, while the international community is reacting in other ways. The Hungarian government has made statements justifying their actions of closing borders and the public opinion polls have proven that the rhetoric and justifications used are widely accepted by the Hungarian public. There are three lenses through which to look at this conflict and understand the reason for the support of Orbán’s policies, as shown through the research: Identity, Religious and Economic. Each lens will be examined at length and discussed for further comprehension of the research results.

4.1 IDENTITY LENS

Identity, and what it means to be Hungarian, is a useful lens to look at this conflict. The world was shocked to see how Hungary handled the influx of refugees. Not only were there instances of targeted discrimination, and police brutality, but there was a lack of official consequence for a camera woman who was filmed purposely tripping a refugee family. As most of the other European Union member states were opening their borders and welcoming refugees, Hungary was staying firm in its decision to close its borders. Hungary is under enormous pressure. Hungary is still trying to determine its identity. While there is a unique Hungarian culture, the past two decades have been the first time that Hungary has been independent and powerful in its own right. Orbán came
to power by standing up against the former regime, acting as a voice for the people, and has argued that he has continued doing so in response to the crisis. There is a sense of fear of the refugees across Hungary—though some of that fear is being created by Fidesz and Jobbik—but there is a majority of the population who fear what could happen if the migrants were to assimilate. Orbán is positioning himself as a protector of his people, and his country from undue fear. This move has made Hungary face criticism from the European Union as well as the United Nations, and nations such as the United States, not only for not allowing refugees into the nation, but also for the police brutality that occurred when the refugees were trying to seek entry. Orbán’s actions, as well as the Fidesz slogan, shows that the Hungarians will not back down from what they believe is right, even if it against popular international opinion. Orbán’s track record with the European Commission speaks to that. To add to the theories of identity that were explained in chapter one: the Four C model, collective axiology, the security dilemma and threat narratives will be discussed at length to discover the identity argument for Hungary’s justification to close borders.

The Four C model is very applicable to this conflict. The four components of the 4C model are: comparison, competition, confrontation and counteraction. The first component is comparison which states, “We-They perception and favorable group comparison” (Korostelina, 147). At this stage, one group will start noticing the differences among the groups, and favor their group. For the Hungarian conflict, there is a clear division between Hungarians and refugees. Hungarians have a common history, culture and religion that does not match the experience of the refugees and therefore,
solidifies the differentiation between groups. The second stage is competition. In which, “instrumental conflicts of interest among counterpoised interactive communities” (Korostelina, 147). As the threat of the out group increases, the more competition there will be. As the government billboards have shown, there is a fear that the refugees will steal the jobs of the Hungarians, resulting in a completion over jobs as well as resources of the state. This competition becomes even more apparent when there is a shortage of resources to begin with. If there are not enough resources for the in group, the out-group even asking for the resources will result in tension. The more the groups interact, the more competition there will be that could lead to conflict. The third stage is confrontation where, “the ideologization of social identities; transformation of conflicts of interest into moral confrontations between the virtuous Us and the demonized Other” (Korostelina, 147).

