CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PEACEBUILDING: A CASE STUDY OF KOSOVO

by

John P.J. DeRosa
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Civil-Military Relations in Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Kosovo

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This is dedicated to my wife, Hasibe Ferati DeRosa, whose memories of the Kosovo war linger like a morning fog burned off by the bright future of our daughters Alesandra and Madeline.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the boundless encouragement and critical guidance provided by Professors Sara Cobb and Thomas Flores. A warm shum faleminderit (thank you very much) to the volunteers of the Forum for Security in Kosovo for supporting, organizing and facilitating this research – specifically, Dajana Berisha, Kaltrina Pajaziti, Deniza Mulaj, Erza Aruqaj, Tokjona Reka, Donika Emini, Diana Lekaj, Besa Shahini, Visar Azemi, and Visar Rushiti. To Mary Frances Lebamoff, thank you for smoothing out the administrative wrinkles securing a Professional Development Grant from the University of Maryland University College to offset international travel costs. Finally, thanks go out to the KFOR peacekeepers who, for nearly sixteen years, continue to secure the peace allowing the tiny Balkan nation of Kosovo to find its future.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

European Union ............................................................................................................... EU
Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)............................................... UÇK
Kosovo Forces ............................................................................................................ KFOR
Kosovo Protection Corps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes së Kosovës)......................................... TMK
Kosovo Security Forces ............................................................................................. KSF
Ministry of Kosovo Security Forces ........................................................................... MKSF
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ......................................................................... NATO
Strategic Security Sector Review ............................................................................ SSSR
United Nations .......................................................................................................... UN
United Nations Mission in Kosovo ............................................................................ UNMIK
ABSTRACT

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PEACEBUILDING: A CASE STUDY OF KOSOVO

John P.J. DeRosa, M.S.

George Mason University, 2015

Thesis Director: Dr. Sara Cobb

Kosovo has become a unique case of trans-Atlantic peacebuilding efforts, a nascent sovereign state that remains under the legal protectorate of the United Nations with a diminishing contingent of international peacekeepers and peacebuilders. The intervention, initially aimed at stemming ethnic cleansing, is now designed to prevent the resumption of violence and to support establishing a durable and sustainable peace. With the current guarantor of peace an international intervention, this research asks whether the emerging contract between the government, its armed forces, and society, one reflecting a diminishing international presence and embryonic Kosovar institutions, capable of sustaining security guarantees to allow peacebuilding to take hold? This project utilized a narrative based program to uncovering an understanding of Kosovo’s reveal the values, interests, and aspirations and an emerging civil-military relations framework in the context of the society’s collective experience. This research investigates
the emerging civil-military relations framework and discovers that an overwhelming emphasis on NATO accessions has stifled the development of dynamic and representative social contracts between the government, its armed forces, and its citizens.
In a symbolic transfer of authority, the out-going Commander of the Kosovo Security Forces, General Kadri Kastrati, relinquishes command to the constitutional civilian authority, the Commander-in-Chief, Atifete Jahjaga, President of the Republic of Kosovo. Source: Ministry of Kosovo Security Forces, “Gjenerallejtënant Rrahman Rama komandant i ri i Forcës së Sigurisë të Kosovës.” http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=2,131&offset=140
CHAPTER ONE

In the shadow of a collapsing Yugoslavia, the international community intervened in a civil war to stem a humanitarian crisis. The Serbian-led government of the failing Yugoslavia was implementing an ethnic cleansing campaign directed against the Albanian majority population of the province of Kosovo. Nearly ten years later, while still under United Nations (UN) administration and ongoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping operations, the Republic of Kosovo declared itself a sovereign and independent state in 2008.

Today, the people of Kosovo are caught within a transitional paradox. While not yet recognized by the UN or other regional institutions, over 100 countries recognize Kosovo as an independent, sovereign state. Serbia’s ongoing constitutional claims on Kosovo and its minority Serbian population stymie its progress towards full participation in the international community. These paradoxes remain central and persistent obstacles to regional peace and security in the Balkans.

The guarantor of peace and security within Kosovo is a large NATO peacekeeping force. This long-standing security guarantee has offered time and space to all parties to continue to negotiate towards an enduring peace to this conflict. This post-conflict peacebuilding effort, initially aimed at stemming the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian majority by the Serbian-led Yugoslavian government, is now designed to
prevent the resumption of violent conflict and to establish a durable and sustainable peace. In fact, Kosovo has become a unique case of international peacebuilding efforts, a nascent sovereign state that remains under the legal protectorate of the UN with a diminishing contingent of international peacekeepers and peacebuilders.

Diving deeper into the structure of the security guarantee, the new state’s constitution, concurrent with NATO peacekeeping and European Union (EU) rule of law mandates, granted the government authority over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and border control within its territory. Subsequent laws that followed the new state’s constitution established a security structure within the conditions of an unrealized UN-negotiated “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” and included a provision for a full review of the security sector to define the strategic objectives and defense policy of the new Republic. With respect to this provision, the government of Kosovo has reached a juncture of this particular peacebuilding process and has completed a Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR). The SSSR postures Kosovo to transform itself from a consumer of the international security guarantee to a producer of a locally acceptable security guarantee.

It is within the current international peacebuilding effort and security transformation questions for this paper emerge. In particular, is the emerging security framework, a reflection of a diminishing NATO presence and embryonic Kosovar security institutions, capable of sustaining a security guarantee allowing peacebuilding to take hold? This paper will investigate the security conditions necessary for the development of a comprehensive peacebuilding approach emphasizing long-term
structural changes within a society. An understanding of the emerging security contract
between the government, its armed forces, and society should advance new approaches to
peacebuilding for countries that remain embroiled in a protracted social conflict.

**Spanning the Security Chasm: Transitioning an International Security Guarantee
to a Locally Sustainable Peace**

Surveying the current landscape, we can see a security chasm that separates
Kosovo from a lasting peace. We find Kosovo on the near side of the chasm, where an
international security guarantee anchors peace. Looking to the far side of the chasm, we
can faintly discern a locally sustainable peace for Kosovo anchored by peacebuilding.
The chasm between the international security guarantee and a locally sustainable peace
requires designing a bridge that spans two distinct but complementary efforts at work in
Kosovo, international peacekeeping and local peacebuilding. This study, therefore, will
consider building a theoretical bridge that transitions the security guarantee from
international peacekeepers to local security institutions.

When designing this bridge, we will not only consider the problem, these
embryonic security institutions, but also the complexities of the bridge location and
customer requirements. When designing this bridge, we will consider what loads this
bridge will bear (a security guarantee) and utilize the available materials (theory) to
achieve the most effective level of strength. Anticipating the load and material, we can
consider appropriate design ideas. Under the supervision of international peacekeepers,
Kosovo is implementing one design idea, the NATO model. Based on the anticipated
load and available material, I am proposing an alternative design of three interlocking
spans – peacebuilding, security sector reform, and civil-military relations. I will form
two model bridges – prototypes of how to visualize a local security guarantee. With these model bridges built, we can test and evaluate the prototypes determining whether there is the necessary confidence in the local security institutions to bear the load of a sustainable peace.

The First Span of the Alternative Design: Peacebuilding

As we build the first span of this bridge, peacebuilding, we begin to discover a tension between short-term and long-term objectives, and international interests and local aspirations for sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a comprehensive approach to addressing local capacities to resolve conflict peacefully. Two significant approaches have emerged to advance peacebuilding and improve local capacity for peace. One approach advanced initially by the United Nations emphasized post-conflict approaches to “…strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”¹ Another approach developed by Lederach, a key scholar of peacebuilding, emphasizes comprehensive approaches to “transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships.”² The “sustainable transformative” approach pioneered by Lederach, seeks a holistic approach, integrating immediate intervention with long-term progress toward peace. A “sustainable transformative approach” is a proactive process that regenerates itself over time changing the conflict relationship.³

Autesserre offers a critique of peacebuilding, citing a dominant culture seeking resolution of national and international tensions allows peacekeepers to ignore micro-

³ Ibid., 75.
level tensions that jeopardize macro-level conflict resolution. A culture of top-down interventions shapes the understanding of the causes of conflict and the path towards sustainable peace limiting interventions to the national and international levels and prohibiting involvement in local conflict resolution. This culture produces inadequate peacebuilding in the short term and potential war resumption in the long term. Autesserre concludes both macro and micro-level peacebuilding, where local nongovernmental organizations, authorities, and civil society are the lead actors, is needed to make peace sustainable.

Frances offers a critique of the former approach, characterized as the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ approach, as a reflection of an internationalist liberal peace agenda, results in an imposition of a Western blueprint on local institutions, which is counter-productive to empowering indigenous capacity. This perception of insufficient indigenous empowerment in favor of an imposition of assumed universally applicable tenants dominates the critique of international peacebuilding operations. Sandole echoes this refrain criticizing the liberal peacebuilding approach as a misapplication of the peacebuilding concept towards national interests-oriented third party interventions ill-suited to resolve deep-rooted causes of conflict. Paris also observes the liberal

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5 Ibid., 255-259.
6 Ibid., 261-271.
peacebuilding approach as “inherently tumultuous” with the potential to “exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects for a stable peace.”

In contrast, Call’s review of peacebuilding operations reveals that a comprehensive approach to transform conflict fundamentally requires “a minimally legitimate and effective state is necessary for sustaining peace.” In his assessment, political exclusion plays a decisive role in a civil war recurrence and political inclusion highly correlated with the consolidation of peace. Inclusiveness provides concrete and persistent guarantees for conflict parties and with respect to the security forces; exclusion is a “very provocative factor in promoting war recurrence.” The mutually interdependent relationship between security and legitimacy requires security forces that are inclusive, fully representative, and possess the minimum levels of capability and capacity for protecting rights of citizens. National elites, not international actors, should lead the process to implement Call’s legitimate peacebuilding approach. Local leaders drive decisions about state design that promotes participation and inclusiveness.

This model supports acceptable levels of representation and participation and reinforces the broad involvement of civil society in state design to advance participation and shunt exclusion. Society has decided to grant the armed forces a monopoly on the use of force to protect the interests of the community and provide a safe environment for

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13 Ibid., 190.
14 Call, Building States, 29, 42 & 229
15 Ibid., 381.
16 Call, Why Peace Fails, 269.
Transitioning the security guarantee is a tenuous, complex and challenging undertaking. Call asks whether post-conflict societies are capable of creating security systems ensuring “…basic rights, apply the law effectively and impartially, and enjoy popular support?” With an eye on bridge building, if the transition privileges the interests, needs, and aspirations of the local populations – in particular, those stretched between multiple societies – domestic security institutions can protect the interests of the society and provide a safe environment for social life. This approach recognizes an array of structures, processes, relationships, and resources in a dynamic social construct that promotes the transformation of conflict and the sustainment of peace. It ultimately seeks to privilege the interests, needs, and aspirations of domestic populations rather than an internationalist agenda.

When reflecting on the almost fifteen years of peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo, it may be counterproductive to seek a resolution to these contradictions. Rather, investigating convergent and complementary peacebuilding tenets in this study should reveal themes and concepts that promote a viable framework for peace. Recognizing the negotiation between international and domestic perspectives may posture Kosovo for a locally sustainable peace.

While constructing this bridge, we discover that building a locally sustainable peace will require the transition of the security guarantee from internationals to locals. Toft submits that “…wars stem from the particular motivation of insecurity or fear,” and

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18 Ibid., 20–21.
where fear is a core dilemma, belligerents need security guarantees or risk “…recreating the conditions that gave rise to the violence in the first place.” A United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations perspective cautions that if local security institutions are to assume the responsibility of the security guarantee, confidence building between the state and the people must be in place to make people feel safe and secure. As noted previously, an international security guarantee has been in place granting the time and space to negotiate dynamic social contracts between parties at multiple levels of this post-conflict environment. International peacekeepers intervened to de-escalate violent conflict, to promote confidence that community interests are protected and to provide a safe environment for a new social construct to take shape.

The Second Span of the Alternative Design: Security Sector Reform

Recognizing the necessity for a new social contract to take shape, Ebo offers an architectural vision for the second span of our theoretical bridge - security sector reform. Security sector reform constitutes,

…measures and interventions to transform power relations and to renegotiate the social contract between state and society, in which

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22 KFOR peacekeeping tasks have included assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees; reconstruction and de-mining; medical assistance; security and public order; security of ethnic minorities; protection of patrimonial sites; border security; interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling; implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty program; weapons destruction; and support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of the province. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “KFOR’s Tasks,” 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm?.
The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute summarizes security sector reform in post-conflict states as reestablishing or reforming institutions and ministerial positions that provide safety and security. While McFate argues security sector reform defies standard definition with no practical doctrine, best practices, or common terminology, it is generally understood to encompass confidence building measures made through locally led assessments, review, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation programs enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of security institutions for the people. In essence, security sector reform supports the notion that security institutions should ultimately serve the people rather than the state, and validates its role in peacebuilding.

