DEMOCRATIC POLICING AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN UN POLICE MISSIONS: 
A MIXED-METHODS STUDY

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

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Dedication

I dedicate this to those who dedicate themselves to peace…
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the Turkish Nation and Government for supporting my graduate education in the U.S.

This study is a product of the joint efforts of many respect-worthy people. First of all I would like to thank to my committee chair Jack A. Goldstone for all his help and guidance not only during our collaboration for this project but also throughout my entire PhD journey at GMU. I also would like to thank Professor Louise I. Shelley for her invaluable support throughout my graduate education in the US. I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee Professors Ann C. Baker, Lehn M. Benjamin and Michael D. Wiatrowski for their contributions and guidance that moved this dissertation to its current form.

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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<td>AI</td>
<td>Appreciative Inquiry</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>UN Civil Police</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing</td>
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<td>CoP</td>
<td>Communities of Practice</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Policing</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace-Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAR</td>
<td>End of Assignment Report</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Units</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>Integrated Police Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Individual Police Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMO</td>
<td>Kaiser-Meier- Olkin Test of Sample Adequacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OL</td>
<td>Organizational Learning</td>
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<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador</td>
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<td>OROLSI</td>
<td>Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBPU</td>
<td>Peace-building Best Practices Unit</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peace-building Support Office</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police contributing countries</td>
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<td>PCEs</td>
<td>Post-conflict Environments</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operation Procedures</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Standing Police Capacity</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNMBIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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Abstract

DEMOCRATIC POLICING AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN UN POLICE MISSIONS: A MIXED-METHODS STUDY

Kutluer Karademir, PhD

George Mason University, 2012

Dissertation Director: Professor Jack A. Goldstone

After the end of the cold war, intra-state conflicts have proliferated (Marshall, 2010), and the UN has become the leading international organization to intervene in these conflicts (Lipson, 2007). In parallel with these developments, the concept of security has also shifted, from being centered on the security of the state to focusing on the security of citizens (Wulf, 2004; Häggi, 2004), mostly as a consequence of the ‘third wave’ of mass democratization (Huntington, 1991). As the international intervener, the UN is charged with the build-up or restoration of the demolished institutions in post-conflict environments (PCEs); however the establishment and the maintainence of order on the streets is a precondition for the implementation of institutional reforms. This entails a great amount of effort to build capacity for the national police forces of post-conflict countries (Ferguson, 2004). The UN’s police component (UNPOL) deals with the training,
supervising, reform and restructuring of host country police forces. UNPOL also conducts active law enforcement duties when the local police organizations are fully incapable. In 1996 the principles of democratic policing (DP) were introduced by the UN as the framework of UNPOL operations. Nevertheless, UNPOL’s capacity to implement DP principles has been questioned due to a set of factors that are mostly stemming from its organizational structure (Call & Barnett, 2000; Perito, 2005). UNPOL is a composite police organization that is comprised of police officers coming from several different countries, most of which are developing countries that themselves have poor records of democracy and human rights (Durch, 2010; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). Moreover, the duration of service is limited to one year and this causes the loss of institutional memory (Mobekk, 2005).

Putting UNPOL’s duties and organizational structure together, this study argues that if the knowledge and experience which exists in the diverse and dynamic working environment of UNPOL can be converted into organizational knowledge then UNPOL will become a better operating organization, and be far more effective in establishing DP principles in PCEs. The conversion of accumulated knowledge and experience into organizational knowledge can be done with the application of organizational learning methods. As a matter of fact, the UN has realized the importance of organizational learning and knowledge management in the 2000s. Yet little has been done since then to improve this domain (Benner & Rotmann, 2008).

This study examines the practice of democratic policing and organizational learning across
UNPOL missions from both individual and organizational levels through a mixed-methods research design. The quantitative data of the study was collected through a web-based survey conducted on several hundred UNPOL officers. The qualitative data was collected through 14 semi-structured in-depth interviews with UNPOL officials from the headquarters and missions.

The quantitative findings of this study showed that UNPOL officers show strong support for the principles of DP regardless of demographic or professional factors such as age, education, mission, or rank. Also, they gain considerable new knowledge and experience on policing during missions, and this knowledge and experience changes their approach on policing. Two OLS models were run to find empirical evidence on the explanatory factors of the perceptions of learning and democratic policing in UNPOL missions respectively. The first model showed that effective leadership, the adequacy of technical facilities and training has positive and significant association with learning in UNPOL missions. The second model found that Organizational Learning (OL) experience is a significant predictor of more positive attitudes on Democratic Policing (DP). Longer tenure years and male gender also have significant positive association with more positive perceptions of DP principles.

The qualitative findings of this study supported the quantitative findings. It was also found that the changing nature of peacekeeping operations entails more specialists who will stay longer. UNPOL’s future policy debates take place around how to render UNPOL an early peace-building actor.
The study concludes that more interest should be paid to OL efforts in UNPOL, especially at the leadership level. If UNPOL becomes a more effective learning organization it can generate the blueprints for democratic policing and disseminate it across the unstable parts of the world. In addition, UNPOL needs to enhance its personnel quality by hiring more professionals. Finally, the tactical aspect of DP is too weak and needs improvement in comparison to community-oriented policing.
Building or restoring peace and social order after conflict is a difficult task. It is generally shouldered by international organizations due to the lack of political and social stability and institutional capability in the local settings of the post-conflict countries (Goldsmith, 2005; O’Neil, 2005; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). The UN has been the primary international organization to take over this task through its peace-keeping operations (Lipson, 2007). Although the peace-keeping operations have several components, the police play a crucial role because they are responsible for providing physical security of citizens and restoring social order upon which other reform efforts can be built. In post-conflict environments (PCEs) local police organizations mostly collapse and need to be either built up from scratch or reformed and restructured (Ferguson, 2004; Marenin, 2005). Typically most police organizations in PCEs have been part of a repressive security sector comprised of the military, intelligence and police systems (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).

As described later in this chapter, after the end of the cold war the proliferation of intra-state wars rendered the UN as the primary international organization to conduct peace-keeping activities across the world (Lipson, 2007). The context of UN peace-
keeping operations were mostly affected by two other post-cold war developments: the third wave of democratization across the globe (Huntington, 1991), and the shift in the security paradigm from a state-centered to a human rights-centered model which is called “human security” (Axworthy, 1997; Bajpai, 2000).

In parallel with the advent of the human security concept, security sector reforms (SSRs) also have become highly significant in post-conflict settings. The security sector in failed states is comprised of the police, military and intelligence branches as institutions of government. SSRs entail the redesign of the security sector according to the principles of democracy and human rights with a citizen oriented approach (Neild, 1999; Wulf, 2004). SSRs are conducted through the ‘governance’ of several state and non-state actors (Bryden & Brzosko, 2005). Since the police are the most important actors of the internal security sector and the primary representative of the state authority to citizens, reforming the police organizations in post-conflict environments (PCEs) can considerably accelerate the overall restoration process (Ferguson, 2004; Marenin, 2005).

Following these developments the UN has put forward the term “democratic policing” with the IPTF (International Police Task Force) report in 1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a comprehensive framework of policing which should be implemented in PCEs. Although the term was first mentioned by the UN, the roots of its principles goes back to the 19th century when Sir Robert Peel introduced his nine principles of policing (Jones, Newburn, & Smith, 1996; Karatay, 2009; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). Both narrow and broad definitions of DP have been developed by international organizations
such as the UN (1996) and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) (2009) as well as scholars (Bayley, 2006; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).

As will be elaborated in the following chapter, democratic policing requires that police organizations be accountable, transparent, to subordinate themselves to civil and democratic authority, to earn legitimacy, be responsive, professional, act according to the principles of human rights and democracy, and consider themselves ‘service providers’. They “respond” to crime and are not paramilitary “crime fighters” engaged in a war on crime (Bayley, 2006; Marenin, 2005). Within the post-conflict context, since the host country police organizations are mostly unable to function by themselves or have a culture of repression, impunity and autocracy, the assistance of UNPOL is crucial for the implementation of these values in PCEs. Therefore, democratic policing could become the framework of police reforms conducted by international organizations in PCEs (Bayley, 1997; Neild, 2001; Marenin, 2005). If successfully implemented, DP can facilitate the internalization of democratic values by the conflict-torn country, enhance the trust and respect of citizens for the state, and accelerate the building or restoration of other demolished institutions- which is the overall aim of the post-conflict process-at large (Marenin, 2005).

Nevertheless, implementing democratic policing in PCEs is a difficult task that entails strong organizational and individualistic characteristics. When the UN police system is analyzed certain deficiencies are frequently underlined regarding the operation of the UN police system in general and that of UNPOL in specific. Among those, the primary issues
with UNPOL are: the slow pace and scant number of the deployment of UNPOL officers, coordination problems due to the multi-national structure of the UNPOL, low quality of UNPOL personnel in terms of policing skills, poor democracy records of the primary police contributing countries and the lack of institutional memory mostly due to the high personnel turnover rate and low quality of UNPOL personnel (Sismanidis, 1997; Boer & Emery, 1998; Call & Barnett, 2000; Perito, 2005; Serafino, 2004; Mobekk, 2005; Campbell, 2007; Benner & Rotmann, 2008; Howard, 2008; Durch & Egland, 2010; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). Furthermore, the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of UNPOL (Sismanidis, 1997; Boer & Emery, 1998; Call & Barnett, 2000; Perito, 2005; Serafino, 2004); and low democracy records of the countries that are the top police contributors (Durch, 2010; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010) are mentioned as other important drawbacks of UNPOL at the organizational and international levels. Given these deficiencies it is important to explore the capacity of UNPOL regarding the implementation of DP principles in PCEs.

**UNPOL and Organizational Learning**

Among the major deficiencies of UNPOL, this study puts a specific emphasis on the lack of robust organizational learning in UNPOL arguing that once accomplished, a learning UNPOL organization will overcome most of its problems and conduct better reform and restructuring of the police organizations of post-conflict countries. That is, because UNPOL itself comprises of many culturally, ethnically and socio-economically different forces including large contingents from non-democratic countries, and because
democratic policing and training in democratic policing have been expanding concerns of UNPOL, the ability of UNPOL to carry out its mission with regard to DP depends largely on vigorous organizational learning. This study thus will examine both the record of UNPOL with regard to DP and the patterns and capacity of organizational learning in UNPOL to help identify policies needed to make UNPOL more effective in regard to these goals. By so doing the seemingly separate areas of democratic policing and organizational learning will be analyzed in relation to each other within the context of UNPOL.

Organizational Learning consists of the exploration, extraction, codification and distribution of accumulated knowledge and experience across an organization through specific methodologies and theoretical models (Benner & Rotmann, 2008; Howard, 2008; Campbell, 2007). That being said, different approaches exist especially as to the conduct of the exploration, extraction, and distribution of knowledge. This study examines four of these approaches: 1- problem-oriented learning (Argyris & Shön, 1978), 2- appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005), 3- communities of practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991) and 4- the knowledge creation spiral (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Toyama, 2003). It will discuss the seminal sources of each approach and attempt to explore to which extent these approaches could be applied by UNPOL.

Problem-oriented learning refers to the identification and description of problems. A “problem” is the mismatch between what is supposed to happen and what actually happens. It encompasses the exploration of the root causes of these problems and updates
the existing state of knowledge accordingly (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Appreciative inquiry is a relatively new area of organizational learning and change which refers to the exploration of peak experiences and codification of the blueprints of success through a four-phased series of workshops called the 4-D cycle. The phases of the 4-D cycle consist of discovery, dream, design and destiny respectively (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005). Communities of Practice (CoP) are groups (real or virtual; formal or informal) formed by individuals who are interested in a certain topic. CoP go beyond the official learning procedures and tools such as in-service training, procedure books and facilitate the sharing of experiences, problems, and solutions in practice through storytelling (Brown & Duguid, 1991). Finally, the knowledge creation spiral refers to the cyclical process between the tacit knowledge embedded in the brains of individuals (members of an organization) and explicit (codified) knowledge through the interactions amongst the members of an organization and their environment. This process occurs in four phases: socialization (production of tacit knowledge from tacit knowledge), externalization (production of explicit knowledge from tacit knowledge), combination (production of explicit knowledge from explicit knowledge) and internalization (production of tacit knowledge from explicit knowledge). New knowledge is created when ‘meanings’ and ‘contexts’ are added to the existing body of knowledge which is changed through the aforementioned interactions in a physical context called ‘ba’ (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Toyama, 2003).

When it comes to the Organizational Learning efforts of UNPOL, it should be
noted that UNPOL does not have a stand-alone OL unit, yet OL can be considered within the OL practice of the UN peace-keeping system. The UN’s OL efforts started in 1992 with the establishment of the department of peace-keeping operations (DPKO), and the department of political affairs (DPA) under the then UN Secretary General Ghali’s agenda for peace policy. In 1995, the Lessons Learned Unit was established under the DPKO. Yet due to an insufficient number of personnel and under-funding the unit did not perform well (Benner & Rotmann, 2008). Nevertheless, based on the recommendations in the 2000 Brahimi report, the Peace-keeping Best Practices Unit was established and became operational. Although the UN argues that it has developed its OL efforts since the 2000s (UN, 2007) scholarly evaluations mostly identify DPKO’s OL as one of its weakest areas (Benner & Rotmann, 2008; Howard, 2008; Campbel, 2007). Therefore it is important to clarify the OL efforts of the DPKO and specifically those of UNPOL to understand if it can make the envisioned transformations of police systems in post-conflict environments.

This study therefore aims to reveal the perceptions of UN police officers and managers of the UNPOL system on democratic policing, and organizational learning which is argued to be the catalyst for the implementation of democratic policing principles first in UNPOL itself and then in host-country police forces through UNPOL. The study also aims to understand the relationships among the factors facilitating democratic policing and organizational learning in post-conflict environments; and to examine the organizational efforts of the DPKO and UNPOL in both democratic policing
and organizational learning through a mixed-methods research design. Finally, this study attempts to address the well-known problems of the UN policing from inside at both the individual and organizational levels, and to introduce new knowledge into the fields of international policing, reform and restructuring of police organizations in post-conflict settings, democratic policing and organizational learning in the context of international organizations.

Methodology

Given the aforementioned arguments this study attempts to answer the following research questions:

Q1- How do UN police officers perceive democracy and democratic policing and is there any variation in this across missions or according to the demography, experience or countries of origin of UNPOL officers?

Q2- How is DP being implemented in UNPOL missions? What are the challenges before UNPOL in implementing democratic policing principles in PCEs?

Q3- What are the factors that contribute to the perception of DP in UNPOL missions?

Q3- How do UNPOL officers perceive the convenience of UNPOL missions in terms of organizational learning?

Q4- What strategies does UNPOL try to implement at the organizational level in
terms of organizational learning?

Q5-What are the factors that contribute to organizational learning in UNPOL missions?

Q6- Is there any empirical association between organizational learning and democratic policing and what are the components of this association if it exists?