The differences between the groups have become clear and the competition over resources has become too great to ignore. This can be shown in Hungary by the increase in extremist movements and ideologies. For years, there have been neo-Nazi and pro-Jobbik marches through the town of Székesfehérvár, to commemorate a remarkable victory of Nazi Germany forces against the Soviets. Székesfehérvár is significant because it is the town where St. Stephen received his coronation and was later buried in the same church, which still stands, and is the most important landmark of the city. (Balough, Feb 8, 2016). The latest of such marches occurred on February 6, 2015. This year, representatives from Jobbik failed to show but the march was not lacking in participants; instead, it was kicked off with a speech from a former Waffen SS guard who ended with, “Glory to Waffen SS!”, “Glory to Szalasi!” (Balough, Feb 8, 2015). While this march is
disturbing within itself, it is more disturbing that people showed up, and were active participants without Jobbik’s presence. This shows that even if it is a small proportion of society, the ideology of Jobbik and xenophobic, racist ideas are spreading rapidly. The refugees and non-Hungarians are seen as outsiders, and some groups in society have been vocal about their disdain for allowing refugees into society. In this example, the extremist groups cite Hungarian Christianity and the prototype of St. Stephen to further differentiate from others. This ideology and perceived moral obligation to protect the nation leads to the last stage of counteraction, where, “discrimination, violence and genocide” are applied (Korostelina, 147). Unable to ignore the differences among groups and the competition, a conflict will escalate. The conflicts at Keleti train station, Roszke as well as the closing of borders can be explained by this counteraction phase. It has become clear that the refugees are a part of the out-group and seen as unable to assimilate into Hungarian culture. Once placed as an outsider, the idea of aid or giving of resources that could be used for the in-group is seen as unreasonable by the population. To preserve what resources they have, the state decided to not allow any refugees in to prevent further conflict, or use of resources. This stage can also explain why there was not much domestic uproar and consequence for the Hungarian camerawomen filmed tripping a refugee family. The perception in society is that the family was trying to breach Hungarian borders, which caused a threat to the locals there and should have been stopped. There has also been a rhetoric around the dehumanization of refugees not only in Hungary but throughout Europe. In Hungary, the government has placed ads in many international newspapers telling refugees not to bother coming to Hungary, as they are
unwanted. This rhetoric is escalating across Europe especially in Germany and Denmark where refugees are being portrayed as violent predators. However, this narrative can also prove negative for some Hungarian citizens. Orbán’s image of a leader, and portrayal of refugees as the enemy may marginalize others as “those in opposition are not just against the government and its program but potentially against the people” (Élő, 229). The research groups were chosen randomly, with the research group ensuring diversity in the groups. While the research groups showed increased support for Orbán, there is no way to tell if that was really the belief of the participants or if they were afraid of backlash for having an unpopular opinion. Even though the research group does not show it, there could be a larger group of citizens who are against Orbán and Fidesz policies, but for a variety of reasons were unable to express those views. This could also lead to citizens who perpetuate the xenophobic ideas to stay within the status quo. Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde explains, “The main risk of internalizing racist and extremist elements in the mainstream political discourse, and media is apparently not in a permanent shift of voters toward the extreme right but in citizens feeling increasingly encouraged to formulate racist opinions” (Mudde and Bernath, 2005; 81). This is a concern, as the crisis sustains and the numbers grow larger, the stronger the xenophobic rhetoric becomes. The strengthening of xenophobic rhetoric which will put the population who is not perpetuating the rhetoric now at risk. The risk of speaking out against the general consensus of the in-group will place a person outside of the group, and create tension. The theory of collective axiology also provides insights into the last stage of the 4 C model.
The system of values, and morals which guide how a group creates relationships within the group as well as outside groups can be defined as collective axiology. There are three main forms of collective axiology: mythic narratives, sacred icons, and normative orders (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2006; 37). Mythic narratives are defined as, “Stories of the threatening other gain potency through dissemination of shocking images, harrowing anecdotes, and accounts of violence. Over time, such stories solidify perceptions of the Other through seemingly fixed negatives that are grounded presumably, in a common place of origin, a shared ancestry, or common flaws” (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2006; 37).

There are certain traits that are required to be in the in-group in Hungarian society, as established by the theory of national identity. St. Stephen has been established as a positive prototype for Hungarians, as a strong Christian leader. Meanwhile, the refugees are being caught up in Hungary’s historical grievance and are being likened to an invasion force. As stated earlier, the past two decades have been the first time in Hungary’s history that has been completely independent and free from outside influence or control. Since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1000 B.C., there have always been battles of control over the nation. It does not help that the Battle of Mohacs, a devastating loss for the Hungarians was won by Ottoman Empire, which practiced Islam. The fact that the refugees are coming from areas that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, are predominately Muslim, and are coming en masse leads to the fear of invasion, and fear that the refugees will try to take control of Hungary. Once this fear becomes popularized by the governmental propaganda campaigns, by use of billboards and statements, the negative images and perception of the refugees becomes more ingrained and leads to the next stage of iconic order.
Iconic order is described as,

“Emerging from specific storylines about localized episodes, icons function as the graphic expressions of negativities. A particular episode, event, action, or encounter is privileged, venerated, and almost sanctified in this transition in the minds of the faithful. Certain impressions produce demonic images, adding to the religious significance of profane episodes. Viewed through such images, a stranger’s action function as prototypes of their unjust, immoral, uncivilized, or possibly inhuman character” (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2006; 37-38).

Images of refugees attempting to push through barricades at Roszke, helped fuel anti-refugee sentiments further cementing the idea of the refugees being an invasion force attempting to conquer Hungary. From this incident the refugees could be likened to animals and criminals, and combined into a common group. The confrontation between the refugees and Hungarian police helped the government propel the anti-refugee rhetoric because it was a mob scene, and the refugees were seen as aggressive, and irrational. From the governmental point of view, refugees are allowed in if they follow the procedures for applying for asylum and get accepted before entering the nation. The refugees trying to force their way through the border is seen as irrational. From this, it became easy for the Hungarian citizens to lump all of the refugees into one group. After this incident, there were no longer good refugees versus bad refugees, instead, the rhetoric turned against all refugees. This leads to the next stage of normative order.

