EXPLORING COMMONALITIES AND TRIGGERS THAT INFLUENCE REVOLUTION

by

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Dedication

This is dedicated to my brother, David Sheehy, for providing me with the support and motivation to continue with bettering myself through aspiring to achieve something close to an ideal version of what I can and hope to attain. Although you have passed, I use you as in inspiration to combat the complacency in being content, because I know I can always do better and will push myself according to the example that you led. Your discipline and commitment was unmatched by any other person I have ever met in my life, and you have left an indelible impact on how I want to live and navigate through this world. Miss you, David. You’re the reason why I have made it this far.
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Words and Terms</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Summary of Research</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Background and Context</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Statement of Problem</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Thesis Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Operational Definitions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Type of Study</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Data Collection Procedures</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Method of Analysis</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Ethical Considerations</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction to Revolution</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Historical Derivation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The Social Question</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Roots of the Modern Conception: Agrarian Society</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Enlightenment and Revolution</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Where does Revolution Come From? .............................................61

e. What Does Revolution Accomplish? ........................................64

f. Engels and Marx: The Communist Manifesto ..............................66

3. Liberty, Freedom, and Revolution

a. Introduction..............................................................................73

b. Defining Freedom.....................................................................74

c. Defining Liberty........................................................................75

d. How these Interrelate in Revolution........................................77

4. Isonomy..................................................................................80

5. Understanding Revolution

a. Understanding the Peasant Class.............................................86

b. Understanding the Interplay of Tyranny and Liberty...............89

c. Post-Revolutionary Considerations .........................................94

6. Defining Revolution

a. Introduction..............................................................................98

b. Definitions for Revolution.....................................................99

c. Conditions for Revolution.....................................................103

d. The Military............................................................................108

e. Counter Revolution...............................................................111

f. Eastern and Western Revolutions..........................................113

g. Revolutionary Waves..............................................................117

7. Mapping Revolution
a. Introduction.................................................................122
b. A Generalized Conception for Mapping Revolution...............122
c. A Mapping for “Radical” Revolution..................................130
d. A typology for Civil Strife Pertinent to Revolution..................132
e. A Mapping for Modernization...........................................136
f. A Mapping for a Resource-Based Approach..............................142
8. Conclusion............................................................................146
9. Appendix A: Johan Galtung’s “A Typology of Violence” ..........151
10. Appendix B: Ted Gurr’s Deprivation Model............................152
11. Appendix C: A Letter from Che Guevara to Fidel Castro..........153
12. Works Cited........................................................................156
ABSTRACT

EXPLORING COMMONALITIES AND TRIGGERS THAT INFLUENCE REVOLUTION

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This thesis explores commonalities between theories concerning revolution crossing the boundaries of various academic domains. A careful observation of bias, including a portion detailing the perils of engaging in a dialectic analysis of theory concerning the matter, is exhaustively plotted within this thesis in an attempt to delineate the attention to detail and considerations of attribution error and analyst bias undertaken by the author. Since this thesis is contingent on being able to appropriately situate, take into account, and synthesize information from various domains of academia in an attempt to plot out and engage with a discourse concerning revolution, acknowledging the possible limitations as such was imperative to establishing an ethic to maintain consideration over.

The specific theory clusters and conceptions engaged with may be perused through in more detail in the “Operational Definitions” section of the thesis, but some of the more salient ones include theory derived from Theda Skocpol concerning structuralist
epistemology, more granular and philosophical considerations iterated upon through work done by Hannah Arendt concerning revolutions, some work done by Ted Robert Gurr concerning civil strife and social mobilization, an examination of a broader typology provided by Jack A. Goldstone, and others. Other more pre-suppositional theoretical material includes basic components of conflict analysis and resolution theory including identity theory, the various forms of violence posited by Johan Galtung, and an iteration of basic human needs shaped by John Burton.

**Key Words and Terms:** Revolution, structural violence, cultural violence, direct violence, rebellion, reform, public happiness, relative deprivation, economic determinism, historical determinism, historical narratives, transgenerational transmission, frustration aggression, historic materialism, social mobilization, social action, structuralism, secularism, enlightenment, American Revolution, French Revolution, charismatic leader, social identity theory, demonstration effect, state-building, isonomy, basic human needs, human dignity, poverty.
I. **Summary of Research**

Revolution seemingly signals the end of a tyrannical, malevolent regime that has created an atmosphere wherein the denizens operating within a given society attempt to spur radical change against a pernicious political ruler or oligarchy through the coercive installation of a new political system, which subsequently affects the means in which society functions; presumably with an inherent insinuation of democratization and political participation, which will thusly be regarded as “public happiness” (see “operational definitions). Differentiating between reform, rebellion, and revolution is imperative, because the three signal more of a staggered occurrence of events as opposed to synonymous. Admittedly, political reform may not be as likely to garner the label of “revolution”, however, depending on the severity and immediacy of the changes brought about through reform, much of the malevolent dynamics afflicting civil society may be mitigated, and may thusly imply the attainment of freedom through democratic petition via political redress. Whereas “Revolution” indicates a radical change in the constituency of polity reflecting a change in social policy and societal inter-group dynamics, “Rebellion” signals the act of initial overt radical rejection of the incumbent regime achieved either through non-violent action, such as strikes and demonstrations, thusly arresting the means of economic and population control through rendering rule ineffectual via mass social subversion, or through armed conflict wherein the goal of the
movement is to spur significant change in the political structure of governance or complete removal of the incumbent regime. A successful rebellion solely denotes a change in power, not necessarily a change in the means of governance and the social structure. Revolution, however, is the political replacement of the incumbent political power structure, thus, it both removes and installs a new means of governance that alters foundational components of the social structure within a given society; effectively signaling the success of an attempted rebellion based on a divergent social structure from the status quo. This thread of discourse will be continued in a healthy segment of the thesis itself, as the implications of nomenclature are rather profound. Summarily, revolution is the ultimate culmination of a rebellion, in that it directly addresses the “social question” (see “Social Question” chapter), while rebellion can only hope for incremental reform or a change in power, but not necessarily the structure of society itself.

What was expected by civil society and was produced by the ruling party within a particular revolutionary context is the most overt condition that rears itself into a deleterious dynamic where civil society and the political apparatus that provides the supposedly auspicious framework to govern civil society clash into a progressively escalatory conflict spiral. The unmet demands stemming from the inability to satiate real or perceived basic human needs create a dynamic of relative deprivation (see “Operational Definitions”) resultant from structurally violent policies (see “Operational Definitions”), wherein coerced abdication becomes the exigent means of recourse by civil society, or, conversely an oppressive approach is adopted by the incumbent regime to
coerce civil society to align with the status quo that has been in place. What manifests from this conflict will ultimately deem the revolution a success or failure, since what is targeted for change is the structurally violent policies along with the ruling party that promotes these policies. Upheaval and change are the goals; but causal factors in this dynamic are what need to be found.

While these are certainly intriguing differentiations to include in the universe of knowledge concerning revolutions, it will be necessary to delve deeper into the socio-cultural motivations that fuel a civil society to engage in what could culminate into a revolution. Discovering an answer behind these motivations is the way in which one may plot out the commonalities in characteristically “human” behavior that can be argued to be labeled as such through pointing to occurrences in history that demonstrate commonalities in seminal events that bridge the human experience in social and political turmoil. The roots of the action that ultimately may be labeled as an attempt at revolt are derivative of a convoluted human mapping system that strives to distill the schema of the given period into a heuristic that builds a simulacrum of events in an answer for “how?” and “why?”. Given the fact that the mere creation of a simulacrum is constrained by the hyper-reality that the model creates in its own paradox of existence, there will, of course, be a space that cannot be explained to the satisfaction of the researcher.

This overview does not touch upon the various intricacies involved in what compels civil society to enact upon rebellious behavior determined to shatter the incumbent means of governance. This is a vague semblance of terms and ambiguous circumstances that
neglect to delve into the nuances of society and culture that prove imperative to gleaning a comprehensive understanding of why this phenomenon occurs and how it manifests along the path to a successful revolution. Several questions rear themselves in the face of this dilemma: How does the collective schema of civil society shift from satisfaction or complacent acceptance to one of belligerence? What motivates the populace of a given state to take up a collectively radical stance against the power structure? What do demagogues or ideologues within the movement and from outside of it espouse to either promote or denounce the turmoil in settling upon a prevailing schema? These questions lead to illuminating the overarching problem apparent in attempting to identify transcendent elements in revolutions, and will be examined in this thesis.

A. Background and Context, and the Statement of Problem

Background and Context:

The resultant research and analysis conducted in this thesis was collected and created with the intention to plot and examine various facets of civil society in the context of pervasive civil disenfranchisement; wherein structural disparity and other perceived or actual injustices resulted into social action against a repressive, tyrannical, or otherwise malevolent regime ruling a state. In addition to examining third tier, grass roots, or what could otherwise be given the label of the “masses of society” in this analysis, examining the broader scope of revolutions is an imperative consideration to include because we must be able to go beyond social mobilization in a step towards encapsulating the dynamics in all of society, including the incumbent power structure, and how various segments of civil society inter-relate, to ensure accuracy in assessment. The inter-
relational dynamics of various segments of a given society interact with the polity of the state; including socio-economic considerations, systems theory pertaining operational capacities of state institutions and civil interaction with the state apparatus, as well international factors that provide the macro-context in which revolution occurs, will be included to attempt to capture this broader, integrative analysis.

This thesis will be inclusive of an inductive epistemological overview concerning revolution, with the ultimate aim of supplementing revolutionary theory, in particular, with seemingly tangential theory clusters that buttress the strength of analysis for contemporary revolutions. Seminal theory clusters which insist upon their exclusive exigent pertinence and demonstrate the current epistemological underpinnings of contemporary revolutionary theory evolved from the French and American revolutions will be used in tandem with other theory clusters not necessarily germane to either of these historical case studies, but relevant to theory concerning revolution all the same.

This proposed research seeks to provide substantial examples of the functions of civil society within the atmosphere directly preceding collective social action in the form of coerced abdication or revolution through examining the manifest expressions of civil discontent and unrest that led to the conditions that engendered these events to unfold. Along these lines, intra- and inter-state dynamics will be utilized in analysis to delineate the roles of the pertinent conflict parties “peri-conflict” and “post-conflict” (or post-revolution) on a temporal continuum, since the evolution of conflict roles in a revolutionary context is essential.
An attempt to delineate a comprehensive theory cluster was deemed imperative to include in this thesis to, in part, designate a scope of analysis that is inclusive, rather than dismissive, of apposite theory concerning revolution; straying away from the constraints of bias and the consequent myopia caused by ego and an academic predisposition to favor a particular field of study. The point of this thesis is not to herald the supposed “truth” of a given theory or domain of academia, rather it strives to portray a holistic picture of the epistemology concerning revolutions, and forge as close to what could be deemed as a heuristic for analysis regarding revolutions. The presupposition going forward is that contemporary revolutionary theory shall be regarded for what it is: segmented through the rigors of proclivities in study, while also compatible in the sense that it can be used to yield a fuller and detailed basis for further analysis for revolution, stemming from the intertextual nature of knowledge.

Much of revolutionary theory postulates social movements that transcend sovereign boundaries in the pursuit of an ideological natural (or universal/transcendent) justice that calls forth a parallel kinship in contexts that may not geographically intersect due to a demonstration effect (to be defined in the “operational definitions” section) or “imagined community” (to be defined in “operational definitions”) combined with seemingly similar social identities (also to be defined in the “operational definitions” section of the paper) that extend beyond these physical boundaries; gained through the democratization of knowledge and a new level of awareness that may be attributed to, at least partially, the tandem factors of globalization and technology that can be more or less summarized as
“modernization” (also to be further defined in the “operational definitions” section); but not solely due to this “cause”, because that would imperil us to the dangers of economic or historical determinism, which we must try to avoid (since the causal relationship of such a supposition is based on a simulacrum). The relationship between states and, in particular, civil society and civil societal figureheads in their corresponding contexts, and other “intra-state” dynamics are important to include because they flesh out the intricacies of distinct societal contexts pertinent to revolution. To ignore this facet of interaction is to operate under the assumption that these revolutions occurred in a sterile, over-simplified environment. Actions carry meaning, and meaning is not restricted to conceivable primary, secondary, or even tertiary actors; thus, the consequence of action, especially one that has a significant cultural penetration in the zeitgeist of society, has untold impact on the collective and even individual perceptions of society. The impact of this resonance is unpredictable and only empirical (through virtue of it being observable) after the fact, thus warrants further elucidation through analysis.

With a multidisciplinary toolset, the differentiation between reform, rebellion, and revolution, or the initial impetus of action by civil actors, and the espoused ideal of a revolutionary consequence of rebellion, will be examined; which will aid in analyzing the duality of society between political actors that stem from the higher rung of the socio-economic (and political) ladder and the lower social component where the majority of a given populace rests. This differentiation relies on distinguishing track 1 actors between
track 2 and track 3 actors, while providing contextual support contingent on the period and geography of the particular epoch and locale of analysis.

The nature of the dual master’s program highlights Mediterranean conflict through virtue of the focus on Mediterranean security, thus the opportunity to analyze an indelible activity in the region, with a tremendous amount of historical material to draw from for comparison with an academic locus that makes the case studies pertinent to both fields of study, is a unique dynamic to research, especially when considering the revolutionary conflict dynamics in the region. As previously mentioned, imperative theoretical underpinnings for revolution, in a general conception, may be utilized in collecting a germane aggregate of invaluable contexts and precedents for revolution. Theory is inextricable form the context in which it derived legitimacy, for the simple reason that the legitimacy of theory is brought about through the fact that the plotted reality acts as the pretense to the posited theory. This thesis will certainly introduce case study specific elements that may not seem directly applicable to an occurrence outside of the specific case examined; commonalities and patterns are the goals for discovery, and this is the means in which these commonalities are found.

B. Statement of Problem:

What are the commonalities apparent in revolutions of the past and present, and are there common markers inclusive of thematic divergences between civil society and government pertinent to revolution?

C. Thesis Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses
**Thesis Question 1:**

Are there reliable indicators that point to revolution or an attempt at revolution?

Hypothesis: Various factors inclusive of socio-cultural, macro-economic, and subversive ideological markers, expressions of discontent, competition for the legitimate resources and social power structures, and, ultimately, a dynamic wherein disparity based on perceived injustices resultant from tyrannical or otherwise illegitimate governing practices that reflects a broad-based dissatisfaction with the status quo are all indicators of the likelihood for revolution.

**Thesis Question 2:**

Do socio-cultural narratives play a role in determining the value of government and legitimacy of revolution?

Hypothesis: Moral convictions are fostered through cultural and personal narratives through transgenerational transmission and other cultural mechanisms that perpetuate particularly exigent narratives, thus, may significantly impact the perceived legitimacy of the state through debasing legitimacy through deriving a “folk devil” from norms and hoisting this negative archetype upon the incumbent sovereign. In this context, this is of course assuming that these historical narratives are directed toward the incumbent power structure in an adverse fashion, in an attempt for reform, revolt, rebellion, or revolution.

**Subsidiary Question, 2a:**
What significance does historical determinism and an extracted universalism from this “correct” natural order derived from history have on the likelihood of revolution?

Hypothesis: While revolution may reform the social and political structure itself into a new dynamic when compared to what directly preceded it, this does not necessarily jar all of the actors within the revolution itself from their previous statuses or attempt to create a just system without some sort of abstract precedence; nor does the aspired “just” system derive legitimacy through its sole existence, because this would imply that legitimacy in this case would be gained on arbitrary grounds on the basis on it being different. Legitimacy is gained through semiotic justification of a romanticized ideal, and cultural narratives point to an origin, or a culturally transmitted idea, that lays the ground work for an ideology that justifies the natural or “true” order aspired towards that fuels revolution. Elites within civil society will grab the reins of power within post-revolutionary society.

**Thesis Question 3:**

What condition of the State is conducive to revolutionary action?

Hypothesis: Myriad issues of a weakened state lend themselves to both the conditions that instill civil discontent and its susceptibility to being overthrown. Included are this are a “weakened” state apparatus, a divided bourgeoisie, a mobilized proletariat, and the incentive for action; be it economically, ideologically, politically, or some other rallying means for consolidation civil discontent.

**Subsidiary Research Question 3a:**
How effective is violence in quelling revolution?

Hypothesis: Depending on the ability of civil societal actors to arm themselves, violence is either highly effective in stymieing revolution, or protracts the conflict. Assumed consent of the military by the ancien régime, is the caveat of this position.

**Subsidiary Research Question 3b:**

How effective is non-violent action in installing a truly revolutionary paradigm?

Hypothesis: Success of non-violent tactics is entirely contingent upon the military’s willingness to use extreme force.

**Research Question 4:**

Are there reliable indicators for a successful revolution?

Hypothesis: These indicators would be inclusive of a variety of factors, but the most apparent would be foreign support and the variable adroit ability of civil actors to contend with the incumbent power; including, but not limited to moral support through appealing to social mores (either suppressed, repressed, oppressed or otherwise dismissed by the status quo), successful acquisition of previously exclusively controlled state resources (economic, political, natural, social), cross-class appeals and adherence that consolidate revolutionary rhetoric and action, and the ability to manifest the wave of liberty (a curiously negative condition in that it affords an abstract person a condition free of restriction in its most protean form) into a tangible, working government. This last portion is more
of a hallmark of the consolidation of a counter-revolution to delineate freedom forged from liberty, as opposed to exploring the origins of revolution, itself.
II. **Operational Definitions**

**Anomie:** “An absence, breakdown, confusion, or conflict in the norms of society…” (Scott and Marshall 22) This term is frequently applied to conceptions of deviance in the academic realm of criminal justice. For the purposes of this thesis, however, this term more be used outside of its traditional connotative implication. Revolution depends on anomie, especially when one considers that “liberty” is a negation of previously imposed limitations.

**Basic Human Needs:** “Inclusive of somatic needs, such as food, water, shelter, and security; but also of psychic needs including recognition, differentiation, and self-determination.” (Scott and Marshall 506) This term is relatively controversial. Designating a need as basic denotes that it is universal and necessary for human existing through virtue of it being classified as a “need”. Many needs posited by the various “Needs” theorists reflect subjective conditions that are more idealist than necessary; but merit inclusion all the same. Although this conception is rather vague on its own, applied to revolution, and with the similar conception of “human dignity”, basic human needs allow for the opportunity to garner further insight into the particular indignities suffered by a disenfranchised populace that turns to societal action against a tyrannical regime to rectify what they perceive to be wrong.
**Charismatic Leader:** This is a term posited by Max Weber. The definition is as follows:

“The initial impetus to revolution, according to Weber, often comes from a ‘charismatic’ leader who challenges traditional authorities, gathers followers, and leads the overthrow of the old regime.” (Goldstone 33) Additionally,

“The term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least … exceptional power or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.” (Weber 33)

Furthermore,

“Bureaucratic authority is specifically rational in the sense of being bound to intellectually analyzable rules; while charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules. Traditional authority is bound to the precedents handed down from the past and to this extent is also oriented to rules. Within the sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force…” (Weber 34)

This theory will be further elucidated upon in the thesis.

**Chosen Trauma:** “I use the term chosen trauma to describe the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors… it is a shared mental representation of the
event.” (Volkan 48) This term deserves inclusion because of the of aspired legitimacy of a new government, and before that, the social movement that builds up and consolidates power to the extent to where it can attempt to form a new government in the quagmire of isonomy. Archetypical enmity may be created from this theory, as well:

“New enemies involved in current conflicts may be perceived as extensions of an old enemy from a historical event. Although the original event was no doubt humiliating, the function of the mental representation of it changes, now serving to bond the individuals in the group, paradoxically raising their self-esteem and fueling their attempt to reverse their ancestor’s humiliation” (Volkan 46-47)

**Cognitive Consistency Theory:**

“The concept of cognitive consistency is built around the theory of hedonism. The theory posits man to be a calculative and pleasure seeking animal that chooses alternative courses of action that are capable of giving him the maximum pay-off. It also follows Thorndike’s law of effects, which emphasizes that behaviour that yields positive outcomes will be reinforced or repeated. Festinger (1964) reports that inconsistency arousal and effort to reduce/eliminate it and ultimately return to *fit* or *consonance* takes place only after a decision; thus, consequences flow from the decision. Inconsistency creates psychological tension and anxiety, and therefore the organism is aroused to finding ways to reduce or remove it.” (Awa and Nwuche 49)
New paradigms introduced by the prospect of revolution invariably have a counter-revolutionary movement associated with it. Cognitive consistency theory could be one of many avenues for explanation concerning the topic.

**Cognitive Dissonance Theory:**

“The theory of cognitive dissonance posits a human phenomenon used by psychologists to express psychological discomforts (Altschul and Sinclair, 1981) or a state of disequilibrium amongst one’s cognition (values, beliefs, attitudes and knowledge) resulting from the inflow of conflicting messages, objects, events or experiences. Stone and Cooper (2000) propose that dissonance begins when people exhibit behaviour and then access such behaviour against some meaningful criterion of judgment or when an action measured against relevant criterion poses a threat to oneself.” (Awa and Nwuche 48)

Akin to cognitive consistency theory, cognitive dissonance theory could also be an explanation for behavior witnessed in some revolutionary contexts.

**Collective Memory:** “Similar to ideology, collective memory gives shape to people’s lives, providing not only a base from which individuals can look back and explain their experiences and actions, but also a platform on which to build and guide the future.” (Selbin 82) Additionally,

“The term collective memory has been used across many disciplines to define a wide variety of phenomena (see Harris, Paterson, & Kemp, 2008; Hirst & Manier, 2008; Wertsch, 2008; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008), and recent psychological
literature has defined collective memories as shared memories that shape
groups…” (Barber, Rajaram and Fox 3)

Collective memory runs parallel with chosen trauma theory posited by Vamik Volkan, but is broader in scope through not focusing exclusively on a “trauma”.