With respect to methodology, the study adopts a mixed-methods approach to answer these questions. Mixed-methods research has been defined from various aspects since the late 1980s (Thashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Surveying a large spectrum of definitions developed since the late 1980s Creswell and Clark (2011) identify the “core characteristics of mixed-methods research” as follows:

In mixed-methods, the researcher collects and analyzes persuasively and rigorously both qualitative and quantitative data; mixes the two forms of data concurrently by combining them, sequentially by having one build on the other, or embedding one within the other; gives priority to one or to both forms of data; uses these procedures in a single study or in multiple phases of a program study; frames these procedures within philosophical worldviews and theoretical lenses; and combines the procedures into specific research designs that direct the plan for conducting the study (p. 5).

Within this frame, this study first conducted a web-based survey of UNPOL officers deployed in ongoing UNPOL missions as of 2010. The survey was offered in both English and French- the official languages of the UN missions- to measure the perceptions of UNPOL officers on such issues as democracy, democratic policing, and
Secondly a procedure for semi-structured interviews with high level UNPOL officials both from the field and the Headquarters (HQ) was developed. The interview procedure was developed in order to explain the findings of the quantitative phase of the study and to understand the organizational factors underlying and shaping the perceptions of UNPOL officers on the aforementioned areas.

The organization of the dissertation is as follows: the following sections of this chapter elaborate on the aforementioned three post-cold war developments in order to form the basis for the following research. Chapter two analyzes the democratic policing concept in general and in post-conflict context. Also examined in the second chapter are the history, evolution and current structure of UN police missions. Chapter three surveys the theories of OL in general and the UN’s organizational learning efforts in specific. Chapter four introduces the methodology of this study. Chapters five and six present the quantitative and qualitative data analyses and findings of the study respectively. Finally, chapter seven discusses the conclusions and policy implications, and addresses the limitations of the study.

1.1. The Mass Democratization across the Globe

The first post-cold war development critical to this study is the spread of mass-democratization following the fall of tyranny in many regions across the globe. It is a commonly accepted fact that democratization and de-democratization occur in waves.
Huntington (1991) and Markoff (1996) take these processes as consecutive events that are generally called “waves” of democratization or de-democratization. A democratization or de-democratization trend is considered a “wave” when large numbers of sovereign states are engaged in it over a span of several decades. According to this approach, democratic waves can be recognized if government transitions take place either smoothly without belligerence or suddenly through coups which trigger democratic governments. Anti-democratic waves, on the other hand, can be observed when government transitions occur which culminate in autocratic regimes and result in repression which violates the rule of law (Markoff, 1996).

Huntington (1991) enumerates three pro-democracy and two anti-democracy waves in modern history. According to Huntington, the first wave of democratization happened between 1828 and 1926. The second wave of democratization took place between 1943 and 1962 in the new era after the end of the Second World War. The third and currently the last wave of democratization began in the mid-1970s.

As was mentioned above, the end of the cold war with the victory of America and its allies accelerated the spread of the third wave of democratization. Figure 1.1 displays the number of sovereign countries with democracy/autocracy scores of 6 or more on the Polity-4 dataset developed by Marshall and Jaggers - which is widely accepted as the threshold for democracy for a regime- in each year starting with 1970. This figure clearly demonstrates the global democratization trend after the end of the cold war.

\[\text{\footnotesize{1\ A similar approach was taken by Cingarelli and Richards (1999)}}\]
The Polity-4 dataset scores democracy and autocracy levels of countries on a -10 to 10 scale where -10 represents a wholly autocratic regime without any democratic characteristics and 10 represents a wholly democratic regime without any autocratic characteristics. In the Polity-4 dataset:

Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009, p. 19).
Figure 1.1 confirms that the difference between the trends in the imposition of autocracy and democratization at the global scale has become larger since the end of the cold war.

In parallel with mass-democratization at the state level, democratic principles were embedded in the governance standards set by major international organizations. In 1993 the Vienna Declaration and Program Action emphasized democracy as a very important constituent of human rights. This was followed by two resolutions in 1999 and 2000 by the UN Human Rights Commission that emphasized ‘democratic governance’ as

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2 Source: Polity-4 dataset, (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009)
a major human right and stressed ‘transparency and accountability of public service’ as the main components of democratic governance (Hänggi, 2003). With respect to the security sector, major international and regional organizations such as the UN general assembly, UNDP, EU, NATO, and OSCE separately emphasized the importance of civilian control over military, police and other armed forces (Hänggi, 2003). Hence, it can be argued that in the post-cold war era the term “democracy”, not merely as a word but by all of its constituents, was considered a significant right and a settled goal for both national and international governance agendas.

1.2. The Proliferation of Intra-State Conflicts and UN Peace-Keeping Operations

The second development in the post-cold war era is the increase in the number and context of the UN-led peace-keeping operations. While the number of inter-state wars has declined, intra-state conflicts have increased in the post-cold war era (Eberwein & Chojnacki, 2001; Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003). Figure 1.2 below shows the number of inter and intra-state wars (the latter is the sum of civil wars and ethnic conflicts) ongoing in a given year between 1970 and 2008. The dataset is the Major Episodes of Political Violence which is constructed by Marshall (2010). When figure 2.1 is analyzed, a substantial increase in the number of intra-state conflicts both in the mid-1970s, at the beginning of the 3rd democratization wave, and in the early 1990s, at the end of the cold war, can clearly be observed.
Political instabilities and internal conflicts triggered with the end of the cold war have strengthened the UN’s role as an international intervention actor. Also, the overall aim of international interventions has been transformed from “observatory” to “pro-active”. Pro-active interventions aim for nation-building (or peace-building) which refers to the restoration of the political, social and economic institutions of the conflict-torn country and capacity-building to facilitate the functioning of these institutions without help from abroad (Jones, Wilson, Rathmell, & Riley, 2005).

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3 Source: The Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset (Marshall, 2010)
Lipson (2007) argues that the end of the cold war opened a window of opportunity for the transformation of the traditional peace-keeping operations into ‘second-generation peace-keeping operations’. According to Lipson, after the cold war had ceased, many forms of conflict, especially intra-state conflicts became more visible. In addition to this, tensions in international politics were eased and states acted more cooperatively towards UN-led international interventions in conflicts. With the coupling of these two trends, a modular version of international intervention was suggested as the solution to the problem of conflicts. The modular intervention strategy was created by ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and included new tasks such as “establishing and monitoring elections; overseeing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; providing humanitarian relief; protecting safe areas, and providing the political foundations for transition governments” (p.88).

The upwards trend in UN interventions in conflicts after the end of the cold war can be seen clearly in Figure 1.3 which illustrates the number of UN-led operation onsets in a given year since 1948. According to Figure 1.3, the number of UN-led peace-keeping operations initiated reached a peak between 1991 and 1995.

In addition to the increase in the number of operations, the amount of budget and number of personnel allocated for the missions have considerably increased. Lipson (2007) notes that the total number of troops deployed has jumped from 10,000 in 1988 to almost 78,000 in 1994. In parallel with this the budget allocated for the operations has jumped from $230 million to $ 3.6 billion within the same period. According to UN’s official fact sheet\(^4\) as of February 2010, a total of 124,000 UN personnel (84,000 troops and military observers; 13,000 police personnel; more than 5,800 international civilian personnel; nearly 14,000 local civilian staff and some 2,400 UN volunteers) were

deployed in 16 UN peace-keeping missions.

![UN Mission Onsets by Years](http://www.un.org.mutex.gmu.edu/en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml)

Figure 1.3 UN Mission Onsets by Years

**The Peace-Related Activities of the UN**

It is a fact that the UN’s importance as an international actor in terms of intervention in conflicts, peace-keeping, and peace-building has been increased since the

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end of the cold war. At this point it is important to clarify the concepts that explain the various peace-related activities of the UN. These activities are explained in both the Brahimi report (UN, 2000) and the Peace-keeping operations guidelines of the DPKO (UN, 2008b). Peace-related activities of the UN involve conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace/nation-building phases.

The Brahimi report defines conflict prevention as “low-profile” and “mostly diplomatic” activities to detect the precursors of inter or intra state conflicts and taking the necessary actions to prevent such disputes from developing into wars (Para 10). The report asserts that peace-making refers to diplomatic interventions- by states, NGOs or key individuals-in ongoing conflicts to stop the conflicts. It can be argued that peace-keeping is a necessary first condition for nation/peace-building. In other words, nation building is the broader objective of international interventions whereas security is the crucial condition for that (Jones, et al., 2005). The peace-keeping operations guideline (UN, 2008) adds peace-enforcement in the range of activities. The doctrine defines peace-enforcement as a set of compelling actions including military interventions applied by the UN Security Council in such environments where peace and security are threatened to prevent a resumption of active violence. Finally, “Nation building involves the deployment of international military forces and includes comprehensive efforts to rebuild the security, political, and economic sectors” (Jones, et al., 2005, p. 5). The “peace-building” concept is generally used interchangeably with nation-building. As a matter of fact, the Brahimi report (UN, 2000) defines peace-building as “activities on the
far side of the conflict to reassemble the foundation of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (Para 13). The report incorporates health issues, good governance and democratization in the peace-building processes (UN, 2000). Future 1.4 below, which was adopted from the PKO guideline (UN, 2008) illustrates the phases of peace-related operations of the UNDPKO and the links among these phases and activities.
1.3. The Paradigm Shift in the Security Concept and SSRs

The final post-cold war development is the paradigm shift in the security concept and its repercussions in terms of security practices in PCEs. This issue needs more

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Figure 1.4 Peace-related Activities of the DKO and the Links In-between

\(^6\) Reproduced from (UN, 2008b, p. 19)
elaboration since UN peace-keeping operations in PCEs are built upon this new security approach.

Until the end of the cold war, the security paradigm was basically focused on the security of territorial state unity from other states through military means (King & Murray, 2002). Nonetheless, this traditional security paradigm was strictly questioned and criticized especially by international development circles. The main argument of these criticisms was that ensuring territorial security of a state does not mean much for ordinary people living in that state unless they secure their everyday needs in terms of jobs, food, neighborhood safety, or health. Moreover, in certain circumstances such as state failure, states can be the source of insecurity for their citizens. Therefore the security concept needed to be re-defined and individual was placed at the core (Axworthy, 1997, 2001).

Bajpai (2000) notes that the Club of Rome meetings in the 1970s, Willy Brandt’s North-South Report in the 1980s, and the Stockholm Initiative for Global Security and Governance in the 1990s can be mentioned as the primary attempts to extend the security concept from its prior antecedents. All of these efforts had emphasized that the security concept should be extended to include such issues as poverty, food and sanitary problems, economic and social inequality, and environmental problems.

1.3.1. Human Security

The term “human security” was first used in the 1994 United Nations Human
Development Report. The report argues that the ‘narrow’ understanding of national security excludes the everyday needs and concerns of people such as jobs, food, health, and safety from crimes, or environmental issues from the security domain and takes security merely as the territorial unity of the state. The report states that: “human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons; it is a concern with human life and dignity” (UN, 1994, p. 22). Therefore, the report urges that the security notion should be redefined placing “individual security” at its core rather than the state as territory, and that the goal of security should be ‘human development’ rather than security as determined by the strength and proficiency of the armed forces of a nation. Within this framework the report enumerates seven areas of human security: economic security, health security, environmental security, food security, personal security, political security and community security. The report also draws attention to transnational threats and identifies six main global threat domains that entail global cooperation: “unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production and trafficking, and international terrorism” (UN, 1994, p.34).

Several definitions of and measurement strategies for the human security concept were developed by scholars (Alkire, 2001; Bajpai, 2000; King & Murray, 2001; Nef, 1997; Roland, 2001; Thomas & Tow, 2002). Some of these scholars found the conceptual
definition of human security in the report rather abstract and some found it too broad and
difficult to operationalize. Nevertheless, all of the definitions keep the individual-
centered human security approach at the core of their definitions.

The Canadian Government has also been a leader in developing the concept of
human security. Then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1997) stated that

[Human security] includes security against economic privation, an acceptable
quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. At a minimum,
human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that
sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as
important to global peace as arms control and disarmament. It recognizes the links
between environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic conflicts, and
migration. Finally, it concludes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until
human security is guaranteed (p. 184).

Axworthy (1997) also puts forward peace-keeping, peace-building, safeguarding
the rights of children, economic development and disarmament with a specific focus on
landmines as the main goals; and the use of ‘soft power’ and international cooperation as
the main strategies to implement the human security notion globally.

Comparing the human security approaches of the UN and the Canadian
government, Bajpai (2000) asserts that although the two approaches were quite similar at
the outset, salient differences emerged in time. The most important differences according
to Bajpai are that although the UN approach mostly adopts an individual-centered
security through developmental means only, the Canadian approach still gives
importance to state security as well as individual security and considers threats to the
territorial unity of the state important. Also, the Canadian approach favors the use of force by international coalitions when necessary.

1.3.2. Security Sector Reforms

In parallel with the development and spread of the human security concept, security sector reforms (SSRs) in post-conflict, post-authoritarian, emerging democracies and developing countries, have gained considerable importance in the international security field (Wulf, 2004; Häggi, 2004). The term was first used by then UK International Development Minister, Clare Short, in 1998. Short’s core argument attached to the SSR concept was one of reducing military spending and channeling those funds into development-based security projects; and in enhancing civil oversight over security organizations (Wulf, 2004).

The most generic definition of SSR was developed by the OECD’s DAC Commission (2001) as:

the transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (p.38).

Since SSRs are taken as a “governance” framework, they include several statutory and non-statutory actors. The broadest range of SSR actors are mentioned in the 2002 UN Human Development report. Table 1.1 below shows that the governance of the security sector involves a great range of statutory, non-statutory, uniformed, civilian, and
judiciary actors.

According to Bryden and Brzoska (2005) the development of SSRs has happened in three phases: first, following the end of the cold war, Western countries and some of major international security organizations such as the NATO and OSCE as a precondition of admission to those organizations required post-soviet countries to transform their civil-military relations in accordance with the democratic principles. These requirements were also extended to intelligence and internal security services which had miserable human rights records. As other multinational actors such as the EU and the Council of Europe enhanced their influence on the security domain, other non-military security components such as policing systems were included in the security sector debates. In addition to that, as the number of civil conflicts increased after the end of the cold war, major development organizations acknowledged the close relationship between security and development, and they considered SSRs as important components of the development path. As a consequence of this set of conceptual changes in thinking about security, donor countries and international development organizations such as the OECD and UNDP incorporated SSRs into their development programs. Finally, post-conflict or failed state environments where immediate reform and restructuring of the security sector is necessary considerably helped the SSRs become more important.

The SSR concept is generally analyzed in three categories: international development, post-authoritarian and post-conflict (Hänggi, 2004). Among those, the post-
conflict SSRs, on which this study focuses, are dramatically different from the others. That is, it is more difficult to implement the security reforms in post-conflict settings since the conflict situation devastates most of the extant security sector institutions as well as the political ones. Nevertheless, destroyed security sector institutions provide a window of opportunity for reformers to build up a new system from scratch. Moreover, reform projects by international actors are mostly welcomed in post-conflict situations (Hänggi, 2004; Marenin, 2005).

