Q: Of all the contributions you've made over the years, what was your most important decision?

A: I think probably the most important decision, and probably also my most important contribution, was getting the approval for Reston in the very beginning. When Rob Simon came down and had the contract to purchase the property and came up with the idea of building a new town out here in the country and staffed himself with a bunch of high-powered planners, attorneys, and experts of all types from all over the country.... I would say in the very beginning when the word first came out what his intention was, no one knew Rob Simon, no one knew these other people except by reputation, and his chances, as we went around and talked to civic groups all around the county, he was probably given a one-in-ten chance of getting this type of approval in Fairfax County. I think the fact that I convinced him that (1) he should employ as many local people as possible--back in those days Fairfax County was a lot more parochial than it is now and looked to the old boy system. Along with that, I think the fact that we convinced him--we started off with a volume of amendments to the existing zoning ordinance, subdivision ordinances, and so forth, to permit him to do what we wanted to do here. And the more we got into it, the more we realized that this was going to be an almost impossible task. So we decided that the best thing to do was that the county would go along with it--would be to plan Reston exactly the way we wanted it to be as if there were no zoning ordinances, no subdivision control ordinances existing at all and then once we all agreed--I say we, I mean Simon's people and the county's staff--all agreed that this was what we wanted then rewrite the ordinances to permit it, giving us the flexibility we needed and at the same time giving the county the controls they felt they needed. So that's what we did and that's really how the RPC Ordinance was born. That's really what permitted Reston to develop, to be here today. I think that we made that complete reverse approach is probably the most important thing that happened because if it hadn't, I don't think Reston ever would have got off the ground.

Q: When Rob Simon had the grand dream for Reston, and in many respects that dream is being realized according to many observers, what was wrong or what was missing in Simon's dream or his philosophy or his strategy that didn't permit him to be there as the dream was being realized, perhaps even through today?

A: I think the major point was that he just didn't have the financial strength. I think that even though he knew and we all knew that to do a development of this magnitude was going to be a very, very costly venture and take a lot of front-end money. As always is the case it seems, it always takes more than you anticipate it will take. And so I think if you had to narrow it down to one major point is that it took so much front-end money before you start realizing any money coming in. And we all knew even when Gulf entered the picture that the real pot of gold at the end of the rainbow was going to be at the very end of the project when we sold of the 1,000 acres industrial land along Dulles Highway which is exactly what's happened. But Simon couldn't stick it out and
Gulf wasn't willing to stick it out and wait for that and now Mobil is cashing in on it. But nothing is happening today that I don't think we didn't foresee 20 years ago but it's just the fact that it took a little longer than we anticipated. Now, one other point... other than just cash is I think that--I don't mean that they didn't lend their moral support--but more and better support, primarily fiscal support, from the governmental agencies would have been the other factor that would have helped alleviate some of the money problems. That is because we were bigger and because we were developing such a large area, the county and the state both expected the developer to do things that normally the county and state would be doing for a developer. For example, if you come in and develop a hundred acre tract into lots and ten different builders was doing this, the major road down in front of the property would have been built by the state highway department; the major water and sewer lines would have been in the road or running along the property, and the developer himself would have done the minor roads within subdivision and the minor sewer lines and water lines—the eight inch sewer lines and eight inch water lines.... They would not have been expected to provide major trunk lines and major highways and all of these things. They would not have been expected to provide the school sites; they would not have been expected to provide a lot of the community facilities. So again the argument is by providing those things, you don't pay for them, it's all added on to the price of the house and the purchaser pays for it in the long run. That may be true but, again, when you build a sewer line like that, a road or school, you're building it for thousands of people and it's going to take you ten years before you recover that cost. So it gets into the same problem that businessmen have all the time, into a cash flow problem. There's so much more cash going out in the early years than is coming in.

Q: Could Simon, if he had a different marketing strategy, if he had shifted gears more quickly in the closing months when the crisis began to develop, could it have turned out any differently or was this foreordained for the reasons that you've laid out?