Normative order creates a binary world. To expand,

“To accept who we are it becomes necessary to define who we are not, that is, ‘who are the others’. Such divisions are often contested and emotionally-charged. This duality of in-group/outgroup identities develops value judgements about how the world should be organized” (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2006; 40).
The demonization of refugees, the images of illegally crossing borders, government made connections of refugees to terrorism and others all help further the divide between the Hungarian citizens and the plight of the refugees. Hungarians separate themselves because they have a value set, and morals due to their Christian identity. They are also a part of the European Union, which gives the perception of being more civilized. The differences in religion between the Hungarians, (Christianity) and the majority of the refugees (Islam) also further the divide. There is a misconceived perception about the tenets of Islam, and the constant references to terrorism further the demonization of the refugees. Collective axiology can explain how the refugees are perceived as threatening, and demonization of all refugees became common in society. It is much easier for people to follow the status quo and stay within their group, where they have security among their group. However, the world is interconnected and interaction will occur in some way leading to more conflict.

The security dilemma is defined as, “people, knowing they require the assistance of other people in order to survive, are faced with a dilemma because they know there is a possibility of being killed by these same people; therefore, they must choose social interaction to survive even in the face of potential threat to their lives” (Herz,1950). This theory has been analyzed by a variety of theorists and reinterpreted. People naturally form groups, and this theory proposes that there are two groups, an in group and an out group. Either party can be the one who is in need of the assistance of the other party for survival. However, that assistance could turn into resentment and create conflicts among the in groups as well. To further expand on this theory Korostelina states:
“In situations based on a lack of information, in group members tend to use their beliefs and stereotypes as a basis for forecasting outgroup behavior. These beliefs can be formed through historical experience, and include chosen traumas and glories. These beliefs can also be the result of favorable comparisons, prejudice, and attribution errors, where outgroups are perceived as cunning, artful, cruel, mean and aggressive” (Korostelina, 142).

If the Hungarians are expecting the refugees to be violent and take jobs, and validate the stereotypes, then it makes sense that they are going to be denied entry. The Median Poll determined a section of society who view all refugees as terrorists, or were planted by the United States and Israel to destabilize Europe (Median, 2015). The conspiracy theory is far-fetched but a large section of society, seventy-seven percent of participants asked in September, agreed that refugees pose a health risk to the native population (Median, 2015). If the public is perceiving the refugees as a security, and biological threat, it is much easier to get people to mobilize against them. Fear is the biggest factor for these policies, but it is the fear of eliminating the in-group, Hungarians, and eliminating the culture, language and religion that makes society fight back. Once values and identity are threatened, it becomes easy to create a binary world where a person is either good or bad, and policies will be established that can be seen as discrimination, but is perceived by the public as just being a matter of security. The security dilemma ties in with threat narratives. Threats can be used to reinforce stereotypes or represent a threatening action by the Other group (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2006; 7). In this case, the government billboard campaigns, portraying the threat of refugees stealing jobs, and the continual comparisons between refugees and terrorism by Orbán reinforce the threat narrative surrounding the admittance of refugees.
Theories of identity are useful to analyzing the Hungarian response to the refugee crisis, as well as explaining the mass support for the anti-refugee policies. Hungary has faced intense international criticism for the ways it handled the refugee crisis, but after researching the Fidesz platform, as well as analyzing Orbán himself, Hungary’s decision should not have been a surprise to anyone in the European Union. What is surprising is that while the majority of people surveyed agreed that the government could have treated the refugees more humanely, they support the government’s decision to refuse refugees, and do not want to cohabitate with the refugees. This can be explained through analysis of identity theories of conflict. It has been very easy to define and differentiate between the culture and values of the Hungarians and the culture and perceived values of the refugees. Identity theories can help explain why the Hungarian government has received so much domestic support for its policies of closing borders. The refugees have been placed within the out-group, through the use of government propaganda, and general sense of fear among society, and therefore, has been treated unfairly. The refugees have been placed on the outside of society and labeled a threat, and the Hungarian government will do what it has to protect their nation and group.

4.2 RELIGIOUS LENS

The government has used religion as a justification for keeping the refugees out, with the assumption that the refugees will taint Hungarian Christian culture. The Kingdom of Hungary led by St. Stephen was a Christian nation, and Christianity and the morals associated are explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. There is an underlying assumption that the values and morals that Hungary holds dear cannot match the values
and morals of the refugees because a majority of them are not Christian; and therefore are unpredictable and untrustworthy. Christianity is such a strong theme in Hungarian culture that if someone does not relate or agree, there will be conflict between the culture and the outsider. This leads to threat narratives. The establishment of religious threat narratives have been salient in this conflict. Threat narratives,

“Shape the value commitments that shape thoughts of group differences... the capacity of the threatening Other to act becomes inseparable from their morally degenerate character. To its victims, the enemy is definable by two essential traits- their agency and immorality” (Rothbart and Korostelina, 2006; 34).