Focusing on the institutions “…responsible for the provision of an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights-respecting public service for the state and the people living in it,” security sector reform targets defense, courts, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, border management, customs and civil emergency agencies. The objective of these reforms is to increase the capability of these agencies to resolve local
security challenges “…in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law.”27 To meet these challenges, security sector reform promotes measures that assess, review, implement, monitor, and evaluate programs that reestablish or reform institutions, and improve the way a state provides legitimate, transparent, equitable, accountable and responsive safety and security.28 Building these institutions require legal and constitutional frameworks that establish systems of security sector governance and oversight that promotes norms and standards of universal human rights, impartiality, and the disciplined use of force.29

Hendrickson and Karkoszka, reflecting on security sector reform in post-conflict peacebuilding, recognize the principles of security sector reform as civil oversight, accountability, and transparency.30 To implement these principles, to integrate security sector reform measures with wider peacebuilding strategies requires the need to be sensitive to the context of the security challenges facing the post-conflict society.31 These two authors organize security sector objectives into seven categories: professional security forces, capable and responsible civil authorities, priority on human rights, capable and accountable civil society, transparency, conformity with the rule of law, and regional approaches.32

28 Meharg et al., 8.
31 Ibid, 39.
32 Ibid, 25.
Useful as a model to evaluate the civil-military relations model in Kosovo, Stojanović conceptualizes security sector reform (similar to Call’s model of “legitimate peacebuilding”) along dimensions of democratic governance and efficiency, and effectiveness of the security provision. In democratic governance, representativeness of minority and women, transparency, accountability, democratic civil control and public oversight, rule of law, participation of citizens and civil society are the main criteria used to evaluate reform. In the dimension of the efficiency of the security provision, good governance, human resources management, and financial management are criteria used to assess positive reform. In the dimension of the effectiveness of the security provision, integration of the security sector, the legitimacy of actors, the ratio between aims, resources, and outcomes are criteria used to evaluate genuine reform.

**The Third Span of the Alternative Design: Civil-Military Relations**

Reaching the final span in our theoretical bridge, we consider how to link the local security guarantee to security sector reform—and ultimately to peacebuilding. The last span of this bridge presents a challenging paradox to resolve: “…because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.” Reflecting on the almost fifteen years of security sector reform efforts in Kosovo reveals that progress has been made with the security

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34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

institutions of law enforcement, justice, public safety, civil emergency response, and border control. Current laws and implementation in the ongoing EU-led negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo codify much of this progress. This paper will focus on last remaining piece of the security sector puzzle and the bridge between an international to local security guarantee, the development of the future defense architecture and the transformation of the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF).38

As a solution to the paradox of creating violent institutions to protect us from violence, civil-military relations considers the interrelationship between civil society and the armed forces charged to protect it. Fundamentally, civil-military relations is an understanding of the social contract between the government, its armed forces, and society in the context of a society’s collective experience. Much like peacebuilding and security sector reform, the core discussions of civil-military relations and relevant theoretical developments have occurred in the West. Civil-military relations studies arose in the United States led by Huntington’s seminal treaty, *The Soldier and the State*. His explanatory theory, institutionalism, separated the world of the military and civilians into different institutions that operate under their own rules and norms.39 As a balance to the

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paradox created by institutions of violence, Huntington postulates that the dominance of
the civilian over the military (objective control) would assure the promotion of “military
professionalism.” This professionalism would characterize the military as politically
neutral experts in the use of force that willingly submit to the civilian authority who grant
the military autonomy in the conduct of military affairs.40

Another important author on civil-military relations, Janowitz would contend with
Huntington’s recipe on how to maintain the balance of civilian control over the military.
In convergence theory, he postulates we will see either a civilianization of the military or
a militarization of society. As these worlds converge, clashes of control would occur
diminishing civilian control.41 To abate diminishing civilian control, Janowitz suggests
promoting the norms and expectations of society within the military that serves it.

Another sociologist, Moskos, hypothesized the expression of norms and values
the military promotes predicts the balance of civilian and military relations. As an
institution the military would promote norms and values that surpass the self-interests of
individuals – notably, service. As an occupation, the military would promote norms and
values that emphasize self-interests – notably, pay and benefits.42 More recently, Feaver
promoted a model of civil-military relations of based on principle-agent theory, where the
military, the agent, either carried out its tasks as directed by the civilian authority or

40 Ibid.
1960).
shirked its designated tasks in promotion of its own interests; the civilian authority, the principle, would vary its control through more intrusive or less intrusive means.43

Citing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s December 1994 *Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security*, Blair attributes seven characteristics of armed forces in a democracy:

1. Established in the constitution and legal code of the country.
2. Assigned the primary mission of external defense, with domestic missions conducted under strict legal controls
3. Representative of ethnic, regional, religious, and tribal makeup of the country, and expected to contribute to society after military service.
4. Politically neutral, aligned with no political party
5. Supervised by a competent ministry of defense
6. Supported by a national budget, providing adequate compensation and administered without corruption
7. Respected by the citizenry and promoted on merit.

Just as there are various theoretical frameworks through which to view, analyze, and understand civil-military relations, efforts to promote an acceptable balance of civilian and military control for transitioning states are varied. Barany has offered an exhaustive study of civil-military relations in transitioning states. He assessed twenty-seven case studies from across the globe under three contexts and six settings: war (after major war, after civil war), regime change (after military rule, after communist rule) and state transformation (after colonialism, after (re)unification and apartheid).44 As suspected in the case of Kosovo, Barany concludes the development of civil-military relations is different from contexts, settings, and individual cases.


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While recognizing that the preceding theoretical approaches are not the final predictor of civil-military relations, Schiff would admit they are a reflection of a salient Western understanding. They offer an understanding that a particular state’s civil-military framework is based on a cooperative agreement between the political elites, the military, and citizenry related to the social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruiting of military personnel, and style of the military.45 Alternately, Schiff advances a “concordance theory” of civil-military relations, emphasizing dialogue, accommodation, and shared values between society and the armed forces in ways that are historically and culturally relevant to a particular country.46 Her theory does not impose a particular form of government, institutions, or processes to a state’s civil-military relations framework. Utilizing Schiff’s three societal institutions, the [armed forces], political elites, and the citizenry, we can outline the concepts used to evaluate the civil-military relations prototypes. Additionally engaging these same institutions in the dialogue Schiff proposes may be able to discern a civil-military relations design relevant to Kosovo.

46 Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE

Building the Prototype Bridges: The NATO and Peacebuilding Models

In designing this bridge, we have considered the load (a local security guarantee) and available materials (theory). After calculating these component criteria, we can construct two prototypes of how to visualize a local security guarantee. Again, this project proposes two designs, the NATO and the Peacebuilding models.

The theoretical bridging material of Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos, and Feaver run through the fabric of the characteristics of local institutions in Kosovo. For the armed forces, professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness, political neutrality and autonomy, and most importantly, subordination to legitimate civilian leadership are salient characteristics considered for modern armed forces.47 In a similar vein, the NATO design articulates requirements for armed forces including the subordination of the military to civilian authorities, a professional military with efficient and effective capabilities and capacity (sufficient resources) to support collective security, and transparency in defense

planning and budgeting. For the political elites who populate executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, their legitimate democratic authority emanates from legal, constitutional, and institutional frameworks, effective oversight, and accountability. In a similar vein, the NATO design requirements for executive, legislative, and judicial institutions include civilian and democratic control of armed forces, respect for the rule of law and individual liberties, and cooperation consultation and consensus between allies. For the citizenry, represented notably by the media and civil society organizations, oversight, accountability, enforcing transparency, and promoting capacity in security matters are salient characteristics.

In a similar vein, the NATO design requirements for the citizenry supports transparency, oversight, and accountability in defense matters. Additional NATO design characteristics not attributed a particular institution include confidence-building, military alliance cooperation, peaceful settlements of disputes, good neighborly relations, and the sharing of responsibilities, costs and benefits of collective security. After articulating the NATO design components, we can now visualize the NATO Civil-Military Relations prototype (see Table 1).

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49 Ibid.
50 Ulrich; Cottey et. al; Bruneau et. al; and DCAF.
51 NATO, “Study on NATO Enlargement,” and “Membership Action Plan”
52 Ibid.
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(Source: Derived from NATO, “Study on NATO Enlargement,” and “Membership Action Plan.”)
With the NATO prototype built, we now can visualize an alternative model that accounts for the core concepts of peacebuilding, security sector reform, and civil-military relations (see Table 2: Peacebuilding Civil-Military Relations Model). First, from a peacebuilding perspective the mutually interdependent relationship between security and legitimacy requires security forces that are inclusive, fully representative and possess the minimum level of capability and capacity for protecting rights of citizens.53 Second, Stojanović’s concept of security sector reform builds on the peacebuilding requirements of legitimacy, capability and capacity along the dimensions of democratic governance, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the security provision.54 Third, consistent with peacebuilding and security sector reform tenets, the resolution of a state’s civil-military framework ought to privilege the interests, needs, and aspirations of the society it means to secure. Therefore, an inclusive and representative civil-military model would suggest citizens determine the purpose of the military, the military is accountable to civilian authorities, and the military operates under the rule of law established by a representative legislature. Schiff’s “concordance theory of civil-military relations” emphasizes a historically and culturally relevant dialogue, accommodation, and shared values between the armed forces, political elites, and the citizenry in in the areas of the social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruiting of military personnel, and style of the military.55

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53 Call, *Building States to Build Peace*, 29, 42 & 229
54 Stojanović.
55 Schiff.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding Criteria</th>
<th>Security Sector Reform Criteria</th>
<th>Civil-Military Relations Criteria</th>
<th>Societal Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong> (Participation &amp; Inclusiveness)</td>
<td><strong>Legitimacy of Actors</strong></td>
<td>- Subordination to legitimate civilian leadership</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Democratic Civil Control</td>
<td>- Military Professionalism</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Political Neutrality</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Autonomy</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Decision-making process</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>- Decision-making process</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representativeness of women</td>
<td>- Composition of the Officer Corps</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Recruiting of Military Personnel</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representativeness of minorities</td>
<td>- Composition of the Officer Corps</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Recruiting of Military Personnel</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation of citizenry</td>
<td>- Composition of the Officer Corps</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Recruiting of Military Personnel</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effective Capacity &amp; Capability</strong> (Protect Rights &amp; Provide Security)</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>- Decision-making process</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Resources Management</td>
<td>- Decision-making process</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Management</td>
<td>- Decision-making process</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integration of security sector</td>
<td>- Style of the Military</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio between aims, resources, and outcomes</td>
<td>- Decision-making process</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Derived from multiple sources including Call, Stojanović, and Schiff)
With these model bridges built, we can now test and evaluate the prototypes determining whether there is the necessary confidence in the local security institutions to bear the load of a sustainable peace. Armed with two designs incorporating the applicable principles necessary for the development of legitimate and effective frameworks to advance peacebuilding, testing and evaluation will determine whether the proposed designs will be effective and suitable. During the on-going transition between international and local security institutions, we can evaluate both design proposals, the NATO and Peacebuilding models, and provide assessments of how each performs under the weight of expected on-the-ground conditions.

Previous research on Kosovo reveals that due to its nascent nature, Kosovo lacks adequate competencies, capacity and capability in defense affairs.\(^{56}\) These shortfalls make it necessary to distinguish the expected conditions – what is “supposed to be” – from actual conditions. Distinguishing what is “supposed to be” is an evaluation of the *de jure* framework and is an assessment “based on or according to the law[s]” in place. It will reveal a state of affairs in line with the declaratory policy of the Government of Kosovo. Distinguishing the actual conditions is an evaluation of the *de facto* framework in Kosovo and is an assessment of the model “in reality.” It will reveal a state of affairs that is in line or not in line with the declaratory policy of the Government of Kosovo.

That is to say, once I conceptualize and align the models according to current laws and policies, the *de jure* civil-military relations, I then will be able to evaluate the models according to how or whether it is actually practiced within Kosovo, the *de facto* civil-

military relations. Ultimately, it will reveal whether the emerging security framework is capable of sustaining a security guarantee allowing peacebuilding to take hold.

Previous research has identified Kosovo’s vital national security interest in establishing the conditions to safeguard and enhance its survival and well-being as a free and secure nation. To generate these conditions, the government’s objectives of the security sector reform have been rooted in the criteria for accessions into NATO and the EU. Therefore, I submit the following hypothesis:

\[ H1: The \textit{de jure} civil-military relations framework is a reflection of Euro-Atlantic accession criteria and not a reflection of an inclusive social contract that promotes peacebuilding. \]

To test \( H1 \), a content analysis of current laws, policies, and strategies is used to evaluate the \textit{de jure} framework against the principles of both the NATO model (Table 1) and the peacebuilding model (Table 2). I expect to discover that an overwhelming political priority to gain accession into NATO, in particular, has stifled the development a dynamic and representative social contract between the government, its armed forces, and its citizens. Therefore, I submit a second hypothesis:

\[ H2: The \textit{de facto} civil-military relations conditions are inconsistent with the \textit{de jure} framework. \]

To test \( H2 \), a content analysis of parliamentary agendas, government press releases, civil society discourse, speeches and news reports within a time period of a year marked by the November 2012 start of Kosovo’s Strategic Security Sector Review, is used to evaluate the \textit{de facto} to the \textit{de jure} framework. It is expected that a foreign model of civil-military relations was imposed in the rush to consolidate Kosovo into a sovereign

\[ ^{57} \text{Ibid.} \]
state and in seeking integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Therefore, I submit a third hypothesis:

**H3**: *The emerging civil-military relations framework does not reflect Kosovo’s cultural, historical, political, or social identity.*

To test **H3**, it is necessary to reveal the values, interests, needs, and aspirations of the domestic actors. Therefore, a facilitated dialogue in Kosovo, “The Development of Kosovo’s Civil-Military Relations,” was an engagement between cross-sections of civil-military actors, designed with the objective of understanding what the current security guarantee looks like and to speculate on what they would like it to be. Open dialogue that addresses the structural issues of a society stretched between two states (Serbia and Kosovo) is necessary to develop an understanding of the emerging framework and, if successful, generate conditions where the participants are positioned so they can collectively formulate and actively engage in relationship patterns that contribute to shaping the security guarantee.58 Considering Autesserre’s critique of international interventions (the lack of direct domestic involvement), the actors invited to participate in this dialogue included the lead local actors charged with building a local security guarantee.59 Invitations to this dialogue, therefore, went to the primary institutions of civil-military relations: the government, the military, and civil society.

