ASSESSING INTERVENTIONS STALLED IN NEGATIVE PEACE: 
A MODEL FOR PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

by

James R. Adams
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
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in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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Date:  _____________________________________  Spring Semester 2013
George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia
Assessing Interventions Stalled in Negative Peace:  
A Model for Peace & Stability Operations

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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis and Resolution</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police Operation</td>
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<td>CMF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Multilevel Framework</td>
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<td>CMPO</td>
<td>Conceptual Model of Peace Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBIH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSRB</td>
<td>Human Subjects Review Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>International Community</td>
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<td>ICFY</td>
<td>International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>Interactive Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>LNGO</td>
<td>Local NGO</td>
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<td>MPICE</td>
<td>Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>European Union Office of the High Representative for BiH</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPA</td>
<td>United Nations Protected Area (“Safe Area”)</td>
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<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>UN Preventative Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Program</td>
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<td>WPPC</td>
<td>War to Positive Peace Continuum</td>
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Abstract

ASSESSING INTERVENTIONS STALLED IN NEGATIVE PEACE: A MODEL FOR PEACE & STABILITY OPERATIONS

James R. Adams

George Mason University, Spring 2013

Chair of Committee: Dr. Dennis J.D. Sandole

International peace and stability interventions have evolved into complex multi-sector multi-level, enterprises usually achieving a negative peace status. However, in some “post-conflict” environments, conflict party sentiments that precipitated the intervention remain largely unchanged, despite intense diplomatic and reconstruction efforts. The overall aim of this research is to assess the problem of a peace and stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace and to explore parameters for achieving and maintaining sustainable positive peace. The research design includes composite frameworks and analytical tools created or adapted for the study utilizing an exploratory approach and abduction theory. The study is a mixed-method but largely qualitatively driven exercise in conceptualizations aided by a survey, using a scheduled-structured interview format, involving 50 Bosnian nationals and 50 intervenors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1990s conflict and subsequent intervention was taken as a case study. Findings were assessed for the perceived status of conflict transformation.
structural and relational elements, and inferred association with a War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum containing key intervention thresholds. Implications and recommendations for theory, research, practice, and policy, are discussed.

By building on and departing from Johan Gultung’s original concepts of negative and positive peace, and utilizing a variety of other concepts, the study concludes that it is possible to assess peace and stability operations and environments in structural and relational and negative and positive peace terms, and make compelling conclusions and recommendations regarding implications for peace and stability interventions and research, theory, practice, and policy. The different perceptions of Track 1 and Track 2 – 9 intervenors on what constitutes conflict transformation, were explored as an integral dynamic of the inquiry.
Chapter 1: Overall Aim and Approach

International peace and stability interventions have evolved into very complex multi-sector multi-level enterprises in an effort to respond to the increased complexities of post-Cold War intra-state conflicts. And, although peace and stability interventions usually achieve negative peace status, in essence, a negotiated political settlement and cessation or suppression of overt hostilities, conflict party sentiments that precipitated the intervention are still in place and remain largely unchanged, despite intense diplomatic and reconstruction efforts, thereby often leading to resurgence of violent civil disorder or war. The overall aim of this research has been to create a methodology and analytical tools for assessing a peace and stability intervention and environment in negative and positive peace terms (the terms are briefly elaborated on in a few pages and discussed at length in Chapter 4), thereby rendering the associated elements, dynamics, and parameters involved more readily visible by which intervenors and conflict parties can more precisely understand the situation and take measures to move problematic elements towards a sustainable positive peace status.

Fundamentally, this study is a qualitatively driven exercise in conceptualizations with a quantified kick-start (primary source scaled-survey) to start an exploration into relatively unknown conceptual territory. The recent conflict and subsequent international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is taken as a case study. An
examination of the factors involved is facilitated by the creation or adaptation of composite multilevel frameworks and models utilizing an exploratory approach and abduction theory. The methodology includes a Lickert-type scale survey utilizing a structured-interview format with 100 individuals in Bosnia (50 internationals and 50 Bosnian nationals) from different levels and sectors of intervenor organizations and Bosnian society. All elements are separated into structural or relational categories of Conflict Transformation and assessed for their perceived status on a structural or relational 7 point scale, and in notional association with a War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum model reflecting the dynamics and parameters of a peace and stability intervention environment inclusive of viable peace, negative peace, and sustainable positive peace thresholds. The different perceptions by Track 1 and Track 2+ (intervenors) about what constitutes conflict transformation are explored. The nature and structure of a peace and stability operation and environment, and associated peacebuilding efforts, are explored in negative and positive peace terms.

By building on and departing from Johan Galtung’s original concept of negative and positive peace, and utilizing or adapting other concepts, this study works through a variety of conceptual issues to eventually arrive at conclusions and recommendations in the final chapter regarding implications for further research, theory, and practice, and implications for peace and stability interventions and policy. Some terms and concepts are briefly introduced early-on with abbreviated definitions for the convenience of readers unfamiliar with them, followed by due elaboration at length in subsequent chapters.
CONVERGENCE OF PERSONAL, PROFESSIONAL, & SCHOLARLY TRACTS

A significant degree of my approach to the research involves drawing on what might be described as a convergence of my personal, professional, and scholarly background. That is to say, drawing on years of experience as a professional field officer in peace and stability operation environments, a Masters’ degree in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and the personal inclinations and insights of observation that usually accompany those areas of interests. In this study, to more meaningfully address or clarify a particular theoretical or practical point, I sometimes cite an actual situation on the ground that I have personal knowledge or experience of -- realities on the ground – that are relevant to a discussion at hand.

Chapter 1 begins with a description of The Problem inducing this study, followed by a status report of on the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discussions of certain historical or situational contextual factors that have a direct impact on peace and stability interventions, follows. A short preview of Chapters 2 – 9 follows at the end of Chapter 1.

Given the numerous conceptual and practical complexities involved in the subject matter, for clarity, each chapter begins with a brief description of its content and the goals of the chapter, and ends with a brief concluding statement. This is followed by a few words leading into the next chapter.

Chapters 1 – 4 constitute a literary progression of key concepts and dynamics derived from my literature review and experiential commentary, all of which build on each other in each succeeding chapter, filling-in the deep and wide contextual picture in
which peace and stability interventions operate. Any number of other factors can be associated with a concept introduced in the text, but be patient if an expected related factor does not appear immediately. Often, key related concepts not mentioned or elaborated on at length initially are introduced later on in the same chapter or in a subsequent chapter.

Now to The Problem.

THE PROBLEM

Peace and stability operations usually achieve *Negative Peace* status, in essence, a negotiated political settlement and cessation or suppression of overt hostilities, but, despite intense diplomatic and reconstruction efforts, often stall without creating positive peace. In this context, an international peace and stability intervention presence holds open warfare or violent civil disorder in check and engages in a variety of reconstruction/state-building projects, but conflict party sentiments that precipitated the conflict requiring the intervention are still in place and remain largely unchanged.

Put another way, negative peace usually involves an intractable conflict stuck somewhere between war and positive peace. This set of circumstances constitutes the broader conceptual problem under examination. On the other hand, *positive peace* - in a peace and stability intervention context - is, in essence (departing from Galtung’s definition of positive peace), a condition in which underlying root causes and conditions and structural and cultural violence have been effectively addressed, or are being
effectively addressed to the extent that mechanisms for assured continuation of progress are in place and effectively functioning, and peace enforcement by outsiders is no longer needed. Fundamentally, then, sustainable peace – of the positive kind – is the ultimate challenge. Restating the overall aim below:

**The overall aim of this research is to assess the problem of a peace and stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace, and to explore parameters for achieving and maintaining sustainable positive peace.**

To clarify something though before proceeding, a positive peace deficit, a term introduced by Dennis Sandole (see Sandole 2010) is implicit in negative peace, but a positive peace deficit may exist also, and usually does, in an environment or country that is not stalled in negative peace but has not yet attained sustainable positive peace.

To expand the overall aim slightly, it is to better understand the nature of peace and stability interventions and environments in apparent negative and positive peace circumstances, and the placement of associated elements in the overall spectrum of peacebuilding. This is done by advancing analysis of peace and stability interventions and environments in negative and positive peace terms with frameworks and analytical tools specific to the purpose. I hope that, in turn, this analytical approach will contribute to analysis and planning in the field that aids in the movement of a stalled peace and stability intervention and environment towards sustainable positive peace. Given the lack of research in the conflict resolution field on this particular topic, my field research needed an enabling framework and model to work with, and therefore an **Enabling Research Objective:** To establish a framework and model by which to discern the
elements and dynamics of a peace and stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace, and by which to explore parameters of achieving and maintaining sustainable positive peace.

The details of my analytical process are presented in the sections and chapters to come, but I include an introductory overview in the next few pages at risk of repeating myself later on.

This study is premised on the notion that negative and positive peace, and conflict transformation - a contemporary concept often cited by intervenors in peace and stability operation discussions - are viable and useful concepts for analyzing a peace and stability operation and environment that has stalled in mission accomplishment somewhere between the initiation of stability tasks and an intervention no longer needed; That is to say, the peace and stability operation is no longer needed to support the achievement and maintenance of self-sustaining positive peace – the apparent ultimate challenge.

Considerable discussion of the theoretical nature of negative and positive peace is undertaken in the study and linkages made to five presumptive positive peace activities (typically thought of in the field as the fundamental peace and stability activity sectors): Good Governance, Security, Rule-of-Law, Legitimate Economy, and Social Well-Being. These activity sectors constitute key peace and stability framework sectors commonly cited by intervenors and advisors.

My research design employs an exploratory approach and abduction theory utilizing basic descriptive analysis with quantitative data, and abduction rationale with qualitative data in connection with quantitative data. Abduction, a concept not commonly
used, is Charles Sanders Pierce’s rationale, which calls for an inference-to-the-best-
explanation and accommodates explanation when statistics may not fully capture a
phenomenon for various reasons (Burton - 1990, and Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, March 2011). Details on Abduction follow in the Analytical Approach
Section of Chapter 6: Research Design. I develop a composite framework and model,
and accompanying graphics and data collection and data analysis instruments in an
attempt to analyze, in negative and positive peace terms, elements and dynamics
associated with a peace and stability operation and environment. I adapt and utilize
within my composite framework the five fundamental peace and stability operation
activity sectors mentioned above as identified by myself and a US/USIP “Interagency
Metrics Framework for Measuring Conflict Transformation and Stabilization” in
connection with stabilization and reconstruction planning. **Utilizing these tools, I
identify the current perceived status of structural and relational elements of conflict
transformation in a peace operation environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.**

My composite model graphically illustrates the status of elements:

1) Within the five primary function-sectors (i.e., Governance, Security, Rule of Law,
the Economy, and Social Well Being);

2) In relation to inferred placement within a War to Positive Peace Continuum; and

3) In relation to inferred parameters of negative and positive peace.

The model enables the collection of data through a seven point Likert-type survey
instrument administered by myself in person in conjunction with scheduled-structured/
focused interviews with 50 international intervenors and 50 Bosnian nationals from various levels of Bosnian public and private life. The data reflect the perceived status of current structural and relational elements related to the devastating ethno-political conflict and subsequent intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Structural and relational elements are discussed at length in Chapter 6, but for now they can be short-listed as follows:

**Structural Elements**
- Good governance
- Safe and secure environment (Security)
- Rule-of-law
- Legitimate economy
- Social well-being

**Relational Elements**
- Trust
- Respect
- Tolerance
- Reconciliation
- Personal violence
- Normalization of Relations
- Empathy towards the other

Essentially, I define structural elements as those that are thought of as institutional or physical tasks and responsibilities of reconstruction - broadly speaking, whereas relational elements are the basic human relationships, interactions, emotions, and sentiments that occur among individuals and groups at all levels in the intervention environment.
I draw primarily on the following theoretical frameworks:

1) Johan Galtung’s concepts of Negative and Positive Peace, which encompass his Structural and Cultural Violence (indirect violence) and Personal Violence (direct violence);

2) Conflict Transformation concepts as defined differently by Track 1 officials and Track 2 scholar-practitioners;


4) Basic peace and stability operation models by Dave Davis, myself, and others;

5) Dennis Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality, and Three Pillar Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution; and

6) My own Comprehensive Multilevel Framework.

Negative and positive peace have been conceptually associated by scholars with conflict and peacebuilding but there has been no methodological attempt that I am aware of to directly link negative and positive peace or structural and relational distinctions to a peace and stability intervention and environment, and so I start by posing the following Primary Research Question: How can the status of negative and positive peace in a peace and stability intervention environment be assessed? In addressing this question, although I utilize Galtung’s concepts of structural and cultural violence intact, I take a departure from Galtung’s original definitions of negative and positive peace and, in order
to capture complexities specific to peace and stability operations and environments, I also incorporate other directly relevant concepts into an overall composite analytical framework and model.

Early on in my review of literature to address The Problem and the Primary Research Question, and based on my years of experience as a professional field officer in peace and stability operations, it became clear to me that there is an important related and implicit dynamic involved here. There is a conceptual dichotomy, generally speaking, between Track 1 (governmental) and Track 2 (non-governmental) opinion as to what constitutes conflict transformation - a term often used of late by Track 1 and Track 2 intervenors and authors in discussing peace and stability operational objectives. In other words, there is an important difference of opinion as to what conflict transformation means in a peace and stability operation context and, therefore, a fundamental difference of opinion as to what constitutes peace, peacebuilding, and a subsequent mission-accomplished status. Consequently, I chose conflict transformation as the primary peace and stability operation conceptual means by which to probe for negative and positive peace notional indicators.

It is also clear that both a structural “minimalist” approach (typically Track 1) and a human relational “maximalist” approach (typically Track 2) are pursued simultaneously and, usually, independently (more on this in Chapter 4, Peacebuilding & Peace and Stability Operations). Although there is some overlap of opinion on the part of Track 1 and Track 2 actors, the preponderance of implementation, policy, and funding
weight is on the structural side. The matter of a structural versus a relational approach to
peacebuilding has significant implications for intervention scenarios and outcomes.

Accounting for the structural/relational divide embedded in the overall mission
aim of conflict transformation, and to better get at an answer to the Primary Research
Question - How can the status of negative and positive peace be assessed? - I insert an
underlying question into my research design that I refer to as the **Preliminary Research
Question**, and that is: **How can structural and relational elements of conflict
transformation yield peace and stability operational environment indicators that can be
associated with parameters of negative and positive peace?** Put another way, the
purpose of the Preliminary Research Question and associated framework is to clarify and
illustrate the nature and placement of various key peace and stability operation elements
and dynamics in a war-to-sustainable-positive peace spectrum that might be associated
with negative and positive peace. In effect, the Preliminary and Primary Research
Questions constitute a distinct two-stage inquiry process in the research design by which
the results of the posed preliminary question inform the primary question.

Subsequently, The Problem under study, and my Preliminary and Primary
Research Questions, inform the **Enabling Research Objective - To establish a
framework and model by which to discern the elements and dynamics of a peace and
stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace, and by which to
explore parameters of achieving and maintaining sustainable positive peace.**

The Problem, the Preliminary Research Question, the Primary Research Question,
and an Enabling Research Objective, all in-turn, inform the construction of my survey
and interview data collection instrument. My composite War-to-Sustainable-Positive Peace Continuum Model was developed prior to this research and subsequently refined.

I elaborate fully on Galtung’s negative and positive peace, and my point-of-departure rationale, in Chapter 4. But, in the meantime, so that readers unfamiliar with Johan Galtung’s concepts (1969, 1990, 1996) can better follow my discussion of The Problem and my basic framework construction, I include some elaboration on key negative and positive peace principles here. I cite my own abbreviated definitions of Galtung’s terms, which I have adapted for use within a peace and stability intervention context.

For peace and stability intervention purposes, negative peace is a condition in which, in essence, a negotiated political settlement and cessation or suppression of overt hostilities has been achieved but the root causes and conditions of the conflict remain largely unaffected. These root causes and conditions can manifest in the form of structural and cultural (indirect) violence, essentially, endemic institutionalized discrimination. Also, root causes and conditions manifest in personal (direct) violence, essentially, violence perpetrated by an identifiable actor(s) based on collective values or beliefs. Manifestations of structural, cultural, and personal violence can all be directed at specific groups. Renewed war or violent disorder is held in check by the presence of outsider international forces - that is to say, by international military contingents, international police, and international civil and political affairs officers, diplomats, and administrators.
The idea of negative peace implies that there is a **positive peace**, which I define here (again, my initial adapted short version) in peace operations’ terms as, in essence, a condition in which hostilities (direct violence) have ended and the underlying root causes and conditions of the conflict and structural and cultural violence are being adequately addressed to more reliably ensure sustainable positive peace conditions (social justice for all and sufficient institutional legitimacy and capacity), and peace enforcement by outsiders is no longer needed. Distinctions between **sustainable peace**, a term often used by intervenors now, and positive peace will be addressed.

**Current Bosnian Situation Overview**

Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is in a negative peace condition. To begin association of that status with The Problem, I cite conflict or “post”-conflict (quotation marks used quite deliberately) countries that seem to be appropriately described as being in a state of negative peace. Two examples at this time, I posit, are Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. More than fifteen years after the signing of the Dayton Accords and the official end of the war between Bosnian-Muslim, Croatian, and Serbian forces, and twelve years after the war in Kosovo, substantial progress has been made in terms of physical and institutional construction/reconstruction. Little progress, however, has been made in the normalization of relations between the conflict parties as evidenced by a) The lack of return of many minority refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their villages or towns of origin; 2) The pervasive nature of deep inter-ethnic animosity, minimal official cooperation across ethnic divides; and c) The pervasive discrimination...
by majority groups against minority groups at societal, institutional, and local community levels. Virtually all of the hostile political and social sentiments that precipitated the violence and subsequent international interventions appear to remain intact and potent. Cooperation with the “enemy” is often perceived as treason to one’s own ethnic group. And, the notion of reconciliation is taken by some conflict party members as naive and insulting.

The current situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, can, I think, be safely described as extant negative peace. Structural and cultural violence are endemic, and distrustful and hostile inter-ethnic relations are pervasive. Re-ignition of open hostilities (direct violence) appears to be largely held in check by the proactive presence and mandate of international police, international military forces, and international political and civil administration officials under the umbrella of the European Union in Bosnia, which includes NATO elements. Points on differences and similarities between the related interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (having a Serbia-Yugoslavia commonality), and interventions elsewhere, are made in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

By comparison, I would characterize Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan as being neither in a state of negative or positive peace but in a state of perpetual civil war or violent civil disorder. All are different in many ways, some with external interventions (Somalia, Afghanistan, DRC), and some not (Iraq, Syria), and some with ineffective intervention (Sudan). What they do have in common is the absence of negative peace.
Specific to the Bosnia situation: In August of 2004 Lord Paddy Ashdown, High Representative of the European Union’s Intervention mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) writes an introduction to the 4th revised and updated edition of the Office of High Representative’s “Bosnia and Herzegovina Essential Texts.” In the introduction paragraphs he cites accomplishments and an overall task:

The physical infrastructure – housing, roads, bridges, utilities – has been largely repaired. More than a million refugees have returned to their homes. BiH has a stable currency, and is developing normal diplomatic relations with its neighbours. These, and many other achievements, represent huge steps forward for a country that less than a decade ago emerged from Europe’s most vicious conflict in 60 years.

But, peace in BiH, although it grows stronger with every month that passes, is not yet wholly self-sustaining. The country continues to face formidable challenges – to build strong and effective institutions, to strengthen the rule of law, to reform dramatically its economy, and to transform defence and intelligence structures….It is however the role of the OHR to bring BiH to the point at which the country is irreversibly on that road so that BiH can continue its journey towards Europe with confidence, supported by its friends, but relying, not on others efforts, but its own.

In this short statement, the High Representative describes the basic status of BiH then, in 2004, as well as today in 2013. In fact, many on-site experts, local and international, are of the opinion that important elements of governance, security, rule of law, the economy, and social welfare progress are not only no longer being advanced but are reversing and that there is serious concern about future stability.

Two key points of information are given above; the intervention in BiH has not achieved sustainable peace or positive peace, given the continued requirement for an intervention presence and authority. Since there is no reported status of war or violent
Based on comments expressed by my interviewees in the summer of 2009, and my personal observations, I can concur that the situation in Bosnia at that time had not changed and, in fact, there was great concern at that time that things were at a grave risk of a recurrence of widespread civil disorder or worse. While I was in Bosnia, the United States Ambassador to Bosnia ordered a reassessment of the security situation and emergency evacuation procedures in connection with worrying intelligence reports on the increase of incidents of inter-ethnic hostility and the deteriorating already fragile political situation (stalemated hardline political positioning, deep governmental dysfunction and corruption, pervasive ethnic hostility and discrimination). In other words, the overall situation was not simply in stalemate, but the relative progress and cautious optimism that were generally expressed by Bosnians and internationals from 2004 to 2008 were moving in reverse.

An extract from the International Crisis Group (ICG) September 2010 situation report for BiH reflects a consensus on concerns shared among governments and intervenors about the current BiH situation:

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), the larger of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two entities, is in crisis. Disputes among and between Bosniak and Croat leaders and a dysfunctional administrative system have paralysed decision-making, put the entity on the verge of bankruptcy and triggered social unrest. Much focus has been on the conflict that pits the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) against the Federation, but the parallel crisis within the Federation also deserves attention. The need for
overhaul of the FBiH has been ignored because of belief that state-wide constitutional reform would solve most of its problems, but any state-level reform seems far off. Bosnia’s challenges all have echoes at Federation level, though in simpler form. Reform in the Federation, starting with establishment of a parliamentary commission, is achievable and could give impetus to state-level reform, while improving the livelihoods of the people in Bosnia’s larger entity. If it does not happen, Bosnia, which was wracked by three and a half years of war in the 1990s, may well slide toward new political and economic ungovernability.

General elections on 3 October 2010 will likely produce more unwieldy, divided coalitions at state and Federation levels that will have to confront urgent economic and social woes. In stark contrast to RS [Republika Srpska], however, the Federation, primarily a Croat-Bosniak condominium, is highly decentralised. It is loved neither by the Bosniaks, who would like to abolish it together with RS in favour of a unitary Bosnian state, nor by the Croats, who want an entity of their own. A workable balance between majority rule and minority rights eludes the Federation. Its elaborate, internationally-designed mechanisms and quotas are easily circumvented and subverted. (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Parallel Crisis, Europe Report No. 209, 28 September 2010)

This International Crisis Group (ICG) situation report provides additional detail to the extent that it is clear that neither viable peace nor sustainable positive peace is within sight. That is to say, it can be assumed that the institutional capacity of BiH has not yet attained the legitimacy or capacity to overcome the drivers of conflict (viable peace); in fact, the highly dysfunctional institutions are a significant part of the problem. Viable peace and sustainable positive peace will be elaborated on at length in subsequent chapters. In essence, sustainable positive peace is the same as sustainable peace, as used in the vernacular sense, but additionally contains the presumption that the status of a conflict and environment has transitioned beyond a fragile viable peace to include local institutional mechanisms by which the root causes and conditions of the conflict are
adequately addressed (my adaptation of Galtung’s positive peace to a peace and stability operation environment; discussed at length in Chapter 4). The information provided by the ICG in its report is consistent with written reports and verbal descriptions expressed to me in conjunction with my Survey and interviews in Bosnia.

I conclude that institutional capacity is weak, conflict drivers are strong, and that placement of the overall status of structural elements in BiH, and the intervention itself, is that of imposed stability not yet having reached viable peace. The matter of the status of relational elements is generally not addressed in governmental or most non-governmental commentary.

How can one further deconstruct the current Bosnian situation and attain a more complete, more certain understanding of the inherent elements and dynamics including the diverging interpretations of conflict transformation? What more precise understanding or actions can be brought to bear or created to enable more effective conflict prevention, mitigation, and peacebuilding in such situations? Put another way, what can be learned or introduced to support intervention efforts to improve the odds for positive peace? – In essence, a cognitive engagement in constructive conflict (Kriesburg, 2007). Attempts to answer to this question are in the construct of the frameworks, modeling, and research design that I have constructed.

But before proceeding to the construction of my framework(s) for analysis and elaboration on particular terms, I need to set the stage for that discussion. I elaborate at length in Chapter 5 on the historical background to the 1992-1995 Bosnia wars. But that conflict and the concepts of negative and positive peace, peace and stability interventions,
and peacebuilding itself all take place within a much broader context. That context, which I further elaborate on in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is the significant geo-political and sociological dynamics at play on the world stage and in the human affairs that underlie it, which continue to influence the outcome of interventions in Bosnia and elsewhere today.

**Post-Cold War Legacy**

Although the bi-polar Cold-War world we had grown accustomed to (U.S. and Soviet rivalry with respective entourages of allies and proxies) is over (1989), the consequences of that particular conflict (and its recent departure) are very much at work. A subsequent major reconstituting, realignment, and resettling of states, nationalities, and people has resulted from the lifting of a suppression effect by the two global super-powers on internal animosities latent within many smaller or less powerful states.

This sudden release of the heavy bi-polar control and rules-of-the-game has since precipitated the eruptions, re-eruptions, redirection, or privatizing of dozens of localized, often protracted conflicts across the globe. Although there were civil wars, border wars, wars for independence, insurgencies, and tribal warfare before that that were directly linked to Cold War ideological and economic struggles, now they seem to be largely driven by individual or group *identity*-oriented forces. A number of conflicts tend to be extremely violent exercises of ethnic cleansing, genocidal in nature or, clearly wars of genocide. This is occurring among groups of the same or different nationalities, culture, language, religion, or ethnic origin.
However, even though the chorus refrain, The Cold War Is Dead, is widely heard, note may be taken of a continuing economic competition whereby developing countries are still routinely enticed or coerced towards western style capitalism in reconstruction planning, for example, Kosovo, under the guidance of the European Union arranged Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (now known as the Regional Cooperation Council). Note may be taken that developing countries may be reluctant to remain simple suppliers of land, discount raw materials, and cheap labor for multi-national corporate interests in developed countries.

A further indication of increasing complexities is that whether or not current conflicts are motivated politically, ethnically, or by religion, power, identity, or resource control, or some combination thereof, there is simultaneously at all levels a strengthening of cohesion and hardening of positions among some groups and splintering of previously coherent groups.

All of this is to say that this current era is very active with conflict and is more complex as the relatively simpler U.S./Soviet bi-polar rivalry has receded and lesser scale bi-polar or multi-polar rivalries emerge, or rather, re-emerge as most conflicts are now intra-state in nature. The nation-state system itself is under stress, as whole societies look inward for identity and destiny. While some groups struggle for a state of their own (Palestinians, Chechens, Kurds), some groups hardly relate to the nation-state, as we know it, at all (Somali clans or Afghan tribes, transnational organized crime organizations, globalized terrorist organizations, and multinational corporations).
I suggest that unless greater efforts are made to control the level of violence involved in this restructuring/identity-searching era, what we get may have far more reaching, undesirable consequences for far longer than anyone would reasonably want (or expect) -- particularly considering that the “doomsday” weapons and means of the Cold War are rapidly becoming more accessible to more states and non-state-actors that may not have the means, or inclination, to responsibly control the use of such ultimate-use weapons of intimidation and destruction.

In contrasting pre-Cold War and post-Cold-War conflict, the *Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* makes the following conclusions:

Violent conflict has often resulted from the traditional preoccupation of states to defend, maintain, or extend interests and power. A number of dangerous situations today can be understood in these terms. Yet, one of the most remarkable aspects of the post-Cold War world is that wars within states vastly outnumber wars between states. These internal conflicts commonly are fought with conventional weapons and rely on strategies of ethnic expulsion and annihilation. More civilians are killed than soldiers (by one estimate at the rate of about nine to one) [15% in 1900, p.11], and belligerents use strategies and tactics that deliberately target women, children, the poor, and the weak.

Many factors and conditions make societies prone to warfare: weak, corrupt, or collapsed states; illegitimate or repressive regimes; acute discrimination against ethnic or other social groups; poorly managed religious, cultural, or ethnic differences; politically active religious communities that promote hostile and divisive messages; political and economic legacies of colonialism or the Cold War; sudden economic and political shifts; widespread illiteracy, disease, and disability; lack of resources such as water and arable land; large stores of weapons and ammunition; and threatening regional relationships. When long-standing grievances are exploited by political demagogues, the scene is set for violence (Carnegie Commission, 1997, xvii-xviii).
These factors remain the case in 2013. The Carnegie Final Report also states that rapid population growth and the rapid acceleration of technology are key factors in destabilization (p. 12); see also Choucni and North’s (1975) “Lateral Pressures” theory.

**Realpolitik Legacy**

As pointed out, the Cold-War and its demise has been a major factor leading to current events. But the Cold War itself took place in a broader-yet context of events. More specifics on those events is revealed by Eckhardt and Sivard who published figures calculating that there has been an extremely sharp rise in the number and intensity of conflicts in the twentieth century i.e., 471 wars between 1700 and 1987 with 101.5 million casualties with over 90% of casualties occurring in the twentieth century (Sivard, 1987, 28-31). They also report a sharp rise of the number of conflicts shortly after the Cold War ended with 29 major wars underway within a single year (1992), an all-time record (Sivard, 1993, pp. 20). Most of the wars during the past 300 years (roughly the era of the modern nation-state) have been in Europe. Between 1945 and 1992, the vast majority of wars (about 92%) has been in developing countries (Sivard, 1993, p. 20); see Sandole, (1999), Chapter 1, pp. 2-3. Additional conflict data, gathered by Hewitt, Wilkenfield, and Gurr (2010), is discussed in Chapter 3.

Several possibilities might account for these phenomena. First, until the Second World War, the colonial powers generally kept a tight lid on internal conflicts in their respective colonies and protectorates. From World War II until the demise of the Cold War, the U.S.–U.S.S.R. super power rivalry generally channeled developing country
conflicts into inter-state competition, given geo-political strategic imperatives of the time, although many conflicts were insurgencies driven by super power ideological-economic competition in the guise of localized civil wars and insurgencies.

Does the extremely sharp rise of war causalities in Europe in the twentieth century prior to the Cold War help explain the sharp rise of intra-state conflicts and casualties since the Cold War? I suspect that the sharp increase in lethal capacity of modern weapons introduced in the 19th century and early part of the 20th century in the hands of European nation-states unaccustomed to handling the much more lethal weapons -- and a lack of appropriate conflict prevention, management, and resolution knowledge and skills -- explains the European sharp increase. By the same token, when the Cold War ended, developing-country societies, upon removal of super-power restraints, had their own opportunity to demonstrate lack of familiarity with handling much more lethal weapon technology with proportionately devastating results.

There is, however, a significant distinction to be made. Inter-state wars have largely been politically and economically driven, and near exclusive matters of geo-political negotiation - as per the newly emerging nation-state system and its diplomatic negotiation and mediation protocols established by the Westphalia Agreement of 1648 intended for handling inter-state disputes. Post-Cold War conflicts in developing countries are, however, largely ethnic and identity-driven and extremely resistant to negotiation.
Whose Reality? – Realpolitik, Idealism, Human Realism

Negative peace is fairly well understood, whether intuitively or conceptually, and in fact, most peace and stability operations are designed to achieve just that (elaboration on this point in Chapter 4). Most intervenors and populations subject to such an intervention are quite familiar with the details of negative peace, although they might not realize it since most are unlikely to know the terminology or concepts involved. Most, I believe, accept the reality of the politics and power of negative peace as a given, although many at some point hope for something more.

Positive peace, on the other hand, is quite another matter. Political realism and the harsh realities on the ground experienced by many in places reckoning with major upheaval and subsequent stalled interventions leave few in a mood to entertain notions of utopia – which is how positive peace, erroneously or otherwise, may appear to many - even though, as I say, they hope for something better. Or, they hope for something better until cold disillusionment settles in, in the aftermath that follows initial hope and high expectations at the beginning of an intervention and sooner or later turns into frustration and anger when things have stalled in the effort and little or no further progress is apparent, or what progress has been made is going in reverse. A kind of mission purgatory exists.

Political realism as we know it is a cold dish and is expected to be served cold. The idea of positive peace is not for realists. Perhaps it is useful for local communities and social activists but not for mission planners and decision makers. I have personally seen and experienced this reality, this frustration, and seen it in many others, heard it
expressed by intervenors and local nationals alike. Political realism is an enabler and protector, but it does not do very well at envisioning a reality beyond itself. It is the yearning for something more, particularly by those most damaged by conflict, that notions of positive peace attempt to address. It is this dilemma that induced me to better understand negative and positive peace dynamics in association with a peace and stability intervention and environment, and to explore for ways that the two approaches might be reconciled, or at least made to be mutually tolerant if not complementary in aim.

And so, I think that it will be useful here, for an overall perspective on my approach to the topic of interventions stalled in negative peace and subsequent efforts to search for parameters of positive peace, to elaborate as to why I eventually felt compelled to investigate the matter further, and invent a conceptual term in that service, human realism.

I finally did so in order to proceed with a foundational reality, a ground-truthing specific to interventions and associated environments, that acknowledges certain hard facts of human interaction, for example, selfishness, territorial/resources win/lose competition, tyranny, and genocide, and simultaneously includes the proven human capacity to understand, to change, and to adopt more collaborative methods of interaction in resolving difficult issues. I needed a conceptual framework separate from realpolitik (political realism), and separate from the long derided idealism. I needed a conceptual framework to deliberately and more clearly take cognizance of humanity’s ability to be simultaneously destructive and constructive in our interactions - given all our flaws in both instances. And so, I spend time probing our dualism, our efforts to view our dual
nature as things separated one from the other - our contortions to deny the existence of one or the other.

*I define Human Realism as the proven capacity of humanity to deliberately engage in inconsiderate, competitive, self-interests driven win/lose acts at others’ expense for personal gain of wealth, power, prestige, or survival. The term also includes the proven capacity of humanity to deliberately engage in considerate, interactive processes to understand, to change, to overlook or forgive, and to adopt more collaborative methods of human discourse and engagement for managing and resolving difficult conflicts and other issues.*

To my mind, such a dualistic concept allows for a realistic and practical conceptual counter-part to political realism. I believe that such a concept can more readily allow for the development of and, very importantly, encourage the application of more constructive interactions where they are most needed in a realpolitik-paradigm dominant environment such as a peace making/peace enforcement stabilization operation. Such a concept captures the complexities of the real world better than a realpolitik or idealpolitik approach alone.

Governments have long been utilizing well-developed political and diplomatic perspectives and practices to assess and intervene into conflicts – essentially, negotiation, mediation, and positive and negative incentives, and direct coercion. The idea, *human realism*, is functional enough, and positive peace principles are becoming clearer, but something is still missing. And that is, of course, the doing of it, the implementation of
conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation that is more
cognizant of negative and positive peace principles and a *human realism* paradigm. More
recently, scholars and practitioners of the fairly young field of Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, beyond traditional political science and international relations thought, have
pondered the matter of international interventions as well. So what does the current field
of Conflict Analysis and Resolution have to offer that is different and useful to
governments and others engaged in peace and stability operations? What is added that
addresses the missing piece or step?

I will discuss specifics of *negative peace* and *positive peace* at length in Chapter
4, but the essence (according to Johan Galtung who did the most to define the concepts,
1969, p.183) is that under conditions of negative peace, there is no personal violence but
there is *structural and cultural violence*. I will add a qualification here that where
powerful *structural violence* (Galtung, 1969, p.170) is in place, the suppression is such
that there is no open fighting or rebellion on a macro scale, but nevertheless, personal
violence may be occasionally perpetrated by the current powers-to-be. Conflict is
basically latent, suppressed, and, essentially, conflict parties on the bottom are merely
biding their time for their chance to turn the tables on whomever is currently on top in an
ongoing win/lose power contest.

Conversely, positive peace (the absence of structural and cultural violence,
Galtung, 1969, 1990, 1996) means that root causes and conditions underlying the conflict
have been or are being sufficiently addressed so that all parties are confident that they are
engaged in a doable and fair ongoing process for resolving differences; basic integrity is
respected, and they see tangible structural changes reflecting their interests, values, and needs.

Although this description captures the essence of positive peace processes -- it still begs the question, why? Why is there a need to think in terms of positive peace and negative peace in conflict analysis, prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation? What is it that is deeper? Where is the bedrock? What is the whole point of looking beyond conventional nation-state political and diplomatic perspectives and approaches?

Looking at peacemaking from a post-Cold War perspective necessarily involves an understanding of current nation-state political and diplomatic imperatives in international affairs, in other words, political realism (more popularly known as realpolitik). Realpolitik embodies well-known classic adversarial political and strategic assumptions upon which win/lose geo-political maneuvering, adversarial (position-based) negotiation and coercive mediation practices and the use of force, are based. Such systemic adversarial views and practices have been the status quo long before the modern nation-state era, and have been adapted very decisively to the roughly 300 year old nation-state structure (post-Westphalia Conference of 1648). Realpolitik thinking and action are pervasive and virtually automatic among political and military leaders as well as in civil society, especially in times of stress and insecurity.

Here is how realism is defined in one dictionary (i.e., American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, 1997, p. 1137), which, of course, reflects the evolution of
popular societal norms, and therefore, terms in which decision makers are likely to view realism and idealism:

**Realism**: 1) An inclination toward literal truth and pragmatism; 2) The representation in art or literature of objects, actions, or social condition as they actually are without idealization or presentation in abstract form; 3) The modern philosophical doctrine opposed to idealism, that physical objects exist independently of perception [known as “Philosophical Realism”].

**Realist**: 1) One who is inclined to literal truth and pragmatism; 2) A practitioner of realism.

**Reality Principle**: Awareness of and adjustment to environmental demands in a manner that assures ultimate satisfaction of instinctual needs.

**Realpolitik**: 1) An expansionist national policy having as its sole principle advancement of national interest; 2) Practical politics.

I suspect that most people (politicians, statesmen, scholars, soldiers, humanitarians, and the general public alike) will readily say that the opposite of realism is idealism or utopianism (notions of idealism and utopianism often being used interchangeably). This is significant considering that decision makers are pressed to make “realistic” decisions. What do we, as society, have to say about idealism and utopianism?

**Idealism**: 1) The act or practice of envisioning things in an ideal form; 2) Pursuit of one’s ideals; 3) The theory that the object of external perception consists of ideas [known as “Philosophical Idealism”].
**Idealist:** 1) One whose conduct is influenced by ideals that often conflict with practical considerations; 2) One who is unrealistic and impractical; a visionary; 3) An artist or a writer whose work shows idealism; 4) An adherent of any system of philosophical idealism (American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd edition, 1997, p.637).

**Utopianism:** The ideals or principles of a utopian; idealistic and impractical social theory.

**Utopian:** 1) Of, relating to, describing or having the characteristics of a Utopia: A utopian island; 2) A - Excellent or ideal but impracticable; visionary; B - Proposing impractically ideal schemes. A zealous but impractical reformer of human society (American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd edition, 1997, p.1487).

Idealism is not the most useful framework from which to call for changes in realpolitik paradigms.

Realism in international relations has a very long intellectual history. Thucydides (400 B.C.) observed during the Peloponnesian War that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” (Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, p.63). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) later wrote that “covenants, without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.” (ibid).

The current perspective on realism in international relations was captured by Hans J. Morgenthau in his *Politics Among Nations* (1948, with subsequent editions). Morgenthau’s position is that there are two schools of thought in modern political thought; that of utopians with their optimistic philosophies of man and politics and the realist who believes that the world “is the result of forces which are inherent in human
nature” (Morgenthau, 1948). His explanation of nation-state behavior has become the foundation for contemporary political and international relations thought and instruction on the topic as predominant in universities after WW II (Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, p.14). Morgenthau’s concept of realist theory is set forth in six principles which define modern nation-state political and diplomatic imperatives in terms of national interests and power issues. This is important in that the political realism perspective is the driving force behind political and diplomatic handling of primary conflicts by nation-states including, by extension, the United Nations.

Morgenthau’s six principles are:

1) Political relationships are governed by objective rules deeply rooted in human nature;

2) Political leaders “think and act in terms of interest defined as power.”

3) All nations are compelled to protect ‘their physical, political, and cultural identity [emphasis added] against encroachments by other nations.” Therefore, all interest is identified with national survival.

4) “…universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract, universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.” In short, in “pursuit of the national interest, nation-states are governed by a morality that differs from the morality of individuals in their personal relationships.”

5) “…moral aspirations of a particular nation” are not to be identified “with the moral laws that govern the universe,” and “we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own.”

6) Political actions must be judged by political criteria (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1993, Ch. 1).

Vasquez, in his book The War Puzzle, makes key observations about the realist international system and war:
The realist tradition has suggested that, in the face of threatening security issues, one must build up power. To increase power, the tradition tells leaders to make alliances and/or enlarge their military. These practices are not the only ones possible, nor do they always work. They are, however, the practices that have been selected out by the realist tradition, and that tradition has guided the modern global system. As with war, these practices are social inventions that have been created as a way of handling a particular situation (1993, pp.155-156).

What realism overlooks, though, is that such behavior among equals tends not to prevent war, but to encourage it. This is because situations arise in which each side becomes involved more with preparing for war and eventually winning it, rather than taking those actions that would help prevent a war.

What all of this means is that reality itself (realism), in connection with international affairs, nation-state decision making, and primary conflict has largely defaulted to political science and international relations paradigms. Consequently, since governments have to interpret reality in order to make decisions, decision makers rely on reality meanings almost exclusively in terms of power, narrowly defined national interests, and adversarial approaches. Within such a framework and mindset, there is little space for more recent positive peace oriented analysis and interactive processes and initiatives of the kind being put forth by the field of conflict analysis and resolution.

There is no question that power is perceived as the defining element of nation-state interactions and security, but a purely power paradigm is not very effective in resolving, or even controlling, desperate clashes among groups of people driven by non-negotiable values and needs, especially those dealing with survival (see Burton, 1990,
1997, and Sandole and Van der Merwe, 1993, Chapter 4 on Burton, “Conflict Resolution as A Political Philosophy”).

Given a Realpolitik worldview in times of stress, trust typically erodes, relationships deteriorate, positions harden, conflicts escalate, and long-term damage is done (see Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes, 1973). Again, precious little collaborative openness or creative/constructive problem solving is likely when groups are dependent on realpolitik assumptions alone. It is in the realm of positive peace that necessary forums and creative thinking can evolve which have proven useful in helping generate new perceptions and ways out of dysfunctional political and social relationships and the associated waste and destruction.

A subsequent school of neo-realism thought (still based on realism’s nation-state actor fundamentals) has evolved that pushes for a somewhat more comprehensive perspective on nation-state dynamics than realism, although still limited in terms of accommodating positive peace process thinking. Neo-realism contains structural realism (Waltz, 1979); constellation analysis (Kindermann, Munich School, 1985); deep structure (Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993); and contingent realism (Glaser, 1994), in Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, pp.80-93.

**Structural realism** connects the structural system of nations domestically (institutional hierarchy) to the relationship of nations (units) to each other in a sovereign anarchical international system. For Waltz, the arrangement of the units to each other in the international system is the key; “The concept of structure is based on the fact that
units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes” (D & P p.82).

Dougherty and Pfaltzfraff describe the six components of constellation analysis as follows:

1) System and decision, including linkages between domestic and foreign policy and decision making;
2) Perception and reality, including the subjective images of decision makers;
3) Interest and power, including how decision makers define the role of power in achieving foreign-policy goals, based on conception of national interest;
4) Norm and advantage, encompassing how legal, moral, or ideological postulates shape the conduct of units of the international system, as well as systemic structures themselves [see Vasquez War Puzzle (1993) Ch. 8];
5) Structures and interdependence, including the effects of structures on levels of interdependence and overall interactive patterns; and
6) Cooperation and conflict, or how all of the aforementioned categories shape the strategies of actors toward other actors and lead to patterns of cooperation, conflict, or neutrality (D & P, p. 81).

This is a significant step beyond strict realpolitik assumptions, but the focus is still nearly exclusively on the nation-state actor as the common denominator. Further evolution is needed to allow for localized and contingent application and use of positive peace processes.

Deep structure refers to rules and norms as well as power and institutions, that is to say, considers the “international societal system, with its emphasis on cultural, legal, and normative behavioral dimensions,” and includes “competition and cooperation” (D &
Contingency realism describes a practice whereby states make a judgment on the advantages and disadvantages of competing with other states or cooperating and make decisions as a rational actor accordingly based on national interests (D & P, 88-89).

Smith (1986), a neo-realism advocate, comments that since nation-state decision makers, adhering to realists based principles, are not normally bound by moral concerns, they do not seem to recognize that “their judgment of morality and their definition of the national interest rested on their own hierarchy of values” (D & P, 1996, p.91).

Kenneth Waltz, a prominent neo-realist thinker (Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 1959), in arguing for a more comprehensive definition of realism, uses restricting terminology in illustrating the problem of paradigm differences. He states, “Optimists and pessimists agree on where to look, but, having looked, describe differently what they see and thus arrive at contradictory conclusions” (Waltz, 1959, pp.42, 77, 113).

The difficulty here is not the reality of different interpretations, as accurately pointed out by Waltz, but the use of the largely derogatory (in political and international relations circles) label of “optimist” (popularly interchangeable with idealist), which places a stigma and dampener on anyone or any group otherwise inclined to probe for deeper understanding or creative solutions to old or new problems; for example, positive peace processes. I am sure that such was not Waltz’s (as a neo-realist) intention. But it does illustrate the real burdens that we can place upon ourselves through our use of particular symbolic words that have taken on derogatory meanings over time, even though not necessarily intended by the original author.
Reality needs to be redefined to allow for peacemaking and peacebuilding with greater perspective and more options to better respond to a more complex world. Reality perspectives and responses need to be expanded to take into account the full range of human capacity; particularly the capacity to willingly, methodically, and jointly broaden our understanding of ourselves and each other. And, to take into account the proven capacity to jointly work towards solving mutual problems in spite of all our personal and collective shortcomings and reluctance. See Ronald Fisher (1997) for a review of many of these processes; Also see Saunder’s Public Peace Processes (1999) and Sandole’s argument for problem-solving cooperative conflict resolution processes when confrontational and competitive processes fail (1999) chapter 7, pp.157.

My struggle for a contextual foundation pulled or pushed me increasingly towards human dimensional and relationship imperatives necessary to work through disputes involving non-negotiable values and needs in a predominantly adversarial position-based, realpolitik managed world. Political realism, which captures our adversarial system well and provides the predominant underlying assumptions of our political, economic, and social systems (and responses to conflict), is problematic for generating sustainable solutions.

So, what sense of reality can capture core elements of human nature and human interactions in relation to conflict and, very importantly, better open a conceptual path to positive peace oriented solutions that political realism cannot do so well? Considering that we necessarily react and interact in human ways - with all associated emotions, fears, opinions, desires, and needs - it seems important to address political, ethnic, cultural,
religious, and organizational conflict by taking fundamental human dynamics and inclinations into greater account when contemplating responses to conflict.

Political realists will likely argue that they have been doing just that all along. Advocates of political realism will argue that realpolitik works -- note the end of the Cold-War – precisely because political realism acted on the dictates of power in the form of competition and a containment strategy against the Soviet Union (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, p.90). However, since political realism assumes the state to be a rational political actor and the common denominator for worldly considerations, there is little inclination to look deeper for other factors, for other perspectives on primary conflict; particularly internal, intra-state conflict (ibid).

The problem is that political realism is largely one-dimensional, considering the management of the world to be a discussion by nation-state actors that are competitive rational actor-units compelled or self-driven to engage in a win-lose contest for survival and advantage and expecting -- actually inducing -- reciprocation in kind. Conflicts worldwide today (90% being intra-state identity and ethnic in nature) are not responding well to conventional one-dimensional intervention approaches (Carnegie Commission, Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, pp. xvii-xviii). A new perspective on assumptions and actors is needed to match the increased complexity of conflicts – and of humans.

John Burton addresses the post-Westphalian and post-Cold War reality and points to relevant initiatives:

Now we have a global society in which all authorities, regardless of the particular political or economic system in which they operate, are caught
between the pressures of vested interests and those of basic human needs, and are unable to prevent the consequent alienation that is disrupting their societies…

…All systems have their faults in addition to their strengths. One focus of this analysis is on the decision-making failures of all societies, of which ideological rivalries and adversarial political processes are symptoms. More constructively, there is also a focus on means of resolving serious social problems by specific collaborative and problem-solving processes, which involve all sections of societies (Burton, 1997, p.12).

Burton (1997) comments on the need for updated conflict resolution in the context of current realist and idealist perspectives:

Any analysis such as this, along with the proposals that are the logical outcome of the analysis, remains idealism in the context of the existing power political ‘realism.’ Those who benefit from existing systems, and by definition these are those who are influential within systems, understandably resist change. Change processes are not possible unless this reality can be addressed. There is, however, another reality. The ‘realistic’ power frame has within it the sources of self-destruction both of those who currently benefit from it and of civilizations. The ‘idealistic’ problem-solving and problem-provention frame becomes a practical option when the processes of change include means by which ‘realists’ can perceive and cost their present and future options accurately, resulting in some agreed shifts towards more secure national and international societies (p.13). [emphasis added]

While pointing out a need for nations to assess their costs of doing business as usual, that is to say institutionally within a purely realist paradigm, Burton comments:

“…societies are faced with the question whether authorities can any longer require individuals to adjust to existing institutions and traditional norms, or whether institutions and norms, traditionally oriented towards interests in production, must now be adjusted to human requirements” (1997, p.10).
Finally, he comments [following a 1989 conference on better understanding human relationships inclusive of basic human needs, which led to his 1990 “Conflict Series” volumes: 1) Burton (1990), 2) Burton (Ed) (1990), 3) Burton and Dukes (1990), that:

Within this conflict frame there was no idealism attached to the desirability of observing human needs. It was a straightforward costing orientation: if needs were not satisfied there would be costly conflicts. Inherent needs for recognition, identity and security (more a psychological security than a physical one) were emphasized in their papers (1997, p.36).

Robert Rubinstein, who has studied the linkage between culture and international affairs pertaining to peacekeeping decision-making, contends that the predominant international affairs view (realism) that the nation-state rational actor is the only significant level for practical consideration, is incomplete in terms of cultural realities:

It also follows that it is not just nations, or even principally nations, that are the actors in international affairs. In fact, the appropriate unit of analysis—who are the parties involved—needs to be constantly re-evaluated in light of day-to-day experience of people, rather than from the perspective of some mythic “national culture.” Recognizing this will not itself bring peace (Booth 1979), but may allow a broader range of information to be treated as relevant. This in turn will help to revitalize work in international affairs and perhaps help us reach wiser policy decisions” (1989, p.54) [emphasis added].

Rubinstein concludes his article by saying that caricaturizing culture by assuming the nation-state to be the appropriate unit of analysis “renders the range of questions that can be legitimately raised about the role of culture in international affairs nearly inconsequential” (1989, p.54). He also comments:

…it is my view that by studying the interrelationship between the culture of international affairs and the role of culture in international affairs we
can better understand the nature of cultural processes as well. And finally, with implications for problem-solving approaches, “Culture allows the representation of the social and physical environments in ways that make it possible to turn problematic situations into problems so that they can be discussed and managed,” (Rubinstein 1984: 173-178);(1989, p.55). [emphasis added]

Rubinstein (1993) also points out that in the 1950s, when the new field of International Relations was coming into its own as a distinct intellectual discipline (distinct from the more narrowly defined political science), it largely adopted the view of anthropology (at that time) regarding the role of culture in worldly decisions. He describes more recent discussions about culture in the in international affairs literature (which I will refer to as assumptions) as being essentially the same as they were earlier, that is to say, that culture is viewed as “stable patterns of behavior, actions and customs.” He goes on to say:

...the use of this view of culture in the international affairs literature: the culture as behaviors view characterized anthropological and sociological thought during the post-Second World War period up until about 1960 and fit particularly well with the then emerging paradigm of political realism. In the past thirty years, however, anthropological analyses have shifted emphasis and recognized the fundamental role of meaning construction, symbolism and rituals in human social life. The result is a conception of culture as ‘meaning’. (Rubinstein, Winter 1993, p.550).

What this means is that the discipline of international relations, which has been based on realism, still fundamentally views humanity as a nation-state collection of rational actors with particular and unchanging national characters and characteristics. This further means that, within the international relations view, it is reasonable to plan and make decisions about war and peace and interventions (local ethnic conflicts included) based on stereotyped assumptions about often-mythic “national” cultures at the national
level. The field of anthropology has since moved on to include various kinds of cultures and ethnic subdivisions in its examination, whereas such is generally not the case within national governments or inter-governmental bodies.

The comments of Burton and others (Sandole, 2010) reinforce my opinion that a multilevel, multifaceted perspective that takes into consideration the full range of human experience is needed to adequately address multilevel multifaceted conflicts in which complex factors are at issue. Such a perspective is needed to better explore and generate sustainable positive peace solutions – therefore, my need to create a new conceptual term – in fact the need to redefine reality so as to make crucial distinctions that can allow new kinds of decisions.

I believe that the terms idealism and utopian have too much negative psychological connotation in the realist and popular mind; particularly for realist decision-makers. It is too much of a barrier to push against. A clear conceptual break is necessary to efficiently progress further. And so I suggest that we stop associating interactive problem-solving approaches with the terms idealism or worse, utopianism. Ultimately, realism needs to be humanized and our dual human dimension needs to be taken into consideration inclusive of our full range of experience and capacities (constructive as well as destructive). This realistic-humanity view needs to be made clearly distinguishable from idealism to make the point and to better enable more cognizant, more capable peacemaking-peacebuilding. And so I arrive at peacemaking-peacebuilding in Human Realism terms.
As an addendum, the term realism in the dictionary and in international affairs is characterized in political and decision-making terms. Human Realism, as a distinct concept unto itself, is not specified anywhere – therefore, my difficulty in arriving at conceptual bedrock for a starting point that captures the imperatives of the kind of peacebuilding approaches, that is to say mutually supportive negative and positive peace processes, that are more likely to have longer-term constructive effect in dealing with the kinds of conflicts we face now. Coincidentally, Post-Cold War conflicts seem to have more in common with pre-1648 Westphalia nation-state conflicts (see Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, 1993).

In summary, *political realism* is one-dimensional; *human realism* is multi-dimensional. *Human realism* allows for considerations and responses on many levels, takes cognizance of the *complexity* of human nature and human interaction and, perhaps most importantly, takes cognizance of the proven capacity of humans to understand and change, although sometimes slowly and reluctantly. *Human realism* also allows for the incorporation of broader perspectives as needed by groups in particular situations to proceed with solutions that will work for them, that is to say, in their specific political, cultural, relational, communal, or spiritual contexts. Decision-making based in realpolitik contexts is encountering great difficulty dealing flexibly enough with such complexities, much less probing for ever more refined and effective mechanisms for constructive human interaction (example: the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003).
I think a reminder of realpolitik’s role in conflict is useful here in that it is the paradigm under which it seems most Track 1 and some Track 2 intervention officials operate -- knowingly or unknowingly. Sandole describes the school of thought this way:

The Realpolitik-defined world is clearly a bleak one, encouraging the use of what Morton Deutsch (1973) refers to as ‘competitive’ processes of conflict resolution: power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, ‘win-lose’ approaches to dealing with conflict. Realpolitik was the determinative Weltanschauung of superpower decision-makers during the Cold War. It has dominated the perceptions and behavior of Serbs and Croats during their war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in (and over) Nagorno-Karabakh, and continues to dominate perceptions and behavior elsewhere (e.g., Northern Ireland, Palestine, Sri Lanka). It is not surprising; therefore, that Realpolitik and the corresponding competitive processes are associated with destructive outcomes (Sandole, 1993, p. 4).

I think the implications here, for trouble, of utilizing an exclusively Realpolitik perspective, are clear enough in the often volatile, always complex, and usually rapidly moving dynamics that Track 1 and 2 officials have to contend with resulting in, I might add, different recognition and interpretations of the same events by Track 1 and 2 officials among themselves, and in contrast with to those of the primary conflict parties.

In other words, different operating paradigms and assumptions in effect for conflict parties and conflict intervenors often result in opposing or hostile conclusions, decisions, and interactions that can and do lead to conflict escalation. This can also occur when parties do not stop to think (Lewis Richardson, 1939, 1960a), or they do stop to think, but in realpolitik terms (Sandole, 1999, p. 229).

Finally, exclusively realpolitik driven interventions can be a form of various degrees of personal (direct) violence to apply Galtung’s (1969) concept here; for
example, the use of sanctions or bombing without benefit of prior direct interactive
dialogues or problem solving exercises that might have revealed perspectives and
alternatives to hardened win/lose or lose/lose actions that eventually and inevitably result
in further efforts towards mutual destruction. It might be argued that U.N. multilateral
sanctions may also constitute structural violence in the sense that culturally derived
aspects of decision makers perspectives are incorporated into the legal underpinning of
U.N. sanctioned enforcement actions. Also, such legitimized actions can and often do
play cruel jokes on otherwise well-meaning people. Consider the use of enhanced
bombing discrimination, commando raids, or severe economic sanctions in order to
ensure that leaders capitulate, but which routinely only succeed in making leaders more
recalcitrant, citizens worse off, and their respective citizens hostile to the intervention --
tricky business.

PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS 2 THROUGH 9

Chapter 9 outlines the implications of the findings for Further Research,
Theory, and Practice and for Peace and Stability Interventions and Policy. My
Recommendations and Overall Conclusions resulting from the study are presented
accordingly. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations, are based on
abduction-based exploratory theory and mixed-method methodology with
resulting composite analytical frameworks and data collection and analysis
instruments.
Chapter 2 – The Broader Mission Context and the Literature

Chapter 2 looks more closely at paradigm and perception dynamics, and on-the-ground situational factors such as the different types of conflicts associated with the conflict parties and, not unimportantly, intervention-related conflicts. The key intervention issues of Security and Sovereignty, Balance of Peace Enforcement and Peacebuilding, Politicization of Programs, Mission Coordination, and Training as Clash of Paradigms Prevention are discussed.

Building on introductory points presented in Chapter 1, I include below a number of pertinent on-the-ground situational awareness factors to take into consideration when trying to better understand an international intervention context, and probe for structural and relational elements or negative and positive peace parameters.

Chapter 3 – Framework Construction and the Literature

Chapter 3 discusses important conflict, and conflict resolution theory, and dynamics taken into consideration in the construction of the framework(s) and analytical modeling needed for examining The Problem in question and carrying out the study. Key concepts, in conflict analysis and resolution terms, included are Schools of Thought, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Stages of Conflict, Nested Paradigm Determination, Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels, and Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection. To better ensure that the analytical frameworks I have constructed are, in the end, in congruence with sound conflict analysis and resolution theory and practice, I introduce Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality
concept and Three Pillar Approach framework by which I perform a conceptual cross-check in Chapter 9.

Chapter 4 – Literature Corresponding with Select Theory & Practice

Chapter 4 takes a closer look at select conflict and conflict resolution theory and practice concepts that I consider crucial to addressing The Problem and building a firm foundation for moving on to peace and stability intervention structural and operational basics in Chapter 5 and the subsequent discussion of the Bosnian background and intervention particulars in Chapter 6. Chapter 4 includes in-depth discussions on Galtung’s Negative and Positive Peace, and my conceptual departure from them, in order to conceptually adapt the principles involved more directly to peace and stability operation environment utility. Chapter 4 also includes discussions on Violence, Constructive Conflict, Relationship concepts, Sociological-Psychological issues, Psychology and Peace Operations, Conscience, the Human Rights Factor, and not least, Intervention Dilemma.

Chapter 5 – Peace & Stability Operation Basics

There are a number of variations on the conceptual division of primary intervention tasks, such as peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace support, and prevention. In Chapter 4, I elaborated on these distinctions but, in Chapter 5, I primarily focus on the concepts as utilized by governmental peace and stability operation intervenors, including the United Nations. Chapter 5 directly addresses the matter of peacebuilding in relation
to peace and stability operations, and presents my argument that there is an intervention
Conceptual Dichotomy involving a crucial difference, generally speaking, in views
between Track 1 actors and Track 2 actors as to what constitutes peacebuilding in a
conflict zone, and in fact what constitutes a status of peace – this distinction centers on
the use of the term Conflict Transformation and has significant implications.

Chapter 6 – The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Chapter 6 attempts to capture historical and current Bosnian complexities, which
are inextricably linked by successive invasions and interventions by outsiders, into a
coherent whole and placed within the recent Bosnian conflict scenario. Specific
complexities discussed are the historical background, Memory and Conflict, Stabilization
(Resolutions, Peace Conferences, Operations, Protection), and peacebuilding/conflict
transformation as Reconstruction and Development.

Chapter 7 – Survey Design

At this point (Chapter 7), I elaborate on the process of inquiry that I used in
addressing the research questions. To begin, I refer back to particular concepts touched
on in the literature reviews. These concepts are specific to the conflict transformation
concept dichotomy mentioned early on and lead directly to the concept hypothesis and
associated research questions and objectives that are integral to this survey design.
Therefore, I will elaborate at some length here on the context for the dichotomy, the
concept hypothesis, and related research questions and objectives. Some commentary and
points raised in the general introduction in Chapter 1, and elsewhere, are repeated in Chapter 7 to accommodate a stand-alone chapter on survey the design.

**Chapter 8 – Findings**

Chapter 8 list the 30 closed-ended survey questions and 4 Open-Ended survey questions, subject responses and comments, including data means frequencies, and my analysis and comments regarding the responses. I explain how to use the Structural and Relational Status Scales on a step by step basis using graphics of the scales leading to combining the scales on the same page with my War-to-Sustainable Peace Continuum model for inferred association with the intervention thresholds and negative and positive peace parameters indicated on it. The responses to the closed-ended questions are incorporated into the chapter. The complete responses to the Open-Ended Questions are located in Appendix A.

Chapter 8 also contains a sampling of subject-response sub-set data, comparing the subject-response means of Bosnian nationals, international intervenors, Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs in relation to the 30 closed-ended questions. The raw data are listed in Appendix B.

**Chapter 9 – Implications of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations**

Inferences are drawn and conclusions made about the viability of the research framework and model, and data collection and data analysis instruments utilized in this study. Implications and conclusions of the overall findings are discussed in two sections:
1) For Further Research, Theory, Practice, and Policy, and 2) For Peace and Stability Interventions (inclusive of planning and decision-making).

In the section on Further Research, Theory, Practice, and Policy, I do a conflict resolution theory cross-check of my conceptual model utilizing Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality and Three Pillar frameworks. In the Peace and Stability Interventions implications section, I include particular comments on Memory and Conflict Implications and on implications of Athen’s Violentization processes for peace and stability operation environments.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 1 presented a description of The Problem inducing this study, followed by a status report of on the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina hypothesizing that Bosnia is in a negative peace status. Discussions followed pertaining to particular political and sociological legacy factors that constitute historical and situational contextual dynamics that directly impact peace and stability interventions and environments. A short preview of Chapters 2 – 9 followed.

Building on the introductory points presented in Chapter 1, I continue my literary progression in Chapter 2 by expanding the discussion to include elaboration on perception and paradigm dynamics and pertinent on-the-ground situational awareness factors to take into consideration when trying to better understand an international intervention context by which to increasingly probe for structural and relational elements and negative and positive peace parameters.
Chapter 2: The Broader Mission Context and the Literature

Chapter 2 looks more closely at paradigm and perception dynamics, and on-the-ground situational factors such as the different types of conflicts associated with the conflict parties and, not unimportantly, intervention-related conflicts. The key intervention issues of Security and Sovereignty, Balance of Peace Enforcement and Peacebuilding, Politicization of Programs, Mission Coordination, and Training as Clash of Paradigms Prevention are discussed.

I use the term mission here to mean intervention missions and operations deployed in the field whether unilateral, bi-lateral, or multilateral in nature, or whether coordinated by the UN, US, EU, NATO, OSCE, The Arab League, Union of African States, or other coordinating entities.

Building on introductory points presented in Chapter 1, I include below a number of pertinent on-the-ground situational awareness factors to take into consideration when trying to better understand an international intervention context, and probe for structural and relational elements or negative and positive peace parameters.

**Conflict of Perceptions - Clash of Paradigms**

As indicated earlier, there is a related crucial point to be made in considering a major undertraining such as an international intervention involving mass application of
resources with lethal force capability, and that has to do with our inherent historical and collective narratives and perceptions of reality that guide our decisions.

Officials routinely encounter the problem of differing interpretations of the same events by different parties, at all levels, among intervenors, conflict parties, and “all of the above.” At best, this leads to sometimes annoying or somewhat stressful delays and use of energy while each party re-explains or re-argues their viewpoints. Sometimes after an episode, trust is higher and relationships are stronger. Sometimes, though, under highly stressed circumstances, though, different perspectives can lead, and often have led, to serious distrust, violence, and bloodshed. What drives this difference of perceptions?

Contrary to Descartes’ “naturalist” position that people may have different interpretations but the same basic recognition of the same events (Sandole, 1999, Ch. 6), Thomas Kuhn argued that the problem of contradictory perceptions can be a factor of different internalized paradigms resulting in different recognitions as well as different interpretations of the same events (Kuhn, 1996).

Since the Somalia conflict is a case rich in conflicted perception-dynamics among all concerned (international and local), and I have first-hand knowledge of the conflict, I will elaborate on what I encountered there in terms of perception and paradigm dynamics. Even though Bosnia is a relatively modern state and years have passed by since the 1995 Dayton Agreement, many experiential lessons, including from distant lands such as Somalia remain pertinent to Bosnia - and to all major interventions. Perhaps it is better to characterize perceptions and paradigms as misperceptions and opposing paradigms – no small matter in a conflict zone.
In the intervention in Somalia, apparent clashes of paradigms were virtually daily events usually resulting in more excitement than most international staff and officials and most Somali individuals and leaders really wanted or were ready for. The following observations are excerpted from some thoughts I put to paper while in Somalia (Somalia Questions, 1994), which largely still applies.

The perceptions of many Somalis are still very connected to ancient nomadic ways. Somalia did not have a written language until 1972. About eighty per cent of the population is still illiterate. About seventy per cent of Somalis still live in the bush. So, old traditions and practices are close at hand. Fighting, raiding, killing, surviving, are deeply ingrained.

The catastrophe that has utterly destroyed Somalia is the result of a number of factors. There are the decades of massive infusions of modern weapons as payment for strategic loyalty; loyalty which was purchased by and benefiting the clan/president in control at the time. These weapons, when put in the hands of the murderous repressive ruling regime (ruling clan), assured deep hatreds, oaths of revenge, and suitable ground for the cultivation of warlords. Given the numerous sub-clan divisions, the warlords were many - bitterness pervasive.

The warlords succeeded in driving out Said Barre. However, the celebration was short. Given deep clan mutual distrust and a tradition of violent confrontation born of the principle that he who controls prospers, the clan warlords and their private militias turned on each other. The civil war continued in an even more deadly version. The enemy was no longer Siad Barre - Dictator, it was everyone around you. These alliances of clans and
sub-clans, warmakers and peacemakers were, and are, in a constant state of conflict, calculations, intrigue, betrayal, reconciliation and realigning again. It is a custom that, when combined with the devastation generated by virtually unlimited modern weapons, Somali temperament, tribalism, and too many war-blunted consciences, got entirely beyond anyone’s control.

Add to this mix, dependency (or more accurately, co-dependency) on foreign aid and arms in exchange for Cold War strategic accommodation, in their turn, of Soviet and American vital interests. Also, prior to the Cold War, many decades of colonialization rights were purchased by Italy and Britain with weapons and economic packages. Somalis knew the arrangement, and have for a long time now seen aid as part of the deal made by foreigners for the right to rule and commercially exploit previously, and the right to base strategically there during the Cold War. Therefore, aid is perceived as a deal, a bargain in which both sides benefit for their own gain. Also, a not trivial complicating factor is the fact that many Somalis now take immediate and extreme exception to a perceived broken deal - which is always referred to as “a promise.”

It seems, though, that now after many generations of this arrangement, many Somalis are not accustomed to distinguishing the difference between aid as payment for rights and aid out of compassion. This clash of perception between Somalis and relief agencies/workers is extremely troublesome and often violent. Combine these factors with the nomadic instinct for fighting over scarce resources -- foreign aid being scarce by the time it sifted down and was parceled out to the loyal local chiefs or government
leaders at various government and military offices -- and aggressive dependency is well
cultivated.

In hindsight, I was probably generalizing to an extent, above, and under the
influence of my own paradigms, however, I think the point of conflicting perceptions is
made well enough.

There was/is plenty of cynical realpolitik and opportunists’ representation on both
the Somali and international intervention sides, but I think that for the most part, relief
aid officials and workers were genuinely certain that they were delivering compassionate
aid and many, if not most Somalis (as many repeatedly told me), were genuinely certain
that the UN and NGOs were obligated to deliver the aid due them and should quit trying
to restrict it (it did not help matters that UNOSOM II was spending the great bulk of its
roughly $1.2 billion budget on its own facilities and large numbers of personnel).

The paragraphs from Somalia Questions contain a number of facets relevant to
this discussion; first, on the matter of conflict of perceptions, or, as Kuhn would probably
put it, conflict of paradigms.

Wilmot and Hocker (1998, p. 34) define conflict as “an expressed struggle
between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce
resources, and interference from each other in achieving their goals.” Coser defines
conflict as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in
which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate the rivals” (Coser,
1967, p.8, as cited in Wilmot and Hocker, 1998, p.33). Rubin et al define conflict as the
“perceived divergence of interest or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously” (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994, p. 5).

I make three points here. First, that it appears that conflict is rife with clashes of paradigm and perception. Clashes of paradigm and perception may well be the driving force in many ethnic and identity conflicts. The second point is that even conflict theorists seem to utilize definitions of conflict that may not be cognizance of the kind of clash of “internalized” paradigms that Kuhn saw. Third, the definitions of Wilmot, Hocker, Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim imply a human realism perspective by utilizing a perception-based context, whereas Coser’s earlier definition implies a realpolitik-based perspective.

Coser does not explicitly mention a perception problem at all. Wilmot, Hocker, and Rubin take things a step further by specifying that conflict is perceived incompatible goals and perceived divergence of interests respectively. However, it is not clear by their definitions if the problem reflects a deeper internalized (subconscious) paradigm clash – it seems not.

Paradigms and Cultural Considerations

Specifically concerning culturally related paradigms, William Wilmot and Joyce Hocker (1998, p. 23) give clarify distinctions between High Context cultures and Low Context cultures. High Context cultures generally pertain to traditional cultures that are socially characterized by collectivism, i.e., Asia, Middle East, and Africa. Low Context cultures generally pertain to western cultures, i.e., Europe, America, and Australia.
Wilmot and Hocker list the associated characteristics of each group in terms of values, beliefs, and styles and how they believe each group would be expected to view and handle a particular problem. For example, a High Context culture would be expected to typically approach an intervention in an “indirect” manner with a “non-confrontational attitude,” whereas a Low Context culture would be expected to typically approach an intervention in a “direct” manner with a “confrontational attitude.”

Although, I believe there is a mixing of styles depending on circumstances, the point here is that cultural differences in conflict and conflict resolution are another area where, if the Track 1 or 2 official or intervenor is not sufficiently aware of them, trouble is not far off.

If, even current conflict theorists and analysts are not sufficiently cognizant of clash of paradigm significance, then I think it’s safe to say that a general lack of awareness of the problem by conflict parties and Track one and two officials in the field is a contributing factor to conflict-as-causes-and-conditions and conflict-as-challenged-relationships (conflict as process). This is especially true for officials and staff new to a conflict intervention environment, whether military or civilian.

Another perspective on cultural conflict is captured by the concept of ethnocentrism. Raymond Cohen focuses on negotiating across cultures but his points are fully relevant to any intervenor/conflict party engagement, which, often as not, is a negotiation of perceptions, regardless of the actual point of discussion (Cohen, 1996, 487-488):

A variety of factors clearly impinge on any negotiation, including system of government, individual psychology and belief, ideology, public
opinion, and misperception. … Culture is made up of meaning, conventions, and presuppositions, that is, the grammar that governs the creation and use of symbols and signs. It can also be thought of as the shared “common sense” or “local knowledge” underpinning a group’s construction of reality (Geertz 1983).

Kevin Avruch (1998) writes specifically on culture, conflict, and conflict resolution. Many of his points are directly relevant to this discussion: cultural paradigms, cultural theory, inadequate assumptions about culture, ethnocentrism, types of culture, culture and negotiation, culture and third party roles, individual culture, family culture, organizational culture, military culture, diplomacy culture, realism culture, and the variety of ways cultural misassumptions and misinterpretations can get us into trouble. I add humanitarian and peace and stability operation intervention cultures to the list.

Avruch specifies a number of common misassumptions -- “inadequate ideas” -- that people tend to have about the nature of culture (1998, p.14-16):

1. Culture is homogenous.
2. Culture is a thing.
3. Culture is uniformly distributed among members of a group.
4. An individual possesses but a single culture.
5. Culture is custom.
6. Culture is timeless.

Avruch goes on to warn of particular dangers associated with such misassumptions:

These six inadequate ideas about culture are related and mutually reinforcing. Using them, we argue, greatly diminishes the utility of the culture concept as an analytical tool for understanding social action, in this case, conflict and conflict resolution…culture is objectified by actors and used in politically charged – usually nationalistic, racialistic, or ethnic-discourses…As Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, and before them Nazi Germany all demonstrate, they are capable of provoking genocide (1998, p.16).
Relevant to the resolution or at least mitigation of conflict among intervenors, Avruch adds that “one strategy for conflict resolution immediately presents itself: the proactive deconstruction, in the sense of debunking or unmasking, of these inadequate ideas (p.16).” He further points out, while referring to disciplines such as international relations, that “older, dominant paradigms of the discipline -- realism and neorealism -- have silenced or misappropriated cultural accounts in striking ways (p.23).” In other words, “Any one of the major assumptions of realist thinking can render culture invisible” (p.28). I concur with Avruch’s conclusion that “In the end, we argue that in any sort of intercultural conflict resolution, a cultural analysis is an irreducible part of the problem-solving process” (p.74). This principle certainly applies to intervenor-conflict party conflict and intervenor internal conflict.

Overall, there are enough problems, challenges, and paradigm shifts for Track 1 and 2 officials to deal with without having to worry about further exacerbating escalation or intractability by inducing conflict and confusion among ourselves and with primary conflict parties.

What all of this means is that Track 1 and 2 officials, being subject to human inadequacies like everyone else, and who are exposed to a variety of difficult demands and/or threatening conflict environments, are subject to virtually all of the mental, physical, multi-level, multi-cultural, paradigm-perception generating complications that one can name, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD problems obviously apply to conflict parties as well:
-- Add to this, the challenge of operating within the differing paradigm worlds of realism and idealism.

-- Add to this, trying to keep up with a rapid shift from a comfortably known Westphalian nation-state world to a post-Westphalian, post-Cold War world in which conflicts are largely *intra-state* and the roles of governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations -- and of conflict parties themselves -- are blurred and changing.

-- Add to this, societal or trans-global groups that just don’t pay attention to any of the traditional rules.

