SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN MOROCCO:
FEBRUARY 20 MOVEMENT, LOCAL TANSIKYATS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
REAL CHANGE?

By

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the
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of
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Social Mobilization in Morocco:  
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADFM</td>
<td>Democratic Association of Moroccan Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMDH</td>
<td>Moroccan Association for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Democratic Confederation of Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Congress Mondial Amazigh</td>
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<td>CNI</td>
<td>National Ittihadi Congress</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDT</td>
<td>Democratic Federation of Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRCAM</td>
<td>Royal Institute for the Amazigh Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Justice and Charity (Adl Wal Ihsane)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDFF</td>
<td>Democratic League of Women’s Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Moroccan Dirham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADS</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Vanguard Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Authenticity and Modernity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Unified Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAF</td>
<td>Feminine Union Action</td>
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USFP  Socialist Union of Popular Forces

UNTM  National Union of Workers in Morocco
ABSTRACT

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN MOROCCO: FEBRUARY 20 MOVEMENT, LOCAL TANSIKIYATS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR REAL CHANGE?

Fatima Hadji, Ph.D.
George Mason University, 2015
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This study examines collective action in Morocco as it emerged in the context of the Arab Spring or what is known in the Moroccan context as the February 20 movement. The aim is to provide an account that reflects what is perceived to be the nature of recent collective action by examining the February 20 movement and its local organizing (known in Arabic as Tansikiyats، تنسيقيات)، and illustrate how Tansikiyats framed grievances to mobilize support. This study therefore argues that the linkages among local organizing committees and a national campaign explain why the February 20 movement succeeded in broadening the political agenda in Morocco.

Primary interviews with activists in Morocco and secondary sources provide the data to support the argument that the February 20 movement brought together diverse components that put aside their historical animosities and ideological differences to demand change and open up the political space in Morocco. This finding challenges the assumption that social movements build on formal existing structures as most of social
movements scholars argue. For the movement itself, it is the decentralized coordinating committees ‘Tansikiyats’ that constitute *February 20*, and their independence allowed them to frame issues locally, yet connect them to the founding principles of the movement (*Ardiya Taassissiya*—أرضية تأسيسية). A leaderless movement that refused to formally connect itself to specific structures of either the political leftist parties or religious Islamist movements such as Adl Wal Ihanse is among its characteristics. Furthermore, mobilization depended upon activation of key subjective dimensions of politics, thereby requiring investigation beyond structural dimensions in order to explain the nature of *February 20* and its Tansikiyats.

This study also found that the *February 20* movement marked a turning point in Moroccan politics. The social movement in Morocco, in contrast to the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, did not seek to replace the monarchical regime. For a long time, Morocco did not recognize the role of ‘agency’—that is citizens in politics. Citizens were regarded as ‘subjects’ in the constitution and politics was conducted according to this conception. This study finds that the *February 20* movement reformulated this view by bringing to the forefront the concept of ‘citizenship’ and engraving it within the societal consciousness (الانتقال الى انتزاع المواطنة). The *February 20* movement did not set out to bring down the regime, but to demand change with less risk (تغيير بأقل خسائر). *February 20* set out to open the public space for the masses, the political space for more voices, and raise masses’ consciousness about politics. The *February 20* movement thereby embarked in a journey of ushering new politics in Morocco.
In summary, the movement raised the political consciousness of the Moroccan citizen and contributed to claiming the street as a political space. The *February 20* movement turned the old Makhzanian narrative on its head by generating a new social contract and pushed citizens to think politically. *February 20* pushed for a shift in the political culture through the decentralization and autonomy of its Tansikiyats, and achieved unity within society, across class, and ideological lines. As seen by many observers, *February 20* actors embodied a new form of collective politics, one that is not concerned with taking political power, but rather with claiming citizenship rights, pressing multiple demands to democratize society, and challenging the status quo “from-below.” This demonstrates the radical nature of the *February 20* movement.
CHAPTER 1 – BACKGROUND: FEBRUARY 20 IN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The substantial research on the Arab Uprisings and regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have not helped us understand the importance of the early 2011 period of political ferment in Morocco. While the Moroccan regime has successfully avoided substantial change through co-optation and other means of manipulation and repression, the February 20 movement represents an innovative type of politics based on autonomous organization that has the potential to transform politics without overthrowing the regime. The February 20 movement mobilized diverse coalition of Islamists, Amazigh [Berber] activists, and youth activists to pressure the king Mohamed VI for meaningful political change. This dissertation argues that in order to understand this movement, it is necessary to examine the innovative local organizing structures (known as Tansikiyats-تنسيقيات). The focus on the processes, frames, and dynamics of local Tansikiyats therefore contributes to our understanding of the February 20 movement’s dynamism and potential to bring about political change. Additionally, Tansikiyats matter because they help us move beyond the broader categories of “protest”, and
“contentious politics”¹ to discover 1) the importance of subjective elements of collective action, 2) “hidden organizational sources,” and 3) “emerging trends in social movements.”²

The Tansikiyats are not centrally controlled, but their connectedness is based on the founding principles of the movement (Ardiya Taassissiya), which represent movement values and master frames, and through informal social networks and interactions both online and offline. This research found that the February 20 movement does not have a centralized organization and that the connecting threads are the values of the movement and the effectiveness of master frames alignment, and resonance with the populace.

Autonomy is understood in terms of creating spaces for grassroots organizing to cultivate power to demand change, and harness their capabilities for strategic political activism. The active role Tansikiyats assigned to themselves contribute to re-affirming their local autonomy, allow them to serve as a “base of political activism,” and construct a “horizontal voice” of the February 20 movement. Tansikiyats activism is seen as one of the expressions of grassroots political activism in Morocco and a novel way of exploring the complexity and the “situatedness” of its political action emphasizing the goal of opening of the political space.³

The nature of social mobilization in early 2011 consists of a very distinct movement called February 20 that encompasses three largely diverse groups: the

² Ibid.
Amazigh, Islamists (under the Justice and Charity known as Adl Wal Ihsane), and youth (leftist, radical left, and independents). Despite that these groups had autonomous political agendas previously; they decided to be grouped under the umbrella of the February 20 movement that emerged in the context of the Arab Spring. While the Tansikiyats include various components, one cannot claim that one of them had a predominant leadership role. Being grouped under the February 20 movement means a certain agreement among all actors to focus on an agenda and the Ardiya Taassissya that speaks to all citizens whether they are Islamists/Seculars, Amazigh, or youth. It is also the coming together around “justice” that made these components see beyond their own individual agenda and focus on a broader narrative of political change. It is the becoming together of these components that also makes February 20 a distinct phenomenon, puts into perspective, and gauges the uniqueness of its Tansikiyats.

Citizens across Morocco (في جل أنحاء المغرب) started, using Van Der Haar words, to “engage in a strong critique of the rampant corruption, political exclusion, linking their local issues to the project of social justice and political change.” As many activists articulate,

The movement came to break the chains of fear, promote a less authoritative culture, contribute to citizens awakening, and establish a new era in the Moroccan political path.

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5 Ardiya Taassissya (Arabic: أرضية تأسيسية) is the founding principles or platform that frames the demands of the movement. There were several versions of the document, but the final version was presented in a press conference in February 17, 2011 at the headquarters of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH).


7 Interviews with five activists from Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, and Fes. Interview took place in October 2013. Translation by the author of this study.
The movement did not emerge from the womb of any political party, but rather is an expression of the populace who want to fight against tyranny, corruption, and the Makhzanian authoritative regime.\

In brief, the February 20 movement actors have consciously avoided partisan political connections, in part because of the weakness of these traditional avenues of political action and the loss of their legitimacy over the last few decades. A clean-start was declared as February 20 vowed that there will be “no return to politics as usual.”

The historical record suggests that since independence, grassroots organizing at the local level has not really initiated or sustained collective action that proclaimed local political interests that are also linked to the broader concepts of dignity, justice, and freedom (كرامة ، عدالة ، حرية). In light of this, February 20 Tansikiyats have helped “create a new form of politics locally” which, has not been achieved prior to February 20 protests, and have provided the space and the base for political activism.

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction about social mobilization in Morocco and background on the February 20 movement that emerged within the context of the Arab Uprisings, the rationale and the significance of the study. Chapter two outlines the components of the February 20 movement. Chapter three presents a comprehensive review of the literature on social mobilization in MENA region and Morocco in particular. The fourth chapter focuses on February 20 Tansikiyats and their localized collective action. Chapter five covers

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8 Translation by the author of this study. Makhzan is an Arabic word that refers to state regime and palace authority. There is a blurred line between the palace and the state. They are oftentimes perceived as one entity.


research methods including the forms of data collection and analysis. Chapter six
discusses the findings and analysis of the case study, research conclusions, and elaborates
on the implications for theory development, and future research. It also includes a
conclusion, as well as references and work cited in this dissertation.

*The Scope of the Study: Contextualizing the February 20 Movement*

Regional Context

The emergence of localized grassroots mobilization in MENA became apparent in recent years. Historically, despite the lack of individual freedoms, Arabs in MENA tended to suppress their divisions to fight a common enemy (colonization) and unite under the umbrella of nationalism and pan Arabism. Recent social movements that emerged within the Arab Uprisings are different. Analyzing these 2011 movements, Glasius and Pleyers argue that “they are broad and heterogeneous, bringing together a wider range of activists, both in terms of generations and of culture of activists.”

Echoing McDonald, and Melucci; Glasius and Pleyers emphasize that understanding “these movements requires attention to affective, cultural and expressive dimensions of activism and citizenship.”

These movements gained momentum as a political self-asserted vehicle for change. Understanding these new movements is important given their presence, specific trajectories, mode of mobilization as well as their current ideas and practice in light of what scholars call “Arab Spring” revolutions.

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People in MENA are no longer fighting just for basic rights; they are fighting to reform the political repertoire within which these rights can be exercised. This is because the political sphere is where the fundamental orientations of a society are defined and where the decisions concerning the principals of domination over social life are made. The triggers of protest are different and the local thresholds in specific time and context vary. However, political instability and the restriction that the regimes impose are what provided an opportune time to mobilize.

The unprecedented and historic events or what is called “Arab Spring” have altered the Arab modern political history dramatically and sparked the dawn of a new Middle East. Recent social mobilization in MENA demonstrated that the region is no longer “a blank space on the global map” of collective action. Arabs no longer lack what Bayat called “truly collective life,” or resort to “mob action.” The case of Tunisia and Egypt illustrates that masses can engage in modern forms of collective action. The newness and the greatness of these movements lie on their leaderless aspect and their cross-sectional approach. It was still a period of “euphoria” in 2011 in MENA and people were still enjoying the outcomes of their democratic protests. However, a degree of uncertainty about the future and the transition to a real democracy remains. Thus, Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett were right when they said that, “a host of dynamics associated with democracy protests—when protest will mobilize, whether mobilization will set a transition in motion, and who will be in control of the transition—is contingent on

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histories that states and movements write together, histories of state repression and movement response.”

In light of social upheaval and protests particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, one cannot ignore their power and the yearning of youth and minority groups for political expression and participation. Many argue that the current events in MENA would certainly be replicated in other countries like Algeria, and Morocco (to list just a few) since there are many similarities between these countries. However, I argue that Morocco remains one of the most complex countries in which it would be difficult to witness the same outcome of regime change.

What the Arab Spring provided to social movements and the activists in Morocco is the drive to reach a level of “critical consciousness” – that is as Brockett puts it “similar to what Warren means by “rational autonomy”: the ability to reflect on and direct one’s desires in such a way that one can develop a life-plan.” The Arab spring provided comparative models (particularly Tunisia) and changed perceptions of political opportunities, framing of struggle, and the likelihood of success (outcomes, and consequences of collective action). For example, activists referred to Tunisia uprising as a crucial historical opportunity (لحظة تاريخية حاسمة) that gave them courage to break down the barriers of fear (التي اعطتنا الشجاعة لتكسير جدار الخوف). This critical consciousness (الصحوة و اليقظة) is influenced by how much trust participants have in organizers themselves and the

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narratives that they tell, a trust to be won on the basis of many intangible and largely non-cognitive factors.\textsuperscript{18}

Moroccan Context

The past decade has witnessed an increase in social mobilization in Morocco. These mobilizations are commonly seen as a response to Makhzanian rule and the socio-economic crisis, both of which create particular hardships for the citizens and continue to silence the marginalized. The seeds of the discontent also reflect decades of social, economic and political injustice against the grassroots majority.

Morocco has a long history of collective action that particularly focused on gaining specific interests (employment for the unemployed graduates, recognition for Islamists, women rights, and workers rights). Yet, these movements were limited in scope as they were not specifically interested in the broader package of political and democratic reform or change the dominant narrative of “hogra” to a new narrative that speaks to all Moroccans.

Unlike previous social movements including the Islamists, feminist, labor, and students’ mobilization; the \textit{February 20} movement is different as it came with demands for broader change that includes those in the margins of society (silent majority). While the \textit{February 20} movement may have not formally utilized these various social movements, their members participated in \textit{February 20} protests.

The \textit{February 20} movement came to reformulate the narrative and demand change from the bottom-up through promoting themes of citizenship and participation.

\textsuperscript{18} Brockett (2005) citing Heather Tosteson, 160.
The purpose of this form of mobilization through Tansikiyats is to enhance the involvement of the marginalized in society and grassroots level, and give citizens greater ownership of their struggle and foster their sense of citizenship.

The social mobilization in Morocco did not aim to be a full-fledged revolution through which Morocco would achieve regime change. Activists were fully aware of the danger of what some call a revolutionary option. One explanation was given by Moroccan analysts is that Moroccans already tried the revolutionary option through efforts of “la dynamo du Maroc” and Ila Al Amame movement, but they failed miserably in 1960s.19 The point here is not to explain why an attempt for a revolution was not successful, but to show that Moroccans still maintain the historical memory about that failure. While one of the reasons for their failure is the inability of revolutionary leaders to consider the structural and cultural elements of Moroccan society back then (Jasper’s micro-foundations), their ideological leftist stance did not resonate with the majority of Moroccans. With that consciousness, the February 20 movement did not include claims of regime change or the breakdown of power structures, but rather claims of re-organizing and re-distributing of power (خلق توازن السلط). The February 20 movement entered Morocco into what Asef Bayat, using Timothy Garton Ash words, called a “re-
olution.” A *February 20* activist simplified the demands of this re-folution as the following:

![Diagram: Simplified Conceptualization of February 20 Demands]

**Figure 1: Simplified Conceptualization of February 20 Demands**

The *February 20* movement is described, by many analysts, as a new form of doing politics, but the impetus for this mobilization did not come from traditional political parties or labor unions as customarily has been the case in Morocco. *February 20* has consciously avoided partisan political connections, in part because of the weakness of these traditional avenues of political action historically.

Abadi notes that *February 20* movement “stood against the so called Moroccan exceptionality” and “signaled a major shift in popular attitudes regarding the monarchy and the current sociopolitical situation.” The evolution of events suggests that there is “a realignment that is profound and that may well represent a radical change in politics.”

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22 Abadi (2014).
Morocco had launched during the last decade, and the limited democratic impact in accounting for popular politics and claims.  

February 20 has different tendencies as it embodies the various movements in Morocco particularly that of the Justice and Charity (Adl Wal Ehsane), the Amazigh, and youth. Weizman suggests that the February 20 movement includes a “cross-section of young activists running the gamut from previously unaffiliated Facebook users, members of Amazigh associations and various leftist groups, to members of the officially banned but reluctantly tolerated Islamist movement, Adl Wal-Ihsane. The February 20 movement, According to Professor Maati Monjib, does not subscribe to a particular organizational model, and is comprised of various components that have separate agendas prior to February 20. Despite that these groups have different histories, trajectories and political agendas, February 20 movement brought these actors under its umbrella.

The February 20 movement is what Bayat calls a “re-folution: revolutions that aim to push for reforms in, and through, the institutions of the existing regimes. And that chose a reformist path” rather than “a revolutionary one.” Mohamed Basek Manar articulates it differently arguing that February 20 was comprised of both the revolutionary approach and a reformist path. Yet, the majority subscribe to Bayat’s refolution approach.

Professor Mohamed El-Ghali points out the difference between the protests pre-2011 and mobilization of 2011 by explaining that pre-2011 protest were

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23 Ibid.
25 Interview with Professor Maati Monjib; interview took place in October 2013.
26 Bayat (Spring 2013).
about political demands disguised on a social frame, but *February 20* protests were about political demands directly.\(^\text{28}\)

*February 20* focus is on social and political claims. The activists today are facing a turning point in their history because of the gains of their continuous struggles for justice and equality - the epicenter of what is called *politics*. This allowed them to understand the terms of the debate underpinning their exclusion, and begin to assert a new mobilizing identity.\(^\text{29}\) This state of affairs constitutes activists’ *awakening*. This awakening is attributed to the adaptation of a new narrative emerged as new ideas are being diffused by the regional dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Schwedler contends that the point of consciousness may not have yet arrived “for the Moroccans to carve their own political space, where the potential for real gains lie,”\(^\text{30}\) but *February 20* with its Tansikiyats protest to “reclaim dignity” and end *Fassad* (corruption) practices of the regime (Makhzan).\(^\text{31}\) In brief, Chapouly Romain describes *February 20* as a “generalist” movement that positioned itself as a movement based on values of justice, and dignity, most importantly “embracing an attitude of citizenship,” and it is not about gaining power or resources “which are the characteristics of a “corporatist” movement, he argues.\(^\text{32}\) He contends, citing Bennani-Chraibi, it is a

\(^{28}\) Interview with Professor El-Ghali in late October 2013 in Marrakesh.


\(^{30}\) Jullian Schwedler. The end of monarchical exceptionalism: the idea that Arab monarchies enjoy greater legitimacy and stability than their neighbors should finally be put to rest (September 2011). [http://English.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion2011/06/2011621155732501502.html](http://English.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion2011/06/2011621155732501502.html). Retrieved 09/06/2011.

\(^{31}\) Makhzan is the Arabic word used to describe the Moroccan regime.

\(^{32}\) Romain, Chapouly. “Le Mouvement du 20 Février au Maroc: Une étude de cas de la coordination locale de Rabat.” (2011), [http://www.memoireonline.com/03/12/5508/Le-mouvement-du-20-fevrier-au-Maroc-une-etude-de-cas-de-la-coordination-locale-de-Rabat.html](http://www.memoireonline.com/03/12/5508/Le-mouvement-du-20-fevrier-au-Maroc-une-etude-de-cas-de-la-coordination-locale-de-Rabat.html)
movement that rose to “annoy the powerful,” and open the public political space.

*February 20* was a catalyst in sparking a national debate about institutional reforms, political stagnation, political reconciliation, and the need for a more progressive political discourse, peaceful management of political differences, political reconciliation between various political factions, and the need for a progressive political discourse in Morocco.

In this light, *February 20* is viewed as a corrective action for a stagnant political process. Mohamed Basek Manar maintains that social mobilization in Morocco transitioned from reactionary protests to a given situation to protests that are more organized and driven by initiative; and from protests with a sectorial, class or regional nature to popular protests. *February 20* did not build on specific pre-existing formal structures, yet protests do not happen in a vacuum. As Musleh points out “youth engagement does not happen in a vacuum it is affected by the context of youth live in. This context includes structures and values, logics and practices that provide young people with opportunities and constraints for development and participation.” Professor Mohamed El-Ghani observed in Morocco, protests are an accumulation and an interconnectedness (*Tarakom and Tarabot*—ترکام و ترابط) between a series of events and episodes of contention. *February 20* surpassed the traditional social movements

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33 Chapouly (2011).
34 Khadija Marouzi interviewed for this research. Aziz Hlaoua also interviewed for this research in November 2013.
35 Khadija Marouazi interviewed for this research in November 2013.
38 Mohamed El-Ghani, Professor of law in Marrakesh. Interview took place in November 2013.
Morocco witnessed including labor unions and socialist movements of the 1970s and 1980s that uniquely claimed socio-economic rights. It even surpassed the emerging movements of cultural identity such as the Amazigh movement in the 2000s. Mernissi views the February 20 movement as “a contemporary innovation of a past project that has never been concretized and that deserves attention to proclaim dignity to Moroccans.”

February 20 combined the claims of socio-economic and the cultural identity rights under its umbrella of political claims, which constitutes a major characteristic of the movement.

_TANSKIKYATS Les Premiers Pas du Virtuel_

When the Arab Spring started in Tunis, Moroccan youth found the opportunity to start a debate on Facebook and formed groups such as “to debate the king” about the role of the monarchy, and accountability. When events in Tunisia erupted in December 2010, youth launched a call via Facebook to meet in front of the parliament in solidarity with the Tunisian people. Virtual activists who called for demonstrations used social media and particularly Facebook as a space for dialogue and exchange of ideas. Social media played a crucial role as “groups can operate with a multi-national scope,” lead “digitally-driven and thus less visible soft actions,” and “organize without

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41 Shirky (2008).
organizations." In the case of February 20, Aziz Samadi wrote in Tanja24 that the debate about the demands of movement started in the virtual world first. Also Aziz Idamine, a February 20 activist argued that,

Before talking about the goals of the movement, we should clarify that this youth movement was launched from the virtual discussions about political and constitutional, social, economic and cultural issues. Through these discussions and the momentum they produced, a group of young people decided to move their activism from the virtual world to the real world, through various forms of expression and organizing so that their voice can reach to the state, society, and both civil and political society.

There was a widespread response to the call, and Oussama Elkhalafi (a youth activist) called to take to the streets on February 27, however this date coincided with the anniversary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario), so the date changed to February 20. Activists agreed to call for protests in their cities, and identify a common meeting place. Youth in each region met in closed spaces and agreed to form local Tansikiyats. After this agreement, youth called for meetings in an open space – (الفضاء العام) so everyone who desires to participate, can participate. Between January 30 and February 15, 2011 and before the official agreement and adaptation of a unified foundational platform, activists virtually launched platforms

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45. ندوة "الصباح" حول حركة 20 فبراير http://www.maghress.com/assabah/6436
46. Translation by the author of this study. Aziz Idamin intervention during a small roundtable organized by Essabah newspaper daily (May 2011).
47. Polisario Front, abbreviation of Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro, an organization striving to end Moroccan control of the former Spanish territory of Western Sahara, in northwestern Africa, and win independence for that region. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/467416/Polisario-Front. Morocco and Polisario were in conflict over the Western Sahara since 1975. Calling for protests in February 27 maybe perceived by the Makhzan as support to Polisario, which would delegitimate the plight of youth for political change in Morocco.
such as “Freedom and Democracy Now,” “February 20…Intifida for Dignity,” “February 20… People Want,” “February 20 Protests for Democracy and Social Justice,” and finally “February 20 Youth Communique”—Bayan Taassissi (البيان التاسيسي). The later was presented as a unifying platform in which founding principles of February 20 or what is called in Arabic Ardiya Taassisiya—الارضية المؤسسة were outlined and presented in a press conference on February 17, 2011. The demands that Ardiya Taassisiya outlined are as follow:

- Establishing a parliamentary monarchy,
- Dissolving the Parliament and the government, establishing a temporary transitional government,
- Establishing a democratic constitution which represents the true will of the people,
- Organizing early legislative elections, the election of a Constitutional Assembly in charge of preparing a new constitution,
- Prosecuting people involved in cases of corruption and human rights violations, abuse of power, theft and embezzlement of public funds,
- Implementing of all the recommendations of the Equity and Reconciliation Instance,
- Releasing political prisoners,
- Creating an independent board to ensure the election process,
- Amending the law on political parties and the electoral code, to achieve the conditions of democratic competition,
- Recognizing the Amazigh language as an official language, and enhancing all components of the historical and cultural and linguistic identity of Morocco,
- Instituting an independent and transparent justice system,
- Increasing the minimum wage, and struggle against high prices,
- Integrating unemployed graduates in the public service, and
- Facilitating universal access to social services including health, work, housing, and unemployment benefits.

Social networks facilitated by computer-mediated communication (internet) helped create what Calhoun; Langman et al. called “virtual public spheres” as they

48 Basek Manar (2013).
“mediate social relationships” that create conditions for “alternative political structures.”

Extending similar line of analysis, online connections across diverse Tansikiyats are important not only in transferring information and connecting, but in expanding familiarity between Tansikiyats activists across the country. The point on familiarity is well-made through Shostak research on labor union movements. A testimony from activist Hamza Mahfoud from Rabat and Amina Terrasse from Marrakesh supports this argument.

This underscores Langman and Morris’ conception of ‘internetworking social movements (ISM)’ arguing that “ISM are organized through mobilizing networks or coordinating structures that mediate and articulate new forms of identities and strategies for participation in social action that contest current social/ global conditions.”

Activists gave importance to personal relationship and interactions; and transfer of ideas, and learning experiences through “virtual public spaces,” and “virtual communities.” Boekkooi argues that online communities “shape individuals and their opinions and motivations and therefore their actions.” Amsidder agrees with this perspective introducing “social technical” communication modes transforming a virtual...
into a “virtual socialization" space. Counter arguments have been made about the notion of virtual “communities.” For instance, Castells maintains that while online interactions enhance or extend modes of relations, the potential for space of a community is less. Yet, research shows that online communities are “real.” As Langman and Morris further explicate, citing Wellman, “such communities, as networks of interpersonal ties are indeed “real” in terms of forming durable relations that provide a number of social rewards including sociability, identity and support networks.” This is in tune with Shostak’s notion of familiarity. Examples include campaigns Tansikiyats lead or communiques they issue in support of other Tansikiyats when are arrested (L7aked, and Benkhdim in Casablanca, the burning of five activists in a bank in Alhocema, detention of six activists in Zayno, death of Kamel Omari in Safi, and the imprisonment of Abdsamad Al-hidour in Taza…etc). Also, the call for solidarity and protest against what is known as Daniel Galvan affair is a case in point. Desrues makes explicit the point that February 20, while scattered and decentralized across the country, is coordinated through internet connections and mobile technology. He further explicates that the challenge for youth, who called for protests, was the question of how to move

56 See (Wellman (1999); Garton, Haythornwaite, & Wellman (1999); Miller & Staler (2000); Earl & Kimport (2011); and Boekkooi (2012).
59 The Daniel Galvan affair refers to the pardon the King Mohamed VI granted to a serial children rapist. Activists mobilized people across the country and protested against the pardon. More specifically, Hamza Mahfoud, a February 20 activist, in collaboration with Lakome. com, an independent online news site that first published the news about the pardon. Hamza mobilized various activists through a call to activists of various Tansikiyats which, in turns, mobilized people both online and on the ground. Galvan’s affair showed the Makhzan the ability of youth to mobilize. While protests may have quiet down, an event such as Galvan Affair that touches the dignity of citizens will result in mass protests. The protests during the affair resulted in debunking the sacredness of the King. Ali Anouzla, the chief editor of Lakom is currently standing trial and the Makhzan shut down the site. The trial of Ali Anouzla is not related to Galvan, it is because he published a link that incites violence on the site. Many analysts however, argue that the Makhzan is punishing Ali Anouzla for helping in the protests against Daniel Galvan’s affair.
“mobilization” from a “virtual” to a “physical” space—that is the street. On this he writes,

“… mouvement de jeunes sans affiliations partisanes, disséminés à travers l’ensemble du pays et qui se coordonnent grâce aux connections internet et à la téléphonie mobile [...] pour les promoteurs de l’appel, l’enjeu consistait dès lors à passer de la mobilisation « virtuelle » à la mobilisation « physique » dans la rue.”

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Figure 2: February 20 from “Virtual” Space to the “Street”

Extending Desrues’ conception, the above illustration shows the evolution of the February 20 movement from cyberspace to the street. The multiplicity of online connections (networks) in a brief period of time before youth took to the street. In January 14, 2011 three young activists from the city of Meknes created a Facebook group

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named “Moroccans dialogue with the king.” The three activists were not affiliated with any political party or civil society groups. On January 27, they decided to change the name of the group to “Freedom and democracy now movement.” With more than 6000 members, youth begun to call for protests and suggested February 27 as the day of protest. Youth later realized that February 27 coincided with the anniversary of the “Arab Sahraoui Democratic Republic” created in 1976. Fearing backlash and negative reaction of media, Makhzan, and citizens, youth changed the date to February 20. By January 28, more Facebook groups were created in other cities including “February 20 movement, people want change,” “February 20 movement for dignity” and “Intifada is the solution”…etc. Youth also created an online video “I am Moroccan” featuring youth, women, and men from all walks of life. They posted it on Youtube and its content became the connecting narrative for action to demand change, and encourage various structures (leftist parties, Adl Wal Ihsane, and rights groups) to endorse the movement.

The rapid multiplicity of actions (groups) in the virtual space has helped activists in various cities (regions) to connect with other activists, share information, and call for protests on February 20, 2011. More than 370,000 people took to the street in 114 cities across Morocco. This corroborates with Fushs’ findings, suggesting that communicative dynamic process contributes to “butterfly effect,” “contagion effect,” and contagious disease effect of protest. This also provides a clue towards the effective role of “virtual space” in connecting activists, while loosely, to take action. Without exception,

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61 See more on this in chapter three.
62 For more on online groups see, Bennani-Chraibi & Jaghlally (2012), Mohamed Manar Bassek (2013), and Fernandez Molina (2011).
63 According to Bennani-Chraibi and Jaghlally (2012), the number is 370,000. Yet, according to the ministry of Interior, only 37,000 people took to the street in 50 cities. See Bennani-Chraibi & Jeghlally (2012), and Fernandez Molina (2011).
64 See ‘butterfly effect’ (Marcuse, 1972), ’contagion effect’ (Hardt and Negri, 2005), and contagious disease effect (Al-Atri, 2012).
interviewees of this research agreed that interactions online though the virtual space was important in diffusing the initial video that called for protest while emphasizing the “Marocaine” of activists. Yet, Saunders’s work on environmental movements shows that “information received” virtually constitutes a weak network dimension to insist on. However, recent research by Castells, Earl and Kimport, and Krinsley and Crossley suggest the contrary.65

TANSIKIYATS: National Council for Support

In the beginning of protests, February 20 activists saw the need for a national body to provide technical guidance and logistical support. Activists agreed on the need to create a national council for support (المجلس الوطني لدعم حركة 20 فبراير) which included 99 members from parties, CSOs, businessmen, and academics. The national council for support members constitute the educated elite, who has been historically categorized as political opposition.

The February 20 Tansikiyats are independents even when the national council for support called for protests, set the date and time for protests. The council also played a role in setting the master frames for the protests. The national council for support has various formal political structures, but February 20 Tansikiyats did not organize under any particular structure as activists were informally sympathizers (الانتماء- Intimaa fakat).

Analysts such as Abdallah El Harif argue that because of the spontaneity and the refusal of a centralized leadership in February 20, Tansikiyats remained isolated in urban

and rural areas and there was no coordination among them. Yet, and as articulated by an interviewee in Marrakesh, “before May 15, 2011 Tansikiyats were independents, but when the national council for support start to call for protests on specific dates, their initiative was viewed as interference.” Another activist from Rabat added that “activists from various cities started to criticize the council’s actions stating that calling for national protest takes away from the independence and credibility of the local Tansikiyats.” Activists are specifically referring to the national call for protest on May 15, 2011. This day was marked by police brutality against February 20 activists, particularly in Rabat as they protested in front of the Temara detention center. Simply put by an activist, February 20 “is a non-organized organization, and should remain as such.”

To remain independent and decentralized, Tansikiyats regarded the national council for support input as interference with an intention to appoint itself as a leader of the movement. The result of this, according to El-Harif, was that the organizing activities of the Tansikiyats were disproportioned. Tansikiyats’ refusal of a formal organization, representative of them or of protests, indicates their fear of a formal structure that may not be representative of all voices. Also, the national council for support comprised of human rights militants both Islamists and leftists, civil society, academics, and few businessmen was viewed by youth as a voice that does represent the marginalized, and

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66 Interview with a member of Tansikiyat in Marrakesh. Interview conducted on November 2013.
67 Interview with an activist in Tansikiyat of Rabat. Interview conducted in October 2013.
68 Interview with an activist in Tansikiyat of Casablanca. Interview conducted in February 2014.
the average citizen. Additionally, it was not perceived as a body that can effectively “prescribe correct mode of action” without having political ideologies collide (that of extreme left and that of Adl Wal Ihsane). 70 Youth assertion that decisions should be taken through a democratic process (public assembly), and the emphasis on the leaderless aspect of the movement, constitute the weak element of the movement. 71 Yet, Tansikiyats see the costs of having such a formal structure greater than its benefits. For example, while the national council for support (مجلس الدعم) played an effective role in mobilizing resources and providing financial support to the movement, its political decisions were viewed as domination and control particularly by Tansikiyats that are far from the center of Rabat and Casablanca. From the instrumental rationality perspective—that is of resource mobilization—activists saw the utility of the national council in its “political encadrement—political education” rather than its “patterning of the resources.” 72 The encadrement utility later proved to be a weakness in the national council’s role.

According to Chaouki Lotfi, the lack of a unified strategic vision, and the contradictions among the components of the national council illustrated its weakness in providing political encadrement to the movement. 73

**What is the Puzzle?**

Morocco stands out as relatively stable country and as Spiegel puts it “Morocco portrays itself as bastion of calm in a troubled region, the Arab world’s model of reform,” and it represents a model worth examining to understand different contexts of

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70 “Prescribe correct mode of action” is a phrase borrowed from C. A. Rootes (1991).
71 Interviews with Professor Maati Monjib as member of the national council for support (Rabat, November 2013).
contention. For Morocco, the Makhzanian authority is not only part of the political repertoire, but part of the social fabric as well. This is because the Moroccan Makhzan relies tremendously on symbolic politics, and the traditional legitimacy that the monarchy draws from its 350 years of existence.

Morocco also witnessed social unrest during the “Arab Spring.” However, as compared to the citizen-led initiatives in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, efforts to demand change in Morocco resulted in measured reforms that lack substance. Nevertheless, given the dynamics of the MENA region, Moroccan political activists are emboldened, recognizing that now it is the time to make more demands and enhance their bargaining power. *February 20* activists recognized Maghraoui’s argument that “Morocco may not be in a pre-revolutionary moment, but piece meal reforms will not turn back the tide of change.” Many analysts like Mohamed Sassi and Nabila Mounib contend that Morocco may not witness a complete fall of a regime, but the regime may evolve to a democratic one where the king rules and does not govern, and where the entourage of the king does not intervene in the politics of the country. Also, Issander El Amrani argues that the “thirst for change and accountability is real” and that people are not only fighting for basic rights; but also to reform the political repertoire within which these rights can be exercised. This is because the political sphere is where the fundamental orientations of a

74 Avi, Spiegel. Just another King’s Speech? (Spring 2011).
76 Nabila Mounib is a professor of law in Casablanca, an activist, and member of Ishitiraki mouhad in Morocco. Mohamed Sassi is also a professor of law in Rabat, a political activist, and a member of Ishitiraki mouhad as well. Both Mounib and Sassi are respected political analysts and activists in Morocco. A roundtable discussion organized by MADA center in November 2011.
society are defined and where the decisions concerning the principals of domination over social life are made.\(^{78}\)

The objective of social mobilization in Morocco is to change the power at the center (خلق التوارن بين السلط). For example, \textit{February 20} Tansikiyats (while autonomous) demand “a democratic package that needs concurrent consideration and re-alignment.”\(^{79}\) \textit{February 20} activists vowed to never be “‘subjects’” again but citizens with full rights and responsibilities. The regional dynamics have helped waken dormant forces to stand against what some called “تشرختين ضد الحكرة والخضوع”—that is a cry against humiliation and exclusion. So understanding the \textit{February 20} movement, through its Tansikiyats, is important given its presence, nature, and mode of mobilization as well as its ideas and practice in light of what scholars call “Arab Spring” revolutions.

First, there is also a considerable disagreement among Moroccan scholars about whether \textit{February 20} is a movement or it is a dynamikiya—ديناميكية.\(^{80}\) Example of those who subscribe to this view is Hassan Tariq and Khadija Marouazi.\(^{81}\) Political scientist Mohamed Tozy also subscribes to the same line of thinking. He reasons that,

في اعتقادي فإن العشرين من فبراير ليست حركة، بل هي سياق يمكننا من دور الفاعلين، و في هذا السياق هناك شباب متحزب و آخر غير متحزب، و لدينا العدل و لاحسان بوصفها جماعة دعوية تحاول أن تنتقل الى الفعل السياسي في المرحلة المقبلة...\(^{82}\)

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\(^{79}\) National Democratic Institute’s country director analysis on \textit{February 20} movement, discussion took place in 2011 during a visit to Morocco.

\(^{80}\) Hassan Tariq and Khadija Marouazi used the word ‘dynamikiya’ to describe the \textit{February 20} movement as a dynamic of protests with specific demands, and according to them since the movement did not have an outcome such as changing the regime, then it could not be referred to as a social movement.

\(^{81}\) Marouazi, K. is professor of Human Sciences Department at Ibn Tofail University in Kenitra and a human rights activist, and the executive director of le Mediateur pour droits et democratie in Rabat. Tariq, H. is a professor of political science at the University of Sitat, and a member of parliament representing USFP.

\(^{82}\) Mohamed Tozy is a political scientist in the university of Rabat and the director of Ecole de Governance et Economie de Rabat. Tozy is a respected political scientist, but who is pro-Makhzan and whose analysis is an alignment to the Makhzan’s narrative.

\url{http://www.tanja24.com/news5537.html}
“In my opinion, the twentieth of February is not a movement, but it is a context that has highlighted the role of actors, and in this context there are youth who are partisan and non-partisan, and Adl Wal Ihsane as a preaching group trying to engage in political action for the next phase…” 83

By investigating the nature of February 20 Tansikiyats, this project challenges this thinking, brings to light the underlying lines of dissent, 84 and helps deflate the discourse of “implicit or explicit exceptionalism” that partly resulted in Morocco’s mobilization being on the “sidelines of the intellectual trend” of social movements’ debate. 85

Tozy’s argument is expected given the fact that he is considered (مثقف الدولة—the intellectual of the state). While Tozy is respected for his analysis, it is a known fact that his line of analysis always aligns with the Makhzan’s goal of downplaying the relevance of the February 20 movement. As for Merouazi and Tariq’s argument about February 20 movement being a dynamikiya (ديناميكية), it does stem from their belief that social movements must have concrete outcomes (bring down the regime for example). In their view, February 20 is a dynamic because it has not resulted in regime change. For them, policy outcomes and reforms are not enough of an outcome therefore, protests and collective mobilization of February 20 can only qualify as a dynamic—a mode of public expression of frustration. While Merouazi and Tariq are respected scholars in their respective fields, their political affiliation speaks volumes about their stand vis-à-vis the February 20 movement. Merouazi is a member of the political bureau of the Modernity and Authenticity (PAM), a party that was created by King IV best friend and advisor Fouad Ali Himma in 2007. Tariq is a member of parliament and of the political bureau of

83 Translation by the author of this study.
85 Joel Beinin and Frederick Vairel. Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2011).
Union des Forces Socialists Populaires (USFP), a party that is in opposition to the current government, but pro-Makhzan. Law professor Mohamed Mounchih counters Marouazi, Tariq, and Tozy’s argument maintaining that,

"شباب 20 فبراير كان في البداية لحظة فتحول الى دعوة فاصبح حركة...حركة رافعة لمعادلة الاصلاح الدستوري و السياسي ورمزانة من المطالب و الشعارات يؤطرها عنوان عريض: هو "التغيير", شباب يقولون بكل وضوح ولا مواربة "الديمقراطية هنا و الآن", "الديمقراطية اليوم و ليس غدا".

February 20 was initially a moment that turned into a call for protest then to a movement... a movement to bring about constitutional and political reform, a movement that produced a list of demands and slogans under the broader banner of “change,” youth clearly and unequivocally said, “democracy here and now,” and “democracy today and not tomorrow.”

While movements in Morocco have always operated under the same political culture and political structures, what varies is the nature of their grievances, adaptation of new narratives, frames of their claims and how they are facilitated or constrained by political opportunities, and how the Makhzan employs various forms of repression and specific strategies vis-à-vis the February 20 movement, its Tansikiyats, and its components. It is worth noting that the February 20 movement has specific characteristics with regard to the dynamics of mobilization. In a blog entry called “Echaab Yourid—People Want...الشعب يريد...”), Ahmed Bouachrine Ansari outlined the main characteristics of February 20. He summarized them into four points:

- حركة 20 فبراير حركة سياسية—February 20 is a political movement
- حركة 20 فبراير حركة شعبية جماهيرية—February 20 movement is a popular movement
- حركة 20 فبراير حركة ميدانية—February 20 movement is a street movement
- حركة 20 فبراير حركة وحدوية—February 20 movement is a unifying movement


This study focuses attention on examining *February 20* movement in depth and particularly from the perspective of activists within its Tansikiyats, and on asking the question: why and how *February 20* movement formed these Tansikiyats that act independently, yet they are an integral part of the larger movement in Morocco. While it is imperative to understand *February 20* movement outcomes, the most important piece that deserves studying is the nature of its Tansikiyats: actors, frames, dynamics, and claims. This is important because Tansikiyats are part of the theoretical project of developing what Guidry labels as a broader, “more dynamic and fluid conception of the terrain of collective action”\(^{88}\) of the *February 20* movement. Another plausible argument is that one cannot understand *February 20* movement, without investigating the localized dynamics and forms of its collective action. Additionally, these Tansikiyats are geographically far from each other, but they cooperate, interconnect, and link local issues to the macro-level claims of the movement outlined in the founding platform of the movement (أرضية تأسسية).

Many analysts have wondered about the *February 20* Tansikiyats as they awakened “historically oppressed, ignored, and silenced” grassroots.\(^{89}\) This project also is an attempt to explain the emergence of Tansikiyats, their relevance and importance in studying the *February 20* movement with its newly articulated demands for a deeper political change.

Referring by analogy to Latin America movements and using Vanden’s language on local organizing, Moroccan scholar Benabdalaoui argues that through the localized

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\(^{89}\) Borrowing Guidry’s words.
Tansikiyats, the *February 20* movement has been able to “take politics out of the palace and the halls of the institutions, where elitist politics and traditional class dominated, and into their space—the villages, communities, and the streets they can control.”

The same analysts also observe that *February 20* is a response to the social and political dissatisfaction felt by popular sectors in Morocco. In this case, using again Vanden’s terminology, the *February 20* movement has engaged in the “development of a new repertoire of action that broke with the old forms of political activity and began to tie individuals members together in a strong forged localized action, and protest in new ways—to expand their repertoire of contentious actions, as might better respond to their needs.”

*February 20* sought to expand the concept of “substantive representation” through claim-making at the local level. Many *February 20* activists spoke passionately about how the movement extended the space for contesting state power not only in urban centers of Rabat, Casablanca, Tangiers, and Marrakesh, but in small towns such as Taghjijt, Ait Mdir, Guelemin, Taza, and Sefrou to list just few. Activists eloquently articulate that protests reached into deeper Morocco-تغلغل الحراك في المغرب العميق.

The Tansikiyats, in this view, help the movement penetrate the country side and the small towns, and remain vibrant despite the state’s efforts to repress it.

Using John Guidry’s analysis on social movements and public sphere, I also argue that through localized Tansikiyats, the *February 20* movement aims to gain “more

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91 Vanden (2007).
visibility and clarity” or what Guidry refers to as “the struggle to be seen.” With this view, “movement actors work the linkages back and forth between the everyday life and politics and in so doing develop important connections between spaces and the larger political system,”93 as they look for new political structures that allow them –indeed, encourage—their participation, and seek forms of political organization that they could call their own.94 This view advances the idea that Tansikiyats are autonomous, self-organized, locally driven and loosely linked. This study found that Tansikiyats are connected informally and use the founding platform known as Ardiya Taassissiya (ارضية تاسسية) as master frames that bring everyone together under February 20 movement umbrella.

Another view contends that while the Tansikiyats are autonomous, and they carve out their separate spaces in which to develop strategies or a broader discourse, they are also important in developing frames of “resonance” that are crucial to popular mobilization (February 20) in Morocco. Since the phenomenon of grassroots politicization is new in Morocco, protesting under the umbrella of February 20 helps Tansikiyats understand the necessity of “popular protest transcending its purely social origins and forms of struggle, to reaching out to political arena,”95 or as Aziz Hlaoua puts it, “التأسيس للنفس اصلاحي جديد—to build a renewed spirit for political reform.”96

In light of these views and for the purpose of this study, I argue that the creation of these Tansikiyats is a strategy and an important innovation of the movement, not just

95 Vanden (2007).
96 Interview with Aziz Hlaoua in November 2013 in Rabat.
an adaption or a response to the political culture and the particularities of Morocco. These Tansikiyats are autonomous and self-governed and self-organized. Among the reasons for the movement strategy is 1) the need to bring more visibility to the movement at the local level, 2) become a popular movement (حراك شعبي), 3) ensure independence, and 4) prevent becoming vulnerable to the monopoly and the manipulation of Makhzanian political parties that may hijack the cause of the movement. February 20

Tansikiyats expand the base of protests to include grassroots from the different ideological spectrum (Islamist both moderate and Adl Wal Ihsane—العدل الإحسان, secular—الليستين, extreme left—اليسار الجدري, and independents—المستقلين), and to reach out to rural communities, and marginalized areas (قلب الاحياء الشعبية) by diversifying their approach, and forms of protests (ممرات, sit-ins, جلسات, and standings). Lack of coverage from state media (التعتيم الإعلامي) forced actors to think creatively to expand the protests in various regions (المغرب العميق). Through Tansikiyats citizens and local activists learn about the movement and that grassroots are able to “make sense of events,” and understand what the movement is about, and subsequently decides their “subjective involvement” in its collective action. People make better sense of what is local, and not anything that is part of a far away world. Moreover, February 20 movement’s multiple forms of collective action emerge and operate in local conditions of being. That is why one finds that these local protests emerge under different names and forms such Tansikiyats—الرابطة, coalitions—الائتلافات, or association—التنسقيات.

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97 Using Erving Goffman terminology.
This study is an attempt to examine the nature of Tansikiyats and how they are linked to the February 20 umbrella, as well how they link local claims to the macro-level political claims. This study however, was not set out to compare February 20 Tansikiyats, but to analyze and investigate their local organizing to strategically study February 20 movement in Morocco from the perspective of activists within its Tansikiyats.

While some may argue that Tansikiyats focus their “resistance strategies on local projects,” using Yashar’s terminology on local organizing in Latin America, I contend that this organizing experience has “a great deal to offer in February 20 struggle.” The Tansikiyats share the commitment to organize and defend the values of justice, dignity, and push for deeper political reforms in Morocco. Organizing as Tansikiyats is a strong indication that citizens no longer want to be “marginalized from political debates.” Tansikiyats opened a new space to “contest power from below and engage in innovative organizing against injustice.” Tansikiyats replaced the traditional methods of organizing with more contentious strategies that directly challenge power at the local level. Or as February 20 activists explicate, the people gave a slap on the face to the Makhzanian culture.

Tansikiyats are autonomous and decentralized, yet connected. Since the beginning of the movement, activists across Morocco agreed to obey by the “values agreement” (الميثاق الأخلاقي) that determined criteria for affiliation and commitment within the
movement. *February 20* Tansikiyats were united around themes of citizenship and social justice. The *February 20* movement is referred to as an “open pot” (وعاء مفتوح) to which every citizen can belong to without exception.\(^\text{104}\)

The scholarly community may assert that the decentralized approach of the movement leads us to consider tensions or competiveness that could emerge between and among Tansikiyats. Yet, based on interviews, over eighty percent disagree with this notion arguing that there is a sense of solidarity among Tansikiyats as exemplified by how they supported each other when the Makhzan responded violently to protest, how they circulated information to garner support and solidarity, and how activists visited various Tansikiyats to strategize.

By “employing less institutionalized forms of action,” Tansikiyats have the “freedom to build their protests in the way that best suits their particular conditions on the ground.”\(^\text{105}\) This freedom is important particularly given the influx of activists, such as rural grassroots population and former members of other movements (unemployed graduates for example), who provide a fresh perspective and innovative ideas, and “focus on the importance of constructing space to most effectively harness the creative potential of activists.”\(^\text{106}\)

My goal is to utilize social movement theories to study the *February 20* movement through its local Tansikiyats. My hope is that this case study will add to the

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\(^{104}\) The term “open pot” is borrowed from Nabil Tarabloussi. *February 20: Reading in the Process of a Facebook Idea that Transformed into an Active and Effective Movement*—*Point of View*—Vol. 18, No. 55 (Winter 2013): 26-98.

\(^{105}\) Martin (November 2008).

\(^{106}\) Ibid quoting Bunnage and Stepan-Norris (2004); Voss and Sherman (2000).
growing case base that feeds into broadening, reformulating, and reworking of theory.\textsuperscript{107}

Within the scope of this inquiry, I used an approach that is sensitive to the localized context of the \textit{February 20} movement to understand the conditions that enabled the formation of its Tansikiyats, and why (while independent) they become important in the broader plight of the movement’s struggle. Tansikiyats are relevant as they tell a nuanced story about the distinct mobilization experience of the \textit{February 20} movement in Morocco.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{Significance of the Study}

Specifically, this study offers a more nuanced and analytical story about the \textit{February 20} movement with its major components (مكونات الحراك), its Tansikiyats, frames, and processes; and illustrates how contentious collective action can directly or indirectly transform existing patterns of political authority and opening up the political space. This case study also expands the pool of cases and builds on Guigni, Burstien, Eidnwohner, and Hollander’s work on moving away from “the dichotomy of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ or even the idea of ‘outcomes’…to considering ‘consequences’ that go beyond the intended goal of collective action.”\textsuperscript{109} This, in turn, contributes to the theoretical shift that reframes old debates about movements ‘outcomes’ and the relation between movements and regimes.\textsuperscript{110}

Furthermore, this project sheds light on the specific context within which collective action takes place. With that perspective, it subsequently helps us resist what

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Localized problematic is a term borrowed from Massalo (1999).
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Oliver, Cadena-Roa, & Strawn (2003), 286. Also, see Guigni (1998), Burstien, Eidnwohner, and Hollander’s (1995)
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Oliver, Cadena-Roa, & Strawn (2003), 286.
\end{itemize}
Edelman refers to as “grand theoretical” generalizations because close-up views of collective action often looks messy, with activists groups, and coalitions forming, dividing, and reassembling with significant sectors of their target constituencies remaining on the sidelines.”\footnote{111} It also reminds us to not “easily forget the critical importance of what we study. The people who make social movements are trying to change the world, trying to promote their visions of peace, justice, and social progress—sometimes at great personal risk.”\footnote{112}

This study differs from the existing or previous studies of movements in Morocco in three significant aspects: first, it contributes to our knowledge by adding an understanding of the significance of youth playing a major role in the success or consequences of these movements; second, it provides new perspective on youth movements that emerged with the Arab Spring; and third, it presents a story about a decentralized movement such as the February 20 movement that counters the story that collective action in Morocco is only about “demands of bread—مطالب خبزية” or demands of specific groups (labor, students, Islamists movements) to a story about broader demands of justice, dignity, and freedom.\footnote{113} From a broader perspective, this case study constitutes a modest contribution to a new and rich debate on social movements and illustrates this “resurgence of varied kinds of struggles against inequality.”\footnote{114}

\footnote{111} Ibid.
\footnote{113} While youth are part of the February 20 movement as it includes other components and categories beyond the youth., but since youth were launched the call for protest, the movement is labeled as a youth movement (حرك شبابي).
Morocco was chosen as a case study for a number of reasons. First, it can potentially illustrate that social collective action despite the deep social and historical roots of inequality and repression imposed by the rigidity of the regime, can take on the task of deepening democracy. Such action affects the scope and boundaries of public politics, while challenging the exclusionary character of the authoritarian regime. This is a case where social forces (February 20) tie local problems to larger issues of political exclusion and lack of accountability and corruption as well as a case where the street became a political actor.

Furthermore, the February 20 movement is a decentralized collective action with more than 114 Tansikiyats across the country (Tansikiyats—تنسقيات محلية). Secondly, the decentralization of the movement to reach other cities far from the urban centers is a new phenomenon in Morocco that has not been witnessed before. Thirdly, this is one of the unique cases where the study of collective action has mostly focused on Islamist, students, feminist, and labor movements and where little attention has been paid to studying collective action (February 20), with such interesting local Tansikiyats, that demands the expansion of public politics and within the domain of contentious politics.