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59 Autesserre, 264-269.
CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology

The fundamental question of how Kosovo transforms itself from a consumer of the international engendered security guarantee to a producer of a locally acceptable security guarantee is rooted in the structural conditions necessary for a society to develop the local capacity to resolve conflict peacefully. In particular, is the emerging security framework, a reflection of a diminishing NATO presence and embryonic Kosovar security institutions, capable of sustaining a security guarantee allowing peacebuilding to take hold? The potential drawback of this transformation remains the imposition of the trans-Atlantic security frameworks within the cultural context of a state encompassing multiple nations.

To resolve this question, I first identified the internationally imposed security requirements guiding the NATO-led intervention and evaluated Kosovo’s progress. Next, to evaluate Kosovo’s progress towards a locally acceptable security guarantee, I identified the security conditions necessary for the development of a comprehensive approach that addresses the significant structural changes that support transformation. A fuller and more clearly defined understanding of the emerging security framework, contrasted with the competing demands of international expectations and local aspirations, should advance new approaches to peacebuilding for a country that remains
embroiled in a protracted social conflict, and may apply to other countries in similar circumstances.

This research was structured in two phases with each phase requiring multiple parts. The first phase of the study set the theoretical foundation for understanding the context in which Kosovo’s transformation is occurring. This phase focused on conceptualizing a set of principles necessary for the development of a sustainable peacebuilding approach and then using these principles as frameworks to evaluate Kosovo’s transformation. The second phase of the research set the conditions necessary to reveal the values, interests, needs, and aspirations of the local actors charged with implementing this transformation. This phase focused on a facilitated dialogue between a cross-section of local actors who considered both the internal and external factors shaping the ongoing transformation. This phase is used to validate the understanding of the emerging framework developed in the previous phase and shape conditions where the participants are positioned so they can collectively generate relationship patterns that contribute to influencing the local security guarantee.

**Phase One: Prototype Testing and Evaluation**

The first phase of this research had three parts. First, to identify the applicable conditions necessary for the development of a sustainable peacebuilding approach, a review of the current literature in peacebuilding, security sector reform, and civil-military relations conceptualized a set of principles to frame follow-on analysis. Second, to test \( H1 \), a content analysis of current laws, policies, and strategies compared the *de jure* framework against the principles of both NATO accessions criteria and a peacebuilding
civil-military relations model. Third, to test $H2$, a content analysis of parliamentary agendas, government press releases, civil society discourse, speeches and news reports within a time period of a year marked by the start of Kosovo’s Strategic Security Sector Review in 2012 was utilized to compare the *de facto* to the *de jure* framework.

Utilizing a content analysis methodology is expected to produce replicable and valid inferences from the sampled texts in the context intended for their use in more fully comprehending recent trends of Kosovo’s civil-military affairs. Examining artifacts of social communication from already existing data sources of publically available laws, policies, and strategies in a systematic approach should extract valuable insights into the existing legal structure in comparison to the practical civil-military relations framework. The benefits of this approach are the unobtrusive and nonreactive nature of previously recorded material. Further, due to constitutional requirements, data sources are readily available via the Internet, translated into English as one of the three legal languages of the state. Conversely, this methodology limits sources to already recorded and translated data and is ineffective for testing causal relationships, especially to investigate the effect of international influence.

An initial survey of the available literature revealed that the nascent state and its constitutional laws presented minimal data collection challenge. Kosovo’s recent independence has not afforded the time to produce significant amounts of legislation, regulations, and other public documents; only a handful of laws form the foundation of statutes that direct the security and defense affairs of the state. Further, in laws predating the current constitution, all documents of state institutions are obliged to be in English for
the duration of the UN interim administration. Similarly, laws were adopted to oblige public institutions to publish materials in electronic form and accessible via the internet. I derived all other non-governmental material (news articles, interviews, and civil-society publications) from the available open source information.

Considering the ready access to electronic material, it is important to determine what data should be included in this analysis. In order to expose the de jure civil-military relations framework analysis of the Constitution, laws relating to the armed forces, security agencies, and defense policy institutions, ministerial policies, regulations, and administrative instructions, and official strategies will be used. In order to reveal the de facto civil-military relations framework, analysis of public speeches and interviews of the President, Prime Minister, Minister of the KSF, and Parliament; newspaper articles; civil society research and publications; and the published agenda of parliament and the security council will be used. Initially, I intend to limit the de facto material to the period beginning with the start of the Strategic Security Sector Review, in November 2012 until March 2014.

In conducting the content analysis, I reflected on the set of civil-military relations, security sector reform, and peacebuilding principles discovered in my theoretical research to establish the units of analysis. I expected to find themes and concepts that would assist

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in uncovering theoretical bases within the source documents. Themes and concepts emerging from the two models formed units of analysis for the research.  

There were indeed patterns and relationships within the data. The comparison of NATO accessions criteria to the *de jure* framework revealed whether laws either comply with accession criteria or not. The comparison of the theoretical civil-military relations and peacebuilding principles to the *de jure* framework revealed a frequency and intensity inferring the whether the structural conditions for a sustainable security guarantee are in place or being implemented. The comparison of the *de jure* to the *de facto* framework revealed gaps in the civil-military relations model. Both comparisons of the *de jure* to the *de facto* framework offered insights into any necessary prescriptive measures to renegotiate the social contract between the government, the armed forces, and society, promoting a local security guarantee providing time and space to all parties to continue to negotiate an enduring peace to this conflict.

**Transition to Phase Two: Evaluating the Prototypes under Field Conditions**

Insights gained from the first phase of research shaped the development of the next phase of research. Specifically, applying trans-Atlantic security models intended to promote and protect multi-ethnic societies and the lingering challenges of legitimacy and inclusiveness may exacerbate the tenuous transformation gap between the international and local security guarantees. When fear and distrust permeates a post-conflict society, security guarantees rooted in historically and culturally relevant dialogue, and accommodation are necessary to build confidence in the armed forces, the political elites,

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and the citizenry. Recognizing this disconcerting friction (and even contradictions) of the evidence in phase one, and realizing that a representative and inclusive framework requires a dialogue of shared aspirations, the second phase of research was designed around an elicitive approach. Elicitive approaches, “...recognize the existence of distinctive cultural understandings of conflict and its resolution, which are then clarified, elucidated, and enhanced through reflection and dialogue.”63 An elicitive approach of micro- and macro practices of narrative conflict resolution was chosen to reveal the de facto framework through the stories the parties used to express their understanding of existing frameworks and to provide meaning to their actions in their institutional role.

**Phase Two: Narrative Engagement**

The second phase of the research was also conducted in three parts: design an engagement, conduct an engagement, and monitor and assess the engagement.64 First, to test \( H3 \) it was necessary to reveal the values, interests, needs, and aspirations of the local actors. The facilitated dialogue between the lead local actors of Kosovo’s civil-military institutions, “The Development of Kosovo’s Civil-Military Relations,” was an engagement in Kosovo designed with the an objective of understanding what the current security guarantee looks like and to speculate on what they would like it to be. Allowing this researcher to listen, learn, and understand, the approach gave local actors a chance to

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64 Note: George Mason University’s Institutional Review Board Approved the research project proposal via expedited review on June 4, 2014.
lead the discussion, clarifying their perspectives of civil-military relations conditions in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Designing the Engagement}

A concurrent objective of the dialogue was to set up conditions to position participants to collectively generate relationship patterns that would contribute to shaping the local security guarantee. Facilitated dialogue fostered an environment where the participants were able to build trust, think creatively, and speculate on potential cooperative futures. An indigenous team trained in the macro practices of the World Café and narrative interviewing facilitated the engagement by starting conversations with participants, listening, asking questions and seeding the discussion between parties.\textsuperscript{66} At the core of these engagements were micro-practices of narrative conflict resolution where each question was crafted utilizing circular questioning and appreciative inquiry.

The macro-practices of the World Café and narrative-interviewing formed the core events in phase two. The intent of each engagement was to promote “conversations that matter.”\textsuperscript{67} The World Café intends to foster collaborative dialogue, active engagement and construct possibilities for action.

Small, intimate conversations link and build on each other as people move between groups, cross-pollinate ideas, and discover new insights into questions or issues that really matter in their life, work, or community. As the network of new connections increases, knowledge-sharing grows. A sense of the whole becomes increasingly strong. The collective wisdom of

\textsuperscript{66} Cobb, page 157 & Mitchell, page 98.
the group becomes more accessible, and innovative possibilities for action emerge.\textsuperscript{68}

The participants would then transition to a deliberative engagement with panels structured around their role in civil-military relations. Three core panels represented the primary institutions of civil-military relations: the government, the military, and civil society. A fourth panel, women from the breadth of the three institutions, as a representation of women was determined to be a critical condition of inclusiveness.

 Invited from among private citizens and decision makers, dialogue participants represented the armed forces, government, and civil society. Participants were citizens of Kosovo who serve as military service members, government employees, elected officials, journalists, professors, academic researchers, and veterans. The dialogue was conducted in the local language as to limit exclusion based on the participants’ command of the researcher’s language.

The government panel was comprised of the Ministry of KSF and members of parliament. The Ministry of the KSF is the bureaucratic mechanism through which defense policy is organized, administered, and implemented. “Civilianization” of defense ministries is important to enable the authorities of the country’s elected executive to exercise control over the armed forces.\textsuperscript{69} Possible panel members included: senior minister of the KSF, liaison officers between the President and KSF, National Security Council Staff, and senior civil servants. Parliamentarians play a central role in accountability in defense and security matters by assessing and approving legislation,

\textsuperscript{68} Brown and Isaacs, Loc 284
control budgets, and scrutinize policy.\textsuperscript{70} Parliamentarians were chosen for their role as current or former members of security oversight committees. Recommended panel members included members of the Committees on the KSF, Foreign Affairs, Public Finance, Intelligence, and a Minority Representative Parliamentarian.

The military panel was comprised of senior officers of the KFS. A military with clearly defined roles and professional areas of responsibility are offered degrees of autonomy in the exercise of their responsibilities to the state. The relative degree of control over military operations between the civilian executive and military command is at the heart of the civil-military relations paradox. Recommended panel members included senior KSF commanders, field grade officers (above the rank of major), a female officer, and a minority group officer.

The civil-society panel represented a core component of oversight and accountability in defense and security matters. Civil Society provides non-institutional oversight, accountability, alternative policy options, and expertise.\textsuperscript{71} Civil Society participants were chosen for their and notably their expertise in public policy. Possible panel members included senior researchers in defense and public policy, academics, journalists, and veterans.

The women’s panel was designed in recognition that a representative and inclusive framework requires cooperation between defense institutions, legislature, and civil society in the field of women’s issues increases the effectiveness of the defense and security sector. Equally important is the promotion of people of all genders to participate

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 44.  
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 46.
in the defense decision and policymaking. Recommended panel members included female members of Parliament, female Ministers, the Land Forces Command Gender Equality Office, female Ministry Civil Servants, and female Civil Society Representatives.

The micro-practices of the circular questions and appreciative inquiry as vital components of narrative conflict were applied in the crafting of questions before the forum to promote conversations that elicited the values, interests, needs, and aspirations of the participants. As noted in the World Café practice, “...often the most powerful Café outcome is discovering the right questions to ask in relation to a critical issue.” Circular questions as a practice in narrative mediation remove the subject from a focus on the problem solving to a curiosity that considers alternative relational views or time perspectives. Appreciative inquiry as a practice in narrative mediation facilitates awareness of "best of what is", establishing ideas of "what might be", and creating consensus on "what should be" for crafting an inclusive and legitimate civil-military relations. This researcher drafted a dialogue instrument and in collaboration with the local facilitation team, questions were translated into Albanian, and chosen by each panel chair based on the role and function of the participants (See Appendix 1: Dialogue Instrument for “The Development of Civil-Military Relations in Kosovo”).

The primary research chose a facilitation team utilizing the resident expertise within the consortium “Forumi per Siguri” (Forum for Security). The Forum for Security

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72 Brown, and Isaacs, Loc 1041.
not only promotes resident security expertise but also allows facilitation to occur in the local language and to utilize their associations with Serbian civil society organizations. Members of the facilitation team each have a solid professional and personal background of in support of their designated panel.

This cadre of security experts from the Forum for Security participated in narrative training to equip them to facilitate dialogue of civil-military relations forum. This training provided facilitators with a skill-based training in the 'setting-up' and conduct of the World Café and narrative interviewing, and to prepare them for some of the practicalities of using this approach to conflict resolution. This training was experiential in nature and facilitated by the primary researcher. The facilitation team also participated in-group and one-on-one discussions with the principal researcher to ensure understanding and appropriateness of questions selected from the dialogue instrument.

