SEPARATED, UNITED, SECEDED: HOW THE CONFLICT BETWEEN KHARTOUM AND JUBA LED TO THE CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

by

Durra R. Elmaki
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science
Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Master of Arts
Conflict Resolution and Mediterranean Security

Committee:

[Signatures]

Chair of Committee
Graduate Program Director
Dean, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Date: 12/5/12

Fall Semester 2012
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
University of Malta
Valletta, Malta
Separated, United, Seceded: How the Conflict Between Khartoum and Juba Led to the Creation of the Republic of South Sudan

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University, and the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Malta

by

Durra R. Elmaki
Bachelor of Arts
George Mason University, 2011

Director: Richard Rubenstein, Professor
School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Fall Semester 2012
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
This work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noderivs 3.0 unported license.
DEDICATION

This is dedicated to all those that struggle in their search to fight for peace and to those that dedicate their lives to justice.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am truly thankful and indebted to my advisor, Dr. Costas Apostolides, for the support and guidance he has shown me throughout my dissertation writing. This thesis would not have been possible without his guidance and direction. The support of the faculty and staff of both MEDAC and S-CAR was invaluable. I also owe a great deal of gratitude to my family and friends for their support of me throughout this process. I sincerely appreciate all of your help.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations and Acronyms</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection Methods</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analysis Method</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Sudan’s Introduction to Foreign Powers</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: British-Egyptian Colonization of the Sudan</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: Britain and Egypt Prepare to Exit Sudan</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: The First Anyanya Rebellion</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: The Numeiri Era 1969-1985</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven: SPLA/SPLM Emerges on the Scene</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eight: Sudan Searches for Its Soul</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Nine: Sources of Arms and the Role of Foreign Powers</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Ten: Looking Beyond Khartoum and Juba</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Eleven: Different Roads to Peace</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Twelve: 2005 CPA and External Factors</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Thirteen: Conclusion</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Fourteen: Current State of Affairs</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1 Intensity of Conflict</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2 Potential Secessionists</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3 Civil Wars Linked to Resource Wealth</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4 Integration Tests for Total Arms Transfers</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Development vs. Total Expenditure Cuts</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Sudan Food Items Prices</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Hypothetical Resource Abundance/Conflict Curve</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Battle Deaths versus Total War Deaths</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABC  Abyei Borders Commission
AU African Union
CANS Civil Authority of New Sudan
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005
DUP Democratic Unionist Part
EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GOS Government of the Sudan
HEC High Executive Council, Southern Regional Government (1972-1983)
IDP Internally displaced person
IMF International Monetary Fund
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda)
NCP  National Congress Party
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NIF National Islamic Front
NRA National Resistance Army (army of Uganda)
NUP National Unionist Party
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PDP People’s Democratic Party

PNC Popular National Congress (Turabi’s party, 2000-)

SLA Sudan Liberation Army

SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army

SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

SPLM-DC Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change

SSDF South Sudan Defense Force (armed wind of UDSF)

SSU Sudanese Social Union (only legal party in the Sudan under Nimairi 1970-1984)

TMC Transitional Military Council (1985-1986)

UDSF United Democratic Salvation Front (Sudan)

UNAMIS United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNIC United Nations Information Center

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WB World Bank

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization
The international community is constantly dealing with an ever-evolving global order and this is most reflected in secessionist movements that have passionately caught the world’s attention. This thesis investigates how the conflict between the Sudan and South Sudan resulted in the creation of the Republic of South Sudan on July 2011. By analyzing this landmark contemporary case, I intend to clarify the complexity of the variables involved in such a unique situation and put forth an explanation on how a secessionist movement can succeed in its goal of creating a separate nation-state. Given the significance of the historical context of the conflict, the time period of this study ranges from the Anglo-Egyptian period of the Sudan’s history to present, contemporary times.
I approach the study by using prominent research strategies: (1) a qualitative analysis of literature available on the Sudan with a focus on the conflict and (2) a careful review of the academic and scholarly literature that put forth theories relevant to the Sudanese conflict. Extensive data has been collected from numerous academically peer-reviewed articles and publications, as well as archives, newspapers, quantitative data banks, and other published reports. I find it necessary to also disclose that as a Sudanese-American I have extensive personal experience living and working in the Sudan, primarily in Khartoum, which provides me with a first-hand perspective on the happenings of the conflict, as well as intricate details surrounding Sudanese culture.

At the forefront of the goals of this thesis is to challenge the dominant argument that asserts that at the core of the establishment of South Sudan is the internal religious-ethnos identity driven conflict that has destined the Sudan to be incompatible with its southern counterpart. Many hold the view that conflicting national identities drove the conflict between the Sudan and South Sudan; however, this thesis argues that the drivers of conflict in the Sudan are multi-faceted and cannot be disregarded as merely being a conflict of identities. Considering that protracted violent conflicts often shift in their focus and in the primary actors involved, it is necessary to take into consideration other factors that may have directed the course of the conflict. To overlook plausible other drivers of civil war is to do the analysis of the conflict an injustice and is a disservice to the field of conflict analysis and resolution.

It is the aim of this thesis to evaluate theories prevalent in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, as well as international relations and apply them to the conflict in
the Sudan, thus leaving room to evaluate whether or not they hold empirically verifiable validity to the conflict. In contemporary times, it is increasingly rare for the international community to welcome the establishment of a new country, making the case of the Republic of South Sudan an extraordinary intellectual opportunity to explore. This thesis also takes into consideration the volatile environment between the two countries and puts forth some policy recommendations that can serve as a guide to fostering better relations between the warring countries.
CHAPTER ONE

The Republic of South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011 and formally separated from its Northern counterpart. Since 1955, the Sudan has been locked in an intrastate conflict that has most recently spilled over into an interstate conflict since South Sudan obtained its independence. The conflict in the Sudan is regarded as the longest standing conflict in sub-Saharan Africa during modern times and despite the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement the two groups continue to have conflict over the drawing of borders and debt allocation, as well as the terms of agreement regarding oil wealth sharing. The current state of affairs demonstrates that despite the secession of South Sudan, there remains a long journey towards peace-building and resolving the conflict between the two countries.

President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who was elected by 93% of the popular vote in April 2010, heads the newly established government of the Republic of South Sudan. The new country faces many challenges and will need a great deal of support from the international community. In the past year the South Sudanese government has been challenged by a failing economy, the threat of food security instability, internal violence, and corruption, as well as accusations of abuse by military forces. The worsening political situation in South Sudan is cause for alarm. In its most recent 2012 report,
Freedom House\(^1\) has reviewed the political and civil liberties of South Sudan and has provided the following scores, “Status: Not Free, Freedom Rating: 5.5, Civil Liberties: 5, Political Rights: 6”\(^2\). The fact that the country is not an electoral democracy and that the transitional constitution, which passed in July 2011, gives broad powers to the executive, has greatly contributed to South Sudan’s low score. This is a disappointing state of affairs for a population whose people have advocated and fought to relieve themselves of a tyrannical past. All these aforementioned factors combined make for a shaky future for a nation that has struggled for decades to free itself from conflict and war.

The Republic of Sudan has been under rule by President Omar al-Bashir, who overthrew the civilian government in 1989. Despite having held multi-party elections in 2010, the Sudan struggles with political instability and the Sudanese have extremely limited forums in which they can express their political opinions, without fear of government retaliation. Thus security forces often respond to open criticism of the government harshly, making the Sudanese regime one of the most criticized governments by numerous human rights advocates and the international community. The 2012 Freedom House scores place Sudan’s status as, “Not free, with a freedom rating of 7.0,

\(^1\) Methodology of the Freedom House Report: The survey includes both analytical reports and numerical ratings for 195 countries and 14 select territories.\(^{[1]}\) Each country and territory report includes an overview section, which provides historical background and a brief description of the year’s major developments, as well as a section summarizing the current state of political rights and civil liberties. In addition, each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating—on a scale of 1 to 7—for political rights and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. These ratings, which are calculated based on the methodological process described below, determine whether a country is classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free by the survey. [www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology]

with civil liberties and political rights rated at a 7.\textsuperscript{3} Gaining inspiration from the Arab Spring uprising, Sudan has most recently experienced a wave of protests demanding change of the regime, though government security forces quickly shut them down. Amongst the international community, Sudan is regarded as a highly corrupt country, which has resulted in the country having limited diplomatic leverage or power, though both Russia and China has used their voting power as permanent members of the UN Security Council to protect Sudan from numerous resolutions.

Sudan and South Sudan have not been able to escape the plight of the global economic crisis and both countries are struggling to stabilize their economies and are under the threat of state collapse. Both countries have resource dependent economies, with oil as the primary commodity of export. The recent secession of South Sudan from the Sudan has had a tremendous impact on the economic state of both countries and as a result, both nations face tremendous fiscal instability. As of 2011, the IMF estimates that Sudan and South Sudan’s GDP stands at $64,750 millions of US$, a significant difference from the WB’s estimate of the two nation’s combined GDP of $55,097 millions of US$. Regardless of the disparity in GDP estimates, both countries face great economic challenges with South Sudan having to deal with the tremendous macroeconomic challenge of establishing the new nation.

Sudan is a country rich in natural resources such as oil, gold, iron ore and copper and has traditionally had an agriculture-based economy but since the discovery of oil by the American company Chevron, the country has largely relied on oil exports, thus

transforming the country into a rentier state. The NCP government has sought to cover the recent growing balance deficit by increasing gold exports; however, the economic return has not yet been seen. The UNDP estimates that 46.5% of the population is currently living below the poverty line, and as a result the government has enacted an Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper which focuses on the promotion of import substitution and exports in order to reverse the trade deficit caused by the shut down of oil production by the government of South Sudan. The growing impact of Sudan’s struggling economy is further demonstrated in a substantial increase in development spending cuts:
The ongoing disagreement over oil-revenue sharing has threatened to strain the already overwhelming impoverished Sudanese population, given that the government had been using some of the oil wealth to subsidize staple diet products, such as sugar and bread. With the rising cost of food and the devaluation of the Sudanese Dinar, the country’s ability to remain relatively stable is being brought into question.

Figure 2: Sudan Food items prices have more than doubled since 2009, (SDG/Kg)

The poor face the very realistic threat of increased malnutrition, a threat of grave concern given that child malnutrition has already been estimated to stand at 31.8% by the UNDP. Worsening conditions have resulted in a recent wave of protests throughout Khartoum and surrounding states; however, the government responded with a violent crackdown of the protestors and was able to silence the resistance.

---

The North-South conflict has been a direct hindrance to Sudan’s development, with the lack of stability making risk-averse foreign investors reluctant to invest in the country, as well as contributing to the instability of trade and economic development. Strained relations with the United States due to a variety of reasons, including the US’ critical stance on human rights abuses in the Sudan, has resulted in economic sanctions, further contributing to Sudan’s underdevelopment and consequently, has also reflected in South Sudan’s underdevelopment. Since the shut down of oil production in January 2012 the situation in South Sudan has deteriorated from troublesome to dire. In a briefing to President Silva Kirr from Mr. Marcelo Giugale, World Bank Director of Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction Programmes for Africa issued a stern warning on 1 March 2012, “The proportion of the population living in poverty is likely to rise from 51% in 2012 to 83% in 2013 (as compared with 90% in 2004); in gross numbers 3.6 million additional people are likely to fall below the poverty line.” Mr. Giugale emphasized his concern by adding that, ”the World Bank has never seen a situation as dramatic as the one faced by South Sudan. In his view, neither the President nor the senior Ministers present in the meeting were aware of the economic implications of the shut-down. He candidly said that officials present had not internalized nor understood the consequences of the decision.” South Sudan’s oil dependence far exceeds even Sudan’s, with 82% of South Sudan’s GDP accounted for in oil receipts. It is alarming that a country so early in its developments may already face state collapse.

---

The ethnic and linguistic make up of the northern region of the Sudan is widely diverse, largely due to the vast migration patterns of entire groups of people traveling into the Sudan from every possible geographic direction. The spread of Islam into Africa, and consequently into the Sudan, contributed greatly to the diversification of the indigenous population. The Sudan remains a predominately Sunni-Muslim country, with a small, minority Christian population. Anthropologists and social researchers in the Sudan, have identified over a hundred languages and dialects, along with over fifty different ethnic groups and an estimated six hundred tribes. According to the UNIC the main tribal divisions in the Sudan are comprised of, “1. The Baraabra (Nubian) tribes of the northern Nile valley, still maintaining the derivatives of their original Kushite language; 2. The Hadendawa, Bishairiyiin and Bani Amer of the Red Sea Hills, speaking their own Hamitic and Semitic languages; 3. A central mass of “Arab” tribes, occupying the entire central belt of Sudan, including the Kababish, Kawahla, Ja’aliyin, the various Baggara pastoral tribes, etc.; 4. Descendants of earlier peoples, such as the Nuba, Fur, and Ingessana, predominately speaking their own languages, together with Arabic.”

These various groups are united linguistically through the widespread use of the Arabic language; however, numerous dialects of Arabic are spoken throughout the country.

Whereas Sudan had been culturally and ethnically diversified due to widespread migration, the local population of what is now known as the Republic of South Sudan has remained largely homogenous, primarily due to geographic and climatic variables that have historically kept the area largely secluded and isolated. The various tribes of South

Sudan have strong affinities with other groups found in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the Congo. The UNIM uses the classification Negroid for these groups and specifically categorizes them in the following manner: “1. Sudanic, composed of the various tribal clusters west of the Nile, including the Azande and Moru-Madi; 2. Nilotic tribes, which inhabit the river valley and swamps, such as the Dinka, Nuer, Shilitfi, and Asholi; 3. The Nilo-Hamitic tribes of the southern Nile valley, such as Bari and Lotuka. Speak English, as well as rudimentary Arabic, serve as lingua franca. Many of the tribes have more or less close affinities with the tribes found in Abyssinia, Kenya, Uganda, and Congo.”

Due to a great deal of missionary work, Christianity is widespread throughout South Sudan, albeit modified to accommodate for traditional, animist practices. Animism continues to be the predominant religion practiced in South Sudan, though many individuals practice other indigenous religions.

---

Introduction
This thesis strives to understand what particular variables from the conflict between factions in Khartoum and Juba have led to the secessionist movement in South Sudan, which has ultimately resulted in the creation of the Republic of South Sudan. Although the international community has stood in solidarity and support of the secession, there has been limited exploration of the driving motivators that has led local Southern Sudanese supporters to seek secession from the Republic of Sudan, nor why the government of Sudan has not contested the secession of their southern counterparts. The initial hypothesis for this thesis states, ‘The driving variables behind the Republic of South Sudan’s secession from the Sudan are not limited to factors correlated with identity conflicts but rather, argues that the causes are multifaceted. The factors that have provoked South Sudan’s secession are a reflection of the same variables, which drove Sudan’s two civil wars; however, it is not assumed that the creation of South Sudan was a natural transition of the civil wars’.

While sub-Saharan Africa is known amongst the international community for long periods of violent conflict, the conflict in the Sudan exceeds the general trend of conflicts in the region so much so that on June 11, 2004 the United Nations established the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) through Resolution 1547 (2004), in order to intensify their peace-building efforts in the Sudan. Protracted violent conflicts
are not rooted in universal causes and special consideration should be given to each individual conflict in order to provide an honest assessment of what factors are actually motivating individuals and societies to continue to promote a state of war. The Sudan has endured two civil wars since 1955, between the leading governments in Khartoum and the political and military elite of the South. While the primary focus of this thesis is to understand the motivation behind the secessionist movement, it is impossible to explore this without carefully taking into consideration the historical context of the conflict, as well as the driving factors behind the two civil wars. It is the position of this thesis that the Sudan has endured two separate civil wars and does not perceive the outbreak of violence of 1983 to have simply been a continuation of the first civil war. The reason for this, which will be elaborated on further into the thesis, is that the second civil war brought in additional participating actors, new elements, and spilled over into areas that were not impacted by the first civil war.

The secession of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan has been in the making even prior to Sudan gaining its independence from Great Britain on January 1956. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 laid the groundwork for the final step in the secession of South Sudan despite the fact that the expressed intention of the drafters was to promote the unity of the Sudan. On January 9-15, 2011 the referendum for secession of South Sudan took place and an overwhelming vote of 98.83% came out in support for the South to separate from the Sudan and establish its own country. The Carter Center, one of the leading independent voting monitors stated, “the referendum process to date is broadly consistent with international standards for democratic elections and represents
the genuine expression of the will of the electorate.” 9 This was a landmark change in the decades old tradition that prevailed throughout Africa, which called for nation-states to preserve the borders that were established by the former colonial powers.

Despite the dominant discourse that alleges that the conflict in Sudan was due to intolerable Arab supremacy over the vulnerable African Southern Sudanese population and that secession from their Arab masters, as the Khartoum government is often referred to, is inevitable, my hypothesis is that the reasons are far more complex and that labeling the conflict in terms of incompatible identity groups is an oversimplification. In order to understand the Republic of South Sudan’s independence on July 9, 2011, it is necessary to conduct a complete comparative analysis of the events that led up to the secession. I would argue that the characterization of the North-South Sudanese conflict as one of an identity conflict overlooks the role of colonialism, the negligence on the part of the Sudanese government to provide basic human needs, and the discovery of exploitive resources, in driving the aggression between the two sides; however, the inclusion of additional contributing factors does not dismiss the role that identity clashes have as drivers of this conflict. Critically analyzing these various factors will provide the basis to understanding how the Republic of South Sudan was able to break empirically established norms of committing to the borders drawn up by the European colonial powers, in an unprecedented fashion.

When research within the field of conflict analysis and resolution narrows its concentration on a limited amount of contributing factors, the field is left with

inconclusive analysis of a conflict, which then limits its capacity to be useful in understanding other conflicts. Conducting a thorough conflict mapping of the conflict at hand is the beginning of understanding the attributing factors in their entirety and serves as a solid foundation for a more complete analysis. It is necessary to then expand beyond this foundation and study the applicability, as well as the validity of relevant theories that provide credible explanations to not only what has occurred in the conflict but also what has led to these developments. The primary benefit of obtaining this heightened sense of understanding provides practitioners with an empirical case study that can serve as an example for conflict management, as well as an example of how peace can be achieved despite decades of unequivocal violence.