**Counterrevolution**: “The term ‘counterrevolution’ refers to a policy of trying to reverse a revolution, and, by extension, to policies designed to prevent revolutionary movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power.” (Halliday 136) It is important to note, though, that, “Counterrevolution is not, however, a single phenomenon, any more than is revolution. In the first place, ‘counterrevolution’ may refer to the overthrow of a revolutionary regime by opponents working within the country and with external support.” (Halliday 137) Additionally, “‘Counterrevolution’ also refers to movements or policies that are not designed to overthrow or corrupt an existing revolutionary regime, but rather to prevent a revolutionary movement from coming to power.” (Halliday 137) Philosophically, counter-revolutions have also been argued as being the process in which freedom is delineated. This will be further explored in the thesis.

**Cultural Violence**: The observable narrative that serves to provide legitimacy to instances of direct violence in a structurally violent system. Essentialist explanations of how a particular system operates in relation to a marginalized group or prototypical individual would be a more abstract example of what comprises this theory. As Galtung states,
By 'cultural violence' we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) - that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. Stars, crosses and crescents; flags, anthems and military parades; the ubiquitous portrait of the Leader; inflammatory speeches and posters - all these come to mind. However, let us postpone the examples until section 4 and start with analysis. The features mentioned above are 'aspects of culture', not entire cultures. (Galtung 291)

Demonstration- Effect: This theory lends credence to the idea that social action is more likely to occur once similar social action in a perceived similar context has been enacted before, either historically or more proximal, temporally. Frequently, this theory is enacted upon capitalist enterprise where mimickery from observed gains is employed in an effort to mirror those gains. John F. McCarthy’s work, available in the “Works Cited” section, plots this course with natural resources in conflict zones, and may be referenced if further, more detailed work into the application of this theory is desired.

Direct Violence: A theory posited by Johan Galtung, which is defined as empirical violence that affects the individual somatically or psychologically. See “Appendix A” for more information.

Eastern Revolution: In summary, an Eastern Revolutionary paradigm sets the stage for what could be considered a civil war, where the incumbent power regime still holds significant power and is in direct competition with an subversive collective that threatens
the monopoly of power that government wields. The following is the appropriate documentation: “The ‘Eastern’ revolution, in contrast, begins with the mobilization of new groups into politics and the creation of new political institutions and ends with the violent overthrow of the political institutions of the old order.” (Huntington 39)

Furthermore,

“In Eastern revolutions… the old regime is modern, it has more power and legitimacy, and hence it does not simply collapse and leave a vacuum of authority. Instead it must be overthrown. The distinguishing characteristic of the Western revolution is the period of anarchy or statelessness after the fall of the old regime while moderates, counterrevolutionaries, and radicals are struggling for power.” (Hunting 41)

In addition, “In the Eastern pattern, the moderates are much weaker; they do not occupy positions of authority; and as the revolution gets under way, they are crushed by the government or the revolutionaries or they are forced by the polarization process to join one side of the other.” (Huntington 42)

**Human Capital:** “A modern extension of Adam Smith’s explanation… [human capital] is the education and training undertaken by individuals or groups of workers.” (Scott and Marshall 321) It must be noted, however, that, “Not all investments in education guarantee an advance in productivity as judged by employers or the market,” (Scott and Marshall 321) which interestingly plays into a “relative deprivation” scenario rather nicely.
**Idea Streams:** “Idea streams – transmitted via people – are powerful and pervasive and travel across time and space… it is evident that modern revolutionaries have to some degree imitated the ‘classic’ revolutions of France, Russia, Mexico, and China… The connections are across time and within time, across cultural boundaries and within them.” (Selbin 79) An interesting application of an “Idea Stream” would be with ideological factors that call upon history, precedent, or sheer idealism to motivate masses into action, which are certainly relevant to revolution.

**Imagined Community:** An imagined community is defined as follows:

“…it is imagined because (a) the members never know or meet most of their fellow members, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion; (b) it is limited because even the largest of them has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations; (c) it is sovereign because its members have the right to govern themselves; (d) it is a community because the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship, despite abiding social inequality between members.” (Scott and Marshall 337)

**Isonomy:** As explained by Arendt,

“This notion of no-rule was expressed by the word isonomy, whose outstanding characteristics among the forms of government, as the ancients had enumerated them, was that the notion of rule… was entirely absent from it. The polis was supposed to be an isonomy, not a
democracy. The word ‘democracy’, expressing even then majority rule, the rule of the many, was originally coined by those who were opposed to isonomy and who meant to say: What you say is ‘no-rule’ is in fact only another kind of rulership; it is the worst form of government, rule by the demos.” (Arendt 20)

It is posited throughout this thesis as being the stage where the state and civil society faces the most political turmoil, in that there is no clear sovereign and there are multiple parties within society vying for power.

**Modernization:** “Modernization has always meant national developments only within the contexts of historically developing transnational structures, both economic and military.” (Skocpol 22) This is a highly controversial topic, as the implied atavism of the “modernizing” society points to a Western analytical bias that holds a culturally superior, condescending tone. See “Political Modernization” for more information.

**Persistent Deprivation:** The following definition for this term appeared paramount to include, considering the ramifications that prolonged exposure to disparate attainment of needs holds on the potential for revolution.

“Persisting Deprivation: In the very long run men's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled tend to adjust to what they are capable of attaining. In the shorter span, however, some groups may persistently demand and expect values, such as greater economic opportunity, political
autonomy, or freedom of religious expression, that their societies will not or
cannot provide.” (Gurr 1109)

**Political Development:** “Political development involves the creation of political
institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to
order the participation of these new groups and to promote social and economic change in
the society.” (Huntington 38) The insinuation of this theory is that if governments
develop concomitantly with society in a “modernization” paradigm, then the impetus for
revolution will be diminished a substantial amount.

**Political Modernization:** “Political modernization involves the extension of political
consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics.”
(Huntington 38) There are several negative connotations with this definition and concept,
in general, in that it promotes an ethnocentric view point and implies a negative cultural
atavism to “other” cultures, communities, societies, and states that do not coincide,
technologically or politically, with Western thought and technological prowess.

**Poverty:** “Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute
misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it
puts men under the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of
necessity as all men know it from their most intimate experience and outside all
speculations.” (Arendt 50) Poverty coincides with the notion of human dignity, in that it
strips people of human dignity due to structurally inequitable circumstances. Poverty was
considered a necessity, a status-quo condition that was ordered in a natural manner;
except that poverty is a relative condition that needs a referent for this to be determined as an adverse condition. Through virtue of this fact, poverty was recognized as a constructed malady that was brought to fruition through exploitation and greed that is reinforced by instigating structural, cultural, and direct forms of violence upon a given socio-economically distinct group. Burton’s basic human needs theory and Galtung’s “Violence Triangle” assist in delineating how poverty interacts in an abstract sense within a given society.

**Private Happiness:** A conception arrived upon by Arendt which is facilitated through the creation of “public happiness” (defined below). Private happiness is the ability to exercise freedoms for the benefit of the individual, as opposed to societal benefit; but interestingly only afforded to the individual if societal freedoms in the form of public participation in governance is present for this sort of self-determination to exist.

**Public Happiness:** “…’public happiness’… consisted in the citizen’s right of access to the public realm” (Arendt 118) This happiness extends toward voluntary association actuated in the polity, in which individuals may participate amongst a body of peers, through virtue of the mutual freedom accorded to them through the attainment of liberty and the freedoms resultant of that freedom.

**Rebellion:** The act of overthrowing an incumbent power structure, but not necessarily causing change to the social system. Violence is usually implied. There is extensive literary discourse concerning this conception, which will be touched upon in the thesis section.
**Relative Deprivation:** The status of lacking a particular good, status, or commodity juxtapose to a given reference group. It can refer to actors outside of the immediate socio-cultural context for a given subject, but more often than not refers to perceived peers or a condition previously experienced by the subject, or points to a referent group that could be considered a peer that has somehow received more from a structural inequality.

Additionally:

“The term relative deprivation is used below to denote the perceived discrepancy, discontent to denote the motivating state which is the postulated response to it. The relationship between dis-content and participation in strife is however mediated by a number of intervening social conditions. The initial theoretical model stipulated three such societal variables that are explored here, namely coercive potential, institutionalization, and social facilitation.” (Gurr 1104)

Furthermore,

“Psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation to aggression. Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear relationship whereby medium levels of coercion, indexed for example by military participation ratios or ratings of regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest magnitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear to limit effectively the extent of strife.” (Gurr 1105)
**Revolution**: The thought out and acted out culmination of rebellion that goes beyond a change in political and power structures. Revolution includes the change of the social structure, stemming from policy changes from elites in the system of governance; wherein this policy results from the democratization of the polity, reflecting the democratized voice of civil society, while also abating tyrannical mechanisms preceding the current mechanism, and introducing social and economic freedoms resultant from the liberty and codified impositional norms relating to the new agreement between civil society, the newly formed polity, and government in the form of a constitution drafted within the atmosphere of revolution. There are a multitude of definitions with slight variations, for example: “The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them.” (Huntington 38) This example focuses more on the political restructure of a polity and corresponding government, but somewhat neglects the intra-state and competing social dynamics that bring a state to a nadir of isonomy intrinsic to revolution. Another definition: “… revolutions *redefine* the political community within a given territory by creating a ‘new state’ that rests on principles and procedures that are a sharp departure from those of the old regime,” (Walt 140) again relies upon the state as the individual unit of analysis for the conclusion of what constitutes revolution. Revolution, conceptually, is usually defined through this analytical lens, but this may be more of a result of domain focus in academia reflecting the import of revolution on a macro scale.
with nomothetic sociologists in line with gestalt theory rather than neglect from the more granular thinkers that involve themselves in this discourse.

**Revolutionary Wave:** “A ‘for’ revolutionary wave consist of those revolutions that established (or earnestly attempted to establish) a particular form of government or socioeconomic system, such as democracy, Marxism-Leninism, Arab nationalism, or Islamic fundamentalism.” (Katz 151) Conversely,

> “An ‘against’ revolutionary wave consists of those revolutions that overthrew a particular form of government or socioeconomic system. ‘Against’ revolutionary waves include antimonarchical, anticolonial, anticapitalist, anti-Western, and antidictatorial ones, among others.” (Katz 151)

**Self-Actualization:**

> “… there is a hierarchy of human needs, each having to be met before a person can achieve his or her full potential. In ascending order, the needs a physiological, security, love and belonging, esteem and status, and finally ‘actualization’: that is, the desire to become everything that one can become.” (Scott and Marshall 678)

**Social Action:** “A defining quality of action is that, unlike behaviour, it carries subjective meaning for the actor.” (Scott and Marshall 4)

**Societal Action:** “Under otherwise equal conditions, a ‘societal action,’ which is methodically ordered and led, is superior to every resistance of ‘mass’ of even of ‘communal action,’” (Weber 35) which is, essentially, a larger scale social action.
**Social Revolutions:** “… rapid, basic, transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below…” (Skocpol 33) This will be further expanded upon in the thesis.

**Structural Violence:** A theory posited by Johan Galtung, which is a means of perpetrating indirect violence in the form of policy that does not necessarily directly interfere with the natural status of the individual, but the externalization of this form of violence predisposes a particular segment of society to deleterious conditions that would not exist absent this policy. Jim Crow laws in the United States are an example of structurally violent practices. See “appendix a” for more information.

**Transgenerational Transmission:** “Transgenerational transmission is when an older person unconsciously externalizes his traumatized self onto a developing child’s personality. A child then becomes a reservoir for the unwanted, troublesome parts of an older generation.” (Volkan 43)

In addition to this,

“New enemies involved in current conflicts may be perceived as extensions of an old enemy from ahistorical event. Although the original event was no doubt humiliating, the function of the mental representation of it changes, now serving to bond the individuals in the group, paradoxically raising their self-esteem and fueling their attempt to reverse their ancestor’s humiliation” (Volkan 46-47)
**Tyranny:** “… tyranny was understood to be the form of government in which the ruler ruled out of his own will and in pursuit of his own interests, thus offending the private welfare and the lawful, civil rights of the governed.” (Arendt 121) Additionally,

“Tyranny… was a form of government in which the ruler, even though he ruled according to laws of the realm, had monopolized for himself the right of action… Tyranny, in other words, deprived of public happiness, though not necessarily of private well-being, while a republic granted to every citizen the right to become ‘a participator in the government of affairs’, the right to be seen in action.” (Arendt 121)

**Voluntarism:** “… denotes the assumption that individuals are the agents of their actions, and gave some control over what they do.” (Scott and Marshall 794) This is contrasted with determinism, where contextual factors are said to be the deciding impetuses for why human action occurs, as opposed to viewing the action itself being purely enacted upon solely through the individual. Reality is probably situated between the two.

**Western Revolution:** Essentially described as the dynamic wherein the *ancient régime* collapses upon itself before civil society actuates into societal action: “In the ‘Western’ pattern, the political institutions of the old regime collapse; this is followed by the mobilization of new groups into politics and then by the creation of new political institutions.” (Huntington 39) Additionally, “In the Western revolution, the principle struggle is usually between the moderates and the radicals; in the Eastern revolution it is between the revolutionaries and the government.” (Huntington 42) And, in conclusion,
“The Western revolution is usually directed against a highly traditional regime headed by an absolute monarch or dominated by a land-owning aristocracy. The revolution typically occurs when this regime comes into severe financial straits, when it fails to assimilate the intelligentsia and other urban elite elements, and when the ruling class from which its leaders are drawn has lost its moral self-confidence and will to rule.” (Huntington 42)
III. Type of Study

An inductive study of theory will be employed to plot the epistemological precedence established to best flesh out the present portrayal of theory concerning the occurrence of revolution; which is otherwise referred to the intertextuality of related thought concerning a particular focus. A diverse set of postulations from various segments of the epistemological pool of theory concerning revolution will be supplemented with additional theory concerning social mobilization, the various forms of violence posited by Johan Galtung that the field of conflict analysis and resolution extols as fundamental truths in conflict mappings, John Burton’s theory concerning basic human needs (which somewhat overlaps theories that concern “human dignity” and poverty), social identity theory, and other multidisciplinary approaches that attempt to detail why and how particular social phenomena occurs in the roots of revolutionary movements. Further concerns regarding academic bias, hyper-reality, and the resultant solipsism arrived upon via an inherent dependence on predetermined factors that behave as simulacra to serve as proofs that point to the reification, and thus, the validity of theory will be touched upon in the introduction to the thesis.
IV. **Data Collection Procedures**

Tertiary and secondary (Booth, Colomb, and Williams 69) sources will be used for the data collected in this thesis. The main impetus for research was to search for commonalities in revolution, thus generalized theories and extrapolation from case studies were identified is the best means of acquiring the answer to this problem.
V. Method of Analysis

Qualitative accounts of what had occurred in these various revolutionary contexts will be extracted and examined using multifaceted schools of theory including the arenas of macro-economics, micro-economics, behavioral economics, sociology, anthropology, socio-psychology, psychology, socio-cultural frameworks of analysis, and political science; which are in line with the multi-disciplinary nature of the program.

Ultimately, the conceived manner of analysis will be derived from the multifarious pool of resources that constitute the interconnected and complex web of thought and perspective concerning revolution. The attempt to construct an answer, and the aspiration to have this answer satiate the interdisciplinary approach relayed by this program of study, is dependent on identifying the overlaying typology – be it based in political, sociological, economic, and other realms of theory – and determining whether or not the revolution can be adequately described by employing this constructed epistemology. Conversely, if the gathered theory is discovered to be deficient in some manner, further insight may be proposed to fill-in the lacuna in knowledge constructed
VI. Ethical Considerations

No human subjects will be interviewed for this research project, thus, there is no need to request permission from the HSRB to further the proposed research in this proposal.

However, the range, level of analysis, and implementation of theory into a greater unified, conceptual framework consisting of seminal intellectual posits attempting to provide explanations for broad-based theory concerning revolutions, as well as theory pertinent to particular case studies dealing with revolution, and therefore iterated upon in this thesis, was selected with the intent to develop a framework derived from a diversity of domains in thought, and subsequently, a multifarious academic pool for analysis, broadly conducive to constructing a comprehensive framework for analysis pertinent to revolution. Ostensibly comprehensive in structure, in that it is an aggregate resembling a multidisciplinary approach for establishing parameters for analysis, the aspirational impetus of this theoretical overview of revolutionary theory is to establish and expand upon the subject matter. In line with the multiple perspectives comprising much of the thought derived through the field of conflict analysis, this approach utilizes epistemological sources in a multilateral sense, thus, ideally, the collected knowledge, by virtue of being diverse, may be employed to establish a built-in disinclination to prefer one particular track of thought to override the legitimacy of what could contribute toward
crafting accurate assessments for conflict, and in this case, stemming from theory concerning revolution.

It is of the utmost necessity to acknowledge that the decided importance of a given assessment is a subjective designation that entirely relies upon the affinities of the person accessing the material; including those who put forth posits that attempt to provide explanations for revolutions in the form of revolutionary theory. Regardless of an effort to assess information on an objective criterion, the selection of criteria will invariably be colored by the bias of experience and affinity with a particular discipline. If the determination of importance is ultimately based on subjective notions derived from individual value orientation based on personal proclivities and experience, then the act of negating divergent thought in the respective grounds for legitimacy based in said proclivity becomes a fruitless endeavor in arguing the tropes of preference in the guise of debating merit and an elusive truth. Once discourse becomes binary in a manner that only allows for polarized argumentation in terms of veracity and falsehood, truth no longer resides within the auspices of discourse directly related to the topic within these parameters of argumentation, because the goal in this distributive dynamic of being right or wrong does not involve the pursuit of a truth rather, it attempts to discredit a seemingly contrarian perspective through the twin tactic of self-derived legitimacy coupled with debasing fundamental principles of a subjectively incongruent posit. Acknowledging this bias, and detailing the exigencies that require attention to successfully circumvent them, hopefully provides the grounds to de-base and eschew such wasteful intellectual formulae
in what consequently merely constructs a myopic simulacra; detracting from accuracy and in turn, diluting the value in assessment in the resultant analysis.

The goal of this approach is to obviate solipsism to the degree to which it may be mitigated for the sake of accuracy, through enumerating and detailing the various pitfalls that bias may present. In two senses of the idea, solipsistic analysis is an odious factor that contributes to unnecessary obfuscation of what should be ideally achieved, and requires to be taken into account when gathering knowledge from sources that participate in this dynamic. First, held ideological inclinations may become peremptory blockades that lead to a disinclination to lend credence to knowledge that may be contradictory on some level to the held affinity, thus discounting the legitimacy in a counter perspective and warping the discourse concerning the issue into an absolute distinction between veracity and falsehood. Consequently, the detailed knowledge becomes isolated insofar as supporting a particular school of thought over others, and insular by means of a depending on a foundational self-reaffirmation through employing parameters that foster opportune conditions of hyper-reality through employing contextual factors that are conducive to reinforcing the arrived upon conclusion, and in turn, degrading alternative viewpoints attempting to explain the same phenomenon. Isolation and insularity (which, together, essentially define solipsism) rely upon the constructed reality that the theory is established upon, and placing emphasis upon the enunciated conceptions and conclusions that set the pillars for an exclusive condition of truth that is resting upon a foundational paradox, wherein reality is regulated into conformity for the sake of convenience in an
effort to service the reaffirmation of a semblance of truth, as opposed to achieving accuracy due to the degradation in validity that bias introduces into the equation. Secondly, philosophically fastening thought to predispositions in an artificial and contrived fashion restricts scope of vision and yields a deformed conclusion, which is antithetical to constructing a holistic perspective, which is the goal in creating these parameters for analysis in the first place. An egalitarian lens, at least in terms of attributing positive benefits in association with conceptualizations concerning revolutions, is much more conducive to gaining a greater understanding as opposed to dismissing and diminishing the usefulness of the contribution for the sake of relative aggrandizement of a particular philosophical or academic affinity.

Ultimately, it is not the locus of knowledge that needs to be proven to be useful or even superior; what is imperative to create is a cogent analysis striving for accuracy and applicability. Domain bias, in any manifestation or degree, artificially limits the usefulness of analysis because it places constraints into arenas of insight that could be valuable to the analyst; the sheer intellectual investment placed into a preferred domain of thought and espoused by those who herald the acclaim of a particular arena of thought do so on a relative spectrum, resulting in the unfortunate repudiation of alternative viewpoints via comparison and claims of exclusive validity. Consequently, derisive or otherwise dismissive predilections for particular explanations manifest and concomitantly diminish valuable input into the convoluted phenomenology included within the social dynamics and radical actions actuated in revolution: “Nothing, after all, compromises the
understanding of political issues and their meaningful debate today more seriously than
the automatic thought-reactions conditioned by the beaten paths of ideologies…” (Arendt
215) We must stay away from these “thought-reactions”, as Arendt states, because then
we are engaging in nothing more than a reactionary polarized automatic response, which
has no place in aspiring for accuracy, since it is devoid of thought beyond what is
involved in articulating a held predilection.

A way to make sense of schools of thought is not necessarily to frame the competing
forces of thought in a distributive, absolute sense of rightness or wrongness; rather,
envisioning a spectrum of pertinence where particular scholars fall in step with the level
of analysis, familiarity of topic, and passion for the material reflected in the
acknowledgement of achievement through the inclusion in the overarching discourse
facilitated by peers provides the notion that while some may claim that their given
conclusions based on their school of thought are the most important, they are by no
means the only conclusions pertinent to the topic at hand. Referencing this expertise for a
holistic framework is imperative for establishing the parameters for accuracy; and while
these argumentations are situated in a larger contrarian discourse of right and wrong, or
dismissed for lapses in accuracy, value may still be extracted from these sources on the
merits of the evidence that is brought forth within the various analyses themselves. The
fact of the matter is that knowledge is intertextual, in that preceding knowledge is
accounted for, considered, and addressed, and becomes a part of a larger whole. The hope
for this thesis is to extend the intertextuality of thought concerning revolution, while
acknowledging and implementing the preceding gathered knowledge in a manner that is constructive to achieving the goal.