**Primary Conflict – Intervention Conflict**

The post-Cold War situation includes tasks and problems decision-makers have to continue to deal with on the ground today. To better understand this it is necessary to distinguish more clearly the types of conflicts associated with humanitarian and peace operations. For this purpose, I distinguish two general types of conflict in the operating environment. I refer to the first type as *Primary Conflict: Those conflicts among conflict parties precipitating an international intervention*. A secondary type of conflict is *Intervention Conflict* in general, which in-turn can be divided into two sub-types: 

1) *Conflicts between intervenors and conflict parties*, and 2) *Conflicts among the intervenors* themselves (internal in-house conflict) generated in the course of the intervention.
All three types become highly inter-related and highly reactive to each other. I believe that intervention conflict is no small factor in frustrating primary conflict peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts on the ground.

Elaboration on the various definitions of peacemaking and peacebuilding, and their conversion with the literature, will be provided in Chapter 4, but for now, broad definitions specific to peace operations, as developed by Dave Davis of George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program, are as follows: Peacemaking – General peace operation decision-making and coordination involving diplomacy, international law (treaties), negotiation, mediation, fact finding, sanctions, and direction of country stabilization efforts by international military, police, and administration units in support of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding – a) Delivery of short-term humanitarian relief goods and services and, b) longer-term institutional rehabilitation and development involving good governance, infrastructure, economics, health care, return and return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the establishment of ongoing conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanisms; all in support of sustainable recovery and stability. Peace Support – Entails tasks generally carried out by military and international police units involving observation, use of force, liaison work, logistics, presence, security, and command and control.

The mention of various terms, of course, begs for definitions and I will elaborate on these in due course, but I need to be clear on something else first. My immediate intent is to highlight key issues involved in different types of conflict in order to make necessary overview linkages. Successful analysis of and progress in one type of conflict
is dependent on understanding the three types mentioned above (primary conflict, conflict between intervenors and conflict parties, conflict among intervenors) and their inter-relationships. Pointing out linkages between the three types of conflict will further facilitate understanding of various dynamics and aid in the development of mutually complementary solutions. There are issues and dynamics common to all three types, considering that basic human interaction is the common denominator. The risk of unconnected treatment is to contribute to continued cycles of mutual interference between primary conflicts and intervention conflicts, thereby frustrating both peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.

**Primary conflicts** are highly resistant to the use of force, or to mediation and negotiation diplomacy by nation-states and the United Nations (UN), based on the very high resurgence rate (31 out of 39 in the last 10 years: Hewitt, et al, 2010). This problem is compounded by intervention conflict. Some factors common to these types of conflicts are conflicting self-interests or conflicting or otherwise problematic mandates, policies, coordination, training, conflict resolution approaches, external pressures, cultural differences, perception-paradigm differences, and basic personality clashes. Personality clashes are no small factor.

I will focus on primary conflict first followed by a discussion of intervention conflict. Connections between the two will be pointed out. The conflict elements listed above and associated explanations here are not exhaustive but should indicate more realistically the life of an intervention in real terms on the ground.
I doubt that peacemaking has ever been easy. It involves different actors with different agendas, different backgrounds, different worldviews, different pressures and, subsequently, different ideas as to how to respond to conflict. Add to this state of affairs the many complexities injected into the equation by close encounters of unprepared populations with each other around the world, as a consequence of globalization and technology. Add to this, the numerous conflicts around the world given life by the lifting of U.S. / Soviet Cold-War geo-political suppression of various populations intent on self-determination or local supremacy.

This presents a quite complicated challenge for peacemaking. Now add societal stresses, new regionalized and local adversarial competition over resources and power, society or state survival, various states of unknowing and uncertainty associated with that survival, diverse political, social and economic assumptions; global economic and environmental pressures, personal survival and subsequent mental and emotional strains with attending dysfunctionalities. Add the deeper complexities of human nature -- the human psyche, emotions, instincts -- the psychological and physiological -- and a need for meaning. In short, we (humanity) find ourselves unexpectedly face to face with each other with all our shortcomings in a tightly wound world, in an adversarial based system, with minimal understanding of our conflicts or reactions, and a minimal sense of practical ways for coping constructively with each other over differences. These phenomena are concentrated and pressurized in a peace and stability intervention scenario.

Something else -- there have been conflicts and various societal stresses for a very long time, however, until recently we were able to take turns in being isolated from each
other in terms of total global impact. That is no longer true. Technology, population growth, massive population movements, global environmental impacts, and political and economic interdependence are now such that a thump on one side of our world will, with certainty, reverberate to the other side and back again in the blink of an Internet eye. Few escape some manner of impact, be it large or small. This is where peacemaking takes place today. Consequently, peacemaking and peacebuilding in today’s more complex global environment require commensurately more sophisticated understandings and solutions to have significant impact, that is to say, help us get beyond temporary fixes or mere delaying tactics in dealing with each other – as individuals, families, groups, organizations, nations, and as humanity.

Having an initial understanding of The Problem under study and important broader contextual factors now leads to construction of a framework to guide my logic of inquiry towards an overall field-research design.

**In-House Conflict**

Vasquez’s description of conflict escalation driven by rivalry among primary conflict parties (cited in my Primary Conflict Section), can also easily describe many interactions and dynamics among international community entities on almost any given day.

Just to drive the point home (and closer to home), Track 1 and 2 officials are members of organizations, and as such are subject to the stresses and strain of a simple reality – internal organizational conflict -- in addition to the already complicated field
environment described above. Since much of organizational conflict revolves around workplace interpersonal conflict, I include an observation here by Kenneth Kaye, 1994, p. 1):

No organization is so excellent, no team so unified, no business so successful that it is immune to internal conflict. Misunderstandings arise. Personalities clash. Petty irritations mount. If no one stands up to the natural course of human emotions, bitter infighting and backstabbing erupt. People battle openly for turf or refuse to communicate at all. In the worst cases, mutual distrust can deteriorate to verbal abuse or even a fistfight, like the widely publicized brawl among the four principal family heirs of U-Haul Corporation at that public company’s annual meeting. Less dramatic but no less destructive are the issues that stay underground, manifested only in poor teamwork. “We don’t have real conflict,” one CEO said, “but I can’t get our people to work together.”

That is real conflict.

I think it’s safe to say that negative (hostile) rivalry of any kind negatively impacts interventions, including the problem of simply not being able to work together as pointed out above. I cannot count the number of times that I have noticed interpersonal, interagency, and intergovernmental activities somehow negatively impacted by competition-driven or personality driven negative rivalry. Personality-clashes and stress-based clashes are a significant issue in undermining maximum mission performance. In Afghanistan, the personality-clash/stress issue is serious to the point of being a known mission-wide problem. Another significant problem is that, often, agencies and NGOs try to perform tasks that they are not trained for or structured to take on. I have little doubt that such is an insidious a factor in conflict escalation.

Pamela Aall (1996, p.v) of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), makes an observation relevant to this point:
New roles for NGOs: While NGOs cannot be expected to solve all the problems associated with humanitarian crises, the new environment in which these organizations operate suggests the following four fundamental roles: early warning functions, human rights monitoring, relief and rehabilitation, and conflict resolution activities. Yet it may be detrimental for NGOs to assume all these roles simultaneously.

David Smock (1996, p. 1), also of the USIP, reports on a recent conference held on humanitarian assistance and conflict in Africa. A central question of the conference was “Is humanitarian assistance part of the problem?”:

While the international community increasingly recognizes and appreciates the value of the effort, some analysts have begun to assert that humanitarian assistance on occasion exacerbates conflict rather than contributing to peace. No one questions that the value of this assistance far outweighs its occasional negative consequences, but members of the assistance community find it necessary nevertheless to address the issue these analysts have raised. They want to assess the extent of the damage and consider how to eliminate or minimize these negative consequences.

In my observation, the sentiments expressed by Aall and Smock apply to all mission areas and countries, although, the training of local nationals to run local-counterpart humanitarian and civil sector NGOs is helpful in mitigating some of the worst consequences, and puts pressure on local and national governments to take more responsibility in looking after the welfare of their citizens.

Security and Sovereignty

Further complexities and constraints to solution finding are the inter-related issues of security, already discussed to some extent, sovereignty, and human rights. Adam Roberts offers a relevant comment on security and protection in his paper *Humanitarian*...
Action in War, which in turn leads us into the hotly debated issue of sovereignty (Roberts, 1996):

The central argument of this paper is that a failure to develop serious policies regarding the security of humanitarian action, and of affected peoples and areas, has been the principle cause of the setbacks of humanitarian action in the 1990s. Such security issues, the inherent difficulties of which are undeniable, have been handled repeatedly in a short-term and half-hearted manner, often with elements of dishonesty and buck-passing. A particular difficulty in discussing the question of protection is that, in some legal parlance which is reflected in that of many aid organizations, ‘protection’ refers not to the provision of physical security, but to efforts (for example, by Red Cross personnel) to establish and maintain a special legal status for protected persons, such as civilians and prisoners of war (POWs). Constructive thinking about security is also not assisted by the tradition, in itself honourable, of associating humanitarian action with impartiality and neutrality: sometimes the provision of security may necessitate departure from these principles (p. 9).

Concerning the mix of security (read as insecurity), sovereignty, and human rights, the international community, as well as indigenous persons, has felt compelled to do something about the gross violations of human rights occurring on a massive scale in many conflicts. The question of unconditionally respecting the national sovereignty (read as non-interference) of all states by other states -- a jealously guarded realpolitik right -- is increasingly losing its hold due to concern for the security and basic human rights of vulnerable populations. Mayote (1992, p. 303) observes that, “The question of national sovereignty and human rights will grow larger as more civilians become internally displaced victims of the wars.” Internally displaced persons (IDPs) outnumbered refugees worldwide for the first time in the mid-1990s.
Somalia, a violent situation of biblical proportions, is now -- despite its failure -- a classic case of intervention beyond sovereignty in the cause of security, protection, and human rights. The failure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to bring about a political settlement was due to many reasons, however, to be fair to UNOSOM II, an environment in which the population is under the severe strain of civil war and lawlessness is not a readily accommodating one.

United Nations conflict management and resolution capacity is constrained by strong external pressures and the same realpolitik (self-imposed) limitations as with all nation states with respect to the wider range of positive peace process options that could be helpful. An additional security issue was, for example, that the military force arrangement in Somalia consisted of about 28,000 military personnel and 2,800 international police and civilian from 30 contributing countries (www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/mission/unosom2.htm) with their own external pressures and agendas. Although it is understandable and laudable to convene the forces of many nations as a symbol of solidarity of purpose, the arrangement is simultaneously unwieldy in terms of coordination, efficiency, and single mindedness of purpose.

Such a large number of contingents simultaneously present often proves to be unwieldy and can, in fact, undermine the accomplishment of mission objectives on the ground.

UNOSOM II exercised conventional realpolitik military coercion and political mediation/negotiation with Somali factions and warlords in efforts to get a political settlement and, therefore, achieve stability, by which to carry out the reconstruction of the
civil society and infrastructure (nation building). Relying largely on military or political means in ethnic/clan/religious/racial conflicts for mitigation or resolution, such as in Somalia and Bosnia, however, has not been very effective.

Having a near exclusive focus on getting a political settlement between conflicting parties in such situations (while simultaneously assuming their cooperation and consent regarding an international presence and goals), can reinforce negative intervenor/conflict party cycles and offers nothing new to the situation; except perhaps to add a new party to the conflict -- the intervening force.

To its credit, UNOSOM II did stop the famine and created some temporary stability, but the core problems that led to the violence have not been addressed. Nevertheless, many Somalis seek healing and reconciliation. In 1995, the Somali Joint Peace Committee, made up of different clans and officially charged with coming up with steps for national reconciliation, was sponsoring an all clan clean-up project in Mogadishu. A chief and member of the committee instructed a Somali with whom I was working, that, as he supervised the volunteers, to “teach them peace, because they are ill inside and need hope.”

I think that this chief knew where much of the problem resided. And, he knew a treatment. A simple lesson learned here is that interventions should “teach peace” in the sense that positive peace processes have been known to get at -- That is to say, personal and relationship transformation in conflict circumstances. Getting a quick political settlement and providing technical assistance is not enough. Some individuals in UNOSOM II tried to address illness and teach peace and, consequently, did touch on a
core element of the conflict. I believe that, for those willing to listen, some broader understanding, some feeling of hope did occur that did, or will, somehow manifest itself.

**Balance of Peace Enforcement and Peacebuilding**

UNOSOM II had a police action / humanitarian mandate, but until nearly the end of the mission, often declined to use necessary force to protect UN life and property (much less Somali life and property). UN military escorts, providing “protection” for convoys containing 10 to 100 or more vehicles, would routinely lay down their arms when confronted by a handful of young militiamen who had put some rocks in the road, shot a few rounds in the air, and demanded surrender. In these circumstances, the kids / militiamen / bandits would take as many vehicles, weapons, and cargo as they could physically manage. This happened on a number of occasions.

These practices had a direct consequence of an ever-increasing harassment of, threats against, and excessive demands on, UN personnel; and boldness of attacks on UN convoys, personnel, and compounds as time went on. The no-resistance interpretation of the UN intervention mandate eventually culminated in the armed invasion of the UN compounds in Belet Weyne and Merka, the taking of hostages, and the attack on the military escorted humanitarian aid convoy to Baidoa in which 9 UN peacekeeping soldiers were killed and 19 wounded. There were a significant number of such incidents.

UNOSOM II’s chosen interpretation of its “use of all necessary means” mandate was don’t fire unless fired upon. So, militiamen/thieves would simply shout “stop, lay down your weapons” fire a few rounds in the air and then aim their weapons at the
soldiers but not (until later on anyway) shoot at them. The soldiers, therefore, not having been fired on, would take no measure to resist.

On one occasion, a routine military escorted bus convoy full of UN international staff and local Somali UN staff was proceeding from the embassy compound in Mogadishu to the airport. They were confronted by several men with guns who demanded that the convoy stop, which it did. The gunmen then boarded the buses and took every local UN employee off. The military escort offered no resistance and left without its local-employee passengers.

The most fundamental principle of police presence is to use necessary force to protect life and property when needed. What police force is going to be able to protect anyone when it simply drops it hands to its side every time it is confronted or threatened? It appears to me that firm resistance is required in certain situations – and consistently, otherwise, there is no point in having a police force anywhere; there is no point in putting a peace and stability operation into a lawless state.

I am of the view that some of UNOSOM II’s timidity, driven by the goal of minimum confrontation in the interest of keeping troop loss at an absolute minimum, came as a result of the failed attempt to handle the situation with the failed military tactical attempt to capture General Aideed. The deadly consequences for the UN and US forces by the action, was not just the result of ill-advised tactics. It was also due to the absence of a strategically and thoughtfully constructed and coordinated effort in which the protection skills of military and police units and the expertise of trained conflict
management and resolution professionals are combined and brought to bear on the problem.

To become completely passive in the midst of lawless militias, warlords, and bandits is vigorously inviting abuse and ineffectiveness. To surge ahead with military force, minus an informed and informing conflict prevention, management, and resolution counterpart is inviting equally unfortunate ineffectiveness, if not tragedy.

Another reason for some of the difficulties that the UN and individual governments experience -- then and now -- is that most governmental officials are trained in realpolitik-based disciplines (international affairs, political science, political diplomacy, law) - realpolitik expression of power. The primary focus is on the utilization and promotion of realpolitik methods of persuasion and instruction to get conflict parties and factions to a political settlement. These are concepts that many conflict factions are already fully conversant in, and which allow some conflict parties to teach their intervenors a few things about realpolitik in terms of brinksmanship. For example, involving the instance of UNPROFOR declaring “safe areas” in Bosnia but not protecting them when it came to the test, which, in turn, led to over running of the safe areas by Serb forces and the execution of thousands of innocent civilians, and led to rescinding the UN policy of using force without the consent of all Bosnian conflict parties -- specifically the consent of Serb leaders. More will be said in Chapter 5 about such dynamics along with details on the Bosnia case.
An effective balance has to be found between the judicious use of protective force, political restructuring, and the application of conflict prevention, management, and resolution processes in the pursuit of positive peace.

The tragic experience of the UN in Bosnia (the massacre of thousands of civilians in UN “safe areas”) also reflects ambivalent will and purpose as well as underdeveloped conflict management and resolution capability. Again, the need is to strike a well-considered balance between the application of positive peace processes, political restructuring, and the use of necessary force to protect life and property when needed in the interim.

Peace operations are very complex undertakings, considering current international humanitarian imperatives, precarious operating environments, and the intractability of many of today’s intra-state conflicts. Another factor in this complexity is that, not unlike military force, relief can also be a blunt instrument -- and one which should be used carefully.

Such are some of the very hard lessons learned in Bosnia, Somalia, and elsewhere. Landgren describes the peacekeeping mission’s experience in Bosnia this way: “UNPROFOR in Bosnia was held to normal peace-keeping rules of engagement, that is, to use force in self-defense. The Security Council chose to assume the consent and co-operation of the parties, notwithstanding what the Secretary-General later described as their lamentable record in this respect” (Landgren, 1995, p.447).
**Politicization**

As if all of the above is not complicated enough, things become more complicated when adding the externality of *politicization*:

Humanitarian assistance has become the West’s favored response to political crisis beyond its borders. Largely through agreements with warring parties, the ability of NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid has grown considerably. It is difficult to discuss relief, however, without mentioning how the concept of development has changed. Through so-called continuum thinking, both are inter-linked within the new aid paradigm. The response of aid agencies has been to redefine earlier developmental goals to accommodate global polarization (Duffield, 1997, p.529).

I would adjust Duffield’s last sentence to read “to accommodate *global fragmentation* and *local polarization*” to be consistent with our post-Cold War multipolar world in which local (*intra-state*) conflicts are predominant.

Minear adds: ‘It is not simply that the UN’s humanitarian efforts have become politicized,’ observed a senior UNHCR official ruefully in late 1993, ‘it is rather that we’ve been transformed into the only manifestation of international political will.’ (Minear, Foreign Policy Association, 1995, p.40).

In practical terms, what politicization of relief aid means for vulnerable groups, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons, is that it will take much longer for their respective homelands to recover from conflict since resources for post-conflict reconstruction programs will be largely channeled into temporary (or not so temporary) relief situations which necessarily reduces resources for reconstruction and development.

Near sole focus on relief aid as international policy (politicization) also means that there is no assurance of sustainable recovery if ongoing peacemaking and
peacebuilding efforts that systemically address root causes (by those trained to do it) and conditions are not incorporated into overall intervention planning.

Minear continues: "Many humanitarian groups throughout the crises (Yugoslavia) have appealed to governments to address the underlying causes of the mayhem, which they term ‘a humanitarian problem without a humanitarian solution” (Minear, FPA, 1995, p. 40).

**Coordination**

Regarding coordination among actors, in particular nation states, it is essential and sometimes critical when it involves sensitive matters in volatile situations where property and lives are at stake. However, as Groom and Taylor express the concept (1990, p. 21), cooperation, especially at the international level, is necessary but conditional on principles of independence and sovereignty. In other words, everyone is entitled to (and often does) refuse to cooperate based on their own interests and needs; this applies to intervenors and conflict parties alike. Cooperation and coordination naturally have decisive implications and impact on intervention efforts within humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

A relevant project is being constructed by Dave Davis at George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP), located in the School of Public Policy. Davis has developed a task overview and coordination model for peacekeeping operations. The POPP’s *Conceptual Model of Peace Operations* (CMPO) “is an information model containing process, functions, tasks, relationships and performing
organizations within the domain of Peace Operations. The model is constructed in a relational data base with a graphical interface.” It encompasses peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace support. The “tasks represent functions that can be assigned to organizations and accomplished on the ground (CMPO Information Sheet, 1998).

**Training as Clash of Paradigms Preventive Diplomacy**

I should mention here that there is little treatment of clash of perceptions and paradigms in the conflict resolution literature, so it seems to me that even current conflict theorists and analysts are not sufficiently cognizant of the significance and consequences of clash of paradigm. I think it is safe to say that a general lack of awareness of the problem by conflict parties, aid providers, decision makers, and intervenors (including track one and two officials) is a contributing factor to the causes and conditions of conflict – certainly, it can be argued that it is an exacerbating factor. Points relevant to this topic are made is subsequent chapters.

**CONCLUSION**

In addition to the well-known conflicts among parties to interstate war, intra-state war, or other major social disturbance, conflict - to some degree - seems to be endemic to many of the **interactions within the international community**, as is reflected in policy, interests, and “personality” clashes within and among governments. Such conflict phenomena continues on to organizational headquarters and field offices in relation to interventions, peace operations, provision of aid, security risks, or any other issue one can
name. This is no small factor in trying to get something accomplished on the ground under already difficult circumstances.

Other activities involving some manner of conflict interaction are included in situation reports, field assessments, coordination, planning, and implementation of programs and operations in conflicted environments.

Officials and staff, particularly those in conflict areas, routinely engage in a multitude of interactions that necessitate formal or informal, official or unofficial negotiation, mediation, or facilitation of some kind, although such might not be the stated objective in a given instance given political sensitivities. It is the nature of the business. However, relatively few intervenors have had formal education or training specific to such interactions (old school or new school), which I suggest is an overall problem of interventions, official and otherwise.

The application of carefully guided positive peace processes to intervenor-conflict party conflict, or to intervenor internal conflict has the potential to contribute to the improvement of circumstances for all concerned, not least, vulnerable populations.

An expected side benefit of the use of positive peace processes in intervention conflict would be the generation of greater awareness of conflict dynamics and conflict prevention, management, and resolution possibilities on the part of the international community and conflict parties. Additionally, the effort would likely generate a greater consciousness about and respect for basic human rights principles at all levels.

My belief is that the increased effectiveness of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace support, sometimes calls for well-judged use of protective force, political
restructuring, and simultaneously coordinated and informed conflict prevention, management, and resolution initiatives. This is necessary to get at the many complexities and constraints impacting humanitarian and peace operations.

I also believe that many of the same positive peace processes utilized to improve primary conflict situations could be helpful in alleviating intervenor-conflict party conflict and intervenor internal conflict. This takes into consideration that positive peace principles directed towards human interactions have a universal multilevel application with, of course, adjustments being made for local circumstances and cultural requirements (in its many meanings). This principle applies to peace operations, international organizations, primary conflict parties, and other associated participants.

Chapter 2 looked elaborated on paradigm and perception dynamics, and on-the-ground situational factors such as the different types of conflicts associated with the conflict parties and intervention-related conflicts. The key intervention issues of Security and Sovereignty, Balance of Peace Enforcement and Peacebuilding, Politicization of Programs, Mission Coordination, and Training as Clash of Paradigms Prevention were discussed.

Upcoming Chapter 3 describes the linkage between my literature review process and working out a logic-of-inquiry to address The Problem under examination. There was not a pre-existing methodology for assessing peace and stability interventions in negative and positive peace terms and so an exploratory process was needed to derive the needed multi-level, multi-sector composite theoretical frameworks to continue the study.
Chapter 3: Framework Construction and the Literature

Chapter 3 discusses important conflict, and conflict resolution theory, and dynamics taken into consideration in the construction of the framework(s) and analytical modeling needed for examining The Problem in question and carrying out the study. Key concepts, in conflict analysis and resolution terms, included are Schools of Thought, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Stages of Conflict, Nested Paradigm Determination, Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels, and Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection. To better ensure that the analytical frameworks I have constructed are, in the end, in congruence with sound conflict analysis and resolution theory and practice, I introduce Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality concept and Three Pillar Approach framework by which I perform a conceptual cross-check in Chapter 9.

The framework of this study is premised on the notion that negative and positive peace, and conflict transformation, a contemporary concept often cited by intervenors in peace and stability operation discussions, are viable and useful concepts for analyzing a peace and stability operation and environment that has stalled in mission accomplishment somewhere between initiation of stability tasks and the condition of no longer being needed. That is to say, a peace and stability operation is no longer needed to support
stabilization and reconstruction efforts towards achievement of self-sustaining positive peace – the apparent ultimate challenge.

Considerable discussion of the theoretical nature of negative and positive peace is undertaken in this study and linkages made to presumptive positive peace intended activities such as good governance, security, rule-of-law, legitimate economic viability, and social well-being. These core activity sectors, or variations thereof, constitute key peace and stability framework sectors commonly cited by international intervenors and advisors. To this list, I add constructive conflict - interaction across otherwise violent societal divides as a cross-cutting positive peace qualifier (Constructive conflict will be discussed later). The intervention environment I speak of entails the conflict(s), the population and leadership in the country or mission area and associated elements and dynamics occurring within the five activity sectors, licit or illicit. Additionally, current and historic local, regional and global influences and strategic context are important factors as is available resources and political will on the part of all concerned.

To qualify another point here, the terms peace and stability intervention, and peace and stability operation can be used interchangeably but only to a certain point. There are and have been many types of interventions, for example, diplomatic initiatives, goodwill gestures, and economic support and cooperation on the lighter side of intervention. Somewhere in the middle are political and economic sanctions and peacekeeper observer missions. Military intervention-based stabilization and peace enforcement missions/occupations are on the heavy end of the spectrum. A light intervention (beyond ongoing traditional diplomatic and development cooperation) might
include a relatively small operational contingent of specialized political, administrative, police, military, and development advisors and projects – some discrete as it were.

On the heavy end of the intervention spectrum, there is stabilization, sometimes referred to as peace enforcement or peace support, which is typically thought of as an operation. Implicit in stabilization is mandated unilateral or multilateral peace settlement (a negotiated or imposed political settlement) and peace enforcement responsibility for major field operational units (usually in response to a complex emergency situation) to subdue drivers of conflict, establish security, return refugees and internally displaced persons, and carry out reconstruction (or construction) of legitimate state institutions and infrastructure, as well as to establish mechanisms for a normal, functioning civil society, a legitimate economy, and transparent representative government. Such interventions usually entail major injections of governance, security, rule of law, economic, and social welfare expertise and resources. More will be said about this in Chapter 4 – Literature Review.

Generally, it is the heavier end of the intervention spectrum that I have in mind when addressing The Problem. But, the framework and model I have constructed are elastic enough, I believe, that the status of key intervention and environment elements and dynamics can be usefully considered whether the status reading is taken sooner or later in an intervention, or the intervention response is comprehensive or limited. Getting a valid status reading of elements during overt hostilities is possible to a degree but would likely be localized and limited in scope. This is yet to be determined but, conceptually, it could be useful in picking up trends or a mid-term status indication.
What does this analytical approach actually get a reading of? An intervention affects the environment it operates in and, likewise, the environment affects intervention decisions and dynamics. I posed particular survey questions to international intervenors and Bosnian nationals in Bosnia-Herzegovina to probe for responses specific to the intervention and the intervention environment. Thus, responses have been obtained that are revealing of both the intervention and the intervention environment as per the stated perspectives of intervenors and primary conflict group members.

My research design employs exploratory and abduction theory utilizing basic descriptive statistical analysis with quantitative data, and content analysis with qualitative data (see Chapter 6). I develop a composite framework and model, and accompanying graphics and data collection and data analysis instruments in an attempt to analyze, in negative and positive peace terms, elements and dynamics associated with a peace and stability intervention and environment. I adapt and utilize within my composite framework the five activity sectors mentioned above as identified by a US/USIP “Interagency Metrics Framework for Measuring Conflict Transformation and Stabilization” in connection with stabilization and reconstruction planning. Utilizing these tools, I identify the current perceived status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation in a peace and stability intervention environment – Bosnia-Herzegovina in this instance.

My composite model graphically illustrates the status of elements:

- within five primary function/activity sectors (Governance, Security, Rule of Law, the Economy, and Social Well Being);
• in relation to inferred placement within a War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum; and,

• in relation to inferred parameters of negative and positive peace.

The model enables the collection of data through a seven point Likert-type survey instrument administered by myself in person in Bosnia-Herzegovina in conjunction with structured-format interviews with 50 international intervenors and 50 Bosnian nationals from various levels of public and private life. The data reflects the perceived status of current structural and relational elements related to the devastating ethno-political conflict and subsequent intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Citing the Bosnian case, I introduce pertinent terms, concepts, situation descriptions, literature, research questions, models, research objectives, and a research design for: Examining The Problem, collecting data, conducting analysis, and addressing implications for peace and stability operations and environments, and further research, theory, and practice.

My War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model illustrates a full range of key intervention and intervention environment thresholds and dynamics. As mentioned earlier, the intervention and associated intervention environment are assessed within the same analytical framework and are, therefore, assessed according to the same elemental structure; in this case, the five primary activity sectors identified earlier: Governance, Security, Rule of Law, The Economy, and Social Welfare. All elements are further broken down and categorized as structural or relational elements. The resulting
survey and interview data means are graphically illustrated and notionally placed in relation to the War-to-Sustained Positive Peace Continuum Model for context discussion purposes. This constitutes the composite analytical framework and model. Further description follows in Chapter 6 – Research Design.

In order to accommodate a stand-alone chapter on framework construction, I list again below the primary frameworks that I draw on in the construction of my overall, composite multilevel framework:

1) Johan Galtung’s concepts of Negative and Positive Peace, which encompass his Structural and Cultural Violence (indirect violence) and Personal Violence (direct violence);

2) Conflict Transformation concepts as defined differently by Track 1 officials and Track 2 scholar-practitioners;


4) Basic peace and stability operation models by Dave Davis, myself, and others;

5) Dennis Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality, and Three Pillar Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution; and

6) My own Comprehensive Multilevel Framework.

Negative peace and positive peace, in association with a peace and stability operation, were under-researched topics in need of a starting-point framework and model;
consequently, I initiated my basic framework construction, and subsequent research design, by posing the following **Primary Research Question**: *How can the status of negative and positive peace in a peace and stability intervention environment be assessed?* In addressing this question, I utilize Galtung’s concepts of structural and cultural violence, but I depart from his original definitions of negative and positive peace in order to capture complexities specific to peace and stability operations and environments. Also, I incorporate other directly relevant concepts into my overall composite analytical framework, such as fragile peace, viable peace, sustainable peace, assisted stability, among others.

One of the complexities of this study is differing definitions of *conflict transformation*. Early on in my literature review aimed at addressing The Problem and the Primary Research Question, and based on my years of work as a professional field officer in peace and stability operations, it became clear to me that there is an important related and implicit dynamic at work here. There is a conceptual dichotomy, generally speaking, between Track 1 (governmental) and Track 2 and beyond (non-governmental) opinion as to what constitutes conflict transformation - a term often used by Track 1 and Track 2 intervenors and authors in discussing peace and stability operation objectives. Various definitions of conflict transformation are detailed in my Intervention Conceptual Dichotomy section of Chapter 4. In other words, there is an important difference of opinion as to what conflict transformation means in a peace and stability operation context and, therefore, significantly, a fundamental difference of opinion as to what constitutes peace, peacebuilding, and a subsequent mission-accomplished status.
Since conflict transformation is often cited as a primary goal of an international intervention, differing perceptions of conflict transformation necessarily present significant implications for peace and stability operations and associated environments and, in turn, any study of peacebuilding elements, including negative and positive peace. Consequently, I chose conflict transformation as the primary conceptual means by which to deconstruct a peace and stability intervention environment into assessable elements, and to probe for negative and positive peace notional indications.

Also concerning conflict transformation efforts in a peace and stability intervention, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, both a structural “minimalist” approach (typically basic Track 1 institutional and reconstruction tasks) and a human relational “maximalist” approach (typically Track 2 tasks involving work on dealing with root causes of conflict and personal and relationship transformation) are pursued simultaneously and, often, independently (see Chapters 4 and 8 for elaboration on the paring of structural with minimalist and relational with maximalist approaches). Although there is some overlap of opinion on the part of Track 1 and Track 2 actors, the preponderance of implementation, policy, and funding weight is on the structural side - that is to say, on physical and institutional reconstruction (or construction) and management at the expense of methodical constructive human-interaction development, which also might be deemed constructive conflict by Kriesberg (1998, and 2012 et al), or provention as envisioned by John Burton (1990b), or a public peace process as outlined by Harold Saunders (1999). The matter of a structural or relational approach to
peacebuilding, or combination thereof, has significant implications for intervention scenarios and outcomes and will be discussed later.

Acknowledging the structural-relational divide embedded in an overall mission aim of conflict transformation, and in an effort to better get at an answer to the Primary Research Question (How can the status of negative and positive peace be assessed?), I inserted an underlying question into the basic framework construction that proceeds the Primary Research Question. I refer to it as the Preliminary Research Question: How can the status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation yield peace and stability operation environment indicators that can be associated with parameters of negative and positive peace?

To clarify further, the purpose of asking the Preliminary Research Question is to identify and illustrate the nature and placement of structural and relational elements in key peace and stability intervention activity sectors, which in turn can be notionally associated with broader intervention/intervention-environment dynamics including negative and positive peace. In other words, addressing the Preliminary Research Question yields deconstructed peace and stability intervention and intervention environment elements, which facilitate addressing the Primary Research Question. And so, the basic framework construction and research design consist of a distinct two-stage process. The Preliminary Question stage identifies the status of intervention and intervention-environment structural and relational elements. The subsequent Primary Research Question stage can then build on the resulting data yielding an overall composite framework and model indicating the status of key intervention and
intervention-environment elements, and enabling notional associations of those elements with other important dynamics and negative and positive peace parameters.

Subsequently, considering The Problem, and asking the Preliminary and Primary Research Questions, led to my **Enabling Research Objective** mentioned previously:

To establish a framework and model by which to discern the elements and dynamics of a peace and stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace, and by which to explore parameters of sustainable positive peace.

The Problem, the Preliminary Research Question, the Primary Research Question, and the Enabling Research Objective all inform construction of my survey and interview data collection instruments, and eventually my War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model.

**ANALYTICAL MODELING**

Now, I arrive at an important framework construction juncture. The paradigm clash mentioned earlier, between intervenors and conflict parties, has significant implications for intervention analysis, planning, and decision making. My distinguishing of different analytical frameworks and models in this section is intended to aid in increasing awareness of paradigm clash issues as well as furthering my framework construction process.
Models coming from the broader field of conflict resolution and from peace and stability operation theorists and planners tend to be conflict models or intervention models. Peace and stability intervenors routinely use intervention models in planning and executing operations but relatively few are familiar with conflict theory or conflict models. On the other hand, Track 2 theorists-scholars tend to have a much better understanding of conflict dynamics, but less of understanding of intervention realities. There are Track 1 and Track 2 scholar-practitioners and authors who strive to capture conflict and intervention elements, inclusive of level indications (local/group, state, national, international, etc.), in a comprehensive multi-level framework. My models are aimed at comprehensive, multilevel utility. However, I rely on the work of others who have come before me to fill-in gaps in my own research and to further expand that work.

**Schools of Thought**

There are a myriad of approaches put forth in recent decades for understanding and modeling conflict and intervention. And, to complicate things, often, different terms are used to describe essentially the same phenomenon, or the same term is used to describe different things. Although the situation is not of chaotic proportions, it does make keeping things neatly separated and distinguishable a challenge. There is considerable overlap and blurring of lines among conceptual presentations.

However, the overall discourse of conflict and intervention seems to break down into two general schools of thought. First, there is the familiar nation-state traditional *realpolitik school of thought* (geopolitical diplomacy), which largely adheres to power-
oriented, position-based mediation or negotiation processes. And second, there is the more recent interactive-collaborative school of thought exemplified by the innovative thinking of John Burton’s pioneering work as described this way by Ron Fisher:

Burton’s work has contributed to the pluralist perspective in international relations and to a proposed paradigm shift from power-based political realism to needs-based functionalism and behavioral realism (Fisher, 1997, p.35).

The relatively recent collaborative peacebuilding school of thought is still a work in progress and a still evolving wholistic orientation, broadly speaking, in which the intervenor’s approach (mediator or facilitator) is still debated, that is to say, whether to be classically neutral or not. Burton describes it this way:

There is revealed here a sharp division between those, on the one hand, who regard intervention as being within a “democratic” framework in which the mediator has no more than a process role, and who warn against any positive role by a third party and those, on the other, who regard the role of the third party as being an active participatory one over and above any process role (Burton, 1990, p.153).

Nevertheless, the overall sum of discourse, old and new, seems to break down into the two general schools of thought. First, there is the more familiar post-Westphalia nation-state school of political diplomacy, which largely adheres to power-oriented, position-based negotiation or mediation conventions (in keeping with Morgenthau’s (1948) Realpolitik description. Second, there is the more recent collaborative-interactive oriented school of thought exemplified by the innovative thinking of John Burton and Ron Fisher. Fisher’s book, Interactive Conflict Resolution (1997), serves as a kind of historical record of the evolution of the current field of Conflict Resolution.
I take particular note of Fisher’s term *behavioral realism*. The meaning implied is the essence of *human realism*. But perhaps the term is a little more susceptible to misinterpretation by persons trained in realpolitik principles who might assume that they already understand behavior very well; that is, that human beings are incorrigible lethal competitors -- hence, to take preemptive precautions, or to strike first, is the only option.

A great deal can be said here about the evolution from a realpolitik viewpoint to the still very much evolving multi-dimensional interactive conflict resolution-oriented viewpoint and approach. A key principle now being discussed within the newer conflict resolution school seems to represent a kind of halfway point in its evolution and centers around the exact role of the third party as an intervenor. Burton, as just described above, shared his view of the “sharp division” in the debate. In other words, in the opinion of some, the third party mediator role should be strictly neutral, imposing no influence on the deliberations of the conflict parties, even if, say, a very disproportionate power and capacity imbalance exists in favor of one of the parties, and the stronger party takes full advantage of the imbalance to intimidate or trick the weaker party into accepting unfavorable terms and possibly unsustainable conditions.

The argument of others is just the opposite; that the third party mediator is morally and professionally obligated to be openly “impartial,” and persuade the stronger party that it is in their interest to ensure that the weaker party gets an equitable agreement or, strictly thinking in practical terms, the conflict will inevitably resurface again and things will probably be worse next time.
So, the rationale is that it is in fact in the stronger party’s interest to ensure that
the weaker party receives a sufficiently fair process and satisfaction. James Laue
expressed particular concern about the power imbalance question:

Always major issues on the intellectual side to me are power and co-
optation. From the very earliest days of the field [of conflict resolution]
the concern has been that persons who wish to promote the status quo
might only see this as a little softer way of trying to get what they want.
We have some data, particularly from environmental mediation, that
suggest that this might be true (Laue, 1987).

The jury seems to still be out on this particular issue. Nevertheless, there seems
to be an across-the-board consensus within the conflict resolution field that the third
party’s role, at minimum, should be one of assisting the conflict parties in engaging each
other in more direct discussion about their respective perceptions, concerns, underlying
interests and needs -- as opposed to simply stating initial bargaining positions and start
hammering away at each other, after the realpolitik hardball fashion, and leave it at that.

Another point of debate within the field of conflict resolution is the argument of
structural change vs. relationship change to get at resolution. That is to say that genuine
resolution of intractable, deep-rooted conflict is a matter of restructuring inherently unjust
systems that thwart fair access and distribution vs. changing destructive relationships that
are inherent in such systems. This discussion was well captured by the Burton-Laue
“debate” with Burton on the side of the structural change focus, and Laue on the side of
the relationship change focus (Rubenstein, 1999). My approach is simply to respond to
the need at hand when and where possible, structurally and relationally -- a simultaneous
or successive “contingency” application.
Also, in the past two to three decades there has been an explosion of intergovernmental (Track 1.5) and non-governmental organizations (Track 2+) that take interest in, and sometimes, take direct active roles in activities formerly reserved for diplomats and governmental administrators (Track 1). The great majority of Track 2+ activity takes place at the local or community level; for example, through “citizen diplomacy” community mediation initiatives in conjunction with local national counterpart, non-governmental organizations in a war zone or “post”-conflict zone. This includes intra-state as well as interstate spheres of influence. One can surmise that at least one reason this is happening is that traditional nation-state diplomacy and intervention has not done so well in the rapid post-cold war proliferation of intra-state conflicts, particularly since many of them take on ethnic or other non-nation state driven characteristics for which traditional power-oriented negotiation and mediation has limited effect. Track 1 intervenors try to negotiate or mediate political or technical solutions whereas intra-state or ethnic identity groups tend to think of the matter as a discussion of values and needs, which is not the same thing. Identity, recognition, and security tend to be non-negotiable values, or needs as Burton would put it (Burton, 1990a), or what Kenneth Boulding (1962) called “inner core values.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

For many of the same reasons cited above regarding the difficulties that traditional nation-state approaches have with intra-state conflict, there has been an explosion of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that actively
participate in activities formerly reserved for government representatives. This activity includes intra-state and interstate conflict analysis and intervention. I think one can safely assume that this is happening since again, most conflicts now are non-nation state ethnic and identity driven.

Former Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond who founded the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, have written extensively about the Track 2+ phenomenon, within which a significant amount of unofficial peacebuilding efforts take place. Diamond and McDonald greatly expand the parameters of peacemaking or peacebuilding. They refer to nine tracks as describing the “whole picture” and lay out the following framework for “understanding this complex system of peacemaking activities.”

1. **Government or Peacemaking through Diplomacy.** This is the world of official diplomacy, policy making, and peacebuilding as expressed through formal aspects of the governmental process: the executive branch, the State Department, Congress, the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, the United Nations, and others.

2. **Nongovernment/Professional, or Peacemaking through Conflict Resolution.** This is the realm of professional nongovernmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by nonstate actors [emphasis here is on the scholar-practitioner].

3. **Business, or Peacemaking through Commerce.** This is the field of business and its actual and potential effects on peacebuilding through the provision of economic opportunities, international friendship and understanding, informal channels of communication, and support for other peacemaking activities.

4. **Private Citizen or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement.** This includes the various ways that individual citizens become involved in peace and development activities through citizen diplomacy, exchange programs, private voluntary organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and special interest groups.
5. **Research, Training, and Education, or Peacemaking through Learning.** This track includes three related worlds: research, as it is connected to university programs, think tanks, and special-interest research centers; training programs that seek to provide training in practitioner skills such as negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and third party facilitation; and education, including kindergarten through Ph.D. programs that cover various aspects of global or cross-cultural studies, peace and world order studies, and conflict analysis, management, and resolution.

6. **Activism, or Peacemaking through Advocacy.** This track covers the field of peace and environmental activism on such issues as disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice, and advocacy of special interest groups regarding specific governmental policies.

7. **Religion, or Peacemaking through Faith in Action.** This examines the beliefs and peace-oriented actions of spiritual and religious communities and such morality-based movements as pacifism, sanctuary, and nonviolence.

8. **Funding, or Peacemaking through Providing Resources.** This refers to the funding community—those foundations and individual philanthropists that provide the financial support for many of the activities undertaken by the other tracks.

9. **Communications and the Media, or Peacemaking through Information.** This is the realm of the voice of the people: how public opinion gets shaped and expressed by the media—print, film, video, radio, electronic systems, the arts (Diamond and McDonald, 1996, 4).

McDonald-Diamond conclude their list by commenting on the relationship of the tracks to peacemaking and peacebuilding:

Each of these nine tracks represents a world unto itself, with its own philosophy and perspective, purpose, language, attitudes, activities, diversities, culture, and membership. At the same time, each of these worlds exists in the context of the others. Among and between these mini-worlds are numerous places of overlapping, collaborative, and complementary activities; relationships that span the spectrum from close and natural allies to adversaries; and varying degrees of openness for communication and mutual support. Therefore, the study of Multi-Track
Diplomacy is more than simply a view into each of the tracks individually. It looks at the interrelatedness between them as well. It looks at the whole system (ibid, p.4).

**Interactive Conflict Resolution Approach**

In driving towards the holistic leading edge of *conflict resolution* (another term often used to generally refer to the newer school of thought), Ron Fisher offers a useful general distinction between the old and newer rationale. The old school approach focuses on that which is objective in nature; a political settlement, based on the assumption of the incompatibility of goals and values, while the newer school focuses on the subjective, that is to say misperceptions, misunderstandings, and relationships that do not assume an incompatibility of goals and values (Fisher, 1988).

Expanding further in the non-traditional direction, a number of new school theorists have been developing new “human-level” collaborative concepts and terms and/or advocating related intervention principles that go deeper into interactions between conflict parties than traditional official governmental approaches are designed to or intended to go. Examples of such approaches are: Provention and Human Needs Theory (Burton), Interactive Conflict Resolution (Ron Fisher), Conflict Transformation (Lederach, Bush, Folger), Problem Solving Analytic Workshops (Burton, Kelman), Pure Mediation vs. Power Mediation (Pruitt, Olczak), Consultation/Pre-negotiation (Ron Fisher), Victim/Offender Conferencing (Howard Zehr), and the Public Peace Process (Hal Saunders).

Several key principles, defined below by Ronald Fisher, are representative of the new rationale (Fisher, 1997):
**Third Party Consultation** - These pioneering ventures and related initiatives have been captured under the label of “third party consultation” in Fisher’s work (1972, 1983), to emphasize that such discussions are organized and facilitated by scholar-practitioners who provide an essential consulting role as impartial intermediaries and analysts (see chapter 7, Fisher 1997, p.7).

**Interactive Conflict Resolution** – Fisher identified this developing scholarly and professional field as *interactive conflict resolution* to emphasize that effective and constructive face-to-face interaction among representatives of the parties themselves is required to understand and resolve complex intercommunal and international conflict (Fisher 1993a). In a focused manner, interactive conflict resolution (ICR) is defined as involving small-group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners. In a broader manner, ICR can be defined as facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice, and equality (Fisher, 1997, p.7).

The general assumption of ICR is that constructive analysis and creative problem solving between antagonists can be most satisfactorily implemented through the assistance of a skilled and knowledgeable third party (ibid., p. 8).

**Problem Solving** – The role of the third party in problem-solving conflict resolution is to place the parties in direct analytical dialogue, to facilitate the clarification
of interests, values, needs, goals, and tactics and to help deduce possible outcomes on the basis of this analysis (ibid., p.33).

A related school of collaboration, conflict transformation, is defined by Bush and Folger as:

**Conflict Transformation** – “…transformation does not mean institutional restructuring but rather a change or refinement in the consciousness and character of individual human beings. Transformation, in the sense used here, necessarily connotes individual moral development, although this kind of change will very likely lead to changes in social institutions as well” (Bush and Folger, 1994, p.24).

Table 1 below is based on Fisher’s (1997, pp.166-169) explanations of old school/content-power mediation and the new school interactive consultation approach:
### Table 1: Traditional Mediation Vs. Consultation Approaches: Some Distinctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third Party Identity</th>
<th>MEDIATION</th>
<th>CONSULTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impartial, knowledge of substantive issues, ability to facilitate negotiation toward a compromise settlement.</td>
<td>Impartial, expertise in theories of conflict, understanding of social relationships and human relations, skills of sharing feelings and perceptions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Relationship | Establish working relationship | Establish consulting relationship. |

| Third Party Role | Facilitates negotiated settlement on substantive issues. | Facilitates parties’ understanding of the conflict itself. |

| Situation | Parties usually separated in caucuses with mediator as go-between conveying proposals with minimum discussion. Mediator does most of the analysis and informs parties. | Face to face flexible and informal discussions. Direct involvement of parties in analysis and management of conflict for joint problem solving. Discussion and free exchange with absence of formal chair and rules of order, noncommitting discussion of crucial issues. |

| Third Party Functions | Motivation: focus on commonalities, emphasize mediator experience, instruct on negotiation, get series of small agreements, assume responsibility for proposals. | Motivation: Induce and maintain mutual positive motivation of parties to enter and sustain the problem solving collaboration and to resolve their conflict. |
| | Communication: Usually redirects discussion to substantive issues or separates parties to diffuse situation when feelings arise. | Communication: Encourages direct communication and focuses on open expression of thought and concerns. |
| | Diagnosis: Focus on substantive issues, own experience, and status of related disputes. | Diagnosis: Focus on understanding the process of discussions and broader relationship. Facilitates self-diagnosis by parties. Provides concepts/models and encourages parties to take an analytical approach. |
| | Regulating Interaction: Works to modify each party’s perceptions of substantive issues and others’ positions through selective presentation of information. Mediator is orchestrator and constructor of settlements. | Paces the phases of interaction from differentiation to integration. Consultant is facilitator of parties’ joint problem solving. |

| Objectives | Attitudes: Good settlement is expected to result in improved attitudes of parties. | Attitudes: Working on improving attitudes is intended to result later in good and durable settlement. |
| | Relationship: No relationship changes expected, zero-sum perspective accepted. | Relationship: Improved relationship is desired to facilitate shared perception of problems, collaborative values, diverse option awareness, complex image of other party. Collaboration desired over win-lose perspective. |
| | Settlement: On specific substantive issues which balances losses and gains and is satisfactory to all parties. | Settlement: Goal is resolution which involves establishment of improved relationship which leads to jointly determined and self-perpetuating innovative solution. |
| | Mediator gathers information and provides an interpretation of issues to parties prior to any interaction. | Consultant integrates parties in mutual sharing of perceptions and joint analysis of conflict. |
Additionally, Fisher’s chart below illustrates the transition of older to newer approaches to peace in *Peace Through Strength*-based approaches and *Peace Through Cooperation*-based approaches. His model shows various traditional perspectives and newer practices within their common international operating environment (Fisher, 1997). This model also reflects the “co-existence” of *realpolitik* and newer collaborative, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* approaches.

**Figure 1: ICR in the Conceptual Domain of Approaches to Peace**

[Diagram showing the transition of older to newer approaches in peacekeeping and peacemaking]
Source: Fisher (1997) Interactive Conflict Resolution, p. 12, Figure I.2. Types of Interactive Conflict Resolution Processes.

Additionally, the Fisher-based graphic below (Figure 2) illustrates the transition from old school to new school, indicating traditional and newer perspectives shown within domestic and international operating environments (Fisher, 1990, p. 12). I have added the Subjective, Objective, Levels of Control, and Sources of Control range indications along the left margin. The newer interaction-consultation approaches are indicated on the lower half of the model:
Figure 2: Taxonomy of Interventions
At risk of stating the obvious, I should emphasize that relationships and constructive relationship-building are primary driving factors in the newer interactive approaches overall. To stress the point, Harold Saunders, a former senior Track 1 diplomat, has this to say about the idea:

Relationships across borders today are facts of life. We cannot ignore them. If we look at these relationships in the context of changes in how nations interact, we may see not only the dangers of improper intervention; we may see that some cross-border interaction can offer opportunities for peaceful change with full respect for others. A sensible approach today might be neither to denounce this interaction nor to apply the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs in pure and rigid ways, but to build relationships in which mutual respect might keep that interaction within limits that define and protect the integrity of each party. Understanding the interaction more fully might even suggest imaginative approaches to common problems in an interdependent world (Saunders, 1991, p.155).

Jay Rothman (1992, p.34) includes a human relations approach component in developing his Synthetic Dialogue Model. He makes this observation within his “Human Relations Approach” segment:

A survey conducted in 1988 of dialogue efforts between Jews and Arabs in Israel lists approximately 45 contemporary human relations organizations designed largely to break down the barriers of mistrust, misunderstanding, and stereotyping so that Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis living primarily within the pre-1967 borders can learn to see the human face of the other (Rothman et al., 1987). Those working in this arena seek to positively influence interpersonal attitudes by fostering improved understanding and friendship between Jews and Arabs” (Rothman, 1992, p.26).

An example of a new school conflict model that accounts for human interaction dynamics specifically is Ron Fisher’s Stages of Conflict (see Table 2 below):
Stages of Conflict

Table 2: Stages of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Communication /Interaction</th>
<th>Perceptions / Relationship</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Outcome / Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Discussion</td>
<td>Discussion / debate</td>
<td>Accurate / trust, respect</td>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Joint gain / mutual decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Polarization</td>
<td>Less direct / deeds, not words</td>
<td>Stereotypes / other still important</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Compromise / negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Segregation</td>
<td>Little direct / threats</td>
<td>Good vs. evil / distrust, lack of respect</td>
<td>Basic needs</td>
<td>Win-lose / Defensive competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Destruction</td>
<td>Nonexistent / direct attacks</td>
<td>Other nonhuman / Hopeless</td>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>Lose-lose / destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: I have added the terms Discussion, Polarization, Segregation, and Destruction in the Stage column on the left reflecting the same terminology Fisher (1997) utilizes in his *Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention*, (Figure 8.2, ibid; p.167).

Fisher’s model reflects stages and dimensions of conflict that conflict resolution analysts and practitioners look for when assessing the status of a conflict. Note that
perceptions, relationships, and basic needs are specified elements of conflict analysis in this framework. In this model, Fisher argues that effective and constructive face-to-face interaction among representatives of the parties themselves is required to understand and resolve complex inter-communal and international conflict (Fisher, 1993). “The general assumption of ICR is that constructive analysis and creative problem solving between antagonists can be most satisfactorily implemented through the assistance of a skilled and knowledgeable third party” (ibid; p. 8).

Three Levels of Conflict Reality

Another perspective on conflict analytical modeling is that provided by Dennis Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality framework, and his associated Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach. Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality framework describes conflict fundamentals, and his Three Pillar Approach describes conflict and intervention fundamentals. I find these frameworks helpful as a foundational cross-check mechanism for my own work, and useful as a point of departure to advance my analysis specific to peace and stability interventions.

To begin, I cite the Peace and Conflict 2010 report (Hewitt, et al), that confirms the 1997 Carnegie Commission conclusion mentioned earlier that non-interstate conflicts dominate conflict occurrences today and that the vast majority of them are resurgent conflicts:

A focus on post-conflict transitions is especially warranted. Strikingly, of the 39 different conflicts that became active in the last 10 years, 31 were
conflict recurrences—instances of resurgent, armed violence in societies where conflict had largely been dormant for at least a year.

And,

Post-conflict states face great challenges of reconstruction, political and social as much as economic. The implication of increased risks of recurrence is that the internationally brokered settlement or containment of many armed conflicts since the early 1990s did not deal effectively with root causes. Our contributors show, for example, that slow economic growth, badly timed international aid, and lack of attention to social reforms are key factors that lead to recurrence. (Peace and Conflict 2010, p.3)

*Peace and Conflict 2010* reports that “Since 2000, conflict recurrences outnumber the onset of new conflicts by a ratio of five to one” (ibid; p. 3). So the trend set in 1989 with the fall of the Soviet Union has not improved since the 1997 Carnegie Commission report. I make particular note here of the Peace and Conflict 2010 report’s assessment that “…the internationally brokered settlement or containment of many armed conflicts since the early 1990s did not deal effectively with root causes.” As stated earlier, addressing root causes and conditions of conflict is a core assumption of positive peace intervention. I also take note of the “…lack of attention to social reforms…” as well for the same reason with the caveat that social reform would presumably include deliberate reframing of interethnic rivalries and hostility into constructive-conflict narratives and interactions.

Sandole’s (2010, p.39) *Three Levels of Conflict Reality* below indicates important conflict fundamentals at three different levels:
Level 1 refers to conflict-as-symptoms. “Symptoms” are observable discrete events which can be perceived as scaled indices (frequencies, intensities) of select categories of conflict (e.g., ethnic conflict, genocide, terrorism) and characteristics of actors involved in conflict (e.g., “failed” state, low level of economic development, autocratic political system, unstable regional environment) (see Hewitt, et al., 2008). As the stuff from which early warning systems are constructed and media reports fashioned, symptoms tend to be our first line of defense. As such, they can be easily framed by concerned policymakers and others as indicators of political and/or research problems in need of prevention, management, solution or, in general, some kind of control.

- Level 2 refers to conflict-as-challenged-relationships that lead to “symptoms” (“conflict-as-process”). “Relationships” captures the dynamic, fluid, real-life, “give-and-take” of parties’ relationships during select periods of time when aspects of latent or manifest conflicts are developing.

- Level 3 refers to conflict-as deep-rooted-causes-and-conditions (“conflict-as-startup-conditions”) underlying the “conflict-as-challenged-relationships.” These are the “independent variables” (e.g., the antecedent/explanatory variables) which affect the behavior of the “dependent variables” (e.g., aspects of the conflicted relationship) of interest to researchers, policymakers, and practitioners [bold emphasis added].

Major peace and stability operation interventions tend to be manifestations of reluctant political will in response to media images of brutality, chaos, and destruction-based complex emergencies (a convergence of political, environmental, and humanitarian crises), particularly when violence is directed against civilians, which happens to be most of the time now. In other words, an intervention is provoked after the fact – a reactive
response to the symptoms of a conflict - after the house catches fire as Sandole characterizes it (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina). A response to symptoms typically involves diplomatic efforts to get a negotiated political settlement, military-based security stabilization, and delivery of emergency humanitarian aid.

More recent interventions (Kosovo, and the latter part of the intervention in Bosnia) have been more comprehensive, comprised of institutional and physical reconstruction (beyond a basic political settlement and security stabilization) meant to reckon with the causes and conditions of the conflict. The effort in Kosovo has been relatively successful in terms of reconstruction and institution-building, but there has been little if any improvement of fundamental relations between ethnic groups, resulting in pervasive structural violence (institutionally-based discrimination) and a latent-conflict status generally. Reconstruction in Bosnia can also be said to be technically accomplished, but the institutions of governance, generally, and relations between the ethnic groups specifically, are fundamentally dysfunctional and discriminatory. In Bosnia and Kosovo, negative peace-based stability has been achieved (an overall absence of violence except for a relatively few serious incidents), although it is a fragile peace in Kosovo and a very fragile peace in Bosnia.

What this indicates, utilizing Sandole’s Three Levels of Reality framework, is that the interventions (negotiated political settlement and security stabilization is assumed) attempted to deal with the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo through largely realpolitik political and structural means (reconstruction), hoping to mitigate the symptoms (the fire), but largely bypassing the challenged-relationships factor (conflict-as-process).
Therefore, the conflict process continues; the fuel from the conflict-as-deep-rooted-causes-and-conditions, which has not been adequately addressed, keeps feeding the conflict-as-process (challenged-relationships); therefore, peace is fragile at best. Essentially, it remains an enforced peace in assisted-stability status. Even though there is no longer a significant international military presence in Bosnia or Kosovo, the peace enforcement option has never been removed from the table and a small presence of international “trip wire” advisors and observers remain in the mission areas with UN, EU, and OSCE offices.

I think it is useful to revisit realpolitik’s role in conflict here since it is the predominante paradigm under which intervention officials operate, knowingly or unknowingly, and it informs the framing and modeling of conflict and intervention, and the pursuit of particular courses of action accordingly.

Sandole describes the old school of thought this way:

The Realpolitik-defined world is clearly a bleak one, encouraging the use of what Morton Deutsch (1973) refers to as ‘competitive’ process of conflict resolution: power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, ‘win-lose’ approaches to dealing with conflict. Realpolitik was the determinative Weltanschauung [worldview] of superpower decision-makers during the Cold War. It has dominated the perceptions and behavior of Serbs and Croats during their war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Armenians and Azerbaijanis in (and over) Nagorno-Karabakh, and continues to dominate perceptions and behavior elsewhere (e.g., Northern Ireland, Palestine, Sri Lanka). It is not surprising; therefore, that Realpolitik and the corresponding competitive processes are associated with destructive outcomes (Sandole, 1993, p. 4).

The potential for trouble, utilizing a near exclusive Realpolitik perspective, is evident enough in the often volatile, always complex, and usually rapidly moving
dynamics that Track 1 and 2 officials have to contend with, often resulting in different interpretations of the same events by Track 1 and 2 officials among themselves, and resulting in different interpretations from those of the primary conflict parties. In other words, as discussed earlier, different operating paradigms and assumptions in effect for conflict parties and conflict intervenors often result in opposing or hostile conclusions, decisions, and interactions that can and do lead to conflict escalation and general confusion. This can also occur when parties do not stop to think (Lewis Richardson, 1939, 1960a), or they do stop to think but in realpolitik terms (Sandole, 1999, p. 229).

If, even contemporary conflict analysts are not sufficiently cognizant of clash of paradigm significance, then I think it is safe to say that a general lack of awareness of the problem by conflict parties and Track one and two officials in the field is an exacerbating factor since it is an issue that disrupts relationships and needed understanding and cooperation on the part of all concerned.

**Three Pillar Approach**

Below is Sandole’s (2010, p75) enhanced version of his *Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach*). For the purposes of my framework construction, I pay particular attention to the fundamental conflict levels indicated in Pillar 2, and the conflict elements in Pillar 1. These levels and elements serve as a generic cross-check of conflict fundamentals for my framework and models. I will refer back to them as needed. Although I concur with the Pillar 3 listing of “Third-party means for achieving goals,” my third-party objectives are deconstructed further and
defined somewhat differently since I use a different approach to presenting intervention
terms and associations in my “Comprehensive Multilevel Framework.”
Table 3: Sandole’s Enhanced Three Pillar Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Causes and Conditions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict Elements</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict Intervention</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-as-underlying-causes</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Third-party objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual (World 2)</td>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>(Violent) Conflict Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal (World 3)</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (World 3)</td>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Conflict Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/Ecological (World 1)</td>
<td>Conflict-handling orientations</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict environment</td>
<td>Conflict Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Third-party means for achieving goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Confrontational and/or collaborative means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative and/or positive peace orientations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Track 1 and/or multi-track (Track 2-9) actors and processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is additional information on the model but I am focused on those listed here.
COMPREHENSIVE MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK

The models I include in this section and beyond reflect progressive stages of my abduction-based analytical tools development; all facilitating needed conceptual analysis and understanding of The Problem under study. With that in mind, I elaborate below on background circumstances leading to the origins of my Comprehensive Multilevel Framework (CMF), which did indeed originate in the field, on the ground, in Africa. But first, some further context comments are necessary.

In recent years, particularly since the end of Cold War associated proxy wars, nation-state adversarial position-based negotiation and mediation protocol has had difficulty with the ethnic, identity, and values-based conflicts that are now predominant. These newer kinds of conflict are actually more of a throw-back to the kind of conflict that was predominant prior to the emergence of our roughly 350 year-old nation-state system essentially established at the Westphalia Conference of 1648.

Most intervention decision makers and officials involved in peace and stability operations have been trained in post-Westphalia nation-state adversarial oriented disciplines such as political science, diplomacy, international relations, law, military studies, and management and engage others according to those long established protocols. These areas of expertise are crucial in analyzing many issues of concern to the international community and parties involved in conflict, and in subsequent efforts to arrive at settlements. However, given the current intra-state conflict dynamics, additional perspectives and protocols are needed given the strong resistance of intra-state conflict to traditional -nation-state protocols.
In response to this growing problem, former Track 1 diplomats, civilians, and military officials, and Track 2 scholar-practitioners have been working steadily on trying to better understand the nature of this resistance and what can be done about it. Consequently, within the past, roughly 25 years, the *field of conflict resolution* (a term generally encompassing conflict analysis, prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation) has been brought into existence to study the problem and devise workable theory and methods of practice for getting at sustainable, constructive solutions. At this point, as discussed above, a substantial amount of pertinent knowledge has been generated and a number of collaborative intervention methods have been introduced.

This study, and my Comprehensive Multilevel Framework (CMF), build on that foundation, especially those concepts that are potentially helpful to the mitigation or resolution of conflicts of direct relevance to peace and stability interventions. The CMF that I have constructed is intended as an aid in the analysis and determination of viable intervention measures. The idea is to have on hand additional tools by which someone trained in conflict analysis and conflict resolution theory and practice can efficiently analyze a conflict situation and plan appropriate intervention actions, and more efficiently brief others on a situation, findings, and recommendations for action. Decision-makers are then free to inquire into the analysis and theory as deeply as they wish. On a practical note, any aid that can help clarify matters will ease stresses on officials and staff (civilian and military) who are subject to very tight timelines, limited resources, and sometimes literal agitation at the gates in the form of protests.
Such an analytical and briefing tool would be utilized in the context of headquarters and field discussions, and so, elaboration on the mission environment is appropriate. The nature of work in humanitarian and peace operations involves continuous interactions *vertically* within and *horizontally* among governmental and non-governmental organizations. Tasks are carried out within the multicultural contexts of UN peace operations, multilateral operations, intergovernmental policy and program coordination, and cooperation with national and local governments, communities and NGOs. Consequently, officials and staffs of governments and organizations often find themselves engaged in some manner of mediation, negotiation, or coordination activity with various other entities in order to carry out the tasks and mandates of their governments or organizations.

Sometimes, tasks that are clearly understood to be conflict resolution-oriented are undertaken to resolve differences between parties to a conflict in order to save lives, resources, meet political aims, or move other work ahead. At some time, mediation, negotiation, or facilitation are engaged in, in some form (officially or unofficially), by almost every type of official (prepared or not) at every level of governmental or non-governmental interaction in today’s very complex and dynamic intervention environment.

The various models presented within my CMF are intended to capture and work out individual associated conflict elements and processes, adding depth and accuracy to an overall assessment and intervention determination.

To begin, the basic orientation of my Comprehensive Multilevel Framework incorporates facets of the following five frameworks/models:
1. **Dugan’s (1996) Nested Paradigm** concept to indicate the encompassing connectedness of inter-level interactions of all concerned (Figure 3);

2. My **Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels** (levels 1 – 6), (Figure 4);

3. A slightly modified **Waltz’ (1959) Framework** (my Equivalent Generic Levels) for better distinguishing the structural levels of activities, conflict parties, and their interactions. This, in turn, enables easier discussion among analysts and decision-makers about the identities and levels of particular actors and associated conflict dynamics (in Figure 4);

4. **North’s (1990) Global Factors Framework** for the same purposes but focusing on trans-national groups and events with global implications (level 6, in Figure 4);

5. My **Intervention Assessment and Intervention Approach Selection Framework** (Figure 5).

In constructing my taxonomic framework, I begin with an overall macro context for purposes of easier identification and tracking of societal or organizational activities (structural levels). In 1997, as a Senior Operations Officer with the International Organization for Migration, I made an assessment of my organization’s formal and informal mediation and facilitation activities in Africa. In constructing a situational awareness grid for the purpose, I identified five primary levels at which interactions typically take place (levels 1 through 5 as indicated below) inclusive of interlocutors – shown at all levels. They can be usefully contrasted with the modified Waltz’ framework
(Images I, II, and III -- individual, society, international), (Waltz, 1959), which I have expanded on and now refer to as Equivalent Generic Levels (see Figure 4, Humanitarian & Peace Operation Activity Levels). I have since added North’s Global and Ecological framework (1990), (Sandole, 1993, 1999, Ch. 6) to make the sixth level.

The first five interaction levels indicated below pertain primarily to typical field activities of Track 1 and Track 2 (and beyond) actors (international, national, and local). In short, the officials of my organization interacted, officially and unofficially, on a daily basis with officials, representatives, leaders, staff, citizens, and communities at all levels and in all sectors indicated on the list below. My resulting 1997 assessment list, shown below (see Table 4), which I later on adapted to Dugan’s Nested Paradigm model when I became aware of it, is the genesis of my Humanitarian & Peace Operation Activity Levels model (Figure 4). I have also added to my original 1997 list the generic level indicators (inspired by Waltz) as well as the North’s global systems indicators.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td><strong>Field Offices for IGOs and INGOs</strong> <em>(Intra-Psychic, Interpersonal, International and Local staff, Service and Security Providers, Contractors, Suppliers).</em></td>
<td>Generically: Individuals, Families, Small Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td><strong>National and Local Groups</strong> <em>(Intra-Group, Inter-Groups, Communities, Local NGOs, Traditional Leadership).</em></td>
<td>Generically: Communities, Organizations, Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td><strong>National, Provincial, and Local Governments</strong> <em>(Intra-Governmental, De-facto Authorities).</em></td>
<td>Generically: States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td><strong>International Aid Organizations</strong> <em>(Intra-Agency, Inter-Agency, UN Agencies, USAID, ODA, ECHO, Danida, INGOs, International Military and International Police, etc).</em></td>
<td>Generically: International Implementing Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5</td>
<td><strong>Donor Governments, Councils</strong> <em>(Intra-governmental, Inter-governmental, Embassies, UN, EU, OAU, OAS, OSCE, NATO, SEATO, ASEAN, International Military and International Police policy making bodies, etc).</em></td>
<td>Generically: International Governmental Policy Organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nested Paradigm Determination

My Conflict Nested Paradigm Determination model (Figure 3), shown below, is adapted to Marie Dugan’s (1999) Nested Paradigm model and my earlier field-based organizational activity levels 1 – 5 presented above. The Nested Paradigm Determination model that I include here in association with my CMF, indicates, in conjunction with other models presented in this study, progressive stages of my abduction-based analytical tools development towards addressing The Problem under study.

The Nested Paradigm Determination model indicates the connectedness of parties, issues, and dynamics at all six humanitarian and peace operation activity levels inclusive of global transnational dynamics. As described earlier, each member of the various groups has his or her own worldviews, mandates, and needs, and acts consciously or unconsciously accordingly. The needs for basic safety, security, and belonging, as outlined in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (1943, 1954) and John Burton’s Basic Human Needs Theory (1990, 1997), are of paramount importance.
Figure 3: Conflict Nested Paradigm Determination – James Adams 2012
Dugan describes her nested paradigm concept this way: “It approaches conflict by identifying on what level its source lies – at the structural level of the system as a whole, within the structure of a sub-system, at the relational or issue-specific level – and stresses the extent to which these levels are related, nested within one another” (Dugan, 1996, p.9). Dugan argues that it is necessary to know at which level a conflict is occurring in order to understand and resolve it.

This model aids in understanding how conflicting parties can have differing views of the same conflict, that is to say, how they can be looking at the same conflict in terms of paradigmatic bases, without necessarily realizing it, because they are looking from different levels with different embedded issues and meanings. The model is helpful in understanding issues or phenomena coming from “out of nowhere” that in fact are simply interactions between levels. Needless to say, fundamentally different perspectives about what is happening, especially when non-negotiable values and personal security are at stake, can cause a good deal of trouble.

In connection with the idea of different perspectives, John Burton has specified that basic human needs, such as the needs for security, recognition, and identity, must be met to ensure sustainable peace. In other words, certain political, cultural, and religious values and security needs are critical to sustainable peace and are essentially non-negotiable (1990, 1997). Such things are fundamentally matters of perception, or some might say, a matter of one’s worldview (paradigm) as to what is a problem or not.

I believe that if intervention decision makers and planners, military and civilian, in earlier missions had been more cognizant of nested paradigm dynamics, such as
discussed here and earlier in relation to the Somalia mission UNOSOM, the outcomes would likely come out better for all concerned.

**Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels**

Many governments, international and local organizations, and conflict parties are impacted by global factors. For example, rapidly increasing populations, resource and environmental problems, economic turmoil, and massive worldwide migrant and refugee movements (North refers to these phenomena as *lateral pressures*), (North, 1990, as cited in Sandole, 1999, p.127). For the same reasons that North added Global and Ecological Systems to Waltz’s three Images (as Image IV), I add it (as Level Six) to my five humanitarian and peace operation activity levels (see Figure 4 below). I also specify Trans-Societal activity within North’s global/ecological level.

Drawing on Dugan’s nested paradigm concept, my 5 levels of field interactions/activities, and North’s global and ecological systems concept, I built the composite Humanitarian and Peace Operations Activity Levels model shown below. For a contextual sense of an overall conflict situation, including possible linkages between elements and parties, I locate groups and organizations within levels 1 – 6 and contrast them with Equivalent Generic Levels on the left side of the model (Figure 4, below).
Figure 4: Humanitarian & Peace Operation Activity Levels
The modified Waltz levels (my Equivalent Generic Levels on the left side of Figure 4), contrasted with the Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels encompassed by the Embedded Paradigm Range border, should be helpful in relating civilian non-war zone activities and levels (on the left) with peace and stability operational activities and levels. This, in turn, should better facilitate informed determination of appropriate levels and types of intervention on the part of intervenors (civilian and military) not familiar with peace and stability intervention environments.

With the basic operating environment in mind, and the aim of furthering analysis of negative and positive peace processes in this project, I utilize two models from a previous project from which I continue to develop my CMF. The original project consisted of my Field Guide for Conflict Briefings, with accompanying analytical worksheets built around my CMF as manifested at that time, and directed at planners and decision-makers in peace and stability interventions. The two models: *Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels* (Figure 4) above, and the *Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection* model below (Figure 5), illustrate the positioning and relationship of various key dynamics in a peace and stability operation environment.

The models provide an initial orientation to many of the current concepts, frameworks, and responses regarding conflict and its handling. Acknowledging that there are different versions, frameworks, definitions, and nuances of the same concepts by different theorists, researchers, and practitioners; the ones I have elected to include in my CMF are those that I have found can readily capture necessary elements.
I should qualify that the terms contained in the models are relatively subjective, and the meaning of any given concept or term is open to interpretation by the user. This is especially so when considering that no two persons are likely to attach the same exact meaning to a complex, conceptually-related experience. Necessarily, then, the terms indicated in the models are subjective to a degree, although, they reflect the thoughtful consideration of key theorists, researchers, and practitioners. Also, it is prudent to point out that no single graph, chart, or illustration can capture all possible elements, complexities, or nuances of a concept or situation. What I attempt in my CMF models is a reasonably workable and useful framework for general analysis and orientation on common dynamics associated with a variety of intervention approaches. They are generally intended for the use of trained analysts to efficiently explain a conflict situation and associated intervention considerations, to humanitarian and peace operation planners, managers, and decision-makers.

As the reader can see in the models, the names of theorists are superimposed next to key concepts that they initiated. Clearly, it is not practical to include all theories and all refinements of the theories and the names of all contributing authors on the models. But, I think those indicated are sufficiently representative of a particular concept being referenced. The purpose of indicating concepts on the models is to better illustrate something of the underlying dynamics, and rationale involved in the analysis - and, presumably, subsequent decision-making.

I emphasis here that I believe that a *contingency* approach towards intervention is more effective overall, that is to say, the utilization of different approaches for different
situations (see Fisher and Kealshly, 1991; Fisher, 1997). The reason for this is that
different conflicts have different origins, reside at different levels within a society,
community, or organization, and respond to different approaches. Also, I emphasize that
it may be necessary, for overall effectiveness, to implement simultaneous multilevel,
multi-sector interventions – based on, in part, the Multi-Track Framework (see Diamond
and MacDonald, 1996).

**Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection**

The *Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection* model below (Figure 5) is
designed to assist with determining an overall intervention strategy based on desired
outcomes and, importantly, awareness of intrinsic elements and dynamics associated with
various intervention approaches. The Model reflects three primary kinds of information
by which to consider what type of intervention approach, or approaches, would be
appropriate for a given dispute (specific incident) or conflict (multiple disputes in an
ongoing conflict). Although I cite numerous terms and authors in my models, I alone am
responsible for how the terms are used and characterized in the models, and any errors or
dispute that may result.

The Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection model contains three
sections, as follows:

**Section A. -- General Nature of an Intervention Approach;**

**Section B. -- Specific Intervention Approaches;** and

**Section C. -- Dynamics Associated with Intervention Approaches.**
Figure 5: Intervention Assessment & Approach Selection
To use the model, an analyst or practitioner can place a vertical line along a given intervention approach under consideration, run the line up through Section C. (Dynamics Associated with Intervention Approaches), and then run the line down through Section A (General Nature of an Intervention Approach). All dynamics (listed horizontally) in Sections A and B that the vertical line intersects are dynamics commonly associated with the type of intervention selected for consideration. Ranges of particular dynamics (listed horizontally) are indicated by arrows with end-brackets.