**Literature Review**

The objective of this thesis is a rather narrow goal, namely, to understand why the conflict between the Sudanese and the Southern Sudanese has resulted in the creation of the Republic of South Sudan. That being said, despite the fact that the thesis topic is specific it requires a wide review of theories and arguments that focus on the variables that can be attributed to the secessionist movement of South Sudan. The first step to understanding why the conflict in the Sudan has resulted in the establishment of South Sudan is to understand the drivers of the two civil wars that occurred in the Sudan. Numerous theories can be found to be applicable to the numerous factors that fueled the secession and they are primarily rooted in various variations of basic human needs theory, identity theory, economic theories that reflect on the motivations of minority groups, and so forth. Given the complexity of the topic at hand the following literature
review will combine both the methodology and chronology approach in order to put forth the numerous theories at hand and then to assess them in their relevance to the historical events that took place in the Sudan.

Understanding the historical events that developed in the Sudan is fundamental to understanding the historical context of the conflict in the Sudan and will frame the secessionist movement that has occurred. Fortunately, despite the high level of violence in the Sudan, researchers have successfully documented the key historical developments that have taken place. This is largely due to the high level of involvement from the international community in the Sudanese conflict. A literature review of twenty-three publications established common areas of key historical events in the Sudan in reference to the conflict between the northern and southern regions of the country. The Sudan has a fascinating and complex history, archaeologists trace the history of the Nubian region to 6000 B.C; however, for the purposes of the majority of this thesis the time period for historical review will begin in 1820 with the introduction of the Turkish-Ottoman invasion of Sudan. This time period has played an important role in shaping the racial tensions between the Sudanese and the South Sudanese.

A literature review of thirty-two publications establishes common explanations provided for the root causes of Sudan’s civil wars and can be summarized in the following terms, “The various root causes explored are: patterns of governance that existed during the pre-colonial independence era; the introduction during the late nineteenth century and reemergence during the late twentieth century of a particular brand of militant Islam; the institutionalization of unequal patterns of socioeconomic
development under colonial rule; the emergence of a narrow, elite-dominated nationalist movement and the failure of post-independence elites to achieve consensus concerning national unity, regional development, and power sharing between the central and regional governments; severe economic crisis during the 1970s and 1980s; the internationalization of conflict within the larger geopolitical setting of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union; and rising foreign interest in exploiting natural resources, most notably water and oil.\(^\text{10}\) The aforementioned factors are accurate in their depiction of what has driven the intrastate conflict and it will be necessary to take these established patterns and evaluate their attribution to the creation of South Sudan.

In order to gain a broader sense of the conflict at hand, a close observation of human security factors needs to be undertaken. A literature review of numerous academic articles that were published from the early stages of the formation of the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution till contemporary times, identified a great deal of theories that can be considered to be sub-categories of the basic human needs theories as presented by one of the founding figures of the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Dr. John Burton. While assessing human rights theories might seem removed from understanding the motivation for South Sudan’s secession, it is arguable that understanding the basic human needs, particularly in terms of a minority group, can provide a basis of understanding the psychological and sociological factors that have driven the parties to

seek certain objectives. This can provide a basis of understanding why various foreign actors supported South Sudan’s secession, the Sudan’s motivation to agree to the secession, as well as why various actors amongst the South Sudanese to either support or oppose the secessionist movement.

The discovery of oil in the Sudan brought forth an additional element of conflict into the Sudan, that of a conflict driven over limited resources. When discussing the issue of resource conflict, the academic literature focuses on basic economic presumptions about unlimited wants and limited resources, as well as the struggle for control over the available resources. To summarize, the academic literature establishes, “If resources are scarce relative to the demand for those resources, nations are more likely to conflict, since the imbalance will impinge on economic health or basic levels of human being. From this argument it follows that international resource conflict will escalate in the future, as human populations and their demands continue to expand while supplies of many basic resources decline in both quantitative and qualitative terms.”

The discussion surrounding resource conflicts is applicable to the Sudanese conflict following the discovery of oil, since oil has become the leading exported commodity of both countries. The available academic literature produces two prevailing schools of thought in regards to resource driven conflicts, “While some authors suggest that international conflict is correlated with scarcity, others maintain that it is relative abundance of resources that is

---

more likely to incite conflict. The ‘resource curse’ hypothesis put forth by these latter authors states that countries well endowed with natural resources are at a greater risk of internal conflict for a variety of reasons, including exposure to price shocks, corruption, availability of finances for rebel groups, and incentives for succession.\(^{12}\)

One of the driving theories in the field of conflict analysis and resolution is the basic needs theory that has been promoted by the field’s founders and continues to be applicable to contemporary conflicts. It is universally argued that conflict, particularly protracted violent conflict like the one that has occurred in Sudan, is rooted in the suppression of the basic human needs of a population. In the case of the civil war that has played out between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, the Southern Sudanese populations were subjected to various forms of structural violence that prevented their inalienable rights of dignity and human liberty; however, given the level of instability and poverty in the Sudan it would be a fair assessment to argue that structural violence is prevalent throughout the entire country, irrespective of geographic location. While the treatment of Southern Sudanese by successive governments in Khartoum has been unacceptable, special attention needs to be taken to observe whether the structural violence they were subjected to, was relative to the degree of oppression to other groups in Sudan. The ongoing conflicts in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains exemplify that there was systematic oppression spread throughout Sudan.

\(^{12}\) International Resource Conflict and Mitigation

Author(s): Mark F. Giordano, Meredith A. Giordano and Aaron T. Wolf

Reviewed work(s):


Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042242

Accessed: 17/07/2012 16:41
In order to understand the many faces of theories on basic human needs, it is necessary to gain understanding of humanistic psychology, which has been promoted successfully by Maslow through his theory of the *Hierarchy of Needs*. Essentially the argument holds that, “human needs can be organized within a hierarchy in which lower order needs must be satisfied before the individual becomes concerned with higher order needs.”  

Beyond understanding theories that explain basic human needs, there is the question of what entity is responsible for providing or even responding to prevalent human needs? Following the formation of the modern day concept of the nation-state, established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it has often been accepted that governments of nations bear the responsibility of providing their respective populations with basic human needs. If we accept the assumption that the state, rather than the individual or private group, is responsible for providing basic human needs for their populations, then we can logically derive that failure to facilitate these basic human needs will lead to instability and conflict between governments and their neglected populations. As Potapchuk states, “Needs cannot be compromised. Means must be found in a conflict resolution process to satisfy human needs in order to resolve (as opposed temporarily to settle) a conflict while wants, the theory holds can be compromised.”  

The secession of South Sudan may have been a means in which the human needs required by Southern Sudanese is satisfied, though given the chaotic state of the new country, this is highly unpromising.

---

13 Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict, Ronald J. Fisher  
14 Processes of Governance: Can Governments Truly Respond to Human Needs; William R. Potapchuk pg. 265
The conflict between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has often been characterized as an identity driven conflict; however, the conflict is arguably driven by numerous factors and it would be more accurately described as being a multifaceted conflict. Research that focuses on the numerous conflicts in Sudan has often depicted the Sudanese wars as clashes of Arab versus African, Muslim versus Christian, or more recently, motivated over economic resources, particularly oil reserves. Existing research has often overlooked numerous factors that could have contributed to the ongoing protracted, violent conflict between the governments in Khartoum and Juba and unfortunately, this has provided an inaccurate, if not directly dishonest, analysis of the conflict of focus. While the National Congress Party (NCP) that has ruled the Sudan since 1989 have promoted a heavy Islamization policy, the history of ethnic-religious conflict has existed between the two groups since the early 19th century.

The popular understanding that the Sudanese conflict is an ethnic conflict, based on identity, demands that special consideration is given to the literature available on identity. A careful review of over fifty academic and scholarly publications, offers a variety of identity theories in the context of conflict and range from the construction of identity to how identity incompatibility can result in an outbreak of violent conflict. Since warring ethnic and regional groups characterize the North-South conflict in the Sudan, it is necessary to review the literature available in sociology that deals with the collective identity. It has firmly been established that social or collective identity plays a prominent role in conflict, particularly in the case of protracted violent conflict. This is partially explained by the narratives that the group has, which will often emphasize the groups
past traumas and will be used as a basis for idealizing the groups future. In most societies the narratives are told in a top-down fashion, where group elites take on the role of promoting the group’s narrative. Social identity theory assumes that individuals in a group will often value their group by devaluing another group, which will function as the other. In fact, many groups develop significant attributes of their identity as their identity conflicts with another group, giving their group unique characteristics, often perceived to be superior to the other.

An initial review of the concept of collective identity asserts that, “Collective identity is a concept grounded in classic sociological constructs: Durkheim’s ‘collective conscience,’ Marx’s ‘class consciousness,’ Weber’s ‘Verstehe’, and Tonnies ‘Gemeinschaft’. So rooted, the notion addresses the ‘we-ness’ of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce.” When it comes to the construction of racial and ethnic identities the collective identity is formed on the basis of perceived racial differences, thus the attributes that the group shares is often limited to physical characteristics, rather than the individual’s ideological beliefs or adherence. In the case of the Sudan where there exists aspects of shared identity between the warring factions it fits that, ‘ethnic identity is no longer anchored in strongly ethnic

---

social structures. Rather, ethnicity is a symbolic entity ‘concerned with the symbols of ethnic cultures rather than with the cultures themselves.’

The development of social or collective identity does not occur sporadically but rather occurs as a process that often starts at the earliest stages of life, which explains the emotional attachment that the individual feels towards his or her respective group. Given this lifelong development, individuals are often willing to offer a tremendous deal of personal sacrifice for the group. In his writing on social identity, Volkan states, “The psychoanalytic view indicates that ethnicity or nationality originates much as other emotional phenomena do in clans or tribes. The sense of self is intertwined at a primitive level with the identity of the group. Membership in these groups is not like that in a club or professional organization, since it is tinged with raw and primitive affects pertaining to one’s sense of self and others and to their externalization and projections.” This idea begins to explain why individuals feel such an overwhelmingly attachment to their group and provides insight on the dedication of people in times of conflict.

Within the context of conflict, sociologists, including Benedict Anderson, often focused on the concept of imagine community, “national identity is a socio-cognitive construct—one both spatially and temporally inclusive, both enabled and shaped by broader social forces. He documents key moments of identity construction, times during which cultural (language) and social factors (capitalism, print technology) convene in a

---

particular historical moment, effectively remaking collective images of the national self.”

The ideas of sociologists, such as Anderson are explained and developed further by others who focus more closely on minority groups, “As Wendy Brown (1998) theorizes, collective identity is often developed as the result of external forces and the collective’s response to them. Coser (1956) first applied this analysis more comprehensively to the maintenance and formation of social groups, theorizing that group conflict (either real or perceived) produces internal cohesion. Both Coser and Brown found this to be particularly true among minority groups forged through the experience of being outsiders and under threat. In Coser’s analysis, social conflict allows for group consolidation and the centralization necessary for social action.”

Ethnic conflicts cannot be oversimplified to be driven only be the identity factor, but must take into consideration the role that conflicting interests have in driving a conflict, as well as motivating group members to engage in acts of violence in order for the group or even the elites in the group to realize their objectives. In order to elaborate on this issue Ross writes, “In examining the role of identity in ethnic conflict, it is important to acknowledge that interests also drive conflict in general and ethnic conflict in particular (Ross, 1993a). If interests and identities are two imperatives that drive ethnic

---


conflict, then each can provide motives for political organization and action. At first glance, interests seem more straightforward motives, are easy to articulate as political claims, and provide a basis for group (or individual) goals.”

Religion and its role in promoting violence or fostering peace is an academic area that until recently, was relatively neglected in the field of conflict analysis and resolution. The available academic literature makes a point to distinguish between soft religion and hard religion where soft religion can be explained as, “The sense of unity is still there, but in everyday life, not as a mystic experience. Religion is warm, compassionate, reaching out horizontally to everybody, to all life, to the whole world without ifs and buts, reservations and exceptions.” Whereas hard religion is understood in the field as, “Hard religion will have difficulties remaining neutral relative to these seven fault-lines in the human condition. To that could be added that hard religion tends to believe in a God that chooses those who believe in Him, the true believers. A fair deal: I/we choose you, you choose me/us.”

With the dominance of religious rhetoric such as animism and Christianity, as well as the legal structure brought through with Islam, exploring the influence on religion in the Sudanese context is key to understanding how it has influenced and shaped the conflict.

Understanding secessionist movements is at the heart of understanding how the secession of the Republic of South Sudan was framed by the dominating players, as well

---


as how it came to be that the southern Sudanese region was able to succeed in its desire to secede when numerous other secession groups have failed or continue to struggle in their cause. Article 1 of the United Nations’ Charter states that one of the primary purposes and principles is, “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” This guiding principle is at the forefront of the secessionist debate because it raises questions, when are groups allowed to secede from the mother country and in what instances are states entitled to wage war in order to protect their borders? A literature review of numerous publications was undertaken to understand how secession movements are framed, a comparison of what makes one group successful while another fails, differences between peaceful versus violent secessions, as well as understanding the different attitudes and perspective of the respective mother countries. Additionally, there exists a great deal of disagreement by what is meant by the term peoples in the UN Charter, “The literal interpretation is not possible because there is no agreed definition of ‘peoples’ in international law nor among scholars, and this interpretation was never intended by the makers of the UN texts. The UN conception of the right to self-determination of peoples was closely associated with the world-wide movements against colonialism and racism. Thus, the right to self-determination was generally interpreted to be limited to emancipation from European imperial rule, and the right not to be subject to racist domination (as in South Africa) or alien occupation (e.g., the situation of the Palestinians).”

22 The Right to Self-Determination in International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy Author(s):
While secessionist movements vary in their goals, secessionist movements generally have one of two objectives, either to create an independent country or to obtain autonomous control over a region in which their respective group resides. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on the former objective; however, mention on the later goal will occur to discuss the transitional period in the Sudan’s history when the southern region obtained a degree of autonomy. In reviewing the literature on secessionist or separatists movements, there has emerged two patterns in the literature that have been be framed as questions by Donald L. Horowitz’s work on secessions, “namely 1.) what forces are responsible for the general upsurge in secessionist movements, from Burma to Biafra and Bangladesh, from Corsica to Quebec, and from Eritrea to the Southern Philippines? and 2.) what moves certain territorially discrete ethnic groups to attempt to leave the states of which they are a part (or at least to secure substantial territorial autonomy), whereas other groups, also regionally concentrated, make no such attempts?”

Taking into account numerous secessionist movements and different groups, it becomes evident that responding to the aforementioned questions should take into account the different circumstances present across different geopolitical environments, as well as the time period when these respective secessionist movements arise.


Given the great deal of debate surrounding secessionist movements there exist six general contemporary theories of national self-determination, all of which are based on liberal democratic values and include, liberal, democratic, communitarian, realist, cosmopolitan and liberal-democratic theories. The liberal theory of national self-determination “must show that national self-determination is necessary to protect the fundamental rights of individuals.” In the case of democratic theories it begins, “with the assumption that the most fundamental value is the view of legitimate power, and locates such power in the people rather than in an elite...Communitarians argue that, if there is a right to self-determination, it must be a communal right...Realist theories are guided by two properties: (1) they endorse only those conceptions of the right to self-determination that could be accepted by the power-holders (particularly, states) in the contemporary world; (2) they accord priority to the stability of the existing states-system...The fundamental principle of cosmopolitan ethics can be found in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’ Cosmopolitans infer from this that national identities and state borders are, in principle, irrelevant to any human being’s entitlement to the necessary conditions of a good life.”

A general rule of thumb appears in the literature that is a starting point to respond to the first question, “Whether a secessionist movement will emerge at all is determined...
by domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state. Whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state.”

The primary exception to this rule is, “A group that might otherwise be disposed to separatism will not be so disposed, or will limit its activity in that direction, if its secession is likely to lead not to independence, but to incorporation in a neighboring state, membership in which is viewed as even less desirable than membership in the original state.”

Numerous factors play determining roles in whether or not a group will seek to secede from its original state and can be categorized into the following: “war defeat (e.g. Austria-Hungary), foreign intervention (e.g. Panama-Colombia), ideological differences (e.g. Taiwan-China), and economic and governance issues (e.g. Singapore-Malaysia)-and the influence of non-ethnic variables-such as economic conditions, regime type, or whether the partition was peaceful.”

By and large, it is accepted that redrawing the world’s present state borders will destabilize the international world order and will generate a quantity of nation states that would be detrimental to diplomatic relations. Despite the notion that respecting state borders is imperative to global stability, this ignores the fact that throughout history
nation states have disputed borders with their neighbors, even conquering lands geographically distant from them, without regard for an international system that would object to such measures. However, due to the establishment of the United Nations and the end of empires around the world, the international community has come together to promote a legal framework in which, state borders are inherently a part of the modern international order.

This newfound and universally embraced notion that maintaining state borders is an imperative part of maintaining global stability was contested by former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council of the Central Intelligence Agency, Graham E. Fuller argued, “Those states that cannot manage their ethnic minorities in ways that satisfy both past grievances and future aspirations for greater self-determination are destine to break apart. Not the present nation-state but self-defined ethnic group will become a basic building block of the coming international order.”28 While the issue of nationalism is often held to have a basis in a heterogenous identity, the present borders were drawn up without regard to ethnic, religious, or cultural concerns. In this sense, the secession of South Sudan can been seen as an affirmation of Mr. Fuller’s statement because it has given the Southern Sudanese a sense of hope that it will establish a framework which will allow the group to achieve their future aspirations.

Given the growing importance of international law amongst the international community, it becomes necessary to explore the notion of self-determination as a guiding principle, as well as a legal framework within international law. It is without a doubt that

28 Redrawing the World’s Borders Graham E. Fuller pg. 11
international law is an ideal framework that the international community works to strive within; however, the international legal system is in its infancy and it is difficult to idealize any principle that falls under the category of international law. International law is currently overwhelmed with the issue of state sovereignty versus the communal sense in which international law operates, at what point in time does the international community have the responsibility to protect citizens of a nation from their own government? How will these laws be enforced? How are weak states supposed to address their grievances with strong states, when they lack the capacity to enforce any legal ruling against the stronger party? This list of questions, and many more, need to be answered if the international community aspires to operate under the structure of international law.