The order in which theory will be introduced in this thesis will serve a dual purpose: it will be included in a somewhat sequential order in how revolutions unfold, in that much of what necessitates, or provides ample opportunity for the next theory cluster to become active, will be presented as a progression, which will be concurrent with a magnification in scope. The success or failure of a revolution hinges on what it births; the form of government, the ideological stimulus, social ramifications, the metamorphosis of a polity from isonomy, and the promulgation of freedom stemming from this newly forged polity all serve as the barometers of a successful revolution. Although the respective theorists place an emphasis on their self-derived legitimacy, and therefore create a concluding, supposedly unequivocally achieved appellation of authority upon their posit, we will correspond salient points of a given theorist’s analysis to complement a holistic, yet consolidated framework conducive for application to case studies in the name of creating a coherent theoretical expression for examining revolutions. Certainly, there are overlapping areas of coverage in terms of levels of analysis, redundant terminology that is relatively congruent, yet juts out with nuance to create the smallest of theoretical incongruities, and posits that do not rest flush with the categories established in the broad or specific classifications, so ideas brought forth by individual authors will be distributed in several domains of classification.
1. **Introduction to Revolution**

Revolution is curiously difficult to define: it is applied to several moments in time where tumult is the exigent descriptor of civil society coupled with where the once clear legitimacy of government becomes obscured by calls of illegitimacy from civil actors from various sectors of society; or, conversely, when conflict manifests in its most visceral form: where direct violence crushes the control of the incumbent system, as fissures cut deep into the societal structure bringing forth bloodshed; wherein vague conceptions of liberty and freedom are strewn about as ideological markers employed as a justification for the bloodletting bedlam brought about for the supposed betterment of the human condition. This is reflected in the multifarious qualifiers placed alongside revolution seen in much of the literature concerning the term. Examples may be seen in the “Operational Definitions” sections, which will be expounded upon in this thesis. Specifically, one example “Eastern Revolution” presented by Samuel P. Huntington, where a clear competition between the incumbent sovereign and a rival faction comprising a significant base of the population meet in a conflict competing for resources and escalating the competition into a dynamic where only violence can reveal the legitimate means of governance. Is this “revolution”? What is the difference between this conception, and say, a civil war? What is the difference between a revolution “from
above” and a coup d’état? Invariably, violence would be involved in both, where the military would play a large role in determining the victor in either scenario. Does the term “social revolution” deserve its own qualifier? It stands to reason that a dramatic change in the polity, meaning, the political apparatus in which whomever is considered a “citizen” is participates (or doesn’t) in government, would hold significant ramifications for how social dynamics work.

Even a seemingly minor change from similarly concentrated centers of governance, say, an autocracy to an absolutist government, holds significantly different connotations for how civil society operates in relation to the polity, and how, in turn, the polity affects the incumbent power structure in the various mean in which one would expect: socio-economic, normative values, ideological motivators stemming from these values, a collective memory or narrative that is justification for such a coalescence of power, and so on. Thus, we should suspect that these qualifiers situated alongside revolution point toward the onus of “revolution”; a tangible social movement (be it militant, or not even “societal”, but from a more concentrated population that holds a disproportionate amount of power in the polity) that we may point to and designate as the orchestrator for upheaval and change. Why, then, label a civil war a civil war and not call it a revolution? Undoubtedly, the social change in achieving victory in civil war would be far-reaching and profound, which certainly has overlapping qualities with what people could consider a revolution. What merit, then, does the dialect, value-laden implication that these respective terms call forth hold when one could portray a mere change in
government with the romanticized backdrop of a people attempting to garner justice, liberty, and freedom in the face of tyranny through revolution? Arguably, both revolution and civil war would be possible descriptors for such an event, as long as revolution was accompanied by the appropriate qualifier.

These qualifiers, however, diminish the meaning of revolution through obfuscating when it is appropriate to use the term, and incorrectly associate events that can already be explained through different terms that needlessly produce an epistemological overlap that confuses the meaning of revolution. We will use this section of the thesis to investigate these avenues of thought through attempting to define what a revolution is, and by using this definition, mainly derived through Hannah Arendt’s arrived upon conclusion (which was done through an extensive and unmatched historical and relativist explanation for how the term was created and why it was used), and contrasting it with how it is used in conceptual literature concerning the term. Similarly, since “liberty” and “freedom” are more or less platitudes slung about as an idealist pursuit for how the world should operate, at least in the context of revolution, these conceptions become imperative to define and understand, since they seem to be the foundational elements of what truly justifies instigating revolution in the form of what is ultimately an ambiguous doctrine.

Although much of the literature may seem vaguely deterministic, in that detailing a clear cause allows one to retrospectively plot events in a manner that allows analysis to become inductive in itself to serve itself; this is the general danger of attempting to
construct causal arguments. This may be falsely convenient, as the attraction of having a clear and simple explanation for revolution may prove to be harmful through constraining the extension of possible explanation. This solipsistic loop, by this point, has been greatly elaborated upon, and the previous discussion concerning the matter will be referenced to as a defense for inclusion. It deserves to be reiterated, however, that this is paramount to include, examine, discuss, and situate in the broader understanding of revolution.
2. **Historical Derivation**

A. **The Social Question**

The social question brings about a dynamic in revolution which, in essence, is supposed to direct the forces that bring about revolution for the betterment of a people or group, or even society at large in the face of tyranny. The social question is seemingly a question that is reared intrinsically in tandem with revolution; yet still apparently begs asking and thusly, differentiating: what does revolution do to remedy the ills of human indignity produced in the form of poverty and structurally violent governing practices that injects society with disparate qualities that establish a means for perpetuating a given injustice befalling a segment of the populace. Looking at the broader picture, one would ask, is this indignity, this disparate access to increasing human potential, not latent in all societies, and, consequently, a ubiquitous phenomenon to behold and to take into account? The answer is complicated, and involves aspects from both of the polar answers of yes and no:

“The social question began to play a revolutionary role only when, in the modern age and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent in the human condition, to doubt that the distinction between the few, who through circumstances of strength or fraud had succeeded in liberating
themselves from the shackles of poverty, and the laboring poverty-stricken multitude was inevitable and eternal.” (Arendt 12)

Historically speaking, poverty was a plight dealt with by the masses because there was seemingly no other alternative, no other condition that could be imagined beyond their very condition that embroiled them in a constant struggle to survive and maintain themselves in a violent system of governance that maintained hegemonic control through suppression and the codification of culturally violent inclinations that consistently encumbers the masses with the adverse condition and circumstance that is bound to them through poverty. Modernity, however, brought with it “new” thought and technological innovations that began to increase the slack that these shackles previously did not allow, and granted further movement away from this abject baseness in the misery applied to the human condition.

This then yields another question: how does this differ, in a basic sense, from revolution itself? The answer is that, ideally, it should not. Although the definitions of revolution will be expounded upon in a later section of this thesis, there is a universal quality to the implied result of revolution: that the oppressive boot of the hegemonic, imperious political order would be lifted from the downtrodden through efforts from societal actors and various social movements that depose the ancient régime, consolidate power, coalesce government, and move forward from this point with a participatory impetus derived from whatever ideological or otherwise catalytic engendering mechanisms were employed during revolution to bring it about in the first place.
Ultimately, in the idealistic perspective of what revolution introduces to a society, it is important to note that, “…the… source and origin of legitimate political power resides in the people,” (Arendt 171) wherein the public happiness, or the self-determination, of a people is allowed to flourish within the auspices of government, as opposed to being squelched by an unyielding tyrant that disallows such discourse and involvement amongst the free individuals that constitute the polity and greater society.

Ownership represents a polar contradistinction from the concept of poverty, and was used in a manner to serve as a conceptual base for what freedom meant within a grounded reality. In going back to a more historical perspective, we can see why this was used: “…who said property, said freedom, and to recover or defend one’s property rights was the same as to fight for freedom. It was precisely in their attempt to recover such ‘ancient liberties’ that the American Revolution and the French Revolution had their most conspicuous similarities.” (Arendt 172) Freedom was framed as an object to be attained, much in the same manner in which property was fought for against those who would dare to attempt to forcibly displace those from land which was rightfully theirs. Constructing the parallel of holding property with freedom provided an advantage in ideological values due to the simplicity of the construct, and consequently held a high appeal potential. Arguments that may lessen the posited appeal of such a concept through pointing out percentages of “landed” (landowners, sharecroppers, etc.) individuals contrasted with those who toiled away fruitlessly on land they did not own with goods that they could not accumulate in surplus, will be set aside for the time being and will be addressed in the
next section of the thesis. The intricacies of an agrarian economy involving the classification of subordinate classes, the impact that modernity held on these seemingly feudal practices, and exploitation of the mass “proletariat” by the landed bourgeoisies are certainly pertinent to the topic, in general, but not for what is being explored, presently. What we are attempting to distill from this construction is the semantic value from these conceptions to expand upon the resonance of thought. The fact of the matter is that at least some peasants owned land, and if they did not, they could at least ascertain the concept of holding land through a simple cognitive imaginary placement of themselves in such a situation, and positioning freedom within the same conditions of legitimacy. The roles that peasants, landed peasants, elites, and politicians would play in the answer to the “social question” present in agrarian society would determine the success or failure of revolution. This guides us nicely into the next section of this thesis: “Roots of the Modern Conception”.

B. Roots of the Modern Conception: Agrarian Society

Building from where we left off, it is now appropriate to define agrarian societies, as they were ostensibly the cradle for the nascent stages of what is considered revolution today. First, a definition:

“An agrarian bureaucracy is an agricultural society in which social control rests on a division of labor and a coordination of effort between a semi-bureaucratic state and a landed upper class. The landed upper class typically retains, as an adjunct to its landed property, considerable (though
varying in different cases) undifferentiated local and regional authority over the peasant majority of the population. The partially bureaucratic central state extracts taxes and labor from peasants either in-directly through landlord intermediaries or else directly, but with (at least minimal) reliance upon cooperation from individuals of the landed upper class. In turn, the landed upper class relies upon the backing of a coercive state to extract rents and/or dues from the peasantry. At the political center, autocrat, bureaucracy, and army monopolize decisions, yet (in varying degrees and modes) accommodate the regional and local power of the landed upper class and (again, to varying degrees) recruit individual members of this class into leading positions in the state system.” (Skocpol 178-179)

Here we see a rather straightforward conception of what constitutes an agrarian society. The financial reliance on the peasantry is apparent: both the landed elite and the bureaucratic government use the peasantry as a pool for both the function and continuation of the status quo through taxation and rent collection, as well as the actuation of government through policy and military directives in a macro-governance and foreign policy scale. With dependency, however, one can identify a weakness in the panoply of the political and landed elite classes of society: without the peasantry serving as a consenting party to their exploited socio-economic station in this system, government, and by extension, societal functions that government establishes, loses its
foundational monetary momentum; therein possibly rendering the entire system dysfunctional and prone to peasant rebellion or social action against the status quo. An additional economic strain could serve as an omen for such an occurrence, because the systemic reliance on the peasantry to compensate for such a strain is intrinsic to the agrarian system. Indeed, “Economic crises… and/or increased demands from above for rents or taxes might substantially enhance the likelihood of rebellions at particular times. But such events ought to be treated as short-term precipitants of peasant unrest, not fundamental underlying causes.” (Skocpol 179) Although an increased demand resulting from various costly governmental endeavors (say, a war, for example), or naturally occurring events, such as droughts, may push the peasantry to the fringe of consent and consequently have some instances where this socio-economic class may spiral into violence in the form of rebellion; especially considering that there is already latent tension in the dynamic: “Agrarian bureaucracies are inherently vulnerable to peasant rebellions. Subject to claims on their surpluses, and perhaps their labor, by land-lords and state agents, peasants chronically resent both.” (Skocpol 179) This lingering tension from the peasants leaves this economic system predisposed to civil tumult, since the peasantry, by virtue of the sheer dependence placed upon them in this system, acts as an indispensable component to the continued function of this system.

Agitation from the peasantry is not limited to an exclusive category of a landed elite or political elite, either: “To the extent that the agrarian economy is commercialized, merchants are also targets of peasant hostility. In all agrarian bureaucracies at all times,
and in France, Russia and China in non-revolutionary times, peasants have had grievances enough to warrant, and recurrently spur, rebellions.” (Skocpol 179) This situation points to a dynamic reminiscent of relative deprivation (see operational definitions), wherein an established referent group draws the ire of the disenfranchised, similar to the archetypical subversion directed toward the aforementioned elite. In this particular condition, the perceived unjust mendacity of a system that relies so heavily on peasant production establishes the pretense for violence where observed opulence becomes the target for violence and rebellion. This abstract referent group is collectively justified as a target for violence through culturally violent narrative mechanisms wherein the engendering collective anecdotal validation for violence creates a “folk devil” (see operational definitions), on which the ills of the peasant condition are heaped upon as a scapegoat.

What becomes apparent after some thought, however, is the realization that rebellion does not necessarily bridge into revolution. Rebellion conspicuously lacks the qualities of societal action: there is no mirrored “elite class” that sympathizes with the peasantry, there is no ideological movement that reaches beyond an increased burden placed upon the lowest rung of society that could close this gap, and the state clearly retains power, Theda Skocpol addresses this, and states:

“Social revolutions in France, Russia and China occurred, during the earlier world-historical phases of modernization, in agrarian bureaucratic societies situated within, or newly incorporated into, international fields
dominated by more economically modern nations abroad. In each case, social revolution was a conjuncture of three developments: (1) the collapse or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries; (2) widespread peasant rebellions; and (3) marginal elite political movements.” (Skocpol 178)

Skocpol postulates that international technological standards that stranded these agrarian communities in the mire of a backwards economic system played a part in dissolving the legitimacy of the state through introducing an international competitive component to the paradigm, therein providing the basis for where an opportunity for rebellion to rear itself could come to fruition.

The additional criterion lists conditions in which a rebellion could have significantly trenchant effects on the social and political systems. With the collapse of the central administrative system, the monopoly on violence wielded by the government falters and, consequently, begins to loosen its grip on the normative mechanisms that induce society into consent through the use of violence. It is important to consider that violence is not power, it is merely a compensating measure of those who are losing power, where consent is garnered through coercion via elimination, deterrence, and spectacle of force that ultimately suppresses subversion. Instead of drawing power through self-evident legitimacy, the state, in this case, makes up for a lack of control through artificially imposing compliance through utilizing its exclusive use of unilateral violence. Without this means of violence to coerce consent from a civil populace, the
previously hidden lack of power wielded by the state is exposed, and rebellion becomes significantly more difficult to quell, and in turn, the effect rebellion holds on a societal level has the potential to be far more impactful. Peasant rebellions were seemingly a more or less common occurrence in agrarian societies, considering the persistent deprivation (see “operational definitions”) that peasants endured. When these rebellions occur and are no longer limited to a specific area due to the dual inducements of disenfranchisement and opportunity, their effect on society at large becomes amplified through volume and impact. It stands to reason that with the collapse of the central authority mechanisms of the state, comes the displeasure of the elite that directly benefited from this dynamic. Once the state loses legitimacy through becoming a dysfunctional husk of what it once was and devoid of ability or lacking broad appeal and consent from the populace, supporting the status quo either becomes untenable or delusional. Unless there is a majority consensus of the elite classes to support the incumbent system of governance, and they use the resources available to them to quell peasant rebellion through violence or appeal, the government will continue to crumble and revolution will take place, or sectarian violence will become the new paradigm. In Skocpol’s criterion, however, the assumption is these marginal elite movements occur and create the potential for revolution to occur. Ideological motivations backed by educated elites create rally points for society at large, and may sway civil consent in their favor in order to consolidate power and create a new political and social dynamic reflective of whatever rhetoric they espoused to garner power. This is, of course, operating under the supposition that the calls of these ideological movements are
genuine, and that the initial spur for revolution remains intact through the tumultuous circumstances of isonomy in the condition of liberty.

C. Enlightenment and Revolution: The American and French Revolutions

Now that we have situated the roots of the modern conception of revolution, the continuation of the explication will be directed into a more historical framework, wherein we will further flesh out the characteristics of the period that bore the modern notion of revolution. The French Revolution is arguably the most referenced historical precedent for the romanticized notion of revolution, which is why its inclusion in developing the context of when and where revolution began. Although the French Revolution’s importance is proven through its seemingly ubiquitous presence in literature concerning the topic, an important question must be asked: was this a revolution? As we examined earlier while addressing the “social question”, the idealized conception of revolution is where legitimacy in governance is derived through the people, wherein the wave of revolution coalesces into a functioning governing body that is comprised of the ideals and pursued freedoms that initially broke the shackles of tyranny and granted liberty to the oppressed. Is what came to be of the French Revolution reflective of this ideal attainment? There is no question that the status quo altered considerably, wherein social movements took advantage of a deteriorating ancien régime, and the democratization of public opinion and public will rode the wave of revolution in various societal ideologies that attempted to detach France from what had preceded through a monumental paradigm shift in the form of laicism and the cult of the supreme being propagated by Robespierre and Rousseau. This paradigm shift, however, succumbed to the counter-revolutionary
movements that relied on violence in the form of terror, targeted assassination in attempts
to stymie fractures in power, and paradoxical roles embodied by Robespierre himself,
which ultimately exposed the susceptibility of power usurpation inherent in the condition
of isonomy, and signaled the rise of Napoleon and the reign of an absolutist government.

Revolutions, or any other event, do not occur in a vacuum; although some
discussion would certainly pose the circumstances as such. Thus, it is important to place
the two revolutionary waves that engaged relatively new threads of thought in a
contradistinctive context when attempting to pose a historical framework concerning
revolution during this time period. Certainly, the societal contexts of America and France
were starkly different, but this only serves to better elucidate the distinctive qualities that
factored into the respective outcomes of both revolutions. First, however, we must
address the controversial factor that either negates or provides additional context to the
American Revolution, depending on the position of the speaker, which is American
slavery. In summary, the concern is that slavery in itself would prevent widespread
human indignity from free peoples because the burden of production and exploitation
would be placed on the slaves and not a merely economically marginalized peasantry. For
the American Revolution to have truly solved the social inequities discussed in the
discourse of the social question, slave emancipation would have had to have been
included in the movement to resolve the inhuman plight imposed upon a large segment of
society:
“If it were not for the presence of Negro slavery on the American scene, one would be tempted by this striking aspect exclusively by American prosperity, by Jefferson’s ‘lovely equality’, or by the fact that America was indeed in William Penn’s words, ‘a good poor Man’s country’. As it is, white man’s country did not depend to a considerable degree upon black labour and black misery – there lived roughly 400,000 Negroes along with approximately 1,850,000 white men in America in the middle of the eighteenth century, and even in the absence of reliable statistical data we may be sure that the percentage of complete destitution and misery was considerably lower in the countries of the Old World. From an obscurity even blacker than the obscurity of poverty; the slave, not the poor man, was ‘wholly overlooked’.” (Arendt 61)

As despicable as it is to consider in the modern context, slavery being “overlooked” in the social question of America was a presupposition that veiled the social problem slavery posed in the thought of the day (although the topic was certainly broached, it by no means gained enough support or thought to be considered anything other than “overlooked”). This reinforces the notion that a relativist perspective is important to maintain while analyzing historical events, and although dismissing the condition of pervasive slavery is a horrendous notion to take into account in itself, dismissing the eventual outcome of what America was able to accomplish through implementing innovative thought, and subsequently reifying these abstractions in the form of a
constitution and republican government is intellectually detestable in its own right, although certainly not as conceptually egregious as slavery.

Nonetheless, “… the conviction that life on earth might be blessed with abundance instead of being cursed by scarcity, was prerevolutionary and American in origin; it grew directly out of the American colonial experience.” (Arendt 13) America’s being a good “poor man’s country” established a dynamic where abject poverty was seemingly non-essential to the human condition; at least in the perspective of white Europeans (and again, dismissing slavery from the formulae of comparison). Regardless of this mitigating factor, “… the ‘new continent’, the American, a ‘new man’, ‘the lovely equality’, in Jefferson’s words, ‘which the poor enjoy with the rich’, revolutionized the spirit of men, first in Europe and then all over the world…” (Arendt 15) Equality in this case was not necessarily a socio-economic consideration, as the aforementioned label of a good poor man’s country would be rendered nonsensical. The “lovely equality” that Jefferson mentioned was more an aspect of public happiness, wherein input and collaboration in government, regardless of socio-economic station was the paradigm in which America operated on a communal basis. Obviously, England constrained American ability to exercise self-determination politically on an independent basis, but the condition of participation in governance itself was what yielded a refreshing notion for the human condition. Thus, with this dynamic in place, an aspirational, relatable model could be established that extricated mankind from what was previously considered a natural condition of existence. Presuppositions began to rally behind this new notion of
the free man, which was a tangible idea thanks to the “lovely equality” experienced by American colonists: “Not the American Revolution, but the existence of conditions in America that had been established and were well known in Europe long before the Declaration of Independence, nourished the revolutionary \textit{élans} in Europe.” (Arendt 14)

Even preceding the American Revolutionary War, the condition of extending opportunity to the poor to be able to act as participants in government and contribute to public opinion invigorated a new assumption concerning people and government.