**Conducting the Engagement**

The second part of phase two, conducting the engagement, occurred on the ground in Prishtina, Kosovo. With participants gathered in the intimate setting of a café, the facilitation team guided the group in three rounds of twenty minute conversations prefaced with questions intended to “foster collaborative dialogue, active engagement and constructive possibilities for action.” The practice of inviting a community to gather in a small group setting, with tables averaging four people, to discuss important questions of the day mirrored social life in Kosovo. People in Kosovo meet in cafés over

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75 The World Café, “Café to Go! A quick reference guide for putting conversations to work…” retrieved from [http://www.theworldcafe.com](http://www.theworldcafe.com)
macchiato or engage in regular visits with family and friends where the host provides čaj (hot tea) or kafe turke (Turkish coffee) and sweets, and they all engage in important conversations. At the completion of the three rounds, we invited the participants to share insights or other results of their conversations with the larger forum.

The participants then carried on the conversation in a deliberative fashion, using micro-narrative practices with panels structured around their primary role in civil-military relations. Three core panels represented the primary institutions of civil-military relations: the government (the ministry of KSF and parliament), the military (the KSF), and civil society. A fourth panel, women from the breadth of the three institutions, was included as a representation of women was determined to be a key condition of inclusiveness.

As with the World Café, the facilitation team guided the panel conversations using narrative interviewing practices and questions shaped by the roles and functions of the various institutional panels. Unexpectedly, but as a valuable contribution to the forum, the Minister of the KSF, Agim Çeku, and the Commander of the KSF, General Kadri Kastrati, asked to deliver keynote speeches to the forum. These two speeches contributed the narrative landscape of the forum by describing the “uniformed tradition” of the KSF and the current efforts to transform the KSF into a regular army. Also unexpectedly and, unfortunately, specific invitations to minority members of the government and civil society were initially accepted but on the morning of the event, declined for unexplained reasons. It is not known whether any minority members of any
institutions attended the engagement, as participants were not required to identify themselves explicitly by ethnicity.

As a record of the engagement and with the consent of the participants, the proceedings of the "The Development of Kosovo’s Civil-Military Relations” was videotaped in order for the primary researcher to be able to preserve the dialogue in order to conduct content analysis in support of the research problem. Future classroom training may use the video data for narrative approaches to conflict resolution. As the engagement was also conducted primarily in the local language of Albanian, and for the understanding of the primary researcher, translator services were available for all participants. In addition to the video record and field notes, local rapporteurs supported the primary researcher.

Assessing the Engagements

The third part of phase two was monitoring and assessing these narrative engagements to evaluate outcomes and determine their impact. These programs concluded with participants encouraged to continue the engagement after they have developed a new and perhaps alternative understanding of the underlying issues and opening the parties to mutually agreeable solutions. The primary researcher monitored if public and private perceptions of participants change over the course of the program. Additionally, requests to facilitate follow-on workshops, visits, and interviews represent a positive outcome of the program, paving the way to thicken cross-party relationships and explore a transformed civil-military relations model.

76 Ibid., 112-122.
77 Mitchell, 98.
To assess these narrative engagements to evaluate results and determine their impact I applied thematic coding analysis to the data collected. Thematic coding analysis allowed patterns in the data to affirm or deny $H_3$ and reveal new insights unassessed in phase one of this research. The two civil-military relations prototypes from phase one contributed to a list of known themes to be uncovered in phase two.

For familiarization with the data, translating both the video record and rapporteur notes from Albanian to English was necessary. Additionally, I carefully coded participants so their comments could not be attributed to real persons. These anonymous codes provided a system to identify people by not using their real names, yet maintaining the answers to the questions and the dialogue that ensued. Notably, the presence of Minister Çeku and General Kastrati did bring the attention of the media. The media also captured the statements of the opposition party’s parliamentary leader, Visar Ymeri. The remaining list of participants was not released to the public.

Utilizing this anonymous response coding and the known themes of phase one, I categorized incidents of responses into the conditions represented in the two models of civil-military relations. These coded responses developed into prevalent themes and the introduction of additional themes not directly associated with the two civil-military relations prototypes. Other themes not directly attributed to the two models often spoke directly to answering $H_3$. Specifically some responses affirmed a NATO or international bias by the government and the challenge of that bias by other participants.

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78 Given.
Other respondents suggested discussions of the nature that this engagement fostered were previously considered taboo, specifically as it related to mapping the legacy of UÇK to the current and future military. Other latent themes, especially with respect to the legacy of UÇK, were developed based on my observations and questions asked while visiting the KSF headquarters and comparing those observations and answer to other public artifacts and documents. With categories, themes, and sub-themes identified, I was able to map responses to the two civil-military relations models and explore, summarize, and interpret the patterns that emerged.
CHAPTER FIVE

Evaluation of *de jure* Civil-Military Relations Framework: The NATO Model

Reviewing the Constitution and applicable laws outlines a *de jure* commitment within to the principles of democratic governance. The KSF is subordinate to civilian authorities with the President designated as the Commander in Chief with the power to appoint the Commander of the KSF and convene the Kosovo Security Council in declared emergencies. The Prime Minister has executive oversight of the Ministry of the KSF with authority to appoint the ministers to carry out executive control. Public oversight and transparency of the defense budget and policies is exercised through committee structures of the Assembly of Kosovo and an independent Ombudsperson. Individual liberties and the rights of communities are guaranteed in Chapters II and III of the Constitution with subsequent laws. The preamble to the Constitution identifies the Republic as a peace-loving country that pursues good neighborly relations and cooperation. Article 1 of the Constitution establishes the Republic has no territorial claims on any other country.

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82 “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.”
Reviewing public policy declarations uncovered armed forces with nascent levels of effectiveness to meet the accession requirements of NATO. In July 2013, NATO declared the KSF fully capable of accomplishing its tasks in accordance with its legal mandates. In March 2014, the government of Kosovo announced the completion of its Strategic Security Sector Review and its strategy for future security architecture; included in this force development plan were general principles for the development of an expanded Kosovo Armed Forces in accordance with international [NATO] standards. To meet the demands of the expanding capacity and capability of the new Armed Forces, additional budget resources are planned through 2019.

Kosovo’s recent membership in the US-Adriatic Charter marked the building blocks for promoting confidence building, regional security cooperation, and improvements in the capabilities of the KSF. This forum has a mandate for practical cooperation and secures the constructive engagement of key regional countries on critical security issues. Kosovo continues to advance its position in security cooperation and confidence building measures in bilateral and multilateral regional and trans-Atlantic activities. Significant bilateral activities in recent years include cooperation with, among others, Turkey, the United States, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania. The KSF has also

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83 Vandiver.
84 “Kosovo government presents facts, figures on planned armed forces.” RTKI, March 4, 2014.
improved bilateral cooperation by establishing military attachés with various key foreign policy and defense partners.  

In summary, when evaluating the NATO civil-military relations model, Kosovo's 

*de jure* framework is solidly reflected in their constitution, laws, and policies. The underlying principles of democratic civilian control over the armed forces are sufficiently codified in the government and armed forces. Despite this, there exist nascent levels of effectiveness of ministry and armed forces capability and capacity to meet the accession requirements of NATO.

**Evaluation of *de jure* Civil-Military Relations Framework: Peacebuilding Model**

Much like the NATO civil-military relations framework, Kosovo's *de jure* peacebuilding framework is also solidly reflected in the constitution, laws, and policies. The constitution, founded on the Ahtisaari Plan, enshrined a legal framework for the protection and inclusion of ethnic minorities and gender equality. Inasmuch, the Constitution mandates “that the KSF should reflect the ethnic diversity of the Republic of Kosovo.” The subsequent laws establishes that as an all-volunteer force, the KSF does not discriminate against ethnic background or gender, establishes Albanian and Serbian as the official languages, and the Law on the Service in the KSF defines a recruitment

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87 Ibid.
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm
89 “Constitution of Kosovo,” Art 126.
mandate for the Prime Minister to allot the number of minorities in the armed forces in line with the last census (an estimated 10% quota for ethnic minorities). The law on gender equality directs the government institutions to meet a proportional percentage of the population of 40% women.

Considering the concordance of a historically and culturally relevant dialogue, accommodation, and shared values reveal a delicate balance that appears to be weighted toward multi-ethnic society. Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution establish the language and symbols of the state are to reflect the character of a multi-ethnic state. Albanian and Serbian are the official languages of the country with Turkish, Roma, and Bosnian are official at the municipal levels or when prescribed by laws. Likewise, the flag, anthem, and symbols of the state reflect a multi-ethnic and mainly European state. Article 58 of the Constitution further engenders the government with the responsibility to preserve, protect, and promote the culture and heritage of all communities. Finally, Article 60 of the Constitution establishes a Consultative Council for Communities under the authority of President (the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces) to promote dialogue and review policies and legislation.

Considering the legitimacy criteria outlined in the peacebuilding model, again the Constitution and subsequent laws establish a de jure framework where the military are distinctly subordinate to civilian authorities with elected officials granted the authorities

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90 Law on the KSF No 03/L-046; Law on Service in KSF (Law No 03/L-082.
91 “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo,”
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid, Article 58.
94 Ibid, Article 60.
to carry out executive and legislative oversight. As under the NATO model, committee structures of the Assembly of Kosovo and an independent Ombudsperson exercise public oversight and transparency of the defense budget and policies. Recognizing the need to include civil society in the drafting of legislation and the oversight and implementation of laws, the Assembly of Kosovo passed a declaration promoting and strengthening the cooperation and participation of civil society with the legislature.

The evaluation of the effective capabilities of the armed forces to protect rights and provide security are again represented by the assessment of the NATO-led training teams that the KSF is fully capable of accomplishing its tasks as mandated and as of standards set out in accordance with its legal mandates. As a reflection of the defense decision making process effectively considering the integration of the security sector and a balance of the aims, resources, and security outcomes, the Kosovo government’s Strategic Security Sector Review outlined its strategy for future security architecture. It included a force development plan that transforms and expands the KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces in accordance with international [NATO] standards.

Evaluating the NATO and Peacebuilding frameworks under the weight of expected on-the-ground conditions, both of the prototypes reveal a state of affairs in line with what is “supposed to be.” When considering the criteria of legitimacy and

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95 “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo,” Articles 84, 125, and 126; Assembly of Kosovo, “Law No 3/L-108 Amending the Law on the Kosovo Security Forces No. 3/L-046.”
97 Assembly of Kosovo, “Declaration for Partnership between the Kosovo Republic Assembly and Civil Society,” No. 04-DO-2165/1, April 3, 2014.
98 Vandiver.
99 “Kosovo government presents facts, figures on planned armed forces.” RTK1, March 4, 2014.
inclusiveness, the *de jure* conditions appear to be set to promote a local security guarantee. In sum, the *de jure* frameworks appear to be suitably codified.
CHAPTER SIX

Evaluation of \textit{de facto} Civil-Military Relations Framework

Evaluating the \textit{de facto} against the \textit{de jure} Peacebuilding model reveals the gaps in constructing a civil-military framework grounded in the principles of legitimacy. As a measure of legitimacy, public perceptions of the armed forces and government institutions can give a sense of the \textit{de facto} framework. Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) conducts regular public perceptions surveys; its latest Kosovo Security Barometer survey concluded in December 2013.\footnote{Kosovo Center for Security Studies, “Kosovo Security Barometer: Third Edition,” December 2013. http://www.qkss.org/en-us/Reports/Kosovo-Security-Barometer-Third-Edition-196} The ethnic breakdown of the randomly selected respondents was 83.7\% Albanians, 13.5\% Serbs and 2.8\% others. No data was available to represent the perceptions by the individual ethnic community. The three Security Barometer surveys consistently note the KSF as the most trusted security institution in Kosovo (68.5\%) (See Chart 1: Public Opinion Perceptions of Trust in Security Institutions).\footnote{Ibid, 5.} As an interesting note, of the respondents, 89.5\% reported having no direct contact with the KSF. In essence, the indirect association develops their trust.

By contrast, the legislative actors are the least trusted state institution at 55.3\% (See Chart 2: Trust in State and Non-state Institutions).\footnote{Ibid.} While not descriptive enough
assessment at the agency level, the Worldwide Governance Indicators ranks Kosovo in the lower third of the world with a negative measure of government effectiveness.  

The Worldwide Governance Indicators also ranks Kosovo in the lower third of the world with a negative measure on the rule of law.\textsuperscript{104} As a measure of the applicability of the rule of law, the KSF is perceived as being not corrupt (64.9%), although the judicial (57%) and government (70.5%) is perceived as being corrupted (See Chart 3: Public Opinion on the Most Corrupted Institutions).\textsuperscript{105} The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 ranked Kosovo 111 of 177 and therefore, it remains among the countries with the highest level of corruption.\textsuperscript{106}


\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, 7.

The government consistently represented the SSSR as inclusive and transparent. It is unclear to what measure of transparency the government is referring. The Prime Minister routinely notes, “This a comprehensive and transparent project, implemented with a significant investment and through the sources of our institutions and international partners,”109 and “The Security Sector Strategic Review process has adopted an inclusive and transparent approach…”110

In contrast, the Forum for Security noted only one collaborative meeting with the ministry of the KSF and civil society in the development of the SSSR and expressed their concern that the salient representation of international representatives at this meeting muted any discussion with civil society. The only other public forum for discussion of the SSSR was a conference held by the Kosovo Center for Security Studies and attended by government and non-government stakeholders.111 Reviewing other civilian public policy institution contributions to the development of the SSSR, only the contribution of the Institute for Advanced Studies, prepared by this author, constitutes alternative analysis.112

It is possible that when the government states the SSSR was a transparent process, it is referring to the inclusion of international advisors. Minister Çeku, in the announcement of results of the SSSR, noted the entire process was carried out under the

supervision of a NATO advisory team. “The NATO advisory team has observed the process from the start to the end;” and “We communicate on a daily basis with NATO…we have regular meetings with KFOR and the NATO authorities.”