As an example of an intervention approach selection, Sustained Dialogue has been highlighted (circled in red) for consideration. As can be seen, the red vertical hyphenated line crosses Resolution and Transformation in Section A. This indicates that the general nature of the intervention is designed and intended to get at resolution and possibly transformation.

Going upwards through Section C, the red line intersects Positive Peace as a notional intent, Identity Focus as a goal, Relational Focus as a goal, Collaboration as a means, and Power of Influence as a means (versus legal or raw power as an intervention means).

Continuing upward, the red line intersects Durability of Agreement close to the High end of the durability range (versus a low durability expectation towards the right of the durability range).

The red line intersects the Level of Control range on the low end. This indicates that a Sustained Dialogue intervention would require a low level of control over the conflict parties as opposed to say a Peace Support or Adjudication intervention in
which a high level of control over conflicting parties and the situation in general would likely be necessary to carry out the intervention.

The red line intersects Sources of Control towards the few in number needed to control the situation and intervention (a high number of sources required typically involves diplomatic, military, police, UN agencies, and NGOs, etc., needed in response to complex emergencies).

Finally, continuing upwards, the red line intersects the Subjective (interactive process based) range. This indicates that interactive processes are subjective by nature as compared to, say, Adjudication, which is based on the implementation of codified law and is, presumably, a more straight-forward objective process requiring less subjective considerations.

Section A (General Nature of Intervention Approach - Terms):

Conflict Settlement -- interrupts hostilities for the time being without either identifying their underlying sources or creating a system of conflict management (Burton, 1990; Richard Rubenstein, 1996), (forcefully stop violence).

Conflict Management -- aims at moderating or ‘civilizing’ the effects of conflict without necessarily addressing the underlying causes and conditions.

Conflict Resolution -- attempts to get at the root causes and conditions of destructive conflict and to eliminate them – if necessary by altering the system that embodies or produces them.

Conflict Transformation -- a change or refinement in the consciousness and character of individual human beings. Implies individual moral development, although this
kind of change will very likely lead to changes in social institutions as well (Bush and Folger, 1994); Hence, also aim at macro-level systemic changes through reconstruction and development, designing and implementing new mechanisms that are not available before the destructive conflict in question.

A new frame for viewing; a different set of categories. A changed sense of what is real and what is possible. Parties change from identity statements, which include answers, accusations, negative energy, and breast-beating, to a joint searching in a cooperative and analytical fashion – with the emphasis on creativity. A critical mass of changed individual behaviors results in optimism that a solution can be created. A transformation ultimately of the substance of the issues and position themselves. This often requires redistribution of resources, recognition (or at least acceptance) of common needs and a sharing of power (Laue, 1987);

A paradigmatic shift is articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution of issues and toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships (Lederach, 1997).

Section B (Specific Intervention Approaches - Terms):

**Extra-Legal:** Outside of legal or constitutional context; without due process.

**Adjudication/Legal Response:** court-ordered legal processes; litigation.
**Peace Support/Peace Enforcement:** Military and police actions in support of peacemaking and peacebuilding, for example, observation, command and control, force, liaison, logistics, presence, and security (Dave Davis lecture, 2000).

**Peacemaking/Peacebuilding:** (Dave Davis lecture, 2000; Boutros-Ghali, 1992). **Note:** peacemaking and peacebuilding are each included twice on this model; once in relation to settlement and management, and again in relation to resolution and transformation. The dual locations of peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, is because they take place in settlement--management contexts (negative peace processes) as well as in resolution--transformation contexts (positive peace processes). This is not to imply that negative peace coercive measures are never appropriate; again, the need is to have an effective balance of negative peace oriented protective force and positive peace oriented processes as appropriate.

**Arbitration:** A legitimate and authoritative third party provides a binding judgment through consideration of the merits of the opposing positions, and imposes a settlement deemed to be fair and just (often by court order)(Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Power Mediation:** The intermediary provides the functions of pure mediation and adds the use of leverage in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments to move the parties toward a settlement (Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Power Negotiation:** Conflict parties utilize various realpolitik negotiating techniques to apply positive and negative pressures to the opposing conflict party or parties to protect or gain leverage for their respective positions at the expense of the opposing party or parties.
**No intervention**: self-explanatory.

**Principled Negotiation**: Negotiating parties focus on basic interests (not positions or persons) and shared problem-solving to generate mutually satisfying outcomes while utilizing fair, objective standards to efficiently arrive at agreements that meet the legitimate interests of each negotiating side (and associated communities) to the extent possible, and are durable (Roger Fisher and Ury, 1981, 1991).

**Pure Mediation**: The facilitation of a negotiated settlement on a set of specific substantive issues through the use of reasoning, persuasion, control of information and suggestion of alternatives (Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Pre-negotiation**: Functions to structure negotiation by specifying the boundaries, the participants, and potentially the agenda in an exploratory, noncommittal manner. Improves the relationship between the conflict parties before dealing with substantive issues; helps decision makers reduce uncertainty and manage complexity in a low risk and low cost manner (Ronald Fisher, 1997).

**Provention/Problem Solving Workshop**: Assist parties in a conflict in making a deep analysis of their conflicted relationships, revealing the hidden data of goals and motivations, enabling an accurate costing of their tactics and policies, and assisting in the discovery of acceptable options; define accurately the interests that are negotiable, and the basic needs and values that are not, and to assist the parties to discover options that are acceptable in terms of their interests and that satisfy their needs (Burton and Dukes, 1990). **Provention**: Steps taken to
remove sources of conflict, and more positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control behaviors; a decision making process in which the future is analyzed and anticipated, and as a result policy decisions are taken to remove the sources of likely disputes and conflict (Burton, 1990, 1997; Burton and Dukes, 1990).

**Sustained Dialogue:** A facilitated five-stage interactive process that brings conflict parties together to change the nature of their relationships -- not bring conflicting parties together to negotiate for assets or political settlements. It is intended to probe the dynamics of contentious relationships that underlie the causes and conditions of a conflict and gradually develop a capacity for jointly designing actions to change the relationships for the better. Then participants go on to decide how to take those insights and steps to the wider community (Saunders, 1999).

**Integrated Peacebuilding:** Development of local capacity to design and positively affect social change and structures by linking crisis management and long-term, future-oriented time frames; generate understanding of crisis issues as connected to systemic roots and develop approaches that explicitly anchor issues within a set of relationships and subsystems; involve grassroots and top leadership in conflict resolution--transformation processes, especially mid-range leadership who can cultivate relationships and influence groups vertically within societies and horizontally across societal divides (Lederach, 1997).
**Psychopolitical Dialogue:** An interactive process whereby facilitators guide a five-stage process containing the following elements: establishing safety, communalization and bereavement, rebuilding trust and the capacity to trust, reestablishing personal and social morality, and reintegrating and restoring democratic discourse (Volkan 1999).

**Victim-Offender Conferencing:** A process whereby the offender and victim meet face to face; the offender has already admitted the offense; The meeting is facilitated and chaired by a trained mediator, preferably a community volunteer…Both parties are encouraged to tell their stories. Both get a chance to ask questions…They also talk about the impact and implication of this experience. When they have done this, they decide together what will be done about it. Once they come to an agreement, they sign a written contract for restitution in the form of financial compensation or means such as community service (Zehr, 1990; Umbreit, 1994).

**Section C (Dynamics Associated with Intervention Approaches):**

Section C contains a variety of key dynamics common to conflict situations and interventions. The listing of dynamics in Section C is, of course, not exhaustive, but intended to provide a general starting-place orientation for analysis (a tentative first-look at some of the primary facets of particular intervention for consideration) and an initial feel for an intervention’s appropriateness and viability of implementation.
General Instructions for Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection

1) Based on all available information, considerations, and desired outcomes, an analyst and practitioner would assess approaches (Section B), and associated general category types (Section A) ranged across the bottom of the model that appear to be the most suited to the desired intervention strategy.

2) They would review the dynamics associated with the potential intervention approach(es) (Section C) for confirmation of desired intervention qualities or indications that the intended intervention contains dynamics or elements not desired, in which case, other interventions may need to be considered.

3) They would consult pertinent literature and other resources specific to the tentative approach(es).

4) They would consult appropriate organizations, decision-makers, conflict parties, and other pertinent actors regarding the viability and appropriateness of the tentative intervention and associated objectives, timeframe, availability of expertise, funds, and other resources needed. And,

5) They would select an intervention approach or approaches (Section B) appropriate to the situation and the meeting of desired objectives. They would advise and coordinate for implementation as needed.

In recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold War rivalry and associated proxy wars around the world, the nation-state, position-based intervention methods of negotiation and mediation have had difficulty with the ethnic, identity, and values/needs-
based conflicts that are intra-state in nature and are now predominant in the world. These newer kinds of conflict -- or perhaps one should say older and newer since they resemble the kinds of conflict predominant prior to the emergence of our roughly 350 year-old nation-state system -- are proving very resistant to nation-state political and diplomatic protocols for settlement, which were largely established at the Westphalia Conference of 1648, ending Europe’s Thirty-Year war. Mary Kaldor (2006) refers to these conflicts as “new wars.”

Additionally, the nature of work in humanitarian, peace, and stability operations involves continuous interactions vertically within and horizontally among governmental and non-governmental organizations. Tasks are carried out within the multicultural contexts of UN peace operations, multilateral programs, intergovernmental policy and program coordination, and cooperation with national and local governments, communities and NGOs. Consequently, officials and staff of governments and organizations often find themselves engaged in some manner of mediation, negotiation, or coordination activity with various other entities in order to carry out the tasks and mandates of their aid-organizations or governments.

In response to this growing challenge, former Track 1 diplomats and scholar/practitioners have been steadily working to better understand the deeper nature of the resistance of the new-old conflict to nation-state political and diplomatic protocols for settlement, as mentioned above, and what can be done about it. Consequently, within the past roughly 25 years, the field of Conflict Resolution (a term generally encompassing conflict analysis, prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation)
has been brought into existence to study the problem and devise workable theory and methods for getting at sustainable solutions. At this point, as already mentioned, a substantial amount of pertinent knowledge has been generated and a number of intervention methods have been introduced and tried out. Numerous books and articles have been published on the causes and conditions of conflict and on intervention principles and methods.

The objective of the Comprehensive Multilevel Framework approach and associated models is to serve as practical guides for a readily useable and efficient, yet valid, conflict analysis and intervention process tool for the use of officials operating in conflict-prone environments with associated time and resource pressures; and furthering the cause of working out the principles and applications of negative and positive peace in association with peace and stability operations.

Humanity routinely engages in the maiming, killing, and displacement of one another in real terms -- *realism* -- as individuals, groups, or nations. Sometimes, force is successful in suppressing further conflict temporarily; however, the underlying causes and conditions that started and fed the conflict often are still present and awaiting re-ignition.

In this context, the concept of *Positive Peace* argues that unless the interests, causes, and conditions underlying a conflict are effectively addressed, the conflict will continue to resurface indefinitely and, even if there is no overt fighting, *Negative Peace* is said to exist by virtue of violent conflict being suppressed, yet latent. Also associated with Negative Peace is the lack of fora for the generation of innovative insights to ensure
political, economic, and legal security, and recognition of all groups. Typically, there are also insufficient processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues and constructive relationship change.

Conflict and conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation challenges are about and driven by human interaction; therefore, additional focus and responses are needed at the human level -- Relationships -- within post-Cold War civil society frameworks. In order for responses to be useful and supportive of official conflict resolution efforts, reinforcement of activities that enhance positive peace dynamics and outcomes is critical. Further integration of positive peace processes into such frameworks can be expected to contribute significantly and positively to overall mission goals over time; that is, by employing integrated strategic planning which includes, as a core component, multilevel civil society positive peace processes.

It is such Human Realism-directed positive peace process actions that afford a fair possibility (under current circumstances global conditions) that a significant number of people in conflict situations can and will be able to, at some point, respond to calls by UN leadership as well as by other world leaders, “to end cycles of violence.” The same approaches would also enable UN officials and staff in the field to more effectively respond to requests by leadership to do more to help bring about realization of this illusory goal.

I define Human Realism as the proven capacity of humanity to deliberately engage in inconsiderate, competitive, self-interests driven win/lose acts at others’
expense for personal gain of wealth, power, prestige, or survival. The term also includes the proven capacity of humanity to deliberately engage in considerate, interactive processes to understand, to change, to overlook or forgive, and to adopt more collaborative methods of human discourse and engagement for managing and resolving difficult conflicts and other issues.

Such a dualistic concept allows for a “realistic” and practical complementary counterpart to political realism. Such a concept can more readily allow for the development, and very importantly, encourage the application, of more constructive interactions where they are most needed in a predominantly realpolitik driven world. Such a concept captures the “complexity” of the real world better than realism or idealism alone. Sandole’s Capturing The Complexity of Conflict, 1999, offers an excellent treatment of complexities “Dealing with violent ethnic conflicts of the Post-Cold War era.”

Many of the same positive peace processes utilized to improve primary conflict situations could be helpful in alleviating intervenor/conflict party conflict, and intra-intervenor conflict. For the convenience of the reader, I repeat the three types of conflicts here that I associate with humanitarian and peace and stability operation environments: The first type is primary conflict (those conflicts precipitating an international intervention). A secondary type of conflict is intervention conflict in general, which in-turn can be subdivided into two sub-types, that is to say, into intervenor/conflict party conflict, and intra-intervenor conflict generated in the course of the intervening.
This takes into consideration that positive peace principles directed towards human interactions have a universal multilevel application with, of course, with adjustments made for localized circumstances, cultural requirements (in their many meanings), and so on. This principle applies to peace and stability interventions, international-community organizations, primary and conflict parties.

Given that issues associated with primary conflict and intervention-conflict take place at different levels, often simultaneously, multilevel analysis and multilevel responses are needed.

The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations reflects an overall framework called Peace Operations, which contains the three primary tasks of Peace Making, Peace Building, and Peace Support. This framework incorporates a comprehensive view of peace operations, each containing sub-tasks for operational implementation, management, and coordination. The integration and close coordination of military and civilian roles and capacities is needed to maximize efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and effect.

Key decision-makers and officials who received briefings on particular conflict situations by analysts or officials trained in multilevel-theory, and utilizing a comprehensive multilevel framework process, could be expected to be more fully informed about the conflict and intervention alternatives that would likely lead to more informed decision-making and, consequently, more collaborative and sustainable outcomes.
It may be necessary, for overall effectiveness, to implement different approaches for different conflicts at different levels simultaneously, in other words, *simultaneous multilevel multi-sector interventions in accordance with the Multi-Tack framework* (Diamond and MacDonald, 1996).

In the end, the need is to integrate the *realpolitik* and *human realism* perspectives (Track 1 and Track 2 +) and *coordinate* mutually supportive, complementary expertise and efforts. The goal is to combine judicious use of *realpolitik* methods when needed and employ *positive peace* processes (based on a broader consideration of human capacity -- *human realism*) to reckon with *political realism* problems as a matter of routine in humanitarian and peace operations.

**CONCLUSION**

For the purpose of constructing viable frameworks and analytical models for examining The Problem, key concepts, in conflict analysis and resolution terms, were considered in Chapter 3 including Schools of Thought, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Interactive Conflict Resolution, Stages of Conflict, Nested Paradigm Determination, Humanitarian and Peace Operation Activity Levels, and Intervention Assessment and Approach Selection. To better ensure that the analytical frameworks that I have constructed are in congruence with sound conflict analysis and resolution theory and practice, I introduced Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality concept and Three Pillar Approach framework by which I perform a conceptual cross-check in Chapter 9.
Chapter 4 continues the literary progression and focuses on descriptions of select conflict and conflict resolution (broadly speaking) theory and practice crucial to addressing The Problem and peace and stability operations and environments.
Chapter 4: Literature Corresponding with Pertinent Theory & Practice

Chapter 4 takes a closer look at select conflict and conflict resolution theory and practice concepts that I consider crucial to addressing The Problem and building a firm foundation for moving on to peace and stability intervention structural and operational basics in Chapter 5 and the subsequent discussion of the Bosnian background and intervention particulars in Chapter 6. Chapter 4 includes in-depth discussions on Galtung’s Negative and Positive Peace, and my conceptual departure from them, in order to conceptually adapt the principles involved more directly to peace and stability operation environment utility. Chapter 4 also includes discussions on Violence, Constructive Conflict, Relationship concepts, Sociological-Psychological issues, Psychology and Peace Operations, Conscience, the Human Rights Factor, and not least, Intervention Dilemma.

There are a considerable number of authors writing about international interventions - sometimes referred to as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, relief and development, peace and stability operations, nation-building, state-building, or most recently in Afghanistan, counter-insurgency operations. Some authors have a narrower focus in their writing, while others elaborate on an extensive cross-section of inter-connecting themes, whether as an article, a complete book, or as an edited volume. While all authors tend to cite their favored theories, some focus on
technical implementation of reconstruction while others focus more on the human relationships involved. Some go further and probe for moral or spiritual elements. There is much overlapping commentary, often utilizing different terms for the same thing or different meanings for the same term.

The complexities inherent in peace and stability operations and negative and positive peace are such that almost any theoretical or conceptual thread can be attached and pursued as relevant. Simultaneously, given the often harsh reality of the field environment and, subsequently a need for literature to, ideally, support informed action in the field, I believe that an awareness of the wide range of relevant theory, concepts, and issues is necessary for an appropriate perspective. Conflict and peace operation factors not mentioned yet, but academically scanned during my literature review process are Identity-Based Conflict, Peace and Conflict Psychology, and Conflict and Memory, to name a few. These categorizations/issues only partially illustrate the myriad of complexities and challenges – understood or not – that confound researchers, intervention planners, policy makers, intervenors, and conflict parties alike.

Generally, in this study, I include coverage of issues that collectively provides a description broad enough to accommodate necessary contextual overview and yet, which is specific enough to enable linkages of particular intervention-related elements to my research frameworks to make essential points. Necessarily, given the need for a broader conceptual range of factors to contextualize peace and stability interventions, an exhaustive treatment of every likely theory or factor is neither manageable in the confines of this dissertation nor useful.
I increasingly focused my literature review on what I have come to think of as a
\textit{nexus of negative and positive peace, peace and stability interventions, and}
\textit{peacebuilding}. Points drawn from other relevant concepts are incorporated as needed. I
note here that I have already provided a brief introduction to Galtung’s \textit{negative} and
\textit{positive peace} and key related principles in Chapter 1.

At this point, I subdivide the literature coverage into four sections, as follows:

1) \textit{Overview of Select Theory and Practice} (Chapter 4); 2) \textit{Peace and Stability}
\textit{Operation Basics} (Chapter 5); 3) \textit{Peacebuilding and Peace & Stability Operations}
(Chapter 5); and 4) \textit{Intervention Conceptual Dichotomy} (Chapter 5), (This fourth
section is key to finding a methodological path to addressing the \textit{Primary Research}
Question} – that is to say, \textit{How can the status of negative and positive peace in a peace
and stability intervention environment be assessed?}

I will progressively build on basic conflict management, peacebuilding, and peace
operation models.

\textbf{OVERVIEW OF SELECT THEORY & PRACTICE}

Major international peace and stability interventions are historically among the
most profound activities in human affairs, for good or ill, and are more complex than
straight forward war by virtue of being simultaneously engaged in peacebuilding and
elements of war to establish security. I cannot cover all possible conceptual connections
in my literature review but I bring into the discussion those concepts and linkages that
help fill-in the parameters of analysis and practice directly relevant to negative and
positive peace, peace and stability operations, and the peacebuilding context. I begin by elaborating further on Galtung’s negative and positive peace and four other foundational concepts with natural linkages between them. This is followed by coverage of other related theory and practice concepts that peace and stability interventions do or might draw on for explanations, or to act on. The four other foundational concepts I make particular mention of are (references are provided with the concept discussions):

1) John Burton’s *Basic Human Needs*, in relation to Galtung’s statement that “…there is a lack of fora for the generation of innovative insights to ensure political, economic, and legal security and recognition of all groups”;

2) Lonnie Athens’ *Violentization Theory*, in relation to Galtung’s structural, cultural, and personal violence concepts that “structural violence seems to be more ‘natural’ than structural peace,” and “personal violence is perhaps more ‘natural’ than personal peace”;

3) Harold Sanders’ *Public Peace Process*, in relation to Galtung’s statement that “Typically, there are also insufficient processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues…”, and

4) Louis Kriesberg’s *Constructive Conflict*, in relation to Galtung’s statement that “Typically, there are also insufficient processes for…constructive relationship change.”

Each of these key concepts, whether knowingly associated or not by the authors with negative and positive peace principles, address negative peace and intervention
dynamics and intervention shortcomings, presumably contributing to positive peace deficits. At the same time, the concepts also address positive peace principles. These four key concepts, in addition to others mentioned up to now, facilitate conceptual placement of negative and positive peace, and this study, into the greater peacebuilding discussion. Placement of negative and positive peace principles and this study into the practical peacebuilding context is specifically addressed in the section on Peacebuilding in Relation to Peace and Stability Operations in this chapter.

**Negative and Positive Peace**

A Former UN military advisor (Rikhye, 1997) unwittingly reveals the lack of conceptual nuance concerning negative peace juxtaposed with war in the conventional sense among field advisors and commanders when, in relation to his discussion on peace operations, he states that “…peace is the opposite of war…” Although he wrote this well informed article in 1997, it is apparent to me that little progress has been made since among intervenors in the field, or among policy makers back home concerning a deeper understanding of what peace is. That is to say, little progress has been made in understanding that there is more than one kind of peace. In other words, **negative peace, in its most virulent form, is simultaneously a state of latent conflict (no visible violence) and war by other means, and evidence of positive peace is clear on-the-ground progress in addressing the root causes and conditions of a conflict, among other things.**
Therefore, I have found the seminal work of Johan Galtung (1969, 1990, 1996) on positive peace, negative peace, structural violence, and cultural violence to be useful for better understanding real situations in which I have worked, observed, and participated in as a professional field officer. Specifically, I have found his concepts useful for framing key dynamics and articulating my own observations. I use Galtung’s concepts in this study as the core around which I gather other relevant concepts and link them in integrated fashion to peace and stability operations and environments to aid in analyzing the increasingly complex nature of such enterprises.

Although authors contemplating negative peace have cited PAX Romana or Pharonic Egypt as early applications of negative peace (Barash and Webel, 2002), more recent conceptual use has been traced to Jane Addams around the turn of the 20th century (Carroll and Fink, 2007) in which she uses the term “negative peace” and the phrase “positive ideals of peace,” both used in much the same way conceptually as Galtung did in the 1960’s, leading up to his elaboration on the general idea and his substantial expansion on it in his seminal article (1969).

Even though Galtung, in 1969, had not yet witnessed the transition of traditional peacekeeping roles (separation of antagonists, observer tasks) into the much more comprehensive, complex, multilevel state-building exercises that constitute enforcement-oriented peace and stability interventions in recent years, his structural and cultural violence concepts, and negative peace and positive peace framework are central to addressing The Problem under examination in this study. However, I should point out early on here that a critique of Galtung’s negative and positive peace concepts is that they
are utopian and posited without empirical basis - as characterized by Alfred Bonisch (1981):

The deficiency of Galtung’s concept is that neither negative nor positive peace have been sufficiently investigated as to how they depend on existing social orders. Therefore, the concept does not address the problem of dangers to peace. As regards to the positive conception of peace, by disregarding to a certain degree the connection between peace and a given social order, the claim to enrich the peaceful order with social justice, humanism, democracy, material prosperity for everybody etc. takes on a utopian character, because of being separated from the relations of production and prosperity (167).

To elaborate Galtung’s concepts: Galtung (1969, pp. 167-191), begins explaining his theory by stating that “peace is the absence of violence,” then proceeds to establish a framework that allows distinctions to be made about the nature of peace and causes and types of violence. For example, “violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is.”

Galtung’s characterization of violence as a mechanism to inhibit personal or collective development or thwart self-actualization has a commonality with Ted Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation in instances where an individual or group makes comparisons, with a sense of unfairness about the disconnect between his or her relatively deprived circumstances and prospects and another’s better or privileged circumstances, or what he or she wants or demands.

Essentially, Galtung defines violence as a condition in which a “human being’s… actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations,” in “vertical development.” He contends that violence occurs at a “personal-direct level” and a “structural-indirect level,” and that actual violence and the threat of violence are
essentially the same thing, that is to say, a threat (intimidation) has as much effect as actual physical violence in that, in either case, a person, group, or society is prevented from fulfilling their rightful potential. Galtung specifies that, “We shall refer to the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect.” I tend to think of indirect violence as systemic, built into the structure, institutionalized – manifesting as a corporate culture of discrimination, bias, or indifference, for example, deliberately discriminatory laws based on race.

Galtung further posits that structural violence is the uneven distribution of resources, and the power to decide on the distribution of resources. He emphasizes the uneven distribution of power, and refers to structural violence as “social injustice.” He states that: “ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets – and may hence be catching the small fry and letting go the big fish.” Here he appears to be saying, for example, that enforcement authorities or rights’ commissions direct their attention to obvious individual perpetrators of direct violence -- to the symptoms of violent conflict -- but may not fully appreciate the insidious nature of broader systemic structural violence, for example, legislated discrimination, i.e., the deep rooted underlying causes and conditions (see Sandole, 2010, Ch. 2). Another distinction he makes is that there is manifest violence (observable violence) and latent violence that could easily erupt, and that the difference between them (“actual and potential realization”) is violence, presumably through fear and
intimidation. He posits that both personal and structural violence are said to occur in physical or psychological ways.

He refers to **structural violence** as a blueprint and an abstract form “without social life, used to threaten people into subordination: if you do not behave, we shall have to reintroduce all the disagreeable structures we had before.” Galtung refers to **personal violence** as being perceived by the object and structural violence as being “silent” and “static,” whereby the “object of structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all.” Galtung assembles these terms and ideas into a coordinated “**typology of violence**” constructed within a framework of actor, system, structure, rank and level. **Actor** refers to individuals of all ranks that interact with each other in systems. **Systems** of a “given set of actors” constitute a **structure**. **Level** refers to territories, organizations, and associations.

Additionally, Galtung cites a specific rank ordering system in connection with barriers to potential realizations in vertical development, explained as “six factors [shown below] that serve to maintain inegalitarian distributions, and consequently can be seen as mechanisms of structural violence.” [emphasis is added]

Each of the six factors, named below by Galtung, may have relevance to any given conflict or peace operation:

1. **Linear ranking order** - the ranking is complete, leaving no doubt as to who is higher in any pair of actors;
2. **Acyclical interaction pattern** - all actors are connected, but only one way – there is only one ‘correct’ path of interaction;
3. **Correlation between rank and centrality** – the higher the rank of the actor in the system, the more central his position in the interaction network;
4. *Congruence between the systems* – the interaction networks are structurally similar;
5. *Concordance between the ranks* – if an actor is high in one system then he also tends to be high in another system where he participates and,
6. *High rank coupling between levels* – so that the actor at level n-1 are represented at level n through the highest ranking actor at level n-1. (1969, p.179)

Galtung links his concepts to other theory and elements, for example, “peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but equally with development theory…and that conditions in the past, present, and future are intimately connected with conflict research, and development research.” Further linking to other concepts, Galtung refers to “expanding theory of vertical development, of participation, decentralization, co-decision.”

It is apparent that in Galtung’s conceptualizations, these comments directly link democracy-building and development to elements of structural violence and negative and positive peace. In practical terms, it so happens that democratic institution building, and development in general, are primary activities of peace and stability interventions in recent decades, whether successful or not, and hence, my inclusion of readings on democratization and development in connection with peace and stabilization interventions (Chapter 6). In essence, Galtung argues that unless the interests, causes, and conditions underlying a conflict are effectively addressed, the conflict will continue to resurface indefinitely, and that we must strive to achieve a reduction of personal violence in association with structural violence (suppression, social injustice, discrimination), and eliminate structural violence.
Before proceeding further, I should point out now that I depart from Galtung’s apparent absolutist’ stance that the absence of violence, presumably the complete elimination of structural and cultural violence, is assumed for positive peace. My view is that it is unlikely that all discrimination, injustice, indifference, greed, ignorance, arrogance, insults, and perhaps misunderstandings, and other human foible-driven manifestations of conflict and violence - apparent elements of structural and cultural violence - will be eradicated entirely from human affairs in the foreseeable future. That is indeed utopian if not the very description of heaven. For the time being, I would add a qualifier that, for a status of positive peace to exist, structural and cultural violence are acknowledged and measures for their control and elimination are institutionalized, active, and effective at all levels, and there are sufficient fora for civil and governmental dialogue – in effect, a macro application of constructive conflict.

I posit non-absolutist descriptions below of positive peace and negative peace as working parameters for analysis in connection with peace and stability operations. There is, of course, the risk that some, who are violently inclined, will take advantage of any declaration posed in less than absolute terms. On the other hand, absolutisms tend to be counter-productive in that they are ignored as being utopian, impossible to attain, or simply unenforceable. I think that finding realistic, sustainable, and humane means to sustainable positive peace is the challenge for policy planners, decision makers, and scholar-practitioners. But for now, my adapted listing of negative and positive peace elements for peace and stability intervention purposes goes as follows:
Positive Peace

• The underlying root causes and conditions of conflict are effectively addressed.
• Structural violence is minimal, and measures are in place for its control.
• There is a legitimate functioning government and civil system that ensures sufficient political, rule-of-law, economic and social welfare security, recognition and identity for all groups.
• There are effective constructive conflict processes for sustained governmental and civil collaborative dialogues.
• Peace enforcement or assisted stability measures by outsiders is not needed.

Negative Peace

• War and widespread violence/civil disorder are suppressed by coercion.
• The underlying root causes and conditions of conflict are not effectively addressed.
• Structural violence is prevalent.
• There is no legitimate functioning government and civil system that ensures sufficient political, rule of law, economic and social welfare security, and recognition and identity for all groups.
• There are no effective constructive conflict processes for sustained governmental and civil collaborative dialogues.
• Peace enforcement or assisted stability measures by outsiders is needed.

By this time in the evolution of peace and conflict studies, negative and positive peace, as concepts, are noted in many works and seem to have reached near axiomatic status among a number of scholar-practitioners. The related commentary of David Barash and Charles Webel (2002) is representative of a growing number of authors that incorporate specific mention of negative and positive peace distinctions as fundamental to understanding the etiology of peace and conflict:

Attention to negative peace, or the simple absence of war, usually results in a diplomatic emphasis on peacekeeping or peace restoring (if a war has already broken out). By contrast, positive peace focuses on peace building, the establishment of nonexploitative social structures, and a determination to work toward that goal even when a war is not ongoing or imminent. Negative peace is thus a more conservative goal, as it seeks to keep things the way they are (if a war is not actually taking place),
whereas positive peace is more active and bolder, implying the creation of something that does not currently exist (p. 8).

Barash and Webel (2002) go so far as to structure fully half of their book around descriptions and measures of traditional Track 1 approaches such as diplomacy, negotiations, settlements, legal mandates, and peace enforcement said to be dedicated instruments to building negative peace (Part III: Building Negative Peace). Part IV (Building Positive Peace) of their book is devoted to descriptions and measures for building positive peace such as the employment of principles of human rights, ecological and economic well-being, non-violence, and personal and societal transformation; approaches likely to involve more kinds of Track 2 actors. The exception to this trend of noting negative and positive peace elements as such seems to be in traditional political, international relations, or peace and stability operations literature, in which structural violence might be mentioned but there is little or no reference to negative and positive peace distinctions.

Common citation of negative and positive peace as concepts has taken some time to catch on; Galtung’s 1969 introduction of the concept is not on Kriesberg’s (2001, 2007) list of publications associated with the growth of the field of conflict resolution for the period of 1946 – 1985. Occasionally, gist’s of the principles involved are voiced in some form or other - perhaps intuitively in the presence of field realities – by intervenors in close proximity to action on the ground, such as by UN or coalition officers, but not specifically named or framed as such (see Covey, et al 2005).
Finally, **negative peace**, as explained by Galtung (1969, pp. 167-191), “exists by virtue of **conflict being suppressed yet latent,”** and he states that “**there is lack of fora for the generation of innovative insights to ensure political, economic, and legal security and recognition of all groups.**” Galtung adds: “**Typically, there are also insufficient processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues and constructive relationship change.**” Galtung’s two statements just cited are important. Whether intended to apply specifically to peace and stability interventions or not, they connect Galtung’s reasoning on negative peace to concepts intended to mitigate violence dynamics or to mitigate negative peace processes in peace and stability intervention environments when it is time to move beyond negative peace.

**Violence**

I argue that taking violence into account as a core concept of peacebuilding is an essential peacebuilding task. Violence is an essential ingredient of war and extensive disorder, and is usually not susceptible to remedy by forcing it below the radar into a frozen negative peace where it lives in the hearts and minds of the afflicted until stimulated into predictable resurrection by opportunists and tragedy as was demonstrated effectively in Bosnia and across Yugoslavia. Violence at its worst is human passion or rationale gone awry. To be clear, though, controlled violence is the very essence of law enforcement (use of necessary means to protect life and property). In theory, the same applies to the stabilization phase of a peace and stability operation. Perhaps, the now ingrained term **peace and stability operations** would be better phrased as **stabilization**

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To say the least, people are often not at their best in a peace and stability operation environment after long periods of stress and trauma, sometimes for decades or centuries. All manner of violence is encountered on a daily basis before and during the early stages of an intervention. There are a number of concepts attempting to explain violence or particular aspects of violence. I pose a few questions here to highlight some of them as relevant to this discussion. Are manifestations of violence aberrant or simply “normal” manifestations of frustration–aggression, as put forth by John Dollard and his colleagues (1939)? Are aggression and its often subsequent conflict escalation consequences largely driven by “normal” reactions of frustration to the thwarting of expectations as Ted Gurr argues in his Relative Deprivation Theory (1970)? - Or, the denial of inherent basic human needs - recognition, identity, and security – as articulated by John Burton’s Human Needs Theory (1997)?

Is frustration-aggression effect a factor of paradigm-perception driven actions and reactions as mapped in the Popper-Sandole Four World’s Model (Sandole, 1999, Ch. 8; 2010, Ch. 1)? - This model tracks event definition, analysis, explanation, and interpretation by humans within distinct mental, natural, human made and biological/physiological worlds.
The same questions could be posed in connection with other related theory; for example, Galtung’s rank disequilibrium (1969), North’s Overperception/Overreaction Theory (1968), Sandole’s Negative Self-Fulfilling Prophecy (Sandole, 1993), and Festingers’ Cognitive Dissonance Theories (1962), as presented by Sandole (1999, p. 219). All of these theories involve violence-prone perceptions, paradigms, values, and belief dynamics that might be considered “natural” and thereby embedded human behavior, and therefore relevant to this discussion on violence and peace and stability operation environments.

I am not able to treat at length in this section on violence all possible associations of the wide variety of concepts related to violence implied in the questions posed above, however, I believe the answer to each of the questions posed above is – yes. All of the concepts pertaining to violence mentioned above are relevant and do collectively, I believe, account for much that can be associated with war, violent disorder, and a frozen negative peace environment.

Galtung makes an interesting observation that “structural violence seems to be more ‘natural’ than structural peace,” and “personal violence is perhaps more ‘natural’ than personal peace (1969).” In this regard, Galtung’s conceptual description echoes Lonnie Athen’s sentiments in Athen’s theory of violentization concerning the etiology of violence dynamics among individuals and communities. Given that Galtung conjectures that violence appears to be a more natural human condition than peace, and that violence, or the threat of violence, is often an unwelcome fact on the ground thwarting progress in peace and stability interventions, I cite Athens below (2003, Vol. 4, pp. 6-7) on what
appears to be a convergence of views between Galtung and Athens on the matter of violence:

My restatement of the theory [violentization] will be based on four key assumptions. The first assumption is that domination and subordination are the common denominators in all human conflict and violence (Athens, 1998, p. 686). The second assumption is that people always strive to make their lives more predictable by “institutionalizing,” which I will define in part III, the critical social experience that they undergo, although not necessarily in the same way. The third assumption is that violent and ultra-violent people undergo a special form of socialization, which I now dub the “violentization process,” where they learn that violence is the basis for deciding who performs the super ordinate and subordinate roles in social activities. The final assumption is that whenever people undergo dramatic personal change (Athens, 1995), as in the case of the violentization process, or else live or work in a community in which they are “social misfits” for too long, they will suffer from at least some personal disorganization (see Thomas & Znaniecki, [1917] 1958, pp. 1647-1653; Blumer, 1979, pp. 67-69). [emphasis added].

Athens' theory of “violentization” (a term he devised) explains processes by which an individual progresses, for a variety of reasons, through stages of increasing capacity and inclination for violent acts in interaction with others (Athens, 1992). Later, Athens expands his violentization theory to explain particular dynamics of violence at the community level with some stated implications for societal levels as well (Athens, 1997). His latest refinement of violentization theory (Athens and Ulmer, 2003) includes re-labeling of some categories and additional argument for relevance to community and societal level structures and dynamics.

It seems that Athen’s comprehensive conceptualizations have significant potential for illuminating matters on chronic violence endemic in community or society-based intractable conflicts and, therefore, have relevance for peace and stability operation
environments. So, for the purposes of this study, I focus on Athen’s conceptualizations on violence in particular. A number of factors need to be taken into account. Peace operations are very complex, multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-structural, political and security-sensitive enterprises with continuous interaction with individuals, communities, and societal level entities, and often in hazardous conditions. A particular theory, to be of real interest and use, needs to be viable in such an environment. Given that Athens’ theory of violentization claims to explain certain dynamics of violence at multiple levels, and that destructive violence is a consistent motivator of peace operation interventions, a closer look is warranted. I will begin by posing additional questions.

Does “violentization” sufficiently explain why and how someone from any given ethnicity, nationality, or culture evolves from a non-violent (or, according to Athens, a marginally violent person) into a violent criminal without remorse? Does the theory offer explanations for sudden increases or decreases in violence on the part of individuals, communities, or societies involving ethnic, cultural, and historical factors? Is the theory useful in explaining the highly dynamic, chaotic, and seemingly unpredictable nature of communities and societies in “post”-conflict areas? Does the theory offer solutions or clues to possible peace operation intervention measures to mitigate violence? I think there are strong indications that violentization is a significant factor in conflicted peace and stability intervention environments and that a dedicated research and pilot project to address the questions posed above is warranted.
**Athen’s Violentization Theory of the Person**

Athen’s Violentization Theory of the Person


Athens’ Volume 4 includes an article by psychiatrist Matthew Dumont who “explores the broader social and cultural implications of Athens’ ideas for human nature, mental illness, and authority” (pp. 43-52). Also, as Co-editor Jeffery Ulmer explains in the preface of Vol. 4, it includes articles by: Richard Rhodes, who explains, using Athens’ violentization theory to explore the progression of ordinary German citizens into specialized Nazi SS mass killers (pp.93-106); Joshua Sanborn, a historian, who discusses violentization and “parallels between the socialization toward violent behavior of criminals and soldiers”(pp.107-124); Ginger Rhodes and colleagues who present an initial quantitative scale and data for measuring violentization (pp.125-146); and Co-editor Jeffery Ulmer, who comments on implications for the future of violentization
theory in general (pp.175-182). Athens, in the course of constructing his theory, developed new terms, concepts, and categories.

With peace and stability operations in mind, I separate my discussion of Athens’ theory into two parts: 1) Athens’ *Theory of Violentization of the Person* (as I refer to it), (see Figure 6 below), and 2) Athens’ *Application of Violentization Theory to Community*, which I think is useful in analyzing societal level dynamics (see Figure 7 below). I constructed the graphics to aid in understanding the stages and dynamics involved, and to list key points being made by Athens.
Figure 6: Athen's Theory of Violentization of the Person

- Violence
  - Violent subjugation
  - Personal humiliation
  - Violent coaching
  - Defiance (formerly beligerency)

- Violent Dominance Engagements (formerly violent performances)
- Epiphany: mitigated violent resolution

- Social Unification
  - Social trepidation by others in presence of former subordinate

- Malevolancy
  - Resolution to unmitigated violence, relishes any opportunity to violently subjugate others
  - Stains ultra-violent status, subjugation process completed
Figure 7: Athen's Application of Violentization Theory to Community
Athens’ **Violentization Theory of the Person** consist of four stages: 1) brutalization; 2) defiance (formerly belligerency); 3) violent dominance engagements (formerly violent performances), and 4) virulency.

When elaborating Athens’ comments below on key elements of violentization stages, I think in terms of the applicability of his theory to peace and stability operation environments:

During “violent subjugation,” authentic or would-be subjugators, such as fathers, stepmothers, older siblings, neighbors, or schoolmates, use or threaten to use physical force to make a perceived subordinate accept their domination.

The second elemental experience that comprises brutalization is “personal horriﬁcation.” During this experience, perceived subordinates do not undergo violent subjugation themselves, but they witness someone close to them, such as a mother, brother, close friend, neighbor, or schoolmate, undergo it.

“Violent coaching” is the ﬁnal elemental experience that comprises brutalization. During this experience, a superordinate places himself in the role of coach and assigns a perceived subordinate to the role of novice. The coach instructs novices that they should not try to avoid, appease, ignore, or run from their would-be subjugators, but instead physically attack them (Athens, Vol. 4, 2003, p. 8).

The second stage of the violentization process is defiance (formerly belligerency). This stage entails a moment of “epiphany”, whereby a victim that has endured the various elements of brutalization including violent coaching makes a “mitigated violent resolution” that it is better to “kill or gravely harm” someone else than to let that someone else do the same to him or her. At this point, the victim has completed a personal psychological re-organization and moves on to the “violent dominance engagement” stage (formerly violent performances). This stage involves a potentially prolonged series
of events involving the establishment of dominance over another or others or the failure to do so. “Unlike brutalization, but like defiance, a violent dominance engagement is also a unitary yet nuanced experience. Dominance engagements arise when disputes break out over dominance, but despite appearances to the contrary, such disputes do not occur instantaneously. Instead, they arise over a process that has a minimum of three basic steps” (Athens, 2003, Vol. 4, pp.12-14): 1) Dominance-claiming gestures; 2) A would-be subordinate must resist being cast into the subordinate role; and, 3) One of the two would-be superordinates must decide to overcome the other ones’ actual or anticipated resistance to performing the subordinate role.

Further, ascending to Athens (ibid., pp. 17-18):

Virulency is the fourth and final stage of violentization of the person process: “After making this new violent resolution, he is transformed from a person who would only resort to violence to resist his or an intimate’s debasement or violent subjugation to a person who relishes any opportunity to violently subjugate others. Undergoing the malevolency experience marks not only the completion of the virulency stage, but the entire violentization process. At the end of this stage, a “violent” individual matures into an “ultra-violent” one and, in the process, discovers a complete “cure” for his earlier personal disorganization. Ultra-violent criminals live and die by a motto that turns the golden rule on its head: “Do onto others as they have done onto you, but do it to them first.

In positioning his “violentization process,” Athens list (ibid., pp. 2-6) the essential arguments of “biological purists” like Mednick (1977, 1982) who “spots the cause of violence in the organism itself”; the arguments of “environmental purists” like Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) and Sutherland (1973) who spot “the cause of violence in living habitats rather than in their bodies”; the “eclectics” like Lewis (1992) who “…spot the causes of violence in multiple factors located in the organism and the environment….but
these factors are not explicitly linked together…”; and the “integrated approach” of Gilligan (1996) in which “He connects together factors lodged in the organism with those lodged in the environment.”

In addition, Athens states (ibid., p. 5) that:

Unfortunately, biological purists, environmental purists, eclectics, and integrationists cannot adequately explain how males or females become violent because they all disrespect the very essence of human experience. A human experience refers to the overt physical actions together with the conscious thoughts and feelings that occur when human beings interact with their environment, including other human beings, at a particular point in time (Dewey, 1929).

The biological purist, environmental purist, eclectic, and integrated approaches are based on a false dualism between the body and the environment because they all trace the alleged causes of violence back to factors that spring from either the body or environment instead of back to the experiences that spring from the interaction between them. Thus a holistic approach that unites the body and environment rather than arbitrarily splits them apart must be taken in the study of violence. Moreover, human organisms, their environmental niche, and their ongoing experiences exist in an interdependent relationship to one another (Lewontin, 1991, pp. 105-128; Mead, 1992, 1932, pp. 32-46, 84-85; 1934, pp. 129, 245-252).

Athens concludes his positioning of violentization in relation to the broader and ongoing debate on the nurture vs. nature dualism of man:

Thus, the relationship between human organisms and their environmental niches are not only interdependent, but also developmental (Lewontin et al., 1984, pp. 119-123; 2000; Montagu, 1985). Because of the conscious, interdependent, and developmental nature of this relationship, children, like adults, always play a proactive rather than merely a passive role in their own violent transformations and in the transformations of the larger communities in which they live (Athens, 1997, pp. 22-27, 115-120; 1998, p. 676; Blumer, 1997, pp. iii-vi). Consequently, to gain a proper understanding of violence, not only must a holistic approach be taken, but one that respects the interdependent and developmental nature of human experiences. [See also Sandole, 1999, Ch. 8]
Athens believes that the human being is a complex thinking entity and responds to biological, environmental, psychological, and other influences through experience, and knowingly participates in his or her own violentization process and is responsible for his or her actions.

**Athens’ Application of Violentization Theory to Community (Society)**

Athens takes a very definite position that his “violentization process” is relevant to understanding violence dynamics in communities and that it has serious implications for societal well-being. He breaks his points down into “Basic Building Blocks of Communities” (dominance, institutions, and socialization), and “Communal Change Processes” (see Figure 7, and Athens, 2003, Vol. 4, pp. 19-38).

Athens (ibid., p. 20) links his comments on community with the work of Robert Park (1952):

“A community has a spatial and geographical connotation. Every community has a location, and the individuals who compose it have a place of residence within the territory which the community occupies.”

“A major community is one in which various minor ones operate (Park, 1952, p.96). In any major community, however, there must be at least some common institutions that effectively operate across all the different minor communities that comprise it. A minor community is the more limited physical space across which at least some unique institutions, including those for the socialization of new members, effectively operate. Minor communities are not static entities, but may evolve or devolve over time. As the minor communities that comprise a major community evolve or devolve, so may the major community in which they are incorporated.

Athens continues drawing the parameters of his view of community in relation to violentization processes. His detailing of dynamics is important, i.e.:

Based on the diameter of the domain in which an institution effectively operates, three types of institutional social experiences can be distinguished: (1) “societal”; (2) “communal”; and (3) “idiosyncratic.”

*Societal* institutions are principles for organizing social experiences in which the effective domain of operation cuts across an entire major
community, with the sole exception of a few of its minor communities. Thus, it is always societal institutions that demarcate the borders of a major community. *Communal* institutions are principles for organizing social experiences in which the effective domain of operation stretches from one end to the other of a minor community, with the sole exception of a few individuals or groups within it.

*Idiosyncratic* institutions are principles for organizing social experiences that do not effectively operate beyond a relatively few individuals or groups within a minor community….Because the evolution and devolution of our institutions are always a contingent and problematic process, the evolution and devolution of our minor communities are also contingent and problematic processes. Dominance is the universal principle on which all social experiences, institutions, and in turn, communities are ultimately bastard (Athens, 2002a, pp. 30-32). Dominance refers to the swaying of a social experience in accordance with our preferences. People dominate when they impose their view of an emerging social experience on other people, and thereby steer the course of its development. The issue of dominance emerges as soon as people begin to undergo together an experience of any length.

….Dominance is also the universal principle on which all communities – past, present, and future – are organized.

….In every community, the members create operating principles for organizing how dominance engagements are waged.

….People primarily rise or fall in their minor community’s pecking order through their winning or losing of institutionalized dominance engagements that they have been socialized to employ….The impact that top dogs have on the tempo and flavor of their minor community’s life far exceeds their absolute numbers in their community.

….Thus, based on the nature and degree of a minor community’s institutionalization of dominance engagements, the socialization that their members receive to wage them and the kind of people that most often win and lose them and thereby rise to the top or sink to the bottom of their dominance orders, three types of minor communities that transcend racial, ethnic, and religious lines can be demarcated. (Athens, 2003, Vol. 4. pp. 20-23)

Here, Athens introduces his “minor community” categories entailing “civil minor community”; “turbulent minor community” and “malignant minor community” (see Figure 7).

Athens then elaborates his views on how minor civil, turbulent minor, and malignant minor communities fluxuate and transition, “evolving” or “devolving” into any
one of the other minor community categories, that is, a more violent minor community or less violent minor community, or one in basic chaos (ibid., pp.34-37).

Finally, Athens concludes by warning of the dangers of increasing violentization at community and societal levels, given our “shrinking” world, and that it is in everyone’s interest to support research and development of programs to help transform malignant minor communities into civil ones and prevent civil ones from evolving into turbulent or malignant ones (ibid., p. 37). Put another way, it is in everyone’s interest, except perhaps criminal organizations, to shift circumstances from destructive conflict processes to constructive conflict processes. In this regard, Athens has just described a core task of peace operations. Whether there are effective processes to prevent or reverse violentization processes associated with minor or major communities in a peace and stability operation context, is a matter I take up in Chapter 9 (Implications of Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations). But for now, I will introduce other relevant concepts into the discussion starting with Kriesberg’s constructive conflict.

**Constructive Conflict**

At this point, linkages of negative and positive peace dynamics to political economies and inter-ethnic/cultural factors may be argued, as well as a connection to Kriesberg’s *Constructive Conflict* (2007), which might be viewed in terms of mitigating personal and structural violence, and reducing the strength of linkages between the two:

The constructive waging of a struggle is not simply the absence of destructive elements. Constructive conflicts are often pursued using persuasive efforts and promises of benefits, rather than relying wholly or largely on coercive threats or actions. The adversaries recognize each other as legitimate entities and do not threaten the other’s existence. They interact to solve the problem they face together - their conflict - by seeking
how best to construct a mutually acceptable outcome. Such problem-solving approaches may be taken by each side’s representatives or by significant groups within each side in the struggle (Kriesberg, 2007, p.19-20).

In addition to a recommendation for a mutual problem solving approach and attitude, Kriesberg suggests that shared understandings of human rights and basic human needs might serve as standards to assess constructiveness (constructive conflict):

“In the context of CAR thinking, conflicts are waged constructively insofar as adversaries maximize mutual benefits and minimize mutual harms.”

And,

“…the widely shared understandings of human rights and of basic human needs will provide standards to assess constructiveness. Insofar as the means of fighting cause great damage to members of the opposing sides, the conflicts are regarded as destructively waged” (Kriesberg in Sandole, et. al., 2009, p. 157).

Might human rights, and a systemic response to basic human needs, also be taken as likely standards for sustainable positive peace?

A contributing factor to a condition of only negative peace (i.e., positive peace deficit) may be the apparent lack of awareness and understanding of negative and positive peace conceptually by conflict parties and intervenors. It might be a conscious rejection of such concepts based on the assumption that such a thing as positive peace is unrealistic in application in the real world. Such a perspective precludes effectively addressing root causes and conditions of conflict and, therefore, undermines progress towards longer-term conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, or transformation.
More Recent Conflict Theory

There is little question that a great deal of thinking and work has been done in recent years in the relatively new multidisciplinary field of conflict theory. For the purpose of highlighting the broad cross-section of more recent “new-school” conflict, I list a number of them below. A number of the theorists and practitioners listed below also have works on conflict prevention and resolution theory, which is listed in following section. Of course, many of the works contain comprehensive treatments of all aspects of conflict, and conflict prevention and resolution, but my attempt is to highlight the broad disciplines with two separate lists. A wide range of relevant works has been produced, based on analysis and a fair amount of actual experience, by scholars and scholar-practitioners actively working on conflict analysis, management, and resolution issues.

Below are representative contributions to the field that help fill-in the peacebuilding matrix that peace and stability operations might tap into:

and Negative Peace (1969); Ichheiser’s Misunderstandings in Human Relations (1949); Kuhn’s work on the paradigm-basis of perception (1996) first published in 1962; Bowen’s work on Family Systems Theory (1976); Wilmot and Hocker on Parties, Roles, Issues, Positions, Styles, Tactics, and Power Currencies (1998); Kipnis on Influential Tactics and Power Terms (1976); Rubin and Pruitt on Structural-Psychological Changes, Definitions, and Terms (1994); Curle’s Progression of Conflict Model and Peacebuilding Roles and Functions (1971); Mitchell’s Structure of International Conflict (1981); Rubinstein on Culture, Symbols, and Peacekeeping (1993); and Anatol Rappaport’s conflict gaming models.

Prevention-Resolution Theory


The list could go on. Suffice it to say, a substantial amount of ground has been covered in recent years. I think that the field does have something to offer those with peacemaking responsibilities in humanitarian and peace operations.
It seems that since all human interaction is necessarily the interaction of people with a broad assortment of sociological, psychological, physiological drivers of behavior simultaneously at work, then it is reasonable to expect that the causes and conditions of human conflict are also subject to the same assortment of multilevel, multifaceted, and simultaneous influences. I make this statement with respect to the complexity of the human condition and to qualify that my particular categorizing of factors and influences under the title of Overview of Select Theory and Practice in this Chapter, is not meant to be an authoritative or exhaustive listing in any way. The categories I have chosen are meant to be an overview of broadly representative and related elements, which I emphasize for the purposes of this literature review and study context.

**Relationship**

An exploration of relationship dynamics with respect to conflict and its resolution is useful. Specific focus on *relationship* in this context has been of particular interest to a number of people studying and/or working on conflict issues. The kinds of relationship played out among conflict parties has long been a concern of former senior diplomat Harold Saunders, who comments:

> Relationships across borders today are facts of life. We cannot ignore them. If we look at these relationships in the context of changes in how nations interact, we may see not only the dangers of improper intervention; we may see that some cross-border interaction can offer opportunities for peaceful change with full respect for others. A sensible approach today might be neither to denounce this interaction nor to apply the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs in pure and rigid ways, but to build relationships in which mutual respect might keep that interaction within limits that define and protect the integrity of each party. Understanding the interaction more fully might even suggest imaginative approaches to common problems in an interdependent world (Saunders, 1991, p.155).
Jay Rothman (1992, p.34) includes a “Human Relations Approach” component in developing his Synthetic Dialogue Model with this observation:

A survey conducted in 1988 of dialogue efforts between Jews and Arabs in Israel lists approximately 45 contemporary human relations organizations designed largely to break down the barriers of mistrust, misunderstanding, and stereotyping so that Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis living primarily within the pre-1967 borders can learn to see the human face of the other (Rothman et al., 1987)….Those working in this arena seek to positively influence interpersonal attitudes by fostering improved understanding and friendship between Jews and Arabs. [italics in the original]

Kevin Clements reinforces Michael Bank’s addition of interdependency of relationship to the discussion. In Clements’s article, “Peace Building and Conflict Transformation” (1997), he quotes Michael Banks (1987) as follows:

People trained in adversarial techniques (lawyers, diplomats, the military) tend to advocate policies which build walls between parties; people trained in problem solving techniques (businessmen, psychologists, technical experts) are more likely to advocate policies which build bridges between parties. Reliance upon a single channel of communication foments misperception; multiple channels give more opportunity to perceive the opponent realistically. Isolationism puts an actor at risk; interdependence, if encouraged, generates a network of criss-crossing relationships, which can ultimately become impossible to tear apart.

Clements concludes his article this way:

This is the challenge for peace and conflict studies: how can we develop a web of interdependent relationships, which will enable the application of reason to problems and their nonviolent resolution? The answer to this question lies in the enhancement of relationship, community and civil society and in the conversations that make this possible between all sorts of identity groups and epistemic communities (Clements, 1997).
This section’s focus on relationship, in connection with conflict, also resonates with the fundamentals of John Paul Lederach’s (1997, Ch. 6) recently developed “Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding.” He integrates his, and others relationship-oriented thinking (Adam Curle, Harold Saunders, Joseph Montville, Jay Rothman, and others) on conflict prevention, resolution, and transformation into an integrated theoretical framework which he refers to as Conflict Transformation. With relationship as a fundamental factor in Lederach’s conflict transformation, he advocates a shift in paradigm:

To be at all germane to contemporary conflict, peacebuilding must be rooted in and responsive to the experiential and subjective realities shaping peoples’ perspectives and needs. It is at this very point that the conceptual paradigm and praxis of peace building must shift significantly away from the traditional framework and activities that make up statist diplomacy. **I believe this paradigmatic shift is articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution of issues and toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships** [bold print emphasis is mine] (Lederach, 1997, 24).

In other words, Lederach advises moving the focus away from political settlement deals to relationships.

**Sociological-Psychological**

Lederach’s comprehensive framework entails intervention at three primary levels of society (grassroots leadership, middle-range leadership, top leadership) and across divides within those levels, hopefully leaving newly networked conflicting parties with new transformed relationship perspectives, and an ongoing, self-owned conflict analysis and resolution process capacity. A key to his approach is close attention to relationship factors in bringing about needed new perceptions, behaviors (cooperation), and outcomes.
Also useful here are the paradigm-based perception considerations and cautions provided by Thomas Kuhn, Dennis Sandole, and Vamik Volkan. For example: people can and do perceive the “same” things differently – scientists and political realists included – depending on their personal or group world views and beliefs (paradigms) (Kuhn, 1996). “Cognitive blindness, cognitive resistance, evaluative-affective resistance I and II (unconscious and “conscious resistance respectively involving value and affect”), are often factors in human perceptions and responses that can negatively impact intervention efforts (Sandole, 1987, Ch. 14). Sense-of-relationship (and paradigm shift flexibility) may be significantly influenced by an individual or group’s egoism of victimization or chosen trauma as Volkan describes an unconscious need to use a particular traumatic memory or keep a conflicted relationship in place (Volkan, 1991, p.213).

Another key conceptual point for consideration is the protracted fluctuation back and forth between confrontation and negotiation that conflicted parties often get stuck in (Protracted Conflict Cycle), as illustrated by Adam Curle’s (1971) Making Peace model (see Lederach, 1997, Ch. 5, and my Figure 15 - Conflict Management Range).

It appears that the confrontation-negotiation fluctuation phenomenon can also be viewed from another perspective by employing Sandole’s elaboration on conflict:

Conflict is defined here as a dynamic phenomenon, a manifest conflict process (MCP), comprised of phases of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination / resolution (Sandole, 1999). An MCP is a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives (e.g., lawyers, diplomats), try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another.

MCPs can occur in the absence of aggression: actions which, whether intentional or not, have the effect of physically damaging or destroying, or
otherwise forcibly eliminating somebody. Two modes of conflict behavior come to mind as examples of MCPs that can occur in the absence of aggression: games and debates (Rapoport, 1960, 1974, pp.181-2). (Sandole, 1999, p.16).

Sandole then goes on to distinguish what he calls an aggressive manifest conflict process (AMCP) as:

….. a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives (e.g., law enforcement or armed forces personnel), try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another; and / or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another. Rapoport’s fights (1960, 1974, pp. 180-1) are an example of AMCPs. It is with fights and the processes leading to them that we are primarily concerned here (Sandole, 1999, p.17).

The overall connection, in this instance, between Kuhn, Sandole, and Curle is that the fluctuation problem may well be driven by a failure of constructive sense-of-relationship and openness to paradigm change due to various elements of cognitive blindness and emotional (affective) factors. These are factors that may otherwise be amenable to skilled and informed relationship-oriented interventions, inducing movement towards resolution or transformation, or at least helpful in providing food for thought and creating temporary settlement breathing space.

Essential human needs for safety, security, and self-esteem are also very likely factors in the interplay of complicating cognitive and emotional phenomena described above in relation to conflict prevention, resolution, and transformation as put forth by John Burton and others in their advocacy of a Human Needs Theory-based approach (Burton, 1979, 1990, 1997).
To elaborate on Volkan’s chosen trauma concept, in his book *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride To Ethnic Terrorism* (1997), He describes the phenomenon this way:

I use the term to describe the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors. It is, of course, more than a simple recollection; it is a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts. … I maintain that the word *chosen* fittingly reflects a large group’s unconsciously defining its identity by the transgenerational transmission of injured selves infused with the memory of the ancestors’ trauma” (1997, p.48).

Clearly, unresolved past traumas are a core complicating factor in reconciling perceptions of conflict parties and moving relationship dynamics more readily towards resolution.

G. Ichheiser’s article, “*Analysis and Typology of Personality Misinterpretations,*” as cited in the book, *Interpersonal Dynamics: Essays and Readings on Human Interaction,* explains his concept of a *unity of personality* error. He explains that people tend to stereotype the personalities of others according to the particular role in which the other person is observed or described. In other words, people tend to mistakenly assume that the context in which they observe someone is the sum of that person’s character (unity of personality); for example, people may not think that someone has any other dimension to their character if they have only known them as a police officer or a priest. There is also the risk of mistakenly assuming the nature of one’s motivation based only on the context within which that person is operating (Bennis, 1968, p. 731).

In such instances, the perception is one-dimensional and, therefore, misleading. There are implications here for political-realism’s one-dimensional, nation-state rational actor and overly simplified assumptions of one-dimensional “national culture.”
Psychology & Peace Operations

Considering that peace operations are interventions into conflict situations that are infused with significant psychological and sociological dynamics -- a safe assumption I believe, given that seriously stressed and traumatized human beings in conflict are involved -- it seems that utilizing some psychology and socio-psychology based guidance in conflict analysis and intervention planning could be helpful. There are a number of mental health professionals and others who share this assumption about the study of major conflict from psychoanalytic perspectives; nevertheless, relatively few focus on the conduct of peace operations, per se, or they conclude by stating the obvious, such as, “peacekeeping” should focus on building more cooperation among conflict parties.

Recognizing that detailed treatment of even sub-sections of human behavioral dynamics in connection with peace and stability interventions could easily fill books, and in fact does. My brief mention of psychological and sociological issues is to stress the point that such dynamics are real and have profound effects on people (local conflict parties and intervenors) and events in peace and stability operation environments. In discussing peace operations and psychology, there is necessarily discussion of theories of the person and social-psychological theories of the group (community/society/nation) since the relationships are deeply interwoven and symbiotic. I should point out that over-reliance on any single perspective or discipline in pursuit of viable peace would be problematic. Consider obvious deficiencies in the near exclusive reliance by states on political state-actor based analyses in dealing with non-state actor driven conflicts of recent decades. Kenneth Waltz’s argument in *Man, the State, and War*, is that one level of analysis is a partial analysis (Waltz, 1959; See Sandole, 1999, Ch. 1).
A number of factors need to be taken into account to arrive at plausible conclusions for relevant conflict analysis and intervention planning. To stress the point again, peace operations are very complex, multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-structural, political and security-sensitive enterprises engaged in continuous interaction with individuals, communities, and societal level entities under hazardous conditions.

For example and perspective, I point out that, in the field, openly suggesting that violence is linked to criminality, even if in the manner of a “benign study” of violence in a peace operation environment, can be - and probably is - deemed a political act by whichever local national individual or group whom-ever is supposedly to blame or feels misunderstood. Such “accusations”, especially by international interveners, can be expected to result in strong political reactions from conflict parties, authorities, and some intervenors also - often with immediate negative consequences. It is best that this be understood beforehand and that measures be taken beforehand to mitigate potential negative consequences of revelations.

I believe that a comprehensive inter-disciplinary approach is essential to render analysis and planning less vulnerable to gaps, gaffs, or disasters on the ground. An informed use of various tools in a mission, inclusive of psychoanalysis or psycho-social analysis, is essential to render conflict analysis and intervention planning less vulnerable to regrettable gaffs or gaps on the ground that can and do cause trouble for all concerned.

Beyond conflict resolution scholars, only a small group of people such as former diplomat Joseph Montville and psychiatrist Vamik Volkan (Volkan, Montville, and Julius, 1991), and sociologist Johan Galtung (1969) have long been advocating for direct sourcing of psychology and socio-psychology to better understand conflict and violence
of the kind that induces the international community to draft resolutions, establish policies, and send military forces to intervene. In recent years, however, a growing number of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social-psychologists have taken up the challenge to study the problem of large-scale conflict. For example, the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence, a division of the American Psychological Association, established a journal called “Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.” The Society’s mission statement is pertinent:

**Division 48 - Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology Division**

Division works to promote peace in the world at large and within nations, communities and families. It encourages psychological and multidisciplinary research, education and training on issues concerning peace, nonviolent conflict resolution, reconciliation and the causes, consequences and prevention of violence and destructive conflict. The Division fosters communication among researchers, teachers and practitioners who are working on these issues and are applying the knowledge and methods of psychology in the advancement of peace and prevention of violence and destructive conflict. The Division seeks to make connections between all areas of psychological work and peace and welcomes participation from all areas of the discipline. A Division journal, *Peace and Conflict: The Journal of Peace Psychology*, is published quarterly (www.apa.org/about/division/div48.apsx).

The establishment of Division 48, is to some extent, a reflection of the earlier activity of the American Psychiatric Association, which, at the invitation of the Egyptian, U.S., and Israeli governments, set up a committee (eventually known as the Committee on Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs) to study psychological barriers in the Israeli-Arab conflict, the “other walls” as President Anwar Sadat of Egypt referred to them. In 1977, Sadat was the first Arab leader to establish formal peace talks with Israel, and while doing so, pointedly stated that there were psychological barriers to overcome and called for
psychologists to formally study the matter (Volkan, 1997, pp. 30 – 35). This encouraged concerned governments to support the initiative.

A number of questions come to mind in considering connections between psychology/social-psychology and peace operations. Does psychological and psycho-social theory sufficiently explain why and how someone from any given ethnicity, nationality, or culture evolves from a non-violent into a violent person or perhaps a “terrorist” without remorse. Although Lonnie Athens addresses violentization of individuals, groups, and societies, does his theory of violentization work in the highly complex, dynamic, and large-scale conflicts typically generating international peace and stability interventions? Is it the same phenomenon as common domestic violence? Does the theory help explain war? Is the theory supported by other theories of human nature?

Do psychological/psycho-social theory and approaches offer solutions or clues to measures of more effective peace operation interventions? Can the intervention approaches be carried out in a peace operation mission area without interfering with ongoing sensitive political and administrative processes? Can such approaches be complementary to ongoing political and mission needs? Can relevant approaches be conducted without openly advocating or even using the term *reconciliation*, which often does little but further anger traumatized people if they are not ready for it. That is, if they have not yet effectively mourned their losses – an essential step insisted on by psychiatrist Vamik Volkan (1997, Ch. 3), or if victims have not received at least a desired acknowledgement of remorsefulness on the part of perceived perpetrators?

It is very difficult to discuss the psychology of the person or group as separate and distinct matters in the context of highly tense macro-interventions, given that an
individual can rarely act without some immediate influence on dynamics affecting the whole even if only in the realm of rumor, which often takes on a volatile and imperiling life of its own. As a consequence, I will attempt to discuss individual and group psychological dynamics simultaneously, while not implying that they are necessarily interchangeable, although, there is some professional argument for blurring the lines between the psychology of the individual and of the group. For example, as quoted in Chirot (2001):

The term, ‘psychosocial’ attempts to express the recognition that there is always a close, ongoing circular interaction between an individual’s psychological state and his or her social environment” (Bergh & Jareg, 1998, p. 13). The aims of psychosocial assistance under war conditions have been defined as “to promote human rights and mental health by strategies that support already existing protective social and psychological factors and diminish the stress or factors at different levels of intervention”(Agger, Vuk, & Mimica, 1995, p.15).

Volkan (1997) states that, “While there are many dissimilarities between the working of the individual and the group mind, the tools of psychology, and especially of psychoanalysis, can shed light on group identity and behavior, not because they concern our unconscious drives or paths of psychosexual development, but because of the tacit assumption that each individual or group has complex and idiosyncratic ways of dealing with the demands of the inner and outer worlds.” Pertaining to his idea of an ethnic group’s identity being under an ethnic tent: “...the tent canvas serves as both personal garment and ethnic tent… The two layers become interchangeable…the second layer compensates for the inadequacy of the first layer.”

This implies that there is significant fluidity between individual and group psychological processes.
Another example of overlapping individual and group psychology is given by Staub (1989, 1999):

My conception of the origins of genocides and mass killings (see Table 1) is based on a theory of motivation and action, personal goal theory that I have developed in other publications. According to this theory, both individual human beings and cultures possess a hierarchy of motives. Individuals and cultures do not always act on their most important motives. Circumstances can activate motives lower in the hierarchy. For example, the need for self-defense and the need for connection to other people can be important or relatively unimportant motives. The lower a motive is in an individual’s or culture’s hierarchy, the more extreme the life conditions needed to make it active and dominant. Whether a motive is expressed in behavior depends on the skills and competencies of individuals, or on the social institutions.

Carrying on the point of overlapping psychological dynamics, Athens (2003, p. 37), in the course of discussing “violentization,” points to a continuum of dynamics that affect “minor communities,” and “major communities” alike: “As in the case of minor communities, major communities are not static entities, but evolve or devolve over time by a similar dynamic that operates on a much larger scale.”

Collectively, mental health professionals have contributed much to the subject of psychology and major conflict dynamics that can be useful to diplomats, politicians, military leadership, and civil affairs personnel involved in peace operation planning and implementation. A cursory familiarization of pertinent concepts such as chosen trauma, unresolved mourning, time collapse, we-ness, enemy images, purification, belonging by violence, internalization, large-scale identities, individual or group regression (Volkan 1999), or processes such as evolving from victim to victimizer (Volkan, 1999) or violentization (Athens, 2003), would be useful.

As I alluded to earlier, discretion in the use of any tool in a conflict zone is prudent. It is also important to consider many perspectives. For example, there is an
apparent assumption that Volkan makes regarding terrorists that I find problematic. He states that, “For Hamas, terrorism is an end in itself.” And, “Because studies of terrorist leaders are rare, and clinically speaking insufficient, it is difficult to know which type of malignant narcissism they may suffer from.”

On this point by Volkan, there is no distinction made between “terrorists” and “freedom fighters.” This can be taken to mean that all “terrorists” and “freedom fighters” alike are by definition mentally ill. In effect, such a presumed status and labeling precludes outreach, compromise, or effective dialogue, or perhaps more importantly, any notion that a state’s own actions or policies might be part of the problem. The only presumed course of action is to kill or incarcerate the “terrorists” – the “bad guy.” This perspective limits options, including efforts to re-humanize opponents on all sides and encourage more moderate flexible views. If a particular radical is beyond reach, beyond dialogue, so be it. However, there are probably many who can be reached.

In connection with this point, there is some disagreement, or perhaps confusion, among experts over the matter of what is psycho-pathologically based, implying a condition that might or might not be treated by psychoanalysis, and what is driven by social behavioral processes and is, therefore, susceptible to behavioral therapy. Athens’ “violentization process” theory describes a series of four stages (brutalization, defiance, violent dominance engagements, and virulency) in which individuals devolve (regress) in which he or she is increasingly conditioned (with the support of his or her “phantom community”) to shift from a non-violent (“marginally violent”) person to a violent person who pre-emptively strikes out in self-defense, and then eventually becomes an “ultra-
violent” person who engages in serious violence for enjoyment (Athens and Ulmer, 2003).

Athens states that an actor who has completed the “virulency” stage and becomes ultra-violent is likely beyond redemption, but that interventions could have been conducted at key points in the four stage process prior to completion of the fourth stage in order to interrupt the devolution. This process is characterized by Richard Rhodes (1999, p. 225) as social-behavioral in character impacted by social pressures, meaning that violentization may be responsive to behavioral therapy, and is, therefore, not a pathology that is beyond behavioral therapy. This is an important point in considering measures for peace operation intervention planning and civil society building in many “post”-conflict societies today.

It seems that Hume could agree with Athens on the latter’s position that experience is the core to understanding violence and the violentization of individuals:

Hume applies empiricism more rigorously than ever before: he holds that all concepts are derived from experience and all knowledge about the world (including human nature) must be based on experience. Pure reason can prove results only about “relations of ideas” in logic and mathematics; it cannot yield any sort of metaphysical truth about the world (Stevenson, 2004, pp. 116).

Perhaps Marx can be called on to offer something here in support of Athens’ violentization process theory:

What is more distinctive of Marx’s concept of humanity is his view of our essentially social nature: in one place he even wrote that “the real nature of man is the totality of social relations. …Marx would say that there is no such thing as a fixed, individual human nature-for what is true of people in one society or period may not be true in another place or time. Indeed, he remarked that “all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature (Stevenson, p. 148).
Perhaps if Marx had met Athens, he would say that all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human behavior.

Since I’m interpreting and applying the opinions of those not immediately available to object, I’ll add Sartre and Malcolm X to Athens’ supporters. Athens expresses firm conviction that violent criminals, despite their social violentization conditioning, are responsible for their actions, which he claims are the result of a deliberate decision on their part, however fleeting the moment of decision was (Athens and Ulmer, 2003, pp.1-18).

Sartre, as interpreted by Stevenson (2004, p. 184), would be of the following view:

Sartre tries to extend our freedom and our responsibility to everything we think, feel, and do. He suggests there are times when this radical freedom is clearly manifested to us. In moments of temptation or indecision (e.g., when the man who has resolved not to gamble anymore is confronted with the gaming tables once again), one realizes, painfully, that no motive and no past resolution, however strong, determines what one does next (p. 33). Every moment requires a new or renewed choice. Following Kierkegaard and Hedigger, Sartre uses the term “anguish” to describe this consciousness of one’s own freedom (pp. 29, 464). Anguish is not fear of an external object, but the uneasy awareness of the ultimate unpredictability of one’s own behavior…Fear is common, but anguish is more rare because it is “the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself” (p. 39).

Athens uses the term psychological “disorganization” in the context of anguish. Malcom X would presumably disagree with Athens on the point of responsibility for all of one’s actions, considering that Malcom said, “I’m nonviolent with those who are nonviolent with me. But when you drop that violence on me, then you’ve made me go insane, and I’m not responsible for what I do.” (Along those lines, when in the Middle East or northern Africa, I have heard the phrase, “it drives me crazy”, a number of times
from local nationals in discussions about western government policies, practices, and prejudices.)

On the other hand, Malcom X and Athens may well concur with Athens’ description of the violentization process. Malcom describes his own observation of what Athens would later call the brutalization stage:

They’d all had the same look in their eyes, the same distancing of themselves from what was happening around them. In time I thought, this boy, too, would go on to acquire the same wariness, a quality of disguised hurt, a quality of removal and disavowal. In some important way he, like them, would cease to care. It wasn’t just that these boys had come to expect to be blamed when they really had done nothing, although that was part of it. No, what was really important was that they’d made it so that it didn’t matter anymore. Because they’d long ago discovered that the way to survive was to hide their real selves from the world. And no matter what happened, they would never, ever, let anything touch them (Steger and Lind, 1999, p. 176).

A very long list of relevant points could be presented and expanded on in connection with psychology and peace operations, such as meaning (Frankl, 1959), basic human needs (Burton, 1990), frustration and aggression (Dollard, et. al.,1939), delusional relationships (Doyle, 1995), cognitive dissonance, (Festinger, 1962), self-esteem (Maslow, 1954; Volkan, 1999). There not being room in this writing to cover all possibilities, I will mention only a few more that I believe deserve particular attention.