The experience and consequent familiarity with self-determination and public happiness in politics in the American context may provide an interesting insight into why the eventualities of the respective French and American revolutions diverged so dramatically in the uncertainty of absolute liberty attained after overthrowing and debasing the previous regime. Ostensibly, “What was a passion and a ‘taste’ in France clearly was an experience in America, and the American usage which, especially in the eighteenth century, spoke of ‘Public happiness’, where the French spoke of ‘public freedom’, suggests this difference quite appropriately.” (Arendt 110) Disparate experience in free discussion and participation by a citizenry would prove to significantly alter domestic political and social dynamics:

“The direction of the American Revolution remained committed to the foundation of freedom and the establishment of lasting institutions, and to those who acted in this direction nothing was permitted that would have been outside the range of civil law. The direction of the French Revolution
was deflected almost from its beginning from this course of foundation through the immediacy of suffering; it was determined by the exigencies of liberation not from tyranny but from necessity, and it was actuated by the limitless immensity of both the people’s misery and the pity this misery inspired. The lawlessness of the ‘all is permitted’ sprang here still from the sentiments of the heart whose very boundlessness helped in the unleashing of a stream of boundless violence.” (Arendt 82)

The disparate condition of the newly “freed man” in these respective contexts is a salient factor to consider. The American Revolution directly confronted an imperial power that suppressed their political ability to exercise self-determination while the respective states were being exploited economically as whole. The conspicuous absence of a deleterious economic constraint that deteriorated the power of the imperious state certainly posed a difficulty in successfully revolting against England, but it also kept intact a systemically functional economic system that was conducive to the “lovely equality” present in the American condition. Since there was no direct dearth to consider that confronted Americans with “necessity”, as Arendt put it, the foundation for successfully establishing a government based upon revolutionary ideals was possible. When we observe what was stated by John Adams, “I always consider the settlement of America as the opening of a grand scheme and design in Providence for the illumination of the ignorant and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth.” (Arendt 13) – and for now, ignore the irony of using universalistic conceptions of slavery and implied freedom
while maintaining slavery domestically – we see an essential principle propagated by the founding fathers that was infused with the creation of the United States.

While a direct conflict between the colonists and the imperial power concerning the resources of authority was the paradigm of conflict in the American Revolution; this was not the case for France. Indeed, while, “The American Revolution was the first such revolution in the modern era that resulted in colonies establishing independence and being recognized by the status quo powers, including the ex-colonial ruler,” (Katz 153) France faced a different predicament altogether: society was collapsing upon itself. The legitimacy of the state, internally, was crumbling due to inability, elite orientations deflected attempts to reform and maintain at least a semblance of the status quo. Removing the incumbent power structure was not the looming problem to consider; it was the social conditions in which society at large endured, and liberty further exposed the poor state that this wounded society experienced. Misery in this static condition, regardless of who wielded power, what ideological imperative was espoused, and where society’s focus was directed upon, bred only more misery and discontent; as is apparent in the increased propagation of various “constitutions” that failed to gain traction, and the opportunistic ideological movements that supplied the vehemence and desperation that reared violence and the concomitant unctuous pity elites employed to garner support.

In more detail:

“Schematically speaking, the conflict between the Jacobin government and the revolutionary societies was fought over three different issues: the
first issue was the fight of the republic for its survival against the pressure of Sans-Culottism, that is, the fight for public freedom against overwhelming odds of private misery. The second issue was the fight of the Jacobins faction for absolute power against the public spirit of the societies; theoretically, this was the fight, for a unified public opinion, a ‘general will’, against the public spirit, the diversity inherent in freedom of thought and speech; practically, it was the power struggle of party and party interest against *la chose publique*, the common weal. The third issue was the fight of the government’s monopoly of power against the federal principle with its separation and division of power, that is, the fight of the nation-state against the first beginnings of a true republic. The clash on all three issues revealed a profound rift between the men who had made the Revolution and had risen to the public realm through it, and the people’s own notions of what revolution should and could do.” (Arendt 237)

Diffuse ideological motivations spanning the spectrum of political thought were present in the socio-political dynamics in the French Revolution. An ostensible power vacuum was torn open from the figurative corpse of the inept, debased, and deposed *ancien régime*. Civil strife reigned, no matter where on the socio-political spectrum an individual was situated. The purportedly moderate Jacobins government attempted to ameliorate diffusion of power through mitigating the widespread of counter-revolutionary movements (in this case, counter-revolutionary would be a subjective designation, as
Robespierre espoused a supposed truth in the Jacobin cause that made detraction from their authority counter-revolutionary through mere distinction). As history conspicuously points out, consolidating power, establishing a government, and providing a basis of legitimate power derived through the people themselves through consent was not to be; explained here as being caused due to a broken societal system of governance that could not be immediately remedied coupled with the sheer novelty and inexperience with political self-determination that France was confronted with.

D. Where does Revolution Come From?

An issue that becomes increasingly glaring when tasked with attempting to establish a new foundational ideology and basis for legitimacy in the context of revolution is that revolution itself was a novel concept that required justification, which lent credence to the notion that the idea of revolution had to be framed in a warranted manner that reflected the universalistic and “natural” postulations that were being introduced by the founding fathers and their contemporary ideologues. It stands to reason that if the ideals espoused by revolutionary leaders were indeed natural and a universal condition for mankind, then there would be a reference wherein this natural order was established for a society to revolve back to (hence the term revolution), or at the very least reference a preconceived idea that was established in history.

The term revolution was, “… used for a movement of revolving back to some pre-established point and, by implication, of swinging back into a preordained order,” (Arendt 33) and points to this lineage of the typology of the term. Yet pointing back to
history would have a far greater impact that solely citing precedence, “… they… restore an old order of things that had been disturbed and violated by the despotism of absolute monarchy or the abuses of colonial government.” (Arendt 34) For a beginning, “…needs an absolute from which it springs and by which it is ‘explained’,” (Arendt 198) but what prevents a new beginning from becoming negated through the paradox exposed in detailing a new motivation through collecting precedent from a disconnected past and apply this to the present?

In part, “What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own principle within itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and principle, principium and principle, are not only related to each other, but are coeval,” (Arendt 205) which does not necessarily mute the inexorable questions arising from a proof relying on induction to claim that what it exchanges for compliance is a truth that manifests through its existence, thus rendering it more or less arbitrary; perhaps, however, the appeal of the principle itself fosters accord on a suppositional basis that allows for hypothetical extrapolation of what would come to be for an establishing truth. For example a “self-evident” truth relies on the principle to be carried out into its outmost progression for it to prove itself within the hypothetical auspices of its assumption of circumstance that would serve as a proof for its validity. The promise of reward serves as the legitimacy of the conception in the first place, thus imparting the given truth of the conception in the appeal for the implementation of this perspective; and solidifies its established truth
through dynamic reinforcement within those who adhere to this truth since the validity of the conception is self-evident and thus self-sustaining through its mere existence.

Legitimacy was a key concern to address, because self-determination and the “public happiness” derived from exercising this freedom was a new concept to consider in the context of an authoritarian sovereign that rendered theses radical conceptions alien to the overlaying dynamic of society at the time. Nonetheless, the conceptions that fueled the ideological fervor of revolution had to find a more concrete grounding for them to appear applicable to a non-idealized context: reality. Justification for such an unprecedented action ironically necessitated proof through precedence, thus, “… they depended even more on memories from antiquity, and they filled the ancient Roman words with suggestions that arose from language and literature rather than from experience and concrete observation.” (Arendt 111) Established and agreed upon historical precedent in the form of conceptions that held no direct bearing on the context of an authoritarian regime provided the foundation for such a trajectory of thought to come to fruition, and yielded enough of a passion behind the sentiment of words and ideas long lost to the traditions of the ancients to resurrect them and apply them to society at the time. The meaning behind the motivation held great significance for the result of revolution that may come to be, and impacted the implication of power deriving from the words used to incite upheaval: “Against tyranny and oppression, not against exploitation and poverty, they had asserted the rights of the people from whose consent – according to Roman antiquity, in whose school the revolutionary spirit was taught and educated – all
power must derive its legitimacy.” (Arendt 64) It stands to reason, then, that, “…without the classical example shining through the centuries, none of the men of the revolutions on either side of the Atlantic would have possessed the courage for what then turned out to be unprecedented action,” (Arendt 188) which means that understanding where the originator for the idea was located is important to composing our general understanding of the conception in the first place: “The modern concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold, was unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century.” (Arendt 18-19) Assuming that this is, indeed, true, then analyzing delving into this topic was important to garner a cogent and broader understanding of how the term came to be and what circumstance it was reared in.

E. What does Revolution Accomplish?

Inciting an unprecedented societal movement would suggest that there was at least an inkling for what would come to be if said societal movement were to be considered an accomplishment. However, this would dismiss the fact that, “… nothing more was originally intended than reforms in the direction of constitutional monarchies, even though the experiences of the American people in the realm of ’public happiness’ must have been considered prior to their conflicts with England.” (Arendt 125) Could it be that reforms provided the foundation for a larger, more foundationally shattering motivation to take its place? In a sense, yes: while, “… there had always been those who hoped for nothing more than a new ‘way of life’,” (Arendt 127) a new “way of life” is a
misleading label that alludes to a much more profound shift in how the relationship between the state and people behaves. A “new way of life” in the American sense of the term would be to forge a state from disparate colonial enterprises operating under the auspices of the foremost colonial power on the planet at the time. Hoping for nothing more than a new way of life reduces the significance of such an occurrence so dramatically that it almost seems like an idea out of synch with the ramifications a paradigm shift of such magnitude would hold on the lives of those who undertook the task. France would confront a similarly new circumstance to deal with, in that France did not share the communal democratization of self-determination in the polity that America had experienced on a smaller scale.

Self-determination was a foreign conception that was relegated to the condition that a good “poor man’s” country could maintain, which meant that the ability to exercise such ability, although to a relatively inconsequential extent within the various communal polities of American communities, was a new appendage that French civil society had no practice in employing. The mere fact that, “None of the European parliaments was a legislative body; they had at best the right to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’; the initiative, however, the right to act did not rest with them,” (Arendt 171) offers insight into generally how restrained the ability to introduce, discuss, ratify, and enact upon policy was. The executive was the origin of power in form of promulgation of law, and garnered consent as more or less a formality. Only when the elite classes of French civil society refused to enact upon mandated reforms by Louis the XVI in attempt to right the errors of a poorly
managed economic system that overburdened the peasantry in the throes of famine did the conditions for revolution become apparent. The ineptitude of the incumbent power structure ultimately unraveled upon itself, and the previously estranged actuation of a “basic human need” in self-determination became a reality.

In brief,

“What each social revolution minimally 'accomplished' was the extreme rationalization and centralization of state institutions, the removal of a traditional landed upper class from intermediate (regional and local) quasi-political supervision of the peasantry, and the elimination or diminution of the economic power of a landed upper class.” (Skocpol 178)

More definitions for revolution will follow in the next section specifically designated as a focus for these various definitions, but Theda Skocpol addresses the condition that the French ultimately aspired toward with the perspective of retrospective analysis. The role of interlocutors between the state and the people was significantly altered in that previously landed individuals and institutions (such as the Catholic Church) were forced from their seats of privilege and a new breath of life was incubated in the nascent stages of this revolutionary wave.

F. Engels and Marx: The Communist Manifesto

Out of the setting of the French Revolution and breakthroughs in thought that were brought forth in the “enlightenment”, a retrospective analysis of revolution began to
take hold of the theoretical and philosophical community concerning the state, civil society, and the various segments of a given populace that constitutes civil society. The French Revolution, after its disastrous end, was at the forefront of thought concerning revolution, and began to serve as the quintessential model for what revolution meant:

“...it was precisely the great amount of theoretical concern and conceptual thought lavished upon the French Revolution by Europe’s thinkers and philosophers which contributed decisively to its world-wide success, despite its disastrous end. The American failure to remember can be traced to this fateful failure of post-revolutionary thought.” (Arendt 212)

Consequently, thought concerning revolution was thusly constrained due to the over-dependence on a case study that culminated with the tumultuous circumstances of violence and structural context; and thought stemming from this orientation was heavily steered in this deterministic direction. Given, there are certainly valid perspectives in what was produced by Marx, Engels, and Hegel (who preceded them), which produced a new typology that resonated not only academically but on a base level that reached people and established an epistemological foundation of thought that merited further investigation through virtue of its ideological traction in the world. However, there were circumstances that Marx and company could not predict would occur; reifications of abstract ideas that did not mesh with the postulations espoused in the *Communist Manifesto*:
“…instead of industrial laborers carrying out socialist revolutions, peasants have often played the major role. Although theorists of revolution continue to value Marx’s insights that revolutions arise from the struggle of different groups competing for dominance, it is clear that revolutions can arise in ways Marx did not foresee.” (Goldstone 37)

As is indicated by Jack A. Goldstone, this does not necessarily devalue the merit of the ideas proposed by Marx, because the social categorizations that he crafted, as well as the inter-relational dynamics that comprised these socio-economic categories left a profoundly indelible mark on thought concerning not only revolution but sociological thought. With this said, the fact that the ideas brought forth by the *Communist Manifesto* are so profoundly foundational to the advancement of thought pertaining to revolutions and how people view class distinctions, its inclusion and accompanying commentary in this thesis is imperative to the goal of understanding revolution.

Capitalism, the ostensible extension of a feudal state that had undergone societal upheaval, was viewed as the middle point between a socialist society and a feudal society. While this would certainly imply progress, Marx made sure to point out the indignity that humanity was confronted with during the industrialization of England: “The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions for oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.” (Engels and Marx 24) Marx maintained that framing the French Revolution in some romanticized notion of freedom
for the masses was misleading: “class antagonism” was a conspicuously exigent deleterious condition that was afflicting capitalist society, and was extensive in its ability to smother the flourishes that mankind could otherwise enjoy. As explained by Marx, “The modern laborer… instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth.” (Engels and Marx 31) Furthermore, “It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation.” (Engels and Marx 25) The new socio-economic paradigm propagated an indiscriminate torrent of the capitalist devaluation of humanity in a dehumanizing, reductionist capacity for the sake of warping human value into capital value: “It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedom, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade.” (Engels and Marx 25) Essentially, the romanticized notion of the individual was swept away with the waves of the French Revolution for the sake of a structural ideal that was fixated on an economic solution for a problem that held not only economic ramifications, but social consequences, as well. Capitalism presented a particularly ominous global presence, in that it transcended traditional conceptions of limitation out of the sheer power of greed and held the unique ability of binding down the proletariat classes of the world:

“The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family-relations;
modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.”

(Engels and Marx 30)

Out of feudalism, and then, absolutism, capitalism came forth and changed the impetus of social action and consequent social and economic policy. While France diverged from the absolute sway of oppressive institutions that perpetrated wrongs against the masses, diverging from these previous institutions did not necessarily guarantee freedom from exploitation and marginalization: “In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.” (Engels and Marx 25) One evil was traded for another, more pernicious evil that was presented beneath the false veil of freedom that hid inherent capitalist inequalities.

Marx’s parasitic parallel goes further: “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole reactions of society.” (Engels and Marx 25)

Revolution, in this excerpt, is framed as a tool for capitalists to wield in an attempt to coopt an ever-increasing number of institutions to extend the oppressive reach of the bourgeoisie upon the masses of the proletariat. The all-consuming, fatalistically destructive beast that Marx posed as capitalism had an insatiable appetite:
“All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe.” (Engels and Marx 26)

In contrast, the proletariat, the oppressed masses that endured the pernicious conditions propagated by the minority of the population that comprised the bourgeoisie, was posed a class of humanity that was fated to oppose bourgeois imperiousness, but was at the same time at the mercy of manipulation by the elite class:

“This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, in continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself.” (Engels and Marx 29)

Similar to the peasantry of the feudal-agrarian economy, the proletariat classes in capitalist society were situated as, “… a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.” (Engels and Marx 30) thus, relationally, “What the bourgeoisie,
therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.” (Engels and Marx 31) Marx entrusted his conception of the proletariat with the self-actualization of a predicted upheaval that held the responsibility of rectifying an unjust system through buckling the machinery driven by greed by the bourgeoisie:

“The proletariat movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.” (Engels and Marx 30)

Since the proletariat was a foundational component of the inherent exploitative necessity for Capitalism to function, disallowing further exploitation on the end proletariat class through self-actualization in the form of a proletariat revolution would hold a significant impact on a societal level. The removal of the pressure of the “superincumbent strata” placed upon the proletariat through capitalist exploitation would require an implied ideological motivator for the proletariat to progress passed the oppressive state that capitalism subjected humanity to, and for Marx, this ideological motivator was Communism.
3. **Liberty, Freedom, and Revolution**

A. **Introduction**

Freedom and liberty are seemingly universally applied to revolutions to the extent that they may indeed be considered axiomatic and thereby inextricable to the conception itself. However, while,

“It may be a truism to say that liberation and freedom are not the same; that liberation may be the condition of freedom but by no means leads automatically to it; that the notion of liberty implied in liberation can only be negative, and hence, that even the intention of liberating is not identical with the desire for freedom. Yet if these truisms are frequently forgotten, it is because liberation has always loomed large and the foundation of freedom has always been uncertain, if not altogether futile.” (Arendt 19-20)

This section of the thesis will define, explore, and extrapolate the yet to be included elucidation of these two inter-related concepts with other conceptions dealing with the topic of revolutions in an attempt to both reinforce the ideas introduced in this section and relay its broader application to the topic. These terms are treated as separate ideas,
yet are conflated with regularity within the context of revolution, mainly because revolution, along with some of the qualifiers for revolution is an occurrence that is also conflated with rebellion. This parallel will also be used to further elucidate the distinctions between these two terms, and will also establish a pre-conditional, temporal relationship that is integral to grasping a better understanding of the two ideas of their application to revolution, in particular.

B. Defining Freedom

Since, ostensibly, a societal action that actuates revolution is done so in the name of establishing an enduring system that upholds newfound freedoms resultant from such an occurrence, with whatever cultural implications and connotations those words hold depending on the context, it is important to define these rather ambiguous terms. Thus, we should establish a definition: “Freedom in a positive sense is possible only among equals, and equality itself is by no means a universally valid principle but, again, applicable only with limitations and even within spatial limits.” (Arendt 267) Freedom, under this framework, implies that there must be a pretext of equality amongst peers; along with an arena (the “polity”) that facilitates such an interaction amongst equally free peoples. Somewhat counter-intuitively to what could be inferred from this condition, this freedom is not solely restricted to the political realm, and in fact, holds more bearing within civil society rather than in some exclusively political sense.

In fact, “…[freedom] has become almost axiomatic even in political theory to understand by political freedom not a political phenomenon, but on the contrary, the
more or less free range of non-political activities which a given body politic will permit and guarantee to those who constitute it.” (Arendt 20) The ability to engage in discourse, debate, ideological exchanges, and other interactions relies upon the assumption of freedom and equality for such a system to function. A peerless system obviates this freedom, and in as cases like an absolute monarchy or a feudal society where the succor of societal input has no significant or real bearing unless violence is employed, the condition of consternation within civil society is implicit, in that a vacuous polity exists that negates the ability for free exchange of thought. As Arendt states, “… it was indeed the ocean of misery and the ocean-like sentiments it aroused that combined to drown the foundations of freedom.” (Arendt 85) This lack of freedom can be attributed as “misery” imposed upon the human condition; and this relatively new sense of freedom, in which the government derives its power from the people, as opposed to peerless individual that does not have the ability nor the imperative to engage in political discourse, unfastened this condition from the perception that this was indeed intrinsic to the human condition.

C. Defining Liberty

Liberty is a term that is constantly bandied about, where the implication certainly has some relational conditionality with freedom, but it remains ambiguous all the same. Thus, just as was the case with freedom, we will define liberty: “… liberty meant no more than freedom from the unjustified restraint, and as such was fundamentally identical with freedom of movement – ‘the power of locomotion… without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law’…” (Arendt 22) The direct application of this
conception as a negation of tyranny is evident. Liberty is anti-monotonic when applied to conditions of tyranny, wherein it establishes an invidious relationship with the status quo and adherents to the notion that a condition of liberty is attainable. Obeisance becomes an absent dynamic once societal cries for action in pursuit of liberty are actuated; but what is striking about this, is that the lack of obeisance directed toward a no longer legitimate ruler implies an absolute condition; a condition where liberty becomes the zenith of what it could possibly attain; where freedom becomes boundless, and, paradoxically, societal freedom becomes abridged in the ensuing chaos of absolute liberty.

The relationship between liberty and freedom is somewhat confounding, in that once freedom becomes codified; liberty becomes suppressed through the delineations of freedom. Liberty is absolute freedom, but the implementation of freedoms takes away freedom in the absolute form of liberty in the manifestation of a social contract constructed to channel the actions which one may actuate on the terms of agreed upon social values hinging on justice. Liberty on an individual scale suggests absolute freedom, but once that abstract individual condition is replaced with a relational dynamic, freedom becomes impinged through the mere interaction of these abstract actors. Freedom is self-denial for the betterment of the collective; hence the establishment of governance founded upon the pretense of establishing conditions where the abridgement is abrogated through policy that allows a semblance of absolute freedom to exist in the name of societal considerations.
D. How these Interrelate in Revolution

Now we have to ask ourselves how these two conceptions work together within the context of revolution and government. It is actually a rather complicated condition that is made somewhat convoluted by the intrinsic paradox inserted into the dynamic that the two terms created. In this sense, a temporal differentiation between the two terms may be useful of elucidating the difference through establishing proprietary conditions and the coincidence of existence:

“If … one keeps in mind that the end of rebellion is liberation, while the end of revolution is the foundation of freedom, the political scientist at least will know how to avoid the pitfall of the historian who tends to place his emphasis upon the first and violent stage of rebellion and liberation, on the uprising against tyranny, to the detriment of the quieter second stage of revolution and constitution, because all the dramatic aspects of his story seem to be contained in the first stage and, perhaps, also because the turmoil of liberation has so frequently defeated the revolution.” (Arendt 133)

This explication helps us in two ways: First, it establishes the temporal distinctions between rebellion and liberty, wherein it may be inferred that a rebellion, and subsequent assumption of the success therein which establishes liberty, is a precondition to
revolution, and the condition of establishing freedom in a constitution in the implied success of this event. In effect, revolution is contingent upon a successful rebellion.