To further expand, within threat narratives, “the virtues (kindness, sincerity, honesty or personal sacrifice) are contrasted with vices (unkindness, insincerity, dishonesty or brutality). (MacIntyre, 1981; 205). The virtues can be considered tenets of Christianity. Since, the majority of the refugees are not Christian they are portrayed as not having the same virtues therefore, they can harbor and carry out the vices. If the refugees are being portrayed as harboring vices that contract the values of Hungarian society, it becomes easy for the society to not trust the refugees due to the perceived unpredictability of their actions. Due to statements made by Orbán, as well as propaganda campaigns linking the refugees to terrorists, there is also a perceived threat of the intention of the refugees to settle within Hungary. The Median poll showed that a portion of people surveyed believed in a conspiracy, in which the refugees were placed by outside forces with the intent to destroy Europe. While some of the outside sources were considered to be Israel and the United States, there is also a fear of the Islamic State, ISIL, and the intention of creating a caliphate in Europe (Balough, 2015). This narrative has increased due to the increased terror attacks in Europe. The real threat of terror
attacks across Europe, combined with the perceived fear that the majority of the refugees are Muslims has led many people to believe that Hungarian Christianity could be under attack if the borders were to be opened. While the world has changed and the threat of terror attacks is real, there is a misconception about the teachings of Islam. While this could be corrected through religious education, it is in the benefit of Orbán to continue propelling this rhetoric. It is also easier to generalize and impose a stereotype onto an entire group as opposed to an individual (Devine, 1989). This idea would also play into the current Fidesz goals. If the government does not want to allow the refugees, for whatever reason, it would be easy to get the public on board with the policies if the refugees were portrayed as being dangerous and a threat to everything Hungarian. An approach to counter these feelings is to use examples from Christianity against the xenophobic rhetoric. While there is a clear misunderstanding about Islam, there is also a distortion about Christianity and the teachings of St. Stephen, the prototype for Hungarians.

Since Fidesz and Jobbik have set up St. Stephen as the prototype for Hungarians, quotes from St. Stephen needs to be analyzed to determine the validity of the religious argument to this conflict. Hungarian-born author Paul Lendvai references a quotation that St. Stephen said to his son in the year 1030, around a welcoming policy. It states, “A country that only has one language is weak and fragile. Therefore, my son, go out and meet the settlers. Treat them decently so that they prefer to stay with you than elsewhere” (Lendvai, 2002; 55). This quotation alone shatters the rhetoric and justification used by Fidesz and Jobbik in response to their xenophobic policies. St. Stephen explains the
benefits of multiculturalism and welcoming the refugees instead of denying them entry. Jobbik specifically is against the idea of multiculturalism, and it would be interesting to see how Gabor Vona, and other members would react when confronted with this quote from their prototype.

Throughout Hungary’s history, Christianity has been used as a unifying force. Many Hungarian church leaders are speaking out against the xenophobic rhetoric promulgated by the governmental parties, to try and ensure Christian leaders do not follow the politician’s paths. Leader of the Reformist Church, Bishop Gusztav Bolcskey, states: ‘every extremist, community-destroying view appearing here and there in the society should not find allies and ground in the Christian churches” (Bayer, 2009; 310). This quotation was in response to the prewar era but can be just as applicable now. Just like the Hungarian Churches were concerned about church association in the prewar era, there is a concern that xenophobic ideas, and the perception that many of the refugees are not Christian, could persuade church leaders to join radical movements in response to the refugee crisis. Many church leaders not only in Esztergom but also throughout Europe, including the Vatican, have condemned the way the Hungarian government has treated the refugees, and see the governmental response as hypocritical. The fact that religious leaders not only in Hungary, but throughout Europe are condemning the Hungarian government’s actions shows that religion alone is not a proper justification for the closing of borders. Hungary does have a historical pattern of returning to religion in times of conflict, and Orbán tacitly understands this. People turn to religion for a number of different reasons. The belief system could be generational, or personal but it is very
difficult to determine motivation for becoming religious. While people can chose to associate with various sects and ideologies of a religion, unifying themes, such as fear and the belief in a higher power which can bring hope, can make people start to search out spiritual answers. It is in this belief, that people will seek answers for their fears, in which Orbán has been extremely successful. Religion can and has been used to mobilize masses. Orbán has used Christianity, under the guise of Hungarian culture and history, and the demonization of the refugees to create a sense of fear among the Hungarian citizens so they fight to protect the values that Orbán has stated is crucial for Hungarian identity. While not completely to blame for the increase in xenophobic feelings, Orbán has an impressive eye for strategy and mobilizing the masses around a cause and he has successfully done this through redefining Hungarian identity and Christianity. By portraying Christianity as being under attack, support has grown for his policies, and he can continue the xenophobic rhetoric without much domestic disapproval. Although many of the policies and rhetoric being used in Hungary have been criticized as being contradictory to Christianity, looking at this conflict through the use of threat narratives, and perceived differences between the two religions, (Christianity and Islam) can help explain why the policies have garnered support on religious grounds in Hungary.