Based on my observation of conflict dynamics in conflict and “post”-conflict zones, I believe that humiliation is a principle factor in the initiation, escalation, intensity, and intractability of conflict, particularly humiliation of the sort perpetrated by those who profess to be superior to those being dominated. Evelin Linder (2002) conducted extensive research into the phenomenon of humiliation in connection with WWI, and the
recent conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi. She refers to the ongoing dynamics as “cycles of humiliation.” She defines humiliation (Lindner, 2002, pp.125-138) as:

“Enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It often involves acts of force, including violent force…the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless.” (Linder, 2002, p. 6)

Lindner describes a dynamic that she calls “humiliation entrepreneurship.”

Feelings of humiliation provide a highly potent element that may be appropriated by leaders. Hitler and the extremist Hutu leaders engaged in what may be called “humiliation entrepreneurship”- the deliberate activation and manipulation of feelings of humiliation in others for the purpose of achieving personal, social, or political objectives.

Humiliation entrepreneurship may be a very cost-effective method of undermining or eliminating rivals or victims…The Hutu elite succeeded in inciting their population to buy their own weapons and take up arms against those they believed to be their would-be humiliators…Such excessive degrees of mobilization are possible because of the virulence of the feelings of humiliation experienced by the perpetrator in the past and feared in the future, and the subsequent urge to retaliate against or preempt such feelings by committing acts of humiliation (Lindner, 2002, pp. 128-129).

Lindner’s description of humiliation processes in effect in Africa has clear resonance with Athens’ violentization dynamics. Acts of humiliation were deliberate strategic tasks in the conduct of war in Bosnia and Kosovo as evidenced by widespread calculated rape of opposing ethnic group females, mutilations, and destruction of religious and cultural facilities and artifacts. Considering Lindner’s viewpoint, one would conclude that the perpetrators of the atrocities were acting out predictable manifestations of prior humiliations and experiential violentization processes.
Intense to extreme prejudice by various groups against other groups is another hard reality that peace operations have to reckon with. In other words, during war and for some time thereafter, the usual societal controls are largely dysfunctional or absent. Two years after the shooting war ended in Kosovo, it became apparent to me that the reason/justification given by some that Roma individuals, families, and communities were badly discriminated against, and subjected to threats and land theft, was because they were collaborators with the Serbs during the war. This seemed plausible enough for a while but after two or three years of increasing criminal activity directed at Roma families and communities, it became clear that the situation really was one of plain racism and opportunism, maybe 90% racism and 10% war related sentiment. Racial comments uttered in my presence made me think of the United States in the south in the 1930s. There were shootings and a continuous problem of minority (non-white) business and land thefts (Albanians or Serbs being the white majority in their respective locales in Kosovo).

There is generally strong prejudice among the principle conflict parties. However, going largely unnoticed is the deeper and stronger prejudice of untempered racism against non-white groups. This is also a problem for peace operation planners and implementers.

Somalia is a prime example of a conflict zone in which there is a consistent tendency for members of conflict parties to change the context of their response to threats and the immediate focus of their prejudice or hostility depending on where a particular threat comes from. Volkan (1999, pp. 25-27) comments on this kind of phenomenon in the context of “we-ness” and social identity:
When one large group interacts with another, “we-ness,” whether it is described with reference to religious, ethnic, national, or racial affiliation, acts as an invisible force in the unfolding drama. …Similarly, individuals are not usually preoccupied with their large-group identity until it is threatened. When a group is in continuing conflict or even at war with a neighboring group, members become acutely aware of their large-group identity to the point where it may far outweigh any concern for individual needs, even survival. It is the psychology of we-ness that may provide valuable insights into why and how large-group identities can act as an invisible force….Large groups, like individuals, regress under shared stress; they fall back on primitive ways of behaving.

On this point, Volkan interprets Freud to say, “Freud believed that the effacement of dissimilarity among individuals that occurs under the domination of collective unity may be traced to the liberation of formerly repressed racial urges common to the group” (Volkan, 1999, p. 26). Somali culture expresses these phenomena in a saying that Somalis have: “I against my brother, my brother and I against the family, my family against your family, and my tribe against your tribe.” I saw this saying played out in reality numerous times, as Volkan points out, depending on where the threat was coming from. All Somali clans claim to have descended from Abraham and have subsequently subdivided into dozens and dozens of sub-clans (families), and every child traditionally must memorize his or her exact lineage divisions down from Abraham. Depending on the particular level of a clan or sub-clan engagement in insult or threat against someone or some persons from another group, the response was inevitably at the same level.

In one case, two neighboring business owners in Baidoa from the same major clan but from differing sub-sub clans got into an argument over the repair of a common wall. The interaction digressed to a fight and within minutes members of the respective sub-sub clans were pouring in to the fight scene from all over town (women and children included) waving sticks, guns, knives, and rocks while running down the streets to
support their respective opposing sub-sub clan side. Within 20 minutes, seven people were dead and emergency evacuation procedures had been initiated for international aid workers in town, including myself. The incident did not involve members of opposing “enemy” clans outside of, or above the particular sub-sub clan involved.

Although, not with the precision that Somali clans or sub-sub-clans divide on short notice, similar group dynamics were demonstrated consistently in Bosnia and Kosovo between ethnic groups, or between “villagers” and “town people” of the same ethnic group. I have tried to capture this dynamic in the graphic below, all of which I refer to as pertaining to an Automatic Prejudice Default Level Response – in essence, the phenomenon I have just described. “Automatic prejudice defaulting” is easily seen in conflict of all types including war, politics, religion, sports, race and ethnicity, urban and rural issues, gender, and occupations. There seems to be no limitation on likely circumstances. The apparent constants are an adversarial context and natural inclination to behave adversarially, combined with poor information, and poor or compromised leadership.

My mention of poor leadership specifically brings to mind a well-known practice by some leaders or influential persons – conflict entrepreneurs -- to incite groups against each other for political or personal gain. Yugoslavia and Bosnia are classic examples of this. Many of those I interviewed in Bosnia told me that their relationship with their Serb or Croat or Muslim neighbors or colleagues or classmates was fine, even close, until forgotten resentments and fears, and newly invented ones, were constantly stoked by hardline nationalist leaders with their own agendas. The realities of war or prolonged prejudicial violence, sets consequences deep into the psyche, into ones bones. I try to
capture these phenomena in the psycho-social oriented model below: *Automatic Prejudice Default Levels* (see Figure 8).

Lonnie Athens’ *Theory of Violentization* again comes to mind, particularly the violentization process concerning communities (see my section on Violence in Chapter 4). The relevant points that Athen’s puts forth in this context are the assumptions of “domination” and “subordination,” and the need for “institutionalizing” (to make life more predictable) such perspectives as defense mechanisms following prolonged exposure to a “special form of socialization” and dramatic social change characteristic of the violentization process at any level. The insidious dynamic of the violentization process, as Athens’ argues, is that the conditions of being subjected to violence, and subjecting others to violence in an ongoing pattern of domination and exacting subordination, become desirable, second nature to those caught-up in the cycle. This dynamic of violentization, I believe, explains much of the difficulty in stopping or reversing a protracted conflict cycle, as illustrated in my Conflict Management Range model, which incorporates negative and positive peace context indications (see Figure 15).

A point of disclosure: I saw an illustration years ago with some of the indicators in my Figure 8 below, but the emphasis in that illustration was on dynamics of humiliation. I forget the source and have not been able to find it again. However, whether focused on humiliation or prejudice (closely related dynamics) the context and results are essentially the same in a violentization process, including one in a peace and stability operation environment.
The Default Levels indicated in the left section of Figure 8 (Automatic Prejudice Default Levels) are broad categorizations meant to be generally representative taxonomies of identity that can contain further deconstructed identities, for example, Community might include urban versus rural distinctions, or military versus civilian distinctions, or any given manner of in-group versus out-group. The deconstruction possible is virtually unlimited given the highly refined capacity of humans to thinly slice prejudicial distinctions on any given occasion with judicious efficiency.

The section of Figure 8 on the right is intended to reflect an associated open, collective worldview perspective in contrast to a closed individual-ego worldview perspective, and a profound metaphysical perspective in contrast to a purely superficial perspective. As qualified previously, no model can adequately capture all elements or
nuances of a concept; I only qualify with regard to this model that balance in all things possible seems to be the constructive way to go.

Gordon Allport (1979) has much to say about prejudice. Regarding the “Group-Norm” Theory of Prejudice, for example:

We are now in a position to understand and appreciate a major theory of prejudice. It holds that all groups (whether in-groups or reference groups) develop a way of living with characteristic codes and beliefs, standards and “enemies” to suit their own adaptive needs. The theory holds also that both gross and subtle pressures keep every individual member in line. The in-group’s preferences must be his preference, its enemies his enemies. The Sherifs who advance the theory write: “Ordinarily, the factors leading individuals to form attitudes of prejudice are not piecemeal. Rather, their formation is functionally related to becoming a group member - to adopting the group and its values (norms) as the main anchorage in regulating experience and behavior.”

Allport attempts a breakdown of loyalty levels (ibid., p. 43) while admitting that accuracy is elusive, his taxonomy includes family, neighborhood, city, state, nation, racial stock, and mankind. The handful of psychological, psychosocial, and sociological dynamics mentioned here reflect situations and factors encountered on a daily basis in a typical peace operation environment.

It is clear that there is a serious level of complexity and debate about how to approach the murky waters of human behavior associated with conflict and peace and stability interventions. There are other examples of intervention approaches and concepts that I have not covered that have real potential for effective use, for example, the Tree Model of Dialogue used successfully by Vamik Volkan and the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction in Estonia (Volkan, 1999, pp. 202-224). Harold Saunders (1999) describes his Public Peace Dialogue Process successfully utilized in Tajikistan and elsewhere. There is Lederach’s (1997) multilevel community approach. And, there
is further work to be done in translating Athens’ violentization process work into large scale application and testing. There is work to be done following-up Montville’s “competition of victimizations.” (Montville, 1991).

Bosnia in particular is a labyrinth of mutual victimhood and mutual offenders. Several Bosnians of different ethnicities told me that the families of their great-grandfathers were tortured and killed by families of a different ethnic group (families that knew each other) in their village or the next village, and that the cycle is repeated every two or three generations with each opposing ethnicity-family taking turns killing members of the other ethnicity-family and, as a matter of course, expecting revenge in kind by the same families in succeeding generations. They expressed this practice as a life and death cycle with no expectation of seeing its end. This is a profound expression of experiential humiliation and violentization to use Hume’s, Lindner’s, and Athens’ terms.

The notion of a role for psychology in peace operations is captured and summarized by Harvey Langholtz, in his book, “The Psychology of Peacekeeping” (1998):

“War represents the failure of diplomacy.” This attributable quote is well known within diplomatic circles. But in today’s wars, characterized by ethno political conflict and chaos, war represents not just the failure of diplomacy, but also the failure of psychology. It is the premise of this book that there are emerging roles for psychologists and other social scientists to play in peacekeeping before, during, and after conflict.

Conscience

Is what seems to be shut off, underdeveloped, or otherwise damaged human consciences, a cause or condition of conflict? Conscience seems to me to be a broad area
connected in some significant way to the operation of paradigms and perceptions and therefore to conflict consequences.

Intractable conflict areas such as Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and elsewhere in the Balkans were, and are, environments of daily societal level violence, apparent manifestations of deadened consciences, and simultaneously, environments of daily notable acts of kindness and courage. Both positive and negative expressions of conscience (or lack of it) have been exhibited; although I think it is fair to say that conflict parties, given extreme and prolonged circumstances of stress such as famine, inter-clan / inter-ethnic warfare, collapsed states and consequent absence of law and accountability, have ample encouragement to take the negative to a logical extreme, and many have done so.

Now, the question is what, is conscience? Is it a biological/physiological/psychological mechanism driven by electrical impulses? Or, is it something of the human or divine spirit? Or, is it some combination of the above?

Perhaps conscience reflects a divine spark selectively distributed or selectively accepted, and, as Niebuhr hypothesizes, war has its origin in “dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche” (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 25). This would suggest a dual role and dual capacity of human conscience.

Is conscience simply a product of an evolutionary arrangement of primitive fight or flight brain mechanisms (reptilian and limbic) evolved into our modern reasoning human brain (cerebral cortex), which now acts as a paradigmatic development, control, and reporting mechanism? Paul MacLean’s *triune brain theory* (1975), as described by Sandole (1999, pp. 114-115), theorizes that since the primitive brain mechanisms still
exist within us and control our basic physiological functions, such mechanisms can account for our fight or flight tendencies and perhaps much of our hasty reactionary tendencies as well.

This idea might have intuitively resonated with Spinoza who reported that, in times of war, passion overwhelms reason, which might account for much of our quarrelling and violence (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 162).

This could all well be true, I suspect, however, that “hardwiring” is not the whole explanation. Otherwise, how do we account for why some people behave nobly in dire circumstances and others of the same apparent background, the same apparent paradigmatic base of factors and circumstances, exploit and kill on the same occasion? -- “hardwiring” on a bad day? -- Interaction of nature and nurture (see Sandole, 1999, Chapter 8).

I have witnessed tangible manifestations of what seem to be conscience, and the apparent lack of it – or, perhaps, its dual positive- negative manifestations. Whatever the case, I know with certainty that the effects on everyone concerned, regardless of the source, or its name, are very real.

Accepting that war and enslavement versus freedom and peace (Waltz, 1959, p.25) are somehow connected to the realm of conscience, or at least consciousness and paradigm generation -- and resulting paradigm clashes -- the question remains, how are conscience and paradigm generation connected to law and order and associated perceptions by its enforcers?

Even boldly stated and fiercely carried out warrior traditions are subject to a code of conduct in warfare, for example, as explained in Spared From The Spear: Traditional
*Somali Behaviour in Warfare*, by the Somalia Delegation of ICRC (February 1997). This code, although severely strained by the consequences of massive infusions of modern weapons to imperial proxy powers for nearly 150 years, served, and still does to some degree, as a control on conscience and behavior. Is this a case of law and code of honor keeping a faulty conscience in check? If so, this question could be posed in any law and order versus faulty conscience discussion in any nation, community, or family.

Are the acts of an apparent conscience gone bad or gone dead simply manifestations of *frustration – aggression*, as presented by John Dollard and his colleagues (1939)? That is to say, is aggression and its often apparent conflict escalation consequences largely driven by “normal” reactions of frustration to the thwarting of expectations as Ted Gurr argues in his *Relative Deprivation Theory* (Gurr, 1970), or the denial of inherent human needs -- *recognition, identity, and security* – as articulated by John Burton’s *Human Needs Theory* (Burton, 1997)? Sandole suggest that it is both (1993, and 1999, Ch. 6).

The same conscience and paradigm generation/clash questions could be posed in connection with many other related theories. For example, that of Galtung’s *structural violence* and *rank disequilibriu theories* (1969, 1996)), North’s Overperception/Overreaction Theory, Sandole’s Negative Self-Fulfilling Prophecy (Sandole, 1993), and Festingers’ Cognitive Dissonance Theories (Festinger, 1962). All of these theories involve perception, paradigm, value, and belief dynamics, to which I’ll add the dynamic of *conscience*, which can help explain interactions, conclusions, and decisions.
Conflict Escalation

John Vasquez (1993, p.82) offers a description of conflict escalation in the context of rivalry, which could easily describe dynamics in some primary conflicts:

A rivalry is a competitive relationship among equals that links stakes into issues on the basis of an actor dimension. The actor dimension results from a persistent disagreement and the use of negative acts that build up negative affect (psychological hostility). Hostility reinforces the actor dimension that gradually reduces all issues to a single overarching issue. Simultaneously, concrete stakes are transformed into symbolic and transcendent ones, and proposals for the disposition of stakes and the resolution of an issue distribute costs and benefits on an unequal basis. This makes for more disagreement, greater use of negative acts, and an intensification of hostility, which in turn reinforces the actor dimension. An escalating conflict spiral creates an atmosphere in which crises are likely to be born.

Rivalry becomes a way of life. The relationship [emphasis added] is difficult to change because each side is involved in a vicious circle in which hostility makes actors become hostile, in part, because of the way they have defined the issues that divide them. [emphasis added]

Vasquez’s comments on rivalry describe primary conflict party interaction very well, for example, in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. It seems that the principle could be applied to virtually any level in primary conflict, or to “in-house” conflict among intervenors, or between “houses” in conflicts between intervenors and conflict parties.

I would expand the definition to include competition among non-equals as well - between actors of greater or lesser capacities. This would encompass rivalries between larger and smaller primary conflict parties as well as the frequent rivalries between larger intervenor governments and smaller intervenor governments, larger intervenor agencies and organizations and smaller agencies and organizations. All possibilities for conflict have an unfortunate basis in reality.
Within this context of trying to better understand conflict escalation and other conflict processes, it is helpful to recall Sandole’s *Manifest Conflict Process* (MCP) and *Aggressive Manifest Conflict Processes* (AMCP) as mentioned previously.

Most conflict theorists make a distinction between constructive competition and destructive competition, for example, Burton, and Wilmot, and Hocker. I concur with the idea of constructive competition. What concerns me, however, are the difficulties generated when conflict parties employ competitive means to try to resolve their conflict, such as with a conventionally negotiated political settlement. Even if they elect to use competitive processes *within* the context of political idealism, chances are increased for transforming MCPs into AMCPs (*aggressive manifest conflict processes*): “Situations in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another; and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another” (Sandole, 1999).

**Responses to Conflict: Some Select Approaches**

*Conflict intervention today: Many different ideas, definitions, and taxonomies by many different people describing different and often the same things.*

As the nebulous lead-in statement above implies, there is a myriad of new conflict intervention ideas, definitions, and taxonomies and approaches dealing with conflict being put forth more or less under the flag of the relatively recently developed Field of Conflict Resolution. The last two decades or so have seen a prolific increase in new conflict prevention, management, resolution, and transformation ideas and methods (see
Figure 5 and Ronald Fisher, 1997). Many different principles, terms, and definitions have been generated and are used to describe, often, essentially the same phenomena. Although, the situation is not of chaotic proportions -- there is evolving consensus -- it does re-prove that keeping things neatly categorized and distinguishable from one another (as is more easily done in well-established older disciplines such as political science and traditional social sciences) can be a rather taxing exercise when an era-size burst of creativity is underway. There is a need for further synthesis.

**Baseline Categories**
In order to reduce confusion in use of concepts and terms, Burton and Dukes (1990) suggest three broad categories of activity in the conflict resolution field in which all other pertinent terms and concepts would fall. Richard Rubenstein (1996) provides condensed versions of Burton and Dukes’ treatment of these base-line conceptual terms, as follows:

- **Conflict Settlement** -- interrupts hostilities for the time being without either identifying their underlying sources or creating a system of conflict management
- **Conflict Management** -- aims at moderating or ‘civilizing’ the effects of conflict without necessarily uprooting its causes.
- **Conflict Resolution** -- attempts to get at the root causes of destructive conflict and to eliminate them – if necessary by altering the system that embodies or produces them.

In the above listing, term, conflict resolution, implicitly contains the essence of conflict transformation, the conceptual heir apparent in the field of the term, conflict
resolution – That is, if the transformation is associated with personal and relationship transformation of conflict party individuals and groups. Otherwise, the term, conflict transformation, would be implicit in conflict management if the transformation is predominately structural in nature and without benefit of positive human interaction and consciousness change.

The interactive processes described by Ronald Fisher (1997) are seen in methods employed by other scholar-practitioners (with variations on the theme) in the Field of Conflict Resolution. A review of these different approaches reveals what appears to be a universality of basic human interaction involved in getting from violent conflict to some manner of resolution or reconciliation. Each of the representative methods indicated below, incidentally, contains variations of the same 4 or 5 basic elements or stages:

**Sustained Dialogues** (Saunders, 1999, p.253):

- Stage One: Deciding to engage in dialogue.
- Stage Two: Mapping and naming problems and relationships.
- Stage Three: Probing problems and relationships to choose a direction.
- Stage Four: Scenario-building – Experiencing a changing relationship.
- Stage Five: Acting together to make change happen.

**Analytical Problem Solving Workshop** (Burton, 1990, p.144):

1. Repeat the purpose of the intervention.
2. Assist the parties in making a deep analysis of their conflictual relationships.
3. Reveal the hidden data of goals and motivations.
4. Enable an accurate costing of their tactics and policies.

5. Assist in the discovery of acceptable options.

**ARIA** (Rothman, 1997, p.19):

1. **Antagonism:** Adversarial Framing; The “What” of the conflict.
2. **Resonance:** Reflexive Framing; The “Why” and Who of the conflict.
3. **Invention:** Inventing; The “How” of cooperatively resolving the conflict.
4. **Action:** Agenda Setting; what solutions can be made.

**Victim/Offender Conferencing, Restorative Justice** (Zehr, 1990, Ch. 9):

1. Both parties are encouraged to tell their stories.
2. Both get a chance to ask questions.
3. Both parties talk about the impact and implication of the experience.
4. Parties decide together what will be done about it.
5. Parties sign a written contract for restitution.

**Community Building** (Peck, 1987, Ch. 5):

**Stage One:** Pseudocommunity – The first response of a group seeking to form a community is most often to try to fake it.

**Stage Two:** Chaos -- Well-intentioned but misguided attempts to heal and convert the others.
Stage Three: Emptiness -- Emptying one’s self of the barriers to communication; the bridge from chaos to community.

Stage Four: Community – entering inclusivity, commitment and consensus.

Tree Model Methodology of Unofficial Diplomacy (Volkan, 1999, p.151):

Stage One: Facilitating team diagnoses of the conflict situation.

Stage Two: Facilitation of psychopolitical dialogues between opposing groups.

Stage Three: Expanding psychopolitical dialogues to larger groups at the community, governmental, and societal level.

Stage Four: Reducing poisonous emotions and resistance to change (conscious and unconscious) thus allowing for more realistic discussions and strategy planning) [cognitive blindness; resistance; E.A.R. 1].

Stage Five: Implementing practical projects and building institutions together.

Volkan’s model, like the others, takes conflict parties through various stages of interaction. A principle distinction, however, is that in Volkan’s model, the psychological dynamics that are active are openly spoken of and guided, whereas in most other models such things are not mentioned openly.

The Five Phases of Psychosocial Recovery (Maynard, 1997):

1. Establishing safety.

2. Communalization and bereavement.

3. Rebuilding trust and the capacity to trust.
4. Reestablishing personal and social morality.
5. Reintegrating and restoring democratic discourse.

Maynard’s *Five Phases of Psychosocial Recovery* also represent an interactive process -- note the similar pattern of events and sequencing. The distinction is that Maynard’s work has been carried out as a program on the ground in a peace and stability operation environment in Bosnia, and so I will elaborate further. Although it is probably not viewed as conflict resolution between the primary parties, per se, it is, nevertheless, an approach that is relevant and complementary to more straight-forward, primary-party conflict resolution efforts in humanitarian and peace operation environments. Maynard (1997, p.204) explains the linkage this way (which also reflects the peacebuilding and development literature, which I elaborate on in Chapter 4 in connection with reconstruction):

Conventional international relief such as food, health care, and shelter does not directly address these less tangible war wounds. The substantial methodological improvements in humanitarian assistance in the past decade have remained largely in the physical and economic spheres and have not yet reached psychological or social issues. However, with the rise in both occurrence and banefulness of intergroup violence and subsequent complex emergencies, international relief and development professionals are gradually recognizing the implications of these issues on recovery efforts. This new component in the rehabilitation equation deserves significant attention on the operational end, as well as in headquarters and in academics and policy circles.

Maynard divides this concept into the *Psychosocial Damage of War*, containing:

a) *Psychological Damage* - for example, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
b) **Social Damage**, in which “…healthy social patterns between dissimilar groups are replaced by distrust, apprehension, and outrage, impairing community cohesion, interdependence, and mutual protection” (ibid, pp. 204-208).

Maynard goes on to describe another concept, “**field diplomacy**,”… which represents a capacity to more readily operationalize the work on the ground.

Additionally she points out the convergence of several pertinent perspectives:

The increased international interest in psychosocial issues has led in several related directions. From one perspective, relief and development specialists are reviewing options for mitigating tension indirectly through community-based reconstruction projects. From another perspective, conflict resolution professional-mediators, academics, NGOs, and private associations-are beginning to look at the potential for “field diplomacy”…field diplomacy features conflict managers engaging community members over root causes, for an extended period of time. And from yet another direction, psychologists are ascertaining the applicability of PTSD therapy in the Western context to civilians in Third World civil wars (ibid, p.209).

**Victim-Offender Conferencing**

A cousin to the conflict resolution approach seems to be what is referred to as **Victim-Offender Conferencing** (a victim-offender reconciliation program) or **Restorative Justice**. This approach, which has evolved as a subset of the field of conflict resolution, contains a core focus on restitution by the offender to the victim, and shares a number of commonalities with conflict resolution as generally discussed thus far in this study.

Howard Zehr, a pioneer and authority on the approach, describes various elements of the process whereby the offender and victim meet face to face, after the offender has admitted the offense:

In these meetings, emphasis is upon three elements: facts, feelings, and agreements. The meeting is facilitated and chaired by a trained mediator, preferably a community volunteer…Both parties are encouraged to tell their stories. Both get a chance to ask questions…They also talk about the impact and implication of this experience. When they have done this, they
decide together what will be done about it. Once they come to agreement, they sign a written contract. Often this takes the form of financial restitution, but that is not the only possibility…These encounters can be important experiences for both victims and offenders. Victims receive a unique opportunity to ‘get the facts,’ to ask the questions that bother them. They can talk about what the offense meant to them and to the one who did it (Zehr, 1990, Ch. 9).

Zehr goes on to describe how, in most instances, the victims are able to get closure and resolve damaging emotional issues and move on with their lives:

Offenders are able to see the impact of their actions first hand and take emotional responsibility. Often offenders are put on a reflective empathetic path that would not otherwise have occurred. Usually, both victim and offender are healed in some way by the reduction in fear and anger that the breaking of stereotyping affords and the taking back of control of one’s emotional life. Also, real justice is experienced, not simply a distant and lingering pain felt by the victim, and a prison sentence experienced by the offender that often does nothing to change his or her assumptions or feelings about anything in a constructive sense; although, in fact, a victim-offender conference sometimes occurs in a prison to which an offender has been placed to carry out a related sentence (ibid).

My purpose in mentioning victim-offender reconciliation approaches is that the steps of initial airing/sharing of experiences, asking questions, coming to understand what happened and why, reduction of fear and anger, and coming to agreement on forms of making things right again, and, perhaps most importantly, getting emotional release and closure, are all specific or implicit elements of third-party facilitated conflict resolution.

It may be useful to explore how victim-offender reconciliation principles can be adapted to primary conflict or intervention conflict situations in peace and stability operation environments, but within perhaps a context of mutual victim hood/mutual offender reconciliation; in which case, it may be better to not use victim-offender
terminology, but instead, establish a context of, perhaps, a “co-existence dialogue” with the parties being “participants.” Perhaps the approach would be helpful in micro conflicts (with broader implications, of course) between two individuals or two families disputing occupation or ownership of a dwelling or business as is the case in many conflicts currently in-progress in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Another core concept directly concerning peace and stability operations and international interventions in general is the matter of human rights. In deep-rooted protracted or intractable conflict, it is often the horrifying images of the abuse of and suffering by multitudes of innocent men, women, and children that ultimately generates an outcry for intervention – an outcry to “do something.” The human rights factor and its associated dilemma are discussed next.

The Human Rights Factor

Context

Hayden White (1990) offers the following perspective in a discussion of narrative discourse and historical representations: “Thus considered, historical studies and their own proper subject matter, namely” [here, White quotes Hegel], those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights and those contingencies that are adverse to this fixed system” (p.30). White goes on to talk about the “proper aim” and “proper mode of representation,” the “(prose) narrative” to “depict these kinds of conflicts.” White continues: “When either the subject matter, the aim, or the mode of representation is lacking in a discourse, it may still be a contribution to knowledge, but something less than a full contribution to historical knowledge.” (p.30).
Although White did not have human rights or peace operations specifically in mind when making the these observations about narrative discourse, they, along with Hegel’s comments, do point to a relevant issue concerning the advocacy, implementation, or enforcement of human rights. And that is the problem of the lack of a clear cut framework, unambiguous set of rules and meanings, and a common narrative language for engaging human rights related discourse and tasks in peace and stability intervention environments.

When Hegel made the above comments about “collisions,” he could just as well have been speaking specifically about the problematic human rights discourse today, and in relation to peace and stability operations. The peace operation environment routinely involves serious collisions between existing duties, laws, rights, and, I add, practices, on the part of local or national entities, and “those contingencies that are adverse to this fixed system” - in this case, the existing duties, laws, rights (and practices) of the intervenors. Any framework, concept, language, or legitimacy difficulties encountered in world discourse outside of a peace operation environment are multiplied exponentially in that environment.

In a peace operation environment, the immediacy of an issue and the personal risks involved for all concerned, project a problem and an encounter far beyond that of simply an interesting intellectual puzzle to be contemplated and debated at leisure. Trouble is literally knocking on one’s door and, often, people’s lives proceed to change for better or worse -- ready or not. One is compelled to engage. Collision is an apt characterization of the meeting of diverse peoples, paradigms, theories, and practices in a peace operation; and, the knock on the door is, often, simultaneously an echo of debates that have occupied many over the years, and a harbinger of human rights narratives to come.
So, what is going on here? What are the conceptual issues; the practical issues? What are the political factors? Are human rights a suggestion or coercion? -- A problem or an opportunity? Who decides? Who cares? What happens after intervenors go home?

Considering that peace operation interventions are usually an international response to serious abuses of whole communities -- often minorities, and can usually be said to involve mass violations of human rights, I think it is useful to elaborate briefly on the structure and complexity of the peace operation popularly known as peacekeeping.

As emphasized earlier, peace operations are very complex. And so the status of human rights protection, adherence, and education takes place among a myriad of factors, dynamics, and participants. Human rights as a need and an objective must be considered in relation to all other elements in the conflict and intervention environment (see Figure 9 below: Peace Operations – Factors, Dynamics, Participants). There are constraints to overcome, local and international organizational partners to consult and work with, law enforcement and legal officers to consult and inform, funding, protection, and social service representatives to coordinate with, institutional and civil society representatives to consult, inform, and coordinate with -- all in the midst of war, violent disorder, or heightened tension.

As pointed out previously, linking violence to a human rights violation, even if in the manner of a “benign study” is, in a mission area, a political act and can be expected to result in political reactions from conflict parties, authorities, the public, and intervenors alike (no secret last long in a mission area), often with immediate security consequences. It is best that this be understood beforehand and that measures are taken beforehand to mitigate negative consequences.
Figure 9: Peace & Stability Interventions: Factors, Dynamics, Participants
I believe that an informed use of various instruments in a mission, inclusive of human rights theory and practice, is essential to render intervention analysis and planning less vulnerable to regrettable gaps and gaffs on the ground, which inevitably and usually in short order, lead to problems or crises if not handled carefully and efficiently. A number of factors need to be taken into account to arrive at plausible conclusions for purposes of analysis, planning, and mandate implementation in support of mission objectives, including support for human rights. Also factored into the equation are mission security and safety objectives for both local residents and international personnel. The series of questions I posed above point in the right direction.

What do scholars and authorities have to say on the subject of human rights and intervention? Given that ethnic cleansing and genocide are typical causal events precipitating demands for international intervention, one place to begin is with a, perhaps, provocative question posed by Nickel (in Patrick Hayden, 2001, pp. 465-477), “What’s wrong with Ethnic Cleansing? The question itself carries an implication that cuts to the core of intervention and human rights rationale – that is, whose business is it anyway to intervene in someone else’s affairs? Who judges, and based on what criteria?

Nickel, in his 1995 article (pp. 465-477), (written when the Bosnian Muslim-Croat-Serbian war was still very fresh), attempts to deconstruct the idea of ethnic cleansing into component parts and search for practical distinctions that might allow intervention authorities to make a more informed assessment of a situation and options, and make decisions accordingly. He begins with a “generic” definition of ethnic cleansing: “...attempting to eliminate or greatly reduce the size of an ethnic national group in order to achieve greater homogeneity within a territory.” He follows with component distinctions:
1) genocidal and non-genocidal, and what he refers to as “near-relatives,” 2) forced relocation for purposes of territory acquisition, 3) ethnic repatriation, and 4) ethnic partition. Nickel makes these distinctions more or less on the basis of technicalities and associated motivations.

Regarding genocide, he categorically states that it is intolerable. Regarding “near relatives,” he relies on nuances of technicalities more or less of a logistical nature, for example, do the means used involve minimal loss of life and injury or use of violence, minimally dangerous transport [my interpretation], and does the action include reasonable “resettlement” assistance and/or compensation. Technicalities are problematic. The motivation bit is decidedly tricky.

Nickel (in Hayden, 2001, pp.466-471) ties motivations to goals; his main points are: 1) Avoiding coexistence in the same country with a group because its members are thought to be unfitting co-residents because of historic grievances or because of their alleged inferiority or depravity; 2) Realizing the nationalist ideal that every large ethnic group should have its own country in which it forms the overwhelming mass of the population; or 3) Avoiding ethnic conflict and civil war between two groups by getting one of them out of the country through partition and relocation.

Nickel then states that “we should be extremely suspicious of the first two goals.” I would add the third goal to the list of extremely suspicious activities. How easy is it for a brutal nationalist regime to claim to be resettling a group, not involving murder, and for their own good, complete with a resettlement package. Nickels concludes this way: “The idea of ethnic cleansing is an intelligible notion that can be defined clearly enough to be used alongside the notions of genocide and forced relocation in formulating international
humanitarian and human rights norms. Further, it is possible to provide plausible explanations of why ethnic cleansing is generally abhorrent, and to identify the sorts of ethnic cleansing that might conceivably be justifiable” (p.476).

I believe that, although “the idea of ethnic cleansing” may “be an intelligible notion that can be defined clearly enough to be used alongside the notions of genocide and forced relocation in formulating international humanitarian and human rights norms,” to open that notion to interpretation and implementation by suspect governments is a dicey prospect. Because a fine intellectual distinction can be made conceptually does not mean that it will not invite routine abuse by recalcitrant regimes in the manner of justification for “helpful” relocation for the safety and good of others with sincere citations of human rights norms. It is a Pandora’s Box that should not be opened. The core issue for me is whether such a proposed “relocation” or partition is forced or voluntary and involving coercion or not.

**Intervention Dilemma**

This brings us to a logical point for a discussion on humanitarian intervention: an overview of ethical issues. Michael Smith (in Hayden, 2001, pp. 478-501), provides observations such as:

One can hardly talk about Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, or other cases of possible outside intervention, without recognizing from the very beginning that ethical dilemmas abound in the way we define our goals, our interests, and the means we use to pursue them. Even Samuel P. Huntington, not usually known to be a moralist, has asserted that “it is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the [US] armed forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another” (p.478).

Smith and Huntington touch on two important, if not overriding factors concerning interventions (humanitarian or otherwise): ethical dilemmas and a willingness to die, or sending others to die, on foreign soil.
In the case of most humanitarian interventions/peace operations, the enterprises often involve messy arrangements with authorities or warlords of the most unsavory sort. Such quasi-agreements typically entered into involve “protection services” or “logistical assistance” or “consent” for the distribution of relief and development goods and services, and turning a blind eye to systematic theft of substantial portions of the same goods or services, or standing back when warlords and militias selectively or not so selectively eliminate those people or groups that they find objectionable among the population that the international community is seeking to assist. There are often only bad options but action is compelled in any case (see Figure 10 below for Intervention Dilemma Environment).

The point about decisions on whether someone should be put in harm’s way or not in an intervention is not hypothetical. I witnessed occasions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo in which civilian and military intervention authorities were compelled to exercise dilemma-immersed decisions. In almost every instance, a human rights factor was involved in some way. Such decisions always ended in stress, anger, regret, anxiety, or relief for those involved -- internationals and locals -- depending on who was spared and who was left hanging out in the wind, so to speak. I heard many times the phrase – “No one wants to die in Somalia,” etc.
Figure 10: Intervention Dilemma Environment
The case of Somalia was a police action essentially calling for the use of necessary force to protect life and property in much the same sense as understood by law enforcement agencies worldwide. The practical realities of Somalia and political realities guiding intervention authorities, however, led intervention authorities to take increasingly passive stances in regards to threats and attacks. For example, a large military escorted food convoy would stop on the road when confronted by a few militiamen with rocks placed on the road. The militiamen, often mere boys, knew the game, and knowing that the standing policy of UNOSOM was not to fire unless fired upon, would aim their weapons at the convoy troops, but not fire. In response, the troops would lay down their weapons and the militiamen/boys would drive off with as many military and civilian vehicles as they could manage.

There was at least one instance in which a UN Zone level civilian office compound (Kismayou) was overrun and international staff held hostage, and the UNOSOM military contingent across the road declined to intervene. I believe that the political impetus by the Force Commander and unit commanders to not risk casualties was so strong in the mission that the consistent practice of passivity, unless UNOSOM troops were directly targeted, led to the total routing of UNOSOM from the country and the eventual landing of U.S. Marines to evacuate remaining UNOSOM staff and troops. To intervene, or not, to avert continued massive human rights violations and save civilian lives, to do business with killers, or not, to risk casualties, or not; there are no easy answers. That is a dilemma.
The enforcement of, or protection of, human rights also involves the matter of state sovereignty. This issue is more of a factor concerning interventions involving a strong regime (not necessarily a strong state) such as those of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Smith (1999) discusses the issue of sovereignty - the delicate balance between nation state common prohibitions against intervention in the internal affairs of other states (Westphalia Conference Protocols) and, in contrast, compelling calls for intervention in response to massive human rights violations. He describes international law, if one is inclined to cite it for justification for intervention, as “thinly institutionalized” and “constantly evolving in ways that reflect emerging normative ideas, an appeal to the law itself cannot solve the underlying moral issues raised by humanitarian intervention “ (p.482). Smith explains that, “such normative consensus is yet to emerge,” and that “morally, substantively, the issues are deeply controversial.” - A position difficult to disagree with.

Smith, referring to Waltzer’s (1977) evolving attitudes on “just wars,” explains that Waltzer was previously an ardent advocate of “quick in and quick out” interventions, but, following on some years of practical intervention failures, is more circumspect and now argues for what is today referred to as a thought-through exit strategy: “There is an obligation to make sure the conditions that require the intervention in the first place do not simply resume once you leave (Waltzer, cited in Patrick Hayden, 2001, p.483).”

Smith makes some distinctions about the sovereignty and intervention question, briefly bringing up the virtues and vices of multilateral vs. unilateral intervention. He contends that, essentially, multilateral interventions are better because they are less
politically problematic; Nevertheless, he states that unilateral interventions can be justified based on the intensity of the violations and because other nation state actors are probably just waiting for someone else to take the lead. Smith continues, “… in general it seems that the old norms of sovereignty and nonintervention are still persuasive for states - at least in their official and quasi-official pronouncements” (p.483).

Smith (ibid.; p.496) concludes:

I think that we could build on the emerging consensus on threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression—the traditional causes that allow us to intervene in interstate conflict….The basic principle that should guide international intervention is this: Individual state sovereignty can be overridden whenever the behavior of the state even within its own territory threatens the existence of elementary human rights abroad and whenever the protection of the basic human rights of its citizens can be assured only from the outside.

Other authors, Sandholtz (2002), Donnelly (2003), and Chandler (2002) cover largely the same territory regarding vague intervention legitimacy criteria and conditional conclusions. Nevertheless, the various authors, while often quoting each other, do offer some different perspectives. Sandholtz distinguishes two different types of globalization phenomena: 1) values, and 2) information. In this context, he contends that the global currency-based economic system tends to provide a reliable format and common language with readily understood and agreed upon rules and conventions. On the other hand, “when globalization turns to political values and norms, the moorings vanish and the discussions bob around uncertainly” (Sandholtz, 2002, p. 201).

This view reinforces the contention that attention to structural elements (technical economic, institutional, and legal, etc.) are predominate in policy, planning, and resource allotment in connection with peace and stability operation reconstruction and
development tasks -- in contrast with attention and resources given to political or social
“relational” elements (values and norms).

Whitman, in the *Special Issue on Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies* in the
journal “International Peacekeeping (Winter 1998), makes a telling linkage between
political values and values normally professed by the UN agencies, e.g., UNICEF, WFP,
and UNDP. He points out that states have a tendency to impose actions through the UN
that are essentially politically value-based and that go contrary to traditional UN norms,
for example, the imposition of sanctions on Iraq that inevitably led to abuses and serious
hardship on the vulnerable in the population. It is one thing for states to directly impose
sanctions on a country. It is quite another for the UN to do so.

The problem of values and complex emergencies goes further for the UN, as
Whitman (1998, p.120) explains:

> The values at the heart of the United Nations system and the major specialized
agencies are diminished by the operational demands of humanitarian disasters and
the necessity of working in tandem with peacekeeping operations. Emergency
humanitarianism not only diverts human and material resources away from
developmental expressions of humanitarian obligation, but also from the
important normative work of the specialized agencies. It is argued that the
greatest challenge facing the UN is how to restore the essentially developmental
ethos of the organization – and the specialized agencies in particular – in the face
of humanitarian emergencies of the number and severity now extant.

Pertaining to information, Sandholtz (2002, p.202) describes the “CNN effect” in
which “brutal or systematic abuse of security rights will quickly be reported around the
world via both print and electronic media, complete with appalling images. The
globalization in this way, of political values in support of massively abused groups has
generated the globalization of human rights values to the extent that, As Sandholtz states,
“global society has developed a set of rules that permit, but do not require, forcible intervention to stop gross violations of basic security rights” (ibid.; p. 201).

Smith and Sandholtz concur that a kind of balancing “tension” has been arrived at, and they come to essentially the same conclusions overall pertaining to their assessment of intervention criteria, legitimacy and sovereignty and other issues, although Sandholtz seems to be more certain in tone than Smith about such things. It should be pointed out, however, that political expediency usually prevails – recall the decision by the White House to not intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, on the basis of framing the conflict to technically not be genocide. Otherwise, action would have been mandated by the international convention on genocide signed by the U.S. and other countries.

Donnelly (2003) adds to the discussion by putting emphasis on the issue of whether human rights and foreign policy should be linked. He asks if human rights are a “legitimate concern of foreign policy.” Donnelly (2003, p.155) proposes that:

…there are three standard arguments against making the connection. The realist rejects a concern for international human rights because foreign policy ought to be about the national interest defined in terms of power. The statist (or legalist) considers an active concern for the human rights practices of other states inconsistent with the fundamental principle of state sovereignty. The relativist (or pluralist) views international human rights policies as moral imperialism."

George Kennan, a stalwart of international relations thought, as quoted by Donnelly (2003, p.158), more or less sums up the nation-state perspective of his time (Kennan, 1985/86, p. 207): “There are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral
principles.” Although, Kennan expresses the legalistic/statist perspective by taking no notice of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), he does characterize general nation-state philosophy prior to the era of the “CNN effect,” and certainly prior to the idea of the international community taking “responsibility to protect” (see Gareth Evans, 2008). The exception to this statist tradition of non-interference into the sovereign affairs of another state being, of course, armed interventions to ensure that communist-backed proxy dictators were not tolerated in the abuse of their own citizens, as opposed to U.S. proxy dictators being tolerated in the abuse of their own citizens in the cause of Cold War communist containment.

Donnelly (2003), at the end of his discussion of realist, statist, and relativist arguments, more or less to be equated with Smith’s and Sandholtz’s distinctions on realist and liberal positions, also ends up advocating the legitimacy of human rights based-intervention, citing aforementioned international conventions, declarations, and moral duty in light of massive human rights violations. However, he lists more grievances presumably worthy of intervention: “We cannot stand by idly and watch torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention, racism, anti-Semitism, repression of trade unions and churches, debilitating poverty, illiteracy, and disease in the name of diversity or respect for cultural traditions. None of these practices deserves our respect, even if they are traditional – which they usually are not (compare 5.7, 6.6).” (Donnelly, 2003, p.159).
A final point I bring in from Donnelly’s (2003) comments on human rights and foreign policy is his recommendation that governments “…add up prices and values already assigned to foreign policy interests”; in other words, governments should conduct costs-benefit analyses constituting a deliberate assessment process as opposed to urgent ad hoc go or no go decision making processes predictably leading to gaps and poor or nil exit strategies.

A contrary view to the consensus expressed by authors so far mentioned in this section that, in the end, a human rights-based rationale is sufficient justification for intervention in the case of mass violations of human rights, is given in Chandler’s book “From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention” (2002). Herman, who provides the preface for the book, comments that; “David Chandler makes an invaluable contribution in spelling out how the human rights activists have rationalized an abandonment of the rule of law and return to a system in which might makes right. That the human rights rationale for interventionism is a genuine menace to human rights and to democracy is convincingly demonstrated in this fine book.”

Donnelly (2003) would presumably place Herman and Chandler (2002) in the camp of disgruntled statist-legalists. Although it appears that the authors mentioned so far would agree that human rights were not considered to be worthy of much genuine official attention, much less action, until the 1990s, there is decidedly a division of views on whether human rights or humanitarian-based interventions are legitimate, justified, or desired.
It is useful to quote Chandler (2002, p.119) at length here on his conclusion addressing the “limits of human rights theory”:

Highlighting the centrality of the self-governing or autonomous human subject to the concept of rights sharply reveals the flaw of the burgeoning human rights discourse and the reason for its inability to establish a foundation for the substance and character of the new rights it proclaims. The redefinition of rights from neutral means to ethnical and value-laden ends, or claims on an external authority, removes the universality and democratic content of rights. Neither the discussions over the substance or content of human rights, nor the means of implementing and guaranteeing them, are resolvable through democratically accountable mechanisms because these political questions of power and distribution are reposed as moral absolutes open to external or juridical interpretation through international institutions or domestic and international courts.

Once humans are universalized, not as competent and rational actors capable of determining their own view of the ‘good’ but, as helpless victims of governments and the forces of the world market or globalization, then democratic freedoms and civil liberties appear meaningless. Under the guise of ‘ethical’ universalism the human subject is degraded to the lowest level, in need of paternalist guidance from the ‘great and the good’ who can establish a moral agenda of human rights to guide, educate and ‘empower’ the people. The assumptions and processes of representative democratic government are turned on their head.

It seems that Chandler and Herman argue against the universality of human rights – and presumed legitimacy of human rights-based intervention - while, at the same time, essentially argue for the universality of individual equality and choice, presumably, to be free to be abused within a free democratic globalized system. This does seem like a global version of the conservative legalist-domestic argument writ large for the right to sleep under a bridge. The complication is what to do if the abused in question, typically the most vulnerable, object to massive abuse, murder, rape, genocide, expulsion, and disenfranchisement, etc.
For perspective, Human Rights Watch –Helsinki produced a list (Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo, 1993) outlining the activities that the government of Serbia considers to be its sovereign prerogatives. The list contains violence and mistreatment in detention, police raids on villages, civilians shot dead by police, torture and death in detention, evictions of Albanians from their homes, raids on Albanian shops and market places, restrictions on freedom of association. Also included are harassment of: human rights groups, individuals who meet with or assist foreign delegations, political organizations and trade unions; manipulation of the courts, prosecution of journalists; discrimination in education, health care, and employment. The list goes on covering only issues prior to the ethnic cleansing and the mass murders that followed.

What does an intergovernmental agency or organization tasked with human rights monitoring and intervention in a peace operation mission have to say about things? What justifications does it cite for its role? The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), comprising 57 members, including the United States, is the lead agency for conducting such tasks in the Balkans. The OSCE provides a handbook on how to monitor, investigate, and report on suspected human rights violations: *Individual Human Rights Complaints: A Handbook for OSCE Field Personnel*, 2003, Warsaw.

The handbook essentially constitutes a practical manifestation of human rights centered activity in response to previous events. The handbook gives a framework and cites legal instruments and agreements for the legitimacy of the role of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), essentially constituting
the political/philosophical underpinnings of human rights concepts and the right of ODIHR to intervene based on prior collective agreements in the OSCE’s “human dimension.” The handbook lays out an extensive set of guidelines for carrying out specific tasks.

A few passages from the handbook are appropriate here (OSCE, ODIHR, 2003, pp.19-21):

When the Helsinki Final Act was adopted in 1975, it marked the first occasion that the “human dimension” of security – in essence, human rights principles – was included as an explicit element of a regional security framework on the same basis of politico-military and economic issues. The Helsinki Final Act recognizes human rights as “an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation” among states….

….OSCE commitments are adopted by consensus among all participating States and are politically binding…Furthermore, all OSCE participating States have accepted that implementation of OSCE human rights commitments is a matter of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and is not an internal affair [emphasis added]…

….The term, ”human dimension” encompasses human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law, as well as national minorities, human contacts, and international humanitarian law…. 

….OSCE participating States have agreed in their human dimension commitments that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for peace and security and are essential for ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms…. 

….OSCE’s basic texts have not created a court or other individual petition body to enforce the implementation of OSCE commitments. This reflects the political character of the OSCE and the intention not to duplicate existing mechanisms. Instead, there are a number of other ways in which individual cases may be dealt with directly or brought to the attention of the institutions or political bodies of the OSCE. These mechanisms are, of course, not limited to usage only by field operations but apply equally to all participating States…. 

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OSCE participating States are thus not in a position to avoid discussions about human rights problems or to assert that raising human rights concerns constitutes interference in internal affairs. 

Based on OSCE’s official declaration that its basic texts (instruments of legitimacy) are of a political nature, I take it to mean that the OSCE does not constitute an enforcement arm per se, which would reflect the observable reality on the ground. When “push comes to shove,” in a peace and stability operation scenario, the OSCE must call on sponsoring bodies such as the UN Security Council, NATO, UN international police, or an international criminal tribunal (a “coalition of the willing”) to do the heavy lifting on enforcement. In the case of a recalcitrant Serbia on massive abuses in Kosovo, the Security Council obliged with Resolution 1244, resulting in the expulsion of Serbian authorities, troops, and militias from Kosovo and creation of UNMIK (UN Administrative Mission in Kosovo) to administer the establishment of democracy-based political and infrastructural systems in the province until a final political status and protections could be established.

The Dayton Agreement accomplished in 1995, essentially the same result in the case of Bosnia. And as Hanson (2001) said, the future of human rights as an intervention rationale was set (at least for now).

What agency would be suggested for those who choose the freedom to be abused is unclear should they decide at a later time to object to the arrangement. Ultimately, in the end, whether relevant agreed upon legal instruments and laws exist, or not, whether natural law Vs. human law, or natural rights Vs. human rights, or statist Vs. relativist
philosophical arguments can be made convincing, or not, the matter comes down to a personal moral decision to take action, or not.

**CONCLUSION**

It is clear enough that many refinements have been made to conflict theory in recent decades; there are many of comprehensive works on conflict, conflict theory, and conflict intervention methods, including publications described as guides, handbooks, or manuals. For example:

- Dennis Sandole, et. al. -- *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (2009).

To my view, the pressing problem now for the field of conflict resolution is not so much trying to figure out what is going on and what intervention methods would be
beneficial, as it is putting current knowledge to use in the field where it is most needed -- in this case, peace and stabilization operations and environments. In short, the problem is *application*. I should qualify my statement by saying that some kind of application is well underway in many countries around the world; however, *positive peace processes* are conspicuous by their absence.

The challenge for application is in encouraging primary conflict parties and intervenors in particular to take the time to listen and not feel threatened by new approaches. Positive peace-oriented interactive processes are complementary to existing nation-state principles and practices, not in competition with them, nor are they a substitute. It is a matter of selecting the right approach for a given situation and set of objectives.

Chapter 4 included important discussions on violence, constructive conflict, relationship concepts, sociological-psychological issues, psychology and peace operations, conscience, the human rights factor, and intervention dilemma. Also included was an in-depth discussion of Galtung’s Negative and Positive Peace, and my conceptual departure from them, in order to adapt the principles involved more directly to peace and stability operation environment utility. Chapter 4 considered key conflict and conflict resolution theory and practice concepts that address The Problem and build a foundation for presenting peace and stability intervention structural and operational basics in Chapter 5. Also, the factors discussed in the chapter establish a more informed standpoint from which to better appreciate Bosnian background and intervention particulars that are presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 5, next, moves on to in-depth descriptions of peace and stability intervention operational specifics necessary to understand the structure and limits of such endeavors.
Chapter 5: Peace & Stability Operation Basics

BASIC STRUCTURE

There are a number of variations on the conceptual division of primary intervention tasks, such as peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace support, and prevention. In Chapter 4, I elaborated on these distinctions but, in Chapter 5, I primarily focus on the concepts as utilized by governmental peace and stability operation intervenors, including the United Nations. Chapter 5 directly addresses the matter of peacebuilding in relation to peace and stability operations, and presents my argument that there is an intervention Conceptual Dichotomy involving a crucial difference, generally speaking, in views between Track 1 actors and Track 2 actors as to what constitutes peacebuilding in a conflict zone, and in fact what constitutes a status of peace – this distinction centers on the use of the term Conflict Transformation and has significant implications.

Having obtained an understanding of The Problem, for example (31 conflicts out of 39 recurring from 2000 to 2010, or conflicts stalled in negative peace) and the fundamentals of negative and positive peace, and having established a guiding Primary Research Question, a Preliminary Research Question, and an Enabling Research Objective, I proceed to a concept integration framework for a discussion of the connection between theory and practice or, in peace and stability operation terms, concept, planning, and execution.
For this illustration, I generally build on and expand a peace operation framework developed by Dave Davis, Director of George Mason University’s Peace Operation Policy Program, that is keyed to the implementation of primary objectives and associated tasks in humanitarian and peace operations. Primary conceptions and tasks derived from former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) *An Agenda for Peace*, are contained within the framework, which I have modified the model slightly.

Readers familiar with the United Nation’s peacekeeping framework, as developed by Former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s in his *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), will see familiar terms and ideas in this section. The principle concepts addressed in *An Agenda for Peace* (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace support) retain their essential meanings (see also *An Agenda for Peace*, 1995, 2nd edition, pp.12-28, and 45-62). In short, the vastly more complex operational demands driven by post-Cold War realities i.e., the trend of increasing intra-state conflicts, and the greatly increased number of intervention participants (governmental and nongovernmental) called for a more complex operational framework and model for the understanding, management, coordination, and the continuous fine tuning of dynamics and activities.

Boutros-Ghali describes the evolution of peacekeeping in the United Nations’ official peacekeeping training manual *Blue Helmets* (1996), by stating that the concept of peacekeeping (traditional peacekeeping) was brought into use shortly after the UN was founded (1948) in which:

…military personnel from many countries have carried out tasks which range from monitoring cease-fire arrangements while peace agreements
are being hammered out to assisting troop withdrawals, providing buffer zones between opposing forces and helping implement final settlements to conflicts. With the end of the Cold War, peace keeping operations have grown in number and complexity (1996, p.3) (see also, Lundgren 1996).

In considering the evolution of international intervention beyond the relatively simple and dated peacekeeping model (e.g., separate the antagonists, obtain a political settlement, and observe activities), I begin with Robert Oakley’s (1998) basic model of Core Components of Peace Operations (see Figure 11):

Robert Oakley’s basic model:

![Core Components of Peace Operations](image)

**Figure 11: Core Components of Peace Operations**

Robert Oakley, formerly a senior official at the U.S. State Department (first Special Envoy for the UN in Somalia) with substantial international experience in
peacekeeping operations and environments, indicates that three core components comprise peace operations: diplomacy, aid, and the military (Figure 11).

Dave Davis builds on this framework through his *Conceptual Model of Peace Operations* (CMPO) Triangle model in which *An Agenda for Peace* primary tasks are prominent and expanded upon (Figure 12).

![Conceptual Model of Peace Operations Triangle](image)

**Figure 12: Conceptual Model of Peace Operations Triangle**

This starting-place framework incorporates the three primary task areas: peacemaking, peace building, Peacekeeping/Security, with Peace Support providing general support to the other three components; each containing sub-tasks as shown below:
Table 5: Peace Making, Peace Building, Peacekeeping/Security, Peace Support Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Making</th>
<th>Peacekeeping/Security</th>
<th>Peace Building</th>
<th>Peace Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fact finding</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Situation Awareness/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Decision Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Disaster Relief Aid</td>
<td>Supervision/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Refugee Relief Aid</td>
<td>Synchronization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation</td>
<td>Military Force/</td>
<td>Development Aid</td>
<td>Information –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Unit Movements</td>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(sanctions/ rewards)</td>
<td>Law &amp; Order</td>
<td>Institution Building</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Demining</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Demobilization/</td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaties</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more complex CMPO model (Davis, 2008, p.3) is outlined below, which I have modified slightly (Figure 13), providing a primary implementation structure model indicating components, actors, and basic elements and dynamics in peace operations. This model indicates that increased Peacekeeping and Security on the Y Axis yields increased order through the application of peace enforcement by military and police contingents (Y axis); increased Peace Building yields increased Justice by virtue of national reconstruction and humanitarian assistance (physical and institutional, X axis); and Peace Making, ideally, moves a complex emergency towards stability and a peaceful environment by making peace operations’ strategic, political, and coordination decisions in support of the creation of conditions for peace building (pushing both X and Y elements toward a stable and peaceful environment in the upper right hand corner).

Peace Support provides logistical, liaison, and other types of mission facilitation support
to the other three primary tasks components. Davis stresses that peacekeeping/security and social justice do not function independently; an increase in civil order encourages an increase in social justice and an increase in social justice increases civil order. However, security (stabilization) initiatives usually predominate in the early stages.

Overall mission coordination is a core function of intervention executive management (Peacemaking). Also indicated (keeping in mind Bosnia-Herzegovina) are the primary roles of the UN and NATO in Peace Support activities and the EU, OSCE, UN, and other international/inter-governmental organizations and NGOs in Peace Building activities. The intended strategic goal is that all three primary core components (Peacekeeping/Security, Peace Building, Peace Making with facilitation by Peace Support) work in a coordinated and synergistic fashion through Track 1 and Track 2 actors/intervenors.

In my professional experience in the field, this is much easier said than done. The zig zag line for Peace Making indicates that diplomatic efforts are usually subject to a series of advances and setbacks calling for alternating and judicious use of peace support and peacebuilding elements (Davis, 2008).
Davis (Aug. 2008) conveys several other important ideas associated with the CMPO framework (This is an intervention model, not a conflict model):

- **Peace Operations**: An impartial intervention for the purpose of maintaining or restoring civil order and social justice.

- It is apparent from historical experience that during an intervention, the *Order* component is determined by the intervenor, yet the Justice component is measured by the people involved in the conflict.

- **Peace**, according to the CMPO, is the concurrent state of Civil Order and Social Justice, implying the presence of both negative peace and positive peace.

- The **Peace Making** process can only function where the root causes of the conflict are being addressed. In many cases these root causes are more than the simple power politics on the surface. Poverty, human rights abuses, displaced populations, ineffective government; all of these
contribute to the conflict and are counter to the work of the Peace Maker. If the violence is stopped by a negotiated settlement, but no attempt to address the causes of the violence is made, the settlement is extremely fragile. The process of addressing these underlying root causes and conditions is that of longer-term oriented Peace Building.

Referring to the Quest for Viable Peace framework (Covy, 2005), that I will discuss below, Davis observes that: “…an important observation is that 22 of the actions are directed at diminishing the drivers of conflict [peacekeeping/Security] and that 31 are directed at capacity building [peacebuilding]. This 2:3 ratio is often not seen in actual operations, where the conflict drivers are the narrow focus and the need for institutional building is given a lower priority.”

Leaving the basic-structure model for the moment, I move on to peacebuilding in relation to peace and stability operations, or perhaps put another way – I move on to peacebuilding theory, politics, and intent.

PEACEBUILDING & PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

There are a wide-ranging number of views by authors as to the exact meaning of various terms including those defined in the United Nations’ seminal Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995), and exactly what peace operations do, or should do. A.B. Fetherston (2000, p.192) discusses a debate about conflict management versus conflict resolution in connection with international interventions:

Even since the expansion of peacekeeping practice, the rise of multidimensional missions, and more concerted involvement, particularly in elections, peacekeeping has not for the most part facilitated the establishment of long-term sustainable peace – it has not created, in other
words, space for conflict resolution. It may be argued that in some cases, peacekeeping missions have had a negative impact on the situation.

Broadly speaking, it is a debate about intent and imperatives. Essentially, Fetherston complains that peace operations are operating under a “conflict management framework,” and she advocates more proactive “Emancipatory Transformation: [local] Counter- Hegemonic Projects” as preliminary to “Reconstructing a Normative Consensus: Making Space for Continuous Transformation” (2000, p.190-218). In her elaboration on this, she advocates intervention in order to, “disrupt destructive local hegemonic mind-sets” to accommodate more broad-based constructive democracy and civil/human rights friendly narratives and, thereby, sustainable peace.

Paul Diehl (2008, p.8) adds negative and positive peace distinctions to the debate on conflict management versus conflict resolution mandates:

There is general agreement that, minimally, the purpose of peacebuilding is to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Yet there is some disagreement over whether this idea of “negative peace” (the absence of violent conflict) should be extended to include elements of “positive peace,” including reconciliation, value transformation, and justice concerns. This distinction is critical, because virtually all differences in conceptualizations of peacebuilding can be traced back to disagreements on this point.

Diehl elaborates further on the point of thinking beyond negative peace by stating that peacebuilding strategies tend to fall into various “dimensions,” that is, a “minimalist strategy” favoring a conflict management approach largely concerned with “decreasing the opportunity to resort to violence,” and a “maximalist strategy” favoring conflict resolution as well as conflict management – “that is, eliminating the ‘willingness’ of parties to use violence.” He states, “Accordingly, many peacebuilding activities are
designed for attitudinal changes by disputants and their constituents. These include programs to promote economic development and human rights protection” (2008, p. 9).

Before the end of the Cold War, the UN mandate and intention was essentially peacekeeping, that is to say, only to interject neutral soldiers between conflict parties that had already come to a cessation of hostilities (ceasefire) or even a peace settlement. That is much less the case today. The UN (member states) needed a more robust intervention framework to cope with the more complex intra-state conflicts, hence, the more comprehensive and complex categorization of activities - peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace support.

Oliver Ramsbotham (2000), describes an evolutionary track for the term peacebuilding beginning with Galtung’s (1975) “three approaches” in the 1960s:

- **peacekeeping** aimed “to halt and reduce the manifest violence of the conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role”;
- **peacemaking**, was “directed at reconciling political and strategical attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation” mainly at elite level; and
- **peacebuilding**, addressed “the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development” (Ramsbotham, 2000, p. 170). [emphasis added].

Ramsbotham goes on to say that, essentially, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali incorporated Galtung’s three terms his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*; keeping their basic meaning intact, but adding a distinction between post-conflict peacebuilding and pre-conflict preventative diplomacy (p. 171). Ramsbotham then says that, “All of this has been brought together within the conflict resolution field in John Paul Lederach’s characterization of **peacebuilding** as the attempt to address the underlying structural,
relational and cultural roots of conflict: ‘I am suggesting [Lederach being quoted] that “peacebuilding” be understood as a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable peaceful relations and outcomes” (Ramsbotham, 2000, p. 171).

The basic preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding operating parameters remain the UN standard operating procedure as Ramsbotham describes it. A further broadening of parameters and tasks has occurred over time with the 1995 update of An Agenda for Peace (Supplement to An Agenda for Peace), adding “multifunctional UN operations” geared to building national capacities for eventual handover by the UN to national and local authorities. Since then, a development component has been added to get at root causes and enhance sustainable peace objectives (2000, p. 171).

Ramsbotham takes pains to make a distinction between post-settlement and post-conflict peacebuilding; the former being, usually, only the beginning of a post-conflict peacebuilding process. Also, he makes distinctions between negative peace, which he describes as “Task A” – “preventing relapse into war,” and positive peace, described as “Task B” – “constructing a self-sustaining peace.” In the course of arriving at a definition of sustainable peace, he comments that:

The second cluster of tasks which make up the composite process of post-settlement peacebuilding is constructing a self-sustaining peace (Task B). This is the positive aspect of the enterprise. The aim is to underpin Task A with a view to long-term sustainability by constitutional and institutional reform, social reconstruction and reconciliation, and the rebuilding of shattered polities, economies and communities.
In connection with the "post-settlement scenario":

Perhaps it is best described as an attempt to make up three deficits which characteristically afflict countries after prolonged internal war and hamper the consolidation of peace: political/constitutional incapacity, economic social debilitation, and psycho/social trauma. In addition, there is an initial critical deficit in the military/security sphere. All these deficits must be made up if peace is to be permanently sustained.(ibid, p.174)

Ramsbotham elaborates much more, but suffice it to say that he adds a kind of final stage measure of negative peace attainment – “More broadly, Task A can only be said to have been finally secured when an incumbent government voluntarily and peacefully relinquishes power after losing an election.”

All of the concepts presented above, including those in previous chapters of the progressive literature review, for example concerning relationship and sociological factors, are concept focused. Harold Saunders’ Public Peace Process described below shifts the discussion to an example of a field application of an interactive conflict resolution concept.

**A Public Peace Process**

The concept of *positive peace* argues that unless the interests, causes, and conditions underlying a conflict are effectively addressed, the conflict will continue to resurface indefinitely and, even if there is no open fighting, *negative peace* is said to exist by virtue of conflict being suppressed but latent. As Galtung points out, an important factor in the perpetuation of negative peace is the “…lack of fora for the generation of innovative insights to ensure political, economic, and legal security, and recognition of
all groups.” Put another way, there are insufficient processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues and constructive relationship change.

I have chosen Saunders’ *Sustained Dialogue* model for this illustration since, for me, it captures well the essence of interactive problem solving approaches designed with deliberate positive peace intent and aimed at working on fundamental issues and relationships to better create conditions for a more durable political settlement, an easier stabilization, and the implementation of positive peace oriented measures beyond. The Sustained Dialogue model also complements the peace operation tasks of civil society capacity building and institutional reconstruction at multiple levels. Again, the general idea is to take those positive peace process measures that are known to aid conflict parties in moving beyond a negative peace mode and into a positive peace mode. Ideally, conflict parties could avoid the open conflict/destructive interaction stage along the conflict management range.

Positive peace processes are designed to move conflict parties towards a constructive interaction status from wherever they happen to be at the time along the conflict management range; this includes movement beyond a protracted conflict cycle.

To better explain what I am referring to, I use a model I have adapted and expanded on to illustrate the conflict management range concept and the linkage of a positive peace process to a peace operation framework. By way of example, I show the linkage process of the Harold Saunders’ positive peace-specific *sustained dialogue* process outlined in Figure 14 below.
Sample Linkage of Positive Peace Process to Conflict Management Range

This concept description contains a series of graphic models to conceptually illustrate how conflict analysis and resolution principles (*positive peace* processes) can be applied to primary conflicts within the peace operations framework specifically. Each conceptual model builds on the one preceding it.

Figure 14: Basic Conflict Management Range (Order & Justice Framework)

Acknowledging that there is virtually an unlimited number of factors associated with conflict and its management or resolution, for the sake of manageability, I have indicated those that I consider minimally essential for illustrating the how and why of applying *positive peace* processes in peace operations. This starting-place model reflects
various kinds of elements associated with deep-rooted protracted conflict, such as
destructive interaction, a protracted conflict cycle, latent or open conflict, strong
suppression, and sometimes a complex emergency. It also contains elements known to
be indicators of successful prevention, management, or resolution of conflict, such as
constructive interaction and functional/considerate relationships. There is, of course, a
multitude of other negative and positive factors that could be named, but I will begin with
these and build upon the model progressively.

In the model above (Figure 14), I have taken Adam Curle’s Basic Conflict
Progression Structure (Curle, 1971; also shown in Lederach, 1997, p.65), and
superimposed it over Dave Davis’s Order and Justice in Peace Operations model (Figure
13)

The general idea is to take those measures possible that are known to aid conflict
parties in moving out of a negative peace mode and into a positive peace mode. Ideally,
the violent conflict stage along the conflict management range (a continuum: lower left
to upper right) would be avoided entirely. Just the same, positive peace processes are
designed to move parties beyond protracted conflict cycles where they are caught-up in a
vicious cycle of fighting and periodic bouts of position-based negotiations which break
down, or result in agreements which are signed, but predictably fall apart, feeding the
phenomenon of conflict occurrence.

To continue on with a description of the dynamics of the model: as indicated, a
high level of order and some justice can result in no open conflict, but conflict is present
all the same. In such a scenario, latent conflict exists whereby, essentially, parties
feeling offense are biding their time until conditions are advantageous for them to overthrow, or re-overthrow (often violently), or otherwise damage the incumbent group. Routinely, in post-Cold War scenarios, in which super-power involvement is reduced, the parties on the “outs” and the parties “in” are not in a position to decisively suppress their opponents enough to maintain a status quo for very long and they have little understanding of conflict resolution principles, techniques, or value, therefore, parties inevitably cross a **confrontation threshold** into violent conflict.

Destructive interaction escalates and conditions are ripe for a **complex emergency** (a term now in routine use by the international aid community) in which there are catastrophic disruptions of political, social, economic, and infrastructural systems - all while even well intended negotiations and mediation are taking place. John Prendergast (an experienced complex emergency field officer), in a lecture (2005?), defined a **complex political emergency** (used interchangeably with complex emergency) as a “multicausal political crises with major humanitarian repercussions.” I characterize a complex emergency as a convergence of political, economic, environmental, and social crisis. Usually, in recent times, the nature of the social conflict is ethnic/identity based.

It is at this stage that conflict parties become mired in what I refer to as the **critical zone** (Note the blue hyphenated circle in Figure 14 above). They find themselves bouncing back and forth across the horizontal blue line, that is, between fighting and periodic desperate bouts of frustrated or obstinate negotiations (with or without third party mediation). They are unable to move further along the conflict management
continuum into the positive peace/constructive interaction domain in the upper right corner of the model. They are caught in a protracted conflict cycle.

It is in this situation that most major, and very costly, international emergency interventions take place in response to primary conflicts. Also, the stronger party may have sufficient strength to suppress their opposition into a temporary latent conflict situation, in which case it is often only a matter of time before the opposition recovers and the conflict status again crosses the confrontation threshold and again enters into the critical zone and again is at high risk of renewing the protracted conflict for another cycle.

Why are many current conflicts highly resistant to mediation and negotiation diplomacy by nation-states, the UN, or regional political bodies? Why are many negotiations (mediated or otherwise) failing? Some key factors have already been discussed. The nature of position-based negotiation (win/lose bargaining) of non-negotiable cultural, security, religious, and identity needs and values by conflict parties is fundamentally a futile exercise (Burton, 1990, 1997). It accounts for much of the perpetuation of conflict cycles in many instances despite enormous political and financial resources and/or pressures brought to bear on the parties by third party coercive mediation -- coercive mediation being the case when mediators have a strong vested interest in the negotiated outcome (power mediation), (Ronald Fisher, 1997, p. 165).

It does little better for third party intervenors to mediate fundamentally untenable negotiations between others. Often, powerful third party intervenors/mediators employ coercive inducements or negative pressures to obtain desired results but, usually for the
same reasons, the long-term solutions they seek continue to be evasive as has been proven again and again. The routine use of interest-based, problem-solving interactive approaches at the Track 1 level is still some time away.

Considering the non-negotiable nature of certain basic human values and needs, alternatives to position-based negotiation and mediation are needed. It is in this context that sustained dialogues and other positive peace oriented approaches are of particular use, the pertinent factor being that positive peace approaches are aimed at changing the underlying assumptions, perceptions, and relationships that drive conflicts. Additionally, positive peace approaches employ knowledge, skills, and abilities that have been developed to guide parties towards getting out of protracted conflict cycles and moving on to functional and constructive modes of interaction (Burton, 1997; Ronald Fisher, 1997; Mitchell and Banks, 1996; Lederach, 1997; Galtung, 1969 and 1996; Volkan, 1999; Saunders, 1999; Folger and Bush, 1994).

There is still a great deal to learn about positive peace processes and much more field work to be done, however, significant progress has been made and a number of persons and groups can attest to the helpfulness of the principles and practices on the ground – see Herbert Kelman’s (1991) description of the use of interactive, positive peace processes at the community level in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chapter 8 in Volkan, Montville, and Julius, 1991, Vol. II); also see Burton (1990) on facilitation of a analytical problem solving process, which Kelman makes use of. Clearly, it is better that political leadership, as well as citizen groups, are exposed to positive peace principles and practices – ideally, all levels simultaneously.
There is little doubt that potent forces of greed, power ambition, hatred, indifference, and even apparent evil are evident in chronic conflict zones, such as Africa and the Balkans; however, the likelihood of coerced or purchased peace settlements lasting very long is not good.

The Conflict Management Range model below (Figure 15) adds positive peace and negative peace to the model. For the convenience of the reader, I reiterate my adapted descriptions of negative and positive peace introduced in Chapter 4, to make additional points in relation to the Conflict Management Range model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Peace</th>
<th>Negative Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The underlying root causes and conditions of conflict are effectively addressed.</td>
<td>• War and widespread violence/civil disorder are suppressed by coercion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structural violence is minimum, and measures are in place for its control.</td>
<td>• The underlying root causes and conditions of conflict are not effectively addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is a legitimate functioning government and civil system that ensures sufficient political, rule of law, economic, and social welfare security, recognition and identity for all groups.</td>
<td>• Structural violence is prevalent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There are effective constructive conflict processes for sustained governmental and civil collaborative dialogues.</td>
<td>• There is no legitimate functioning government and civil system that ensures sufficient political, rule of law, economic, and social welfare security, recognition and identity for all groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peace enforcement or assisted stability measures by outsiders is not needed.</td>
<td>• There are no effective constructive conflict processes for sustained governmental and civil collaborative dialogues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peace enforcement or assisted stability measures by outsiders is not needed.</td>
<td>• Peace enforcement or assisted stability measures by outsiders is needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reader might have noticed that, under Positive Peace, I qualify structural violence to read as “sufficiently minimum” structural violence in contrast to Galtung’s
“absence” of structural violence. The reason is simply that I am reluctant to view human systems, political or otherwise, in absolute terms.

Figure 15: Conflict Management Range (Negative Peace & Positive Peace Added)

The concept of Positive Peace argues that unless the interests, causes, and conditions underlying a conflict are effectively addressed, the conflict will continue to resurface indefinitely and, even if there is no open fighting, Negative Peace is said to exist by virtue of conflict being suppressed, yet latent. Also associated with Negative Peace is lack of fora for the generation of innovative insights to ensure political, economic and legal security, and recognition of all groups. Typically, there are also
insufficient processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues and constructive relationship change.

This next model superimposes a *Peace Operations Framework* over the *Conflict Management Range*.

![Conflict Management Range (Peace Operations Framework Added)](#)

Figure 16: Conflict Management Range (Peace Operations Framework Added)

As one can see, the *Order* and *Justice* frame remains in place along with all other elements previously introduced. The distinction here is that the three primary components of Peace Operations: *Peace Making, Peace Building*, and
Peacekeeping/Security (outlined with the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations - Figure 13) are now taking responsibility, respectively for:

- **Order** (military and police activity – *Peacekeeping/Security*);
- **Justice** (institutional reconstruction and humanitarian aid – *Peace Building*); and
- **Conflict Management** (executive decision making, general management, and coordination in support of Peace Support, Peace Building, and general conflict prevention, management, and resolution activities directly engaged with conflict parties and other affected entities – *Peace Making*). Now we can look at how a positive peace process, for example, a sustained problem solving dialogue, would fit within a peace operations scenario (Figure 17).