Second, it places some of the confusing terminology, and the redundant nature of some of the existing terminology concerning the topic in a light that accounts for some of these curious occurrences. Additionally,

“… to be free from want and fear, are of course essentially negative; they are the results of liberation but they are by no means the actual content of freedom, which, as we shall see later, is participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm. If revolution had aimed only at the guarantee of civil rights, then it would not have aimed at freedom but at liberation from governments which had over-stepped their powers and infringed upon old and well-established rights.” (Arendt 22)

Since liberation is essentially a negation of a previously experienced condition, it is by default, a non-definition, which adds to the confusing nature of the term. This excerpt further defines the relationship between revolution, liberty, and freedom, through explaining the disestablishing nature of liberty while pointing out the founding principles in freedom.

Given that freedom is situated as antithetical to the conditions of tyranny, it stands to reason that, “Ascending or aspiring groups and rigid or inflexible institutions are the stuff of which revolutions are made,” (Huntington 43) which furthers the intricacies of some aspects of how tyranny affects a polity, and also relays how “rigid institutions” and
not merely societal and political dynamics that can be summarily explained as “tyrannical” are susceptible to the antithetical values that freedom poses to the rigidity of a given institutional structure. Furthermore, “… the two prerequisites for revolution are, first, political institutions incapable of providing channels for the participation of new social forces in politics and of new elites in government…” (Huntington 43) which, again, cites “rigidity”, or the unwavering insistence to rely upon monotonic policies, and disharmonious relations within the ranks of the “elite”; concomitant with, “… secondly, the desire of social forces, currently excluded from politics, to participate therein, this desire normally arising from the group’s feeling that it needs certain symbolic or material gains which it can achieve only by pressing its demands in the political sphere,” (Huntington 43) which is a typology that can be more or less summarized as our conception of “freedom”, expounds upon the notion of overlap in principle concerning revolution, and also indicates how these foundational components are touched upon in multiple domains of thought. These are pre-suppositional hallmarks that can be seen in almost all conceptions of revolution, and now have grant us the benefit of gaining a better grasp of what they mean within the framework of revolution.
4. **Isonomy**

Considering that the term “isonomy” has been used, and will be continue to be used, with regularity, it becomes an important aspect of revolution to further investigate. With this considered, let us proceed with a definition:

“This notion of no-rule was expressed by the word isonomy, whose outstanding characteristics among the forms of government, as the ancients had enumerated them, was that the notion of rule… was entirely absent from it. The *polis* was supposed to be an isonomy, not a democracy. The word ‘democracy’, expressing even then majority rule, the rule of the many, was originally coined by those who were opposed to isonomy and who meant to say: What you say is ‘no-rule’ is in fact only another kind of rulership; it is the worst form of government, rule by the demos.” (Arendt 20)

Isonomy, somewhat similar to liberty, is a negation of a condition; it is the apparent lack of an existing structure, but also implies the attainment of absolute equality through the absence of a collective norm. However, be it positive or negative, this aspect of the term is left to be determined, and is not necessarily contingent on change, but is a condition in
itself, regardless of what preceded it. Equality is an implied condition in isonomy, in that there is no superincumbent structure in place to govern the people, thus situating an absolute form of political equality in the sense that there is no traditional sense of a collectively impactful political action in the first place. In fact, there is no structure whatsoever. In its place, exists a people sans government in any conventional sense of the term, wherein the polity is not consisting of a collective, rather it is made up of individuals, which lays the foundation for a contradiction in terms. Rule is essentially rendered into a state of “no-rule”, where there is no authority, there is no institution, and there are no political actors beyond the actions of the individual, and by extension, the impact that these individual actions have on others situated within the confines of a direct relational dynamic. Isonomy is the absolute form of what the term democracy suggests: rule of the people, in that majority rule, a contingent element of democracy that has imperious dimensions (commonly dubbed the tyranny of the majority) on minority segments of a given population, was utterly absent from the condition of isonomy, since there was no means of installing policy because of the non-existence of a political structure to establish a collective status quo. The major difference in these conceptions is that there is a polity, a political structure, installed in a democracy. Isonomy lifts the structure from the political formulae, and serves as the absolute form of “rule by the demos”.

However, equality is a complicated subject to broach in terms of the impact isonomy has on this condition:
“Isonomy guaranteed… equality, but not because all men were born or created equal, but, on the contrary, because men were by nature not equal, and needed an artificial institution, the *polis*, which… would make them equal. Equality existed only in this specifically political realm, where men met one another as citizens and not as private persons.” (Arendt 20-21)

Unsurprisingly, isonomy provides us with another contradiction. While equality is certainly one implication of what isonomy may provide, this would be contingent on the notion that mankind was naturally equal, that inherently, there exists a natural balance between people both in the manner in which they inter-related, and their natural potential for action or inaction. The distinction that this inequality is not predicated on a supposition suggesting that there is a particular segment of people superior to another based on the premise of race, ethnicity, or some other non-abstracted form of “mankind” must be made because these distinctions are not relevant to this construction. We are not attempting to establish some justification for racism or discrimination in any sense of the term, in fact, the mere difference inherent to the human condition sans a government supplies another form equality (touched upon previously) in the form of a negation of imperious inequality in that there is no structure in place to accommodate collective oppression or marginalization that could be predicated on some variant of structural violence. This aspect of isonomy is merely indicating that inequality is intrinsic to an abstract notion of “mankind”, and is not situating particular peoples in some sort of subordinate condition. To put it in other terms, people are inherently different. Just as
there are certainly commonalities amongst people, there also exist differences, and this
plainly suggests the existence of inequality shown through difference on an individual (or
private) level, since equality in this sense of the term would suggest that people would be
homogenous (this homogeneity is artificially created by suppressing difference through
providing the salient identity of a citizen situated within the auspices of the polis). Since
people are certainly not homogenous, this entirely dismisses this possible hang up, and
with this said, let us move on. According to Arendt, this notion of equality in isonomy is
false, at least in a relational sense, wherein, without a structure in place to ensure the
equality that would otherwise be provided in the polis, equality is not able to exist.
Equality, framed in the political sense, provided a public political identity in the form of
the citizen distinguished from the “private person”. Since isonomy is predicated on the
notion of “no-rule”, there would be no framework for people to interact in an egalitarian
arena because they would all be assuming the role of the private person, where there is no
egalitarian framework, as opposed to intermingling with one another as citizens, where
they would be political equals within the auspices of the polis. Indeed,

“The equality of the Greek polis, its isonomy, was an attribute of the polis
and not of men, who received their equality by virtue of citizenship, not by
virtue of birth. Neither equality nor freedom was understood as a quality
inherent in human nature, they were both not… given by nature and
growing out by themselves; they were… conventional and artificial, the
products of human effort and qualities of the man-made world,” (Arendt 21)

which reinforces the notion that equality was predicated on the establishment of a framework that allowed it to exist in the first place, assuming that the natural condition of mankind was naturally inclined to be unequal in the “private” sense.

The impact that isonomy has on revolution is profound, because isonomy and liberty are interconnected. Liberty is an aspired condition to be achieved through revolution, and, as previously discussed, liberty is the negation of an oppressive condition, the negation of a previously incumbent structure, wherein absolute freedom is attained, but collective freedom is conspicuously absent. The idea of isonomy buttresses this notion, because, as we have established, isonomy lays the groundwork for a condition wherein the lack of structure, the lack of an artificially egalitarian arena, is not a present condition where people can interact. The supposed equality of isonomy is inherently unequal, and is achieved through the process of attaining liberty through the negation of a status quo. Freedom, the codification of rights in relation to other citizens and the state, essentially replaced the absolute freedom of liberty, and concomitantly moves past isonomy (direct rule of the demos) to ideally install a form of democracy (majority rule, and by extension, a structure fostering equality amongst citizens), since, ideally, a government would derive its legitimacy and power from the consent of the people in a politically participatory manner based on the premise that legitimacy of rule is
derived through the people; and not arbitrarily obtained through oppression or artificially maintained through violence.

“… it is not the revolutionary spirit but the democratic mentality of an egalitarian society that tends to deny the obvious inability and conspicuous lack of interest of large parts of the population in political matters as such. The trouble lies in the lack of public spaces to which the people at large would have entrance and from which an élite could be selected, or rather, where it could select itself.” (Arendt 269)
5. Understanding Revolution

a. Understanding the Peasant Class

To attain a better understanding of revolution, ascertaining a better definition for the common archetype applied to an abstract hypothetical concerning revolution is imperative to engaging appropriately with the literature concerning this issue. We have already discussed peasant rebellion and its implication for revolution in the context of agrarian feudal society, but there are broader implications for scholars also referenced (such as Max Weber) that have differing assumptions of what constitutes a peasant-class. Although somewhat nuanced, the various assumptions for this group are important to take into account, as the implications that these assumptions hold have great significance, especially with suppositions that contribute to conclusions, on the final outcome of what scholars posit.

With this said, let us continue onto the differentiation:

“Scholars of revolution all at a very minimum understand peasants to be rural cultivators. But many consider them to be more than this. Three additional attributes, or combinations of them, figure prominently in academic understandings of peasants. Peasants, alternatively, (1) own or
control the land they cultivate, and/or (2) are socially subordinate to a rural dominant class, and/or (3) are typified by distinctive community cultural practices.” (Kurtz 94)

The assumptions supplied by Kurtz coincide well with the already drawn out theory concerning peasants, rebellion, and, to their fullest potential (contingent upon myriad other factors), revolution. A center-periphery dynamic is strongly suggested in the enumeration of characteristics inherent to the peasant condition, situating the peasantry, proximally, away from the power centers of urbanized areas, while also posing a subordinate relationship that further reinforces this power disparity between peasants and landed elites. The presence of “distinctive community practices” also strongly suggests a rather insular cultural dynamic that had not been touched upon, yet. With a concurrent culture that exists alongside the superincumbent culture imposed by the elite classes, it can be posited that differing cultural values may manifest into disparate normative pre-conditions, wherein values held in rural peasant communities may not necessarily coincide with what is considered a cultural presupposition by elite groups. This becomes a more pronounced problem with disparate access to the polity, and, consequently, the normative enforcement mechanisms that are supposed to ideally reflect the values of a given society.

Kurtz also provides us with,

“…five distinctive definitions of the peasantry. The Weberian conception considers peasants to be typified by all three attributes - land-ownership,
cultural, and social - in addition to being rural cultivators. The Marxian tradition focuses on the combination of land ownership and social subordination. The anthropological tradition centers its understanding on the cultural distinctiveness of peasant communities. The moral economy approach adds social subordination to this focus on the integrity of the peasant community. Finally, a minimalist understanding of peasants, focusing only on their status as rural cultivators, can be found most prominently in rational-choice approaches to peasant revolution.” (Kurtz 94)

Focus on the aspect of peasant life can be traced back to the major focus of the author detailing the condition. With Weber, it is apparent that his sociological inclination in study has a significant effect on the scope of focus of what he includes in his unit for analysis concerning the peasant class. The anthropological focus, as one would expect, focuses on the cultural aspects of agrarian life. The Marxian tradition focuses on subordination, as this is an exigent supposition to elucidate in the posited relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, as was explicated earlier. The minimalist understanding, which can arguably be viewed as a somewhat derogatory implication, applies to structural and other macro-levels of analysis; as rational-choice theory is highly relied upon in economic and deterministic perspectives concerning the peasant class.

With this explained, multidisciplinary, conception of what constitutes the peasantry, and taking domain bias into account, we can see what ramifications these
definitions hold in the context of revolution. For example, by saying that, “Revolutions generally promise peasants justice and at least some relief from rent, taxes, usury, and traditional restrictions on their movement,” (Kelley and Klein 87) we can take into account the various intricacies that comprise the condition of a peasant, and expand upon this posit. For instance, a Marxian approach would pose the relationship as a superincumbent one, where the exploitation of the peasants by a superincumbent bourgeoisie would be fixated upon, and the form of justice exerted by the peasantry would be in the form of revolution by fulfilling the historical determined role to do so. On the other hand, a “minimalist” approach would take these factors into account as contingencies that would determine future behavior depending on whether or not circumstance would lend credence to the possible occurrence of revolution. The peasantry, as unit of analysis, would not necessarily be the center of discussion; rather, the circumstances would be cited as bearing responsibility for what would ultimately occur.

b. Understanding the Interplay of Tyranny and Liberty

Tyranny and liberty are antithetical motivations reflective of the righteous indignation of the oppressed, juxtapose with the aspired consistency in condition that the abstract tyrant attempts to maintain in the presence of revolution. As Arendt states,

“… the mighty current of the revolution, in the words of Robespierre, was constantly accelerated by the ‘crimes of tyranny’, on one side, by the ‘progress of liberty’, on the other, which inevitably provoked each other,
so that movement and counter-movement neither balanced nor checked or arrested each other, but in a mysterious way seemed to add up to one stream of ‘progressing violence’, flowing in the same direction with an ever-increasing rapidity.” (Arendt 39)

The more attempts at placation through veiled circuitous or ineffective reforms were enacted to maintain the status quo of a tyrannical governmental condition, the louder the calls for liberty came to be: “Promises and oaths were nothing but a rather awkwardly construed frontage with which to cover up, and win time for, an even more inept intrigue contrived towards the breaking of all promises and all oaths.” (Arendt 95) Increases in either category in this spectrum of tyranny and liberty would invariable escalate the conflict into a spiral that has the increased likelihood of resulting in violence and societal turmoil. Once societal action becomes actuated, it is difficult to stymie the progress of civil society once the instruments for coercion and perceived legitimacy crumble before the tyrant. Thus, when the mechanism in which civil discontent would have been squelched is subject to abject dysfunction because of disharmonious power dynamics, and discordant relations between the tyrant and the once acquiescent elites that would have condoned and consented can rule no longer, the infrastructure for suppression is lost to the tyrant.

It can be said that,

“…people comply with directives of the regime in order to gain both the symbolic rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with
which government first associated itself, an argument that applies equally well to acceptance of deprivation and is compatible with experimental findings, in work on the frustration-aggression relationship, that people are less aggressive when they perceive frustration to be reasonable or justifiable.” (Gurr 1106)

Once these rewards, symbolic or otherwise, are no longer a part of the equation for the accepted acquiescence with the status quo by elites, or align with conditions that make deprivation in the form of misery untenable by the masses, then consent is abolished through frustration spilling over into the manifestation of aggression in the form of violence. As Gurr stated, once the frustration inducing actions of the incumbent power were no longer tolerable, power disintegrated on multiple fronts, consequently disestablishing the legitimacy of rule through degrading consent that rule derived its power from. This occurred in the context of the French Revolution when, “… upheavals began as ‘middle class’ reform movements for free elections and enforcement of electoral results, but the destruction of the ancien régime rested on peasant and worker rebellions,” (Eckstein 121) which is partially true, because we know that there has to be a sympathetic elite movement that is ideologically motivated through the passion of an ideological virtue that is extolled as a justification for such an upheaval, and power that will come with overthrowing those residing atop the current power structure.

Violence, however, cannot address the concerns that bring the exigent need of attaining liberty to the forefront of civil concern;
“For violence can indeed be easily understood as a function or a surface phenomenon of an underlying and overruling necessity, but necessity, which we invariably carry with us in the very existence of our bodies and their needs, can never be simply reduced to and completely absorbed by violence and violation.” (Arendt 54-55)

Liberty must not be mistaken for reform, or the establishment of a policy that ameliorates adverse conditions that undoubtedly fueled the calls for liberty. As we have discussed, liberty is a negation; a condition of not being, as opposed to a positive construction of building toward some abstraction of freedom. Liberty is a relational paradox of freedom, not a structured freedom. This imperils revolution to the effects of relative deprivation (see “Operational Definitions”), wherein perceived progress in this particularly arena does not necessarily reflect the actual progress accomplished, and these unmet desires for bettering a negative condition may be met with an increase in frustration, and consequently, even more aggression through the dual conducive factors of isonomy and the precedence for implementing violence against rivals as established through wielding violence to displace the tyrant from his seat of power.

But what about violence from the superincumbent presence; from the incumbent sovereign that wishes to maintain the status quo?

“A major part of the answer, I believe, lies in the insight that 'not oppression, but weakness, breeds revolution'. It is the breakdown of a societal mode of social control which allows and prompts social revolution
to unfold… the unfolding of social revolution depended upon the emergence of revolutionary crises occasioned by the incapacitation of administrative and military organizations. That incapacitation, in turn, is best explained not as a function of mass discontent and mobilization, but as a function of a combination of pressures on state institutions from more modernized countries abroad, and (in two cases out of three) built-in structural in-capacities to mobilize increased resources in response to those pressures.” (Skocpol 181)

This “weakness”, this discord prominent within the incumbent power structure, left the status quo susceptible to upheaval. Especially considering that, “… once administrative/military breakdown occurred in agrarian bureaucracies with such especially insurrection-prone peasannies, then…revolutionary leaderships have great impact upon their societies' development-though not necessarily in the ways they originally envisaged.” (Skocpol 181) The monopoly on violence theoretically held by the state to coerce consent for rule was no longer present, and this held significant implications for the functionality of the government. Specifically, this meant that revolution was soon to occur, because the circumstances in which these conditions are met strongly suggest that there were various factors inclusive in revolution (relative deprivation, ideological motivators, cultural narratives, discord amongst the elite, abandonment of the military, etc.) that point to the disintegration of the incumbent power structure.
c. Post-Revolutionary Considerations:

As we have established thus far in the thesis, revolution culminates and is reified through introducing freedoms in the form of a constitution that is built upon the attained liberty from tyranny. Thus, for a societal action to be considered, the tumult must have settled and founded freedoms garnered through the upheaval of civil society against a tyrannical presence in governance. However,

“…most so-called revolutions…. Have not even been able to produce constitutional guarantees of civil rights and liberties, the blessings of ‘limited government’, and there is no question that in our dealings with other nations and their governments we shall have to keep in mind that the distance between tyranny and constitutional, limited government is as great as, perhaps greater than, the distance between limited government and freedom. But these considerations, however great their practical relevance, should be no reason for us to mistake civil rights for political freedom… For political freedom, generally speaking, means the right ‘to be a participator in government’, or it means nothing.” (Arendt 210)

This is because of the convoluted power dynamics that come onto the scene of civil society and the concurrent polity, wherein power becomes a fleeting, competitive object of attainment, especially when the previous infrastructure and governmental institutions are completely abolished or no long exist in any form. Thus, another strange dynamic concerning the lexicon employed in revolution must be introduced into the fold: counter-
revolution. Counter-revolution has several definitions, but within our liberty and freedom paradigm, it carefully places itself within the space where isonomy forged through liberty in the pursuit of revolution is consolidated in a counter revolution to establish the conditions of a legitimate revolution. To help shed light to this concept, here is a quote from Arendt: “…the Constitution of the United States, the true culmination of this revolutionary process, is understood as the actual result of counter-revolution,” (Arendt 133) which points to this delicate understanding of how counter-revolution situates itself within the framework of revolution.

Counter-revolution is a somewhat misleading conception, but it is multifarious, in that it certainly can become ideologically counter to what brought about liberty in the first place, but also must be applied to an instance where liberty becomes stymied through the implementation of ideologically-aligned promulgated freedoms. Counter-revolution becomes integral to actually successfully implementing a revolution in the attempt for the ideals to take hold. However, the contingent factor concerning this counter-revolution is power, and how power is derived by this counter-revolutionary front:

“Power can be stopped and still be kept intact only by power, so that the principle of the separation of power not only provides a guarantee against the monopolization of power by one part of the government, but actually provides a kind of mechanism, built into the very heart of government, through which new power is constantly generated, without, however,
being able to overgrow and expand to the detriment of other centres or sources of power.” (Arendt 142-143)

Essentially, if power yields power in a complementary fashion, wherein the threat of tyranny rearing itself through the established freedoms introduced through revolution is mitigated through dispersing power centers in the hopes of reinforcing the pretense of freedom throughout the existence of a sovereign established on the tenets of freedom predicated upon an ideological liberty, then the means in which power is derived does not become corrupt and collapse its legitimacy upon itself. This does not condone complacent acquiesce to a governing body if these freedoms become abrogated, however. Thomas Jefferson said that, “…’the tree of liberty must be refreshed, from time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure,’” (Arendt 225) which stands to reason that a founding father of the first lasting revolution in the modern era could stand to have liberty “refreshed” through re-establishing liberties in the face of the expansion of “freedom”.