According to Ferguson (2004) the SSR concept directly involves the primary causes of the problems that yield to conflict. Therefore, international assistance programs for PCEs must pay attention to the importance of SSRs in their reform programs. Ferguson contends that once the security sector in a post-conflict state operates well, disorder in the streets will stop, the institutions of democracy will develop and foreign investment will be attracted which will then undermine the causes of conflict by creating social order, regenerating the economy and reducing unemployment.
Table 1.1 The Main Actors of the Security Sector Governance\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>President and Prime minister</td>
<td>Judiciary, Justice ministries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>National security advisory bodies</td>
<td>Prisons,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paramilitary forces</td>
<td>Legislature and legislative select committees</td>
<td>Criminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmeries</td>
<td>Ministries of defense, internal affairs and foreign affairs</td>
<td>investigation and prosecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence services</td>
<td>Customary and traditional authorities</td>
<td>services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(military and civilian)</td>
<td>Financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units)</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret services</td>
<td>Civil society organizations (civilian review boards, public complaints commissions)</td>
<td>commissions and ombudspersons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast guards</td>
<td></td>
<td>Correctional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border guards</td>
<td></td>
<td>services,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Customary and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve and local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, presidential guards, militias)</td>
<td></td>
<td>traditional justice systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonstate</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberation armies</td>
<td>Professional groups</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guerrilla armies</td>
<td>The media</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private bodyguard units</td>
<td>Research organizations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private security companies</td>
<td>Advocacy organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political party militias</td>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Source: UNHDR 2002, p. 87
The Starting Point of SSRs

As was mentioned above, SSR is a rather holistic and broad domain aiming to merge security with development. However, it is not easy to know which component of SSR to give priority in practice (Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004). When SSR is taken in post-conflict contexts, it is generally established that priority should be given to physical security and public safety. It is impossible to launch broader development projects unless at least a certain level of physical security is provided in PCEs (Ball, 2002b; Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004; Marenin, 2005). Within this frame, Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder (2004) note that:

Deficits in the public provision of physical security are usually perceived as one of the core problems in post-conflict situations. Typical manifestations of insecurity include organized crime and illegal paramilitary organizations, trafficking in drugs and weapons, the unregulated possession of firearms, terrorism and violent extremism and the abuse of power by state security apparatuses (p.126).

Similarly, Marenin (2005) asserts that “Largely as a consequence of the destruction wrought by conflict and the availability of weapons and ex-soldiers with no jobs, there is an immediate need and demand for public security which, if not addressed effectively, will undermine local will and the capacity to achieve reforms which last” (p. 5).

At this point the crucial question to ask is: what is the most appropriate strategy to establish physical security of citizens given the human security and SSR concepts? The aforementioned debates over the shift in the security paradigm and reforms of the
security sector imply that once the armed conflict is stopped the space of the military in the security sector should be reduced and more civilians should be included in the governance of the security sector. In the post-conflict settings where physical security is considered the precondition for SSRs, police come forward as the primary actor to provide security and deal with the aforementioned crime and terrorism problems in PCEs.

Wiatrowski, Pino, and Pritchard (2008), for example, contend that special paramilitary security forces—police with military weapons and training might be considered a solution since the normal capabilities of police forces can be exceeded by the demands faced in post-conflict contexts. Yet, they also stress that such an approach can have several drawbacks. It can fuel existing conflicts if militias are powerful. Moreover, police mostly lack training facilities for gaining professionalism in terms of military capabilities. Finally such an approach might undermine the democratization process by breaking the organic connection between legal authorities, which is primarily represented by the police, and citizens.

As a matter of fact, the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) report (2008) gives an example of what might happen unless the roles and responsibilities of the police are clearly identified in a post-conflict situation. According to the crisis group report, the functions of the police have not been crystallized in Afghanistan mostly because the military considered the police merely as a complementary unit of security and thus police are primarily used for combating insurgency rather than policing. Such an approach, consequently, paved the way for increased crime rates and chaos in the streets.
Furthermore, insurgents used the lack of government authority [due to the lack of police visibility in the streets] as a propaganda tool to recruit more militia members. The ICG group contends that both international and national police should adopt community policing to build more communication and dialogue with citizens and exhibit state authority on the streets.

The Perito report (2005) presents another example from Iraq. The absence of a civilian police force that can deal with large-scale civil chaos created significant problems in Iraq. Moreover, military units mostly cannot and did not want to function as police forces as was seen during the looting events in Baghdad in 2003.

Given the above debate, it can be concluded that although police seems to be only one of the several components and actors of SSRs and human security concepts, they have very crucial functions in the security-development nexus in PCEs. These functions are not only limited to confronting the problem of street crimes and establishing order in the chaotic environments but they also include establishing the bridge between the community and government authorities. It is frequently noted in PCEs that the police are the most visible sign of government and they must do more than man checkpoints and patrol in vehicles. The contact that they have with the public, the problems they solve and the respect they gain by being perceived as fair might lead to more citizen participation in social, economic and political domains that will then accelerate the peace-building process. Trust is very difficult to build and it can be destroyed in an instant if force is used gratuitously or the police are perceived as corrupt. This study, therefore, focuses on
the role of police in post-conflict environments and in particular on their functions within
the democratic policing framework, which can be accepted as the policing aspect of the
human security notion and SSRs. As mentioned above, the role of the UN as an
intervener in conflicts has become dominant in the post-cold war era. In other words, the
UN is the primary policy-maker and executer in most of the PCEs with the exception of
Iraq and Afghanistan. Within this framework, this study will scrutinize UN police
missions as important tools for the implementation of human security and peace-building
in PCEs.
Chapter 2 UN Police Missions and Democratic Policing

The central thesis of the previous chapter was that the security concept has undergone a significant transformation since the end of the cold war. The new security paradigm, human security, is a merger of development and security domains and it puts more emphasis on the security of individuals than security of states. Such an approach is an outcome of the third global democratization wave that focused on certain concepts such as human rights, civil liberties, transparency, legitimacy and accountability of public organizations around the world. The shift in the security paradigm has inevitably redounded to shape the goals of SSRs.

Within the complexity of post-conflict settings, the holistic and multi-faceted context of SSR can yield to confusion in terms of pinpointing the start line of reforms. Still, it is generally agreed that the physical security of citizens should be given priority in post-conflict environments where several types of crimes are committed and social disorder is pervasive. In other words, internal order, public safety and stability generally deteriorate in PCEs due to the absence of a state authority. The lack of order paves the way for the emergence of organized crime groups, vigilantes, militias and warlords. Still worse is the fact that the police in PCEs, who are supposed to combat these crimes and
disorders, lack the capacity, strategy and tactics to restore order. It is common that they
become part of the problem and engage in violence, extra judicial punishment, criminal
activities and human rights abuses (O’Neil, 2005). Ideally, policing entails frequent
communication with civil society both to get to know their operational environment, and
to have citizens feel safe and secure in order to build trust and legitimacy. The existence
of a trustworthy police service in the streets is one of the strongest indicators of a
democratic state authority to the public (Ferguson, 2004). It is also important to mention
that the military cannot produce effective solutions to this type of intra-state and
mostly asymmetrical security situation because neither their organizational mindset nor
training is appropriate for dealing with such situations (Dunlap, 1999; Serafino, 2004;
Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

Nevertheless, in PCEs, local police organizations are often a source of the
aforementioned problems. According to Goldsmith (2005), citizens are fearful of the
former regime’s police and this forms a significant obstacle to the entire SSR process in
post-conflict settings. Therefore, international assistance is necessary in order to take
over or help regenerate the crucial functions of policing in such environments. As
elaborated below, the UN has been the dominant international police-deploying
organization since 1960. Thus, it is critical to explore through research the strategies the
UNPOL uses to implement DP principles in PCEs.

Relying upon official UN documents, secondary data, and scholarly literature on
international and democratic policing, this chapter analyzes the history and evolution of
UN police missions and democratic policing concept.

2.1. The Historical Development of UN Policing

2.1.1. First-Generation UN Police Missions

The role of the UN police in the first generation missions was limited to ‘observing’ the activities of local police, ‘assisting’ the local police, ‘advising’ the mission leadership on policing issues, and ‘reporting’ human rights violations to the mission leadership (Schmidl, 1998; Hansen, 2002).

The first UN police deployment occurred in 1960 with the MONUC mission in the Congo and lasted until 1965. The second UN police deployment took place during the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTAET) in West Papua between 1962 and 1963 (Schmidl, 1998). Although these were the first two police deployments by the UN, it is important to mention that police units were not deployed as a part of the pre-mission planning in MONUC and UNTAET. In 1964, however, 200 UN police monitors were deployed in Cyprus as a part of the UNFICYP mission. The term “CIVPOL”, or Civilian Police, was created in this mission in order to tell the police units apart from those of the military. Also, UNFICYP was the first mission with a built-in civil police unit (Hansen, 2002).

In the cold war era, police were used in relatively small numbers in post-conflict situations. Moreover, the distinction between the police and the military was not clear.

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8 Beginning with the UNFICYP mission in Cyprus, 1964, UN police were named CIVPOL (acronym for civil police). In 2005 CIVPOL was changed as UNPOL (acronym for UN police). These acronyms are used interchangeably in reference to the UN police in this study.
and the police were generally considered a complementary element of the military in post-conflict settings (Durch, 2010). According to Call and Barnett (2000), the primary reason for the small number of police deployments is that, in that period, the UN mostly intervened in inter-state conflicts, or wars, where deployment of police forces was not appropriate. When it comes to the functional ambiguity between the military and the police in post-conflict countries, Call and Barnett argue that this was a reflection of the organizational mindset which was constructed by the colonial powers during the colonial era and conveyed to the post-colonial era. That is, the colonial powers such as France, Portugal and Spain had militarized the local police by establishing hybrid security organizations (i.e., military police, constabulary or paramilitary forces) to ensure public order in their colonies in Africa, Asia and South America. After the end of the cold war, second-generation peace-keeping operations began.

2.1.2. Second-Generation UN Police Missions

The second generation (transformational) police missions were gradually formed in the post-cold war era. In addition to monitoring and advising, second generation mandates have included reform-restructuring, training, and mentoring roles for the CIVPOL. The general characteristics of these missions were shaped between 1989 and 1995; and especially by four missions, namely UNTAG, UNOMOZ, ONUSAL, and UNTAC, which can be cited as the landmarks for the development of the second generation CIVPOL actions. Among them, the ONUSAL mission in El Salvador, 1991 - 1995, was a very important milestone in UN policing because the reform and
restructuring of the local police by the CIVPOL was mandated and largely succeeded for the first time in this mission (Hansen, 2002; Stanley & Loosle, 1998).

Another important development in UN policing in this era was the introduction of the ‘SMART concept’ to identify the core duties of the CIVPOL in ‘A Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights for CIVPOL Monitors’ in 1995 by the center for Human Rights. The acronym SMART stands for: Supporting human rights, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting and Training (Hansen, 2002; Hartz, 2000).

The major differences between the first two generations of UN police missions are significant. The context of monitoring has been transformed from passively watching into a more active type of observation based on the international criteria of criminal justice and human rights. Also, reform-restructuring and training activities were included in the roles of UN policing in the second-generation missions (Hansen, 2002). In terms of structure, Hartz (2000) identifies the general features of the second generation CIVPOL missions as “unarmed, no executive power, multinational, independent chain of command, reporting only to the head of the mission and performing according to the ‘SMART’ concept” (p. 30).

2.1.3. Third-Generation UN Police Missions

The third generation of UN police missions began in 1999 with the UNMIK and the UNMAET missions in Kosovo and East Timor respectively. In these missions, in addition to the previously mentioned roles of monitoring, advising, reform- restructuring and training, the UNPOL were charged with actual policing and law enforcement duties,
such as crime investigation, arrest, traffic and crowd management, and collecting criminal intelligence. Within this context, the deployment of 4,500 CIVPOL officers was authorized in UNMIK and 1,640 were authorized in UNTAET by the UN Security Council (Durch, 2010).

2.1.4. The Brahimi Report: The Problematic Areas of UN Policing

The number of UN-led peace keeping operations grew especially in the 1990-95 period, which is followed by a relatively calm four year period until 1999. It increased again in 1999. Twenty five peace-keeping missions, with police components, were started in this period. The proliferation of UN operations inevitably entailed research studies. Durch, Holt, Earl and Shanahan (2003) note that after the second commencement of complex operations in 1999, the Secretary General charged the Panel on UN Peace Operations to prepare a comprehensive evaluation of UN peace-keeping operations in 2000 and the product of the panel was a landmark report, called the Brahimi Report named after the chair of the Panel Lakhtar Brahimi.

The report scrutinized the peace-keeping operations from several aspects, addressed the shortcomings of the system and made several concrete policy suggestions. In terms of the CIVPOL, the report indicated that member countries were reluctant to send police officers to the UN missions. The report noted that a 25 per cent deficiency existed, as of 2000, in the number of deployed versus the authorized number of UN police. Another issue raised by the report was that the selection and training of CIVPOL officers slowed down the deployment process. Training was supposed to be completed
within 30 days, after a Security Council resolution is issued for ‘traditional’ operations and within 90 days for ‘complex’ operations, according to the report. Finally, the report emphasized the inconsistency that stems from the multi-national structure of the CIVPOL among CIVPOL officers in terms of skills, training and policing mentality (UN, 2000).

The report put forward a number of recommendations to include:

A doctrinal shift in how the Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal, human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner (UN, 2000, Para 40).

Specifically, the Brahimi report suggested that member states create and hold ready reserve police forces for international deployment, build up bilateral and multi-lateral (regional) partnerships to jointly train police officers for international operations, and delegate a single contact point (department or office) to conduct these relationships among the member states regarding peace-keeping issues. The report also suggested the establishment of separate police and military units under the DPKO, and the preparation of a 100-person on-call list in the UN Headquarters, out of senior police officers and technical staff, to be deployed to a new mission area within seven days to set up the CIVPOL infrastructure and begin training the incoming UN police officers.

After the report was issued, the Secretary General refused to implement the ‘doctrinal shift’ that the report called for and instead indicated that there was “a need to review how CIVPOL, human rights experts and related specialists can work more closely together in peace operations” rather than a doctrinal shift (Durch, et. al., 2003, p.29). In
terms of other suggestions, only a few countries took serious steps to form national police reserves and appointed skillful officers in those units whereas most countries either did not or would not consider the recommendations. Secondly, only the EU started a regional effort to fulfill the joint training suggestion of the report. Finally, the efforts of the DPKO to create an on-call roster became mired in an onerous screening and vetting process that also suffered from lack of qualified candidates (Durch, et. al., 2003).

The rapid deployment of adequate numbers of police officers - or ‘deployment gap’ as Dziedzic (1998) identifies it- in post-conflict environments was also raised by many others (Broer & Emery, 1998; Call & Barnett, 2000; Durch, 2010; Durch & England, 2010; Hansen, 2002; Lewis, Marks, & Perito, 2002; Serafino, 2004; Sismanidis, 1997) as one of the greatest problems of UN policing. Different political interests of UN member states can often be an essential source of the deployment gap (Hansen, 2002).