![Figure 17: Conflict Management Range (Positive Peace Process Added)](image-url)
I’ve chosen Saunders’ Sustained Dialogue model for this illustration since, for me, it captures well the essence of interactive problem solving approaches aimed at working on fundamental issues and relationships – not simply getting a political deal or a settlement (often tenuous at best). The Sustained Dialogue model also complements the peace operation tasks of civil society capacity building and institutional reconstruction at different levels.

Again, the general idea is to take those positive peace process measures that are known to aid conflict parties in moving beyond a negative peace mode and into a positive peace mode. Ideally, conflict parties could avoid the open conflict / destructive interaction stage along the conflict management range entirely (following the arrow from the lower left corner to the upper right corner of the model). Just the same, positive peace processes are designed to move conflict parties towards a constructive interaction status from wherever they happen to be at the time along the conflict management range (continuum). This includes the protracted conflict cycle.

To reiterate, the Sustained Dialogue Process is a specific process within a broader Multilevel Public Peace Process approach to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. It originally evolved during the Dartmouth Conference as a joint de-escalation, relationship, and options improvement process over many years within the U.S.-Soviet semi-official, bilateral effort to get control of the nuclear arms race. The process has been further refined and tested by Harold Saunders as a particular practice for effectively moving towards positive peace in deep-rooted conflicts.
Sustained Problem Solving Dialogues have proven helpful in broadening perspectives of high level conflict-party influentials, mid-level influentials, and grassroots representatives regarding their situation and each other (Saunders - Tajikastan, 1999; Kelman – Israeli/Palestinian conflict, 1990), Volkan – Estonia, 1999). Various themes on short analytical problem solving workshops, or relatively long-term facilitated dialogues are considered by key conflict resolution theorists and practitioners to be a likely aid to improving the status of a conflict for the better. Sustained dialogue, specifically, could be accomplished by establishing relevant guided processes for sustained collaborative governmental and civil dialogues and constructive relationship change at several societal levels simultaneously and within different sectors (Saunders, Burton, Mitchell, Lederach, Volkan, Ronald Fisher, Kelman, Deutsch).

Sample Positive Peace-specific Process (Sustained Problem Solving Dialogue)

Familiarity with realpolitik and human realism, as described earlier, is helpful to understanding the positive peace framework since, in fact, such a dialogue proceeds under the influence of both paradigms simultaneously – see Sandole (1999, Ch. 8, esp. pp. 192-205, and Ch. 6 on the “4+2 Framework”) for his argument on the need to integrate realpolitik and idealpolitik frameworks. This is particularly true early on in a process, then less so for different participants as time goes on and as positive peace dynamics gradually take hold.

An additional distinction between realpolitik and human realism is that, as Saunders (1999) puts it in a discussion about a conflict, “experts talk about technical
solutions and citizens talk about values.” Considering that many, if not most, conflicts today are essentially value-driven, it seems helpful to analyze issues with that in mind.

Since I chose Sustained Dialogue as a sample positive peace process for use in the peace operations framework analysis (Figure 17), I created the model below to better illustrate the symbiotic relationships involved in an interactive multilevel/multi-sector, public peace-sustained dialogue process (Figure 18).

![Figure 18: Sustained Dialogue Multilevel Public Peace Process](image)

I have taken the liberty of linking three distinct models by three different interactive process-oriented scholar practitioners (Lederach’s three-tiered society
leadership model on the left, (1997); Saunders’ Sustained Dialogue stages in the middle (1999); and Diamond and McDonald’s Multi-Track Diplomacy model on the right (1996). The combined/modified models reflect overall sustained dialogue dynamics and flow of interactions.

As mentioned earlier, Sustained Dialogue is embedded within a broader multilevel public peace process (Saunders, 1999), which aims at generating needed conflict resolution political will and momentum within and between interacting civil society levels and sectors (Somewhat similar in principle to Lederach’s Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding, defined below by Lederach (1997) as Integrated Peacebuilding:

Development of local capacity to design and positively affect social change and structures by linking crisis management and long-term, future-oriented time frames; generate understanding of crisis issues as connected to systemic roots and develop approaches that explicitly anchor issues within a set of relationships and subsystems; involve grassroots and top leadership in conflict resolution--transformation processes, especially mid-range leadership who can cultivate relationships and influence groups vertically within societies and horizontally across societal divides.

Constructive interactions can be facilitated, and conflict parties nudged towards creative joint problem-solving exercises. Such exercises have proven effective in parties arriving at mutually helpful perceptions and options for conflict remedy and co-existence.

As indicated on the left side of Figure 18, mid-range leadership (while usually in consultation with top leadership) and grassroots leadership, participate in joint interaction-problem solving (and hopefully relationship/perception-changing) exercises. Participants typically include near top influential and official leadership and top or near top opposition leadership, as well as key private influential persons from diverse sectors.
of society. The five stages within the Sustained Problem Solving Dialogue, describe in brief form the stages that such dialogues usually follow. Typically, there is revisiting of stages as new problems are selected for consideration and jointly worked through. Eventually, the consensus is to consolidate views and decisions and move out to the body politic.

Once the participants arrive at a place where they are functioning as a joint problem-solving team and have developed options or steps for peaceful interactions and solutions, they take these insights and options back to their respective superiors or communities (body politic) for consideration, input, or action. Civil society body politic is well captured by Louise Diamond and John McDonald’s (1996) Multi-Track Diplomacy framework containing nine tracks. The resulting feedback is directed from the body politic back to the sustained dialogue group, (Martin Deutsch, et. al., 2006, refers to this as a “virtuous cycle” in contrast to a “vicious cycle”) establishing a positive cycle of joint deliberation, feedback, and adjustments.

A number of such sustained dialogues have resulted in positive movements in otherwise paralyzed official positions or broadened overly limited perspectives (Kelman, Burton, Mitchell, Saunders, McDonald, Lederach). One reason this is so, is that top leadership can discretely encourage unofficial dialogue with the enemy while maintaining an official position against such contact. A common practice at Stage Five is that, having taken on a substantive joint problem solving mind-set, representatives from opposing conflict parties mutually support each other in their “re-entry” consultations with their own governments or groups. In connection with these phenomena, most scholar-
practitioners stress that problem-solving processes need to be institutionalized (Lederach, 1997; Saunders, 1999; Burton, 1997).

The insights, constructive treatment of issues, options for movement ahead, and changed relationships eventually generated in the dialogues may be expected to slowly transfer to key decision makers and groups outside of the immediate dialogue group. In some cases, the outcomes of previous dialogues have evolved into acceptable negotiation points, agreements and processes that were eventually adopted by official governmental and factional entities as well by broader social movements - all of which represent important steps towards sustainable solutions (Saunders -Tajikistan, 1999; Volkan - Estonia, 1999).

Lederach’s civil society approach contains many of the same elements. His plan of action is to establish multi-level intervention mechanisms across societal divides. This would be accomplished through local grassroots, middle-range, and top leadership levels, utilizing, for example, problem solving workshops (Lederach, 1997, p. 39). The plan requires attention to crisis management, prevention, root causes, and vision (Burton’s “provention”) directed over the long-term towards transformation utilizing Lederach’s “Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding” (Lederach, 1997, p. 80).

The reader will note that I draw particular attention to Stage Four of the Sustained Problem Solving Dialogue (Figure 18). This stage entails a key positive peace dynamic. Most participants from opposing conflict parties in a Sustained Dialogue usually, eventually, find themselves working together productively to explore problems and solutions from a joint problem-solving perspective. This does not usually happen unless
the representatives have, with the help of knowledgeable facilitators, effectively moved beyond their earlier realpolitik position-based demands, assumptions, and perceptions regarding the conflict and each other. In essence, they find a third way beyond their respective hardened positions and are able to constructively proceed by viewing their conflict as a mutual problem to be solved together. Such an event requires a shift in understanding and relationship interaction – see Ben Broome’s Chapter 7 in Sandole and van Der Merwe (1993) and more recently his Chapter 13 in Sandole, et. al. (2009), for his comment on a “third culture.” This is one pivotal objective of sustained dialogues and positive peace processes in general.


**Steps of a Typical Sustained Dialogue Process:**

**Stage One: Deciding to Engage**

- Find respected participants.
- Agree on time, place, and how long (open ended period of months).
- Agree on nature, purpose, and rules of dialogue.
  
  (listen thoughtfully, respect confidentiality, speak for self only).

**Stage Two: Mapping Problems & Relationships**

- Explain how problems affect you.
- Explain how problems affect other party.
- Examine how problems affect real interest.
• Determine what is needed to resolve problems.
• Choose 2 or 3 problems to focus on.

Stage Three: Probing Problems & Relationships for Direction

• See how relationships affect interest.
• Glimpse how relationships might change.
• Decide whether to try.
• Identify main elements of the problem.
• Describe principle people and parties involved.
• Discuss how problem affects what you and your group value most.
• What future is preferred?
• How do you propose to change course?
• Costs willing to pay?
• Relationship change needed?
• Common ground?

Stage Four: Scenario Building & Experiencing a Changing Relationship

• Thinking together about changes needed that all agree on.
• Develop interactive steps needed to gradually change how groups feel about each other.
• List obstacles to change.
• List steps to overcome obstacles.
• Who can take steps needed?
• Steps needed to persuade action?
• How can dialogue group create public recognition that something different is happening?

**Stage Five: Mutual Supportive Outreach**

• Re-entry into larger community: exchanges with whole bodies politic.
• Decide whether to act in larger community
• Practical ways that scenarios can be put into action?
• Conditions needed for transfer of experiences and insights?
• Capacities to follow through on hand?
• Who needs to take what steps?

A few paragraphs directly from Saunders (1999) are offered as useful elaboration and reinforcement of the concept. Also, in each case, I have added within brackets and in bold lettering below a specific comment on how the dynamics or content described in the respective paragraph applies to conflict resolution capability and an indication of its value in civil society restructuring and capacity building:

Beyond diplomatic exchanges, there can be a depth of communication among human beings that reveals deep-rooted interests, perceptions and misperceptions, priorities, identity, purpose and political dynamics. Now we are beginning to see the possibility of adding to governmental channels, nonofficial dialogues that can broaden the range of interaction, sharpen understanding, deepen communication and partly replace adversarial interaction and contests of force as a means of resolving differences...In a process of sustained dialogue, participants can actually
design a scenario of interactive steps that will gradually make bodies politic aware of a changing pattern of interaction (ibid.; p.39). [This statement describes a potent and likely trickle-up and trickle-down effect].

The outcome of dialogue is to create new human and political capacities to solve problems (ibid.; p.85). [Capacity building].

Introducing the dimension of building civil society into the overall task of resolving conflict tangibly changes the character of a dialogue. Adding thought about the kind of society or relationships participants envision enlarges their options in making peace (ibid.; p.230). [Empowerment, capacity building, and viable response generation].

The philosophy and strategy that participants have articulated show far greater breadth and originality than those of the prevailing political forces in the country. They reveal a way of working that differs from the confrontation and compromise of negotiation. They reveal a sense of ownership of the peace process by these citizens of different factions working together as a microcosm of what a unified Tajikistan might become (ibid.; p.235). [Evidence; testing].

If you limit your view of a problem to choosing between two sides, you inevitably reject much that is true, and you narrow your field of vision to the limits of those two sides, making it unlikely you’ll pull back, widen your field of vision, and discover the paradigm shift that will permit truly new understanding (ibid.; p.248). [Complexity and creativity capturing perspective]

…Above all, I argue that the multilevel peace process is the context for peacemaking in which all parts of a society can interact (ibid.; p.249). [Versatile/comprehensive]

INTERVENTION CONCEPTUAL DICHOTOMY

The preliminary sorting-out of a methodology for this study begins with the identification of an apparent conceptual dichotomy concerning the implementation of peace and stability intervention tasks. That is, an apparent fundamental difference in conceptions on the part of many Track 1 and Track 2 intervenors as to what constitutes conflict transformation, which in turn, leads to my positing a concept hypothesis. The dichotomy constitutes a fundamental difference in conception as to what actually constitutes a state of peace in a peace and stability operation area – whether it be called sustainable peace, positive peace, conflict transformation, conflict resolution or other intended end-game status, or process. Such a dichotomy raises fundamental questions regarding thought processes behind peace and stability interventions, and peacebuilding in general. Is peace a change in fundamental conflict party relationships from one of assumed win/lose adversarial brinksmanship, to one of empathetic constructive-conflict interaction?, Or more strictly speaking, to one in which particular mandated structural political, security, rule of law, economic, and institutional technical benchmarks are attained.

The different meanings attached to the term conflict transformation by different intervention dedicated groups, reveals significantly differing views about what conflict transformation is as an instrument of peace for achieving and maintaining a condition of positive peace. The dichotomy also raises implications about differing views as to what peace itself is. This calls for preliminary analysis specific to conflict transformation as
precursor to consideration of the *primary research question* and *primary research objective*.

This preliminary sorting out of fundamentally different interpretations (paradigms) of conflict transformation, and subsequent peace operation policy and implementation implications, informs my mixed-method quantitative and qualitative methodology for addressing the research problem and associated questions, and for identifying and exploring the status of key elements of conflict transformation in a peace and stability operation environment.

To begin, the recent work of Covey, Dziedzic, and Hawley (2005), *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, is an excellent example of a field experience based theoretical and practical analysis. Covey, et. al., set out an analytical framework containing Stages and Strategies of “Conflict Transformation;” much of which is based on actual peace and stability operation interventions in the Balkans and intended for direct practical use in the field. The analysis could have been described as grounded-theory based abduction if the authors had been inclined.

Covy uses the term *viable peace* to define the point in an intervention in which the “capacity of legitimate institutions” overcomes the “power of obstructionists.” He uses the term *conflict transformation* to describe “the way in which power is obtained, maintained, and exercised,” entailing “diminishing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and economic aspirations” (pp.13-17).
Below is a graphic model, *Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity* (Figure 19), from Grossman-Vermass, Redding, and Wyler, March, 2008 that sums up the essentials of the *Quest for Peace* concepts of *Imposed Peace, Viable Peace,* and *Sustained Peace* as indicators of the status of the *Drivers of Conflict* and the status of *Institutional Capacity* (performance) in a mission area. I will expand on the concepts, but I point out that I have embedded an origin disclosure statement at the top of Figure 19.

Figure 19: Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity Parameters
Essentially, **Imposed peace** indicates coercive peace enforcement and on-site conflict management and settlement by outside intervenors (in the case of BIH, a sequence of peace and stability operations). **Viable Peace** is that point at which national/local legitimate institutions can hold their own against the drivers of conflict (obstructionists), but international presence and assistance is still needed; **Sustainable peace** is the institutional capacity-point at which peace can hold independently of outside intervenors.

I reference *Quest For Viable Peace* (Covy, et. al., 2005) in particular to make a point about how different intervention approaches, for instance, an academic or purely theoretical approach in contrast to a largely Track 1 operational approach, is sometimes a matter of semantics, but sometimes may reflect a fundamental difference in conceptions about how to think about and respond to deep-rooted conflict.

To clarify my point, in the definition of conflict transformation provided by Covy, et. al., which I see as capturing the essence of the Track 1 state-driven approach, “viable peace” and “sustainable peace” are to be taken as markers of conflict transformation based on, essentially, successful implementation of security measures, a political settlement, and technical reconstruction - that is, sufficient establishment or re-establishment of legitimate institutions and democratic/developmental components. This approach may well be the only viable option during a stabilization phase. However, any priority consideration given to improving relationships is largely focused on improving relationships between intervention officials and national elites, as needed to ensure attainment of political settlements and mission technical benchmarks, not on improving relationships between conflict parties, per se.
I want to be clear here that stabilization or achievement of negative peace and viable peace in an active conflict or war zone are extraordinarily difficult and costly in blood and treasure, and are often necessary to prepare conditions for more direct positive peace work. On the other hand, conflict transformation, in much of the conflict and peace studies literature (for example, Bush, Folger, Lederach, Rothman, Fisher, Sandole, Saunders, Laue, and Banks), is taken to mean that fundamental changes in personal and societal narratives have been achieved. That is, changes in personal perspectives and human relationships. Barash (2002) refers to this latter interpretation as “personal transformation” and “societal transformation.” This is not purely accomplishment of the reconstruction/reconfiguration of institutions, or the re-educating, intimidating, bribing, jailing, or otherwise successful marginalization of a sufficient number of obstructionists, be they hardline nationalists, organized crime elements, or more mundane opportunists – no matter the necessity. In the end, real transformation and sustainable positive peace lies beyond political and economic power, or even the power of coercion, albeit such may be foundational. I know personally that many Track 1 officials in the field know this and strive to address the issue. It is the balancing and timing of needed conceptual approaches that I am focusing on in this examination of conflict transformation with a hopeful hypothesis that both negative and positive peace objectives can advance towards sustainable positive peace.

Below are several representative Track 1 definitions for **Conflict Transformation**:

- Conflict Transformation guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of

- The goal of conflict transformation is to reach the point where the host nation is on a “sustainable positive trajectory,” where it can independently manage the dynamics causing violent conflict. Conflict transformation requires reducing the drivers of conflict while supporting those that mitigate conflict across security, economic, and political spheres. For the long term, transformation rests on the ability of the host nation to sustain stability and create conditions for long-term development means (The U.S. Department of State Office of The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (*Principles, 2008*), as quoted in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization And Reconstruction* (2009, p.3-21): USIP, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute; and *Quest for Viable Peace* (2005) Covy, Dziedzic, Hawley.

- The process of diminishing the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. Success in this process permits evolution from internationally imposed stability to a peace that is sustainable by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost. (U.S. Government, “Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.”) as quoted in *Guiding Principles for Stabilization And Reconstruction* (2009, p.11 - 229): USIP, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute; and *Quest for Viable Peace* (2005) Covy, Dziedzic, Hawley.

- The fundamental premise of ‘Conflict Transformation and Stabilization’ is that sustainable peace is achieved by decreasing drivers of conflict and increasing the performance of institutions to the point that they are able to address and peacefully resolve conflict (*Metrics Framework For Assessing Conflict Transformation And Stabilization, Version 1.0, August 2008*).
My impression is that the conceptualization of conflict transformation is manifested in two related, but distinctly different ways: that is, transformation primarily through structural change and structural means, or transformation through primarily relational change and relational means in and among individuals or groups. For scholar-practitioners in the field of conflict resolution, that is to say principally Track 2 actors (definitions quoted previously), conflict transformation generically implies a fundamental change of relationship between conflict parties from that of mutual antagonists – position-based opponents - having often the worst assumptions about each other’s intent and character, to that of mutually supportive, or perhaps mutually tolerant, mutual problem solvers who have acquired an appreciation of the interests, security, and welfare of the other. This is said to be accomplished by skilled facilitated dialogues that get at underlying causes and conditions of a conflict and mutually derived and implemented solutions (Folger, Bush, Lederach, Burton, Laue, Saunders). This is based fundamentally on a change in experiential interaction and change of relationship that go beyond typical confidence-building measures.

It appears that the relationship-change interpretation of “transformation” is intended to indicate a deeper psychological or sociological attitude and behavioral change than traditional diplomacy, political settlements, administrative directives, and security enforcement measures are assumed to accommodate. A relationship-based interpretation also appears to go beyond the technical accomplishment, strictly speaking, of institutional and infrastructural reconstruction, notwithstanding how vitally important these components are as elements of sustainable peace (i.e., sustainable positive peace).
Another factor surfaces in the consideration of different interpretations or conceptions of conflict transformation. There seems to be a growing number of intervenors who recognize that peace and stability, despite the best efforts of diplomatic, administrative, and military peacemakers is unlikely if the root causes and conditions of a conflict remain unaddressed. Root causes and conditions are typically described as chronic political oppression; abuse of civil, human, and minority rights; poverty; creation of refugees and internally displaced persons, corruption, ineffective and discriminatory governance and institutions, and corrupt political-criminalized economies, to name some.

These factors certainly strike me as conditions of conflict, but perhaps less as causes than as symptoms. It seems that if these conditions are indeed symptoms of deeper level causes, and if concepts of relationship are to be taken seriously, then a step beyond treating symptoms is needed, a deeper level of conflict dynamics’ deconstruction is warranted. In short, working on relationship dynamics specifically to address a deeper level of conflict-condition or genesis is called for.

This seems to be the conceptual crux: the control of violence with a focus on fundamental relationship and attitudinal change (narrative change) as contrasted with the sole control of violence through political settlement, law enforcement, economic, and structural/institutional change – a matter of how to get it done, with what balance and expediency, and how to maintain that “transferred” state of affairs. What is clear at this point is that policy for relational matters is generally missing from Track 1 management of peace and stability interventions.
In practical terms, it appears that time-sensitive political, security, and funding needs call for enforcement expediency (minimalist, negative peace measures), whereas deeper relationship work, which seems to take more time, comes when that option in prioritized, if considered at all (maximalist positive peace measures). The question, then, is which intervention outcome – negative peace or positive peace (or combination thereof) - must actually be achieved for a declaration of sustainable peace, positive peace, or a mission-accomplished status to be made? Clearly, this is a matter of one’s conception of conflict transformation and therefore success.

Is success the achievement of technical-structural benchmarks or a fundamental relationship change? When has a conflict status or intervention transitioned beyond negative peace to positive peace? To complicate conceptual considerations further, are sustainable peace and positive peace the same thing?

In philosophical terms, is this line of questioning merely a new chapter in the ancient journey of humanity from natural man to enlightened man? And now, perhaps, on to transformed man? I hypothesize that some manner of cognitive blending of relationship-based and structural-based approaches will prove to be more productive than a case of either/or and, perhaps, there is another element to be encountered in the process.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter 4, I discussed structural concepts utilized by the United Nations and the Peace Operations Policy Program at George Mason University. Chapter 4 directly addressed peacebuilding in relation to peace and stability operations, and the issue of the
intervention Conceptual Dichotomy involving Track 1 and Track 2+ intervention actors. Understanding the fundamentals of a peace and stability operation structure and tasks, and the conceptual dichotomy, builds a foundation for better understanding the concepts and practices specific to Bosnian historical and current intervention dynamics in Chapter 6 to follow.
Chapter 6: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

BACKGROUND

General

Chapter 6 attempts to capture historical and current Bosnian complexities, which are inextricably linked by successive invasions and interventions by outsiders, into a coherent whole and placed within the recent Bosnian conflict scenario. Specific complexities discussed are the historical background, Memory and Conflict, Stabilization (Resolutions, Peace Conferences, Operations, Protection), and peacebuilding/conflict transformation as Reconstruction and Development.

The complexities of historical events and current affairs in the Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in particular, are virtually limitless. Much of this is due to the seemingly never-ending ebb and flow of populations, civilizations, religions, and marching armies over millennia as imperial systems and local kings and warlords intrigued and contested for influence or control of the same landscape (Malcom, 2002; Burg and Shoup, 2000; Silber and Little, 1997).

Complexity is deepened by claims of superior legitimacy based on conflicting claims from all quarters as to what history says about who got where first, or who is or was in the majority in a given area, and, therefore, what group is presumably entitled to ownership and control of the land and associated political, economic, and social
prerogatives. Intractability in this regard has been deepened by unspeakable brutality and injury.

All of this is further complicated by confusion or contrivance in connection with which perspective is to be used in adjudicating or forcing claims, that is, which timeline measurement of legitimacy and entitlement is to be used: ethnicity, religion, or state? Nearly all Bosnians - to use the term uncharacteristically all-inclusive by local standards - agree on one thing, that traditionally there is no distinction to be made between ethnicity and religion, that they are exactly interchangeable. Based on my interviews, nearly every subject stated that, in BiH, all Bosnian Croats are presumed Roman Catholic, all Bosnian Serbs are Serbian Orthodox Christian, and all others are Bosnian Muslims with the exception of a few tiny minorities, and that religion and ethnicity are inseparable. Many Bosnian Serbs vigorously argue that the state (nationality) should also be distinctly separate according to ethnicity/religion; Croats somewhat less so, and Muslims much less so. I did talk with some individuals who did not subscribe to these presumptions, but generally, it is stated as a given in Bosnian discourse regardless of nuanced opinion to the contrary.

Another complicated, confounding factor is the often discussed argument that multi-ethnicity does not apply in BiH (concerning Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) since modern day Muslims (Bosniaks) are deemed to be of Slavic decent but adopted or were coerced into Islam under the roughly 400 years of Ottoman rule. The term Bosniak was first introduced in the 19th Century by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, after the end of Ottoman rule, to distinguish Muslims in Bosnia from Croatians and Serbs since Austro-
Hungarian authorities (the new rulers of Bosnia at the time) did not want to recognize citizenship according to religious affiliation. The term went out of use during the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia era in favor of the more universal “Yugoslav,” pertaining to all ethnic groups as per the wish of Marshal Josip Broz Tito. But “Bosniak” was brought back into use by international intervention authorities after the 1992-1995 war for largely the same reason it was introduced the first time by Austro-Hungarian rulers (Malcom, 2002).

The historical background of Bosnia and Herzegovina is material for many volumes and topics, but I will limit background coverage to relatively brief descriptions for context of recent events and dynamics. But first, a few demographics for perspective: The last national census in BiH was completed in March, 1991, shortly before the most recent war. At that time, by “nationality”, “43.7 percent of the population was Muslim, 31.4 was Serb, and 17.3 percent was Croat…” (Burg and Shoup, 2000, p. 26).

The following numbers are drawn from the CIA World Fact Book for Bosnia and Herzegovina (only available online now) and closely reflect figures, give or take 1 or 2 percentage points, utilized by other international bodies keeping track of population statistics for BiH such as the World Bank and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in its ongoing “Population and Vital Statistics Report” – July, 2010 (also online). All primary sources for current BiH population statistics start from the 1991 census.

The most commonly cited total population estimate for Bosnia and Herzegovina (roughly the size of West Virginia) is about 3.8 million. In 2000, the CIA projected a
population of 4.6 million by July 2011. The most commonly cited population breakdown estimates are as follows:

**Nationality/Ethnicity:** Bosniak (Muslim) (48.3%), Serb (34.0%), Croat (15.4%), others (2.3%);  
**Religion:** Muslim (40%), Serbian Orthodox Christian (31%), Roman Catholic (15%), Protestant (4%), other (10%);  
**Language:** Currently described as Bosnian, Serbian, or Croatian by the respective ethnic groups. All are essentially the same language described as Serbo-Croatian prior to the wars of 1992-1995, with slight local dialectic differences. Serbian uses Russian Cyrillic script; Croatian/Bosnian uses the Latin alphabet;  
**Literacy** (age 15+): Total (96.7%); Males (99%); Females (94.4%);  
**Age:** 0-14 (14%), 15-64 (71%), 65+ (15%);  
**Urbanization:** Urban (49%), Rural (51%);  
**Urbanization Rate:** 1.1%.

Two other basic-perspective statistics are those concerning refugees and internally displaced persons. These particular numbers are and have been extremely sensitive and politically charged points of discussion and contention in the Balkans. This is especially true for BiH since BiH has the most ethnically diverse population and is seen historically as the melting-pot of the Yugoslav people from the surrounding more homogeneous nations, but principally from Croatia and Serbia. In fact, some Croatians and Serbs, particularly those in Croatia or Serbia, have argued that BiH has no real nationhood of its
own at all since Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), they argue, are simply Slavic Croatians or
Slavic Serbs who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.

There are distinct categories of refugees and internally displaced persons. There
are those who have been pushed by conflict across international borders, or displaced
internally within a country, or that find themselves in particular “return” circumstances,
in which they have returned to their country of origin - or to the region they left in their
country of origin - but not specifically to the villages or homes they left. Also, in the case
of BiH, there are Bosnian and non-Bosnian refugees that fled from the surrounding
Yugoslav republics into BiH given that the 1992-1995 war was regional in nature. But
for the moment, I cite only the two most basic statistics for BiH provided by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its current on-line Country
Operations Profile for Bosnia and Herzegovina (statistics from January, 2013):

**Refugees** - those displaced to outside of BiH):  58,578

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)** - Those displaced from their homes or
communities but remaining in BiH; and those who have returned to BiH as refugees from
abroad but subsequently joined the ranks of IDPs internally: 113,000.

Any discussion of the Balkans and Bosnia-Herzegovina must contain references
to mass migration and forced population movements (ethnic cleansing) since such is the
core of common experience and complaint of the Bosnian people, currently and
historically. This is why I mention refugees and IDPs and demographic percentages as
preface to elaboration on historical background particulars:  Now, on to particulars.
The history of the Balkans and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular is one of migration, population displacements, conquests, subjugation, intrigue, and struggles for independence and identity – put another way: invasions, settlements, civil and imperial wars, shifting boundaries, and shifting rule and allegiances – internal and external. The same can probably be said of the entirety of human affairs and all civilizations throughout human history, but I conveniently set aside that detail for now and focus on the immediate sticky problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina and associated interventions. In any case, there is little doubt that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s place as a literal cross-roads of history has, over millennia, reliably concentrated acute competition among warring civilizations, religions, and passions - perhaps only surpassed by Israel and Palestine.

The idea and territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken many forms over the centuries, depending on how far back one feels compelled to go to cite evidence of ethnic, religious, or national presence for purposes of arguing national legitimacy and territorial rights, or for citing injuries inflicted. A number of meaningful dates and events can be cited, and often are by respective ethnic/religious/national groups. Then there is the mix of facts and myths for arguing one way or the other, depending on one’s perspective or purpose. I will not attempt in this study to sort out deeply held truths of Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs, beyond pointing some out and noting the general nature and timing of events. Noel Malcom’s “Bosnia – A Short History”, is representative of works listing essential events in Bosnian history from long past centuries up to recent times that are usually cited for placing current Bosnian circumstances in context. In this section, I
will primarily cite Malcom’s chronology. In any case, most commentators begin with Roman times.

In the several centuries before the Christian era, the lands approximating recent Yugoslavia and Albania are generally understood to have been populated by the Illyrians; a tribe that spoke an Indo-European language “related to modern Albanian.” During those last centuries B.C. and into the early Christian era, Rome pushed its empire eastward conquering and subsuming the Illyrians and their lands, and other assorted remnant tribes in the region, leaving in its wake Roman forts, roads, Christian basilicas, and settlements comprised of Roman veterans and various peoples from around the Empire. Also, notably, while expanding eastwards though Illyria, Rome created a military/commercial powerbase providing material and human resources to Rome, including Illyrian soldiers for the legions, and Illyrian governors and generals, some of whom became Roman Emperors (Malcom, 2002).

During the 4th and 5th centuries A.D., Gothic-Germanic tribes from the North invaded the former Illyrian, now Roman lands in the Balkans, making serious in-roads, but were driven out in the 6th century by Emperor Justinian, thereby shifting rule nominally from western Roman rule to eastern Roman-Byzantine rule. Also in the 6th century, Avars (a Turkic tribe) and Slavs migrated westward from the Caucasus into the Balkans. The Avars were driven out in the 7th century. Soon thereafter, Croat and Serb Slavic tribes moved down from the north of the Caucasus (approximately modern Poland and Czechoslovakia) into the western Balkans.
“…the Serbs and Croats were, from the earliest times, distinct but closely connected, living and migrating in tandem, and both having some kind of Iranian component. What is also clear is that by the time they came to the Balkans there was already a large Slav population in place.”…“The Serbs settled in …southwestern Serbia” and the “Croats settled in the area of modern Croatia…including most of Bosnia proper (Malcom, 2002, p. 8).”

Over the next 400 years or so of the middle ages, conquests in the western Balkans by armies of the Franks (Charlemagne), Byzantines, Serbs, Croatians, and others, contested Bosnian lands back and forth among themselves until Bosnia “…became for the first time, a more or less an independent state” in the 1180s (Malcom, 2002, p. 11).

Bosnia is mentioned specifically by Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus in 958. By the 1180s, under a series of Bosnian rulers, Bosnia had acquired sufficient territory, power, and independence from its immediate competitors (Croatia, Serbia, and Hungary) to become a major Balkan power in its own right. Simultaneously, the Bosnian Church largely pulled away from the control of the Roman Catholic Church, although, as with all things political, religious, and territorial in Bosnia, the ebb and flow was continuous. In 1326, Bosnia acquired a large chunk of Croatia in the southwest (Hum), and thus became Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, another empire was on the move.

By the late 1400s, roughly 60 years after the Ottoman Empire had turned its attention to the Balkans, the Ottomans had progressively conquered various Bulgarian, Hungarian, Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian armies west to the Adrian Sea and north to just outside of Vienna. In 1414 the Ottomans duly installed an exiled Bosnian ruler
Tvrtko II as the new King of Bosnia and settled in to rule for the next 400 + years. The battle of Kosovo Polje on 28 June 1389, in which Serbians and Bosnians fought Ottomans, is cited as the last real stand against the Ottoman Empire’s relentless onslaught. From this time until 1815, the Ottomans focused on administration and commerce in the Balkans - while fighting off continuous individual or collective efforts by Austrian, Hungarian, Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian armies and insurgents to evict them.

The Austrian army had pushed the Ottomans out of Hungary by 1687. And, as always, the fighting produced hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced populations of every kind. The French, under Napoleon, and the Russians, under Catherine the Great, added to the turmoil in the Balkans and south Caucasus during their reigns with wars of their own. The pattern of constant wars, insurgencies, plundering, massacres, IDP/refugee generation, and trading of territories and control continued through to 1878 when, at the Congress of Berlin, Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed under Austro-Hungarian occupation while still technically within the Ottoman Empire. The matter of the return of IDPs and refugees to their villages and towns of origin is not just a contemporary issue. Austro-Hungarian authorities had over 200,000 refugees on their hands needing return, and all of the difficulties associated with that enterprise. Turkey gained its share of refugees also: 350,000 Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire, the principle heir of the dying Ottoman Empire, gained full annexation of Bosnia in 1908, following an agreement in 1909 with Turkey. This event ushered in what might be said to be the beginning of the modern era of
organized Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat political-nationalist rivalries. It is during this time that the Muslim National Organization, Serbian National Organization, and Croatian National Society, “begin to function as real political parties,” and the interaction of nationalists’ agendas and imperial maneuvering set the stage for the explosion of the first Balkan wars of the 20th century and WWI (Malcom, 2002, p.151).

Also, the idea of a Yugoslav nation, the coming together of all South Slavs (Muslims included) into a common Pan-Slav entity, was gaining traction.

By October, 1912, Montenegro and Serbia declared war on Turkey and drove them out of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Novi Pazar, in the process, “causing tens of thousands of Slav Muslims to flee from Macedonia and subjecting Bulgarian-speaking Muslims to forced conversions” (ibid.; pp.153-54) This “First Balkan War” ended in May, 1913, with the Treaty of London ending Ottoman-Turkish domination and ushering in the “Second Balkan War” in which the Balkan allies of the First Balkan War turned on each other. The turmoil in the local Bosnian scene that had ensued prompted the Austro-Hungarian overlords, in the person of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, to pay a supervisory visit to their troubled Bosnian claims. In the process, he and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo on the 28th of June, 1914 by Gavrilo Princip, a member of the “Black Hand” -- either a radical Serb-Yugoslav group or a radical nationalist group (depending on who you ask), which generated a series of events culminating in a declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, which in turn and in short order tragically initiated a chain of pre-set automatic military mobilizations of opposed alliances across Europe leading to WWI. It so happens that the 28th of June was
also the decisive day of the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) in 1389, held by Serbs as their sacred defeat for the cause of Christendom against the Ottomans – reinforcing for Serbs the potency of the concept of “Chosen Trauma” (Volkan, 1997).

WWI facilitated repetitions of long familiar Balkan war patterns of atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and refugee movements among empires and between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslims, and Serb, and Croat factions in various configurations. Once again, empires and Croatia and Serbia worked to carve up Bosnia among themselves. In the interwar period, Serbia and Croatia contested politically through their Serbian centralism (backed by Austria) and Croatian regionalism (backed by Hungary). Again, Bosnians found themselves struggling with identity, with some Muslims referring to themselves as Muslim-Croats and some as Muslim-Serbs (Malcom, 2002, 165).

Post WWI agreements led to the establishment of The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs and, separately, Bosnia and Herzegovnia. The various Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serb, Serbian, Croatian or Yugoslav groupings, and increasingly politicized religious leaders, pursued a variety of peaceful and violent approaches to further their respective causes until the advent of WWII, when in April, 1941, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary in a collective Axis, invaded Yugoslavia.

Croatia, which had developed a potent nationalist-fascist component, split off to the Nazis; Serbia, also with a potent nationalist core, sided with the Allies. Bosnia, as usual, was annexed entirely by another power; in this case, Croatia with Nazi Germany military backing, and Italy, which got a large part of the Dalmatian coast for its reward. Croatia’s paramilitary Ustasa, Serbia’s paramilitary Cetniks, and Tito’s paramilitary
Communist Partisans fought each other in a three-way war while simultaneously fighting with their great power Axis or Allied partners, respectively.

Ultra-nationalists in Croatia and Serbia worked diligently with extreme violence to take advantage of WWII to realize a Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia at each other’s expense and especially at the expense of Bosnia. In February, 1942, Serbian ultranationalist Moljevic argued for ‘the cleansing (ciscenje)’ of the land of all non-Serb elements” (Malcom, 2002, p.178). Bosnians, especially, Bosnian Muslims, again having no country of their own, fought on all sides against all sides, but primarily against Croatia. Malcom places the problem in the context of its ultimate consequences for Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims in particular: “In this whirlpool of conflicting forces – every one of which, it will be noted, had its origin outside Bosnia – the most natural and popular course for Muslims to follow was to form their own local defense units and try to protect themselves against all comers” (ibid.; p.188).

As was the case prior to WWI, during the interwar period, during WWII, and to this day, the matter of national and ethnic identity for Bosnians, particularly Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), has been and is a difficult, and often, deadly issue. For example, Communist Party debates regarding Bosnia in 1939, “rejected at this stage the idea that any set of people defined by their religion could have a political or national identity” and in 1943, “described the Muslims as an ‘ethnic group’, yet excluded them from the list of Yugoslav nations”. Regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, “…the final compromise was to give it republican status but to describe it as a republic inhabited by parts of the Serb and Croat nations, as well as by the Bosnian Muslims” (Malcom, 2002, pp.180-181).
As with previous wars in the Balkans, and Bosnia in particular, WWII facilitated unspeakable atrocities and massacres and the generation of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. Approximately one million people died in the Balkans during WWII.

With Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s communist partisans having come out on top in the three-way internal Yugoslav war during WWII, the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was established as a communist state under Tito’s leadership. The three way internal war involved Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian militias. The Bosnian militias were made up mostly of Bosnian Muslims, but included Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs as well. The new communist federation was comprised of the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

While Tito was alive, the Yugoslav federation enjoyed a relatively prosperous and stable period out from under strict Soviet Communist control with Tito’s Non-Alignment stance, and with ultra-nationalist ambitions held in check. But this phase was to be short-lived. After Tito’s death in May of 1980, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by escalating confrontations between hardline nationalists in Serbia for dominance in Yugoslav affairs, and hardline nationalists in Croatia reacting in-kind, with Bosnia again caught in between. The Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was not to survive. Renewed age old calls by Pan-Serbia and Pan-Croatia ultra-nationalists to incorporate all Serbian and Croatian populations into their respective motherlands resurfaced forcefully once again during the simultaneous rise of Slobodan Milosevic and
the fall of Yugoslavia. This again precipitated the also age-old design for the division of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.

Pertaining to this dissertation, it is not a specific study about identity, but problematic identity issues are a consistent theme throughout Balkan history, particularly for Bosnians, and most particularly for Bosnian Muslims. So, before moving on to the next phase of discussion (the 1992-1995 war and subsequent international interventions), some additional elaboration is useful regarding the communist Yugoslav Federation’s struggle with the ever-sensitive matter of Bosnian national identity – particularly that of Bosnian Muslims.

The problem of ethnic and national identity for Bosnians and Bosnian Muslims (the term in use during this period) in particular, remained a challenging dilemma even within the all-encompassing identity of Tito’s Communist Yugoslav brotherhood. This is reflected in ongoing debates about the proper categorization of nationalities, ethnicities, and religious groups in national census exercises in the decades following WWII. There was apparently an assumption, or a plan, on the part of the newly installed Communist Party in Yugoslavia that Bosnian Muslims would declare themselves as Croats or Serbs, thereby resolving the troublesome identity issue. “At the first Party Congress after the end of WWII, it was stated that ‘Bosnia cannot be divided between Serbia and Croatia, not only because Serbs and Croats live mixed together on the whole territory, but also because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet decided on their national identity’” (Malcom, 2002, p.197).
Malcom describes the fluid nature of the identity debates revealed in the national census exercises of 1948, 1953, 1961, and 1971 (ibid.; pp.197-198):

In the 1948 census the Muslims had three options: they could call themselves Muslim Serbs, Muslim Croats or ‘Muslims, nationally undeclared’ (or ‘undetermined’). This gave the Bosnian Muslims a chance to demonstrate just how reluctant they were to be either Serbified or Croaticized: 72,000 declared themselves as Serbs and 25,000 as Croats, but 778,000 registered as ‘undeclared’. The next census, in 1953, produced a similar result. This time, the official policy was to promote a spirit of ‘Yugoslavism’: the category ‘Muslim’ was removed from the census altogether, but people were allowed to register as ‘Yugoslav, nationally undeclared’. In Bosnia, 891,000 did so.

Continuing (Malcom, 2002, pp.198-199):

The first sign of change came with the 1961 census, where people were allowed to call themselves ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’. Then the 1963 Bosnian constitution referred equally in its preamble to ‘Serbs, Croats and Muslims allied in the past by a common life’ – implying, but not stating, that they were equally to be regarded as nations. This was regarded as a decisive step, and from now on it became common in Bosnia to treat the Muslims as a national grouping on par with the others; one reflection of this change was that the documents for the election of officials of the Bosnian League of Communists in 1965 simply listed people as either ‘Serb’, ‘Croat’, or ‘Muslim’…. Despite fierce objections in Belgrade from Serbian nationalist Communist such as Dobrica Cosic, this policy was accepted by the central government. And so, on the 1971 census form, for the first time, the phrase appeared: ‘Muslim, in the sense of a nation’.

“Muslim” had still not been officially deemed a nation, but after a period of continued Muslim pressure to make it official, and very stiff resistance to not do so by Serbian nationalists (ibid.; p.199):

…success finally came in May 1968, where a communiqué was issued containing the following statement: ‘Practice has shown the harm of different forms of pressure…from the earlier period when Muslims were designated as Serbs or Croats from the national viewpoint. It has been
shown, and present socialist practice confirms, that the Muslims are a distinct Nation.’

In the end, Noel Malcom, pointing to the many centuries of absorption and mixing of different races and ethnic groups in the Bosnian lands, concludes about Bosnian ethnicity that, “All that one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were Slavs who lived in Bosnia” (Malcom, 2002, p.12).

Regarding the impact of Tito’s constitutional trending towards decentralization and greater local autonomy (meaning de-facto ethnic autonomy), Malcom concludes that “…federations of different national entities can work successfully only if they are based on a genuinely democratic political system; but this was not the case in Communist Yugoslavia” (Malcom, 2002, p.202). Consequently, it is not surprising that the otherwise well-intended gesture of decentralization could not work out in a politically and economically corrupt and dysfunctional communist system, or that subsequent ethnocentric pressures contributed towards the simultaneous rise of ultra-nationalism and the fall of the Yugoslav Federation.

Ironically, allowing greater autonomy and representation (de-facto ethnocentrism) facilitated a direct line of increasingly potent hardline nationalist reaction through media, academic, and political mechanisms, culminating in arrival at the logical extremes of nationalist agitation and reaction. Further changes to the constitution in 1974 created the autonomous province of Vojvodina (Hungarian and Croatian majorities) in the north of Serbia, and the autonomous region of Kosovo in the south of Serbia (Albanian majority). But ultimately, the pressure for non-Serb or non-Croatian ethnic
autonomy was too much to bear for pan-Serbian and pan-Croatian hardline nationalists –
along with the temptations of power gains, which proved too much to resist for
opportunists.

Examples of key events in the 1980’s usually cited in describing the lead-up to the
wars of 1992-1995 are:

1) Writings endorsed or written by the Serbian Academy of Sciences (the 1986
   Academy of Sciences’ “Memorandum”) complaining that Tito had stirred up
   nationalism by his decentralization policies and that the Serbian people had a
   rightful claim to “integrity” as a people and a culture that transcends political
   or geographical boundaries;

2) By 1989, deep economic stagnation with 250% inflation and mass labor
   demonstrations;

3) The forced resignations of the governments of Vojvodina and Montenegro;

4) The Serbian Assembly abolishment of the autonomy of Vojvodina and
   Kosovo through constitutional amendments;

5) The rise of Slobodan Milosevic and his increasing agitation for Serb
   dominance, a Greater Serbia, and acquisition of personal power. On June 28,
   1989, the anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje - symbolic as the
   key Serb military loss (“chosen trauma”) to the invading Ottomans -
   Milosevic declares, in effect, that Serbs will not be mistreated again and that
   armed conflict in that cause “cannot be excluded yet”;

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6) Serbian author Dobrica Cosic calls for parts of Croatia to be “re-assigned” to another republic;
7) Slovenia declares legislative sovereignty.

A rapid acceleration of actions and statements like those just described characterized 1990 and 1991 and intensified. Tactics to radicalize Serbs were employed by militant Serb nationalists through the use of incitements through the media and staged armed attacks on villages and local police to induce calls for armed defense by local police and villagers, and demands for Yugoslav Army intervention and protection. This tried and true population-radicalization tactic long used by guerilla movements around the world was refined and repeated often and successfully in Bosnia (Malcom, 2002, Ch. 3).

Eventually, the levels of agitation and violence reached critical mass, leading to declarations of independence, first by Slovenia and Croatia, then shortly after by Bosnia and Macedonia. The full weight of Yugoslav Serbian and Bosnian-Serb army, security, and paramilitary units were pressed into full-scale war against Croatians/Croats and Bosnian-Muslims in Croatia and Bosnia, presumably to save the Federation. But as the conflict intensified, and Serb police and Yugoslav army units became more instruments of Serb or Croatian nationalism than of Yugoslav federalism, the centuries-old fight was on again for a Greater Serbia, a Greater Croatia, and the ever tempting division of Bosnia between the two.
Memory and Conflict

Given the profound meaning attached by each of the conflicting groups in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia to their respective “background context” memories just discussed – that is to say, their respective narratives. I believe that a discussion dedicated to memory and conflict in the Bosnian case is appropriate. This discussion involves an examination of differing accounts of history, the nature of the dynamics involved, and resulting effects on conflicted parties and outsiders alike. For this purpose, I break the discussion down into: 1) Concepts of Memory, and 2) Related FRY Conflict Issues and Effects. There seems to be little literature linking history and memory issues specifically to conflict resolution and peace and stability operations, so I will make some linkages and conclusions of my own. I will address implications of memory and conflict for conflict resolution and peace and stability operations in Chapter 9.

There is a broad range of memory-history concepts and opinion useful for an overall perspective and clues to linkages. However, the multitude of concepts and opinion is a reflection of the complexities involved and defies concise summation. A challenge here is separating out a smaller number of interconnected factors for convenience of analysis even though, on the ground, such separation is problematic. I will restrict my focus to an abbreviated probe of historical memory, or history construction, as the case may be, with relevance to the Bosnian case.

The literature generally falls into discussions of individual and collective memory and the interaction between them. Although different authors use somewhat different
terms for the same idea and approach the topics from differing perspectives, the principal points of discussion can be listed as follows:

- Individual memory and social interaction
- Individual memory contribution to historical discourse
- Collective memory contribution to historical discourse
- Memory and forgetting
- Witness and memory
- Identity and memory
- Ethics and memory
- Memory and power
- Cultural memory
- Popular memory

Within this category many authors cite Maurice Halbwachs early on in their writing. Halbwachs is known as the founding father of collective memory concepts in sociology upon whose work others have built. He argues that memory is not a function of the individual but only of the collective and that group collective memory influences behavior accordingly (Halbwachs, 1992). Subsequent treatment of the general subject falls into a variety of specializations. Kerwin Klein (Winter 2000) elaborates on the development of the “memory trade” as he refers to scholarly debate in recent decades on “memory in historical discourse.”

Avishai Margalit (2004) ponders the ethics of memory, which is appropriate for inclusion in a study of conflict involving genocide. Margalit contends that historic relations develop “thick” relations between friends, relatives, and like tribal or ethnic group members that account for better understanding, compassion, and treatment, respectively, and “thin” relations between strangers and those who have little in common. The latter status necessarily leads to less consideration being given to the “other,” in
other words, selective application of positive ethics. Another example of thinking on
collective memory and ethics is provided by Ricoeur, et al (2004), who try to explain
why some historical events remain fresh in “memory-consciousness” and others do not,
for example, the holocaust vs. the Armenian genocide or colonial-based genocides. I will
elaborate more on Ricoeur’s thinking below.

Thomas Vogler, et al (2003) explore effects of mental and physical shocks on
witnesses of serious violence and resulting memory-behavior phenomena, as compared to
those who have not personally witnessed or experienced such violence. Vogler stresses
that witnesses and non-witnesses alike contribute distinctive collective memories.
Suffice it to say for now that numerous authors give a variety of views on the subject of
memory and history or memory and conflict, and that there are concepts with overlapping
meaning.

I feel compelled to produce an extended list below in order to indicate, at least by
inclusion on the list, many related typical complexities. Most of the issues will only
appear in the list below with no subsequent treatment in the text; this is not because they
are unimportant, but because they are important and therefore included on the list if only
for greater appreciation of complexities.

I list the issues as follows:

- Psychological
- Sociological
- Cultural trauma
- Collective identity
- Strategic politics (local, regional, international)
- Myths and legends
- Propaganda (yours, mine, ours, political, victim centered)
- History and moral political dependency
A variety of authors touch on key points in these interconnected issues. For example, Lorey, et al (2001) look at what they call the “politics of remembrance” associated with violent episodes at different times and locations around the world. Alexander, et. al. (2004) address cultural trauma and collective identity. Anzulovic (1998) looks at dominant Serbian myths and psychological-sociological factors to explain rationalizations for genocide in the region. Cohen and Riesman (1997) look at the role of propaganda and the “deceit of history” in the conflict. Other authors examine factors such as the inadvertent or deliberate contributions of the international media, academics, and intervenors of all sorts to the creation of or perpetuation of myth or distortion. Vertzberger (June, 1986), examines a connection between foreign policy decision making and a concept he refers to as “practical-intuitive historians: applied history and its shortcomings.” It seems there is no shortage of intricacies for contemplation when it comes to history, memory, and conflict.

The implications of memory and conflict for conflict resolution and peace and stability operations, which I address in Chapter 9, are much less substantiated by the literature and so I tentatively list pertinent elements as follows:

- Cultural variations in conflict resolution
- Mental health recovery
- Collective recovery
- National recovery
Concerning what to make, analytically, of implications and -- beyond that -- what
to do on the ground that would be useful, is another matter altogether. In this regard, it
seems that I will need to do more exploration outside of the history-memory-conflict
scholastic box. There are known conflict resolution concepts to consider such as
sustained problem-solving dialogues, appreciative enquiry, positioning theory, and
related but less conflict resolution-specific interventions such as conflict trauma
counseling and so on. And there are suggestive approaches surfacing in works such as
that by Venna Das, et. al., in “Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering, and

Linking insights derived from the authors’ insights and conflict resolution and
peace and stability operations, is not a straight forward matter but I attempt tentative
thoughts.

**Concepts of Memory**

There is debate about whether memory concepts reflect individual or collective
phenomena and to what extent memories are mental constructions or not and, therefore,
can be said to be divorced from “fact” or not. Halbwachs contends that memory is not an
individual function but a function taking place only within the collective context; that
collective memory is selective, it influences behavior, and reconstructs the past
accordingly (Halbwachs, 1941, 1992):

If recollections were preserved in individual form within memory, and if
the individual could remember things only by forgetting human society
and by proceeding all by himself – without the burden of all the ideas that
he has acquired from others – to recapture stages of his past, he would
become fused with this past; that is, he would have the illusion of reliving
it.….There is hence no memory without perception. As soon as we locate
people in society it is no longer possible to distinguish two types of observations, one exterior, the other interior (ibid.; p.169).

….But forgetting, or the deformation of certain recollections, is also explained by the fact that these frameworks change from one period to another. Depending on its circumstances and point in time, society represents the past to itself in different ways: it modifies its conventions. As every one of its members accepts these conventions, they inflect their recollections in the same direction in which collective memory evolves (ibid.; p.172).

….People living in society use words that they find intelligible: this is the precondition for collective thought. But each word (that is understood) is accompanied by recollections. There are no recollections to which words cannot be made to correspond. We speak of our recollections before calling them to mind. It is language, and the whole system of social conventions attached to it, that allows us at every moment to reconstruct our past (ibid.; p.173).

And finally,

….But when reflection begins to operate, when instead of letting the past recur, we reconstruct it through an effort of reasoning, what happens is that we distort that past, because we wish to introduce greater coherence. It is then reason or intelligence that chooses among the store of recollection, eliminates some of them, and arranges the others according to an order conforming with our ideas of the moment. From this comes many alterations (ibid.; p.183).

The idea of individual selective memory is not new to popular understanding – “so and so only remembers what he wants to.” What Halbwachs introduces is a framework for explaining living social memory processes, social construction. In the context of Balkan conflicts, this can translate into a concept that societies, as well as individuals, can become “fused” with the past and “have the illusion of reliving it;” a collective freezing in the past.
Ricoeur (2004), has much to say about memory, history, and forgetting. Helpful to this study are his comments on “blocked memory,” “manipulated memory,” and “obligated memory.” Ricoeur falls back on memory-related clinical analysis by Freud for explanations of these elements (ibid.; p.70).

The starting point for Freud’s reflection lies in identifying the main obstacle encountered by the work of interpretation (Deutungsarbeit) along the path of recalling traumatic memories. This obstacle, attributed to “resistances due to repression” (verdrängungswiderstande), is designated by the term “compulsion to repeat” (Wiederholungszwang); it is characterized among other things by a tendency to act out (Agieren), which Freud says is substituted for the memory. The patient “reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (S.E., 12:150; G.W., 10:129).

Freud’s follow-up rationale is that blocked memory, which he refers to as the “pathological-therapeutic level,” is a repression that manifest itself by way of eventual transference to the other in order to attain inner reconciliation and relief of distress. Ricoeur makes the linkage to collective memory and he includes from Freud a clinical remedy, although Freud expresses it in relation to the individual. Freud states:

But something is also asked of the patient: ceasing to lament or to hide his true state from himself, he must find the courage to direct his attention to the phenomenon of his illness. His illness itself must no longer seem to him contemptible, but must become an enemy worthy of his mettle, a piece of his personality, which has solid ground for its existence and out of which things of value for his future life have to be derived” (S.E., 12:152; G. W., 10:132)” (ibid, p.70).

Ricoeur (2004) speaks of manipulated memory as being a “practical level”, “passive” acceptance of memory “abuses” by people “resulting from a concerted manipulation of memory and of forgetting by those who hold power (ibid.; p.80).” – what Ricoeur refers to as “instrumentalized memory.” This idea has clear resonance with
Athen’s violentization process explained earlier, in which those further along in the violentization process try to intimidate, coerce, manipulate, and “teach” their subordinates the ways of the world and to submit; then the abuser conveniently forgets that they have abused the subordinate. Ricoeur then links the memory question to that of identity: “The problem is therefore carried back a step, from the fragility of memory to that of identity” (ibid.; p.81).

Next Ricoeur discusses obligated memory placed at an “ethico-political level,” existing at the “region of conflicts among individual memory, collective memory, and historical memory, at the point where the living memory of survivors confronts the distantiated, critical gaze of the historian, to say nothing of the viewpoint of the judge” (ibid.; p.86)—and, I might add, that of world opinion.

Ricoeur variously characterizes obligated memory as the “work of memory,” “duty of memory,” and “work of mourning,” leading to a “duty of justice,” an “imperative of justice;” a cathartic process to “pay the debt” and “inventory the heritage” (ibid.; pp.88-89); to which I presume that the inverse of that idea can be perceived to apply— that is, to take obligated revenge. Ricoeur’s obligated memory is reminiscent of some principles of restorative justice, although left at a heuristic, conceptual level. He concludes his commentary on obligated memory by suggesting an “eventual right of forgetting,” and a delicate confrontation between the “discourse of memory and forgetting and the discourse of guilt and forgiveness” (ibid.; p.92).

Francesca Cappelleto, in her Long-Term Memory of Extreme Events: From Autobiography to History, (2003), contends that there are “mechanisms of construction of
group memory, considering the recollections from the perspective of both their social pattering and their emotional quality.” She continues:

Working from Bloch’s assertion that there is no difference between the representations of autobiographical memory and those of historical accounts, I argue that visual imagery associated with past traumatic experience is a fundamental part of oral narratives, and facilitates the passage from personal to public memories. Treating the memory as a form of intersubjective knowledge endowed with symbolic content, rather than as a unanimous, collective endeavour, I argue for an approach that integrates different disciplinary theories. (Cappelleto, 2003, p.241).

Cappelleto also stresses, based on Fentress and Wickhan (1992), the concepts of “episodic memory” and “semantic memory.” Episodic memory is “descriptive of the event, connected to the concept of the self, procedural, and chronologically organized; it deals with episodes recollected from an individual’s past life and non-rationally organized experience (ibid.; p.242).” Semantic memory, she states: “...is the description of what we know of these events. It is abstract knowledge of the world; it derives from episodic memory and uses it in a process of generalization; it is the rationally organized memory (ibid.; p.242).” It seems, in short, that episodic memory can be seen as memory of an experienced event, while semantic memory deals with what we know about the event and its place in the overall scheme of things.

Another aspect of historical memory relevant to this study is examined by Gedi and Elam, in their work on collective memory (1996), in which they cite a significant perspective provided by given by Anita Shapira (1948) that historians, politicians, and social elites constitute “memory agents” that “shape the picture of the past according to
the needs and agonies of the present, and furthermore, project this picture back onto the historical research that cannot free itself from them.”

Of interest here is the element of manipulation of historical memory which Shapira describes this way: “...academic historical writing” merely “pretends to be based on impartial research”, and historians actually “seek to shape a certain historical memory,” and the next move is to relate to “collective memory” as if it were a historical version on par with any other historical version or interpretation, including those substantiated by historical research. History no longer appears to be suspicious of memory. On the contrary, it turns out that history has been duped by memory all along” (ibid.; p.31).

Newbury, (2002) in her work on history and memory in the Rwandan genocide would be familiar conceptual territory to a student of, or for that matter, a participant in the Balkan conflicts. She describes at length, in the Rwandan case, “…competing visions of the past – the politics of history,” and “…intense struggles over power carried out by leaders – struggles involving the politicization of ethnicity and a perverse dynamic of violence and fear. The conflicts have been based in part on intellectual foundations, on mental maps of history”; “A key element,” Newbury says, in “politicizing ethnic cleavages” and developing and propagating a “corporate view of ethnicity.” She adds, “The generalization of blame was dramatically evident….” (ibid.; pp.67-83).

Newbury goes on to say that the competing visions of the past are “central to the process of political reconstruction” and dealing with a traumatized people. Lorey, et. al., cite such historical memory components in violent episodes elsewhere in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and Europe, leading to the unavoidable conclusion that historical memory development and manipulation are common fare in seriously protracted conflicts. The question is to what degree, and how much violence is involved?

**Related FRY Conflict Issues and Effects**

What linkages can be made between historical memory-related points discussed so far and FRY conflict particulars? There are obvious connections to blocked memory (widespread denial), intellectual and politicized semantic memory or memory consciousness. A concrete example of applied historical memory manipulation is examined at length by Cohen and Riesman (1997) in which they detail a well-oiled and systematic historical memory development and manipulation machine managed by Serbian authorities and intelligentsia since World War II – a review of memory manipulation from the communist era through recent years. Cohen and Riesman include this revealing 1988 comment by Yugoslav politician Milovan Djilas: “The hardest thing about being a Communist is trying to predict the past.”

Cohen and Riesman elaborate:

Within postwar Yugoslavia, much of the documentation that would reveal the sequence of historical events was suppressed, while the interpretation of history was tailored to suit contemporary ideologies. Therefore, a broad antifascist movement attributed to wartime Serbia, while denying Serbia’s collaboration with the Nazis. Nazi collaboration in other parts of Yugoslavia, particularly Croatia, was emphasized and resistance minimized. The revised, pro-Serbian view of the war was disseminated abroad by a public relations network that included Yugoslav embassies and consulates, businesses, and various professional forums. Western perceptions of Yugoslav history were shaped accordingly.

In the 1990s, in order to influence Western policy makers and blunt international outrage, Serbia’s information campaign has promoted its war effort as justifiable. One essential feature of Serbian propaganda has been
to portray Serbia’s enemies, especially the Muslims and Croats, as a threat not only to the Serbs, but to European civilization. Thus Belgrade has claimed an “Islamic threat” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where religious fundamentalism has never existed, and has accused Croatia of fascism, when in truth the resistance movement during the Second World War was strongest in Croatia (ibid.; p.134-135).

Another examination of the Serbian experience of historical memory-making is given by Anzulovic (1998). This writing, contrary to the more technical process of memory development described by Cohen and Riesman, focuses more on psychological, if not spiritual dynamics. Vamik Volkan would find much familiar about dynamics as described by Anzulovic. There are obvious “episodic memory” elements that Volkan would describe in terms of chosen trauma, that is, the Serbian defeat at the 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje to the Ottomans, and the subsequent “semantic memory” exercise by the defeated Serbian leader Knez Lazar (and subsequent Serbian generations) to choose heaven over military victory, as national imperative, in order to bear the unbearable. Such an historical memory-coping mechanism has been continuously relied upon and manipulated for centuries in response to a perception of ultimate national humiliation.

Schivelbusch (2003) aims his sociological-psychological focused lens at the American South after the Civil War; France following the Franco-Prussian war; and Germany at the end of World War II. Nevertheless, his description of the associated reactions to total defeat and perceived national humiliation could just as well describe the Serbian experience. An important distinction, however, is that the Serbian experience, or acting out, of national trauma and mourning, is still at the forefront of Serbian
consciousness and, consequently, still at the forefront of the collective consciousness’s of Serbia’s neighbors.

I posit that if one were to ask, nearly everyone on the street in Pristina, Sarajevo, or Zagreb whether Serbia exhibited a “culture of defeatism,” there would be an immediate intuitive recognition of the phenomenon and its association with Serbian cultural expression.

Schivelbusch characterizes the kind of total defeat that can be associated with early Serbian experience and for that matter with the experience of all Balkan entities at various times, as “crushing” to national self-confidence. Such experiences are purported to eventually induce mental and physical reactions such as strong heroic self-characterizations, a sense of superiority, and quests for security and revenge. The question now is how can this kind of reality, once deeply internalized and systematized, be changed in light of general retreats to hardened nationalism and centuries of repetition? To what extent is a culture of defeat a factor in historical memory management on the part of all Balkan conflict parties as they retreat to bastions of nationalism, as Schivelbusch puts it? These are unanswered questions at this point and guides for further research by qualified researchers.

Having provided points on historical context leading up to the most recent Balkan/Bosnian war (1991-1995), I move on to subsequent international interventions carried out during and after that war. Since the war and intervention dynamics prior to, during, and after the war are closely intertwined, I sequence pertinent points on the war itself within the intervention discussion below.
INTERVENTIONS INTO THE BOSNIAN WAR(S)

General Considerations

Although I highlighted a variety of perspectives on peacebuilding and peace and stability operations in Chapter 5, the descriptions were generic in nature. In this section, I focus more on Bosnian intervention specifics: events, resolutions, operations, motivations, and harsh intervention realities that the Bosnian case reveals. No intervention is simple, but the Bosnian case presents a particularly complex scenario given the multiple largely reactionary interventions involved and a time-span of nearly 20 years now and still counting. There are a great many details associated with the Bosnian interventions. I comment on those that can collectively provide an overview of essential points starting with a few notable Bosnia intervention themes, which, it seems, also reflect interventions generally. To begin, I stress a point concerning the fundamental issue of political or (military) will associated with interventions.

Bosnia is a case in point for the lack of political will concerning the pledges of protection for civilians and peace enforcement. On the opposite end of the spectrum from a lack of political (military will), to actually back-up declarations of protection, is the designation of a rogue state (a commonly used unofficial term) for the purpose of pursuing an aggressive controversial “intervention”; the U.S. invasion of Iraq comes to mind. The designation of Iraq as a rogue state based on false information concerning weapons of mass destruction, led to a questionable and very costly intervention in Iraq in terms of blood and treasure, and in Afghanistan also by virtue of diverted resources from Afghanistan to Iraq, thereby lengthening the war in Afghanistan considerably. Whether a
lack of will or the exercise of questionable aggressive will is involved, intervenor national political interests typically drive intervention decision-making, not necessarily what is in the best interest of conflict parties or conflict resolution.

The designated name of an intervention mission or operation or UN resolution implies priorities and the assumed responsibility of its initiators, which, if not accomplished, can present an embarrassing and lingering problem; that is, latent blame for inaction or failure to live up to the name. At risk of stating the obvious, what to call an intervention or an intervention component can be problematic if the objective is unclear and political will underwriting the objective is ambivalent or contradictory. Notably, serious pause needs to precede a pledge of protection if there is insufficient political will or military will to back the pledge. Recall UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) and the siege of Sarajevo, and the declaration of Safe Zones for which protection was not forthcoming when it came to the test, especially in Srebrenica in July 1995, where the bodies of the roughly 8,000 Muslim males summarily executed by Serb forces are still being dug up at the time of this writing.

An intervention or mission nomenclature defines its conceptual box and therefore its limits. Generally speaking, thinking outside of the box is challenging or politically risky in any context, but especially so when political and military imperatives clash with each other and with realities represented by facts-on-the-ground in conflict situations; a scenario which Bosnia well represents. This clash of intervenor imperatives (intervenor national interests) and realities represented by facts-on-the-ground is central to understanding the Bosnia as well as other interventions.
The capacities and responsibilities of various intervenors have been increasingly overlapping between civilian agencies and military units and Track 1 and Track 2 actors. Therefore, conceptually assigning or tracking intervention tasks is an increasing challenge with regard to the delivery of emergency aid, political settlements, security, the demobilization of combatants, re-establishing governance and rule of law, stabilizing the economy, and supporting the establishment or re-establishment of a functional civil society and, as emphasized of late, establishing democracy in association with development projects. Although this is less of an issue in Bosnia today, it is a significant issue in Afghanistan now and therefore has implications for interventions in general. As described in Chapter 5, the models of peacebuilding and peace and stability operations present a generic description of peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peace support concepts and do contain the assumed tasks just named (see Table 5: Peace Making, Peace Building, Peacekeeping/Security, Peace Support Tasks). The problem is not identification of tasks, per se, but overlapping tasks coverage and coordination (cooperation), and competence.

For the practical purpose of wading through the complexities of a particular intervention, Bosnia in this case, I shift to a field-based perspective on intervention. Consequently, I divide all things intervention into stabilization and reconstruction, the bedrock divisions of responsibility in the new intervention era (post-Westphalia Agreement, post-Cold War, post-peacekeeping). In this context, civilians tend to think in terms of conceptualization and implementation; the military think in terms of planning and execution.
Referring back to the mention of the Post-Westphalia Agreement, etc., above, I specify post-Westphalia to reflect the now dated notion of non-interference into the affairs of sovereign states - failed or failing ones that is to say - without local consent (usually, based on international multilateral consensus and resolutions). I say post-Cold War to reflect the dominance, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, of internal (intra-state) conflicts in association with failed or failing states. I specify post-peacekeeping to reflect the relatively recent realization that inserting a traditional UN peacekeeping mission into an active war zone tends to cause more problems than it solves. This is particularly the case since most conflicts now are internally driven affairs within failed or failing states with ongoing civil wars, insurgencies, or separatists movements - all involving violent disorder – and are not just a straightforward matter of inserting peacekeepers (national troops on loan to the UN) between the troops of consenting sovereign nation-states only in need of assistance with a cease fire and neutral mediation on a political settlement.

Traditional UN peacekeeping missions that involve a policy of strictly neutral mediation and no intervention without local consent, even for the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid, fare badly in the middle of a shooting war or violent disorder involving uncooperative or hostile conflict parties. Concerning this problem, some lessons have been learned following mostly disastrous intervention episodes in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and early on in Bosnia, hence revised mandates and policies paving the way for more comprehensive, sometimes non-consent based, interventions leading off with a
robust stabilization phase then, in due course, an all-fronts reconstruction phase (e.g., Kosovo and East Timor).

The UN, and a substantial number of member states, better understand intervention limitations now, and the need for a comprehensive approach to stabilization and reconstruction;

*The pressing problem now is what to do when a political settlement, and stabilization and reconstruction as we know it, are not enough to break a deep-rooted protracted conflict cycle.*

In the course of discussing Bosnian stabilization and reconstruction below, I will elaborate on issues raised above and on events, resolutions, operations, motivations, and intervention limitations and lessons learned. Additionally, I include points on democratization and development, and intervention experiences elsewhere.

**Stabilization**

*Resolutions, Peace Conferences, Operations, Protection*

Comprehensive ground-up state-building – essentially reconstruction tasks – were fairly well identified and refined by the time of the Kosovo intervention five years after the Bosnia war ended; however, I believe that the tone and parameters set in a stabilization phase significantly impact and accommodate, or not, the reconstruction phase that follows and the overall outcome of an intervention. Stabilization’s tone and parameters are critical for setting-up negative or positive peace parameters and influences that carry through reconstruction and beyond.
Ninety one United Nations Security Council resolutions were issued between September 25, 1991 when the arms embargo was levied against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and November 22, 1995 (www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions) when the embargo was suspended upon “initialing” in Dayton of *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Dayton Peace Accords) by the Presidents of The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegovic), The Republic of Croatia (Franjo Tudman), and The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milosevic), as indicated in the Office of the High Representative document: “*Bosnia and Herzegovina, Essential Texts, 4th revised and updated edition*” (August, 2004). Sanctions against Yugoslavia were suspended the same day, November 22nd. Another four Security Council resolutions were passed by December 14, 1995, when the Dayton Accords were formally signed in Paris by the three Presidents. By the end of December 1995, Security Council resolutions were passed authorizing NATO to replace UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force), the UN military mission in Bosnia, with IFOR (NATO Implementation Force), with a six week overlap for handover purposes, and to establish the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia. The initial stabilization phase of the international intervention into the war(s) between Bosnian-Muslims, Bosnian-Serbs, Bosnian-Croats, Serbs, and Croatians was accomplished.

There were still many stabilization tasks to accomplish involving politicians and diplomats, and international civilians and troops, but the shooting war was over and one could envision a period of follow-up stabilization overlapping the reconstruction phase to
come, and even beyond that to notions of Bosnia, and the other former Yugoslav
repúblicas, democratizing and joining the expanding European Union.

Before going further, I think it useful here to reiterate the last paragraphs of my
Bosnia General Background section, and then pick-up the flow of particular events,
resolutions, and operations again:

Examples of key events in the 1980’s usually cited in describing
the lead-up to the war of 1992 to 1995 are: Writings endorsed or written
by the Serbian Academy of Sciences (the 1986 Academy of Sciences’
“Memorandum”) complaining that Tito had stirred up nationalism by his
decentralization policies and that the Serbian people had a rightful claim
to “integrity” as a people and a culture that transcends political or
geographical boundaries; By 1989, deep economic stagnation with 250%
inflation; Mass labor demonstrations; The forced resignations of the
governments of Vojvodina and Montenegro; The Serbian Assembly
abolishment of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo through
constitutional amendments; The rise of Slobodan Milosevic and his
increasing agitation for Serb dominance, a Greater Serbia, and acquisition
of personal power. On June 28, 1989, the anniversary of the 1389 Battle of
Kosovo Polje - symbolic as the key Serb military loss to the invading
Ottomans - Milosevic declares, in effect, that Serbs will not be mistreated
again and that armed conflict in that cause “cannot be excluded yet”. And,
Serbian author Dobrica Cosic calls for parts of Croatia to be “‘re-assigned’
to another republic;” Slovenia declares legislative sovereignty.

A rapid acceleration of actions and statements like those just
described characterized 1990 and 1991 and intensified. Tactics to
radicalize Serbs were employed by militant Serb nationalists through the
use of incitements through the media and staged armed attacks on villages
and local police to induce calls for armed defense by local police and
villagers, and demands for Yugoslav Army intervention and protection.
This tried and true population-radicalization tactic long used by guerilla
movements around the world was refined and repeated often and
successfully in Bosnia (Malcom, 2002, Ch. 3).

As stated earlier:

Eventually, the levels of agitation and violence reached critical
mass inducing declarations of independence, first by Slovenia and Croatia
then shortly thereafter by Bosnia and Macedonia. The full weight of Yugoslav Serbian and Bosnian-Serb army, security, and paramilitary units were pressed into full-scale war against Croatians/Croats and Bosnian-Muslims in Croatia and Bosnia, presumably to save the Federation. But as the conflict intensified, and Serb police and Yugoslav army units became more instruments of Serb or Croatian nationalism than of Yugoslav federalism, the centuries-old fight was on again for a Greater Serbia, a Greater Croatia, and the ever tempting division of Bosnia between the two.

The harbinger of armed international intervention is usually an outcry in the international media and editorial opinion pages to “do something” in response to graphic images of atrocities and war refugees coupled with calls for protection of emergency-relief supply channels run by international humanitarian organizations on the scene (the “CNN effect”). Such outcries usually follow ineffective diplomatic conferences and sanctions, which are in-turn usually followed by conflicted reactionary responses from the international community (generally thought of as the UN and western governments). Bosnia was no exception. Kosovo was an exception and elaboration will follow.

In the midst of the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation during the fall of 1991, UNHCR in Croatia was deeply involved in a refugee and internally displaced population crisis. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbian forces had invaded the Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia territories of Croatia, carrying out violent ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from the area intent on incorporating the Serb-majority areas there into Serbia. During this period, European governments, hoping to avoid a military confrontation, were counting on diplomatic conferences such as the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (September 1991), plus an arms embargo (UN Security Council
Resolution - UNSCR 713, September 25, 1991) and economic sanctions (UNSCR 757, September 30, 1992) to resolve the conflict.