4.3. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC LENS

While looking at the Hungarian response to the refugee crisis can be useful through identity and religious lenses, the conflict also comes down to politics, and deflecting attention away from serious internal issues of the state. Orbán has had many successes in his career and has moved Hungary into a very stable place in European
politics, but he has been facing major domestic problems lately. The refugee crisis has created a convenient facade to distract from the real problems. Currently, there is a massive campaign of teachers and parents, and 50,000 students, just on March 1, 2015, who are protesting Hungary’s “overly-centralized and underfunded” educational system (Budapest Beacon, March 1). The protests have been going strong for a week, with no sign of a break anytime soon. There is also an increased push for inclusive schools in which Roma and other minorities can be integrated into the system, instead of segregated where they are in many rural areas of Hungary currently. There was another wide protest to a proposed internet tax, in which a person would be charged per gigabyte used, which could limit free expression and access for those who could not afford the tax (BBC, 2014). This tax proposal was dropped but there are still many issues in Hungary.

To explain the discontent with the economic situation in Hungary in relation to the refugees, relative deprivation is applicable. Ted Robert Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation discusses the idea that, “deprivation occurs when people feel that they cannot improve their condition under the current state of affairs; if one feels able to achieve more, one perceives the situation as just and will not feel deprived” (Korostelina, 2007; 133). Although Hungary is a member of the European Union and therefore, has increased the wealth, influence and quality of Hungarian life. Although there have been many positive changes, there is still a lot of public discontent with domestic economic policies. The idea that the refugees will take the much needed resources away from Hungarian citizens, is enough to push people to support Orbán’s policies against the admission of refugees. Gurr’s theory further explains that, “people get frustrated when they have an
innate disposition to lash out at the sources of their frustrations in direct proportion to the intensity of their frustration” (Korostelina, 2007: 133). The more the state is not providing for the Hungarian citizens, in theory, the more the citizens will lash out against the refugees. There are not enough resources for the Hungarians let alone any extra to give to the refugees; and the citizens will fight to get all of the resources they can. The domestic economic situation must improve before the Hungarian citizens feel there will be enough stability to share resources, otherwise there is a fear that the economy will continue to deteriorate and cripple the Hungarians. The welfare system shows that Hungarians do not view charity in the same way as other nations. Instead, Hungarians feel that everyone should work for benefits: “The basic principle espoused by the government, but dismissed by the opposition as guilty of ‘discriminating against the poor’, is that welfare is not an inalienable right but a benefit for which effort must be made, and that the country cannot afford the luxury of dispensing with the endeavor of individuals to improve their own lot” (Ablonczy, 61). If this is a common thought, then it is understandable why the government is so adamant about refusing refugees into the country, where support is expected. This is not to say that Hungary is cold and heartless to the struggles of the refugees. Hungary, as stated in the Hungarian Constitution, does believe in helping those less fortunate and will grant asylum to refugees if they go through the legal route. The problem is that the government views the refugees as illegal immigrants, and therefore not eligible to be considered as asylum seekers. (Novak, 2015). Understanding the extraordinary circumstances, Hungary first started collecting information and names of the refugees in the Keleti train station for immigration
purposes, but soon realized the task was too overwhelming, and it would be easier to refuse any refugees into the country without pre-applying for asylum. Thus, leading to the investigation lead by the European Commission. This idea of welfare can also explain the support for Orbán’s policies. If Hungarians work to get benefits, it would be unfair to give the refugees benefits without working. There is a scarcity of jobs as it is and many Hungarians are unsatisfied with the benefits they receive so giving out those crucial and much wanted benefits to refugees instead of Hungarians, is enough of a reason for people to keep the refugees out. There is something much greater at play.

Some analysts argue that Orbán is using the refugee crisis and international criticism strategically to his advantage. Andras Biro-Nagy, head researcher for the Budapest think tank, Policy Solutions, stated, “Prime Minister Orbán thinks that this subject is not only useful for him in terms of his domestic political agenda but also for reframing his negative image outside of Hungary. Outside Hungary, Orbán’s image is of an authoritarian populist. But he thinks that this refugee crisis gives him a chance to appear as a defender of Christianity and the defender of Europe” (Frifield, 2015). This tactic has proven successful, as the research shows.