Prior to exploring the legality of secession it is important to take into account the moralistic issues surrounding the topic. Surveying the literature unveils common concerns prevalent in the moralistic debate regarding secession, which can precisely be summarized as, “Among the most important of these are questions about the rights of the state over territory and about the authority with which it governs its population. These are issues about legitimacy. Secessionist demands also raise questions about the moral status of nationalism and other particularistic attachments, and about the power of such attachments to justify political arrangements. And they raise deep questions about democracy and liberalism, including issues about the priority of liberal justice, since a population might reveal in a democratic plebiscite that its support for secession takes
priority over its desire for justice.\textsuperscript{29} This debate cannot be overlooked, especially at a time when intrastate conflict has become commonplace and it seems possible, that the future will witness a great increase in groups who are looking to secede from their present countries.

In terms of protracted violent conflicts, peace agreements often offer a glimmer of hope for a peace resolution; however they vary in form and effectiveness. According to peace researchers Harbom, Hogbladh, and Wallensteen, agreements can be categorized into three groups, namely full agreements, partial agreements and peace process agreements. The available literature explains the categories in these terms, “The most clear-cut is a full agreement defined as an accord where at least one dyad agrees to settle the whole incompatibility… A partial agreement is defined as an accord where the parties in at least one dyad agree to settle part of the incompatibility… The third type is a peace process agreement, an accord where at least one conflict dyad agrees to initiate a process to settle the incompatibility.”\textsuperscript{30} It is likely that the secessionist movement of South Sudan is a demonstration of a combination of the aforementioned peace process agreements.


Data Collection Methods
The research for this thesis was carried out using a predominately qualitative approach. In order to conduct an intellectually honest analysis of the conflict and how it has led to South Sudan’s self-determination, it is imperative to conduct a cross-study analysis of the available data, as well as to use different critical analysis methods to generate new sources of knowledge. One of the primary goals of this study is to correlate and generate an understanding of the variables that are in play with the conflict. One of the primary benefits of doing so will be establishing trends that are present and it will become clearer which variables have casual versus correlated impact on one another. It will be necessary to use various approaches in gathering the data in order to develop a pattern of the historical occurrence and to discover any overlap in existing data. The basis of the study will require qualitative and quantitative research. At the start of the research a thorough literature review will be conducted in order to establish what information and knowledge is already available in the field. Conducting a literature review will allow room for a historical comparative analysis to take place, which can be verified by the accessibility of primary sources, such as official documents.

Given that the conflict in the Sudan has had a significant basis in history, and has continued to present times, I undertook mapping of the conflict in order to clarify and prioritize the events that occurred in the Sudan, with the intention to bring clarity into a highly complex conflict. Using the Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three-Pillar Approach model presented by Dr. Dennis Sandole I took into consideration that the information I presented should be beneficial to conflict practitioners, “conflict analysts and potential third parties would want to know something about: (a) the
parties; (b) the issues about which the parties are conflicting; (c) the objectives they hope to reach by conflicting over those issues; (d) the means they are employing to achieve those goals; (e) their orientations to conflict and conflict handling; and (f) the nature of the environments within which their conflict occurs and their efforts to deal with it are played out.”

The high level of complexity of the Sudanese conflict was reflected in that the nature of the conflict was both structural and nonstructural. This became readily apparent during the compilation of the issues involved in the conflict.

In order to begin assessing how the conflict in Sudan has led to the succession of South Sudan it is necessary to undertake an extensive qualitative study in order to put forth theories that can properly explain the context of the numerous variables at play in the conflict. Due to the complexity of the conflict, as well as the overlap between contributing variables, I opted to invoke a method of a modified Venn diagram, as is outlined in Kristin Luker’s textbook on conducting qualitative research, *Salsa Dancing Into the Social Sciences*. The null set for this thesis study involved: Sudan, colonialism, secessionist movements, international law, negotiation agreements, etc. The justification behind this particular list was it became necessary to assess and understand this background information to put forth an argument that was applicable to the unique situation in the Sudan. Much of the intellectual discussion surrounding South Sudan’s secession has accepted that given the incompatibility of the groups in the Sudan, the secession was inevitable; however, looking at international case studies it is readily

---

apparent that the situation and relative peaceful secession of South Sudan could not have been anticipated.

The data collection conducted for this thesis can be broken down into 2 parts. The qualitative research undertaken for this research reviewed the literature available on identity and resource conflicts, as well as articles which assessed the colonial context of the conflict. Thus, theory testing is one of the pillars of the approaches taken in this thesis. In order to proceed with the theory testing approach, I began by carefully outlining questions that I would need to investigate in order to conduct useful testing of the available theories with the empirical evidence that is available. Essentially, I launched the research process by collecting and analyzing the available data in stages. I worked on basic assumptions and the understanding that I had of the Sudanese conflict, as well as theories rooted in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, then proceeded to expand my assumptions and hypothesis as I reviewed the available literature. The general goal was to find an applicable theory, which was able to facilitate an explanatory value.

While conducting my literature review, I outlined several patterns and themes in the literature. I began reviewing the previous literature in the field by assessing how researchers interested in the Sudanese conflict, characterized the conflict, as well as investigating what were being identified as the root causes of the conflict. The key ideas and notions which were identified include the role of identity-be it ethnic or religious, economic motivations, British colonial policy, influence of foreign countries, as well as differences in regional development. In terms of which factor was held to be the root cause of conflict, the available research championed religious and ethnic tensions as the
primary drivers of violence. Given that the two aforementioned factors were perceived in
the academic realm to be the primary causes of the Sudanese conflict, I proceeded to
explore them at much greater length, by studying not only why researchers were blaming
these two respective factors for the conflict but also what multiple disciplines within the
social science sphere, understood these two factors to have on causing violent conflicts.

After focusing on the role of British colonial history in the Sudan, as well as
clashes in religious and ethnic identity, I found that the two factors failed to thoroughly
explain the conflict in the Sudan and moved onto the other factors that were believed to
play a role in driving the conflict. The conflict in the Sudan is so complex, it required
careful evaluation of all the various factors that are likely to have had an influential role
in driving the secessionist movement of the southern region. Many of these variables
were interwoven and remain difficult to assess thoroughly given the lack of reliable
documentation; however, a close review of the quantitative data available on South
Sudan provide great insight on the socioeconomic differences that have heavily
contributed to the secessionist stance.

The second stage of research involved collecting and reviewing theory from
within the field of conflict analysis and resolution, in an attempt to determine which
theories held water when tested against the happenings of the North-South Sudanese
conflict. In order to assess the applicability of the theories, they were analyzed within the
historical context of the Sudanese conflict and were also tested for their own validity.
Evaluating the accuracy of the theories against the conflict in the Sudan is needed in
order to see if the theory can withstand empirical verification, particularly across various
conflicts. It is necessary to iterate that it is not assumed that if the theory is not applicable to the Sudanese conflict that it should be disregarded, instead the aim is to investigate whether or not the Sudanese context makes the theory useful. Given that the field of conflict analysis and resolution is in its early, developing stages, it is critical that theories that are promoted by practitioners are assessed against contemporary conflicts in order to edit and modify theories as necessary. The deductive approach was the overall theoretical drive of this research project, testing numerous theories from multiple disciplines.

There are of course, limitations as well as advantages to using a qualitative approach; however, given the historical context of this conflict, the qualitative approach was the best research method available to gain understanding of the conflict in the Sudan. It is necessary to acknowledge that there exist so many details in a conflict as complex as the one in Sudan, that it would be difficult to assess all of them, primarily because they are not being documented, but also because of time and resource constraints. Interviewing individuals that have had much influence in leading the Southern Sudanese secession would have benefitted this study tremendously and further exploration of this type is necessary to gain a more accurate understanding. Despite the fact that there are clear limitations to conducting qualitative research, there does also exist a great deal of benefits.

One of the greatest advantages to using a qualitative approach in this thesis is that there exists a great deal of primary sources available from official government sources that opened up the option to validate theoretical claims that were put forth in the literature, this is especially true once British colonization took place but also, the United
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, along with other international organizations have made a great deal of information available to the general public. This of course, is due to the high level of organization that the British government enforced during the colonial policy and the need for these international bodies to be transparent in the work that they conduct. Having a great deal of transparency in highly controversial issues eases the research challenge.

Given the aforementioned limitations of the qualitative research approach for this research topic, it became necessary to include a quantitative analysis to further investigate the research topic, as well as to further test several of the aforementioned theories. In order to uphold the validity of the arguments put forth behind the factors that drove the secession, it became necessary to conduct quantitative research to search for variances between different regions of the Sudan, as well as amongst ethnic and identity groups. The lengthy North-South civil war is filled with empirically verifiable statistics. As such conducting a quantitative study is necessary to thoroughly assess the grievances and devastations of the two wars. A great deal of data is available from numerous international organizations, as well as international government organizations, including but not limited to the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Union, as well as humanitarian organizations such as CHF International, Action Against Hunger, International Rescue Committee and the International Medical Corps. This of course is not an exhaustive list but is a starting point in which the research was conducted.

Analyzing these various data sources is necessary in order to find the most accurate
data, as well as to pinpoint and weed out any inaccuracies in the knowledge bank. Some of the essential variables that will be considered will indicate economic and political differences between the two regions. General war figures are necessary in order to assess the consequences of the war including but not limited to the number of individuals who were directly killed by the war, figures for individuals who died as an indirect consequence of the war, military expense figures, figures of displaced people due to the war, and cost of rebuilding after the conflict, all of which are factors that need to be carefully reviewed in order to provide an accurate understanding of the happenings of the conflict.

**Data Analysis Method**

Given the overwhelming quantity of relevant resources available surrounding not only the conflict in Sudan but the numerous subcategories that are relevant to this thesis, it became necessary early on to conduct a thorough process of reduction, in order to determine which of the resources were not only applicable to the study but which were able to generate a persuasive argument that can be found to be empirically sound, as well as theoretically vibrant. To achieve this reduction, I found it necessary to search for patterns amongst the arguments that were prevalent in the qualitative review that I conducted. Additionally, it was necessary to research arguments that were not found in the general trend of arguments in order to assess whether the dominant discourse was misguided, if not all together wrong. One of the greatest challenges I faced while eliminating information that seemed relevant, was assessing whether or not arguments that were accepted as theoretically sound, could be verified empirically.
After I conducted my literature review, it was necessary to verify whether or not the general assumptions that were made in the literature could be validated. In order to do this I obtained official documents that had been archived by both the United States’ Library of Congress and the United Kingdom’s Official National Archive, who had obtained documents from British, Egyptian, and Sudanese government officials. At this point, there are numerous assumptions that have been firmly accepted as universally truth, specifically in regards to the Sudanese civil wars, and I felt compelled to challenge these assumptions, specifically because I believed that they did were not critically analytical stances to take.

I found it extremely beneficial to pull up the work of social scientists that were researching and reflecting on the conflict in the Sudan as they unfolded. In doing so, I uncovered that there was a general shift in the understanding of the conflict at hand, and it seems to have occurred in the early 1990s. Researchers writing in the 1940s and well into the 1970s did not perceive the conflict as one that was driven by the ‘clash of civilizations’ notion but rather, the general understanding was that British colonial policy, as well as the British approach to granting the Sudan its independence, fostered growing animosity between the Northerners and Southerners. On the other hand, contemporary researchers give far more attention to religious and ethnic incompatibility and in doing so; essentially ignore the implications of British colonial policy. Essentially, this approach overlooks the root causes of ethnic tensions, which as a result makes it difficult to put forth policy that could effectively overcome the rising animosity between conflicting ethnic groups. I also discovered, that while some researchers focused on
British colonization and some did not, there was rarely any mention of the impact that the Turkish-Ottoman empire had in the Sudan, in regards to their influence on creating racial tension between the Sudanese and the Southern Sudanese groups. While the influence of history should not be exaggerated, it needs to be given its fair due because conflicts are not static happenings, but rather are the culmination of history.

**Discussion**

In order to understand how the North-South Sudanese conflict transpired into the secession of the Republic of South Sudan it is imperative that there is a solid understanding on what are the root causes of the conflict. Researchers have almost universally agreed on the causes of the Sudanese conflict, “The roots of the conflict between northern and southern Sudan lie in religious diversity, geography, racial, mixture, and colonial experience”\(^{32}\); however, the aforementioned description of the conflict needs to be challenged for its validity and its value as a critically conclusive assessment. One of the most obvious factors that are overlooked in the above description is the role that the discovery of oil has had on increasing tensions between the North and the South, as well as the efficiency of the civil society that has historically existed in the Sudan. Referring back to the original hypothesis of ‘The driving variables behind the Republic of South Sudan’s secession from the Sudan are not limited to factors correlated with identity conflicts but rather, that the causes are multifaceted. While identity and

ethnic conflict are commonly discussed as distinctive types of conflict, this discussion generally places racial, religious, and cultural aspects of conflict within the framework of identity conflict. The factors that have provoked South Sudan’s secession are a reflection of the same variables, which drove the Sudan’s two civil wars; however, it is not assumed that the creation of South Sudan was a natural transition of the civil wars’.

The following discussion will begin by testing the proposed theories established within multiple-disciplines in the social sciences against the aforementioned root causes of the conflict. In order to achieve this, a careful overview of the events that have unfolded throughout the Sudanese conflict will be presented and analyzed for their conformity and adherence to the theories, which have been outlined during the Literature Review section. In the case that the theories present a cause and effect argument, the events in the Sudan conflict will be used to test whether or not they align with the prediction of the theory. Additionally, there will be a great deal of discussion on the events that led up to the secession of the Southern region, which will assess the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, foreign and/or external influence, as well as economic and political factors that influenced the Southerners to vote for secession.
CHAPTER TWO: SUDAN’S INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN POWERS

While the history of the Sudan is considerably long, the events that have led to the current conflict can predominately be traced back to Sudan’s period of colonization by the Anglo-Egyptian forces. The primary exception to this is that the tragic history of slavery in the Sudan, which has of course imprinted a conscious into contemporary Sudanese society in an incomparable manner, can be traced back to the 1830s. It would be impossible to deny the impact that colonialism has had on contemporary conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sudanese conflict is no exception; however, to blame the current state of conflict in the Sudan solely on its colonial history will be do to a disservice to the inherent truth of the matter. As the research has demonstrated the reasons that have fueled the war in the Sudan are numerous and overwhelmingly complex, and yet understanding how they have come together is an extensive process. Understanding the underlying root causes of the two Sudanese civil wars is the beginning to understanding how the South was able to secede from the Republic of Sudan. While it will be detrimental to the integrity of this thesis to exaggerate the role that colonialism has had on driving the conflict in the Sudan, to discredit it will be just as damaging. British colonial policy in the Sudan has had a great deal of influence on the present-day conflict, yet this influence most be placed into an accurate context and assessed with a balanced perspective.
The turn of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of the establishment of the Sudan’s modern history, one marked by numerous achievements and tragedies, which the Sudan, even till today, has been unable to overcome. In 1820, under the leadership of Muhammad ‘Ali, the Ottoman Army launched its first attempt to invade the Sudan, having set its eyes on the potential wealth in the Sudan which manifested itself in gold, ivory, and the slave trade. The Sudan was a country characterized by disunity amongst its tribal society, thus the Sudanese were able to put up little resistance against the invading Ottoman forces and were brought under Ottoman submission with little exertion. However, the tax system, which the Ottoman forces attempted to implement in the Sudan, greatly vexed the Ja’aliyyin tribe who refused to submit to a tax system that demanded that payments were to be made in gold and slaves. This unjust system sparked a resistance movement amongst the Sudanese groups, momentarily uniting the various tribes against the foreign occupier and in 1821, Ottoman forces, including Ismai’l were overcome and burned alive by the indigenous Sudanese. This temporarily forced the Turko-Egyptian forces to retreat until 1827 when they returned to re-establish themselves in the Sudan, this time bringing a far more reasonable tax system and even the use of diplomacy methods to persuade the local Sudanese chiefs to support the Turko-Egyptian administrative government.

Up until this point the Ottoman forces were only successful in asserting their control over what is today referred to as the Northern Sudan. The southern region, known as the Sudd was surrounded by a 40,000-kilometer swamp and was virtually segregated from the North, that is until 1827 when Ali Khurshid Agha Pasha, driven by his insatiable
thirst for slaves and gold, led an expedition to cross the Sudd and in doing so, redirected the course of history in the Sudan. While slavery had occurred under various kingdoms in the Sudan for centuries, none of the previous kingdoms were able to establish a stable slave trade system beyond the Sudd. Under the authority of the Turko-Egyptian Administration, slaves, gold, and ivory were all extorted out of lands beyond the Sudd; however, the lack of strong rule in the Sudan made the area vulnerable to other foreign forces. Christian Europeans were seduced by the economic potential in the Sudan and were driven by their desire for power, making them staunch competition for the Ottoman Empire. Not only was the Sudan now vulnerable to foreign invasion but also the lack of strong government left its economy to become stagnant. The failure to establish a strong central government in the Sudan during Ottoman rule has, in retrospective, foreshadowed the country’s modern history of backwardness and instability.

The matter of slavery in the Sudan is a complex issue and unfortunately lacks a great deal of documentation. What information is available would seem to indicate that slavery in the Sudan took a form that was unique to the slave-trade in Africa, with male slaves brought on to either serve as part of the Ottoman Empire’s military forces and female slaves being used as domestic servants in the various parts of North Sudan. Slaves were also used for farming work, given that agriculture labor dominated the Sudanese way of life. This legacy of slavery in the Sudan was the start of shaping the different identities amongst the various groups in the Sudan, identifying one group as a slave and the other as the slave master. There was also a great deal of cross-ethnic marriage, which morphed the two identities together. This distinction between the two
groups took an unprecedented hold on shaping the dualistic Sudanese identity, which for decades has continued to shape the discriminatory policies by the country’s elites. Not only did the system of slavery shape the internal attitudes of the Sudanese but it also influenced the external actors who eventually were drawn into the Sudan. This was largely due to the general racist attitude held by the European powers at the time, which was legitimized by formal institutions that prevailed around the world, in all respects, throughout the nineteenth century.

The system of the slave trade in the Sudan destabilized in 1854, when Muhammad Sai’d Pasha became the new Viceroy of the Ottoman Empire and he brought with him his desire to bring an end to the establishment of slavery in the Sudan; however, the lack of strong government in the Sudan made his attempts to end the slave trade ineffective and inadequate. This new policy direction was met with great animosity by the indigenous Northern Sudanese slave traders who believed that trading in slavery was not only a legitimate form of business, but one which would raise the trader’s social status, particularly since slavery was condoned under Shari’a, which remains a source of tremendous influence on Sudanese culture. Regardless of this change in policy, by 1860 it is estimated that 12,000 to 15,000 slaves were sent from the non-Arab speaking, non-Muslim groups of the South to the Arab and Muslim groups in the North.