Independent civilian defense experts, civil society, and journalists engaging elective officials and public servants on defense matters encourage transparency. Further, the engagement of civil society actively contributes to accountability and good governance through the empowerment of marginalized groups, dialogue and debate, and monitoring. Promoting the conditions that encourage independent analysis and alternative sources of information through civil society dialogue and discussion, policy relevant defense and security affairs resource and independent monitoring of reform of policy and statutory compliance is vital in Kosovo. If the security guarantee granting time and space to transform this protracted social conflict to an enduring peace, local actors (Forum for Security and many others) ought to be empowered to “…actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources” from within Kosovo.

The representation of women is a stronger area of legitimacy for Kosovo. In 2013, the government reported that 24% of the civilians in the ministry of KSF to be women with 8% serving in uniform. As an institution the government is falling short of meeting its mandates of 15% and yet, compared to militaries who have integrated

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women into their armies for over 20 years, Kosovo isn't far behind (Germany 8.8%; UK 9%; Canada 12%; and the United States 14%).  

The representation of minority communities is the weakest area of legitimacy for Kosovo. In 2013, the government reported that 4% of the civilians ministry of KSF to be from minority communities with 9% serving in uniform. As an aggregate figure, the government is nearing its mandate of 10% and surpassing the last census of 7% minority participation (see Table 3: Minority Representation in KSF).

Table 3 Minority Representation in KSF
(Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics, European Center for Minority Issues in Kosovo, MKSF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>GoK Census 2011</th>
<th>OSCE Estimates</th>
<th>Difference GoK vs. OSCE</th>
<th>KSF 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>1,616,869 (92.9%)</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>+4.9%</td>
<td>2345 (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>25,532 (1.5%)</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>15 (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>27,553 (1.6%)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td>31 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>18,738 (1.1%)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td>53 (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashkali</td>
<td>15,436 (0.9%)</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td>31 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>11,524 (0.6%)</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td>20 (0.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorani</td>
<td>10,265 (0.6)</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td>2 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>8,824 (0.5%)</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>+0.1%</td>
<td>3 (.01%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, this aggregate number is misleading. Uncovering the discrete participation of minority communities in the KSF presents the largest gap in legitimate civil-military relations. The latest report on minority participation notes the biggest

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minority group, Serbs, are distinctly underrepresented. The strength of the minority participation resides in the Turkish and Bosniak communities.

Compounding the challenge of minority participation first is the underrepresented census reporting of 2011. As a community, Serbs in the northern municipalities boycotted the last census; Serbs in the southern municipalities partially boycotted the census. Per the 2011 census, minority populations are 7% of the population. Based on international organization estimates, a Serbian population of 140,000 would recalculate the minority population as 12% of Kosovo and not 7%. Despite this discrepancy, the government mandate is 10%. The government has reported that through a concerted recruitment campaign, 26 of the 32 new recruits entering the KSF in 2013 are Serbian. It is unclear how the April 2013 Normalization Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia will influence the future participation of the Serbian community in both the state censuses and, ultimately, the armed forces.

The biggest test of legitimacy for inclusiveness and participation lies with the implementation of the proposed new security architecture that includes a Ministry of Defense and transitions the KSF to the Kosovo Armed Forces. Minority members of parliament are publicly tying the proposed amendments to the constitution and laws establishing a Ministry of Defense and Kosovo Armed Forces to the extension of the

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expiring constitutional mandate for minority reserved seats in parliament. As the Constitution requires two-thirds of the members of the minority communities in the Kosovo Assembly are required to vote in favor of constitutional amendments, many minority members are banding together to seek political power sharing compensation for their votes. Rasim Demiri, a deputy from the minority “Six Plus” parliamentary group, stated,

We will insist that if they want our votes for changing the constitution because of the Armed Forces, there has to be also a change to the constitution that provides for extending the reserved seats for one more mandate.

If the appropriate numbers of votes are secured to amend the constitution, it perhaps can only be seen as partial legitimacy in the eyes of at least the Serbian minority – in particular only those Kosovo Serbs who are currently participating in the government. It is a largely held assumption that those in the Serbian minority that oppose the independent state of Kosovo also oppose the establishment of a “Kosovo Army.” In the eyes of this opposition, the establishment of an army is the foundational symbol of the establishment of a state.

The constitution and laws of Kosovo lay a foundation of effective and efficient accountability, oversight, and governance of its armed forces. Yet those charged with oversight often lack the professional capacity to engage effectively in vigorous participation in defense affairs. The lack of local senior level military universities and...
the absence of local graduate level university programs in defense and security studies
limit the pool of qualified candidates to perform legislative oversight, civil society
participation, and advance the careers of military officers and ministry civil servants.
Currently, the government is leveraging training and education opportunities with
regional and Euro-Atlantic partners for entry-level, mid-grade, and for senior officers and
non-commissioned officers and civil servants.\textsuperscript{127} The SSSR recognized this shortfall and
has directed the establishment of a Program on National Security and Defense to develop
future leaders in the defense ministry and armed forces at the University of Prishtina by
2016.\textsuperscript{128}

The weak effectiveness of parliamentary oversight responsibilities residing with
local institutions as a result of the previously reserved competencies for security by
international administrators have markedly stymied the development of manage and
oversight of Kosovo’s security institutions.\textsuperscript{129} As a result, legislators and others have
limitations on their ability to perform their duties in defense-related procedures and
deliberations due to lack of staff support, expertise, experience or interest.\textsuperscript{130} Further
development of legislative and judiciary oversight systems, enhancing the involvement of
the relevant committees for defense matters, improving parliamentary committee

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\textsuperscript{127} Muhamet Koci, “Kosovo Security Force Head Details Achievements, Future Objectives: Interview with
\textsuperscript{128} Prime Minister of Republic of Kosovo, “Analysis of the Strategic Security Sector Review of the
\textsuperscript{129} Qemajl Marmullakaj and Lulzim Peci, “Mapping out the Current Parliamentary Oversight of the
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
participation in defense fiscal matters, and overseeing the disbursement and implementation of defense outlays are crucial.\textsuperscript{131}

For the criteria of effective capacity and capability to protect rights and provide security, it appears the armed forces and executive agencies are recognized as meeting the standards of capability but falling short in the full capacity necessary. Despite that shortfall, NATO declared in July 2013 the KSF fully capable of accomplishing its tasks as mandated and according to standards set out in accordance with its legal mandates.\textsuperscript{132}

As a method to evaluate its effectiveness, the KSF participated in a series of the field exercises aimed at strengthening the cooperation between the countries of Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro under NATO standards for responses to emergencies and crisis management.\textsuperscript{133} To evaluate effective defense strategy and policymaking processes, the government completed a comprehensive SSSR in March 2014 and presented its plan for its future security architecture. The SSSR included in this force development plan were general principles for the development of an expanded Kosovo Armed Forces in accordance with international [NATO] standards.\textsuperscript{134}

With continued deference to ensuring the legitimacy of actors, rule of law, and democratic civilian control, the government regularly refers to the necessity to submit the appropriate legislation to amend the constitution. They also wish to introduce new laws to redefine the MKSF as a Ministry of Defense, the KSF as the Kosovo Armed Forces, and

\textsuperscript{131} Baranay.
\textsuperscript{132} Vandiver.
\textsuperscript{133} Ministry of KFS, “Year of Full Operational Capabilities,”
outline new statutes for the service in the armed forces.135 Minister Çeku regularly notes, “The conclusion of the [defense transformation] process will take some years, but once the changes to the Constitution have been introduced, we will have the Armed Forces of Kosovo with a new mandate.”136

To meet the demands of the expanding capacity and capability of the new Armed Forces, additional budget resources are planned through 2019. Agim Çeku, Minister of the KSF recognizes the limitations inherent in balancing the ratio between aims, resources, and outcomes, “We have to admit that financial capacities will have an impact on the structure, size, and equipment of the [armed forces].”137 Petrit Selimi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, also recognizes the necessity to balance aims and resources noting, “Naturally, our armed forces will be small and not offensive and within limitations of our financial means.”138 Nonetheless, Minister Çeku concludes,

We will have everything we need to carry out our mission- both in terms of numbers and armaments. We will have a normal armed force matching the Kosovo capacities and capable of providing security for Kosovo and its citizens.139

Considering the convergence of a historically and culturally relevant dialogue, accommodation, and shared values reveal a delicate balance that appears to be weighted toward multi-ethnic society. Subsequently, the symbols of the KSF reflect first the national symbols of the multi-ethnic character: yellow on blue to reflecting a European community, stars to represent the six ethnic communities. Similarly, KSF unit insignia

136 Albert Ahmeti, “Kosovo to Have 8,000 Soldiers,” Zeri, February 19, 2014, 4-5.
137 Ibid.
138 “Petrit Selimi: Kosovo, the US, the EU, Serbia and the creation of full-fledged armed forces.” Peacefare.net, March 8, 2014.
portrays neutral animal and functional symbols set in colors of olive drab and black (see Figure 1).

*Figure 5 Emblem and Ranks of the KSF*  

Unfortunately, the balance of ethnically neutral KSF is tenuous as a narrative that emphasizes the efforts of the Albanian nationalist Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) is strongly threaded through the KSF.\(^{140}\) In Prishtina on June 20, 1999, the KFOR

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\(^{140}\) The Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - UÇK) was a nationalist Albanian insurgency regarded as one of the most successful insurgent groups in the modern history. The lack of international recognition of the plight of the Albanians in Kosovo at the hands of the Serbian-led Yugoslav government discouraged nationalist groups. Further, the lack of perceived progress of the non-violent strategy of President Ibrahim Rugova in the face of violent suppression by the Serbian government led to the formation of UÇK. James Pettifer, *The Kosovo Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency*, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2012).
Commander signed an agreement with Hashim Thaci, the political leader of UÇK and later Prime Minister of Kosovo, for the demobilization of UÇK. The agreement included a clause that recognizes the inheritance of the UÇK as, “the formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard in due course…” As if attempting to specifically include UÇK, elements of the SSSR hold true to the history of Kosovo Albanians. In its force development plans that emphasize a focus on homeland defense, the government will organize the reserve component of the Kosovo Armed Forces as the “National Guard Command.” After an address by Prime Minister Thaci announcing the plans to transform the KSF at Adem Jashari Barracks of the KSF Land Forces Command, Minister Çeku affirmed this inheritance,

The legitimate right of the Republic of Kosovo to have its own army is being exerted; our legal duty to review the KSF mandate is being met so Kosovo can identify the needs for its own security. I would also say that the Prime Minister is fulfilling a promise, a commitment that he took not only in this governing term but a commitment he took in 1999. When we demilitarized and transformed the Kosovo Liberation Army [to a civilian Kosovo Protection Corps, predecessor of KSF], he vowed that Kosovo will have its own army, its own armed forces.143

In his in-depth history of the UÇK, Pettifer captures the essence of the state where the inheritance of the UÇK lingers over Kosovo at the ever present memorials to the sacrifices of the UÇK as “…a reminder of a tangible and close history.”144 Military headquarters, barracks and memorials named after UÇK Commander Adem Jashari are the site of regular parades and ceremonies commemorating the “heroes and martyrs of the

141 Pettifer, 282.
143 “Kosovo officials determined to upgrade civilian force to proper army,” RTK, February 21, 2014.
144 Pettifer, 252.
nation.”¹⁴⁵ Perhaps not as overt as the official commemorations of UÇK heroes, the use of the eagle in the symbol of the ministry and Land Forces Command could be construed as representing the majority Albanian population. The national flag of Albania, symbolized by the silhouette double-headed black eagle, promotes Albanian nationalism. The open-wing double-headed eagle represents many communities, Serbian included; however, nationalist movements emphatically promote their community’s color (black for Albanian, white for Serbian). The silhouette of the black open-winged eagle encompassing the unit symbol of the Land Forces Command, despite the inclusion of the stars of the six communities, may fall prey to nationalist narratives. Perhaps reinforcing the narrative emphasizing Albanian nationalism, the Assembly of Kosovo passed a number of war veterans laws that define deceased veterans of UÇK as martyrs and commemorates national heroes for their sacrifice and efforts supporting the liberation of Kosovo.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ “Annual Report of the KSF.”
¹⁴⁶ Adem Jashari is explicitly recognized in law as the “Legendary Commander of the UÇK.” Assembly of Kosovo, “Law on the Status and the rights of the martyrs, invalids, veterans, members of the Kosova Liberation Army, civilian victims of war and their families.” December 28, 2011.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Evaluating Perceptions Revealed During the Facilitated Dialogue - "The Development of Kosovo’s Civil-Military Relations"

In the next phase of research, assessing the participant responses during the facilitated dialogue against the two models of civil-military relations allowed me to explore, summarize, and interpret the perceived *de jure* and *de facto* conditions in Kosovo. Quotations that follow, unless noted otherwise, are responses of the participants with their names withheld for anonymity. When considering the participants’ responses, the friction between the Ministry of KSF and the other participants is striking when considering the perceived *de facto* conditions under the NATO model. Specifically, the ministry and military responses affirmed the declaratory policy and implementation efforts of the government to meet the NATO accessions criteria. In contrast, parliament and civil society responses objected to the characterizations by the government that each condition of the NATO model.

Under the criteria of “democratic governance,” there is an overwhelming disconnection between the *de jure* and the perceived *de facto* conditions. The ministry and military affirm the KSF, “operates under transparency, accountability, and openness,” and that Kosovo has, “laws and policies in place that ensure democratic civil-military relations.” One respondent explicitly noted the NATO accessions criteria and the government’s compliance, "One of the main conditions for NATO is civilian and
democratic control over the armed forces. This is a component that Kosovo has arranged and will continue to expand in the near future.” However, parliament and civil society responses contradicted these assertions.

There is a big problem because we are talking about civilian control over the armed forces, and KFOR troops are the armed forces in Kosovo. We have armed forces that has come to help Kosovo but on which forces we have no decision-making power, hence, KFOR is the main topic to be discussed. The legal basis of KFOR should be discussed. KFOR is not like the presence of NATO in a sovereign country based on agreements signed by the state institutions. Therefore, KFOR has no responsibility toward the Republic of Kosovo.

Respondents further noted that KFOR “…is not accountable to Kosovo’s institution and Kosovo’s public.” The challenges to the assessment of “democratic governance” here appear to operate outside of the NATO model and within the Peacebuilding model of “legitimacy of actors.” The laws, policies, and structures for democratic governance, as evaluated by previous research and affirmed by ministry/military responses, are shaped to be compliant with NATO accession criteria. However, the actual implementation of the NATO framework is hindered, at least in the view of the forum’s participants, by the legitimacy of the armed forces operating in Kosovo, which are KFOR, outside the sovereign authority of the government.

Subordinate conditions of the “democratic governance” criteria continued to challenge the government’s assertion that it is complying with the NATO model. In one area of perceived concurrence between participants, “civilian oversight,” a parliamentarian commented that he “finds it difficult to oversee…” the efforts of the ministry because of a sense of professional camaraderie he feels toward fellow former members of UÇK. Members of civil society reported an absence of public debate in
Parliament and used the words “superficial” and “has almost been nonexistent” to describe its absence. They further went on to request the defense and security strategies be debated in parliament, and the ministry and KSF begin conversations to promote oversight by civil society.

In another area of perceived concurrence yet also to the detriment of complying with the NATO model, consensus within the political elite is in question. One parliamentarian noted that until they could overcome various political obstacles, Kosovo would not realize the future armed forces and a democratic civil-military relations model. Based on the context of the response, it is implied those obstacles are the Serbian minority in Kosovo, the Serbian government claims regarding Kosovo, and some international roadblocks. Civil society respondents noted that after the war in 1999, UNMIK imposed a government structure without consensus from Kosovar society. Further, the evolution of armed forces in Kosovo, starting with the creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps, was not a reflection of local consensus but was planned in foreign capitals.

In other areas of “democratic governance,” participants continued to disagree with the reality of civil-military practices. “Good neighborly relations,” probably one of Kosovo’s more significant challenges when considering neighboring Serbia, the government notes its progress in building cooperation with its neighbors and former Yugoslav republics at odds with Serbia. Parliamentarian responses were less optimistic about their neighborly relations noting, “We should continue to rationally accept the risk posed by Serbia. Why else have an Army?” Despite the government’s efforts, the lack of
recognition of Kosovo’s independence by regional states represents a fundamental lack of
good neighborly relations.

For the criteria of “effectiveness,” again respondents challenged the declared
policy of the government. Where the ministry noted, “…we will build a security sector in
Kosovo, which guarantees safety, and it is reliable and always efficient.” Other
participants retorted with, “[The] KSF often failed to protect the citizens of the Republic
of Kosovo.” Noting the presence of the Serbian gendarmerie within the northern Serbian
enclaves, participants challenged the effectiveness of an army to stop the infiltration and
preserve territorial integrity. Further, participants characterized the KSF as a “…‘strange
army’ because it can only serve outside our borders in defense of territorial integrity, but
not internally.” Where military participants noted the KSF trains to NATO standards and
has “official attributes of a professional army,” civil society suggest the KSF was
anything else besides a military.

This because Kosovo Protection Corps never dealt with ‘Protection’ as its
name was, and same today, the Kosovo Security Force never dealt with
‘Security’, as a normal military organization would.

Despite noting the KSF’s ineffectiveness as a military organization, participants did offer
aspirations of what future armed forces should be capable.

Kosovo should not build an army to help police the crowd, but must build
an army that protects the integrity of citizens and territorial integrity in case
of aggression from outside. We need a strong military because our enemy
[is] stronger. Kosovo's current policy [is] so illogical that Serbia has
surpassed the concept of hostility to Kosovo. If you listen to Serbia, they
openly say they will restore Kosovo [to Serbia]. Therefore, we should be
prepared to oppose any attempt to invade us.

The final NATO criterion of “efficiency”, there was a perceived concurrence in
participant responses: again toward non-compliance. There was a mismatch between the
defense budgets of Kosovo (42 million euros) and Serbia (400 million euros) and weaponry KSF (600 automatic rifles) versus Serbian Army’s “600 tons of automatic rifles.” This capability overmatch demanded a “concept of protection to balance the risk.”

Once more, civil society participants noted the low capacity within their organizations to ensure public accountability of defense budgets and why “…a constructive dialogue with the armed forces has never been functional.”

When evaluating Kosovo against the NATO model, there is an apparent divergence in the *de jure* and *de facto* conditions. The subsequent phases of research have affirmed part of the hypothesis H1—*the de jure civil-military relations framework is a reflection of Euro-Atlantic accession criteria*. That is to say, the government policies, the constitution, and laws are congruent with the NATO model of civil-military relations. However, the overwhelming perception among the “forum” is that the *de facto* conditions do not comply with the conditions of democratic governance, effectiveness, and efficiencies. This is not to suggest the government is not democratic, nor the shaping of the military as an institution is to comply with the conditions of an undemocratic society. There are challenges endemic to the ongoing overwhelming influence of international peacekeeping and development agencies, political conditions restricting Kosovo’s consolidating itself as a sovereign state, and insufficient capacity within the parliament and civil society to effectively and efficiently provide the necessary civilian oversight and accountability expected of a NATO-caliber military.

Kosovo is even more seriously challenged when considering the perceived *de facto* conditions of the Peacebuilding model. As with the evaluation of the NATO model,
the ministry and military responses affirmed the policies and implementation efforts that would comply with the proposed Peacebuilding model. Again, in contrast, parliament and civil society responses object to the characterizations by the government that would comply with the Peacebuilding model.

For the criteria of “legitimacy”, there is an overwhelming sense of disconnected \textit{de jure} and the perceived \textit{de facto} conditions supporting the Peacebuilding model. These echo areas of concerns focused on international versus sovereign authorities. A parliamentarian noted, “KFOR is the real military [in Kosovo], and it is controlled by the United Nations Security Council.” Civil society continued that the NATO military force in Kosovo [KFOR] is not constitutionally based and, “is not accountable to Kosovo’s institutions and the public.” Respondents suggested that without a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with KFOR, NATO is in violation of the United Nations Charter. They submitted,

...a SOFA would be the start of the exit strategy for KFOR while keeping KFOR Peacekeepers in accordance with UN Charter and the sovereign will of the state.

As noted earlier, respondents believed the civil-military relations framework and structure of security forces in Kosovo were decided in foreign capitals. Eventhe transformation of UÇK into the TMK was not reached through local consensus, and the follow-on transformation into the KSF “was decided in Vienna with the Ahtisaari agreement” and transferred to the current constitution. The continued transformation of the armed forces in Kosovo “[relies] on international opinion.” As if answering H1
directly, the civil society panel concluded, “... internal decisions in foreign capitals are driving or hindering progress to a local security guarantee.”

Similar to the evaluation of “civilian control” in the NATO model, the Peacebuilding model is challenged in its implementation. The government believes it is in compliance with democratic civilian control. While structures and processes are in place, implementation is questionable. Further, the capacity to provide effective oversight by parliament and civil society also challenges the full implementation of this condition of the Peacebuilding model.

Again similar to the evaluation of “transparency” in the NATO model, the Peacebuilding model is challenged in its real-world implementation. The government reiterates, “Kosovo operates under transparency, accountability, and openness.” The civil-society retorts that security strategies and policy debates occur behind closed doors and not subject to open parliamentary scrutiny. As a researcher, I am left wondering, how often, if at all, civil society representatives testify in front of the parliamentary committee on the KSF?

Of the sub-conditions of the “legitimacy” criteria of the Peacebuilding model, representation of ethnic minorities and women proved an interesting contrast in nearly de facto compliance with de jure laws and policies, yet not meeting the aspirations of society for full representations. Specifically, the ministry and armed forces marginally meet targets established for representation of minorities. However, when considering the state’s component minority groups, Kosovo falls short of compliance. As uncovered in the first phase of research, the largest minority group, Serbian, is distinctly
underrepresented.\textsuperscript{147} The strength of the minority participation can be credited largely to the Turkish and Bosnian communities. Further, there increasingly is significant evidence of violations of an “ethnically neutral” climate in the armed forces. Government and military representatives noted the continued recruitment and integration of the Serbian minority. However, Serbian recruits are required to learn Albanian to communicate with their peers and leaders, and their officer cadets are sent to the Macedonian Military Academy in Skopje to complete their training in their native language. In contrast, Albanian officer candidates undergo training in English at a U.S. sponsored university in Kosovo. One participant questioned the military’s increasingly prevalent references to Albanian heritage in traditional ceremonial uniforms (see Picture 1); the officer responded that such decisions for ceremonial uniforms were left to the politicians in the ministry.

\textsuperscript{147} MKSF, “Annual Report 2013,” 16-17.
The discussion of the inclusion of women in Kosovo’s civil-military relations was possibly the richest and included additional sub-themes of representation, leadership, and security concerns as areas to explore further. Their discussion also contrasted with my previous assessment that women’s representation was a strong area for the criteria of legitimacy. The women’s panel began with the recognition that while Kosovo has one of the highest levels of women representation in the armed forces compared to other NATO countries, “…the statistics are misleading as they are not at the decision-making ranks,” and “women, not ethnic groups are the minority.” Considering the government is nearing its mandate of 15% women representation, participants suggested,¹⁴⁸

We heard from [the ministry] that 8% of KSF is represented by minorities. His second sentence was that 23.8% are women, which means women are a minority at KSF. So if we talk about equality, there is no equality here.

Participants stated that there was a disproportional representation of women in the KSF and, in particular, representation across all institutions, uniformed, civilian ministry and Parliament. Participants were concerned that quotas for representation were not a sustainable policy solution but recommending expanding education about women’s roles. (This was an interesting recommendation considering the women panelists calling the military representative to the women’s panel “Miss” and not by her rank as they did with the male representatives.)

The female military panelist noted the growth of women in the ranks of the KSF but lamented about the challenges of recruiting quality female candidates. She agreed with her fellow panelists that much needed to be done to educate the current and future generations of military recruits. She cited that societal norms were shifting in Kosovo as this generation saw the first female police cadets. In an area of contradiction, when asked about restrictions on women in combat roles, one senior representative stated there were no restrictions, yet a colleague noted there were not women in the Rapid Reaction Brigade - the primary combat unit of the KSF.

For the discussions of women’s leadership roles, it was emphasized that there have been senior women active in UÇK, Kosovo Protection Corps ([Trupat e Mbrojtjes së Kosovës] or TMK), and the current KSF. Women are excluded in the discussion of civil-military relations despite the fact that the commander in chief, President Atifete Jahjaga, is a woman (and a former police commander). A survey was discussed that suggested that when asked who is the commander in chief, 64% of women said “I don’t know” and 16% responded, “General Kastrati” (the Commander of the KSF). The most
senior woman in the ministry of KSF was a deputy minister, a Serbian member of parliament who replaced her predecessor when he was caught passing information to the government of Serbia. With the recent elections and creation of a new government, there is no longer a female deputy minister of the KSF. It was also noted that there also are no women sitting on the Kosovo Security Council. The most senior woman officer, a colonel, is the deputy commander of the logistics brigade.

The other area of discussion of women’s representation was the accountability for women’s security concerns. Members of the women’s panel challenged the mentality that security is a male-only profession and “security is not of one gender.” A female parliamentarian noted, “…women issues are not fashionable - it is constitutional.” In reflecting on the minority women in Kosovo they noted, “…women in the north [of Kosovo] are under immense security threats yet are not under the umbrella of the state’s security institutions.” The women noted that they were equally concerned with the economic and political stability, the status of Kosovo and the security of the State. They also reminded the audience “…the Yugoslavian Army, without democratic civil-military relations, started four wars in the Balkans.”

In the other main condition of the Peacebuilding model, “effective capacity and capability,” Kosovo remains challenged between the *de jure* and perceived *de facto* conditions of implementation. The government reiterates that, “…the KSF is a professional organization, disciplined and capable,” and the “…the armed forces is prepared to take all necessary powers and responsibilities in accordance with the nature and functions of an army.” The military reiterates their structure and capabilities have
been to NATO standards and their training, education, and exercises, “...are used to promote a professional force capable at home and abroad.”

At this point, the panelists were divergent in perceptions noting that the “...KSF often failed to protect the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo.” A parliamentarian noted that international political control has prevented the KSF from fulfilling its constitutional obligations to preserve the territorial integrity of the state from intrusions by security forces from Serbia. Civil society panelists concluded that as long as “...the presence of an international army [KFOR] in Kosovo continues,” the KSF and the future armed forces will not be able to perform its security and defense duties.