Different intervention decision-makers, officials, and critical commentators, come to their descriptions of effective or failing international responses to the Yugoslav break-up and Bosnian war from their own distinctive perspectives. I find longtime Eastern Europe analyst Steven Burg’s general description of Bosnian intervention elements usefully presented in his 2001 article “Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Bosnia.” He breaks down the Bosnian intervention into “…diplomatic/political peacemaking intended to find a solution to the conflict; and military/diplomatic peacekeeping intended at first to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief, then secure and maintain the limited agreements reached by the parties during the course of the conflict and, finally, to carry out UN decisions taken without the support of the warring parties.” Burg includes in his descriptions of peacemaking and peacekeeping, “the imposition of economic and other sanctions” under UN authority; “acts of deterrence, carried out through a combination of military threats and the demonstrative use of force, implementation of a comprehensive strategy of coercive diplomacy, including the use of limited, but effective force; and, finally, military occupation and state-building intended to implement the settlement imposed on the warring parties” [emphasis added].

Burg points out the obvious that “without credible use of force,” and relying on Westphalia-based “Helsinki principles of interstate relations” (traditional inter-state dialogue and local consent-based measures) to resolve or contain the conflicts, which Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb political and military leaders simply ignored, intervenors’
efforts were ineffective and trailing well behind events on the ground (Burg, 2001, p.3). Also Burg points out that Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb military and political leaders interpreted the lack of interest on the part of the European Community (EC, predecessor of the European Union) and the United States (which did not see the conflict as a direct threat to its national interests at the time) in going beyond the arms embargo and sanctions to armed intervention, as free license to continue their ethnic cleansing campaign. In other words, for the Serbs, being adept at Balkan brinksmanship, sanction penalties were an acceptable cost for creating their long sought Greater Serbia.

It is worth noting that of the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by 35 states on August 1, 1975, five were specific to state sovereignty (www.osce.org/mc/39501):

I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
II. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
III. Inviolability of frontiers;
IV. Territorial integrity of States;
V. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs;
VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
IX. Co-operation among States;
X. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.
Ironically, the Helsinki Final Act was supported by some countries, particularly the Soviet Union, to enforce the principle of inviolability of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, while at the same time, other countries and groups cited the Act as the principle argument for the protection of human rights and self-determination of national peoples in repressive countries. The OSCE -- which succeeded the CSCE in 1995 -- has become the principle body for promoting and protecting national, human, and minority rights in Europe.

Since the Geneva Conference agreement (November 23, 1991) had the effect of freezing Serbian military gains on the ground in its favor in Croatia’s Eastern and Western Slavonia, and Krjinia, Yugoslavia did sign the agreement concurring with UNSCR 721 (November 27, 1991), calling for the establishment of a ceasefire and proceeding with plans to establish a peacekeeping mission in Croatia. However, when Yugoslav cooperation was less than forthcoming in real terms on the ground (violations of the ceasefire), another UNSCR (743, February 21, 1992) was issued establishing the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission with United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) in Croatia, but only for two months in anticipation of progress with peace negotiations. When it was clear that the Serbs were not cooperating, the UN issued UNSCR 749 (April 7, 1992) to renew UNPROFOR for a year and expand its operational mandate to Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia with a liaison office in Slovenia (www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions).

As war and ethnic cleansing spread, events accelerated rapidly with declarations of independence by Slovenia (June 25, 1991), Croatia (June 25, 1991), Macedonia
(September 8, 1991) and Bosnia (March 3, 1992, after an independence referendum on February 26, 1992) leaving various European and UN peacemaking initiatives behind; for example, the UN-EC sponsored peace talks facilitated through UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and EC Representative Lord David Owen proposing the division of Bosnia into 10 autonomous cantons (International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia), which was rejected by Bosnian Serbs in a referendum of their own.

EC, US, and UN recognition of the independence of the former Yugoslav republics came quickly after the declarations. In May of 1992, the UN recommended membership in the United Nations for Croatia (UNSCR 753), Slovenia (UNSCR 754), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNSCR 755) as independent states. Burg (2001) argues that EC and UN negotiation-concessions to the Serbs, conflicting EC and US individual national interests, and unwillingness by intervenors to use credible force, directly led to the strategy developing in 1993 and 1994 to partition Bosnia based on defacto Serbian war-gains on the ground – an example of coercive diplomacy with no teeth.

The continuing scenario of ethnic cleansing war-gains on the ground by Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb forces, accompanied by ineffective peace initiatives and hollow declarations of protection by the UN and EC through UNPROFOR, is reflected in the sampling of Security Council resolutions listed below (www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions):

- UNSCR 757- Economic sanctions (May 30, 1992);
- UNSCR 761- UN control of Sarajevo Airport (June 29, 1992);
• UNSCR 770 - Delivery of humanitarian aid to concentration camps (August 13, 1992);

• UNSCR 776 – Protection of relief convoys (September 14, 1992);

• UNSCR 781 – No Fly Zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 9, 1992);

• UNSCR 819, 824, 836, 844, 900, 913, 959 – Declarations of and reinforcing of UN Protected Areas (UNPA) “safe area” mandates and troop increases, inclusive of air power for Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, and Zepa (1993 and 1994);

• UNSCR 1004 – Restoration of the UNPA “safe area” for Srebrenica after the massacre of 7,000 Bosnian-Muslim men and boys days earlier (July 12, 1995).

• UNSCR 1010 – Demand that Serb forces allow UNHCR and ICRC access to the survivors of the massacres of civilians by Serb forces in Srebrenica and Zepa (August 10, 1995).

Each resolution was issued because the preceding resolutions were being ignored. UNSCR 1004 followed the shelling and overrunning of Srebrenica by Bosnian-Serb forces under the command of General Ratko Mladic in the second week of July 1995. More than 7,000 unarmed civilian men and boys were methodically killed over a period of six days after being handed over to Bosnian-Serb forces by the Dutch UN peacekeeping detachment in Srebrenica. Earlier, when Serb shelling of Srebrenica began and the threat of being overrun was a certainty, the residents of Srebrenica asked the
Dutch Commander for retrieval of their weapons from the local UNPROFOR warehouse to defend themselves (weapons that had been confiscated by peacekeepers when the UNPA was originally set-up). The Dutch commander refused to release the weapons, informing the Bosnian-Muslims that airstrikes would be called in to protect them. General Mladic did overrun the UNPA and made an agreement with the Dutch commander in Srebrenica to free the 14 Dutch peacekeepers that he had taken hostage upon the threat of airstrikes by NATO against Serb positions. Two bombs were actually dropped by NATO jets but an effective airstrike mission was not initiated due to pressure by British, French, and Dutch envoys on the UN and NATO to not do so. The remaining non-Serb population was forced out of the area on foot.

Burg points out that although UNSCR 770 was issued with a UN-Charter Chapter VII “coercive authority” mandate to use “all measures necessary,” to get emergency humanitarian aid through to victims of ethnic-cleansing, the intent was offset by the “highly restrictive rules of engagement that reflected the original Chapter VI authorization of the UNPROFOR mission, which made it dependent on the cooperation of local forces” (2001, pp. 8-9).

Although UNSCR 781 (October 9, 1992) established a No-Fly Zone over Bosnia, which cleared the skies of Serbian war planes, UN concern that UN troops and personnel would be taken hostage by Serb forces in retaliation for air strikes against Serb ground units prevented useful effectiveness. The “dual key” system of control in effect at the time permitted a UN Secretary General veto of NATO airstrikes or the escalation of airstrikes. In fact, Serb forces did take UN troops and personnel (hundreds) hostage in
1994 and 1995, when limited airstrikes were threatened or intended to discourage Serb forces from overrunning Srebrenica, Bihac, and Gorazde, “Safe Areas,” and continuing the shelling of Sarajevo. This continuing scenario eventually led to the complete ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR as a military intervention mission:

The Serb reaction not only compelled NATO to cease its use of force, but also forced UNPROFOR to renounce the future use of force by reaffirming its adherence to strict peacekeeping principles as a condition for release of the UN hostages. Thus, while the earlier instances of the use of force did have at least a short-term deterrent effect on the Serbs, the May 1995 events [airstrikes and hostage taking near Sarajevo] had no such effect. On the contrary, they had the effect of deterring UNPROFOR from further use of force, and thereby contributed to both the collapse of the UN mission in Bosnia and the emergence of a comprehensive, US-led strategy of coercive diplomacy (Burg, 2001, p 19).

The dire circumstances of the collapsing of UNPROFOR in the latter part of 1994 through the summer of 1995 and continuing events like the massacre at Srebrenica and Serb shelling of the main market in Sarajevo, eventually led to NATO, via the Contact Group, taking full control of the military intervention in Bosnia under U.S. leadership, without the dual key restriction. It also eventually led to the proactive U.S. diplomatic initiative led by principle U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrook (1998) to compel all parties to the negotiating table to stop the war. UNSCR 1010 (August 10, 1995) authorized the Croatian offensive against Serb troops in Croatia and the North and South NATO sectors of Bosnia, the lifting of the arms embargo, and NATO military actions such as Operation Deliberate Force air strikes (August 30 – September 20, 1995) against Serb weapons and munitions’ emplacements to redress the imbalance of military capability on the battlefield.
In effect, this created more than a balance of power on the battlefield favoring Croatian, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian-Muslim forces opposing Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb forces. This new reality, including pressure by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic on Bosnian-Serbs to relent in order to get the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia lifted, compelled Bosnian-Serbs to eventually accept a cease fire and reluctantly accept that Yugoslav President Milosevic would negotiate on their behalf at the peace settlement talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio in November, 1995.

The Contact Group, responding to the upgraded interests and initiatives of the U.S., took effective control of negotiations from the UN-EC sponsored International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and moved towards implementing a coercive-diplomacy strategy (Burg, 2001). The Contact Group was an informal discussion group of high level foreign ministry diplomats and officials of the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Russia that met periodically to discuss pressing issues concerning the stabilization of South Eastern Europe (Holbrook, 1998). The principle motivation for the newly found U.S. interest in “doing something” was the realization that an uncontrolled collapse of UNPROFOR amid the continuing Serb ethnic-cleansing onslaught and loss of the war would mean that the U.S. would have to make good on its pledge to evacuate UNPROFOR troops in such an event (Burg, 2001). The new U.S. seriousness about the intervention in Bosnia was a direct result of the looming threat to NATO cohesion and therefore to vital U.S. national interests.
I have personally seen an intervention-collapse scenario play out to its bitter end in Somalia. Some UNOSOM II peacekeeping detachments had to fight their way out of their bases to get to the Mogadishu Airport or sea port for evacuation when the mission collapsed there in February of 1995. This occurred following on a similar series of failed UN peace conferences and ignored Security Council resolutions, and lack of resolve, even with Security Council Chapter VII “use of all needed measures” authority, in confronting militia attacks on UN and INGO compounds, the taking of UN and INGO hostages, and seizure of UN and INGO humanitarian supplies and UN military weapons and equipment.

An example: In the summer of 1994, a rival militia invading the District of Belet Weyne, encountering no UNOSOM resistance, took over the UNOSOM military base there. About a week later, all UNOSOM troops were marched off the base in their underwear towards Mogadishu minus dozens of armored personnel carriers, trucks, heavy and light weapons, and tons of ammunition, fuel, and supplies. A couple days after the takeover, I and the three other civilian UNOSOM officers posted to Belet Weyne were evacuated from our camp, across the road from the base, by Australian commandos in a U.S. C-130 aircraft.

UN use of force in self-defense is not without precedent. Indar Jit Rikhye, a former UN military advisor, in his article *The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* (1997) recalls that UN force commanders on the ground in Cyprus in 1967 and 1974, respectively, were under attack and responded forcefully in self-defense to
repel attacks. The 1974 incident involved protecting the airport and had specific concurrence from UN Secretary General U Thant (ibid.; p.20).

In February 1995, as I and three other UNOSOM officers -- the last of the UN Humanitarian Division personnel in Somalia -- were getting on the aircraft for evacuation to Nairobi, we saw U.S. Marines landing in hovercraft on the beach next to the airport to assist with the evacuation of remaining peacekeepers and technical staff.

Completion of some remaining UNOSOM II tasks, for example, several already scheduled return and reintegration movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their villages of origin (3,000 to 6,000 IDPs per movement), and surveys of IDP camps, were managed for the UN’s Nairobi Regional Headquarters. I would take an occasional day trip to a location outside of Mogadishu to coordinate with local national staff remaining behind.

The calamitous end of UNOSOM II in Somalia predictably and inevitably followed in the midst of a clan-based civil war, the steadfast application of the strictly neutral-local consent Westphalian inter-state mediation model of intervention, without resolve to sufficiently protect even UN facilities and operations. This end followed an earlier golden hour of opportunity to end the conflict when UNITAF (United Task Force) troops first deployed in Somalia (1992) and large numbers of Somali individuals and militias believing the conflict was over were surrendering their weapons to UNITAF troops or laying their weapons out in the streets to preclude UNITAF troops from entering their homes to confiscate weapons – a spontaneous disarming momentum that was not followed-up on and therefore wasted.
Concerning Bosnia, although UN civilian and military officials had to overcome significant obstacles to implement the Security Council resolutions listed below (www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions), they were able to eventually carry them out with intended effect:

- **UNSCR 808** - Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that “…shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991” (February 22, 1993).

- **UNSCR 981** - Establishing the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) to supervise the cease fire agreement of March 29, 1994 “between the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities;” and facilitate implementation of the Economic Agreement of December 2, 1994 “under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia” (March 31, 1995).

- **UNHCR 983** - Establishing the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to coordinate and cooperate with UNPROFOR and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), (March 31, 1995).

- **UNSCR 1035** – As per the Dayton Peace Agreement, transferred police authority from UNPROFOR to the UN International Police Task Force
(IPTF) for the purpose of providing international civilian police services and training in Bosnia (December 21, 1995).

I make particular note of UNSCR 859 (August 24, 1993). It is exemplary as an expression of the UN, EC, and U.S. principles and approach for a settlement of the Yugoslav/Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis prior to the imminent collapse of UNPROFOR, and before the looming catastrophe was obvious to everyone. UNSCR 859 captures the aspirations and mind-set of the pre-NATO, pre-Dayton intervention period. I interpret UNSCR 859 as a general manifestation of traditional (pre-intra-state war era) Westphalian state-sovereignty, consent-based diplomatic protocols in effect at the time. Perhaps it is more accurate to describe the Westphalian protocols as the operative paradigm of the time; and probably still is for the most part.

Although discovery of a post-Westphalian world on the battlefield is not a scientific revelation, per se, I think resistance to a profound paradigmatic shift concerning the centuries old nation-state response to conflict can be seen as a Kuhnian example of adherence to an ingrained operative paradigm preventing recognition of a new reality despite overwhelming evidence of its existence (Kuhn, 1962).

Figure 20 below reproduces a copy of UNSCR 859. A Security Council resolution regarding an intervention constitutes the legal-basis within international law for an intervention and spells out the issues of concern, any prior resolutions referencing the matter, and principles of international or human rights law involved, as well as named measures to carry out (actionable tasks) on the part of conflict parties and intervenors.
What became starkly clear to Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb forces and to hundreds of thousands of Bosnian-Muslims in particular, is that UN, EC, and NATO political and military leaders were operating under an unwritten policy that their military capacity was in Bosnia to protect their own forces, not civilians, when it came to the test. The actual choice was plainly stated as such (internally) by some diplomats and commanders (Burg, 2001).

UNPROFOR was a tragic, misplaced peacekeeping mission; more so because of the UNSCR 859 upgrade to Chapter VII “use of necessary measures” status that proved wholly impotent in the Balkan game of brinksmanship. In fact, UNSCR 859 (shown below) -- primarily directed at Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb forces and leadership -- is self-neutralizing. The resolution very carefully cites the concerns about “the deterioration of humanitarian conditions”, “the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar, and other threatened cities”, the “unacceptability of the acquisition of territory through the use of force and the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’,” and the “threat to international peace and security.” Under Chapter VII authority, UNSCR 859 also conveys calls for an “immediate cease fire,” the “unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance”; and that the operational safety and effectiveness of UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel should be respected. Point Number 5 on Page 2 of UNSCR 859 below, acknowledges the Secretary General’s letter, “stating that the United Nations has now the initial operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Point Number 7 “Recalls the principle of individual responsibility for the perpetration of war
crimes” and the Security Council’s decision to establish an international tribunal to try war criminals.

Then, in Point 6C and Point Number 8 respectively, the carefully crafted list of concerns, demands, and actions is effectively undermined and neutralized by the following stipulation that…“the principle of a negotiated solution freely arrived at…” and, “…once it has been freely agreed by the parties…” applies [emphasis added]. In other words, in practical terms, all of the measures and stipulations of UNSCR 859 applied -- if the signers agreed to it, if they had consented.

Recognizing the Westphalian inter-state, local-consent protocol stipulation in UNSCR 859, Yugoslav and Bosnian Serbs simply did not consent, ignored it, and pressed on – because they could. The UN was in a trap. By strictly adhering to consent only to Westphalian protocols and not actually using “all measures necessary” to protect Bosnian civilians in “safe areas” and Sarajevo, and enforcing a defacto severely imbalanced military capacity in favor of Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb forces through the arms embargo, intervenors ensured that Bosnian Muslims and Croats were trapped as well.
RESOLUTION 859 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3269th meeting, on 24 August 1993

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this regard,

Reaffirming further that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a State Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to be subject to armed hostilities in contravention of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) and other relevant Security Council resolutions and that, despite all efforts by the United Nations as well as regional organizations and arrangements, there is still no compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular by the Bosnian Serb party,

Condemning once again all war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law, by whomever committed, Bosnian Serbs or other individuals,

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in and around Mostar, and determined to support in every possible way the efforts by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to continue providing humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in need,

Concerned about the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar and other threatened cities,

* Reissued for technical reasons.
S/RES/859 (1993)

Page 2

Strongly condemning the disruption of public utilities (including water, electricity, fuel and communications), in particular by the Bosnian Serb party, and calling upon all parties concerned to cooperate in restoring them;

Recalling the principles for a political solution adopted by the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;

Reaffirming once again the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory through the use of force and the practice of "ethnic cleansing";

Stressing that an end to the hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is necessary to achieve meaningful progress in the peace process;

Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security;

Taking into account the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia contained in documents S/26233, S/26260 and S/26337;

Determining that the grave situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and security;

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Notes with appreciation the report by the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the latest developments at the Geneva peace talks and urges the parties, in cooperation with the Co-Chairmen, to conclude as soon as possible a just and comprehensive political settlement freely agreed by all of them;

2. Calls for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as essential for achieving a just and equitable political solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina through peaceful negotiations;

3. Demands that all concerned facilitate the unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance, including the provision of food, water, electricity, fuel and communications, in particular to the "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

4. Demands also that the safety and operational effectiveness of UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina be fully respected by all parties at all times;

5. Notes with appreciation the Secretary-General's letter of 18 August 1993 (S/26335) stating that the United Nations has now the initial operational capability for the use of air power in support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

6. Affirms that a solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law; and further affirms the continuing relevance in this context of: /...
(a) The sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(b) The fact that neither a change in the name of the State nor changes regarding the internal organization of the State such as those contained in the constitutional agreement annexed to the Co-Chairmen's report in document S/26337 would affect the continued membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the United Nations;

(c) The principles adopted by the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, including the need for a cessation of hostilities, the principle of a negotiated solution freely arrived at, the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force or by "ethnic cleansing" and the right of refugees and others who have suffered losses to compensation in accordance with the statement on Bosnia adopted by the London Conference;

(d) Recognition and respect for the right of all displaced persons to return to their homes in safety and honour;

(e) The maintenance of Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre;

7. **Recalls** the principle of individual responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and its decision in resolution 827 (1993) to establish an International Tribunal;

8. **Declares its readiness** to consider taking the necessary measures to assist the parties in the effective implementation of a fair and equitable settlement once it has been freely agreed by the parties, which would require a decision by the Council;

9. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Figure 20: UNSCR 859- Principles for Settlement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis
A lesson learned? For the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, yes; otherwise it remains to be seen. Wishing to be better prepared for major intervention situations, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” in May 1997, as a comprehensive civilian agency and Department of Defense preparation outline for future coordinated interventions. The subsequent Bush Administration rescinded the directive and a similar national security directive because it “usurped the national command authority of the Secretary of Defense” (Smith, 2010, pp.38-39). Nevertheless, conceptually, protection of civilians across borders has taken on a greater resonance as reflected in what has come to be known as the R2P concept (Responsibility to Protect) that was adopted by the UN World Summit in 2005 - “When individual states fail to meet that responsibility, protection becomes the collective responsibility of the international community (ibid.; p. ix).”

Smith points out that repeated attacks on civilians in Darfur by government backed militias did not trigger an R2P international community response in terms of “effective action.” On the other hand, the Kosovo intervention was essentially unfinished business in the Yugoslav wars, and the intervention capitalized on the momentum of a compelling sense of guilt associated with the failure to protect Bosnian civilians from genocide in the middle of Europe just a few years earlier.

Following a decade of increasingly severe repression and violence against Kosovo-Albanians by Yugoslav and Kosovo-Serb authorities and security forces, the UN Security Council issued UNSCR 1160 (March 31, 1998) under Chapter VII authority, calling on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop the violence against Kosovo-
Albanians and resolve the conflict through political dialogue, adhere to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, and that all concerned be guided by the counsel of Contact Group representatives. UNSCR 1160 also established an arms embargo on all parties. As in the case of Bosnian-Muslims, Kosovo-Albanians were vastly outmatched in capacity by Serbian military and security forces.

The repression and structural violence included rescinding Kosovo autonomous provincial rule in 1989, revoking constitutional rights and freedoms of Kosovo-Albanians, and replacing Kosovo-Albanian governmental officials, institutional administrators, business and industry leaders, and university professors and so on, with Serbs from Kosovo and with Serb refugees from other Yugoslav republics, stemming from the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict, who were in need of housing and employment. Albanian universities were closed and use of the Albanian language in government offices and schools was prohibited. By 1999, institutional discrimination (structural violence) and direct violence and repression against Kosovo-Albanians were as bad as or worse than that of the South African apartheid. Albanians made up about 92% of the population in Kosovo, Kosovo-Serbs approximately 5%, and Roma, Bosnians, and other minorities the remaining percentage. I should qualify here that many Kosovo-Albanians (now Kosovar-Albanians) told me that “things were Ok” for Kosovo-Albanians before the resurgence of radical Serb nationalism, led by Slobodan Milosevic, and the rescinding of autonomy in 1989. In response to the revocation of autonomy and increasing violence, the Kosovo-Albanian majority in the National Assembly passed a declaration of
independence of Kosovo from Serbia, and created a collection of armed Kosovo-Albanian militias, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to carry out a guerilla warfare rebellion towards that end.

Unlike in the case of Bosnia, the UN Security Council was able to request that the OSCE (which replaced the CSCE in 1995) provide on-the-ground verification of the status of conflict party compliance with Security Council resolutions and measures, in particular those concerning the treatment of Kosovo-Albanians. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission agreement was signed by Yugoslavia on October 16, 1998 and the mission began its work shortly thereafter (www.osce.org/node/44552).

While the Verification Mission carried out its observations and inquires in Kosovo, negotiations in Belgrade and elsewhere involving Contact Group representatives and Ambassador Richard Holbrook who had shifted their focus from Bosnia to Kosovo, continued as the asymmetrical violence against Kosovar-Albanians increased and additional UN Security Council resolutions condemning Yugoslav and Kosovo-Serb violence (leading to over a million refugees, up to 10,000 dead, and many thousands missing) were issued. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission pulled out of Kosovo on March 20, 1999, saying that it was too dangerous to continue its work. It cited the lack of cooperation by Belgrade and Kosovo-Serb authorities and that violence against Kosovo-Albanians was accelerating.

What followed on March 23, 1999, was a decidedly different approach from that taken with UNPROFOR. Based on prior UN Security Council resolutions and consultations with the Contact Group and OSCE, and the determination of non-
compliance by Yugoslav and Kosovo-Serb authorities with Security Council resolutions, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana authorized NATO Operation Allied Force airstrikes against Yugoslav and Kosovo-Serb targets, beginning on March 24, 1999 and ending on June 10, 1999. This was two days before Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic consented to the Rambouillet Agreement (peace agreement) and the associated Military Technical Agreement with NATO, consenting to NATO security forces in Kosovo (www.nato.int/kfor).

On June 10, 1999, UNSCR 1244 authorized a civilian and security force presence in Kosovo. Effectively, UNSCR 1244 established UNMIK (UN Interim Mission in Kosovo) to manage the civilian aspects of recovery, stabilization, and reconstruction, while NATO established the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide the military-security stabilization component from the beginning. Thus, the use of military force to bring about compliance with Security Council resolutions was short and efficient, enabling UN civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts to get underway, unencumbered by protracted war. Intervenors were able to immediately get to work on emergency relief, rebuilding the infrastructure and institutions, and establishing the fundamentals of democracy and development (albeit immersed in the Balkan centralized state corruption and organized crime context). I believe the approach saved many thousands of lives and shortened the war by years.

Kosovo has been stabilized and reconstructed and is functioning reasonably well. Although, the infrastructure and all government, justice, banking and economic institutions had to be rebuilt from the ground up as well as social institutions. There were
significant obstacles to reconstruction and the building of transparent institutions to be overcome due to widespread corruption and discrimination in the governance, economic, and justice sectors as legacies of the former communist and Balkan traditions. Additionally, there were countless property disputes related to socially owned properties and factories and houses and apartments taken over as spoils of war by labor and business groups or returning refugees and displaced persons.

The Kosovo national assembly declared independence on February 17, 2008, as the Republic of Kosova, which was subsequently recognized by about 95 countries and the UN. Serbia has not yet recognized the independence of Kosovo. However, there is still the matter of profound post-war hostile sentiments and inter-ethnic discrimination among the ethnic groups in Kosova, which is essentially unchanged, as it is essentially unchanged in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (Latent Manifest Conflict). The EU, NATO, OSCE, and UNMIK each maintain a small presence in Kosova/Kosovo a today.

**Transition to NATO and Dayton in Bosnia**

The upgraded U.S. interests in preventing a bad situation in Bosnia from becoming catastrophic included, by the end of December 1995, Security Council resolutions that authorized NATO to replace UNPROFOR with IFOR (NATO Implementation Force) as the military intervention operation in Bosnia (UNSCR 1031, December 15, 1995).

The war did not come to an end due to a natural “ripening” or a “hurting stalemate” as some conflict resolutionists might argue (Burg, 2001, p.17). At the beginning of the war, the arms embargo, equally enforced against all conflict parties, artificially induced a severe imbalance of power against Bosnian-Muslim forces by virtue
of the Yugoslav Army already having a vastly superior stockpile of heavy and light weapons and munitions at the time the embargo was issued (including tanks, artillery, and fighter-bomber aircraft). The final months of the war entailed an artificially induced ripening in the balance of power equation when the arms embargo was lifted and Bosnian-Muslims were able to start seriously arming and increasing their battlefield capacity. Also, although controversial, Croatian forces were now allowed to retake Croatian and Croat areas ethnically-cleansed earlier by Yugoslav and Bosnian-Serb forces. The Dayton peace agreement followed shortly thereafter.

A cease fire and negotiated political settlement are normally expected to facilitate a transitional phase between stabilization and reconstruction. In the case of Bosnia, a new ethnicity-based constitution was written into the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Accords) as an integral state-building feature of the combined cease fire and peace agreement -- referred to as “constitutional engineering” by Marcus Cox in his October 1998 article (Strategic Approaches to International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The problem of the ethnicity-based structure of the constitution and its mandated ethnic divisions within the associated structures of the government did, and does to this day, create profound difficulties for normalization of the situation, ethnic relations, and the state. The constitution was not presented for consideration by a legislative or public body in Bosnia. According to diplomats I interviewed in Bosnia, the constitution was assumed to be transitional by the original negotiators, but it was never officially designated as such, therefore, no transitional plan or timeline was set in place to
generate a normative transitional expectation process from the Dayton ethno-constitution to an individual rights and minority rights-based constitution. The hoped for transition was placed at the mercy of expedited, fear-based ethno-structural elections that only served to entrench ultra-nationalists and obstructionists in power. In my view, these two factors are the most fundamental, if not fatal, flaws in the entire Bosnia state-building exercise, and a lesson to be learned.

However, being cognizant of reality, getting an optimal political settlement/peace agreement in the heat of the moment, as with all things in war and intervention, is easier said than done. This point is underlined by Elizabeth Cousens’ comments in her article: From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia (p. 560-561) in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens’ Ending Civil War: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (2002). Cousens laments the coercive imposition of the Dayton Agreement terms on reluctant or recalcitrant conflict parties, which “naturally” led to a “perpetual trusteeship strategy of implementation,” which in turn sent signals to “Bosnian parties and the population at large about democratic process and legitimacy: if due process does not yield results, override it, at least if one has the political backing to do so.” At the same time, Cousens argues that the Dayton implementers should have, from the beginning, “begun tight coordination among civilian efforts with a panoply of carrots and sticks at their disposal, capacity to override non-compliance and establish certain ground rules for a continuing peace and political process, and integrated civil-military command.” In short, lamenting coercive trusteeship
strategy and recommending the overriding of non-compliance, reveals the fundamental dilemma of coercive intervention itself - one of damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.

Principal Dayton negotiator U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke, in his Washington Post editorial opinion (*Was Bosnia Worth It?*, July 19, 2005), describes the ethnicity-based peace agreement as a necessary compromise to get any agreement at all at the time to stop the war, stop the acts of genocide, and prevent Bosnia from becoming a fundamentally criminal state in the middle of Europe, or another base for al Qaeda and the associated horrors of an insurgency-quagmire that that implies. To stress the precariousness of the circumstances and dangers for Bosnian-Muslims, Holbrooke reiterates that the UN, Britain, and France would not agree to effective (timely) air strikes against Serb tanks and artillery poised on the hills above Srebrenica until after Dutch troops were evacuated from the area, by which time, of course, genocide was already a fact on the ground.

To round out intervention, I cite the following additional comments by authors and intervenors relevant to intervention issues raised in this section. Andrea Kathryn Talentino, in her 2005 book *Military Intervention after the Cold War*, characterizes crossing the post-Westphalia nation-state inviolability threshold (following on the humanitarian intervention disasters in Somalia and Bosnia) as a “normative revolution” created by the phenomenon of globalization, which:

...changed the nature of the state by making borders more permeable and creating new standards of legitimacy. It also changed the nature of the international community by broadening the consensus on liberal ideas and making issues like human rights and conflict resolution a central part of
the international agenda. The changes affected both those governments experiencing crisis and those merely observing it. Each was held to a standard of responsibility that placed more emphasis on the protection of individuals than on the prerogatives of states. The practice of intervention changed as a result and became part of conflict resolution approaches that, in extreme cases, required military force to end violence and provide support for reconstruction programs. An act long considered aggressive and illegal was reborn as part of an international strategy to build both intra- and interstate peace, moving from banned to desired, manipulative to constructive in the space of a decade. At the same time the use of force without institutional approval or a widely shared objective became discredited...Taken all together these changes reflected a normative revolution that seemed to raise principle above power and redefine legitimacy in the context of responsibility. Some of the basic expectations of international relations-state behavior, law, and norms – changed in the process. (Talentino, 2005, p.276)

Talentino points out that “Somalia established the link between humanitarian objectives and military force,” and that Bosnia established the connection of “military intervention to nation building and long-term reconstruction efforts” and that “Kosovo forced direct consideration of the theoretical issues connected to intervention, such as the meaning of sovereignty, legitimacy, and security.” Nuances that I would add to Talentino’s perspective are:

1) The intervention in Bosnia was not an act of nation-building but of state-building. The Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian-Muslim nations were already rather well-defined, if not overly-defined, albeit residing in interspersed villages throughout Bosnia. The notion was to build a functional common state because of the difficulty of sufficiently separating ethnically interspersed villages;

2) I agree that sovereignty, legitimacy, and security were direct theoretical intervention issues forced to graphic clarity by the Kosovo/Serbia intervention, but issues
of sovereignty, legitimacy, and security were no less directly considered, if not agonized
over, in Bosnia, Somalia, East Timor, Rwanda, Angola, The Democratic Republic of The
Congo, and Haiti – multi-lateral missions in which robust intervention measures were
taken, or a decision was made not to forcefully intervene. In fact, it was the strength of
such considerations that usually maintained the sanctity of state sovereignty and the
principle of non-interference without local consent, despite public outcry to “do
something.”

Morisson, Fraser, and Kiras in their 1997 edited book Peacekeeping With Muscle:
The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution, point out that the UN intervention
in the Belgian Congo in the 1960’s, and its consequence of heavy casualties and debt to
the UN, “haunted the UN and ensured that peacekeeping would remain consensual and
non-threatening in nature for almost three decades“(ibid.; p.ix). The distinction in the
Kosovo intervention is that it constituted the final push toward decisive post-Westphalian
pro-active action to intervene with use-of-force in the internal affairs of a sovereign state
– without local consent (consensus). Kosovo embodied the convergence of
globalization’s rapid communication and pan-humanity awareness with a critical-mass
momentum that had been building for decades, if not centuries, to reconcile the
Westphalian paradigm dilemma of respect for a another state’s sovereignty, no matter the
consequences to victims within its borders, with a growing compelling sense of
humanity’s obligation to intervene in the name of civil society to save victims of mass
human rights abuses within borders - The irony being that the Westphalian state was the
presumed pinnacle of civil society at the time of its creation.
3) Conflict resolution has indeed become a central theme, if not mandate, in the international intervention dialogue. However, as I said earlier, the question now is how conflict resolution or conflict transformation (terms now being used liberally in civilian and military intervention policy discussions) are being interpreted and acted upon in agency and organizational headquarters and in the field. I have already pointed out the intervention conceptual dichotomy between conflict transformation as physical and institutional reconstruction as opposed to conflict transformation as relationship change. I will say more about this in Chapter 9, Implications of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations.

Does Peace Enforcement Work? Jane Boulden (2001), a long time British scholar on UN interventions, when considering The Democratic Republic of The Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia, argues that such missions are high risk endeavors and highly susceptible to failure, either when the limitations of impartiality restrict freedom to act decisively, or when impartiality is used cynically to avoid acting at all. She concludes that, “Militarily, the case studies present a very consistent message for decision makers inside and outside of the Security Council that peace enforcement requires a consistent and serious commitment of resources. These are not situations in which half measures can be expected to generate success” (ibid.; 2001, pp.136–148).

Carl Bildt (1998) was a co-negotiator at Dayton and the first European Union High Representative for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) for Bosnia-Herzegovina, created to oversee the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia. It his view, the Dayton Peace Agreement “…balances the reality of division with the
structures for cooperation and integration and is based on the hope that over time the imperative of integration in the country and the region will be the dominant factor as long as war can be deterred.” Further, “I believe that we can only escape the separatist approach when the structures and integrative aspirations of European cooperation begin to have a serious impact on the region as a whole (Bildt, 1998, p.392-393). In other words, Bildt was betting on the strength of reintegration of the antagonistic ethnic groups back into Bosnia, and their eventual assimilation into a minority rights respectful European Union, to overcome the necessary evil of expedient Dayton ethno-constitutional structures – providing that a lid could be held on the volatile nature of divisive ethno-government structures in the meantime (negative peace). After 18 years, the lid is still holding, but the boiling underneath continues unabated.

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reflects back on threshold-level intervention moments in Bosnia, the first being the failure to protect Safe Areas and the subsequent massacres leading eventually to Operation Deliberate Force when, “finally, enough was enough” (Annan, 2012, p.72). Annan cites it as a lesson eventually learned, leading to Security Council (principally the U.S., Britain, and France) reversal of their earlier decision (UNSCR 836) to not take sides in the conflict concerning the protection of Safe Areas (meaning to “deter” attacks on Safe Areas, not actually “defend” the areas), thus “…choosing war in firm rejection of peacekeeping” (ibid) at that point. The second moment for Anan , concerns the Dayton ethno-constitution. Here, Annan reflects that “there were many contradictions and tensions in the agreement, particularly surrounding
the governance and policing of respective territories by different communities – but it is a peace that has held for nearly twenty years” (ibid.; p.73).

I conclude this section on stabilization with a thought shared by Richard Holbrooke when he was discussing the Bosnian intervention in his book To End A War (1998). He was commenting on Henry Kissinger’s general juxtapositions of the foreign policy approaches of “realists” – Nixon, Kissinger, Kennan, and Theodore Roosevelt – with the approach of “idealists” Carter and Woodrow Wilson:

But based on personal experiences in the late 1970s with authoritarian leaders like Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Park Chung Hee of South Korea – both of whose corrupt strongman regimes were peacefully replaced by democracies – I came to the conclusion that the choice between “realists” and “idealists” was a false one: in the long run, our strategic interests and human rights supported and reinforced each other, and could be advanced at the same time. In short, American foreign policy needed to embrace both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. These thoughts were never far from my mind as we searched for a way to end the war (ibid; p.366).

When death is at the door, an armed negative peace enforcement response (reality/realism) rejected on the basis of principle by “idealists”, serves victims no better than the proffering of the illusion of protection (“Safe Areas”) by “realists.” The results are just as unfortunate for victims either way. When the moment of truth arrives, decisive action is required in the face of imminent threat, particularly a known lethal practice that is repeated again and again with impunity against civilians, as was the case in Bosnia.

Concerning Safe Areas and the protection of civilians in Bosnia, the instincts of both realists and idealists failed. Richard Holbrooke, in his call for the simultaneous advancement of mutually reinforcing strategic interests and human rights is, in effect,
calling for intervention with cognizant application of what I refer to as *human realism* (see Chapter 1 above for elaboration on human realism). As I conceptualize it, human realism describes a fundamental dualism inherent in the human condition -- the proven capacity of humanity to deliberately engage in inconsiderate, competitive, self-interested, win/lose acts at others expense for gain of wealth, territory, prestige, advantage, or survival, but also simultaneously, the proven capacity of humanity to deliberately engage in considerate, interactive processes to understand, to change, to overlook or forgive, and to adopt more collaborative methods of interaction for managing and resolving difficult issues and conflict.

In Bosnia, the concept of human realism would have called for the simultaneous application of effective use-of-necessary-force to protect civilians (a concept familiar to any law enforcement agency) and the introduction of constructive conflict principles and practices – concepts familiar to many judges, social scientists, and conflict resolutionists.

**Reconstruction and Development**

My initial thought was to separate reconstruction into democratization and development sub-sections. However, recent international peace and stability interventions (Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo) and the latter half of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions have fundamentally become exercises, or at least efforts, at democratization through development, so democratization separate from development is not a distinction easily made now. In the context of reconstruction, I will essentially
discuss democratization and development as simultaneous inter-woven phenomena yet with some distinctions.

In contrast to stabilization, reconstruction has traditionally entailed a more straight-forward process of carrying out predetermined concrete state-building or state reconfiguration tasks. That is, straight-forward as opposed to stabilization’s nefarious struggle to fundamentally figure out what is going on, what to do about it, what intervenors are willing to get involved, and to what degree there is agreement and cooperation among intervenors and conflict parties for stopping overt hostilities and destruction. Also, often, intervenors and conflict parties are diametrically opposed in interests and viewpoints, including among themselves, as to how and when to bring an end to hostilities.

Previously, reconstruction was assumed to proceed when the shooting-war was over, based on ceasefires and political settlements. However, it appears to be largely accepted policy now, following on the latter parts of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, that reconstruction overlaps and complements ongoing stabilization efforts before stability is secured. Hence, the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which had their advent in Iraq, and then became part of the intervention/anti-insurgency effort in Afghanistan. In other words, there is now initiation of tasks typically associated with reconstruction while there is still significant instability (shooting/bombing/kidnapping) – this being an effort to win over public support to legitimate national and local government, fill power vacuums, and remove obstructionists and other drivers of conflict before various obstructive/destructive elements become
further entrenched, such as politico-economic organized crime syndicates, insurgents, predatory militias, or transnational terrorists groups. Nevertheless, in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, although the security/peace status was (and still is) fragile (latent conflict) the shooting war was over when reconstruction got underway.

In considering reconstruction, whether in Bosnia or in connection with the (post-Westphalian) all-fronts, all-levels type of reconstruction scenario as carried out in Kosovo, or the all-fronts, all-levels, all-conditions type of reconstruction scenario carried out, or attempted, in the latter parts of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, I point out the evolutionary intervention-reconstruction process that is underway, which has negative and positive peace implications beyond the Bosnia case.

A short point on recovery as opposed to reconstruction: Recovery is a term sometimes heard in the media in reference to emergency relief activities at the end of a war. In peace and stability operations and environments, recovery would conceptually fall in the transition phase of a complex emergency between war and reconstruction. Most likely, it is initiated in stages in different parts of a conflict zone as security and access improves area by area. A complex emergency typically entails the convergence of natural environmental disasters, disease, and famine induced or compounded by armed conflict, political turmoil, economic collapse, and lawlessness with significant refugee and internally displaced population movement.

Concerning Bosnia, I think it is safe to claim that the physical reconstruction of state infrastructure and public institutions in Bosnia is essentially accomplished, even technically updated. Therefore, in considering reconstruction in Bosnia, and elsewhere,
and the focus of this study, I will concentrate more on the implications of
democratization and development in relation to conflict transformation and notions of
viable peace, sustainable peace, and negative and positive peace - as opposed to
enumerating the tons of material used or the number of clinics and schools rebuilt and so
forth. The utility of knowing how much material and funding input has gone into
reconstruction in Bosnia and the number of roads and structures rebuilt is rendered less
useful -- even if broken down by governance, security, rule of law, economics, and social
welfare sectors -- by the fact that most resurrected or newly established post-war
institutions and facilities are ethno-politicized at various levels, discriminatory (most
schools are still ethnically segregated – some even by entrances, schedules, or floors in
the same building), and dysfunctional due to the nature of relations between the ethnic
groups, past centralized-state (official) corruption traditions, and dysfunctionalities
induced by Dayton ethno-constitutional structures – even though the Dayton Agreement
is said to be the best that could be done at the time under the circumstances.

Being politically sensitive to complete intervention failures in Somalia and
Rwanda, and the near catastrophic intervention episode in Bosnia, as well as to ongoing
threats to international security elsewhere, the United States Department of State
established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in
2004 and a Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in 2011 (that absorbed
S/CRS) to increase U.S. institutional capacity to “…conduct democracy promotion
operations in post-conflict states” (John Schmidt, “Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to
Post-Conflict States?” (Orbis Quarterly, Winter 2008). The United Kingdom and the UN
have established similar units (ibid). The S/CRS and CSO are described as follows (www.state.gov):

Failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves. On August 5, 2004, Secretary Powell announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to enhance our nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies…The Core Mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy…

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) was established in November 2011 to focus on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities as mandated by the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)…

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) advances U.S. national security by driving integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace…(ibid, p.115).

The model and tasks as described above are encouraging as an effort to improve capacity for timely and effective intervention, however, whether these new institutions prove effective or not remains to be seen. Hopefully, the efforts will not be hindered greatly by bureaucratic struggle and overly constrained funding. Nevertheless, the United States Government is the primary driver of international intervention policy, funding, coordination, and operations - whether civilian or military, or unilateral or multilateral and under UN resolution authority. This being the case, and given the mission statements just listed, the focus on establishing peace, however that might be
interpreted, and democratic and development processes (in accordance with the capitalist model) in Bosnia or elsewhere is the grand objective of the day and carries authority as such. Given this fact, looking at democratization (essentially meaning transparent and representational governance that provides essential public goods and services) and development (usually associated with economic, agricultural, health, education, rule of law, security, civil society participation, and technical modernization), seem to be good places to start.

John Schmidt (the founding Deputy Coordinator for Security and Governance in the S/CRS) asks an astute question – “Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States?” (ibid.; pp.107-122). Schmidt lists general conditions that indicate the likelihood of success or not in the democratization of a post-conflict environment:

- The higher the GNP, the greater the likelihood of success in democratization;
- The lower the acceptance of a political culture of democracy, the less the likelihood of success;
- The greater the religious, ethnic, or factional animosities, the less the likelihood of success.

Schmidt argues that a comprehensive assessment of the roots of a conflict and an assessment of the popular culture is necessary to fully understand a situation before planning or committing to a democratization or development program in connection with an intervention. He points out several nuances (ibid.; pp.110-111): Former communist countries artificially induced low individual incomes and, thereby, created a “middle-class-in-waiting,” which, when stimulated with a market economy and representative government, will more likely succeed in democratization.
Similarly:

“States where the exercise of power is arbitrary or where official corruption is widespread are likely to be highly resistant to democratization, since political elites have a strong stake in maintaining the status quo. Democracy is rare in the Islamic world because Muslim societies lack the clear divide between governance and religion characterizing the secular West.

If the critical mass of political actors are driven primarily by sentiments incompatible with democracy—be it avarice, the desire for power, class hatred, ethnic animosity, or radical Islamic zeal—the result is unlikely to be democracy (ibid.; p.119).

At the end of the day, what is required for establishing democracy is a willingness to play by democratic rules” (ibid.; p.112).

Finally:

“…if the intervention requires extraordinary efforts, such as fighting a war or combating an insurgency…outsiders may choose not to risk direct intervention, but to pursue other measures, such as sanctions—or they may determine not to get involved at all. Since outsiders can bring democracy to post-conflict states only sometimes—when the political cultures of those societies are ready for it—it is critical to have the best possible understanding of just when those occasions might be” (ibid.; p.122).

I agree with Schmidt’s analysis, however, I add several points for consideration when deciding the viability of a democratization-development intervention in Bosnia or elsewhere, assuming that the criteria for meeting the tests of Threat to International Peace and Security and Humanitarian Crises have already been met:

1) Bosnia (about 48% Muslim) and Kosovo (about 92% Muslim) are clearly exceptions to the hypothesis that Islamic countries do not have a clear divide between governance and religion. The great majority of Bosnian-Muslims and Kosovar-Albanians are decidedly secular in their outlook on governance. When the subject came up during interviews, Bosnian-Muslims consistently told me that for the great majority of
Bosnian-Muslims, acceptance of humanitarian and military aid from Islamic sources during the Bosnian war was much more a circumstance of desperate pleas for help from any quarter than any desire for Islamist inroads into Bosnia; in fact, quite the opposite. However, interviewees did point to a well-known relatively small number of dedicated Islamists, mostly in the Zenica area, who were working towards such ends. One manifestation was the encouragement of women to wear the veil, which was being seen a little more often on the street, although still a tiny fraction of the population. Although radical Islamization was/is clearly an ambition for by a relatively few, as overtly illustrated by a well-stocked Iranian religious store on a busy street in Sarajevo, Sarajevans seemed to give it little notice while going into the bars, clubs, and restaurants serving alcohol all around it. Also, the Bosnian government has deported a number of former foreign jihadists who fought during the war. I believe the Islamic factor is of minimal influence in impeding democratization in Bosnia. The same can be said for Kosovo.

2) Concerning Bosnia and the likelihood of acceptance of a political culture of democracy, I refer back to the phenomenon of hardline nationalists gaining office initially through premature fear-based elections and then consistently retaining office through resurrection of familiar fear-based appeals since – something along the lines of, “We saved you from the (fill in the blank); do you think you can trust them now?” Resistance to genuine democratization (transparent representative discrimination-free governance) and fairly distributed employment and development is generally ethnic faction - - and corruption-based. This is a major factor in Bosnia and, as Schmidt
projects, a major inhibitor of genuine acceptance of democratic process and development. A qualification I make in the case of Bosnia is that the general public is not at all happy with the situation as indicated by subject responses to survey questions inquiring about the degree of polarization among political leaders and corruption in government, both of which they rate as Very High (see Table 10, Chapter 8, Questions 5 and 17).

3) Schmidt raises another point that, despite comprehensive, well intended and well-delivered stabilization and reconstruction programs by outsiders, “They may end conflict, restore infrastructure, provide financial assistance, offer sound economic advice, shore up government institutions and encourage ethnic religious and factional reconciliation…provide technical advice on establishing political parties and NGO’s…help design constitutions and legal codes, and organize and administer free and fair elections” ibid, p. 119; however, “there are no programs or actions they can take that will ensure that the political actors in that society will internalize democratic values and embrace democracy once they leave” (ibid.; p.119).” [emphasis added]. As I pointed out earlier, the barriers to democratization and democratization-dependent development in Bosnia (and Kosovo) are fundamentally based on ethno-faction alliances, a centralized state legacy, and corruption. Although, as a side note, according to several interviewees directly involved in monitoring or fighting organized crime activity in Bosnia, cooperation is perhaps is counter-intuitively, relatively common among organized crime syndicates of different ethnicities.

Although Schmidt’s point number three above, which I have underlined, is intended as a description of the lack of programs and actions, globally, in interventions to
ensure internalization of democratic values by political actors, it does readily apply to the Bosnia case. Florian Bieber (2006), a respected Bosnian and scholar, voices the concern specifically, stating that despite some post-Dayton regulatory reforms (pp.144-145):

…there have doubtlessly been successes associated with the external intervention, as explored in the case of Brcko, the very nature of the intervention remains problematic. Not only has no domestic social and political infrastructure developed to sustain and support the institutional framework of Bosnia after the departure of international actors, there is still no sufficiently strong local constituency that would ensure that key reforms are carried out in the post-conflict period.

...abolishing outright institutional discrimination, they [reforms] added a degree of complexity that can render Bosnia ungovernable, especially once international actors, in particular the OHR, withdraw.

…Additionally, the power-sharing system between the three constituent nations contains the inherent danger of exclusion of either minorities or those citizens who do not identify with any of the three nations.

…the inherent ethnic self-understanding – irrespective of the constitutional revisions -- of the entities have been identified by a variety of observers as a key obstacle to render the Bosnian system of governance more manageable and less antagonistic.

In response to this Bosnian governance conundrum, authors generally cite and advocate one or more of three general approaches to dealing with governance and civil participatory issues (Bieber, ibid.; p.148):

1) **Integrative Power-Sharing** – “…lays greater emphasis on encouraging cooperation between groups through the alternative voting system and the dispersion of power”;

2) **Consociationalism** – “…essentially entrusts political elites of the groups to arrive at compromise”;

3) **Integrative Approach** – “…seeks to promote a moderate and cooperative elite.”
Generally, Track 1 intervenors tend to advocate power-sharing arrangements as indicated by Schmidt above and the Dayton Agreement itself. On the other hand, while acknowledging typical intervention complications, such as conflicting intervenor objectives, short-term output funding demands, and the grave difficulties generated by maintaining an ironical stabilizing status-quo (ethnic division) at the cost of needed meaningful, long-term change, Roberto Belloni (2007) advocates a modified integrative approach in which he calls for the paring-up of international advisors with institutional officials and authorities and civil society organizations with emphasis at the local level for long-term perspective, grass-roots up impetus by which to challenge ethno-nationalism with participatory democracy and individual human rights.

In effect, this describes the UN model that was established and run fairly successfully in Kosovo; the difference being that the UN had embedded international advisors and administrators at all levels in all sectors and retained state and local authority until such time as specified performance benchmarks were largely met and tasks and controls were transitioned to national and local officials by sector and level. The UN actively advocated the establishment of, and support for civil society organizations (NGOs, associations, and councils), albeit a number of them were proxy post-war political or commercial enterprises. The OSCE, USAID, UNDP, and other organizations carried out similar support initiatives in Bosnia, but as Belloni and others point out, the bulk of political and funding support goes to maintaining the political status quo with OHR intervention when needed to avert or reverse a particularly egregious
violation of security safeguards, individual or human rights, or democratic governance principles.

A variation of the UN model described above might have had a chance to work in Bosnia also if the precipitating conflict and initial stabilization in Bosnia had been efficiently handled (as it was in Kosovo) prior to reconstruction, and the viability of the UN mission had not been undermined by indecisiveness and inaction by all concerned as described earlier.

Perhaps Stewart Patrick (2008) best captures the current general intervention ethos when he poses the question – Is U.S. intervention policy now a return to realism? In this question, he is referring to a process (following the unfortunate circumstances in Somalia and Bosnia, the non-planning “fiasco” in Iraq, and the demands of diligently planned anti-insurgency interventions in Afghanistan and elsewhere), that a practical middle-ground between “naive enthusiasm to unwarranted dismissal to grudging recognition that some degree of US involvement in nation-building is unavoidable – and that a more sophisticated approach to preparing, planning, and mobilizing is needed for these missions” (p.146). In essence, Patrick calls for practical comprehensive approaches on a case-by-case basis aimed at practical success, supported by thought-through, pre-established military and civilian institutional capabilities.

As outlined in my Chapter 5 section on Peacebuilding & Peace and Stability Operations, there exists now a fairly coherent matrix of tasks utilized in post-Bosnia peace and stability operations, hence, the near axiomatic five intervention sectors of governance, security, rule of law, legitimate economy, and social wellbeing. Activities
directed from the concepts of Integrative Power-Sharing, Consociationalism, and the Integrative Approach, discussed above, generally fit into the broader reconstruction and development context through one or more of the those five basic task sectors. However, not speaking so much of the Bosnian intervention, but generally, there is a delicate issue of potential serious obstacles to progress in reconstruction and development concerning disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, and security sector reform (SSR).

Robert Muggah (2009) sees the problem of armed groups (militias) and poorly managed “former” combatants in “post”-conflict environments as high risk factors potentially jeopardizing or derailing otherwise satisfactory progress in the “security and development sectors.” There is no question that such groups are currently of primary concern in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as within Africa and Latin America. If, ultimately, the Bosnian or Kosovar peace arrangements degrade, such groups could again be significant obstacles to normalization and development in the Balkans.

Muggah urges intervenors to: 1) Conceptualize beyond “top-down narrow inflexible” DDR/SSR programs that are disconnected from the broader political, economic, and social contexts; 2) Better coordinate among disparate agencies; 3) Increase the use of benchmarks as is common in other development activities; and 4) Push for an effective “all of government” coherence in connection with DDR (ibid, pp. 1-21).

Regarding Afghanistan, there are a number of embedded advisors in central government institutions, but I believe more efficient progress would be made by extending the practice to regional and local levels where possible.
Another important aspect of reconstruction is captured by the relatively recent conceptual framework of “post-conflict development.” That is to say, the conceptual crossing of what was previously thought of as traditional third world development initiatives (modernization of technical, agricultural, educational, health, and economic capacities) and active post-Westphalian conflict zone dynamics. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren devote an edited volume to the subject (2005, *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*). They conclude that:

Because conflicts are embedded in the fabric of local societies, regional rivalries, global flows of information, trade and investment, and international high politics, conflict transformation needs a very comprehensive approach. It has to be embedded in an overall development strategy supported by many different groups. The implementation of such strategies requires a learning attitude, intensive multilevel coordination, and a long-standing commitment of the actors involved (p. 325)

For Leaderach (1997), this can take 20 or more years. Factors that lead them to this conclusion are: 1) Competitive interactions between conflict prevention/resolution focused organizations, emergency relief- humanitarian aid organizations, and capacity development and institution-building organizations – all of which have different priorities, experience, and risks associated with their respective intervention work (ibid, p.3). Junne and Werkoren characterize the implied disconnected, if not dysfunctional, intervention phenomena by use of the phrase “peace versus development in postconflict situations.” As Junne and Werkoren point out, intervention realities commonly manifested in the field by organizations that are conflict prevention and resolution oriented are such that they, “have seen their hopes shattered by war and may find it too early to work with a highly traumatized population” – what I refer to as circumstances
being overtaken by events. “Humanitarian organizations rush in but are neither interested in the causes of the conflict nor in long-term development. Development organizations see these situations as an exception and may find the situation too unstable to resume their work…,” or “not have much feeling for politics,” although the recent “aid effectiveness debate has prompted development scholars and practitioners to look more closely at the role of political and legal structures in stimulating or inhibiting development (ibid.; p.5).

Junne and Werkoren further state that there is a need to, “reconcile the fields of development and peacebuilding” and that “What the situation demands is another type of development that addresses these structures and helps to avoid violent conflict” (ibid.; pp. 4-6). Junne-Werkoren point out that traditionally conceived and applied development projects can and have perpetuated conflict through the re-establishment of, or support for proven conflict perpetuating structures and systems – by not taking into consideration historically destructive institutional elements or providing new safeguards for mitigating institutional abuses, particularly towards minority groups.

These phenomena clearly mandate closer scrutiny of governance, security, and rule of law structures and practices in connection with guidance in those sectors and in coordination with development projects in traditional development sectors. An opportunity to interject international side-by-side, hands-on partnering of international institutional advisors and administrators with national and local officials in Bosnia, as per the Kosovo model, was squandered by the gross mishandling of the initial stabilization effort there.
Doga Ulas Eralp (2012) describes a belated, less involved European Union effort in 2008 in Bosnia - the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which, as a European Partnership process, tasks Dayton’s consociationally (cooperation between ethnic leadership assumed) constrained leadership to, “implement a list of capacity-building reforms on the short, medium, and long term until its accession to the EU” (p.118). Eralp reports that no significant progress has been made and that the failure of the EU to recognize that tasking state level officials with devising a reform plan, when the entities have the de-facto power, is a polarizing and self-defeating exercise. He recommends a “new two-track integration strategy for BiH that would allow entities to negotiate with the EU separately, and at the same time guarantee that they join the EU together as Bosnia-Herzegovina” (ibid.; p.119).

Such a two-track integration strategy might meet the test of the integrated statebuilding/peacebuilding precautions outlined by Charles T. Call (2008), who lists “five tensions between peacebuilding and statebuilding” (points 6 – 10 shown here) that need to be carefully considered when planning and coordinating peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions” (pp. 63-66):

6) Statebuilding can spark or facilitate armed conflict, especially if the emergent state is endowed with too many powers too quickly;
7) International peacebuilding undermines statebuilding when it bypasses state institutions, even though this may at times make sense;
8) Meritocracy, the main principle of Weberian statebuilding, often must be balanced with central principles of peacemaking – compromise and power sharing – in order for peace to survive the short run and make sustainable statebuilding possible;
9) Corollary #1: Going too far in one direction – with a single-minded focus on strengthening state capacities, especially security – if done without attention
to inclusiveness, accountability and political processes, can foster human rights abuses, political exclusion, state de-legitimation, and even war;

10) Corollary #2: Going too far in the other direction – appeasing spoilers in the interest of peace while neglecting the development of a sustainable state – can strengthen the hand of repressive or authoritarian state rulers, jeopardizing the sustainability of both the state and peace.

Call identifies three particular statebuilding functions, and the interrelationships between them, as crucial for peacebuilding -- “legitimacy,” “state capacity,” and “security” -- which need to be judiciously balanced. In this instance, Eralap’s proposal above for a two track integration strategy (separate, but parallel state and entity direct negotiations with the EU regarding steps to eventual accession) would seem to undermine Call’s intent expressed in point number 2, that is, that state institutions should not be bypassed - although in this instance the concern would apply to not bypassing the Bosnian entities that actually hold the meaningful power in Bosnia.

Among various policy and structural contradictions imposed by the Dayton Agreement, the U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, of the Committee on International Relations (One Hundred and Ninth Congress), makes specific mention of the Stabilization and Association Process for Bosnia’s proposed accession to the EU (Hearing report of April 6, 2005, Serial No. 109-22, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfinished Business*): “The EU Feasibility Study makes this clear that Bosnia’s wartime divisions (and, by implication, the resulting entities) are a structural problem: Dealing with these divisions and securing a functioning state is important in the context of a SSR, *as only coherent, functioning states can successfully negotiate an agreement with the EU*” [emphasis in the original]. The Subcommittee report refers to the
Dayton Agreement as an “anachronism” to be overcome in resolving the structural
dilemmas confounding the path from Dayton to Brussels. In fact, the report states that
progress on the “road to Brussels” is “unthinkable” without constitutional revisions and
governmental restructuring (ibid.; pp. 1-30). In effect, the report calls for a stronger
central state and weaker entities that would be more compatible with the EU model. The
 Bosnia conundrum continues unabated.

In regards to such a conundrum, Simon Chesterman (2007) makes a distinction
between “actual political control” on the part of national authorities and a “transformation
in mentality.” In this sense, he refers to intervention mandates in general when he
describes local ownership of internationally implemented governance and development
initiatives as tending to “…be used figuratively – much as ‘buy-in…” He contends that
“ownership emerged as a shibboleth of the development community” and has affected
policies where the United Nations exercised quasi-sovereign powers” (pp. 3-26). The
same scenario would readily apply in the Bosnia case except with the OHR substituting
for a UN Special Representative for the Secretary General in the mission area.

Along these lines, Alex Jeffrey (2007) presents an argument against “imperial
interventionism” in the name of humanitarian aid, or deterring a rogue state threat to
international peace and security. Jeffrey’s principle argument regarding, “imperial
solutions” is that,“such pragmatism is misplaced, since it depoliticizes both the means by
which ‘failed countries’ are recognized and the subsequent mechanisms, by which local
participation and democratization is nurtured.” Jeffrey further describes how intervenor
classifications such as “failed state” and “rogue state” are “constitutive practices
designed to validate particular styles of intervention,” which guide intervention and development “discursive, financial, and legal frameworks” in a manner of self-fulfilled prophecy that “serve to govern the practices and politics of civil society and reproduce the hegemony of international discourses” (ibid.; pp.445-446). Jeffrey also points out that, “…the process through which civil society is incorporated into the calculations of the emergent state institutions embeds specific values of professionalism, individualism and a profit motive. These will not conform to an exit strategy, but are rather entrenched through neo-liberal policies of ‘good governance’ “ (2007, p.462).

I believe that this is true to a degree. However, personally, I do not object to encouraging professionalism in governance and economic systems badly burdened by systemically corrupt traditions. And, it is the manifestation of individual courage of local nationals that pushes against the overwhelming tide of a corrupt status quo. As it is, the profit motive concept in such a corrupt system is already well understood and practiced, but generally for the benefit of the few. So, professionalism, individualism, and profit seeking, are also a matter of a fair balance for everyone concerned in the pursuit of legitimate, transparent governance, economics, and justice.

The real question to be asked is, is there justification for doing so? should outsiders intervene at all? I have lived with and worked with many nationals in conflict and “post”-conflict environments. With few exceptions, most citizens prefer notions of transparent representative governance and civil participation, albeit poorly attempted, to the pre-intervention status of corruption, brutality, or chaos – irregardless of the interests of “imperial powers”, commercial or otherwise. In fact, most local nationals are relieved
that finally, something is being done about a condition of all pervasive corruption and
discrimination, which, as it happens, is a major obstacle to mitigating drivers of conflict
and moving towards sustainable positive peace.

Local ownership, as a preferred conceptual description of intervention
programming and hoped for transition of governance responsibility, was formally
presented as transition policy when adopted by the Development and Assistance
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD,
1995), (Jeffery, 2007, p.7). At the same time, however, the OHR was “granted ‘final
authority in theatre’ to interpret the Agreement” (ibid.; p.12).

Implicit in the broader reconstruction and development conundrum is the matter
of intervention as conflict resolution and peacebuilding -- as opposed to intervention as
democratic governance -- one easily confused for the other. There is a fine line between
leaving behind successful political settlements and technical democratic enhancements
and leaving behind the same destructive structures and perspectives that precipitated war
and intervention to begin with, even with benefit of free and fair elections; in other
words, carrying out reconstructing but leaving transformation of relationships and hostile
traditions and perspectives untouched and the likelihood of renewed conflict only a
matter of time. There are no absolute definitive answers on how to resolve with certainty
of consensus and success the issues and dilemma touched on in this section, but I
conclude Reconstruction with a few thoughts from Pauline Baker (2001).

Baker describes the conflict resolution versus technical democratization dilemma
as being, “at the heart of the current debate about how best to pursue peace in the twenty-
first century.” The issue, specifically, is how to “reconcile the two imperatives of peace: conflict resolution, on the one hand and democracy and human rights, on the other” (ibid.; p.756). She asks, “Should peace be sought at any price to end the bloodshed, even if power-sharing arrangements fail to uphold basic human rights and democratic principle? Or should the objective be a democratic peace that respects human rights, a goal that may prolong the fighting and risk more atrocities in the time than it takes to reach a negotiated solution” (ibid.; 756)?

To my mind, peace at any price essentially describes establishing a negative peace of some description, which has been achieved in Bosnia. A democratic peace respecting human rights, broadly speaking, is a positive peace of some description that has yet to materialize in Bosnia.

Baker goes on to distinguish between two types of peacemakers: 1) “Conflict managers” who are involved in preventative diplomacy, mediation, dispute resolution, dispute regulation, and conflict mitigation, and 2) “Democratizers” who are described as “…those who advocate human rights, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the prosecution of those who commit war crimes and atrocities.” Baker adds that:

…conflict managers tend to concentrate on short-term solutions that address the precipitous events that sparked the conflict; above all, they seek a swift and expedient end to the violence. Democratizers tend to concentrate on longer-term solutions that address the root causes of the conflict; they search for enduring democratic stability. The former see peace as a precondition for democracy, the latter see democracy as a precondition for peace.

…Illustrations of conflict resolution that tilted toward the conflict managers’ model are Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, and Sierra Leone….Basically, settlements in these countries represented power-sharing arrangements with weak democratic foundations
Examples of conflicts settled along the lines of the democratizers’ model are South Africa, Namibia, and El Salvador, where real political change included measures to ensure moral accountability and justice in the long term…in recognition that the crises were basically human rights struggles…(Baker, 2001, pp.756-760).

In traditional conflict analysis and resolution terms, I interpret “conflict managers”, as described by Baker as, essentially, Track 1 diplomatic, political, and military/security officials tasked primarily with immediate crises management, security, and governance objectives. I interpret “democratizers” as, essentially, Track 2 – 9 reconstruction and development intervenors. As Baker qualifies, there is an overlap of tasks and objectives, but fundamentally, I think that Baker’s categorizations apply. My question for this study is: To what degree is genuine conflict transformation or conflict resolution carried out by either “conflict managers” or “democratizers?” Put another way, are root causes and conditions of conflict being addressed – whether by conflict managers or democratizers? Baker indicates above that democratizers “…tend to concentrate on longer-term solutions that address the root causes of the conflict.” A second question then is: Is an additional distinction to be made between democratization and conflict transformation or resolution? - Are they the same thing, or not?

Although long-term in perspective, democratizers might or might not have relationship change and addressing root causes and conditions as specific objectives. As put forth in Chapters 1 and 4 of this study, conflict transformation and resolution, as interpreted by Track 2 scholar-practitioners, specifically has relationship change and addressing root causes and conditions as objectives.
Bosnia is still stuck in Dayton ethno-political purgatory -- a variation of negative peace with no end in sight. Certainly this is better than being stuck in perpetual war or violent disorder, but the agony needs to come to an end. In this regard, perhaps a shift in perspective on the part of all concerned would be aided eventually by an understanding of basic principles of negative and positive peace. More will be said on this point in Chapter 9 on implications of the findings.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 6 attempted to capture key historical and current Bosnian complexities into a coherent whole and place them within the recent Bosnian conflict scenario. Specific complexities discussed were the historical background, Memory and Conflict, Stabilization (Resolutions, Peace Conferences, Operations, Protection), and peacebuilding/conflict transformation as Reconstruction and Development. Up to this point, I having followed a particular progression of relevant literature and discussion in Chapters 1 through 6, linking The Problem and pertinent concepts, issues, factors, and practices to peace and stability operations and environments, Bosnia in particular. In doing so, I have laid a foundation for a arriving at a research design and methodology for moving beyond the literature to the creation and use of instruments for data collection and analysis for the Bosnian case, the subject of Chapter 7. Now on to my design of the survey I conducted on some of these issues with international intervenors and Bosnian nationals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Chapter 7: Survey Design

PATH TO METHODOLOGY

At this point (Chapter 7), I elaborate on the process of inquiry that I used in addressing the research questions. To begin, I refer back to particular concepts touched on in the literature reviews. These concepts are specific to the conflict transformation concept dichotomy mentioned early on and lead directly to the concept hypothesis and associated research questions and objectives that are integral to this survey design. Therefore, I will elaborate at some length here on the context for the dichotomy, the concept hypothesis, and related research questions and objectives. Some commentary and points raised in the general introduction in Chapter 1, and elsewhere, are repeated in Chapter 7 to accommodate a stand-alone chapter on survey the design.

The Dichotomy

Peace operations are complex enterprises. Necessarily, the peace and stability operation-related literature covers a wide range of concepts, issues, actions, and structures. This includes tactics, strategies, planning, mandates, security and stability enforcement, reconstruction; technical, political, and economic implementation; negotiated settlements, community building, state building, democratization, development, civil society building, humanitarian relief, and refugee and internally
displaced person return, among others. All can be said to be facets of post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding. Some authors analyze Track 1 intervention while others focus on related work (coordinated or not with Track 1) of Track 2 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and citizen-diplomacy efforts that often take place in the same space, but usually at a more localized community level.

Broadly speaking, regardless of the particular focus or terminology used, all concepts in the literature, in one manner or other, are related to the rehabilitation or reconstruction of political, security, rule of law, economic, institutional, or social elements. It seems that all of the topics noted in the various literature reviews, whether action or theory oriented, can readily enough fall within a peacebuilding taxonomy, if not also a peace and stability operation tasking framework.

Further, it appears that, with or without a deliberate association with positive peace, the rehabilitation or reconstruction of political, rule of law, economic, security, and institutional elements - all intended to be constructive - is understood as essential. Generally, elements of a coercive nature, essentially, negative-peace measures, are understood and are given due attention by intervenors, whether or not there is a deliberate conceptual association with negative or positive peace.

Nevertheless, the differences of conception on the part of intervenors as to what conflict transformation is, as described earlier, is an important distinction and beyond mere semantics. That is, whether conflict transformation is seen as fundamental consciousness and/or relationship change among conflict party members, or as primarily physical reconstruction, the establishment of legitimate institutions, the training of
legitimate actors to run them, and the neutralization or removal of obstructionists. This difference again suggests a dichotomy associated with the concept of conflict transformation and, presumably, conceptions about how to respond to deep-rooted conflict in weak or failed states. This further suggests that there may be a clear distinction between negative and positive peace measures, although negative peace measures, such as coercive neutralization or removal of obstructionists, may be essential groundwork for sustainable peace or positive peace.

We can presume that perceptions on the part of intervenors and conflict party members are particularly poignant during highly dynamic periods of political and social change, perhaps especially during a “normalization” phase. I argue that it is, in fact, perceptions that drive differences in concepts pertaining to conflict transformation in interventions. I argue that the concept dichotomy is paradigm-based and perception-driven and, as a consequence, a comprehensive examination of underlying perceptions of intervenors and conflict party members should be undertaken.

Interventions stalled in negative peace, and the concept dichotomy specific to conflict transformation and peace and stability interventions and environments, might be explained by:

1) **A general lack of awareness about negative and positive peace concepts, principles, and application.**

And/Or,
2) **A lack of understanding of how differing conflict transformation conceptions contrast with each other, and how they impact negative and positive peace dynamics in the field;**

A conflict transformation concept-dichotomy, of course, is not the sole determinant factor in the challenging shift from negative to positive peace, but it is likely an important contributing factor to the Research Problem. To state the research problem slightly differently: negative peace has largely been achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina through necessary negotiated political settlements and infrastructure and institutional reconstruction, and an ongoing international presence; however, sentiments that precipitated the war remain largely unchanged and intense discrimination and latent animosities remain prevalent.

This leads to at least one conclusion, that relationship issues, even within a physically and institutionally reconstructed environment, can thwart the best of “post”-conflict reconstruction efforts, are not adequately understood, and if embedded in root causes and conditions of the conflict, are not sufficiently addressed. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that coercive peace measures are often necessary in such circumstances to achieve stability (negative peace), and prevent re-ignition of war or serious violent disorder (latent to manifest violent conflict), that would otherwise only be a matter of time; an opinion shared by a number of informed international intervenors and Bosnian nationals (see interview comments, Chapter 8).
Concept Hypothesis

As stated previously, the research objectives of this dissertation are to better understand the dynamics at work in a peace and stability intervention and environment, particularly in stalled negative peace circumstances, and to develop tools for associated assessment and modeling. In support of these objectives and in acknowledgment of an apparent concept dichotomy, I believe that the analysis of conflict transformation concepts and intervenor and conflict party opinions as to the status of structural and relational elements, is timely and warranted.

Therefore, I pose the following Concept Hypothesis:

Assessing the current status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation will enable:

1) References to discernible peace and stability intervention environment dynamics and negative and positive peace parameters; and,

2) Shed light on the problem of peace operations and environments stalled in negative peace, resulting in positive peace deficits.

The Problem, the Preliminary Research Question, the Primary Research Question outlined earlier, and subsequent Structural and Relational Elements Framework, informed my survey construction and interview data collection instruments, as well as my War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model.

I focus now on field research points and the collection of relevant data. Whereas political, administrative, security, and physical reconstruction tasks (generally, structural
elements) described in conflict transformation terms are well defined and carried out relatively routinely, tasks specifically directed at improving conflicted or dysfunctional relationships (relational elements), by comparison, are significantly under-addressed or underexplored. This phenomenon represents an important piece in the study of peace and stability operations and environments, and calls for a preliminary level research question to serve as a stepping stone to better get at: 1) answers to the Primary Research Question; 2) understanding The Problem, and 3) deriving further indications for remedies.

Therefore, as indicated earlier, I posed a:

**Preliminary Research Question**

*How can the status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation yield peace and stability intervention and environment indicators that can be associated with parameters of negative and positive peace?*

To address the Preliminary Research Question, I needed to gather data on the status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation, analyze the data, and then attempt to discern how the elements impact, or are impacted by, presumptive negative and positive peace dynamics in a conflict area.

To accomplish this, I posed further questions:

1. What are structural and relational elements of conflict transformation in a peace operation context?

2. Can structural and relational elements be identified in relation to specific operational tasks such as diplomacy, security, political, economic and institutional reconstruction, and civil society building?
Subsequently, considering The Problem and asking the Preliminary and Primary Research Questions led me to my **Enabling Research Objective** mentioned in the Introduction in Chapter 1:

*To establish a conceptual framework and a graphic model by which to discern the elements and dynamics of a peace and stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace, and by which to explore parameters of sustainable positive peace, including how to shift beyond negative, toward, and into, positive peace.*

Tasks in support of addressing the Enabling Research Objective are as follows:

1. **Ascertain, through interviews, views on the status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.**
2. **Analyze responses for patterns and trends.**
3. **Attempt to locate the status (condition) of structural and relational elements in relation to known intervention thresholds, and in relation to conceptual parameters of negative and positive peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.**

**SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SURVEY**

Although the terms negative and positive peace are mentioned increasingly by Track 2 authors now, the various literature reviews indicate that there is no previous research that establishes how negative and positive peace can be empirically identified or assessed in connection with a peace and stability intervention and environment. Neither
am I aware of any previous framework and model subdividing peace and stability operation tasks into structural and relational elements, whether or not associated with conflict transformation or negative and positive peace.

**Analytical Approach**

Given the multiple factors and general complexity involved, I decided to use a mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) analytical approach in this study utilizing *exploratory and abduction theory*. A review of social science methodological approaches suggested that an exploratory and abduction theory approach can better facilitate exploration of relatively unknown research areas (a search for common and dissimilar themes) and optimally explore why certain dynamics are present in peace and stability operations. Specifically, in this case, an exploratory, abduction theory approach may be expected to better facilitate discovery and hypothesis development (Frankfort Nachmias, Nachmias, 2008, p17) with regard to:

1) Initial identification, framing, and assessing of structural and relational elements in an actual peace and stability intervention environment; that may enable,

2) Identification of and at least notional linkage of those elements to viable peace, sustainable peace, and negative and positive peace parameters; and finally,

3) Obtaining greater clarification on the problem of interventions stalled in negative peace or experiencing serious positive peace deficits.
Given that I am a professional field officer with years of experience in peace and stability operation and complex emergency environments, I also utilize my general experiential-based observations and the rationale of abduction theory to facilitate some degree of triangulation between the survey data, conceptual framework indications, and my field experience-based observations to achieve greater clarity and validity of findings generated by analysis of responses to survey (interview) questions.