Although the DPKO started a one-year rapid deployment roster pilot project, including a roster of 360 persons in 2003, the project suffered from confusion and a lack of commitment allegiance from the member states and the DPKO suspended the project in 2005 (Gourlay, 2006).

2.1.5. The New Horizon Initiative

A significant reform step after the Brahimi Report was the ‘New Horizon Initiative’ that started in 2009. The New Horizon report takes the Brahimi report as a baseline and updates the challenges and its policy recommendations to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of peace-keeping operations in the future. The document
states that “UN peace-keeping must be ready to act in ways that are more flexible, effective and efficient. Piecemeal approaches are not an option. A global approach is required. The foundation of this is a renewed global partnership among the Security Council, the contributing Member States and the Secretariat” (UN, 2009, p. 6). Within this framework, the document asks the Security Council to build more feasible mandates and provide greater political support from member states for the fulfillment of the mandates. The Secretary General is to provide strategic support and member states must provide logistics and personnel to support peace-keeping operations. The ‘global approach’ involves developing three types of partnerships among these three actors: a partnership in purpose, one in action, and one for the future. For each of these domains the New Horizon document identifies concrete steps to take (UN, 2009).

In October 2010, the first progress report on the New Horizon Initiative was issued by DPKO and DFS. The report stresses that: “After a period of surge reaching a historically high scale of deployment in 2010, UN peace-keeping may now be headed towards a period of consolidation” (UN, 2010b, p. 7). Evaluating the policy debates on the aforementioned issues the report indicates that several bilateral and multilateral workshops, seminars, briefings and policy debates were held and concrete outcomes have emerged especially in four areas: policy development, global field support strategy, planning and oversight, and capability development. Among others, the roles of peacekeepers as early peace-builders were clarified by member states and other key partners. The capability-driven peace-keeping approach was supported by member states
and efforts to fulfill the recommendations of the New Horizon document on the issue were started and several workshops were held regarding the global field support such as creation of ‘modularized service packages’ for the rapid deployment and providing the security of peace-keeping staff were carried out. Finally, the foundation of a ‘global service center’ in Brindisi, Italy was laid. Important improvements in financial resources for mission startups and improvements in human resources were implemented (UN, 2010b).

In conclusion, the context of UN policing has undergone both quantitative and functional improvements since the first deployment of a UN police element in the Congo in 1960. The roles of the UN police in PCEs have been transformed from simply observing and assisting to executing law enforcement functions when the local police capacity is absent. In addition, a great majority of UN police operations have been mandated for training and reform-restructuring of the host country police force. The Brahimi report, issued in 2000, has been an essential document in terms of the identification of problems in practice and setting criteria for future operations. Although the suggestions of the Brahimi report were mostly ignored by member states, efforts of the DPKO continued with the New Horizon Initiative that aims to build up a holistic peace-keeping approach and cohesive partnership strategy among member states, the secretariat and the Security Council on crucial policy areas.
2.2. The Current Structure of the UN Police

Currently, UN policing system operates through four units: the police division at the UN headquarters, Individual police Units (IPUs), Formed Police Units (FPUs), and Standing Police Capacity (SPC). Among those, (IPUs) and (FPUs) together form the ‘UNPOL’; the Standing Police Capacity launches new missions and gives advisory support to ongoing ones; and the police division in New York provides strategic, logistical and policy support to the UNPOL units in the field.

2.2.1. The UN Police Division

The roots of the UN police division go back to 1993 when a small unit was formed under Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) to give strategic support to CIVPOL in the field. The actual police division was established in 2000. Based on the recommendations in the Brahimi report (UN, 2000), emphasizing a holistic law enforcement approach that integrates every component of law enforcement, the police division was integrated into the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) under the DPKO. The police division supports the field by developing policy and guidance on international policing, strategic planning, vetting and recruiting qualified personnel and increasing the number of female officers in the field. It develops strategies and policies to combat sexual and gender based violence, and builds up cooperation and partnerships with international and regional actors to enhance effectiveness. The UN police division provides logistical and strategic support to 5 political and 12 DPKO missions, with a total deployment of approximately 13,750 personnel as of 2010.
2.2.2. Individual Police Units

Individual police officers (IPUs) are one of the two components of the UNPOL who conduct the mandated roles of UN police in the field. As explained above, these roles range from observing and reporting to conducting law enforcement activities. Nevertheless, the primary functions of IPUs are training, mentoring and supervising local police officers, given that the majority of mandates entail second generation (transformational) policing.

The UN has the following requirements for becoming an UNPOL officer: being between 25 and 62 years of age; language proficiency in terms of listening, writing and speaking the operational language of the mission to be deployed- which is currently either English or French; having a valid driver’s license with at least one year of driving experience; proficiency with using firearms; and having basic computer skills. In addition to these mandatory requirements, candidates with “previous experience in a UN mission; proficiency in map reading, land navigation, use of global positioning systems; knowledge of basic negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution; interviewing techniques; and basic first aid” are given priority in recruitment, according to the official website of the UN police (UNPOL, 2010).

2.2.3. Formed Police Units

Formed police units (FPU) are the third element of UN policing. The first FPU deployment occurred in 2003. The first significant FPU deployment occurred in Liberia in 2003 (Durch & England, 2010). In a policy paper prepared by the DPKO and
Department of Field Support (DFS) (UN, 2010a) FPUs are defined as:

Cohesive mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management. FPUs work in support of the establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human rights abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive and more robust policing in accordance with the mandate (Para 8).

Each FPU is comprised of a minimum of 120 police officers. For better operational flexibility, FPUs are divided into at least three platoons with 40 police officers in each platoon. Platoons are comprised of 10-person ‘sections’, which is the smallest unit within a FPU. Sections cannot be broken into smaller units because the cohesive structure of the section and ability to control it would be lost. Command units, commander and deputy commanders, and logistical support units are also included in FPUs. Therefore, the total number of officers in an FPU might amount up to 140.

FPUs have three core duties: “public order management, protection of UN personnel and facilities, and supporting police operations that require a formed response and may involve a higher risk (above the general capability of individual UN police)” (UN, 2010a, Para 12).

Thanks to their advantages in terms of rapid deployment, cost-efficiency, operational and strategic strength, flexibility and cultural homogeneity (because a FPU is composed of officers from the same country), the DPKO has increasingly relied on FPUs for the last decade. As a matter of fact, in reference to the official DPKO statistics, the FPU deployment has increased over the years in parallel with the demand for UN police. For example, while only 20% of CIVPOL officers were FPUs in 2001, the average
number of FPU officers deployed by the end of 2010 is 6,547, which accounts for almost 49% of the total police deployment in that year (Durch & England, 2010).

Another important advantage of FPU deployment is related to its cost-effectiveness. That is, it is 75% cheaper to deploy a FPU officer in comparison to an IPU officer. Moreover, the UN pays a per capita reimbursement to the contributing state for FPUs. Therefore, states are more eager to send their police officers as FPUs rather than individual police officers (Durch & England, 2010).

2.2.4. The Standing Police Capacity

The Standing Police Capacity is the final major component of the UN police system. The need for this type of unit was first mentioned in the ‘Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (UN, 2004). In 2006, the report of the secretary general on the overview of the financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations (UN, 2006b) declared that the initial launch of the SPC, with 27 personnel, would be supported in the 2006-2007 budget.

The standing police capacity have two core functions: (a) to start up new United Nations police operations, including participation in pre-mission planning, as required; and (b) to assist existing United Nations police operations with police reform and in capacity-building activities and operational audits (UN 2006b, Para 93).

The core functions are explained in detail in the report. At the outset of a new peace-keeping mission, the SPC staffs are deployed in the field to prepare the convenient working conditions for incoming UNPOL units and establish cooperation with local
police. When they are not deployed for mission startups, the SPC personnel are supposed to improve ‘police management’ in ongoing police missions, provide strategic advice to the local police on police training, recruit new staff and develop policy related to policing matters (UN, 2008a).

The 2008 ‘Report of the Panel of Experts on the Standing Police Capacity’s first year of operation’ asserted that the SPC was a promising unit yet needed improvement in several areas. The report suggested that the number of SPC personnel be raised up to either 54 or 76; cross-training of SPC staff in at least one other area in addition to his or her own area of expertise (in order to create functional redundancy); delegation of a SPC focal point at the HQ level in New York; and inclusion of complementary personnel from several areas, such as civil engineers, contract managers, and human-resources managers, simultaneously or in advance of the SPC deployment to facilitate the working environment of the SPC (UN, 2008a). In 2010, the Security Council had decided to increase the capacity of the SPC by 50% (Durch & England, 2010).

2.3. Democratic Policing and UNPOL

2.3.1. The Definition and the Development of the Democratic Policing Concept

The basic principles that shaped the contemporary discussion of democratic policing were first introduced by Sir Robert Peel in 1829 (Jones et al., 1996; Karatay,

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9 The report puts forward two options in terms of capacity enhancement: in option one it suggests 54 personnel comprised of 5 x 10-some teams of SPC personnel + 4 team assistants; option two proposes 77 personnel comprised of 7 x 10-some teams + 5 team assistants + deputy chief of SPC + chief of SPC.
2009; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). The industrial revolution in England caused the English population to move from rural areas to the cities. The resulting increase in crime exceeded the capacity of the traditional county sheriff system to respond to it. Sir Robert Peel was charged with reforming the London Police based on the Metropolitan Act of 1829. Peel’s approach to policing—which he formulated as “police are the public and the public are the police” - can be accepted to be the keystone of modern policing (Karatay, 2009). Peel summed up his paradigm of modern policing into nine principles. These include accountability of the police to the public, rule of law in policing matters, enhancement of police effectiveness through cooperation with the community, minimization of the use of force by the police, and fairness and non-partisanship of the police when conducting duty. Peel asserted that police should never go beyond their limits in the law enforcement system by engaging in extrajudicial punishment. Finally, the primary indicator of police efficiency, according to Peel, was low levels of crimes and high levels of social order rather than a visible police presence (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

Certain political factors have facilitated the paradigm shift in police reform toward democratic policing. Among those, the most salient ones are: the end of the cold war, the spread of democratic values that are accepted to be the means of economic development by the majority of the world’s countries, the shift in citizens’ perception of “policing” (paralleling with democratization) as a facilitator of democratization through enforcing the laws and maintaining order, and finally the rise of terrorism as a new threat
that has fueled interventionist policies by the US and international organizations (Bayley, 2006). Also, despite police assertions to the contrary, there is considerable evidence that aggressive police activity does not lower the amount of crime in the community (Weisburd & Eck, 2004).

The general context and principles of DP for the UN was first identified in ‘the commissioner’s guidance for democratic policing in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in the IPTF report in 1996. The report stated that:

In a democratic society, the police serve to protect, rather than impede freedoms. The very purpose of the police is to provide a safe, orderly environment in which these freedoms can be exercised. A democratic police force is not concerned with people's beliefs or associates, their movements or conformity to state ideology. It is not even primarily concerned with the enforcement of regulations or bureaucratic regimens. Instead, the police force of a democracy is concerned strictly with the preservation of safe communities and the application of criminal law equally to all people, without fear or favor (UN, 1996, pp. 1-2).

The IPTF report also enumerated seven principles of democratic policing as follows:

1- police must be oriented and operated in accordance with the principles of democracy; 2- police, as recipients of public trust, are professionals whose conduct must be governed by a professional code of conduct; 3- police must have as their highest priority the protection of life; 4- police must serve the community and are accountable to the community they serve; 5- protection of life and property are the primary function of police operations; 6- police must conduct their activities with respect for human dignity and the basic human rights of all persons; and 7- police must discharge their duties in a non-discriminatory manner (Bayley, 2006, p. 8).

Later, another international security organization, OSCE’s guidebook on
democratic policing (2009) emphasized that the police can significantly enhance the 
legitimacy of the state authority when they work congruently with the principles of 
democratic policing. The guidebook stressed that: “the main duties of the police are to 
maintain public tranquility, law and order; to protect the individual’s fundamental rights 
and freedoms, particularly life; to prevent and detect crime, to reduce fear; and to provide 
assistance and services to the public” (Para, 2). Within this context, it draws a broad 
framework that encompasses qualifications and requirements for DP at the state, 
organizational, and individual levels.

At the state level, that includes macro policies facilitating the implementation of 
DP. The guidebook (2009), inter alia, stresses that roles, responsibilities, professional 
codes of conduct and ethics standards for the police should be identified clearly. One 
reason that makes this requirement crucial is that the police have to enforce various types 
of laws, ranging from domestic to the international level, and this might cause role 
ambiguity (OSCE, 2009). Police traditionally had an order maintenance responsibility, 
‘Keeping the King’s Peace’. Dispute resolution in the community brought the police into 
conflicts between disputing groups. The police did not want to be armed social workers 
although this accounted for much of their work. Thus, the term Law-Enforcement 
Officer was invented to narrow their role (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Secondly, the police 
should be controlled by a democratically elected civil government. Nevertheless, police 
chiefs should be given freedom in appointing their staff and making operational 
decisions. Thirdly, the composition of a democratic police force should reflect all the
groups in the community they serve. Minorities and women should be given proportional representation at all levels in democratic police organizations. Fourthly, internal and external accountability mechanisms overseeing the police should be established. External accountability mechanisms might include ‘the executive’, ‘the legislature’, ‘the judiciary’, ‘the media’, certain NGOs and ‘independent ombudspersons’ (Para, 84) and civil review boards. Finally, the police should have the same rights as the community and their equipment should be sufficient for the execution of their duties (OSCE, 2009).

At the organizational level, which refers to the tactical and operational aspects of DP, the guidebook asserts that the police should stay out of the political domain and ‘serve’ all the groups in society in an unbiased and equal manner, based on international standards of human rights and democratic values. Within this framework, all police activities, from patrol to the use of force, should be planned and conducted in a way that does not single out any group in society based on race, ethnicity, religious or sexual orientation. Another requirement of DP at the organizational level is transparency. According to the guidebook, the police should establish certain sorts of mechanisms to facilitate communication with the public. Such mechanisms might include but are not limited to: call-for service systems, open police hours, open police-citizen forums where citizens can directly bring forth their problems and concerns regarding policing issues, public surveys, routine press briefings, and community oriented policing programs, that should also focus on outreaching minority groups. In terms of community oriented policing the guidebook emphasizes that the police should gain the trust and support of the
public. Within this framework, decentralized police organizations can facilitate the implementation of community oriented policing. The report also emphasizes that induction and in-service training should be given periodically and these training should cover macro level issues, such as democratization and human rights as well as operational subject matters at the micro level. Finally, the cooperation and collaboration between the police and other elements of the law-enforcement system is crucial for the success of democratic law-enforcement systems as a whole (OSCE, 2009).

At the individual level, the guidebook contends that democratic police officers should work according to the professional codes of conduct and ethical standards identified by legitimate laws, be respectful and responsive to the needs of the public in a non-discriminatory manner and stay out of corruption\(^\text{10}\) (OSCE, 2009).