When evaluating Kosovo against the Peacebuilding model, again there is a clear divergence in the de jure and de facto conditions. Unfortunately, the subsequent phases of research has failed affirmed the second part of the hypothesis H1, that Kosovo’s de jure civil-military relations framework is “not a reflection of an inclusive social contract that promotes peacebuilding.” That is to say, the laws and policies, while not directly developed with the Peacebuilding model in mind, do reflect aspirational conditions to promote peacebuilding. Again, however, the overwhelming perception among the “forum” is that the de facto conditions do not comply with the conditions of legitimacy and effective capability/capacity. In this regard, insights from phase one of this research have revealed, and phase two has affirmed H2 - the de facto civil-military relations conditions are inconsistent with the de jure framework. This is not to suggest the government is not legitimate, nor the military as an institution is not developing to comply with the conditions necessary to be effective and efficient. There are other
challenges to implementing the Peacebuilding model that the engagement in phase two has solidified - namely an overwhelming NATO-bias and the unresolved legacy of UÇK.

The overwhelming NATO-bias is not inherently a negative condition of Kosovo’s *de facto* civil-military relations. As a political condition of a newly independent state, integration with and recognition by the international institution are significant objectives in the consolidation of as an independent and sovereign state separate from the remnants of the former Yugoslavia. Integration into NATO and meeting the accession conditions it requires will be a significant step consolidating the new Republic and, in a practical sense, promoting a security guarantee that preserves the state. During the engagement, the government continuously affirmed these *de jure* conditions in its constitution and declaratory policies,

...we are not waiting to begin this partnership [with NATO], we very well know of which conditions a country must fulfill to become a member of NATO, and we declared that we [would] accomplish these conditions when the time comes for NATO integration.

However, it appears this bias has also become a crutch that the government and military have become over-reliant. The government and military have crafted a narrative that, with international support through NATO and the U.S., the KSF is transforming itself into a “real military,” capable, and functionally well established. While it is the case that key NATO countries are contributing the transformation of Kosovo’s security institutions, there are continued reservations from the alliance as a whole. The government of Kosovo often shares significant contributions by states like the U.S. as examples of NATO’s support but these are more accurately a reflection of a single state’s independent security cooperation activities. When reflecting on the NATO support to
security institutions in Kosovo, military representatives to the forum noted, “...initial challenges but with support from internationals it is now functioning well.” The challenges he referred to were the reservations on the part of the alliance to provide training and advisor teams to Kosovo. For these reservations, NATO has explicitly separated the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT) and NATO Advisory Team (NAT) from the KFOR mission. These distinctions are regularly affirmed by NATO and KFOR representatives.\footnote{I would like to underline that NLAT is distinct from KFOR.” Linda Karadaku, “NATO helps develop Kosovo Security Force.” Southeastern European Times, December 15, 2014. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2014/12/15/feature-01} The NLATs and NAT are also distinctly separate from the U.S. Defense Institution Reform Initiative mission, which appear to be providing redundant support to Kosovo.\footnote{U.S. Defense Institution Reform Initiative partners U.S. Department of Defense civilian experts with foreign counterparts to build ministerial core competencies such as personnel and readiness, logistics, strategy and policy, and financial management. Ministry of KSF (March 2013). “Ministry for The Kosovo Security Force Newsletter.” http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/NEWSLETTER_MARCH_1.pdf and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (n.d.). “Defense Institutional Reform Initiative.” http://www.dsca.mil/programs/defense-institutional-reform-initiative}

NATO also regularly makes inconsistent statements with the government of Kosovo about its cooperation. For example, in a recent exchange on social media, the President of Kosovo shared on Twitter, “Good discussion w/ NATO Secretary General @jensstoltenberg #Kosovo will move forward in close partnership with #NATO.” The Secretary General’s response suggests perhaps two different conversations occurred, sharing on Twitter, “@PresidentKosovo Thanks for good discussions about NATOs KFOR mission, security and stability in the region.”\footnote{https://twitter.com/PresidentKosovo/status/558628473733132288} While this exchange does not explicitly indicate different conversations occurred, it does continue a diplomatic
narrative where NATO regularly is reserved in its public discussions about Kosovo’s status as an independent partner nation with the alliance.

These reservations are not lost on the forum’s participants. A parliamentarian noted, “Kosovo has difficulty entering the EU and NATO, [due] to the fact that in both these organizations has states that do not recognize Kosovo,” and “KFOR is the real military [in Kosovo] and it is controlled by the [UNSC].” The civil society panel concurred with this observations stating, “Internal decisions in foreign capitals are driving or hindering progress to a local security guarantee.” They also concluded, “...the issue of security structures in Kosovo is an international state-building problem, not an internal issue.” Concerned about the continued transformation of the armed forces, they noted, “the linchpin of the future armed forces seems to rely on international opinion,” and “we can only stand up an Army if the international forces allow.”

Let it be repeated: assuming a NATO-bias is not inherently a negative condition of Kosovo’s civil-military relations. However, Kosovo’s singular focus on meeting NATO accession criteria limits considerations for a framework that is inclusive of all of Kosovo’s cultural, historical, political, and social identities that would promote a legitimate local security guarantee. Further, superficial compliance with the NATO model overlooks the pervasiveness of the unresolved legacy of UÇK.

During the forum, Pettifer’s “pale shadow” of UÇK lingered over the engagement.¹⁵³ During his keynote address, Minister Çeku, shared a narrative of the legacy of democratic civil-military relations in Kosovo beginning with the establishment

¹⁵³ Pettifer, 247.
of UÇK. Reflecting on his and some of his colleagues service in the former Yugoslav
Army (JA), Çeku shared that the historical military control of society by the JA was
considered wrong and so at its onset

...when we began building the UÇK we did so with the future in mind
looking past the JA and toward NATO, so we elected leaders to have
civilian oversight of the general headquarters of UÇK.
UÇK was volunteers, uniformed with a clear chain of command to civilians
in the government.

He further elaborated that UÇK’s successor, the TMK, carried forward this legacy of
democratic civil-military relations with UNMIK in control and KFOR as its executive
agency. A military panelist reiterated this image of a uniformed tradition of democratic
civil-military relations from UÇK, to the TMK, and on to the KSF. However, he shared
that previous discussions of this uniformed tradition dating back to UÇK has been
reserved only for politicians and this was the first time uniformed officers publically
discussed the legacy of UÇK prevalent in the armed forces.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Evaluating the Narrative Engagement

The third part of phase two was monitoring and assessing these narrative engagements to assess outcomes and determine their impact. In addition to listening to local actor perspectives on the conditions of civil-military relations in Kosovo that contributed to the preceding evaluations, the engagement sought to create conditions where the participants were able to build trust, think creatively, and speculate on potential cooperative futures. The macro- and micro-practices of narrative engagement could potentially position the participants collectively to generate relationship patterns to contribute to shaping the local security guarantee. That is not to say that the outcome of the engagement expected to reveal a new strategy or a negotiated action plan collectively developed by the participants. It was expected, however, to show participant invitations to thicken cross-party relationships and explore a transformed civil-military relations model.

As reflected in the previous evaluation of perceptions revealed during the dialogue, the micro-narrative practices revealed a rich discussion of perspectives. Specific references to the macro-narrative practices by the participants were encouraging as well. Reflecting specifically on the World Café, Minister Çeku did commend the Forum for Security for trying a “risk[y] and provocative approach to consider these
important questions.” Military participants commented that they were happy to participate in the dialogue and were pleased to talk about the transformation of UÇK to KSF as it was previously was taboo.

Also encouraging were the offers further to develop a relationship with the military and civil society through specific invitations to connect in the future. Civil society participants asked for a continued dialogue with the military. A participant offered that the military should use the civil society panel as their advocates for building an effective and efficient army. The military participants reciprocated this offer by inviting more parties to this discussion to expand the circle of actors interested in improving and increasing civil-military relations in Kosovo. A military participant was interested in inviting civil society to the KSF headquarters to continue this discussion about civil-military relations. Another military participant specifically invited this researcher and the executive director of the Forum for Security to his headquarters to discuss how to proceed.

Because of these exchanges, this researcher continues to collaborate with the executive director of the Forum for Security to develop future opportunities for the civil society and military to collaborate. One project in development is a fellowship program seconding military officers to civil-society organizations to conduct policy research and participate in the consortium's regular discussions and activities. A second project in development is establishing an affiliate chapter of Women in International Security, a network of women dedicated to advancing the leadership and professional development of women in the field of international peace and security. This chapter, linking local and
regional women from the primary institution of civil-military relations, would sponsor leadership training, mentoring, and networking programs, as well as support research projects and policy engagement initiatives.

While the invitations offered by the civil society and the military are encouraging, the transient nature of Kosovo’s parliamentary system does not appear to necessarily support continuity of efforts to cultivate a relationship between the ministry of the KSF and Parliament. Over the course of the project, elections occurred resulting in a replacement of the senior leaders of the ministry and parliamentary oversight committee. Perhaps a positive outcome of this transition is lower risk of personal reservations, suggested by one parliamentarian, for providing appropriate oversight as one of the parliamentarians suggested.

Additionally, a new Minister of the KSF replaced Agim Çeku. Çeku’s aspirations for KSF transformation is deeply rooted in a personal legacy with UÇK. Çeku was the most experienced senior commander in UÇK having been an officer in the JA and subsequently commanding operations on behalf of the Croatian Army during its war with Serbia. Following the Kosovo War, Çeku served as the commander of TMK overseeing the demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration of UÇK fighters. Since that time, he regularly advocated the transformation of UÇK into Kosovo’s Army. The new Minister of the KSF, Dr. Haki Demolli, appears not to be as professionally and emotionally connected to the UÇK legacy as his predecessor. Dr.

Demolli previously served as the Minister of Justice, the Director of the Kosovo Law Center and an Assistant Professor of Law at the School of Police and the University of Prishtina.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{157} Assembly of Kosovo (n.d.). “List of the Deputies of the Kosovo Assembly - Haki Demolli.” http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,102,693
CHAPTER NINE

Kosovo’s Civil-Military Relations: Where are the Gaps?

Evaluating the perceptions of civil-military relations in a society serves a variety of purposes. In the U.S., such evaluations contribute to assessments of military effectiveness and defense policy processes (among others).158 In the transition period following the end of the Cold War, the enlargement of the NATO alliance to states formerly allied with the Soviet Union was a necessary step to increase security and ensure stability across Europe. In the case of Eastern European and Balkan states, these evaluations contribute to assessments of a state’s willingness to contribute and capability to assume the obligations and commitments of joining the NATO security alliance. Therefore, the assumption is that compliance with NATO accessions criteria and ultimately membership in the military alliance translated to increasing security and ensuring stability for the new member states and the alliance. With respect to Kosovo, this research means to challenge that assumption.

NATO membership for Kosovo may expand a security guarantee offered by the military alliance against outside threats. In the future absence of the NATO’s peacekeeping force, Kosovo’s embryonic military, confronted with Serbia’s constitutional claims on the territory of Kosovo, would certainly benefit from NATO’s

security guarantee in terms of expanding its capability and capacity to mitigate threats to peace. In the interim, NATO’s peacekeeping force provides a long-standing security guarantee to offer time and space for all parties to negotiate towards an enduring settlement. This effort, initially aimed at stemming the ethnic cleansing, is now designed to prevent the resumption of violent conflict and support the development of institutional capabilities and capacities that ensures peace. At the core of the institutional capabilities and capacities is an emerging local security guarantee embedded in the relationship between the government, its armed forces, and society.

Challenging the assumption that membership in the military alliance translates to increasing security for the aspirant countries required an evaluation of the de jure civil-military relations framework. To shape the research, the alliance’s accessions criteria visualized a NATO Civil-Military Relations Model. Additionally, a set of principles rooted in the development of institutional capabilities and capacities that ensures the peace visualized a Peacebuilding Civil-Military Relations Model. It was then postulated:

\[ H1: \text{The de jure civil-military relations framework is a reflection of Euro-Atlantic accession criteria and not a reflection of an inclusive social contract that promotes peacebuilding.} \]

Evaluating Kosovo’s progress towards implementing the NATO and Peacebuilding models in the de jure sense replicates the technocratic evaluations conducted in practice. NATO aspirants are expected scrutinize their laws and policies, and describe how the reflect accessions criteria. This has been part of this research, to reveal de jure compliance with both models. Whether utilizing either NATO accessions criteria or peacebuilding concepts grounded in legitimacy and effectiveness, through the emerging
security architecture in Kosovo, the *de jure* civil-military relations bridge is adequately built to span the chasm between the international and local security guarantee.

However, questions remain as to whether this bridge is anchored in a culturally relevant legitimacy. Expecting to discover an overwhelming political priority to gain NATO accession has stifled the *actual implementation* of institutional capabilities and capacities rooted in legitimacy to ensure the peace, it was postulated:

*H2: The de facto civil-military relations conditions are inconsistent with the de jure framework.*

Evaluating the *de facto* conditions of the peacebuilding model has revealed gaps in the implementation of legitimacy criteria for minority representation, transparency, and rule of law. Despite nearly matching the policy-mandated goal of 10% minority representation in the KSF, the underrepresented Serbian population has a distinct challenge in recognizing the armed forces as a legitimate representative to secure the society. Questionable measures of voice and accountability, along with confusing interpretations of open and inclusive debate surrounding the SSSR paint an unfocused picture of transparency. The broader challenge of trust needed between all elements of Kosovo society threatens the foundation of the rule of law in this nascent state.