A means in which to aid this effort can be sought by, “…the formation of broad, multi-class coalitions in opposition to highly repressive dictatorships that have been supported (and perhaps installed) by foreign powers.” (Foran and Goodwin 108) By introducing a common ideological resonance, mirroring a shared value for what liberty introduces into society, and establishing universal freedoms upon this basis, civil society may coalesce in a productive, contributive manner to establish a polity reflecting the priorities of civil society in relation to why liberty was broached in the first place. This
can be further safeguarded if, “…political leaders within the original revolutionary coalition are able to hold on to state power after the overthrow of the old regime…” (Foran and Goodwin 108) Presuming that the ideological motivations cited by the revolutionary leaders that are present at the forefront of liberation are genuine, and that the lust for power is not the main catalyst for actuation (since the axiom that power corrupts seemingly rings true), then maintaining these same revolutionary leaders that brought forth liberty would seemingly establish a strong basis for the continuation and crystallization of these values into the polity.
6. Defining Revolutions

a. Introduction

Defining revolution is imperative to gaining an understanding of what the broad approach to revolution is, because these definitions ultimately derive and dictate what would be appropriate analysis to apply toward the study of revolution. While there is certainly an apparent overlap in definitions, as we will soon see, there are also nuances to each definition that hold varying implications for the trajectory of analysis. The given definition of revolution serves a significant indicator for the domain of focus of whoever is working with the term and producing subsequent analysis of the occurrence. Because of this, it is important to determine what particular predilection each definition reflects, and from discovering this, determining what implication this may have on the analysis operating under the pretext of this truth in definition. In this portion of the thesis, we will look into counter revolutions, in a more traditional sense of the term; given definitions for revolution; a differentiation between Eastern and Western revolutions expounded upon by Samuel P. Huntington, a phenomenon dubbed “Revolutionary Waves”, and certain conditions that could result in revolution. First, we will examine the various definitions and move on from there.

b. Definitions for Revolution
For our first definition, we will begin with a rather straightforward approach: “…revolutions redefine the political community within a given territory by creating a ‘new state’ that rests on principles and procedures that are a sharp departure from those of the old regime.” (Walt 140) According to Walt, the noticeable impact of what revolution brings about in a given context is a significant paradigm shift that serves as a “departure” from what had been in place preceding the new system implemented via revolution. While this could certainly be viewed as true, this also allows room for various other forms of societal tumult to occur beyond just revolution. A coup d’état, for instance, could be driven exclusively by the military in a democratic society and bring about a tyrannical, and consequently oppressive regime change that serves no real betterment for civil society at large. Huntington echoes this concern by stating that,

“A coup d’état in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community.”

(Huntington 38)

On the other hand, revolution, as we have come to understand it, also falls under the auspices of this definition, as various actions drawing from either collective memory (see “Operational Definitions”), societal narratives espouses a particular ideological affinity, or other forms of motivation for social action would necessarily enact upon this “departure” from what preceded, because the status quo in that abstraction would
seemingly not coincide with societal values that provided for societal action in the first place. This definition is indicative of an inclination to leave a lot of possibilities for what could be considered revolution.

Next, we move onto another definition that uses a slightly more nuanced approach: “A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.” (Huntington 37-38) Huntington details an event where not only is the preceding power structure the victim of societal upheaval, but significant changes in the manner in which society at large and the political apparatus operates are also instilled. Additionally, a “change in the dominant values and myths in society” reflects the inclusion of the conspicuously absent aspect of revolution in Walt’s definition. This change in dominant values and myths could be indicative of a radical ideological shift that may have served as a motivating factor, driving civil society to coerce abdication of the ancient régime on the basis of some universal or natural right or idealized functionality of society. In addition to this, Huntington states that, “… revolution is characteristic of modernization. Revolution is the ultimate expression of the modernizing outlook, that belief that it is within the power of man to control and to change his environment and that he has not only the ability but the right to do so.” (Huntington 38) A further explication of the deficiencies in this explication is expounded upon in the conflict mapping portion of this thesis, but, for now, we can safely say that encapsulating revolution in a controversial term such as modernization is likely to curry
detractions. Modernization is rather polarizing because its usage strongly suggests an ego-centric or state-centric schema in how the world inter-relates, based on the fact that this term reflects a “Western”-centric perspective. Essentially, it implies a cultural atavism for countries that have yet to “modernize”, and is vaguely objectivist. There is some merit to the claim, however, because Huntington states that, “Revolution is the extreme case of the explosion of political participation,” (Huntington 38) and additionally states that, “A complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order. The successful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization.” (Huntington 38) The assumption here is that with modernization comes the increasing inclusion of people who could not previously participate in the polity. Thus, revolution serves as a radicalized variation of modernization wherein revolution acts as an “explosion” of political participation in a context wherein the rigidity of the incumbent system would not otherwise allow this to occur. Huntington indicates that this explosion also serves as an indicator for how “revolutionary” a revolution is, through stating, “The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion of political participation. The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth.” (Huntington 38) This last portion, the measure of how successful a revolution is, is extremely important to take under consideration. No matter how “revolutionary” a revolution becomes, it is all for naught if the freedom constructed from the foundation of liberty crumbles upon itself.
Building from Huntington, we will move onto an explication of revolution provided by Theda Skocpol:

“As Huntington points out, social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of socio-economic and political institutions, and-as Lenin so vividly reminds us-social revolutions are accompanied and in part effectuated through class upheavals from below. It is this combination of thoroughgoing structural transformation and massive class upheavals that sets social revolutions apart from coups, rebellions, and even political revolutions and national independence movements.” (Skocpol 175)

Skocpol uses the theory established by Huntington, and embellishes it with a revolutionary leader in Lenin, to provide a two-fold occurrence of revolution from both “above”, in the form of rapid systemic change, and from “below”, manifested through class upheavals. Skocpol dubs this occurrence as “social revolution” and provides contrasting examples of other forms of power upheaval as foils to define through differentiation. This is rather important to consider, because following this criteria, a previous case study employed to elucidate the meaning of revolution would be excluded with these conditions. The American Revolution would certainly fall under the designation of a “national independence movement”, if not a “political revolution”, and would suggest that the qualifier of “social” in front of “revolution” would not be appropriate for what occurred in the American Revolution. This serves as an example of a definition providing the basis for analysis, in that the definition necessarily includes and
excludes what would be appropriate to include in analysis; and this is consequently indicative of the domain of study in which the scholar holds a preferential predilection. This, however, can also serve to expose the preferential predilections of other sources of discourse concerning revolution, and is invaluable to take into account when approaching the subject of revolution. Skocpol also indicates that, “Revolutions are not just extreme forms of individual or collective behavior. They are distinctive conjunctures of socio-historical structures and processes. One must comprehend them as complex wholes—however few the cases—or not at all.” (Skocpol 177) which is indicative of a historical deterministic perspective derived from a neo-Marxist purview that holds its theoretical underpinnings on the notion of historical materialism.

These definitions are by no means supposed to undertake the entire responsibility of what defines revolution; the entire thesis essentially serves that purpose. Rather, they give some broadly accepted understanding of what constitutes revolution, and serve the additional purpose of exploring how definitions reflect academic affinities discussed in the “ethical considerations” of the thesis.

c. Conditions for Revolution

This section of the thesis will indulge in exploring the conditions, or possibly preconditions, for revolution to occur. This also somewhat includes what comprises revolution, and may certainly seem to overlap with the previous “Defining Revolution” section, but the focus in this section will be in examining the ideal circumstance for revolution to occur.
If we are to construct an understanding of what is necessary before revolution occurs, we should start with broad perspective concerning the incumbent government:

“…a revolution should be predetermined by the type of government it overthrows; nothing, therefore, appears more plausible than to explain the new absolute, the absolute revolution, by the absolute monarchy which preceded it, and to conclude that the more absolute the ruler, the more absolute the revolution will be which replaces him.” (Arendt 146-147)

Here, Arendt indicates that a predetermining factor is the absolute measure in which the incumbent regime imposes its will on the masses. Basically, the more tyrannical or “absolute” a government is, the more radical or “absolute” a revolution is in what seems to be a compensatory reaction for stringent imperious policy promulgated in the interest of the state, and in effect, dampening or otherwise fastening the human condition to the depths of human misery through the indignity of oppression. The measure of how “absolute” a government is a curious factor to consider. It stands to reason that if a given government is tyrannical to the point of not even lending the glimpse of political freedom to the populace, and holds still in measures to impose these tyrannical policies upon the populace, that the ability to enact a societal movement as large-scale as revolution would be exceedingly difficult. This odious circumstance seems to be somewhat mitigated, however, in the fact that revolution is already a supposition to take into account; in this abstraction, revolution is occurring, and the intensity of revolution is predicated on the intensity of imperious government that preceded it.
Freedom, or at least some sort of subjective derivation of the word, is at least partially the goal of any revolution (if not the predominant imperative of the movement itself), and may also serve as a pre-condition for the justification for such an event. A historical example comes in the form of the French Revolution, where Arendt shares that,

“… four years after the outbreak of the French Revolution, at a time when Robespierre could define his rule as the ‘despotism of liberty’ without fear of being accused of speaking in paradoxes, Condorcet summed up what everybody knew: ‘The word “revolutionary” can be applied only to revolutions whose aim is freedom.’” (Arendt 19)

Arendt suggests that the failure of Robespierre’s historical example was pre-determined through the fact that what came about form the isonomy created by the establishment of liberty was the “despotism of liberty” as opposed to the establishment of freedom. Since freedom was more or less eliminated from the formulae of governance, its conspicuous absence foretold the doom that Robespierre was to meet. The consolidation of power unto one individual, where “power” is derived through violence, and the legitimacy of which was espoused through ideological rhetoric that was more concerned with maintaining power than establishing freedom, undercut the impetus of revolution in the first place, and, essentially, as Arendt alludes to, serves as a paradox in status in a revolutionary context. Arendt reinforces this notion by explicating that,

“… only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government,
to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.” (Arendt 25)

In effect, freedom must be both the impetus and the end-result for revolution to be legitimate, otherwise legitimacy on either end of the temporal plane of revolution begins to falter, and the pretense of freedom unhinges from the situation on hand.

Authority, or exclusive control of what could be considered traditional governmental resources, may also serve as an indicator or a condition to be met before revolution can be attributed to what is occurring in a given situation. Charles Tilly relays that, “A revolution begins when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims from two or more separate polities.” (Tilly 50) These “mutually exclusive claims” establish a competition for both legitimacy from the populace and control of governmental mechanisms that establish and maintain control. Once control becomes a question, revolution may be an applicable label to designate for the situation. Indeed, “…we may say that no revolution is even possible where the authority of the body politic is truly intact, and this means, under modern conditions, where the armed forces can be trusted to obey the civil authorities.” (Arendt 106-107) Once the predominant means of maintaining control, force, is either legitimately challenged, or longer functions as an extension of the government, the terms for revolution may be established; as a significant
impediment to societal action, imperious violence, is taken out of the revolutionary equation and unleashes the potential of a social movement onto the scene.

Action may favor the other side of the equation, however, and,

“If a new social force… or a combination of social forces… can quickly secure control of the state machinery and particularly the instruments of coercion left behind by the old regime, it may well be able to suppress the more revolutionary elements intent on mobilizing new forces into politics… and thus forestall the emergence of a truly revolutionary situation.” (Huntington 40)

Thus, a non-revolutionary faction that usurps power from revolutionary conditions for the sake of a non-revolutionary outcome or motivation may be able to take advantage of the isonomy resultant from liberty, and sabotage the efforts that brought this condition about in the first place. However, similar to what happened to Robespierre when he dubbed the term “despotism of liberty” and governed on these grounds, this lack of freedom established upon the grounds of liberty serves as a poor means of establishing control, and may be indicative of a porous power base that may not remain intact for very long.

d. The Military

The military is an incredibly important aspect of the state apparatus to take into account when attempting to ascertain whenever or not revolution is possible. Essentially, the military is a key component to consider not only when gauging whether revolution
will succeed, but also touches upon what kind of conflict may arise consequent to the attempt at revolution. In accordance with Samuel P. Huntington’s conception regarding “Western” and “Eastern” (see “Operational Definitions”) revolutions, the maintained loyalty of the military to the incumbent power would strongly suggest that an “Eastern” pattern of revolution would occur, and a conflict closely resembling a civil war may unfold. On the other hand, if the military no longer remains loyal to the incumbent power, then the means to compensate for lack of governmental power and legitimacy through violence is no longer available to the sovereign. The intricacies involved with the military and revolution, however, are much more nuanced than this simple rendition of what could occur may suggest, and we will further investigate some of the impacts that the military may have on a revolutionary condition. We will explore the “reliability” of the military in relation to the state, wherein we will examine the intricate inter-relational dynamic of the military with civil society.

Now, let us assess what impact “reliability” of the military may hold on revolution: “Where the government openly recruits officers from all classes, provides extensive training for the rank and file, and keeps troops isolated from civilians, the army is usually a reliable tool for suppressing domestic disorders.” (Goldstone 7) This scenario would be an instance wherein the “reliability” of the military would not be in doubt: they would be “a reliable tool for suppressing domestic disorders”, and would consequently be able to violently quell attempts of social or possibly even societal action because loyalty to the government would not waver. However,
“…where army officers come primarily from a landed elite, they may sympathize with their own class in a conflict between the central government and elites. Where troops are recently recruited and fraternize with the populace, their sympathy for civilians may override their allegiance to their officers.” (Goldstone 7)

In this scenario, identity salience becomes a mitigating factor for the military’s loyalty to the state. When the military has an overt connection to a segment of civil society, be it the “elite” or with the populace in a general sense, the interconnectedness between the military and civil society may override any semblance of loyalty that would suggest that the military would follow the orders of a government that no longer has the support of the people. This creates a dynamic wherein, “In either of the last two cases, the unreliability of the army increases the vulnerability of the state to revolution.” (Goldstone 7) This implies that it is in the state’s best interest to isolate the military from civil society in such a manner wherein the identity of a soldier is less and less tied to a corresponding segment of civil society; so that if the need arises to quell rebellion or an attempt to societally actuate a revolution, the connection in identity between the military and civil society has less of a chance of becoming a salient, common characteristic that may cause loyalty to the government from the military to waver. This is interesting to consider because this suggests that the variable “reliability” in the military has a direct correlation with “fraternization” with civil society. In essence, a low amount of fraternization with civil society would likely mean that there would be an increase in “reliability”.
Goldstone supplies us with “… societal structures [that] are also prone to state breakdown. And again, the relationship between states and elites in the key factor.” (Goldstone 8) An example of this dynamic relayed by Trimberger via Goldstone suggests that there may be a dynamic inclusive of relative deprivation between landed and non-landed members of an elite class within the bureaucracy of a given conflict context. This may also include officials within the military that are experiencing relative deprivation (see “Operational Definitions”), which, in effect, increases dissatisfaction with their station within the state’s power system:

“First, even if there is no strong independent elite outside the state bureaucracy, conflicts between states and elites may still occur. Trimberger has argued that this is likely when officials who lack great personal landholdings or ties to landlord classes but who share a tradition of state service and elite training hold positions within the bureaucracy or armed forces.” (Goldstone 8)

Of course, a condition for “frustration” in the relative deprivation dynamic to manifest into “aggression” is that there usually must be a trigger to serve as a pretext for action. In this case, that trigger is explained by Goldstone by stating that, “If exceptional military or economic pressures from abroad threaten the state and this elite decides the state is failing to meet those pressures, the elite is likely to initiate what Trimberger calls an ‘elite revolution’.” (Goldstone 8) With the precondition of dissatisfaction with the status quo already in place, and theoretically reinforced through relative deprivation, a crisis that
confronts the state in a moment of weakness, or otherwise exposes a weakness in the state, would serve as an exacerbating factor that could incite “elite revolution”. The means of recourse in this instance could manifest in a manner wherein, “Powerful civil or military officials may seize control of the central administrative apparatus and reshape the pattern of resource distribution and extraction in an effort to solve the military and economic difficulties that threaten the nation.” (Goldstone 8) This would mean that the elite classes experiencing relative deprivation would more or less hijack the state apparatus in a moment of weakness and direct resources and control into favorable channels that fuel their self-interest, or the betterment of the nation.

e. Counter Revolutions

In defining counter-revolutions for this portion of the thesis, we will stray away from the notion that counter-revolutions constitute the segment of the “ideal” revolution wherein a counter-revolutionary movement establishes freedom within the context of an established condition of liberty. In its place, we will examine the more direct notion of what a counter-revolution constitutes: the direct opposition to revolutionary movements. The two terms have been separated, because, in essence, they describe and attempt to define two very different things. The first described notion of a counter-revolution is a serves almost as a pre-condition for success, whereas the other acts more as an impediment in an effort to subvert a successful revolution. With this said, let us continue with defining counter-revolution.
Halliday states that, “The term ‘counterrevolution’ refers to a policy of trying to reverse a revolution, and, by extension, to policies designed to prevent revolutionary movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power.” (Halliday 136) In this extract, we can see that this definition presumes that a counter-revolution is confined to the actions of an incumbent power, or possibly allies of an incumbent, instilling policy upon a revolutionary condition in an effort to stymie the tide of revolution. This suggests an increase of an imperious display of power that may further restrict political freedoms, such as the ability to demonstrate, or imposing a moratorium on oppositional perspectives in media outlets or other forms of controllable speech, or a more direct, coercive means of stymieing a revolutionary effort in the form of direct violence (see “Operational Definitions”).

Halliday furthers this notion by stating that, “Counterrevolution is not, however, a single phenomenon, any more than is revolution. In the first place, ‘counterrevolution’ may refer to the overthrow of a revolutionary regime by opponents working within the country and with external support.” (Halliday 137) The implication here is that, supposedly like revolution, counter-revolution has the ability to manifest in myriad forms. While they are not explicitly enumerated, one could intuit that further limitations, such as the aforementioned tightly monitored ability to articulate oppositional perspectives to the government, could be implemented in several fashions. From propaganda, to rendition, the toolset available to the government is vast and varied, as is the means in which revolution may supposedly manifest. Also, like revolution, assistance
from allies may be provided to foil further revolutionary efforts. In essence, “It denotes, therefore, both reversal or overthrow, and what has been referred to, variously, as suppression and containment,” (Halliday 136) and may further pre-empt revolution through implementing, “…movements or policies that are not designed to overthrow or corrupt an existing revolutionary regime, but rather to prevent a revolutionary movement from coming to power.” (Halliday 137) Thus, counter-revolution is two pronged: It attempts to block revolution from occurring through implementing policy that dissuades revolution from occurring in the first place, and also may occur during revolution in the form of counter-measures directly aimed at containing and exterminating the revolutionary threat.

f. Eastern and Western Revolutions

Samuel P. Huntington provides with an interested differentiation to consider with revolution: an “Eastern” and “Western” discernment that suggests a different cause, context, and occurrence between these respective terms. First, let us define Eastern revolutions:

“In Eastern revolutions… the old regime is modern, it has more power and legitimacy, and hence it does not simply collapse and leave a vacuum of authority. Instead it must be overthrown.” (Hunting 41)

In this conception of revolution, the incumbent power has not had any substantial loses in either how it derives its power, or in the manner in which norms of the status quo are enforced and regulated. Huntington’s insistence on dubbing this power dynamic
“modern” indicates that the incumbent sovereign is not mired with the difficulties of “tradition”, and has both the technological and political prowess to theoretically politically accommodate the populace, although in this instance, we should suspect that the manner in which this is implemented is not to the liking of the opposition party. Indeed, an adverse political situation is also experienced by the moderates caught in the midst of revolution: “In the Eastern pattern, the moderates are much weaker; they do not occupy positions of authority; and as the revolution gets under way, they are crushed by the government or the revolutionaries or they are forced by the polarization process to join one side of the other.” (Huntington 42) Not only do the experience a weak political condition, the moderates are also in the position of not having enough of a backing, according to Huntington, to exist beyond the turmoil of revolution. Disparate power dynamics also mark this manifestation of revolution, in such that, “In the Eastern revolution… terror marks the first phase of the revolutionary power struggle. It is used by the revolutionaries when they are weak and far removed from power to persuade or to coerce support from peasants and to intimidate the lower reaches of officialdom.” (Huntington 42) Huntington points out that terrorism is resorted to those with relatively limited holds on power within a conflict context. Be it through marginalization, or through virtue of being a radical action in itself, terrorism relies upon an extremist stance in an effort to cause subversive harm and escalate the conflict dynamic into a spiral that may ultimately curry further favor and further harm to denizens from which the terrorist movement sprung from the act of employing terrorism and the consequent violent retaliation usually employed by a government. This stance is enacted upon by those that
do not hold a broad base of support, which could be resultant of myriad circumstances; but it is imperative to note that terrorism is not necessarily reflective of a broader sentiment, due to the fact that it is inherently radical and consequently relies on radical means of articulation via violence that are not necessarily condoned by a large segment of a population. This notion of terrorism being employed when there is a significant power disparity is apparent in that, “In the Eastern pattern, the stronger the revolutionary movement becomes the less it tends to rely on terrorism,” (Huntington 42) thus indicating that more legitimate forms of direct opposition, possibly in the form of what may resemble a civil war, may manifest once a broader base of support is curried by the oppositional force.

In contrast, however, the Western pattern of revolution does not entail a direct struggle against an incumbent power. In fact, the opposite is true: “The distinguishing characteristic of the Western revolution is the period of anarchy or statelessness after the fall of the old regime while moderates, counterrevolutionaries, and radicals are struggling for power.” (Huntington 41) This suggests that the *ancient régime* is more or less a non-factor in the Western pattern, wherein the ineptitude of the government caused it to become more or less de-legitimized in the face of political turmoil; and what replaced it was a condition of anarchy, wherein various factions engage in sectarian strife to gran the reins of power. This pattern falls in step with a rather prominent example, namely the French Revolution (hence the name “Western”). This typology resembles this seminal revolution in that,
“The Western revolution is usually directed against a highly traditional regime headed by an absolute monarch or dominated by a land-owning aristocracy. The revolution typically occurs when this regime comes into severe financial straits, when it fails to assimilate the intelligentsia and other urban elite elements, and when the ruling class from which its leaders are drawn has lost its moral self-confidence and will to rule.” (Huntington 42)

This is indicative of prominent fissures rearing themselves in the power structure, through a combination of a precipitating event occurring that brought crisis upon the status quo and reared further crises to spring forth in the ensuing cracks in the political panoply of the incumbent power structure; thusly, causing the system to collapse upon itself due to a sudden lose in legitimacy manifested in an inability to rule.