According to Marenin (2005) democratic policing is a reflection of the “human security” concept in the policing field. It is a shift in the mindset from state-security oriented policing to citizen-security oriented policing. DP entails that the police should be accountable and transparent; police organizations should be designed semi-autonomously to balance the responsiveness to the citizen demands and legal procedures; police organizations should also be representative of the major fractions of the community they

\(^{10}\) The guidebook (2009) notes that corruption includes the direct or indirect offer, or the solicitation or acceptance, “whether directly or indirectly, by a police officer of any money, article of value, gift, favor, promise, reward or advantage, whether for himself/herself or for any person, group or entity, in return for any act or omission already done or omitted or to be done or omitted in the future” in or in connection with the police officer’s position or “performance of any function connected with policing (Para, 26; quotation marks original ).
serve in terms of race, ethnicity, religion and gender; police administrators should manage integrity well; and finally, the police should be considered citizens and democratic norms should be applied to situations in which they are involved.

Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) enumerate several principles of democratic policing. These principles are in fact principles of democracy that are supposed to be applied to policing. The first principle of democratic policing is *rule of law* that entails that all laws that police enforce are created through democratic processes by legislative institutions in the respective democracies.

The rule of law concept requires elaboration because it is one of the central components of DP. According to Carothers (1998, 2003), *rule of law* is an application of clearly elaborated rules that can be accessed publicly by every related party in the society without any discrimination or favoritism. Maintaining the rule of law is crucial for democratization, since it is the only way of ensuring the rights of individuals against the state and against one another. Democratization is also accepted by Western democracy promoters as the only cure for corruption and crimes that are prevalent in countries that need democracy promotion (Carothers, 1998).

The second principle of DP, according to Pino and Wiatrowski (2006), is *legitimacy*, which is the acceptance of laws and legal regulations by citizens. Another DP principle is *transparency* that refers to openness of governmental activities to the public who employ government from a democratic standpoint. *Accountability* is a natural outcome of the previous two principles. Accountability requires “responsiveness with
citizens, elected officials and the news media” (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006b, p.85). The final principle of democratic policing is *subordination to civil authority*, which means planning of police activities jointly with police, civil authorities and the public.

**Community-Oriented Policing**

Since the democratic policing concept is often confused with police community relations and community policing, or community oriented policing (COP), it is necessary to discuss the community policing concept and address the similarities and differences between the two types of policing. COP was first elaborated on by Trojanowicz and Dixon (1974). According to this approach the robustness of relations between the law enforcement, justice systems and citizens primarily depends on the relationships between police officers on the street and citizens. Police always need public support to be successful. The community is a platform on which people with common interests, goals, or values socially interact. Communities can differ based on factors such as geographical factors, demographic characteristics, size, ethnicity and so forth. Therefore, communities are not only places where people live but they also help them socially interact with one another on common interests. In other words, all social interactions happen in a community (Trojanowicz and Dixon, 1974).

In order to develop the structural, psychological and communicative skills of the police, Police-Community Relations (PCR) units should undertake substantial planning, recruit skillful officers and conduct training and experiments. Yet the PCR programs cannot be effective if the police discriminate amongst the members of a community based
on race, ethnicity, religion, or socio-economic status. When mutual trust is established between the community and police, however, citizens will be more likely to help police in crime prevention or investigation. The first step should be taken by the police officer in this process. Police can develop strong relations with the community through using any opportunity to communicate with the community; patrolling on foot on some occasions; patrolling with citizens; and participating in social activities of the community. Also, PCR programs can attract the participation of citizens by having them believe that their ideas will be heeded and they will participate in the assessment of community related issues. PCR processes can help citizens and police better understand the problems in the application of criminal justice policies and they could jointly put pressure on the policy makers to take action (Trojanowicz & Dixon, 1974).

Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) assert that police organizations can contribute to social development by building social capital within communities. Social capital was first developed as a concept by Coleman (1988). Coleman noted that in conflict areas and disorganized communities trust and informal social control were destroyed. The Broken Windows Theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) was an early version of this. They noted that community policing went into socially disorganized areas and worked to create a democratically determined social order through social consultation. Social capital can be developed between police organizations and citizens through more problem solving, interaction and dialog. In such an environment, police-citizen relationships are based on trust that begets close cooperation and communication in crime prevention or solving.
The point here is that social capital increases trust which is the basis for social cooperation and democratic governance. Problem solving, as described by Goldstein (1990) in Problem Oriented Policing, has demonstrated that the police can be a lead element in community development and social revitalization. This cooperation is assumed to increase social order and reduce crime.

Democratic policing is considered to be the next generation of police in a manner reflecting the “eras” of policing of Kelling and Moore (1988). The reason for this is that community policing failed to transform the professional model of policing. As is frequently the case of attempts at organizational reform, the new model fails to take hold and it is defeated (Bayley, 2006; Wiatrowsky & Pino, 2006). Differences between Community-oriented policing, DP and professional policing in the tactical and operational domains are demonstrated by Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) in the below table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime response and control</th>
<th>Professional Policing</th>
<th>COP</th>
<th>Democratic Policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responds to crime, controls scene, and writes reports. Police investigation of crime</td>
<td>Responds to crime, and interacts with the crime scene. The officer obtains additional information, and views this an opportunity to educate</td>
<td>Responds to community, assesses impact on community, and enters it into an information system which</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006, pp.90-93
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>the public on prevention issues</th>
<th>links it with other community activities. The police allow citizens or other third parties to help shape the general responses if necessary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen contact</strong></td>
<td>Random patrol based on assignment. Contacts with citizens only for investigation purposes or suspicious activities</td>
<td>The officer is knows his/her community, both good and bad. Contact is started to enhance the knowledge of the community on the officer and his roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen security</strong></td>
<td>unaware of accurate measures of crime or the fear of crime</td>
<td>Deals with fear of crime and recurring patterns of crime. develops strategies in cooperation with the community and evaluates the outcomes of these strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crime prevention</strong></td>
<td>establish separate crime prevention sections in PDs</td>
<td>crime prevention is not separable from community policing officers basic duties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crime is considered a serious threat before development of democracy. Yet crime prevention activities should not violate personal freedoms. Serious accountability measures are
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Coproduction of public safety</strong></th>
<th>No coproduced safety. It is done single handedly by the police.</th>
<th>There is consultation with the community as to identification of problems but the final decisions are made by police.</th>
<th>The community is consulted at both problem identification and solution implementation phases. Priority is given to the community.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collection and analysis of information</strong></td>
<td>reports of crime, crime mapping</td>
<td>in addition to traditional sources, information is collected through trust and cooperation with the community</td>
<td>As with the COP this will be further developed as information is linked to other sources which provide information about institutional accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption and police misuse of authority</strong></td>
<td>Corruption is a corollary of the isolation of police from the community. Moreover external regulations result in more reticent police sub cultures</td>
<td>the independence of the community police officer is has resulted in great attention being placed on integrity issues</td>
<td>as accountability, transparency, subordination to civil authority and legitimacy increases corruption will diminish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-terrorism</strong></td>
<td>SWAT teams, infiltration</td>
<td>contacts with community promote cooperation, prevention and intelligence flows</td>
<td>the model may delegitimize the claims of terrorist organizations through enhanced democracy and integration with the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic development</td>
<td>Police is isolated from the community to fulfill their function</td>
<td>supports interaction with citizens and social capital building which yields democratization</td>
<td>The police activities are evaluated through accountability mechanisms. Active cooperation with the community is promoted for effective feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute resolution and ethnic conflict</td>
<td>conflict resolution is not considered a “real police work” and not taken seriously</td>
<td>recurring disputes cost significant time and resources. Alternative dispute resolution and community justice are utilized</td>
<td>Officers can articulate and protect human rights. Police keep their contacts with community members in probable conflict regions to estimate future conflicts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Narrow Definitions of DP**

Regarding the narrow definitions of DP, the emphasis is on the most ‘distinguishing’ components of the phenomenon which are generally mentioned to be ‘accountability’, ‘responsiveness’ and “effectiveness” (Bayley, 1997; Neild, 2001). Neild (2001) contends that the ‘effectiveness’ of the police depends on the ‘respect’ they show to people and the ‘responsiveness’ to their demands; “this dynamic relationship between, respectfulness, responsiveness and effectiveness lies at the core of democratic policing”
DP, according to Neild, entails a move away from the preservation of ‘social order’, which implies that the police can do away with the rights of criminals or spoilers for the sake of the peace of society at large, to a more balanced approach considering the ‘norms and practices’ in the state and society (Neild, 2001). According to Bayley (1997), there are two criteria to test the level of DP in a police organization as to responsiveness. The first criterion is the ratio of police work conducted upon calls for service from certain citizens whom Bayley calls ‘the disaggregate public’. The second criterion, on the other hand, seeks whether or not citizens refer to the police service without hesitation not only when they are in serious need for it but also whenever they sense a need for police help.

When it comes to accountability, Bayley (1997) argues that the police should be held accountable to multiple external actors from the government in the form of oversight, the judiciary, the media, NGOs, and ombudsmen and community groups. The criterion of democratic policing in terms of police accountability, according to Bayley, is whether a country allows other countries in to examine the practices of its police (Bayley, 1997). Similarly, Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) and Carty (2008) contend that police should establish three accountability mechanisms: intra-organizational, to the government and to society at large. The basic question here is “Who Polices the Police?” Carty (2008) notes that “Key requirements for accountability are the maintenance of effective and efficient instruments of internal and external oversight, as well as transparency and the cultivation of a co-operative police-public partnership” (p.38).
Stone and Ward (2000) also put forward accountability as the core of DP and conceptualize an outline including actors, goals and strategies for developing police accountability. They also stress that police should simultaneously be held accountable to internal, governmental (or state), and civil mechanisms separately. These mechanisms and strategies to establish police accountability according to Stone and Ward are presented in table 2.6 below.

Table 2.2 Mechanisms of and strategies for building accountability in police organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability To Public safety (reducing crime, violence, disorder, and fear)</th>
<th>Accountability for Police behavior (reducing corruption, brutality, and other misconduct)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Control</td>
<td>Training, line commanders, crime statistics reporting, reward structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Control</td>
<td>Operational direction by elected and appointed political officials, budget authorities, prosecutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control</td>
<td>Neighborhood safety councils, community based organizations, media, policing research and policy institutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In another document, Marenin (1998) mentions concerns about ‘congruence’ and ‘general order’ in addition to effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness as principles of DP. Congruence entails that the police act, taking into consideration the local norms, values and belief systems of the societies they serve. General order, on the

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12 Source: Stone & Ward, 2000, p.17
other hand, basically refers to the use of low level coercion to the extent possible by the police. Marenin’s criterion to test the level of democratic policing is: “when a person can yell, even offensively, at a police officer to her/his face and not get beaten up for it, for neither police culture, nor organizational norms, nor political preferences would sanction this exercise of force, then democratic policing exists” (Marenin, 1998, p.172).

DP is a comprehensive concept that consists of certain principles directing or controlling police authority with democratic norms and values, such as the rule of law, universally accepted human rights and civil liberties, accountability to citizens and other legal mechanisms ensuring transparency, responsiveness, representativeness, and minimum use of force to achieve compliance with a lawful police order. Having these characteristics, democratic policing introduces a significant change in the policing mentality from “fighting” crimes to “serving” the community with police forces that are formed out of officers coming from all groups in society (Neild, 2001). Despite efforts to narrow down the definition of DP for the sake of parsimony, it can be argued that the foremost distinguishing feature of democratic policing as a new strategy and model of policing is its comprehensive nature, which merges macro level strategies and organization level tactics to control the police as a democratically determined institution in which police authority comes from the people through the democratic process and not through an undemocratic authoritarian state. Given its characteristics, predominantly stemming from the core principles of democracy, it can be argued that DP has a broader focus in comparison with community-oriented or problem-oriented types of policing.
because it recognizes the importance of organizational transformation to implement DP. Moreover, it is more congruent with the human security paradigm, since it is individual-oriented, rather than state-oriented and considers security a basic human right. The following section analyzes the democratic policing concept within the context of post-conflict settings and SSRs.

2.3.2. Democratic Police Reforms in Post-conflict Environments

As explained in the introduction, post-conflict and post authoritarian settings are perhaps the most demanding environments for the implementation of security sector reforms. These reforms should start with changing the police from the practices associated with keeping a repressive regime in power to supporting democratic reforms which includes but is certainly not limited to the police at the center. As Bayley (2006) notes, police reform is a very important part of democratization because the police are one of the primary and most visible representatives of the government authority to the citizens. Changing police behavior is difficult. Moreover, it is impossible to establish democracy in the absence of public safety and physical security which is provided by the police in partnership with civil society.

By the same token, Ferguson (2004) notes that the police are the most visible representatives of ‘state authority’ with respect to citizens. Citizens’ perceptions of their individual safety and security are closely associated with the level of confidence and respect they place in the police. Therefore, if appropriate policies are followed to render
the police organization worthy of trust and respect, the state authority and the legitimacy of the police might easily be established in the eyes of citizens.

To start with, police reforms are crucial for constructing a discourse of “change” in the post-conflict era in two domains. Firstly, the military directly evoke the concept of conflict in the minds of citizens. Once the military is replaced with the police in the post-conflict process, it is a strong indication of “change” in the sense that ‘the conflict is over and the military is gone’. In addition to that, citizens’ view of the police in the pre-conflict era is mostly negative and even horrendous since the police and the military were the primary tools of oppression then. Therefore, post-conflict policy makers can give the message of “change” to citizens by transforming the police into a democratic and professional service organization. (Ferguson, 2004). Then the critical question to ask is how should democratic police reforms be implemented and then evaluated in post-conflict countries?

The issue of police reforms in PCEs is rather difficult and demanding. First of all, the term reform is associated with transformation in the status quo and current balance of power. This transformation will inevitably create discomfort among current holders of political power. Another potential source of resistance to police reforms is the very local police organizations to be reformed in PCEs. Therefore, it should be mentioned at the outset that reforming police organizations in PCEs is a long term and cumbersome process that normally exceeds the limited capacities of police organizations and entails the incorporation of local and international politicians and civil society at large (O'Neil,
Reforms for the construction of democratic police forces in PCEs are predominantly analyzed in regard to four aspects: the organizational structure of new police organizations, the training of officers, tactical issues regarding policing, and local political issues. The following is a review of the main findings of scholarly analyses on efforts at police reforms in PCEs.

Bayley (1997) enumerates certain conditions for international police reformers, including the UN police to account for in the implementation of reforms in PCEs. In short, these conditions include careful pre-deployment planning that takes into account the changeable and unchangeable aspects of the local police; setting realistic and feasible goals for the reform process; concentration of democratic policing efforts in the core features of DP which, according to Bayley, are accountability and responsiveness to the ‘disaggregate public’ as well as the state authority rather than tactical strategies that might vary significantly across countries and are very difficult to change; gaining the support of local politicians and the local media for the reform process; and taking into consideration all the actors, including governments, domestic and international public opinion and police organizations themselves. Such an approach might affect the reform process and shape the reforms according to the needs of the local public among others.