Arguably, the nature of slavery in the Sudan did not uphold itself to the standards set forth for slavery under Islamic law, but nonetheless, slave traders continually used religious rhetoric to justify this means to their livelihood. Given the great deal of religious devotion that Muslims in the North had, this approach was able to generate a
great deal of sympathy amongst the society, even amongst groups who did not engage in the slave trade. Nonetheless, the attitude, which prevailed, can be summarized as such, “Slave dealing [in the Sudan] is considered by the natives as a legitimate and honourable source of profit, and all efforts at its suppression are viewed as an unjust and unreasonable interference with a custom sanctioned by the Koran, and with a time-honoured privilege.”

In a surprise turn of events under Viceroy Sai’d’s leadership, there began appointing a series of non-Muslim, European individuals to the post of Governor-General of Khartoum, which was highly resented by the native Muslim population. Islam in Sudan had flourished under the guidance of Sufi sheikhs, who spread the faith by adapting it to the needs of Sudanese society, making the customs and the laws of the religion flexible to the society that adopted it. This was unlike the Orthodox Islam, which had flourished under the Ottoman Empire, for this reason many of the Sudanese resented the Ottoman-Turkish presence in the Sudan and they grew more hostile to their presence once the Viceroy opted to promote non-Muslims to govern. This act was considered heretical by the native Sudanese population, as well as in direct contradiction to the Orthodox Islam that the Viceroy himself, ascribed to. Given the contradictions in the decision, the move to appoint these governors was viewed as not sanctioned by religious law but also driven by financial and political motivations. The Turko-Ottoman forces did exert a great deal of effort to introduce a more Orthodox form of Islam in the Sudan;

---

however, they failed to attract a strong following since many groups in the Sudan preferred a less legalistic practice of the religion.

Under Viceroy Sai’d’s governorship of Khartoum and Sennar, Christianity was permitted to be introduced to the non-Muslim population in the Sudan, further sharpening identity differences between the Sudanese in the North and in the South, that continues in contemporary times, to shape the identity clashes amongst Sudanese society. Not only did this sharpen the divide between the various Sudanese groups, but the decision to allow Christianity to spread throughout Sudan resulted in the Muslim Sudanese population becoming more resentful towards the Ottoman-Turkish presence in the Sudan. Despite the fact that this policy decision was down under Muhammad Ali’s official authority, it reflected the fact that his monopoly of power over the Sudan was beginning to slip away from his grip, under the pressure that he endured from the growing European presence.

Following a free-trade agreement enforced under Muhammad Ali’s authority, European traders united with representatives from the Vatican to promote the spread of Christianity; however, they had no plans to convert Muslim inhabitants of the Sudan and sought to spread the Christian faith amongst the Southern Sudanese who continued to practice ancient, tribal faiths, predominately animist in nature. In conjunction to saving lost souls, the Catholic Church also pursued the lucrative ivory business that continued to flourish in South Sudan. The root causes behind the decision to avoid converting the Muslim population in the North is unclear, it may be that Islam was perceived to have too strong of a following amongst its followers to convert them to Christianity, since the country and the culture had informally institutionalized Islamic law and practices.
With escalating religious and social differences taking hold amongst the various regions in the South given foreign influence, the increase in tension was further escalated by the economic exploitation by foreigners in the Sudan. During the mid-nineteenth century, Europeans, particularly British traders and government officials, were becoming unappeasable in their demand for ivory and were growing desperate in their extraction of ivory from the Sudan. At the beginning of this soon to be thriving industry, ivory trading created a great deal of partnerships between the native Africans and the foreign European traders who were at the mercy of the Africans since they possessed a large stock of ivory and because the Europeans lacked the willpower and the resources to simply loot the ivory out of the Sudan. Initially, the partnerships were between the Southern Sudanese and the Europeans; however, when the stockpile of ivory was close to being depleted the Europeans were forced to turn to the Arabs in order to hunt down the elephants and extract from them the ivory directly.

During the period of time in which the Arabs and the Europeans were extracting as much ivory as possible, the Arabs married the local African women and took on a great deal of slaves from the Southern Sudan in which they were conducted their trade. This intermarriage began peacefully but soon escalated into a series of violence as the indigenous tribes were becoming increasingly frustrated over their lands and people being exploited, especially since they were no longer being given any financial compensation. Backed by support and weapons from the Ottoman-Turkish central authority, the Arab-speaking groups began to use the opportunity opened to them from the ivory trade, to heavily raid the South for more and more slave sources. Excluding the
non-Arab groups from financial gains led to a great deal of conflict between them and the Arabs, and foreshadowed the outbreak of protracted violence that would proceed in upcoming decades.

Turk-Ottoman rule left a lasting legacy in the Sudan, having opened the door for interaction to the peoples beyond the Sudd, that for centuries had remained isolated from the rest of Sudanese society. Despite efforts to spread the Arabic language throughout the Sudan, there was little disturbance to the linguistic character of Sudanese society and despite sixty-years under foreign occupation, many tribes were able to keep their indigenous languages alive and strong. The effort of the various tribes to continue to adhere to their traditional languages exemplifies that despite Islamic leanings, many groups in the North did not wholly identify with other Arab groups, such as those from what is now known as the Middle East and North Africa, and perceived the Arabic language as simply a means of facilitating trade and religious understanding, rather than the adaptation of a new culture, a new way of life. They strongly desired to hold onto their traditions and customs, which after evolving for centuries had developed into a strong cultural identity. One of the lasting legacies of the Ottoman presence in the Sudan, is that the country was brought into the fold of the Muslim world, a new aspect of the country’s identity that it still has not successfully managed to come to terms with. As the Turko-Ottoman hold on the Sudan began to decline, it became unclear whether European interests or those of the Ottoman Empire were guiding the leadership in the Sudan, especially since there was growing overlap amongst the commercial and political interests.
One of the greatest revolts experienced in the Sudan was achieved under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abdallah, a man of Dunqulawi descent who claimed to be the awaited Mahadi, a man prophesized in Islamic tradition who would arrive to restore righteousness and purity in the faith. In 1881, Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah attracted a tremendous following; despite his opposition to the Sufi order that was well established in the northern region of the Sudan. He declared jihad against the foreign occupiers in the Sudan and led numerous revolts against the Turko-Egyptian forces, as well as the growing European presence in the Sudan. The British authorities, who had successfully brought Egypt under their control in 1882, supported the Turko-Egyptian and sent in an expedition force of 10,000 soldiers, under the command of Colonel William Hicks. Despite British efforts to defend the Turko-Egyptian establishment in Khartoum, by sending one of its greatest generals Governor-General Gordon, their administration fell to its fate in 1884 after a brutal attack by Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah who was aided by the Ansar. Governor-General Gordon was killed, along with the destruction of Khartoum.

Having established their capital in Umdurman, Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah and the Ansar were able to successful bring central Sudan under their government’s administration after completely removing foreign presence from the area; however, the success that they achieved in the center was meet with almost equal failure in the periphery. The central government spent a great deal of energy and resources silencing rebellions all over the periphery; however, it was meet with great resistance by the Southern Sudanese. By 1897 there Mahdist central government was wholly absent from
southern Sudan. The failure to secure any presence in the South was largely due to limitations in resources. The sheer mass of the land in the Sudan made it contrary to reason to think that a government at the time with limited technological advancements could be expected to assert any sort of control over a territory as large as what the Mahdist state had conquered.
CHAPTER THREE: BRITISH-EGYPTIAN COLONIZATION OF THE SUDAN

The reemergence of European interest in the Sudan was a direct result of external conflict, primarily the failure of the Italian government to subdue the Ethiopian army under the leadership of the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II in 1896, “The Italian government requested a British diversion on the Nile to discourage any Madhist attack on the weakened Italian garrison in Kassala. The British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, responded with alacrity to this splendid opportunity to seize Dongola at little cost as a prelude to the conquest of Sudan if any European power foolishly sought to control the waters of the upper Nile.”34 This resulted in the launch of efforts to reconquering the Sudan and in 1889 Great Britain sought to protect its interest in the Suez Canal by ensuring that none of the other European powers would seek to establish themselves in the Sudan; the German, French, and Italian governments all demonstrated growing interests in conquering the lands surrounding the Nile river. With the Suez Canal at stake, Great Britain seized upon the internal division that existed in the Sudan and launched an offensive attack with the help of the Egyptians and Sudanese groups who were at conflict with the central government in Umdurman.

Given the legacy of colonialism in the Sudan, it would be impossible to undertake this thesis study without reviewing the literature available on British colonial rule in

---

Africa, with a focus on the history and policies of the British in the Sudan. The instability in the Sudan during the late 19th century made the country a prime target for colonization by the British and the Egyptians, thus opening the door for the country to being ruled by an Anglo-Egyptian entity in January 1899, with the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement establishing the British as the government responsible for governing the Sudan. Great Britain’s success at establishing itself as the sole European power in the Sudan came after Napoleon’s dream of having his forces establish France as the leading imperial power were overcome as French forces were destroyed, not by military conquest, but by disease that defeated them.

During its time in the Sudan, the policy of the British government was fluid and adapted to the needs of the country, as well as the political restraints that were in place; however, what remained consistent throughout the British government’s time in the Sudan was its divide and conquer policy, a policy of the British government commonly used during its time as a colonizing power. Prior to the British approval of Egypt’s declaration of independence in 1922, the Sudan was being ruled through a joint-condominium agreement, often favoring the Arab and Muslim tribes of the northern region of the Sudan over the Black-African tribes of the southern parts of the country. The uneven social, economic, and political developments that took place in the Sudan have its roots in this favoritism. Rather than perceiving the Sudan as a multi-cultural society, the British and the Egyptian governments took a dualistic perception of Sudanese society, categorizing the Sudanese as either Arab and Muslim or Black and pagan, a gross oversimplification of a people who at the very least, have hundreds of different tribes and
ethnic groups. To be more specific, the southern region of the Sudan, and which is now the Republic of South Sudan, is mostly inhabited by numerous Nilotic tribes, whose population adheres to a mix of both Christian and animist religious beliefs.

After the Sudan came fully under British control, the British government opted to govern the Sudan through indirect rule, allowing indigenous leaders to promote British policy throughout the country during the 1920s and 1930s. While governing the Sudan, the British government was highly invested in the northern region’s economic development and modernization, and pushed for modernization by employing advanced European technology to economic projects, as well as liberalizing the institutions that were in place. Despite all these advancements made in the North, the South was by and large ignored and excluded from the modernization projects that were underway. In practice the Southern region was detached from the rest of the Sudan and was thus governed through the implementation of a separate development policy, which curtailed the region’s development.

The decision of the British administration in the Sudan to take on this separatist policy was rooted in economic motivations, rather than a racist ideology, which can largely be justified by the fact that to the British, the Sudanese were all seen to be inferior and savage. However, the racial factor developed out of the expressed opinion by the British authorizes that the cultural standard of the Arabs made the open for consumerism; whereas the Southerners held a cultural standard that was beneath the modern standard of consumerism. This in part, demonstrates the weakness as well as the genius of British colonial policy. Rather than exhausting their resources to transform the societies that they
colonized, the British government created a system that only required so little resource investment to educate and modernize the populations that were easiest to control and exploit. The outcome of such policy established colonization as a highly profitable business and at the same time a strong vehicle for institutionalizing racism not only between the colonizing forces and the Sudanese, but between the various tribes within the Sudan.

This was of course tied to the nomadic and agrarian societies that flourished in the southern region of the Sudan. Being driven by basic economic rationalization, the exploitation of the southern region of the Sudan was estimated to be far too costly than the British government was willing to invest, given that that the expected rate of return was thought to be low. The British and Egyptian governors looked to the northern territories, particularly areas that were largely populated by Arab tribes for economic exploitation because these areas were open for economic gains without the need for a great deal of capital investment, comparatively speaking. In the northern region, the Nile River provide a means of cheap transportation for raw materials found in the Sudan and which were used for manufacturing numerous goods. Cotton was particular good that was a high priority for the British given the financial return that it provided. It was the combination of these economic motivators that led the British government to educate the Arab tribes, build roads and railways, as well as establish trading centers throughout the northern region. Unfortunately, these development efforts created a great deal of economic disparity between the two Sudanese regions, which remains even till today.
This may be explained by the remoteness of Southern Sudan, but regardless, the policy of inaction in the south led to its underdevelopment. Excluding the South from economic and social development was justified by the British government on the grounds that the south was not adequately prepared to be exposed to the modern world. Additionally, despite preserving the Islamic tradition and system that was in place in the north, the British enforced a program to converting the southerners to Christianity by allowing Christian missionaries into the southern region, while simultaneously discouraging and even at times preventing Christian missionaries from entering the northern part of the Sudan.

The British Crown received a great deal of criticism for their separate policy and the harshest criticism came from their colonizing partners the Egyptians. In their response to the British claim regarding the differences amongst the different peoples of the Sudan, the Royal Egyptian Government stated, “The Annex referred to the wide differences of culture, race, religion and political development existing among the Sudanese. Some of these differences lack actual scientific support such as the difference of race. The Sudan Administration is to blame for the rest of those differences for it has deliberately sought to isolate the South of the Sudan from the North and to prevent the inhabitants of the North from getting in touch with those of the South thereby standing in the way of natural penetration and spreading of the Arabic language and the Moslem religion into the South.”

While the aforementioned statement holds a great deal of validity, it ignores the historical separation that has occurred between the North and South, which has existed

---

before British colonization. Geographic differences played a key role in separating the North and the South, the South being referred to as the Sudd, given its lack of navigable terrain. The British policy of separate rule simply reinforced the preexisting system established by the Ottoman forces and solidified by geographic separation.
CHAPTER FOUR: BRITAIN AND EGYPT PREPARE TO EXIT SUDAN

It wasn’t until 1946, with the establishment of the Sudan Administrative Conference that it was determined that the Sudan would no longer be governed as two separate entities, but rather the southern region would finally be united with the remainder of the Sudan. This decision was taken without consultation of southern leaders, leaving many southerners resentful and hostile to the decision. When it became clear that the Sudan would be granted its independence from the British, the issue of how to handle the southern region gained more attention than ever before. At the root of the general mistrust between the northerners and the southerners, was the legacy of slavery in the Sudan, which persisted even during colonial rule. The history of slavery, with Arab and Muslim slave traders from the North capturing and selling slaves from the South, left the Southern Sudanese with the opinion that if the South would be joined with the North under the authority of the Arab groups, they would have in essence agreed to be ruled by their former slave masters.

Understanding the motivation and factors driving the two separate civil wars generates a great deal of understanding on the way the secessionist movement of the southern Sudan came into play. It is necessary to discuss the two civil wars separately, with the first period of conflict occurring from 1955 until 1972. In the late 1940s, a Legislative Assembly was organized to promote and organize self-determination.
measures for the Sudan; however, given the limited number of southern Sudanese in politics, there was underrepresentation of southern Sudanese in the Legislative Assembly. The education system in Khartoum was far more advanced than in the southern region, thus southerners whom were well educated by and large received their education in the northern Sudan. It was these same southern individuals who were called upon to represent the southern interests in the Legislative Assembly despite the fact that they were far removed from the happenings of south Sudan and that they were more aligned with the interests of the northern Sudanese given their affiliation with them in education level and lifestyle. The outcome of the Legislative Assembly was the decision that occurred in 1952 that the Sudan would achieve self-determination. Unfortunately, the Assembly was conducted under the control of the foreign powers, rather than under the authority of internal actors, which of course, influenced the outcome. While it is without question that the Sudanese desired independence, there was little consideration given to the opinions of Sudanese individuals on how the new nation would move forward.

This was then followed by the Juba Conference, a gathering of southern Sudanese politicians in October 1954, which discussed the interests of the Sudan in its entirety, with a special focus on what course of action would be in the best interests of the southern Sudanese. The outcome of the Juba Conference was a vote for, “independence of the Sudan from Egypt, but on the condition that a federal system for the entire country be adopted, with an autonomous state in the South. Failing that, the South reserved its right of self-determination, which included the option of complete independence from the
North.” The decision for the southern politicians to form a conference separate from the northern Sudanese is a clear indicator on the sense of divisiveness that existed between the two groups, prior to the Sudan receiving independence. Both British and Sudanese delegates organized the Juba Conference, in order to promote Great Britain’s desire that the Sudan should be united into a singular political entity. The two groups realized that their interests were distinct from one another and they failed to develop a unified vision of the future of the Sudan.

Correspondence between the government of Great Britain and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflects a great deal of disagreement between the two colonizing powers on how to deal with the matter of the Sudan. The issue of which foreign power the Sudan belonged to was at the center of this debate. In a statement sent to the British Cabinet office, the Egyptian government stated, “The British viewpoint omitted to mention the Unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown. This is an established fact and no agreement which fails to recognize this fact can ever be acceptable to any Egyptian Government.” Not only does this aforementioned statement reflect the colonizing policy, which the Sudan was ruled by but the limited regard for the opinion of the Sudanese on their fate.

Prior to 1955, an outbreak of events occurred which laid out the course of the first civil war in the Sudan. Douglas H. Johnson argues that the Sudanization process that began in 1954 triggered a sense of hostility from the Southerners towards the

---

Northerners, “The results of the Sudanization commission, announced after the election, were a severe disappointment, as Northerners were appointed to all the senior positions in the South. Most politically active Southerners saw this as the beginning of Northern colonization of the South. The rapid increase of Northerners in the South as administrators, senior officers in the army and police, teachers in government schools and as merchants, increased Southern fears of Northern domination and colonization.”

The Sudanization process was a policy promoted during the period of colonialism, “Sudanization was an official policy of the 1940s and ‘50s. But as a term for a bureaucratic process, it can describe the entire colonial period. Thus extended, “Sudanization” can refer to the waves of hiring and promotion that displaced Egyptians, Lebanese, and Britons from the conquest to withdrawal. In the years from 1953 to 1955, a period of self-government that preceded formal independence in 1956, Northern Sudanese supplanted the British authorities who had once towered over the administration. These employment patterns—affected by educational developments, economic and political crises, and changes in leadership—are explored.”

The Sudanization process that occurred resulted in a domination of northern Sudanese who were predominately of Arab or Nubian ethnic backgrounds, which reflected the socioeconomic disparity that existed between different ethnic groups in the Sudan. Many of the Southerners grew apprehensive and hostile towards the Northerners, who were increasingly being perceived as new colonizers. Since it became clear that the

---

38 The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Douglas H. Johnson, pg. 27
39 Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Heather Jane Sharkey, page 74
British were going to grant the Sudan its independence, thus bringing together the North-South entities as one country, the Southerners began to develop growing apprehension that the Northerners were going to become their colonizers. The language that was used by the Southerners towards the Northerners is one that is characterized by a sense of rebellion.

Despite British attempts to promote the idea that the Sudanization process was done in favor of the Sudanese in order to ease the transition post-colonialism, there is strong evidence that financial difficulties forced the British to train Sudanese nationals in professional occupations to replace the more expensive foreign expats. The events leading up to the summer of 1955 fueled great animosity between the Southerners and the Northerners, and eventually resulted in violent rebellion that began in Equatoria and which spread to the Nzara and Torit provinces. While an exact estimate of those murdered is unknown, numerous merchants, soldiers, administrators and their families, all of northern origin, were killed. As a result of the outbreak of violence the British grew anxious and eager to withdraw from the Sudan, and hastened to grant the Sudan its independence.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE FIRST ANYANYA REBELLION

The 1955 mutiny that occurred was the first outbreak of violence that triggered a conflict that endured until 1972. The first civil war that occurred in the Sudan was referred to as the “War of Liberation” or the First Anyanya Rebellion and was driven with the ideas of secession, with the southern Sudanese desiring to secede from the northern region and establish their own, independent African state that was to be modeled along the same framework as the other eastern African nations. Most estimates state that almost half a million people died over the seventeen years in which the first civil war occurred, with hundreds of thousands more left internally displaced. Most of the violence took place in Southern Sudan and caused many of the Southern Sudanese to seek refuge in nearby neighboring countries such as Uganda and Kenya. The civil war destroyed the limited progress that was made in South Sudan through the destruction of schools, private residences, and hospitals. The extent of the brutality is outlined in the following graph:
The unprecedented outbreak of violence was temporarily brought to a halt in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The agreement was negotiated between the government in Khartoum and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), with the agreement to grant the south regional autonomy being the key aspect of the

---

agreement. However, despite agreeing to grant the south regional autonomy, the agreement came with a precondition that the two warring factions would foster greater unity for the Sudan, thus resulting in the southern groups to abandon their goal of secession. The international community regarded the Addis Ababa Agreement as a landmark peace agreement; one of the first of its kind during the post-colonial period but unfortunately, the agreement came with many drawbacks. The language of the agreement was too vague and a great deal of disagreement occurred between the government in Khartoum and the SSLM, particularly in regards to what was meant by the south having regional autonomy. The Southern leadership understood autonomy to mean that a federal system would be established in the Sudan, as whole, whereas the Nimieri government pushed for a Southern Regional Government that eventually was agreed to by the southern leadership.

Intensive negotiation was at the core of attempts to negotiate a resolution to the first civil war. The Addis Ababa Agreement negotiated in February 1972 was one of the most prominent negotiation agreements between the warring factions in the Sudan. Despite this landmark peace resolution, the Addis Ababa Agreement failed to resolve many of the underlying conflicts between the Nimeiri regime and those under the leadership of Lagu. Several negotiations were carried out under Lagu’s and Nimeiri’s leadership, with both sides proving their shared desire to bring an end to the outbreak of violence throughout the country. Security aspects of the agreement were clearly the most controversial, particularly in terms of the specifics of the military force. The SSLM openly expressed their desire to maintain an army of Southern soldiers, separate from that
of the north government. However, the Khartoum government who advocated for the presence of Northern forces in the South, in order to ensure that another rebellion would not break out once again, rejected this proposal. The actual text of the Addis Ababa Agreement was vague and it is troubling that it failed to articulate in clear terms aspects of the agreement that required specific action to be carried out. The Addis Ababa Agreement was successful in establishing regional semi-autonomy for the southern region, as well as ensuring that southern politicians would be granted a certain degree of representation in the central government in Khartoum. The agreement also contained provisions for developing the southern region, which since the time of British colonization of the Sudan had remained underdeveloped and by all accounts of modernization, backward.
Arguably it was former President Jaafar Numeiri who was from the Nubian tribe, the Dongola, who made the greatest policy push to establish the Sudanese identity as being one as an Afro-Arab nation. In a speech to the Sudanese Social Union, Numeiri stated, “It is the fate of the Sudan and the Sudanese people to be an inalienable part of the Afro-Arab entity. If conditions of disunity and humiliation in the past and defunct regimes prevented our country from contributing to the Arab and African fields of struggle, the present-day Sudan responds today to the call of affiliation and the call of destiny in fulfillment of its national responsibility towards our Arab nation and our mother continent.”

President Nimeiri envisioned the Sudan as a bridge between the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and took advantage of the dual identity prevalent in the country to achieve this. While this approach was not designed as a social movement but rather as a foreign policy initiative, it exemplifies the Sudan’s desire to identify with both Arab and African societies. The statements made by Nimeiri can be seen as political moves in order to gain favor with both Arab and African countries; however, within his government he acted on this rhetoric on numerous occasions. Policy changes were implemented and a push for the South’s economic and infrastructure development was underway.

The failure of the previous regimes to recognize and respond to the identity crisis that faced the Sudan following its independence, made Nimeiri’s efforts well received across tribal lines, particularly with the Southern Sudanese who were growing apprehensive, fearing that the Khartoum government would opt to characterize the nation as an Islamic-Arab one. This apprehension contributed to the commitment of both parties to the civil war that was raging on throughout Nimeiri’s reign. While the travesty of the first civil war cannot be understated, there is a key benefit that arose during the first civil war that brought forth the role that identity had played in the conflict. In a statement released by the Foreign Ministry of the Sudan, following the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which remarked, “We can look back and see that certain advantages have incidentally accrued on both sides. Through this conflict, the Northerner has come to realize that the Southerner bitterly resented his lower status and was willing to fight and die for recognition. This made the Northerner feel that there must be something vitally important, worthy of respect, and probably justifiable in the Southern demands. The Southerner on his part must have realized that national unity was of paramount value to the Northerner and that he was willing to fight and die for it.”

In the aforementioned statement made by Nimeri, the former president of the Sudan, choose language which reflected division amongst groups from the north and the south, referring to the populations based on their geographic affiliation rather than recognizing them as citizens of the Sudan. The fact that this realization arose in the conscious of both the Northern and the Southerner, decades after the Sudan was granted

---

independence, can be a strong indicator of how removed the two groups were from one another. Many of the Northerners were unaware of the demands of the Southerners and often perceived them as rebelling groups rather than individuals with valid concerns. In addition to the geographical distance that separated them, the two groups generally did not run in the same circles even when living in close proximity towards one another. By promoting a strong stance on his Afro-Arab policy, President Nimeri was a visionary in leading Sudan to accept its dualistic national identity as an Arab and African nation; however, as it has been pointed out, “The major test of the Sudan’s Afro-Arab policy must be determined by the Government’s efforts to promote regional development and integration, and to implement the constitutional arrangements embodied in the Southern Sudan Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, as approved in a regional referendum.”

Nimeiri undermined his own efforts to promote an Afro-Arab policy in the Sudan during the last two years of his presidency, when in 1983 he sought to impose Shari’a throughout the entire country, an approach that was contrary to the separate policy that was initiated under British rule of the Sudan, “The war in the Sudan began in 1983, when the Sudanese President Gaafar Numeiry took a series of measures that upset the delicate balance between the predominantly Muslim north and the heavily Christian and Animist south; among these measures was his decision to place newly discovered oil in the country’s south under jurisdiction of the north, and to build an oil refinery in the north instead of the south. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) subsequently

---

complained that the North was stealing the resources of the South, including oil; 
demanded that work cease on a pipeline to take oil from the south to the refinery in the 
north; and in February 1984, attacked an oil exploration base, killing three foreign 
workers and bringing the project to a halt. Unfortunately, President Numeri lost his 
sight of his goal to unite the country through a dualistic identity that embraced both the 
Arab and African history of the nation. Due largely to Hassan al-Turabi’s influence, the 
effort to undo the marginalization of the non-Arab population was thwarted.

---

This outbreak in violent conflict is reflective of the Hypothetical Resource Abundance/Conflict Curve, which predicts that, as there is an increase in resource abundance the probability for conflict increases. The Sudan conflict provides an empirical example of how the discovery of oil has led to a cycle of violence. However, what is unique about the Sudan case is that the conflict has broken out following the

---

discovery of petroleum resources in the Southern region, a resource that is generally not associated with internal resource conflict because it is not a lootable resource, “not that while “lootable” resources (that is, high-value natural resources with low economic barriers to entry) may provide the means and the motive for rebellion and thus engender political “disorder”, under other circumstances such wealth may contribute to the consolidation of political control and, perforce, political stability.”46 Given the wide diversity amongst the experiences of different nations that are resource dependent, it is clear that the commonly accepted resource curse theories that predict that in the case of resource-dependent states government elites deal with the high likelihood of an outbreak of conflict as individuals scramble to gain control over the resource. The following graphs express additional aspects of the relationship between economic factors and secessionist movements:

Table 2: Potential Secessionists, by Group and Regional Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backward groups</th>
<th>Advanced groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Backward regional economies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudanese</td>
<td>Ibo in Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karens in Burma</td>
<td>Tamils in Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims in the Philippines</td>
<td>Baluba (Kasai) in Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims in Chad</td>
<td>Lozi in Zambia&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagas and Mios in India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims in Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengalis in Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northerners in Ghana&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advanced regional economies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda in Zaire</td>
<td>Basques in Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakonjo in Uganda</td>
<td>Yoruba in Nigeria&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batéké in Gabon&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Baganda in Uganda&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Nonsecessionist groups.

---

Many connections can be drawn between the first and second civil wars; however, the second civil war that occurred differed from the first civil war in that the stated objective of the SPLM/A was to liberate the entire Sudan, not just the south, from the system of oppression that was generated by the centralized government in Khartoum. This was a key turning point in the conflict, as it signaled that many people were eager to see themselves as Sudanese first and foremost, rather than focusing on their geographic

location or tribal connection. Changes in the political objective of the rebelling southern groups grew out of changes in the identity of the group. This identity shift that occurred was the greatest indicator that the Sudan could remain united, if structural changes were made that would eliminate the oppression of weaker ethnic and tribal groups. A group’s identity is compiled of several different variables and different aspects of one’s identity shift in the order of their priority.

Moving past the demand of secession to the demand of unity with the condition that all of the different peoples of the Sudan would be recognized as equal citizens under the law, was the framework in which the platform of the New Sudan was based on. The Old Sudan was a nation that was structured based on the desires of a minority population, excluding the needs and demands of the rest of the population, often discriminating in regards to one’s ethnicity, religion, gender, and socioeconomic status. The essence of the New Sudan would be to resolve the grievances of the past and move forward as a united nation, in order to prosper and live together peacefully.
CHAPTER SEVEN: SPLA/SPLM EMERGES ON THE SCENE

The Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army (SPLA) have dominated the political realm of the southern region of the Sudan since its establishment by its infamous leader Dr. John Garang in 1983. It grew out several different political factions in the south as President Numeiri implemented key policy changes that resulted in a deteriorating relationship with key southern leaders. Several key policy decisions planted the seed for backlash from the southern group. Sensing growing dissidence in the south as well as in the north, Numeiri became highly paranoid and began to tighten his control over the Sudan. Threats of overthrowing his government became commonplace, with numerous groups attempting assassination and coups. In an attempt to reassert his power, Numeiri dissolved the Regional Assembly and Governments that were in place in 1980, 1981 and again in 1983. Additionally, his government, issuing daily arrests, trials, and even executions on any who challenged his authority, implemented authoritarian steps. On April 29, 1984, he declared a State of Emergency and authorized unrestricted authority to the armed forces, police, and civil authorities, going as far as to remove any constitutional checks to his power.

The second policy change which further intensified the already tense relations between the Khartoum government and groups in the South was the redefining of borders in the South, “The decision in May 1983 by Numeiri to divide the South into three
regions—Upper Nile, Bahr el-Gazal, and Equatoria, each region being headed by a Governor, appointed by Numeiri, and aided by a Deputy Governor and five regional Ministers.”

Implementing this policy decision not only demonstrated complete lack of respect for the interests and desires of the peoples of south Sudan but it demonstrated the central government’s desire to not only impose its political will of the south by weakening the region, and by generating a great deal of political and economic inequality between the southern groups. The decision to divide the south was welcomed by the Equatorians who had a long history of collaborating with the central government in Khartoum but it also infuriated the Dinka who dominated the area of Bahr al Gazal and the Upper Nile.

President Numeiri’s decision to redefine the borders of the South was driven by the newly discovered oil resources that were in the southern region. The southern part of the Sudan has always had a vast deal of economic potential given that the land is highly fertile and if developed, could have been used for a great deal of agricultural projects. In addition to the fertile lands of the south, the land is also rich in natural resources that include gold, uranium, copper, and nickel. Despite this great deal of economic potential, the south was continually neglected not only by the British colonizers, but by the Khartoum elite. The discovery of oil changed this and brought into play the role that resources which are easily accessible and exploited have in driving conflict between groups, particularly when a weak government is in place. Dividing up the Southern

region made it easier for the ruling government in Khartoum to exploit the economic potential of the South, with little regard to the wishes of the local population.

The violent outcome of the discovery of oil reserves in Southern Sudan and as a result the policy changes enacted by then President Numeiri align with the highly influential research conducted by the World Bank under the guidance of economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler who demonstrated that, “countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities—a category that includes both agricultural produce and natural resources—are highly prone to civil violence. In explaining the correlation between primary commodities and conflict, Collier and Hoeffler argue that conflict may be explained either by greed or by grievances, such as feelings of ethnic or political marginalization.”

While the Sudan did not begin oil production until 1999, the perceived potential for wealth was enough to spark violent resistance against the regime in Khartoum, resistance that had become complacent over the years.

In retaliation to the new policy reforms implemented by Numeiri, former prominent Anyanya officers developed to contingency plans, “The first was where a socialist government was to be established and measures taken to assist in transforming the situation in Khartoum. The second plan, in the event that Khartoum attacked first, was to regroup and reorganize to wage a protracted armed struggle for the total liberation

---

of the Sudan. As a result of the Khartoum government’s attack on Bor and Pibor garrisons in the summer of 1983, the Ayod garrison led an attack against Khartoum forces. This is the outbreak of violence that led to another cycle of violent conflict between the two groups. Many of the southern soldiers who had been absorbed into the Khartoum military deserted their positions and went into hiding in the bush, where they aligned themselves with other southern groups who were organizing to lead the southerners in an all out war with the Khartoum government.

While there were numerous factions of these Southern groups, the South People’s Liberation Army emerged as the leading group under the leadership of Coloniel/Dr. John Garang de Mabior, a southern of Dinka heritage. Under Dr. John Garang’s leadership the SPLA/SPLM abandoned the idea of the South seceding from the North and sought to establish a new way of life in the Sudan. The ability of the SPLA/SPLM to survive in such a turbulent climate, such as that which existed in South Sudan during the 1980s, was really the result of external forces providing financial and resource support. Dr. Garang allied himself with President Nimeiri’s enemies, and found financial support from Israel, Ethiopia, and even Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi. Tracing the origin of the unification movement and the external conflicts which were ongoing between Ethiopia and Eriteria, Israel and the Sudan, and Libya and the Sudan, it seems plausible to conclude that the rise of Dr. Garang to a position of leadership had more to do with logistical support, rather than a reflection of the unified will of the Southern Sudanese.

---

51 The Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army (SPLA); Philipa Scott; Review of African Political Economy, No 33, War and Famine (Aug. 1985), pp. 69-82; Taylor and Francis, Ltd. Pg. 70
One of the primary supporters of Dr. Garang came from Ethiopia’s leader at the time, Haile Mengistu Mariam who was dealing with the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea which shared a great deal of similarities with the Sudanese conflict, given the Eritrean calls for secession from Ethiopia and the religious divide that existed between the Muslim majority population in Eritrea and the Christian majority Ethiopian population. Since Ethiopia could not outright endorse Southern Sudanese vision of secession given its struggle to prevent Eritrea from seceding, Mengistu fostered for another venue to support the SPLA/SPLM, “Mengistu looked to the creation of the SPLA to pursue a national agenda that called for a united Sudan and adopted a Marxist ideology of the type favoured by the Ethiopians, that is, statist, centralized, and beholden to Addis Ababa and its Eastern Bloc supporters.”

52 Given Nimeri’s support for Eritrea during this conflict, it seems as though Mengistu exploited this opportunity to undermine Nimeri in the internal Sudanese conflict. It would have also served Ethiopia’s interest at the time of the Cold War to have a regional ally. Additionally, this conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea coincided with growing tensions between the Sudan and Israel, which was supportive of Ethiopia during that time.

During the early 1980s, the SPLA promoted socialism as the only ideology, “which can unify a country of such sharp racial, religious, and tribal diversity.”

53 This strategy is well in line with [insert theory that socialism is the best ideology for

53 The Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army (SPLA); Philipa Scott; Review of African Political Economy, No 33, War and Famine (Aug. 1985), pp. 69-82; Taylor and Francis, Ltd., pg. 71
revolution]. Not only did the SPLA aim to establish the Sudan as a socialist country but the group was also hard at work shifting the identity of the nation by abandoning terms such as Northerner or Southerner and instead promoted the idea of unity by identifying every individual as Sudanese. The New Sudan or Sudanism, was an innovative concept, developed by Dr. John Garang in 1983, in response to what many are now referring to as the Arabization or Islamization policies of the Khartoum governments, initiated during the last two years of Numeiri’s presidency. In essence Sudanism was an attempt to overthrow the oligarchy of the Muslim Arab political elites who had obtained dominance over the country’s affairs since the Sudan was granted independence. The idea that any inhabitant of the Sudan should be embraced as equal citizens of the law was an idea revolutionary in the country because for centuries the nation had been divided up based on the ethnicity and religion of its inhabitants.