The absence of the government as a vying power to take hold of the ensuing isonomy of revolution is rather conspicuous, as is relayed by Huntington: “In the Western revolution, the principle struggle is usually between the moderates and the radicals; in the Eastern revolution it is between the revolutionaries and the government.” (Huntington 42) The power dynamics present in the Western pattern only include powers that were not necessarily in power previous to revolution. In contrast, the Eastern pattern operates under the supposition that the government is still in place and is being directly challenged by an oppositional force.
Terror may still rear itself in the Western pattern. Indeed, the *terror* was a rather indelible period in the French Revolution that was marked with extreme violence to coerce adhesion to the aspiring *Jacobin* revolutionary government. Huntington shares this in his typology by stating that, “In the Western revolution, terror occurs in the latter phases of the revolution and is employed by the radicals after they come to power primarily against the moderates and other revolutionary groups with whom they have struggled.” (Huntington 42) Since legitimacy is not yet firmly established in the chaotic aftermath of a revolution, the power to impose a legitimate form of violence based upon a broad base of support is impossible when a radical faction attempts to take and consolidate power in the absence of a generally condoned form of government. Since power is ultimately garnered through the consent of people, power is seemingly absent from a radical revolutionary power through virtue of their insistence in employing terror to coerce acquiescence to their ostensibly illegitimate rule.

g. Revolutionary Waves

Revolutionary waves are an interesting concept to consider: the idea is mainly founded upon a demonstration effect (see “Operational Definitions”) and imagined communities (also defined in “Operational Definitions”), wherein the implication of the theory is that impetus of revolution has the ability to transcend the notion of a state border, and reach various respective civil societies in respective states. The terminology is much more nuanced than this, however, but it is important to ground the basic premise of the theory in established theory to contribute to the credence of the notion.
Now, to define a “for” revolutionary wave: “A ‘for’ revolutionary wave consist of those revolutions that established (or earnestly attempted to establish) a particular form of government or socioeconomic system, such as democracy, Marxism-Leninism, Arab nationalism, or Islamic fundamentalism.” (Katz 151) This points to a unifying ideology that does not necessarily conform to the specific necessities of a given populace, but is presented as a universal panacea for the plight of human misery. For example, democracy supposedly extols the virtue of deriving legitimacy through virtue of granting the freedom of speech and political participation from its populace; and “Marxism-Leninism” supposedly provides a better experience through establishing a society on egalitarian principles based on the principle of the soviet. These terms and conditions could ostensibly apply to numerous circumstances and is not necessarily limited to a specific context, although a regional appeal is certainly a factor (especially with Arab-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, since they include distinctive qualifiers based on “race” or creed). The point of the matter is that the applicability of the ideology is not relegated to solely one state or circumstance, and since this is so, it has the ability to transcend a particular circumstance when outside groups identify with the revolutionary movement, as is posited in imagined community theory, and my be further inclined to attempt to instill a revolution on similar grounds, on the basis of a demonstration-effect.

In contrast, “An ‘against’ revolutionary wave consists of those revolutions that overthrew a particular form of government or socioeconomic system. ‘Against’ revolutionary waves include antimonarchical, anticolonial, anticapitalist, anti-Western,
and antidictatorial ones, among others.” (Katz 151) In this case, an “against revolutionary wave” focuses its energy on the negation of a condition; on achieving liberty, for example, against a tyrannical, imperious government that oppresses its populace. Although there could certainly be an ideological motivation to consolidate and coordinate a revolutionary effort against an incumbent government, what is being posited with this notion is that the overriding imperative in this situation is the negation of an adverse condition, which would suggest that the motivating factor is a common enemy, not necessarily a common ideology.

A model for revolution may be construed from a context wherein revolution was successfully actuated, in the form of what is dubbed a “central revolution” within a revolutionary wave: “A revolutionary wave can contain a central revolution, which articulates a vision of altering the existing international system by inspiring a series of revolutions similar to its own, and by acting as the center of this group of revolutionary states.” (Katz 152) The alignment with a demonstration effect in this situation is rather pronounced, especially considering that the success of the central revolution serves to “articulate a vision” for other would-be revolutions to mimic in the aspiration for success. Although the nuances of context may vary wildly, as long as there is at the very least a semblance of similarity in condition between the central wave and other aspiring revolutions, the impetus for revolution is established on the perceived legitimate grounds of success from the central revolution. Accordingly, “Aspiring revolutionaries are inspired by the central revolution, attempt to emulate it, and usually seek its assistance in
coming to power,” (Katz 152) and although the aspiring revolutionaries attempt to emulate the central revolution in the revolutionary wave, “… the central revolution is the strongest state within a revolutionary wave,” (Katz 152) which suggests that true emulation of a revolution is impossible since that would suggest that the aspiring revolutionaries would be able to surpass what was initially achieved by the central revolution.

In addition to the “aspiring” variety of revolutionaries, there are subordinate revolutions: “Revolutionary regimes set up by central revolutions in countries they have invaded are subordinate or puppet revolutions. By definition, of course, such subordinate revolutions do not voluntarily affiliate themselves with a central revolution.” (Katz 152) This is an incredibly imperious approach to spreading revolution, and seems akin to a proxy war, especially since the occurrence is not necessarily voluntary. Although an exception to this notion could be a situation wherein the revolutionary opposition requires assistance from an outside power to ouster the incumbent regime; but the end-result of possibly being a “puppet revolution” implies a degree of subordination to the assisting power that demolishes any notion of true freedom reflecting the desires of the people.

Another aspect of the revolutionary wave comes in the form of an “affiliate revolution”, which, “… is one in which the revolutionary government voluntarily aligns itself with the central revolution. Since the affiliation is voluntary, it can occur to different degrees, from tight to loose.” (Katz 152) In addition,
“Affiliate revolutions can be either ‘ambitious’ or ‘unambitious’. An unambitious one is allied with the central revolution, but it does not actively spread the revolutionary wave itself. An ambitious affiliate, by contrast, works actively to spread revolution to other countries while maintaining its alliance with the central revolution.” (Katz 152)

The level of adherence to the tenets of the central revolution, and the degree of propagation of these revolutionary ideals or what these two characteristics entail, are the measures of relative intensity in two respective spectrums of affiliation. This seems like a situation more applicable to leftist revolutions in Central and South America, wherein a demonstration effect and direct ties between nations and national leaders were established to propagate the virtues of this leftist ideology (an example of this can be seen in a letter from Che Guevara to Fidel Castro appropriated in “Appendix C”).
7. **Mapping Revolution**

**A. Introduction**

Revolution ostensibly lends itself to being categorized in a sequential manner; wherein once conditions are met in one enumerated category, and then the next step in the revolutionary process may come to fruition in the given typology posited by a given theorist. This section of the thesis will cite and provide commentary to various typologies posited from several theorists, beginning with a broad-based approach and ending Charles Tilly’s conception concerning the topic. Knowledge collected thus far in the thesis will be applied to these conceptions in an effort to provide further insight to what is being posited.

**B. A Generalized Conception for Mapping Revolution**

Jack A. Goldstone provides us with a broad, purportedly generally accepted notion of what needs to occur for revolution to happen. We will follow this typology with commentary, to further flesh out the conditions, while also considering what has been written up to this point, in an attempt to ground our notions of revolution in established theory.
First, Goldstone claims that, “1. Prior to a revolution, the bulk of the ‘intellectuals’ – journalists, poets, playwrights, essayists, teachers, members of the clergy, lawyers and trained members of the bureaucracy – cease to support the regime, write condemnations, and demand major reforms.” (Goldstone 3) This would coincide with the notion that there has to be turmoil “from the top” amongst urbanized elites and intellectuals that is indicative a fracture occurring established by a cognitive dissonance juxtapose to a cognitive consistency situated against the status quo. A “bulk” of this category of denizen would certainly provide a solid base of elite support for abdication of the incumbent sovereign, but is by no means required for the calls for revolution to be banded about within civil society. What a “bulk” may be representative of, however, is a resonating discontent that is shared not only by cultural demagogues or ideologues, but also a healthy segment of the “masses” that reinforce these general grievances. Goldstone elaborates upon this conception through detailing that, “When hereditary nobles, high officials, and professionals countenance such public criticism, the regime must be failing to provide services such as security of property and rank, high-level positions for the children of prominent people, and victories and spoils in war.” (Goldstone 3) Essentially, the symbolic and other rewards mentioned by Gurr are not being met within this dynamic, and dissatisfaction begins to bud from this relative deprivation in station, and aggression manifests in the form of discord.

Next, Goldstone states that, “2. Just prior to the fall of the old regime, the state attempts to meet criticism by undertaking major reforms.” (Goldstone 3) This relates to
two previously touched upon conceptions: The first is that the incumbent government would attempt to enact reforms to placate civil discontent through giving the impression that they are attempting to remedy the ills that are contributing to this discontent. However, these reforms usually become muted efforts because of the lost legitimacy in government through the degradation of consent and trust, which is amplified through the concurrent loss of power that is predicated upon this notion. The second is that since this regime is either too “rigid” or downright tyrannical, there is no appropriate space for these grievances to be met in a productive fashion. Goldstone addresses this through stating that, “Such reforms often attempt to absorb additional groups into the regime without giving them any real influence by adding parliaments or councils with strictly advisory powers.” (Goldstone 3) These are ultimately empty gestures that have little to no significance on how the polity operates within the system. Furthermore, “They act both as an admission that the regime is flawed and as encouragement to others to pressure the government for further changes.” (Goldstone 3) Once weakness is exposed, and attempts to pre-empt further exposure through pseudo-reforms are considered ineffective, this incentivizes further societal actuation in the political realm (which is also reflective of values in the social realm), and further degrades the legitimacy of the government. Goldstone provides a rather Draconian axiom concerning this topic, and shares that, “This pattern bears out Machiavelli’s warnings to rulers: ‘If the necessity for [reforms] comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.’” (Goldstone 3) Calls for reform reflect a loss of consent by
traditionally supportive actors within society; and also implies that violence that could have otherwise prevented such exposure was not an available tool for the incumbent government at the time, which suggests deeper rifts in power derived through consent that may not have been noticed before they were articulated.

The next condition relayed by Goldstone states that, “3. The actual fall of the regime begins with an acute political crisis brought on by the government’s inability to deal with economic, military, or political problem rather than by the action of revolutionary opposition.” (Goldstone 3) This condition suggests that there was a conflict trigger that made adhering to the status quo an unbearable condition that warranted societal action against the incumbent power structure. Examples provided include, “…state bankruptcy or a weakening command of the armed forces…” (Goldstone 3) which indicates that, “The sudden onset of revolution thus stems from a weakening or paralysis of the state rather from a sudden gain in strength of revolutionaries.” (Goldstone 3)

Power is relational, so it matters not that power is either gained or lost by one party or the other. If the state is paralyzed, then the opportunity for oppositional actors is there through virtue of the apparent loss in a particular resource which would reflect the consent given to government and the legitimacy derived from this consent. What matters is how this shift in the relational power dynamic manifests in the context of revolution. If the military is no longer responsive to the incumbent power, then the means of coercion, the aforementioned monopoly of violence that the government wields, is no longer an option to wield to stifle oppositional ideas and movements. If a state faces economic
peril; denizens of the state will effectually become disenfranchised through ceasing to function appropriately in the sympathetic institutionalized manner that coincides with how the state treats economic policy. This discontent base would be ripe for oppositional engenderment through virtue of being disenfranchised within the system that they exist. Ultimately, it’s opportunity, not “power” that an acute crisis yields; although they are certainly related, they are not the same.

The subsequent step toward revolution is that, “4. Even where revolutionaries have united solidly against the old regime, following its collapse their internal conflicts eventually cause problems.” (Goldstone 3) The premise is that once a unifying common goal is accomplished, group fractures appear rather inevitably. Essentially, once a common interest is met, the divergent interests of various groups become the salient factors in group differentiation, and these divergences in values may result in fracture, or even violence. Goldstone posits that, “The revolutionaries usually divide into three factions: conservatives, who seek to minimize change (many of whom eventually call for the return of the ousted regime); radicals, who seek rapid and disunity among revolutionaries range from coups to civil war,” (Goldstone 3) and the implied third group are those who straddle the spectrum as moderates. Polarization concerning reform and what will ultimately be established as government is consistent with conceptions concerning cognitive dissonance (radicals) and cognitive consistency (conservatives), which may provide a basis for further research concerning why these splits occur.
It stands to reason, then, that, “5. *The first group to seize the reins of state are moderate reformers.*” (Goldstone 3) The assumption with this point is that moderates would have broader appeal amongst those strewn about the political spectrum. Since moderates would be essentially situated in the middle of this spectrum, they would draw the interest of those situated similarly to themselves, as well as the less ardent supporters of either end of the spectrum that would vote for either end of this polarized polity (either conservative or radical) if the moderates were not a factor to consider.

Goldstone’s next step states that, “6. *While the moderates seek to reconstruct rule on the basis of moderate reform and often employ organizational forms left over from the old regime, alternative, more radical centers of mass mobilization spring up with new forms of organization.*” (Goldstone 4) Stability from the isonomy in the state would be the priori of concern since unrestrained liberty in a societal sense is more or less chaotic. Moderates provide this stability through taking small steps toward reform that placate both sides of the political spectrum while the moderates are in power, and resort to existing institutions and methods to deliver upon the political promises that they posed. There is, however, a somewhat historical deterministic dynamic bubbling beneath the surface of the calm: as both sides of the political spectrum begin to consolidate on their particular ideological poles, moderates will tend to lose power and be replaced by either one side or the other.

Subsequent to moderate control is: “7. *The great changes in the organization and ruling ideology of a society that follow successful revolutions occur not when the old*
regime first falls, but when the radical, alternative, mass-mobilizing organizations succeed in supplanting the moderates.” (Goldstone 4) The moderates will eventually lose control because, “…the moderates, seeking continuity, do not rid the government of the liabilities that caused the old regime to fail. Hence, they inherit the same inability to deal with urgent economic and military problems.” (Goldstone 4) Liberty in almost any circumstance inclusive of tyranny would essentially stand as a radical position within the political spectrum of a given context. Thus, when “radicals” take power from the moderates, this would be indicative of a group that holds the virtues of liberty that brought forth revolution in the first place in power, thereby more or less establishing a government based upon the principles that brought forth revolution in the first place. Presumably, this would serve as an indicator of a successful revolution. Failure, on the other hand, would be if the other end of the spectrum, the conservatives as defined by Goldstone, were able to wrest power away from the moderates. Rebellion would have occurred, because the status of liberty was attained (albeit briefly), but Revolution would have failed to launch since the principles that brought forth liberty were dismissed for had preceded the condition. Moderates may be able to remain in power if, “the moderates repudiate and dissociate themselves from the old regime – a task in which they are unlikely to equal the radicals…” (Goldstone 4) but this seems unlikely, given that the priority is stability, consistency, and the continued use of a dysfunctional system.

After moderate control is lost, Goldstone posits that, “8. The disorder brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical control usually results in forced
imposition of order by coercive rule.” (Goldstone 4) This relates to the notion that violence is employed in attempts to coerce power through delivering consent from targets, or those who are deterred from diverging from the new power through witnessing the negative effects that discord holds for those who articulate alternative viewpoints. This is by no means a heuristic, however, as the American Revolution stands as an exception to this notion; unless the civil war is brought into consideration. Inclusion in the United States was granted upon the basis of voluntarism, that is, the voluntary association of the movement through signatories who relayed intent to revolt against England. Coercive rule would have no place in this dynamic.

Next, Goldstone shares that, “9. The struggles between radicals and moderates and between defenders of the revolution and external enemies frequently allow military leaders to move from obscurity to commanding, even absolute leadership.” (Goldstone 4) The military coincides with nationalistic aspirations, especially with a budding identity and pride contingent on the successful formation of a new status quo in a state experience political and civil turmoil. Cultural heroes forged through successful military campaigns would, in effect, be held as cultural markers of pride, and would certainly garner popularity in such a situation.

The last step is, “10. The radical phase of the revolution eventually gives way to a phase of pragmatism and moderate pursuit of progress with in the new status quo.” (Goldstone 4) Polarized competition will eventually come to rest once an agreed upon constitution is established that delineates the freedoms in which civil society can engage.
This, in effect, serves as the “new status quo”. What becomes somewhat hard to predict, however, is adherence to a constitution. As previously mentioned, during the 18th century’s French Revolution, multiple constitutions were forged by various cahiers in an attempt to consolidate power and implement a new status quo, but adherence was an overlooked consideration that negated attempts at crafting this status quo; and constitutions failed to gain any traction as a result.

C. A Mapping for “Radical Revolution”

Radical revolution is a relatively straightforward approach to mapping revolution in that the typology is relatively simple and specific to a particular segment of a given population in a particular epoch of the epistemological spectrum concerning revolution: “Our theory deals with the predominantly rural, premodern, peasant-dominated societies in which most revolutions have occurred. (Kelley and Klein 87)” Conspicuously absent in this conception of revolution is a particular ideological affinity that calls forth universalistic principles to coalesce groups from differing socio-economic stations in society, as well as the dynamic role of government when confronted with the threat of revolution. “Radical Revolution” is thusly vaguely reminiscent of a Marxian perspective concerning revolution, in that the plight placed upon the peasant class of society serves as the analytical imperative for the typology, and does not necessarily extend to the culmination of revolution or what the impact revolution would hold on a societal level beyond the immediate effects experienced by peasants.
Kelley and Klein assert that their conception of “Radical Revolution” is applicable to instances wherein,

“(1) a politically and economically dominant traditional elite has previously been able to expropriate a large fraction of the surplus produced by peasants (e.g., by control over land, forced labor, discriminatory taxation, usury, or through monopoly privileges in agriculture, trade, or government), and (2) the revolution has liberated peasants from traditional exploitation (e.g., by redistributing land, allowing freer access to opportunities in farming and business, expropriating or destroying accumulated capital).” (Kelley and Klein 87)

Thus, their typology dictates that “Radical Revolution” ameliorates exploitative practices employed by a superincumbent power structure situated to take advantage of the exploitative system in place that puts peasants in a condition of misery. Kelley and Klein also allude to the abolition of structurally violent policy that was specifically discriminatory toward peasants and established a monopoly within the agrarian economic system wherein a disproportionate burden was placed upon the peasantry that the government and elites had a direct influence on. Absent, however, is the political and identity-fueled impetus of self-determination that would serve as a means for how these reforms were achieved, and instead relegates revolution to a condition vaguely reminiscent of a free-market, wherein the disestablishment of structural violence resultant from an undetailed manner of accomplishment by the peasantry redistributed land and
lent them some measure of control over trade markets in a manner that was deemed beneficial to peasants. Kelley and Klein, “…call this combination of events a radical revolution, and we limit consideration of short-term effects to revolutions of this kind.” (Kelley and Klein 87) This level of analysis may be of benefit to analyze the direct impact that economic reform holds on the peasant class, but does not necessarily touch upon the nuances of revolution.

D. A Typology for Civil Strife Pertinent to Revolution

While “civil strife” is by no means wholly demonstrative of what occurs in revolution, Gurr’s typology may be able to provide us with some insight concerning the aspect of civil action. Similar to what preceded this mapping, specifically, “Radical Revolution”, Gurr’s typology is narrow in focus, and fixates on a particular activity that occurs within the context of revolution. Although it is a somewhat narrow focus, it is also essential to constructing a broad spectrum of what occurs in revolution, and as such, will be included and commented upon with the collected theory that we have accumulated thus far in the thesis.

Gurr’s, “…general categories, and representative subcategories, are (1) Turmoil: relatively spontaneous, unstructured mass strife, including demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.” (Gurr 1107) Which begins the typology with a manifestation of discontent that is reified in the form of violence, be it direct in a manner such as open localized rebellions, or less so in the form of demonstrations. Either scenario indicates a degree of “civil unrest” that is being enacted
upon in an empirical fashion, wherein direct tangible evidence of civil dissatisfaction is brought into the forefront of civil society in violent variety. This manifestation of unrest could either precede attempts at reform, which would be indicative a level of relative deprivation that was triggered through some unprecedented event that resulted in this turmoil, or another form of relative deprivation, wherein reforms enacted in an attempt to placate civil unrest did not meet expectations, or was withdrawn in some displeasing manner that instigated this form of civil unrest.

After turmoil, comes, “(2) Conspiracy: intensively organized, relatively small-scale civil strife, including political assassinations, small scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups, mutinies, and plots and purges, the last two on grounds that they are evidence of planned strife.” (Gurr 1107) This notion assumes that there is a disparity incumbent in the relationship between the opposition groups and the reigning sovereign. This notion of resource disparity is indicative in the labels attributed to the types of actuated violence, and the conditions in which these actions would occur. Terrorism, for example, lacks viability when there’s a broad base of support relative to civil society at large; it is resorted to in instances where the rigidity of the institutions does not allow for alternate means of recourse to be articulated or legitimately accounted for; it is deemed viable when the cause underlying the action itself is subversive in nature, thereby indicating that it is considered illegitimate when contrasted with norms, be they imperiously imposed or engrained in the status quo; it is radical, and through virtue of being a radical manifestation, is both polar and polarizing. On the other side of the
spectrum, opposition mitigation appears to be the imperative of the government. It is in the best interest of the status quo actors to eliminate threats to the continuation of their power base, and depend on political “purges”, assassination (although this is by no means an exclusive ability that the government alone may employ), and uncovering and disposing of plots directed toward debasing their hold on society.