In another study, Bayley (2006) asserts that foreign assistance donors should establish a ‘legal basis’ for the new police organization before anything else in their programs to implement democratic policing in target countries. Such a legal basis demarcates the
limits of authority for the police, specifies their missions, identifies internal and external oversight mechanisms and rules, and determines procedures related to hiring, firing and promotion of personnel. In addition to these, senior management is essential for the reform process; therefore, senior managers should be selected among those who can be trained to manage the reform process well (Bayley, 2006).

O’Neil (2005) identifies several conditions for successful police reforms in PCEs. Two of those, however, are most salient. O’Neil argues that low ranking officers’ opinions might lead to significant outcomes in the reform processes. Hence, the reform process should be shaped by taking into consideration the opinions of officers of every rank at every phase. Such a bottom-up approach could be the key for the successful implementation of reforms if merged with ‘effective leadership’. O’Neil then suggests a ‘diagnostic approach’ for the resolution of problems during the reform processes. This approach includes detection of problems, identifying the underlying causes of these problems, implementation of a solution, reviewing the process and assessment of the outcome respectively. This problem-oriented approach will be elaborated in the next chapter of this study.

Neild (2001) notes that the selection of new police recruits should be done in a non-partisan manner; salaries should be sufficient in order to attract highly skilled people interested in policing; minimize corruption; in-service training by international supervisors is crucial in capacity building for the quality of the training mostly makes up for the low skills of new recruits; the ‘institutional framework’ of reforms should be
based on democratic policing principles; the leadership cadre should be comprised of those who believe in and support the reform process; also, police reforms should be acknowledged as long-term and demanding processes by the international donors; and police reforms should be bolstered by other sectorial reforms, primarily in judiciary systems.

**The role of Training in Democratic Police Reforms**

Unlike Neild, Bayley (2006) does not consider training to be a crucial component of democratic police reforms, but many other scholars put significant emphasis on it. Mobekk (2005), for example, asserts that if conducted carefully, training can pave the way for the institutionalization of modern policing principles and accountability in local police organizations in PCEs. Also, Wiatrowski and Goldstone (2010) stress that in PCEs only police organizations trained according to the principles of democratic policing can successfully confront crime through improving community conditions and deal with police corruption through providing safety and security for their citizens.

Currently, international organizations—primarily the EU, NATO and OSCE—implement training programs to build local police capacity according to democratic principles, since post-conflict and post-communist countries typically lack police organizations that are knowledgeable about these principles. These international organizations require reforms which are then monitored for implementation as a precondition of admission to the bodies. The UN has no such requirement that police
forces of member states be “democratic” as this would infringe on the sovereignty of member states. Nevertheless, such training programs have certain deficiencies. The primary problem with the international police training programs in PCEs is the focus on increasing the number of police officers in short periods of time. America certainly confronts this in Iraq and Afghanistan and failed miserably in the police forces it attempted to create by equating it with military training. Such police had no skills to interact with the public. Such an approach inevitably paves the way for under-trained and low-quality police officers in PCEs where robust police organizations are greatly needed (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

Wiatrowski and Goldstone (2010) contend that active policing duties should be conducted by international police forces according to the principles of democratic policing until the local police capacity, which is more congruent with democratic policing standards, is built. Within this frame they emphasize that:

This option would be more readily available if NATO, the EU, the U.S., or the UN had budgets to train and maintain a stand-by force of several thousand police, who had trained together and were proficient not only in democratic policing but also in working with translators, working in fragile states and post-conflict environments, and cooperating with military and specialized forces (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010, p. 85; emphasis added).

In addition to the establishment of a ‘stand-by force’, they suggest the extension of the length of service for international trainers up to ‘several years’, owing this to the aforementioned fact that building capacity for indigenous police is a long term effort.
Regarding training, Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) note that it is not possible to bring about organizational change toward democratization by training the new police force on policies and procedures only because some portion of former police officers keep their positions and most of ex-military personnel are hired as police officers during democratic transitions. As an alternative, democratic policing refers to furnishing police organizations with the core principles of democracy and human rights.

Given a proper base in democratic values and an organizational structure consistent with democratic values, police strategies can support democratic values, create the conditions that support economic, political, human and social development, provide safety and security and create the associated networks of capital or investment and ultimately reduce crime (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006, pp. 71-72).

According to Marenin (2005), to reform and restructure the police based on democratic policing principles in post-conflict situations where police systems mostly have failed, it is essential to refer to the lessons learned from past missions. These lessons can be analyzed in three contexts: domestic, strategic and tactical.

After surveying international reform-restructuring efforts, Call (1998) concludes that politics at both international and local levels closely affect the reform restructuring process in post-conflict settings. At the international level, it is mostly the integration between the international community and the post-conflict country that is the problem. At the local level, reform depends on the conflicts between political groups and local
politicians each seeking to implement their reforms. Other than politics, representativeness of the new police organization, the effectiveness of the new criminal justice system, and a developing civil society that is actively engaged in political development are necessary for successful reform programs in PCEs.

Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) criticize the current police reform processes that they call “police-building” based on the ‘lessons learned’ approach, building upon the cases of East Timor and the Solomon islands. They argue that problems in the reform processes mostly emerge because reformers have insufficient knowledge of local factors and overemphasize the technical aspects of the reform. They argue that the lessons learned approach ignores the unique underlying local causes and social and physiological drivers of conflicts. Also, this approach puts little emphasis on the organizational characteristics and the cultural background of local police organizations and officers. More importantly, reform processes are run by donor countries who try to transfer western style organizational structures into PCEs. Having identified these problems, Goldsmith and Dinnen stress that police reformers should understand the local context not only in terms of the technical elements of policing but also the political, cultural and social characteristics of the host environment. In their words, “effective reform will depend not just on a panoply of supporting oversight and auditing mechanisms, but also upon establishing connections to local sources of values and potential public legitimacy” (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007, p. 1107).
Finally, a very important caveat should be expressed regarding police reforms in PCEs. While new police organizations are constructed by international actors, the contexts of crucial concepts especially ‘democratic policing’ and its core components such as accountability, responsiveness, and human rights, should be defined clearly to minimize the variation in the application of these concepts in practice.

Morreale and Lambert (2009), for example, claim that when the community-oriented policing concept was introduced, police departments were not given clear explanations and they were expected to implement the COP principles by themselves. The departments resisted change and most police organizations simply created small offices with a few officers which applied some elements of community policing. This was at odds with the underlying nature of the community policing concept, which as envisioned by Trojanowicz was organizational transformation. This is why strategies to transform policing to the Democratic Model emphasize transformation, thus qualifying it as a fourth generation model of policing (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006).

Similarly, Mobekk (2005) notes that UNPOL officers in Timor-Leste expressed various ideas about COP, ranging from developing close relations with the community to leaving the community to police itself. Of course the international police themselves may have been clueless about what COP really was and how to tailor it to specific contexts, having never been educated or trained in it.

In the other example, Morreale and Lambert (2009) argue that a similar situation was
valid for the change in the concept of national security after the 9/11 attacks. According to them, a shift in the function of local and state police departments was expected to move toward more involvement in national security issues, such as counterterrorism, but these organizations were not equipped with tools for such missions. As a matter of fact, a survey on New England police organizations revealed that police organizations are confused about their roles in terms of national security and combating terrorism (Morreale & Lambert, 2009). Therefore, in terms of democratic policing reforms in PCEs, it is necessary for policymakers to clarify what is meant by democratic policing and have local police organizations understand the concept. Systematic training programs conducted by professionals might accomplish this purpose. Otherwise, democratic policing cannot be implemented smoothly and deficiencies in security sector reforms will hinder the overall social, economic and political development of the country.

In conclusion, the importance of police reforms as the starting point of security sector reforms in PCEs was underscored before in this study. The above discussions lead us to argue that reform and restructuring of police organizations should be conducted within the democratic policing framework in PCEs because DP is an application of the principles of democracy in the security domain. As Marenin (2005) stresses, post-conflict situations might present great opportunities for establishing strong democratic policing institutions provided that these opportunities are understood and the necessary steps discussed in detail above are undertaken by the international and local reformers. Once the democratic police reforms are successfully implemented and spread to the other
elements of the criminal justice system, such as the judiciary and corrections systems, the social, economic and political reforms will be implemented more easily because democratic police organizations will establish trust and understanding between the national democratically elected governmental authority and society at large. Yet, it is crucial to clarify what is meant by democratic policing and have police officers internalize its principles. The following section analyzes the efforts of UNPOL as the implementation of DP principles in PCEs.

2.4. Democratic Policing in the UNPOL Context

To this point, the evolution and current structure of UNPOL has been explained, the democratic policing concept was defined and certain strategies in terms of the implementation of DP reforms in PCEs have been addressed. In this section, organizational and personnel characteristics of UNPOL are analyzed in order to assess the applicability of democratic policing principles within the UNPOL context. The question to be answered in this section is how the current organizational structure and personnel quality of UNPOL can affect the implementation of democratic principles in PCEs. In this section, first UNPOL’s mandates, operational guidelines, organizational reports and other official documents are surveyed to reveal how much emphasis is put on the term ‘democratic policing’, and in what contexts by the UN. Then, the organization of UNPOL is analyzed especially in terms of UNPOL’s personnel quality and levels of democracy in PCCs. These two issues are frequently addressed as serious obstacles to overcome before we can expect the successful UN deployment of DP in PCEs.
Democratic Policing Concept in UN’s Mandates

As previously mentioned, democratic policing principles were first identified by the UN police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. But they were not implemented in that mission because the concept was little understood at the time. Since that date, more than 20 UN peace-keeping missions have been deployed. The question then is how much headway has the UN made in terms of democratic policing in post-conflict environments?

UN peace-keeping missions operate according to their mandates issued by the Security Council. A mandate sets the overall objectives of the peace-keeping mission. Therefore a content analysis of the mandates and other UN documents might give insights into UNPOL’s democratic policing efforts. Such an approach can be fruitful in terms of identifying UNPOL’s DP efforts at the organizational level.

When the UN police missions that ended after 1997- which is the date of the introduction of the DP concept- the term ‘democratic policing’ is mentioned in the mandates of only four missions: UNMBIH, UNMIL, UNMIS and MINUSTAH. Except for the mandates, the term is mentioned in the 39th paragraph of the Brahimi report (UN, 2000) and in the 13th page of the first issue of the UN Police Magazine (UN, 2006a). Nevertheless, the term ‘democratic policing’ is not referred to in any of the UN’s guidelines, including the Capstone Doctrine and the New Horizon Document, which is supposed to be the framework for the future of peace-keeping operations and the
remaining the mandates. Table 2.7 below demonstrates the sources where the concept of democratic policing was used in a UN document with the quotation to show the context in which the term was used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate/Document</th>
<th>The context that the term “democratic policing” used in</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS (vii)</td>
<td>To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with <em>democratic policing</em>, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police;</td>
<td>S/1590 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL (n)</td>
<td>to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with <em>democratic policing</em>, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States;</td>
<td>S/1509 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH (b)</td>
<td>to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with <em>democratic policing</em> standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and training, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police;</td>
<td>S/1542 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMBIH</td>
<td>28. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on the work of the IPTF and its progress… in particular its work in assisting the restructuring of law enforcement agencies, coordinating assistance</td>
<td>S/1088 1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in training and providing equipment, advising law enforcement agencies on guidelines on democratic policing principles with full support for human rights, … as well as to report on progress by the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in regard to such issues, in particular their compliance with IPTF-prescribed guidelines including their taking prompt and effective action, which could include dismissal where appropriate, in respect of any officer notified to them by the IPTF Commissioner as failing to cooperate with the IPTF or adhere to democratic policing principles;

The Brahimi report 39 ...Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence …

A/55/305-S/2000/809

UN Police Magazine  

Principles of Democratic Policing

Representative policing ensures that: Police personnel sufficiently represent the community they serve; minority groups and women are adequately represented through fair and non-discriminatory; recruitment policies in police services; and the human rights of all people are protected, promoted and respected.

Responsive policing ensures that: Police are responsive to public needs and expectations, especially in preventing and detecting crime and maintaining public order; policing objectives are attained both lawfully and humanely; police understand the needs and expectations of the public they serve; and police actions are responsive to public opinion and wishes.

Accountable policing is achieved in three ways: Legally: police are accountable to the law, as are all individuals and institutions in States; politically: police are accountable to the public through the democratic and political institutions of government as well as through
It is apparent that the doctrinal emphasis on democratic policing in the UN’s official documents, primarily the mandates, is lacking because the term was used in only four out of 25 (16%) mandates. Similarly, other doctrinal documents show the same pattern, seeing that only the Brahimi report addresses the term whereas other strategic documents such as the New Horizon, which is supposed to follow up on the Brahimi report, do not.

The UN’s Personnel Quality and its Impacts on the Implementation of DP in PCEs

A second significant domain regarding the implementation of the DP principles in PCEs is related to the national and individual characteristics of UNPOL officers. This domain can be analyzed in three categories: 1-) the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural formation of individual UNPOL officers; 2-) the job skills of UNPOL officers; and 3-the low level of democracy in the major police contributing countries.

According to Durch and England’s analysis (2010), based on the Freedom House scores of the police contributing countries (PCCs), although 61% of UN police officers were coming from ‘free’ countries in 2001 this amount had fallen to 25% in 2010. Furthermore, the number of officers coming from ‘not free’ countries has risen from 9% in 2001 to 22% in 2010. Until the end of 2001, five out of the top ten PCCs (namely the US, Spain, Germany, Portugal and the UK) were developed countries and as of
December 2001, almost 25% of the UN police were coming from these five countries (Durch, 2010). In total, the rate of police from developed contributing countries was 37% by the end of 2001 (Smith, Holt, & Durch, 2007). After 2001, however, a gradual decrease in the ratio of police officers, seconded by developed countries happened whereas the number of African and Asian police officers boomed. Durch (2010) notes that the US and Germany remained in the list of the top ten PCCs as of 2005, albeit these countries significantly reduced their police contributions soon and finally no developed PCC remained in the top-ten list as of 2009. The proportions of police officers deployed in UN peace-keeping operations as of 2010 based on continental origination is as follows, according to DPKO’s official web site: Asia: 37%; Africa: 34%; America: 5%; Middle East: 9% and Europe: 15%.

Different explanations have been offered regarding the shift in the composition of UN police officers within the last 10 years. Durch (2010) asserts that the political interests of top police contributing developed countries have shifted after 2001. Among those, the US placed its police training resources in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Germany focused more on training the Afghan police. By the same token, the UK focused in the training of Sierra Leone police; and finally, Spain significantly reduced its international police deployments after the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid.

Durch and England (2010) claim that changes in the geographical distribution of conflicts have paved the way for the shift in the composition of PCCs. According to them, the number of UN police deployed from Africa increased as the number of
conflicts in Europe diminished and those in Africa rose in the mid-2000s. Secondly, the European Union had also started to deploy police officers to the conflict regions in Europe. The UNMBIH mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was passed on to the EU authority in 2003. Similarly, although UN’s UNMIK mission in Kosovo is still going on with five personnel, as of 2010, the major policing organization has been the EULEX-Kosovo since 2008. Therefore it is apparent that European countries second most of their officers to the EU and NATO missions and make fewer contributions in UN missions (Durch & England, 2010).