Abduction allows for a probable/approximate explanation of a phenomenon that is derived from a subset factor of a premise that is not necessarily true for the whole premise. In the instance of understanding survey responses in an intractable-conflict zone, this is useful, particularly when there may be multiple explanations and subset phenomena involved in response to survey questions (put to deeply conflicted groups and individuals, some with ulterior motives or agendas). For example, in response to the question, “Do political leaders fully support the peace agreement?” the premise that they do might be true for one ethnic group but not another, or it may be true in one area or at one level, but not another, or across the board (a possible original premise). Abduction’s allowance for inference-to-the-best-explanation accommodates explanation when statistics may not fully capture a phenomenon for various reasons.

Abduction is derived from the work of Charles Sanders Pierce around the turn of the 20th Century and has been incrementally refined since as an analytical tool that is said by some to be the basic intuitive rationale for modern scientific hypothesis development and discussion – often combining quantitative and qualitative analysis (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011). Essentially, it is directed at intuitively getting at an
“Inference to the Best Explanation” of a phenomenon or expressed view. Unlike deduction or induction, and specific to “testimony” as relevant to this study:

…in abduction there is an implicit appeal to explanatory considerations, whereas in induction there is not; in induction, there is only an appeal to observed frequencies or statistics. (I emphasize “only,” because in abduction there may also be an appeal to frequencies or statistics…);

Specifically, it has been argued that decoding utterances is a matter of inferring the best explanation of why someone said what he or she said in the context in which the utterance was made. (ibid.)

Former diplomat and conflict resolution pioneer John Burton (1990) advocated the use of Pierce’s conception of abduction for conflict resolution problem-solving purposes, for example:

He stressed the need, first, for hypothesis projection – that is, postulating in an imaginative way possible explanatory hypotheses. These are not guesswork or trial and error, but imaginative hypotheses based on available knowledge, intuitions and insights. This he called an “abductive” process. Second, he attached importance to the questioning and elimination of hypotheses, not just on empirical grounds, for testing is sometimes impossible, but on analytical, common-sense, intuitive grounds. This he termed “retroduction.” He did not attach a great deal of value to trial and error and testing, for testing may suggest a fault, but it cannot provide a better theory (ibid.; p. 19).

Burton cites the practical experience of successful problem solvers, that is, “businessman, lawyers, diplomats, managers, and administrators…They start with a carefully thought out definition of a problem in all its fundamental aspects and the goals to be achieved. They take all variables into account, variables ranging from facts to feelings, needs, and values. They then construct a theory relevant to the situation. This theory guides them to an approach, a policy, a method. Then there is application with the
results fed back into the original hypothesis and changes made when necessary. It is a kind of informed common-sense, as Peirce observed” (Burton, 1990, p.256).

It is this approach that I am incorporating in my overall methodology to assess my framework construction, questions, concept hypothesis, and modeling, and in analyzing the quantitative and qualitative data (albeit limited) generated by my study, including interviews. The same approach applies in the consideration of eventual conclusions, implications, and recommendations for theory and practice. Fundamentally, this study is a qualitatively driven exercise with a quantitative kick-start (scaled-survey data) to start the exploration into relatively unknown conceptual territory.

Utilization of the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MIPCE) analytical tool (explained below) of the Metrics Framework for Measuring Conflict Transformation and Stabilization, is intended to operationalize (Nachmias, 2008, p.30) my Structural and Relational Status Survey questions as conflict transformation/structural and relational indicators. The expected result should be that “the responses to the questions will [define] the empirical existence of each dimension” (ibid.); the dimensions in this case being conflict transformation structural and relational elements.

Survey responses to closed-ended questions were computed as statistical means to facilitate analysis. Abduction was utilized in connection with both closed-ended and open-ended question response analysis. For the purposes of this study, I focus on analysis of means within peace and stability operation activity and demographic sectors.

I stress that this study is an exploratory work in progress, and that analysis conducted at this early stage is primarily to identify and integrate concepts and
frameworks for establishing an overall investigative model for the analysis of peace and stability interventions and environments in structural and relational, and negative and positive peace terms. Also, although the database is extensive and much more can be done with it quantitatively, I am focusing on the initial conceptualization and operationalization of the composite framework and model, and their placement within the overall peacebuilding discourse. Analysis beyond that needed to establish the conceptual framework and graphic model will have to follow at another time.

Concerning research location, I believe that if this type of research is not conducted in the field with actual subjects relevant to peace and stability operations, the data and conclusions remain largely theoretical. Therefore, in an effort to better ensure data validity, reliability, and practical utility, the research involves international third parties and local nationals involved in an active peace and stability operation environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Also, I believe that the methodology utilized herein is appropriate for the current circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina, taking into consideration sensitive political, security, and social factors. Further, it seems to have potential for contributing to operational utility and some degree of theoretical generalizability within yet to be determined limitations.

**Domain of Inquiry**

A discussion of the domain of inquiry for this study begins with the Dave Davis’ CMPO (Conceptual Model of Peace Operations) Civil Order and Social Justice in Peace
Operations model (Figure 13, Chapter 5) that illustrates a basic peace and stability operation structure. The three primary functions of Peace Making, Peace Support, and Peace Building are indicated. Within this context, the domain of inquiry for this study is placed within the five targeted end-states identified by *The Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (2009, pp2-8). They are, again, stable governance, safe and secure environment, rule of law, sustainable economy, and social well being. All are situated as *Cross-Cutting Principles*.

**Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)**

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments, as mentioned earlier, is one of the primary frameworks I draw on for this study. For the purpose of more readily conveying the resulting data and analysis of this study to intervenors and planners, I modified and adapted a recently developed Track 1 analytical tool - **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)** - an incorporated within the U.S. Government, *Interagency Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization* - Version 1.0, August 2008) – see Figure 21 below for the original unadapted framework, which I made into a MindManager graphic. The original MPICE framework contains 5 major mission elements/activity sectors, 53 issues/goals, 153 indicators/questions, and 800 + measures.

MPICE is defined thusly:

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) is a tool that is organized according to the five end states presented in this manual [Safe and Secure Environment, Rule of Law, Stable Governance, Sustainable Economy, Social Well Being] and offers a means to assess whether
conflict drivers have been diminished and whether host nation institutions can maintain stability without significant international assistance (*Guiding Principles for Stabilization And Reconstruction*, 2009, pp. 5-33).

As suggested by the authors of the MPICE framework:

There is a requirement to identify which of the over 800 measures are relevant to the particular policy goals and entrenched sources of conflict in each case. This down-selection process entails identifying a manageable number of measures that are of greatest relevance to the conflict environments (*Metrics Framework for Measuring Conflict Transformation and Stabilization*, USIP, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009, p. 7).
Figure 21: Original MPICE Framework (using MindManager format)
I have drawn on the MPICE framework, in conjunction with my own previous framework, terms, and questions, to meet the particular analytic objectives of this study. I modified the MPICE framework in order to channel analysis through a framework of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation, and to adapt a smaller set of issues and indicators for a manageable-sized field research project (see Table 6 below). No data are utilized from the interagency MPICE framework since none were in association with it.

I should mention that, with regard to the MPICE framework, the interagency project was unknown to me until Professor Dave Davis, Director of George Mason University’s Peace Operation Policy Program, brought it to my attention and referred me to one of the authors at the U.S. Institute for Peace. As it turns out, I and a U.S. interagency team had been independently and simultaneously developing a similar conflict transformation-based analytical framework and set of sectors and elements for analysis of peace and stability operation dynamics (I had begun the development of my framework and identification of elements in 2006). Our two versions (mine considerably smaller) cited many of the same elements involved in peace and stability operations, although in somewhat differing orders of placement within the overall framework.

Another difference is that I had distinguished structural elements from relational elements, which are embedded together in the MPICE framework. I had originally framed 10 primary structural sectors/elements and 10 primary relational sectors/elements. I have since adopted the five primary sector (end states) of the MPICE framework, which I place on the structural side of my framework, while retaining 7 of my original 10
primary relational elements on the relational side of my framework. I find the breakdown of primary elements into the smaller five sector framework (therefore somewhat broader sectors) easier to work with in general and easier for communicating with analysts and decision makers by virtue of utilizing the same structural sector terms as common language. The five MPICE Desired End-States/Functional Sectors are listed below on the left next to my original Structural and Relational elements on the right:

Table 6: MPICE Desired End-States/Functional Sectors and Adams Original Structural Relational Elements

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desired End-States / Primary Functional Sectors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structural Elements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Safe and Secure Environment</td>
<td>1. Negotiated Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Rule of Law</td>
<td>2. Stable Self-Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Sustainable Economy</td>
<td>4. Rule of Law</td>
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<td>5. Social Well-Being</td>
<td>5. Reestablishment of Institutions</td>
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<td>6. Reconstruction of Infrastructure</td>
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<td>7. Sustainable Legitimate Economy</td>
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<td>8. Democratization</td>
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<td>9. Treatment of Minorities</td>
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<td>10. Structural Violence</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Relational Elements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Respect</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Tolerance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Reconciliation</td>
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<td>5. Personal Violence</td>
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<td>6. Consensus Building</td>
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<td>7. Normalization of Relations</td>
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<td>8. Empathy Towards Others</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. Return of Refugees &amp; IDPs</td>
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<td>10. Freedom of Movement</td>
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The simultaneous existence and similarity of MPICE and my framework tells me that at least some of the authors of MPICE and myself have similar significant hands-on field experience in peace and stability operation environments and, therefore, have come to similar conclusions about the need for such an analytical framework, what questions to ask, and what key issues, dynamics, and elements are involved. I consider this fact to be an unexpected, but legitimate function of methodological triangulation concerning the valid identification of elements and issues relevant to this study. However, as far as I know at this time, my field research in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 2009 was the first field test of the framework, although modified, through empirical data collection.

As will be elaborated in the data collection section on sampling strategy, the survey questions for this study are keyed to those five end-state/functional sectors and are intended to draw out responses as to the current actual status of the respective functional (activity) sectors/elements. In turn, I assign each element to the Structural Elements or Relational Elements branches, which are the primary branches of the Key Elements of Conflict Transformation (see Survey Questions Embedded in Modified MPICE Framework, Figure 22 below). Figure 22 includes the actual survey response statistical total means in parentheses for sectors and elements (in red), which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Figure 22: Survey Q.s Embedded in Modified MPICE Framework (means in red)
Recalling the Concept Hypothesis, the idea is that the survey response total means, associated Key Elements of Conflict Transformation, will indicate the perceived actual status of the elements and sectors and will, subsequently, also give an indication of the level of effectiveness, of and importance of the primary peace and stability functions of peace making, peacebuilding, and peace support, including indications of where imbalances might be. I should emphasize here that the aim is not to appraise exactly the physical intervention inputs or the technically exact outcomes, but rather the perceptions and opinions of intervenors and individual nationals as to the status of the respective elements and sectors.

**Research Limitations**

With regard to research limitations, one possible source, as Strauss (1998) puts it, is that of “operational philosophies,” that is, subjects have been known to put forth less than candid responses to questionnaires and interviews than typically given in normal daily discussions. Nevertheless, in Strauss’s view, greater internal validity may be expected by the use of the triangulation that is an integral part of a mixed methods approach. In any case, some degree of cross-check regarding subject responses may be expected by contrasting survey closed-ended question responses with written comments on those questions; and contrasting closed-ended question responses with corresponding open-ended question responses.

One problem that I encountered was not being able to interview a representative cross-section of rural residents due to insufficient funds to carry out a country-wide rural
survey. Nevertheless, my survey does include a reasonably countrywide cross-section of subjects in large and medium-sized towns.

Another limitation has been in obtaining a precise cross-section of Bosnian subjects according to ethnicity from different social and public sector levels, although efforts were made to broaden the cross section sampling as much as possible.

Regarding the matter of obtaining candid answers, my impression is that generally it was not a problem, although there did seem to be instances of selective memory or omissions at work in a few cases.

DATA COLLECTION

Combined Interviews/Survey Administration

Administration of the survey was conducted utilizing a structured face-to-face interview format with each subject. The interviews had format elements of a scheduled-structured interview in that each subject was asked the same questions in the same order. Elements of a structured interview were involved in that the subjects had direct knowledge and experience concerning the topic being studied; that is, the structural and relational elements in a peace and stabilization intervention and environment directly related to the research Concept Hypothesis (Nachmias, 2008, pp.207-228).

Structural and Relational Status Survey for BiH

Questions posed (see Table 6 below) constitute an operationalization of the Concept Hypothesis:
Assessing the current status of structural and relational elements in conflict transformation will;

1) Highlight discernible peace and stability intervention and environment dynamics and negative and positive peace parameters; and,

2) Shed light on the problem of peace operations and environments stalled in negative peace, resulting in positive peace deficits.

The questions are intended to assess the views of intervenors and conflict party members as to the current degree of completion, effectiveness, or intensity of particular structural and relational elements of conflict transformation in the international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is, responses to interview questions will allow us to assess the actual status of elements pertaining to Stable Self-Governance; a Safe & Secure Environment; the Rule of Law; a Sustainable, Legitimate Economy; and Social Well-Being.

The Structural and Relational Elements Status Survey was administered to 50 international intervenors and 50 Bosnian nationals. The Survey includes thirty closed-ended questions about perceptions and attitudes (Nachmias, 2008, p.422). Responses to closed-ended questions were recorded in terms of a 7 point Likert scale: 1) Nil, 2) Very Low, 3) Low, 4) Moderate, 5) High, 6) Very High, 7) Completely; DK for Don’t Know is available. Additionally, four open-ended questions were posed by which subjects could freely comment on any issue or on any answer they gave to the closed-ended questions.
In effect, these opinions constitute an attempt to measure, in terms of degrees, the status of structural elements (agreements and institutional and physical construction/reconstruction) and the status of relationship with The Other. This is intended to aid with identification of possible concept dichotomy-driven difficulties in negative and positive peace implementation, and relate directly to the Concept Hypothesis.

The survey instrument was pilot-tested by me in Bosnia-Herzegovina with six actual subjects (representatives of local NGOs, my interpreter, international intervenors), through an interpreter when needed, and discussed with local advisers in the field before formal use. Subsequently, I reduced the Survey from forty statements to thirty statements and reformulated them as questions. Unfortunately, if I were to avoid a 5 to 6 week in-country delay on the project to await approval of the survey revision by the Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB), I had to make the changes and submit the revision to the HSRB from the field on an overnight basis, which left insufficient time to reformulate the statements neatly as questions – so I simply added questions marks, and I and my interpreters made very clear that we were asking questions, and we relied on voice inflection to express the statements as questions. In any case, whether posed as statements or questions, responses on the scale are the same. Also, I added a Comment Section next to the questions to enable respondents to make written qualifications to their circled answers if they wished.
STRUCTURAL and RELATIONAL STATUS SURVEY for BiH

Please answer the following questions by circling one of 7 possible answers that indicates your best estimate of the current status (in terms of degrees of completion, frequency, or intensity) of key structural elements and key relational elements of post-war reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. You may select Don’t Know if desired.

The seven possible degrees of completion, frequency, or intensity are the following:

1 = Nil (0), 2 = Very Low, 3 = Low, 4 = Moderate, 5 = High, 6 = Very High, 7 = Completely, DK = Don’t Know

You can add a qualifier comment in the right column to any answer you circle.

Table 7: Structural and Relational Status Survey for BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATEMENT</th>
<th>To What Degree… (Circle Response)</th>
<th>Qualifier Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 = Nil (0), 2 = Very Low, 3 = Low, 4 = Moderate, 5 = High, 6 = Very High, 7 = Completely, DK = Don’t Know</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

CLOSED ENDED QUESTIONS
(Questions Associated with Structural Elements)

1. Political leaders fully support the peace agreement? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
2. Government institutions are reestablished? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
3. The election process is fair and transparent? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
4. There is civic group participation in governance? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
5. Political leadership is polarized along ethnic lines? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
6. Government has a mechanism to facilitate peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
7. Legitimate institutional capacity outweighs corruption and lawlessness? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
8. Police and security forces provide a safe and secure environment for everyone regardless of their ethnicity? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
9. All refugees and IDPs can return and live safely in their villages of origin anywhere in BiH? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
10. To what degree is an international presence needed for security? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATEMENT</th>
<th>To What Degree… (Circle Response)</th>
<th>Qualifier Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 = Nil (0), 2 = Very Low, 3 = Low, 4 = Moderate, 5 = High, 6 = Very High, 7 = Completely, DK = Don’t Know</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Laws are fair for all ethnic groups?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Laws are applied equally to all ethnic groups?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Government institutions discriminate against members of particular ethnic communities?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Reconstruction of infrastructure is accomplished?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. People of any ethnic community can have a business anywhere in the country?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Corruption and crime is a factor in the economy?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Corruption is a factor in government?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. People of any ethnic community can buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Questions Associated with Relational Elements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATEMENT</th>
<th>To What Degree… (Circle Response)</th>
<th>Qualifier Comment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Respect is shown between different ethnic groups?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<td>21. Tolerance is shown between ethnic groups?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. To what degree do people of different ethnicities interact in your area?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Students of any ethnicity feel accepted in any classroom in Bosnia-Herzegovina?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. There is violence against individuals due to ethnic hostility?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Society is polarized along ethnic lines?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. I have hope that normalization of relations is possible between former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DK</td>
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<td>STATEMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 = Nil (0), 2 = Very Low, 3 = Low, 4 = Moderate, 5 = High, 6 = Very High,</td>
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<td>(Circle Response)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 = Completely, DK = Don’t Know</td>
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<td>Comment</td>
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</table>

29. To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war?

30. To what degree can people of different ethnic groups have empathy towards each other?

**OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS**

1. What is the result of intervention by outsiders?

2. Why do some conflict resolution or peacebuilding ideas not work?

3. How would you improve relations between ethnic groups?

4. What other thoughts would you like to share?

Below, please provide general demographic information. This information is for general perspective and will not be identifiable with you personally.

1. Age: 18-29 ___ 30-44 ___ 45-64 ___ 65-79 ___ 80+ ___

2. Gender: Male ___ Female ___

3. Education Completed: Elementary School ___ Secondary School ___ University Degree ___ Master’s Degree ___ Doctoral Degree ___

4. Military Experience: Yes ___ No ___

5. Citizenship (I – if international) _______________________

6. Nationality (I – if international) _______________________

7. Ethnic Group (I – if international) _______________________

8. Religion: (I – if international) _________________________ Non-Associated ___

9. Liberal ____ Moderate ____ Nationalist ___

10. Occupation _______________________

11. Entity: ________________________ Urban (city) ____ Rural (village) ____
Sampling Strategy

The 50 international intervenors were drawn from a cross-section of representatives, officials, and staff of international governmental organizations (civilian and military), and international non-governmental organizations with current and direct knowledge of the status of structural and relational elements in BiH. Also, 50 conflict party subjects were drawn from a cross-section of Bosniak, Croat, Bosnian-Serb leadership, influential persons, and staff from Bosnian governmental and non-governmental organizations, academia, and the business community, as well as citizens from the general public. The target population includes persons from governance, security, rule of law, economic, and social sectors (military, civilian, men and women).

The interviewed/surveyed subjects constitute a combination of the following sampling units and types:

1) **Purposive** (judgment) *Sample* - an attempt to get a representative sample of subject related views (Nachmias, 2008, p.168). For example, I would arrive at a location and select several organizations to interview managers or staff;

2) **Stratified Purposeful** - A deliberate attempt to interview different subgroups to facilitate comparisons. I interviewed people of different ethnicities at different levels of public and private sectors (Cresswell, 1998, p.119);

3) **Snowballing** – “Identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are information-rich” (ibid.; p.119);

4) **Opportunistic** – “Follow new leads; taking advantage of the unexpected” (ibid.; p.119).
I would estimate that my subjects were fairly evenly spread out in terms of sampling type. My intent was to obtain expert views and the views of ordinary citizens who, given the nature of the questions, were often as likely, or in some cases more likely, to have more informed views on certain matters under investigation than so called experts.

International subjects typically posted to peace operations, constituted a wide range of nationalities, ages, and ethnic backgrounds, and are male and female. National subjects were identified and drawn from a population of Bosniak (Bosnian-Muslim), Bosnian-Serb, and Croat (Bosnian-Croatian) communities. All are adults of apparent mentally and physically healthy status. Interviewing of “local” subjects from a wide range of ages and demographic origins was attempted, i.e., urban and rural, different economic levels, non-displaced and displaced persons, and differing occupations, male and female.

All surveys were administered in person by me, and through an interpreter when needed in conjunction with an interview using a structured-interview format. Face to face interviews were employed in order to avoid difficulties associated with remotely filled-in surveys in conflict zones, such as misunderstandings of the exercise, the spread of unfounded rumors, or actual sabotage of the project; all of which can generate data confounding issues and discourage participation in the research project.

The development of the composite framework discussed earlier, plus the survey questions are based on years of experience in peace and stability operations and conflict zones by me, the researcher, as a professional field officer with the United Nations and
International Organization for Migration as well as international NGOs (most of the work has been in association with complex emergency operations, civil affairs, minority affairs, and local governance).

Advantages and Disadvantages of Sampling Strategy

**Administration of a Survey Utilizing a Structured Interview Format**

**Advantages:** All subjects were asked identical questions (the 30 closed-ended survey questions and 4 open-ended survey questions) in the same order, thereby enabling direct comparisons. Subjects were able to speak openly. Discussion points were kept on topic and tied to the concept hypothesis.

**Disadvantages:** Some subjects may not have understood certain questions or refused to answer certain questions fully or truthfully. Interviews can be very time intensive and expensive if distant locations and political or security issues are involved.

**Expert Knowledge**

**Advantages:** Subjects were expected to have directly relevant knowledge and experience to address the questions and issues at hand and were often able to provide important context, background, and historical information.

**Disadvantages** – Experts might convey private corporate or political agendas so as to intentionally or unintentionally mislead the investigator, or might not be knowledgeable enough, if an outsider, about local opinion on certain issues.
Surveys

Advantages: Can provide a useful assessment of public opinion on a variety of values and issues, and can reach a large number of people.

Disadvantage – Subjects may not be candid or truthful in responses or might misunderstand the questions. Questions need to be carefully constructed for the subject and context.

Demographics

Basic Subject demographic information is contained in Table 8, below: BiH

Survey Interviewee Demographics. As stated previously, an attempt was made to get a representative cross-section of international and national subject views at different levels and from different sectors, ethnicities, and backgrounds. The intent was to obtain a well-rounded, yet informed set of perceptions as to the status of structural and relational elements in an intervention context. I think this was reasonably accomplished except with rural-located subjects of which too few were surveyed to be calculated as a variable as such. At the same time, many subjects in other categories are from or still have close ties to their rural origins. Many expressed opinions regarding the influence of rural populations on events before, during, and after the wars of 1992-1995 and previous wars.

I need to comment that expert opinion was sought from all international subjects and a large number of national subjects, and this is reflected in the high level of well-educated and well-placed subjects overall in the study. As specified earlier, the exact same questions were posed to all subjects, however, I largely place the opinion of
ordinary citizens (nationals) on an equal footing with highly educated, well-placed
nationals in terms of expert opinion since many of the questions posed have to do with
personal experience and sentiments regarding Bosnia, not just technical data. The intent
was to know what people believe the status of the various elements was, not the actual
count of materials used, projects completed, or official complaints recorded, etc.

Interviewee Demographics for BiH Survey

Demographic Codes:

Education: Elementary – E, Secondary – S, University – U, MS/MA, Doctorate - D
Military Experience: Mil
Citizenship-Nationality: Bosnia & Herzegovina/Bosnian – BiH/Bsn, Republika Srpska -
Religion: Muslim/Islam – M/Isl, Serbian Orthodox – O, Catholic – Chl,
Christian – Chr, Non-Associated - NA
Political Orientation: (Pol Orien): Liberal – L, Moderate – M, Nationalist - N
Entity: Bosniak-Croat Federation – Fed, Republika Srpska – RS
Urban (city) – U, Rural (village) – R
International Organization or Agency: IO/AG
International Non-Governmental Organization: INGO
Local Non-Governmental Organization: LNGO
BiH Authorities (BiH Auth): Local – L, Canton – C, Entity – E, State - S
Institute: State – S, Private – P
Level: Representative – Rep, Officer – Ofr, Staff – Stf, Worker – Wkr
NA: Not Applicable
X: Check Mark
Table 8: BiH Survey Interviewee Demographics

**CODES:**
- **Education:** Elementary – E, Secondary – S, University – U, MS/MA, Doctorate - D
- **Military Experience:** Mil
- **Citizenship - Nationality:** Bosnia & Herzegovina/Bosnian – BiH/Bsn, Republika Srpska - RS, Serb - S, Bosniak - Bsk, Croat - C, Roma - R, int’l – I (or dual citizenship)
- **Ethnic Group:** Bosniak – Bsk/Msl, Croat – C, Serb – S, Roma – R, Other – O
- **Religion:** Muslim/Islam – M/Isl, Serbian Orthodox – O, Catholic – Chl, Christian – Chr, Non-Associated - NA
- **Political Orientation (Pol Orien):** Liberal – L, Moderate – M, Nationalist - N
- **Entity:** Bosniak-Croat Federation – Fed, Republika Srpska – RS
- **Urban (city) – U, Rural (village) – R**
- **International Organization or Agency – IO/AG**
- **International Non-Governmental Organization – INGO**
- **Local Non-Governmental Organization – LNGO**
- **BiH Authorities – BiH Auth:** Local – L, Canton – C, Entity – E, State - S
- **Institute:** State – S, Private – P
- **Sector:** Government – G, Security – Se, Law – L; Economy – E, Social - So
- **Level:** Representative – Rep, Officer – Ofr, Staff – Stf, Worker – Wkr
- **NA – Not Applicable**
- **X = check mark**

**Personal Demographics:** *(1-50 National, 51-100 International)*

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>Bsk</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>NA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>/C</td>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>k</td>
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<td>Bsk</td>
<td>Bs</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>Isl</td>
<td>L</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**NATIONAL**  

**INTERNATIONAL**
| Subject | Age  | Gender | Education | Elem Exp | Scnd Univ MS/MA Doc | M N l l l l  | l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Level</th>
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<tr>
<td>86.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U Y l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>Fed</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Se</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M N l l  l</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Hd.of Law Enfrmnt</td>
<td>F/RS</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Se</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M N l l  l</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>F/RS</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Se</td>
<td>l</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M Y l l  l</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Mil-Pol.Consultant</td>
<td>F/RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>GSeLESo</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>D Y l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Intl.Officer</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>U N l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Political Officer</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GSeL</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U N l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Business Manager</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M N l l  l</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Civ.Affairs Officer</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GSeL</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M N l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Human Rts Activist</td>
<td>F/RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GSeLESo</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U N l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GEso</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>S N l l  l</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>RS</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>SeL</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U N l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
<td>Brko</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>SeL</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98.</td>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>U N l l  l</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Political Officer</td>
<td>Fed</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GSeL</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M N l l  l</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
<td>Fed</td>
<td>UR</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GSeLESo</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>D Y l l  l</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Diplomat</td>
<td>F/RS</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>GSeLESo</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The basic demographics breakdown by count is as follows:

**Personal Demographics Frequency**

(Frequencies that do not add up to 100 for the potential frequency count reflect missing data i.e., someone declined to answer a question; frequencies that add up to more than 100 of the potential frequency count reflect overlap i.e., individuals having responsibilities in more than one sector):

**Note**: The last census in Bosnia-Herzegovina was conducted in 1991. At that time the population by ethnicity was determined (rounded up to the nearest 1%) to be 44% **Bosnian-Muslim, 31% Bosnian-Serb, 17% Bosnian-Croatian, and 3% Other** (CIA Factbook website, 2010). International and local authorities in BiH estimate that the ratios are still roughly the same, except that the respective ethnicities are much more segregated now as opposed to being largely interspersed in villages and towns before the 1992-1995 war.

**National Respondents**: 50

**International Respondents**: 50

**Age Range**: (18-29): 7; (30-44): 44; (54-64): 45; (65-79): 4.

**Gender**: Female 30; Male: 70.

**Education**: Secondary School 12; University 41; Masters 38; Doctoral 9.

**Military Experience**: National 24; International 19.

**Self-Described Citizenship**: Bosnia & Herzegovina 32; Bosnian 5; Serb 3; Croat-International 1; BiH/Republika Srpska 3; International 50.
**Self-Described Nationality:** Bosnia-i-Herzegovina 9; Bosnian 6; Serb 9; Bosniak 12; Croat 4; Croat-International 1; Bosnian-International 1; Muslim 1; International 50.

(The Self-Described Nationalities of Bosnian-International and Croat-International are an indication of dual citizenship as explained to me by the two respective Subjects).

**Self-Described Ethnicity:** Bosniak 14; Muslim 3; Croat 5; Serb 9; Bosnian 1; Mix 1; Orthodox (Serbian Orthodox) 1; Bosnia-i-Herzegovina 2; Undeclared 12; International 50.

**Primary Ethnic Identity** (as determined by investigator): Bosniak 21; Croat 8; Serb 14; Undeclared 7; International 50.

**Religion:** Muslim 19; Orthodox (Serbian) 3; Catholic 6; Non-Associated 12; Agnostic 1; International 50.

**Political Orientation:** Liberal 51; Moderate 30; Liberal/Moderate 1; Nationalist 0

(No one checked the Nationalist block on the survey. Presumably, as I was repeatedly told by nationals, this is because the nationalist label is currently associated with the most aggressive actions and atrocities of the war and war criminals). Further, I was told a number of times that the concept of Liberal is relatively unknown in BiH, and that the common orientation is either moderate or nationalist.
Table 9: Self-Described Occupations of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropologist</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Minister</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Consultant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Director</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Manager</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomat</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist/Returnee</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Technician</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Official</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Law Enforcement</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights Activist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
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<tr>
<td>International</td>
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<td>International Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Mufti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist/Program Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Political Consultant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Assembly President</td>
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<td>Ombudsman</td>
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<td>Pensioner</td>
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<td>Political Analyst</td>
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<td>Press Officer</td>
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<td>Soldier</td>
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<td>Spokesperson</td>
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<td>Tourism Clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV Program Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Student</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Entity of Residence in Bosnia and Herzegovina:**

Bosniak-Croat Federation: 40; Republika Srpska: 24; Federation/Republika Srpska: 35;

Brcko: 1.

**Primary Activity Location of Respondents:** Urban: 91; Rural: 3; Urban/Rural: 6.

**Sector or Level of Respondent Responsibilities - Frequency**

**Respondent Representation Level:** Self: 15; Int’l. Organization/Agency: 50;

Int’l. NGO: 4; Local NGO: 12; Gov’t. Authority: 9; Public Institution: 4:

Private Institution: 3; Business: 3.

**Respondent Gov’t. Level:** Municipality: 3; Canton: 1; State of BiH: 7;

Not Applicable: 89;

**Respondent Function Level:** Representative: 47; Officer: 44; Staff: 2; Worker: 3;
Ethical Considerations

Reasonable efforts were made to ensure that subjects were not subjected to undue risk or political pressures by virtue of their participation in the research. Participation was purely voluntary and precautions were taken to protect identities, participation, and information. Consultation with local advisers regarding security and safety issues was undertaken regarding interaction with subjects. Persons interviewed and surveyed were fully informed of the purpose of the research prior to being asked for permission to proceed with the interview or receiving the questionnaire (see Figure 23, Verbal Informed Consent Form, below).

Prior to initiation of the interviews, the dissertation proposal was submitted to the George Mason University Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB) for clearance, which was granted in keeping with the code of ethics standard for research as specified in the Code of Federal Regulations, 45 CFR 46, Protection of Human Subjects. Also, a waiver of the requirement for a subject’s signature on the consent form was requested of the
HSRB and granted. The reasoning for this being that subjects would feel more at liberty to be candid in their responses.
Verbal Informed Consent & Information for Participants:
Structural & Relational Status Survey

This study is a Ph.D. dissertation research project associated with the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A.. The purpose of this research is to better understand the nature of structural and relational elements in peace building efforts and the effects on negative and positive peace. This will be accomplished by posing a variety of questions to you about the current status of different structural and relational elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Your participation is voluntary, and you may discontinue your participation at any time for any reason. There is no penalty for not participating or withdrawing. The interview will probably take about an hour.

No particular risks are foreseen, and in any case are expected to be minimal. The same questions will be posed to participants from Bosniak, Bosnian-Serb, and Croat communities. All participants are being given the same respect, the same information, and asked the same questions. All participants are given the same opportunity to share their views and concerns should they wish.

There are no costs or personal benefits for participation to you or any other party.

All information collected in this study is confidential; no signature is needed. I will fill out the questionnaire for you as you select answers. All person-identifiable information is general in nature so that you cannot be personally identified, and it will not be shared with anyone. Your survey answers will not be shared with anyone.

Although there are no absolutely right or wrong answers, choosing an answer that most accurately reflects your opinion or best guess is the most important thing you can do. No one will be asked questions about his or her own particular situation or behavior.

This study is being conducted by James R. Adams who is a Doctoral Candidate at George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A. He may be reached at 387.62.813.866. You may also contact the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University at 001.703.993.1300 if you have any questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in this research. If you wish to write, the address is 3401 Fairfax Drive, MS403, Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A. 22201

This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Review Board at George Mason University regarding procedures governing your participation in this research.

Do I have your permission to proceed?

Figure 23: Verbal Informed Consent Form
DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

Concerning Demographics

As can be appreciated with demographics’ descriptions in general, demographics in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not a straightforward matter and, therefore, have an impact on analysis, and on findings to some degree. Descriptions that Subjects make of themselves vary greatly in some categories, for example, concerning self-described citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity. This reflects the significant confusion and uncertainty about precise identity in BiH today because state identity and fundamental identity in some ways are uncertain, insecure, and evolving. Having become aware of this dynamic while pilot-testing the survey, and needing clear categories for useful quantification of data, I created one variable in which I assigned each subject (local nationals) to one of the three primary ethnicities (Serb, Croat, and Bosniak) according to my best estimation.

Interestingly, subjects informed me, without exception, that everyone (nationals) adheres to the tradition of identifying one’s ethnicity by religion. Exceptions to the rule that Bosniaks are Muslim, Serbs are Serbian Orthodox, and Croats are Catholic are rare. Although I did meet some people for whom the rule did not apply, these instances involved intermarriages in which tradition normally compels wives to take the ethnicity of the husband and children to take the ethnicity of the father.

Another complicating or confounding factor is the often discussed argument that multi-ethnicity does not apply in Bosnia, since all are deemed to be of Slavic decent, although some adopted or were forced to convert to Islam under Ottoman rule and are
now the modern day Bosniaks (Bosnian-Muslims). The term “Bosniak” was first introduced in the 19th Century by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (upon the departure of Ottoman rule) to distinguish Muslims in Bosnia from Croats and Serbs, since Austro-Hungarian authorities (rulers of Bosnia at the time) did not want to recognize citizenship by religious affiliation. The term went out of use during the Yugoslav era but was brought back into use after the 1992-1995 war by intervention authorities for largely the same reason it was introduced the first time about a century earlier.

In any case, although other interesting themes and ideas can be derived from the interview and questionnaire data, the objective was to analyze views specific to the current status of identified conflict transformation structural and relational elements. And so, for practical purposes, and adhering to Bosnian colloquial code, I assigned each subject (Bosnian national) to one of the three primary ethnicities (Serb, Croat, Bosniak), as appropriate (There were seven Bosnian nationals for whom I could not determine ethnicity based on demographic information given by those seven persons).

**Methodology for Analysis**

Basic *descriptive statistical analysis* was used to examine responses to the closed-ended survey questions. *Content analysis* was used to search for common and dissimilar themes in responses to the open-ended survey questions, and to assess respondents’ qualifications, if any, to their responses to the closed-ended questions. The ability to compare and contrast intervenor and conflict party (Bosnian nationals) responses was achieved by administering the same survey to intervenors and Bosnian
nationals in a scheduled-structured format in the field. The survey design was intended to facilitate analysis and comparison of views/perceptions given by subjects pertaining to the actual status of key structural and relational elements of conflict transformation in the mission area. The resulting data were assessed for structural and relational elements status, and negative and positive peace inferences and insights pertaining to the apparent conflict transformation conceptual dichotomy, and implications for intervention planning.

Responses to the closed-ended questions on a 7-point Likert Scale were calculated as arithmetic means to facilitate comparisons between the two primary groups of respondents, the 50 Bosnian nationals and 50 international intervenors. Responses to the open-ended questions were subjected to content analysis to explore for similar and dissimilar themes. Finally, abduction was used to explore the validity of the findings using my professional field experience as a basis.

**War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model**

The War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model (Figure 24 below) incorporates the Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity Parameters model (see Figure 19). It is an overall intervention/mission dynamics indicator model. I progressively introduce components of the final composite War-to-Positive Peace graphic below, and in Chapter 8 (in conjunction with introducing the findings). In other words, I progressively explain how the survey results are scaled according to structural or relational categorization and then associated with intervention thresholds and negative
and positive peace parameters on the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum, which I place underneath the Structural and Relational indicator scales in the overall composite graphic (see Figure 29).

In the end, the structural and relational scales shown over the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum are intended to facilitate notional linkages and inferences pertaining to status of structural and relational elements and various peace and stability intervention thresholds, and negative and positive peace parameters. A detailed explanation of the model is in the “Referencing War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model” section at the end of Chapter 8.
CONCLUSION

In Chapter 7, I linked the Conceptual Dichotomy with the Preliminary Question to underpin the earlier Primary Question, and the resulting Concept Hypothesis. This also involved presenting a description of the conceptual process further resulting in the analytical frameworks underpinning the data collection and data analysis instruments specifically designed for drawing out perceptions from interviewed Subjects as to the status of key structural and relational elements in connection with the conflict and recent peace and stability operation and environment. All, in turn, generated empirical data for
assessing the status of those elements, and serving as indicators for notional association with the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum model of peace and stability operation environment thresholds and negative and positive peace parameters. Also, I made a preliminary introduction of the War-to-Sustainable Continuum model by explaining that I incorporated the Driver’s of Conflict and Institutional Performance concepts into the War-to-Sustainable graphic.

Peace Chapter 8 outlines the findings generated by the Structural and Relational Status Survey during interviews and explains the process by which the results (arithmetic means) are indicated on the Structural and Relational 7 point Likert 7.
Chapter 8: Findings

Chapter 8 lists the 30 closed-ended survey questions and 4 open-ended survey questions, subject responses and comments, including data means’ frequencies, and my analysis and comments regarding the responses. I explain how to use the *Structural and Relational Status Scales* on a step-by-step basis, using graphics of the scales, which are eventually notionally linked to my War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum for situational awareness purposes and inferred associations with intervention thresholds and negative and positive peace parameters indicated on it. Representative responses to the closed-ended questions are incorporated into the chapter. The complete list of responses to open-ended questions is located in Appendix A.

Findings from the Structural and Relational Elements Status Survey resulted from administration of the survey in a face-to-face meeting with each subject utilizing the scheduled-structured interview format. I distinguish three types of distinct results revealed in the findings: 1) The raw data itself, quantitative and qualitative, that provides empirical data and direct assessment indicators of the perceived status of structural and relational elements in Bosnia in relation to residual conflict dynamics and the intervention(s); 2) Indirect-inferred indications of the status of structural and relational elements in association with conflict and intervention thresholds and negative and positive peace parameters as indicated in the composite War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace...
Peace Continuum; and, 3) Indirect indications of the viability of the theoretical and conceptual approach taken in this study with the composite analytical frameworks and models created or adapted for the purpose.

And now to the findings specifically:

There are three types of survey and interview based-findings given by subjects:

1) Subject responses to closed-ended questions;
2) Subject comments regarding their responses to closed-ended questions;
3) Subject responses to open-ended questions.

Although, I had not been posted to Bosnia specifically, I have added useful commentary regarding peace and stability intervention factors based on my personal observations and expert opinion. This is based on my approximately 10 years of previous experience as a professional field officer in peace and stability intervention/complex emergency operations in Somalia (and other East and Central Africa states), Kosovo, and Afghanistan, in addition to the four and one half months I conducted in-depth interviews with 100 individuals in Bosnia for this study.

**RESPONSES TO SURVEY CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS**

To begin, I list the survey questions below as they were posed to all subjects, but unlike the survey sheet itself, shown in Chapter 7 (see Table 7), I have subdividing them into structural or relational-oriented categories. The survey questions are followed by a section explaining the *Structural and Relational Elements’ Status* scales and how to
interpret the element-status frequencies in Table 10 below. Table 10 contains the actual total frequencies (arithmetic means) for responses to each question, based on the actual selected responses by all subjects for each closed-ended question. Following that, the 30 closed-ended survey questions are listed again, this time with examples of actual written or verbal comments or qualifications that subjects made to their closed-ended survey responses. I add some commentary as needed in the section on subject comments on their structural questions responses. The section on subject comments on their responses to relational questions contains only subject comments with no paraphrasing or summarizing by me. The section on open-ended survey questions follows after that. Chapter 8 ends with a section on Referencing the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum.

Closed-Ended Survey Questions

(Questions Associated with Structural Elements)

1. To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement?

2. To what degree are government institutions reestablished?

3. To what degree is the election process fair and transparent?

4. To what degree is there civic group participation in governance?

5. To what degree is political leadership polarized along ethnic lines?

6. To what degree does government have a mechanism to facilitate peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups?

7. To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?
8. To what degree do police and security forces provide a safe and secure environment for everyone regardless of their ethnicity?

9. To what degree can all refugees and IDPs return and live safely in their villages of origin anywhere in BiH?

10. To what degree is an international presence needed for security?

11. To what degree are laws fair for all ethnic groups?

12. To what degree are laws applied equally to all ethnic groups?

13. To what degree do government institutions discriminate against members of particular ethnic communities?

14. To what degree is reconstruction of infrastructure accomplished?

15. To what degree can people of any ethnic community have a business anywhere in the country?

16. To what degree is corruption and crime a factor in the economy?

17. To what degree is corruption a factor in government?

18. To what degree can people of any ethnic community buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

(Questions Associated with Relational Elements)

19. To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups?

20. To what degree is respect shown between different ethnic groups?

21. To what degree is tolerance shown between ethnic groups?

22. To what degree do people of different ethnicities interact in your area?

23. To what degree do students of any ethnicity feel accepted in any classroom in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24. To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups?
25. To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries?

26. To what degree is there violence against individuals due to ethnic hostility?

27. To what degree is society polarized along ethnic lines?

28. To what degree do I have hope that normalization of relations is possible between former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

29. To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war?

30. To what degree can people of different ethnic groups have empathy towards each other?

Using the Structural & Relational Elements’ Status Scales

The data below are based on respondents’ answers to the 30 closed-ended questions posed in the Structural & Relational Elements Status Survey for BiH (see Table 7 for the survey form). Some respondents chose not to circle some answers but instead wrote a comment next to the question to suffice as his or her answer. Some respondents circled more than one answer, explaining that a single answer did not capture the complexity of the situation; in such cases, I asked the respondent to write a qualifying comment next to the question in the Qualifier Comment Section. For quantification purposes, I chose the lowest value circled.

For all questions and associated answers, I calculated the mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value frequency; see BiH - Structural & Relational Status Survey Frequencies -Table 10. The 30 questions are listed in the top row and descriptive statistical frequencies in the bottom row. The data shows the total mean of responses for all respondents of the survey sample population of 100 (50
national and 50 international), although some did not answer every question, which accounts for missing data.

I should reiterate that although the data are rich in detail, the statistical calculations done at this time are basic and limited. In-depth statistical analysis is not attempted in this study. The calculations presented in this study are for the purpose of capturing the fundamental statistical means of the views (perceptions) of subjects regarding the status of various structural and relational elements by computing means for different subsets of the 100 respondents e.g., Bosnian nationals contrasted with international interveners, and different ethnic groups contrasted with each other, etc. In turn, this preliminary information serves to establish the basic utility of the composite framework, model, and data collection instrument as per the Overall Aim and Enabling Research Objective. More in-depth statistical analysis will need to follow in a subsequent study in which a wide-range of statistical tests are conducted in association with the many different data subsets.

For an effort at triangulation at this time, quantitative data (response means) are compared with qualitative data (written or verbal subject qualifications to closed-ended survey responses, and subject responses to open-ended questions), plus my commentary.

**BiH - Structural & Relational Status Survey Frequencies** (Questions 1-30, all sectors/elements, all respondents: n=100)

**Sector/Element Codes:**

**S (Structural Sector)**  
Gv (Stable Self-Governance)  
Se (Safe & Secure Environment)  
Lw (Rule of Law)
Ec (Sustainable Legitimate Economy)
So (Social Well-Being)

**R (Relational Sector)**
- Tru (Trust)
- Res (Respect)
- Tol (Tolerance)
- Rec (Reconciliation)
- Per (Personal Violence)
- Nor (Normalization of Relations)
- Emp (Empathy Towards the Other)

The minus symbol (-) indicates “missing” data, and the initials (dkm) indicate “don’t know” when the subject did not know or did not check an answer. Missing (-) and Don’t Know Data (dkm) entries were not calculated in the means.

As mentioned in the Data Collection section, each question and resulting answer is keyed to a particular structural or relational element. Each question begins with: **To What Degree ...?** For example, Question 1 (q1) “To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement?”, is keyed to the **Stable Self-Governance** element/sector. Stable Self Governance is, in turn, keyed to the primary **Structural** element/sector, which in turn is one of the **Key Elements of Conflict Transformation** (See Figure 22, *Survey Questions Embedded in Modified MPICE Framework*).

The questions are intended to assess the opinions of intervenors and conflict party members as to the current degree of completion, effectiveness, or intensity of particular structural and relational elements of conflict transformation in the international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In effect, respondents were asked to assess the actual status of elements pertaining to **Stable Self-Governance; a Safe & Secure**
Environment; the Rule of Law; a Sustainable, Legitimate Economy; and Social Well-Being.

Returning to Question No. 1, and as an example of how the 7 point Likert-type scale is used: the total mean for all subject responses to Question 1, shown in Table 10 below (3.89), was placed on the Structural Elements 1 to 7 Likert-type Scale (see Figure 25 below). The 3.89 indicates that the total mean perception of all respondents pertaining to that structural element is the degree to which leaders support the peace agreement (Dayton Peace Agreement); i.e., Moderate on the Likert 1 to 7 Scale (all figures are actual survey results).

Figure 25: Means - Structural / Stable Self-Governance/ 3.9 example

In Figure 26 below, BiH – Element Status Indicators Model (Means:
**Structural/Stable Self Governance**, one can see the total means for each Stable-Self Governance element indicated for questions 1 through 7. For example, the degree to which political leaders fully support the peace agreement (Question 1) is 3.9 (moderate) in terms of the respondents’ estimate of the status for that element. On the other hand, the degree to which leadership is polarized along ethnic lines (Question 5) is 6.25 (Very High), (rounded up to 6.3) (see Table 10 below).

![Figure 26: Structural & Stable Self-Governance / 2.8 – 6.3 examples](image)

Other descriptive statistics data that can be seen in Table 9, for example, the standard deviation measure of dispersion of .812 for Question 5, indicates that there is a
high degree of consensus of opinion among all respondents that ethnic polarization of political leadership is very high (a measure of the spread of individual responses around the mean response. There are similar standard deviation scores for Questions 16 and 17 regarding corruption in the economy and government.

Another example is Question 25 for which the mean (2.72) indicates that the degree to which respondents felt that amends for past injuries has been made is between very low and low; the standard deviation (.834) indicates a relatively high level of consensus. Corroboration of the indications is reflected in the bar charts for Questions 1, 5, 16, and 17, shown as examples in Table 10 below.

Although Figures 25 and 26, and the bar charts in Table 9 are presented as examples for the purpose of explaining how to interpret the information contained in them, the data shown in the figures and table are actual survey results.

Since there is not room for the questions to be fully written out in the frequencies’ report below (Table 10), the essence of each question is indicated.

Although, the median, mode, minimum, and maximum scores are indicated in Table 9, I focus only on the mean and standard deviation for the purposes of this study.
Structural & Relational Elements: Status Frequencies - Closed-Ended Questions

Table 10: BiH - Structural & Relational Elements: Status Frequencies

(Using Likert-Type 7 point scale for Survey Closed-Ended Questions: q1 – q30)

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<th>q3 S/Gv - dkm: Election Process Fair &amp; Transparent</th>
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\(\text{a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown}\)

J. Adams 2010
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\(^a\) Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
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### q17 S/Lw - dkm: Corruption in Government

![Histogram showing frequency of responses]

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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject Comments Regarding Their Responses to Closed-Ended Questions

This constitutes a test of the Survey Instrument to capture nuance. Some respondents qualified some of their selected answers or otherwise added a comment, for example, Question 1, which inquires about the level of support that political leaders have for the peace agreement. A typical comment pertaining to that question was that each ethnic group supports only those parts of the peace agreement that are advantageous to their own ethnic group. An example regarding particular ethnicities: Many non-Serbs claim that Serbs support the Dayton Peace Agreement much more than Bosniaks or Croats because it “legitimizes Serb war gains” and prevents a one-state union, which Bosniaks want and precludes a three state union which the Croats want; so non-Serb respondents selected the middle ground (3.89, moderate) in response to the question. At the same time, most Serbs claimed to be opposed to the peace agreement since they wanted a state of their own. This type of response occurred in connection with some other questions and that is why, following the survey pilot test, I added a “Qualification Comments” section next to the questions section in the survey form. This enabled capture of explanations of responses to closed-ended responses.

Below I include a sampling of actual qualifications by subjects for each of the 18 Structural associated questions and 12 Relational associated questions. In the Structural Questions section, I paraphrase or summarize, or add an observation of my own as needed. In the Relational Questions section, I show only actual subject responses with no paraphrasing or summarizing by me.
Again, closed-ended questions were responded to in terms of the following Likert-type scale:

1) Nil, 2) Very Low, 3) Low, 4) Moderate, 5) High, 6) Very High, 7) Completely; (DK for Don’t Know was available for selection).

(Questions Associated with Structural Elements)

(Actual Subject responses)

1. To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement (3.9)?
   • Comment provided above.

2. To what degree are government institutions reestablished (4.4)?
   • Subjects consistently qualified that the institutions of government were all in place but were mostly dysfunctional and corrupt along ethnic lines as per the Dayton Agreement ethno-political/constitutional criteria and nationalist dominated elections. Some subjects qualified that some local municipal governments were less corrupt, more effective, and cooperative with each other.

3. To what degree is the election process fair and transparent (4.9)?
   • Generally, subjects qualified here that elections were fair and transparent, but nevertheless marked their answers lower because of the use of fear tactics and intimidation by ethno-politicized nationalist parties (usually headed by hardliners or ultra-hardliners, or war criminals in some cases) to get reelected. Moderate parties generally did poorly.

4. To what degree is there civic group participation in governance (3.1)?
   • A number of NGOs have been created since the war (many were supported by UN or western aid agencies) to advocate for civil and human rights, and mental health and education services and so forth. However, as some NGO managers have explained to me, there are too few of them and they have very limited access to political offices that are often ethno-politicized and corrupt. A number of NGOs are arms of ethno-political parties. There is little sense of personal civil participation or opportunity.

5. To what degree is political leadership polarized along ethnic lines (6.3)?
   • Response to this question drew one of the highest levels of consensus (lowest standard deviation) scores corroborated by the fact that hardline or ultra-hardline ethno-nationalists continue to dominant national politics, including a
Bosniak president who was favored by Western diplomats as a promising moderate who later became an ultra-nationalist.

6. **To what degree does government have a mechanism to facilitate peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups (2.8)?**
   - Subject response to this question essentially repeats that for Questions 2, 4, and 5. No concrete example of such a mechanism was given.

7. **To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness (2.8)?**
   - This is another example of high consensus among subjects regarding an issue. Subjects clearly believe that governance and the political-economy have not yet reached a moderate level of controlling corruption and lawlessness.

8. **To what degree do police and security forces provide a safe and secure environment for everyone regardless of their ethnicity (4.5)?**
   - Subjects qualified that they felt generally safe in the cities and when staying in areas predominately of their own ethnicity. Also there was consensus that police generally are very attuned to keeping inter-ethnic confrontations to a minimum. Nevertheless, a qualification given a number of times is that some are very uncomfortable living or traveling in areas where they see police or authorities on the street that are known war criminals and/or rapists etc.

9. **To what degree can all refugees and IDPs return and live safely in their villages of origin anywhere in BiH (3.6)?**
   - The great majority of Subjects qualified that they could indeed return to and probably live safely in their villages of origin, but significant qualifications were specified: 1) Someone else might be living in their house and/or have taken over their business property, and it could take years to get it back if ever; 2) Discrimination based on ethnicity makes it nearly impossible to get a job or a decent job; 3) Their family, or their business, would be shunned by the community if now made up of a majority of a different ethnicity, which applies now to many villages and towns in Bosnia.

10. **To what degree is an international presence needed for security (4.6)?**
    - Although some Bosniaks were ambivalent on this point, most Bosniaks preferred that the international presence continue in order to safeguard their interests. Most Serbs want the presence to end as soon as possible. Croats were in between on this point.

11. **To what degree are laws fair for all ethnic groups (4.2)?**
• The moderate mean score on this question is, as a number of Subjects explained to me, not so much because the laws discriminate against some and not others, but that the systemic ethno-political constitutional mandates induce discrimination equally against all minorities regardless of ethnicity.

12. To what degree are laws applied equally to all ethnic groups (3.8)?
   • See response to Question 11.

13. To what degree do government institutions discriminate against members of particular ethnic communities (4.2)?
   • See response to Question 11.

14. To what degree is reconstruction of infrastructure accomplished (3.9)?
   • Reconstruction in this case, as explained to Subjects, refers to physical infrastructure: roads, railways, bridges, transportation, communication facilities, electric and water supply, schools, hospitals, etc.

15. To what degree can people of any ethnic community have a business anywhere in the country (4.4)?
   • The responses to this question parallel those of Question 9. The great majority of Subjects qualified that they felt that they had the right to have a business anywhere in the country and that that principle would not be challenged. The difficulties are that: 1) Someone else might be occupying their former business property and it could take years to get it back if ever; 2) New ethnic-majority officials make the licensing/permit process very difficult and residents and other business people would effectively boycott their reestablished business. In other words, they would not be welcome.

16. To what degree is corruption and crime a factor in the economy (5.7)?
   • Essentially, the great majority of Bosnians of all ethnicities believe that corruption in the economy is High or Very High, referring to the situation as a widespread system of corruption-cooperation and bribery demands at all levels in the economy.

17. To what degree is corruption a factor in government (5.6)?
   • According to Subjects, corruption in government is closely tied to getting government jobs and corruption in the economy; that is to say a corrupt politicized economy with close collusion between government officials and organized crime syndicates at macro levels, and common bribe demands at local levels for services to be handled without delays or other difficulties. The problem increases in instances of minority ethnicity applications and requests.
18. To what degree can people of any ethnic community buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina (4.5)?

- Generally the same response applies as given for Questions 9 and 15. Subjects generally did not believe that their right to buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia would be questioned, but that the process of doing so would be made difficult and they would be harassed, shunned, and made to feel unwelcome if they were in a minority status in the new location.

(Questions Associated with Relational Elements)

(Actual Subject responses)

19. To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups (3.8)?

- Although there may be normal appearing interaction on the surface level, deep down, a sense of betrayal is now embedded.
- But doesn't work when people with extremist views are involved.
- My sense is that individuals trust one another. It is group distrust that is more the issue.
- People of different ethnic groups have helped each other and common people were always getting along, they are easily tricked and manipulated by political leadership; same in WWI, WWII, and 1991-95.
- The issue here is that of pre-war neighbors or post-conflict neighbors.
- The system forces segregation and distrust, especially among the youth via schools and ethnically cleansed areas.
- There has been no serious discussion between ethnic groups about the war. I feel pressure of Ustase on my neck.
- This improved slowly after 1995, but has dropped considerably because of political polarization since 2006.
- Trust towards people you know but not towards an ethnic group.
- Trust?, towards the 5th Column people in Sarajevo - No!
- A lot of distrust, amplified by politicians who benefit from it.

20. To what degree is respect shown between different ethnic groups (3.8)?

- Respect is not possible when Serbs use heavy equipment to dig-up mass graves and rebury bodies in more dispersed mass graves.
- 3 generally, but at individual level the situation is better.
- Depends on locale (local football team in Zvornik is called Genocide); it's OK in Sarajevo, Banja Luka.
- Depends on the person.
- Ethnicity always comes first. Though in the absence of direct conflict, respect and cooperation does exist.
• There are some striking instances of disrespect; Older, more sophisticated people show more respect; younger people and villagers, less.
• When there is no trouble, everybody is friendly; when there is trouble, fast/hard separation follows.

21. **To what degree is tolerance shown between ethnic groups (3.9)?**
• Depends on location: city is more tolerant, village is least tolerant, town is in between. Bosniaks in general are more tolerant than Serbs or Croats.
• Young more problematic than old.

22. **To what degree do people of different ethnicities interact in your area (4.5)?**
• Communities try to stick to themselves; for friends, this rule does not apply.
• In Sarajevo yes, otherwise...
• Less mixing of population after the war.
• Most places are ethnically cleansed now; people can enter hotels, restaurants, and buildings etc. dominated by another ethnicity but generally do not.
• Not many integrated areas left to try interacting in.
• Segregation is growing all the time; people don't know people anymore from different ethnic groups.
• The presence of the International Community allows people to interact.

23. **To what degree do students of any ethnicity feel accepted in any classroom in Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.2)?**
• 6 in FBiH, and 2 in RS.
• Education segregated, ethnocentric; Sarajevo much less multi-ethnic now than before the war; previous long-time Sarajevans more tolerant than newer war related urban migrants from villages/small towns.
• From my local experience, on the surface - higher (5), otherwise moderate (4); 5 for Canton 1; 4 for Canton Prijedor.
• Many schools are officially or de facto segregated.
• My experience shows bad and getting worse.
• Newer teachers work to separate kids as opposed to integrate them.
• Only university students.
• Special events maybe ok, but on a daily basis, no.
• Special problem: two-schools-one roof, separate schedules or entrances, Some cantons in FBiH, also RS.
• Still many separate classes and curricula.
• Teachers do not allow children to interact; Students are manipulated by political elites, parents, and religious leaders to dissassociate from children of other ethnic groups.
• The problem is that school curricula and teaching is biased towards one ethnicity; Teachers emphasize respective ethnic perspective in instruction.
• There is some mixing at the secondary school level, but not at the primary school level.

24. To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups (4.5)?
• Again, this depends on the locale and the situation. On a national level, there is a long way to go.
• Collectively, Serbs deny wrongdoing, individually, Serbs wish for reconciliation. Different responses between intellectual levels, group levels, and different groups.
• Depends on where; Urban areas tend to be more reconciliation friendly.
• First, conflict parties need to reconcile within their own groups, within their own pain, then work on reconciling with other ethnic groups (many felt betrayed by their own groups and leaders).
• Generational change is necessary and reinterpretation of personal values.
• If we exclude extremist minorities.
• In 15-20 years, Serbia will have a major impact on BiH; When Serbia matures past it's nationalism episode, it can/will have a major pos. influence on RS (things in RS will settle down).
• Maybe in 100 years.
• Obstacles are: unenlightened population, influence of religion, low cultural standard, emotional factor, character traits (hate, envy, spite), influence of communism, incapability of humility.
• One has to hope, but: a) Election system should be changed, 2) It took other countries 40 years, so why should it be quickly done? Reconciliation is when ethnicity doesn't matter.
• Only with change in the political system.
• People of different ethnicities don't talk about important things such as religion, the war, harm done; We need to be able to speak frankly about differences.
• Reconciliation has not taken place yet; there is still much stoking of open wounds in the media; Reconciliation needs a solid foundation, bridges need to be built; IC needs to build linkages.
• Reconciliation: If there is remorse, and a desire, reconciliation will to go forward.
• Structural divisions created by the constitution, therefore, structure causes obstructions to improvement in ethnic relations.
• Timeframe sensitive: people have to see a future for themselves and their families.
• Very high if/when citizens get courageous and visionary leadership.
• With time and possibly better with future economic investment, jobs and recruitment on western models.
• We have more than one truth.

25. **To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries (2.7)?**

• Difficult to prosecute and discover crimes at the same time; first discover the crimes, then prosecute; allow families of victims to get their dead back; Admit that not all Serbs are killers.
• For Bosniaks, wreath laying by RS at Srebrenica would be more meaningful than jailing Milosovich and Karadic.
• Justice is needed; criminals walk freely among their own people.
• Legally mostly yes, emotionally no.
• Need better economy and less pressure from religious leaders.
• Non-war crimes are prosecuted, but there is no cooperation on the prosecution of war crimes.
• Offers of amends-making are subject to political pressures.
• People feel there is no justice and no way for victims to ask the guilty for it; Houses not rebuilt for victims without connections (corruption/favoratism).
• Politicians have not done anything to make up for me having to spend my teenage years in the war in Sarajevo.
• Really don't know how people feel; What is felt and what is reported may well be very different.
• Returnees are not satisfied regarding amends.
• The idea of Transitional Justice has only recently been introduced to the people of BiH.
• The method is "let's not talk about it, or one group outbidding another on who is the greater victim; but no real amends are made. There is competition about who was the most wronged.
• The whole BiH society has PTSD. Serbs say that there were logically more Serbs killed than Muslims since there are more Muslims proportionately, so proportionately more Serbs were killed.
• There are thousands of war crimes on record for which no action has be taken.
• There is no justice e.g., Srebrenica.
• This is the Balkans, even educated people have their own version of history.
• Very little, the problem goes back for centuries.
• Very little. Hard to see beyond Mladic's arrest-trial and stepped-up prosecutions of local level war criminals.
• Was high, but is decreasing rapidly.

26. **To what degree is there violence against individuals due to ethnic hostility (3.1)?**
• 3 for FBiH, 6 for RS.
• Depends on the region.
• Generally not a problem though there is random unorganized incidents. Hooliganism can be a trigger.
• If discrimination, then high.
• In schools, I'm hearing.
• Mental Vs. physical violence.
• Mostly at sports events or around them; There is a lot of potential for violence against individuals.
• No, except for violence against Roma persons.
• Not so much because of segregated living; Graffiti is indicative of latent violence.
• This is not widespread, but the fear of it keeps people segregated.

27. To what degree is society polarized along ethnic lines (5.4)?
  • Depends on region.
  • Everything divides: press, political parties, societal issues.
  • The very purpose of the current constitution is to divide and feed the negatives of ethnic division; Constitutional/institutional reform would dissolve ethnic animosities.
  • There are more divisions arising than unifying forces.

28. To what degree do I have hope that normalization of relations is possible between former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina (4.9)?
  • At the moment, low, due to the fact that education is totally divided.
  • But not in my lifetime.
  • But only with force and political changes.
  • I am an optimist.
  • I have confidence that a common denominator can be found, but not without a radical change that breaks the current oligarchical political system.
  • If BiH splits, then chances are very low; if BiH proceeds reasonably well to EU accession, then chances are high for normalization.
  • It would be possible if it weren't for the leadership who make it impossible to normalize relations.
  • None.
  • Ordinary people want normal relations, but politicians don't; politicians push politics of fear.
  • Some days I have hope, and others not.
  • The EU is making things technical (arrangements) as opposed to emotional/nationalistic.
  • Time and prosperity heals things, opens issues up, then deal with/move immigration and separation activities/systems i.e., elections etc.
29. *To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war (3.6)?*

- Attitudes are worse now than before the war.
- Attitudes that led to the war were not of those people in the country, it came from outside (initially); The attitudes that led to the war are still around although tempered.
- Attitudes, despite recent nationalistic fervor, have changed in terms of no appetite for war by anyone.
- Before the war, I didn't look at people as Croat, Serb, or Muslim, now I do; now most people do; Now there is little inter-marriage, before the war there was.
- Causes of war were power struggles coupled with brain washing and media campaigns; I think you can do that with any people in the world however civilized; Only now many people don't want another war.
- Gotten worse.
- Leaders that prepared the war are gone; war continues by other means; attitudes haven't overcome the fact that no one won the war, so war objectives are still being pursued.
- People’s minds are not flexible.
- Regarding attitudes: to feel better about one's actions/history: 1) Don't talk about it, 2) If we hadn't done it, they would have done it to us, 3) By not knowing, they protect themselves.
- Strong human insecurities (class, ethnic) led to the war; There is still a sense of ethnic/human insecurity.
- The opinions that led to the war are still there; Serbs don't see themselves as aggressors; Serbs think "If we don't stop them/kill them, then they will kill us."
- The primary change is that people are more aware of the dangers of escalation.
- The war not generated from inside. The question would be better put this way - the question of attitudes is regional capitols.
- There are serious disagreements about what led to the war. There was no real reconciliation after WWII.
- They have been maintained as a means to keep power; The war did not come from below, it was a forced mass mobilization from political/military/nationalist elite.
- Very little among opinion framers/politicians.
- We have solidarity on dealing with natural disasters (civil emergencies), but not about war. People don't talk about problems outside of their own ethnic group.

30. *To what degree can people of different ethnic groups have empathy towards each other (4.1)?
• Absolutely, 120%.
• Between 4 and 5.
• Between common people there is not a problem generally speaking - except when there is a crisis.
• Depends on location/area of conflict.
• Depends on the person, but generally low.
• Find mutual interest and people can be pragmatic.
• How can youth have empathy when they have no experience of the other. Before the war, 40-60% of marriages in Sarajevo were inter-ethnic, now almost no new marriages are inter-ethnic.
• Moderate but highly variable; War forced everyone to focus on one identity (ethnic) Vs. other comprehensive identities; IC has not given a context for locals to come together-no strategy between two points.
• More over 30 years old than under 30 years old.
• Need outsider facilitation.
• On the basis of personal relationships.
• Only if A. admits and apologizes then B. will (a vicious cycle).
• Politicians have none; People are normal.
• Some people do not want to understand others.
• These are not ethnic but religious groups.
• Very high if they as individuals talk to each other, but if generalized, then there is low empathy.

The total statistical means for each Sector is shown below and in Figure 22:

Survey Qs Embedded in Modified MPICE Framework (means are given next to the questions).

**Structural Elements (3.6):**

1. Stable Self-Governance (3.4)
2. Safe & Secure Environment (4.2)
3. Rule of Law (3.5)
4. Sustainable, Legitimate Economy (3.1)
5. Social Well-Being (4.4)
Relational Elements (3.9):

1. Trust (3.8)
2. Respect (3.8)
3. Tolerance (3.9)
4. Reconciliation (3.6)
5. Personal Violence (4.9)
6. Normalization of Relations (3.7)
7. Empathy Towards The Other (4.1)

The Grand Total means for Key Elements of Conflict Transformation is (3.7):

(structural + relational elements).

RESPONSES TO SURVEY OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

The open-ended questions, posed on page 4 of the Structural & Relational Elements Status Survey are:

1) What is the result of intervention by outsiders?
2) Why do some conflict resolution or peacebuilding ideas not work?
3) How would you improve relations between ethnic groups?
4) What other thoughts would you like to share?

The purpose of posing the four open-ended questions was to draw out deeper, more fully elaborated views and explanations pertaining to particular key factors in the
intervention as well as to facilitate triangulation to some extent of closed-ended question data. The actual responses for Open-Ended Questions 1, 2, and 3 are provided in Appendix A. The actual responses to Open-Ended Question 4, are not placed below or in Appendix A. I will explain why below.

Open-Ended Question 1: Comment on Responses

What is the result of intervention by outsiders?

Appendix A. contains the actual Open-Ended Question 1 responses in a list format. My comment and observations regarding the responses are below. It becomes fairly apparent that there are definite trends and patterns in the responses, although different words or expressions are used to make essentially the same point. All answers listed below are actual subject responses without paraphrasing or summarizing by me. I have highlighted some answers in bold that have particular relevance to particular points in this study.

A cursory review of the responses to the open-ended questions regarding the result of the intervention reveals that there is a very high level of consensus and appreciation for the intervention having stopped the war. On the other hand, a significant number of qualifications have been made; For example, yes the war was stopped, but it could have and should have been stopped much sooner. Some respondents point out that much has been done to reconstruct BiH, but there is still as much ethnic tension as there was before the intervention. Several point out that the Dayton Peace Accord stopped the war, but is seriously flawed and has resulted in seriously flawed governance and
institutions.

I think the responses to open-ended Question 1 capture fairly well the complexities of conditions in BiH and the intervention, and provide some indication of the contrast between success in terms of structural reconstruction, albeit flawed, and relational and tolerance improvement, which has not been successful at all.

Open-Ended Question 2: Comment on Responses

_Why do some conflict resolution or peacebuilding ideas not work?_

There is a high degree of consensus regarding the idea of doing something, anything just to stop the war, which the Dayton Accords did, but the process has left many large problems that continue to seriously undermine any real return to a normalized state or normalized relations between ethnic groups.

Two points stand out here: 1) The Dayton Accords peace agreement-based reconstruction has established seriously dysfunctional and discriminatory institutions and governance mechanisms, and 2) The peace agreement, and any conflict resolution or peacebuilding efforts intended to address underlying causes and conditions, and presumably improve relations between the ethnic groups, has been very weak and has essentially failed. This implies two things, first, that the degree to which primary structural elements are flawed is high, if not very high, and as such, (2) constitutes a state of serious structural violence, which is unlikely to be reduced until flaws inherent in the structures are remedied. In essence, the agreement that stopped the war became frozen into a constitution, which perpetuates the structural violence and, therefore, precludes improvement in structural elements, and seriously inhibits improvement in relational
Open-Ended Question 3: Comment on Responses

How do you improve relations between ethnic groups?

Open-Ended Question 3 elicited the most diverse comments and suggestions making categorization of trends and patterns less straightforward. A dissertation in its own right could be done on responses to Question 3 in regard to peacebuilding and improving relationships, and what can enable or thwart well-intentioned efforts to that effect. It appears that most of the responses can be separated into structural change or direct relational change suggestions or comments, if one wanted to take that approach. Many respondents seemed to understand, directly or intuitively, that there is a connection between structure and relationship. So the challenge is to decide which approach to take or what combination thereof. Although there are some strong views given, it still remains up to the intervenor to decide or consult others on which approach(es) should be attempted.

Based on responses to Question 3, it is apparent that no satisfactory formula has been realized or implemented to date in the BiH intervention to improve relations among ethno-national groups. In fact, the opposite effect seems to be the case, largely due to the innate ethno-political division inherent in the design of institutional and political systems according to the Dayton Accords, albeit, the agreement did facilitate an expedient negotiated political settlement, and thus stopped the war. In other words, Dayton brought negative peace to Bosnia, which is still in effect, with little sign of any meaningful
movement toward positive peace.

Open-Ended Question 4

What other thoughts would you like to share?

Responses to Question 4 essentially repeat responses given to the previous three questions, but with some further elaboration on one point or the other and so I do not include the actual text of responses to Question 4 in Appendix A.. (Question 4 responses remain available in data binders).

REFERENCING THE-WAR-TO SUSTAINABLE POSITIVE PEACE

CONTINUUM MODEL

Since giving a brief description of the basic peace and stability operation structure in Chapter 5 (CMPO model Figure 13) and Figure 19: Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity Parameters), I have focused on the creation of a framework and methodology to identify and assess structural and relational elements. Now I shift the focus back to context.

Referring to Figure 27 below, one can see the Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity Model (top half of page) juxtaposed with my composite War- to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model (bottom half of page). I have taken the Quest for Viable Peace framework and concepts and superimposed them onto my War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model, resulting in a composite model, and adding to it, negative and positive peace, war and violent disorder, and initial imposed
stabilization. The War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model is now able to reflect a full range of key peace and stability intervention dynamics (from pre-intervention war to sustainable/positive peace) by which to graphically demarcate, based upon mean responses to closed-ended questions, the status of structural or relational elements in relation to the peace and stability intervention and environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Figure 27: Comparison: Drivers of Conflict & Institutional Capacity Model (top) and War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model (bottom).
The Structural Element and Relational Element Scales can be located directly above the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model. See Figure 28 below. By imagining a straight line going down between an element-status mean (indicated on the Structural Elements or Relational Elements Scales above) to the War to Positive Peace Continuum Model below, one can locate that particular element in relation to peace and stability operational dynamics and context shown in the Continuum. This linkage between the means of elements above and the threshold parameters in the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace below is notional for situational-awareness purposes only. Association based on a-priori statistical significance has not been established at this time; therefore, no direct association is possible. A follow-on study would build on the current approach and attempt to achieve an a-priori basis for such an association.
While still in Bosnia, after all interviews were completed and survey forms filled-
out, I asked some of the interviewees to locate the status of various elements directly on the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model. With very little explanation from me, and almost intuitively on the part of the individuals, and consistently among the individuals (national or international), they located the status of a given element in nearly the same spot along the continuum range in the model. The individuals felt that their chosen point on the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model did indeed fairly well reflect the dynamics at play at the time and the overall contextual parameters in BiH for the element.

A possibility for future research on the identification and analysis of structural and relational elements in association with a peace and stability operation and war-to-sustainable positive peace parameters, would be to have all subjects identify the status of each element directly onto the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum itself, with a 1 to 7 scale superimposed on it.

Such an exercise, however, would probably limit the subject base to populations that are literate. For Bosnia, this would not be a problem since the general literacy rate is very high. This approach might need to be altered for countries in which literacy is low.

As an example, if the mean for Question 7 (To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?) is 2.8 on the Structural Elements Scale and if one were to drop a line straight down from 2.8 to the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model, the indicated location of the mean score directly on the Continuum and graphically indicate the operational dynamics that can be associated for an element with that mean score. In this instance, the mean score would
suggest that it would be in a context of war or violent disorder.

So if that is the case, why is there no war or violent disorder in BiH now? I think that is explained by the presence of the international intervention authorities and the accompanying imposed stability. In theory then, without an international intervention presence, the status of such a crucial element could be expected to drag the status of other elements backward into fragile peace or worse. Conversely, it is the influence of other higher mean-status elements that resist the backward pull of a lower mean-status element(s) so that the overall condition is improved over war or violent disorder.

When I asked a few individuals to locate directly on the War-to-Positive Peace Continuum Model the overall status of all structural or relational elements (all things considered), or the overall situation in BiH in general, they consistently said somewhere just before or after the Viable Peace threshold line, but qualified that the situation was deteriorating. Also, they qualified that some elements were pushing into the Self-Sustaining Peace zone, for example, in some municipalities, but others were regressing backwards, for example, state governance institutions. One astute individual speculated that when international officials were paying close attention to an element, it moved above the Viable Peace threshold, but when international officials were not paying attention, it regressed below the Viable Peace threshold.