A: I think that the biggest mistake that Simon made, and no one will ever know if this would have made any difference, I did recommend against it.... I think that the biggest mistake that probably doubled his investment here in those early years was splitting Reston into two parts and trying to do two things at the same time, that is, developing the Lake Anne area and developing the Hunters Woods area where you had two completely different animals, looking at two completely different markets. Now his reasoning for that, his explanation as to why he did that was the Lake Anne area was completely new, was an experiment, and we tried to provide a little bit of everything in that first section.... We tried to provide townhouses, apartments, and single family houses on the lake and single family on the golf course and some that were just in between, and commercial and a little industrial, and a little bit of everything. No one knew that the townhouse in the country, which is what it was called back then, concept would work because people always thought of terms of town houses. But today everyone takes it for granted but in those days the only place you had townhouses was lined up against the streets in downtown Baltimore. That's what people thought of when you talked about townhouses. And when we said, we're going to set it in a town park setting and it's going to be different and use the cluster concept and preserve the open space. All of those things are accepted today but they weren't back in those days.
That was all new—new ideas and new concepts. So he wasn't sure that—he said, I know because everyone else is doing it, I know I can sell one acre lots for single family houses in Hunters Woods so we'll go down there and build those and if the Lake Anne area is slow in coming on, we'll get our money from that area. But what happened was by splitting it into two he had to bring in so much more of the infrastructure in the early years. The reason we chose Lake Anne as the starting point—there were several reasons as a logical place to start. 1) It was the most accessible to Route 7 which was really the only major way in, if you want to call it, a two-lane road at that time into Reston. 2) It was the closest point to a major sewer line which meant you had to run the sewer line from Difficult Run up to Lake Anne right along Lake Fairfax and the watershed there. 3) It was the closest to existing water lines, which was the Goose Creek water line in the city of Fairfax which runs down the W & OD Railroad. And 4) we had the logical place to build Lake Anne and we wanted this type of feature to build something really unique to build the first village around. So for all of these reasons we started in Lake Anne. Then when he went down to Hunters Woods, there was no sewer line within miles of there; there was no water except again at W & OD but it's a much further run or you had to come from Navy Vale up the other way from the county system. The only road network—Reston Avenue which was called a dirt trail (which) the Fairfax Hunt used for running their horses up and down. All of these things had to be built. We built that tremendous stable facility down there. And by dividing (Reston), it divided everyone's attention; it created the fight between the First and Second Homeowners Associations that went on for years. It was two different worlds and him here trying to balance both of them at the same time. Whereas if he had stuck to Lake Anne and if he wanted to do some single family lots, do them up in the uplands where we did some anyway....I'm not saying this would have saved it, no one knows...but he certainly would have had a much better shot at saving it than he did. Part of that problem was brought on by some of the things that the county did. For example, you know in the master plan when you look at it, all the way around the periphery was a low density area and that was put there, supposedly at that time so that the county would have an excuse for not zoning any of the land around Reston. It was all supposed to remain low density farms and Reston was going to be sort of an island. ...We joked about whether they were protecting Reston from the outside world or the outside world from Reston by putting this low density around it. But all along the Lawyers Road area and what we call the Glade and the Snake—the two major branches down there—they were large lots and they were not to be sold; they were to be septic tanks; that's why they were half acre and larger. We were going to provide water but in working out the compromise of getting the zoning on the master plan down there, Simon agreed to put all of these low density lots around the perimeter of Reston. Our original plan had more of a mix of even density throughout the whole 7,000 acres. And the county insisted that this low-density buffer go around it which meant it made a little higher density in the center and along some of these sinews, lower density on the outside. It ended up the same number of people approximately but put this low density around there which we knew was going to be more costly to develop. But they were not to be sewer. It just happened, just about the time were we were going in for our rezoning, over in Montgomery County there was two or three subdivisions with $20k or $200k, 2 or 3 hundred thousand dollar houses that started having problems with wells being contaminated.
And when this story broke in the Post and there were pictures there and everyone got up in arms and so everyone in Fairfax got concerned that the wells were going to be contaminated. W pointed out first of all we weren't going to have wells; we were going to have public water supply but we were going to have septic tanks. But the health officer came into the county, Dr. Kennedy at that time, and recommended that the zoning be denied unless we brought sewer lines in there. And the Board of Supervisors went along with his recommendation and at the last minute while we were down there at the courthouse during the rezoning hearings, we had to go out and caucus in the outer rooms and come back and say whether we would sewer those lots. And if we hadn't, we probably wouldn't have gotten the rezoning for the whole RPC. And so here was a switch that meant that—I don't know what the total was but it was a couple of million dollars probably, additional funds that you had to commit in order to come in and sewer those lots. If we had known in the beginning that it was all going to be sewer, we probably wouldn't have built that many large lots in that area. And there were several other situations like this. The reason that I'm explaining this is that I don't want it to look like Simon went ahead will-headed to do this even though everyone told he he was going to go broke. It was a lot of circumstances that caused these things to happen. This was just one example of what happened....

Q What major impact has Reston had on changing the course of urban/suburban design? People talk about the decline, even death, of the new town concept. Do we need to conclude from that that Reston can't have had much of a contribution to urban and suburban planning? Is there a legacy?

A Yes, there is legacy. In fact, I think even the professional planners today don't realize it and don't appreciate (it) and I don't think Reston gets the credit that it should for the contributions that they've made to the whole urban development or suburban development scheme of things. So many things that were innovative in our days have been taken up by counties and other municipalities and by developers over the years and are now considered more or less routine. Just to mention a few. One of the major changes in the zoning concept with the RPC zoning was to get away from what was then the standard zoning process of having minimum lot sizes and minimum setback requirements, and this type of control over your zoning. And we switched to what is more commonly called the density concept zoning where you're allowed so many people per acre or so many units per acre. And we also came up with the concept of eliminating the arbitrary setback requirements and coming in with what is now commonly called cluster zoning. The great criticism in those days about the cookie cutter subdivision and, I don't mean this derogatorily, the Levittowns and the Sterling Parks...and the fact that the houses were lined up in a line and the fact that all the trees were cut and everything was the same. But what people didn't realize is that the developer was forced into those things by the ordinances that controlled him that said you had to setback so many feet from the front, the side and the rear so that dictated where the house was going. So if there was a big tree in the middle of the lot, the big tree came down. It said that the grade had to be so much from the street up to the garage or to the house, so that meant you had to strip the trees in front in order to accomplish that grade and you really had no flexibility at all. Another thing
thing that Reston did was providing the community facilities. It provided the pools and the walkways and the tennis courts and these types of things. And in those days developers didn't think of providing anything. They were provided either by the local jurisdiction and when the local jurisdiction couldn't do it—remember for a while there was this animal of swimming pool associations all over the area where a community would group together and each person would put in $200 or whatever and they would build a pool and you would join and pay a couple hundred dollars a year to belong to that pool... In the beginning under the RPC ordinance, you needed 750 acres in order to get an RPC zone. So every developer started to see this and they came in and they said this isn't fair. 'Why should we be penalized because we don't have 750 acres. We would like to do cluster zoning. We would like to preserve open space and we would like to group our houses up here on the high ground and preserve the low area and the stream valleys and this type of thing. And so as a direct result of the RPC ordinance, we came up with the planned development type zoning, the PD zonings; we came up with the whole cluster concept of zoning. I think also more and more developers started then, particularly on the larger scale, making part of their package offering that they would build swimming pools and tennis courts and walkways and other types of recreational(facilities). So I think all of this was a direct result of Reston. Certainly the concept of mixing commercial and residential and even industrial uses was completely new then of completely new because we pointed out in our presentations that it wasn't new—that's the way it was a hundred years ago and you had the corner grocery store in a residential area and the owner lived up above the store and people walked to the store. And then we got away from that and all the commercial—everything was zoned and designed or planned in concentric circles with the commercial in the middle and the high density around that and the medium and the low so you had all your open space out on the perimeter and the low density where you didn't need it and you didn't have it in the middle. Again on that, we planned much more of that than we were allowed to do (by): the county. For example, we had large areas scattered throughout Reston that were going to reserve for industrial use, when I say industrial use it could be association, offices and that type of thing, not heavy industry. And we felt that would spread out the traffic situation where everyone wouldn't be coming into the same area at the same time each day but it would be spread more over Reston and these would provide community facilities both in terms of recreational facilities on their grounds and maybe meeting rooms and that type of thing that could be available to the community....But the county refused to make industrial zoning part of the RPC. Even today...you have to go in and get it zoned industrial; it is not RPC.... They(County) agreed to do the Lake Anne concept....but they refused to go along with industrial. That's why the industrial is all lumped together along Dulles Highway on both sides in one piece and not broken up in several pieces and scattered around.

Q Has that not contributed to a sort of strip zoning of the industrial—some people refer to disparagingly as why does such a well designed community has what seems to be conventional strip industrial zoning?

A That's because the county insisted that it all be in one location and that it be along the Dulles Highway.
Q: What was it like moving over to the farmhouse in September of '63? What was the mood and what was your role in those days?

A: Original offices were in the City of Fairfax on Main Street just next door to the Truro Church. And we were there because for the first two years all of our dealings were planning and zoning and dealing with the county we could run back and forth across the street. Pritchett & McCandless were attorneys locally there so we could run back and forth on a daily basis.

When the Farm became available, Peter Clow and I came out and negotiated the purchase of that. In the beginning my title was Project Engineer and I guess almost immediately after that I was Vice President of Planning, Engineering and Construction. So when we started construction out here the first things were the golf course and Lake Anne and then all the roads and amenities around them, the Lake Anne area around here. I said you know I really need to be out (here)—I was running back and forth constantly. It's more important that I be out on the site now than I be here in town (Fairfax)." In the meantime, Simon had hired two other people: Peter Clow who was Director of Marketing and Livingston Goddard in charge of administration. That's another story, I think we've told this before, both of them were presidents, both insisted on being president and then they weren't sure who I should report to so I guess I reported more to Livi but to be truthful about it, I really reported to Simon. I wasn't a president, I was a vice president but we really had a three-headed monster...with Simon pulling the strings.

But anyway when we bought the property, I suggested that I move out there so I moved out with my engineering and construction people and did a little remodeling there and set up my office in what was the living room with a nice fireplace and all. The secretary had a fireplace in hers and another one in the outer office. It was really nice...it worked out real well. And I had only been there about two months and the other people decided it was time they came out and visited me. And when they came out and saw my offices, they said this is nicer than anything we've got, we all want to move.

So they moved the whole shebang out there. And then we were so overrun, so crowded, that's when we started to put on a little addition on the back which ended up being the engineering room and from there we started bringing in the trailers and we grew from there until, of course, we built Newton Square and moved over to a location (there).... You see Simon, and again I think this was a bad decision, but he tried to do everything with our own people, our own selves. And To compare what I'm doing here with what he was doing is ridiculous in a way but I go along with the theory that I hire the best of anything and everything I need for any project that I do and then I pay them for that project and then they're gone and I don't have to worry about their overhead and carrying them during slow times, fringe benefits and all the other things that you do. But Simon wanted to do everything we possibly could with our own people and build up this big organization rather than utilizing all the other people. From hindsight I think it was a mistake too. I think we should have gotten by with just what the management people we needed to pull the strings and contract everything else.

Q: Why was Simon so unsuccessful in attracting capital?

A: Well, I really don't think you can say he was unsuccessful. I think that Simon probably did as much or more than anyone could do. I think he was very .... Again you've got to remember that the most conservative people in the
are bankers and bankers, you know, will loan you all the money you want
and need if you can prove you don't need it. But if there's anything
experimental or anything new, they first want proof that it's worked somewhere
else before. In looking for capital we looked at large corporations all
over and we had almost a handshake deal with Washington Gas Light Company.
This was going to be an all gas town. And Armisted Booth who was first
local attorney for Simon and who was in the state Senate then and, of course,
worked out of Alexandria; he was a Booth of Booth, Perkins & Dowdy (?). And
he had contacts with Washington Gas Light and made the initial contact.
And Armisted Booth and I worked closely with them and we had them almost to the
point where they were going to come in as a partner in the Reston venture.
And then at the very late stages of this thing, Simon brought in all of his
New York contingency again and frankly I feel and I think and if you get a
chance to talk to Armist about this I think he'll confirm this, I think it just
scared Washington Gas Light away when they started bringing in all these
strange people from New York to try to switch everything around and change
the deal. But then from there you know, we talked with many of the oil
companies. But the fact that he got Gulf to come in and put in the original,
I think, was 18 million and another 3 1/2 million and Gulf eventually had
about 24 million that they had loaned into the project. And the fact that at he
worked out the loan package he did with Metropolitan to take over all of the
financing of the Lake Anne Center and of that part of it. I would say, you
know again, it was a matter of size being the pioneer that hurt him more
than his inability to raise.

Q Bill Magness...has sometimes been vilified by people in Reston....
But you knew Magness very well. What kind of person was he? What did he
really contribute in that transitional period?

A Well, it's true, I think, mainly because of Bill's personality, his abruptness
and he didn't believe in talking just to be talking. But I think Bill had an
amazing talent to immediately get to the crux of a matter or a problem and
not waste time. I think one of the reasons I liked him and got along
together although there's two different styles I think and personalities is that--
this doesn't mean he was right but 99% of the time I would agree with his
conclusion on the same problem. And again, this might be a little egotistical,
but I do think one of my abilities is to listen to a lot of talk and a lot of problems
and cut through it and say well you know, this is the part that matters and
let's solve this and the others will probably take care of itself. But it's so
easy to get off on a tangent and waste all your time and energies. The other
thing about Bill Magness is he was—it's true he had no real estate experience
when he came here—a very intelligent man but he had been 20 years overseas
and again one of his problems was his personality is that he had been in that
environment for 20 years where...the compound he was in he was the "king"
and he had all his subjects there. And you come into an area like this and try
to operate the same way and you know, the people are used to that and they
resent it and don't like it. So for this reason, except for Bill's very close
friends who understood him and understood how he worked, people were turned
off by him and his attitude and his abruptness and this type of thing. But what
I was going to say, he was Gulf's representative here and he was the pipeline
pocketbooks in Pittsburgh and he had to fight for every penny that Gulf invested in here. And I'd say that both Bill Magness and Bill Henry, to whom Bill reported, were convinced that Reston was a good investment for Gulf and they fought right to the bitter end to keep Gulf in here. But when they had the big major corporate changes in Pittsburgh and they brought in new corporate planners, they said that land and oil doesn’t mix and there was two different worlds and advised Gulf to get out. (That’s) why they got out ....

Bill moved here, he moved right into the community, he became a part of the community, he got involved in every aspect of it—the cultural, the recreational, the country club, all of the various things that went on here unlike, you know, some of the other people who came in. Bob Ryan was here for a short time but never was really part of the community. I’m not saying this in criticism but Jim Tide (?) was here for a long time but always kept himself aloof and removed from Reston except for the working aspects of it. But Bill threw himself in completely in the community and took a lot of flack and all because of it. And a lot of people disagreed with him at times but everything he did, he did because he felt it was best for Reston. I say this in summary because we all used to say this a lot of times, the thing we had to keep reminding people remembering all the time was the first two or three hundred people we got into Reston were very unusual, strong-willed, pioneering type people. And of course, you can’t help but have your own self-interest at heart. And so we got involved in this thing, all of these people were getting involved and they had suggestions for everything that went on. But we used to say that our role we felt was looking out for that 60,000 people who were yet to come to Reston and had no one here in Reston to represent them now. So we had to look at the big picture locating recreational facilities or swimming pools or tennis courts or whatever we were doing, we had to think what’s it going to be like when there’s 30,000 people here, not doing what’s best for the 5,000 that are here today. And Bill was strong enough not to buckle in under that type of pressure but to go forward and do what we thought was right.

How were you able to turn Reston around in about 48 months from a nearly bankrupt community to one that really began to... (tape stops at end of side A)

I think the major point, getting back to one of the earlier questions, was that the finances were there and we were able to continue our development and do things to show people that it did work. And part of it was strictly the market. You know the market is a cyclical thing and dependent on swings back and forth, back and forth, and you know that’s how developers make money, they hit it at the right time and pull in their horns at the right time. And of course, everyone’s always said that the secret of the large scale development is patient money and being able to get through these hard times until the market swings up again. And so I think it was a combination of those things and the USGS was built and came here, of course that’s another story the way that came about. That was primarily Simon’s doing, not Gulf’s although it was finished up when Gulf was here, it was initiated....He gave away future value but at that time he really wasn’t giving away anything because the land was there and as you know they ended up with a lease and after the 20 year lease, they’ll own the building because Nixon put a restriction on the government building any more buildings during that time. So everyone says OK the USGS
is out, they can't build it. So we worked out a scheme to where we would build it and they would lease it because there was no restriction on leasing but at the end of the 20 year lease, they'll own it. So we got around that obstacle and got the USGS out here but it was imperative that we get some type of major facility or industry out here to get the attention of not only the market but of the government; the federal government.

Q: You mentioned a minute ago that oil and land did not mix and that became the conclusion in Pittsburgh. Was there a strategic decision by the Gulf policy makers?

A: Yes. What I mean by that is, if you think about it, an oil company like Gulf is a publicly held company and the thing that people look to is the bottom line each year is the profit and earnings per share and how do the shareholders make out. Real estate, on the other hand, is a leverage business and the way real estate developers make money is to use other people's money and borrow every penny they can—they'll borrow 100% if they can. As a rule they'll borrow a minimum of 80% is borrowed money. Well, the Gulf hierarchy had been led to believe that debt is bad and even though you have assets to offset that debt, it was still bad. And they would come in here and look and see where Reston owed 200 million dollars and they said 'Oh my God.' The fact that it had assets worth 7-800 million didn't make that much difference to them. Also, from an earnings standpoint as I said earlier, all their earnings are at the end. And so all these years they were pouring money into it that there was no profit, no earnings being shown. So, you know, this is completely contradictory to what we tried to do. We tried to have as little debt as possible and as high earnings as possible. And whereas the real estate people try to have a little cash but from a tax standpoint, they try to show no earnings and all your money is capital gains at the end.

Q: Did the oil embargo sharpen this idea, did it aggravate?

A: I don't think so. I think it was another thing that bothered them. See you've got to realize not only Reston when they formed COREDCO—Gulf Oil Real Estate Development Company—got involved in real estate development all over the world. We were still just an asterisk on the balance sheet of Gulf, you see. It really amounted to nothing; they lose more money in one dry well than we lost here the whole time. That really wasn't the reason but it was taking more and more of their attention, it was taking more and more of their time, they were fearful, particularly in foreign countries, of getting involved in real estate where political implications were there. For example, one of the last jobs that I had that I had was that I went to Iran three different times and we were negotiating a project over there for a big development right outside of Tehran. Bill Magness had spent ten years in Iran... And I was fearful because I could hear the rumblings going on back then and Bill and I had some of the biggest arguments and he'd say no way the Shah will ever be overthrown because of all his police forces and all those type of things. One of the better decisions we ever made was not to get involved in that project and a year or so later was when the Shah was overthrown. But Gulf said, you know,
there are too many political implications for the money to be earned and we’d rather concentrate on the oil business and not be concerned with all this... 

(Mobil is?) getting ready to make the same mistake by getting a little greedy. They see that all the developers around here—what a demand there is for land and to see all the developers "making all this money!" And they say why should we let the developers make all this money, why don't we make it ourselves? So now they're saying there's nothing available in Reston, everything that's left we're going to do ourselves. And we're going to develop the town center or we're going to develop whatever else there is remaining. Again, I may be proven wrong and it may turn out great but it's not going to happen as quickly as the other development you saw happen just in fact because, you know, a big corporation is doing it, you know, you've got to go through New York to get approval of everybody in the world and beside this and get the funds. They're going to find out that they don't quite understand leverage and how the development business works... and I think they would have been better off and the people of Reston would be served better if they would plan it and retain tight controls over both the timing of it and the development of it and all of this but, you know, stay out of the development business....But they say well you know it's there and why shouldn't we cash in on it.... All I said to them, well what I'm telling you is from experience. That was Simon's problem and that's one of our problems instead of trying to do everything yourself.

Q: Do you think that one of the counter arguments might be that such a large parcel to develop and it needs to be developed so ambitiously that it will take a large entity to do it?

A: I'm saying that there are large enough development entities that would gladly do that. And I'm saying too that it does need close control... I agree that you can't subdivide it up into, you know 400 one-acre parcels and develop it and make it make sense. But they can... build an apartment complex, you know one person here, and a major office complex and a commercial center, you know. It can be done. What they're thinking about — I think maybe they're going to do this, they haven't decided themselves, which would be a compromise and wouldn't be too bad. I think what they might do, and I suggested this because this is really how I work, a joint venture. They own the land, put in the land, putting in the land debt-free—you can put a value on the land in fact down the road—but then a developer could come in without any of his money—there's enough equity in the land that the developer could borrow all the funds needed for the construction and let them own it jointly. The developer do the financing but only jointly and then they get their money back and the developer get a development fee and then they each share in the profit.... So that's what they're talking about. So I think that's a reasonable compromise....

Q: Do you have or would you know of where we could find some archival photographs?

A: I probably have as complete an archive of Reston history as anyone. I guess. I've got file cabinets full and two or three drawers full in there... and some photographs and material and articles and also. I'll go through that and see what I have... I'll have to dig them out. I have photographs and I also have slides that I made when back when I was in charge of construction. I've got slides of Lake Anne cleaned but no water. I've got slides of all phases of Lake Anne Center construction....