As of December 2010, the UN deployed 14,322 police officers from 85 countries. Palau is the smallest PCC with one officer and Jordan is the largest PCC with 1902 officers. The top 10 PCCs account for 64.3% of the total police deployment. Table 2.4 below demonstrates the top ten PCCs as of December 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>(%) of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second problematic issue with the formation of UNPOL is that some of UNPOL officers are recruited from countries wherein an ongoing UNPOL mission already exists. This irony was addressed by Wiatrowski and Goldstone (2010) regarding Bangladesh, which is one of the top PCCs. They cited the International Crisis Group report identifying Bangladeshi police as “a source of instability and fear [in their own country] rather than a key component of a democratic society. Human rights abuses are endemic and almost all Bangladeshis who interact with the police complain of corruption” (p.86- no emphasis added). Tagging on this approach, a map of the UN PCCs who are the object of a UN mission can be built based on the official statistics presented by the DPKO. When these statistics are analyzed for the year 2010 (December), four countries that are already hosting a UN or EU police mission are making police contributions in the UNPOL. Specifically, 152 officers were deployed from Cote d’Ivoire; 80 officers from Chad; 27 from the Congo and 20 from Bosnia and Herzegovina in UN peace-keeping operations.

The multi-cultural structure of the UN police is also pointed to as another problem in its functioning. As discussed previously, UNPOL consists of individual police units (IPU) and formed police units (FPU) coming from more than 80 countries. Although each FPU is organized with some 140 compatriot police officers, the IPUs are multi-ethnic
elements and operate according to the UN’s organizational system regardless of the
equality of officers. Such a structure raises an immediate concern: how can such an
ethnically and culturally diverse organization be effective in terms of democratic
policing? Broer and Emery (1998), for example, note that the multi-cultural working
environment had emerged as the most urgent problem to be addressed by police monitors
deployed in the UNPROFOR mission after the analysis of a training needs assessment
questionnaire in 1995. Also, some other respondents in the same study mentioned that
some CIVPOL monitors tolerated the torture of suspects by local police officers. As was
mentioned above, problem areas of UNPOL are highly intertwined. The biggest issues
with the multi-cultural structure of UNPOL is different job skills, organizational cultures,
and work ethics of UN police officers. As a matter of fact, scant job skills of police
officers have been mentioned by almost every scholarly or non-scholarly study to be the
weakest aspect of CIVPOL/UNPOL at the individual level since the beginning of UN
police operations (Call & Barnett, 2000; Perito, 2002; Sismanidis, 1997). At the basic
level, the UN requires all CIVPOL/UNPOL candidates to have proficiency in the official
mission language and the ability to drive four-wheel vehicles. In several cases, however,
it has been pointed out that UNPOL officers lack even these basic skills (Sismanidis,
1997). Especially the language problem in that UNPOL officers do not speak the local
language, is one of the biggest obstacles to effective mentoring, monitoring and training
(Broer & Emery, 1998).

Hansen (2002) made two suggestions for minimizing the negative impacts of the
cultural problems of UNPOL. The first suggestion includes the allocation of specific
districts to compatriot contingents of the UN police. By doing so, only one police
contingent would serve in a given geographical district and there would be no inter-
cultural mingling of officers. The second approach, on the other hand, is on the allocation
of certain policing functions, such as criminal intelligence, crowd management, forensic
science and so forth, to certain national contingents. Nonetheless, neither of these
approaches has been fully implemented in any missions so far.

A final issue that might significantly undermine the implementation of DP
principles in PCEs is the lack of mechanisms to convey accumulated knowledge and
experience across UNPOL officers. The lack of institutional memory and the derivation
of knowledge from that experience to guide future operations still exist. Mobekk (2005)
identifies three reasons regarding the deficient ‘institutional memory’ of UNPOL at both
headquarters and field levels. According to Mobekk, the rotation of UNPOL personnel
within and, occasionally, between missions negatively affects effectiveness, given that
the duration of missions is limited to one year. In addition to that, the commencement and
dismissal of UNPOL officers are done en masse, which means that when the personnel is
circulated a great number of experienced officers are replaced with mostly inexperienced
newcomers. Secondly, there is no comprehensive procedure for passing the accumulated
experience across cohorts of officers. Finally the lack of ‘debriefing culture’ among
UNPOL officers undermines the development of institutional memory in UNPOL
missions.
In conclusion, although the UN has formulated and extended democratic policing to post-conflict environments, it puts little emphasis on developing the term for policing in its major documents. In addition to that, the level of policing skills, knowledge and experience of UNPOL officers and the level of democracy in the nations that donate police to UN missions raise concerns about the effectiveness of the UNPOL. Nonetheless, the validity of these concerns may be treated as an area in which more research is needed than the subject of speculation and secondary analysis. The question may be better understood through research rather than heuristic inferences. It is possible to directly examine the performance of officers and relate their performance to the level of democracy of the countries from which they come. There is no primary research study in this field measuring the perceptions of UNPOL officers about democracy in general and democratic policing principles in specific. UNPOL officers are instead labeled with the democracy scores of the countries they come from, and if these countries are undemocratic then the police officers coming from that country are assumed to be undemocratic without any data to test that assumption. In order to put forward a robust picture of the policing efforts of UNPOL in relation to DP, this study will first give voice to UNPOL officers regarding their opinions on democracy and democratic policing. Also, it will attempt to explore what UNPOL does in terms of democratic policing at the organizational level.

This study asserts that organizational learning is a crucial requirement for UNPOL in order to minimize the negative impacts of the above-mentioned problems.
stemming from the multi-cultural structure of the organization. The positive relationship between OL and DP will be hypothesized and tested in a statistical model in the following chapters of this study. Therefore, the next chapter elaborates on organizational learning in general and in the UNPOL context.
Chapter 3 UN Police Missions and Organizational Learning

The previous chapters of this study addressed the paradigm shift in the SSR concept and its reflection in peace-building. Also examined were the organizational, strategic and tactical issues required to implement democratic policing principles in UNPOL missions. To sum up, the notions of human security and universally accepted democracy and human rights criteria have become the building blocks to restore order, insure safety and create security in PCEs. In regard to the organizational aspects of peace-keeping and building, we have underscored the difference between military and police organizations in terms of capacity, structure and mindset in the transition towards stability. It was underscored that once the armed conflict is stopped by the military, the restoration of order in conflict-torn communities should be left to civil police and non-governmental organizations that can mediate between the state – or legal authority- and citizens.

We then analyzed the history and development of UN policing activities since the UN has been the primary international policing organization in PCEs and is the focus of this study. Finally, democratic policing principles were introduced as the type of policing necessary to form the basis for fulfilling goals of political, economic and social development and the creation and transformation of institutions in such environments.
Within this frame a set of weaknesses regarding the UNPOL system in general and the implementation of DP principles by UNPOL in particular were identified. Among those, the problems stemming from multi-ethnical and multi-cultural structure of UNPOL, low job quality of most UNPOL officers and meager levels of democracy and human rights in most of the major police contributing countries were addressed as the major handicaps of UNPOL. Another remarkable weakness of UNPOL was the lack of capacity to develop institutional memory.

UNPOL’s role as an international security organization is to train, build capacity, reform and restructure the police organizations according to modern and democratic policing principles in the intervened post-conflict countries. Nevertheless, the aforementioned handicaps of UNPOL cast doubt on its capacity to fulfill its functions. At this point, this study posits that the gap created by the organizational problems that might hinder UNPOL from fulfilling its functions including the development and implementation of DP principles can be bridged if UNPOL becomes a learning organization. Hence this study attempts to explore the existence of empirical association between UNPOL’s democratic policing efforts and OL.

This chapter examines organizational learning which is hypothesized in this study as a facilitator for the implementation of democratic policing principles in PCEs. Within this framework the primary sources of the general OL literature are surveyed, their relevance to one another and to the UNPOL system is discussed and the organizational
learning efforts of the DPKO and UNPOL in peace-keeping operations are examined.

3.1. Organizational Learning

The concept of organizational learning (OL) has undergone multiple transformations since it was first introduced in the middle of the previous century. Yeo (2005) notes that in the 1960s organizations were accepted as machines that should be updated regularly by means of new technologies. In the early 1970s, however, a new approach emerged accepting organizations as living organisms and highlighting the human aspects of organizations such as culture, trust, and inter and intra-personal relations. This approach viewed organizational learning as a process that develops with the development of the cognitive skills and changes in the behavior of individuals, groups of individuals (teams) and the organization as a whole. The individual is emphasized as the primary conveyor of the learning activity yet what spread learning across the organization are the cooperative interactions among individuals.

In this study three major OL approaches will be surveyed by reviewing their foundational studies. These theories are (1) the theory of action, (2) appreciative inquiry and (3) communities of practice (CoP). In addition to these theories the knowledge creation process will be examined, because there is a close relationship between knowledge creation and organizational learning. These OL theories were chosen due to their relevance and applicability to the UNPOL context.

UNPOL missions are comprised of police officers from different countries. Given the fact that each country has a different policing approach, the aggregate volume of
international experience and policing knowledge involved on such missions is quite considerable. Each of the mentioned theories can be used to extract this “individual” knowledge—which refers to personal knowledge—and convert it into organizational knowledge. As this process continues the new knowledge can be transmitted across missions through training.

3.1.1. Theory of Action

Argyris and Schön’s (1978) theory of action is one of the most frequently cited theories in the OL field. It is based on the basic assumption that the environment in which organizations and individuals transact is highly uncertain and is continuously changing. Organizations and individuals, therefore, have to learn continuously to exist in this unstable environment. It is important to define two types of theories of action: the “espoused theory” and “theory-in-use”.

A theory of action is a theory of deliberate human behavior which is for the agent a theory of control but which, when attributed to the agent, also serves to explain or predict his behavior… when someone is asked how he would behave under certain circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he gives allegiance and which, upon request, he communicates to others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is his theory in use, which may or may not be compatible with his espoused theory; furthermore, the individual may or may not be aware of the incompatibility of the two theories (Argyris & Schön, 1978, p.11).

To expand on this, espoused theories of actions are formal and intended behavior patterns that individuals feel obliged to perform in certain circumstances. Theories of action, on the other hand, refer to the actions that people actually do consciously or
unconsciously, and these two theories do not always overlap although they are supposed to as elaborated below. This notion can be applied to organizations too. Action research considers organizations living organisms. Cells of these living organisms are the people who are their members. Each person has a certain belief in his or her mind on what the organization does and what the role he or she plays in it. Therefore, organizations, like individuals, have their espoused theories (objectives, official procedures, organizational diagrams) and theories-in-use that are what their members actually do. The theory-in-use of an organization changes as the images of organization change in the minds of individuals who are its members. In order to bridge the gap between the espoused theories and theories in use, organizations have to take action, intervene, to manage the process of change in the minds of their employees (Argyris & Schön, 1978).

Argyris and Schön define organizational learning as “… a process in which members of an organization detect errors or anomalies and correct them by restructuring the organizational theory of action, embedding the results of their inquiry into organizational maps and images” (p.58). An “error” is the mismatch between what is supposed to happen and what actually happens. Based on this definition, they propose two types of learning: single loop and double loop. Single-loop learning refers to the diagnosis and elimination of the symptoms of problems by merely applying existing knowledge. Hence, when members of organizations detect such problems, they question the existing strategies that might cause it and search for new strategies and then learn how to solve the problem. Nonetheless in order for “individual” learning to become
organizational learning, the new patterns (theories-in-use) that emerge in the minds of individuals need to become a part of the organizational memories and each member of the organization needs to regenerate his or her image (mental models) related to the strategy that solved the problem. In other words they are supposed to regenerate their theories-in-use by updating their mental models based on the lessons learned from the resolution of the problem. Single-loop learning helps with changing the “action strategies” that did not work (Argyris and Schön, 1978).

*Double loop learning*, on the other hand, goes one step beyond that of merely diagnosing and solving of problems. It involves changing the organizational “norms, policies and objectives” that underlie the problem. Since the process of change will create conflicts among different groups in the organization, double loop learning requires the resolution of these conflicts through “inquiry” by developing new explanations for the sources of conflict and possible outcomes of proposed strategies from different perspectives (Argyris and Schön, 1978).

Argyris and Schön (1978) argue that most organizations have “limited learning systems” that allow only for single loop learning. Ambiguity in organizational theory-in-use is associated with failure of individuals to diagnose errors in organizational norms. “Primary inhibitory loops” are the major factors of limited learning. “Self-reinforcement”, for example, is an inhibitory loop. Inhibitory loops push organizations into vicious cycles called “conditions of error” in which organizations make new errors
while trying to correct another. When self-reinforcement occurs each conflicting side
reinforces the other due to the presence of any of the conditions of error which can be
incongruity, incompatibility, vagueness, ambiguity or the scatter of information in task
assessment. Self-reinforcing activities of sides then inhibit them from questioning these
conditions and from learning. Argyris and Schön (1978) conceptualize this lock-in
situation as the “model-I theories of action”. They claim that model-I theories of action
undermine double-loop learning by blocking organizational change and are prevalent
across modern organizations (Argyris and Schön, 1978). According to this model,
primary inhibitory loops engender “secondary inhibitory loops” that elicit “correctable”
and “uncorrectable” errors. Correctable errors are subjected to a learning cycle and either
become corrected or turn into a new error. Uncorrectable errors, on the other hand, are
mostly “camouflaged” and trigger new primary inhibitory loops which make it
impossible for double loop learning to happen (Argyris & Schön, 1978).

In regard to the individualistic inhibitors of OL Argyris (1993) introduces the
concept of “defensive routines.” Argyris (1993) defines defensive routines as mental
mechanisms embedded in the minds of individuals, that inhibit organizational learning by
hindering the “detection and correction of error … [and] problem solving and decision
making … [and yields to] less effective organizational performance” (p.19). According to
Argyris, defensive routines stem from the paradox between the strictness of written rules
.espoused theory) of organizations and the “complexity” of issues that members of
organizations have to deal with in reality. Defensive routines “overprotect individuals and
groups and inhibit them from learning new actions. They are routines because they occur continually and are independent of individual actors’ personalities” (Argyris, 1993, p.20). Defensive routines are implanted in the minds of individuals from their “early life” experiences. Organizational cultures can also pave the way for individuals to use these mechanisms. Thus, since defensive routines are constructed by individuals and organizations together, they can be overcome by mechanisms that address both individual mindsets and organizational procedures and cultures (Argyris, 1993).

As a solution to the aforementioned problems before organizational learning Argyris and Schön (1978) propose the “Model O-II organizational theory in use”. Organizations that put Model O-II theory-in-use into practice will detect problems and apply appropriate solution strategies to them. This requires the correction of the conditions of error either by single loop learning in which only the error is corrected, or double-loop learning in which the underlying cause(s) of the problem is questioned, different proposals are brought together and debated, and then solutions are applied. The organizational learning process explained above will create new conditions of error that will start new learning cycles because organizational learning has a dialectical nature. In this sense conditions for error are beneficial for organizations since they cause the perpetual inquiry of existing norms and the attribution of new meanings to them through double loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978).