Evaluating the *de facto* conditions of the peacebuilding model has also revealed gaps in the effectiveness criteria of oversight, accountability, and human capital capacities. Each of these gaps is an interlocking strand of the same rope; the fraying of one strand threatens the integrity of the whole. While civilian executive oversight, nurtured by international ministry advisors, appears to be expanding in effectiveness as their experience grows in managing defense policy and budgeting processes, the
capacities of parliamentarians and civil society are struggling to provide effective oversight of defense affairs. The tattered ability to provide effective oversight threatens the ability to hold the security architecture accountable. The government recognizes the human capital shortfall; it is working with the University of Prishtina to establish a defense and security curriculum to develop future defense leaders. In the interim, educational and leader development opportunities are mostly achieved through international cooperation and study abroad.

Perhaps the most tenuous gap in the emerging civil-military relations model within Kosovo lies at the heart of Schiff’s concordance theory. If, in fact, the indicators of a civil-military relations bridge that spans the chasm of security is rooted in historically and culturally relevant dialogue, accommodation, and shared values, there may be the cause for concern in Kosovo. It was expected that a foreign model of civil-military relations was imposed in the rush to consolidate Kosovo into a sovereign state and in seeking integration Euro-Atlantic institutions. Therefore, I postulated:

*H3: The emerging civil-military relations framework does not reflect Kosovo’s cultural, historical, political, or social identity.*

While Kosovo’s *de jure* model is entrenched in the constitution and laws promoting and protecting a multi-ethnic society, the lingering inheritance of the UÇK remains tightly woven in the strands of the *de facto* civil-military relations model. Appropriately and accurately capturing the pervasiveness of cultural symbols that represent the “pale shadows of UÇK” cast over civil-military relations in Kosovo are
difficult while examining them through primary and secondary sources. The tension that pulls the cultural balance of civil-military relations away from an inclusive model is tenuous but recognized by this researcher in my own first-hand experience as twice deployed to Kosovo as a peacekeeper in the U.S. contingent of KFOR. During my second deployment to Kosovo, two months after the Declaration of Independence, billboards were erected across Kosovo commemorating the “Legendary Commander of the UÇK” Adem Jashari; one such billboard was strategically placed outside the main entrance of the home of the U.S. task force at Camp Bondsteel (see Figure 2).

Figure 7 [Uncle, it is done!]
(Source: Albanian Reality Check 160)

159 Pettifer, 247.
Despite the passage of time since, continued monitoring of events with Kosovo reveals the pervasiveness of the UÇK legacy with the armed forces remains. KSF bases are named after significant persons in KSF history; the two most prominent Albanian names, Adem Jashari and Skënderbeu, mark the KSF Headquarters in Pristina and the Training Command in Ferizaj. These names are in direct violation of KSF regulations where names of bases and facilitates are to remain “ethnically neutral.”

Naming these two KSF bastions in this manner further reflects the pervasiveness of memory and the positions of historical interpreters.

In official meetings with KSF leaders and visiting foreign officials, the ministry and KSF comply with the regulation to be ethnic neutrality. Flags present are exclusively KSF, Kosovo, NATO and the national flag of the visiting official. In contrast, in following engagements with a military commander, the headquarters offices included Albanian flags and paintings depicting Albanian national heroes, Adem Jashari and Skënderbeu, in violation of the same regulation that only flags of the Republic of Kosovo and its Armed Forces are authorized. The exception to this regulation is the use of national flags of visiting officials.

Increasingly, however, much like in the private office of the military commander, pictures of the UÇK commander, Adem Jashari, regularly appear. As an example, in Picture 2, the Commander of the KSF, General Kastrati, appears with a foreign military

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162 The general’s office included flags of Albania, United Kingdom, United States, NATO, and Kosovo.
delegation; prominent in the background is a picture of Jashari hung on equal status with the President of Kosovo.

Figure 8 General Kastrati with military delegation
(Source: Ministry of KSF http://www.mksf-ks.org/?page=1,131)

In another picture, members of the KSF appear with soldiers from the U.S. Iowa National Guard; again a picture of UÇK commander Jashari appears prominently (See Figure 8).
Additionally, I travelled to Prekaz, Kosovo to affirm the assessment by Pettifer the pervasiveness of the UÇK legacy in memorials to the sacrifices of the UÇK as “…a reminder of a tangible and close history.”163 As expected, I found monuments to the massacre of the Jashari family by Serbian forces. What I did not expect, was the honor guard provided by a squad of uniformed KSF (See Figure 9).

163 Pettifer, 252.
Larger demonstrations the KSF sponsors like the “Celebration of the Resistance Day” punctuate these smaller indicators of a lingering UÇK legacy. In a ceremony on the anniversary of the deaths of the Jashari family, the KSF conducted an official parade at their headquarters. In his remarks, General Kastrati noted,

Today, in this legendary anniversary, in honor of this emblematic event, are lined in front of us Kosovo Security units that explicitly imply the determination of Kosova to build its Armed Forces. A Force designed and hallmarked by sacrifice and heroism of Legendary Commander Adem Jashari and his fellow fighters.¹⁶⁴

With speaker and attendees including the President, Speaker of Assembly, Prime Minister, representatives of the Jashari family and leaders of political and military

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institutions of Kosovo, the previously noted insistence the UÇK legacy are reserved for politicians and not military officers is disconnected from reality.

More recently, the new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Isa Mustafa, offered a more explicit connection to the UÇK legacy. At a ceremony marking the UÇK history, Mustafa noted the transformation of UÇK into TMK, and later the KSF, is just one of many success stories of the free, sovereign and democratic Kosovo. Continuing, he noted, “Obviously, the process of advancing the Kosovo Security Forces will continue further with the establishment of the Armed Forces of Kosovo…a real mirror institution of Kosovo with all its ethnic and linguistic coloration.”

I find it difficult to suggest these contradictions are of minor consequence to the inclusiveness and effectiveness of armed forces. If the emerging civil-military relations framework reflected historically and culturally relevant accommodation and values, the laws and policies would explicitly allow for these displays of Albanian nationalism. Even so, it is unethical (and illegal) for any public or private display of ethnically biased symbols on official government property as to create an atmosphere of mistrust or discrimination between the representative population.

Kosovo’s Civil-Military Relations: A Potemkin Village?

The contrasting evaluations of *de jure* and *de facto* civil-military relations in Kosovo have revealed significant gaps in the implementation of institutional capabilities and capacities that would promote a local security guarantee. The stark difference in perceptions between the government, the armed forces, and society as revealed in the dialogue facilitated by this researcher gave pause to ask whether the *de jure* framework was built merely to impress? Are the laws, regulations, policies, and institutions a Potemkin village, built solely to deceive international onlookers into thinking that conditions in Kosovo are better than it really is?

Over the course of the long-term foreign intervention, critics have levied numerous claims characterizing various institutions in Kosovo as mere façades. In 2003, Father Sava Janjic, a well-respected Serb-Orthodox monk in Kosovo who continues to bridge the gap between Serbian and Albanians, called UNMIK’s creations in Kosovo a Potemkin Village – its constitutions and institution building a “smoke-screen for false multi-ethnicity.” In 2012, Gerard Gallucci, former U.S. diplomat and former Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo under UNMIK, claimed the Kosovo government was closing the UNMIK offices in the Serb-dominated north of Kosovo in favor of its

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government departments run by a “Potemkin administration.”  

A year later, Daniel Serwer, a former Vice President and Balkans envoy at the U.S. Institute for Peace retorted, while Gallucci and his Serbian constituents, “…mock Pristina’s office in the north as “Potemkin,” but it is clearly intended to begin providing services there.”

I will refrain from assessing Kosovo’s de jure framework as Potemkin, but not without reservations. Continuing to neglect implementing actual institutional capabilities and capacities legally obligated by law and policy will remain an impediment to a domestic security guarantee. The de jure framework demands a multi-ethnic military representative of and serving all members of Kosovo’s society. To achieve these conditions, laws and regulations demanding an ethnically neutral atmosphere are in place. In contradiction of the de jure framework, de facto conditions for which I have offered only a small sampling, suggest the UÇK legacy and, more broadly, Albanian nationalism, inhibits this realization.

The de jure framework also demands democratic civilian control over the armed forces assured by transparency and public oversight. The absence of public debate and “superficial” oversight defense and security matters is a contradiction to core concepts of either model. Promoting the conditions that encourage independent analysis and alternative sources of information through civil society dialogue and debate, policy relevant defense and security affairs, and independent monitoring of reform of policy and statutory compliance is necessary for Kosovo.

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The adverse impacts of the *de facto* conditions offer little sense of local or civil ownership of security institutions; it engenders inefficiencies and places severe strains on limited capacities. If a domestic security guarantee is to grant time and space to transform this protracted social conflict to an enduring peace, local actors ought to be empowered to “…actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources” from within Kosovo.\(^{169}\)

That is not to say there have not been positive implications of the *de jure* frameworks. A generation of new recruits and new officers are being shaped to believe professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness, political neutrality and autonomy, and most importantly, subordination to legitimate civilian leadership are salient characteristics of Kosovo’s armed forces. Through regular engagement with and training of its high performing junior officers and non-commissioned officers at military academies and technical schools of the professional armed forces of NATO, the *de jure* frameworks established in Kosovo may soon reflect *de facto* conditions.

Nonetheless, Vankovska reminds this researcher that in the Balkans, “Western models of civil-military relations only provoked many dilemmas in ethnic-centered states that are fraught with deep identity problems and are in the midst of nation-building processes” and “the interplay between ethnicity and the military” represents one of the most neglected aspects of civil-military relations.\(^ {170}\) As if inverting the ethnic dynamics of Kosovo, Vankovska chronicles a Macedonian model where the minority Albanian


community questions the legitimacy of the majority Macedonian-led armed forces. Her conclusion for the Macedonian case, interethnic reconciliation processes should form the foundation of the security sector, seems to parallel the peacebuilding bridge modeled for this case study. Where fear and distrust permeates a post-conflict society, security guarantees are necessary to build confidence in the armed forces, the political elites, and the citizenry.

In an effort to understand the core principles that promote local security guarantees, I offered a peacebuilding model emphasizing the mutually interdependent relationship between security and legitimacy. This relationship requires security forces and institutions to be inclusive, fully representative, and possess the minimum level of capability and capacity for protecting rights of citizens. An emerging objective of this research was to facilitate conditions positioning participants to collectively generate relationship patterns to contribute to shaping the local security guarantee, reflective of the conditions mentioned above. A facilitated dialogue fostered an environment where the participants were able to build some degree of trust, to clarify their perspectives of civil-military relations conditions, and speculate on potential cooperative futures. The dialogue simultaneously afforded this researcher the opportunity to listen, learn, and begin to understand the cultural considerations necessary to advance new approaches to peacebuilding for a country that remains embroiled in conflict.

The questions that remain for this researcher are numerous. Now that in this study and, more importantly, in their own words, the challenges of implementing a civil-military relations model promoting a local security guarantee through legitimacy and
inclusiveness are apparent – how do we transition *de jure* to *de facto*? How do we engage the upcoming generations of local government, armed forces, and civil society actors so that the *de jure* frameworks established in Kosovo may soon reflect *de facto* conditions? Are there additional and, if needed, alternative avenues to continue to build trust, clarify perspectives of *de facto* conditions, and speculate on potential cooperative futures? Are there other cases where conditions of post-conflict transformations where emerging security frameworks defer to international standards rather than accommodating shared values between society and its armed forces in ways that are historically and culturally relevant to a particular country?

Through insights gained from this research, my initial responses to these questions point to further application of this mixed method approach utilized here. The macro- and micro-narrative practices utilized in this study offer the opportunity to continue the engagement between the lead local actors charged with building a local security guarantee. The offers to continue dialogue between participants of the “The Development of Civil-Military Relations in Kosovo” forum promise to be opportunities to continue to build trust and write new stories of cooperative futures. Finally, NATO-supported security transformations are ongoing in neighboring Macedonia and Bosnia where societal questions of legitimacy and inclusiveness challenge local security guarantees. Are they deferring to international standards rather than utilizing local dialogue to resolve the paradox of creating violent institutions to protect themselves from violence?
APPENDIX


1. What is “civilian control”?
2. How would you characterize civilian control in Kosovo?
3. What role, if any, should military forces play in internal security and in handling domestic emergencies?
4. How did the Ahtisaari Plan view the relationship between the military and the government?
5. Who has had more influence in the post-Declaration of Independence era – civilian or military leaders?
6. How would you describe democratic civil-military relations in Kosovo?
7. Which is better for a democratic Kosovo: conscription or an all-volunteer professional force?
8. How do civilian authorities coordinate military policy with other aspects of national power?
9. How does one think about using force for the political purposes of Kosovo?
10. Should military leaders control the implementation of strategy, operations and tactics? Alternatively, do operations have policy implications that give political leaders a right to interfere?
11. Whose preferences – civilian or military – prevail in the initial decision to initiate the use of force?
12. Whose preferences prevail in decisions about how to use force?
13. What is “military effectiveness”?
14. What is the role of civil-military relations in military effectiveness?
15. Is the military a profession? (If yes) What are the core qualities and traits of the military profession?
16. What are the biggest civil-military challenges in for Kosovo moving ahead? What are your recommendations for how to manage or ameliorate them?
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BIOGRAPHY

John P.J. DeRosa graduated from Bartlett High School in Bartlett, Tennessee by way of Leilehua High School, Wahiawa, Hawaii in 1993. He received a Master of Arts in National Security Studies and a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from California State University – San Bernardino. He has served over twenty years as a soldier, officer, and civilian in the Department of Defense, and in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo in 2002 and again in 2008-2009.