In the past, Hungary has been accused of sliding away from democracy and towards authoritarianism. While many scholars argue that position, Tibor Fischer, a novelist of Hungarian descent, disagrees with this idea. He states, “Democracy isn’t about loving everyone and everyone being loveable. It’s precisely the opposite. It’s accepting that others are out there who disgust or repel us, whom we don’t approve of or don’t agree with, but we accept their right to be that way, as long as they stay within in
law” (Fischer, 2015;33). He raises many questions about what a democracy really means. It would seem that Orbán is exercising an unpopular viewpoint, which is allowed in Fischer’s definition of democracy. Moreover, the view of Orbán as an authoritarian leader is only expressed by those outside of Hungary, who have disagreed with his stance in the crisis. Many Hungarian citizens do not see Orbán in this way. Laszlo Csaba, professor of political economy at Central European University in Budapest, stated: “There has been a big demand here for a strong leader, someone who puts things in order. Nine months ago, Orbán was anything but. Now he is the strong guy who has taken control, a resolute leader. He’s become a player in Europe” (Fifield, 2015). It is precisely because Orbán has stood up against the popular opinion that he has garnered so much support. Much like what is happening in the United States with the support for populists Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, they are popular for going against the grain. The more criticism that Orbán gets, and the more he fights back, the stronger his support group grows. For example, “Orbán’s image is that of an honest country boy (his government was labeled plebeian in its nature by himself) who entered politics by an uncompromising freedom speech against the Russian army on Hero’s Square, and who became the leader of the forefront of freedom fight in the new world of leftist European political correctness and global economic and financial oppression. After 2010, he is a man of the people, in constant fight against the transnational powers: global banks, financial institutions, transnational networks of bureaucrats and mediocrity elites. This was the story which could unite and mobilize his supporters” (Élő, 268). The Hungarian people believe that Orbán is just like them, and therefore, knows what is best for them. There is also a fear of what could happen if Orbán is not the leader. As already mentioned, Orbán lost his reelection to the Socialist candidate Ferenc Gyurcsány, whose actions forced Hungary to be placed under austerity measures from the European
Commission. Orbán was reelected to clean up the mess that was created before him, and fought the Commission to get the austerity measures decreased, which eventually brought Hungary out of severe debt. Orbán rescued the country from bankruptcy and saw through Hungary’s acceptance into the European Union, and therefore, is seen as a protector of Hungarian interests. Orbán has gained the trust of the Hungarian citizens, and there are very few people who disagree with his policies, or think that he does not know what is best for the nation. As his domestic support has risen, Orbán astonished the international community.

During a recent European Union summit, Orbán stunned the Union and members of Fidesz by signing an agreement stating the responsibility of all member states is to share the burden of accepting refugees. Orbán’s signature meant that 1,300 refugees are allowed to enter Hungary (Balough, 2016). The government said that the signature was not an acceptance of refugees, rather, it was a voluntary quote for the maximum number they would accept. Fidesz insists that their stance is the same as it has always been and that refugees are still not allowed in Hungary; but the signature was a way in which Hungary could be seen as complying and trying to compromise with the European Union (Balough, 2016). Orbán agreed with many of the other stipulations of the agreement, including the non-restriction of free movement of European Union citizens. In response to the agreement Orbán stated, “I feel that today nothing has been forced upon us which Hungary would not want or could not accept” (Orbán, 2016; Feb 18). Orbán could have signed because he accepted everything else listed in the agreement, or he could have used
this as a way to show other European nations he is not as unreasonable as he is being portrayed.

During the summit, Orbán also argued that Europe was finally accepting Hungary’s position as the correct position. Many nations in Europe are quickly reaching their maximum capacity and building perimeter fences to deter any more people from entering the country is under consideration. Orbán has argued that building fences is the only way to protect Europe. Orbán states, “The countries on the Balkan route and Austria have set out on the path of common sense, because what these states are now doing is the Hungarian solution: they are building fences, stopping migrants and sending them back, this is the only way that the southern borders of Europe can be protected” (Orbán, 2016; Feb 20). The fact that other countries are following Hungary’s fence-building lead has taken some of the criticism and pressure off of Hungary. Orbán can once again play the Savior of Europe, this time claiming to know the answers to solve the refugee crisis. Due to many Balkan nations, such as Croatia, Serbia as well as Macedonia, now reaching their refugee capacity, and also implementing policies to keep the refugees out of their countries, Orbán has now issued a referendum for the European Union quota system. Again speaking against the European Union on behalf of other nations he referred to Hungary as a plebiscite and stated, “Nobody has asked the European people so far whether they support, accept or reject the mandatory migrant quotas...we Hungarians think introducing the resettlement quotas for migrants without the backing of the people equals an abuse of power” (Dunai and Than, 2016). Orbán has always been vocal on his stance that the European Union enforcing the quota was a breach of state sovereignty.
Now, he has been given the extra incentive to fight on behalf of the other states as well. Orbán is shifting the power of the European Union away from a few key states and major players and trying to shift the power of the Union back into the hands of the individual states. Political analyst for the Political Capital Institute, Peter Kreko responded to Orbán’s proposal by stating:

“All in all, we can see that Orban is in a winning position as long as he speaks about migration issues, as it allows him to play the role of defender of the nation. It is in his interest to keep the issue on the agenda until elections in 2018. That way, the referendum would eclipse such issues as education and healthcare. It would also preempt a political defeat for Orban if the European Court rejects Hungary’s suit against the quotas” (Dunai and Than, 2016).

It is clear with this statement that Orbán signed the agreement during the summit as a way to keep the issue relevant. He did not agree with the terms, as predicted by many analysts, but needed to keep the conversation, and Hungarian opposition going. Orbán has been watched closely by the international community because of his unconventional methods that some argue are in contradiction to the democratic ways of Parliament. However, Orbán is a very intelligent man who understands his nation, his people, and what needs to happen to keep him in power. However, since three thousand more refugees are expected by 2017 more nations are going to reach their capacities, support for Orbán and Fidesz will likely rise internationally due to his newfound hero narrative (BBC, 2015). Many nations may start following Orbán’s initiative and start closing borders to preserve the resources they have for their own people. It is much easier for Orbán to focus on saving Europe, and maintaining the hero narrative he has created than to focus on serious domestic issues that have no clear solution.
The European refugee crisis has strained many European nations, who were on much better economic and domestic standing than Hungary. While Orbán’s response to the crisis, of building fences and skirting around international law have been heavily criticized by the international community, his actions could be seen as self-preservation. There are real domestic issues in Hungary and the stress of providing resources for the refugees could very easily prove too much for the nation to handle. There is fear about what would happen if refugees were allowed admittance into Hungary. While the propaganda campaigns of Fidesz and Jobbik have been successful in increasing xenophobic feelings, there is fear felt throughout society as well. Orbán can use the refugee crisis and his response to it, to continue perpetuating the ‘hero complex’ that he has established in Hungary. He was pivotal in the post-Communist transition, he rewrote the Hungarian Constitution, and rescued Hungary from austerity measures while also helping Hungary become a member of the European Union. He has a large support system in Hungary and as more nations are at their breaking point with resources, he is stepping up to be the savior of Europe as well. The international condemnation of Hungary was tough at first but now that more nations are struggling, Orbán has the chance to influence, and be the savior to many other nations, all the while continuing to deflect from his domestic issues. It makes sense for Hungary to keep the conversation against the quota going. It has been argued that the economy and infrastructure really could not handle the influx of refugees, but it would be foolish for the government to admit that. Not only does keeping the refugees out protect the resources that Hungary
has, but it keeps Orbán relevant and as the crisis continues, positively shifts public opinion of his policies across Europe.

CONCLUSION: BRINGING LENSES TOGETHER

Looking at this conflict through individual lenses is helpful to delve deeper into the reasoning and justifications that the government has used to explain the decision to close borders. However, in order to fully understand all of the dynamics of the conflict and receive a well-rounded analysis, all of the lenses must be used in conjunction. There is a high degree of overlap between theories and concepts between the lenses. National identity and religion have been intertwined to deflect away from serious internal problems within the state. Relative deprivation, threat narratives, historical grievances and the idea of conflicting religion and morals between the refugees and Hungarians were prevalent in all lenses. There is a real sense of fear of terrorism felt throughout Europe, due to the recent terror attacks. This fear of terrorism, combined with the differences of religion, in which Christianity is highly salient in Hungarian culture, plus the lack of resources for Hungarian citizens has led to increased support for Fidesz and Jobbik policies, as well as the continued demonization of refugees. The themes that were prevalent through the research were: economics, security and values, Christianity and morals, and the previous communist regime; and were all used as justifications by the government for their decision to close borders. Historical grievances, and the threat of invasion and control of an outside force due to Hungary’s geographical position, threat of the Islamic State’s intention to create a caliphate and destroying Christianity and serious
structural problems in Hungary are used as examples to successfully garner support for the government’s decision.

To answer my research question, the international criticism, as well as propaganda campaigns created by Fidesz and Jobbik have increased nationalist feelings in Hungary, and there is support for Orbán’s policies towards the refugee crisis. The international criticism forced Hungarians to cling together and create an even stronger national identity. Once that national identity was solidified with shared values and the prototype of Saint Stephen, it became easy to exclude the refugees from society because they did not fit with the identity of the nation. This made the propaganda campaigns by Jobbik and Fidesz even more effective, because the division between ‘us versus them’ had already been created. There is also a large political strategy behind the decision to close borders and defy the calls of the European Union to help the refugees. There are serious structural problems in Hungary. Despite the serious domestic problems, the Hungarian people have shown a great amount of trust in Orbán and believe that not backing down to the European Union, and the closing of borders is for the protection of the nation, which has created even more support for Orbán. The Hungarians are supportive of Orbán’s policies, and now there is a push to get other European leaders to follow his lead. As more and more nations are starting to close borders, Orbán once again can use his hero complex, and portray himself as the savior of Europe, a narrative he established during his first term as Prime Minister.
Hungary is unique in the fact that it was the first nation to close borders to refugees, and there were highly publicized confrontations between the police and refugees. However, the increase in xenophobic sentiments and support for radical right-wing groups has not only occurred in Hungary but is happening across Europe. The refugee crisis is far from over, and as more nations struggle with resources or close borders, it will be interesting to see if Orbán becomes the strong leader in European politics, with great influence, that he is setting himself up to be.
APPENDIX 1

Publicus Survey Results

How do you think, is the fence that is being built along the Serbian-Hungarian border suitable for stopping refugees? (% of all respondents)

July 2015
- Fully suitable: 46
- Somewhat suitable: 8
- Not very suitable: 4
- Not at all suitable: 19
- N/a: 21

September 2015
- Fully suitable: 56
- Somewhat suitable: 5
- Not very suitable: 3
- Not at all suitable: 14
- N/a: 22
If it had been up to you whether to build the fence along the Serbian-Hungarian border, then what would you have decided?

(% of all respondents)

**July 2015**
- 56% it should (rather) be built
- 34% it should (rather) not be built
- 11% n/a

**September 2015**
- 50% it should (rather) be built
- 40% it should (rather) not be built
- 10% n/a

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To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

(% of all respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Rather Disagree</th>
<th>Rather Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is our obligation to help refugees</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees should be treated more humanely</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary should accept a number of refugees that is within its capabilities</td>
<td>-55</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are too many refugees arriving, Europe will not be able to handle the influx</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have to defend our borders from the refugees who arrive, if need be with weapons</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How do you think, has Hungary's international standing deteriorated or improved as a result of our handling of the refugee situation?
(% of all respondents)

In general, how do you rate the government's handling of the refugee crisis?
(respondents who provided a substantial response, average on a scale of 1-5)
APPENDIX 2

Median Public Opinion Poll Results

Translation: Do you know how many refugees arrived in Hungary in January?
Orange- Well aware of the number
Red- Can Guess
Green- Do Not Know
Can you guess an approximate percentage of refugees presently in Hungary?

Orange: Well aware
Red: Can guess
Green: Do not know

Are you familiar with the current political parties proposing ways to curb the influx of refugees? If yes, list the ones you are familiar with.
Translation:
Changing Views on Migration

Should the country tighten its policies on refugees?
Should more nation’s tighter restrictions?
Should there be greater restrictions on Jews?
Is it immoral to allow homosexuals into nation?
*Answers are in yes

Which party has the best solutions for certain problems?
The refugee problem?
The emigration of Hungarians?
The conflict between Roma and society?
Corruption?
Support of the majority population?
Which of these groups should have the most control and most appropriate policies for refugees?

Police, civil society, Hungarian government, Pope, Germany, Austria, Jobbik, Hungarian Catholic Church, EU, the Left, or USA

Grade statements on the refugee crisis on a hundred point scale.

Refugees pose health risks, refugees increase terrorism, police are doing the best they can, should the refugees be treated humanely during their stay, refugees do not respect our laws, the government has been making preparations for months, illegal border crossings should be a criminal offense, countries must receive refugees when they occur, the government is doing the best they can, refugees should be split among EU partners, refugees can be beneficial to the workforce.
Proposals for solving refugee crisis.

Orange-the border needs to be permanently sealed and rubber bullets and gas should be used to keep refugees back

Green- Refugees must be sent to camps until their claims for asylum are awarded

Red- Refugees must be ensured they are not headed to Germany

Blue- Do not know

The construction of the fence supports this percentage of voters.

Orange- supports fence

Red- does not support fence
What is the probability that Muslims will soon be the majority in Europe and force their religion and culture?
Orange- likely
Red- not likely

To your knowledge how do the refugees in Hungary behave?
Orange- peaceful
Red- aggressive
To what degree do you think that people who cross the border illegally should be declared perpetrators and punished?

- Answers in yes

Do you agree that the influx of refugees significantly increases the threat of terrorism?

Answers in yes
Do you think that allowing refugees into Hungary could be beneficial to the workforce?

Answers in yes

Do you support the following solutions?

Orange: the border must be permanently sealed and rubber bullets and tear gas should be used as deterrents

Red- Refugees should be sent to camp until asylum awarded

Green- Make sure Hungary is not being used as transit place but actually want to settle.

Blue- do not know
Do you agree that hosted refugees should be split based on population and economy and distributed among countries of the Union?

Do you agree countries should accommodate the refugees where they occur?
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BIOGRAPHY

Meredith Bailey King graduated from Osbourn High School, Manassas, Virginia, in 2010. She received her Bachelor of Arts from American Public University in 2013. She participated in a study abroad focusing on post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe in 2015, which inspired this thesis.