This study contributes knowledge towards a deeper understanding of the February 20 movement as it examines narratives of activists in Tansikiyats and tells a story about the movement from their perspective. Finally, this is a perfect case to apply “the tools that social science has developed for the rest of the world, while it is a complex and fascinating laboratory, not only to confirm the applicability of social movement
theories but also to enrich our theoretical knowledge of social movements and other forms of political contestation.”

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CHAPTER 2 – FEBRUARY 20 MOVEMENT COMPONENTS

Introduction

This section provides an overview about February 20 components. February 20 has different tendencies as it embodies the various components (مكونات مختلفة و متعددة) in Morocco particularly that of the Justice and Charity (JC or Adl Wal Ihsane), the Amazigh, and youth. In other words, February 20 is “cross-section of young activists running the gamut from previously unaffiliated Facebook users, members of Amazigh associations and various leftist groups, to members of the officially banned but reluctantly tolerated Islamist movement, the Adl Wal Ihsane (Justice and Charity).” 116 Despite that these groups have different histories, trajectories and political agendas, February 20 movement brought these actors under its umbrella.

Youth at the Core of February 20

Like other Arab countries, youth predominates in relation to the total population in Morocco. While today’s youth refuse to engage in the “silencing of the self” 117 as way to internalize repression and exclusion, they were also caught in the dilemma of co-optation and the pitfall of irrelevance. Intrepid attempts by youth activists to assert themselves, including the formation of several youth organizations calling for youth

116 Weitzman (2011). Important to note that even though the movement includes youth, Amazigh, and Adl Wal Ihsane, it is labeled as a youth movement because youth took the initiative to launch the call for protests.
117 “Silencing the self” is a term borrowed from Dana Jack scholarly work.
empowerment, civic and political participation. Youth tried to structure themselves in a manner that demands democracy, inclusion and economic and political empowerment. Yet, they continue to be excluded from the position of political power and the decision-making process. By the government being preoccupied by the narrative of stability, especially after the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, youth issues seem to be addressed by non-governmental organizations, youth associations, or they find creative ways for expression such as art and music (Boulevard festival) to convey their disapproval of government policies and the political system itself.

Historically, Moroccan youth have expressed their discontent with the Makhzan and the most recent expression before February 20 was the 2007 legislative elections in which many youth took a stand not to vote. In a country “where activism, detainment and torture have been closely linked, this fear is not easily overcome.”

One should cast a critical perspective on the “menace of exclusion.” The inadequacy of state policies in addressing youth issues or including them in political and policy formation processes is among the factors that trigger discontent. With the increasing strength of reactionary government policies, and the parallel focus on stability discourse, youth issues in Morocco were increasingly ignored and the distinctive role of youth in politics never has been seriously considered. Their activism efforts have been faded as countering extremism policies continue to occupy the space.

The contribution youth make to political and social change includes the call for youth political participation. Youth in Morocco continue to learn new ways of how to shatter the symbols of power that most Moroccans revere as they continue to push the boundaries to have their voice heard. In the context of the February 20 movement and eloquently put by Azzedine M, —youth are key partners in the process of change. —

**Who Are the Febrayeyeens?**

The increased exposure level of youth to ideas from the MENA region facilitated by information communication technology (ICT) and the internet contributed to the growth of interest among youth to connect and learn from each other. These youth are particularly middle-class with more access to information, and who felt their exclusion from the politics even more sharply than the marginalized youth did. These youth have devoted much attention to the ideas diffused during the Arab Uprising to help other youth get involved and stimulate marginalized youth to challenge their silence and their "hogra." The diffusion of ideas particularly from Tunisia and Egypt awakened a large segment of society and re-informed the appeal for demanding change in Morocco. So, Morocco is not exceptional, February 20 participants were generally deprived, oppressed and marginalized. By and large, February 20 attracted citizens and youth that state policies have failed over the last few decades.

Youth particularly grassroots and marginalized segment of society felt an acute sense of relative deprivation resulting from the prevailing economic, social, and political

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119 Interview with Azzdine Maliri in October 2013.
conditions. These conditions are seen as large-scale repression exerted by the Makhzanian policies. This affected youth populations particularly that youth population exceeds 50 percent of the society. The economic, social, and political conditions coupled with other institutional and systemic injustices, the denial of rights and the practices of ‘hogra’ are a major source of discontent, which provided insufficient reasons for many to support the status quo. The economic deprivation was somehow tolerated when compared to other values such as respect, security, communality, self-actualization, status etc.\textsuperscript{120} With the Arab Spring uprising, the demonstration effect—exposure to the outside world, raised expectations for Moroccan youth to demand better policies and end political marginalization.\textsuperscript{121}

Through \textit{February 20}, powerless individuals were empowered. While the leading activists within Tansikiyats represented a middle class whose parents were militants during the years of lead of 1970s and 1980s, protesters represented various classes including grassroots. The representation of the elite class however, was limited given its historical ties with the Makhzan. In Morocco, the elite class holds social, economic, and political power. Its interests are linked to those of the Makhzan so they regarded \textit{February 20} as a threat looming larger, particularly as they sought to defend the status quo.

On balance, research interviews found that participants that are more visible and leading activities within Tansikiyats tend to be educated, politically aware, and connected

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{121} Demonstration effect is among Gurr’s four sources of rising expectations: “demonstration effect”—exposure to the outside world; “introduction of new ideological belief”; improvement in reference group’s position; and contradiction in value positions.
\end{footnotesize}
through the blogosphere and ICT with other activists in MENA. Most of *February 20* activists are primarily individuals who also were former members of organizations and political parties. In other words, these actors were previously trained in political parties or civil society organizations. They therefore benefited from trainings and debates that took place within civil society and political parties. This has helped youth acquire discursive capacities.\textsuperscript{122} The independent participants (with no prior political or civic affiliation) were mostly from grassroots and preferred to engage in protests without being overly visible. For them, Tansikiyats represented an opportunity to learn and build their political awareness with less risk. In an interview, the famous blogger and activist of the *February 20* movement, Najib Chawki explained that the majority of the *February 20* activists are less than forty years old (نشطاء حركة 20 فبراير شباب دون الأربعين). These youth rebelled against the political, social, economic, and cultural traditional values (تمرد شبابي على القيم التقليدية السائدة على المستوى السياسي وعلى المستوى الاجتماعي وعلى المستوى الاقتصادي وأيضا ثقافيا).\textsuperscript{123}

**A Structured Movement within an Unstructured Movement: Al-Adl Wal Ihsane**

In Morocco, Islamists groups are many, yet the two main groups are: Justice and Charity (JC) or what is called in Arabic Adl Wal Ihsane -- العدل و الاحسان, and Justice and Development (PJD) that is a registered legal party.\textsuperscript{124} PJD did not participate officially in *February 20*. So this section looks into Adl Wal Ihsane as a component of the *February 20* movement. JC is a complex and structured movement that decided to join the *February 20* movement and expressed its willingness to form alliances with other components (left, radical left for instance). I do not wish to delve into the ideological

\textsuperscript{122} Based on an interview with activist H. M. Interview took place in October 2013.

\textsuperscript{123} Interview quoting Najib Chawki posted originally in Lakome, reposted in Maghress: [http://www.maghress.com/lakome/11103](http://www.maghress.com/lakome/11103)

\textsuperscript{124} Adl Wal Ihsane and JC are used interchangeably.
realm of Adl Wal Ihsane because other scholars such as Zeghal, Lauziere, Maddy-Weitzeman, Elahmadi, Hamoudi, and Motaouakel have extensively explored it.  

It is worth noting that Adl Wal Ihsane is the only Islamic group in Morocco that does not practice the politics of proximity with the palace. JC’s political logic is that there is no sacredness of the king and no recognition of the monarchy as a system of governance -- لايعترفون بقداسة الملك أو الملكية كنظام سياسي --. Adl Wal Ihsane does not recognize the religious stance of the monarchy (rule of the game) so participation in the political process is a way of recognition, which consequently would be co-optation. For JC, the cost of participation is higher (co-optation), while remaining outside the institutional game may (one day) provide the opportunity to influence future politics. Adl Wal Ihsane maintains that the state aims to politicize Islam rather than Islamize politics. However, critics of JC contend that it is a group that is traditional, backward, and obscure (تقليداني، رجعي، ضلالي).

The insight here is that Adl Wal Ihsane is a model of a group in which charismatic leadership, ideology, and structure played a role in its growth, expansion, and sustainability. Historically, Adl Wal Ihsane has been transformed from a Da’oua (preaching) organization to a political player in Morocco. In 1997, Adl Wal Ihsane established the political committee to review and advise on political matters. This constituted a strategic move towards a political agenda. A movement like Adl wal-Ihsane,

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125 See Zeghal, 2005; Lauziere, 2005; Maddy-Weitzeman 2006; Elahmadi, 2006; Hamoudi, 2010; and Motaouakel, 2014.
127 Cavatorta (2007).
dynamic and continuously growing, cannot get stuck in a fixed format all the time argues Motaouakel.

The aim is not to trace its structural changes, but to shed light on how it transformed from a *Da`oua* association to a movement with a complex structure, yet coherent and succinct. Motaouakel notes that, “Adl Wal Ihsane organizational structure reflects to some extent the prevailing stifling political mood in the country.”

JC has always been flexible in reconfiguring itself within the Moroccan political context. To put it briefly in the words of Motaouakel, JC “has exploited every opportunity to make its voice heard, and has exhibited a lot of creativity to foil the Makhzan’s strategies or turn them to its advantage.” While it is not perfect and still faces several challenges, the movement is rational in its approach given that “in some cases it finds itself compelled to undertake, not what appears best or preferable, but rather what is possible.”

The chart below provides an overview of Adl Wal Ihsane’s formation, growth, and structure:

**Table 1: Chronology of Adl Wal Ihsane Formation, Growth and Structure.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/ Period</th>
<th>Formation / Structure/ Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1981 to 1986 | ➢ Name of the movement is “Usrat-Al-Jamaa”  
➢ Educating of members and expansion of membership.  
➢ No local, regional or national committees.  
➢ Name remains the same “Usrat Al-Jamaa” |

129 Lakmouch (2013).  
131 Ibid., 100.  
132 Ibid., 98.  
133 This information was compiled from Motaouakel (2014) research on Adl Wal Ihsane.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Key Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1991 to 1998  | - Expanding the executive council, fineness strategy for members’ involvement. Revamping structure by adding and removing committee. Nine committees in total. Creating affiliating committees at the local and regional level.  
|               | - Establishing a consultative assembly to debate issues of special importance.  
|               | - Providing women members opportunity to improve and secure their organizational independence within the movement. |
| 1998 to 2011  | - Establishing the political section of the movement.                        
|               | - Dissolving the executive council.                                          
|               | - Women section became structurally independent.                             
|               | - Establishing task groups: lawyers, human rights, council of scholars, leadership training, writers’ league, and support committee. |
| 2011 to present | - Continuing the improvement of structures to operate coherently.            
|               | - Creating a high level planning committee (in 2012) for a more integrated structure. |
|               | - JC continue to search for the best legitimate way to formally enter politics without giving in to the rule of game (recognizing the superiority of the monarch as a religious leader). |

**Adl Wal Ihsane Religious Ideology**

The ideological tenets of Adl Wal Ihsane derive from Islam and most importantly from the method of Al-Minhaj an- Nabawi (prophetic method) that Sheikh Abdessalame Yassine studied and followed. According to Motaouakel, the tenets are outlined as follow:

- Rejecting violence categorically
- Rejecting underground activism
- Being independent organizationally and financially
- Rejecting monopoly or exclusive representation of Islam or Muslims (no one has the monopoly over that)

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134 This chart was adopted from Motaouakel (2014) work on Adl Wal Ihsane.
- Refuting the idea of ascribing to *Jahiliya* (ignorance) to Muslims. Moroccan society is not completely disconnected from Islam.\(^{136}\)
- Believing in gradual change, flexibility, and dialogue as a way for settling differences or searching for a common platform to undertake the reforms.
- Emphasizing moral and spiritual education, effective organization, civic and political engagement.

In general, Adl Wal Ihsane’s thinking can be summarized in the triangle of spirituality, social, and political activity shown below.

![Adl Wal Ihsane Triangle of Spirituality, Social and Political Activity](image)

**Figure 3: Adl Wal Ihsane Triangle of Spirituality, Social and Political Activity**

On the religious aspect, Adl Wal Ihsane believes that education of individuals is important to the success of the movement. Sheikh Yassine believes that knowledge precedes actions.\(^{137}\) On the social, speaking for the marginalized and helping the needy is

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\(^{137}\) Abdelouahed, Motaouakel. “Al-Adl wal-Ihsan: An Explanation of its Rise and its Strategy for Social and Political Reform in Morocco.” PhD Dissertation in Arab and Islamic Studies. University of Exeter (2014). [https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/14880/MotaouakalA.pdf?sequence=1](https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/14880/MotaouakalA.pdf?sequence=1). It must be noted that Motaouakel is the leader of the political circle of Adl Wal Ihsane. Adl Wal Ihsane has two important decision making bodies: the first is the majlis Irchad (guidance council) that provides the religious guidance of the movement, and the second is the Da’era sisyassiya (political
central to achieving social justice. JC calls for a return to “true” Islam; the terms “justice” and “spirituality” were from the Koran (90:16): “God advocates justice, charity, and regarding the relatives.” On the political side, Adl Wal Ihsane clearly voices its political position on issues, but does not participate in the political game. For JC, the question is why participate when the rules of the game are already rigged. It does not perceive that there is a real political process in Morocco. Accordingly, because the rules are rigged, Adl Wal Ihsane is afraid it would not be able to deliver to its constituencies if they participate. So Adl Wal Ihsane reverted to withdrawing support to the monarch (Étienne de La Boétie concept of power withdrawal). Some critics however, argue that Adl Wal Ihsane’s decision not to participate in the political game may be viewed as a self-defeating strategy that can result in a costly isolation (see Cavatorta, 2007; Lakmouch, 2013; and Cherkaoui, 2014).

Adl Wal Ihsane is a non-violent movement. Until today, the movement remained banned (جماعة محضورة). Since its inception, Adl Wal Ihsane criticized King’s policy and governance. Sheikh Yassine’s two famous publications serve as evidence to that. In 1974 under Hassan II, Yassine published Al Islam aw Attofan (Islam or the deluge), and in 2000 under the reign of Mohamed IV, he published Mozakkira Ilan Man yahomoho alamr (Memorandum to whom it may concern), a 35-page document in French urging the King

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138 Soage Belen (Fall 2013).
to get rid of corrupt people, give people their wealth back in order to regain the public trust.\textsuperscript{140}

Since then, Adl Wal Ihsane has faced violent repression by the Makhzan and for that reason it chose to issue public statements instead of demonstrating in the street. Makhzan repression included smear campaign against Adl Wal Ihsane, and formally banning the movement in January 1990 without an official court order.\textsuperscript{141} Hence, in early years JC benefited from the government repression to build a wide grassroots base and followers. Makhzan crackdown on JC contributed to: 1) enhancing its weight politically, 2) building more support and broadening its base, and 3) urging members to come together in support of their leaders, dispelling any misconceptions, and establishing a strong movement.\textsuperscript{142} Makhzan repression forced JC to rethink its strategy on cohesion and determination to continue the struggle.\textsuperscript{143} In this case, Motalouakel contends that repression had an opposite effect. While the Makhzan aimed to suppress the movement and abort its emergence, the opposite occurred as JC solidified its existence and “secured a firm place in the social and political firmament of the Morocco.”\textsuperscript{144}

Also, the Makhzan strategy to constrain Adl Wal Ihsane outreach to a wider audience, particularly when Sheikh Yassine was put under house arrest from 1989 to 2000, pushed the movement to retool its outreach approach and explore alternative ways to reach its audience such as books, audio-tapes, publications, and tapes of speeches.

\textsuperscript{141} Lakmouch (2013).
\textsuperscript{142} Motalouakel (2014).
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 71.
Since its inception, Adl Wal Ihsane continued to maintain self-control and a non-violence approach to its struggle. Motaouakel writes,

“whatever the provocation… Adl Wal Ihsane continues to speak loudly against the corrupt practices of an autocratic regime earned al-Adl Wal Ihsane the respect and admiration of many Moroccan people. No wonder that within two years, that is, from January 1990 to January 1992, the movement saw the greatest increase in its base since its inception in September 1981.”

*Adl Wal Ihsane: Yassine’s Leadership and Charisma*

Adl Wal Ihsane followers obey the decision of the leadership, as Soage Belen elucidates “Yassine put great emphasis on obedience (*ta’aa*--طاعة), and his organization was molded as a pyramidal structure with the murshid—i.e., Yassine himself—on top.” Adl Wal Ihsane murshid (leader) is Abdessalam Yassine, a charismatic leader with not only a spiritual, but a political vision as well. The charisma of the murshid is important in the structure of Adl Wal Ihsane. As Max Weber notes, “the term ‘charisma’ will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”

A distinctive feature of Adl Wal Ihsane, according to Motouakal, is the attributes of Abdessalam Yassine as a charismatic leader. On the subject of charismatic leadership, Asef Bayat notes,

“for Weber the activities of groups derive primarily from their adherence to a particular belief system. Ideas and symbols, therefore, play a fundamental role in social change; and groups are activated principally by charismatic leaders

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145 Ibid., 100.
who are able to galvanize people committed to a particular idea.”\(^{148}\) In this perspective, leadership manifests the personification of the emotion, energy and desire of the participants. The expressed ideas of the leaders are assumed to be internalized by the constituencies, thus making up the ideology of the movement.”\(^ {149}\)

In general, what makes JC attractive and popular is the qualifications and qualities of its leader Sheikh Yassine. Because of his intellectual mind, the depth of his knowledge, and his charismatic appeal, “even those who disagreed totally or partially with his line of thinking recognized his talents, sincerity and his courage to say “no” and in powerful ways.”\(^ {150}\) Motaouakal has done an excellent job surveying and critiquing the literature on Adl Wal Ihsane. He argues that JC is not just an ideological movement, but a political entrepreneur that evolved over time. He tries to debunk opponents’ argument that Sheikh Yassine “was the movement,” by demonstrating that Yassine’s charisma was central to the movement expansion in its early stages, but the movement as an organization has always “sought to modify, update or rethink its structures and diversify its activities so every individual can find a place and get involved.”\(^ {151}\)

Using Chatterjee’s concept of inner (spiritual) and outer (rational) domains is another entry point to understand Adl Wal Ihsane.\(^ {152}\) Its inner domain is constituted by “an Islam that combines the conservative Maliki school of Islam typical of Morocco with Sufi mysticism.”\(^ {153}\) The inner domain is the basis for its unique activism and its complexity. Adl Wal Ihsane adapted what is known as “the 3 NOs”: no to violence, no to

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\(^{148}\) Bayat (2005).

\(^{149}\) Ibid.

\(^{150}\) Motaouakal (2014).

\(^{151}\) Ibid.


underground activism, no to any ties or affiliation with any foreign entity or party. By envisioning the political change it wants to see, JC depends on its ideological tenets to mobilize and build a grassroots base. Cavatorta argues that Adl Wal Ihsane is a political actor whose objective is not only shaped by its ideology, but by the political realities as well. JC has a strategy that combines political action and moral and spiritual promotion. As much as JC is a product of ideology, it is also a product of rational thinking.

It recognizes the need to rationally understand the political reality within which the movement operates to make decisions and respond to issues politically (Chatterjee’s outer domain). The premise of its vision for political change “starts with consensus building around a national pact and end with a new constitution and general elections, without excluding other ideas that may emanate from free public debate.” It has a political circle that guides its strategic choices while aligning them with the spiritual tenets of the movement. The political circle is the focal point of the movement that is responsible of “assuring the links with the other political actors on the Moroccan scene as well as defining the societal project and the political programme of the association (movement).”

More effective than any political actor in Morocco, Adl Wal Ihsane has a clear response on a variety of contentious issues. While it has a greater focus on the moral and

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154 Motaouakel (2014).
155 Lakmouch (2013).
157 Motaouakel (2014).
158 Cavatorta (2007).
159 Motaouakel (2014).
spiritual education “tarbiya” as it believes that reforming the individual is part of reforming the group; it does not take away from its posture as a political actor.\textsuperscript{161} This posture is not only exemplified by the decisions of its political circle, and the maneuvering of the political landscape in Morocco, but also by Sheikh Yassine’s linguistic discourse and terminology to position the movement within the Islamic and political culture of Morocco. Simply put by Motaouakel,

“Yassine was keen on the use of Islamic terminology. It is not out of some cultural chauvinism that he insisted on certain terms but rather because he believed that concepts are not always neutral. They reflect the values and the culture that they spring from. For this reason we find that he preferred, for example, “kawma” [uprising] instead of “thawra” [revolution] because the cultural charge is not believed to be the same: the former, he argues, involves “legitimate force”; the latter “violence and bloodshed.”\textsuperscript{162}

While Adl Wal Ihsane utilizes ideology to mobilize and draw popular support, it also presents itself as a political actor. While ideology and being political are not necessarily contradictory, critics argue that the ideology of Adl Wal Ihsane prevents it from presenting a logical political agenda for reform particularly that Adl Wal Ihsane demands an Islamist republic as a system of governance. For this reason, many accuse Adl Wal Ihsane of being backward (حركة رجعية), and while having a social and religious vision, JC does not necessarily have a political vision for the future (العدل لايمتلك رؤية ولا مشروع سياسي).

The above section provided an overview about Adl Wal Ihsane, its ideology including the charisma of its leader, and structure, which is important to examine in order to understand the ambiguity of the movement. Because of its ideology and organization,

\textsuperscript{161} Motaouakel (2014).
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
Adl Wal Ihsane remains a movement that behaves in a conservative and traditional way even politically as many activists (excluding Adl Wal Ihsane activists) lamented during interviews. They maintained Adl Wal Ihsane is rethinking its structure as an organization therefore, they in an internal organizational crisis. 163

February 20: Adl Wal Ihsane Participation

The purpose of this section is to illuminate the role of Adl Wal Ihsane within February 20 Tansikiyats. Adl Wal Ihsane is a very complex movement so its participation in February 20 movement was surprising, but welcomed.

Each February 20 Tansikiyat incorporates traditional and non-traditional actors such as Adl wal Ihsane. While Adl Wal Ihsane, according to Lauziere, is “an illegal yet tolerated movement;” 164 JC is the only conservative current that participated formally in the February 20 movement. Adl Wal Ihsane issued a communiqué in February 16, 2011 in which it announced its participation. Below an extract from the communiqué:

1. We call for participation and support all initiatives in favor of building a state of freedom, dignity and justice, including protests of February 20, 2011
2. We emphasize the peaceful nature of our participation, and we invite all to remain vigilant against any possible provocation.

163 Interview with activists from Meknes, Casablanca, Rabat, and Kenitra conducted in November 2013. Activists were non-Islamists.
3- Moroccan regime bears responsibility for any consequences resulting from standing against the right of the Moroccan people to peaceful protest.\textsuperscript{166}

JC was one of the strongest components of the February 20 movement. Joining February 20 Tansikiyats provided a political opportunity for Adl Wal Ihsane to first enhance its visibility in the political and public sphere while sending a message to the Makhzan that it still has power in numbers. In Tansikiyats, Adl Wal Ihsane was present and coordinated with activists locally after its leadership announced its engagement in the February 20 movement. Three February 20 activists in Marrakesh explained that “youth from Adl Wal Ihsane were following every step in the planning both virtually and offline, yet they could not engage on the ground until the leadership officially announced its participation which shows loyalty to the structure.”\textsuperscript{167} To reiterate what one activist from Kenitra said “Adl has a tremendous human capital from which February 20 benefited significantly.” “Adl Wal Ihsane youth were not free riders, they participated all the way, and they were committed,” he added.”\textsuperscript{168} Aziz Hlaoua further explains that for the activists of Adl Wal Ihsane, once the agreement was received from their political leadership, the recruitment of Adl Wal Ihsane activists in Tansikiyats was a matter of negotiation of how to participate, not a matter of participation itself. Hlaoua proceeds to say that, “Adl wal Ihsans were not free-riders, they participated and were engaged.” \textsuperscript{169}

With Adl Wal Ihsane activists, it was a matter of how to engage in the rituals of public assemblies and gatherings and how to partake in a coordinated action. An activist (A. T) from Adl Wal Ihsane in Marrakesh indicates that “the political leadership agreed

\textsuperscript{166} Translation by the author of this study.
\textsuperscript{167} Interview with three activists Mahjoub, Hicham, and Yassine in Marrakesh in October 2013. Summary of the main points about Adl Wal Ihsane.
\textsuperscript{168} Interview with a youth activist from Kenitra. Interview conducted in early November 2013.
\textsuperscript{169} Activist and researcher Aziz Hlaoua (interview conducted in November 2013 and follow up on March 2014).
to participate, so for us (Adl), it was a done deal, we participated with large numbers, but we just needed to know how to participate.” She adds, “we brought the power of numbers because we have large grassroots networks and affiliations.” M.K, a member of Adl Wal Ihsane political leadership from Meknes reminds us that “the structure of Adl Wal Ihsane is built in a way that all decisions for participation in February 20 and its Tansikiyats come from the top…the manner in which action should be coordinated with local Tansikiyats was deferred to local entities and activists themselves.” She further explained that, “the support and engagement of Adl Wal Ihsane in February 20 Tansikiyats was based on the fact that we (as Adl) identified with its goal of combatting corruption, and ending tyranny. Joining the pro-democracy movement indicates our intention for collaboration and support for democratic claims,” she further explained. These respondents’ accounts demonstrate that Adl Wal Ihsane played a major role in February 20 Tansikiyats as they have taken the logistical burden and grassroots outreach; yet they were silent during public assemblies and agreed to not be publically be vocal with their religious demands or use any religious slogans during protests.

Several modes of participation in each Tansikiyat are evident relating to how Adl Wal Ihsane contributed or mobilized in each Tansikiyat. Many activists explained that Adl Wal Ihsane youth activists followed the program and respected the process of public assemblies. They clarified that JC activists respected their engagement within the Tansikiyats. While asking a leftist sympathizer and an independent activist in Marrakesh

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170 A.T are the initials for first and last name of the interviewee as she did not want to be fully identified, yet authorized the use of her initials.
171 Interview with A.T (Adl Wal Ihsane activist). Interview conducted in November 2013.
172 Interview with M.K in Meknes. M.K is a member of Adl Wal Ihsane political leadership. Interview conducted in October 2013.
173 Interview with a female (M.K) leader within Adl Wal Ihsane, interview conducted in Meknes in October 2013.
174 Interview with youth activists in Fes and Meknes. Interview conducted in late October 2013.
about their perspective on Adl Wal Ihsane participation, their response was that at the beginning Adl Wal Ihsane provided many concessions such as refraining from religious slogans during protest. They emphasized that JC showed great commitment and collaboration with other factions of the movement. Activists’ testimonies on Adl Wal Ihsane behavior and role within Tansikiyats illustrated that Adl Wal Ihsane maintained its commitment until post-referendum (July 1, 2011).

After that Adl Wal Ihsane became vocal and began speaking up during public assemblies as they started to exhibit signs of wanting to control the process. Two independent activists from Casablanca, during my second field visit in early March 2013, responded to the question about Adl Wal Ihsane in a surprising way. They stressed that Adl Wal Ihsane joined the movement to take over its goals and demands. This argument did not hold true, given that the interviews conducted in Rabat, Fes, and Meknes Tansikiyats did not support it because activists believe that Adl Wal Ihsane were not free riders.

The dominant narrative however, is that Adl Wal Ihsane were not free-riders and that they participated and stayed engaged until December 18, 2011 when they officially announced their withdrawal.

Adl Wal Ihsane: Is It a Rational Political Actor?

There is no theoretical thinness of the literature on conceptualizing rational choice in collective action. The point is not to evaluate, downplay or investigate rational models

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175 Interview with two activists in Marrakesh. One activist is a leftist sympathizer and the other one is independent. Interview conducted in late October, 2013.
176 Interview with two independent activists in Casablanca, Interview conducted in early March 2013.
or approaches, but to refer to some of these perspectives to explain the Adl Wal Ihsane decision-making process within February 20 and their choice to both participate and leave the movement later on. The key here is not to look at the grand theories, but to show that JC is a pragmatic political actor.

JC considers collective goals above the individual ones. Critics of Adl Wal Ihsane however, argue that the complexity of the movement structure and its top-down approach (Sheikh/leadership-grassroots) is what contributes to its perceived rigidity and backwardness. Motaouakel contested that argument. One of JC leaders in Temara views its structure as a comprehensive platform that allows for solidarity and unity among JC members.177 To articulate it clearly, I borrow Hagen’s words, “a solution to the problem of collective action or social order is found with the emergence of rational solidarity as a medium that symbolizes the difference between individual and collective rationality as a unity: one should sacrifice individual opportunities to achieve collective goals.”178

JC always presents its agenda within the fringes of political arena. This means that Adl Wal Ihsane, while it participated in the February 20 movement and agreed to “public silence,” it did so as a political calculation. Understanding Adl Wal Ihsane participation in February 20 Tansikiyats is viewed within a political rationality. Critics of Adl Wal Ihsane, particularly after its exit from February 20, side with this perspective. Realpolitik pragmatism influences Adl Wal Ihsane’s strategic choices and even its behavior within the Tansikiyats. The fact that Adl Wal Ihsane agreed to participate and stay engaged is indicative of several things. Firstly, it is a strategic choice as JC would

177 Interview with Adl Wal Ihsane leader in Tamara. Interview conducted October 2013.
not have been seen as a solo instigator of protests as the Makhzan always blames and accuses its members of “agitational politics.” JC has constantly been subject to censorship, violence, and brutal repression. Secondly, as many analysts argue, Adl Wal Ihsane wants to show its strong muscle to mobilize, its popular support, and its organizational capabilities. Thirdly, several JC demands align with those of February 20 youth. For example, ending corruption, political tyranny, and injustice are among those demands. Nonetheless, other analysts maintain that JC demands are well known as they were clearly outlined in Sheikh Yassine’s two famous publications. Their demands were known by the regime and the public before the emergence of February 20. Lastly, Adl Wal Ihsane considers itself a non-violent movement, while structured and ideological, it promotes democratic principles. So joining February 20 constituted an opportunity to show that it is a pro-democratic actor, and able to reconcile and join forces with those with different ideology for the promotion of a democratic agenda. Hence, even before February 20, Amghar noted that “Adl Wal Ihsane supports democracy as a way to show opposition to the regime.”

Adl Wal Ihsane political rationality is demonstrated by how it manages the balance between uprising and participation and its ability to think through methods, and timing to strategize and advance some of its goals. Researcher Aziz Hlaoua specifies that February 20 provided JC with an opportunity to publically reiterate its message to its supporters, engage differently through innovative tools and decentralized channels

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179 Interview with Hamza Mahfoud, a prominent February 20 activist. Interview conducted November 2013.
(Tansikiyats), test its geographical reach and the ability of its militants to respect the movement agenda and mobilize within their communities in masses. Interviews with Professor Maati Monjib, researcher Aziz Hlaoua, and Professor Mokhtar Benabdelaoui also indicate that Adl Wal Ihanse’s participation was a political move through which it sought to reconcile with the leftist forces, project a forward thinking ability, and demonstrate willingness for collaboration despite their ideological divergence. Also, debunk the negative media image and the misconceptions about its agenda.

The general consensus among informants (both Islamists and non-Islamists) is that Adl Wal Ihsane never forced any religious agenda during the public assemblies within Tansikiyats or religious slogans during protests. In this case, the conclusion is that JC entered into a process of negotiation and communication with other components of the February 20 movement. Here, I recall that scholars working on the model of negotiation and communication (Jasper, 1997; Johnson and Klandermans, 1995; and Melucci, 1996) place particular emphasis on “perceiving social movements as resulting from processes of negotiation and communicative actions.”

Despite its ideological posture, Adl Wal Ihsane is a rational political actor given how it maneuvers the political game and uses openings and constraints as a political resource.

Moreover, Monjib describes Adl Wal Ihsane’s actions as rational as it has considered the precise moment of February 20 as a priceless opportunity. Not only that it

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recognized the utility of political opportunity, but they treated it as an opportunity that
came after long agonizing decades of repression and struggle. In light of the perceived
opportunity, it was necessary for Adl Wal Ihsane to engage on a “rational solidarity”
process. Interviewee, blogger, and February 20 movement activist Hamza Mahfoud
emphasizes that February 20 provided the opportunity for Adl Wal Ihsane to take to the
street publically and in a transparent way and they have taken up a logistical burden
within Tansikiyats. He adds that they remained silent publically and respected the
demands outlined in the Ardiya Taassissiya of the movement. At least this was the case
until after the post-referendum (July 1, 2011). Adl Wal Ihsane measures its strategies in
the context of the political happenings. They read the situation then they react as they
avoid taking the blame alone.

Adl Wal Ishane made a rational political decision to participate, and mobilize its
garssroots members. This mobilization requires a conceptualization of an ideological
frame. Adl Wal Ihsane framed participation in the protests as a good religious deed.
Monjib notes that “protest is link to religious advantage--"الاحتجاج مرتبطة بالأجر، ان لم يفدنا في الدنيا --سيشفع لنا في الآخرة."  Mahjoub, an activist from Marrakesh, agrees with Monjib on this
point. In his view, participation and protest, for JC members, are considered “devotional
symbols—"مطاس تعدي--because Adl Wal Ihsane youth always end the day of protest with a
prayer “—may Allah accept from us and from you--"يتقبل الله من و منكم--"

183 Professor Maati Monjib interviewed in Rabat in early March 2014 (follow up interview).
185 Professor Maati Monjib interviewed in Rabat in early March 2014 (follow up interview).
186 Interview with Mahjoub, a youth activist and a leader within the Tansikiyat in Marrakesh. Interview conducted in November 2013.
The different explanations to why Adl Wal Ihsane participated in the *February 20* movement vary. So it is here where we expand the realm of rational choice to account for both the moral/cultural and the institutional contexts that drive actors to political action. While Adl Wal Ihsane made rational decisions to participate in *February 20*, it did not make them purely based on material incentives or interests (economic approach), but based on motives that account for nuances of ideology, meaning as well as the environment it operates in. Jasper explicates that oftentimes, “choices are made within a complex set of cultural and institutional contexts that shape the players themselves, the options perceived, the choices made from among them, and the outcomes.”  

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*Adl Wal Ihsane: The Sudden Exit from February 20?*

It is not surprising that Adl Wal Ihsane withdrew from the *February 20* movement. The analysis of Adl Wal Ihsane tells us that the Tansikiyats operated based on a kind of contradiction where one of its key components had a short-term tactical reason for cooperating but, not surprisingly, was not willing to remain within the movement and hence the movement weakened over time.

Borrowing from Asef Bayat’s literature, I argue that Adl Wal Ihsane exited the movement because of the discord among various *February 20* movement components. So what are the sources of this discord: divergence of interests and/or in interpretations (constitution, and type of governance). For many analysts, the Adl Wal Ihsane exit from the *February 20* movement came as a surprise, yet for others, it was expected. According

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to an Adl Wal Ihsane official communiqué, the main justifications for parting way with 
*February 20* include the toxic atmosphere within the movement resulting from certain forces’ attempt to push the movement to a certain ideological direction that contradicts the values of Moroccan society. In addition, it appeared as if the movement became the platform for settling personal scores. Moreover, it was time for Adl Wal Ihsane to return to its internal affairs agenda. ¹⁸⁸

Unified Socialist Party (PSU) Secretary General Nabila Mounib discusses that “Adl Wal Ihsane entered into negotiations with PJD after they won the elections therefore, their exit was expected.” ¹⁸⁹ Yet, Khalid Mona, and Zakaria Ghani note that “Adl Wal Ihsane recognized the need to revisit its strategy internally, and does not want to put itself in a vulnerable position given the fate of Islamists (Egypt) in the region.”¹⁹⁰ Informant Mahjoub from Marrakesh analyzed it differently. He argued that JC realized that its youth are learning new ways of thinking and doing things differently within the Tansikiyats by engaging in dialogue with other non-Islamist factions. This change was viewed by Adl Wal Ihsane leadership as a danger that may result in the loss of youth membership.¹⁹¹ JC youth wanted to continue protesting in *February 20*, but it was the decision of the leadership to leave the movement.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Nabila Mounib is a professor of Law in Casablanca and is the secretary general of leftist political party PSU. Interview took place in November 2013.
¹⁹⁰ Interview with Khalid Mona (a sociology professor in Meknes) and Zakaria Ghani (anthropologist). Both interviewed in Rabat in November 2013.
¹⁹¹ Interview with Mahjoub in Marrakesh in November 2013.
¹⁹² Interview with Adl Wal Ihsane activist in Tangiers. Interview conducted in October 2013.
Monjib confers that Adl Wal Ihsane have practiced what he calls *la politique du pire* (*siyassat al Aswa*)—that is the politics of the worst case scenario. Here is the scenario, if protests continue, the Makhzan would pressure the new PJD government to govern effectively and allow the space to enact policies and reforms. If protests are not sustained however, the government (PJD) would not effectively govern. They would just engage in the politics of proving to the palace their loyalty through political alliances with pro-palace parties. In this case, PJD would not focus on social and economic issues that matter to citizens and as a result the socio-economic crisis would persist. The Makhzan then (in the person of the King) would intervene to enact policies from above, which would result in PJD losing credibility in the eyes of its constituencies. Few analysts agreed with this explanation given that JC and PJD political agendas are different. A leader from Adl Wal Ihane in Rabat, disagreed with this explanation, but maintained that there were other reasons beside what was in the official communiqué. Yet, those reasons are not to be shared publically.

Youth informants in Mohammadia contend that JC made a cost-benefit analysis decision. The majority of Adl Wal Ihsane grassroots followers are poor, simple, religious, and do not like to engage in politics. So to mobilize people, Adl Wal Ishane has to pay for transportation for people to take to the streets. JC viewed this way, particularly after PJD’s election, was not cost effective.

Professor Benabdelaoui sees things differently. He proposes that the Adl Wal Ihsane withdrawal was a result of many factors. Adl Wal Ihsane’s decision was not

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193 Interview with seven youth informants in Mohammadia. Interview conducted in late October 2013.
sudden; it was carefully studied by its political circle leadership as well as its guidance council. The period of the constitution drafting and the constitutional referendum provided an opportunity for Adl Wal Ihsane to study the behavior of its counterparts (particularly leftist and radical left) and what kind of position they may take regarding the constitutional process. Worth noting is that leftist forces did not have their act together, they did not have a unified voice therefore they did not officially contest the constitutional process. Adl Wal Ihsane issued a statement arguing that the process is undemocratic; consequently boycotting the referendum as the right thing to do. Additionally, leftist forces exemplified in the PSU, the Socialist Party Democratic Vanguard (PADS), the Ittihadi National Congress (INC), and the Ennahj democrat disagreed on the ceiling of their demands (الاختلاف على سقف المطالب). This disagreement was an indicator of lack of commitment and sustained engagement, which was perceived by Adl Wal Ihsane, as a sign of weakness so parting way with the movement was the best option possible.

Adl Wal Ihsane exists and acts as a collective group. From this vantage point, its interests were not only material (change type of governance, and end corruption), they were also social and moral (social justice, and reputation). A part from interests, actors hold different perceptions and interpretations on issues. According to Bayat, this may lay on actors “distinct experiences, and their specific biographies (Jasper) or their inner ‘complexity’ (Melucci).”\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{194} Bayat (2005).
Since leftist forces did not take a strong position during the constitutional process and they did not agree among themselves on the ceiling of their demands, Adl Wal Ihsane sought the benefit of preserving its reputation as a bold Islamist movement that does not only promote Islamic education, but articulates its position on issues politically and publically.195 Bayat states that “difference in interests accounts for the major source of discord and dissension.”

It is true, that Adl Wal Ihsane historical experience has been nothing but struggle starting with the imprisonment of Sheikh Yassine to legally banning the movement in 1991 without a court order. Besides, Adl Wal Ihsane suffered the consequences of the historical rupture with the leftist forces that resulted from the killing of leftist leader Omar Ben Jalloun by Ichabiba Islamiyia. 196 Adl Wal Ihsane distinct experience (Melucci’s inner complexity and Chatterjee’s inner domain) also accounts for the interpretation of its engagement, position, continuity and discontinuity in the February 20 movement. Adl Wal Ihsane expectation is that the leftist forces would have a clear vision and a unified position on the constitutional referendum (مرحلة ما بعد الاستفتاء). Conversely, that was not the case. This particular divergence in perceptions and expectations appeared post-March 9, 2011 speech and particularly during the constitutional process.

It is also important to note that there is a significant contradiction between objective and subjective interests of Adl Wal Ihsane as well as of other components of the February 20 movement. This contradiction (tension) was very difficult to manage.

195 Ibid.
196 Islamist youth organization established in 1969, but its violent approach resulted in its delegitimization and its dissolution in 1976.
which created a period of confusion among the components of *February 20*. Furthermore, *February 20* components (particularly moderate left Unified Socialist Party (PSU), and radical left Ennahj democrati) were also subject to this contradiction. This contradiction manifested itself in the different interpretations of the master frames and expectations *post-March 9* king’s speech. For JC, this obvious contradiction illustrates the weakness of the leftist and their non-readiness for effective or real change. For JC, the obvious choice is to withdraw and continue the struggle with dignity and credibility.

Adl Wal Ihsane presence in the Tansikiyats was strongly felt and their cooperation and their agreement to “public silence” to advance the demands of the movement were unprecedented. Their exit from the movement was noticeable given the decrease in the numbers of people who took to the streets later on. Whether Adl Wal Ihsane based its decision to participate and exit the movement on rational calculations or not, the fact is that JC presented itself and cemented its position as a pragmatic political actor in the Moroccan political landscape.

**The Question of an Ethnic Group: The Amazigh/ Berber**

This section provides an overview of the Amazigh as a component of the *February 20* movement. *February 20* movement founding principles (*Ardiya Taassisiya*) included the recognition of the Amazigh language as an official language in the constitution. Amazigh joined the *February 20* movement without focusing on the ethnic identity aspect.
Within this context, it is worthwhile to understand the historical struggle of the Amazigh in order to provide perspective on how they framed their demands throughout their struggle.

Who are the Amazigh/ Berbers?

The indigenous people of North Africa arrived from unidentified places. Where they come from depends on the mythology within historical narratives. The “nobles” or “hommes libres” (Amazigh), the Berbers are the indigenous people of North Africa, despite the fact that generally Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are categorized as Arabs in today’s geopolitical milieu.197

There are divergent myths about the origin of the Berbers. This sparked off a tremendous debate between the European (French) and the Arabs. On the one hand, the Arabs scholars claim that the origins of Berbers are Semitic. The Arabs insisted that since the Berbers “Amazigh” are of a Semitic origin anyway, and not from European origin, the Arabs brought them civilization and prosperity to put end to the Romans’ obscurantism. The Arabs promoted a myth of an Arab North Africa “billad Ifrikiya.” The Berbers fought the Arabs because they did not know their “Niya” “intentions, and confused the Arabs intentions’ with those of previous conquerors.”198 The billad Ifrikiya was applied to Algeria and Tunisia where the Salafis’ argument states that Arabs were a liberating force that brought justice and freedom to the Berbers. As Hannoum confirms echoing Ben Abd Allah’s argument, “the noble desire of Islam is to spread faith, which consists of the principles of democracy and the supreme values (mabadi al dimuqratiya wa al-qiym al- muthla).”199 Additionally, the Arabs argue that the Berbers have lived a painful past

199 Ibid., 97.
under the Romans “destroyers of civilizations”, and therefore, Arabs are the saviors of the Amazigh under the umbrella of Islam. The Arab invasion or “fath” was “a call for a new idea, crystallized in the tolerant principles of Islam.”

Hannoum using Madani’s argument that legitimizing the Arab fath argues that,

“the Arabs and the Berbers are not two reconcilable forces. The Berbers fought the Arabs not because they were Arabs, but because they were an unknown invader who, in the Berbers’ mind, were no different from the Romans…and the fight against the Arabs was a continuation of a fight against the Romans.”

Hannoum adds, that what facilitated the Arabization and the Islamization of Berber Ifrikiya is the impact of the Phoenicians because they were of a Semitic origin. The claim that the Arabs fought Kahina, the Berber queen of Israeli origin, was unwelcome by Thaalibi who maintained that “the Arabs brought a system of Justice” and did not fight to “establish authority.”

On the other hand, the Europeans maintained the Berbers are of European origin. The Africans migrated from the Arabian peninsula, and the name Berber was given to them by the Romans, who called every non-Roman a Berber, as the Arabs called every non-Arab an ajami.”

But the Arabs insisted that “the origins of Africans were not only Semitic, but in fact Arab. Gautier asserts that the Berbers were prosperous under the Romans and actually the Arabs brought the darkness and they “were conscious of their identity, and achieved a great deal of autonomy under the Vandals and the Romans, and were finally unified under the leadership of Kusayla.” Such is the contested Berbers’ myth of origin.

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200 Ibid., 89.
201 Ibid., 88.
202 Ibid., 94.
204 Ibid., 90.
Politicization of Amazigh Identity

The Amazigh reject the theory of “relegating their language and culture to museum or to folklore.”205 They are faced with a “complex renegotiation of their social identity”206 in the Moroccan socio-cultural and socio-political realms. This is because the problem of Amazigh language was not resolved clearly and entirely; it stayed for a long time “a taboo concept” and is still viewed with “le petit bout de lorgnette,” that is, it is only touch upon from far.207 It is the Morocco’s unspoken dark secret; no one likes to unpack the “double cultural conquest” of the Berbers.208 Chaddadi posits an importance on the Amazigh question “abandoning or neglecting Amazigh is an attempt against us, an intolerable defamation of our personality, a denial of our history, and an alteration of our heritage. The Amazigh, same as Arabic, is an essential element of our identity as Moroccans.”209

The Arabs and the Amazigh lived in “osmosis” for centuries, but their relationship today is transformed to “oppressed and oppressor.”210 The Amazigh today, are fighting against identity dehumanization and cultural annihilation.211 They are fighting against ideologies that claim, “there is no contradiction between Islam and Arabization” (Al-arabia Jouz aoo Mahia al- Quraan). Ideologies as such maintain that Islam and Arabic complement each other, therefore, Arabic is an essential element of Islam.

208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
One should not forget that there are theories that negate this concept; there is “no difference between black and white, or Arab or non-Arab (ajami) except by taqwa (righteousness)”

The Amazigh narratives today rest on the demand for recognition of “Tamazighte” as an official language. However, Morocco is lagging behind Algeria who recognized “Tamazighte” as an official language in 1997. Despite Hassan II’s speech in 1994 recognizing, for the first time, “Imazighen as partie des composantes de notre authenticite” and introducing “Amazigh dialects” to the school curriculums, the road towards recognition and rights for the Berbers is still rocky. Hassan II’s speech came right after the Tilelli Affair (Goulmima May 3, 1994), “a rally organized by the local trade union section SNE/CDT to demand the rights of the Amazigh. During the rally, three sympathizers and four members of Tilelli were arrested because they carried banners saying “No Democracy without Tamazight.” They were charged with violation of public security and the constitution.”

The Tilelli affair is an illustration of the historical suffrage of the Amazigh people. Some aspects of Hassan II’s speech are materialized today (some public schools are teaching Tamazight), however, the desired change and the demand to redress the larger Amazigh’s grievances is very minimal. The Tilelli incident reminds us of “les annees du plomd” or the years of the “armed feast” in which, freedom of expression was a forbidden matter.

The Tilelli affair brought a lot of international attention and it was no longer a national affair, it became an international one. This has pushed Morocco to show good “niya” in addressing the Amazigh issue. King Mohammed IV assumed power in 1999 after Hassan II’s death. Mohamed IV took steps to address the Amazigh issue and in the October 17, 2001 speech in Ajdir (Khenifra), the King publicly recognized the “Amazigh heritage as being part of national

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214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.,154.
culture…a national responsibility, because no national culture can deny its historical roots.”

The Ajdir speech was also a ceremony of the cherifien Dahir for the creation of a Royal Institute for the Amazigh Culture (IRCAM). Amazighs recognized the King’s efforts to redress their grievances. Currently, there are many TV programs, writings and cultural events in Tamazighte.

However, the expansion of the cultural space has not matured politically because of the limited lens through which the notion of culture was conceptualized—just as mere traditional and customary manifestation rather seeing culture as multiplicity of ‘individual and collective experiences.’ Hence, this limited conception of culture, left the political space still closed. For full realization of Amazigh’s culture, their collective experiences, their language, symbols of meanings and inter-group interactions, societal and cognitive experiences must be integrated and reflected in the Moroccan constitution.

Currently the Amazigh’s identity struggle has reached a stage of “etre ou ne pas etre,” that is be or not to be—to break the imprisonment of their identity and reinvent history. The Berbers are entering a discourse of reflection on their ideology and philosophy of being. Brousky reminds us that the Berber identity is inseparable from the Moroccan one—and history is here to remind us of that indelible fact. Therefore, the cultural symbolism imbedded in language, traditions, and identity should be understood on the basis of their Berber particularism. With an enlightened view of history, new Morocco is possible to emerge. But that dream rests of the political power to effect change in the society.

There is an urgent need to address relative deprivation and development imbalance in Berber dominated regions such as the Rif, Middle Atlas, and High Altas where roads are archaic.
and schools date back to ancient times. It is important also to rewrite some of historical narratives and reconcile the grievances of the Amazigh past (marginalization of Rif, and their labeling of “Aboubach”). In fact, the Riffins will never forget the day they have been called “savage people” by their king (Hassan II). Redressing such ethnocentric national attitudes, calls for redefined political will that appreciates the centrality and the inseparability of the Amazigh identity from that of the nation of Morocco.

In his book *Les Berbers Face a Leur Destin*, Brously allocates a great major of importance to the Berbers’ history and argues that it is necessary to force history to declare itself, because the Amazigh ethnic identity is constructed by time. Additionally, he asserts that the Amazigh man is “*un homme tragique*” who lived to honor death and life, and strive for freedom “*la liberte*” as Saint Augustine puts it. Striving for the recognition culturally and politically, the Berbers seek to preserve and consolidate their group identity and promote an equal distribution of social and political power.

Principally, for the Berbers, underdevelopment and lack of political voice are two major challenges that mark critical turning point in the groups’ failure to reclaim their political rights of the “Amazigh.” The Arab bourgeoisie intended to alter the Amazigh historical past, by means of Arab elite doctrinaire ideology, also deprived them from power, political voice, identity and history for which the Amazigh continue to fight even today. Joffe writes “often elites exploit the political structures and economic opportunities that have emerged from colonization, through corruption or neo-prebendalism,” and have come to form elements of “neo-patrimonial political structures
that reinforce central power.”\textsuperscript{222} Also, the question of the Amazigh is certainly a product of state strategy of continued politics of exclusion. Amin Kazak writes, “despite the Amazigh commitment to the cause of national unity and liberation in North Africa…the regime have systematically pursued de-Berberization and Arabization policies as well as discriminatory exclusion of the Amazigh from equal access to government services and political power, and the enjoyment of economic and cultural rights.”\textsuperscript{223}

This systematic denial of political power has largely contributed to the Amazigh struggle today. Many scholars who write about Amazigh of North Africa are quite puzzled by the continuing manifestations of their struggle and their strong sense of self-determination. These manifestations aim at changing the existing patterns of political authority, stand against the tyranny of the regime and the denial of rights of citizenship. In a Manifesto submitted to the European parliament in 2010, the Congress Mondial Amazigh (CMA) denounced the “apartheid politics” that the Amazigh are victims to in Morocco.\textsuperscript{224}

\textit{The Amazigh and the February 20 Movement}

In light of the above context, it is important to mention that the Amazigh made several gains over the years. The first is the establishment of the Royal Institute for the

\textsuperscript{222} Joffe (2007): 935
Amazigh Culture in 2001, the second is the introduction of the Amazigh language in public schools in 2003 and 2004, and the third is the creation of an Amazigh TV channel in 2010.

Under the umbrella of the *February 20* movement, the Amazigh emboldened their action. A major demand of the Amazigh has been included in the founding principles of the *February 20* movement since the beginning calling for greater political pluralism. Activists were aware of the plight of the Amazigh and their decades struggle for cultural and political recognition. The demand of instituting the Amazigh as a national language has been responded to in the 2011 constitution. The Amazigh wanted to secure their own place in the national order in Morocco. The Amazigh movement has joined forces with the *February 20* movement since its inception. So activists who are Amazigh identified as the *February 20* activists without emphasizing their ethnic identity. Many activists proudly acknowledge that the *February 20* movement accomplished what Amazigh associations did not accomplish over the years (حركة 20 فبراير كانت كافية لدفع النظام لتنظيم الهوية الأمازيغية في خطاب 09 مارس، وترسيمها في الدستور — the *February 20* movement was enough to push the regime to recognize the Amazigh as an official language in the constitution).  

While the Amazigh movement led decades of struggle for recognition, the nature of the struggle has being critiqued as being led by Amazigh associations that are elitist and acted out largely of parochial interests, and have a narrow-mindedness approach to reforms. The *February 20* movement provided an opportunity for politicization of the Amazigh population and broadening the scope of the struggle at the grassroots level. For

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225 Interview with four Amazigh activists in Meknes and Khnifra in October 2013. Translation by the author of this study.
the reasons mentioned above, the Amazigh could not provide leadership for *February 20*,
but they continued mobilizing under the umbrella of the *February 20* movement. Their
action was in line with *February 20* as they have been a strong voice within the
movement.

**Chapter Summary**

This analysis meant to provide an overview about the components of *February 20*
movement. The Amazigh demands were included in the *Ardiya Taassissiya* of the
movement, which made it easier to engage under the umbrella of *February 20* without
bringing the ethnic character to forefront. This section focused more on Adl Wal Ihsane
because there is a need to understand its behavior and its political thinking and is the only
conservative force that officially joined *February 20* youth. Also, its youth members
would not have engaged if the top leadership did not publically and officially support the
*February 20* movement. The relevance here is that Adl Wal Ihsane acts as a structure
that joined an unstructured movement led mostly by youth. Historically, Adl Wal Ihsane
protests are well-known by their religious nature and character. Because of the Makhzan
repression over the years, Adl Wal Ihsane’s religious council and political circle issued
communiques and statements as a form and mode of protests and did not take to the
street. Interpretations of why Adl Wal Ihsane participated and exited the movement are
based on analysis of its behavior, interviews with activists, scholarly analysis; yet the
actual motives remain ambiguous and only the decision makers of JC know that. So what
Adl Wal Ihsane discloses to its members are the decisions that are made, not why they
are made.
CHAPTER 3—A BROADER PERSPECTIVE: EXPLORING LITERATURE

Introduction

Exploring social movement literature will afford this project a better starting point for analyzing recent collective action in Morocco and the February 20 movement in particular. The existing scholarship on social movements is vast and covers a range of topical areas. For this study, I focus on framing research. Before that I will provide a synthesis on literature that examines the February 20 movement.

Existing literature has not paid sufficient attention to the role played by social mobilization in the structuring of crises and in attempting to reshape the politics in Morocco in particular. Existing studies, while they have provided valuable perspectives, have not examined the repertoire of contentious politics, and the different challenges imposed on the political culture and the regime by movements of the “Arab Spring” or “Democratic Spring,” and specifically by February 20 and its Tansikiyats. Recent scholarly work focus primarily on specific themes related to Morocco, but did not delve into examining the repertoire of contentious politics and the nature of mobilization within that context. For instance, Theorie du Choix Revolutionnaire by Nessah and Tazdait
(2008), while the book does specifically focus on Morocco, it does examine the ultra-rational approach (instrumentalist paradigm) to collective action of why actors chose to engage or not, but it does not examine the subjective elements of contentious politics or why actors organize the way they do. This approach leads to “questioning why individuals choose to act collectively, particularly if in the absence of doing so they can still enjoy collective benefits.”

The first edition of Joel Beinin and Frederick Vairel (2011) book titled: *Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa* brought to light a debate that hinges on the premise that studying movements (beyond Islamist movements) in the MENA region, will allow us to “expand and enrich” social movement theory. Beinin and Vairel’s work included two essays on collective action in Morocco. The first one is a comparative analysis between Egypt and Morocco by Frederic Vairel of Islamists movements and collective action advanced by civil society. The second article by Montserrat Badimon examines the unemployed movement and its strategies for apolitical mobilization. The second edition of Beinin and Vairel’s book (2013) provides a more nuanced extension of the case studies presented and expands to include Tunisia, Yemen and Syria. Moreover, Ricardo Renee Laremont’s book (2014) *Revolution, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa: the Arab Spring and Beyond* is the most recent publication that examines recent uprisings in North Africa including Morocco. The specific article on Morocco titled “Reformist Monarchy” by Mohamed Darif focuses on examining the monarchy’s response to February 20 movement and the trajectory of monarchy-led reforms. Also, sociologist Zakia Salime


European scholars primarily study the history and the situation of labor and sectorial mobilization in Morocco. Yet, there are several writings on February 20 movement that were published in: Annee du Maghreb Revue (Desrues 2012, Cédric Baylocq and Jacopo Granci, 2012); CERTI (Chawqui, 2011, 2013); Revue SciencePo (Beatrice Hibou 2011, 2012); Revue Tiers Monde (Ben Nefissa & Destremau, 2011; Sidi Hiba, 2011); Outre-terre (Ben Nefissa & Destremau, 2011); Mouvements (Tourabi & Zaki, 2011); Les cles du moyen orient (Germain, 2013); Jacques Berque publications (Ghani, 2014); Confluences-Mediterranee (Bennafla, 2011; Gonzalez-Riera, 2011; Catusse, 2011, Monsterrat Badimon, 2011; Ferrié and Dupret, 2011); Brahim El Guabli
(2011), Cherkaoui Roudani (2011), Mohammed Hashas (2013), and Charles Saint-Prot and Frederic Rouvillois (2013). While these publications provide a significant analysis on themes including Moroccan exceptionalism, the genesis of February 20, implications of February 20 to the monarchy, the future of February 20, trajectory of public contestation in Morocco, civil society and February 20, and reforms and new constitution; they pay a little attention to movement structures and its decentralized approach.

A specific review of the existing literature by Moroccan analysts on social movements lacks a coherent analysis on how February 20 emerged, how its Tansikiyats were formed and organized, frames, and components. So far, the literature that exists on the February 20 movement is very limited except for a study by Bennani chraibi and Jeghlally who focused on the Tansikiyat of Casablanca city (Tansikiya Dar Bayda). The leading themes in the Moroccan writings on the February 20 movement include themes related to the contributing factors of the movement emergence, and losses and gains of the movement. Examples include articles by Houssam Hab titled “harakat 20 Febrayer: El khalfiyate, Annachaa wa Al assela Al Marhaliya—February 20: Background, Emergence, and Current Questions;” El-Harif titled: Revolution Processes in the Arab World and the Situation in Morocco--Essayrourate Attawriya bil

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229 Charles Saint Prot was described by Demain online newspaper as "Le perroquet Francais du Makhzan." See http://www.demainonline.com/2013/11/03/charles-saint-prot-le-perroquet-francais-du-makhzen/


The February 20 Movement in Morocco: Reading the Context and Process, and Evaluating the Gains—Harak 20 Febrayer bil Maghreb: Keraa fi Siyak wal Massar watakyeem el Hasseela; and a conference paper by Basek Manar:

“Edahira Ihtijajiya: Mokharab Sociologiya l-harake 20 Febrayer—Protest phenomenon: a Sociological Approach to February 20 movement” by Hadi El-Haroui (2011); and “Le Mouvement du 20 Fevrier au Maroc: Vers une Seconde Independance?” by Leila Mernissi (2011) are good examples. Another theme that is of importance is the movement chronology of events since its inception as shown in Tarabloussi (2013). On the dynamics of the movement, Lofti (2014) and Karmouni (2012) articles are most illustrative as they provide a leftist perspective on dynamics, processes and lessons learned from February 20. On gender and feminism Salime (2012) and Abadi (2014) provide a deeper analysis on gender perspective within the February 20 movement. On political Islam and the Moroccan Arab Spring see Ait Dada and Van Schaik (2012). On critiquing February 20, Benchemsi’s book article (2014) in Taking to the Street: Transformation of Arab Activism does a great job in pinpointing February 20 weaknesses. A nice surprise however, is an article written by Moustaoui Srrhir (2013) titled “Le movement 20 Fevrier au Maroc Entre L’Autolegitimation et La Delegimation de L’Etat: Une Analyse Critique du Discours.” This article was the only analytical piece that examines the narratives of the movement vis-à-vis state.

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In addition to these writings, few opinions pieces and newspapers articles on local and regional online press were also published. Two documentaries were also produced about February 20 movement. The first one is “Spring of repression and dignity,” which won an award at the 2011 Arab Film Festival in Holland. The second one is “Those who are coming.” Both documentaries presented testimonies from the activists and gave an overview of the pre-February 20 movement political context in Morocco. In April 2012, Mohamed Al-Asri, a Moroccan rights activist and a writer published a book called “The Legitimacy of February 20 Demands”, in which he examines the movement’s demands particularly those demands related to exposing state corruption. Additionally, short pieces on February 20 movement were published in various media outlets including, but not limited to, Telquel (French), Hespress.com (Arabic), Lakome.com (Arabic and French), Le Monde (French), JeuneAfrique (French), Amazigh World.org (Arabic & French), Mamfakinch.com (Arabic and French), and Revue Marocaine pour les Politiques Publique (Arabic), in addition to blogs, and facebook posts.

Although the above studies provide a great documentation and analysis of the February 20 movement, their main focus was on palace’s response to protest, broader political discourse, and the broader demands of the movement with limited examination of the movement analytically from the perspective of its activists and its structure. European scholars are focusing on the new found research territory (Maghreb/ North Africa) region. Hamza Mahfoud, a prominent February 20 activist, a journalist and an

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235 www.lakome.com/ءهؤلاء القادمون
interviewee for this research lamented that many European scholars particularly French scholars found the Arab Spring to be an opportunity to re-engage in researching issues of North Africa, specifically Morocco and Tunisia. Yet, most of the writings are from the perspective of the researcher rather activists within the movement.

Also, with the exceptions listed above, Moroccan scholars including Tozy, Darif, Saaf, and Aroui have been silent all along; their contribution is limited to pieces in newspapers and few short writings with a focus on the monarchy’s response to protest. Many attribute this silence to the historical absence of Arab intellectuals as producers of knowledge and ideas as they have focused on legitimizing the existence of the regime (at least that is the case in Morocco). During a conference on the February 20 movement in late 2011, Mustafa Bouhadou posed a crucial question: هل المثقف العربي أصبح مثقف الدولة من ريع الدولة؟ — did the Arab intellectual become the intellectual of the state benefiting from its rentier policies."

In light of this question and the need for renewing the role of the intellectual in the Arab Spring is apparent, political scientist Boutchich recognizes this gap and examines how to overcome the stalemate reached by the Arab intellectuals as shown by their absence and failure in the Arab Spring revolutions.

**Translation by the author of this study. I attended the conference during which civil society activist and expert Mustafa Bouhadou made that statement.**

**Translation by the author of this study.**

Thinkers such as Maati Monjib, Mohamed Sassi, and the late Mehdi Minjra are considered opposition and venues available to them for producing ideas are limited and constrained.

A compelling article by Farid Am’aadchou (2011) titled “How Our Intellectuals See Collective Action of the Arab Street” concluded that intellectuals and analysts have been silent and seem to have suppressed the desire to contribute to “the voice that demands a new future.” He argues that the lack of analytical studies and the production of new knowledge on social mobilization given the events of the Arab Spring requires from the Arab intellectuals to “re-think and re-position themselves” within the new political reality in the MENA region. Am’aadchou also contends that Arab analysts and intellectuals realized that their role has been diminished and they have yet to effectively contribute to, and enrich the debate and literature on social collective action. The absence of the intellectual and the analyst is apparent and for that reason a regional gathering was organized in Alexandria in Egypt entitled “Narratives and Writings of the Mediterranean Basin” to develop recommendations and strategies on how to re-engage the intellectual with society in order to make possible the development of new perspectives and analytical models on social movements.239

I reviewed more than 350 documents and publications including media articles and opinion pieces in French, and Arabic as well as few available pieces in English; and I was surprised by the limited in-depth research and analytical writings on February 20 and recent mobilization in Morocco. Also, most of the writings were produced by

European scholars. The shortage of Arabic research on *February 20* and on recent collective action by Moroccan scholars was shockingly noticeable as they were insufficiently analytical. In light of this, this study aims at opening up venues for further research on *February 20* and its Tansikiyats, fill in the current gap in the literature, and construct a body of knowledge on *February 20* movement and collective action in Morocco. These publications are important in creating a depository of information about the *February 20* movement, factors that drove people to the street, Makhzan’s response, and the role *February 20* played in pushing forward the reforms in Morocco. Yet, the literature is thin in providing an analytical story about the movement structure and how it helped define its goals.

This study does not claim to provide the only or the “correct model” of explanation of *February 20* movement Tansikiyats and contentious politics in Morocco as various explanations can be valid as well. Specifically, this study concentrates on an explanation that focuses on social mobilization particularly the *February 20* movement; and examines the subjective elements of this mobilization, particularly within its Tansikiyats. This is because, Morocco presents “a complex and fascinating laboratory to enrich our theoretical knowledge of social movements and other forms of political contestation” which will allow us not to limit ourselves to “validating or confirming the classical concepts of political opportunity structures, collective action frames, mobilizing

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240 The term “correct model” is borrowed from Marwan Khawaja.
structures, and repertoires of contention,” but to open new areas for enquiry and position social science thinking as a means to explore new socio-political landscapes. Until now, the available literature on the February 20 movement primarily focused on providing a rational perspective to its emergence as well as on the Makhzan’s response to protests. Yet, literature incorporating subjective elements and how they shape February 20 mobilization remains limited. Certainly, these writings did not neglect February 20 movement, but they mostly focused on various determinants that disregarded the subjective and symbolic dimension of mobilization. Therefore, it became necessary to recognize this gap. For the purpose of this study, I deploy terms such as “subjective elements” to denote movement frames and emotions. This study does not seek to reveal or debate the weaknesses of other models (structural or rational models), but to show how subjective elements were incorporated into the February 20 movement in innovative ways. From this perspective, I consider this study a contribution to further opening up the debate and raising new kinds of questions about collective action that emerged in the context of the Arab Spring.

Also, this study is not concerned with an investigation at the macro level of when “broad forces of social change (such as war and cultural contact) upset the existing power relations” as one cannot solely explain the “occurrence of social movements by looking at the broad elements by themselves or in a combination with each other,” but it is concerned with the subjective aspects of social movements.

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243 Ibid., 1.
The subjective elements shape how people perceive frames, narratives, and opportunities. I argue that Tansikiyats are to be viewed as “local situations that produce emotional energy and recycle it up and down; re-circulate ideas, especially those highly loaded with symbols. In this view, there is a certain ripple effect that constitutes what Collins calls feelings of legitimacy, or of business confidence.”

What this means for our discussion on February 20 movement Tansikiyats is that the narratives and frames that have a moral dimension that cross over all the boundaries (ideology, ethnicity, or specific political agendas), create “change in the subjectivity” of the activists, and a “unified collective will” to organize and mobilize.

Also, subjective elements offer the potential of exploring “soft” factors that can impact or shape movement’s success.

Goodwin and Jasper conceptualization make explicit “how collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction ... mediate between opportunity and action.”

Subjective elements shape how people perceive frames, narratives, and opportunities. What this means for our discussion on the February 20 movement Tansikiyats is that the narratives and frames that have a moral dimension that cross over all the boundaries (ideology, ethnicity, or specific political agendas), create “change in the subjectivity” of the activists, and a “unified collective will” to organize and mobilize.

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247 Ibid. p. 2 Citing Mc Adam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996b:2
Now I broaden my discussion to the literature concerning collective action, social movements and social mobilization. These terms are used interchangeably.

**Social Movements are Not a “Thing”**

“A social movement is more like the whole winter, or the whole ocean. Even if we can say quite a bit (and we believe we can) about why and how particular people engage in some single collective event, this will not necessarily tell us why a social movement came about.” Marwell and Oliver (1984, p. XX)

In examining social mobilization, Meyer argues that “social movements community includes diverse individuals and groups whose primary focus at any one time may vary tremendously, but who are united by a generally, shared view of the world and their place in it.” While Marwell and Oliver consider the concept of “social movement” a “theoretical nightmare,” scholars including McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly remind us that in order to understand mobilization, it is crucial to explain its dynamic processes instead of seeking to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for mobilization, action, or certain trajectories. McAdam et al. view “mobilization as a process intersecting with other mechanisms and processes—such as creation and transformation of actors, their certification or decertification, repression, radicalization, and the diffusion of dynamic processes.” In exploring mobilization as a process, it is important to learn about the dynamics of contention, specifically the processes that expand social protest and magnify its significance. These processes include diffusion and brokerage to list just few. Diffusion refers to the spread of protest activities from one place to another. It can take place both within nation borders or at the transnational level.

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251 Ibid., 13.
Elkink echoing Kopstein and Reilly define diffusion as “a complex process that involves information flow, networks of communication, hierarchies of influence, and receptivity to change.” This calls attention to “the ways in which events affect other events.” If we consider Oberschall’s diachronic analysis, one can argue that the perceived success of Tunisia and Egypt has alerted Moroccan activists’ perceptions and probability of success (if they coalesce and mobilize).

The February 20 movement benefited from the general context in the Middle East particularly Tunisia and Egypt through traveling ideas that helped shift the perceptions of political opportunity and inspired activists to effectively engage in cyber-activism to further diffuse the ideas they learned through the channels of satellites TV stations, Facebook, Youtube. Diffusion of ideas helped February 20 movement to become innovative. The innovation is activists are looking for what Paczynszka refers to, using Bensinger’s model, as “modular phenomenon” or the “influence of example” which in the case of Morocco helped activists understand that the Makhzan would not react in a violent so it is time to demand more change. Bensinger’s concept of influence of example provided activists to rethink engagement to defend new ideas and fend off repressive political elements. A renewed sense of civic activism was born with February 20 which is exemplified through its Tansikiyats. In the words of ten activists interviewed, the ideas about justice and dignity resonated with us and the courage of people taking to the street.

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254 Elkink (December 2011).
in Tunisia and Egypt provided a new hope and aspirations — جددت الثورة التونسية امل الشباب في العيش الكريم و المستقبل الافضل. They added that the first protests that took place in major cities such as Rabat and Casablanca were in support of Tunisians youth and their demands for justice — لقد كانت الوقفات الشبابية قبل 20 فبراير دعما للشباب التونسي و مطالبهم للعدالة الاجتماعية. 257

Tansikiyats were not concerned with bringing down the regime; they were concerned with demanding an alternative way of centralized power and building up a society with more justice and rule of law. This diffusion of ideas about justice, people’s power, and solidarity from Tunisia and Egypt were not just passively accepted or received ideas. Activists engaged in the process of adapting them to the Moroccan context. For example, *February 20* activists developed a video “I am Moroccan” to put to rest the question of identity and of Marocanness as counter-narrative to the Makhzanian narrative accusing them of touching the fundamentals of the nation “God, Nation, and King.” So activists welcomed the ideas of the Arab Uprising, but rationally considered the context of Morocco. The video included also why people are taking to the street on February 20, 2011. According to Abadi, “*February 20* grounded its political legitimacy in cultural beliefs, values, and local public cultures.” 258 On this point, Cecelia Walch-Russo argues that “processes of adoption and adaptation are most often negotiated and contested amongst actors.” 259 And that the “diffusion across transnational movements involves not only top down, but also bottom-up adoption, with a reformulation of tactics and strategies by adopters as well as transmitters.” 260 Recent work building on Chabot

257 Ten activists interviewed in November 2013. One from Tangiers, two from Rabat, three from Casablanca, and two from Marrakesk, and one from Khenifra, and one free lance journalist in Rabat.

258 Abadi (2014).


and Duyvendak was conducted by Roggeband. In addition to studies listed above, there are other scholars (Jasper, Johnson and Klandermans, and Melucci) who place emphasis on the negotiation and communication aspect of collective action.\textsuperscript{261}

Mekouar argues that without political agents, diffusion is not possible. He particularly underscores that informational cascades and subsequent mobilization are “the results of the strong involvement of respected political agents who break the informational silence in an authoritarian regime and signal to the population that important local actors are dissatisfied with the regime and willing to mobilize against it.”\textsuperscript{262} He maintains that actors help break down the informational and psychological firewalls. Mekouar’s argument is purely based on the symbolism of the local agents and did not provide their role in framing the issues to resonate with the populace.\textsuperscript{263}

Thanks to the new media technology, new ideas were diffused from the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, yet reformulation and connection between ideas of justice and dignity and the reality of youth in Morocco was important. This connection is what Tilly and Tarrow refer to as brokerage as another major source of protest expansion and the first step of transforming fluid or spontaneous forms of social mobilization into more institutionalized patterns of political representation.\textsuperscript{264} For Tarrow and Wood “explanations of social movements and their history must mesh with explanation of other sorts of contentious politics.”\textsuperscript{265} Tarrow and Wood’s work catalogues social movements (1768-2008) in Europe. This body of work showed that “despite considerable differences

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Chabot and Duyvendak (2002); Roggeband (2007); Jasper (1997); Johnson and Klandermans (1995); and Melucci (1996).
\item Mekouar, (2014).
\item Tilly & Tarrow (2007).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
in timing from regime to regime, in each regime the shifts clustered together; and that within the cluster emerged a distinctive combination of campaigns, performances, and displays. Participants and observers alike eventually began calling this new form of politics a ‘movement.’” In this view a social movement “is not just a thing; it is primarily a process, and should be studied as a historical phenomenon in a span of time.” Simply, Tilly views “cohesion, concentrated ideas and actions are what in a sense define a movement.”

Another relevant dimension in social movements is “fluidity” as illustrated through Gusfield (1981) and later Bayat (2005) work. Gusfield argues against a “linear” conception of social movements, and argues for a more “fluid” and “amorphous” notion. On his part, Bayat disregards “monolithic and totalizing narratives, because they ignore and even suppress narratives which may come to give different understanding of things.” Therefore, Bayat embraces “a fluid fragmented vision of social movements” in an attempt to present “an angle which might help account for complexities of contemporary movements.” This concept of “fluidity” focuses on “ideas” of movements and their complex interactions with other social trends. In the context of the Arab Spring, movements’ ideas are about “justice.” The Arab Spring was about the injustice that stemmed from corruption and from decades of suffering under authoritarian

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266 Ibid., ix.
regimes. These ideas are diffused across the region, but the response to how to denounce “injustice” and proclaim “justice” may differ from one place to another. At least this is the case in Morocco. Activists in Morocco strategized about how these ideas can be translated to account for political and socio-economic contexts. February 20 Tansikiyats (through public assembly processes) embraced and localized these ideas while considering the complexity of outcomes and consequences of collective action.272

While Bayat discusses fluidity and fragmentation, Edelman demonstrates a shift from old social movements that consider labor and class their foci to new social movements (NSM) that,

“emerge out of crisis of modernity and focus on struggles over symbolic, informational, and cultural resources and rights to specificity and difference. Participation in NSMs is itself a goal, apart from any instrumental objectives, because everyday movement practices embody in embryonic form the changes the movements seek.”273

In addition to new social movements emerging from crisis, new social movements encompass features such as networks, expansion of public space, and collective claims.

In light of this, I draw on Fuchs’ extensive collection of definitions of new social movements by selecting three definitions that includes the above aspects.

Social movements are “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities.”274

Social movements are “best conceived of as temporary public spaces, as moments of collective creation that provides societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals.”275

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272 Tansikiyats is an Arabic term used to refer to local coordinating committees or local coordinations.
274 See Diani (1992: 13).
A social movement consists of “(1) campaigns of collective claims on target authorities; (2) an array of claim-making performances including special-purposes associations, public meetings, media statements, and demonstrations; (3) public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.” 276

It is equally important to examine the features of contentious episodes in the movement. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly define contentious politics as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” 277 – that is collective political struggle. Meyer defines claims as not only by what activists want but also by what they think is possible. The nature of the state and the content of public policy define both urgency and possibility. 278 McAdam et al. are mostly concerned with episodic rather than continuous contentious politics that takes place in public and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant. 279

Bourdieu also brings contention to light stating that “contention, not stasis, is the ubiquitous feature of collective life that his varied inquiries aim at making at once visible and intelligible. Struggle, not ‘reproduction,’ is the master metaphor at the core of his thought.” 280 For Brockett however, most of contentious politics “occurs in situations of acute grievances, and carries high risks even to life itself …under conditions of acute grievances and high risks, contentious movements are fueled and constrained by hope.

277 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly(2001).
279 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly(2001).
and fear, by love and rage, and underneath, far too often, but grief.”

He adds that contentious politics is a function of “political realities confronting members and challengers at any given time, as it is of grievances, availability of resources, or underlying socio-economic change.”

To give voice to February 20 movement struggle and see the movement from within, I must consider perspectives on subjectivity as they play a critical role in translating grievances that drove protesters into the street in the first place. As Oliver, Cadena-Roa and Strawn argue, “orientations in social movements are broadly organized around four concepts: framing, identity, culture and emotions.” Since this study focuses on framing, attention is directed toward the subjective dimension of how grievances are strategically framed to resonate with protesters. Within framing, we find a subjective dimension (interpretation) that stands between grievance and action. Oliver et al. view framing as concepts that “enable us to examine empirically the process through which a given situation is defined and experienced.”

In this sense, framing maybe understood as a rational way to mobilize as much as a subjective sense of meaning-making. In this respect, understanding framing requires a consideration of the debates around subjectivity.

From a collective behavior approach, scholars like Reed worry about the lack of subjectivity in politics and the over emphasis of rational models of contention politics. He

asserts that “the focus has done much to reveal political contention as rational, instrumental, or purposively motivated mobilization, has similarly tended to bypass the subjective agent, especially in terms of how cultural, emotional, and interpretive processes constitute the agent.”

This is where Reed, Polletta, and Jasper respond to structuralists like Mancur Olsen, and Dennis Chong who views collective action through the prism of “public goods.” Chong argues that the “pursuit of public goods constitutes multiple-player prisoner dilemma.”

Polletta and Jasper’s work however, provides an alternative to the structural approach to mobilization. Their work goes beyond the focus on “how structural shifts gave collective actors the resources to act collectively on longstanding grievance,” to putting emphasis on why people mobilize. They argue that the emphasis on the how of mobilization over the why of it leads to leaving many important issues unexamined. With this approach, Reed, Polletta and Jasper open “the door to understanding the political process as more than a matter of formal practices.” Thus, rational model does not “appear to be a promising venue of interpretation.”

Given the perspective on subjectivity, Brockett contends that “in contentious politics, emotions play an important role for both non-elites and elites in motivating their actions. For non-elites, emotional responses are what turn objectives circumstances into grievance, and an important part of what determines whether grievances will generate mobilization, at what intensity, and how long it will persist in the face of a lack of

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288 Ibid., 614.
governmental responsiveness and perhaps even repression.\textsuperscript{290} For him, the full understanding of emergence, trajectory, and outcome of contentious movements requires a fuller integration of grievances into our work.\textsuperscript{291}

He asserts that while honoring the rationality of the behavior, it should not be achieved on “the expense of a better account of human behavior.”\textsuperscript{292} Authors like Benford, Snow, Polletta and Brockett do subscribe to the notion that “most of contentious politics is fueled by specific grievances…which are given a shared interpretation through collective action frames.”\textsuperscript{293}

Conversely, Tilly and Tarrow contend that most of contentious politics are not social movements. They propose that movements are a combination of sustained campaign of making claims, an array of public performances including meetings, demonstrations, and so forth, repeated display of worthiness, unity, and commitment, and draw on networks, solidarities and traditions.\textsuperscript{294} Furthermore, they assert that contentious interaction depends not only on political opportunity, but on the “triggering of a finite set of mechanisms and processes.”\textsuperscript{295}

Both authors support McAdam’s approach stating that contentious politics should be interactive – that is “a viable model of the individual must take full account of the fundamentally social/ relational nature of human existence.”\textsuperscript{296} Because “contentious politics is complicated,”\textsuperscript{297} one needs not to just examine traditional concepts (features,}

\textsuperscript{290} Charles, Brockett (2005).
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{296} McAdam cited in Tilly and Tarrow (2007) ,xii
\textsuperscript{297} Ibid., 27.
political actors, performances…etc.), but to investigate additional concepts including the events and episodes of streams of contentious and the mechanisms and processes that constitute them.\textsuperscript{298}

Because of this complexity, the focus of this study will be on transgressive contention. The \textit{February 20} movement, falls into the category of transgressive contention because it includes collective self-representation, and adopts means of claims that are forbidden within the Moroccan regime.\textsuperscript{299} The transgressive contention involves innovative claim making. The \textit{February 20} movement is considered transgressive because of the nature of its demands that take on a political flavor.

The innovation is that movements in Morocco are rethinking engagement and are able to defend new ideas and fend off repressive political elements. They are practically moving away from what Bayat calls “\textit{quiet encroachment}” to being real movements. Bayat describes the notion of “\textit{quiet encroachment}” as “silent, protracted and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on those who are propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives.”\textsuperscript{300} \textit{February 20} articulated their claims by demanding the end of conditions of \textit{hogra}, an “expression of referring to socio-economic marginalization and inequality, a lack of transparent justice and treatment as “second-class citizens.”\textsuperscript{301}

Like in other Arab countries, Moroccans set the date of \textit{February 20} as the day of “reclaiming dignity” and ending \textit{fassad} (corruption) practices of the state.

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{300} Asef, Bayat. Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the Middle East. \textit{United Research Institute for Social Development. Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 3} (2000). Bayat citing Bayat, 1997b, Chapter1. See also Bayat (1997c.).
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 28.
The *February 20* movement made innovative claims that did not only involve protesting against degrading socio-economic conditions, corruption, and political exclusion, but also that involve breaking down the *Makhzanian* authority. The *February 20* movement did not engage in a revolution which is “the most radical form of transformation,” but portrays itself as a movement. Unlike revolutions, movements “often produce institutional change that alters power relations in a non-revolutionary way.”

In the case of *February 20*, Khadija Riyadi argues that the movement was able to “shake the pillars of the regime, and create a change, even though it did not reach all its objectives. Morocco after the *February 20* movement is different than Moroccan before the inception of the movement”

Abdelhamid Amine adds that the *February 20* movement is considered the hope of Moroccans in bringing about change, and it continues its struggle on the ground to counter the Makhzan in all its dimensions and build Morocco of dignity, freedom, equality, social justice and democracy. Abdelhamid Amine notes,

> واستدرك أمين أن حركة 20 فبراير، التي اعتبرها "أمل المجتمع المغربي في تحقيق التغيير"، ما زالت موجودة على الساحة، وما زالت تناضل ميدانيا "التخلص بلدا من المخزن في كل أبعاده، وبناء مغرب الكرامة والحرية والمساواة والعدالة والاجتماعية والديمقراطية".

Abdelhamid Amine notes however, that the *February 20* movement is considered “the hope of the Moroccan people to bring about change; and is still present on the scene, and struggle on the ground ” to rid

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303 Khadija Ryadi (Arabic: خديجة الرياضي) is a Moroccan human rights activist, former president of Morocco Association for Human Rights (AMDH), and a member Annahj Addimocrati – a party that supports *February 20* movement. AMDH played a major role in supporting and providing advice and guidance to activists. Khadija Ryadi was among the people who were targeted by Makhzanian authorities during protest.
304 Abdelhamid Amine is a human rights activist, a former vice president of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), and a former member of the leadership of Moroccan Union of Workers (UMT).
the country of the Makhzan with all its dimensions, and build Morocco's dignity, freedom, equality, justice and social democracy.”305

*February 20* activism is marked by stories of struggle and sometimes violent confrontations. McAdam maintains that “activism indeed have the potential to trigger a process of alteration that can affect many aspects of the participants’ lives” and that “the consequences of this process may be lifelong or at least long-term.”306 This continuous mobilization has dragged movements out of oblivion into an arena of contentious politics.307 Wacquant adopting Weber and Bourdieu’s vision, states that “society is fundamentally agonistic—that is the social universe is the site of endless and pitiless competition, in and through which arise the differences that are the stuff and stake of social existence.”308

Contentious politics tends to be concentrated around issues that are tied to their context which is also the case in Morocco. These issues include “closing of political access, the lack of state responsiveness, intimidation and harassment by the state, state violence, and frustrated rising expectations.”309

**Do they Matter: Social Networks**

To contextualize how Tansikiyats are interconnected and connect to the broader context of the movement requires an understanding of the interworking of informal social networks among and between Tansikiyats. By social networks, I refer

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305 Translation by the author of this study.
306 McAdam (1989), 758.
308 Ibid., 4.
309 Burton –Rose, 56.
to a web of interactions among activists, ties, both online and offline that function as both a support system (material and non-material) and informational sharing channels. Based on my conversations with activists, it seems that the connecting threads among activists within various Tansikiyats are these informal networks. They function in a variety of ways that serve activists despite the geographic distance. Activists’ accounts are a testimony to how social networks played a role in connectivity and building solidarity. Activists relied on informal networks to stay connected, informed, to build solidarity between activists across the political spectrum, and coordinate action (Amazigh, Adl Wal Ihsane, leftists, independents...etc). Furthermore, a deeper understanding of February 20 Tansikiyats requires attention to how they function within and in connection to each other and to the broader context of February 20. In fact, literature on social movements corroborate the importance of informal connections to facilitating access to tangible and non-tangible resources, providing a sense of belonging and solidarity, as well as a learning opportunity to come together and overcome ideological differences. In light of this, it is essential to examine literature and existing scholarship related to the subject.

Understanding how February 20 Tansikiyats are connected requires considering the concepts of fluidity, linkages, brokerage and most of all networks. Extensive work has been done by scholars on networks. For instance, studies have shown that social networks are important in social movement studies. Scholars have proposed different conceptualizations that attempt to spell out what constitutes social networks. For a start,
Manuel Castells looked into the genesis of networks and have done an excellent job in connecting networks to communication, power, creation of meaning, and to social movements. As he writes, citing Fritjof Capra, “the network is a pattern that is common to all life. Wherever we see life, we see networks.”

He continues to argue against the superiority of vertical-hierarchical organizations over networks explicating that “networks have their strengths in their flexibility.”

Others like Diani & McAdam (2002) looked into why networks matter while others including Coleman (1990), Marvell & Oliver (1993), and Crossley & Ibrahim (2012) focused on the efficiency and effectiveness of networks in collective action. On his part, Diani conceptualizes social movements as “networks,” which includes a level of coordination, and interaction. Other scholars argued for the “social capital” of networks discussing density and ties among actors. Krinsley and Crossley argue that higher density among actors is empirically and theoretically linked to “increased solidarity, mutual support, and generation of incentives for self-sacrifice to engage within the movements.”

The authors also reviewed Coleman (1988) and Fisher’s (1982) conception on networks density and their relevance in facilitating the formation of situational definitions and substance in social movements.

Many studies have also shown that the value of strong ties in influencing norms and behavior (Kitts, 2006); and people’s attitudes (McAdam, 1986; Gartrell, 1987;

Advocates of social networks analysis emphasize the need to engage in aspects of meaning creation, therefore a quantitative approach remains insufficient. They proposed a “mixed method strategy” (Crossley, 2010; Edwards, 2009; Emirbayer & Goodwin; 1994; Mische, 2003). The point here is that meaning and content matters in social networks. Krinsley & Crossley recall White’s (1963) distinct conception of networks arguing that “the cultural content and aspects of networks are always central: social ties are narrated, either explicitly or not.” Tilly’s earlier work referred to networks as “catnets,” and later expanded White’s conception of networks to include interactive connections. This was later deepened through Mische’s (2003) taking it a step further towards cultural analysis. In her work on environmental protests, Saunders explores the relational approach of social networks focusing on relational partners rather than positional approach (structure). Saunders refers in her study to Diani’s Green Networks and how he mixed both approaches in his study of Milanese environmental networks.

Langman & Morris (2001) and Castells (2004) explore the realm technology in social networks. Langman & Morris (2001) consider the notion of online communities “internetworked society” building on Wellman’s (1999) work. From his perspective, Castells (2000) does not subscribe to the idea that online communities are ‘real.’

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315 Krinsley & Crossley (2014).
316 Catnets is concept that Tilly borrowed from White’s work “From Mobilization to Revolution.” Tilly views collective identity as a notion that arises from the network relational ties among members of a group (catnet).
317 See more on Krinsley and Crossley (2014).
Boekkooi (2012), Krinsley & Crossley (2014), and Earl and Kimport (2011) do not support Castells perspective.

Since technology facilitates exchanges and connections that are flexible, and timely, it became important not to overlook its place in collective action. Technology has expanded the range of available informal social networks. Yet, scholars like Saunders critiqued the role of technology particularly information sharing. She contends that sharing information via technology is an informal interaction and it is “too weak of a network link to form a real movement.” She suggests a collaborative aspect of networks which constitutes an important dimension of a “movement.” She agrees with Diani’s (2003) argument.

In his later work, Castells theorizes that,

“The emergence of mass self-communication offers an extraordinary medium for social movements and rebellious individuals to build their autonomy and confront the institutions of society in their own terms and around their own projects. Naturally, social movements are not originated by technology, they use technology. But technology is not simply a tool, it is a medium, it is a social construction, with its own implications.”

He adds,

“social movements do not exist only in the Internet. Local radio and TV stations, autonomous groups of video production and distribution, p2p networks, blogs, and podcasts constitute a variegated interactive network that connects the movement with itself, connects social actors with society at large, and acts on the entire realm of cultural manifestations. Furthermore, movements, in their wide diversity, also root themselves in their local lives, and in face-to-face interaction. And when they act, they mobilize in specific places, often mirroring the places of the power institutions.”

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Roggeband extends the idea of cultural manifestations and identifies the gap in theoretical models in failing to account for what she calls “intercultural communication.” Roggeband’s work provides an entry point that illustrates that networks mediate the diffusion of ideas and exchange of information, yet local appropriation, re-contextualizing and framing of these ideas. Based on her study of women’s movements, she contends that the “process of importing a new idea or model in another context required strategic framing efforts.”

Passy and Monsch recently emphasized the importance of social networks in social movements noting that, social interactions—through talks, discussions, and discourse— influence not only an individual’s identity frame of action but also other cognitive elements that are essential when participating in protest politics; for example, those emphasized by Gamson (1992): injustice and agency frames.

**Ta’atir Al-hirak: Collective Action Frames**

Leila Mernissi notes that “context count – le lieu compte.” The February 20 movement is exceptional as it differs across Morocco (various Tansikiyats), but coalesce around same claims of “justice and injustice.” Mernissi goes on to argue that February 20 was about “reflecting together about a new political agency—reflechir ensemble sur a un nouvel agencement politique.” This is indicative that the purpose is unity of collectively created new forms of political action and space.

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322 Ibid.
The ideas from the Arab Spring can be viewed as master frames that can travel beyond a single case of social movements. The Arab Spring (particularly in Tunisia and Egypt) made a real contribution in awakening the dormant forces in Morocco or what Mernissi calls “la majority silencieuse.” Yet, February 20 movement activists understood the dangers and negative consequences of the participation of this grassroots majority. Therefore, localizing protest (through Tansikiyats) was a strategic choice. Activists’ accounts elucidate that the need to frame and portray February 20 as a popular movement was an important task. A prominent February 20 activist (Ouidad Melhaf) summarized this point effectively stating that,

 مباشرة من بعد إطلاق النداء بدأ شباب من مختلف المدن كيديرو مجموعات على فيسبوك بشكل عفوي من أجل التنسيق والخروج في نفس الوقت تحت إشارة نفس السنارات مع بعض الخصوصيات بالنسبة لكل تنسيقية حيث كان شيء مرات في بعض التسنيقات يغلب عليها طابع المطالب الاجتماعية أكثر من مطالب إصلاح الدستور والقضاء إلى غير ذلك...

 Directly after the first launch of the call to protest, youth from various cities started their own Facebook groups spontaneously to coordinate and take to the street at the same day and under the same frames and slogans with particularities of each Tansikiyat because some Tansikiyats have more social demands more than just demanding amending the constitution and judiciary…etc. 324

 The appeal was directed to all regions, political and civil society organizations to show that the movement extends to the farthest point in Morocco and it is a popular movement and it is not linked to the center and with the elite only that is in Rabat and Casablanca. 325

 Local Tansikiyats were in charge of adopting the narrative of protest locally (from master frames to sub-frames) through consensus building during Tansikiyats’ public assemblies.

324 Interview with Ouidad took place in November 2013, and a follow up in February 2015.
325 Interview with Ouidad took place in November 2013, and a follow up in February 2015.
February 20 activists were aware of the diversity and the heterogeneity within the movement which needed to be accounted for.

The current project raises important issues on collective action in Morocco. Here some of social movements’ theories are used as a framework for analyzing the local organizing of the Tansikiyats and how they link to the movement in a broader sense. Echoing Martin, “perspectives like framing (Benford and Snow 2000) and political opportunity (McAdam 1982) have the potential of explaining the local organizing and the wide range of outcomes” and consequences. For example, research on “framing will demonstrate how movements present their claims to gain support, explore the link between movement tactics, culture, and success, and highlight how the adaptation of specific organizational forms and repertoires of action are also important strategic decisions.” Furthermore, “framing processes have taken center stage in an attempt to understand the emergence and development of social change efforts.”

The term frame was first used by Goffman referring to “schemata of interpretations” that enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large.” And they are utilized to mobilize “potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.” Frames can be effectively used to mobilize supporters and achieve movement’s goals. On this, Benford & Snow and Fisher expanded the tasks of

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328 Croteau & Hicks (2003), 252.
framing to include diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames, which are

“constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.”

Snow and Benford define framing as,

“an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction…and the resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as ‘collective action frames.’”

Collective action frames,

“are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.”

Brockett stresses that a movement’s framing must be “empirically credible, commensurate with their experience, and resonate with existing cultural narratives.”

But Noonan considers human agency a key ingredient in collective action frames. She underscores the importance of human agency claiming that “framing activities are not simply reflections of a passive internalization of ideology.” With this argument, she brings “social psychological factors back into the analyses of social movements, while maintaining the notion that participants are rational actors engaged in the construction of their own mobilizing beliefs and strategies.”

She notes the significance of Benford and Snow’s (1992) work that introduced master frames to the equation. Accordingly, master

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331 Benford & Snow (2000), 615.
332 Ibid., 614.
334 Ibid., 161.
frames “provide the interpretive medium through which collective actors associated with different movements…assign blame for the problem they are attempting to ameliorate.” She also refers to what Gamson calls “ideological packages” and at the core of a package “is a central organizing idea or framing for making sense of relevant events.”

Taking the view of McAdam, McCarthy, Zald (1996a) and Tarrow (1998), Edelman explains framing as “a category encompassing the ways in which collective identities arose, as well as the interpretative, discursive, and dramaturgical practices that shaped movement participants’ understanding of their condition and of possible alternatives.”

Frame analysis highlights the role that ideas, emotions, culture and discourse play in shaping collective action. This approach focuses on the way in which activists perceive their status and convey their concerns to the public. The decision to mobilize as February 20 is about how to frame collective action. In Morocco, February 20 movement framed their concerns stem from humiliation and marginalization (hogra/Tahmeesh) and centralization of power on the hands of the Makhzan. They framed their problems in terms of their Moroccan identity “Kolna M’gharba—we are all Moroccans,” “Harak 20 Febrayer, chaabia, Jamahiriya—February 20 is grassroots and popular movement,” and the common experience of exclusion and marginalization.

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prompted diverse groups to join the plight for participatory democracy and political change.

The *February 20* movement wants to transform the relationship of Moroccans with the state and Moroccans with themselves (من راعية إلى مواطن). The government itself was challenged not only from within but also from outside by the emerging international order. Mobilizing within the identity and infrastructure of the *February 20* movement was the most readily available means for advancing claims about exclusion, social justice and social change—even when those claims did not concern the Amazigh or youth or Islamists exclusively. Manisha Desai argues that it is “necessary to look beneath and beyond expressed identities to find the sources of social movement claims.”

Additionally, what the *Arab Spring* provided to social movements and the Islamists in Morocco is the drive to reach a level of “critical consciousness” – that is as Brockett puts it “similar to what Warren means by “rational autonomy”: the ability to reflect on and direct one’s desires in such a way that one can develop a life –plan.”

The Arab Spring provided comparative models (particularly Tunisia) and changed perceptions of political opportunities and the likelihood of success. This critical consciousness is influenced by how much trust participants have in organizers themselves and the narratives that they tell, a trust to be won on the basis of many intangible and largely non-cognitive factors.

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**Framing of Claims and Accounting for Emotions**

Activists face the task of articulating or framing the narratives that both “resonate with the experience of the target population as well as providing a legitimate motivational basis for contentious action.”

Activists engage in framing issues to build what Robnett refers to as “emotional resonance.” This task is well captured by collective action frames, a set of beliefs and meaning that “perform this mobilizing function by identifying the problematic condition and defining it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of corrective action.”

Frames are strategically advanced not only by the activists themselves “Siyada Chaabia ala El Karar— الإسلامي الشعبي على القرار; but also by the state and the media in order to maintain the status quo (royal youth counter-frames, Rachid Niny’s newspaper article against February 20). For this reason, Tarrow concludes that,

“not all framing takes place under their auspices. Most of the cognitive frames individuals use to navigate daily events, and most frames promoted by mass media and the state, interpret situations in ways that are in synchrony with the status quo, thus working to discourage collective action. …all social movements must ‘break the frames’ of quiescence and acceptance of the status quo that characterizes everyday life.”

Even when the media and the state use framing to demobilize the masses, framing strategy remains an important element for activists. Johnston and Noakes offer a model from Kenney’s work that articulates the “success of Poland’s freedom and peace (WiP) movement in 1989 as a good example of how framing can open political

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343 Brockett (2005), 160.
opportunities.”347 Poland example illustrates the “ability of the movement entrepreneurs to reframe state oppression as evidence of the illegitimacy of the Communist state.”348 The central argument for Brockett is that it is important to integrate grievances with attention to resources, frames, opportunities, and mechanisms.349 However, he contends that “long-standing deprivations cannot alone explain emergence of movements. The interaction between long-standing deprivations and other variables is important for understanding the trajectory of collective action and its outcomes.”350 In his view, grievances do matter, not only to protesters but also to any analysis that hopes to understand the causes and course of contentious movements.351 While framing is an integral part in understanding how people mobilize, one cannot assume that all frames lead to successful outcome. Because of competing frames, a dominant frame is always the outcome of contentious politics. For this reason, Hewitt and McCammon (2005) writings focused on the impact of framing activity on a movement’s ability to organize and attract participants.

Goodwin and Jasper have done an exceptional work on placing different scholarly work in the field of collective action starting with LeBon’s work (1960) on understanding the psychology of the crowd. Pointing to LeBon’s argument, Goodwin and Jasper contend that crowds “were guided primarily by unconscious motives and exhibited ‘very simple and very exaggerated’ emotions.”352 The argument here is that LeBon is not sympathetic to crowds as they are “impulsive and credulous.” To some extent, Weber and

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347 Johnston and Noakes (2005), 22.
348 Ibid., 22.
349 Brockett (2005), 38.
350 Ibid., 46.
351 Ibid., 66.
Durkheim (theory of social control), Freud (frustration-aggression theory), and Smelser agree with LeBon. Yet, Smelser (1963), and Turner & Killian’s (1957, 1972, and 1987) view was rooted in breaking down social control in collective action. Accordingly, they accept the psychological dimension in protests. Goodwin and Jasper maintained that theories of emotions during that period (1950s and 1960s) “were a rather simplified form of Freudian psychoanalysis.”\textsuperscript{353} Kornhauser’s (1959), classic structural theory of mass society, on the other hand, specifies that “only formal organizations protected against alienation.”\textsuperscript{354}

Models of this period showed that “the more emotional an individual (or crowd) became, the less rational he or she (or they) became. The actual stuff of contentious politics—moral principles, stated goals, processes of mobilization, the pleasures of participation—was ignored.”\textsuperscript{355} Early theorists may have focused on the pathological aspect of emotions, but at least they paid attention to them, which is not the case of structural models that emerged later on. These theorists focused more on the collective choice rather collective behavior. In the 1970s, the debate shifted to focus on the question of rationality and rational actors. Accordingly, “activists campaign outside institutional politics because they are blocked from pursuing their interests through regular political channels, not because they are personally alienated.”\textsuperscript{356} It is here, where the shift from “motivational ‘why’ to strategic ‘how’ questions happened.”\textsuperscript{357}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{353} Goodwin & Jasper (2006), 613.
\textsuperscript{354} Goodwin & Jasper (2006), 613.
\textsuperscript{355} Goodwin & Jasper (2006), 614.
\textsuperscript{356} Goodwin & Jasper (2006), 614.
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 614.
\end{footnotes}
Returning to rational choice, Tilly’s model makes “collective action a function of interests,” and presented the variables of “interests, organization, the mobilization of resources, power, repression (or facilitation), and opportunities (or threats), as independent of people’s feelings and beliefs.” Tilly’s structural account may be viewed as discouraging further consideration of emotions because “emotions are irrational.” Simply put by Goodwin and Jasper, “although the earlier theorists portrayed protesters as emotional to demonstrate their irrationality, the new theorists demonstrated their rationality by denying their emotions.”

Compatible with structural approach, Kemper’s (2001) point on hierarchies within social movements may not have received a full acceptance among social movements students as he attribute various emotions to status and power within hierarchies. Yet, as Goodwin and Jasper assert “today’s protest groups, especially the so-called new social movements, rarely exhibit the kind of internal hierarchy that defines structure in Kemper’s sense.”

Surveying scholarly work to bridge the gap on this debate, scholars like McAdam (1982), and Melucci (1995) recognized the role of grievances (McAdam) and “emotional investment” (Melucci). Also, Horowitz (2003) theory on the psychology of the masses demonstrates that non-elite groups are mobilized not only based on rational interests, but on “sentiment” and on the role institutions play to impact it. He later elaborated that we must be able to account for “the passionate, symbolic, and apprehensive aspects.”

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358 Ibid., 615.
359 Ibid., 615.
360 Ibid., 627.
361 Horowitz (2003), 226.
Indeed emotions are important given that even scholars such as Chatterjee (1993) who focuses on macro theories of nationalism emphasized the notion of emotions. Chatterjee’s theory of “middleness” defends the entrapment and subordination of the middle class as being based on fear as the hegemony of power is both ideological and physical. Despite the “mortal fear of the Englishman,” Chatterjee asserts that fear was also a source of new strategies for resistance and survival.

Refuting the indifference of structural accounts vis-à-vis emotions is also apparent in Snow and Benford (1992) on framing. They elaborated that there are three kinds of frames (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational). They implicitly emphasized the emotional components on the motivational frames. Gamson (1992) later solidified this notion, by looking at “injustice frames” which, as Goodwin and Jasper quoting Gamson (1992), argue depend on “the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul.”

**Political Opportunity**

Historically, political opportunities have certainly played a part in the rise and fall of social movements. Some literature on political opportunity shows that openings in political opportunity are a prerequisite for the emergence and success of contentious movements. However, some scholars do not agree with this general idea. For instance, Brockett argues that “changes in the configuration of political opportunities are often critical for explaining the emergence of contentious movements, as well as their trajectories and outcomes.”

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363 Brockett (2005), 259.
Many authors examine political opportunity as a series of events of contention distinguishing between the “events,” “conjunctions,” and “long durees,”\textsuperscript{364} while others focus on the “opening or “closing” of political opportunities.\textsuperscript{365} Other scholars study “conflicts occurring around the same time in relation to space, within a given region or nation (Shorter & Tilly 1974), or as part of a cross-national comparison.”\textsuperscript{366}

The changes in political environment affect how protests develop new ways of political engagement. Meyer emphasizes that “despite the fact that opportunity to act collectively and to act effectively are not related, for groups to mobilize in the face of increased exclusion, the opportunity to mobilize extra-institutionally should be inversely related to the opportunity to exercise meaningful influence on policy.”\textsuperscript{367} For Tarrow, political opportunities are “dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure.”\textsuperscript{368}

Citing Koopmans, Brockett contends that “not all of opportunity is agency, some of it is structured.”\textsuperscript{369} He however, views the shift in structure political opportunities positively stating that “it could be in ways advantageous to challengers, mass mobilization is encouraged, challengers’ political leverage increases, and the possibility

\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 290 citing (Tarrow1989).
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 290 referring to Gamson & Meyer (1996).
\textsuperscript{367} Meyer et al (2002), 15.
\textsuperscript{368} Meyer (2002), 15 citing Tarrow 1998a, 76-77.
\textsuperscript{369} Brockett (2005) , 17.
of positive outcomes improve.” Movement organizers could also “exaggerate the opportunities present in a particular situation in an effort to mobilize people to act.”

Echoing Tarrow (1981), Meyer claims that “as the state alter the costs and benefits of collective action and develop new techniques for controlling collective action, they allow, encourage, provoke, or discourage movements’ particularly changing strategies of influence.” A cyclic pattern emerges, as states respond to movement challenges and alter the opportunities available to contemporary and subsequent movements. From this vantage point, one may argue that the state, through its public institutions could shape and constrain patterns of social mobilization.

Brockett discusses the relationship between mass political activity and repression. He argues that it is often noted that state violence crushes popular mobilization under some circumstances, but at other times similar levels of violence (or even greater) will provide broad contention. State violence is the most salient grievance explaining the radicalization of contention.

Political opportunities can change rapidly and significantly, and they can be altered by movement activities for better or for worse. For example, in Central America, “repression often has been directed at limiting the effectiveness of opposition political parties, or worse, at eliminating them—or even their activists’ altogether.”

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370 Ibid. p. 15 citing McAdam (1982), 43.
373 Tarrow (1981a).
374 Tarrow (1988); Goldstone (2003).
375 Brockett (2005), 12 -40.
376 Ibid., 16.
Some kinds of repression drive claim makers far underground, or into radicalizing mass alliances. Other types of repression may “decimate activist institutions and render protest tentative and cautious; still others may distinguish those who elect moderate dissent from potential radicals. Movement identities emerge in relation to such processes of contention and are not essential or fixed.”

Repression decreased Iranian protest in the short term, but in the long run brought large numbers of people in streets. The same thing happened in Tunisia recently where repression pushed the Tunisian people to come out in large numbers to rebel against Ben Ali and his regime. Meyer puts it eloquently,

“It is over time that the interaction between state repression and social movements created a set of relational possibilities between social and state actors. State repression influenced whether social allies were physically, organizationally, or ideologically available to potential state defectors. The state can (like in Philippine) adopt a policy of eliminating neither protest nor political organization, but harassing; the strategy was designed to preserve a liberal façade to mollify moderate opponents. Instead it accumulated across the dictatorship. The movement success or failure depends on both the movement’s capacity and the State’s resilience.”

For Benford and Snow political opportunity structures can constraint or facilitate action frames. While they contend that changes in political opportunity lead to changes in frame resonance, they hold the view that degree and the level of how political opportunity facilitates or restricts action is still open for debate. This is because, “movement activists interpret political space in ways that emphasize opportunity rather than

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378 Benford and Snow and (1992), 29.
379 Brockett (2005), 267 citing Rasler (1996), 143.
380 Johnston & Noakes (2005), 30- 44.
constraint; they may stimulate actions that changes opportunity, making their opportunity frame a self-fulfilling prophecy.\textsuperscript{382}

Johnston and Noakes support Gamson and Meyer (1996) stating that,

The student of social movements must also recognize that political opportunity can be framed in different ways and that this is a necessary part of the agency component of a collective action frame. It is the agency component of a collective action frame, you will recall, that encourages aggrieved parties to become agents of their own history. \textsuperscript{383}

To gain perspective, the literature discussed above will help us understand the general framework of collective action. For instance, the review of theory and research on social mobilization constitutes a significant body of work based on which collective action in Morocco could be examined as a process. Bayat’s concept of fluidity provides the framework within which one can investigate social actors’ frames, dynamics and processes, and how they change and evolve within Morocco’s political climate. Additionally, the theories on contentious politics constitute a departure point from which the dynamics of contention in every February 20 Tanisikiya and the conditions that expand February 20 movement significance could be analyzed as well. This project also builds on McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s insights to examine the features of social mobilization while surveying the interaction among makers of claims (February 20) and their subjects (Makhzan) before and after the reforms measures that Morocco undertook in light of the Arab Spring. Using subjective theories of social mobilization offers a closer look into how and when grievances of February 20 activists generated mobilization and what are the prospects for its continuation given the on-going shift in

\textsuperscript{382} Ibid. p.631 citing Gamson and Meyer (1996).
\textsuperscript{383} Johnson & Noakes (2005), 23.
forms and levels of state repression. The analysis of *February 20* Tansikiyats provides many accounts on forms of activism, tactics, frames, strategies, and manifestations of *February 20* within a specific context, time and space.

The application of a more nuanced interpretation of frames helps coordinate and sustain collective action by linking local Tansikiyats to movement values, claims, and master frames. Framing and the exploration of the political opportunity greatly contributes to a better understanding of how these Tansikiyats are constituted, function, develop, and how they may change their character over time. Framing provides a perspective for understanding how Tansikiyats define and frame themselves, and give a name to their grievances locally. Linking to Olesen’s work on Zapatismo’s local organizations, I argue that master frames “create a synergy that provides individuals involved or sympathetic to the movement with varying explanations for the need for mobilization.”

Specifically, *February 20* activists recognized that political knowledge is scarce among grassroots, so to mobilize effectively Tansikiyats serve as a bridge linking local political context to the demands of the movement. It is important to pinpoint that the political content that *February 20* brought to the populace across Tansikiyats needed to be context-driven and disseminated through various means including informal interactions in order to increase participation and buy-in to movement’s demands. The central insight here is that activists viewed effective framing, context of demands, and informal networks as important contributors to building

popular legitimacy and convincing a large majority of Moroccans to take to the street. Interviewees of this research agreed. Activist Ouidad Melhaf summarizes this point effectively, بناء شرعية شعبية خصوصا وأن الحركة راهنت على اقناع عدد كبير من المغاربة بالانخراط في الاحتجاج. In a TV interview, Amina Boughabli argues that the objective of the movement was to mobilize and unify the Moroccan people around the demands of the movement – توحيد الشعب المغربي...هزو مطالب اللي هي مطالب الحركة.

**How about the Makhzan: State Strategies**

This section provides insights into the Makhzan’s response to the February 20 movement. The state-society relationships at the macro-level also provide insights into how Tansikiyats adopt and reformulate their relationship with the center. The interplay of the state—Makhzan with the movement whether at the local or the national level provides valuable insights into February 20 Tansikiyats’ continuous effort to organize politically and link to broader issues of political change. While the state and its repression is not the main focus of this project however, one cannot study February 20 Tansikiyats without taking the Makhzan into the equation and explore how Tansikiyats employ strategies to avoid state repression and build resilience. The Makhzan in Morocco employs the same tactics and strategies either at the local level or at the national level. So in addition the strategies listed in this section that describe how the state is dealing with activists, the Makhzan also engage in counter mobilization efforts at the local and

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385 Interview with Ouidad took place in November 2013. Ouidad effectively summarized the argument. Translation by the author of this study: building popular legitimacy especially that the movement undertook the responsibility to convince a large number of Moroccans to engage in protests.

386 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtvcFmmPzeo
Amina Boughabli on roundtable discussion on TV (Mouaten Al Yawm—المواطن اليوم). Amina is the face of the movement as she was the first person to call for protest in the youtube video produced by activists: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZm750joM0U

national levels. Example of this, is the *March 9* movement (حركة 9 مارس) that received its name from the king’s speech of March 9. The Makhzan uses resources to create incentives to engage people in order to promote state discourse and infiltrate the movement to identify activists and leaders both nationally and within the Tansikiyats. So this counter mobilization “presents a number of challenges, from how activists frame contentious situations (Benford and Snow 2000) to their ability to achieve desired goals (Andrews 2002).”

Examining state-movement relationship will help us understand how Tansikiyats local organizing contributes to renegotiating of state-society relations.

The state is pragmatic and understands the specific relationship between the political elite and the large apolitical masses. According to Paczynska, the regime creates venues of incorporating the challengers and they enter in a bargaining process. Paczynska sees this process of bargaining as benefiting the regime. While it may not be any longer the case in most Arab countries, political bargaining with challengers still exist and it is conducted in many different ways.

Understanding this relationship helps the state craft its political strategy vis-à-vis the *February 20* movement, by targeting each component differently. For instance, the state recognizes the fact the “Amazigh activists have shown a great aptitude for strategic thinking in their agitation for equal rights, even against powerful actors such as the state.” Therefore, the state saw the new Amazigh activism as an emerging competitor of its interests and to the existing status quo for the benefit of the political elite. The

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389 Ibid.
pattern of “seyast T’ahmeesh” -- policies of exclusion-- was widespread until the state began to adopt policies of bricolage or what Hoffman and Miller called “brioleur spirit”—that is to use whatever is available to ease the activists without dealing with their core issues or demands. 392

The objective of the state is to co-opt activists and provide them with a new position and a new label. Drawing from Bourdieu, Wacquant advances the idea that “the position of any individual, group, or institution, in social space may thus be charted by two coordinates, the overall volume and the composition of the capital they detain. A third coordinate, variation over time of this volume and composition, records their trajectory through social space and provides invaluable clues as to their habitus by revealing the manner and path through which they reached the position they presently occupy.” 393 Members occupy a new social space that imposes specific determinations upon all those who enter it. 394 In light of Bourdieu’s argument, the members here refer to those actors who intentionally or unintentionally fell into the traps of the Makhzan. The argument here is that anyone who sides with the Makhzan is by definition co-opted. To a large extent, the process of co-optation led some actors to become part of what is called Al Khasa or Ayan – very distinguished elite. For instance, some Amazigh elite and youth groups became makhzanise or literally have been transformed into a de facto representation of the state (Makhzan). 395 Because of this, the gap between the elite and the masses widened tremendously and the state benefited from that. Hoffman and Gilson

392 Hoffman & Miller (2010).
394 Ibid. p. 7
Miller argue that “we must keep in mind that activist and elitist representations do not necessarily stand for the experiences of the masses, who are largely rural, often politically disengaged, and frequently economically deprived, and whose concerns tend to diverge widely from those of the urban intellectuals.” 396

Many Amazigh analysts considered the state’s approach as bricolage to preserve regime stability and to the “application of despotic power,” 397 and as an undercover for what Silverstein called pouvoir assassin — authority assassin. 398 For the state, accepting activists’ demagoguery or regarding them as political actors constitutes a political suicide given that the state was not willing to enter in a dialogue of renegotiating power. Historically, the state is known to play tricks to neutralize the “demagogues” through the co-optation of key elites allied to the movement.

In addition to the policies of co-optation and bricolage, the Makhzan also employs two major strategies: strategy of containment (Ihtiwaa-الإحتواء) and strategy of rejection (Raf’d-الرفض). An example of Ihtiwaa strategies is the recent attempt of the Makhzan outreach to February 20 activists to partake in the national council of youth that is supposed to be established under the new constitution. The Makhzan invited February 20 activists despite the fact that the organic law that will govern the national council for youth has not been drafted, approved, or passed by the parliament. These strategies are exemplified in the political parties policies vis-à-vis February 20 political inclusion. For example, youth within the political party equation are seen as voters, but not necessarily as active political actors. In response to February 20 mobilization in Morocco, the king’s

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396 Hoffman and Miller (2010), 10.
397 Joffe (2009), 937.
398 Ibid., 28.
speech in March 9 outlined seven items for reforms that included a new constitutional referendum to foster democratic principles that include youth in the process. Yet, *February 20* youth viewed these reforms as a cosmetic change given the fact the constitution was imposed (*dosteur mammouh* - دستور ممنوح - ), and does not embody the concepts of genuine democratic reforms. Many also contend that the referendum and the fast pace of the reform agenda were meant to circumvent (*Intisas* - إمتصاص - ) citizens’ frustration. The draft constitution requires twenty organic laws to be enacted for its practical application without a given time frame of completion. Interviewee Nabila Mounib argues that there is a complete disconnect between the discourse and the application as the Makhzan always works with the “logic of accumulation - سياسة التراكم.” Therefore, there must be a break with this notion that portrays the Makhzan as the only actor in the political landscape, and the only one that proposes policies and enact them. Additionally, the concept of pre-emptive - (إستباقية - ) has always marked the Makhzan approach to containing the political scene in Morocco. The Makhzan adopted its strategies and policies through various stages to suppress *February 20* movement, and lessen its power and momentum. These stages include according to Yassin Bizazz (2011): 1) favoritism, 2) repression, 3) blockade, and 4) indifference. The Makhzan continues however, to manipulate the political landscape by going back and forth between these stages. Still, the dominant one is the stage of indifference. In its indifference, the Makhzan continues its wave of reforms (new referendum, and new

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399 Logic of accumulation (or siyat tarakom) means that the results of the reform is an accumulation of various efforts through the years.

400 Nabila Mounib is a professor of law in Casablanca, an activist, and a member of Ishtiraki mouahad in Morocco

401 Yassin Bizaz is a political activist and a member of the national committee of *February 20* movement. Notes drawn from a discussion that took place in November 2011.
legislative elections). For many, this approach constitutes a continuation of a guardianship attitude (Wissaya-وصاية) by the Makhzan towards the Moroccan citizen. Many *February 20* activists like Hamza Mahfoud, Samad Ait Aicha, Yassine Bizaz and Aziz Idamine view this attitude as a lack of respect to citizen engagement particularly when the Makhzan plays on the notion of ambiguity, confusion and ignorance to direct citizens’ opinion towards a specific desired outcome. The Makhzan sets an agenda and the citizens are supposed to support its outcome (for example: a favorable yes to referendum and a higher voter turnout in the elections are two desired outcomes).

Despite these policies and strategies, many activists continue to challenge the state and prove to be actors that can no longer be ignored. As the state continues its tactics and strategies, *February 20* is still active and street protest still continue. The state controls the media and utilizes it to advertise its agenda rather than giving the spot light to the protests. *February 20* views the process of collective action as a way to challenge the state and invoke change. Fantasia maintains that the “process of collective action, channeled through existing structures, social movements break the bounds of these same structures and bring about change.”

According to Meyer, Whittier and Robnett, the state makes “dissidents” creating common cause and constituencies to essentialize identity and ignoring the importance of possibility of human agency. Only by understanding structure and constraints can we have a meaningful –and ultimately empowering –and understanding of agency. In the

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case of Moroccan dissidents, the state, by limiting democratic means of participation, turns every one with a grievance into a democracy activist—at least for a time.\textsuperscript{403}

Despite its strategies against the \textit{February 20} movement, the Makhzan was obliged to give concessions that were not entertained before the \textit{February 20} movement. Law professor and one of PSU leaders convincingly said that,

ان الحكم اضطر الى ان يقدم تنازلات لم يسبق ان قدمها للنخب السياسية طوال مرحلة محمد السادس. يمكن ان نقول بأن التنازل الاهم هو الدستور الجديد.\textsuperscript{404}

The regime was forced to make concessions that had never been given to the political elite throughout the reign of Mohammed VI. We can say that the main concession is the new constitution.\textsuperscript{405}

The point of this section is not to focus on the Makhzan’s response to the \textit{February 20} movement, but to focus on the movement itself. There are extensive writings that focused on the Makhzan’s response to protest. So shedding light on the Makhzan again would be redundant and irrelevant.

\textit{Chapter Summary}

This chapter provides a broader perspective on theories on collective action and aimed at specifically focusing on framing as a framework to understand the \textit{February 20} movement in local organizing Tansikiyats. The \textit{February 20} movement tailored its mode and form of mobilization to the Moroccan context. While it was inspired by the events in Egypt and Tunisia, it remained committed to grounding grievances and narratives locally.


\textsuperscript{404} Interview with Mohamed Sassi conducted by Mokhtar Benabdalou in \textit{RihanatMmagazine} (Winter 2014), issue. 30

\textsuperscript{405} Translation by the author of this study.
to “generate new understanding of politics” and create a new public discourse about social and political issues.\textsuperscript{406}

The theories discussed in this chapter, the level and the degree to which they differ in their contribution, their interplay with the subjective elements that are context-driven, and the microanalysis of local dynamism and processes of how grassroots are mobilized or choose to join the Tansikiyats in their cities and communities helps expand and unlock the "frameworks of understanding."\textsuperscript{407} The next chapter on theoretical framework provides and links both the explanation that build on existing social movements theories (discussed in this chapter) and the subjective elements that emerge from the field research. It contextualizes \textit{February 20} Tansikiyats as a means to understand and valorize localism and framing in collective action in Morocco.

\textsuperscript{406} Hadia, Abadi. Gendering the February 20\textsuperscript{th} Movement: Moroccan Women Redefining: Boundaries, Identities and Resistance. \textit{CyberOrient}, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2014), \url{http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=8817}

CHAPTER 4- TANSIKIYATS: LOCALIZING COLLECTIVE ACTION

Introduction

The emergence of local Tansikiyats of the February 20 movement that proclaim and promote local political rights, and contest the lack of access and restrictions imposed by the Makhzan, are one of the expressions of grassroots political activism in Morocco. This local activism is an example of the “situatedness” of political action.\(^{408}\) The localized character of February 20 Tansikiyats extends beyond the need to maneuver around the Makhzanian authority, but to contributing to the development of an alternative to politics in a place where grassroots politicization is a new phenomenon. Tansikiyats are exemplary of a type of local organizing that transcends divisions among actors. In sum, using Bayat’s words, an activism in which, “popular classes demonstrate a remarkable capacity for innovation in activism, self-organization and democratic decision-making.”\(^{409}\)

Recent mobilization in Morocco differs from traditional Moroccan political structures, but resembles other mobilizations such as the Zapatistas and the indigenous mobilization in Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador. While there are pronounced differences

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between movements in Latin America and Morocco, one point of similarity is in their organizing structures. Like grassroots organizing in Latin America, *February 20* Tansikiyats seem to prefer a “model of autonomy that build from the community level upward, remain open to a kind of pluralism of autonomies—a world in which many worlds can fit”—that did not force a choice between autonomy models.\(^{410}\) *February 20* Tansikiyats mobilize in ways or modes that link the struggle and their local problematic to a broader social movement and in a way that does not create competing structures with that of the old structures (opposition leftist parties, Adl Wal Ihsane or Amazigh for example).\(^{411}\)

Given the need for context-informed interpretations, it is worth noting that *February 20* is better studied by examining its Tansikiyats rather than by arguing for the application of broader categories of collective action.

Tansikiyats play an important role in the movement’s processes and dynamism. The focus on the Tansikiyats provides us with insights into these processes, frames, and dynamics, and is a starting point to advance the idea that *February 20* is Tansikiyats are an integral part of understanding the unique experience of social mobilization in Morocco.

The Tansikiyats are more than a geographical spatial formation or units, but an emergent form and process of political activism and “site for solidarities.”\(^{412}\) Borrowing Zeynep Gambetti terminology from her work on public sphere and collection action, I


\(^{411}\) Stahler-Sholk (Mar. 2007).

contend that the Tansikiyats need to be considered in terms of their “connection to struggle, collective action and self-determination.” Tansikiyats should also be viewed as a collective of various social projects inspired by, connected, and linked to the February 20 movement master frames and “essential claims of freedom, equality, and justice.”

**TANSIKYATS: The Question of Existing Structures**

The Arab Spring may have provided the macro-political model for organizing in Morocco. But “the incentive to organize” as February 20 Tansikiyats lays in refusing to engage with traditional and existing structures that are ideological. Borrowing Musleh words, the February 20 movement “did not count on organizational precursors.” Like any other youth in the MENA region, Moroccan youth “have been facing many challenges such as being stuck within older structures, led by older generations, which did not allow youth to have a role in decision making within the organizations and parties structures.” Yet, while youth left those structures, they played a role in nurturing them and building their political consciousness.

There is a debate about the degree to which old structures has helped the Tansikiyats mobilize locally. Tansikiyats’ organizing is not strongly linked to the old structures such as of that of Adl Wal Ihsan, the Amazigh or that of formal opposition

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414 Castillo (2006), 123.
417 Ibid.
political parties. Adl Wal Ihsane and the Amazigh were active in the February 20 movement and therefore in the Tansikiyats that are an intergral part of the movement.

Yet, the movement did not formally link itself to their structures. This is because, on one hand, political parties who participate in the political process did not support February 20 and are considered “makhzanized” parties (الاحزاب المخزنية), while non-participating opposition are still trapped in ideology, and lack what Bayat calls “the means and vision necessary for a fundamental transformation.”418 These include Unified Socialist Party (PSU), Ittihadi National Congress (INC), and radical left of Ennahj democrati and Socialist Party Democratic Vanguard (PADS). They are viewed as elitist and suffer from lack of unity (تشرد ) and vision (الاحزاب اليسارية ليست لديها رؤية موحدة ولا تحمل مشروع سياسي و مجتمعي واضح—leftist parties do not have a unified vision and a clear social and political program.)419 From this perspective, Mohamed Elhanifi contributed to Oujdacity online forum discussion with a piece titled “February 20 movement is a popular movement that has no religion, no party, no union , and no association -- ان حركة 20 فبراير حركة شعبية لا دين لها, لا حزب, ولا نقابة, ولا جمعية ولا حزب, ولا نقابة, ولا جمعية.” He remarks,

والانطلاقا من كونها ليست حركة دينية، تنحاز لدين معين، ليست كذلك حركة بيئية، ولا بيئية، ولا وسطية، وكل من يجرها في اتجاه اليمين، أو اليسار، أو الوسط، إنما يعمل على تحريفها عن طريقها، التي لا تتجه لا إلى اليمين، ولا إلى اليسار، ولا إلى الوسط. فهي حركة 20 فبراير، التي يلتقي فيها اليمين، واليسار، والوسط، لتحقيق المطالب التي تنص عليها الأرضية التأسيسية، التي لا يستطيع أحد أن يجادل فيها...420

On the basis of not being a religious movement and not aligning with a particular religion; also it is not a right-wing movement, nor leftist, or centrist. Anyone who pulls the movement in the direction of the right, or left, or center is trying to divert its direction and distort its nature; which does not lean to the right, left, or center. February 20 is a

419 Translation by the author of this study. This statement reflects activists’ view of leftist parties and reasons why these parties cannot lead a popular movement. There was a majority consensus among activists interviewed for this research including those with a leftist leaning or are sympathizers. Nabila Mounib, secretary general for PSU, who was also interviewed for this research disagrees with this statement.
420 http://www.oujdacity.net/regional-article-52805-ar/
movement that brings all these (right, left, and center) to achieve demands set forth in the *Ardiya Taassissiya* that no one can argue against…etc.  

On the other hand, Adl Wal Ihsane and the Amazigh have been careful in articulating religious or ethnic discourse as a stimulus to action and source of mobilization.  

Particularly, Islamist group Adl Wal Ihsane is considered an unlawful group (جماعة محظورة) by the Makhzan. Elhanafi addressed this question explaining that,

The purpose of not making a reference to religion in the *Ardiya Taassissiya* was to open the space for everyone participate in the peaceful struggle led by the *February 20* movement, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims, or have no religion, and whether they are right-wing or left-wing, or other centrist, or from the far right or the far left; so that *February 20* movement unifying movement. Its unity becomes its strength so that can impose its economic, social, cultural, and political demands. And achieve its goals of dissolving the government, the parliament, end tyranny, end Makhzanian economic, social, cultural and political corruption, amend the constitution, and hold accountable corrupt actors…etc.  

Participating parties in the parliament but that were in the opposition, such as Justice and Development Party (PJD), did not support *February 20*. PJD’s Secretary General Abdelilah Benkirane pressured the party’s youth wing to back away from their position and withdraw their support publically. The Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), a party founded by the King’s best friend Fouad Ali Himma, mobilized its leadership to talk about Moroccan exceptionalism and discredited *February 20* protests. With

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421 Translation by the author of this study.  
423 http://www.oujdacity.net/regional-article-52805-ar/  
424 Translation by the author of this study.
exception of Union Socialists Forces Party (USFP) youth wing that supported *February 20* youth activists, the rest of the parties took a position of “wait and see” or what Mohamed Basek Manar called ‘*Tarakob el Hadeer*’—الترقب الحدير,’ without publically defining their official position.425

Moreover, while *February 20* activists may have been nurtured by political parties previously, they made a strategic move away from the old structures to embrace diversity and engage all the components and actors from a broad spectrum. Interviews with activists revealed that youth within Tansikiyats preferred not to give away to “grand visions and emancipatory utopias,” but rather to “fragmentary projects, improvisation and loose horizontal networks.”426 Taking into consideration the reality of youth in the Arab World, Moroccan youth are not different in wanting to “present themselves as catalysts of change.” With this view, they want to pioneer their own way of grassroots organizing. I borrow Musleh’s quote to argue that youth, “don’t find a place within these structures; politically affiliated youth and youth involved in organizations could not get out the authority of these structures to have their own way of thinking and develop their field of interest. Therefore, it is clear that the existing structures of the various institutions and political parties did not encourage youth participation, which resulted in the youth’s mistrust in these institutions. It goes without saying that within these structures, usually, the politically affiliated youth could not remove the hat of their political party and wear the hat of a youth activist that as a different vision.”427

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426 Asef, Bayat (Spring 2013).

Tansikiyats replaced the traditional methods of organizing with more contentious strategies that directly challenge power at the local level. By “employing less institutionalized forms of action,” Tansikiyats have the “freedom to build their protests in the way that best suits their particular conditions on the ground.” This is particularly true given the influx of activists, such as rural grassroots population and former members of other movements (unemployed graduates for example), who provide a fresh perspective and innovative ideas, and focus on the importance of constructing space to most effectively harness the creative potential of activists. Interviews with activists showed that February 20 activists within Tansikiyats launched calls to civil society, syndicates, labor unions, and political parties to join the movement. Accordingly, in an interview, Professor Maati Monjib describes February 20 as a “movement acephalous—a leaderless movement that created a space in which various components with divergent agendas were able to coalesce.” Moreover, research respondents made it clear that the movement is not organized by any political party (الحركة غير منظمة حزبيا وسياسيا).

Since youth launched the call for protest, February 20 youth made a strategic move away from the old structures to embrace diversity and engage all components and actors.


432 Interview with professor Maati Monjib in October 2013.
representing a board spectrum. Activists argue that *February 20* is a youth movement par excellence.\(^{433}\)

**TANSIKIYATS: How They Operated and Functioned?**

The way Tansikiyats organized locally illustrates a dedication to local ownership of protest process, frames, and claims (صياغة محلية للتحديات). This reflects a commitment to local empowerment and local organizing that acknowledges the agency and values of each Tansikiyat. Each Tansikiyat seems to have a character of its own. Each Tansikiyat puts its own articulation of struggles, and issues central to its organizing. Each Tansikiyat is comprised of five committees formed of volunteer activists chosen based on the skills and competencies they possess:

- Logistics committee (responsible for flyers, funds raising… etc)
- Media committee (devise a media strategy)
- Organization committee (location, time, and date of protests)
- Slogans committee (creatively come up with slogans for the protests which are voted on during public assemblies)
- Monitoring committee (*Lajnat Dabt*—*لجنة الظبط*) that creates plans and a counter strategy to violent attacks by the Makhzan).

While the Tansikiyats include the five committees, each Tansikiyat remained independent and autonomous, which reflects a deliberate choice to have their own rhythm in protests. Beside the national days of protests which took place on the 20\(^{th}\) day of each month, each Tansikiyat decides which day of the week or month to take to the streets.

During the interviews, activists argued that timing and call for protest differs from one

\(^{433}\) Translation by the author of this study.
There were Tansikiyats that called for protests in a weekly, semi-monthly, and on a monthly basis. Also, each Tansikyat held its own public local assemblies in which decisions about strategy, action plans, claims, and actions of each committee are discussed and decided upon. These public local assembly meetings are open to all activists, and to the general public. During the assemblies, activists volunteer to take on tasks and activists who lead discussions during these meetings are elected. These public assemblies—(الجمع العام) included a facilitator (elected by majority), and two rapporteurs who are responsible to take notes. Each public assembly concluded with a statement and a list of recommendations (البيان الختامي للجمع العام) which then are posted online (main face book page or face book pages of Tansikiyats, blogs…etc). During the assemblies, participants took turns to share their ideas, comments, and voice their concerns. Each Tansikyat adopted a variation of this process to fit its context. For example, activists in certain Tansikyat (Marrakesh, Khenifra, Meknes, Fes…etc) did not meet in public spaces, they used civil society and political party facilities. However, the meetings (public assemblies) were open to the general public, by-standers, and sympathizers of the movement. In a nutshell, decisions in the public assemblies were based on consensus (Mabdaa Tawafouk). Activists can become members of a Tansikyat voluntarily and willingly (الانخراط بشكل تطوعي). To become a member either as

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434 Examples of these statements are provided as annexes. Note: youth created face book pages in both Arabic and French and under different names and banner just in case the Makhzan hack into one them, they have others to disseminate information and connect with activists.

435 To avoid crackdown on activists by the Makhzan, activists conduct public assembly meetings inside civil society or political parties’ facilities. Opportunities like this, provide activists with logistical as well as resources to print documents, banners…etc. Activists interviewed for this research stated even when using CSO and parties facilities, there is no interference. There is a sense of independence and autonomy.
an activist or a strategist of a Tansikiyat, a person needs to first attend public assemblies at least twice before earning the right to the membership (loose membership). The idea of open public assemblies is one of the strengths of February 20 as they were open for everyone, and promoted the concept of inclusion and participatory democracy. However, they have also opened the door for spoilers and infiltrators from the Makhzan.

Interviews demonstrated that activists, during the public assemblies that took place between February 20- May 15, 2011 decided to mute the ideological differences. Specifically, activists emphasized the fact that February 20 brought together various social forces and different political currents that were stuck in a long historical staleness. The actors understood that differences of Islamist / left / liberal are the result of historical grievances (years of lead) and of the Islamization of the state during Hassan II to counter the socialist’s ideology in the 1970s. Put differently, within each Tansikiyat, activists are ideologically different and diverse, but they collectively decided to unite and respect each’s person’s individuality. In other words, each Tansikiyat included activists with no prior political affiliation (independents), youth with political affiliations (previously affiliated with leftist parties —الانتماء السياسي—), and those affiliated with Adl Wal Ihsane. Yet, they agreed to coalesce under the February 20 movement umbrella. This attitude helped bridge differences between elements in the movement.436 Like youth in Egypt and Tunisia, Moroccan “youth ability to overcome the personal ideology and their sense of agency to take different stands other than their political parties,” whether affiliated or not,

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436 See Glasius and Pleyers (2010).
was apparent. Activists within the movement recognized the need for a liberal interpretation of religion to denounce ideological differences and claim a progressive view of social change. They also recognized that they belong to the same physical spaces of neighborhoods, and cities, and they subscribe to similar political and socio-economic grievances. With this perspective, activists wanted to demonstrate to authorities that protesters, using Charles Tilly’s term, “worthy, united, numerous, and committed.”

Additionally, activists put ideological differences between parentheses and solely identified with February 20 adopting its spirit and dynamism (الالتزام بالتغيير). Interviewees of this research maintained that the components of February 20 barricaded the ideological difference in order to effectively coordinate (التنسيق الميداني ودعم وحدة الحركة). Putting aside ideological differences does not particularly constitute a construction of a collective “us” February 20 protesters verse “them” the Makhzan as Bennani-Chraibi and Joghlally argued in their analysis.

February 20, according to interviewee Maati Monjib, does not subscribe to a particular organizational model, and is comprised of various components that had separate agendas prior to February 20.

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440 Interview with Maati Monjib. Interview took place in October 2013.
Tansikiyats consider their collective experience of protesting as a means for contagious excitement or what Durkheim called “collective effervescence.”

Echoing this notion, Tansikiyats consider themselves as “local situations that produce emotional energy and recycle it up and down; re-circulate ideas, especially those highly loaded with symbols.”

Like any other movements and as Pleyers articulates, public assemblies become ‘spaces of experience’ understood as ‘places sufficiently autonomous…’ which permit actors…..to express their subjectivity.”

The majority of visible actors, within the public assemblies, who moderate and facilitate the proceedings are individuals with advanced degrees or are employed in sectors of education, art, or fields related to the production of knowledge. Interviews provide robust evidence showing that these actors are well-read and articulated as they always drew reference to the western thinkers such as Harbermas, Gramsci, Erickson, and Touraine…etc. These are the “most educated, modern and globalized youth populations that the Middle East has encountered.”

Civil society actors and academics interviewed for this research provided their view on February 20 youth activists as youth who exhibited courage, maturity, and projected a good image of the movement. Also, like the Spanish anti-austerity movement known as 15M activists, February 20 activists are different from past militants as they, “currently have higher education levels of formal education, come from middle class households, have a tardier entrance to political militancy, and complement

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441 Aminzade, Goldstone, McAdam, Perry, Sewell Jr, Tarrow & Tilly (2001), 59.
442 Referring to Collins’ sociological model of analysis.
this type of engagement with various others. In addition, younger militants in the
last few years have tended to give a political sense to their vital projects.
Conversely, past activists used to a vital meaning to their political engagement;
politics was at the nucleus of their lives. This inversion between “life” and politics
could be signaling a change in the processes of political socialization, and in the
priorities between private life and public action.  

These youth acquired their legitimacy and political knowledge through their former
association with both political parties and civil society organizations, but decided to
become non-affiliated by leaving these structures (منها كن تشبع في المجتمع المدني أو في الأحزاب) . These are youth who, using Alain Touraine idea, have
“the will to think and react for oneself, to develop and express one’s own creativity, to
construct one’s own existence.” Also, part of the profile of these figures include that
they are sons and daughters of former militants and activists of the “lead years—annees
du plomb.” As many may argue “شباب متعدد المشارب—diverse youth.” This means that
the militants of years of lead transmitted their values and commitment to social justice to
their children to ensure the reproduction of activism and continuous engagement. Based
on the interviews conducted for this research, more than seventy-five percent of activists
interviewed for this research hold at least a bachelor degree and more than forty percent
have parents of family members involved in earlier forms of activism during the years of
lead. While Tansikiyats took a horizontal approach in their local organizing and their
decision making processes through public assemblies; several interviewees subscribe to

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445 Tejerina, B, and Perugorria, I. Continuities and Discontinuities in Recent Social Mobilizations. From New Social Movements to
the Alter-Global Mobilization and the 15M. From Social to Political: New Forms of Mobilization and Democratization. Conference
Dignity. Development and Change. Published on behalf of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Academia.edu:
447 Expression used to describe the diversity of youth within the movement. Most of the interviewees of this research referred to the
movement as a diverse movement
Pleyers’s argument stipulating that “horizontal networks and autonomous spaces ought not to be idealized; lack of formal hierarchy should not be confused with a total absence of hierarchy. In the vacuum of explicit rules about decision and formalized power, prominent individuals may acquire considerable influence.”

**TANSIKIYATS: National Council for Support**

In the beginning of protests, *February 20* activists saw the need for a national body to provide technical guidance and logistical support. Activists agreed on the need to create a national council for support (المجلس الوطني لدعم حركة 20 فبراير) which included 99 members from parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), businessmen, and academics.

The *February 20* Tansikiyats are independents even when the national council for support called for protests, set the date and time for protests. The council also played a role in setting the master frames for the protests. The national council for support has various formal political structures, but *February 20* Tansikiyats did not organize under any particular structure as activists were informally sympathizers (*Intimaa fakat* -- الانتماء فقط).

Analysts such as Abdallah El Harif argue that because of the spontaneity and the refusal of a centralized leadership in *February 20*, Tansikiyats remained isolated in urban and rural areas and there was no coordination among them. Yet, and as articulated by an interviewee in Marrakesh, “before May 15, 2011 Tansikiyats were independents, but when the national council for support start to call for protests on specific dates, their

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initiative was viewed as interference.”

Another activist from Rabat added that “activists from various cities started to criticize the council’s actions stating that calling for national protest takes away from the independence and credibility of the local Tansikiyats.” Activists are specifically referring to the national call for protest on May 15, 2011. This day was marked by police brutality against February 20 activists, particularly in Rabat as they protested in front of the Temara detention center. Simply put by an activist, February 20 “is a non-organized organization, and should remain as such—ذالك على يبقى على ذلك—.”

To remain independent and decentralized, Tansikiyats regarded the national council for support input as interference with an intention to appoint itself as a leader of the movement. The result of this, according to El-Harif, was that the organizing activities of the Tansikiyats were disproportioned. Tansikiyats’ refusal of a formal organization, representative of them or of protests, indicates their fear of a formal structure that may not be representative of all voices. Also, the national council for support comprised of human rights militants both Islamists and leftists, civil society, academics, and few businessmen was viewed by youth as a voice that does represent the marginalized, and the average citizen. Additionally, it was not perceived as a body that can effectively “prescribe correct mode of action” without having political ideologies collide (that of extreme left and that of Adl Wal Ihsane). Youth assertion that decisions should be taken through a democratic process (public assembly), and the emphasis on the leaderless

449 Interview with a member of Tansikiyat in Marrakesh. Interview conducted on November 2013.
450 Interview with an activist in Tansikiyat of Rabat. Interview conducted in October 2013.
451 Interview with an activist in Tansikiyat of Casablanca. Interview conducted in February 2014.
453 “Prescribe correct mode of action” is a phrase borrowed from C.A rootes (1991).
aspect of the movement, constitute the weak element of the movement. Yet, Tansikiyats see the costs of having such a formal structure greater than its benefits. For example, while the national council for support (مجلس الدعم) played an effective role in mobilizing resources and providing financial support to the movement; its political decisions were viewed as domination and control particularly by Tansikiyats that are far from the center of Rabat and Casablanca. From the instrumental rationality perspective—that is of resource mobilization—activists saw the utility of the national council in its “political encadrement—political education” rather than its “patterning of the resources.” The encadrement utility later proved to be a weakness in the national council’s role. According to Chaouki Lotfi, the lack of a unified strategic vision, and the contradictions among the components of the national council illustrated its weakness in providing political encadrement to the movement.

**TANSIKIYATS: Internal Dynamics, Subjective Elements, Framing, and Collective Identity**

This section is intended to engage theories of emotions. I must declare that while Tansikiyats made a strategic choice to remain independent and autonomous, actors within Tansikiyats posit a great deal of importance on their existence within them. This section does not intend to map out the historical record on theories of emotions or their critique, but it is concerned with examining emotions such as anger, indignation, pride, fear, dignity, and confidence played a mediating role in protest mobilization. The point here is

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454 Interview with professor Maati Monjib as member of the national council for support (Rabat, November 2013).
not to belittle any contributions of emotion theories scholars or to just exaggerate the singularity of particular conclusions, but my analysis intends to privilege the existing scholarship in specifying the context for understanding the dynamics within *February 20* movement Tansikiyats.

As mentioned in the literature review chapter, Goodwin and Jasper reviewed the moral dimension of emotions. Accordingly, this may “label various players as good or bad.”

I call attention here to social labeling theory, which provides a conceptual framework through which collective action dynamics can be framed or evaluated. Understanding the labels, attached to certain actions, is critical in designing appropriate response by social actors. For instance, the social labeling approach by the Makhzan (labeling activists as “Christians” or “gays”) was meant to strip them from their legitimacy and question their struggle. For example, the Makhzan labeled a youth activist named Oussama El Khalfi as “gay,” while labeling another named Ateed as “a Christian.” This labeling was strategic from the part of Makhzan because they played up the moral dimension of the issues in a society that is Muslim and socially conservative. Everyone acknowledges the extent to which social labeling can be damaging to activists. Because of its serious implications, Mohamed Akdim wrote on alhiwar online network that,

Defamation of movement activists through linking them to the Polisario mercenaries, missionary movements, and homosexuality, breaking the fast during Ramadan, and

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457 Goodwin and Jasper (2006), 617.
458 http://www.alhiwar.net/ShowNews.php?Tnd=18794#.VN_dIth0x9g
through other labels of misbehavior. In addition to, hacking their face book pages and social media accounts.\textsuperscript{459}

The Makhzan played the card of social labeling to frame activists as “aggressors” of social moral norms, not as “right or justice defenders.” People respond differently to the labels attributed to actors. In this case, independent activists may choose to withdraw their participation from protests, and average citizens began to give in to the Makhzanian narrative of “stability within reform.” This labeling as Stein argues is an effort to defend (Makhzan) “distinctive attributes as virtues and label the distinctiveness of others” (\textit{February 20 activists}) as vices.\textsuperscript{460}

The feature of labeling has a great significance “in the case of collective behaviors because the way in which protests are labeled partly determines the countermeasures employed and such labeling can have far-reaching consequences.”\textsuperscript{461} It is evident that social labeling posits significance on whether actions of particular individuals or groups are viewed as violent or not or appropriate or not. Social labeling creates the course for responsive actions and influences the public interpretations of collective disruptions. Generally, “when justifiable grievance are combined with restrained, selective and principled rejection of violent tactics, protest activities gain legitimacy that makes them less amenable to labeling as antisocial outbursts.”\textsuperscript{462}

\textit{February 20} activists in the Tansikiyats, as they seek to protest against injustice

\textsuperscript{459} Translation by the author of this study.
\textsuperscript{461} Stein (2006), 9
\textsuperscript{462} Stein (2006), 9
practices, are considered agents of social change rather than villains aiming at disrupting public calm.

Through social labeling, the Makhzan aimed at provoking the emotion of “hogra-humiliation” among activists, and distorting the pride/shame balance. In addition to creating the emotion of “Ihbat--disappointment” among independent activists as they constitute the networks of recruitment for the Tansikiyats. In an interview, Professor Maati Monjib elaborated that, “activists were resilient and showed more perseverance facing the brutality of the Makhzan.” He later added, “activists had to continue to preserve respect among their peers—among those independents.” To the point of respect, Honneth contends that “when groups lack certain kinds of recognition from others—affective bonds, respect for their rational autonomy, and esteem—they develop a righteous anger that leads to mobilization.” The emotion of anger, in turns, “activated the desire to take to the streets to claim dignity not only of those targeted by the Makhzan labeling, but of any Febrayri out there,” commented S.T, an interviewee from Tangiers. Makhzan’s negative social labeling of activists stems from the emotion of fear to lose control over the public space—that is the political space. The Makhzan created a “public rhetoric” around moral issues that matter to Moroccans. Yet, those are the same emotions of anger and fear that drove activists in the Tansikiyats to protest and find novel pathways of collective action. Activists, particularly within larger Tansikiyats of (Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and Marrakesh) engaged in a process “personalization” of these social labeling attacks by the Makhzan. Emotions of anger resulting from “hogra/

tahmeesh—humiliation and marginalization,” and emotion of depression “Ihbat—disappointment” resulting from a long-duration of waiting for meaningful reforms. People are “tired of waiting,” asserts sociologist and activist Khaled Mona. The end result is more anger and possible action. I recall Scott’s work here to complement this idea. As Scott argues, when issues are “a consequence of human injustice,” and “arrive in a quiet, personal, concrete, and mediated form,” they become unbearable and cannot be endured. From this perspective, February 20 Tansikiyats functioned as reservoirs of emotions of pride, confidence, and dignity; yet of fear. In support, Goodwin and Jasper pinpoint that “face-to-face interactions can generate emotional energy that people crave, seeking out situations that generate more of it.” Again, this is exactly what Durkheim called “collective effervescence.” A thought provoking idea here is that Tansikiyats organizing of public assemblies were also a function of processes and interactions that circulate energy among activists. Arguably, when tensions arise during debates, activists’ sense of fear of giving in to ideology became apparent. It is the emotion of fear that motivated activists to become confident in their solidarities. To keep on track, activists repeat the slogan of “live February 20, independent, peaceful, and persistent (عاشت حركة 20 فبراير، مستقلة، سلمية، صامدة). In the words of an activist in Marrakesh, “questioning ourselves and being fearful was good in a way that we built confidence to continue as Febrayrayeen.” He adds, “it was a real test for activism.” The emotion of fear is viewed as a motivation to engage, and confidence as a motivator to remain engaged.

464 Interview with Khaled Mona professor in Meknes. Interview took place in Rabat in November 2013.
467 Interview with an activist (with prior-political affiliation), interview conducted in November 2013.
Borrowing Barbalet’s words, this is where “confidence and fear can advance collective action.” Based on the different interviews conducted, I confidently argue that emotions played a critical role in provoking “hidden powers,” and illustrating the “raw interactions” of the February 20 movement activists which became the basis for mobilization. As activists put it, February 20 helped us discover the ability, power, and activism of youth.

To counter February 20 activists, the Makhzan created its own activists called “la Jeunesse Royaliste—Chabab Malaki—شباب ملكي” The Makhzan mobilized the underprivileged youth emphasizing the emotional appeal of pride that stems from sentiment of loyalty. Respondents stated that oftentimes it was difficult to know who is who. There were infiltrators from the Makhzan. Ahmed El-Mohaghi summed up this point arguing that “infiltrators” and “anarchists” who have nothing to do with the struggle or politics were hired to partake in public assemblies as well as protests. Their goal was to create tensions among activists and escalate them to disrupt the peaceful flow of protest, create artificial noise and friction between various components of the movement by sowing the seeds of discord, skepticism in order to destabilize the movement.

469 https://www.lakome.com/%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A/49-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A/11281-2012-01-02.html
These youth, as one interviewee stated, were what we called “bamaltajia.” Their job is to encounter protests in various Tansikiyats by chanting slogans of pride and allegiance to the king, “such as — long live the king, February 20 is dead.” He explained that “bamaltajia were youth from impoverished neighborhood with low level of education, with fifty dirhams a day, they were willing to do anything.” I must say, he added, “they also believed in the king and they saw their counter mobilization as a means to protect the king and keep Morocco safe and stable.” They “associated the monarchy with stability.” In trying to deal with the street, the Makhzan was smart in activating not only the emotion of pride, but also that of fear. A female activist in Rabat pointed out that “bamaltajia’s fear was linked to security.” “The fear, for instance, if protests continue, that Morocco will become like Libya.” She notes that “these youth are apolitical and live in the margins of the society.” The bamaltajia youth “were also angry because they perceived February 20 activists as villains who want to take the country to dismay.” Their argument is that they feared the outcomes of what Tarrow called “ugly movements.”

Both February 20 Tansikiyats frames and the bamaltajia counter-frames activated the emotion of fear and anger which clearly demonstrate the importance of the emotional dimension in the movement. Certainly, the emotional appeals played out the “street (February 20) against the street (bamaltajia)—” as articulated by a group

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470 Interview with an activist in Casablanca. Interview conducted in March 9, 2014.
471 Interview with an activist in Casablanca. Interview conducted in March 9, 2014.
472 Interview with K.N, an activist in Rabat and Casablanca.
473 Interview with K.N, an activist in Rabat and Casablanca.
474 Tarrow (1994).
of activists representing several Tansikiyats. The intensity of emotions was certainly vibrant from the period February 20- through May 15, 2011.

**TANSIKYATS: The Importance of Collective Frames**

The different emotional appeals in framing issues that resonate with activists within the Tansikiyats are the variables that deserve an examination to understand the dynamics within Tansikiyats. Examining these subjective elements shows the need for “micro-foundations” to counter the argument of rational theorists.

Modern scholarship on social movements is dominated by structuralism, rational choice, and theories of state and power, which makes the feature of subjective theories, approach a refreshing and a complementary one. It is necessary to yield and analyze the meaning-making in collective action of *February 20* Tansikiyats. Kurzman explains that “social movements actively make meaning, challenging established meanings.” The concern here is not with the theories that avoid (like crowd psychology) meaning-making feature in collective action; it is concerned with examining *February 20* Tansikiyats from the perspective of its participants. I must declare that this is not to ridicule or have a “dismissive attitude” towards any contribution of early theories, but I am just emphasizing and expanding the “the leading concept of framing” in participation in collective action, while accommodating the interaction of various components such as collective identity, emotions, and frames. I want to incorporate an approach that provides movement participants an opportunity to provide their perspective, and study social mobilization within (*February 20* Tansikiyats.) It is here where Kurzman’s insights are

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important as he states that “from a dismissive approach at the turn of the 20th century, social movement studies have come to embrace meaning-making at the turn of 21st century.”

The decision to mobilize as *February 20* is about how to frame collective action. In Morocco, the *February 20* movement framed their concerns stem from *hogra/Tahmeesh* and centralization of power on the hands of the *Makhzan*. They framed their problems in terms of their Moroccan identity “*Kolna M’gharba*--كلنا مغاربة”, and the common experience of exclusion and marginalization prompted diverse groups to join the plight for participatory democracy and political change. *February 20* activists consider political exclusion as a contributing element of indignity.

The master frames were created and determined as part of the founding platform (*Ardiya Taassisiya*) which was developed with the contribution of activists across Tansikiyats. So each Tansikiyat took the master frame of “ending tyranny and corruption” and translated it locally as the master frame did not come up with any concrete way of what it means to end corruption.

Each Tansikiyat worked within the master frame to take control of the public domain (the street). The street is the main political space for ordinary people and for those who are marginalized by authority institutions. Each Tansikiyat politicized the street by transforming it to a space for political expression outside the institutions.

There were marches, sit-ins as well as demonstrations during which activists chanted

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477 El-Harif (Winter 2014).
479 Zeroual (Winter 2014) citing Hmed Choukri: *Reseaux Dormants, Contingence et Structures*. 151
slogans and carried banners. Organizing as Tansikiyats is a strong indication that citizens no longer want to be “marginalized from political debates.” Tansikiyats opened a new space to “contest power from below and engage in innovative organizing against the injustices.”

Tansikiyats skillfully utilized master frames of “injustice” and “ending corruption” to create diagnostic sub-frames. In the words of activists, “these frames motivated us to participate, to partake in a process to regain dignity as citizens.” They added that, “these frames were what ignited the emotion of believing in something that matters, and that fear no longer rules our lives.” Many activists considered frames of “shaabo Yourid (الشعب يريد)—people want” (prognostic frame) a language that unified everyone to take to the streets (motivational frame).

الشعب يريد تغيير الدستور—people want to change the constitution
الشعب يريد تغيير الحكومة—people want to change government
الشعب يريد تغيير الدستور العبد—people refuse a constitution of slaves
ادانة شعبية للسياسة المخزنية—popular denunciation of Makhzan’s politics
الشعب يريد مغربا جديدا—people want a new Morocco

Activists’ perception of the Makhzan and its maneuvering of the political domain that they defined as “unjust and it is this framing that justified and legitimated their participation in protest.

**TANSIKIYATS: Cycles of protest, Mobilizing Collective Identity, and Collective Frames**

According to Benford and Snow “collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimize the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization.” In the context of the February 20 Tansikiyats, oppositional frames were the most salient to encourage collective identity formation among various components and the public. Also, Chanler maintains, “a movement’s frames can be a reflection of the collective identity. At the same time, frames can help create identity and shape societal perceptions.”

Independent activists were an untapped potential for recruitment. Activists with prior political affiliations (شباب دو توجه سياسي) used emotions, not ideology to recruit independent activists. Aziz Hlaoua, an activist and a researcher at the French Center Jacques Berque remarks that, “dignity was important, independent activists wanted to gain dignity, express themselves within the crowds, and be there to make history.” It is, he adds, this “sense of intense participation that drove people to the street.” Referring to Bell’s work on pleasures of participation on black civil rights demonstrates that activists participate to “gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression.”

During the period of **February 20- March 9**, the Makhzan became the target of the struggle. *February 20* communiqué, which was posted on the main Facebook page

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484 Activist and researcher Aziz Hlaoua (interview conducted early March, 2014) He agreed to use his name.

and which was circulated among activists through social media and local and regional online websites, is a great example of how *February 20* incorporated master frames of injustice and justice with an emotional appeal. The words they used in Arabic carry metaphorical connotations and appeals that speak to everyone (masses).

Given the situation Moroccan people live today because of social dissatisfaction and the sense of humiliation and inferiority, the decline in consumer power of citizens because of the freezing of wages, the incontrollable increase of prices, and the denial of access to basic social services (health, education, employment, housing ...) all of this is caused by a rentier economy filled with corruption, fraud, bribery, and tax evasion, and human rights climate characterized by the systematic repression of freedom of opinion –continuous detentions, constraining right to assembly, and the suppression of freedom of the press ....- .Our belief as "youth of *February 20*" that the accumulation of social challenges is mainly due to the political choices and the structure of the Moroccan political system that stands against the interests of poor people.

This extract from the communique of *February 20* synthesizes the narrative of movement frames. The words in Arabic filled with emotions that convey a sense of injustice and the need for justice. The poor people here are the people that suffer from the injustice of Makhzan and its policies of exclusion. This also shows how *February 20* engaged in de-legitimizing the Makhzan and legitimizing *February 20* as a movement (عزل الشرعية عن المخزن واعطاء الشرعية للحركة).

Also, Tansikiyats refer to a famous poem, by Kacim Chabi, which is filled with emotions of hope, and dignity.

486 [https://www.facebook.com/Movement20/info?tab=page_info](https://www.facebook.com/Movement20/info?tab=page_info)
February 20 Tansikiyats organized themselves against a common threat such as injustice caused by corrupt government. Using diagnostic (oppositional frames) to create we-ness (youth that are leftist, Islamists, and Amazigh) implies the nature of collective identity vis-à-vis the Makhzan. For instance, the “anti-tyranny” and “anti-corruption” demands of the movement became the collective action frame of “anti-King’s entourage” as reflected in the slogans “no to silence, silence is humiliation—لا لصمت، الصمت مذلة—لا لصمت، الصمت مذلة—لا لصمت، الصمت مذلة—لا لصمت، الصمت مذلة—we are going out and no concessions,” “خارجين اما مامفاكينش” “we are going out and no concessions,” “مافاکینش” “we are going out and no concessions,” “مافاکینش” “we are going out and no concessions,” “مافاکینش” “we are going out and no concessions,” “مافاکینش” “we are going out and no concessions,” “Makhzan get out,” which were regularly chanted everywhere.  

The demands of “limiting the powers of the king” were directed towards the persona of King as a sacred being (constitution 1996, article 19). While each February 20 component had its own agenda (prior to February 20); they had to ignore and push aside fractions among them in order to define a common threat—that is of a repressive regime (diagnostic frame). These local agendas are mainly focused on local issues that are yet linked to corruption and injustice. Most of these local agendas had a social nature to them. What February 20 Tansikiyats did is contexualize these issues politically. A respondent and a prominent figure within Adl Wal Ihsane, credits February 20 Tansikiyats for working together and to “situating master frames of injustice in their localized context, link them to the lives of

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Poetry from Abu Al Kasim Chabi, a Tunisian poet. This poetry was written in 1933 and is considered one of the most famous poetry writings in the modern Arab literature. It conveys hope, dignity and underscores that in order for people to live in dignity, darkness must go away and chains must be broken. The chains meaning chains of colonization and marginalization. The poetry is used metaphorically and has powerful message to the human desire for change.

Mamfakinish: English (Mamfakinsh) is one of principle slogans that is found in every Tansikiyat. This name became a name of an online platform for and about February 20 movement. The platform was created in February 17, 2011
local citizens. Yet, while the frame of unity among the components within Tansikiyats is not quite authentic, it served the purpose of collective identity building and was the basis for the “prognostic” frame for political change.

Prognostic frames embody what the movement is for such as envisioning a better society based on a new constitution, a parliamentary monarchy, equal opportunity for the poor, and transparent political processes both at the national and local level. Furthermore, collective identity was the cement that brought activists to the Tansikiyats. Under February 20 umbrella, activists formed new collective identity that of “being a Febrayri or Ichreeni.” This identity carried meaning of being courageous and of the notion of coming together to stand against corruption and injustice. Within the February 20 Tansikiyats, every component had their own collective identity (Amazigh= ethnicity; leftists= ideology); Adl Wal Ihsane= (ideology). These groups came together to forge a new collective identity on behalf of which activists made claims to regain dignity and seek social justice. Activists were proud to come together under one umbrella. Pride also constituted their collective identity frame. Polletta and Jasper (2001) contend that “the development of group pride is a form of identity work.”

Strategic choices to craft a new collective identity and collective frames were important. As an activist from the left explained, “in the beginning of protests we were one group… this is the first time Adl Wal Ihsane activists agreed to meet us anywhere in bars and places where they have never been before…they held political discussions with us…who they are as Adl Wal Ihsane activists never came up during our discussions…all these moments were

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490 Polletta and Jasper (2001), 283-203.
What this means, is that despite the different collective identities (ideology or ethnicity) within the Tansikiyats, they were “re-imagined by movement activists” to craft a new collective identity that is “based on a shared membership in a movement.”

“We are Febrayereyeen” shaped activists’ decisions, and motivated them to make sacrifices, and build trust among them.

Consequently, a recurring theme among activists in the Tansikiyats was finding the common thread that forms the core of their collective identity and that was being, according to activists, “Febrayereyeen or nahnou Ichreeniyeen----we are Febrayereyeen نحن فبرايريين or nahnou chabab Al-Ichreen—we are youth of the twentieth—نحن شباب العشرين.” The assertion of commonality was an objective of the activists to expand movement membership particularly attracting independent activists (with no prior political affiliation). Two independent female activists explicated that “face-to-face interactions with other activists facilitated the imagining of a community without boundaries of ideology or ethnicity.” This “‘Febrayeri’ identity is real to us. We live it; we believed in it; it was all what we got to face the Makhazan.”

This case shows how collective identity is lived and how identity gave meaning to activists within Tansikiyats. Activists did not only call themselves ‘Febrayereyeen’, they experienced it and lived it through the rituals within the Tansikiyats that included the public and private assemblies, demonstrations, and online protests. Activists deployed collective identity, and emotional connections between individuals and a broader

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491 Interview with an informant from Mohamedia. Interview took place in October 2013.
494 Ichreen (Arabic) is twenty. So Twentieth refers to the 20th of February, 2011. Activists interviewed for this research refer to themselves as Ichreeneyen or Febrayreen.
495 Interview with two independent female activists from Tangiers. Interview conducted in November 2013.
community of people who believed they needed to be “dignified.” Borrowing Bernstein (1997) concept on identity, this is an illustration of how activists strategically “positioned identity to meet the goal of the movement.” This what informants of the research refer to as - وحدة الهوية و وحدة المطالب - unified identity reflects unified demands. Based on the response of activists within Tansikiyats examined for this research, I argue that activists were searching for commonality to build consensus; respond to questions about legitimacy and solidarity; and coalesce for action. Some argue though that activists sought commonality in the struggle (diagnostic frame), yet somehow failed to achieve commonality in the alternatives responding to the struggle (prognostic frame particularly post-March 9 king’s speech). There is no formal membership within the Tansikiyats, but activists felt a sense of “accountability” to the ideals of dignity and justice. Activists shared the goals of the February 20 movement and built a ‘collective identity awareness’ to achieve those goals. For instance, three activists from Tangiers explained that they were aware the unity and collective sense that the February 20 movement brought to them (حركة 20 فبراير كانت هي هوية النضال الجماعي الموحد بمطالب الارضية التأسيسة). The collective identity frames were both strategic and expressive. Constructing a collective identity is considered by many part of the “movement outcome.”

One must not forget to mention that the position of February 20 Tansikiyats vis-a-vis attribution of blame (diagnostic framing), the need to remain independent and autonomous (prognostic framing)--, and the refusal of any interference by the national

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497 Interviewed conducted in October 2013.
council for support constituted an internal motivational frame for *February 20*

Tansikiyats. Those Tansikiyats which are geographically closer to the center of power including Rabat and Casablanca publically articulated that *February 20* is a youth led movement and that its independence remains vital. The Tansikiyats that are geographically far are one step removed from the interference of the council for support.

In summary, this cycle of protest was marked by “the amplification of the common cause dimension of collective identity” frames.\(^{499}\) Activist Yassine Bizazz persuasively articulated that: "كل الشعارات التي ترفعها حركة 20 فبراير،كلها في المجال العام و ليس في "المجال الخاص—all the frames (slogans) of *February 20* represent the public domain, not the private one."

What Bizaz meant is that *February 20* movement frames and slogans are not for the interest of a particular sector or segment of society, but for the interest of the masses in the broader sense.\(^{500}\) Respondents of this research subscribe to this notion. They argue that the movement is a popular one—حركة شعبية—.*

Also, this cycle of protest was marked by the fact that *February 20* linked prognostic frames to diagnostic frames. They utilized various innovative ways to link to the two. A good example is a song in the Moroccan dialect that everyone can understand (both literate and illiterate citizens). The song also includes images, text, and comic cartoons of people who are perceived as corrupt. Below is a summary of the song:

أنا مغربي، لا أرضى أن يُنظر الى بلدي : بلاد الأمية، بلاد الفقر، بلاد الفساد، بلاد المهاجرين، بلاد الجنس، بلاد

الظلم


\(^{500}\) Yassine Bizaz is an activist who was invited to intervene in the roundtable discussion on *February 20* movement organized in Rabat by Association Jeunes pour Jeunes in November, 2011.
The song conveys a message that Moroccans are not satisfied with the country's illiteracy, poverty, corruption, injustice, and youth immigration…etc. I am going to take to the street on March 20 to say no to all of this, say yes to democracy, yes to freedom, yes to equality, yes to dignity, and yes to the trial of corrupt people.

The period of post March 9 - July 1, marked a very interesting turn in February 20 movement and its Tansikiyats. After the King speech in March 9, the discomfort started to surface particularly in the slogans used during the protests. An interviewer lamented that “during protest marches, we find different slogans.” She added “people started to get confused as some activists begin to engage in confrontation with other youth.” No one knew who those youth are….we later learned that they were bamaltajia.” This confusing situation, activist (O. M) argues, “has created an environment of mistrust and the protests lost a large numbers of independent activists and a priceless opportunity to build alliances and networks.” Also, youth with prior political affiliation began to give away to their political identity and were not able to reformulate frames that would ensure independent youth sustained participation. In turns, independent youth refused to become a tool for political manipulation of various factions of the movement. Components within Tansikiyats started to disintegrate because prognostic collective frames depicting a desirable society characterized by participatory democracy and social justice were shaken. In other words, Adl Wal Ihsane and the rest of the components started to face a tremendous challenge in terms of their collective identity and sustained

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501 أغنية رائعة ومُعبرة لحركة الشعب المغربي 20 فبراير: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpOLVJ-m-1c (more than 450,000 youtube views).
cohesion. March 9 speech produced what Jasper called a “moral shock” that created a fraction in the *February 20* collective action frames (prognostic).\footnote{James, Jasper. *The art of moral protest: Culture, biography and creativity in social movements.* (Chicago: University Press, 1997).} Within each Tansikiyat, a debate started to take place about “what do we want;” when we refer to “a parliamentary monarchy” and to accountability” The dilemma emerged when no consensus was reached about what does exactly “parliamentary monarchy”? What was unclear about the parliamentary monarchy is that there is was a need to explain and justify this demand after the king’s speech of March 9, 2011 particularly that he called for a constitutional amendement that would provide the prime minister and the parliament with more powers to govern.

For Adl Wal Ihsane, it is clear in their public communique what exactly they want, in other words, Adl Wal Ihsane did not clearly articulate its demands. Yet, it is a known fact that Adl Wal Ihsane wants to negotiate a way to re-institute the Islamic system of governance. On this stance, Monjib explains that the left, the radical left, and independents disagreed with Adl Wal Ihsane and also among themselves given that the (radical left) is not unifed about the demand of what type of governance they want.\footnote{Interview with Professor Maati Monjib in November 2013 and follow up on March 2014.} The splintering of solidarity and the weakening the unity among members in the *February 20* Tansikiyats was apparent. One of the interview questions for this research was: “in your view, what kind of monarchy you’d like to see and why, and what are the goals of *February 20* in relation to that?” The response by four activists (two from Adl Wal Ihsane, one independent, and one from the left) was similar when it came to the need to conceptualize a new monarchy—that is a parliamentary monarchy. Yet, their responses
were very different when it came to explaining what does it mean and what they would like to see operationally and politically. Their statements were indicative of the hesitation to clearly state their vision for the parliamentary monarchy, and it is illustrative of where the points of divergence land. To cast analytical light, *February 20* components were clear and unified on the diagnostic frames (identifying shared grievances, and common bonds) and on the prognostic frames (*February 20- March 9*); and wisely used motivational framing that became the beacon to stimulate various groups on a shared vision of positive political change. For instance, the frame of “Morocco without injustice” complements the diagnostic frame in terms of fighting “against indignation--Hogra,” which became effective in garnering public support. Hence, given the diversity within *February 20*, frames related to fighting political status quo and limiting the King’s political powers needed to be broad because the differing alternatives to diagnostic frames (absolute power of the King over the political scene) based on divergent ideological tensions lead to friction. This was clearly the case in *February 20*, between heterogeneous groups within Tansikiyats as well as the general public. This period witnessed an intra-movement contestation of collective identity.

The shift that took place after March 9 echoes the debate over the components of collective solidarity within the movement Tansikiyats (وحدة الحركة). Without a compelling account of what the components of *February 20* movement have in common when it comes to collective identity frames (prognostic frames), it seemed difficult to appeal to independents activists and to sustain participation. This calls attention to what Jasper (2004) refers to as “extension dilemma.” Within the diverse circles of activists, there are
those who argued that “there was a blow to the collective identity of activists within Tansikiyats.” Those who subscribe to this view contend that the overarching collective identity was “purposely constructed.” Activists maintain that they could not agree anymore on what constitutes the movement as a movement, which in turns, caused disagreement on the political agenda (do we want a parliamentary monarchy or not, do we agree with the constitution or not…etc). The vision of political change varied among the components in a variety of ways. Because of this divergence, efforts started to become scattered and less effective. The components of February 20 start to enter a phase of identity assertions and counter-assertions particularly when the Makhzan launched a massive campaign to garner support for the constitution. As activists from Fes and Meknes Tansikiyats put it, there was a “Tajyeech Chaab litasweet alaa doustour abra zawaya, tarheeb, targheeb—use of religious zawaya, force, and sympathy tactics to mobilize people to vote yes for the constitution.” They explained that “February 20 components were not able to counter the Makhzan’s proposal of a new constitution, and new elections.” They elaborated that “the populace considered that the reforms advanced by the March 9 speech showed the King’s willingness for meaningful reforms and for that reason we give more time to prove himself.” For Adl Wal Ihsane, it became a question of making a strategic choice.

The period of July 1- post- November 25 elections, illuminated another cycle of February 20 Tansikiyats protests. Charting the shifts in collective identity within the movement was very apparent. February 20 components start to stick up or pull away

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504 Interview with four activists, two from Fes and two from Mekens. Interview conducted October 2013.
505 Interview with four activists, two from Fes and two from Mekens. Interview conducted October 2013.
their identity poles and both Adl Wal Ihsane and leftists commence clamoring for the protection of their identities. This poses the question of did the Makhzan political adjustment strategy create a fissure within February 20 Tansikiyats? This period also showed how February 20 components begun to pull back to their orginal positions particularly when it relates to the question of system of governance. This period also elucidated how February 20 Tansikiyats collective identity was also a process, not just a strategy. Collective identity was a process to mobilize within Tansikiyats, not just a strategy since many activists felt unrepresented over time within the Tansikiyats. This particular point was emphasized by independents activists who have not been engaged before the February 20 movment and that engaged in protests because they believed in its demands for justice and dignity. Informants who identify as independents expressed their frustration and their disappointment on both Adl Wal Ihsane and leftist that they could not agreed on the ceiling of the demands after the king’s March 9 speech. Yet, even when collective identity is constructed as a process, it needs to be carefully managed during the process, strategically framed, and “ritualize assertions…without suppressing difference” to ensure participation and commitment. 506

It was the democratic process (consensus within Tansikiyats during general assemblies) in the decision-making that caused the February 20 components to no longer agree on the prognostic frames of their claims. In an interview, researcher and academic Mokhtar Benabdelaoui argued that this notion of grappling with questions of consensus

in the decision-making is what perturbed the movement. After the March 9 speech, the framing of claims took two turns: radical (avant-guard approach by those leaning to the left or radical left); and moderate ones (by Adl Wal Ihsane), the Amazigh (generally known for their leftist approach) took the stand of the left. Most of the leading Amazigh associations and Amazigh leaders such as Assid have a leftist leaning. Also, the king’s March 9 speech referred to institutionalization of the Amazigh language, which has been a demand of the Amazigh movement for decades.

During this cycle, collective identity transformed from identity of inclusion to identity of exclusion. Viewed against this background, “exclusionary identities” emerged. Many activists within various Tansikiyats pointed out that since “our collective identity was linked to the framing of issues,” this period proved to be difficult given looming question of framing post-constitution. The divergence of collective frames was apparent and boundary construction while loose was evolving. Aziz Hlaoua, clarified that before the vote on the constitution (July 1), the dynamics within the Tansikiyats and the decision-making processes gradually transformed in a way that began to exclude Adl Wal Ihsane activists. He added that there was a disagreement whether to boycott or not and whether to publically voice a position vis-a-vis the process by which the constitution was drafted and voted on. While the activists within Tansikiyats said no to the constitution (لا لدستور ممنوح), Adl Wal Ihsane voiced its position to boycott, but the left and radical left did not even issue a statement or voiced their opposition officially and publically. A group of six activists note also that “the persona of the movement

507 Interview with professor Benabdellou in Casablanca in October 2013.
508 Interview with Aziz Hlaoua conducted in early March, 2014.
began to transform.” They added, that “Adl Wal Ihsane no longer wanted to be silent publically.” “The collective identity of the movement was being re-negotiated at that time,” they lamented. 509 When internal disputes emerged, boundaries while loose were created and notions of exclusion surfaced. Referring to Gamson’s work on messages of exclusion, “the gap between practice and public discourse suggests that internal movement debates over inclusion and exclusion are best understood as public communications. They depend heavily on the communicative environment,” he argues, “especially the location and nature of the primary audience.” 510

Given the historical hostilities between the left and Adl Wal Ihsane, activists across Tansikiyats negotiated “public silence” by which Adl Wal Ihsane would not make religious claims or slogans. However, Adl Wal Ihsane has recognized that public silence may hurt their collective identity in the future. As usual, Adl Wal Ihsane, as a structure, was expected to respond to the process of and the voting on the constitution with an official statement. The structural elements came into play during this cycle of the protests (see section on Adl Wal Ihsane as a religious factor). Two leaders of Adl Wal Ihsane interviewed for this research, assured me that the silence and non-commitment of the leftist structures to support the protests in the street with a public and a strong statement showed us that the left still holds on to the historical rupture --القطيعة التاريخية-- between the Islamists and non-Islamists. 511 So Adl Wal Ihsane needed to remind its supporters of its enduring struggle both civic and political, and communicate its clear position on the

509 Interview with six activists from Mohammadia conducted in November 2013.
511 The historical rupture --القطيعة التاريخية-- caused by the killing of leftist leader Omar Ben Jalloun by Ichabiba Islamiyya (Islamist youth organization established in 1969, but its violent approach resulted in its delegimization and its dissolution in 1976).
Makhzan proposals for reform (new constitution and elections). At the same time, remind the Makhzan that Adl Wal Ishane, while softening its approach, still maintains its collective identity as it is shaped by its structure.

Perceptions form ideologies and on this; Clausewitz appreciates the difference between the ideal and the real.\textsuperscript{512} Basing their logic on the difference between backwardness and secularism is what contributes to the activists’ logic of action.\textsuperscript{513} Both leftists and Adl Wal Ihsane reverted back to their default ideological mindset and their historical political identity. In the words of an interviewee, ideology became the driving force of the debate and discussion among the Tansikiyats (are you a Adli or a leftist?). They did not ask the question of “are you an Amazigh?” because a Adli or a leftist could be an Amazigh. Some activists lamented that ideology became the identity group. Rothbart & Cherubin argue that identity group live according to its polis-idea ‘wisdom’ of ‘a sacred past propelled towards two visions of an idealized and purposive future.’\textsuperscript{514} Usually, groups hold “simplified beliefs or stereotypes of the other”\textsuperscript{515} and use ideological “traditions” as tokens of differentiation.\textsuperscript{516} As leftists started to differentiate themselves; they “invariably develop prejudices for their group and against the other group”\textsuperscript{517} --that is Adl Wal Ihsane. It was apparent that the issue of ideology was always hidden under the blanket of unity and solidarity as many activists lamented. In addition, activists begun to build tight bonds with each other, but this time based on ideology. It

\textsuperscript{512} Daugherty, & Pfaltzgraff (2001).
\textsuperscript{513} Rothbart & Cherubin (2009).
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{517} Volkan (1997), 22.
was here that emotional ties start to “motivate movement disaffiliation.” An independent activist from Fes said that “we as independents felt alienated and left out.”

Hirschman laments that people “burn out” and “participation in public life offers only this unsatisfactory too-much –or-too-little choice and is therefore bound to be disappointing in one way or another.” This is attributed to emotions (frustration and disappointment…etc) he continues to say that “the turns from the private to the public life are marked by widely exaggerated expectations, by total infatuation, and by sudden revulsions.”

**TANSIKIYATS: The Question and the Dilemma of Collective Identity**

Broadening the scope of understanding entails, echoing Kurzman, reflecting not just on the factual assessments and using “objective” indicators as Karl Marx did in interpreting workers conditions, but including “attitudinal questions.” This is because we cannot presumably conclude that workers interpret their conditions the way Marx did. Therefore, including the contributions of meaning-making approach is critical. Kurzman remarks that, “the concept of collective identity had not been only seen as a precondition for successful social movement mobilization, but as part of the process of mobilization.”

From his perspective, Jasper asked “why not simply admit the emotional satisfaction of collective identity.”

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519 Interview with an independent activist from Fes. Interview conducted in October 2013.
522 Kurzman (Winter 2008).
Did activists in Tansikiyats join in search of collective identities or to forge new collective identities for the movement? Beforehand, I would like to underline Kurzman’s point on treating elements of meaning—making (such as framing, collective identity, emotions”) as variables.) Kurzman notes,

“what if meaning-making were treated, not as a variable alongside other variables—or even as a mechanism alongside other mechanisms, to the use of new causal language proposed for social movement studies by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001)—but rather as constitutive of all variables and mechanisms? Perhaps it is possible to examine how people’s understandings of the world shape the way that they respond to the conditions and processes that academics may call variables and mechanisms.”

Cook-Huffman defines identity as “complex, historically bound, socially constructed and thus ever moving” in other words, “identity is a sense of a self, and a way individuals know and understand themselves.” It must be said that there is a distinction between individual identity and collective identity. Collective identity is referred to as “social identity.” Using Tajfel words, Cook-Huffman investigates social identity as part of individual’s self-concept that s/he derives from his/her knowledge of his/her membership of a social group. Identities are symbols of meaning created from social interactions, are constructed within specific relationships, time and space, and become salient over time. Thus, identities are propelled towards self-enhancement and this brings them into competition. This is where, according to Bryne and Senehi “individual group members rely on cognitive or symbols and cognitive structures that organize information and some

524 Kurzman (Winter 2008).
525 Cook-Huffman (2009), 18.
526 Cook-Huffman (2009).
segment of past experience.”

We should not forget that self and identity as doubly contested concepts. Oftentimes, nature and meaning of group-based identities are often contested in socio-cultural discourses. Not only that identities are contested among/between groups, but also the meaning and nature of identity and self as social constructs are contested by researchers and theoreticians of other schools (i.e- social constructivists argue against studying self and identity objectively). Their psychological worlds are nourished by feelings of emotional energies that always reach to their inner beings, and hence, project outward behaviors that constantly reinforce the images and reminds the parties of who they are, what is theirs and who the rest are and guide their aspirations and their relationship with each other in their socially and politically defined social spaces. Certainly, Volkan (2009) followed Erik Erickson as a model to discuss identity from an individual perspective, and Volkan took it to a different level discussing large group identity. I believe that Volkan wanted to shift away from the criticism that Erikson received by not linking the individual identity to large-group identity (collective identity). Collective identity creates the subjective sense of sameness.

The emotion of “dignity—الاحساس بالكرامة” was used to construct not only a collective identity within Tansikiyats, but the collective identity of the movement as a whole. February 20 movement was unified by sense of belonging and dignity (we are all Moroccans—كلنا مغاربة). This sense of belonging and solidarity were the driving forces that broke down the barriers of ideological difference among activists. As pointed out by an activist in Meknes, “activists identify as ‘Ana Ichrini—I am a Febrayri).” He added, “Tansikiyats were places

of solidarity and inclusiveness—تعتبر التنسقيات بالمعنى المعنوي مراكز للتضامن والشمولية والالتزامات لكل مكونات الحركة.” Using another interviewee’s terminology, “it is the sense of togetherness that inspired me to make an emotional investment.” He later lamented that “it is a first time in Moroccan history that people focused on issues rather than ideologies or ethnic identity.”

I argue by analogy to M15, that “participation in local action has given activists a strong sense of coherence and unanimity. The local ambit is immediate, visible, and therefore apprehensible; it is the space in which demands are displayed, and where the ‘we’ gets crystallized through face-to-face encounters and relationships.”

The emotion of dignity and anger against “hogra/tahmeesh” is what brought everyone together and what created a collective identity within Tansikiyats. As pointed out by a prominent activist (Mae-Aynayn), “it is the spirit of being a Febrayri – أنا فبرايرى that helped us recognize our own place in the protests,” and “belonging as a Febrayri is what forged our collective identity which transcends any ideology.”

Sentiments of anger and distrust in the Makhzan combined with the positive feelings of trust and pride among activists provided the confidence to take to the streets (action). He added that “our collective identity (as February 20) was the glue that cemented trust among activists.” During an interview, Hicham and Samad Ait Aicha maintain that “most of the Amazigh activists for instance, do not identify as Amazigh, they identify as Febrayri or Ichrini, Amazigh activists do want ethnic identity to overshadow their February 20 identity — جل الشباب الامازيغي لا يريد ان يجعل هذه الهوية ان تغطي على الهوية الفبرايرية، فهم شباب عشرينيين.”

Similar to 15M, February 20 activists wanted

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528 Interview conducted on November 2013.
529 Tejerina and Perugorrria (2012), 104.
530 Interview with Mae-Aynyn, a prominent activist. Interviewed conducted on March 9, 2014.
531 Interview with Abdelatif, Hicham and Samad Ait Aicha who are both activists and Amazigh. Interview conducted in November 2013.
to “craft a narrative of becoming; that “we” has a present and a future, but also has a traceable past.”

I do not want to just emphasize the connection and belonging aspect of collective identity and the imagining of a “shared status or relation” as shown by Polletta and Jasper in their exhaustive analysis of collective identity in social movement. Yet, despite their focus on connection and belonging of the individuals to the movement, they also argue for collective identity as a basis for collective action. In their overview and work on feminist movements, Taylor and Whittier also stress the notion of belonging in collective action. While Taylor and Whittier writings largely demonstrate collective identity construction as a process, they also recognized the link between collective identity and action. This notion is exemplified by a quote from activists (Fes, Meknes, & Knitra) “نحن شباب العشرين ، صامدون” — we youth of February 20, we persevere.” Activists from Khnifra used another version conveying the same notion —tahiya ichriniya, tahiyat moumana wa somoud—ichreeni greetings, greetings of objection and steadfastness.

Reviewed in Holland, Fox, and Daro (2008) literature, Mellucci’s conceptualization (1995, 1996) adds to the notions of “solidarity” and “claims of belonging,” by accentuating collective identity as “the process of ‘constructing’ an action system.” He describes collective identity as “a process of negotiations among constantly shifting forces, including balancing between identification declared by actors themselves

and identifications given by adversaries, allies and other outside the collective.”

He also views a movement as an actor, a view that Holland, Fox, and Daro share. They also argue for a decentered approach that “recognizes the difficulties and contentiousness of producing movements’ identities amidst multiple discourses and practices.”

Perceived in this fashion, collective identity formation is a decentered and dialogic process— that is “movement’s collective identity is continually emerging, forming, and reforming between people and groups in multiple sites and places of contentious practice,” which is a view I share. Empirically, while youth have February 20 as an identity umbrella, they also use the same flag with Februray 20 written on it either in Arabic, French, or Arabic and Amazigh. The flag is unifying symbol of February 20 identity. Most of the banners refer to the theme of “mamfakinch—مافاكينش—no concessions,” which became an identity theme of the movement Tansikiyats used and chanted during protest. Also, another symbol of February 20 collective identity is its “Ardiya Taasssiya.” Every Tansikiyat referred to the Ardiya Taasssiya in variations depending on how activists contextualize it to align with their local context. Activists within Tansikiyats rework this identity to become specific to their place and context. Review of texts, images, and facebook pages of Tansikiyats is a great example, we always find February 20 Tansikiyat followed with the name of the city for instance (please see examples provided as annexes).

Identities are constantly shifting, as new relationships emerge and new social conditions take primacy. This fluidity makes the deconstruction process a difficult one.

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538 Holland, Fox and Daro (Winter, 2008).
Identities often build strong fences around their social and political spaces. Identities use cultural resources like symbols, rituals, styles and networks to clothe and define their identities from the rest (Adl Wal Ihsane for instance—عدلي و عشريني). This process defines the identity’s social structures and boundaries—the territories that include and exclude others.

The debate on collective identity is based on the need to debunk the notion that structural alterations is what provides the opportunity to mobilize, and to broadly examine the important issues of longstanding shared grievances that lead people to act upon them collectively. Also, as Polletta and Jasper (2001) theorize “collective identity seemed to capture better the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize.” And “identity can appeal as an alternative to material incentives.”

In this respect, being a February 20 activist is a new identity that sheds positive light on Moroccan youth. In a recent conference on youth, Hamid Hima coherently puts it, فإن حركة 20 فبراير، أعادت صياغة هوية الشباب المغربي: إنه الشباب المتمرد على تعليم “جيل الضباع”، بتعبير الراحل محمد جسوس. كما أنه، أيضا، ليس شباب التطرف الديني والاجتماعي، بل شباب واع، يفكر في السياسة رغم أنها هي- السياسة لا تفكر فيه، من منظور الدولة وقسم كبير من الأحزاب، إلا في تدجينه وصرف انتباهه عن القضايا الحقيقية للمجتمع والوطن.

February 20 played a role in recasting Moroccan youth identity: it is a rebellious youth against what Mohamed Guessous calls “generation hyenas”. Also this youth, is not youth of social and religious extremism, but conscious youth who are thinking of politics even though politics does not take them into account (particularly the state and political

parties) except when they want to divert and distract youth from real issues and the issues of the nation.  

Chapter Summary

In considering collective identity, emotions, collective frames, and specifically how these elements are nested, and interacted throughout *February 20* protest cycles; I argue that without them, activists within Tansikiyats would have not been able to coalesce and mobilize as a collectivity, and unify towards the movement’s goals at least in the period between *February 20 and May 15, 2011*. This reflects the role of collective identity frames, and illustrates how collective identity was created, constructed within the Tansikiyats, yet was not well-managed or maintained as activists argue to sustain participation. If the argument holds that emotions mediated the formation of collective identity frames, yet emotions may also have played a role in its disintegration. The acephalous nature of *February 20* and the nested interaction between various components within the movement Tansikiyats provided us an opportunity to understand the complexity and messiness of a decentered collective action in a place such as Morocco. This messiness is represented in how collective identity frames incorporating traditional and non-traditional actors such as Adl Wal Ihsane played out in the movement Tansikiyats, formed, and reformed throughout the protest cycles. Emotions helped promote new ways of thinking about collective identity, and the emotional atmosphere played a role as a mediating factor in *February 20* protests. While

540 The concept of generation hyenas (Arabic: جيل الضباع) metaphorically refers to “generation of stupid youth.” In the Arab world, when a person refers to someone else as being a hyenas is considered very degrading and insulting because it denotes stupidity. See Mohamed Hima:

http://klamkom.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-20-%D9%81%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B6
February 20 claims were primarily political in nature, it was necessary to produce a collective identity frames to build solidarity as well as the platform for action. It is important to note that subjective elements shape how people perceive frames, narratives, and opportunities. Referring to Collins’ sociological model of analysis, I argue that Tansikiyats are to be viewed as “local situations that produce emotional energy and recycle it up and down; re-circulate ideas, especially those highly loaded with symbols. In this view, there is a certain ripple effect that constitutes what Collins calls feelings of legitimacy, or of business confidence.”

What this means for our discussion on February 20 movement Tansikiyats is that the narratives and frames that have a moral dimension (dignity and justice) that cross over all the boundaries (ideology, ethnicity, or specific political agendas), create “change in the subjectivity” of the activists, and a “unified collective will” to organize and mobilize. Also, subjective elements helped explore “soft” factors that impacted or shaped movement’s outcome.

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CHAPTER 5 - METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of qualitative research approach including a case study approach and narrative analysis. I have undertaken the analysis of the available data at three levels: first, I revisited studies related to social mobilization in North Africa in general and Morocco in particular, reviewed human rights reports, government reports, and news articles, existing scholarly books and articles on the Morocco and written testimonies of political activists, as well as those of the Islamists. This preliminary activity helped me fill the gaps in information about the current state of affairs and understand how social movements in Morocco evolved and changed since the somber years\(^{544}\) in Morocco (1980s and 1990s) and after the *Arab Spring* revolutions. Secondary documentation is crucial for triangulation as they allow me to cross-check primary data. Secondly, I conducted a preliminary research on *February 20* movement. The preliminary research took place in summer of 2013. Thirdly, I conducted in-depth interviews with *February 20* movement activists in various Tansikiyats. This case study

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\(^{544}\) Somber years or years of lead refer to the regime of Hassan II regime of torture and fear.
uses framing as a framework to analyze and reinterpret the data. It also employs a narrative analysis to investigate Tansikiyats and what they tell us about February 20 movement as a whole. The source of the data comes from available resources that include research journals, books, media reports, newspapers, articles posted on the internet, as well as transcriptions of 60 field interviews, and Tansikiyats documentation.

**Qualitative Research**

In order to address research questions, this study uses qualitative research approach. Qualitative research provides “complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research issue. It provides information about the “human” side of an issue – that is, the often contradictory behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals.”

More specifically, Creswell defines qualitative research as an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The research has the opportunity to build a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conduct the study in a natural setting.

Additionally, qualitative research indicates inductive, generative, constructive and subjective processes (see Pidgeon & Henwood 2004; Ryan & Bernard 2000; Lecompte, Preissle, & Tesch, 1993). Specifically, it deals with an interpretative approach to data collected through interviews, field notes, text, and images. On this, Denzin & Lincoln contend:

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545 Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide. Module 1: Qualitative Research Methods Overview
http://www.fhi.org/en/donlyphes/etl7ogszehu5s4stphb3sgqpp7rouy4wqy17elpbeyi3tgmcm4y6dunhccfxtaj2rvbaubzme4f/overview1.pdf

546 Creswell (1998), 15
“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.”

This project also incorporates qualitative case study research methodology. Case studies are “empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomena within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear evident.” The understanding of complex issues and obtain context-dependent knowledge necessitates in-depth case research. Case studies also “provide opportunities for inquiry...bounded by experience, framed by theory, generating possibilities, and transforming practice.” Patton articulates that case studies are particularly useful where one needs to understand some particular problem or situation in great-depth, and where one can identify cases rich in information. The strength of the case study derives from its detailed examination of phenomena and its ability to utilize a broad spectrum of evidence, and multiple sources and techniques in the data gathering process.

The frame of reference of this study is Morocco, a country with a history of collective action (including labor, students, Amazigh, and Islamist movements). This project focuses on the February 20 movement with its components, and Tansikiyats to

understand their formation, strategies, processes, and claim making, and how they framed issues to organize, within the repertoire of contention. This case study helps see the movement by its “own words” as Manuel Castells emphasizes."\textsuperscript{552} The investigation of \textit{February 20} helps “bring out the unique features of the case…and show how these unique features affect the working-out of putatively general social processes.”\textsuperscript{553}

\textit{Methods and Measures}

\textit{Sampling}

This project intended to employ various sampling techniques which include purposive sampling targeting political elites and civic activists in Morocco and members of the national council for support of the \textit{February 20} movement. The national council for the support of \textit{February 20} that is constituted from civil society organizations, labor unions, academics, members of political parties and different political and religious currents. This research set out from the assumption that interviewing and getting a wide range of perspectives helps to: 1) establish plausible narratives of how the decisions came about and within Tansikiyats, who are these actors or leaders within Tansikiyats, and how things are changing within them as well. The purposive sampling intended to select respondents among youth and the Amazigh particularly youth representing an age category of 18-35 years old activists within \textit{February 20} and its Tansikiyats. However, this study employed a snowball sampling instead given the challenges mentioned previously. The sample of participants that belong to the Islamist group (Adl wal Ihsan) was selected using a snowball sample, as it is very hard for people to admit that they

\textsuperscript{552} Asef, Bayat (2005).
\textsuperscript{553} Thelda, Skocpol, and Margaret, Somers. The Uses of Comparative History in Macro social Inquiry. \textit{Comparative Studies in Society and History}, Vol. 22 (2) (April 1980): 174-197. Referring to Greetz, Lang & Bendix work.
belong or are members of the Adl wal Ihsan Islamist movement. I wanted to understand what draws people members of Adl Wal Ihsane to part take in protest led by Tansikiyats and why.

However given the reasons listed previously, the sampling was done using a snowball approach, and through referrals and recommendations. Despite the necessary modification in sampling procedures, I was able to interview a diverse group of activists representing various components of February 20, elites, political actors, academics, and civil society actors.

Data Collection

In-depth interviews

For the purpose of this research, a standard methodology for qualitative data collection was employed: selection of respondents, design of questions and review of objectives with informants, and administrating interviews with sample population. Denzin and Lincoln define “an interview as an exchange between two people leading to a contextually bound and mutually created story based on objective data for scientific purpose.” Interviewing helps the researcher collect data by “learning about settings that would otherwise be closed to us: foreign societies, exclusive organizations, and the private lives of families and couples.” Particularly in social movements, interviews, “allow scholars to gain access to the motivations and perspectives of broader and more diverse groups of social movement participants that would be represented in most documentary sources” (Kathleen Blee and Verta Taylor p, 93)… the openness of interviews helps: 1) to challenge, clarify’ or elaborate existing movement

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interpretations through participant perspectives, 2) deal critically with the relationship that participation has to ‘semantic contexts’ (e.g., discourse and ideological structures), meanings of action, and the larger social setting; 3) capture the rhythms of social movement growth and decline, and participant involvement and withdrawal over time; 4) make sense of the construction processes associated with collective and individual identities; and most importantly 5) ‘bring human agency the center of social movement analysis’.

In order to collect data for this study, I employed open interviews and semi-open interviews with key informants related to how they view the current political state of affairs in Morocco, the political situation which they mobilize under, and what compels them to join the struggle for mobilization in the Tansikiyats, and mobilize under February 20 umbrella. Tashakkori and Teddlie state that by conducting semi-structured interviews “each new person has the potential to provide information regarding more than one case, the sample mushrooms as the study continues.”

This research explored the effects of framing both within and across the movement both at the level of the Tansikiyats and the movement as a whole, its narratives, and how it predicted or foresaw the outcome or consequences of their struggle. I conducted in-depth interviews with activists who are either part of February 20 Tansikiyats or supporters of the movement, new media activists, human rights activists, and members of national council for support of February 20, in addition to interviewing participants that are Amazigh and Islamists. I documented and analyzed how they view the nature of the struggle within the movement and more specifically within the Tansikiyats and state interaction with the their demands, what makes February 20 Tansikiyats exceptional, why they mobilize, and chose to mobilize under February 20

umbrella, what kind of challenge they impose on the current regime, and how it is
different of that of previous movements in Morocco.

**Focus groups**

To get the insights of the general population, I only conducted one focus group,
which was composed of seven participants. A local civil society group organized this
particular focus group and its executive director served as a moderator. This provided me
with the opportunity to take notes because tape recording was not allowed. The selection
of participants was random and included four female and three man representing
grassroots youth (18-35) and a generation over forty years old. Participants background
was mixed (educated and illiterate) with a diverse socio-economic background as well.
Focus groups are important to pair with other research methods such as individual and in-
depth interviews. David Morgan maintains, “focus group interviews have reemerged as a
popular technique for gathering qualitative data.” Focus group is a “research technique
that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher.”
They provide the “advantage of identifying a range of experiences and perspectives, and
drawing from that pool to add more depth when it is needed.” Additionally, focus
groups method can “locate the inter-action in a group discussion as the source of the
data.” The strength of the focus groups “is not simply exploring what people have to
say, but in providing insights into the sources of complex behaviors and motivations.”

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559 Ibid., 5.
560 Ibid., 7.
561 Ibid., 7.
In addition to, collecting data related to how general population perceive political realities, frame their narratives, interpret their grievances, and what compels them to join and continue the struggle in their Tansikiyats; interview questions were also designed to assess to what extent they feel marginalized and oppressed under the current political regime, and how they view the role of the state in responding to their particular claims. In light of Tunisia and Egypt revolutions, it was crucial to collect data on what way these revolutions affected activists in Morocco and how diffusion of new ideas affect how and why people are ready and continue to mobilize.

The chart below provides an overview about the participants of this research:

**Table 2: Overview of Research Participants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees profile</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Islamists (independents)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No political affiliation and no prior activism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist (including radical left)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Affiliated or sympathizers of either leftist parties or civil society with a left leaning ideology (i.e. Moroccan Association for Human Rights AMDH and activists within labor unions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazigh</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Interviewees in this category introduce themselves as <em>February 20</em> activists not as Amazigh activists. Except for those who are members of Adl Wal Ihsane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adl Wal Ihsane</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Interviewees included three youth activists, two female leaders, two male leaders, and one female who used to be a member, but left Adl Wal Ihsane. Yet, her father is a local leader of Adl Wal Ihsane in Marrakesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Adl Wal Ihsane Islamists</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Interviewees with moderate Islamist ideology or are sympathizers of PJD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Two independents, two leftists, and two Adl Wal Ihsane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Independents media (youth journalists including two male and female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organizations supporting February 20 movement including human rights and youth organizations who are members of the national council for support of <em>February 20</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Two members of parliament: one representing PJD (moderate Islamist) and one representing Union Socialists des Force Populaires (USFP) = moderate left.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>This includes university professors and think tank researchers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
who are members of the national council for support of February 20.  

Data Analysis and Reporting

I conducted and transcribed each interview. Because I did not use a tape recording or any technology devise, the interviews were long (average of three hours). The long durations of the interviews provided me with the opportunity to dig more and ask follow up questions. After the transcripts were completed, I conducted the interpretation of data manually by analyzing emerging common themes, words mostly used during interviews in and across transcripts, key words, repetitive phrases, and places where people pause or laugh or express anger or joy. I used narrative analysis for interpretation and meaning making of themes emerging from the research. Narratives provide the opportunity to analyze the “plot lines” and elements of “transformation” over time. Narrative analysis also provides a more in-depth approach to give respondents the venue to articulate their own viewpoints and evaluative standards. Alvarez and Urla maintain, “respondents are also engaged in creating the meaning of the questions and answers that constitute their narratives.”  

This leads me to agree with Fine’s argument that narrative is both a vital form of movement discourse and a crucial analytical concept. This research also looked into definitive documents of the February 20 movement. I focused on movement related texts and narratives of activists to identify

563 This chart includes participants from the preliminary research conducted in summer 2013. Ten interviews were conducted during the preliminary research and fifty interviews were conducted in October and November 2013.
564 Alvarez, Urla (2002).
patterns, linkages, and structures of ideas. This led me to identify that the broader connecting thread between Tansikiyats of *February 20* are the “*Ardiya Taassissiya,*” framing of local issues within the broader values of the movement, and connections among activists mediated by online platforms and field visits of activists to Tansikiyats. In reviewing the materials and field notes from interviews, it is noticeable that narratives, discourses, and texts produced by activists were not just about information sharing, they were part of the process and dynamics of the movement. Activists’ narratives and Tansikiyats’ documents (communiques, images, facebook pages…etc) were considered a valid indication of elements of shared master frames. Klandermans and Smith argue that “collective action frames include numerous items such as the ‘protesters’, the ‘police’, the ‘grievances’, the ‘protest songs’, and the ‘movement’ that are organized in the memory and accessed as experiences arise.”

I also used the transcriptions of 60 interviews with activists, intellectuals, and civil society actors to identify master frames of the *February 20* movement that are grounded in ‘aardiya taassissiya.” Previous research showed that interviews and secondary data were used in identifying master frames (see Johnston & Aarelaidtart (2000) research on national resistance in Estonia, and Chepak’s (1993) work on environmental justice). The analysis of documentation (including images, and texts…etc) helped me verify elements and their relationships to each other and linkages to activists’ narratives.

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Furthermore, I employed Benford and Snow (2000) variable features of frames to understand interpretive aspects of collective action frames within the February 20 movement Tansikiyats and how they were used to simplify aspects of “world out there” in ways that intend to garner support and demobilized antagonists. Activists within Tansikiyats engaged in framing tasks (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing). Benford and Snow’s (2000) features of collective action frames include: problem identification and direction or locus of attribution; flexibility and rigidity; inclusivity and exclusivity; interpretive scope and influence; and degree of resonance.

**Problem identification and direction or locus of attribution:** February 20 movement Tansikiyats engaged in identifying problems that resulted from “hogra—humiliation” and from elfassad--corruption. The words *hogra* and *fassad* were repeated by activists, elites, and citizens in general across the board. The words of *hogra* and *fassad* are important in constructing meaning of injustice master frame with a greater utility across movements. Tansikiyats engaged in interpretive processes of what *hogra* and *fassad* means and how they affect people’s life locally. Gerhards and Rucht argue that the larger the range of issues a frame can cover, the greater the groups that are addressed by the frame as well as its greater capacity for mobilization. Problems that citizens face (denial of rights, lack of basic services, and lack of accountability) are all connected to one another and to hogra and elfassad. This is in tune with Gerhards & Rucht (1992) qualifying aspect of frames (see list for diagnostic frames).

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568 Garhards & Rucht (1992) quoted in Benford and Snow (August 2000)
Flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity: the *February 20* movement

Tansikiyats adopted master frames that are elastic, open, flexible, articulate a greater number of ideas that speak to the majority of people (شعبية), and account for the diversity of movement components (تعددية). This elasticity is exemplified in Tansikiyats’ ability to articulate ideas about injustice and justice in various ways utilizing slogans, images, and texts.

**Interpretive scope and influence:** this deals with how broad collective action frames matter. The use of diagnostic frames (injustice) and prognostic frames (عدالة، حريّة، كرامة—justice, dignity, freedom) can be elastic in their interpretation in a variable way that corresponds with local realities. These frames accommodate larger categories and ideas. These master frames created space for other sub-frames that are context-specific. Tansikiyats understood that how frames are interpreted can affect the mobilization of by-standers and marginalized population. The qualities of frames does include their “culturally resonant to their historical milieu.”

**Resonance:** for frames to resonate with people, they need to first be consistent, credible, and real (apparent fit). First, frames needed to be consistent with the *February 20* movement values, claims, and actions that are outlined in its “*Ardiya Taassissiya.*” Second, frames needed to be articulated in real and believable indicators (diagnostic frames is a case in point here). Third, the credibility of claims articulators also matters. As Desrues argues, *February 20* youth were concerned about the credibility of the movement, so they insisted on protesting peacefully and without destroying any public

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569 Swart (1995) quoted in Benford and Snow (August 2000).
goods (السلام والانظباط). Youth also engaged in creating emotional resonance (see Robnett, 2004).

Field notes and interviews suggest that the four features listed above were particularly pronounced during the period of protest (February 20-May 15, 2011); a period that witnessed increased protest across Morocco (see chapter three). Frames that are broad and elastic in their conception remain applicable even after Adl Wal Ihsane left the movement in December 18, 2011. However, certain frames with limited scope and flexibility shifted or declined. The frame of “haraka Jamahiriya” is a case in point.

Six content categories (i.e., frames) were found to be of primary significance in relation to this research and frames and sub-frames are embedded within the founding principles of the movement (الشعارات العامة محددة داخل الأرضية التأسيسية). These content categories are: the “presence of marginalization slogans” during the protests, the “presence of specific demands,” the “presence of identity frames,” the “presence of strong anti-Makhzan symbols,” the “presence of mostly secular slogans,” and less “presence of religious slogans,” during protests, sit-ins, and demonstrations. For instance, the presence of marginalization slogans: the way Tansikiyats framed issues locally included references to long standing marginalization and humiliation (hogra) of citizens. Such references ranged from against ‘hogra,’ united against the Makhzan, no to silence, silence is humiliation—la lisamt asamtu madala, to portrayals of anti-Makhzan slogans and images.

Discussion with February 20 activist Hamza Mahfoud during his visit to Washington DC on March 25, 2014.
Each respondent was asked to provide some biographical information and if they partook in protests before or not. Also, respondents were asked if other activists within their local Tansikiyat would share their perspective and to elaborate further on their response. I further asked what Tansikiyat means in their view. Through the question about the meaning of Tansikiyats, respondents focused on independence, autonomy, and solidarity aspects and always linked to the values of the movement “قيم التي جاءت بها الحركة” This is suggestive of the view that there was a prior agreement about utilizing the “ardiya taassissiya” as a reference for framing issues (تأطير الحراك). A follow on question was about the flag of the February 20 movement, what it means and why Tansikiyats use the same flag? The response was that the flag symbolizes unity of the movement given its decentralized Tansikiyats (المطالب ووحدة المكونات تعددية).

Additionally, respondents were asked to provide their perspective on interactions and dynamics within a continuum of time, and highlight any changes within these time series. I disclosed that I was researching protests cycle over a one-year period with major happenings (King’s March 9th speech, Temara violent response of the Makhzan on May 15\textsuperscript{571}; July 1\textsuperscript{st} constitutional referendum; elections of November 25; and the exit of Adl Wal Ihsane in December 18, 2011). I reviewed materials including newspapers articles, documents published in websites of leftist parties, and Adl Wal Ihsane, blogs, writings on February 20 to cross reference with the themes that emerged from interviews about centrality, decentralized approach of the movement as well as independence and autonomy of Tansikiyats.

\textsuperscript{571} Témara detention or interrogation center- معتقل تمارة السري as it is known is located near Rabat. February 20 movement activists marched and set up a picnic on May 15, 2011 however, the security forces responded violently to protesters.
The list below provides the macro categories and themes across transcribed interviews and secondary data reviewed (newspapers articles, blogs, Tansikiyats communiques, satirical prints, slogans, speeches…etc) that speak of a “time” a “space” and “people.”

The themes listed in each category are repeated and mentioned at least three times by each of the 60 interviewees. Any theme that was mentioned once, I did not include it. Also, the words and themes used when describing February 20 movement introduce activists not only as part of a local protest, but as part of the entire movement.

The list below is a summary of main emerging themes:

Table 3: Summary of Emerging Themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes related to characteristics &amp; nature of February 20</th>
<th>Themes related to diagnostic framing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>جماهيرية مستقلة, Popular, independent</td>
<td>الحكمة, الظلم الاجتماعي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>تغيير حقيقي, Real change</td>
<td>Humiliation, social injustice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>شعبية، مناضلة, Popular, militant</td>
<td>عدالة، كرامة، حريّة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, dignity, freedom</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الصمود، النفاذ, Perseverance, struggle</td>
<td>مغربدا جديدا</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مغربدا جديدا</td>
<td>Authoritarianism, tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>التعددية، التضامن, Pluralism, solidarity</td>
<td>القمع</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>استقاف الفساد, End corruption</td>
<td>Repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>التنسيق الميداني, Field coordination</td>
<td>الفيزياء الشعبيّة، سيادة شعبية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s will, people’s sovereignty</td>
<td>Daily repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سلمية، شابة, Peaceful, youthful</td>
<td>التهميش</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مطالب شعبية، جماهيرية, Popular mass demands</td>
<td>Marginalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>التنسقبيات المحلية, Local coordinations</td>
<td>الأصلاح</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الاحترام</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الواقع المعزّي المزدري</td>
<td>الاحترام</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>مصداقية، التقائة</th>
<th>الفضاء العام</th>
<th>المخزن المستبد</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy, connectedness</td>
<td>Public space</td>
<td>Authoritarian Makhzan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الشاركية في صناعة القرار</td>
<td>ما مفاكينش، لا للصمت</td>
<td>الاحترار، الإلهام</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory decision-making</td>
<td>No to silence, we are not giving up</td>
<td>Humiliation, oppression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of these themes particularly those related to justice and injustice frames is loaded with emotions which were necessary to connect protesters to the values and claims of the movement (for details see chapter three). These themes are translated into slogans and images that resonate with people emotionally. Furthermore, these characteristics serve as an auto-representation of the movement.

Another element that this research cannot overlook is the variable of Adl Wal Ihsane both as a major component of the February 20 movement and as a contributor to the decline or shift of certain frames. When asked about Al Adl Wal Ihsane and their role in February 20 protests, non-Islamists activists expressed their foremost admiration for Adl Wal Ihsane extremely high level of organization and ability to retain integrity in the face of co-opting forces throughout protests. However, activists (who are leaning towards a leftist ideology), expressed their dissatisfaction with Adl Wal Ishane withdrawal and considered it a rational political calculation and a political deal that was struck with Justice and Development Party (PJD) who won the elections in November 25, 2011. Also, when asked about “haraka jamahiriya,” independent activists’ response was different than that of the leftist leaning or sympathizers. The response was that “after the exit of Adl Wal Ihsane, we cannot call it haraka jamahiriya because this word conveys power of numbers and Adl Wal Ihsane has the power in numbers الفئة العددية.” This is
indicative of framing shift overtime. Also, that Adl Wal Ihsane variable is understood (by independents) as a vehicle that drove the numbers of ordinary citizens to the street.

When it came to the question about the movement’s centrality, decentralization of its Tansikiyats, and connectedness among and between Tansikiyats; I faced a challenging task. Activists wondered why I was even asking about something called the center of the movement. I encountered many stares and unpleasant responses. Research respondents never mentioned that there is a center or a central organization of the movement. They argued that they worked hard to keep the movement independent and autonomous. In addition to respondents’ responses, I reviewed documents related to February 20 and texts Tansikiyats produced trying to investigate if literature refers to “a center of the movement.” The finding is that February 20 is not a centralized movement and does not have a center. Yet, interviews revealed that there was an attempt towards centralizing the movement (Casablanca), but it failed. Also, there were several accusations vis-à-vis the national council for support for trying to take over the movement.

The movement does not have a specific organizational structure particularly at the center so activists and frontline activists within Tansikiyats serve as discourse (narrative) at the organizational level. According to Klandermans and Staggenborg, it is common that the discourse produced by intellectuals and movement activists is taken as organizational discourse. As noted by Rochon, this discourse is also “reflective of discursive elements that resonate among the larger populace, akin to processes of frame alignment and frame bridging.”

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573 Kladermans and Smith (2002).
One key finding is that narratives from interviewees corresponds with the general narratives of scholars (independents) and elites (independent, leftist, and Islamist) about the characteristics, its values, claims, and local organizing of movement Tansikiyats. However, where the divergence is identified is on the centrality and independence of Tansikiyats. Most leftist figures (including Nabila Mounib and figures within AMDH) reluctantly argued that the left want to help create the general framework for the movement, not to take over the movement decision-making processes. She adds that the national council for support is a diverse body and it was established to provide support and serve as a political umbrella that guides the movement. Activists however, countered this argument stating that structures and national council for support aimed at centralizing the movement and Casablanca attempt is case in point. Activists contend that they were clear when they produced the video  الملي خاص كناش تعرفو وفهمنا ما مورانا حتى شي تنظيم سياسي.حنا شباب مورنا خيوم الشعب المغربي ومسؤولية التغيير what everyone should understand is that there is no political organization behind us, we are youth pushed by grievances of Moroccan people and by a responsibility for change."574

The bottom line is that we are dealing with, as Aarts and Cavatora articulate, “societal forms of unstructured mobilization and non-traditional, leaderless and horizontal social and political actors.”575

Transcriptions of interviews revealed recurring words and themes throughout.

These themes include: التشارك، التماس، التكامل، التواصيل، التأقلم، التفاهم، التضامن، بحالة تأسيسية.

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574 This a video posted on Youtube as a second campaign announcing the creation of February 20 and a call for the second protest. The video can also be accessed through hespress.com http://www.hespress.com/videos/28216.html (نداء جديد من شباب 20 فبراير)

leaning, framing, exchanging, sharing experiences, connecting, communicating, solidarity, coherence, founding principles, and common ground. These words are characteristics of social networks. To capture this dimension, I once again examined movement’s texts, images and activists’ narratives as well as articles and newspapers articles written about the movement. I follow up with a series of questions to clarify these concepts and understand the meaning behind them. To do this, I scheduled a series of five phone calls with academics, and civil society actors, as well as five Skype calls with activists (now that trust is established). Since framing is an essential part of social networks and since these informal social networks are crucial in connecting activists within various Tansikiyats through internet, personal relationships, and interactions; Kribi captures it well when he wrote,

“Slogans are communicative messages. Slogans inside February 20 movement, do not just target one recipient, but four type of audience: the Makhzan first, local and general public (masses), February 20 components (all actors including stakeholders within the movement, people who are directly engaged and sympathizers), and the international public opinion.”

Kribi Abdulkarim (October, 2011). حركة 20 فبراير و سؤال الشعارات. Article published in Lakome.com in October 2, 2011 https://www.lakome.com/%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A/49-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A/8746-2011-10-02.html

576 Translation by the author of this study.
Research Limitations

There were two looming questions that needed to be answered: 1) who am I as a researcher? And what is my position vis-a-vis *February 20*? There are various challenges associated with conducting field research in Morocco. The first challenge is that political situation was tense and the new government was promoting the narrative “reform within stability” in light of the security situation in MENA region. This narrative meant to promote that Morocco made the right choice to reform and chose the “third way” which saved it from a disastrous outcome (referring to Libya and Syria). So conducting research and asking questions can be viewed as countering Makhzanian narrative. The second challenge is that respondents’ response might not offer a complete story as they may choose to recall certain events, but not others and as they fear to answer my questions because of possible political ramifications my research might subject them to. I overcame this challenge by employed a snowball approach to sampling. Furthermore, I have a personal connection to Morocco so interpreting narratives collected through interviews, focus groups, examining common themes of these stories, analyzing them and interpreting them raises the question of subjectivity. McCaslin and Wilson Scott contend, “behind…methodology of qualitative research “stands the personal biography of the researcher, who speaks from a particular class, gender, racial, cultural, and ethnic community perspective.” 578 Recognizing this subjectivity is important. To overcome this limitation, this research was conducted from the perspective of the interviewees of this research. Labov and Waletzky note that it is “necessary to gain entrance to the

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perspective of the speaker and the audience, tracing the transfer of information and experience in a way that deepens our own understandings of what language and social life are all about.” For this research, the purpose of narrative analysis is not to provide definite answers, but help provide an opportunity to realize my shortcomings and motivations - as well as that of others. The challenge remains that qualitative analysis offers a higher validity of the findings but less reliability. The third challenge is that in addition to strengths, framing scholarship has also its limits because as, Davis argues “framing perspective draws on moral claims of movements, but provide little illumination of how specific moral responses are aroused.”

It is important to recognize that I am part of the data I collect, so it imperative to consider the impact of my own positioning and that of others – e.g. research respondents; and my intended audience – on this study. My hope is that this study will provide an opportunity for further interest in researching collective action in its specific-context, and raise as many questions as it answers.

CHAPTER 6- FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: PART I

Introduction

*February 20* focus is on social and political claims. The activists faced a turning point because of the gains of their struggle for justice and equality-- the epicenter of what is called *politics*. *February 20* activists understood the terms of the debate underpinning their exclusion, which constitutes their political *awakening*. This awakening is attributed to the adaptation of a new narrative emerged as new ideas are being diffused by the regional dynamics of the MENA region.

In an interview with *Akhbar Alyaoum* newspaper in April 2014, Abdel Ali Hamiddine, a member of PJD political bureau and a Member of Parliament, supposed that *February 20* was the breakthrough Morocco needed to put an end to Makhzan’s control grip, and to the political stagnation that Morocco has witnessed since 2007 (الانحصار). *February 20* “has played its historical role and we cannot ask for more unless it transforms itself to a political party, and that is not possible given the diversity of its components.” Hamiddine asserts that these components came together

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581 In May 16, 2003 Morocco witnessed a horrific violent events led by extremists groups of what is called Salafia Jihadia. Since then, Moroccan government started to tighten control over political and social spheres. The legislative election of 2007 demonstrated the political stagnation of the Moroccan political system and particularly apathy of youth towards political participation and engagement.

because they wanted and believed in the same political demands, not necessarily because they have common platforms or proposals for political change.\textsuperscript{583} \textit{February 20} demands were about ending corruption, tyranny, and political change, but it did not exactly specify what type of political system it aspires to (prognostic frame dispute). This became one of the contentious elements post-March 9 speech.\textsuperscript{584} Hamiddine alluded to the fact that \textit{February 20} components struggled to agree on a common agenda for change that would articulate a vision beyond multiple identities, ideologies, and thematic objectives pursued by specific organizational structures. Yet, there are those who argue that the point of \textit{February 20} is also to open up the political space. Respondents (independents) and academics interviewed for this research agree with this point, which can be summarized in four themes:

\begin{itemize}
\item From sectorial social protests to political protests\textsuperscript{**}
\item Move the public debate from the corridors of the institutional elites to public space\textsuperscript{**}
\item Remove sacredness from the king and bring institutional monarchy, elites and power to the circle of discussion\textsuperscript{**}
\item Expose the political system, indicators of its continuity, and its willingness to change\textsuperscript{**}
\end{itemize}

A renewed sense of civic activism was born with \textit{February 20} which is exemplified through its Tansikiyats. Tansikiyats were not concerned with bringing down the regime; they were concerned with demanding an alternative way of centralized power and building up a society with more justice and rule of law. Evidence shows that the broader

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{583} Abdel Ali Hamidine, interview with Akhbar Alyaoum newspaper, Nadwat Echahr, Akhbar Alyaoum dated April 26, 2014 in the paper copy of the newspaper. Website: www.alyaoum24.com.
\item \textsuperscript{584} Abdel Ali Hamidine, interview with Akhbar Alyaoum newspaper, Nadwat Echahr, Akhbar Alyaoum dated April 26, 2014 in the paper copy of the newspaper. Website: www.alyaoum24.com.
\end{itemize}
aspects of the movement’s demands were outlined in its founding principles (ardiya taassissiya) which included dissolution of the government and parliament, the establishment of a temporary transitional government, and an independent and transparent justice.\textsuperscript{585}

The power of Tansikiyats experience helped in changing the Makhzian lexicon from that of security approach to considering rights and participatory approach to politics (new constitution and new national institutions). \textit{February 20} Tansikiyats re-introduced ordinary citizens to “street politics.”\textsuperscript{586} Through this “street politics,” \textit{February 20} Tansikiyats, “brought to the surface the hidden layers of unreported patterns of subjugation and silencing.”\textsuperscript{587} As many respondents articulate it “\textit{February 20} exposed the vicious nature of the Makhzian regime.”\textsuperscript{588}

I devote the upcoming sections to discussing findings of the research relating to \textit{February 20} Tansikiyats. This dissertation makes the case for framing as a viable framework to understand the experience of Tansikiyats as part of understanding \textit{February 20} in a broader sense. From a theoretical perspective, framing played a paramount role in explaining Tansikiyats dynamics, processes, how they define and frame themselves, and give a name to their grievances locally. Also, a crucial move here is that, \textit{February 20} movement is a case that illustrates that new social movement can transcend existing formal structures contrasting social movements’ literature that suggests that mobilization

\textsuperscript{587} Hadia, Abadi. \textit{Gendering the February 20\textsuperscript{th} Movement: Moroccan Women Redefining: Boundaries, Identities and Resistance. CyberOrient,} Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2014), http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=8817
\textsuperscript{588} Interview with six activists that took place in Mohammadia in November 2013.
builds on existing structures. *February 20*Tansikiyats made a strategic decision not to engage with formal existing social or political structures. Certainly, religious (Adl Wal Ihsane), and Amazigh structures (Tawada, Azzeta,) were engaged and participated without taking on their religious or ethnic stances. The Islamists and the Amazigh are components of *February 20* movement and building on their structures would not have been strategic to lead a mass movement. The upcoming sections are outlined as follow:
The first section offers a summary of observations and findings related to the marginal role of labor unions, and the lack of gender considerations and leadership within Tansikiyats; and it moves on to discuss and elaborate on these findings. The second section introduces findings on frames, how Tansikiyats make popular claims visible in the political arena (prognostic frames) using master frames, tackle the causes, and legitimate grievances (interpretive frames) that have caused widespread alienation among youth and ordinary citizens: growing levels of inequality; injustice, and a raft of Makhzan policies that support corrupt practices and seem to value the status quo (diagnostic frames). This section also discusses findings on how Tansikiyats were not bound by existing structures or seen as static, which presents a challenge to literature on social movements (Goodwin and Emirbayer 1994; Goodwin and Jasper 1999). This section brings together various theoretical framing concepts by building on the malleability of frames (Oliver and Johnston 2000), interactive process (Gamson et al. 1982) to expand framing effectiveness to serve Tansikiyats to motivate and mobilize, and create narrative of collective identity frame and frame resonance. It demonstrates the decline of certain frames, frame dispute; critiques, and responds to Benford’s conception of shortcomings...
of static tendencies, and elite bias of framing. The third section presents a summary of the chapter, and the fourth provides a perspective for further research.

**General Observations and Findings:**

**Summary of Findings**

Among the general findings of this study is that labor unions played a marginal role in *February 20* movement Tansikiyats and withdrew their support early on. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, labor unions in Morocco were free-riders and interests driven (rational choice), which supports Olson’s theory of economic and material incentives and refutes Udehn’s theory of “free-riding is not always a dominant strategy.”

While Tansikiyats engaged in participatory processes during public assemblies to ensure inclusiveness, gender was taken into account particularly in a context where private and public spaces are clearly defined for women. Gender equality was part of the broader debate of *February 20*, but it was not a strategic goal within Tansikiyats. Tansikiyats processes and dynamics did not center on gender questions or even where made part of their routinization processes. Also, women and feminist organizations did not support *February 20* provided the traumatic experience that scared their memory when Islamists led a counter mobilization to stop women’s advocacy efforts to reform the family law in 2000. Women and feminist organizations decided not to engage in *February 20* given that Adl Wal Ihsane is one of its major components.

Tansikiyats dynamics and processes showed that hierarchy was a characteristic that activists rejected within Tansikiyats. Not only that Tansikiyats rejected hierarchy,

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they also overrated the leaderless aspect of their organizing which proved to be detrimental. Tansikiyats relied on mass movement “haraka jamahirya” frame to compensate for the deficiency in leadership. This over-confidence on the “haraka jamahirya” frame proved limited as the frame declined overtime particularly when Adl Wal Ihsane exited the movement in December 18, 2011. Lack of leadership was palpable post-constitution referendum as Tansikiyats engaged in prognostic frames dispute which resulted in collective identity frames shift (Islamists vs non-Islamists). The below section elaborates and further discusses the above findings.

**Where are the Labor Unions?**

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, labor unions in Morocco did not play a crucial role in the February 20 movement Tansikiyats. Until today, everyone still ponders the question of why labor unions took the back seat during protests. The long history of repression and the quelling of labor unions’ efforts to mobilize for sectorial change to better living conditions of workers may have played a role in their limited participation in February 20 Tansikiyats. In Morocco, labor unions have a long history of struggle dating back to 1950s. Labor unions are mostly dominated by leftist or radical leftist activists. In addition to small labor unions, there are five major unions including Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) that is a semi-independent union; Fédération Démocratique du Travail (FDT) is dominated by radical left; Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT) is affiliated with the leftist party of Union Socialist of Popular Forces (USFP); Union Generale des Travaileurs au Maroc (UGTM) that has direct ties to the Istiqlal party, and the Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc (UNMT) which affiliated with Islamist party of Justice
and Development (PJD). The first organized labor protest in Morocco took place on December 8, 1952 in solidarity with the Tunisian labor unions in light of the assassination of Tunisian labor activist Farhat Hachad. Historically, Morocco witnessed several waves of labor strikes and sectorial protests led by labor unions. It is worth mentioning the protests of 1981 across Morocco against prices increase. These protests were most notable as they were violent particularly in Casablanca in May 29, 1981. These protests resulted in a decrease of prices. Since then, labor protests were taking place regularly but with less violence. In 1996 and 2002, Moroccan labor unions entered into social peace agreement with the government which resulted, according to Moroccan analysts, in labor unions’ leadership co-optation. However, despite these setbacks, labor unions continue to incrementally win specific benefits for their supporters. While labor unions are not invested in demanding full democratic reforms, they exploit political opportunities to advance their sectorial interests. The February 20 movement is the case in point in which labor unions exerted pressure on and elicited concessions from the government.

Labor unions have called their local sections across Morocco to partake in the protest and they were present in the first weeks of protests, however as soon as the Makhzan devised a plan for wages increase, unions’ public support to February 20 decreased. Unions including Democratic Confederation for Labor (CDT), the Democratic Federation for Labor (FDT), and particularly the Moroccan Labor’s Union (UMT), the largest in Morocco, were satisfied with the outcome of the negotiation with the Makhzan. Unions negotiated an increase of 600 Moroccan Dirham (MAD) across the board for
public sector employees which was a significant gain compared to a percentage increase they were able to negotiate prior to the February 20 movement. This Makhzanian deal was enough to halt labor unions participation in February 20 or support its demands publically. Nabil Tarabloussi notes that even when labor unions did not fully support the movement, February 20 Tansikiyats mobilized and took to the street in support of labor unions in Labor-Day (May 1) protest. This was an implicit statement to labor unions declaring that “even if you don’t support us, we will support you.” and that “we know what’s going on.” In an interview with Akhbar Alyaoum, Koudss Lafnatsa, a February 20 activist, lamented that the fierce negotiation process that the Makhzan entered into with labor unions which brought about the signing of April 26, 2011 agreement, it was clear that it came with the conditionality of silence. The Makhzan negotiation process also resulted in the signing of July 1, 2011 agreement and the creation of 4000 jobs for the unemployed graduates. Among the prominent figures of labor unions and human activists are Abdelhamid Amine and Samira Kinami that continued to support, participate in protests, and remain vocal on issues of injustice and corruption.

Labor unions withdrawal did not necessarily affect the intensity of protests. Tansikiyats activists continue to mobilize for action. This indicates three things: 1) the limited role labor unions played in participation and mobilization even if they were very active in mobilization in earlier times (see Manouni, 1976; Ayache, 1982; Benseddik, 1990; and Gallessot, 1998); 2) youth perception about labor unions co-optation was validated, and 3) February 20 was an opportunity for the unions to reap benefits from the movement. The argument is that unions were simply incentive driven (as rational choice
and self-interest argument might suggest). Simply put, labor unions were free-riders. This confirms free-riders hypothesis that “no one will contribute to the collective good in the absence of selective benefits.” In fact, unions’ support after wages increase was largely mute as respondents argue, “اصبح منطق الانتهازية هو السائد لدى النقابات و المنظمات الممغنزة,” Many activists confirmed that even if several prominent union leaders (in an individual capacity) participated in protests (such as Abdelhamid Amine and Samira Kinami), and the fact that UMT and CDT made their facilities available to hold public assembly meetings during the first few weeks of protest, UMT and CDT were not able to withstand the pressure of the Makhzan. For instance, pressured by the Makhzan, UMT top leadership requested that Abdelhamid Amine resigns his position within the UMT leadership bureau. For many, such reaction was expected given that UMT is perceived as a co-opted organization and the majority of its leaders are Makhzanized. As Professor Mohammed El-Ghali articulates, labor unions have been weakened particularly after the politics of alternance of 1990s. I concur with Bayat’s powerful comment on labor unions:

“while trade unions are continuing to push for living standard adjustments--opposing aspects of structural adjustment policies—they nevertheless represent only a fraction of the total workforce in the region. In general trade unions have failed to link community concerns to those of the workplace. The vast majority of the labouring classes remains dispersed in the informal urban economy. In

591 A discussion with three civil society and February 20 activists who were active within unions as well as political parties, but left both organizations many years ago.
592 Professor Mohammed El-Ghali, interview conducted in Marrakesh in October 2013. Politics of alternance refers to the political shift King Hassan II pioneered in 1998 in which the prime minister will be chosen alternatively from various political parties instead of the winning party. This process started in 1998 when Hassan II invited back Abderrahman ElYoussoufi from USFP from exile to lead the government. Many argue that Hassan II was pretending to reform to ensure a smooth transition of the throne to his son Mohammed VI. Mohammed VI became a King in 1999. This process has been reversed with the new constitution in 2011.
general, trade unions have failed to link community concerns to those of the workplace. For this reason, urban grassroots movements may find a space for collective action in the community."

Bayat captures the inability of labor unions to link the sectorial demands to community concerns.

I must mention though that Paczynska may disagree with Bayat’s argument in the case of Egypt. In this respect, Beinin argues that “the labor factor is not present in any of the other Arab countries that have experienced popular uprisings” with exception of Egypt.

In the case of Morocco, this inability typifies the perception that labor unions remains interests-driven and free-riders even when there is an opportunity to extend and amplify frames of injustice and justice beyond sectorial demands. So, the question is why labor union did not use these frames to gain legitimacy and alter individuals’ perceptions of reality? In light of this and based on a review of framing literature, I came to agree with Benford insider’s critique that framing is not able to capture the problem of free riders, and what types of frames are needed to bring them in to support the movement without calculating their limited material incentives. Mahmoud Jadid writes in Mounadil (a) that labor unions were not able to amplify the frames because the leadership of the unions is historically an extension of the ministry of employment and the leadership of the major unions is corrupt as they engaged in silencing internal opposition. Labor leadership bought in to the Makhzanian narrative and did not stand against laws that suppress the demands of the labor classes. He notes that this resulted in قمع الأصوات النقابية "

The importance of discussing labor unions involvement is that despite their limited participation formally, because of the autonomy of the Tansikiyats, unionized individuals continue to participate under the umbrella of February 20 movement.
Presence versus Voice: The Question of Gender Considerations

A surprising finding is the silence around gender considerations within Tansikiyats. In cultures, such as Morocco, gender definition is confined to its context and usually takes into account the place relegated to women within that particular social structure. For this purpose, the term “gender” is defined as a reference to the unequal power relations that are structurally assigned positions for both men and women in a patriarchal system.598

In the February 20 movement, women have been in the front lines of protest and resistance. Examples of these brave women include Khadija R, Amina Y, Ouidad M, Zineb B, Karima N, Koudss L, Amina T, Sarah S, and Amina B. These visible women activists are from Tansikiyats of Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakesh, Fes, and Kenitra. Also, Adl Wal Ihsane women were not necessarily visible during Tansikiyats public assemblies as they only constituted a pool for recruitment and were participants in protests. Participation for Adl Wal Ihsane is a family affair and is a religious duty (طقوس تبعية). So the entire family (husband, wife, and kids) took to the street based on that assumption (see chapter on Adl Wal Ihsane). Adl Wal Ihsane used a specific realignment frame (Diani 1996) and special interests frame (Ryan 1991) to motivate for participation.

When asked about the inclusion of women in Tansikiyats and what role they played, the response was, “women were champions during protests.” Both young and old women are seen everywhere, they were there. This unsatisfactory response of “they were there” reflects the thinking about women as audiences, not necessarily as actors who have 

equal power as men. This is indicative that gender considerations were absent (characteristic of patriarchal society). Also, when asked about women of Adl Wal Ihsane, interviewees’ response was “Adl Wal Ihsane has agreed to participate; it did not necessarily negotiate gender considerations given where they stand on women’s issues.”

The argument advanced here, does not question women’s participation in protests, it sheds light on the fact that gender issues may have been part of the broader February 20 debate, but advancing gender was not among the strategic goals of movement Tansikiyats. The argument that women activists were visible at the front line is troublesome. The concern was not about whether women were visible during protests or not, it was mostly about their participation in the decision-making process within Tansikiyats. It was about having a voice to influence. For instance, the women listed above were most from the Tansikiyats of Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakesh. In Tansikiyats such as Meknes, Knitra, and Khenifra, the decision-making process was dominated by men. Many respondents argued that feminist movements and feminist organizations did not support February 20 movement was unexpected. Feminist organizations chose to continue their struggle by working within the system (government institutions) specifically on issues related to women, and did not necessary want to engage in the plight for broader democratic reforms. Salime notes that “unfortunately, among February 20 activists, there is a real feeling of betrayal by the leadership of feminist organizations... that feminism, as a struggle to institute gender equality, has

599 Interview with Amina T (activism nickname bent chaab) in November 2013. Amina T. is a student and an activist from Adl Wal Ihsane and her father is the local leader for Adl Wal Ihsane in Marrakesh.
not informed *February 20.* Houda Abadi supports this perspective. This lack of support to *February 20* particularly from prominent feminist organization such as Association Marocaine des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), the Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes (LDDF), the Union de l’Action Feminine (UAF), the L’Association Marocaine pour la Defense des Droits des Femmes, was due to their traumatic experience with Islamists movement (both Adl Wal Ihsane and PJD). Islamists movements led counter-mobilization efforts against the one million march that feminist movements organized in March 8, 2000 to reform the Moudawana family law. Adl Wal Ihsane is a major component of *February 20*. On this, Salime’s writes “the ability of *February 20* to work with the Islamists of Justice and Spirituality (adl) posed a true challenge to feminist organizations.” Salime agrees that feminists illustrated a myopic vision that abstracted them from seeing the broader context of *February 20* movement, and as “an extension of the struggle for gender equality to issues of social justice.”

Commentators and activists within the movement lamented that this was a lost opportunity for women and feminist organizations to reconstruct a strong narrative about women in public space—that is political space. Undoubtedly, feminist movements and elites within women organizations have missed the opportunity of influencing the diagnostic and prognostic frames related to women, equality, and justice. This is a surprising finding given that women and feminists organizations have always argued that they are leading the struggle for equality in all fronts.

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601 Salime (2012).

Another explanation that activists provided regarding gender considerations was that processes within Tansikiyats public assemblies were long and oftentimes lasted until mid-night discouraged young women from generally attending the meetings. This has resulted in lack of emphasis on women as agents rather than just an audience. The weak representation of women in the decision making process in Tansikiyats serves as a testimony that the patriarchal concept of “Roujoula” or manhood is a symbolic demarcation of inequality between men and women. It is also a concept that defines the limits between public and private space for women.

After May 15, 2011, tensions in social relationships among activists became apparent, and identity politics (about gender) come into play. Adl Wal Ihanse activists started to vocalize their dissatisfaction with non-Islamist female activists smoking during public assemblies. Interviewee Maati Monjib, a researcher, and a member of the national council for support explained that activists in various Tansikiyats complained about Adl Wal Ihsane comments towards non-Islamist female activists attitudes (smoking in public). This generated tensions among activists as independents and leftist sympathizers labeled Adl Wal Ihsane as backward, and non-tolerant. The fear of being ridiculed and accused of being westernized also impacted women’s attitudes during public assemblies and during protests which resulted in social boundary creation (Benford’s framing boundary). Tensions mounted against slogans that included that women and men are equal and specifically mention individual rights. Adl Wal Ihsane rejected them so

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activists engaged in negotiating a middle ground with slogans such as “men and women are equal in struggle.” The process of slogan formation witnessed a conflict and divergence in perspectives when it comes to content related to gender and individual rights. Adl Wal Ihsane activists offered a conservative perspective while non-Islamists opted for a more liberal or secular conception. These tensions played a role shaping individual rights, and formulated the rules on which Adl Wal Ihsane engaged in collective action within Tansikiyats.

In a broader sense, these tensions illustrate a tangible fact that women still grapple to deconstruct gender power relations and reconcile public and private spaces within which women are confined to operate. And “challenge entrenched patriarchic customs, and pressure for political changes.” This demonstrates the prevailing manner of thinking that advances conservative views on female affairs. Reshaping the public space and increasing the visibility of women are further complicated by the dichotomous relation between religio-cultural tradition and the country’s modernization agenda. This leads us to believe that further efforts are needed to effectively reform the public and political repertoire within which gender considerations and rights can be exercised. This is because; the political sphere is where the fundamental orientations of a society are defined and where the decisions concerning the principals of domination over the social life are made. Now, that the February 20 movement has “demonstrated women’s

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605 A.Hajji, an activist from Casablanca, who was independent and became a member of PSU, interview conducted in early March, 2014.
rights and issues are part of the larger debate on the critical understanding of citizenship and rights.”

Both Salime and Abadi make similar argument about new kinds of feminism and women activism summarized by Abadi’s comments:

“women's activism in the February 20th movement differentiates itself from the older feminist movement not only in its understanding of state power and it conscious effort to not be coopted but also in its generational dynamic and negotiation of identities, ideologies, use of social media, and their artistic expression of protests. In a sense, it can be characterized as a departure from the older Moroccan women movement that focused solely on law changes and institutions.”

I agree with this perspective because it is hopeful and innovative in deconstructing state power and conveying a sense of seriousness around gender. I must argue however, that I disagree with the assumption that “feminism has not only penetrated the social imaginary of a new generation of activists, but has also informed their practices.” While the assumption that feminism informed activists’ practices maybe true its broader sense and in larger Tansikiyats such as Rabat and Casablanca, evidence shows that the content during assemblies (mostly held at night) in Tansikiyats such Meknes, Kenitra, Tangier, Sidi Ifni, Al Hoceima, and Ouazazate (to list just few) did not consider the role of women or gender considerations. Five women activists including Amina T, Ouidad M, Karima N, Amina B, and Maria M interviewed reported that women are welcomed to protest, were among the people who called for protest (Amina Boughalbi), and engaged fully during protests, yet the process of public assemblies that took place late at night discourage

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609 Abadi (2014).
610 Abadi (2014).
women from staying late. They clarified that the fact that women organizations did not officially join the movement was disappointing. Another element that activists interviewed agreed on is the tensions that started to emerge during protests is the reaction of Adl Wal Ihsane towards women smoking during public assemblies. Two women from Adl stated that the decision to participate was made as an organization, not as women of Adl Wal Ihsane. They emphasized the vertical aspect of the decision-making within Adl Wal Ihsane as an organization.

Similarly, Salime’s argument cannot be generalized to other Tansikiyats that are geographically distant from Rabat and Casablanca. The reason is that,

“partial, locatable critical knowledge create an understanding of women’s issues from below...as politics and the epistemologies of location, positioning and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims. These claims on people’s lives; the view from a body, always a complex, contradictory structuring and structured body; versus the view above, from nowhere, from simplicity.” 612

The body that Haraway refers to is the body of knowledge that derives from a grounded contextualized perspective. To achieve this perspective, more research is needed to effectively explore the notion of subjectivity of women and lack of gender considerations within decision-making processes of the February 20 movement Tansikiyats. Hopefully, as Abadi insinuates in her article, her research will further explore gender in the February 20 movement in a deeper and nuanced manner.

The autonomy of Tansikiyats provided an important opportunity to young women to get engage without particularly bringing the agenda of women organizations and without having to defend themselves for protesting along the side of Adl Wal Ihsane.

**Is Leadership Needed: A Leaderless Movement**

A source of pride among Tansikiyats activists was the leaderless aspect of the movement. Many considered the horizontal, non-organizational, and non-hierarchical approach a valuable aspect of the movement. Activists argue that everyone felt like a leader, youth did not appreciate the rigidity of vertical structures (referring to previous movements such as Ila-Amman, labor movements, Islamist movements, and leftist structures...etc). This is where activists have extended Gramsci’s philosophical thinking that every human being is a philosopher and by that every human being can be a leader.613 This leaderless approach made activists feel a sense of pride, determination, and self-worth. When asked about the shifts and changes in perspective about leadership or leaderlessness within Tansikiyats, youth activists’ response was surprising “we are Moroccans-- M’gharba” “we are Febrayereyen Ichreeniyeen; we collaborate, protest together, and lead together.”614 This was at least the case in the beginning of protest until the constitutional referendum. The collective “we” in each Tansikiyat proves a sense of togetherness, a realm of open possibilities for a movement without a central leadership that would set the agenda according to its ideology or its organizational goals. It is worth

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614 Interview with a group of twelve people in Mohammadia in November 2013. The group includes: two Islamists activists, two leftists, two civil society activists, one unemployed graduate, three independents activists, and two labor activists. This interview was conducted in a group setting.
emphasizing, though, that there was no central authority to regulate processes, monitor and keep everyone in check, or manage emotions within the Tansikiyats.

Consistent with discussions with activists in various Tansikiyats outside Rabat and Casablanca, there was a horizontal approach to the movement, and it was leaderless because there was no national strategy as it was an idea that needed to be studied. When there was a reaction to what happened in Rabat and Casablanca, then activists in other Tansikiyats start to think about strategy, an activist from Meknes explained. Many respondents pointed out that movement activists, mostly comprised of local youth were determined initially to struggle against, using Harvey’s terminology, injustice and “inequalities multiplying rather than diminishing” facing communities in their daily life.

Lack of leadership was also apparent and limits of self-organization were hard to deny. While activists within Tansikiyats opted for a participatory process through public assemblies, the process lacked guidance and leadership input to devise a strategic plan for action. Oftentimes, public assemblies would conclude without making a single decision as an independent activist from Fes explicated. Many argue that the lack of leadership was detrimental for Tansikiyats mobilization particularly when the movement was facing uncertainly and internal frictions post-March 9 speech.

As Ganz observes, “leadership is accepting responsibility to create conditions that enable others to achieve shared purpose in the face of uncertainty.”

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responsibility not only for their individual “part” of the work, but also for the collective “whole.” Leaders can create conditions interpersonally, structurally and/or procedurally. Activists within Tansikiyats argued that the lengthy process of public assemblies and lack of coherent procedures started to take a toll on activists, there was no person who occupied the role of a leader or a person to go to. There were committees in each Tansikiyat, however the committees were assigned specific tasks to achieve and complete. No one occupied the position of a full-time leader. The dependency on volunteers committees and volunteer activists to run public assemblies required commitment and relational work. In a nutshell, Tansikiyats members (loose membership) needed practical skills to build competency (movement competence) to motivate, and manage social relationships among activists and new-comers to the Tansikiyats. Ganz was right when he wrote,

“Leading in social movements requires learning to manage the core tensions at the heart of what theologian Walter Bruggemann calls the “prophetic imagination”: a combination of criticality (experience of the world’s pain) with hope (experience of the world’s possibility), avoiding being numbed by despair or deluded by optimism. A deep desire for change must be coupled with the capacity to make change. Structures must be created that create the space within which growth, creativity, and action can flourish, without slipping into the chaos of structurelessness, and leaders must be recruited, trained, and developed on a scale required to build the relationships, sustain the motivation, do the strategizing, and carry out the action required to achieve success.”

The gap of leadership was not apparent in the beginning of protests, Tansikiyats were self-reliant and members were eager to recruit other members and spent hours online disseminating messages and coordinating (under usernames such as Bent Achaab, Dada

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617 Ganz (2010).
618 Ganz (2010).
Ahmad Boutfounast). Many informants describe the period of February 20 – May 15 as the period of euphoria and excitement. Tansikiyats activists refused the “wisaya" or tutelage of any type of leadership or structure even that of the national council of support (which was later dissolved). Tansikiyats self-organizing illustrates a rejection of this “wisaya” and structure. They basically reject authority as it reminds them of the “wisaya of the Makhzan.” Structures as discussed by many scholars determine “the opportunities and incentives for protest may also derive from political institutions, since they are responsible for setting the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1981).” With this in mind, Tansikiyats activists wanted to set their own “rules of the game” and have a local ownership to their activism, they were also confident of their commitment and ability to coordinate and mobilize. It appears as if activists see a formal organization as an extension or political alliance of a particular entity. Localizing protest frames and presenting Tansikiyats as ‘sites of solidarities’ is key to sending a message to ordinary citizens that “they have a choice,” that is not, using Quaranta’s terminology, “constrained, or determined by any above structure.” This notion of choice points to frame extension and amplification (Snow et al. 1986; Benford 1997; and frame malleability of Oliver and Johnston 2000).

As discussed previously and based on informants accounts, February 20 Tansikiyats were a school of learning how to organize, how to create slogans. It was a valuable practical experience on the ground. Youth always thought about how their

actions would shock or attract the populace, what actions should be taken and why? This is because *February 20* was viewed as a popular movement (*Haraka Jamaheeriya*—حركة جماهيرية). This master frame of “haraka Jamaheeriya” used by Tansikiyats illustrates that no one is a leader, but everyone is a leader. This notion clarifies the desire of movement Tansikiyats to transcend the boundaries of ideology, class, gender, and socio-economic status. This has proved to be true in the beginning stages of the movement. Adl Wal Ihsane, independents, and left sympathizers both women and men, poor or rich, Amazigh or Arab protested together. There was a sense of intensity within the Tansikiyats. The word “jamaheeriya” is loaded with emotions such as pride, belonging, dignity, and collectiveness (Jasper, Polletta, Benford, Snow, Desai, and Brocket work on subjective elements).

Against this background, Tansikiyats dynamics and processes showed that hierarchy was a characteristic that activists rejected within Tansikiyats. While Tansikiyats functioned in a participatory process, the analysis found that lack of organization and coherent leadership was apparent. Respondents of this research agree that the movement needed direction particularly during the post-referendum period, but there was no leadership to provide that direction. They added that Adl Wal Ihsane would not have been welcomed to provide such direction, and leftist parties did have a unified vision. Respondents argument corroborates Marina Ottaway statement that “It’s almost too democratic for its own good in the sense that it really doesn’t have a strong leadership structure,” which makes it “very difficult to have a coherent direction.”  

During the course of protest (protest cycle post-March 9 speech), the need for a leader to manage and direct emotions towards motivation and urgency was apparent. Leadership was needed to recapture and retell the story of the movement “public narratives,” the importance of the Tansikiyats, and their vision of hope; and re-articulate master frames in a way that lessens emotions of fear, uncertainty, and isolation. These emotions work as resources to underscore identity categorization and collective identity boundaries. Seventy percent of research informants support this statement arguing that there was a momentum that needed to be captured and capitalized on, however no one emerged at the national level as a leader to provide that direction.

The lack of leadership was also a contributing factor to recasting the dynamics within Tansikiyats that provoked the demarcation of collective identity boundary (frame boundary of Benford et al. 1997). Moreover, there is no leadership so there was no one to make deals with so the Makhzan opted for co-optation and violent repression of activists. Explicitly, Tansikiyats youth volunteers were limited in contributing to, using McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) language, action mobilization in which independent activists (movement supporters) were not effectively activated to recruit and help generate more adherents (consensus mobilization). In such a case, a large number of activists felt embittered that their voices were not heard and no one provided a clear direction, thus evidently indicating the gap in leadership and interaction among various components within Tansikiyats. Beset by internal contradictions, Tansikiyats have not been able to...
construct a context in which activists would come together, recruit, and sustain the intensity of protest after Adl Wal Ihsane has withdrawn from the movement. Clearly, Tansikiyats were plagued by internal problems emanating from the lack of leadership. Fifteen activists interviewed (who are mostly independents) reported that after Adl Wal Ihsane exited the movement, strong leadership was needed to guide the movement; however leftist parties were not ready and are still stuck in the narratives of the past. Yet, Monjib, Benabdaloui, Ghani, Ghilani (scholars interviewed) argued that the horizontality and the leaderless aspect of the movement played an essential role in giving the movement legitimacy at the grassroots level. Like other protests in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, February 20 was leaderless. In his essay “Revolutions, Revolt, and Reform in North Africa,” Ricardo Rene Laremont writes that “the Arab Spring revolts were characterized not only by spontaneity and rapidity but also by the absence of an identifiable leadership and by deficiency of ideology.” The deficiency of an identifiable leadership is exactly what has contributed to frame dispute, collective identity frame shift, and the widening gap of internal contradictions among various components of the Tansikiyats. I shall conclude here that the “Haraka Jamaheeriya—حركة جماهيرية frame has declined after Adl Wal Ihsane exited February 20 movement. Given the debate on leadership, I conclude that movements that lack leadership are just different movements that play an essential role and come with specific advantage and disadvantages.

The View within Tansikiyats: Specifying Framing, Social Inventions, and Raw Interactions

Summary of Findings

Being aware of the complexity and the messiness of collective action within Tansikiyats, what becomes apparent is that there are no specific grandiose generic theories that would provide a perfect explanation to the existence of Tansikiyats. This is because Tansikiyats are an example of the messiness of collective action (Tarrow, 1998). This study attempted to apply both conceptual and empirical approach using framing as framework for analysis. Among the goals of this study is to show how framing is best suited to explaining participation and disintegration of February 20 Tansikiyats by bridging various framing theories. In other words, this study argues that framing explains both the participation in and disintegration within Tansikiyats. Such theories were used to understand the effective use of master frames, frame malleability/alignment, and frames shift and dispute within the Tansikiyats. Specifically, a conceptual taxonomy of framing is significant. That is to say, how interpretive and transformative frames were mediated by subjective elements of emotions and grievances within Tansikiyats throughout protest cycles. And how activists see the seriousness of their condition, label things, and what they do to shape the outcome of their action.

This study found that master or generic frames developed by scholars of social movements have great general utility within the cultural context of Tansikiyats. This study concurs with Benford analysis and as demonstrated in previous chapters, justice and injustice were effectively used within Tansikiyats to motivate for action. Oliver and
Johnston, citing Blumer’s (1955) research on master frames, pinpoint the analytical utility as it “captures an epoch's major streams and tendencies regarding social change.” February 20 Tansikiyats made central justice and injustice frames thereof their variation (Gamson et al. 1982) the focal point of their struggle. In Tangier Tansikiyat for instance, activists leading protest were changing slogans of justice (الحكومة عيق عيق، يا حكومة فيق فيق يامشؤومة، راه الحالة مأزومة، الفرحة و العدالة و الحرية بالخدمة و الترقية، او بالمنظار للترقية — oh pessimist dormant government wake up, wake up, the situation is dire, joy, justice and freedom are to be accomplished with jobs, promotion, and a vision for promotions). This slogan is illustrative of injustice caused by dominant government, and that justice could be accomplished through economic growth to find jobs for youth and to promote those who have been marginalized. To contextualize this, it is important to mention that Tangiers is located in the Northern region of Morocco that Hassan II ignored and marginalized for decades.

While Tansikiyats lacked leadership, they effectively used master frames that were translated into practical sub-frames at the local level. Once again, this is where framing malleability comes into play.

The findings from this study clearly support literature (Brockett 2005; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Snow & Benford 1992; Meyer, 2002; Benford, 1997; Oliver and Johnston, 2000; and Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986) suggesting that collective action has to account subjectivity including grievances and emotions; and the role this

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624 For the Arabic version of the slogans see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8HaTY1dqzVA
subjectivity plays in transforming master frames (generic frames) into frame resonance and alignment.

Through analysis, I was able to show that Tansikiyats had difficulty dealing with counter-frames of the bamaltajia, recasting collective identity frames, recapturing the legitimacy of the movement after Oussama ElKhalfi’s move to PAM and Adl Wal Ihsane withdrawal. Going back to Goffman’s conception of “what is it that is going on here,” I found that Tansikiyats showed limited capacity in presenting themselves, and reformulating frames (collective identity frames) that reflect a version of reality that ordinary citizens identify with particularly post-constitution and post-Adl Wal Ihsane exit (see chapter two). Despite the “emphasis on the intentional ways in which movement activists seek to construct their self-presentations so as to draw support …”\(^625\) has been weakened once Adl Wal Ihsane exited the movement. This weakness is an indication that framing dispute and frame shifts has occurred within the Tansikiyats. Blogger and February 20 activist Said Benjabli contends that the movement started to suffer from disintegration of its components because of ideology and disagreement on the ceiling of demands which impacted independent youth who launched the movement.}

\(^625\) Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986).
\(^626\) http://www.hespress.com/politique/42983.html. Said Benjabli is the president of bloggers association in Morocco and one of the founders of February 20 movement.
As such, framing alone proved limited in explaining why non-Islamists activists were not able to recreate narratives that would mobilize people to action in an intensive manner. This is an area that is worth further investigation.

On the concept of malleability (Oliver & Johnston 2000), this study contextualizes Tansikiyats within that conception as it offers a fluid and interactive view of frames. This view counters Benford’s insider critique of frames’ descriptive bias, and static tendencies. The analysis showed that framing is a dynamic process rather than “things” and “activists or other participants do the framing.” This dynamic process of framing and the consideration of human agency are important in overcoming the static tendencies which this research has clearly demonstrated. Additionally and as demonstrated previously, emotions played a role within Tansikiyats in mediating participants’ perception of reality, and contributed to frame resonance through frame extension, amplification and transformation. Analysis showed how Tansikiyats have effectively used the three types of frame alignment/ malleability to locally motivate for action (Oliver & Johnston 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). Considering emotions counters the conception that social movements as purely rationalistic in nature. This conclusion provides a response to Benford insider critique, and aligns with Schmitt (1986), Polletta (2001), Reed (2005), and Brockett (2005) on the need to further understand emotions within collective action.

Tansikiyats were able to develop a narrative that is customized to their context, but respect and connect with master frames of dignity, justice, and freedom. The same
frames lost salience over time particularly when the components of the movement started to disintegrate (تشرد).

The analysis demonstrates that Tansikiyats engaged in collective action at the local level that proclaimed local political interests that are also linked to the broader concepts of dignity and justice. Respondents stated it powerfully, “كانت هناك صياغة محلية للتحديات والاندماج التشاركي لصياغة السرديات المحلية للحركة” – there was a local contextualization of issues and a participatory approach to creating local narratives of the movement.”\textsuperscript{628}

Tansikiyats have helped the February 20 movement “create a new form of politics locally”\textsuperscript{629} which, has not been achieved prior to February 20 protests, and have provided the space and the base for political activism that is not based on ideology or ethnic identity. As evidenced and elaborated in previous chapters, Tansikiyats utilized master frames malleability to effectively define, frame themselves, and connect diagnostic frames to real issues and develop prognostic frames that resonate with ordinary citizens. Interpretive framing of grievances and activation of emotions were used to build the momentum and intensity within Tansikiyats and protests (particularly in the beginning stages of the movement). This conclusion supports Stekelenburg et al. view that, “people respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it, and if we want to understand their cognitions, motivations, and emotions we need to know their perceptions and interpretations. While context matters the perception of context matters even more.”\textsuperscript{630}

\textsuperscript{628} Translation by the author of this study.
However, it was also evident that Tansikiyats focused on the know-how and process techniques during public assemblies (routinization processes). This focus on processes approach proved problematic, not because they were not necessary, but because Tansikiyats fail in the more important task of understanding that strategy is as important as process. As such, they created a self-fulfilling prophecy. Activists bypassed any in-depth, reflective understanding of how not to fall victim of the narrative of ‘us’ against ‘them’ (shifts in collective identity frames). While Tansikiyats wanted to test the limits of their creativity, lack of strategy, leadership, and frame disagreements (dispute of prognostic frames) was apparent particularly when collective identity frames begun to shift. This finding suggests two things: 1) Tansikiyats’ focus on ensuring that their processes are inclusive on building consensus was at the expense of strategy, 2) and that “frame theory cannot explain why the frame disputes occurred, or why these master frames lead to different patterns of activism.”

Tansikiyats effectively utilized frame malleability/alignment particularly frame extension and amplification, and transformation to motivate and mobilize, but fail to show capacity and competence in using frames to maintain intensity within Tansikiyats. Specifically frame extension in which “the movement is attempting to enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with values or interests of potential adherents.”

This study found that not all frames were effective. Throughout Tansikiyats, diagnostic frames varied, but did not drastically change over time. Prognostic frames

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631 Oliver and Johnston (2000).
632 Snow et al. (1986).
however, changed post-March 9 speech and post-constitution referendum. For example, I found that the frame of parliamentary monarchy declined, but Tansikiyats continue to engage frames of justice, dignity, and freedom. Also, the frame of “haraka Jamahiriya” declined after Adl Wal Ihsane withdrew from the movement in December 2011. This is indicative of the power in numbers that Adl Wal Ihsane brought to the movement Tansikiyats which impacted movement participation and intensity over the course of protest cycles. Non-Islamists activists within Tansikiyats found difficulty re-articulating frames to resonate with ordinary citizens. The decline of frames indicates their ineffectiveness. This finding is in line with suggestions by Hewitt and McCammon (2005) that not “all frames utilized in a successful mobilization outcome contribute equally to success,” and for that reason, it is necessary to “distinguish between effective and ineffective frames used by a movement.”

This study responds to Benford’s critique that scholars have the tendency to “relapse into reductionism” and individual level of explanations. This study attempted to respond to that concern by focusing on the collective level of frame narratives that contribute to frame resonance (Benford’s concept of “movement talk” and narratives).

A critique this study presents to social movement literature is that February 20 Tansikiyats processes challenge the top-down bias in collective action frames. Benford refers to this as “elite bias” meaning that elites within movement push their “rhetorical button.” It is not the case in February 20 Tansikiyats. Analysis demonstrates that framing processes are not often “built in and top-down.” Particularly striking is the

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perception activists within Tansikiyats have about elites. Research respondents opted for a non-elite approach and a participatory process within the Tansikiyats. The general consensus is that there are three types of elites: the pro-Makhzan elite (both secular and religious), non-Makhzan religious elite, and oppositional elite exemplified mostly in leftist parties of Unified Socialist Party (PSU), the Socialist Party Democratic vanguard (PADS), the Ittihadi National Congress (INC), and Ennahj democratic. The latter, while regarded with respect given their historical struggle during the “years of lead” of 1970s and 1980s, they are criticized for the rigidity of their discourse and elitist politics that do not necessarily speak to ordinary citizens and activists. This is due to lack of innovation, weak, and non-democratic processes within these structures. On the religious elite (non-Makhzan), Adl Wal Ihsane has always been perceived as a grassroots movement, and its religious elite (majlis Irchad) is still trapped in what non-Islamist activists and analysts call الخطاب الخشبي—comparing its discourse metaphorically to a piece of wood to convey its backwardness and its out-of-touch approach. In subjecting these elements to scrutiny, Tansikiyats played a major role in formulating and reformulating frames to respond, represent, and speak to the localized context of their struggle. Most importantly, they engaged in framing processes that define their legitimacy and their public image which is critical in mobilizing ordinary citizens. *February 20* Tansikiyats decided to lead a movement that speaks to ordinary citizens (الصيغة الشعبية للحراك) to formulated frames that generate “sentiment pools” without engaging any elite or structure.

However, I found that there is a group of several independent intellectuals and thinkers that could have been instrumental in providing guidance and strategy for
February 20 Tansikiyats. However, the lack of clarity and the deficit in developing systematic set of ideas resulted in sidelining this group that would have significant impact on framing youth mobilization to achieve consensus mobilization and action mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977). February 20 Tansikiyats did not necessarily recognize the opportunity to engage them. This is once again, indicative of how Tansikiyats focused on processes rather than strategy. Many of these intellectuals such as Monjib, Abdelmoumni, and Sassi (to list just few) were part of the national council for support of the February 20 movement, and because youth resisted the council so it would not take over the movement, these intellectuals were perceived in that light and also they failed to strategically position themselves as leaders. Activists reported that these intellectuals are respected and well-regarded for their advice and guidance, yet they did not show strategy and cohesiveness. Also, because Adl Wal Ihsane engaged as a structure within the movement, its political and religious structures needed to approve the positioning of any of its members. For that reason, Adl Wal Ihsane kept its participation in the street and was not interested in the debate about leadership, but the debate about demands and claims.

For this study, the value of the Tansikiyats is that they represent the political nature of the movement and the determination to reclaim the public space as belonging to the people, not just to the Makhzan. It is not so much whether the Tansikiyats were physical spaces in larger cities or small towns; it is rather about the components that constitute the Tansikiyats, the role they played in collective action, and how context-informed interpretations of framing narratives were both the connective tissue (master
frames, diagnostic frames, and prognostic frames, justice and injustice frames), and detrimental factors (collective identity frame shift, frame dispute and counter frames) of February 20 Tansikiyats. What this means for our discussion on February 20 Tansikiyats is that the narratives and frames that Tansikiyats were unified (وحدوية الحركة), used master frames outlined by “Ardiya Taassisiya,” and protested in order to open up the political space.

The below section offers a further discussion of the above findings:

**Tansikiyats: Transcending Pre-Existing Structures**

While Tansikiyats did not build on existing formal structures, they tapped into the emotional reservoirs built from grievances and the dissatisfaction with “price hikes—Ghalaa El Asaar—” — demonstrations in 2007 and 2008 that took place in urban cities across Morocco protesting against the government raising the prices of basic goods. These grievances produced emotional reservoirs resulted in ad hoc “ponctuelles” demonstrations. These ponctuelles demonstrations about price increase happened in larger cities such as Marrakesh, Casablanca, Mohammadia, and Rabat in 2006 and 2007. The scholarly view of this is drawn from Bayat’s writings of what he referred to as urban mass protests that “are usually spontaneous, ad hoc, and consequently uncommon; they often involve violence and a risk of repression.” The “unemployed graduates” protests fall within the category of ponctuelle protest as well. Additionally, these “ponctuelles”

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634 The word ponctuelle is a French word for being punctual, but in this case, it means “having a limited time span or one off demonstration.” Demonstrations or protests that are “ponctuelles” are limited in time. They come and go and mostly the authorities know the activists that lead such protest. The point here is that small towns, and rural areas have witnessed protests since early 1990’s so while ‘ponctuelles,’ they provided the fertile ground for February 20 Tansikiyats to emerge. To learn more about “ponctuelles” demonstrations and protest, see Anonymous, “Greve and Parlement” Liberation, No. 409 (December, 1990): 3-4.

mode of protest were not formal structures, there were loose demonstrations that took place from time to time. Professor Mokhtar Benabdalaoui declares that Tansikiyats, and their processes are unprecedented in Morocco. He adds that Tansikiyats did not necessarily build on, but crossed with the ponctuelles demonstrations فبراير تقاطعت مع احتجاجات أخرى ذات طابع محلي. Benabdaloui uses the word “intersected” instead of “built on” to emphasize the “ponctualite” of these demonstrations, underscore the organic political nature of February 20 Tansikiyats, and the cooperative spirit of the movement. Also, these “ponctuelles” demonstrations tended to formulate frames with less general utility. They included special interest frame (Ryan 1991), inclusion frame (Diani 1996), political economy frame (Carroll and Ratner 1996), and student left master frame (McAdam 1994). For instance, the frames that demonstrators used were mostly special interests frames such as graduate employment, increase in workers’ wages, retaining health subsidies, and increase in cost of living…etc. These frames are limited in scope and utility therefore, they disappear over time (Benford 1997).

There were no viable and credible formal structures to build on except those of Islamist Adl Wal Ihsane, leftist parties, labor unions, and the Amazigh movement. These are viewed as movements or structures that have specific demands that do not speak to all citizens (كانت لديها مطالب خاصة بشريحة من المجتمع—they have demands specific to a segment of society). Activists understood the danger of leading a movement that is framed within an ethnic or a religious stance. On the Islamists, Bayat argues that despite their ability to

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636 The word بنيت means building on something. Professor Benabdalaoui did not use that to indicate that Tansikiyats crossed with other demonstrations, but did not necessarily build on it.

637 Extensive list of specific frames could be found in Robert, Benford. An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective. Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 67, No. 4 (November 1997): 409-430.
mobilize, Islamists’ “religious exclusivism, discrimination against secular forces and religious minorities, as well as women who conform to Islamism, defeat any idea of free participation.” 638 “This kind of ideology, in most cases, has led to demobilization of the populace,” he writes. 639 Also, labor unions did not provide the platform from which February 20 can build on. In Morocco, labor unions have always focused on sectorial demands and are not interested in the boarder demands for democracy or broader political reforms (النقابات ركزت على مطالب قطاعية—unions focused on sectorial demands only). Also, existing structures of opposition parties did not engage for several reasons including the fact they were afraid of being accused of influencing the process within February 20 Tansikiyats by imposing their organizational ambitions. Additionally, their structures are very weak at the local level because of centralized decision-making processes. Benabdaloui notes that “youth organized locally because structures did not have enough power to influence local organizing.” 640 He added that youth made a deliberate choice that provided Tansikiyats with autonomy and independence. Also, the diversity of Tansikiyats components required that protest be localized so it can succeed, he notes. 641 Many commentators (including Monjib, and Hlaoui) argue that labor unions and Adl Wal Ihsane were not able to provide platforms for large scale social movements because labor unions are not independent and always were at the mercy of the Makhzan as historically the minister of labor has always being appointed from within the labor unions. As for Adl Wal Ihsane, while they have a large base of grassroots membership, the fact that they

638 Bayat(2000).
639 Bayat (2000).
640 Benabdelouj Mokhtar interview in early November 2013.
641 Benabdelouj Mokhtar interview in early November 2013.
demand an Islamic republic instead of a monarchy as a system of governance stands as a challenge to mobilize all Moroccans around that specific demand. As for the Amazigh, while the majority of Moroccans subscribe to their demands of political recognition, oftentimes the radical stances of the Amazigh movement leaders (separation of politics and religion) remains a challenge.

Tansikiyats operated in a manner that promotes “Siyada Chaabia ala El Karar—السيادة الشعبية على القرار.” The concept of “siyada” literally means sovereignty, but metaphorically indicates “control over” or “power over.” The word “chaabia” refers to popular (ordinary citizens). This siyada chaabia embodies the notion of autonomy and de-linking February 20 from any existing structure. February 20 Tansikiyats constituted what many commentators call “الاحتجاج الممنوع”—that is forbidden protest. Before February 20 movement, politics was a red-line for ordinary people, it is a reserved field for pro-Makhzanian elite. February 20 Tansikiyats broke down the taboo.

The failure of existing social and political structures is the inability to influence and provide an “encadrement” for February 20 activists. This is also explains the “spontaneity” of youth contestations. While Tansikiyats diagnostic and prognostic frames were political, they had no clear, cohesive, and well-studied political vision or strategy. Existing structures were not able to bridge this gap or build the analytical and political capacity of youth activists. A plethora of questions come to mind when one ponders the existing structures. As discussed elsewhere, existing structures particularly those of leftist parties suffer from archaic organizational culture, aging leadership, and rigidity of
political discourse.\textsuperscript{642} Evidently, this perception was in tune with how Tansikiyats came to deal with existing structures. Precisely, Tansikiyats refused the intervention of any structure including that of the national council of support that was initially created to guide and support the movement. Youth within Tansikiyats recognized the shortcomings of existing structures. This conclusion was later validated when PSU held its national congress in December 2011, in which party leadership invited the \textit{February 20} movement activists from across Morocco to partake in its national congress with the intention of integrating youth within party structures. However, the outcome of the national congress was the election of 12 youth to PSU’s national council, but no one was elected or granted access to party’s political bureau (decision-making body). This is illustrative of how PSU expanded its ideological message to embrace youth, but in practical terms, it was not able to pivot to revamp its institutional structures or regenerate itself within a broader strategy of inclusion.\textsuperscript{643} Other parties including leftist parties of Unified Socialist Party (PSU), the Socialist Party Democratic vanguard (PADS), the Ittihadi National Congress (INC), and Ennahj democratic suffer from similar challenges and inadequacies. As one activist put it differently and eloquently, because of existing structures inadequacies, \textit{February 20} activists saw the need to help them revitalize their thinking and strategy –\textit{harkanat attandima}–\textsuperscript{6} locally. This finding is an indication that youth within Tansikiyats made a strategic decision not to formally engage existing structures. In such case, Adl Wal Ihsane engagement remains an exception


\textsuperscript{643} El Karmouni (March 2012).
because they agreed to “public silence” and to engaging logistically (numbers power only) (see chapter on Adl Wal Ihsane). Clearly, this finding challenges social movement literature. In contrast to social mobilization literature that emphasizes movements building on existing social or political structures, the February 20 movement suggests how new movements can transcend the existing social and political structures. In other words, the February 20 movement did not build on formal structures such as oppositional leftist parties, Islamist structure of Adl Wal Ihsane, or ethnic Amazigh associations; they are the components of the movement (مكونات الحراك), but the movement did not build on their formal structures (حراك شعبي مستقل).

An interesting finding is that Tansikiyats refused to decouple politics from the demands of the movement. Thirty respondents argue that while Tansikiyats’ action was localized, the demands were political, not just social or economic (مطالب سياسية بإمكانات شعبية—political demands with popular means). Tansikiyats engaged in re-defining the meaning of what is political to take it away from the dominant political elites (الشباب يبحث عن لغة التغيير فضا لخطاب النخب المخزنية و نخب المعارضة الجامدة—youth are looking for a new meaning for change refuting both the meaning created by the Makhzanized elites or the stagnant oppositional elites.) To be a Febrayeri is to think in political terms about local and national issues. It is within this framework that Tansikiyats are analyzed. Many respondents pointed out that while issues were local, it was necessary to frame them within larger issues of corruption and injustice. They argued that the founding principles (Ardiya Taassissiya) of the movement (as mentioned earlier) provided the frames of the movement within which Tansikiyats can extend, amplify, and bridge to local issues. It
was essential to break away from the sectorial protests that trade unions led back in 1965, 1981, 1984, and 1990’s or student movements of 1980 and 1990s in Fes and Marrakesh. These protests were about health, education, poverty, and bread needs. February 20 movement is about the politics and policies of unaccountability and injustice within these sectors. As noted in previous chapters, Tansikiyats were not about achieving bread claims. Youth within Tansikiyats come from middle class, educated, and their claims are beyond what some call “Mataleb Khoubzia—مطالب خبزية” or “bread claims” of the poor.

On this point and drawn from Oscar Lewis (1959) work on Latin America, February 20 Tansikiyats activists debunked the notion of “culture of poverty” that categorizes grassroots mobilization or what Bayat calls “passive poor” mobilization. Tansikiyats were not constituted of passive poor activists who just want to achieve goals of “Mataleb Khabzia.” Youth activists are committed to broader concepts of democracy and justice, and to reforming the repertoire of politics.

Using Tejerina & Perugorria words, Tansikiyats participants “were discovering their own creativity and power to change the problematic state of affairs. They were expressing political ambitions before having formalized them, and before having created the necessary tools—like structures or organizations—to make them real.”644 While spontaneous and through February 20 Tansikiyats, youth made their debut in local and national politics as a political voice that can no longer be ignored. In contrast to social mobilization literature that emphasizes movements building on existing social or political

structures, *February 20* movement suggests how new movements can transcend the existing social and political structures.

**Pressure from Below: Tansikiyats Processes, and Raw Interactions**

There is no formal or structured explanation to how things work; they were born within, organically, it is like a school where activists had to learn everything themselves, many activists explained that “حركة 20 فبراير كانت بمثابة مدرسة التي تعلمنا من خلالها كل شيء، كل شيء انبثق بشكل طبيعي من خلال الممارسة الميدانية.”

Digging into sociologist Gabriel Tarde’s work on “Lois de l’imitation,” I argue that Tansikiyats are also what he called “social inventions” that “appear and propagate themselves in the still virgin social milieu.”

This process involves what Tarde refers to as imitation. Tarde in his explication of the concept of imitation emphasized two notions (habit/tradition and fashion). If this concept is applied to *February 20* Tansikiyats, I can then infer that Tansikiyats have built on the habit/tradition (imitation costume) of grievances and discontent that existed in the social milieu, and on fashion (imitation–mode) through which other spontaneous variations (grievances and discontent framed in political terms) were brought to light. While Tarde’s notion advances fashion (imitation-mode) as an overthrow of the habit/tradition (imitation-coutume), I contend that instead of a complete overthrow, it is an alteration that pushes for invention that he suggested in subsequent literature. Tarde’s conception of invention is,

“… any improvement whatsoever, traced back to an anterior innovation, in any kind of social phenomena. In his conception of the social process the power of

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645 Fifteen activists interviewed for this research reported that February 20 was a school of learning.
transformation is attributed not only to genius, the appearance of which is to be considered as a revolutionary event, but to each idea, great or small, easy or difficult to conceive, which comes to life in the social milieu.”

In similar vein, the conception of the Moroccan sociologist Abdelrahman Al-Atri treats Tansikiyats as if they experienced what he calls “protest infection—العدوى الاحتجاجية.” Al-Atri’s conception is that Tarde’s imitation coutume has spread to encompass a wider pool of ‘social inventions’ across Morocco (114 Tansikiyats).

While there is no formal membership to Tansikiyats, the sense of belonging or knowing the potential of belonging to such model is important to activists. Each Tansikiyat grew out of its localized context (روح الانتماء للحركة والعمل والتظاهر محليا اعطي مصداقية—belonging to the movement, working in proximity and protesting locally gave more legitimacy to the movement). What this means is that there was a sense of valorization of localism (التنسيق الميداني كان حاضرا بقوة—local coordination was strongly present). The movement is not centralized as there is no centrality of the political action which constituted a condition of the movement’s strength. (الحركة ليست ممركزة، ليست هناك مركزية الفعل السياسي هدا شرط من قوتها—Arguing by analogy to the theoretical claims of Mario Quaranta (2013) quoting Kreisi and Westholm 2007:257, discussing the role of the meso-level context, notes that “…this context is likely to influence the readiness of individuals to act upon their discontent in more specific situations.” This line of reasoning suggests that the viability of Tansikiyats and their role is fashion coutume to create knowledge (نريد خلق ثقافة سياسية وثقافية ليس فقط على المستوى العام ولكن على مستوى الحراك ككل—we want...
to create new political and cultural knowledge not only in general, but about the movement as well) about the movement and how they want it to be perceived and represented.

Raw interactions among activists within Tansikiyats, while oftentimes difficult, advance new ideas and new thinking that is innovative and courageous than that of political elite or that of formal existing structures. The notions of freedom from the past and breaking the barriers of fear have been underscored by the informants of the research as they expressed hope for a new Morocco and new politics. This was the strong view of independent activists who did not have prior political or civic engagement reported that engaging in protests within Tansikiyats constituted what some call “processes of collective learning.” They elaborated that Tansikiyats are important in telling the story of the movement—it is like a nursery where initiatives are created, and new knowledge is consolidated by youth). Rochford (1992) writes, “members [of movements] gain power and influence to challenge the tendency of researchers to reconstruct their worlds in the image of conventional social science theory and rationality”.

With a proud attitude, thirty interviewees reported that for them, Tansikiyats are not only considered the loci of cooperation but are also seen as spaces for peaceful political dialogue among activists. If we think of Tansikiyats as community, not in a spatial or geographical dimension, but a space that provides a sense of belonging and a consciousness of working together (concepts of Taylor 1982; and Cohen, 1995) then

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Tansikiyats are an umbrella of unity and collective identity that advances prognostic frames of justice and positive change. Yet, when examining the processes and dynamics within Tansikiyats, one can notice, using Etzioni (1996) words “the dark side” of the community.

Fourty out of sixty informants interviewed commented that Tansikiyats are loose and horizontal and activists came together during the processes of public assemblies that took place monthly, bi-monthly, weekly, or even daily depending on how Tansikiyats chose to structure them. In Rabat and Casablanca for instance, public assemblies take place in a regular basis daily during early weeks of protests, while Marrakesh, Meknes, and Khnifra meet weekly for instance. An other example is that Tansikiyats such as Khenifra, Nador, Al-Hoceima created their own processes to ensure inclusinviness given that these cities are dominated by the Amazigh. The absence of critical reflection and self-criticism imposed challenges on the scope of Tansikiyats’ recruitment and activism. Public assemblies were grounded in routine of meetings to build general consensus, plan for protest, and discuss what and where to go next. Routinization of assemblies became in itself the detriment of the Tansikiyats. The absence of conscious efforts to impose time limit to interaction among Tansikiyats activists to build consensus on issues was warring on activists’ ability to sustain pressure of successive nights without enough sleep. The opinion of many respondents reflected the prevailing public opinion that the process during public assemblies was long and draining, and most nights ended without agreement a decision or agreement on any issue. Also, because of the open nature of public assemblies, Tansikiyats also attracted pro-Makhzan activists whose goal is to
derail the process and cause frictions among activists. Yet, despite these challenges, the February 20 Tansikiyats opened up the political space and created political awareness among youth. These are an outcome of this kind of inclusive process.

Many respondents from the left alleged that also Adl Wal Ihsane manipulated the process during public assemblies (as they attended in large numbers); they have more voice in the process. Among the reasons why the process was long is that Adl Wal Ihsane members keep asking questions and dragging the conversation too long, and by midnight most of the activists leave. Since Adl Wal Ihsane thinks about its interests (rational choice), they want to ensure that some of its agenda items are included and they have a say in the process. At the end, they are making a huge contribution to the movement Tansikiyats and they have to bear the cost of transportation and their base of supports give up a day of work to take to the street.

While the earlier focus was on building consensus and strategizing about how to avoid Makhzan’s repression, the post-referendum period was centered on how to manage differences and make decisions about concrete actions. This is indicative of how the movement acted differently across two time frames. The struggle seemed, according to many informants, about making decisions rather than the nature of the decisions. Ensuring that the process is inclusive and representative, youth put more emphasis on the process than strategy. While youth gained legitimacy and credibility, they branded themselves as “technical experts” rather than political strategists. This was detrimental to Tansikiyats post- Adl Wal Ihsane exit from the movement.
An Unhappy Story

Not all the stories about Tansikiyats are happy. This seems true especially when February 20 Tansikiyats gained high levels of public acceptability, many issues begun to rise with personalities that sought to cash in on its popularity by claiming to be the "spokespersons" of the and "representatives" of the movement (example Oussama Elkhalfi). In Rabat/ Sale, Oussama ElKhalfi was among the first activist to call for protests through a Youtube video. As described by Rachid Elbalghiti (2014), ElKhalfi does not only possess the ability to create effective slogans and run public assembles, he was also the face of protest. In the Youtube video, Oussama called for protest against corruption and tyranny. He later asked “the King to leave.” This radical statement, according to many, did not set well with activists because that was not among the goals of the movement. Elkhafli however, cashed in politically by joining the Modernity and Authenticity party (PAM), which is founded by King’s friend Fouad Ali Himma. The relevance of this account underlines how the democratic process of open public assemblies opened a door for pro-Makhzan activists, bamaltajia, and chabab Malaki (royal youth) to infiltrate Tansikiyats, build relationships with prominent activists and finally co-opt them through various means. The underlining allegation is that he was genuinely a dissident who then was coopted. Elkhalfi’s co-optation and his public statement that it is better that he joined PAM sent a signal. This particular signal set off various emotions of confusion, fear, and identity politics within the Tansikiyats. In

650 Hespress.com is the most read electronic website in the Arab world. Rachid Albalghiti is a journalist that also was interviewed for this research. www.hespress.com
Meknes for instance, activists argued that when people like El-Khalfi who are the face of the movement joined the party of Authenticity and Modernity, activists became confused (وقع هناك خوف وتبكيه و أصبح الشباب يواجهون الاضطهاد الواضح).

Incidents like this also brought to the front questions about Adl Wal Ihsane human capital within the movement Tansikiyats. The irony is that few months after Adl Wal Ihsane announced its withdrawal from the movement, Oussama El Khalfi was allegedly charged with raping a 17 old boy, and was sentenced to four years in prison where he is label as “maskhout sidna—the disgraced of the King.” Many commentators maintain that Oussama El Khalfi’s co-optation and later his imprisonment illustrate three things: 1) Makhzan’s ability to co-opt activists, 2) prominent figures such as Elkhalfi that activists in various Tansikiyats across the country view as model, are not to be trusted, and 3) and they are driven by self-interests rather than by the movement’s values (counter-frames).

One must recognize that the story is complicated and Oussama is still in prison so knowing precisely what his motives or actions were requires time and understanding of possible implications if one choses a narrative that counters the Makhzan’s.

Creating Narratives through Malleability of Framing

Social movements’ scholars have called our attention to the need of extending our analysis to the malleability and flexibility of framing in collective action. The work conducted by Snow et al. (1986) examining frame alignment (also Benford 1997); have been complimented by Oliver and Johnston work (2000). The analysis in previous

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651 Interview with two activists in Meknes in November 2013.
chapters demonstrated that framing played a major role in *February 20* movement Tansikiyats.

This research concludes that the prognostic frame of parliamentary monarchy was very high in the initial inception of the movement, but it declined over time. Said Benjebli, an activist and one of the founders of the *February 20* movement in a *hespress* piece illustrates it effectively,

Regardless of justice demands and spirit of the Arab Spring, it is certain that the declaration of the *February 20* movement since the inception did not aim to overthrow the monarchy, but demand that the monarchy develops into a parliamentary monarchy which has given the movement great legitimacy and credibility in the national and international public opinion and give it a growing momentum. This demand has put the monarchy in an awkward position and forced to accept the movement and respond to it with a speech in March 9 as a way of entertaining its demands.\(^654\)

The majority of research respondents argued that the response of the king to the *February 20* movement demands created confusion within the components of the movement particularly among those who advocate for a republic (Adl Wal Ihsane (Islamist), and Ennahj democratic). Particularly, when the king alerted to amending the constitution which would constitute the foundation for a constitutional, democratic,

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\(^653\) [http://www.hespress.com/opinion/s/32976.html](http://www.hespress.com/opinion/s/32976.html). Translation by the researcher of this study.

\(^654\) Translation by the author of this study.
parliamentary, and social monarchy. أَكَد العاهل المغربي محمد السادس خلال خطاب للأمة الجمعة أن مشروع مراجعة الدستور المغربي "يوطد دعائم نظام ملكية دستورية ديمقراطية برلمانية واجتماعية".

The focus was on ending corruption, freedom of expression, and social justice. Activists were very aware of what they can and cannot achieve. There was a sense of realism and pragmatism to the demands despite the fact that critics (experts & analysts close to the Makhzan) consider them vague and ambiguous.

The diagnostic frames discussed in this research relating to Makhzan repression (hogra/tahmeesh) and government corruption (fassad) did not drastically change however, they were constantly in flux, emerging, interactive, and malleable to respond to the shifts in local contexts (depending on the intensity of repression, uncertainty, fear…etc). This malleability of framing also contributes to the fluidity of Tansikiyats. This fluidity helps us understand why Tansikiyats use prognostic and diagnostic sub-frames and modify their framing practices. With this perspective, we can understand Tansikiyats as part of the larger political and social contexts.

Many activists within Tansikiyats used “February 20,” injustice and justice as master frames or what Benford & Snow call generic frames. This generic frame is used to generate specific frames or sub-frames within Tansikiyats. For instance these frames were translated locally to slogans such as لا صحة وتعليم،هدا مغرب الله كريم “—no health, no education this is Morocco of god will give/bless,” فللوش الشعب فين مشات في الوسكي والحفلات“—فلفول الشعب فين مشات في الوسكي والحفلات”.

where did people’s money go, to whisky and parties,” "سوى اليوم ولا غدا، التغيير و لا بد，“ — whether today or tomorrow, change is necessary,” "لغينا مغرب الكفاءات و ليس مغرب العائلات،” "we want Morocco of competence, not Morocco of families,” "نطالب بالحكام عادلة، بالوحدة و التضامن لبغيناه اكون اكون "— we demand fair justice, with unity and solidarity, what we want will be will be.”

On this, I also draw on Reed’s perspective on subjective agents. He regards subjectivity (emotions of pride, fear, anger…etc) as an interpretive mechanism of generic frames into frames that can make ordinary citizens motivated to mobilize. Tansikiyats used master frames to create new narratives about power, politics and injustice — فبراير 20, has succeeded, as a social movement, in breaking down Makhzanian project, imposed several initiatives for reforms to contain public anger, and exposed trade union inability.656 As Alvarez et al. articulate, “meanings are constitutive of processes that, implicitly or explicitly, seek to redefine social power.” 657 On this, Abdessamad Ben Chrif states “الناس توصلوا الى ان هم لم يعدوا عاجزين و انما قادرين على انتاج الفعل و مفهوم السلطة — people arrived to the conclusion that they no longer handicapped, they are now able to produce action and redefine the concept of power,” he explains that — the movement brought back relevance to the public political discourse.”658

656 Translation by author of the study. http://klamkom.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-20-%D9%81%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B6/ 657 Alvarez et al. (1998). 658 Journalist Abdessamad Ben Chrif intervention during a public conference organized by Youth for Youth organization in Rabat in 2011. This conference brought together politicians, youth, civil society actors, and academics to discuss, Movements in Morocco: What is the Contribution of the Intellectual, Journalist, Civil Society, and Youth?
This is in line with Jasper and Polletta’s conception of social movements as more than formal processes, but an interpretive process of narratives, and grievances (state repression, poverty, injustice). Framing also was a key to understanding the “opening of political opportunities.”  

Tansikiyats used injustice and justice frame to reframe the Makhzan as the source of all problems (diagnostic frames: until when we should put up with marginalization -- أنحنا جيين اشفرا، كلشي غادي بالرشوة، كلشي جاي بالرشوة، البرلمان ( حثالين الحكمة -- thieves, we are coming; everything is going by bribery, everything coming by bribery; parliament by bribery; hospitals by bribery; municipalities by bribery; employment by bribery; education by bribery; enough of bribery.”

Discussions on frames are often debated, yet the value and importance of master frames is their generality to accommodate cultural and political contexts of various movements. As Oliver and Johnston (2000) documents in their extensive and detailed review of framing and ideology, prominent examples of generic framing include “injustice frames (Gamson et al.1982), mobilizing frames (Ryan 1991), antisystemic frames, revitalization frames, and inclusion frames (Mario Diani, 1996).” In addition to justice frame (Ryan 1991), oppositional frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes (1993); Coy and Woehrle (1996), hegemonic frames (Blum-Kulka and Liebes (1993), equal opportunity frames, and rights frames (Williams and Williams 1995). This analysis provides a response to social movement scholars who focus their attention more on collective action processes (Tarrow and McAdam for example) and those who

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659 Johnston and Noakes (2005), 22
660 Translation by the author of this study. These slogans are examples of how Tansikiyat of Khnifra translated the diagnostic frame of injustice (caused by corruption).
661 Benford(1997).
662 Benford (1997).
strictly believe in structural opportunities (Dennis Chong), and the economic model of material incentives (Olsen 1965, 1968).

Without revisiting the body of literature on framing discussed in previous chapters, I extend Oliver and Johnston’s work quoting Goffman that frames are inferences of what’s going with the “caveat that they are under constant revision based on new occurrences and unexpected actions by others.” In this sense, Oliver and Johnston argue that frames should not be treated as static or fix templates; they are “malleable and emergent.” This emergence and malleability was referred to by Gamson as “interactive emergence of a frame, of a shared understanding of ‘what's going on’ that they labeled an injustice frame, and the way in which a public announcement of this frame was essential for rebellion against authority.”

This proves true in February 20 Tansikiyats particularly in early stages of the movement. Tansikiyats framed the injustice in terms of oppressing communities locally through the centralization of power, corruption, and tyranny. A great example is when activists used a metaphor to refer to the Makhzan as a pregnant woman (aunt dawya) who is in labor and in order to help her deliver the newborn (new government and new constitution), we need to protest (خالتي الضاوية المخزن - شدو الوجع، يمكن هذا شعور، الاحتجاج هو سرو، خالتي الضاوية بعينا نظام جديد، بعينا دستور جديد، خالتي الضاوية - aunt dawya, makhzan is in labor, probably it is the month when he is due, aunt dawya, protest is its secret, we want new regime, we want new constitution, aunt dawya). Another example of this malleability is when activists during protest mock the Moroccan democracy by repeating the situation is same old same and linking democracy to the

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entourage of the king (الحالة هي هي، ياسلام عليها يا سلام، ديموقراطية مروكان، يسمنة طلعتي في راسي، الماجدي—لاهمة و الفاسي—للاية ياسما، ماجدي، هما، وأ فاسي). This malleability is also viewed by Benford and Snow (1992) and Benford (1997) as frame alignment. Tansikiyats functioned in a manner of this alignment. Another example is the use of “Ichreeni” or “Ichreeniyeen” as a master frame. Referring to Snow and Benford (1992), Oliver and Johnston explicate that “movement participants draw upon master frames to portray their perceived injustice in ways that fit the tenor of the times.” In the beginning stages of protest, frames were sharply distinguished from ideology. Many respondents in the Tansikiyats argued that “February 20” was also a master frame in itself (Ichreeniyeen February 20 is a free movement). To be “Ichreeni” is the frame that brought everyone together. This frame does not have a specific ideology, but it indicates respect to the founding platform of the movement (Ardiya Taassissya—احترام الأرضية الأولية كمعيار—respect for founding principles as a criterion) and (ميثاق شرف للحركة—code honor of the movement). Activists consciously framed their struggle within umbrella terms such as (in Fes: freedom, dignity, Social Justice), (in Amazigh Rif: for a dignified life, against injustice). Tansikiyats utilized this malleability in various ways. For example, in Tangiers, the frame of injustice was used to pinpoint to citizens suffering from the mismanagement of natural resources that resulted in an uneven distribution of water between poor and rich neighborhoods. In Marrakesh, the injustice frame was used to shed

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664 Activists refer to Yasmina Baddou who was the minister of health and who is perceived as corrupt. Majidi is a businessman and the personal secretary of the King Mohammed VI. Ali ElHima is the king’s best friend and the founder of the political party of Modernity and Authenticity (PAM). Abbas El Fassi was the prime minister of Morocco from 2007-2011 and he represents the party of independence that is pro-makhzan.

665 Oliver and Johnston (2000).

666 Interview with Aziz Hlaoui, a researcher at Jacque Berque Center in November 2013.
light on the plight of underdeveloped and impoverished communities such as of that “Sidi Ali Ben Youssef,” where people move to as a result of the growing gap between classes, and price increase of real estate provoked by corrupt local politicians taking over of public lands. In Meknes, activists linked corruption to humiliation (hogra) through slogans such as: majinash min bara, nahbou fina amwal, oukhatmouha bel hogra, wladed ya Maghreb—we did not come from outside, (you) they took our wealth, and (you) they topped it with humiliation (hogra), Morocco we are your kids!

How should the message be understood at the local level? Injustice frame was, for instance, understood as lack of effective processes in providing basic services or as lack of respect for basic citizen rights. So, Tansikiyats considered demands for dignity, and end to humiliation (hogra) as a means to end injustice engendered by corruption and tyranny.

Oliver and Johnston note that “the malleable conception of a frame calls attention to the interactional processes that occur at every level of a movement, both within a movement organization and between the movement and outsiders.” Tansikiyats, particularly those that are far from the center of power, tend to invoke master frames strategically and tactically. On this vein, we revisit Benford’s diagnostic, prognostic, and resonance concepts to explain how Tansikiyats used master frames to promote their activism, without seemingly attempting to invoke the conception of following guidance from Rabat or Casablanca. These Tansikiyats are large and have key activists that are on the spotlight. Activists within Tansikiyats were conscious of the influence historical

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667 Oliver and Johnston (2000).
668 Rabat and Casablanca are perceived as center of power where decisions are made. Casablanca is the economic capital of Morocco and Rabat is its political capital.
political and socio-economic trajectory of their region needs to be accounted for in reformulating and interpreting master frames into sub-frames. The sub-frame needs to resonate with local ordinary citizens and independent activists. In this sense, frames have to resonate with local grievances (Brockett, 2005; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; and Snow, Rochford, Benford, and Worden, 1986) that were brought upon by corrupt policies and unjust behavior of the Makhzan. Snow et al., recognize the interpretive notion of grievances. They stress that the issue is not “merely the absence or presence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations.”

What’s also important is how people experience grievance (McAdam’s 1982 variability in the subjective meanings). This subjectively is understood through political, socio-economic histories of various regions and activists biographies in light of those histories. Frame alignment/ frame malleability bring together the notion of framing issues and grievances. This tendency of linking issues with grievances is what also provides richness and messiness within Tansikiyats. For instance, how issues and grievances are interpreted in Rabat is very different from how they are interpreted in Khenifra, a city whose economy is largely based on agriculture, limited tourism, but mostly prostitution.

Tansikiyats’ public assemblies served as a venue for formulating frames that justify and motivate people for action. When asked about framing, many respondents


670 Khnifra is well known by its beautiful Berber women and its market of prostitution. Historically, the French set up brothels to cater to soldiers who were stationed in the region. The region is mostly Berber and was considered part of bilad siba during the French protectorate. Khnifra is still perceived a place for prostitution and most of girls of impoverished families revert to prostitution as a profession. Khnifra residents still suffer from the French policy of making the city a brothel heaven. The Makhzan/ Moroccan government has done nothing (social or economic policies) to promote a new brand economy. There are few academic writings on this, however no TV channel whether Moroccan or foreign is allowed to report on issues unless they get permission from the ministry of interior which is very difficult to do.
agreed that framing of issues is key to motivate for action. Activists viewed framing as means to persuade ordinary citizens to take to the street and transform by-standers and skeptics to activists. Tansikiyats public assemblies meant to play that role. This corresponds to Oliver and Johnston’s conception of framing as “a behavior by which people make sense of both daily life and the grievances that confront them.”

Snow et al. (1986) advance frame amplification, frame bridging, and frame extension, and frame transformation as types of frame alignment. These frame alignments are what Oliver and Johnston refer to as frame malleability which is a necessity for mobilization. To expand this notion, February 20 Tansikiyats interpreted master frames into frames that align with issues resonating with ordinary citizens. An anecdotal example of frame amplification is invoking negative images about the King Mohammed VI circle of friends and advisors. In underscoring the corruption of the Makhzan, activists portrayed the King’s circle of friends as an octopus with eight arms (each arm has a picture of a Makhzan personality). The head of the octopus is a picture of Fouad Ali AlHimma, the King’s best friend. Activists attempted to substantiate the claim that corruption comes from the top by focusing and amplifying the belief that people who govern Morocco are corrupt, and that corruption is the source of injustice.

Additionally, Tansikiyats utilized extension frame through diffusion of campaign videos across the country and the re-appropriation of symbols. As Abadi (2014) explains that activists re-appropriated the symbol of Fatma Hand “by inserting new message: don’t suffocate our nation’s Children” and “Don’t Steal from my Country.” Abadi adds,

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671 Oliver and Johnston (2000).
“February 20 re-appropriation of the state symbol was a direct response to the regime’s accusation that these young activists were terrorists. At the same time, it also served as an indirect critique to the King Mohammed VI title of ‘King of the Poor.’ It highlighted the severity of poverty and corruption within the nation. By altering the old message, young February 20th movement activists redefined nationalism and patriotism to dignity, economic, social justice and freedom.”

These videos are vivid examples of frame extension invoking the justice, dignity and freedom frames. Once these frames are extended, they were amplified at the local Tansikiyats through rallying slogan of: أنا عشريني حروخارج نهار 20 فبراير كيف دما من اجل الحرية و الكرامة والعدالة الاجتماعية—I am a free Ichreeni taking to the street on February 20 as usual to claim freedom, dignity, and social justice. This slogan was developed by activists of Sbata Tansikiyat. In Khribga, activists created a slogan of: حبيبي خريبكة سنطهرك من المفسدين في اقرب وقت ممكن—dear Khribga, we are going to clean you from corrupt people in the shortest time possible.” Activists extended and amplified the frame to send a message to ordinary citizens about economic and political corruption practices that deprive them from benefiting from phosphate revenues. Khribga is very rich in natural resources particularly phosphate. The purpose of frame extension is to “encourage the prospect to attend or contribute to movement function.” In Khenifra, activists repeated slogans such as “down with tyranny,” “we want an independent judiciary,” and “there is no sacredness in politics.” Because Khribga has resources, the dominant local politics is

673 Khribga is a city located in the South East and it’s known by its natural resources particularly Phosphites. Morocco is the second largest phosphate exporter in the world. Khribga citizens do not benefit from the reviews given that it is under the umbrella of the King’s holdings.
674 Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (August, 1986).
675 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RR3YLw-thw
676 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehIMyXG4TYY
that of PAM which control the distribution of profits and does not invest in local development of the communities.

Transformation frame alignment is contingent of development or adoption of injustice or variation thereof (Gamson et al. 1982). Domain-specific transformative frame was essential for participation in the Northern part of Morocco, specifically in Chefchaoun region. Snow et al., elucidate that domain-specific transformative frame “frequently appear to be a necessary condition for participation in movements that witness dramatic changes in the status, treatment, or activity of a category of people.”677 A concrete example is provided by how activists in Bab Bared Tansikiyat perceived the ‘seriousness of the condition’ of injustice. More specifically, activists realized that the source of their problems in the region is not necessarily drug trade, but drug traffickers that influence local politics and police practices in the region. James Ketterer observes that “drug barons have steadily made themselves into a serious crime problem and security threat and also major players in the Moroccan political system.”678 Abdallah Eljout, a civic activist and a member of Bab Bared Tansikiyat explained that the status of local authorities and police became more negative than was before. Activists reframed and redefined the source of issues and mobilized around the idea of ‘legalizing drug trade’ in the region. Youth activists were trying to find the pressure tracks to push for change. Activists invited political party members to attend citizen forums discussing issues of the region. PAM is leading the debate in parliament about the drug trade in the North. An outcome of the struggle of Bab Barred is pressing political party particularly those in

677 Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (August1986).
government and opposition in parliament to consider shedding light on the issue and include it among the legislative issues before the parliament.

_Tansikiyats: Narratives of Collective Identity Frames_

The general sense within Tansikiyats is to gain recognition for new identities (Pizzarno, 1978) or establish new cultural codes (Polletta and Jasper, 2001) or what Hassan Tariq referred to as _قدرة الشارع على تغيير المعادلة_—the power of the street to change the equation). Collective identity frame was not based on a fixed category (such as race, class, or religion); it was effectively used as a mobilizing frame that encompasses various components. Such observation suffice to illustrate that collective identity frame is both a mobilizing factor and an outcome of _February 20_ Tansikiyats collective action. Youth activists were willing to champion their cause through forging new collective identities. For _February 20_ Tansikiyats, “Febrayeeriyeen” collective identity is about the goal of the movement, its master frame, and not so much about the ideologies of its components.

Collective identity frame mediated by emotions of pride and belonging to be a “Febrayeeri” has assertively contributed to transforming by-standers and independents to activists, who were “obliged to protest.” As Polletta and Jasper analysis of collective identity in social movement related:

“one can join a movement because one shares its goals without identifying much with fellow members (one can even, some cases, despise them). Likewise, people develop collective identity on the basis of their distinctive know-how or skills, but such know-how and skills can have influence even in the absence of collective identities around them.”

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679 Hassan Tariq is a professor and a Member of Parliament and supporter of February 20. Interview took place in November 2013.
In the beginning of protests, *February 20* Tansikiyats engaged in changing and forging new identities that became one of the goals within Tansikiyats. Polletta and Jasper write, “changing identities is often a primary movement goal.” More specifically, activists used movement frames as a source to establish what they called “*Febrayereen* or *Ishreeniyeen*” identity. During the early stage of the movement, the concept of “*Febrayereen*” created the umbrella identity under which movement components operated and functioned. Activists across Tansikiyats shared the confidence and the pride to be “Febrayeeri.” In several Tansikiyats, activists meet and greet each other with “tahiya Ishreeniya or Febrayeeria—تحية عشرينية أو تحية فبرايرية” This subjective element of confidence and trust in the collective identity frame contributed to translating the structural constraints into discontent within Tansikiyats. During interviews with informants, trust and confidence were re-occurring themes which shows a positive association between collective identity frame and collective action. Scholars of social movements have alluded to collective identity to explain “how structural inequality gets translated into subjective discontent” *(Taylor & Whittier 1992: 104; see also Morris 1992; and Mueller 1992).* 

Activists within Tansikiyats engaged in constructing an identity frame that is effective in pressuring political decision-makers. For example, throughout the protest and even until now, activists used “ana Febrayeeri” as a way to negotiate with or pressure decision makers at the local level. Khaled Mona, a sociologist in Meknes, said that “Febrayeeri or Ishreeni” was used by activists as a creative means to challenge authority. He refers to this challenge in French as “chontage” and in Arabic as

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“tahadi -تحدي”. Here, collective identity frame was utilized to gain power. This frame was embedded in local Tansikiyats (Polletta & Jasper concept of micro-mobilization processes). This concept of “chontage” can be explained as a belief (value amplification) about ‘efficacy of collective action.’ The basic proposition is that the frame of “Febrayeeri or Ishreeni’ is rooted in the belief that authorities’ response would be in favor of activists demands. There is a belief about expecting an outcome (value-expectancy theory of Klandermans, 1984). If the frame is used collectively, its utility would yield an anticipated outcome. According to Klandermans, “values and expectancies are both important factors in taking an action; however, what is more dominant is the expectancy of success. Even if the issue is attacking values highly, people do not take any action if they think their action do not have any success.”684

*February 20* collective identity is preserved “in popular cultural material” that becomes available for what Polletta & Jasper quoting Eyerman and Jamison, “subsequent waves of protest.”685 The Daniel Galvan affair was an example of this preservation. In this sense, the *February 20* movement Tansikiyats whether expressed explicitly or not had both political and cultural impact. As Polletta and Jasper argue, in new social movements, “most social movements have combined political goals with more culturally oriented efforts.”686 Even Abdel Ali Hamidine, a PJD political bureau member and Member of Parliament, acknowledges that *February 20 movement became the consciousness of society therefore; it cannot be erased from the collective political and

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What this tells us is that beside the outcomes in the political sphere, the impact of the Tansikiyats collective action has also transformed the cultural sphere.

I concur with Polletta’s observation that “rather than viewing collective identity exclusively as a kind of cultural movement impact, separated from the domain of institutional impact like legal reform and policy change, these analyses point to the ways in which prominent or reformulated identities can transform the institutional political playing field.” For this particular point, Tansikiyats’ formulation of master frames into localized sub-frames helped create a sense of collective identity frame used effectively to advance Tansikiyats interests’ and strategy for citizen mobilization. It is a creation of “imagined communities” (Polletta & Jasper 2001), and “imagined solidarities” (Asef Bayat) to impact institutional change.

Tansikiyats: Decline of Framing or Framing Shift?

Among the “learning outcomes” is recognizing the impact that the Makhzanian move (March 9 speech, constitution, elections) had on collective identity frame shift within movement Tansikiyats. Many activists argue that there was a sense of confusion and uncertainty within the Tansikiyats, which has attributed to the rise of identity politics (see chapter three). Activists were not able to sustain their creativity to encounter Makhzan’s offer of a new constitution and new elections. While the earlier focus was on working towards collective understanding of issues (diagnostic frames), in the later phase

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688 Translation by the author of this study

Tansikiyats activities came to be centered significantly on dealing with frame dispute and counter-frames. This state strategy of divide and rule was meant to keep activists focused inward. Additionally, during protest cycles (post- March 9 speech), a contentious aspect of the movement Tansikiyats have been the resistance of their components to formulate a ceiling for the demands or to coalesce behind a single, unified demand (dispute over prognostic frames). The king’s March speech is perceived as a “moral shock.” It was not just a prompt response to the demands of the movement, its timing, and symbolism stems from the desire to tame the emotion of anger of protesters that were rooted in the long-duree of “attentism--waiting.”

Detailed accounts from activists showed that contradictions between the movement components were apparent during public assemblies, yet the general external perception was that of unity among the components, also there are obscurantist forces in the street, argues interviewee Hassan Tariq. Tarabloussi (2013) observes that in December 2011, protests continued, but tensions among various components, particularly between Adl Wal Ihsane youth and leftist youth was clearly visible. These tensions appeared in several Tansikiyats. In this line of inquiry, Tarabloussi posed a question: would good intentions be enough for a popular movement to continue since its activists reject structure and organization? Did Tansikiyats inevitably succumb to their own internal contradictions?

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690 Elsassi, Mohamed (August, 2012) interview with Mamfakinch.com
692 Tarabloussi (2013).
Beside the Bamaltajia that created counter frames and led the counter mobilization, Tansikiyats have witnessed frame shifts (dispute) from within. Activists (Adl Wal Ihsane) contested movement frames by formulating other frames. Activists (leftist particularly) argued that Adl Wal Ihsane begun to impose their own views during protests. Many informants claim that Adl Wal Ihsane joined the movement to test its ability to take over the movement (see chapter on Adl Wal Ihsane). This gradual change in perception started to build up and non-Islamist activists (particularly those of radical left – يسار الرديكالي) shifted to explaining Adl Wal Ihsane’s motivation for joining *February 20* Tansikiyats differently. They alleged that Adl Wal Ihsane joined the movement with a rational calculation to take over its values and its cause and establish a new hegemony. From this vantage point, Adl Wal Ihsane was portrayed as potential enemy rather than a partner and a valued component within Tansikiyats. This was also advanced by the Makhzan and the media as a counter-frame which forced Adl Wal Ihsane to switch to damage control mode to soften its presence within Tansikiyats (public silence) until it withdrew in December, 2011. On the Amazigh front, they mostly followed the leftist stance or remained salient given that they want to crave out their own space without attaching an ideological flavor to it. It is important to mention that among Adl Wal Ihsane leadership are Amazigh and the same goes for the leflist and radical leftist parties. For instance, the founder of the PSU is Said Ait Idir from the Moroccan Atlas. Adl Wal Ihsane leadership, I interviewed for this research was also Amazigh. A case point is provided by Adl Wal Ihsane’s role as a component within *February 20* Tansikiyats,

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*693* Interviews with activists in Fes, Meknes, Casablanca, Rabat in early November 2013.
which bring the debate between interpretive and structuralist notions to the forefront. The contradictory conception of Adl Wal Ihsane motivations (rational vs. subjective) could be seen as an “interactive process” (Gamson et al. 1982) of situating their struggle within the interpretive frames of injustice that the Makhzan imposed on them for decades, while utilizing using *February 20* master frames to effectively advance some of their political interests (rational choice). Because of the debate on prognostic frames post March 9 speech, components of *February 20* start to enter a phase of identity assertions and counter-assertions. Non-Islamists actors such as Monjib speculate that Adl Wal Ihsane suffers from internal contradictions (طاقة داخلي). Hlaoua argues that Adl Wal Ihsane was faced with a huge challenge regarding its participation in the movement. This challenge is how a structured Islamist movement with a rigid centralized leadership (see section on Adl Wal Ihsane), can protect its identity brand and its enterprise as an Islamist movement with ambitious political goals; while being a component of a non-structured/decentralized movement such as *February 20*. This is indicative of the fact that (post-March 9 and post-constitution) Adl Wal Ihsane engaged internally in strategic framing processes to interpret not necessarily diagnostic frames, but prognostic frames (alternatives to issues), diffuse, transform, and dispute socially constructed meaning within Tansikiyats. This is the transformative aspect of framing (frame alignment). This is where different interpretations of old ideas and practices are taking place to construct a new meaning, and invent new interpretations. This interpretive and transformative process was happening internally within Adl Wal Ihsane which resulted in a new meaning of prognostic frames and created a frame dispute or frame disagreement with the
other components within Tansikiyats. Tarrow recognizes that “new frames of meaning result from the struggles over meaning within social movements and from their clash with their opponents.”

Was there a shift in identity frames within Tansikiyats? The shift in identity frames had a negative effect on the cohesiveness of Tansikiyats and resulted in Tansikiyats disintegration particularly during the post-constitution protest stage. Respondents of this research declared that this shift was apparent particularly after the March 9 speech given that the king outlined constitutional amendments that include more power to prime minister and parliament. This confirms that frame shift or frame dispute resulted from “expressed identities to find the sources of social movement claims.”

The analysis demonstrated that the dynamics within Tansikiyats post-constitution showed the transformation of frames of collective identity from “push” to “pull” factors. This period witnessed a framing shift. The shift in collective identity frame created what Weber and Bourdieu refer to as “pitiless competition” engendering difference in social relations.

It appears that collective identity frames did not withstand fragmentation and ideological in-fighting post-March 9 and post-constitution periods.

On this matter, I invite Cohen (1996) concept of ‘politics of influence’ and ‘politics of identity’. This duality is problematic as it presents conflicting choices within Tansikiyats. February 20 Tansikiyats activists came together to defend values of justice and dignity (value amplification of frame alignment). This coming together (collective

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694 Frame dispute of Benford (1993) and (1997).
695 Tarrow (1998), 197.
696 Manisha Desai in Meyer (2002).
697 Wacquant (May, 2006), 4.
identity frame) illustrates their ability to engage in politics of influence, and disrupt Makhzan’s hegemony. Tansikiyats contributed to an alternative to politics in places where grassroots politicization is a new phenomenon.699

Yet, identity politics played a major role immediately after March 9 speech.700 In addition to the analysis on collective identity frame shift discussed previously, I shall conclude that a factor of framing shift (collective identity frames) has been the over-rating of the ability of various components to engender and sustain cohesiveness within Tansikiyats on their own. Hassan Tariq explicates, there was a danger of partisanship because of the different components and the danger of intra-conflict and self-limitation among the components—خطر الحصار الداتي و وجود فرضية التمثّل من الداخل). I contend that this self-organizing character of Tansikiyats and new form of activism that is based on volunteerism resulted in increased self-confidence and acquisition of practical skills, but not necessarily in building a collective ethos to resist the slippery slope of politics of identity. Taraboussi attributed these contradictions to what he called the birth the movement Tansikiyats through a caesarean section (الولادة القصرية) insinuating that February 20, while organic in its nature, the coming together of its components were not.

The point here is that the movement became a victim of internal contradictions given that the alliance of Adl Wal Ihsane with other components (left and radical left) was not meant to be a lasting one. Many argue that the February 20 movement provided the opportunity for these various components (historically enemies) to come together, see beyond their past and build trust for the future:

699 Interview with professor Maati Monjib in late October and early November of 2013. A follow up interview took place in early March 2014.
700 Interview with Hamza Mahfoud, October 2013.
Rather, mobilization championed by the *February 20* movement has provided opportunities for dialogue, communication, and coordination in the field between this group (meaning Adl Wal Ihsane) and leftist parties individually and collectively; *February 20* movement was about to establish a new era in which many can forget the injuries of the past and build confidence that was lost before February 20, 2011.\(^{702}\)

Also, this is where activists’ focus on processes within Tansikiyats was counter-productive in a way that undermined their political strategy post-Makhzanian response to protests and post Adl Wal Ihsane withdrawal. This is an illustration that while processes were important and focused on democratic participatory approach, Tansikiyats lacked strategy. For example, independents participants (who constituted the prospective recruits for Tansikiyats) were in a situation of uncertainty and confusion. There was no leadership or even a “recruitment committee” that would have helped to reduce this uncertainty (uncertainty reduction theory). Volunteer activists relied on personal networks to recruit participants. Hence, compared to Islamists, non-Islamist networks were limited. This elucidates that Tansikiyats depended mainly on Adl Wal Ihsane’s networks presence in protest. The argument regarding Adl Wal Ihsane participation and withdrawal influenced the intensity of protests is valid. Adl Wal Ihsane has power in numbers, according to Cavatorta (2006); it is approximately between 50,000 and 600,000 members.\(^{703}\) Therefore, Adl Wal Ihsane as a variable can be understood easily as a vehicle that drove the numbers of ordinary citizens to the street. With this position, Adl

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\(^{702}\) Translation by the author of this study.

\(^{703}\) Cavatorta (2006).
Wal Ihsane could have not initiated the call for protest within Tansikiyats given its historical trajectory with the Makhzan (see chapter four), but can drive the numbers to the street through its centralized leadership decisions and formal and informal networks across Morocco. It is safe to conclude that Adl Wal Ihsane presence impacted both participation and intensity within Tansikiyats. This was apparent when Adl Wal Ihsane withdrew from the movement entirely (see section on Adl Wal Ihsane). While Adl Wal Ihsane drove the numbers to the street because of their grassroots membership, they did not influence the rhythm and character of protests because as discussed earlier, they agreed to public silence (no religious slogans and no Adl Wal Ihsane expression). Adl Wal Ihsane needed to respect the founding principles of the movement. To underscore the role of networks, Passy and Giugni wrote that “networks influence the intensity of involvement in social movement indirectly. They alter the perception of the effectiveness of the engagement and of collective action, of the risks of being engaged, of the legitimation of the authorities (and of citizens), and of one’s personal availability.”

Despite Adl Wal Ihsane’s withdrawal, Tansikiyats attempted to remain relevant to the new reality of losing the most important component of the movement. The contribution of Adl Wal Ihsane to the intensity of protests was apparent in Tansikiyats. It was difficult for activists to effectively modify not so much the diagnostic frames, but the prognostic ones and maintain resonance with independent activists, by-standers, and ordinary citizens. These target audiences appeared to be somewhat satisfied by the

reforms advanced by King’s March 9 speech and by the election of PJD to the government. Ordinary citizens entered a phase of let’s wait and see (Intidar--الانتظار).

The *February 20* movement Tansikiyats responded to Adl Wal Ihsane and state repression by reframing themselves. Questions of strategic innovation of the movement Tansikiyats is their ability to metamorphize through initiatives that were born from the movement. This line of thinking is confirmed by Koudss Lafnatsa, a female *February 20* who asserts that many cities continue to take to the street which transform to mass protest at any moment. Youth continue to mobilize differently through engaging in less risky activism and more in low risk activism (McAdam 1988; Yates 1999). Youth activists invented new forms of engagement and became flexible in joining various initiatives. These initiatives include the theatre of the poor, let’s read, philosophy in the street, Guerria cinema, and festival alternative. These initiatives, while different, they built on the Tansikiyats to mobilize people to the street. Through these initiatives, *February 20* continues to strategize for future mobilization and educate people on political issues, but in a low key (under the radar) manner. Understanding the reality in Morocco after PJD was elected, Adl Wal Ihsane exited the movement, and labor unions failed to consistently support the movement, and given the reality in MENA region in general, Tansikiyats were making good strategic choices.

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705 Koudss Lafnatsa’s interview with Akhbar Alyaoum newspaper, Nadwat Echahr, Akhbar Alyaoum dated April 26, 2014 in the paper copy of the newspaper. Website: [www.alyaoum24.com](http://www.alyaoum24.com)
Chapter Summary

Tansikiyats carved a place to expose the plight of the marginalized and ordinary citizens. The opinion of many respondents reflected that February 20 movement exposed the gap in political reforms in Morocco-الفراغات السياسية both at the local and national levels.

Also, while localized, they have broader message on justice and dignity that similarly echoed in the Arab Spring MENA countries. Despite February 20 focus on broader plight for political and social change, it is largely known through its localized Tansikiyats. Tansikiyats have never been about changing or uprooting the power structures at the local or national levels; it is about re-balancing and re-organizing it to serve the people. Tansikiyats are loosely defined so there is no criterion for membership or participation. Tansikiyats never created a physical space or a concrete entity as they seem to be fluid and unstructured which, according to many informants, forms their viability.

This research showed how framing has been used effectively by the Tansikiyats to motivate and mobilize; and connect their issues to the broader concepts of justice and dignity. It also illustrates how malleability of framing proved effective, how emotions contributed to how participants perceived their reality and their grievances. Yet, Tansikiyats are a good case of frame decline and frame shift. This was a result of disagreements about prognostic frames post-constitution. The shortcoming of framing as a framework analysis was illustrated through it inadequacy to capture free-riders issues, and respond to why frame disputes happen when they happen. From a broader
perspective, Tansikiyats lacked strategy, leadership and they focused on processes routinization which hindered their ability to reformulate effective frames and account for variations both in diagnostic and prognostic frames post-Adl Wal Ihsane. The withdrawal of Adl Wal Ihsane proved detrimental to intensity and sustained participation. Despite this shortcoming, February 20 Tansikiyats were able to achieve several goals and they engage in low risk activism.

This study also underscored the need for further and more nuanced approach to understanding the “multilayered complexities” of framing particularly when movement components are diverse and the conditionality for joining the movement is to put aside “ideological identity” and “structural influence.” Tarrow’s theory offers the ingredients of “un cadre” within which social movements are constructed and sustained. Tarrow (1998) moves towards the direction of art in order to stay close to the "messiness" of real processes and change and to recognize the unexpected discoveries emerging along the way. Referring to the messiness of human interaction, narratives of how actors define their realities, social construct and collective identity narrative constitute (frames), while sustaining contentious politics, are among the components that create contradictions—that is conflict.706

The notion of understanding the “multilayered complexities” and the messiness of collective action puts me in accord with Polletta (1997) argument that an attempt needs be made for “dichotomous conceptions.” If there is any validity to this idea, then Polletta must be right when she said that “the retention of various dichotomous conceptions, such

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706 Tarrow (2001).
as culture versus structure, have tended to constrain theoretical and empirical
development in the study of social movement...’ the time has come to consider the
possibility that structural and interpretive approaches may be complementary rather than contradictory.”

**Perspective for the Future**

This research has exposed us to how the messiness of collective action is by itself the very essence of the movement. Additional research however, is necessary to refine existing concepts how ideology influence collective identity shifts, particularly in movements that brings together various components such of the *February 20* movement, with one component (Adl Wal Ihsane) that is very structured and acts according to decisions at the marco-level. Furthermore, this is a need to effectively study how “contextual configurations are relevant to understanding cross-national variation in political protest (Kriesi et al., 1995); and how geopolitics characteristics define the incentives to participate and mobilize for action. In addition to further studying what’s the phenomenon that drives activists to reject structure (leadership) and engage in processes of “leaderfulness”—everyone is a leader.”

Research on collective identity frames may have well been advanced among theorists of social movements to account, but there are still lingering questions about various emotions involved in constructing this identity, what is the link between collective identity and rational choice, and how they influence each other? Accordingly,

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we do not know the interplay of emotions and identity or how they influence each other or create each other. Furthermore, how can we, as researchers, continue to develop ways to study local organizing in relation to broader social mobilization? It is worth also examining how Moroccan youth have engaged and are engaging with politics of feminism. This is an area that deserves exploration.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: PART TWO

Introduction

Debates over monarchy’s response to the February 20 movement tend to dominate discussions among scholars in Morocco. But these debates obscure the far more important notions about February 20, its decentralization, autonomy, and ability to mobilize without a formal structure. Although, many pro-Makhzan scholars refer to February 20 as a dynamiya, I claim that it is a movement. To properly begin, I recall Diani (1992, 1992b) definition of social movements as it encompasses shared commonalities by other scholars. Diani notes that social movements are “a network of informal interactions between individuals and organizations that engage in collective action on the basis of a shared identity. Therefore, organizations, whether they are formal, informal, institutionalized or non-institutionalized, can only be considered to be part of a movement if they are networked to other organizations that engage in collective action on similar issues.” From this vantage point and of relevance to this project is the exploration of connecting tissue of February 20 Tansikiyats.

Not only that Diani’s conception is expandable, but it is updated to include social movements as “specific modes of coordination for collective action …” This

708 See chapter one for more on this debate.
definition sets the stage for Holland, Fox, and Daro’s argument that “the recently emerging, de-centered approach to social movements studies calls for less attention to movements as they are formulated by leaders and core members and move attention to movements as placed-based, or situated in particular sites and venues.”^711 So a key element in connecting the macro picture of a movement and its place-based is the consideration of social networks. Many according to Saunders go as far to say that without considering networking—that is interaction—“research becomes over focused on mobilization processes and organizational characteristics.”^712

The concern here is not the investigation of social networks link to participation. Scholars have amply documented that as Monsch and Passy concluded in their research. They found that a study by Snow et al., (1980) on Hare Krishna, and Jasper and Poulsen’s work on animal rights protests showed that “participation occurs without networks.”^713 So this study is conducted on the basis that February 20 Tansikiyats sought loose and informal networks to exchange ideas, interact, and connect with each other. I cannot however, ignore the connecting value of the “virtual space” as a mediating element. For this study, the traveling of ideas and learning experiences among Tansikiyats led me to explore the explanatory potential of networks. I must mention, however that Tansikiyats depend on framing processes to give a voice to local grievances and mobilize the demobilized population. In the case of the February 20 movement, by looking at Tansikiyats and how they connect with each other to make a broader sense

^713 Monsch and Passy (2013).
about the movement requires us not to sideline the significance of framing and informal social networks both online and offline. To explore the contours of social networks within the movement, one cannot ignore how master frames were extended, amplified, and bridged within Tansikiyats since there is diversity within movement components as well as diversity of actor grievances.

**Tansikiyats: Are They Connected?**

Instead of focusing on networks’ role in connecting activists with a protest opportunity, Passy and Monsch view networks in interpretive terms as they “shape identity, which is essential to become involved in contention.”

Through the interpretive lens of networks is where we can find the role of interactions and conversations. These interactions affect not only identity frames, but “they clarify meanings, such as injustice and agency frames.” While *February 20* Tansikiyats sub-frames always link to the master frames outlined in *Ardiya Taassissiya*, interactions among activists play an important role in translating these master frames into slogans and sub-frames that are embedded in local context and respond to populace grievances locally.

It took 60 interviews, unlimited reading of facebook posts and blogs, and a review of 350 publications and media writings on the *February 20* movement to convincingly conclude that there is nothing called “the center of the movement” and there is no

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reference to any form of an organizational structure that could be considered a central “organizational structure of the movement.” Eighty percent of research respondents claimed that there is no formal or structured leadership to the movement, but the movement produced youth leaders locally and nationally (لقد افرز الحراك قيادات شبابية). However, twenty percent of respondents (mostly independents) stated that there is an invisible leadership that wanted to take over the movement. Here, they are referring to Adl Wal Ihsane and the radical leftist structures.

So I asked the question, how are Tansikiyats connected? Interviews indicated that, العلاقات الافقية لعبت دور مهم جدا في خلق انسيابية متعددة و كذلك المجموعات على الشبكات العنكبوتية إضافة إلى التنافسات داخل الجموع العامة و الزيارات الميدانية من طرف النشطاء. to mean that activists within Tansikiyats refuse the conception of formal structures as they view them as restrictive, and prefer the notion of loose and informal ones. Also, that horizontal relationship, online discussion, as well as field visits by activists were important. Tansikiyats’ refusal of a formal structure was the reason behind the dissolution of the national council for support (رفض الوصاية, see chapter three). This also advances the view that social networks are what connect Tansikiyats across Morocco.

Extending Diani’s line of analysis, the plausible connecting tissue between Tansikiyats is the conception of loose networks both online and offline. Yet, it was necessary to first understand what activists mean by social networks. They articulated حركة 20 فبراير هي بمثابة مدرسة و تلاميدها هم النشطاء و الناشطات في التنسيقات، هناك ترابط و تلحم و تبادل المعرفة و " to mean the February 20 movement serves as a school and its students are activists, (both
male and females) within the Tansikiyats, as there is cohesion among them to exchange knowledge and learning.

I found that the closest definition to Tansikiyats’ understanding of networks is the conception of Passy and Monsch. They conceptualize, building on White’s notion, that “networks are composed of discourses, stories, and meanings; networks themselves are created through narratives.” More specifically, networks are “islands of meanings,” inter-animation of talks and ties (Mische & White 1992), interactions (Diani & Eyerman 1992), conversations (Tilly 1998), and learning experiences (Roggeland, 2007). This idea builds on Kitts’ (2000) research on network mechanisms (information process, identity mechanism, and exchange process). The focus is on the latter in which ideas are exchanged and information is circulated among actors. McAdam (2003) advances the notion of linkages or what Kitts, McAdam, and Passy (1998, 2001, and 2003) refer to as a “connecting process.” The concern is not to debate the role of networks in protest participation, but to use a networks approach to understand the connectedness of

February 20 Tansikiyats. Most importantly focusing on networks in a loose sense or what Boekkooi (2012) refers to as “liquid structures,” informal (Diani, 1992b), networked society (Castells, 2000), interpretive networks (Passy & Monsch, 2013), forms of connectivity (Langman & Morris, 2001), and relational connections (Roggeband, 2007). These conceptions allow for openness, adaptation, and flexibility. Eloquently put by Fuchs, “…decentralized structures are types of networks that matter in social

\[717\] Monsch & Passy (2013).
movement analysis. A social movement is not a singular group, but a network of protest groups that are communicatively linked.718

To explain further, I draw on Boekkooi’s continuum on social loose/liquid networks:

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**Figure 4: Modified Continuum of Formal and Loose Networks**

Adopted from Boekkooi, this modified continuum illustrates how *February 20* Tansikiyats fit within a range of connections that include traditional/formal organizations (such as Adl Wal Ihsane), and loose networks that connect activists across Tansikiyats. The point here is that Tansikiyats opt for loose and liquid forms of organizing and mobilizing. These networks serve as a connecting thread among and between Tansikiyats. This fluid aspect is needed because the composition of the movement is diverse as includes traditional (Adl Wal Ihsane) and non-traditional actors (youth). *February 20* activists were aware of the diversity and the heterogeneity within the movement which needed to be accounted for. All the activists interviewed for this research argued that there is awareness about the diversity within the movement.

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Interviewed for this research, anthropologist Zakaria Ghani articulates— the *February 20* movement is not a homogenous movement,” yet everyone identified with what the movement represents. What Ghani advances is that Tansikiyats, while decentralized, identified with the universal values of *February 20*, thus are the movement. On this point, interviewee professor Benabdelaoui notes that— given the diversity of its components, protests would not have been successful if the decision was not localized.”

Tansikiyats are reluctant to attach themselves to a central entity and prefer liquid or fluid structures (loose networks) which they could expand, build on, and shape locally. Liquid structures allow the flow information, exchange of ideas and tactics of how to maneuver Makhzan’s oppression. Activists do not want to feel restricted to a particular group or structure (Lichterman 1996). Since, networks are both the product and the central locus of diffusion, ideas and practices spread through movement networks. Additionally, loose networks constitute a moral support system and a connecting tissue to those activists in Tansikiyats that are in deep Morocco (المغرب العميق) and far from Rabat and Casablanca. In addition to online connections, interpersonal relationships and interactions serve as an effective way to connect Tansikiyats to each other. For instance, Idir, a journalist and a civic activist, traveled between Rabat and Beni Mallal to share ideas and what he learned from each Tansikiyat. Melhaf, a well-known female activist,

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[719] Interview with anthropologist Zakharia Ghani, in November 2013.
[720] Interview with anthropologist Zakharia Ghani, in November 2013.
[721] Interview with professor Benabdelaoui in 2013.
who lives in Rabat area and pursues her studies in Tangiers developed connections with activists and shared the know-how from both Tansikiyats. A consistent response from activists is that geographical distance was not a problem given that interactions are regular among activists both online and offline. Mohammedia activists Hassan and Ahmed explain that usually known activists travel to other Tansikiyats to show support and solidarity and share information and ideas. Examples include Hamza Mahfoud, Najib Chaouki, Ossama Elkhalfi, L7aked, Benkhdim, and Bziz, and Samad Ait Aicha. They add, “-نشتغل بحس التضامن مع الاخرين--we work in solidarity with others.” This solidarity is exemplified in how activists greed each other “-Tahiya Ichriniya. This is a clear indication that activists take initiative to connect with each other and organize around networked solidarities and individuals (Wellman et al. 2003).

Analysis of respondents’ reports also indicate that Tansikiyats, particularly in the beginning stages of the movement, were characterized by high levels of interaction, communication, and information exchange through online channels, mobile technology, and visits of activists to other Tansikiyats. For instance, Tansikiyats shared tactics and strategies on how to avoid Makhzan’s crackdown and repression. Tansikiyats learned from each other how to effectively establish -lajnat dabt—the Makhzan monitoring committee or what interviewee Maati Monjib refers to as -القيادة الأمنية- security leadership. An effective way for distracting the Makhzan, cited by activists, is that lajnat dabt usually is constituted of 15-20 people including front line activists as well as newcomers to distract Makhzan authorities (who would spend energy and time trying to identify new-comers rather than focus on arresting front line activists).
The consensus among activists is that loose networks play a major role in moral support, collaboration, and learning experiences. Tansikiyats that are far from the political capital of Rabat and the economic capital of Casablanca are cases in point. For instance, when the Makhzan responds violently to protests in Casablanca and Rabat, other Tansikiyats engage in refining their local strategies. To this, February 20 activists Mahjoub (Marrakesh) and Issam (Meknes) note that "دائما نترقب ماذا سيفعله المخزن وماهي ردة الفعل -- في الرباط والدار البيضاء" we always follow what the Makhzan would do or how would it react vis-à-vis activists in Rabat and Casablanca. They add, we follow what was happening and we communicate regularly -- نتابع و نتواصل باستمرار. What this tells us is that communication is constant among and between Tansikiyats or what Fuchs (2006) calls “regularized patterns of interaction.”

This communication dynamic process is an indication that Tansikiyats are active actors and are not just passive receivers of information. The notion of dynamism is a characteristic of self-organizing movement. Fuchs’s work citing previous research by Hardt and Negri (2005), Marcuse (1966, 1969, & 1972) aligns with this analysis. On decentralized movements, Fuchs notes that “extensively, the common is mobilized in communication from one local struggle to another.”

The idea stresses the dynamic process, communicative action and learning which “help to refine local strategies and avoid pitfalls encountered elsewhere” — in this case other Tansikiyats that is.

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Fuchs (February 2006).


724 Fuchs (February 2006).


726 Conny, Roggeband (2007).
Tansikiyats are also connected through the distribution of information (or intelligence). Interviewees of this research kept referring to “Tifraz,” an online persona that played the role of a ‘communication coordinator.’ Tifraz was a female activist based in Tangiers, but known for her online activism and information sharing among various February 20 activists online. Krinsky and Crossley call this “brokers” of information and ideas. Tifraz diffuses relevant timely information through Tansikiyats’ facebook pages, sending mobile messages, and calling main activists within Tansikiyats. Activists then communicate the information locally. Public assemblies serve as a forum in which ideas and information are communicated, discussed, debated, and decided on accordingly. This illustration agrees with Krinsky and Crossley’s (2014) concept of “network-metaphorical thinking.” They explain that in social movements, “it invites the observer to look below the official stories and representations that movements and their activists make and discover hidden dynamics and relations (which, it is true, activists sometimes want to keep from view, but also sometimes appreciate as clarifying why they are running into roadblocks).”

_Tansikiyats: Decentralized, but Networked_

To safeguard the principles outlined in the “Ardiya Taassisiya” document, and because February 20 components are diverse (Islamists, leftists, radical left, independents, youth, Amazigh…etc), and local appropriation of protest is valorized

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727 Tifraz is an actual person that played a major role as mechanism that disseminate and share information with activists within Tansikiyats both online and offline.
Tansikiyats opted for a more fluid, liquid, networked approach that allow cooperation, and coordination on the ground (*Tansik Maydani*). To maintain independence and remain decentralized, Tansikiyats contested the existence of the national council for support fearing it may transform into a central structure of the movement. To summarize respondents’ perspectives on this, scholar Mohamed Darif (2013) eloquently articulates,

رغم تأسيس العديد من الهيئات والمنظمات السياسية والنقابية والجمعوية المساندة للحركة لاطار تنظيمي أسمته: المجلس الوطني لدعم حركة شباب 20 فبراير، فإن شباب الحركة ظل على مسافة منه، ولم يخرط فيه شباب حفاظ على استقالية الحركة عن أي تيار أو تنظيم رغم أن العديد من نشطاء الحركة هم أعضاء في تنظيمات وحزاب وهيئات مدنية وسياسية.

Despite the establishment of the national council of support of the movement by several political bodies, labor unions, and civil society; the youth remained at a distance from the council. While youth may have been members of these bodies, they decided not to get involved with the council in order to preserve the independence of the movement. 730

The conclusion is that despite the establishment of a national council for support, activists stayed away from it to ensure independence even if many youth activists belong to or associate themselves with the council’s civic or political structures. Tansikiyats gradually distanced themselves from any influence of a new or existing structure. In a *Jeune Afrique* article published in June 2011, Boukhriss clarifies that “…le Mouvement du 20 Février n’a pas cherché à former de structure légale ou hiérarchique-- February 20 movement has not sought to form a legal or hierarchical structure.”731 He adds, “ses [Feb20] militants revendiquent cet esprit libertaire, condition d’existence… --its activists

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730 Translation by the author of this study.

claim a libertarian spirit, a condition of existence.” This underscores February 20 activists’ intention to keep the movement decentralized and autonomous since its inception in February 20, 2011.

Professor Benabdelaoui argues that even if the national council for support wanted to transform itself to a centralized organization, it does not have enough power to influence organizing at the local level “ليس لديه قوة للتاثير على الاحتجاج محليا.” This argument supports Abdelhamid Amine’s statement published in Lakome in January 2012. Amine writes,

Amine acknowledges February 20 movement’s decentralized nature. On his first point, Amine reminds us that February 20 was established based on Ardiya Taassissiya -- founding principles that everyone agreed upon and respect. On his second point, Amine stresses the need for transparency and clarity on the role of structures specifically the national council of support. On the third point, Amine declares that February 20 Tansikiyats are the ones that led protests on February 20, 2011. On the fourth point, Amine commands Tansikiyats’ decision-making processes, which take place through

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public assemblies, ensuring consensus on issues and action plans. Amine’s fifth point clearly states that there is no national or formal coordination between Tansikiyats, except through online discussions. Amine’s statement highlights Tansikiyats independence from the tutelage of any formal or ideological structure. Through this, Amine reiterates that there is no central entity that plays the role of a coordinating entity or a movement organization. Basically, Amine made an attempt to debunk the perception that the national council for support is trying to highjack the movement (see more on the national council in chapter three).

The finding here is that Tansikiyats are organizing without having any fixed organization. In a critique of February 20, Hassan Tariq, while critiquing the movement, ironically emphasized that February 20 independence by saying (لنسنا امام حركة مفهومة المعالم، ليست لها قيادة مركزية—we are not facing a movement with clear landmarks, a movement with no centralized leadership). So Tansikiyats are the movement. Field interviews support this perspective, a recurring theme is that there is field coordination in February 20 movement. The emphasis on Tansik Maydani is a clear indication that Tansikiyats are decentralized and autonomous, yet networked. While Tansikiyats led protest locally, they participated in national days for protest. National days for protest (Yaoum Watani—اليوم الوطني) are specific days that activists agreed upon since the beginning of February 20. The first national meeting was organized in

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733 Abdelhamid Amine is a February 20 movement activists, was a leading member of Union Marocaine des Travailleurs (UMT), and a member of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), a well-known organization with large membership across the country and its radical positions on the Makhzan policies. Amine was selected as the coordinator of the national council for supporting February 20 movement. The points mentioned above are an extract of a longer statement published as “wijhat nadir—view point” titled “Strengthening and Developing February 20 movement” on 734 Hassan Tariq during an intervention in November 2011; Hassan Tariq is among scholars that referred to February 20 as a dynamic, not a movement. Yet, during his critique of the movement, he referred to is as movement. The translated quote is case in point.
Marrakesh in March 6, 2011 which brought activists from various Tansikiyats to discuss the movement. The goal was to ensure that Tansikiyats have a homogenous understanding and interpretation of movement’s values, claims and master frames. Activists note that Tansikiyats are considered a “collectivity of initiatives that work towards a common goal and work within a common master frame.” Marrakesh meeting was also important in defining the strategy to focus on local rather than macro level issues, and agreeing on every 20th of each month as a national day of protest. National days of protest focus on specific national issues. For example, protesting against corruption or protesting to free political prisoners. National days of protest allow activists to coordinate both online and offline, share technical knowledge, and promote their dialoguing capacity. The call for protest nationally is communicated to activists including those of Adl Wal Ihsane through online platforms and during public assemblies. Each Tansikiyat then is responsible for activating local capacity to mobilize.

Interviews and a review of secondary sources on February 20 reveal the common understanding that Tansikiyats are February 20 movement. I was surprised to counter angry stares from respondents of this research. One of them (from Fes) angrily notes, 

"لماذا التبعية المطلقة يختصي و ما هو الدور الذي يمكن أن يلعبه ما تسميه بالمركز أو النواة؟ كل منطقة في المغرب لها خصوصياتها التاريخية و السياسية مع المخزن. نحن نظاهرا ضد الوصاية المخزنية و ضد التبعية الفكرية و السياسية التي خلقها النخبة في المغرب."

The point here is that activists want to breakdown the narrative that Tansikiyats follow something called “center” and to emphasize the decentralized aspect of the movement.

The angry response is very much crystallized in Desrues writings. He confidently notes,
La décentralisation des coordinations explique les écarts d’influence, d’un endroit à l’autre, entre les différentes composantes du M20F. De même, la trajectoire de la relation de ces dernières avec les autorités diffère selon leur localisation. Partant, les dynamiques contestataires et leur gestion de la part des autorités ont varié d’un lieu à un autre. Ce faisant, la capacité des promoteurs des mobilisations à éviter les débordements des participants était fondamentale, afin de projeter l’image d’un mouvement pacifique, civique et responsable […] Ce faisant, le 20 février, il s’agissait d’attirer une population démobilisée et craignant les conséquences potentiellement négatives de sa participation au M20F. Les promoteurs du mouvement étaient conscients que l’intervention des forces de l’ordre réactiverait les critiques virulentes des opposants au mouvement qui ont surgi, dès les premiers appels à manifester. C’est en ce sens qu’ils ont essayé d’encadrer les participants et de sélectionner les slogans en organisant un service d’ordre étoffé à Rabat et à Marrakech, tandis que des membres des coordinations locales se chargeaient de vérifier que les slogans coïncidaient avec des mots d’ordre qui avaient fait l’objet d’un consensus lors des réunions préparatoires.  

Desrues elucidates that decentralization of Tansikiyats explains the extent of influence from one place to another, between the different components of movement. Similarly, the trajectory and the experience of these components with authorities differ depending on their localism. Therefore, how authorities manage and respond to protests vary from place to place. The ability of organizers to avoid overflow of participants was fundamental in order to project an image of a peaceful, civic and responsible movement […] February 20, is mostly concerned with attracting demobilized population, while fearing potential negative consequences of its participation. Movement organizers were also conscious about the potential danger of a counter mobilization (royalists youth, and bamaltajia for instance) that critique the movement. It is in this sense that activists organized two national gathering in Marrakesh and Rabat to effectively framed issues and carefully selected slogans. Local Tansikiyats were responsible for verifying that frames and slogans correspond with local realities and agreed upon during Tansikiyats’ preparatory meetings.

Desrues elucidates that decentralization of Tansikiyats. Yet, there are those who believe that decentralization and the absence of a proper national coordination structure limit movement’s ability to collectively elaborate priorities, construct a balance of power, and move beyond days of repetitive and decentralized action. When the movement reached its

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736 Organizers were not sure what would be the reaction of the population during protests if the Makhzen used violence to crackdown on protests as organizers wanted to ensure the peaceful aspect and non-violence during marches, sit-ins, and demonstrations. If public goods are destroyed and violence broke out, the movement would lose its legitimacy and people would be scared to take to the street again.
737 Desrues (2012).
peak on April 22, 2011 there was a need to collectively debate questions that were asked of the movement and influence the rhythm of mobilization. Blogger and *February 20* activist Chawqui remarks,

> “L’absence de coordination nationale propre au mouvement n’a pas permis d’élaboration collective, « centrale » des initiatives nécessaires à l’expression/construction nationale du rapport de force, au-delà des journées d’actions répétitives et décentralisées. Notamment lorsque le mouvement a connu un pic comme le 22 avril et d’une manière générale, pour aborder collectivement toutes les questions posées au mouvement et peser sur les rythmes de mobilisations (et la nature des actions à promouvoir).”

— the absence of national coordination of the movement did not allow for collective consultation of focal initiatives that are important to consolidate efforts for national force of protest beyond the repetitive decentralized actions, particularly when the movement reached its peak in April 2, to address the big questions posed about the movement and the nature of actions to promote.

In his critique, Chawqui elaborates that *February 20* weakness stems from its foundation as a horizontal movement with no hierarchical structures and spokespersons. Its loose membership has helped diverse local associations and structures to provide support and serve as a shield against the risk of hegemony. Hence, this type of loose structures involves real weaknesses as well.

Desrues disagrees. He comments, “l’hétérogénéité due à la coexistence dans un même mouvement d’acteurs affiliés et d’autres non-engagés, certains étant des activistes multipositionnés dans le champ associatif et partisan, a été renforcée par la décentralisation et l’autonomie des coordinations locales.” He argues that decentralization and autonomy of Tansikiyats enhanced the heterogeneity of the movement, and co-existence of its various components including those affiliated or non-affiliated, and those who are

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739 Chawqui is a February 20 movement activist and a blogger <https://badiltawri.wordpress.com/> Also see: <http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article2506>

740 Translation by the author of this study.


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multi-positioned within nonprofit and partisan fields. Activist and *February 20* media coordinator Samad Ait Aicha agrees with Desrues, that decentralization and heterogeneity gave the movement legitimacy and credibility which fostered the possibility of a unified perspective, he notes —the movement played a role in bridging the gap among actors’ perspectives.

The heterogeneous aspect of the movement aimed at bringing together everyone to speak with ‘one voice’ to stand against injustice and demand change. To awaken the marginalized populace “*la majorité silencieuse,*” and celebrate the ‘becoming together’ of various components as *February 20* movement; activists emphasized the fluid and decentralized aspect of *February 20.* Fluidity provides the space for cooperation towards rising one voice against the Makhzan معا ضد المخزن. Fluidity is a relevant dimension in social movements as Gusfield (1981) and later Bayat (2005) illustrate. Gusfield argues against a “linear” conception of social movements, and for a more “fluid” and “amorphous” notion. On his part Bayat embraces “a fluid fragmented vision of social movements” in attempt to present “an angle which might help account for complexities of contemporary movements.” *February 20* components (Adl Wal Ihsane and other components) do not aim to become a long lasting collective; rather, they want to demand change with one voice. Benabdelaooui further explicates, *February 20* is “*un mouvement rassembleur,*” or “a movement with convening power.”

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743 Desrues (2012) translated and rephrased by the author of this study.
744 Interview with activist Samad Ait Aicha in October 2013 and early November 2013.
745 Mernissi (2011).
746 Adl Wal Ihsane never joined forces with other factions since 1960s; please see section on Adl Wal Ihsane for further explanation.
748 Bayat (2005).
749 Follow up interview with Dr. Mokhatar Benabdelaooui, August 2014.
750 Ghassan Wail El Khamouni (2012).
Fluidity allows youth without any political affiliation (independents) to join Tansikiyats on their free will and identify with February 20 values, goals, and claims. Freelance journalist Omar Radi (2011) describes the movement as an “open circle.” The finding is that decentralization and fluidity also allow formal networks such as Adl Wal Ihsane to join forces with informal groups to demand change. This conclusion contradicts Boekkooi (2012) finding, suggesting that formal and informal networks/structures do not necessarily go together. *February 20* is an example of how a structured movement such as Adl Wal Ihsane can join forces with a decentralized and leaderless movement as long as ideologies are put aside and identity politics do not come into play.

Basically, it is a centralized movement within a decentralized movement. This tension is also manifested through the objective and subjective debate about Adl Wal Ihsane participation and exit from the movement. Adl Wal Ihsane was a major component in the *February 20* movement, it participated as a solid structure until its withdrawal in the December 18, 2011 (see chapter on Adl Wal Ihsane). The Amazigh are not as structured as Adl Wal Ihsane. The Amazigh in various regions can join protests without a formal authorization from anyone because the Amazigh organizing is different than Adl Wal Ihsane. The Amazigh have a strong presence in the movement since its inception.

*Tansikiyats: An Attempt towards a “Noyau Dur”*

While activists were decisive about keeping *February 20* decentralized and independent, there were attempts to establish a center for the movement. Activists (affiliated with leftist parties) in Casablanca Tansikiyat proposed that the movement
needs a center “noyau dur—a nuclus” that decides on what direction the movement should take moving forward. The idea of “noyau dur” came to a halt when the “collectif of February 20 movement independents” accused youth affiliated with political structures (particularly leftist) of wanting to centralize the decision making process of the movement. The response to these accusations labeled “collectif of February 20 movement independents” as thugs “baltajia de l’interieur.” The idea of “noyau dur” sparked a controversial debate within the components of the movement. This debate resulted in keeping the movement decentralized. This debate was about whether the movement should have a center or what is called in French “noyau dur,” so the attempt in Casablanca was advanced by leftist activists and the sympathizers of the left (PSU, Annahj, PADS, and CNI), but independents (no political affiliation) were wary that the initiative was driven by the left which would promote its dominance over independents and Adl Wal Ihsane. Yet, the main groups accused of trying to centralize the movement is Annahj democrat and Adl Wal Ihsane. To corroborates this idea, a piece was published about the issue on Mohammedia local newspaper:

A disagreement among February 20 activists/ representatives: the independent members accused and members with political affiliation particularly youth from Annahj and Adl Wal Ishane as wanting to impose a thinking that has nothing to do with how Moroccans think and seek to drag the movement to escalation, which resulted in him falling into the trap of confrontation with citizens as Casablanca Sbata case in point.  

751 Noyau dur is a French term that refers to a center or nucleus of something.
753 http://mohammediapresse.com/news1002.html
754 Translation by the author of this study.
Independents members within *February 20* considered that the movement would no longer belong to the Moroccan people, but to the people who want to use it for political speeches and gains that are outside the logic of respecting the principles of the nation*, independents accused Adl Wal Ihsane of not respecting the founding principles of the movement (incident of May 10 is case in point). In the same context, they (independents) accused Adl Wal Ihsane and Annahj of leading alliances within the movement with the aim of taking the Moroccan people to the abyss.

The reaction to the proposed plan in Casablanca put the idea of centralization at rest and the initiative was defeated. Independents argue that the movement should not have a dominant group (*لا للهيمنة و نحن مع الاستقلالية*). Independents activists outside Casablanca lamented that they refused to be part of a movement that may fall into the trap of a monopoly or a group think mentality. Two activists from Meknes stated that, “we don’t have a herd mentality and we do not want to follow the calculations of the left, it failed historically so it need to correct its path without trying to take over the movement*—*لا نريد ان تكون لدينا عقلية القطيع و نتبع حسابات اليسار فقد فشل تاريخيا و عليه ان يصبح مسارة دون الهيمنة على الحركة." In an interview with *Rue89*, co-founder and activist in Rabat Tansikiyat Ossama Elkhalfi responded to the question about ‘*noyau dur*’ stating, “*on ne peut pas recréer le noyau dur du mouvement. Je suis contre. Par contre, nous allons faire pression lors des assemblées générales pour remettre le Mouvement sur les rails*—*we cannot recreate « noyau dur »*. In contrast, we are going to exert pressure during general

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756 Translation by the author of this study.
assemblies to put the movement back on track. This is a testimony that the experience of ‘noyau dur’ experience cannot be replicated and that the idea of movement centrality is farfetched. When respondents of this research were asked about their perspective on ‘noyau dur,’” surprisingly, their response included five recurring themes:

- The organizations still have a role
- Guardianship
- The statements are from all areas
- There was an agreement on the demands and not on ideology
- Coordination was for the defense of the demands

These five themes emphasize the decentralized and autonomous nature of Tansikiyats: no to guardianship, structures do not have a role, regions produce their own communiqués, agreement was on movement’s claims and not ideology, and coordination (Tansik-تنسيق) was to defend the demands of the movement. To be clear, Tansikiyats share movement values, link their local struggle with larger struggle for political change through transforming local power relations. To that, freelance journalist Omar Radi affirms that the strength of February 20 resides in its openness, fluidity, and local character. 758 Desrues agrees. This local character is embedded in the ability of Tansikiyats to organize locally rather than rely on pre-existing structures to mobilize. Desrues writes, “les slogans généralistes à portée nationale côtoyant les revendications à caractère local.” 759 Tansikiyats extended master frames and translated them into effective slogans locally. 760 In sum, Tansikiyats constantly engage in re-contextualization processes through strategic framing effort. Roggeband’s research on women against violence movements supports

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758 Interview with free lance journalist Omar Radi in late October, 2013
759 Desrues (2012).
760 Translation by the author of this study.
this notion.\(^{761}\) Also, Langman and Morris emphasize that movement ideologies, and strategies are continuously ‘renegotiated and rearticulated’ in various public spaces.\(^{762}\)

**Tansikiyats: Decentralized, Networked, yet Framing Matters**

By taking a decentralized approach, *February 20* activists were quite aware of the limitations of a centralized approach to protest. The goal behind the decentralized approach is to promote grassroots participation (الطبقات الشعبية) which has been absent in social movements in Morocco. Four activists from Tangiers note that "الهدف هو بناء الوعي السياسي لدى الطبقة المهمشة و جيل الشباب الصاعد، فانتخابات 2007 برهنت على العزوف و على تردي الوضع السياسي في البلاد، فحركة 20 فبراير جاءت لتوقف هذه الاطباق و تعطي نفسا جديدا للشباب و المواطن المغربي لهذا الطابع المحلي للحرك كان ضروريا، الغرض كذالك لم يكن بناء النواة الصلبة لأن التعددية و اختلاف المكونات لن يسمح بذلك و الشباب كان يرفض التحكم و الالتفاف على الحركة و خدمة املصالح الضيقة." — "the goal is to build political awareness among the marginalized class and the younger generation, elections of 2007 demonstrated youth apathy and the deterioration of the political situation in the country, so *February 20* came to awaken these dormant forces and give a new sense of awareness to youth and Moroccan citizens. The local character of the movement was necessary, and the purpose of the movement is not to build a nucleus since its pluralism and differences among components would not have made it possible, and because young people refuse domination and control of a particular structure to just promote its narrow interests."\(^{763}\)

Yet, one must admit that there are trade-offs for each approach. In the case of the *February 20* movement, a decentralized approach seems to be the best suited one in order

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\(^{761}\) Roggeband (2007).


\(^{763}\) Translation of the Arabic interview into English by author of this research.
to mobilize the silent majority and differentiate the *February 20* movement from previous protests Morocco has witnessed in the past. The trade-off here is lack of professionalization, leadership, and division of labor. For instance, post-referendum period (July 1, 2011), there was a debate about the strategic goal of the movement between Adl Wal Ihsane and the rest of the components of the movement. Also, activists (particularly independents) started to complain about the ambiguity and lack of clarity within the movement (for more on centralized and decentralized movement see Zald and Ash, 1966; Freeman, 1983). With a decentralized approach, *February 20* activists ultimately acknowledge the constraints, trade-offs, and the costly aspect of action. Therefore, connections and interactions were necessary to share practices, advice, and technical input. The process of diffusion of ideas and practices through loose and interpersonal networks (offline) and virtual ones (online) also generate new networks and expand existing ones. Yet, processes of importing ideas, and experiences to the local context required engaging in “strategic framing effort.” Tansikiyats engaged in “framing processes to overcome difference among them.” As extensively analyzed in chapter three, framing was necessary to transform, translate, and align ideas with local realities. From their perspective, Krinsky and Crossley see framing language as using network-like metaphors and view the practice of ‘frame bridging’ as an example. Also, master frames of justice and injustice traveling through *February 20* Tansikiyats were crucial in motivating for action (motivational frames). Krinsky and Crossley’s research shows that “diffusion of master frames” was important to demand

765 Roggeland (2007).
group rights in 1960s and 1970s; they further make a compelling case for traveling frames through “networks of interrelated activists.”

Previous chapters of this study show how frames were extended, amplified and bridged. *February 20* figures such as L7aked (movement rapper), Youness Benkhdim (movement poet), and Ahmed Sanussi known as Bziz serve as ‘bridge leaders’ who unofficially play a role in connecting activists across Morocco through music lyrics, poetry, and comedy. An example of this, is when L7aked song “kelab dawla—كلاب الدولة” was released portraying police and government forces as dogs. The portrayal of police as dogs was a metaphoric image of framing injustice and Makhzani repression and brutality. Another song with a strong message against Makhzani injustice is titled “Magharaba 3eekou—المغاربة عيقو Moroccans wake-up!” As a counter to L7aked, the Makhzan utilized a rapper named “Don bigg” to propagate a song “mabghitch—I don’t want” conveying the message that I don’t want to happened in Egypt and Tunisia to happen in my country. Bigg’s song did not gain traction given that his aunt is a member of parliament and the advisor to PAM.

On his part, *February 20* poet Youness Benkhdim used poetry as a means to connect with activists. Benkhdim’s poetry was in Moroccan dialect and classical Arabic, which shows his ability to connect with educated and illiterate segments of society. He

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767 Krinsky and Crossley (2014).
768 The song resulted in detaining L7aked and sentencing him to one year in Casablanca prison. The official charges against him were not about the song, but that he insulted a public officer (a police officer). The basic idea is that the Makhzan does not want to make of L7hakd a political prisoner which will make him a hero and a model for other activists across the country. The link to the song received about 509,202 views on youtube: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYkw14Q3w28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYkw14Q3w28).
769 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TgCVBUtCtCk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TgCVBUtCtCk). This song received about 339,409 views in Youtube.
770 Don Bigg’s real name is Taoufik Hazib the new of Milouda Hazib who the advisor to the Party of Authenticity and Modernity founded by the King’s best friend Fouad Ali Himma in 2007. Few years ago, Don Bigg was among the rising star in using lyrics to criticize social and political situation in Morocco. Over the years however, he brought his position to that closer to the Makhzan. During February 20 protests, Don Bigg became an opponent to L7aked trying to discredit him as an artist.
recites “الائم بغضب وحرقتهم انكم لا غابر ون” “with the anger of nations, and their disappointment, you will disappear” what Benkhdim is referring to is that people’s anger will turn on you one day (you meaning the Makhzan). He adds, أولاد القحبة، سفاحون، قادون—sons of b*^&^&^, bloodthirsty, pimps.” The words of Benkhdım’s poetry are in Moroccan dialect and their vulgarity conveys anger and accentuates Makhzan’s negative image, its injustice and lack of dignity. Unfortunately, both Al7ked and Benkhdim were arrested and given a one year jail sentence. Comedian Bžiz used his political sarcasm and satire to describe political stagnation in Morocco. Bžiz participated in protest, and expressed his views in public as well as performing in events organized in support of the February 20 movement. His skits were recorded and posted on Youtube and facebook. Because of his political activism, Bžiz is banned from appearing on TV or government owned theatres, and universities. Bžiz represents a generation that witnessed the “years of lead” of 1980s and 1990s. Through his political sarcasm, Bžiz connected with the younger generation as well as older one. In light of this, ‘bridge leaders’ played a crucial role in this study.

Robnett effectively theorized the role of ‘bridge leaders’ in Civil Rights movement.772

The above analysis demonstrates that Tansikiyats are connected both online and offline (loose social networks). These connections provide ideas and information however Tansikiyats framed them in the local context to give legitimacy to their action. While Tansikiyats are a model of localized collective action that addresses the local problems, their localism has also a universal aspect of social movements. Tansikiyats

771 Youness Benkhdim poetry recited during protests in public space then posted on Youtube by activists: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ox6l01lkbpk
local activism is manifested in a way that link to broader politics that contest the balance of power and promote counter-hegemonic possibilities.

For activists, local activism is important to introducing by-standers and the silent majority to politics that foster status quo and political opportunities that challenge it. Local activism also brings with it the notion of particularism. Nevertheless, Harvey’s writings on local associations in the U.S. illustrate how “communities are imagined and constructed opens possibilities for broader counter hegemonic platforms.” The conclusion here is that activists connect the particular (local issues) to universal values of justice and dignity (master frames) without compromising the independence and autonomy of Tansikiyats. Connecting the local with the universal (justice frame) promotes “imagined solidarities” (Bayat, 2005), and builds a “networked society” (Castells, 2000) and “communities” (Harvey, 2000). This connection requires an effective articulation of how hegemonic system contributes to local problems. On this, I recall Harvey’s dialectical approach to particularism and universality, he notes “…universality always exists in relation to particularity; neither can be separated from the other even though they are distinctive moments within our conceptual operations and practical engagements.”

One cannot also overlook the role loose networks played in learning and exchange of ideas about justice, injustice, power, and hegemony. Narratives from interviews reveal that non-Islamists and independent activists’ identification with movement claims and values was stronger when issues were framed locally (local appropriation) and within

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773 See chapter three on Tansikiyats which can be viewed as communities, sites of solidarities, and site of inventions…etc. I also subscribe to Harvey notion on community as not a thing, but “…a process of coming together.”
justice and injustice frames. For instance, they reported that when protests were about the lack of service delivery, corruption and how it manifests locally, and about releasing activists who were detained. Another example of local appropriation was in Marrakesh, when activists chanted “حنا مغلربة ماشي اوباش—we are Moroccans, not savages.” In Al-hoceima, activists chanted (سوا اليوم ولاغدا، الحكامة ولابدا—either today or tomorrow, governance is necessary). The reference here is to need for local governance and accountability.

Tansikiyats translated movement master frames in a manner that resonates with people and aligned with local realities. Exploring this line of thinking, Fuchs argues that “protest networks produce knowledge and common values.” While decentralized, February 20 Tansikiyats act and react within the universal framework of Ardiya Taassisiya. Social networks were instrumental in facilitating cooperation and collective intelligence –that is “a form of communication and co-operation” or a “form of distributed intelligence constantly enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective mobilization of skills.”

Chapter Summary

In sum, February 20 activists strategically understood that having a “center” would prove difficult as ideological and generational differences become problematic, pressure to conform surfaces, and contradiction for what the movement stands for (non-ideological) would discourage newcomers and by-standers from joining the protest in

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775 King Hassan II called people of Marrakesh, Al-Hoceima, Nador, and Ksar kabir “اوباش—savages” in his speech 1984 as there were riots because of price increases. See speech at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bzo5QX_DvUU
Tansikiyats. Also, the decentralized approach demonstrates a level of consciousness among activists to breakdown the notion of Makhzan’s approach to vertical control. This is because Moroccan Makhzan mostly relies on the vertical solidarities to control the populace and break the establishment of horizontal solidarities.

The analysis also found that decentralization and autonomy of February 20 Tansikiyats were important in legitimizing the movement, regaining access to public space not only in major cities such as Casablanca and Rabat, but also in deeper Morocco (العميق المغرب). Understanding February 20 requires consideration of its micro context and its different political, social-economic realities.\textsuperscript{779} Clearly, local context matters “le lieu compte.”\textsuperscript{780} While recognizing these elements, Tansikiyats were connected in various ways through online and offline social networks. As previously indicated, Tansikiyats did not depend on networks to construct meaning as framing alignment and resonance was necessary for mobilization. While the benefits of networks (both formal and informal) are well-documented, more research is needed to study how they are maintained over time, and evaluated are areas that merit further exploration. Also, more research if needed to further investigate various influences ‘virtual space,’ and ‘online connections and networks’ play in motivation and participation in collective action.


\textsuperscript{780} Mernissi (2011).
CONCLUSION

Since its inception, *February 20* has achieved many objectives which could be summarized by the following: 1) *February 20* re-energized a new generation of activists (from youth, Amazigh, Islamists, independents, and leftists) that political parties have left behind, 2) helped Moroccans return to and reclaim the public space (احتلال المجال العام), 3) re-introduced a culture of protest (ترسيخ ثقافة الاحتجاج), and 4) for the first time in Morocco, activists raised the ceiling of their demands to reduce the king’s powers, and helped move the debate about reforms from conceptualization to a practical and realistic political dialogue (استطاعت هذه الحركة الاحتجاجية أن تخلق حراكا سياسيا واجتماعيا كبيرا، وان تفتح حورا حول أوراش الانتقال الديمقراطي). *February 20* movement brought about hope for the Moroccan people.

 Particularly, it became a beacon of hope and an asset that Moroccans gained through their struggle.

في ذكرى 20 فبراير .. جمعيات تُصدر كُتيبًا يستعيد إرث الحركة: http://www.hespress.com/politique/254989.html

February 20 Movement is "an asset and a symbol of struggle that must be owned by the Moroccan people, and it is a shining light in Moroccan people’s struggle for freedom, democracy, and the fight against tyranny. It is an event in which protesters exposed public authorities crisis and inability in managing political, economic, social and cultural affairs.

The demands were clear and realistic as they include claims to end corruption, tyranny, rentier economy (اقتصاد الريع), give power to citizens to elect their representatives, and the inclusion of youth and marginalized groups in politics. In sum, *February 20* broke the
silence of a forgotten majority as it continues to advocate for a democratic project, and demand an end to status quo politics. \footnote{Mokhtar Benabdalaoui, professor and the president of MADA center in Casablanca. Discussion in early November 2013.}

The *February 20* movement was able to contribute to the fundamental shift in how Moroccans view themselves (from passive subjects to citizens). This concept of citizenship exemplified in having the courage to challenge the state and break down the chains of fear (كسر جدار الخوف) and revive a sense of confidence and awakened the spirit of resistance. The *February 20* movement introduced new language in the public sphere (I am a citizen, I have rights—انا مواطن و لدي حقوق). The bottom-up approach of *February 20* reinvigorated citizens’ interest (particularly youth) to engage in politics and demands more. A Facebook page of the Alliance for *February 20* Youth, had a post on Abdelhamid Amine’s comment on *February 20* movement stating that “*February 20* still constitute the hope for democracy for the Moroccan people—مازالت حركة 20 فبراير تشكل الامل الديمقراطي للشعب المغربي.” \footnote{Hassan Tariq is a Member of Parliament and an academic scholar in Morocco.}

In the words of Hassan Tariq, the movement helped structure political life in Morocco (الحركة حدث مهيكل للحياة السياسية). Overall, with this research, I aim to expand our knowledge about the *February 20* movement through the narratives of its Tansikiyats. Though the debate as to what accounts for the movement being a movement or a dynamiya as many argued, the consensus in the literature holds that *February 20* is a movement despite the fact that its goal was not a to bring down the regime. Regardless of what the motives are for Adl Wal Ihsane’s participation and exit from the movement, its contribution to the intensity of the
movement was evident. The frame of ‘haraka jamhiriya’ declined which an indication that Adl Wal Ihsane played a role in the movement. In the beginning of this study, I did not expect that the debate about Adl Wal Ihsane role’s would be of importance, yet by the end I was convinced that the debate was not just about the important role of Adl Wal Ihsane, but also about how Adl Wal Ihsane’s exit underscored the leftist parties’ (opposition) incapability to create a narrative or a framework for how to move forward without a major component (Adl Wal Ihsane).

Throughout this study, I attempted to shed light on non-structural elements that the movement Tansikiyats utilized to lead protest, organize when they chose to, yet be part of the umbrella of February 20. I frame my analysis by positing a great deal on subjective elements particularly emotions that Tansikiyats built on for frames resonance and transform the by-standers to sympathizers and participants. While rational factors are important and must be accounted for; many scholars particularly Europeans have delved into that extensively to explain the February 20 movement, its position vis-à-vis the Makhzan and vise versa. The aforementioned chapters presented the reader with analytical and informative details about the February 20 movement, but from the perspective of activists within its Tansikiyats. While there are various ways to study the movement, it was imperative to provide an analytical lens from within to interpret how movement Tansikiyats are important, decentralized, autonomous, and yet they are the February 20 movement. In addition to examining activists’ narratives and the story they tell about the February 20 movement. Throughout the analysis, I found evidence that the February 20 movement did not build on existing formal structures, yet used the
emotional reservoirs and grievances from previous protests to build momentum locally. These findings make it plausible to think that February 20 Tansikiyats understand that the political opportunity presented by the Arab Spring and availability of resources would not have been enough to organize and mobilize masses to the street, and that how issues are framed matter more in mobilization. This analysis also brings forth the possibility that different components of the movement can coalesce around issues and putting aside their ideological stances.

Of greatest importance is the fact that the findings in this dissertation not only have implications for Morocco, but they have implications for various components of the movement including youth. This provides evidence that academia must take into account decentralized and leaderless movement when studying any academic question focusing on collective action, and recent mobilization that emerged within the context of the Arab Spring. More importantly, outside of academia, decision-makers must take into account that protests embody dormant forces which can be activated with a political opportunity and the importance of the issue (Daniel Glavan affair is case in point), and note that youth are more likely to be concerned with social policy, thus to be representative. As we see further political transitions in authoritarian countries, advocacy for an increase in citizens particularly youth participation in policy input should open-up the space for participatory approach to politics.

Future research should look at why the February 20 movement chose the path of not demanding “down with the regime” and put the ceiling of the demands to ending

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784 The Daniel Galvan affair refers to the pardon the King Mohamed VI granted to a serial children rapist. See note details on the affair provided in the first chapter.
corruption, new constitution, and new elections… etc), why the *February 20* movement chose a localized and a self-limiting approach to protest, why youth advanced a prognostic frame that is vague—نريد التغيير—we want to change without specifying what kind of change is needed beside the demands outlined in its “*Ardiya Taassissiya.*” It also falls on the responsibility of other scholars to determine whether self-limiting approach to collective action constitutes self-awareness and limitations of what can or cannot be achieved, or whether political culture (notion of attentisme) impacted the approach of the *February 20* movement. The country examined here is a monarchy. Future analyses should also take into account the possibility of how the *February 20* movement components entered into agreement may have affected the way they behave once they partook or supported the movement.

My focus here was mainly on understanding the movement through the perspective of activists within Tansikiyats representing various components of the movement. I did not explore political culture’s effects on the choices of the movement or its components. This study has shed light on the missing stories, thus adding to the literary publications and bibliography articles on collective action in MENA region.
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