Despite the fact that the SPLA/SPLM grew to become the dominant political wing of the South, many Southerners were resentful that the group did not promote the South’s secession from the North. Even amongst the SPLA, at the start of the group’s formation, there was a great deal of division on whether or not the group should support a secessionist movement of South Sudan. Dr. John Garang resented the notion of secession mainly because of the failure of the Anyanya 1 rebellion during the 1950s to secede. Dr. John Garang often argued that the primary challenge that the Sudan faced had little to do with secession but rather was rooted in the injustices that were prevalent throughout the country and which were enforced by the ruling government. Despite being championed for his unprecedented leadership and for his potential to resolve the ongoing conflict
between the North and the South, under Dr. Garang, the SPLA did not operate with a
democratic system and it was generally understood that challenging his position,
particularly when it came to the notion of secession, was unacceptable.

One of the greatest challengers to the ideals of the SPLA/SPLM was the Anyanya
2 movement, which resented the SPLA’s abandonment of the secessionist movement,
which it had promoted since 1955. Not only was the secession of the South the primary
objective of the Anyanya 2 group but also the group greatly resented the SPLA’s
commitment to liberating the entire Sudan because they believed that the primary loyalty
should be to the South. They perceived their struggle to be limited to the South and they
had no desire to embrace a Sudanese identity but rather hoped to establish a Southern
Sudanese identity that was ethnically, culturally, and geographically distinct from the
Sudanese of the north. A great deal of this belief was rooted in the fact that there exists a
homogenous society in the South, that is by and large culturally distinct from other tribes
in the Sudan, despite the fact that there continues to exists tribal differences in the South.
The tribal disagreements that characterized internal conflict in the South cannot be
overlooked. The Dinka tribes from Bahr el Gazal and the Upper Nile regions primarily
supported the SPLA. Other southern tribes, particularly the Equatorians, resented the
work of the SPLA and were openly hostile to certain SPLA activities, especially when
the political group turned to kidnapping foreign workers stationed in the Sudan.
CHAPTER EIGHT: SUDAN SEARCHES FOR ITS SOUL

The acute crisis of identity of the Sudan is often deemed to be the driving factor of the root causes and now arguably, the secession of South Sudan; however, it is almost now accepted without question that the shaping of the national identity was driven by, “three factors-Arabization, Islamization, and slavery.”\textsuperscript{54} Focusing on these factors has led to the following questions, who are the Sudanese? Is the Sudan to be considered amongst the Arab-Islamic nations of the Middle East and North African countries, or should the Sudan be categorized with Black sub-Saharan Africa? The notion that the Sudanese identity, regardless of geographic location or ethnic features, cannot be limited to a singular characterization is often dismissed. Many prominent Sudanese leaders recognize that the nation remains in search of its national identity, with Dr. John Garang once stating, “Sudan’s major problem is that it has been looking and is still looking for its soul, for its true identity.”\textsuperscript{55}

Despite the fact that the Sudan has an extensive history that has shaped and reshaped the identity of its inhabitants, there has been a great deal of focus on the development of the Arab identity of some tribes in the North. If we affirm that the Sudan

\textsuperscript{54} Sudan: A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself, Francis M. Deng, pg. 155
\textsuperscript{55} Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at...Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 127.
is in fact a tribal society and has been for centuries then it is without a question that the Sudan is a nation whose inhabitants possess mixed ethnic roots, often combining Nubian, Arab, and indigenous groups through intermarriage; however, numerous groups in the Sudan have sought to avoid mixing with other tribal groups for numerous reasons. The notion that the country could be divided into Arab or Black-African ethnic groups based simply on an arbitrarily line is simply an assertion that is based on ignorance of the Sudanese population.

A mistake commonly made is the general association with Islam as a faith and Arab as an ethnicity or culture; however, it would be naïve to underestimate the reach that Arab culture has had on the people of the Sudan and to a much smaller extent numerous clans and tribes in South Sudan. While the vast majority of the Sudan is not ethnically Arab, the vast majority of the population is Muslim and due to their conversion to Islam many have adopted the Arab language in place of the indigenous languages that were there. In the case of numerous tribes, such as the Nubian tribes of Dongola and the Mahaas, the Arabic language is used as a widely spoken second language. This point is important to emphasize because it demonstrates how the vast majority of the Sudan adopted the Arab culture in conjunction to their own rather than using it as a replacement. What is meant by Arabization remains unclear. Taking on the language of the religion of Islam, which is arguably Arabic, is often seen as an attempt to Arabize the population; however, the logical deduction from this argument is that when a group adopts a language it adopts the culture, which is an overly simplistic understanding of how cultures evolve. Culture is a multi-faceted aspect within society and does not depend
solely on a single variable but rather it is constructed on numerous aspects of one’s society.

One of the mistakes that many researchers make when they emphasize the Arab side of the leaders of Khartoum, is that they neglect to realize that with the exception of President Omar Bashir who is from the Jaayli, the remaining presidents since the post-colonial era have been of Nubian decent and made no attempts to claim Arabic lineage. When it comes to forming identity many in the field of international relations find it difficult to conceptualize a dual-identity. In the case of Sudan it is impossible and dishonest to characterize the Sudan as anything other than an Afro-Arab nation; however, this description does not fit neatly into the standard division of the region since countries are either thought to fall into the Middle East/North Africa category with Arab and Islam being the defining characteristics or sub-Saharan Africa where it is generally described as Black Africa. Dividing the world in these categories fails to accommodate ethnically diverse nations and in a way is a restrained form of coercion for vulnerable countries to identify with a group. This is especially relevant to the Sudan, particularly during the years prior to Britain withdrawing from the country when the colonial power was putting together economic and social policy that would either unite the Sudan with the Arab Middle Eastern countries or with the East African countries in which it shared borders and centuries of interaction.

The Sudan’s geographic location leaves many to wonder about the origin of the Arab identity that is claimed by numerous tribes in the Sudan. For centuries Arab traders traveled throughout the Sudan and given their wealth the indigenous Sudanese who were
unaccustomed to the level of wealth that the Arabs possessed regarded them with a great deal of privilege. This eventually opened the door for intermarriage to occur between the Arab merchants and the local women of the Sudan. At the same time, the Arabs brought with them their religion of Islam to the indigenous peoples of the Sudan and there began a steady rate of conversion from Christianity to Islam amongst the Nubian territories. The Arab influence greatly expanded and flourished during the seventh century, when the Islamic empire sought to conquer the Nubia lands of the Sudan, eventually resulting with the conversion of the southern Nubia people, who at the time were part of the Christian kingdom, to Islam in 1523. The invasion of Nubia was brought on by the Turko-Egyptian’s demand for slaves, which was achieved through the promotion of black African inferiority, particularly in regards to the non-Muslim populations.

The influence of Arab and Islamic culture remained concentrated in the northern parts of the Sudan and this was largely due to the geographic difficulties that made it challenging for the Arabs to move further south. Additionally, the Nile River provided an attractive location to settle along and the Arab merchants were not inclined to migrate further south. Many tribes from the northern part of the Sudan adopted aspects of Arab and Islamic culture; however, they were not inclined to completely abandon their own traditions and customs. Till this day, the Arab tribes prevalent in the Sudan remain distinct in their customs and traditions from the rest of the Arab world. Further solidifying the Arab elites’ of North Sudan commitment to their Arab identity, the Sudan joined the Arab League in 1956, shortly after receiving its independence.
The extensive debate regarding the Sudanese identity exaggerates the influence that the identity issue has had on being a driving factor behind the civil war. Looking over centuries of conflicts that occurred in the Sudan, whether motivated by the incompatibility of identity or not, do not provide us with the grounds we need to understand what has motivated individuals from both sides to pick up arms and respond to their leaders calls for war today. It is necessary to emphasize the point that this ‘clash of civilization’ explanation of the conflict in the Sudan overlooks the implications of policies that were enacted throughout colonial Britain’s rule over the Sudan which have carried on over into contemporary times. Clashes over identity, whether ethnic or religious, were notions promoted by the elites of both sides of the conflict in order to achieve their respective objectives. Arguably, if an enforceable legal system had been put into place that would have ensured that there would have been regarded citizens as equal before the law, despite race, religion, and social class, the Sudan would have been able to overcome the identity divides that have allowed war and conflict to prevail throughout the course of the country’s history.

Identity based theories in essence promote a ‘clash of civilizations’ perspective on conflict, which in practice largely ignores the underlying root causes of the conflict. At the foundation of a ‘clash of civilizations’ perspective, is the general understanding that civilizations are culturally and ethnically so different from one another that despite economic and ideological homogeneity, they will not be able to pursue peaceful relations with another. This is in direct conflict with various theories that surround resource conflict, many of which argue that economic resources will motivate and drive people to
conflict, often violent in nature, particularly when it is believed that there will be a great economic return. In case of the Sudanese conflict, limiting the understanding of the conflict to one based on incompatible differences does not do justice to the numerous variables driving the conflict.

Within the field of conflict resolution or even conflict management, religious conflicts can be framed as conflicts of values; however, in most contemporary conflicts that are labeled as religious, the conflict is not rooted in differences in religious doctrine but religion is often used to frame the conflict at hand. An example of this can be found in the ongoing conflict between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. This description resonates true for many who are directly involved in the conflict. The Khartoum government is well known to promote jihad against their southern counterparts and the Juba government has also promoted the idea that their soldiers are fighting against religious intolerance.

However, despite framing the conflict with religious rhetoric the underlying root causes have almost nothing to do with religious differences but rather are a result of a colonial history that has left the more established Khartoum government to promote political and economic policy which marginalized the Southern Sudanese tribes because they were an ethnically minority group. While there are theological differences between the Islamic and Christian faiths, both share a great deal of theological similarities and are by and large compatible with another. There are numerous examples both contemporary.
and historic which document societies where there Muslims and Christians have peacefully coexisted for extended periods of time, including countries neighboring the Sudan such as the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt and the Muslim minority population living amongst a predominant Christian population in Ethiopia. If the conflict could be explained simply as one of religious differences, how then would one explain the large number of various Christian populations living in different regions of Sudan, with minimal conflict with the Khartoum government? In order to be effective in helping to resolve the conflict between Juba and Khartoum, it is imperative that a conflict resolution practitioner recognizes not only the deeply rooted underlying causes of conflict, but to understand that religious rhetoric is being used as a psychological tool by both governments in order to keep their respective populations dedicated to the war cause.

The Islamization of the Sudan is not a movement that has occurred spontaneously, but rather is the outcome of several key events and developments in the Sudan. It is unclear what the term Islamization means; however, through its frequent use throughout the academic literature and within political rhetoric it can be deduced that the term is meant to mean a process of implementation of the Islamic religion within a society, which is strongly correlated with judicial reforms to implement Shari’a, or rather the legal system that was established by Muslim scholars based on legal aspects of the Quran and the Hadiths. It is important to take note of the development of Islam in the country because it has had a critical role in shaping the identity of the predominant tribes in the Sudan, notably the Fur, the Nubians outside of the Nuba Mountains, as well as the
various Arab tribes that exist throughout the Sudan. Islam has had a long history in the Sudan; however the religion did not spread evenly throughout the country, rather it was the Arab societies and other groups in the northern region of the Sudan who were early converts to the religion, having been familiarized to monotheistic faiths since the time of the early Christian kingdoms, such as the Kush.

In terms of the southern region of the Sudan, Islam did not institutionalize among the native population and little effort was made by the Muslim community to preach to the locals in the south. This was largely due to the general geographic separation between the north and the south that limited the contact between the two groups, until the latter period of British colonization of the Sudan. The first contact that the largely pagan groups of the South had with the Muslim population occurred during the slave trade period that occurred, with the Arab populations raiding the indigenous African population for slaves that were traded under the Ottoman Empire.

As of late, the National Congress Party that is in power in Khartoum has been largely developed by the ideology of not fundamentalist Muslims in the Sudan but by individuals that have both nationalistic ambitions and who are willing to use Islamic rhetoric to promote their views. The most conservative Muslim groups in the Sudan is without a doubt the Ansar-Sunnai group who by and large has distanced themselves from the political sphere and who have sought to implement Shari’a in their communities outside the stronghold of the central government. The Ansar-Sunnai leadership has been one of the most vocal opponents of the NCP, often using the masjids as pulpits to speak
out against the government and openly criticizing what they believe to be the exploitation of the less empowered groups throughout the country.

Hassan al-Turabi is a charismatic leader of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Sudan, who has taken on the role of promoting and demanding, an Islamic identity for the Sudan. President Numeiri’s reawakening as a pious Muslim man, is in large part due to the influence of al-Turabi. In Khartoum, and in the Arab world even beyond the Sudan, al-Turabi has been a strong force in preying upon the vulnerability of the youth, and connecting their ambitions for a future of self-respect and dignity to their identity as Muslims. Since the 1960s, al-Turabi has sought to promote a politically powerful Islamic group and eventually was able to successfully establish himself as one of the leading intellectuals of the National Congress Party. While using Western political ideology in his criticism of Western nations, al-Turabi has gained a large following in the Sudan whose many supporters buy into his belief that the United States is an anti-Islamic entity and in turn, has developed in his followers a strong commitment to their Muslim identity as being the primary aspect of who they are, not only as individuals but as members of society. His political life plagued with inconsistency, al-Turabi has heavily criticized anti-democratic regimes in the Sudan, while also accepting the role of attorney general under President Numeiri’s military regime.

The Second Civil War in the Sudan raged on between 1983 until 2005, and as a result the nation documented the highest civilian death toll in any armed conflict since World War II. The impact of the Second Civil War was felt most directly in the South, where almost virtually all of the military confrontations took place. Between 1983-2005,
an estimated 1.9 million war casualties resulted due to the ongoing violence between the successive governments in Khartoum and the rebel leadership in Juba. Additionally, the United Nations estimates that in the Southern region alone, the conflict left 4 million people internally displaced due to the violence.

Despite the fact that the South experienced the most direct impact of the conflict, the North has had to deal with numerous indirect consequences of the civil war. The conflict began and endured mostly in Southern Sudan; however, there was a great deal of violence and military clashes against rebel groups that occurred in the Blue Nile state and in the Nuba Mountain region. The loss of life for both sides were outrageously high; however, battle-deaths for both forces were nowhere near comparable to the loss of civilian life:
Figure 4.1 Battle-deaths versus total war deaths in selected sub-Saharan African conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Estimates of total war deaths</th>
<th>Battle-deaths</th>
<th>Battle-deaths as a percentage of total war deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Anya Nya rebellion)</td>
<td>1963–73</td>
<td>250,000–750,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>3–8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Biafra rebellion)</td>
<td>1967–70</td>
<td>500,000–2 million</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>4–15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975–2002</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>160,475</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (not inc. Eritrean insurgency)</td>
<td>1976–91</td>
<td>1–2 million</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1976–92</td>
<td>500,000–1 million</td>
<td>145,400</td>
<td>15–29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1981–96</td>
<td>250,000–350,000 (to mid-1990s)</td>
<td>66,750</td>
<td>19–27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983–2002</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1989–96</td>
<td>150,000–200,000</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>12–16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>1998–2001</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The indirect impact of war in sub-Saharan Africa is revealed by the comparison of battle-deaths with estimates of war deaths from all causes—primarily disease and malnutrition.

Figure 4: Battle-deaths versus total war deaths in selected sub-Saharan African conflicts

---

56 Lacina and Gleditsch, 2004, Battle Deaths versus Total War Deaths in Selected Sub-Saharan African Conflicts
CHAPTER NINE: SOURCES OF ARMS AND THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POWERS

One factor that has frequently been overlooked in the conflict in the Sudan, and frankly in intrastate conflicts in the sub-Saharan region in general, is the issue of who is the source behind the military arms that are sustaining these violent conflicts? Following Sudan’s independence from Great Britain, British forces trained and recruited local Sudanese men in order to prepare them for the possibility of the outbreak of conflict with the Southern Sudanese, and supplied them with a great deal of necessary weapons. Tracing back through the trail of the source of the arms provided to both sides of the conflict, demonstrates that the Sudan was vulnerable to external ideological battles that were occurring around the world, particularly during the Cold War. David Kinsella’s graph outlines the worldwide transfer of arms during the tense Cold War period:
The British, Americans, and West Germany continued to demonstrate a great deal of support for the government in Khartoum by providing them with arms supplies in

---

order to deal with the Southern rebellion; however, due to the Sudan’s position during the 1967 Six-Day War the aforementioned countries suspended their relations with the Sudan in a demonstration of solidarity with Israel. This provided the Sudanese with the opportunity to engage in commercial agreements with the other superpower of the time, the Soviet Union as well as other countries with Communist leanings. Between 1968-1972 the Soviet Union supplied the Sudan with a large but undetermined, number of weapons, as well as military training to the local military forces in the Sudan. However, as tensions arose between the Sudan and Marxist elements of Ethiopia’s leadership, then President Numeiri cancelled the contracts that he had with the Soviet Union and began negotiating with other nations in order to receive arms supplies.

A deal was struck between China and Sudan and by the late 1970s; the Chinese were the largest suppliers of military arms to Sudan. This particular aspect of China-Sudan bilateral relations has been impacted by the UN Security Council’s passing of Resolution 1591 in 2005 which states, “that all States shall freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that are on their territories on the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons designated by the Committee pursuant to subparagraph C, or that are held by entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and decides further that all States shall ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available by their nationals or by any or by any persons within their territories to or for the benefit of such persons or
entities”. China abstained from voting and has been accused by independent observers of violating Resolution 1591 since it continues to supply small arms to the Sudanese.