Figure 29, the Grand Total Means: All Structural Elements + All Relational Elements graph, indicates the actual statistical means calculated for the element grand totals just mentioned. It so happens, that the unofficial placement of the status of important sector activities by individual intervenors and nationals on the War-to-
Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model closely coincided with the actual survey results. This was done without reference to a structural or relational scale, and neither I nor the individual knew the mean for any element, since the means were not calculated until after I left Bosnia.

Figure 29: Grand Total Means of All Structural and All Relational Elements
The grand total mean of all structural elements is 3.6 and for relational elements it is 3.9. Prior to arriving in BiH and conducting the survey, I fully expected that the total mean score for structural elements would be significantly higher than the total mean score for relational elements, given that the reconstruction of BiH (in structural and institutional terms) is essentially complete. I expected that given the general lack of symbolic, or otherwise, apologies or amends being made, that relations and hostile sentiments would be worse. So, are the statistical means indicated inaccurate and questionable?

I believe yes and no. As discussed earlier, the fundamental flaws in the Dayton Peace Accord-based, ethno-political constitution (which was intended to be only temporary), has rendered the associated governance structures and institutions highly divisive and dysfunctional, and institutionalizes discrimination. In other words, a system of serious structural violence is deeply embedded in the post-war BiH structure. This would explain the low structural element mean score, even though, on paper, the governance and structural elements are essentially in place and completed. In fact, the view that Bosnian governance is largely corrupt and dysfunctional is almost universal.

Why is there a relatively moderate relational total-mean score (nearly at the Viable Peace Threshold) when there are lower mean scores on individual relational elements? Again, drawing on the qualitative data, based on survey response qualifications and open-ended question comments in face to face interviews, I suspect that the 3.9 is and is not accurate. It is accurate in that a good number of subjects, in response to relational element questions, such as “To what degree is reconciliation
possible between ethnic groups?”, expressed cautious optimism by telling me afterwards, “Well, I checked a higher score because I have to hope don’t I?”

At the same time, the 3.9 is not accurate in that subjects told me that nothing has been done to improve relations and as soon as another crisis comes, people will quickly fall back into familiar verbal and physical hostilities. A reason expressed as to why there are relatively neutral relations or little manifest personal violence now, is that most people are war weary, and international and national authorities and police are very sensitive about keeping small conflict incidents from exploding into a crisis (as most subjects told me). In other words, while local authorities are actively suppressing cultural violence, little is being done to meaningfully improve relations (re-relating?). The serious structural dysfunctionality clearly works against improving relational elements.

I also asked a handful of individuals, after interviews, what they thought needed to be fixed first in order to have normalization: structure or relations. Some immediately said the structure needed to be fixed first, then everything else will follow. Some immediately said that fixing relations had to occur first or there would be no progress, no cooperation, with fixing the structure. Some said both had to be worked on simultaneously.

Then I asked what is holding up fixing the structure the most, the structure itself or the relationship problem? Some of those who at first said - fix the structure first - then switched over and said that relations are holding up progress on structure. Also, interestingly, I found that of those who suffered serious personal losses during the war, nearly all said relations needed to be fixed first.
SAMPLE COMPARISON OF MEANS FOR 5 SUB-SET GROUPS

This section contains a sampling of responses from sub-set groups in which the response means of Bosnian nationals, international intervenors, Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs are provided with brief comments (all local nationals were Bosnian residents in Bosnia). As mentioned earlier, the quantitative focus of this study is primarily on means; an extensive statistical analysis will have to follow at another time. For all means and standard deviations for all closed-ended survey responses, see Appendix B: Means & Standard Deviations for Survey Questions 1 – 30), (Tables 12 – 16). For a comparison of means and standard deviations of the 5 sub-set groups row by row, see Table 17 in Appendix C.

Table 11: Sample Comparison of Means for Sub-Set Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>1.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>1.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>.921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>1.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>.941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### q7: To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### q17: To what degree is corruption a factor in government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>.806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>1.019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### q19: To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>1.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>.956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>.968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### q25: To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>.954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
q29: To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The means shown in Table 11 reflect the large size of the sub-sets calculated with outlier responses washing out in the averaging. As the sub-set groups are further deconstructed, the dispersion between responses of subjects would be expected to increase; nevertheless, a few preliminary findings can be discerned. Generally, the sub-set groups concur on most issues when asked. However, as explained in the section above on Subject Comments Regarding Their Responses to Closed-Ended Questions, some subjects added conditional written or verbal comments to a number of their checked responses on the survey. For example, relations are generally OK for now (but inter-ethnic interaction is minimal), but if ultra-nationalist leaders and groups get really active again, then everyone will very quickly fall back into deep hostilities, and serious violence or war will not be far behind.

Regarding **Question 1**, the mean score for Croats (4.38) is the highest score among the five sub-set groups suggesting that Croats have a slightly higher level of confidence that leaders support the peace agreement. Their .916 standard deviation indicates a fairly narrow dispersion from the mean suggesting a greater consensus on the matter than Bosnian Serbs, who had the second highest mean score but much less
consensus according to their standard deviation of 1.710. Nevertheless, the score of 4.38 or 4.00 respectively is still only a moderate level of confidence that leaders support the peace agreement. This modest level of support overall carries implications and perhaps partial explanations as to why there is generally minimal cooperation between official ethno-political groups regarding the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It is not clear from these particular figures alone if the actual lack of support for the peace agreement, on the part of leaders, reflects support or lack of support for the Dayton three “Entity” (mini-state) political arrangement or if there are other significant issues. Greater clarity on this issue is derived from subject written and verbal comments associated with Question 1, which reveal more nuanced information as discussed in the section above on Subject Comments Regarding Their Responses to Closed-Ended Questions. This point seems to lend credence to the idea that abduction, as a methodological process is useful in terms of allowing for inference-to-the-best-explanation when statistics may not fully capture a phenomenon for various reasons; as conjectured in Chapter 7. To reiterate, subject comments specific to this point were that leaders tend to support those aspects of the peace agreement that benefit their respective ethnic group specifically and tend to ignore or work against the other parts of the agreement.

The standard deviation for Bosniaks (.740) reflects the highest level of consensus (smallest dispersion about the mean) among the sub-set groups concerning Question 1, indicating that they perceive less support, on the part of leaders for the peace agreement. This may reflect the decisive movement of the Bosniak president (of the three member
rotating Bosnian presidency) who rather dramatically shifted from a western-favored moderate to an ultra-nationalist stance on political issues, including full implementation Dayton Agreement terms; this occurred only a couple of years before the survey for this study was conducted.

*Question 5* indicates that international intervenors perceive the level of polarization, along ethnic lines, among political leaders to be slightly higher than Bosnian Nationals as a whole. Although, Bosnian Serbs, as an individual sub-set group, perceive the polarization to be slightly higher than do internationals or Bosnian Nationals as a whole. The relatively low standard deviations for all sub-set groups indicate a fairly high level of consensus among all groups on this point.

*Question 7*: The 2.94 mean for internationals indicates a slightly higher level of confidence that legitimate institutional capacity outweighs corruption and lawlessness. Do local nationals know something that internationals do not? Or, to turn it around, do internationals see the benefits of future democratization and development more clearly?; assuming all goes well.

Just the same, an important point regarding the “very low” to “low” mean scores for Question 7, is that there is an, essentially, “across-the-board” consensus among all five key sub-set groups that “institutional performance” is a long way from overriding the “drivers of conflict” discussed earlier and therefore reaching the “viable peace” threshold, as shown on the War-to-Sustainable Peace Continuum. Legitimate institutional capacity is a key factor for stable self-governance. This information strongly suggests that there are serious obstacles, in the governance sector, to progress towards viable peace and
sustainable positive peace. It further suggests that other factors are preventing an actual status of violent civil disorder at this time, such as the significant international presence in Bosnia with its continued intense on-the-ground guidance and support, and trip-wire function. This factor alone, in my opinion, warrants a continued international presence on the ground, and a search for alternative approaches to dealing with the governance “stalemate.”

Croat Response to Question 17 suggests that they have slightly more confidence in their political leaders and governance than the other ethnic groups or internationals, that is, by perceiving slightly less corruption in government (5.13 mean score). Internationals, despite having expressed a slightly higher level of confidence in legitimate institutional capacity (Question 7, with a 2.94 mean); perceive the highest (slightly) level of corruption in government (Question 17, with a 5.90 mean). Nevertheless, there is, essentially, a broad consensus among all groups that the degree of corruption as a factor in government is between “high” to “very high.” The “very low” to “low” mean response scores by all sub-set groups for Question 7 (legitimate institutional capacity Vs. corruption and lawlessness, which is, in effect, “legitimate institutional capacity” Vs. “the drivers of conflict”) is not surprising then when corruption is taken into consideration. A “high” to “very high” level of corruption in government corroborates a “weak” “institutional performance” status and, consequently, a “strong” “drivers of conflict” status on the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum.

Concerning Question 19 and according to the means’ scores, Bosnian Serbs believe there to be a higher level of trust between neighbors of different ethnicities, with
the internationals’ lowest mean score suggesting that internationals perceive the lowest level of trust between ethnic groups. A question that might be pursued here in future deeper deconstructed analysis is whether the Bosnian Serb optimism is truly held, or if it is perhaps hoped for as a measure of assurance for maintaining at least a separate Bosnian Serb Entity, if not state at some point in the future – based on support underpinned by trust.

The unanimous “very low” to “low” mean scores for **Question 25** clearly indicate that no one, internationals or Bosnian nationals of any ethnicity, believe that much has been done to make amends for past injuries. Also the standard deviations all indicate a fairly high level of consensus on this, especially Croats. Clearly, this is an issue that is very sensitive for all concerned, and as such, deserves closer examination to determine if it is indeed a significant obstacle to normalization of relations, and by association, normalization of the state.

The “low” to “moderate” mean scores for responses to **Question 29**, suggest that attitudes that led to the war have not changed much since the war. This clearly suggest that there is much work to be done given that, as I have suggested earlier, sentiments that precipitated the war are largely untouched in terms of intervention peacebuilding or conflict transformation, however one wishes to define the terms.
CONCLUSION

Chapter 8 presented the findings of the Structural and Relational Status Survey conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina utilizing a scheduled-structured interview format. I distinguished three types of distinct results revealed in the findings:

1) The raw data itself, quantitative and qualitative, that provided empirical data (means and standard deviations) and direct assessment indicators of the perceived status of structural and relational elements in Bosnia in relation to residual conflict dynamics and the intervention(s);

2) Indirect-inferred indications of the status of structural and relational elements in association with conflict and intervention thresholds and negative and positive peace parameters as indicated in the composite War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum, and,

3) Indirect indications of the viability of the theoretical and conceptual approach taken in this study utilizing the composite analytical frameworks and models created or adapted for the purpose.

Resulting implications for theory-building, research, and practice and peace and stability operations and environments, as well as overall conclusions and recommendations is outlined in Chapter 9.
Chapter 9: Implications of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Chapter 9 outlines the implications of the findings for Further Research, Theory, and Practice and for Peace and Stability Interventions and Policy. My overall conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study are presented accordingly. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations, are based on an exploratory approach to the research, utilizing abduction theory and a mixed-method methodology with resulting composite analytical frameworks and data collection and analysis instruments. But before proceeding with implications, conclusions, and recommendations, I pause to reflect and ensure that my overall analysis is in keeping with known sound conflict resolution concepts, and so I engage a short conflict analysis and resolution theory cross-check below.

Conflict Analysis & Resolution Theory Cross-Check

As mentioned in in the Framework Construction/Analytical Modeling section of Chapter 1, I find Dennis Sandole’s (2010) *Three Levels of Conflict Reality* framework, and his associated *Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach*, helpful as foundational cross-check mechanisms for my own work, and useful as a point of departure to advance my analysis specific to peace and stability interventions. Sandole’s *Three Levels of Conflict Reality* framework describes
conflict fundamentals, and his *Three Pillar Approach* describes conflict and intervention fundamentals.

**Three Levels of Conflict Reality**

**Level 1** of Sandole’s *Three Levels of Conflict Reality* framework refers to *conflict-as-symptoms* (Sandole, 2010, p.39):

> “Symptoms” are observable discrete events which can be perceived as scaled indices (frequencies, intensities) of select categories of conflict (e.g., ethnic conflict, genocide, terrorism) and characteristics of actors involved in conflict (e.g., “failed” state, low level of economic development, autocratic political system, unstable regional environment) (see Hewitt, et al., 2008). As the stuff from which early warning systems are constructed and media reports fashioned, symptoms tend to be our first line of defense. As such, they can be easily framed by concerned policymakers and others as indicators of political and/or research problems in need of prevention, management, solution or, in general, some kind of control.

In this study, conflict-as-symptoms is the reality on the ground calling for intervention comprised of structural and relational elements, which need to be assessed and rendered into scaled indices (structural and relational element scaled indications) for consideration by peace and stability intervention policy makers, managers, and conflict parties towards better understanding where things stand in a peace and stability intervention environment (Bosnia in this case).

Sandole’s **Level 2** refers to:

*Conflict-as-challenged-relationships* that lead to “symptoms” (“*conflict-as-process*”). “Relationships” captures the dynamic, fluid, real-life, “give-and-take” of parties’ relationships during select periods of time when aspects of latent or manifest conflicts are developing.
By distinguishing between peace and stability intervention environment structural and relational elements in this study, and listening in person to the concerns of intervenors and Bosnian nationals, I have captured a meaningful degree of real-life relational dynamics through the scaled survey closed-ended questions, which have been refined through open-ended questions and subject qualifications/clarifications to their responses to the closed-ended questions.

**Sandole’s Level 3** refers to:

*Conflict-as deep-rooted-causes-and-conditions* ("conflict-as-startup-conditions") underlying the “conflict-as-challenged-relationships.” These are the “independent variables” (e.g., the antecedent/explanatory variables) which affect the behavior of the “dependent variables” (e.g., aspects of the conflicted relationship) of interest to researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.

By researching the deep-history of events and relations in Bosnia, combined with the face-to-face interviews and resulting data analysis, I have attained a useful understanding of the deep-rooted causes and conditions underlying the Bosnian conflict and the structural and relational elements and behavior related to conflict-as-challenged-relationships (conflict as process).

Reiterating an earlier reference to Sandole’s Three Levels of Reality framework, the interventions (negotiated political settlement and security stabilization are assumed) attempted to deal with underlying deep-rooted causes and conditions through largely realpolitik political and structural means (reconstruction), hoping to mitigate the symptoms (the fire), but largely bypassed the challenged-relationships factor (conflict-as-process). Therefore, the conflict process continues. The fuel from the conflict-as-deep-
rooted causes and conditions, which has not been adequately addressed, keeps feeding the conflict-as-process (challenged-relationships); therefore, peace is fragile at best.

Essentially, it remains an enforced peace in assisted-stability status. Even though there is no longer a significant international military presence in Bosnia, the peace enforcement option has never been removed from the table and a small presence of international “trip wire” diplomats, and civilian and military administrators and advisors remain in the mission area with UN, EU, and OSCE offices. My research design and data results are compatible with the conflict resolution theoretical aspects of Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict analytical criteria, and confirm the viability of the Three Levels of Conflict concept, as a tool for conflict research in a first step in considering the design of a proposed peace and stability intervention into a violent conflict system.

**Three Pillar Framework**

Referencing Table 3, in Chapter 3; it can be seen that the categories, levels, elements, and objectives utilized in my Comprehensive Multilevel Framework and associated models -- Figure 3: *Conflict Nested Paradigm Determination*; Figure 4: *Humanitarian & Peace Operation Activity Levels*; and Figure 5: *Intervention Assessment & Approach Selection* -- reflect those indicted in Sandole’s *Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach* (2010, p.56-72), These levels and elements served as a cross-check of generic conflict and conflict resolution theory fundamentals.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following comments comprise my analysis and general conclusions and recommendations concerning the problem of interventions stalled in negative peace as suggested by the findings, analysis, observations, and experience:

- The status of peace and stability interventions can be assessed in structural and relational elements terms, and in inferred association with negative and positive peace parameters.
- The status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation can be discerned.
- Negative and positive peace oriented measures can be discerned.
- Structural violence is suggested in the status of structural elements.
- The parameters of negative and positive peace can be inferred pertaining to the status of structural and relational elements of conflict transformation.
- Positive peace oriented measures alone are often not sufficient to ensure sustainable positive peace.
- Negative peace oriented measures alone can ensure sustainable negative peace until the revolution, or until combined negative and positive peace measures can push the overall status of structural and relational elements past viable peace and sustainable positive peace thresholds respectively.
- Negative peace measures can enable conditions for positive peace processes but are not sufficiently stand-alone actions for moving conditions towards and into sustainable positive peace.
- Positive Peace processes support negative peace achievements but often are not stand alone actions.
- **Negative and positive peace oriented measures can and, when possible, should proceed simultaneously and in concert for optimal progress towards viable peace and sustainable positive peace status.**

Fundamentally, I have demonstrated that a researcher can explore the perceptions of local nationals and international intervenors on the status of structural and relational elements, contextually, in a peace and stability operation, without indicating to what extent those perceptions actually correspond to conditions on the ground. Still, it is perceptions that matter because they drive conflicts.

In Chapter 6, I posed the question: Can structural and relational elements be identified in relation to specific operational tasks such as diplomacy, security, political, economic and institutional reconstruction, and civil society building? I believe that the question can be answered now, at least indirectly, within the five basic operational sectors named previously (utilizing my Modified MPICE Framework, Figure 22): Good Governance, Security, Rule-of-Law, Legitimate Economy, and Social Well-Being, which contain the 5 structural sector/elements just listed, and the 7 relational sector/elements (Trust, Respect, Tolerance, Reconciliation, Personal Violence, Normalization of Relations, and Empathy Towards The Other). Also, essentially, the same answer applies to the identification of operational tasks in relation to negative and positive peace. The distinction is that relational elements and positive peace oriented measures are more narrowly focused on personal, group, community, or societal relationship improvement and values consciousness-shifting (Track 2+ type Conflict Transformation).

This principle could apply to any task in any sector. The distinction is a matter of focus. Structural and negative peace oriented measures tend to involve coercion and/or
implementation of institutional and technical solutions (Track 1 type Conflict Transformation), whether relationship improvement or consciousness-shifting is expected or not. Nevertheless, Conflict Transformation constitutes two sides of the same intervention coin. It is apparent to me that progress towards a general status of sustainable positive peace involving all structural and relational elements requires due attention to negative and positive peace oriented measures and activities on all fronts and at all levels, including attention to relationship and values consciousness shifting, which can be associated with any task in any sector of activity, structural or relational, Track 1 or Track 2+. There is no overriding reason, beyond political ones, that relationally focused activities cannot be carried out within diplomatic, security, political, economic and institutional reconstruction contexts, as well as in more traditionally relationship -- consciousness-shifting -- civil society peace building.

The status of different structural and relational elements may be at different points above or below the Viable Peace or Fragile Peace thresholds - as inferred on the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum -- however, the need is to make those conceptual/policy-calculated efforts needed to move all elements beyond the Viable or Fragile Peace thresholds towards and into Sustainable Positive Peace status. Essentially, this requires awareness-raising on the part of intervenors in all sectors and conflict parties alike regarding the dynamics and processes involved and the expected benefits. There is a need for all concerned to focus on relationship improvement and consciousness-shifting.
Having just stated my overall conclusions above, I make a somewhat arbitrary division, below, between findings for further research, theory, practice, and policy, and findings for peace and stability interventions. I make the distinction between findings for practitioners, and findings for peace and stability operation intervenors (decision makers), to indicate that I understand that practice is a term commonly used in scholastic and legal contexts, whereby, peace and stability operation managers and staff use terms like implement or execute, and might not readily understand the meaning intended by scholar-practitioners use of the term “practice” in a mission context. Additionally, peace and stability operation managers and commanders, exercise direct authority over events, projects, and people, which the term “practice” is usually not associated with. The tasks of operational managers and commanders are fundamentally different than those of practitioners as commonly understood; thus, my separation of comments on findings, concerning findings for theory, research, and practice, and findings for peace and stability operations.

To elaborate a little, theory for intervenors, whether scholar-practitioners or peace and stability operation managers and commanders, is essentially the same thing, except that scholar-practitioners are more focused on applied conflict resolution theory (broadly speaking), and peace and stability intervention managers and commanders are focused more on the operationalization of policy and planning, which incorporates at times some degree of conflict resolution theory, that is to say, in this case, Conflict Transformation.

In fact, there is a kind of parallel universe of intervention, or a dual track of intervention to pay due attention to. Track 1 proceeds according to political imperatives,
followed in-turn by strategy and policy development, followed by policy and planning implementation on the ground, in the field (planning and execution, if military). Track 2+ (I am thinking of scholar-practitioners in particular) proceed according to theory imperatives conditioned by peer-reviewed discourse, followed in-turn by applied-theory practice in the field by scholar-practitioners or trained facilitators. As discussed at length earlier, both Track 1 and Track 2+ actors carry out conflict transformation tasks according to their respective perspectives and approaches. Policy for the construction/reconstruction of transparent democratic institutions and systems (structural elements) is well understood and receiving due attention, actually the predominate share of attention (the greatest amount of planning, funding, and resources as said earlier). Generally speaking, policy for relationship work is missing, and it is a significant gap in the overall intervention picture.

Peace and stability interventions/operations are now very generalized enterprises, involving a wide range of sector activities and numerous skill specialties. Such operations are Track 1 managed and controlled, although there are localized Track 2+ projects, many of which are sub-contracted (with Track 1 criteria) by Track 1 agencies or organizations to Track 2+ actors (INGOs or for profit contractors).

Conceptualization of approaches, whether policy-derived or theory-derived, is a definable distinction between Track 1 and Track 2+ interventions, and perhaps a meeting ground between the two – there is overlap. And so, in this concluding chapter, I reference some findings (according to the respective approaches of Track 1 and Track 2) of particular pertinence to the further research, theory, and practice of scholar-
practitioners and facilitators; and separately, of particular pertinence to peace and stability operation managers and commanders. Essentially, the distinctions I make on implications for further research, theory, and practice are research oriented, and the distinctions I make for implications for peace and stability interventions are policy and operations’ oriented. There is precious little time for managers and commanders to do sufficiently focused relationship work, and there is far too little time and resources allowed scholar-practitioners to do the kind of peacebuilding research on the ground needed to carry out meaningful relationship studies and mediation or facilitation.

There is overlap, and I ask for indulgence on points of commonality or repetition. In any case, I would think that, generally, intervenors regardless of orientation have, an interest in, if not a stake in, knowing more about the approaches of their intervention colleagues.

**FOR: FURTHER RESEARCH, THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY**

Fundamentally, this study has been a qualitatively driven exercise in conceptualizations with a quantified kick-start (primary source scaled-survey) to start an exploration into relatively unknown conceptual territory. There was not a pre-existing methodology for assessing interventions and environments in structural or relational or negative and positive peace terms, and so much of the work of this study has been to create a path to the needed methodology. An abduction-based approach has been the primary mechanism to do so, that is, “inference to the best explanation.”
The Comprehensive Multilevel Framework that I have constructed is intended as an aid in the analysis and determination of viable and appropriate intervention measures. The idea is to have on hand additional tools by which someone trained in conflict analysis and resolution theory and practice can efficiently analyze a conflict situation in structural and relational, and negative and positive peace terms, advise on appropriate intervention measures, and efficiently brief others on a situation, findings, and recommendations for action. Decision-makers are then free to inquire into the analysis and theory as deeply as they wish. So in addition to the theoretical points being made above and below, the practical nature of the study also applies.

Concerning my Concept Hypothesis, I believe that it is supported in the affirmative in that:

Assessing the current status of conflict transformation structural and relational elements will enable:

1) References to discernible peace and stability intervention environment dynamics and negative and positive peace parameters; and,
2) Shed light on the problem of peace operations and environments stalled in negative peace resulting in positive peace deficits.

Restating The Problem:

Peace and stability operations usually achieve Negative Peace status, in essence, a negotiated political settlement and cessation or suppression of overt hostilities, but despite intense diplomatic and reconstruction efforts, often stall without creating positive peace. In this context, an international peace and stability intervention presence holds open warfare or violent civil disorder in check and engages in a variety of reconstruction/state-building
projects, but conflict party sentiments that precipitated the intervention are still in place and remain largely unchanged.

The Problem was examined empirically and qualitatively in this study by looking at the recent international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The overall aim of this research was to assess the problem of a peace and stability intervention and environment stalled in negative peace, and to explore parameters of sustainable positive peace.

I introduced pertinent terms, concepts, situations, literature, research questions, research objectives, and a methodology for examining the problem, collecting data, conducting analysis, and addressing implications for peace and stability operations and further research, theory, and practice.

In this study, I have utilized the following:

1) Johan Galtung’s concepts of Negative and Positive Peace, which encompass his Structural and Cultural Violence (indirect violence) and Personal Violence (direct violence);

2) Conflict Transformation concepts as defined differently by Track 1 officials and Track 2+ scholar-practitioners and others;


4) Basic peace and stability operation models by Dave Davis, myself, and others;

5) Dennis Sandole’s Three Levels of Conflict Reality, and Three Pillar Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution; and

6) My Comprehensive Multilevel Framework and War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model.
Based on these concepts, frameworks, models, and subsequent analyses, it does appear that the peace and stability intervention and environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina is stalled in negative peace and that associated dynamics and elements involved can be at least partially assessed and graphically identified and contextually located on structural and relational Likert-type scales and associated with parameters of negative and positive peace.

Yes, the above collection of frameworks, concepts, and models does shed light on The Problem and complexities, and offers insight into where to make adjustments to move the status of elements towards and into sustainable positive peace parameters.

Although many other statistical manipulations of the data can be done -- for example, to determine where mean responses between groups of respondents are statistically significant -- it does appear that taking each subset of the survey population, the mean responses to each question, for each element/sector, and for each primary element/sector, finally resulting in the grand total mean of for all Key Elements of Conflict Transformation, and placing those means on the Structural Elements and Relational Elements descriptive scales, can allow researchers and practitioners to (assess) structural and relational elements of peace and stability interventions.

Further, it appears that there is utility in inferring the dynamic context of the status of structural and relational elements in notional association with the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum model, including parameters of Negative Peace, Viable Peace, Sustainable Peace, and Positive Peace, with the caveat that linkage between the means of structural and relational elements and the threshold
parameters in the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace is notional for situational-awareness purposes only. Association based on a-priori statistical significance has not been established at this time; therefore, no direct association is possible. A follow-on study would build on the current approach and attempt a research design to achieve that next-level of research sophistication.

Based on the data collected and subsequent analyses, it is apparent that structural elements and relational elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina are nearly equally problematic and in need of greater attention, since both primary elements (grand structural mean: 3.6; grand relational mean: 3.9) fall within the *Fragile Peace* zone, short of the *Viable Peace* threshold, when inferred against the *War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum*. It is clear, based on the situated primary elements and associated dynamics that structure and relationship, and the intervention and environment itself in Bosnia, are in a status of *Negative Peace*; a fragile, if not precarious, circumstance requiring ongoing *Assisted Stability*.

**Can structural and relational elements be assessed in a peace and stability intervention and environment context?** Yes. Given that Bosnian nationals and international intervenors were able to distinguish structural elements and dynamics from relational elements and dynamics without much difficulty, and apply scaled ratings to those elements in relational (cultural) and structural terms; Yes, there is clear indication that it is possible to distinguish structural from relational elements.
Can the status of negative peace and positive peace in a peace and stability intervention be assessed and explained and thereby shed light on the dynamics and negative and positive peace parameters of an intervention stalled in negative peace?

Yes. Utilization of the Likert-type structural and relational survey scales and derived data, in conjunction with the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model, give clear indication that it is possible to identify negative and positive peace parameters in association with a peace and stability operation and environment. This involves coordinated use of the composite Comprehensive Multilevel Framework, the Structural and Relational Elements Status Scaled Survey, and the composite War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model, in conjunction with triangulated observations and expert opinion. Therefore, associated intervention dynamics can be tentatively identified, including negative and positive peace parameters.

Can positive peace processes be effectively implemented in a peace operation environment? Yes, but they depend on location and timing. The data suggest that some elements can be in a status of sustainable, perhaps positive peace, in one location, or at one level, while the same element is in a fragile and negative peace status at another location, or at a different level. And so, sustainable positive peace processes may be possible within certain locations or sectors of an intervention area, but a generalized state of sustainable positive peace may or may not exist in a broader area. So it does appear that positive peace processes can be implemented in a peace operation environment, although a general state of sustainable/positive peace may or may not exist.
Pertaining to all of the points made so far in this section, I add a qualifier: Conflict resolution implicitly contains the essence of conflict transformation, the conceptual heir apparent of conflict resolution, if the transformation is associated with conflict party personal and relationship transformation. Otherwise, conflict transformation would be implicit in conflict management if the transformation is predominately structural in nature without benefit of positive human interaction and consciousness change.

FOR: PEACE AND STABILITY INTERVENTIONS

Different conceptualizations of conflict transformation pertaining to peace and stability interventions and environments and consequently different normative responses, imply possible cross-purposed actions. In the context of a peace and stability intervention, this could mean an implementation void or a response imbalance. In terms of determining where elemental needs require timely adjustment or not, utilization of the composite War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum framework, model, and data collection instrument appears to be a viable set of tools for accommodating discussion on identifying elements, issues, trends, priorities and where adjustments might be needed.

It also appears that planners and decision makers can utilize the structural and relational data and scales for analytical purposes to better identify what the status is of a particular element, and to identify what associated contextual dynamics to expect in relation to that element status. Consequently, policy and planning are better informed and focus and resources can be more readily adjusted accordingly to move problematic
elements towards and into \textit{Viable Peace} and \textit{Sustainable Positive Peace} status. In essence, the framework and composite model draw a picture of key elements, dynamics, and context parameters that are clear for all to see and discuss. This is particularly useful for those who are new to field work or not familiar with peace and stability interventions or environments. It would also be useful for conflict parties who are focused on events without benefit of reflective conceptualizations, to aid discussions.

It is useful here to repeat for emphasis a qualifier I made above in the implications for further research, theory, and practice section: Conflict resolution implicitly contains the essence of conflict transformation, the conceptual heir apparent of conflict resolution, if the transformation is associated with conflict party personal and relationship transformation. Otherwise, conflict transformation would be implicit in conflict management if the transformation is predominately structural in nature without benefit of positive human interaction and consciousness change.

Continuing on, by taking elemental status and context dynamics’ information back to Figure 5 (\textit{Intervention Assessment & Approach Selection}), one can determine more accurately which approach would be more appropriate for a given situation and set of objectives, then consider the peace operation basic structure overview model, Figure 13 (\textit{Civil Order and Social Justice - CMPO}), to determine which primary component (peacemaking, peacekeeping/security, peacebuilding, or peace support) to adjust accordingly.

I believe that it is reasonable to assume that key decision-makers and officials, who are briefed on the status of particular elements and context dynamics and parameters
utilizing the Comprehensive Multilevel Framework and models presented in this study, would be more fully informed about the dynamics associated with a particular conflict and be more readily able to discern additional actions to take. Further, I think that subsequent decisions made, and the resulting outcomes, could be expected to increase the chances of intervenors and conflict parties being more mutually collaborative, utilizing the Comprehensive Multilevel Framework and models as a common guide between them (not exclusively political elites). This could apply to activities of governmental organizations (GOs), international organizations (IOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) operating in conflict-prone environments.

Utilization of the Comprehensive Multilevel Framework and graphic models in face-to-face briefings with intervenors and conflict parties, is likely to improve the chances of mutual understanding and collaboration by virtue of having a tangible picture of the conflict and intervention factors, dynamics, and options involved, that can enable all-concerned to more readily see them and, thereby, operate (literally) from the same page.

In short, the Comprehensive Multilevel Framework and associated models, and the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum, serve as practical guides for all concerned with the assistance of trained briefers and facilitators in peace and stability intervention environments.

Below are descriptions of two facets of conflict, and subsequent implications for peace and stability interventions, that I believe warrant particular attention; and so I
elaborate on them next in this section: The implications of memory and conflict, and the implications of violentization processes.

**Memory and Conflict Implications**

I imagine that the first reaction of the average citizen outside of the Balkans, when posed with the question – what should be done about the Balkans? - would respond something along the lines of, well, that’s up to governments to deal with. I bring this up to point out a complication that is inherent in the hypothetical average citizen’s suggestion just posited to leave such things solely to governments.

Inherent in that response is an assumption, and a challenge, that government policy and decision-makers always know what to do and, perhaps more importantly, have healthier less problematic historical memories and motivations to bring to bear on a problem in question. Yaacov Vertzberger, in his article “Foreign Policy Decisionmakers As Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings” (1986, p.234), makes this observation:

Why is the use of history so tempting and widespread among decisionmakers? In a nutshell, because it is functional, convenient, habitual and socially acceptable. The past, as has been argued, can be exploited for coping with a wide variety of information-processing and decisionmaking-related tasks, and the mental procedures involved are familiar and accessible to political leaders. Foreign policy decisionmakers are not, in most cases, specifically trained and prepared for coping with the complexities of international politics. When beset with the realities of foreign policy problems and with the complexities and uncertainties of the international political arena, it is natural that they bring to bear those coping mechanisms with which they have had past experience. By transferring skills acquired in other professions and issue-areas to the political field they avoid the stress and sense of inadequacy which may
result from having to search for and apply new, for them untested, coping strategies with which they have had no experience.

In my experience, intervention officials and policy decision-makers with requisite appropriate coping mechanisms; a useful understanding of their own historical memory dynamics and motivations, and those of conflict parties; and an ability to distinguish between the two, are not the norm in interventions. A predictable result, in relation to addressing historical memory induced complications is that of lack of real change in the situation. All of the sentiments that precipitated the recent wars and subsequent interventions in the Balkans are still largely unaddressed. The root causes and conditions of the conflict, inclusive of problematic historical memory factors, remain untouched in the drive to get political settlements and compliance, however laudable.

So, what implications are there for future consideration? As I eluded to in the Concepts of Memory section in Chapter 6, the idea of obligated memory, in the Ricoeur sense, might be taken to mean a kind of restorative justice or victim-offender process, or perhaps a version of a truth and reconciliation proceeding, or perhaps a series of facilitated interactions at local, national, and regional levels, along the lines of Hal Saunders’s (1999) sustained problem-solving dialogue model. But, based on findings about historical memory factors put forth by the authors included in this study, such processes would need to be creatively modified to incorporate a response to such factors.

On a separate, but related matter, although I think such processes have potential in Bosnia and elsewhere, I have great reservation, generally, about the use of the term “reconciliation,” which in the Balkan context immediately drives deep into problematic
memory dynamics and reactions. I think the term is used much too loosely by the media and politicians, and by intervention administrators and military commanders, increasing difficulties on the ground as a result. I am much more inclined, for a number of practical reasons, to characterize an otherwise dialogue or reconciliation-intended encounter as an effort towards “improving a practical working relationship” as a general objective; The idea is to pose non-threatening interaction options that are more conducive to mutual acceptance in our lifetime and not to pose a highly provocative challenge right up front, which the term reconciliation generates for many, individuals in the Bosnian and other conflict environments.

If reconciliation is immediately and openly proclaimed as the context and objective for a conflict party dialogue or interaction, or an interaction involving any deeply wounded group, it presents right off to potential participants, perceived naïve and likely insulting assumptions on the part of intervenors, unnecessarily creating intense urgent challenges to emotions and predictable entrenchment or reverses. Such an approach is simply counterproductive, except perhaps at the interpersonal, family, or local community level. Selection of other contextual terms would be prudent, as per the example above, as well as selection or facilitation of a more organic process and timeframe. I think, nevertheless, that open mention of conflict psychological factors, as exemplified in Saunders’ and Volkan’s Estonia sustained dialogue model, is a viable option.
Violentization Process Implications

It appears that, in principle, Athens’ theory of the “violentization process,” and its application to community violence dynamics, is relevant to peace and stability interventions and environments, in that it offers an explanation of individual and community violence progression, which is certainly a factor in the chronic violentization of groups and ethnic-communities in Bosnia and elsewhere. As I mentioned earlier, peace operations are very complex enterprises (see Figure 9, Peace Operations Factors, Dynamics, and Participants), and interacting with official or unofficial persons or groups at local, societal, and state levels to improve conditions on the ground (decrease violence of all sorts) is what peace operations are about (ideally).

Peace operation interventions are, however, often disappointing in the implementation in terms of desired long-term results. Many difficulties in interventions are due to the influence of violent or ultra-violent persons in “turbulent” or “malignant minor communities”, to use Athens’ terms. Some individuals are violence managers without a need to perpetrate acts of violence personally; they act through violentized subordinates. I believe that greater familiarity with the violentization process would afford more realistic and effective intervention analyses, strategies, and mechanisms for interrupting or reversing such processes on the part of individuals, communities, or societies.

I believe that an understanding of the violentization process would indeed be helpful to officials and staff of peace operations as well as intervening IOs and NGOs in their analysis of the conflict situation and respective program planning. Athens is gaining
increasing support for his theory. Richard Rhodes (in Athens, 2003) applies violentization process analysis to the violentization of:

“…ordinary” citizens into mass murderers (Athens, 2002, Vol. 4, 93-106). He concludes that “The experiences and difficulties of the SS-Einsatzgruppen and Order Police on the Eastern Front during the Second World War test and strongly support Athens’s violent socialization model of violence development. The SS leadership systematically extended the range of EG victims by categories that Athens’s model predicts would maximize virulence….Athens’s violent socialization model evidently applies to the training and activities of military and police and of mass killers as well as of violent criminals (Athens, 2003, Vol. 4, p. 106).”

Joshua Sanborn (in Athens, 2003), who examines parallels between Athens’ violentization process and military indoctrination of soldiers, has this to say: “The comparison of the production of violent soldiers and the production of violent criminals has the potential for important insights into the bloody history of the modern age on battlefields and city streets alike. It is highly significant that the processes by which young men are transformed into violent criminals so closely parallels the way that they are trained as soldiers. In each case, ‘violent coaches’ undertake a process to ‘break down’ young men by making their ‘will’ to commit violent acts stronger than what Dragomirov called their intellectual desire for self-preservation….. They become new social beings with new outlooks on the world that are patently dangerous for those around them and for themselves.” Sanborn suggest changing public policies to focus on changing the phantom communities of violent persons (Athens, 2003, Vol. 4. p. 122).

Martha Finnemore (2003), in referring to military interventions in association with peace operations, stresses that the ultimate purpose of intervention is to change
beliefs about the use of force. The reason I cite these comments here is to point out that the lack of coherent strategies, policy, and perspective regarding violentization processes, is a chronic problem in peace operations. Perhaps, a basic understanding of Athens’ violentization process, by intervenors and conflict parties alike, can bring greater clarity to an otherwise little understood or approached problem (violentization processes) and as a result, better focus intervention policy and planning on the problem in interventions; A problem that I consider to be a core element of root causes and conditions, or as Sandole (2010) would put it – conflict as process.

A concern that arises where knowledge of the “violentization process” may be useful is that some intervenors and organizations operate on the assumption that reconciliation should be the focus of changing the attitudes and behavior of conflict actors or populations in post-conflict areas (Borris and Diehl, 1998). This is needed, however, if Athens is right, and I think he is as attempts at openly advertised reconciliation will have no positive effect on individuals or communities that are, or are well on their way, to achieving “virulency” or “malignant status.” In fact, attempts at reconciliation, if publically promoted as such, will have the opposite effect and bring only contempt and likely increased violence or, at best, intransigence and discrediting of intervenors.

It is also interesting and of concern that the “Brahimi Report,” released by the UN in 2000, which offered analyses of peace operations and measures to improve effectiveness, did not include in its recommendations any specific measures to address the issue of violentization processes (which is clearly a core factor compelling
interventions) beyond a suggestion for “robust” use of force. The report’s recommendations focused on better political consultation, “robust” use of force, and better coordination and logistics for rapid deployments, etc. (United Nations, 2000, pp.183-212); in other words, a predominately structural “minimalist” focused approach as opposed to a relational “maximalist” approach.

It is worth repeating an earlier paragraph on Diehl’s (2008, p. 9) point concerning violence:

…peacebuilding strategies tend to fall into various “dimensions,” that is to say, a “minimalist strategy” favoring a conflict management approach largely concerned with “decreasing the opportunity to resort to violence,” and a “maximalist strategy” favoring conflict resolution as well as conflict management – that is, eliminating the “willingness” of parties to use violence. Accordingly, many peacebuilding activities are designed for attitudinal changes by disputants and their constituents. These include programs to promote economic development and human rights protection.

I point out the irony here that the Brahimi Report recommendations to reduce or end violence, a primary objective of intervention, does not address perhaps the most insidious element of the root causes and conditions of conflict, and that is violentization processes (beyond use of robust force to suppress violence). The Brahimi recommendations clearly lay out a prescription for achieving negative peace, but are self-limiting in terms of moving beyond that condition.

Clearly, there is a gap in peace and stability intervention strategy and policy planning in which knowledge of violentization processes can be put to good use. If for no other reason than to support the efforts of those mediating negotiations, attempting peacebuilding, reconstructing criminal justice systems, or trying to understand why a
reconciliation or conflict resolution effort chronically fails. Both minimalist and maximalist programs involve fundamental reworking of political and institutional structures, and general reconstruction, including that of civil society mechanisms. I believe that utilizing and promulgating Athens’ understanding of violentization processes among intervenors and conflict party groups would improve the odds for progress in interrupting violentization processes in a peace and stability intervention environment – in effect, a **violentization process awareness campaign**.

I add a short paragraph here on the related matter of victim-offender conferencing discussed in Chapter 3. It may be useful to explore how victim-offender reconciliation principles can be adapted to primary conflict or intervention conflict situations in peace and stability operation environments, but within perhaps a context of mutual victim/mutual offender reconciliation (not using the victim-offender or reconciliation terms specifically), but instead, establish a context of perhaps “co-existence or problem-solving conferencing” with the parties being “participants.”

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the context of recommending steps for further research, theory, and practice, I reiterate an observation that I made earlier in this writing:

*The pressing problem now is what to do when a political settlement, and stabilization and reconstruction as we know it, are not enough to break a deep-rooted protracted conflict cycle.*
The following measures are intended to contribute towards theory, research, practice, and policy in support of improving the odds for sustainable positive peace and alleviating the problem of interventions stalled in negative peace:

1) Directly field-test the *War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model* in Bosnia, or elsewhere, involving intervenors and nationals in an attempt to establish an a-priori basis for the model by having subjects identify the status of structural and relational elements directly onto a scaled *War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum Model*.

2) Have a thorough statistical analysis of existing and future data done.

**NOTE:** Having subjects place their estimates of structural and relational elements directly onto the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum scale, however, would probably limit the subject base to those who are literate. As indicated earlier, this is not an issue for Bosnia since the literacy rate is about 98%. In low-literacy intervention areas, a possible compensating option would be to have literate subjects place elements directly on the Continuum, but verbally communicate questions and answer-selection options to those who are illiterate, then record their verbal responses on the structural or relational scale, as was done for this study in Bosnia. This, in turn, could then be directly associated with the War to Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum scale.
3) Follow-up on mutual-victim and mutual-offender restorative justice concepts for application in peace and stability operations and environments.


5) Follow-up on the Dialogue Support Unit concept for application in peace and stability intervention environments.

6) Advance and promulgate Athens’ explanation of violentization processes to improve the odds for progress in interrupting violentization processes in peace and stability intervention environments – in effect, a violentization-process information awareness campaign (taking into consideration principles and cautions (listed in Chapter 2) as outlined by Avruch, Narel, and Combelles-Siegel (2000, Information Campaigns for Peace Operations).

7) Establish a pilot project in a peace and stability intervention environment for testing and refining the Comprehensive Multilevel Framework, the Structural and Relational Elements Status Scales, and the War-to-Sustainable Positive Peace Continuum model as analysis and briefing tools.
APPENDIX A: OPEN-ENDED QUESTION RESPONSES

Open-Ended Question 1:

*What is the result of intervention by outsiders?*

- **Stopped the war.**
- Stopped the war.
- Stopped the war.
- Negative & Positive
- Stopped the war.
- **Brought stability, law and order.**
  - Brought peace.
  - Intervention prevented major three-way war and much higher casualties; Created/expedited more structured normalization process; Most technical issues have been resolved.
  - Dayton Peace Agreement; Post conflict peacebuilding.

- Positive: stopped the war; Negative: outsiders project own realities on locals.
- Bringing peace, security, and stability; Little achieved or done on removing the causes of the war (distrust) or on reconciliation.
- Direct violence stopped.
- Brought peace
- Positive
- War stopped but State set-up is very dysfunctional.
- The war was a tie; no clear winner.
- Positive impact.
- End of war.
- Negative and Positive, but too soon to make final conclusion.
- The most important result of the intervention was to end the war; People cannot solve the problem of BiH alone.
- Too little, too late; we were expecting much more.
- Results are perceived differently in different territories, but everyone can agree that it stopped the war.
- Low impact.
- Peace, bringing a sense of order.
- Stopped war, but didn't address causes of war or social problems.

- If it weren't for the intervention, the war would still be going on.

- Positive
• Good that outsiders are in State, but our leaders need to take over more responsibility.
• Bloodshed has been stopped, but the effect of the intervention in a political sense and in solving human rights problems is small.
• Very weak.
• Sometimes impact is very high, sometimes very low; best time was 1997-2001.
• Peace and trust.
• Intervention very important, it stopped the war, but could have done it in 1992; IOs do not help enough to ameliorate the political situation - too cynical.
• War was ended.

• The international community admitting mistakes generates (unnecessary) accusations.
• Peace, and orientation towards EU integration.
• Peace, stability; EU vision for BiH; Lack of accountability in local sense; Lack of ownership by citizens towards country.
• It was necessary.

• Peace, there is no open conflict.
• More security, less democracy.
• Dayton ended the war.
• Established peace in BiH but not welfare of people.
• Peace and rule of law.
• Negative and Positive.

• A culture of "No-responsibility" for society.
• Stabilization, state building, information, training, education assistance.
• Created conditions for ending war; Positive effects by institution building.
• Stopped violent conflict; Development slower than comparable countries.
• 1995-1996: Ended war; 1996-2006: Created conditions for democracy; 2006-present: Malaise since 2006 by IC.
• Keep situation from deteriorating further; Lack of policy direction; No benchmarks defining IC departure.
• A quicker end to war; But at this point, it seems to perpetrate lack of accountability by elected officials.
• IC created cultural dependency; people ask "what is OHR doing? and not do anything themselves; Now it's too late.
• Misdiagnosis of why the war occurred and what maintains polarization.
• Impact is huge, executive powers used approximately 800 times.
• Fragile peace; retarded political-economic development (BiH as
mixed.

- Limited progress, no armed conflicts any more, but defiance still high.
- More modern governing structures, competence, ability to cooperate, resources/technology needed for econ. stability.
- Stopped war; Built workable structures; Locals using IC as excuse for inactivity/scapegoating.
- Depends on respective interests: Stopped the war, but not enough political will to impose a definite regimen.
- Dayton with all the good and bad.
- Intervention was needed; A way out has to be found [exit strategy], intervention now creating dependency.
- Mixed.
- Positive: Physical reconstruction, institution building, conf. prev.; Negative: Culture of dependency, lack of responsibility.
- Retaining IC military and police presence is prevention.

- Lack of clarity re: what the intervention is; Lack of consensus by Contact Group/PIC undermines all things; IC actors focus on structure.
- Infrastructure, culture of dependency; More decisive early intervention would have prevented current muddled mess.
- Assumptions of Dayton were flawed.

**A mistaken assumption is that Dayton was a reconciliation process; The political system is along ethnic lines; No dialogue has taken place.**

- Dayton was an armistice agreement; The Bonn (Powers) agreement was an effort to fix Dayton;
- Stopped war; Took away ownership of the process from locals, therefore, took away local's dignity (not good enough).
- **IC did not build a viable political system.**
- Very limited now.
- Neg: Re: Influences from Croatia & Serbia; Moderate: Re: IC lack of coherent constructive policy towards BiH.

- Armed conflict ended.
- Freedom.
- Answers that are too simple; we have a great deal to answer to.
- Stopped war; Basic infrastructure; Supervision of local politicians.
- Dependence on outsiders to make decisions: IFOR, SFOR, EUFOR, OHR all trained the leaders that they know best.
- End of war.
- **Negative Peace.**
- Only in creating security and democracy, not in real change; The IC forgot
the need for prosperity.

• Very high, 1996-2004; IC was the glue that prevented a worse situation; driving force for reconstruction/capacity building/legislative action.

• **Intervention incomplete; no end goals as originally defined; War ended but reform & sustainability remain elusive.**

• Overall: Improvement of living conditions (housing, public infrastructure, employment, human security (mines).

• **Maintaining peace only because outsiders are here.**

• Peace in the country;

• Intervention ended the war and allowed post-war elections and return of IDPs.

• In the beginning (at the end of the war), the IC guaranteed peace.

• Generally positive, despite mistakes.

**Open-Ended Question 2:**

*Why do some conflict resolution or peacebuilding ideas not work?*

• War ended at status Quo without a winner.

• Foundations are not good; Structural divisions created by constitution which obstructs improvement in ethnic relations.

• Because they endorse results (of the war).

• Starting with false assumptions.

• Individual self-interests not taken into consideration.

• Wrong models, lack of local buy-in.

• **Ideas are usually created by outsiders who are not familiar with the real BiH or people or issues; Some ideas laid out with unrealistic timeframes.**

• Bosnian specificities not taken into consideration; Elections too soon; Political system is ethnic based and the IC doesn’t like to invest in the long-term; April package was a good idea but Hileh Silazech bombed it.

• We have solidarity on practical responses to national civil emergencies e.g., floods, earthquakes; Processes not based on reality.

• Because the reconciliation process is not a mechanical process.

• No systematic approach, no specific goals defined.

• **We are waiting for outsiders to solve our problems; Local authorities don’t want responsibility; Waiting for U.S & E.U. to solve our problems; Lack of local people ready to take responsibility and confront their own communities; Lack of clear alternatives.**

• Because of the people it’s applied to.
Nothing works except justice and law enforcement.
BiH should have been made a protectorate; No one really knows what will work - it's all trial and error; Lack of local responsibility; Outsiders have always been managing BiH.

War ended in status-quo without a winner.
Politicians resent changing the current state of affairs.
Because there was no equality and ideals in the war; Individual self-interests not taken into consideration.
Due to corruption, lack of will, and possibly hidden reasons.
No strict implementation of what is said and what is agreed upon; Deals pushed by outsiders went against the interests of nationals and so were not implemented.
Not enough initiatives; Not enough determination to do more: IC supported bad agreements e.g., no state police.
State building/govt. capacity building disjointed; Projects started too soon w/o local buy-in or not fully implemented, not designed specifically for BiH and with little or no follow-up; Projects implemented by LNGOs generally failed or died out as the funding and int’l. presence evaporated.
Don't know.
I do not believe in conflict resolution but in conflict management.
Double standards were employed; IC was fragmented & needed to unify its own approach to BiH to be effective; Dayton Peace Agreement signatories had different interpretations of what it was.
Because BiH leaders cannot agree on anything (outsiders should stay); Because of self-interests.
Because there is no understanding on either side; Politicians are not exercising good will.
Different interpretations of Dayton by different ethnic groups.
Because it is not in the interests of some individuals; Some people/politicians just make things worse; every ethnic group has its own opinion.
All sides need to work hard to find compromise.
Because of the people in power, extremism is emphasized in decision making i.e., extreme nationalism and religious politics; All three ethnic groups are politicized nationalist.
Because of nationalistic parties in power.
Lack of strategic approach to intervention in communities anywhere in BiH; There is no unified anything in BiH in perspective or attitude or structure.
Lack of political will and media control.
Because of the lack of profound interest in the problems of the society,
especially the permanent crisis produced by war suffering, ethnic cleansing and genocide; There is not a deep enough understanding of local dynamics.

• Applicability models differ from one region and people to another.

• Courts are very unfair to Serbs; The priority of the courts goes against Serbs; Serbs are prevented from attaining reconciliation because justice is being unfairly directed at Serbs.

• Unresolved political questions.

• Models that work in Washington or Brussels don't work in BiH, or are superficial; There are always pressures/actions by outsiders to do or act in ways locals cannot relate to; They are not really connected with local context; Internationals often do not do what they ask locals to do (hypocritical).

• Dayton Agreement is a strait jacket that forces deadlocks between ethnic groups.

• Lack of political elites with vision.

• No willingness to reconcile, too many victims and horrible crimes.

• Lack of internal consensus.

• Because of different understandings/interpretations by nationals of what BiH is.

• By not implementing international legal norms.

• The election law is the biggest mistake; Perceptions between ethnic groups is personal affinity or gross generalization; good Serbs or Muslims Vs. bad Serbs or Muslims.

• Too theoretical; It was a mistake to allow the Dayton Peace Agreement to morph directly into the constitution (lack of foresight); Should have stated up front that the Dayton Agreement would be void in 5 years; Bonn powers introduced too late.

• The people's mindset does not allow for reconciliation across all parts of society.

• Lack of political will; Wounds still open as a result of the war.

• Continued ethnic tensions sometimes caused by corrupt leaders.

• Using short-term intervention approach without knowing the local specifics; Need mentoring, not diplomats making deals; Need tailored guidance, one size doesn't fit all.

• No involvement of civil society; Daily services of BiH institutions/agencies get bound-up at the higher ministerial levels.

• Unaddressed resentment, primarily against Serbs (in my experience)
makes people ill-disposed to overt reconciliation activities.

- No education focus; hostile segregation taught in school.
- IC misdiagnosis, wrong response for the problem; **The current system (dominate paradigm) is fundamentally flawed, it is not designed for people to get along;** Overall political environment not at all conducive to reconciliation (uphill battle).
- Ethnicity always comes first, which undermines and blinds everyone to genuine conflict resolution/peacebuilding efforts; People do not link problems incurred to their choice of leaders who are not accountable to their people; There is no feeling for the State.
- There is a lack of tolerance disguised as old traditions; Conflict resolution and positive peace need peace enforcement, subtleties don't work in BiH.
- You can't be a cop/peace enforcer and a peace builder at the same time.
  - Because they are not related to reality on the ground; **There is no model.**
  - Because they are imposed from outside plus the legacy of the war and history.
  - Many people feel somehow cheated; Did not get a fair return from the top down system.
- **The BiH authoritarian/communist transition to democracy is a cocktail of transition issues and difficulties.**

  - They need to be tailor made; The wrong steps were taken with the wrong mix of elements; Need the right mix of elements.
  - BiH political elite are not flexible.
  - The war was stopped before resolution; no clear winner and there are 2 or 3 versions of everything [interpretations by different ethnic groups].
  - They are inappropriate or appropriated by politicians; Mihandling of political party development by U.S.; Structures, institutions, political elite think only in zero-sum terms; Some peace building NGOs have succeeded improving relations at the community level.
  - Too many IOs/INGOs not coordinating; BiH worrying too much about who the next ethnic group leader will be; **Entity arrangement too complex, expensive, not sustainable.**
  - Many IOs/Agencies use the same terms but have different meanings; Often plans are not given time to survive, or given proper forethought; The IC doesn't have enough of an historical understanding of the conflict.
  - Religious leadership/groups are very politicized and divided within moderate or hardline nationalist camps; **There is no coordination among major IC actors in institutionalizing reforms;** Most "peace-building" efforts that are working are at the grassroots level.
• There are major consultancy contradictions; Ideas that work in U.S. or Germany don't necessarily work in BiH.
• Assumptions of Dayton were flawed; Locals need to feel more accountable.
• What is missing is a reconciliation process; The mutual ethnic veto idea has back-fired - everyone wants to be the king of their respective areas.
• Too many ideas are not country-specific; Many IC staff came from Cambodia with that model.
• Criminal Justice Vs. Symbolic Justice (apologies); Victims count less and less in criminal justice processes.

• Dayton left war objectives unaddressed; EU/Brussels bureaucracy imposing diverse ideas and conflicting approaches; Lack of culture.
• Due to political authorities (in BiH) lack of interest for progress, which opposes their personal interests; BiH people are hostages to the politicians.
• Proposed solutions from the outside not connected to roots of the problems.
• Politicians support fear of other ethnic groups (fear mongering).
• Poorly planned, lack of time.
• Lack of coordination by IOs; Expectations not realistic.
• Most peacekeepers and foreign national builders are not properly educated in the causes of the war, and are highly influenced by one party or another with whom they deal.
• Can't answer the question since the constitutional target is unknown e.g., Cantons are not known as being permanent, look for permanent institutions; EU bureaucracy is imposing diverse ideas with conflicting approaches; Dayton left the war objectives unaddressed.
• Due to the complex political/ethnic structure of BiH, peacebuilding ideas have not been fully fruitful.
• The problem has been tackled too directly, except the political system where little has been achieved; There are no structural incentives to cooperate; There is no common national identity; Low level of political accountability/politically owned media.
• Combination of factors: not understanding cultural differences, not sufficient advance planning, HQ to field different perceptions; Post-conflict situations spawn media/society polarizations; There is no objective national media.
• Peacebuilding and conflict resolution ideas have not been seen through to their end, nor have they been given adequate explanation; Too often the public in not directly involved.
• Mainly due to the state structure being divided into two entities and the constitution institutionalizes the war effects and political division
along ethnic lines; Politicians use structure to press nationalist agendas and manipulate people.

- Hatred is too strong.
- All push zero-sum game; People here don’t talk about the war or bad things - they are just waiting for the next episode of violence to get revenge, there is little or no mixing (time bomb); Hatred is high.
- Because they are based on false notions or more often have vague goals; The IC became lost when tasks became more generalized; No one is measuring implementation anymore.
- No, the IC presence is an excuse by locals to not take responsibility for decisions into their own hands.
- Politicians are more about dividing wealth, not creating it (division of the spoils); Politicians talk about territory, which is generally ethnically run.

Open-Ended Question 3:

How do you improve relations between ethnic groups?

- Forbid politicians from speaking in name of ethnic groups.
- Constitutionally mandated ethnic veto option blocks progress as well as promotes the dictates of individual and corrupt interests.
- Build on state affiliation.
- Look for moral leaders.
- Establish universally recognized truth (facts).
- Integration of classrooms.
- Interaction, confidence building.
- Politicized issues need more time to rest, and be reassessed and redone.
- Advocate tolerance; Invest in education; Persuade politicians to accept EU/NATO process; Use transitional justice.
- Need a dialogue among communities: each has their own story, but ethnic groups don’t know each other’s stories (need to complexify the picture, challenge assumptions).
- By not focusing on ethnicities.
- Expediting war crimes proceedings across the board involving all 3 ethnicities; Put them on joint economic development projects; Strict control over the media regarding the coverage of sensitive issues relative to war crimes and ethnicity.
- Through: Political solutions; Building of new transformed institutions; Changing school curriculum; Fostering dialogue; Deconstruction of problematic collective narratives.
- I don’t know.
- Implement a bottom-up process (elites exploit results of the war) to
understand each other through media, cultural programs, a social contract.

- Improve the economy; Improve quality of life.

- **Promotion of:** Trust through famous people and the media, positive examples, multi-ethnic teams (e.g., sports), and projects.
  - First step is to decrease corruption.
  - **With lots of dialogue between ordinary people rather than between politicians or self-proclaimed ethnic leaders:** Promote much more and wider education; Do not give up on hope in reconciliation, no matter how hopeless some things might seem.
  - Before everything else, I would tell them that they are citizens and especially people, and only then members of ethnic group combinations.

- **Build a common identity.**
  - Need economic prosperity; Need constitutional changes; Promote EU integration.

- Educational events insisting on constant positive interaction.
  - Invest in education.
  
  - **Promote official and unofficial exchange visits for youth to socialize with kids of different ethnic groups** every day; As it is, we are separated physically and spiritually.
  - There is no possibility of improving relations with the mentality of the current political leaders.
  - Fight for a common State and the best interests of individuals.
  - Talk openly, promote dialogue; Young individuals should be brought together more; Put more emphasis on the education of youth and integration.
  - Establish more direct communication between people, economical bonding, and *psycho-therapeutic work with people/survivors of trauma; Need more direct interaction, activities, and joint projects* (30% of BiH population has war trauma).

- **Economy and economy.**
  - Need to give more space to people in media instead of political leaders;
  - **Create a new constitution with proper democratic and human rights safeguards.**
  - By dialogue and work on common problems.
  - The triple-apartheid constitution must be changed to stimulate the posterity of individuals, not ethno-nationalism ideologies.
  - **Social status (civil society) capacity building.**

  - By treating everyone fairly.
• Integration into the EU.
• Fix the current political issues and force the economy.
• **Send young people abroad for education** and training to cause a critical mass of progressiveness when they return.

• By people obeying the laws and constitution of BiH.
• Build confidence and compromise without foreigners.
• I think it's not possible.
• Political elites must set an example, introduce a culture of tolerance and dialogue; Everyone must understand that it takes time.
• The NGO sector (many NGOs) should be more active; **NGOs facilitate private sector discussion about Bosnia problems (establishment of a critical mass).**
• Introduce communication and tolerance.
• By bringing about political impacts that can change the consciousness of people.

• Politicians don't want positive peace; **Marginalize the spoilers; Change the electoral system to build peace.**
• Allow more separation/autonomy (local responsibility).
• Do not allow for nationalist influence in governance; Focus on impartial education of children at all levels.
• Confidence building; Strong signals from US and EU and influence on political leaders; Improve economic situation.
• We're looking at a number of targeted efforts towards youth and the media.
• Work in local communities; Create normalcy in local conditions; **Community policing**; Step by step process of political change (local govt. does influence higher level govt. leaders).
• Economic incentives; Structure civil society to give it a voice and hold power to accountability.
• **Promote development initiatives at the local level that require active participation by both groups.**
• People need to see how outsiders live, to de-provincialize.
• With a constitutional system that de-ethnifies territory, forces political accountability; Establish municipalization with a two-layer government structure of state and localities; This could be accepted by a critical mass of each constituent people if IC acts as security/catalyst for change.

• Improve the performance of elected politicians.

• Kidnap all major politicals and send them to a desert island until they
agree!

- Start with mixed (integrated) schools and education.
- Continue trust building measures; Bosnians have to identify with BiH; Must raise civil and rights awareness at the communal and municipal levels (4-5 years) bottom-up approach, supported by Bonn/Paris Agreements.
- Create jobs, work together.
- Don't try to force integration.

- Education; Creating a civil society network.
- Work together.
- **Focus on the issues;** All are concerned about the same issues (economy, health, etc.).
- Reconciliation (Education and time, a new generation); RS youth think their capitol is Belgrade.
- Meta communication is needed in order for Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats to understand each other; Listen and try to make them talk, don't pre-judge them.
- **People exchanges: Societal-level dialogues/inter-action on a bigger scale.**
- Change election law.
- **Change structure and attitudes will change, although people will still have to go beyond their core animosities.**
- Fix structure, then present opportunities to work together; Create spaces for shared space and interactions (there aren't many social/public spaces for inter-ethnic interaction).
- **Change the constitution; the very purpose of it as it stands now is to divide and feed the negatives of ethnic division.**
- Try to play down ethnicity; consider that similar levels of experience create more affinity with people of opposing ethnicities than with people of the same ethnicity; Different ethnicities need to listen to each other's stories.
- **Build political system that is fair to all; Need to provide ethnic security (securitization of ethnicity).**
- Keep the ethnicities separate/distant.
- **By promoting the sense of BiH citizenship,** reflecting different cultures traditions etc.; Ban the term "ethnic" - a total nonsense; Promote non-discrimination.
- Economic development; Project development, multiethnic education with a decentralized approach.

- Meaningful dialogue and strict application of law.
- I would put more efforts in educating a new generation of politicians;
Schools are an important part in improving relations as well.

- Force integration of schools (You cannot change the opinions of the generation who fought in or were victims of the conflict - you have to educate and target the next generation to break the cycle of ethnic conflict that is kept alive by grandmothers tales of violence and atrocities.

- People need to look to their own economic welfare and normalization (autonomies); BiH is a fiction of a State, a mistake.

- Only through dialogue, but current "stubborn" approach by all stakeholders just aggravates the relations.

- **The EU is a success due to economic interdependency, not political will; This should provide an insight for BiH;** create outside economic interests (int'l. trade), (containment doesn't work).

- A big factor is how to change the present political structure that is polarized and influences downwards; The IC should stay the current course of gradual incremental steps.

- **Give communities what they want i.e., closure, effective govt., and a sense of justice;** Help them put the war behind them - These are undefined "pie-in-the-sky" concepts but it is what people want; Need a de-politicized constitutional reform process.

- Strengthen the independence of the judiciary, and the independence of politicians from ethnic politics and corruption.

- Improve economic stability;

- **Best solution is a three-way split;** The U.S. must play a more active role.

- **Establish a truth commission;** Remove discriminatory features from the structure (remove blame game option); Certain communities get along very well depending on where.

- **Have the same education for children and take religion out of the schools.**
APPENDIX B: MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR CLOSED-ENDED SURVEY QUESTIONS

Table 12: Means q1 - q30: Bosnian Nationals

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Table 14: Means q1 - q30: Bosniak

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| No                | N 70 | Mean 4.10 | Median 4.00 | Std. Deviation 1.414 | % of Total Sum 80.3% | % of Total N 77.4% | N 67 | Mean 5.10 | Median 5.00 | Std. Deviation 1.257 | % of Total Sum 81.0% | % of Total N 77.0% | N 70 | Mean 3.06 | Median 3.00 | Std. Deviation 1.048 | % of Total Sum 76.7% | % of Total N 77.9% | N 72 | Mean 6.35 | Median 7.00 | Std. Deviation .790 | % of Total Sum 79.3% | % of Total N 79.3% |
| Yes               | N 20 | Mean 4.10 | Median 4.00 | Std. Deviation .740 | % of Total Sum 19.7% | % of Total N 19.7% | N 20 | Mean 4.00 | Median 4.00 | Std. Deviation 1.414 | % of Total Sum 21.1% | % of Total N 21.1% | N 20 | Mean 3.25 | Median 3.00 | Std. Deviation 1.209 | % of Total Sum 23.3% | % of Total N 23.3% | N 20 | Mean 5.95 | Median 6.00 | Std. Deviation .759 | % of Total Sum 20.7% | % of Total N 20.7% |
| Total             | N 93 | Mean 4.32 | Median 4.00 | Std. Deviation 1.318 | % of Total Sum 100.0% | % of Total N 100.0% | N 90 | Mean 4.85 | Median 5.00 | Std. Deviation 1.225 | % of Total Sum 100.0% | % of Total N 100.0% | N 90 | Mean 3.10 | Median 3.00 | Std. Deviation 1.368 | % of Total Sum 100.0% | % of Total N 100.0% | N 92 | Mean 6.26 | Median 6.00 | Std. Deviation .797 | % of Total Sum 100.0% | % of Total N 100.0% |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 69                                              | 71                                                  | 72                                            | 70                                            | 71                                            | 60                                            | 67                                            | 71                                            | 71                                            | 71                                            |
| 2.96                                             | 2.86                                                | 3.60                                          | 4.33                                          | 4.44                                          | 3.75                                          | 4.42                                          | 4.11                                          | 4.31                                          |
| 3.00                                             | 3.00                                                | 3.00                                          | 4.50                                          | 5.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          |
| 1.22                                            | 1.10                                                | 1.30                                           | 1.370                                         | 1.622                                         | 1.500                                         | 1.267                                         | 1.269                                         | 1.379                                         | 1.600                                         |
| 79.7%                                           | 79.8%                                               | 81.4%                                         | 79.7%                                         | 72.3%                                         | 82.0%                                         | 78.0%                                         | 79.8%                                         | 82.3%                                         | 77.5%                                         |
| 77.5%                                           | 77.2%                                               | 77.4%                                         | 77.4%                                         | 76.9%                                         | 77.2%                                         | 78.4%                                         | 77.9%                                         | 77.2%                                         | 77.2%                                         |
| 20                                              | 21                                                  | 21                                            | 21                                            | 21                                            | 19                                            | 21                                            | 21                                            | 21                                            |
| 2.56                                             | 2.43                                                | 3.07                                          | 3.14                                          | 5.62                                          | 3.28                                          | 3.43                                          | 3.35                                          | 3.00                                          | 4.24                                          |
| 2.00                                             | 2.00                                                | 4.00                                          | 3.00                                          | 5.00                                          | 3.00                                          | 3.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 3.00                                          | 4.00                                          |
| 8.28                                            | 1.12                                                | 1.19                                          | 1.062                                         | 1.123                                         | 1.102                                         | 1.076                                         | 1.098                                         | 1.049                                         | 1.480                                         |
| 20.3%                                           | 20.2%                                               | 16.5%                                         | 20.3%                                         | 27.7%                                         | 18.0%                                         | 22.0%                                         | 20.2%                                         | 17.7%                                         | 22.5%                                         |
| 22.5%                                           | 22.8%                                               | 22.6%                                         | 23.1%                                         | 22.8%                                         | 23.6%                                         | 22.1%                                         | 22.8%                                         | 22.8%                                         | 22.8%                                         |
| 89                                              | 92                                                  | 93                                            | 93                                            | 91                                            | 92                                            | 88                                            | 86                                            | 92                                            | 92                                            |
| 2.82                                             | 2.75                                                | 4.44                                          | 3.49                                          | 4.60                                          | 4.17                                          | 3.67                                          | 4.31                                          | 3.06                                          | 4.29                                          |
| 3.00                                             | 3.00                                                | 4.00                                          | 3.00                                          | 5.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          | 4.00                                          |
| 1.154                                            | 1.116                                               | 1.339                                         | 1.316                                         | 1.358                                         | 1.434                                         | 1.250                                         | 1.331                                         | 1.387                                         | 1.566                                         |
| 100.0%                                          | 100.0%                                              | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        | 100.0%                                        |</p>
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<td>q20 R/Per-dkm: Violence Against Individuals</td>
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<td>q27 R/Nor-dkm: Society Ethnically Polarized</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF 5 SUB-SET GROUPS 
ROW BY ROW

Below are means and standard deviations for the following Structural and Relational
Survey sub-set groups: 1) Bosnian Nationals; 2) International Intervenors; 3) Bosniaks; 4) Croats; 5) Bosnian Serbs:

Table 17: Means & Standard Deviations for 5 Sub-Set Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>q1: To what degree do political leaders fully support the peace agreement?</th>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>1.172</td>
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<td>3.98</td>
<td>1.407</td>
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<td>3.38</td>
<td>.740</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>.916</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>q2: To what degree do are government institutions reestablished?</th>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1.185</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.282</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>q3: To what degree is the election process fair and transparent?</th>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>1.457</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.414</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
q4: To what degree is there civic group participation in governance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.229</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>.911</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.401</td>
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</table>

q5: To what degree is political leadership polarized along ethnic lines?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>.921</td>
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<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>.688</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>.759</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>1.126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>.941</td>
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</table>

q6: To what degree does government have a mechanism to facilitate peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.076</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>1.260</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>.826</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.272</td>
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<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.069</td>
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</table>

q7: To what degree does legitimate institutional capacity outweigh corruption and lawlessness?

<table>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.141</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.126</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.121</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.916</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
q8: To what degree do police and security forces provide a safe and secure environment for everyone regardless of their ethnicity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>1.457</td>
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<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>1.281</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>1.604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>1.051</td>
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q9: To what degree can all refugees and IDPs return safely and live in their villages of origin anywhere in BiH?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.493</td>
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<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.233</td>
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<td>3.14</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
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q10: To what degree is an international presence needed for security?

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<th>Mean</th>
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<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.458</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.774</td>
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q11: To what degree are laws fair for all ethnic groups?

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<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.92</td>
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<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.43</td>
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<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>1.657</td>
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q12: To what degree are laws applied equally to all ethnic groups?

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<td>3.70</td>
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q13: To what degree do government institutions discriminate against members of particular ethnic communities?

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<td>1.508</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.598</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
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<td>1.391</td>
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q14: To what degree is reconstruction of the infrastructure accomplished?

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<td>1.151</td>
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q15: To what degree can people of any ethnic community have a business anywhere in the country?

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<td>1.463</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>2.128</td>
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### q16: To what degree are corruption and crime a factor in the economy?

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<td>1.211</td>
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### q17: To what degree is corruption a factor in government?

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<td>5.50</td>
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### q18: To what degree can people of any ethnic community buy and live in a house anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

<table>
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### q19: To what degree is there trust between neighbors of different ethnic groups?

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<td>.956</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
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<td>1.035</td>
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<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.21</td>
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### q20: To what degree is respect shown between different ethnic groups?

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<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
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<td>1.149</td>
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<td>3.75</td>
<td>.967</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>.886</td>
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<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.86</td>
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### q21: To what degree is tolerance shown between ethnic groups?

<table>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>.886</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>1.626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### q22: To what degree do people of different ethnicities interact in your area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.225</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>4.76</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.069</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.499</td>
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</table>

### q23: To what degree do students of any ethnicity feel accepted in any classroom in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>1.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1.646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
q24: To what degree is reconciliation possible between ethnic groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>1.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>1.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>1.432</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

q25: To what degree do people feel that amends have been made for past injuries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>.917</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>.751</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>.940</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>.378</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>.954</td>
</tr>
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</table>

q26: To what degree is there violence against individuals due to ethnic hostilities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.284</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.192</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>1.035</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.603</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

q27: To what degree is society polarized along ethnic lines?

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1.125</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>1.146</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>.814</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>1.122</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### q28: To what degree do I have hope that normalization of relations is possible between former warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

<table>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1.387</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>1.217</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>1.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>1.188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.737</td>
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</table>

### q29: To what degree have attitudes that led to the war changed since the war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>International Intervenors</td>
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<td>1.132</td>
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<td>Bosniaks</td>
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<td>1.226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
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<td>1.226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.251</td>
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</table>

### q30: To what degree can people of different ethnic groups have empathy towards each other?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-set Group</th>
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Nationals</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>1.310</td>
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<td>International Intervenors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian Serbs</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>1.345</td>
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Curriculum Vitae

James R. Adams is a veteran of the U.S. Air Force and served as an aircraft mechanic in Viet Nam, Thailand, and Germany. He received his Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from San Francisco State University in 1981. Following college, he worked as Assistant Director of the Mayor’s Citizen Assistance Center of the San Francisco Mayor’s Office.

He has since worked professionally with NGOs, The International Organization for Migration, the United Nations, and the US Agency for International Development in East and Central Africa, Geneva, Kosovo, and Afghanistan as an Emergency Reconstruction Project Manager, Field Director, Desk Officer, Senior Operations Officer, Regional Project Coordinator, Civil Affairs Officer, and Governance Officer. Examples of assignments include Humanitarian Affairs Officer with the UN co-managing, with military counterparts, Internally Displaced Person Return and Reintegration Operations for UNOSOM in Somalia, and working with local communities and authorities in Kosovo with UNMIK on minority civil and human rights protection issues, and in Afghanistan on local governance issues.

From 1998 to 2000, James completed a Master’s of Science in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.

Currently, he is a Doctoral Candidate with the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia.