Four Years After 11 September: What Can 'Conflict Resolution' Possibly Tell Us About Terrorism?

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INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the catastrophic attacks of 11 September 2001, the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University -- located not too far from one of the targets, the Pentagon -- convened a meeting of its faculty to discuss "what could we do?" in response to what seemed to be a new form of terrorism; i.e., where the attackers were, for religious and other reasons, prepared to give up their own lives in the infliction of massive death and destruction on "soft targets".

Some at that meeting declared that there was nothing we could do. Clearly, we could not deal with the obvious "law-and-order" issues of protecting passengers on airliners and at airports, retrofitting impenetrable cockpit doors on airliners, tracking down other terrorists who might conduct future attacks, and the like.

What we could do, however -- and this was my view -- was enhance our understanding of the motivation for such attacks and our capability as a field to recommend long-term as well as shorter-term responses to the "new" terrorism. One immediate consequence of this view was that I established the Working Group on War, Violence, and Terrorism at ICAR to provide an institutional basis for faculty, students, and others to come together to generate responses to the question of what we as a field could do to better understand and respond to global terrorism.¹

On the occasion of this special issue of Social Justice: Anthropology, Peace and Human Rights, which follows right on the heels of the devastating attacks on London (7 July 2005) and Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt (23 July 2005), I thought it would be useful to revisit the question: "what can we in Conflict Resolution do in response to the new terrorism?"

In contrast to surveying only the relevant multidisciplinary literature and trying to assemble it in a coherent manner for ease of readership, I thought that I would try a more interactive approach on this occasion. As a point of departure for revisiting the question, I
decided to use the insights generated by a special meeting of recipients of Hewlett Foundation funds, held at John Jay College, in New York City, during 21-23 March 2002, to address three related questions: (1) "What do we [in the field of Conflict Resolution] know?" (2) "What don't we know?" And (3) "How can we find out?" The answers to these questions, against the background of existing knowledge in the field, provide insightful responses to the question we are revisiting here after the London and Sharm el Sheikh attacks, not to mention the growing insurgency in Iraq where suicide bombing has become the dominant modus operandi of anti-occupation protest.

**WHAT WE (THINK WE) KNOW IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

First of all, we in the field -- variously conceptualized as, among others, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), conflict and peace studies, conflict resolution, community relations, dispute settlement -- are characterized by one dominant, overriding paradigm despite all the other differences that may separate us: a belief in the proposition that there are credible alternatives to people killing one another over their differences. We adhere to this proposition *ideologically*, even in the face of stark evidence that such alternatives may not actually exist; are not known; or if they are, are not being employed in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Northern Ireland, Southern Africa, or in other conflict zones (including here at home in the U.S.).

Part of the "field's" *ideology* is another proposition: that despite major differences at least in the scale and "appearance" of conflicts at, for example, the interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, and international levels, there are profound similarities of "process," not just in the causal development of violent conflicts at those levels, but also in how potential third parties deal with them. We also continue to argue this point, often in the face of a lack of obvious empirical confirmation.

It is with a profound sense of gratification, therefore, that I can report, based on my experience of the aforementioned meeting of recipients of Hewlett Foundation funds at John Jay College during 21-23 March 2002, that both statements -- normally a part of the *ideology* of conflict resolution -- received a good deal of empirical confirmation, with implications for what the field has to say about the "new" terrorism.

On the evening of the first day of the Hewlett conference, Thursday, there were warm welcomes extended by Dr. Maria Volpe of John Jay College; Hewlett Foundation conflict resolution program director Melanie Greenberg, Esq., and the former and current directors of ICAR, Drs. Sandra Cheldelin and Sara Cobb, respectively. This was followed by dinner and presentations on hostage negotiation by three members of the New York Police Department (NYPD) and one FBI agent.

During the next day, Friday, there were presentations by people of faith in the morning discussing conflict and conflict resolution in their religious communities and in the afternoon, by
a group of distinguished diplomats at the UN, addressing their experiences at the international level.

Finally, on Saturday, we had, among other things, a discussion of how the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001 have affected how we think, teach about, conduct research and practice in the field: themes which are especially relevant to the question being revisited in this article. We were then privileged by a presentation by one of the parents of the field, Professor Morton Deutsch, in which he shared his thoughts about developments in the field over the past 50 years.

Following most of these sessions, the attendees broke up into small, facilitated discussion groups, with NGO, ADR and community relations colleagues being thrown together with lawyers, environmental conflict resolution practitioners, university professors, and others, to discuss and respond to the three main questions of the conference: (1) What do we know? (2) What don't we know? And (3) How can we find out?

From these small-group sessions as well as the conference presentations, I experienced a deep sense of a meeting of minds across multiple levels -- an example of what I felt compelled to call "exquisite synergy". For instance, on the issues of (a) alternatives to the use of violence in solving problems and (b) generic problemsolving processes -- again, often expressed as components of conflict resolution ideology -- the four hostage negotiators set the stage by making comments such as:

-- "when we experience failure, it is because we have deviated from the basics;
-- "there is a commonality of process across situations";
-- "the process brings all the disciplines together"; and
-- "all crisis situations are both unique and generic, hence, the need for, and utility of theory."

The hostage negotiators also mentioned that often "these guys [and nearly all hostage-takers are males; hence, the importance of gender²] just need someone to talk to," which is very revealing of their need for satisfying relationships. When violated or otherwise unfulfilled, the need for positive relationships can lead to the high stress hostage situation. The negotiators remarked, therefore, that communication is very important and, as part of that, the need to listen and to be empathetic, as well as to be able to develop trust and credibility in the process (e.g., "don't lie").

Implicit here was the importance of perception: knowing not only how hostage-takers perceive hostage negotiators, but how they perceive themselves. Also, the need to be proactive,
to have *mechanisms* in place, and as part of that, the need for appropriate *training* for hostage negotiators to know how and when (and hence, the importance of *timing*) to develop trust in a relationship-building and maintaining process that *empowers* the hostage-taker to communicate effectively his *grievances* without killing his hostages as a further symbol of frustration-generating nonresolution.  

The hostage negotiators made one further important point: "we are not problemsolvers!" The implication here was that to conduct a *comprehensive intervention* into the lives and social spaces of hostage-takers requires more than the use of police officers trained to negotiate a peaceful surrender. In other words, hostage negotiation is, can, or should be part of a more comprehensive strategy, involving a series of *coordinated*, sequenced interventions: a process which Ron Fisher (1997, Ch. 8) refers to as a *contingency approach*.

Most of these themes, particularly the power of perception (*class*-based) and the needs to be proactive, to have relationships and mechanisms in place to empower the disempowered, and to develop trust -- all in the pursuit of *justice* and *reconciliation* -- were also mentioned by the faith-based group, comprising Jews, Christians, African- and European-Americans, women and men. They also mentioned the role of *relative deprivation* in the etiology of *class-based conflict* (see Gurr, 1970) and what might be called a *"knowledge deficit"*: that good intentions to the contrary, some people may not know what to do with, or in a complex conflict situation. This, of course, relates to the need -- also stressed by the hostage negotiators -- for appropriate training. In the faith-based case, however, it was for counseling, the "ABCs of conflict resolution," and coalition and consensus building.

A major common theme expressed by the diplomats and others working at the international level was that, "no one actor can do it all." This was also implied by the hostage negotiators: the need for coordination among many different actors, each enacting a role that is a relevant part of an integrated whole. Among those actors in the European setting, for example, are international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), plus nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as International Alert (IA) which is based in London and Search for Common Ground (SFCG) which is based in Brussels, Belgium as well as in Washington, DC.

In effect, according to Dr. Hal Saunders, one of the architects of the Camp David Accords agreed to by Israelis and Egyptians during the Carter administration, "Governments can negotiate peace treaties, but only people can make peace. ... Don't expect the military to provide political solutions. There is a need, therefore, for a cumulative, multilevel, multiactor, open-ended process to transform relationships."

Apropos the common theme of timing, the diplomats mentioned that "pressure often
leads to very bad decisions"; e.g., the "CNN effect" or the public impact of TV showing the suffering of civilians and others. According to Swedish Ambassador (to the U.S.) Jan Eliasson: "CNN got the UN involved in Somalia and then got the U.S. and the UN out of Somalia."

The diplomats also emphasized the needs to be proactive, have mechanisms in place, develop personal trust, have dialogue, and to listen to "all voices." In this regard, Dr. Hal Saunders (1999) discussed his well-known five-stage process of sustained dialogue. One additional, theoretical point made poignantly by Dr. Saunders was that the traditional paradigm governing international relations, Realpolitik or "Political Realism," offers insights and is useful for those occasions when the use of force is justified (e.g., Rwanda in mid-April 1994. See Dallaire, 2004). Realpolitik is not, however, "realistic" or large enough to "capture the complexity" of the whole body politic (see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 6).

The discussion of the impact of 9/11 on how we think about, teach, do research, and practice in the field generated themes such as: despite the present U.S. administration's obvious contempt for multilateralism, there is, according to Dr. David Hamburg, a need for "extensive, sophisticated cooperation," to prevent failing states from failing further, to help them develop into peaceful democracies, and to eliminate poverty worldwide: a breeding ground for "catastrophic terrorism" (see Hamburg, 2002). Also mentioned, by Ms. Fatima Shama, was the necessity to deal with stereotypes and hate crimes committed against Arab and Muslim Americans in the wake of 9/11, and the role of gender (mentioned earlier by the hostage negotiators) in the "internal clash of civilizations" among Muslim Americans: a theme very much relevant to the concerns of British Muslims in the wake of the July 2005 bombings in London.

In general, this discussion emphasized that, given the events and aftermath of 9/11, it would be unethical as well as impractical to allow conditions of "massive disparities" and hate worldwide to continue. Also, it was "no longer [only] a matter of ultra humanitarianism for the rich countries of the world" to be concerned with the North-South divide, that they had to redefine their national interest away from a "male"-based Realpolitik emphasis only on "us," toward an Idealpolitik emphasis on "all of us" (including "them").

Finally, in his overview of developments in the field over the last 50 years, Professor Morton Deutsch shared with us nine questions that the field addresses, overlapping with many of the themes generated in the earlier presentations and discussions:

(1) What are the conditions that give rise to a destructive or constructive process of conflict resolution? (Themes: absence or presence of proactive problemsolving mechanisms; negative vs. positive perceptions [e.g., presence or absence of stereotypes]; fractured vs. fulfilling relationships; absence or presence of effective communication processes; dominance of Realpolitik vs. Idealpolitik [or a mix of] paradigms; presence or absence of relative deprivation and frustration-based anger.)
(2) What circumstances, strategies, and tactics allow one party to do better than others? \( (\text{Themes: } \text{training; education; class.}) \)

(3) What determines the nature of agreements that the parties are able to reach? \( (\text{Themes: } \text{training; education; class; timing.}) \)

(4) How can third parties be used to prevent conflicts from becoming destructive? \( (\text{Themes: } \text{training; education; timing; use of dialogue processes to facilitate communication, listening, building of trust, shifting from Realpolitik toward Idealpolitik perspectives [or at least to a more comprehensive paradigm which includes elements of both], empowerment, improved relationships, and pursuit of justice.}) \)

(5) How can people be educated to manage their conflicts more constructively? \( (\text{Themes: } \text{sensitivity to costs associated with adherence solely to Realpolitik paradigm; modeling of constructive behavior by others; training; university undergraduate and graduate programs.}) \)

(6) When and how should third parties intervene in a protracted conflict? \( (\text{Theme: timing: intervening proactively "before the house burns down."}) \)

(7) Why/how do ethnic, religious, and [other] identity conflicts frequently take on a protracted, destructive character? \( (\text{Theme: class and other identity group-based disparities, relative deprivation and frustration-based anger.}) \)

(8) How applicable to other cultural contexts are theories and processes developed in the U.S. and Western Europe? \( (\text{Theme: generic processes.}) \)

(9) Oppressive power: How do we overcome it? \( (\text{Themes: judicious use of Realpolitik-based force when conditions warrant, but only as part of a more comprehensive strategy that allows for the subsequent pursuit of Idealpolitik-based justice for all concerned in any particular relational structure [see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 7].}) \)

Professor Deutsch also noted: "We don't have enough knowledge to deal with the problems we will face in the future (e.g., water shortages). \( (\text{Theme: knowledge deficit.}) \)

Taking all of the above into account, and noting what research methodologists label as "triangulation" -- the phenomenon of overlapping, similar findings or themes generated by different methods or sources (see Brewer and Hunter, 1989) -- it seems clear to me that the "exquisite synergy" flowing out of this two-day meeting of the minds across levels conduces to the further development and refinement of theory, especially with regard to conflict handling, management, resolution and transformation, again with implications for understanding and dealing with terrorism.
This refined sense of theory comprises, for domestic and international conflicts, the following steps that disputants and third parties can take when seeking, or facilitating recognition of, alternatives to the use of violence in settling differences:

1. Establishing, further developing, and maintaining proactive mechanisms at all levels: in effect, responding to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's claim that "wars [and violent conflicts at other levels, including their terrorist manifestations] occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232).

2. Initiating, in the short term and at the most appropriate points in time, training and dialogue processes to facilitate communication, trust- and credibility-building, the surfacing of all voices, development of empathy, surfacing of negative perceptions (stereotypes), a shifting from Realpolitik toward Idealpolitik perspectives (or at least to a more comprehensive paradigm that includes elements of both [see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 8]), and eventually reconciliation.

3. Initiating, in the middle to long term and at the most appropriate points in time, processes to manage and reduce economic and other resource disparities between classes, ethnic, religious and other identity groups within and between states, in order to manage and reduce relative deprivation and frustration-based anger and violent conflict; ultimately improving and further developing long-term relationships by achieving and maintaining significant degrees of social justice for all concerned in any particular relational system.

4. As part of these short-, middle- and long-term processes, developing and maintaining carefully monitored and coordinated coalitions across class, ethnic, racial, religious, organizational, national, regional, and other identity lines to ensure that everything is working as intended; and if not, to make the appropriate tactical adjustments or strategic shifts.

The further development and refinement of theory emanating from the "exquisite synergy" of the two-day conference also included a generic sense of elements that contribute to the etiology of violent conflict, including the suicide bombings carried out by the four British-born Muslims in London on 7 July 2005:

1. Absence of proactive problem-solving mechanisms (e.g., effective training, communication, monitoring and early warning processes);

2. Dominance of male gender (and patriarchy);

3. Dominance of Realpolitik thinking and behavior;

4. Negative perceptions (stereotypes);
fractured relationships;

class and other identity group-based economic and other disparities (absence of justice);

absence of constructive empowerment options (perceived or actual) for those experiencing disparities and injustice; and consequently,

felt relative deprivation and frustration-based anger.

APPLYING WHAT WE KNOW (THE EIGHT COMMON THEMES) TO THE "NEW" TERRORISM

A cursory examination of the relationship between "Western Civilization" (the North) and the Islamic world (the South) in terms of these eight common themes, against the background of the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001, reveals the following:

[1] There is an absence of effective problem-solving mechanisms to deal with North-South issues, although some might feel that the UN, World Bank and IMF already fulfill this need. Given the massive protests that confront meetings of these international organizations, however, it is clear that improvements can be made in this area. For example, there are no positive relationship-building (peacebuilding) mechanisms to deal with Islamic-Western "civilizational" or Israeli-Palestinian concerns. Perhaps as a consequence, hijacked airliners have careened into skyscrapers and Palestinian teenagers have blown themselves up in order to get their voices heard.

[2] The dominance of male gender and patriarchy is significant as, more and more, it is clear that, worldwide, most acts of violence are committed by males 15-29 years of age: a demographic group that is increasing in the South (see Hudson, et al., 1999, p. 81; Kaplan, 2001; Barash, 2002). All 19 of the hijackers who took over the four aircraft on 11 September 2001 were male, as are most (but not all) Palestinian suicide bombers. As indicated by Lerner (2002), one of the hijackers, Mohammed Atta, apparently was not "male enough" in the eyes of his father (also see Kimmel, 2002), which may have contributed to his participation in what for him and others was undoubtedly an act of great sacrifice and heroism.

[3] The dominance of Realpolitik thinking and behavior is as clear in the actions of the 19 hijackers of 11 September 2001 as it is in the post-911 actions of the Bush administration. It is also as clear in the actions of Palestinian suicide bombers as it is in Israeli responses. In other words, at various levels, we are witnessing an escalation in confrontational, lethal, "bite-and-counterbite" behaviors where, at the end of the day, everyone is worse off than they were at the beginning: conflict-as-process has come to overwhelm and overtake conflict-as-startup conditions, so that, at any point in time, it does not matter "who threw the first punch," because
the process itself, more than the deep-rooted causes and conditions, drive the conflict. The conflict has become self-stimulating and self-perpetuating (see Sandole, 1999). Hence, the conclusion that John Vasquez (1993) has drawn from his comprehensive assessment of scientific studies of war, that Realpolitik makes war (and by implication, terrorism) more, rather than less, likely!

[4] There are clearly negative stereotypes at work in the relationships between North and South, "Western Civilization" and Islamic Civilization, Israelis and Palestinians. "Racial profiling" has taken on new meaning in post-911 America, where hate-crimes and detentions without trial have been recorded, or are feared, at new levels (see Pierre, 2002). Profiling has also been occurring in normally liberal, humanistic Western European countries, where far-right, anti-immigrant politicians have recently been scoring impressive electoral gains (see Applebaum, 2002). In the Russian Federation, in addition to the war in Chechnya, white supremacist groups are attacking anyone of "dark" complexion: among others, Chechen, Azerbaijani, and Tajik Muslims; but also Jews, Indians, Africans, and even fellow Christian Armenians (see Baker, 2002).

Not only has the global "War on Terror" succeeded in replacing the post-Cold War development of a multipolar system with a new bipolar system -- terrorists vs. the rest of us -- but it has also created a new bipolar ethnic/religious/racial system -- Arabs vs. non-Arabs, Muslims vs. non-Muslims -- which enhances the more traditional bipolar economic divide between "have-nots" and "haves," and indeed, the ultimate trap: the development of a "Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington, 1993, 1996)!

[5] Given the above, fractured relationships clearly exist between the North and the South, Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, in one variant of the Muslim/non-Muslim relationship, Pakistan and India have been threatening to go to war over Kashmir in a way that includes use of nuclear weapons:

Although the current South Asian crisis seems to have ebbed, the underlying dynamic remains. The next flare-up will be even more dangerous if the region's nuclear confrontation develops in the same direction as the U.S.-Russian standoff -- with nuclear missiles on alert, aimed at each other and ready to launch on warning (Mian, Rajaraman and von Hipel, 2002).

[6] As is commonly heard in the popular culture use of American English, one does not have to be a "rocket scientist" to realize that there are profound, identity group-based economic and other disparities, and an overall lack of justice, in the fractured relationships between North and South, non-Muslims and Muslims, non-Arabs and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, as was reported over 20 years ago by the first Brandt Commission Report (1980), "one fourth of the world's population (the North) has four-fifths of the world's income, while three-fourths of the world's population (the South) has one fifth of the world's income"
(cited in Sandole, 1999, p. 126):

In the North, the average person can expect to live for more than seventy years; he or she will rarely be hungry, and will be educated at least up to secondary level. In the countries of the South the great majority of people have a life expectancy of closer to fifty years; in the poorest countries one out of every four children dies before the age of five; one fifth or more of all the people in the South suffer from hunger and malnutrition; fifty percent have no chance to become literate (Brand Commission Report, 1980, p. 32; cited in Sandole, 1999, pp. 126-127).

Willy Brandt (1980, p. 7) basically concluded that these objective conditions of structural violence on a grand scale constitute the "great social challenge of our time. [Hence,] the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for mankind" (cited in Sandole, 1999, p. 127). It seems that, with 911, we have clearly arrived at that fateful point for Humankind!

[7] Most importantly, there is an absence of constructive empowerment mechanisms for minorities worldwide, for the South, for Palestinians, and others. And here, we may have the single most powerful explanation for, and predictor of terrorism: The absence of viable, "peaceful" alternatives to having to continue contending with humiliation, degradation and structural, cultural, and physical violence. Indeed, who ensures that the "occupied" Palestinian voice gets heard? Yasser Arafat or the suicide bomber? As Mao Tse-tung said years ago, "Power flows from the barrel of a gun." Sad, but true, especially within the setting of the dominant political paradigm, Realpolitik.

Finally, against the background and interactive accumulation of the above factors:

[8] Perceived structural violence (relative deprivation, rank disequilibrium), felt frustration and anger (rage), contribute further to the tendency for "Violence [to be] the expression of impotence grown unbearable":

Using Erikson's theory of identity formation, particularly his concept of negative identity, the late political scientist Jeanne N. Knutson (1981) suggests that the political terrorist consciously assumes a negative identity. ... In Knutson's view, terrorists engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives. Her political science-oriented viewpoint seems to coincide with the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Knutson (1984) ... carried out an extensive international research project on the psychology of political terrorism. The basic premise of terrorists whom she evaluated in depth was "that their violent acts stem from feelings of rage and hopelessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information-dissemination and policy-formation processes" (emphasis added)
(Hudson, et al., pp. 30, 34-35).

Quite simply, *triangulated* factors 1-8 make terrorism more rather than less likely.

**Applying the Overall Findings to the Middle East Conflict: A Major Source of Terrorism**

There is a photograph of Yasser Arafat on the front page of the *Washington Post* (2002a) after the Israelis lifted their one-month siege of his headquarters in Ramallah in spring 2002, that is revealing of intense rage. Held captive and hostage, isolated and occupied militarily -- in effect, marginalized not just by Israel but by the international community for half a century -- plus Ariel Sharon's assaults on refugee camps and townships: these and other aspects of Palestinian life experiences might make Arafat or any Palestinian feel that "Death is a way of life" (see Leiby, 2002).

What else might this rage lead to? For expressing one's frustration, suicide bombings might be considered an option, albeit a grim, indiscriminate one, especially for Palestinians who lack the trappings of state power possessed by Israel and used against them: F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopter gunships and tanks, not to mention the ever-present, home-destroying bulldozers. So, dispossessed, disempowered, desperate Palestinians could likely blow themselves up, killing Israelis (including children) in the process, as they have been doing, as their way to communicate their rage, to be "heard" by their occupiers and the international community at large.

In other settings, frustration-based rage has been a factor in explaining violent behaviors. And then, as expressed, for example, in the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* -- the Kerner Commission Report (1968) on urban riots in the U.S. -- long-term structural (*Idealpolitik/non-Marxist radical*) as well as short-term security (*Realpolitik*) measures are advanced to deal with that rage, so that the horribly violent behaviors do not have to repeat themselves.

But what do we see in the Middle East? Under the cover of the U.S.-led "War on Terror," Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has been reducing to rubble Palestinian residential areas already under Israeli siege or domination, preventing a UN mission from investigating possible war crimes in the Jenin refugee camp, and in the process, probably creating legions of future suicide bombers among the youth televised and photographed by the international media for all to see, digging through the rubble of their homes looking for loved ones and personal possessions. And yet both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives endorsed, overwhelmingly, Israel's military campaign to "dismantle the terrorist infrastructure" (*Washington Post*, 2002b) despite evidence of probable violations of human rights in Jenin.

As long as the deep-rooted causes of Palestinian rage are not addressed, Israel, with one of the world's most powerful armed forces, will continue to pulverize the already vanquished
who have nothing to lose -- why else would a young Palestinian girl blow herself to bits? -- enhancing rather than decimating the "terrorist infrastructure" among the Palestinians.