Additionally, since Sudan had cut ties with the Soviet Union during the late 1970s, the United States renewed their relations with Sudan and continued to be a major source of military equipment, with military sales between the two countries reaching a peak of $101 million in 1982. This inconsistent position of the United States periodically supporting Sudan with military assistance and at other times breaking diplomatic ties, is a valuable demonstration of inconsistent diplomacy that occurs between countries of limited political and economic strength and their relations with far more powerful global players. During the peak periods of the Cold War the Sudan was in a stronger position to pursue other sources of support; however, during the post-Cold War era that is no longer the case. Egypt maintained a critical military partnership with Sudan during the 1970s, and publicly supported Khartoum’s desire to bring an end to the Southern rebellion. In 1983, as American relations deteriorated with Sudan, Iran began investing heavily in Sudan’s civil and provided a total of $17 million in direct financial aid to Khartoum, as well as $300 million, which financed the purchase of military arms from China. The most recent investigations conducted by

Military assistance to the rebel groups in Southern Sudan trend towards countries that at various times have had diplomatic hostility towards the Sudanese leadership. When relations with Sudan deteriorated the rebel groups were supplied by Ethiopia who resented Sudanese support for the secession of Eretria. Israel has also been noted for

supplying the rebel groups, following Sudanese support of the Arab nations during the 1967 Six-Day War, though military arms were facilitated to the rebel groups from Israel by way of the Israeli embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Part of the reason the Southern groups were able to obtain substantial military support from foreign powers is that the prominent rebel groups did not adhere to a specific ideology and thus were able to appeal to numerous countries, “Downplaying ideology has served to promote the leadership role of Garang, and to strengthen the militarist nature of the movement which, in turn, gave short shrift to civil administration. The strong support the SPLM/A received from Libya, the Eastern Bloc countries, and the military regime in Ethiopia further reinforced the militarist mentality of its leadership, and raised hopes that the war could be won quickly, consequently it was not necessary to forge deep links with civil society.”\(^59\) While this served the SPLM/A in its fight against the North, it failed to provide the South with a strong civil society that it would need in order to foster growth and stability in the South once the violence ceased.

One of the most controversial of the supporters of the Southern rebel groups, particularly once the SPLA/SPLM was formed was from Libya, “The expression ‘an enemy of your enemy becomes your friend’ can aptly be applied to Libya’s position in the Southern scenario. The failure of Garang to secure Western support in the beginning

\(^{59}\) Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace Author(s): John Young

led SPLA to accepting Libya aid.” At first glance it would seem that given Gaddafi’s Arab-Muslim background that there would presumably exist the basis for a strong alliance between him and the Arab-Muslim leadership in Khartoum; however, relations between the Sudan and Libya have been cordial at best and at worst, which seems to be the more frequent occurrence, openly hostile. The Libyan government provided the SPLM with arms supplies and military training, and at various occasions, has offered to take in various rebels. While it seems as though Gaddafi would never support a non-Muslim rebellion, his resentment towards Numeiri’s close ties with the United States was enough to pull him away from his Pan-Arab stance and instead viewed Numeiri as being an internal barrier to the Pan-African ideology he began to heavily promote throughout Africa.

---

CHAPTER TEN: LOOKING BEYOND KHARTOUM AND JUBA

Beyond the happenings in Khartoum and Juba, a look at developments outside of the two central governments provide great insight into the complex political, economic, and social developments. Reviewing the history of subnational governments in the Sudan provide key insight into the inner working dynamics of South Sudan’s road to independence. Through his research, Randall Fegley was able to identify three patterned themes of interactions of governmental units in Sudan, “The first encompasses the opposing trends that have pulled the Sudanese polity back and forth between centralization and decentralization. The second theme is that of external influences, including events both within and beyond Sudan’s borders that have profoundly affected sub-national politics. Related to this, discussion of various Arab, African, Turkish, French, British, foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local influences is necessary to see how past and present systems have been shaped. Finally, four interlocking problems of trust, function, poverty and conflict are examined.”61 During the early part of Sudan’s modern history, colonial powers primarily consolidated power through the central government. Sudan has since evolved and the advent of local government began to take shape during the 1940s.

As the modern world continued to evolve, decentralization became a widespread policy throughout the world. During President Numeiri’s rule, decentralization policy began to take hold in Sudan. Decentralization tends to follow periods of economic growth because it makes the system of responding to local demands of goods and services more efficient, which is what was occurring in Sudan during the 1970s. Numeiri’s initial attempt was to divide the country into four distinct regions, namely, the Northern region, Southern region, Western region, and the Eastern region. The homogeneity of the local groups in these distinct territories in regards to local practices and customs made dividing them regions more manageable for the central government. However, the ongoing conflict in Darfur forced the central government to abandon the four regionally divisions and by 1980 the country was into the following: Northern Region, Eastern Region, Khartoum, Kordofan Region, Southern Region, Central Region, and the Darfur Region.

The emergence of these regions brought about the establishment of local governments, which lead to the development of a financial relationship between the central government and the newly established local governments. The central government transferred a great deal of financial wealth to the regional governments and there was a great policy push for regional development; however, there were a great deal of economic complications. The government in Khartoum struggled with distribution of wealth, “A continued balancing role for the national government between the wealthier and poorer regions seemed to be indispensable…Given the critical economic situation at the national
level, it could hardly be expected that the new regional administrations would obtain the means to meet the aroused expectations of their inhabitants.62

By the 1990s divisions between South Sudan and the remainder of the country had become undeniable. Khartoum’s relationship with the other regions in Sudan have been strained, despite the implementation of formal sovereignty for local governments, the central government is able to dominate and direct the local regions without much regard for the desires and wishes of the local governments. This has resulted in an outbreak of intrastate conflict in the Sudan, with rebellion groups in the Nuba Mountains and Darfur being the most prominent of the numerous conflicts currently occurring in Sudan. The central government has failed to develop the numerous regions equally and the underdevelopment of the Sudanese peripheries is contributing to an increase in resentment of the central government authorities in Khartoum. At this time, there was also a growing realization between both parties that their objectives could not be achieved through military confrontation; however, neither party would commit to putting down their arms nor both continued to spontaneously alternate between negotiations and military confrontations well into the next decade.

South Sudan’s governmental structure is uniquely removed from any design in any of the other Sudanese peripheries. Since the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, the South of Sudan has been able to obtain greater regionally autonomy when compared to the other regions in the country. This regional autonomy expanded through the 2005 CPA, which allowed for the South, under Salva Kiir’s leadership to establish state

governments and the establishment of a transitional Southern legislative assembly. The President has broad powers and there is concern that the system of government could benefit with some democratic reform. The Republic of South Sudan is currently operating under the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan and the drafting of the permanent Constitution is currently being conducted and is due to pass in 2015. As of August 2011 a new Southern parliament has convened, “The SPLM holds 90 percent of the 332 seats in the lower house, the National Legislative Assembly (NLA). In addition to members of the old Southern legislature, the chamber includes 96 former members of the National Assembly in Khartoum and 66 additional members appointed by political parties. The upper chamber, the Council of States, consists of 20 former members of Sudan’s Council of States, plus 30 members appointed by President Salva Kiir. The SPLM was given all but five posts in a 29-member cabinet. South Sudan has a decentralized system, with significant powers devolved to the 10 state assemblies. Nine of the 10 state governors are members of the SPLM.”

The dominance of the SPLM is a growing cause for concern, as the minor Southern Sudanese tribe are becoming increasingly frustrated with the dominance of the Dinka tribe.

Despite the fact that the North-South war has undeniably had the most profound impact on Sudan’s political, social, and economic structure, in recent years the North-South conflict has become overshadowed by the conflict in the Darfur region which to many serves as a microcosm of Sudan. Many have suspected that the conflict in Darfur follows the ethno-religious trends that are prevalent in the North-South conflict but the

population in Darfur is dominantly Muslim; however, the conflict has arisen due to a long history of tension between the nomadic Arab tribes who travel into Darfur in order to have their livestock graze and the settled Fur tribes, who led agrarian lifestyles. In 2003 the conflict peaked when groups in Darfur under the leadership of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army along with the Justice and Equality Movement took up arms against the Sudanese government and the groups aligned with them. The loss of life has been estimated to be around 10,000 and numerous dialogues have been established to try to reach a workable peace agreement. Progress was made in a ceasefire agreement between the government in Khartoum and the JEM. It seems that the JEM is aspiring to establish a semi-autonomous region in Darfur, similar to what occurred with South Sudan in 2005. Despite numerous negotiations revolving around the conflict in Darfur without substantial progress, a meeting was held in Doha 2011 between the Liberation and Justice Movement and the government of Sudan, in 2011 the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed. The agreement allowed a movement for power-sharing at the national level, financial compensation for the victims of the outbreak of violence in Darfur, as well as the establishment of a new Darfur Regional Authority which is charged with overseeing the region.

The conflict in Darfur has drawn a great deal of international attention given to the media presentation of the conflict as one driven over racial divides, “[M]ischaracterisation of the Darfur conflict as being about ‘Arabs’ committing genocide against an ‘African’ population was meant to appeal to a broad albeit only American audience, uniting East Coast liberals, African-American churches, and Deep South
nativists behind resolutions…led by movie stars and campus activists who decried Darfur as an ‘African Auschwitz.’ While land disputes provide a more accurate representation of the source of the conflict in Darfur, it is difficult to ignore that much of the slogans chanted at the villagers are racially charged, demonstrating a great deal of resentment to the settle Fur population. A closer examination of the Darfur conflict generates images that much of the violence that has arisen in the region has more to do with the interference of the Khartoum government and their support of the Janjaweed.

The government of Sudan’s interference in the Darfur conflict is articulated in the following statement: “There is a vicious and deliberate interlocking of decentralized violence, forced migration, racialised language and ethnic divide and rule. The scorched earth tactics in which displacement and terror are often more important than actual killing; the dehumanizing discourse that stirs up hate and antagonizes communities; the use of proxy militias, composed of marginalized groups in their own right, who are given total impunity to combat the enemy; the systematic transfer of assets (cattle, land, water holes, …) from those targeted by the government to those fighting for Khartoum; the aerial bombardment of civilians and the use of aid as a weapon against people; the false cease-fires and the relentless obstruction of humanitarian operations to wear down the international community and rebel opposition: the pattern of violence in Darfur eerily

mimics that of war in the 80s and 90s in Southern Kordofan, Equatoria, and Bahr al-Ghazal." 

CHAPTER ELEVEN: DIFFERENT ROADS TO PEACE

The Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement have been landmark agreements negotiated between parties of the north and south of the Sudan. Since the very objective of the agreements was to achieve a peaceful resolution and end the violence, it is necessary to evaluate their effectiveness on whether or not they achieved their end goal. We start by building on three simple principles of peace as has been outlined by Galtung, “1. The term ‘peace’ shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most. 2. These social goals may be complex and difficult, but not impossible, to attain. 3. The statement peace is absence of violence shall be retained as valid.”66 The case of the civil wars in the Sudan demonstrate the necessity of peace agreements to promote positive peace, which in theory will overcome the root causes of the conflicts, thus preventing the outbreak of another cycle of violence.

The key turning point in the ongoing conflict between Khartoum and Juba was brought to head in 2005, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It seemed to offer the greatest hope for keeping the Sudan united and offered solutions to

many of the issues that were not resolved in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. The realization that this conflict in the Sudan could not be won militarily is what is likely to have prompted both the Sudanese and the Southern Sudanese to seek other means of resolutions to bring an end to the devastating conflict. With the help of the international community, particularly the United States which helped set the stage for negotiations to begin taking place, negotiations between the Khartoum government and the senior leaders of the SPLA/SPLM began to take place in September 2001. While at the time there were numerous other Sudanese actors who were interested in negotiating peace agreements with the government of Khartoum, notably the rebel groups from Darfur, both the SPLA/SPLM and the leaders of the NCP opposed the inclusion of any other group, despite repeated efforts of the United Nations, the African Union, and the United States who urged the two parties to reconsider.

Within the context of his assessment on the negotiation of the CPA 2005, Mr. Timothy Carney makes two notable points, which are believed to have made the negotiation possible, “In 2001 two other important factors converged to make the negotiations possible. First, Kenya’s then president, Daniel arap Moi, decided to energize the IGAD process to end the civil war in Sudan. He saw the conflict as a source of regional instability. Moi also saw an opportunity to boost his legacy by becoming a peacemaker. He asked a very competent Kenyan general, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, to spearhead an effort to bring the Sudanese to the negotiating table. Second, the positions that formed the basis of successful negotiations had already emerged in prior talks. In one forum or another, with one interlocutor or another but usually not with each other, the
authorizes in Khartoum and the rebel SPLM/A broached, accepted, and published declarations, communiqués, and agreements that addressed important elements of each side’s demands and grievances concerning power and wealth sharing, security, and the relationship of religion and state.”67 The two points made in the United States Institute of Peace Report demonstrate that growing trend of African leaders to exert effort to become actively engaged in regional affairs and they signify that despite decades of violent conflict, there has consistently been communication between the leadership in Khartoum and Juba. On going communication has made strides in managing the conflict possible and has facilitated opportunities to explore various methods of resolving the conflict.

As Mr. Francis Mading Deng pointed out, “The CPA has addressed the national identity crisis between the North and the South by granting the South autonomy during the interim period and the right to opt out of unity through a referendum to be held at the end of that period.”68 One of the primary benefits established through the CPA 2005, was that it provided an opportunity for the Khartoum government, under the guidance of Vice-President Ali Taha, to make the idea of unification attractive to the Southern Sudanese within the five-year period prior to the referendum, in essence, this was an opportunity to begin healing the wounds of the past and to make preparations for a strong future. Not only did the CPA call for a cessation of violence but also it was guided by policy reform to correct the socio-economic disparities between the North and the South;

however, the fact that the CPA reinforced a one-state but dual-system structure made it inherently unlikely to achieve the goal of unification.

Since the Southern Sudanese leadership has been fairly consistent, wavering only on their stance on unity or secession, understanding their reasons behind these positions are straightforward. What remains unclear is whether or not the governmental leadership in Khartoum is sincere in their desire to keep the Sudan united or if it was their sincere desire to allow the South to secede. The interim period after the signing of the 2005 CPA in Nairobi, Kenya provided a golden opportunity for the government in Khartoum to seriously pursue policies which could have made maintaining the Sudan as a single entity more appealing not only to the Southern leadership but to the overall Southern population. Researchers familiar with the conflict in the Sudan presented two plausible explanations, “Ironically, although the preservation of unity was considered of paramount importance, especially to the North, not enough was being done to make unity attractive to the South. This raised suspicions in certain circles, including in the North, that the NCP in fact favored Southern secession to ride themselves of the non-Muslim factor that was a constraint in their implementation of the Arab-Islamic agenda. Cynics believed that the NCP was not concerned about secession because they did not intend to honor the self-determination provisions any way.”69

Since the Republic of South Sudan has recently celebrated its first-year anniversary with conflict with the NCP government being limited to oil revenue sharing disputes and the region of Abeyi, it is clear that the NCP did intend to honor its

commitment to the self-determination provisions. There is a strong possibility that the NCP was in fact unwilling to abandon their Arab-Islamic agenda; however, I would argue a third possibility, which is that the NCP was not in a position to either develop the South in a manner that would make unity attractive to the Southerners nor was it in a position to continue to wage civil war and therefore had to relent to allowing the secession occur. Since the military coup in 1989, the NCP government has consistently implemented economic policy, which have halted and led to the Sudan’s underdevelopment; however, this changed when oil production began in 1999 that brought the Sudan a much-needed economic boost. Despite being fiscally hurt by the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, the Sudan has been able to establish lucrative commercial ties with other nations including the United Kingdom, France, India, and particularly China; however, the Sudan’s economy has remained largely underdeveloped and the NCP’s survival has become almost solely dependent on oil revenues from the oil production that has been generated from South Sudan.

Despite years of negotiations and the many milestones that were brought to head through the trust and peace-building process, a great deal was undone as a result of Dr. Garang’s death in 2005, “But within hours of the announcement of Garang’s death, shemasha (street people) in Khartoum and a number of towns in the south were attacking and looting northern establishments. The rioters drew support from many disadvantage communities, but significantly the largest numbers were from Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, and these groups were most likely to have carried out the fire bombings. As a
result, the rioters included more Moslems than Christians in their ranks.\textsuperscript{70} The 2005 riots demonstrated three key points that need to be emphasized, the first point providing the greater understanding of the various stances taken by the Southern Sudanese.

The first being that Dr. Garang was perceived by both Southern and Northern Sudanese as a key leader for the New Sudan; however, much of the progress made between the two regions was concentrated in the leadership of both groups and did not necessarily trickle down to the rest of the constituents. The sense of unity that was experienced under his leadership was lost following his death and this begins to explain the new direction taken by the SPLA/SPLM. The SPLA/SPLM quickly abandoned the New Sudan envisioned by Dr. Garang, and instead, returned to the secession ideology that had by and large been censored under his leadership. Given the lack of credible information and polls available on South Sudan, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the Southern Sudanese wholeheartedly embraced the New Sudan paradigm or if there existed a stronger endorsement for secession, even prior to Dr. Garang’s death.

The second and third point rally around the racial and religious identity issues which surround the Sudanese conflict. The second point is that the ongoing conflicts in the Sudan cannot be explained away by racial or religious identity. Regardless of the religious similarity shared between the Arab elite in Khartoum and the Fur, did not exempt the Fur from coming into conflict with the Khartoum leadership. Like the Southern Sudanese, the Fur have been discriminated against and the area has been largely

ignored in regards to benefiting from the influx of capital that has been the outcome of the discovery of oil in the Sudan.

The economic and social disparities that existed in the South up until 2005, was similar to the ongoing disparities that exist in the Northern peripheries. The National Congress Party has not only failed to develop and incorporate the rest of the Sudan and what is now South Sudan in the economic developments that have been achieved in Khartoum. The international community often cites the ongoing conflict in Darfur as an example of the injustice and economic disparity that exists in the Sudan; however, the same case can be made for the underdevelopment, even by Sudan’s standards, in the Nuba Mountains, Kurdofan, and even Khartoum’s neighboring state, Umdurman. It is important to take note of the following observation made by the UNDP, “Past growth was not sufficiently broad-based. Investments and services are concentrated in and around Khartoum state. The significant disparities between rural and urban areas and between regions contributed to growing inequalities and an increasing urban informal sector accounting for more than 60% of GDP. This state of affairs has been encouraging a rural-urban migration that might weaken the agricultural productivity and deepen poverty in both urban and rural areas.”\(^7\)

---

CHAPTER TWELVE: 2005 CPA AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

Given the timing of the negotiations surrounding the 2005 CPA, it is necessary to not overlook the external events that were going on that had either a direct or indirect impact on the situation in the Sudan. Like many ongoing current events, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, had tremendous consequences for the course of events in the Sudan. Following the trend of increased use of multi-lateral economic sanctions during the post-Cold War era, the Sudan was under economic, as well as political sanctions by the United States and many of its allies; however, as a result of 9-11 there was a general shift that occurred in the United States’ foreign policy and the United States became increasingly focused on waging the War on Terror, and as a result the Sudan has been included in the United States’ list of terrorist sponsoring states.

The relationship between Sudan and the United States has been strained since the Cold War, mainly due to former President Nimeiri’s Communist leanings and the relations were further strained during the 1990s due to Sudan’s support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Additionally, “Throughout the 1990s, Washington supported the southern insurgents while isolating the northern government in the hope that Khartoum would eventually fall. This policy was justified by reference to the Sudanese government’s habit of violating the human rights of its citizens, its destabilization of the region, and its
support for international terrorism.” Given Sudan’s ties to al-Qaeda, particularly during the 1990s when Osama bin Laden resided in Sudan, the country became one of the focus points during former President George Bush’s War on Terror; however, the efforts to address terrorism in the Sudan began in May 2000 when the two countries entered into bilateral discussions focusing on counterterrorism. Such efforts have resulted in an improved relationship between the Sudan and the United States, despite that fact that significant policy differences exist between the two nations.

In a slightly new course of direction the Obama administration, under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s leadership the State department announced a new Sudan strategy on October 19, 2009, “U.S. strategy in Sudan is comprised of three core principles: 1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur; 2) Implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path between two separate and viable states at peace with each other; and 3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for international terrorists.” With its focus specifically on the North-South conflict the second core principle is the most relevant to this thesis discussion.

The official policy of the State Department towards developing the CPA was summarized in a statement by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi


Frazer, “We are not going to do it for them; we will do it with them. We can’t replace African leadership. We can’t replace African initiative. What we can do is empower it, facilitate it and support it.” Despite the fact that this statement represents the United States’ government’s desire to play only a supportive role in resolving the conflict in the Sudan, there is strong evidence to suggest that prior to the 2011 Referendum the United States did aim to ensure that South Sudan would secede from the North and while it may not have explicitly express this, it did in more subtle, nuanced ways encourage this. The United States, along with other Western nations, have committed and already invested billions of US dollars into South Sudan, with the exact figure unclear.

China’s role in the Sudanese conflict cannot be ignored, especially given its connection to bolstering the economy and being a source of financial revenue. Chinese-Sudanese bilateral relations can best be described by the statement of President Bashir, “From the first day, our policy was clear: To look eastward, toward China, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and even Korea and Japan, even if the Western influence upon some [of these] countries is strong. We believe that the Chinese expansion was natural because we filled the space left by Western governments, the United States, and international funding agencies, with China, Malaysia, India and other countries. The success of the Sudanese experiment in dealing with China without political conditions or pressures encouraged other African countries to look toward China.”

As the leading driver of Sudan and now South Sudan’s oil production, China has continued to be at the forefront of the influential international players in the region. It is without question that

---

Sudan’s economy has managed to survive primarily due to its oil sector which in the past decade has increased oil production and has managed to benefit tremendously from the past decades high oil prices, which has resulted in the Sudan having access to unprecedented inflows of foreign direct investment.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: CONCLUSION

One of the fundamental lessons learned from the North-South conflict in the Sudan that has lead to better explaining how the conflict has led to the secession of South Sudan, is that conflicts are not static events but rather are constantly evolving, frequently changing even the source of tensions. While the conflict in the Sudan has obtained its classification as an ethno-religious conflict, this label has better suited the conflict in its early history, specifically from the period of Anglo-Egyptian colonization to the late 1980s. Following the discovery of substantial oil reserves in the Southern region of the country, the conflict has been fueled and is more accurately labeled as a conflict over resources. With the current focus on the dependency on oil, both groups have abandoned their focus on identity issues and have turned to focus on the issue of economic wealth. This has attributed to the increasingly volatile economic and resource crisis of the country, that while benefiting the country in terms of providing an influx of much need foreign direct investment and economic expansion; it has become a source of frustration to the severely underdeveloped Southern region.

This extensive history of conflicting interests amongst the dominant Sudanese actors serves as the background for explaining the events that have unfolded in the conflict in the Sudan and a great deal of the theories relevant to secessionist movements and identity conflict are well aligned with the happenings in the Sudan. Since the period
of colonization in the Sudan the two countries have struggled with the question of keeping the southern part of the country united with the rest. Mistrust and open hostility between the two groups made reconciliation seem impossible. The political leadership in Khartoum through successive regimes continued to promote policy, which isolated the South from the rest of the country and has in practice resulted in the South operating as an autonomous region within the Sudan, with limited interference in the way of life from the government of Sudan. The South is also where the greatest infrastructure damage has occurred, and the South continues to deal with the reconstruction of their country.

Since achieving independence from the Anglo-Egyptian colonizing presence, the Sudan has witnessed two periods in which a united Sudan was heavily promoted. The first occurred during President Numeiri’s presidency, in which he promoted the identity of Sudan as an Afro-Arab nation. This was the first time that a sitting president in the government of Sudan was actively seeking to address the issue of the Sudanese identity and who was working to unite the war-torn nation through a dual-ethnic identity. Unfortunately, Numeiri abandoned this policy once he sought to establish the country as an Islamic state, making the Southern Sudanese hostile to the change in policy. The second period occurred under Dr. Garang’s leadership, when the ideology of a New Sudan advocated for the unity of the country. Dr. Garang saw the need for the Sudan to remain united given their economic dependence on one another, as well as the dual-identity of the Sudan. This policy was also abandoned by the SPLM/A following the death of Dr. Garang, and it remains unclear how much the Southern Sudanese genuinely supported Dr. Garang’s vision for a united Sudan.
Despite the length and intensity of the civil war, there are two prominent themes that have made the secession of South Sudan possible: 1. Despite having had the opportunity to enact policy measures that would have made the unity of Sudan attractive to the Southern Sudanese, the government of Sudan did not seize the opportunity and 2. While there remain disputed areas, the Republic of Sudan was the first country in the world to recognize the Republic of South Sudan after the new country achieved its independence. There is a broad assumption that a country will go to any measure to secure the integrity of its borders, which is why it is perplexing, as to why the government of Sudan did not contest the Southern secession? With the government of Sudan signing onto the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, it openly acknowledged to the international community that it was willing to abandon its demand for the unity of the country.

The historical overview of the conflict between the Sudanese and Southern Sudanese shows that numerous overlapping factors have occurred which have paved the way to the secession of South Sudan. The extensive history of policy marginalization of the southern part of the Sudan made the Southern Sudanese resentful of the dominant elite in Khartoum. The government of Sudan was presented with the opportunity to end its marginalization during the six-year interim period following the signing of the CPA; however, there was absolutely no policy reform implemented to do so. The government became focused solely on the issue of oil revenue sharing and did not address any of the SPLM/A’s concerns that were expressed explicitly to the government of Sudan in the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005.
While it is arguable that South Sudan would not have sought secession if the SPLA/SPLM did not lose Dr. John Garang as the visionary for a New Sudan, past events cannot be altered. The reality of the situation is that Dr. Garang’s charismatic, but authoritarian-like leadership was able to rally Southern Sudanese behind the idea of the New Sudan, despite the fact that many had struggled for decades to secede from the North. This provides a basis for understanding why following the death of Dr. Garang the new SPLM/A leadership began to focus solely on developing the South rather than creating a national political movement, in essence, the vision of the New Sudan was abandoned. During Dr. Garang’s reign as leader of the SPLM/A, openly speaking against the New Sudan idealology was met with harsh repercussions, which discouraged many of the SPLM/A to speak out. However, with the new leadership in place, the SPLM/A was able to move forward with their plans for secession and they began to focus on South Sudan’s development as an independent country.

The NCP’s Islamization project and their increasing desire to promote the Sudan as an Arab nation rather than an East African country has resulted in their decreasing desire to maintain South Sudan within the borders of Sudan. When it comes to violent conflict, economic motivators cannot be underestimated. Since 1999, the government of Sudan’s primary interest in South Sudan has been its focus on oil production and the unprecedented amount of wealth that the exportation of oil has been able to deliver. Taking the government of Sudan’s increasing economic dependency on oil, with its location being predominately in South Sudan, it is clear that Sudan would seek to protect this vital economic source, which many have assumed would mean preserving South
Sudan with the rest of the country. However, the fact that the oil pipelines are in sovereign Sudanese territory, has made it possible for the Sudan to continue to receive financial compensation through oil production. On August 2012, South Sudan and Sudan came to an agreement in which South Sudan will pay US $9 per barrel to transport oil to its ports, as well as US $3 billion for compensation for the revenue lost since the shut-down of oil production in January 2012. With the ability of Sudan to continue to benefit from oil production it seems that the government of Sudan would have benefited very little to keep the South united with the rest of the country.

The impact of external intervention in the Sudanese conflict has had varying consequences and has established two prominent trends, with external actors either facilitating the continuation of the civil war or with external actors serving as meditators of various sorts to bring about a conclusion to the civil war. With the ongoing conflict in Darfur and various other conflicts in Sudan, the Sudanese leadership was facing increasing pressure from the international community to bring about some sort of sustainable resolution to the North-South conflict. The ability of the Southern Sudanese leadership, through the efforts of the SPLA, to gain support for secession from the international community worked against the government of Sudan and made it increasingly difficult to object to the desires of the people of South Sudan. With the United States taking the lead supporting role of peace negotiations between the two warring factions, it made its position clear that it would support South Sudan with its desire to secede if that were the results of the referendum.
The dominant opinion in South Sudan has long been to secede from the Sudan, though under Dr. Garang’s leadership this was temporarily suppressed. Given this history, the Southern Sudanese were able to plan ahead for the development of South Sudan as an entity independent of Sudan; however, thus far, South Sudan has failed to become a self-sufficient nation. The new country is currently dependent on the various UN agencies for 80% of basic services to the Southern Sudanese and it is not expected for this to change in the short term. Nonetheless, this outpouring of international support for the SPLM/A has made it possible for the Southern Sudanese to establish an independent country but the question remains whether or not the country will succeed on its own.

Since January 2012 both countries have struggled to avoid state collapse due to the failure of reaching an agreement regarding the sharing of oil revenues. The instability caused by economic failure continues to threaten both countries with an outbreak of violence. The ability of South Sudan to achieve its independence can be a source of hope for other secessionist movements around the world; however, if the country fails to stabilize it may deter other secessionist groups from seeking independence. With the current ongoing problems of both Sudan and South Sudan, it seems that despite the achievement of establishing South Sudan as an independent nation, both countries are dependent on each other for their survival. South Sudan and Sudan will need to achieve self-sufficiency if there can be any hope for them not to return to a state of war.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

When the results of the 2011 Referendum announced 98.3% of Southern Sudanese support for secession, the NPC did not contest the outcome of the vote and has by and large upheld its commitment to honor the desire of the Southern Sudanese to pursue establishing their own sovereign nation without interference from the North; however, the post-CPA period is proving to be challenging and fragile at best. Failure to resolve the three disputed areas (Abyei, Southern Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan) is demonstrating to be an additional source of conflict for Sudan and South Sudan. In order to achieve a lasting peace, both countries need to resume negotiations in order to reach a settlement on the three disputed areas or else, both could face a return to war. It is important for the international community to remain committed to the peace-building process through active third party mediation. Talks between the two groups frequently break down quickly with both groups willing to return to military measures in order to assert their selves and achieve their stated objectives.

President Salva Kiir and his government need to tackle the threat of state collapse head on or the country faces the real threat of state failure. South Sudan’s decision in January 2012 to shut down oil production has resulted in ongoing threat of economic collapse of both countries. As a result of the shut down of oil production by South Sudan’s government, post-CPA negotiations have collapsed and efforts by both sides are
being taken to resume talks. In the most recent talks held in Addis Ababa in August, an agreement was reached on the financial compensation that Sudan would receive from South Sudan; however, oil production has not resumed. If the two nations are unable to resolve these ongoing conflicts there is a real security threat that interstate war could erupt. One growing area of concern is the size of South Sudan’s military forces, which was inflated prior to the secession of South Sudan due to concerns of a military confrontation with the Republic of Sudan; however, the size of the military is proving to be a financial stress for the South Sudanese budget.

The lack of economic diversification has hurt Sudan’s development and the country now faces unique challenges, particularly since it has to find ways to cover the loss of oil revenue following the secession of South Sudan. The current account balance of the Republic of Sudan is an additional cause for concern, “After a substantial surplus of US$2.7 billion during Jan-June 2011 prior to the secession, the current account balance drastically turned into a large deficit of US$1.2 billion during July-September 2011, and further aggravated into a US $1.5 billion deficit during October-December, due to the loss of oil exports.” Soaring inflation has continued to devalue the local currency (SDG) and according to the WB, “Inflation continued to accelerate in the first four consecutive months in 2012, with annual inflation rate hitting alarming 28.6 percent in April 2012.” This hinders the vast majority of the Sudanese to protect their assets and has substantially reduced their purchasing power parity. The country faces the worst economic situation is has seen since oil-production began in 1999, yet there is little that

can be done by the government in order to provide relief to those that will be hardest hit, unless both countries can come to an agreement regarding the distribution of oil revenue. Regardless of whether or not negotiations are resumed between the two countries, both should seek to diversify their economies and reduce their dependence on oil. Moving forward, it is possible that once these issues are resolved, both countries will be able to flourish, without the threat of another outbreak of violence.
REFERENCES

• Africa's Dilemmas in the Sudan The World Today Vol. 54, No. 3 (Mar., 1998), pp. 72-74

• Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan African Studies Review Vol. 42, No. 2 (Sep., 1999), pp. 105-123


• A New Political System in Sudan African Affair Vol. 73, No. 293 (Oct., 1974), pp. 408-418


• Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements Author(s): Lotta Harbom, Stina Högbladh and Peter Wallensteen Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 5 (Sep., 2006), pp. 617-631


• Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide toward Civil War Foreign Affairs Vol. 87, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2008), pp. 77-93


Colonialism and Class Struggle in Sudan MERIP Reports No. 46 (Apr., 1976), pp. 3-17+20


Confrontation in the Southern Sudan, Ann Mosely Lesch Middle East Journal , Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 410-428 Published by: Middle East Institute


Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions Author(s): Jaroslav Tir Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 5 (Sep., 2005), pp. 545-562 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.


• **Food as a Weapon for Peace: Operation Lifeline Sudan** _Africa Today_ Vol. 36, No. 3/4, Shari’a Law and Strife in the Sudan: Is Peace Possible? (3rd Qtr. - 4th Qtr., 1989), pp. 29-42

• **FOREIGN POLICY OF SUDAN UNDER PRESIDENT NUMEIRI** _Pakistan Horizon_ Vol. 28, No. 4, THE MIDDLE EAST, 1975 (Fourth Quarter, 1975), pp. 19-52

• **Funding Fundamentalism: Sudan** _Review of African Political Economy_ No. 52, Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion and Politics (Nov., 1991), pp. 103-109


• Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at...Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid _Call for Democracy_, 127.


• _Grounding Local Peace Organisations: A Case Study of Southern Sudan_ Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen _The Journal of Modern African Studies_ Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 2005), pp. 537-563 Published by: Cambridge University Press

• **Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict** _International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)_ Vol. 54, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), pp. 421-436


• How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases Author(s): Michael L. Ross Reviewed work(s): Source: International


- Iran, Sudan and Islam The World Today Vol. 49, No. 6 (Jun., 1993), pp. 108-111

- Israel and Sudan: The Saga of an Enigmatic Relationship Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp. 19-41


- INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY ABYEI ARBITRATION AWARD International Legal Materials Vol. 48, No. 6 (2009), pp. 1254-1257


• John Garang’s Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A & the South; John Young; Review of African Political Economy; Vol. 32; No. 106; Africa from SAPs to PRSP: Plus Ca Change Plus C’est la Meme Chose (Dec., 2005), pp. 538; Taylor and Francis Ltd. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20059107; 24/07/2012


• Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Heather Jane Sharkey, page 74

• *Mahdism and Islamism in Sudan* International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 219-236


• *More Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics This Time?* Middle East Journal Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 579-595


• Needs Theory, Social Identity and an Eclectic Model of Conflict, Ronald J. Fisher


• *Personal Law in the Sudan--Trends and Developments* Journal of African Law Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1973), pp. 149-195

• *Political Economy of the Oil Industry in the Sudan Problem or Resource in Development* (Politische Ökonomie der Erdölwirtschaft im Sudan) Erdkunde Bd.

- Post-Liberation Politics in Africa: Examining the Political Legacy of Struggle *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 27, No. 6 (2006), pp. 1085-1101

- Post-Numeiri Sudan: One Year On *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 9, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 891-905

- Processes of Governance: Can Governments Truly Respond to Human Needs; William R. Potapchuk pg. 265


- Recent Constitutional Developments in the Sudan *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 28, No. 3 (Jul., 1952), pp. 310-321


• Self-Determination The American Journal of International Law Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jul., 1971), pp. 459-475


• State Rules: Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan Third World Quarterly Vol. 28, No. 5 (2007), pp. 997-1016


• *Sudan after Numeiri* Third World Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 4 (Oct., 1985), pp. 958-972


• *Sudan's Economic Nightmare* MERIP Reports No. 135, Sudan's Revolutionary Spring (Sep., 1985), pp. 15-18+32


• *Sudan's Islamic Experiment* Foreign Affairs Vol. 74, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1995), pp. 45-58


• *Sudan: Oil & War* Review of African Political Economy Vol. 30, No. 97, The Horn of Conflict (Sep., 2003), pp. 478+504-510

• *Sudan's Perfect War* Foreign Affairs Vol. 81, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), pp. 111-127

• **Sudan's Political History in Brief** *Middle East Journal* Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn, 1990), pp. 668-670


• **Sudan: Recent Developments** *Africa Today* Vol. 36, No. 3/4, Shari'a Law and Strife in the Sudan: Is Peace Possible? (3rd Qtr. - 4th Qtr., 1989), pp. 5-10


• **The Ethics of Intervention in Self-Determination Struggles** Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 2 (May, 2003), pp. 382-406

• **The People's Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy** Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Jun., 2007), pp. 293-324 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.


• Winning the War, but Losing the Peace? The Dilemma of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 2005), pp. 1-20
CURRICULUM VITAE

Durra R. Elmaki received her Bachelors of Art in Economics in 2008 and her Bachelors of Art in Government and International Politics in 2011, from George Mason University. In 2008, she founded and directed the Nile Institute of Economic Studies in Khartoum, Sudan, a not-for profit policy and academic center.