The last aspect of civil strife relayed in Gurr’s typology is, “(3) Internal war: large-scale, organized, focused civil strife, almost always accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, private wars, and large-scale revolts.” (Gurr 1107) Assuming that the preceding stage held resonance within civil society, including across-cutting socio-economic appeal that founded a starting point for consolidating power, then this step seems plausible. Once there is a legitimate threat, resource wise (resource being ambiguously inclusive of various “resources” including money, people weapons, and other such item), then the conflict between the government and civil opposition groups can only escalate until there is a tipping point in violence through either claiming victory (although this is exceedingly difficult once ideologies of revolt are propagated to an extent to where it could be deemed pervasive) or there is some sort of agreement on the political side of the dynamic that ameliorates violence through reform. A conspicuous aspect of this typology is that there is a continued assumption of preserved power within the government. With this preserved power, there is no opportunity for strife to become revolution, because the condition of the government would not have deteriorated to an extent wherein it would be
possible to do so. Although civil strife could certainly progress into becoming a civil war, most of what we have covered thus far in the thesis predicates revolution on the assumption of a deterioration of power in the government itself, initially instigated through losing the means by which it derives power: consent.

Aside from solely focusing on these general topics concerning civil strife, another consideration must be taken into account: magnitude. Gurr details the means in which magnitude may be differentiated by, again, employing a three-fold typology:

Three aspects of civil strife thus ought to be taken into account in specifying its magnitude: (1) Pervasiveness: the extent of participation by the affected population, operationally defined for this study as the sum of the estimated number of participants in all acts of strife as a proportion of the total population of each polity... (2) Duration: the persistence of strife, indexed here by the sum of the spans of time of all strife events in each polity, whatever the relative scale of the events, expressed in days. (3) Intensity: the human cost of strife, indexed here by the total estimated casualties, dead and injured, in all strife events in each polity as a proportion of the total population... (Gurr 1107-1108)

Pervasiveness runs parallel with a previous nomenclature that we have employed: civil resonance, which Gurr operationalizing in a manner of framing the conception in a “per capita” relationship in regards to society at large, or at the very least, the polity. Duration is interesting to include, because it certainly overlaps with “resonance” or pervasiveness,
but holds an altogether different denotation that extends into a dimension that has been, up to this point, taken for granted by conflating two different categories of measure into one occurrence. Retrospectively, conflating pervasiveness and duration is an exceedingly simple trap to succumb to, because one seems to be contingent on the other, and essentially coeval. Duration, however, can certainly be artificially stymied through violent means in order to coerce consent from a populace, which may be of use as a marker for oppressive regimes, failed attempts at revolution, or some other factor that could account for an inability to actuate revolution. Gurr’s definition of intensity is curious, if not grim. Intensity measured through the death count accumulated as a result of the engagement in civil strife certainly may be indicative of the intensity of experience felt during the actual moments of civil strife, but this could also serve to undervalue trenchant, relatively peaceful moments of civil strife that achieved more than the more violent, loss-of-life inducing situations.

**E. A Mapping for Modernization**

Technological gains are a common characteristic of revolutionary circumstances, and coupled with this technological gain is the concept of “modernization”. As mentioned in the “Operational Definitions” section of this thesis, modernization implies both an expansion of the political apparatus to account for a growing demography, as well as the technological aspect of what modernization implies. The driving thesis behind this concept is that as societies “modernize”, the impetus for revolution increases as the prior status quo of the polity and life within civil society becomes exceedingly untenable
because they cannot reflect the progression of gains achieved by a given populace. Goldstone shares that, “Huntington argues that a key aspect of modernization is the demand for increased participation in politics. Where certain groups do not have access to political power, their demands to change and broaden government lay lead to revolution.” (Goldstone 37) With a polity that is either inept or seen as incapable of placating such needs through inclusion, subversive tactics become depended upon through either reform or attempting to coerce abdication, as has been previously discussed.

This conception was advanced by Samuel P. Huntington in the context of revolution, and we will overview his mapping with additional commentary to, again, ground our collected knowledge thus far of revolution and use this knowledge base as a jumping point for further analysis of what has been posited. Huntington relays revolution as a condition that is dependent on meeting pre-conditions for whether or not revolution will reify in the context of a society undergoing modernization. These conditions include, “…(a) the extent to which the urban middle class – intellectuals, professionals, bourgeoisie – are alienated from the existing order…” (Huntington 44), followed by, “…(b) the extent to which the peasants are alienated from the existing order…” (Huntington 44) and ended by, “… (c) the extent to which urban middle class and peasants join together not only in fighting against ‘the same enemy’ but also in fighting for the same cause. This cause is usually nationalism.” (Huntington 44) Here we see a common thread of thought emerging from the various sources of revolutionary theory that we have collected thus far: there must be both turmoil from the “elite” classes of society, as well
as the peasantry, or the masses. In addition to this, there must be a corresponding ideological rallying point that bridges socio-economic disparities between these two groups that allows for civil society to unify in a concerted effort against tyranny. Huntington cites nationalism as an example of this, which is somewhat vague, but could certainly be one possibility of many that may be inclusive of transgenerational transmission, cultural narratives, folk devils, and other social identity exemplifiers that could serve to consolidate a social group or several social groups in this case, and prepare them to actuate a societal action. This aspect of revolution, the coalescing of social groups to undergo a uniform (or close to) effort to enact an upheaval against a given regime, is imperative: “For a major revolution to occur, however, not only must the urban middle class and the peasantry be alienated from the existing order, but they must also have the capacity and the incentive to act along parallel, if not cooperative, lines.” (Huntington 44) Employing an ineffective ideological appeal that lacks cross-cutting resonance amongst the various social groups in society would undercut the effectiveness of any attempt at social mobilization, especially one that requires for the various participants to act upon “parallel, if not cooperative, lines”. Of course, the presence of a common enemy certainly increases the likelihood of some sort of collective demonization to occur, thereby establishing a commonality for all groups disillusioned with the status quo to at least initially act together to depose the incumbent sovereign. This would, however, would only last as long as this common enemy posed a threat, and the lack of a common ideological stance amongst social groups would become increasingly glaring as fissures regarding the natural or universalistic conditions that invariably rear themselves
in the context of revolution would undoubtedly cause some tension amongst the existing groups.

Next, Huntington offers an insight that suggests that revolution may be explained, entirely, within modernization; reducing it to a trait for what modernization brings to a given societal context, and relegates the subsequent reduction to the political domain: “… revolution is characteristic of modernization. Revolution is the ultimate expression of the modernizing outlook, that belief that it is within the power of man to control and to change his environment and that he has not only the ability but the right to do so.” (Huntington 38) Positing that revolution is a “characteristic of modernization” is certainly an interesting way to approach revolution. Modernization, in some circles, carries with it a connotation of condescension through implying that a Western referent for the ideally attainable condition of being “modern” is the universally aspired condition; thus suggesting that conditions that are categorically non-Western are guilty of being culturally atavistic, which would be reflected in both politics and social dynamics. This may be viewed as degrading, centrist, and xenophobic, by some. Revolution on the other hand, suggests an empowerment contingent of the self-actualization of a multitude of individuals that would comprise a societal action on the basis of extricating this multitude for the superincumbent imposition of an illegitimate ruler. One approach is vaguely deterministic, and the other is somewhat voluntaristic, but this by no means poses these two ideas as opposite, rather, they may be in fact apposite, in some respects:

“‘Modernization’ is a vague, tendentious concept. ‘Revolution’ is a controversial one as
well,” (Tilly 45) which is reflected in the idea that, “Political modernization involves the extension of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics.” (Huntington 38) This sounds strikingly similar to the concept of “public happiness” relayed by Hannah Arendt, and reflects a Burtonian “basic human need” in self-determination and identity, particularly since the formation of a new social group would heavily involve the expression of a previously suppressed identity that becomes exigent within the context of political self-determination.

Next, Huntington provides further insight into what comprises political development from the foundation of political modernization, and delves into what contextual factors would be more or less conducive to housing a revolution. First, political development, “…involves the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent to absorb and to order the participation of these new groups and to promote social and economic change in the society.” (Huntington 38) Essentially, becoming politically “developed” at least poses the pretense of inclusion, or the potential for inclusion. Obviously, cultural denigrations for a particular social group or minority could certainly continue to suppress the political freedoms of a given group through virtue of being categorically marginalized via structural and cultural violence (and maybe even direct violence), but aspirations for inclusion still, at the very least, provide a promise of potential equality in freedom.

What this has to do, specifically, with revolution is that, “The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of
new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them,” (Huntington 38) which would consequently cause serious damage in perceived legitimacy and actual functionality of a government, since the political apparatus would be inundated with a political element that it was not created to account for. The subsequent posit relayed by Huntington is that, “The less traditional the society in which the old regime has collapsed and the more groups which are available and able and inclined to participate in politics, the more likely is revolution to take place,” (Huntington 40) which would make sense under the additional stipulation that the coercive mechanisms in place have also degraded with the legitimacy of the government, or if the monopoly on previously exclusively utilized resources by the government was somehow overtaken by an opposition group. In contradistinction, “Revolutions are unlikely in political systems which have the capacity to expand their power and to broaden participation within the system,” (Huntington 43) which, would imply that the state is “modernized”, since the ills that would negatively affect a state, namely, the inability to expand, are absent here; which would additionally suggest that the incumbent political institutions have already been democratized, rendering additional revolution either redundant and reflective of serious internal concerns that may not have to do with political-determination, or that the incumbent democratized system needs to have the tree of liberty “refreshed”, as Jefferson put it. Either way, this would significantly diverge from our classical examples of revolution, and would delve more into what Huntington labeled as “Eastern Revolutions” (See “Operational Definitions”).

140
F. Mapping for a Resource-Based Approach

Building somewhat from what Huntington has previously asserted we will delve into a resource-based approach broached by Charles Tilly. Tilly begins this approach by relaying what should be kept intact from Huntington’s approach in three broad categories: the first being, “(a) that revolutions and collective violence tend to flow directly out of a population’s central political processes, instead of expressing diffuse strains and discontents within the population…” (Tilly 48), followed by, “...(b) that the specific claims and counterclaims being made on the existing government by various mobilized groups are more important than the general satisfaction or discontent of those groups, and that claims for established places within the structure of power are crucial…” (Tilly 48) and ending with, “...(c) that large-scale structural change transforms the identities and structures of the potential aspirants for power within the population, affects their opportunities for mobilization, governs the resources available to the government, and through it to be the principal holders of power.” (Tilly 48) Thus, the foundation of existing theory has been established for Tilly’s own typology, but first we must analyze these claims.

Claim a stands to reason because through virtue of “diffuse strains” reflecting a multitude of individual motivation, coherence is consequently lost because the unifying factor of a unilateral societal action is dependent on broad-based adherence on the principle in which self-actuation must be engaged. The political process essentially condenses claims against the government through claims that governing practices have run afoul against an ideological right natural to the human condition in the ideal form of
the social contract held between the government and the people. The political process amplifies discontent, and since discontent broached in a political fashion in effect garners more exposure, there is an increased opportunity for appeal in the political grievance levied against the incumbent sovereign.

Claim b holds merit on similar grounds, because of the amplification that claims and counter-claims experience through virtue of being political in nature. This is reflected in Gurr’s conception of relative deprivation, in that relative deprivation is an idea that proves difficult to quantify, and there are myriad variables that would indicate whether or not the pent up frustration experienced by a given populace would manifest in tangibly aggressive practices. Once claims and counterclaims are articulated in a political fashion, the reservation of whether or not frustration is being reified through observable aggression becomes non-essential because there is a tangible factor to take into account. Claim c takes into account the relational and dynamic nature of the arrangement between government and the polity. Power in this respect comes in the form of opportunity, and in highly contentious dynamics involving the government and oppositional mobilized groups, opportunity is contingent on the evolving nature of the conflict to bring forth what options are available to either party in this dynamic.

Charles Tilly expands upon his accepted and incorporated notions posited by Huntington by introducing his own, “Three conditions [that] appear to be necessary, and a fourth strongly facilitating,” (Tilly 50) for a revolution to occur. These conditions are, first, “1. The appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusively
alternative claims to the control over the government currently exerted by the members of the polity…” (Tilly 50) followed by a, “2. Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population…” (Tilly 50) which then requires a corresponding, “3. Unwillingness or incapacity of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition or the commitment to its claims…” (Tilly 50) followed by a facilitative, “4. Formation of coalitions between members of polity and the contenders making the alternative claims.” (Tilly 50) Tilly’s first claim suggests that alternative groups directly challenge the control of the government through posing an oppositional stance toward a particular resource wielded by the government to derive its own legitimacy: the polity. Significant alternative claims introduce a disharmonious element that can hold an effect on how the polity operates in relation to the government in which it is actively engaged. Through debasing legitimacy through claims of illegitimacy, groups detract from this power resource and essentially ensues a contentious power struggle against the status quo.

Tilly’s second claim draws upon the same conception of power and political resource by stating that commitment from the subject population necessarily indicates that power is through influence and consent is being lost by the incumbent sovereign; thereby challenging the monopoly on resources.

Tilly’s third point introduces two interesting considerations when looking into the question of governmental inaction or effectiveness. An unwillingness by the agents of government suggests that the legitimacy of action attempted to be employed by
government has come into question with those already entrenched in the establishment, and is indicative of far-reaching disharmonious relations within the elite and the political elite. An incapacity suggests that the power previously wielded by government has significantly degraded to the point of almost non-existence. This would imply that the various groups making claims against the government have encroached upon what was once a monopoly on power to such an extent that the various resources available to government are no longer so, thus incapacitating governmental mechanisms in the process.

The fourth claim would be indicative of an aforementioned ideological resonance taking hold on a cross-cutting basis, regardless of socio-economic station. With this, the ensuing power struggle between vying political factions has the potential to occur with relatively dampened violence, when compared to the alternative of sectarian violence taking root through exclusive enclaves in political motivation extoled by the respective groups engaged in taking control in the consequent isonomy of achieved liberty.
8. Conclusion

The practical extension of building upon a theoretical overview of revolution would be to apply it to actual instances of revolution, or instances wherein the term revolution is applied to a particular conflict context, in a means to draw upon the presented theory and delve into the intricacies of a purportedly revolutionary context. As is the concern with most theoretical conceptions, the application of the theory and constructed understanding of revolution would only serve best when applied to the reality of a given situation; wherein the validity of thought outline in this overview could be judged through virtue of its application to reality. While, invariably, theory will not be able to account for all the occurrences in a revolution, or a purported revolution, the opportunity to expand theory to match the occurrences in the reality of the situation presents the ability for growth and greater accuracy in thought. Certainly, one could gauge theory through its direct application to a particular situation and gauge validity of said theory in a binary distinction between right and wrong, but all that would serve as is designating a negation, or ignoring incongruities that do not entirely mesh with the proposed reality in theory; while what we should be pursuing is a truth, and modifying preconceived notions of what is valid on the basis of aspired accuracy.
With this said, the current geo-political landscape, as was implied in the beginning of this thesis, would be an exceedingly interesting case study to apply revolutionary to. The “Arab Spring” is still in swing of revolution, which provides myriad case studies to draw from all ranging on various levels of civil strife and societal turmoil that would provide a tremendous foil to allow theory to expand and evolve through either reinforcing presuppositions concerning revolution, or showing gaps in the current epistemology of the theory cluster and constructing complementary ideas to compensate for what was not previously accounted for. The foreseeable issue with selecting a contemporary and constantly evolving case study is self-evident, however: the states that underwent rebellion and purported revolution in the “Arab Spring” are still engaged in a period rife with relative tumult. Whereas selecting case studies with the advantage of hindsight would allow for greater accuracy in the sense that the waves of revolution have subsided and crystalized into a more or less static form of governance. Indeed, “The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion of political participation. The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth,” (Huntington 38) and consequently may not be easily interpreted with the labels of either success or failure (this is, of course, is dependent on a given criterion that denotes what constitutes a revolution) while civil society, the polity, the state, and social institutions are in conditions of turmoil. Bahrain and Syria are two violent examples of oppression where rebellion is either quelled or encountering an escalatory spiral into intensified violent conflict, but where questions linger and seemingly portend further turmoil. Yemeni civil society has attempted to
coerce abdication through petition and protest against Al Abdullah Saleh, only to encounter deflections and delayed deadlines toward ambiguous later dates that have been continuously unmet; thus it may be gathered that attempts of reform have been stalled, and the status quo will remain, for the time being,

On the other hand, while civil unrest persists as an observable phenomenon due to the fact that the remnants of the preceding power structure previous to the supposed revolution are wielding the power of the state to maintain the vestiges of control that the military holds within Egypt; the country is in a relatively stable condition when contrasted with the isonomy brought forth through revolution and the abdication of the incumbent political structure, and would provide fruitful insight into the praxis of revolution with further analysis. Tunisia is in the best condition for analysis as the transitional system of governance is fostering structural legitimacy and civil participation through ratifying a constitution, and is ostensibly an example of an actually successful revolution occurring within the Arab Spring. Libya provides an intriguing case study because of the overt foreign intervention in support of a rebel movement that opposed a storied anti-Western sovereign on the grounds of humanitarian assistance for civilians, where connotative ramifications for victory hold an international implication judging from the historical prominence of the country. While the ultimate outcomes of each of the contemporary revolutions inclusive in the Arab Spring have yet to reach their culmination into a static system of governance, the apparent conditions respective to each situation leads to compelling evidence of individual conditional factors for each conflict context
within the parameters of what is deemed a successful deposition of the incumbent regimes; which aids in elucidating how these conditions came about, and what factors aided in determining said condition in a broader sense.

Another potential pitfall to this research would be the cultural contextual factors that dramatically influence the events that unfold during an attempted revolution. Focusing on this level of minutia unique to each conflict context may cause a situation with an unwieldy amount of data to coalesce into a cogent report. The power dynamics alone in any of these conflict contexts would require extensive differentiation to plot supposed or actual causality in the events leading up to revolution, or failure to successfully revolt. This complication should be met with approaching the revolutionary movements themselves in general approaches, focusing on not only macro, but micro commonalities between influential actors and events that led to these respective revolutions; both contemporarily and historically. Additionally, supplying an antithesis corresponding with a given thesis when working with data should produce a dialectical approach, wherein universal social forms are categorized to segment government, religion, ideological leanings, socioeconomic conditions, and inter-relational dynamics touching upon the macro, interstate level, micro, intrastate levels of interaction. Further sensitivity to socio-cultural, psycho-social, and anthropological approaches to analysis should aid in forging a comprehensive framework that allows for an exhaustive means for gleaning insight into the case studies and derived theory. Given, this may be regarded as merely a nomothetic approach to what could be argued as instances of collective action that are unique upon
themselves through virtue that no culture, in either time nor location, is identical to another, according to the socio-ecological conditions a specific moment in time and space create; but individual action should not be ignored, nor should the conditions that prove to be conducive to action be similarly ignored. A theoretical balance between the polar approaches of organization in gestalt theory and granular perspectives should be attempted through variety in theory and complementing said theory with general revolutionary theory to portray a theoretical, inter-relational discourse in the analysis.
Appendix A: Johan Galtung’s “A Typology of Violence” (Galtung 292)

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<tr>
<td>Direct Violence</td>
<td>Killing</td>
<td>Maiming, Siege, Sanctions, Misery</td>
<td>Desocialization, Resocialization, Secondary Citizen, Penetration, Segmentation</td>
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<td>Structural Violence</td>
<td>Exploitation A</td>
<td>Exploitation B</td>
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292  *Johan Galtung*

Table I. A Typology of Violence
Appendix B: Ted Gurr's Deprivation Model (Gurr 1105)
Appendix C: A letter from Che Guevara to Fidel Castro

Fidel:

At this moment I remember many things: when I met you in Maria Antonia's house, when you proposed I come along, all the tensions involved in the preparations. One day they came by and asked who should be notified in case of death, and the real possibility of it struck us all. Later we knew it was true, that in a revolution one wins or dies (if it is a real one). Many comrades fell along the way to victory.

Today everything has a less dramatic tone, because we are more mature, but the event repeats itself. I feel that I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution in its territory, and I say farewell to you, to the comrades, to your people, who now are mine.

I formally resign my positions in the leadership of the party, my post as minister, my rank of commander, and my Cuban citizenship. Nothing legal binds me to Cuba. The only ties are of another nature — those that cannot be broken as can appointments to posts.

Reviewing my past life, I believe I have worked with sufficient integrity and dedication to consolidate the revolutionary triumph. My only serious failing was not having had more confidence in you from the first moments in the Sierra
Maestra, and not having understood quickly enough your qualities as a leader and a revolutionary.

I have lived magnificent days, and at your side I felt the pride of belonging to our people in the brilliant yet sad days of the Caribbean [Missile] crisis. Seldom has a statesman been more brilliant as you were in those days. I am also proud of having followed you without hesitation, of having identified with your way of thinking and of seeing and appraising dangers and principles.

Other nations of the world summon my modest efforts of assistance. I can do that which is denied you due to your responsibility as the head of Cuba, and the time has come for us to part.

You should know that I do so with a mixture of joy and sorrow. I leave here the purest of my hopes as a builder and the dearest of those I hold dear. And I leave a people who received me as a son. That wounds a part of my spirit. I carry to new battlefronts the faith that you taught me, the revolutionary spirit of my people, the feeling of fulfilling the most sacred of duties: to fight against imperialism wherever it may be. This is a source of strength, and more than heals the deepest of wounds.

I state once more that I free Cuba from all responsibility, except that which stems from its example. If my final hour finds me under other skies, my last thought will be of this people and especially of you. I am grateful for your teaching and your example, to which I shall try to be faithful up to the final consequences of my acts.
I have always been identified with the foreign policy of our revolution, and I continue to be. Wherever I am, I will feel the responsibility of being a Cuban revolutionary, and I shall behave as such. I am not sorry that I leave nothing material to my wife and children; I am happy it is that way. I ask nothing for them, as the state will provide them with enough to live on and receive an education.

I would have many things to say to you and to our people, but I feel they are unnecessary. Words cannot express what I would like them to, and there is no point in scribbling pages. (Guevara)
Works Cited


Curriculum Vitae

Daniel J. Sheehy graduated from J.E.B. Stuart High School, Falls Church, Virginia, in 2005. He received his Bachelor of Arts from George Mason University in 2011.