In the meantime, Ariel Sharon and Hamas, among others, will continue to provide the world with a negative conflict model, showing the absurd levels to which violent conflict can descend, where each day that the conflict lingers, the conflicting parties are worse off than they were the day before.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, the Middle East will continue to resemble the Balkans, with Israelis in the role of Serbs and Palestinians in the role of Bosniaks. Although each side will continue to slaughter the other, according to any "objective" standard, the dominant victims will continue to be Muslims -- not a very useful image to go forward in the post-911 world!5

CONCLUSION

We are not only talking about Muslims in the Middle East, Africa or Asia who may have this perception. According to a recent Frontline program on "Al Qaeda's New Front" (Frontline, 2005):

Home to an estimated 18 million Muslims, Western Europe has become the new and deadly battleground in the war on terror. That's because disenfranchised Muslims, inspired by local radical imams and jihadist websites are taking up the causes of jihad. And al Qaeda, once just a loose organization on the continent, has morphed into a powerful ideological movement.

"The threat is before us, not behind us," France's top antiterror judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, tells FRONTLINE. "And we are quite concerned....I think that the terrorist threat today is more globalized, more scattered, and more powerful...than it was before September 11."

What's driving the terrorism threat? Many experts in counterterrorism say it's the belief that violence is justified in order to free the Muslim world from corrupt governments and the influence of the United States and Europe. And because it is difficult for jihadists to launch an attack on U.S. cities and institutions, their focus has turned to local targets in Western Europe.

Hence, the attacks on Madrid on 11 March 2004, killing nearly 200 and injuring more than 1400 early morning commuters aboard four trains:

The key reality faced on the other side of the Atlantic is the 18 million Muslims whose ranks are expected to swell to 20 percent of Europe's population in the next
15 years. This community of immigrants who share religious and ethnic bonds has largely failed to integrate into Europe societies. Many are poor and subject to bigotry; they have lived in Europe for years and many were born there, yet often feel that they are not full members of society. This sense of alienation is deepened by the ubiquity of television with its non-stop images of their suffering brethren in Palestine, Iraq, and Chechnya. Inspired by local radical imams and jihadist Web sites, disenfranchised European Muslims are taking up the cause of jihad.

With full-scale war between the U.S. military and Islamic insurgents in Iraq -- which is just a two-and-a-half day drive from Berlin -- the reality of a war between Islam and the West is a domestic problem for Europe (ibid.).

After Madrid, we now have London. According to Inayat Bungalwala of the Muslim Council of Britain:

The scale of disenchantment amongst Muslim youth is very clear to see. Various factors are at play: underachievement in education; a high rate of unemployment; discrimination in the workplace; social exclusion, and also the government's own policies, especially in Iraq (CNN, 2005).

In Leeds, England, the friends of Shehzad Tanweer, one of the four suicide bombers of 7 July:

did not agree with what Mr. Tanweer had done, but made clear they shared the same sense of otherness, the same sense of siege, the same sense that their community, and Muslims in general [the *Umma*], were in their view helpless before the whims of greater powers. Ultimately, they understood his anger (Fattah, 2005).

The story seems to be the same no matter where one goes, including in The Netherlands where a Dutch-born Muslim man killed the well-known filmmaker Theo van Gogh (a distant relative of the famous painter), who made a film perceived by Muslims to be a sacrilege and assault to Islam:

Many [Muslim] young men [living in The Netherlands] have found an expression for their growing sense of frustration, alienation and anger in orthodox Islam. They have no use for Holland's tolerance of alternative lifestyles, or for its professional blasphemers. Last Nov. 2 a young Islamic fundamentalist, born in Amsterdam to Moroccan parents, shot Mr. Van Gogh in the street and then tried to cut off his head. In a final statement at his trial [July 2005], the murderer declared that he had killed Mr. Van Gogh for insulting the Prophet (de Winter, 2005).
This is powerful stuff: a "story" that represents all eight of the above common themes on the etiology of violent conflict and violence, including terrorism: (1) absence of appropriate problemsolving mechanisms; (2) dominance of male gender (and patriarchy); (3) dominance of Realpolitik thinking and behavior; (4) negative perceptions (stereotypes); (5) fractured relationships; (6) class and other disparities (absence of justice); (7) absence of effective empowerment options for eliminating disparities and injustice; and consequently, (8) felt relative deprivation and frustration-based anger.

So what would the field of Conflict Resolution have us do in response? Dr. Hal Saunders' wisdom, cited above, hits the nail on its head:

Governments can negotiate peace treaties, but only people can make peace. ... Don't expect the military to provide political solutions. There is a need, therefore, for a cumulative, multilevel, multiactor, open-ended process to transform relationships.

As indicated above, part of this comprehensive response comprises the following elements:

--- Initiating, in the short term and at the most appropriate points in time, training and dialogue processes to facilitate communication, trust- and credibility-building, the surfacing of all voices, development of empathy, surfacing of negative perceptions (stereotypes), a shifting from Realpolitik toward Idealpolitik perspectives (or at least to a more comprehensive paradigm that includes elements of both, and eventually reconciliation. And

--- Initiating, in the middle to long term and at the most appropriate points in time, processes to manage and reduce economic and other resource disparities between classes, ethnic, religious and other identity groups within and between states, in order to manage and reduce relative deprivation and frustration-based anger and violent conflict; ultimately improving and further developing long-term relationships by achieving and maintaining significant degrees of social justice for all concerned in any particular relational system.

Another part of this must be an internal debate within Islam about what their religion calls upon them to do, in response to what challenges, and employing what means. According to an editorial in the Financial Times (London) on precisely this point:

Common to all Islam is a doctrinal concern to build a just society and to preserve the unity of the Umma, the worldwide community of believers. That is already a powerful and appealing political combination even before the spark of belief is added. Add to it the familiar list of timeless and actual Muslim grievances, the sense of a religion under assault combined with a sense of lost glory, and what begins to emerge is a liberation theology. In its extreme form this combines a
virulent Islamist "nationalism" with a civilizational war to recover all the lands of Islam and cleanse them of the taint of the infidels and their "apostate" puppets.

It is also important to realize that the international jihadism franchised by Osama bin Laden is almost entirely a Sunni Muslim phenomenon, with its hinterland in the ossified Sunni order in the Arab countries and South and Central Asia. It remains a self-inflicted wound at the heart of Islam that the Sunni establishments for all practical purposes closed down philosophical and theological speculation in the 12th century, believing it to be divisive as well as inimical to their monopoly of power. This stifling of debate and enquiry, of curiosity and innovation, is or should be at the heart of the debate about Islam and modernity.

In our immediate debate, it requires a profound self-examination within the Muslim community in the UK and across Europe, in tandem with a re-examination of integration policy (FT, 2005).

In the meantime, Islam and movements based on it (e.g., *Hizb ut-Tahrir* or “Party of Liberation” in Britain) will remain "especially compelling [because] they articulate the fundamental anger of many British Muslims that more mainstream movements seem incapable or unwilling to discuss" (Fattah, 2005).

In this regard, we might contemplate one further thought that Prof. Deutsch left with us at the Hewlett conference, which he attributed to Frantz Fanon: "Violence is the expression of impotence grown unbearable!"

Understanding and dealing with this felt impotence and the rage that often accompanies it is a task for all of us, and not just the field of Conflict Resolution. It should be clear from this overall discussion, however, that the multidiscipline of Conflict Resolution certainly has something to say on the matter.
References


Press, Ch. 8.


Sandole, Dennis J.D. (2005). "Hurting Stalemate in the Middle East: Opportunities for Conflict Resolution?" ICAR News (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason


Notes

1. Thus far, the Working Group has produced two volumes, both published by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) -- not the usual outlet for conflict resolution scholarship, but then, 9/11 was far from usual. In addition, I have written some other papers addressing the issue (see Sandole, 2002, 2004; Sandole, et al., 2004).


4. For a discussion as to why a sole reliance on *Realpolitik* might make violent conflict *more* rather than less likely, see Sandole (1999, Ch. 1) and Vasquez (1993, Ch. 5).

5. For one way out of this "dilemma," see Sandole (2005).