In order to convert Model O-I organizations into Model O-II organizations “intervention” is necessary. “To intervene is to enter into an ongoing set of relationships
for the purpose of being of help” (p.158). Intervention, from an organizational learning perspective, aims to bring organizations at a level where members of organizations are better able to detect errors and change the underlying factors of errors in the organizational structure (double loop learning). Interventions attempt to diagnose the problems inhibiting the members of an organization from developing model O-II learning skills and teach them how to develop a dialectic approach. Such an approach entails viewing new problems that will emerge while the members of the organization try to solve other problems as opportunities to change organizational norms and applications that have become obsolete in time (Argyris & Schön, 1978).

3.1.2. Communities of Practice

A second approach to OL is Communities of Practice (CoP) which is a relatively new field related to organizational learning and knowledge sharing. Wenger, McDermont and Sneider (2002) defined CoP as “groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis” (p.4). CoP are composed of people with similar interests, problems or goals who come together regularly to take advantage of one another’s knowledge and experience on the topic of interest. CoP emerged as a criticism to the traditional knowledge management paradigm that pays very little attention to practice-based knowledge. In the seminal article of the field, Brown and Duguid (1991) emphasized the great difference between formal rules, that they call “canonical practice” and what individuals actually do in practice or “non-canonical
practice”. They contend that organizations generally downplay the value of the latter in relation to organizational learning and innovation. They argue that “working”, “learning” and “innovation” are highly interrelated but they require a mental shift to see the interactions between those elements. Normal “office procedures” such as official job descriptions or written procedures, and routine organizational learning procedures (which may come from planned in-service training sessions for example) mostly ignore the practice that includes the rich details of the nature of the work which are typically not formally or even informally shared. Such routine organizational learning procedures addressed above aim to encode and embed practical information into abstractions which in fact often leads to the elimination of the most important details. Therefore, learning, in the traditional approach, is reduced to official training sessions and abstract texts and does not take into consideration any method which derives knowledge from the experiences of the employees as actors themselves (Brown & Duguid, 1991).

Based on ethnographic studies, Brown and Duguid (1991) claim that official procedures, databases, Frequently Asked Questions and so forth are typically insufficient when working in the field. Moreover, these formal organizational instruments might even be counterproductive when the solutions they offer do not work and the organization has no procedure for learning the “tricks of the trade” and then processing them into knowledge which can be shared. Employees frequently feel obliged to exceed the borders of these formal rules, when they are inadequate, and initiate contact with others who have the practical experience that provides a solution for a problem they confront. In this
process the clarification of the problem is done by “narration” or what amounts to extensive storytelling, “collaboration” or exchange of information and lessons derived from rounds of trial and error, and “social construction” or the creation of a shared understanding of the problem that is different from formal definitions. This all culminates with the creation of a community which identifies itself around an issue or practice. Thus CoP are not “designed” or pre-planned but are mostly “emergent” as groups of understanding that arise around that issue or practice. CoP evolve through the informal interactions of people. Therefore a priori formal group membership is not a necessary condition for participation in the community. Anyone who is interested in a certain topic can participate in meetings without being asked to sign a membership form or pay a membership fee. Learning occurs based on the shared practice and experience in the CoP. Dynamic structures of CoP have paved the way for problem detection, strategy development and implementation of appropriate solutions (Brown & Duguid, 1991).

Wenger (1999), identified the theoretical background of CoP as “social” and “activity-based” learning enablers. Learning is meaning and identity creation through social participation of humans in practical environments. This definition includes four key components of learning that are closely connected to one another: meaning, practice, community and identity. Meaning is the structured beliefs and opinions of individuals that can change when they acquire new experience and knowledge. Practice is the accumulated experience that becomes the basis for the communication with those who are interested in it. Community is an environment in which people with similar experience
come together. Finally identity refers to internalized mental models that are constructed or transformed through learning in communities.

3.1.3. Appreciative Inquiry

The third theory of OL and organizational change to be analyzed in this study is appreciative inquiry (AI). This phenomenon emerged by the application of positive psychology in the field of organizational learning. Positive psychology basically emerged as a reaction to the applications of psychology that focused merely on the negative aspects of human behaviors. Positive psychology claims that there are several positive aspects of human behavior and focusing on these aspects might help the curing of psychological problems (Luthans & Church, 2002).

Problem oriented action research has been dominant since the 1970s in the OL field. As was mentioned before, action research views problems as opportunities for learning and knowledge creation and aims to find and solve problems using double loop mechanisms, so that learning happens (Argyris & Schon, 1978). As a reaction to this approach Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987) have argued that problem oriented research considers problems to be exogenous factors that are “out there” and need to be explored by researchers and solved by managers. Such an approach separates ‘theory’ from ‘action’ and focuses on the latter. What lies behind this is the ‘rational’ mindset of industrialism which is result-oriented and focuses on products or measurable outcomes. However, the “theoretical” aspect of organization development is as important as the practical side because theory is a necessary condition to regenerate and redesign the
settled culture, norms and beliefs in organizations. This feature of ‘theory’ is called “generative capacity”. Therefore the separation of theory and practice, and giving up theory for the sake of practice can hinder organizational development and change (Cooperrider and Srivastva 1987).

Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987) consider theory together with practice as necessary to creating organizational change. They call this approach “socio-rationalism” and describe it as a “post-industrial” paradigm. Socio-rationalism posits that individuals can ascribe different meanings to the same events they come across based on their prior experience because personal experiences are stored as mental models and retrieved when certain symbols are received from the environment. Social science theory, then, can generate new capacities by extracting positive memories from the minds of individuals through language and its interactive use in creating shared meanings and understandings and use this to formulate these capacities into new ways of action in a meaningful way. Thus, the socio-rationalist paradigm incorporates not only the secular and formal but also moral, informal and even absurd events that help people to make sense of their environment. The role of the socio-rationalist scientist is different from that of a traditional empiricist in that the socio-rationalist scientist is not a neutral observer but a participant and stimulator who aims to push the subjects towards the areas of their minds hosting positive (appreciative, affirmative) memories to extract new insights that might be the kernel for organizational change (Cooperrider and Srivastva 1987).

Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987) argue that appreciative inquiry provides a
research perspective that is uniquely suitable for discovering, understanding, and fostering innovations in social-organizational arrangements and processes” (p.149). AI aims to use the aforementioned “generative theory” to both extract experience-based knowledge through participative dialogs and implement necessary changes based on the tools which emerged in the inquiry process. AI accepts that every organization has a “positive core” and tries to reveal this core through “inquiry, imagination and innovation” (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005).

Given the above definition it can be argued that AI is both a theory and a research method. The following explains the AI process as a research tool. The AI process consists of four phases called the 4-D cycle. The first phase focuses on “appreciation” in organizations which assumes that in every system there is always something that works. The AI process aims to reveal the working components of the system by inquiring about “what is working”. The second phase then provokes the minds of members to ask about “what might be” as an example of what is being asked. The third phase expands on the findings of the previous two phases and generalizes to create insights from the affirmative experiences in the past. The third phase finds certain underlying characteristics of positive experiences and defines them as new seeds of organizational change by asking “what should be?” The final phase then overlaps what might be done and what should be done to reveal a range of possibilities of “what can be” done. These four phases of AI demonstrate that it is not a utopian or totally theoretical field but that it has a scientific base including theory, observation, data collection and theory building for
action. The method for achieving this is goal is to ask “innovative questions” and to stimulate affirmative experiences through story-telling (Cooperrider and Srivastva, 1987).

AI is put into practice through the implementation of the 4-D cycle: Discovery, Dream, Design and Destiny. In sum, this process is a series of workshops that can be both informal and formal. The 4-D process ideally includes every single member of the target group and encourages them to tell stories about achievements and positive outcomes they have experienced in the past in order to reveal the blueprints of success in the organization. The members of the organization are then asked to think and talk about what might become a successful practice of the past. Ideally these successful practices of the past will be translated into achievements in the future. Once these dreams are made real and codified, this can lead to the formation of teams to achieve this goal (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005).

### 3.1.4. Knowledge Creation Spiral

Fundamental to all organizational learning is to understand how new knowledge is obtained. Most useful for this is the knowledge creation model of Nonaka (1994) which explains the knowledge creation process as a product of interactions among the members of an organization. Such interactions extract the hidden bits of information embedded in the brains of individuals, codify them into explicit forms of knowledge and distill the codified form of knowledge into new mental models in a cyclical manner. Nonaka (1994) first lays out the epistemological and ontological dimensions of knowledge creation. In
terms of the epistemological dimension he first differentiates between information and knowledge contending that “information is a flow of messages, while knowledge is created and organized by the very flow of information, anchored in the commitment and the beliefs of its holder” (p.15). Information is the building block of knowledge but every piece of information is not necessarily transformed into knowledge. Nonaka then identifies two types of knowledge as “tacit” and “explicit”.

Tacit knowledge has both cognitive and technical elements. The cognitive elements center on… “mental models” in which human beings form working models of the world by creating and manipulating analogies in their minds… By contrast, the technical element of tacit knowledge covers concrete, know-how, crafts and skills that apply to specific contexts… Explicit knowledge is discrete or digital. It is captured in records of the past such as libraries, archives and databases, and is assessed on a sequential basis (pp. 16-17).

In terms of the ontological dimension, Nonaka (1994) asserts that the primary actor of the knowledge creation process is at the individual level; yet, knowledge creation is a result of interactions among individuals. By the same token, knowledge can be created at the inter-organizational level. “Intention”, “autonomy” and “fluctuation in the environment” determines the commitment of individuals in organizational knowledge creation processes. Intention involves mental models of individuals that affect the conversion of information into knowledge. Autonomy is the degrees of freedom given to individuals for expressing their ideas and putting those ideas into practice. Fluctuations are sudden shifts in the environment that make an impact on individuals.

**The Modes of Knowledge Creation**
Nonaka (1994) posits that knowledge creation occurs in four “modes” that range “from tacit to tacit, from tacit to explicit, from explicit to explicit, and from explicit to tacit” (p.18).

The first mode includes the creation of tacit knowledge through interactions where sharing of experience happens. This mode is called “socialization”. Apprenticeship or mentoring can are examples of socialization. The second mode is called ‘externalization’ and it refers to the creation of explicit knowledge out of tacit knowledge through the conceptualization of shared experiences into a concrete (written) format. The third mode is called “combination” and it refers to the creation of explicit knowledge out of existing explicit knowledge by means of certain exchange mechanisms such as meetings. Finally, the fourth mode “internalization” refers to the transformation of knowledge from explicit to tacit which happens when a person renders the piece of explicit knowledge a part of his or her routine behavior.

Nonaka (1994) claims that “organizational knowledge creation” is only possible through the harmonization of the dynamic interactions among these four modes by organizations into a continuous process that is called the “spiral of organizational knowledge creation”. In this model, the importance of the uses of metaphors and analogies are emphasized. A metaphor “is a creative, cognitive process which relates concepts that are far apart in an individual’s memory… Metaphor plays an important role in associating abstract, imaginary concepts” (Nonaka, 1994, p.21). Analogy, on the other hand, puts forward what is common in the different phenomena used in metaphors. In
other words, metaphors find contradictions among different phenomena whereas analogies clarify them (Nonaka, 1994).

**The Process of Knowledge Creation**

According to Nonaka (1994), the process of knowledge creation starts with the enhancement of the individuals’ tacit knowledge through gaining “high quality experience” and “knowledge of experience”. Nonetheless, experience based elements of knowledge creation should be adjusted by “knowledge of rationality”. This process can be thought of as the test of tacit knowledge, which is produced by bodily experiences of individuals, by the explicit knowledge, which is the existing body of coded knowledge, to confirm its validity. At the second phase of the knowledge creation process is the establishment of “self-organizing teams” where individuals can interact and exchange their personal knowledge with each other. Such environments pave the way for “mutual trust” and “implicit perspectives-or shared tacit knowledge” which is “conceptualized through continuous dialog among members” in the organization (p.24). Exchange of tacit knowledge (socialization) happens via the “interaction rhythms” of bodies. After the conceptualization mode, comes the “crystallization” which is a testing of the reliability of knowledge created by self-regulating teams. This process is the distillation of explicit knowledge and its transformation into tacit knowledge (internalization) at the “collective level”. “Redundancy of information” is a necessary element for the crystallization phase because it facilitates people with knowledge and experience to take action when the necessary conditions are found to exist. The next phase in knowledge creation is
“justification” which is the final evaluation of the knowledge based on certain standards that are mostly determined by the middle or top managers. Finally, all of the aforementioned phases form the “networking knowledge” that is then added to the existing knowledge base of the organization in a circular way. Therefore knowledge creation in organizations is a continuous process (Nonaka, 1994).

Nonaka and Toyama (2003) argue “knowledge created through the SECI (Socialization, Externalization, Combination and Internalization) process can trigger a new spiral of knowledge creation, expanding horizontally and vertically as it moves through communities of interaction that transcend sectional, departmental, divisional and even organizational boundaries” (Nonaka and Toyama, 2003, 6).

Nonaka and Toyama (2003) also describe the concept of “ba” which refers to the “physical context” or “place” in which knowledge is created. However “ba” should not be understood merely as a physical space. It is rather a tool generating interactions that change the context and meaning of existing knowledge. Therefore the need for geographical proximity can be overcome by the creation of “ba”. SECI and “ba” are two dynamic mechanisms facilitating the knowledge creation process through constantly integrating the contradictions among tacit and explicit knowledge in organizations. (Nonaka & Toyama, 2003).

3.1.5. OL Theories in Relation to One-another and to the UNPOL Context

When the theories and models that were explained above are juxtaposed, several
similarities and differences emerge. In general, organizational learning is considered the change or update of the mental maps of individuals and organizational norms, procedures or rules through the creation or acquisition of new knowledge in all of these theories. Differences mostly stem from the methods, means or procedures to achieve OL. The theory of action and appreciative inquiry, for example, look for “change” in organizational procedures, norms or codes of conduct for organizational learning to happen. However, while the theory of action focuses on the detection of problems and eliminating their underlying components, AI focuses on the positive aspects of organizational procedures and aims to improve the positive core of the organization. The theory of CoP is different from both with respect to its view of learning. Contrary to AI and the theory of action, CoP does not pay attention to the espoused theories that they call the canonical practice. The theory of CoP rather focuses on what people actually do in practice and aims to extract knowledge from the sharing of experiences on given areas. The theory of CoP contends that the construction of meaning and identity in communities leads to organizational learning. The social construction of meaning and identity in a physical or virtual space is also pointed out by Nonaka and Toyama (2003) with the concept of “ba”. The theory of CoP is similar to AI with respect to its emphasis on the sharing of experiences through narratives and storytelling in informal meetings. Still, AI goes one step beyond the sharing of experiences and incorporates the “dream” phase which forces people to think about the best possible state in an organization.

All of the abovementioned theories of OL contain elements which are closely
relevant to the context of UNPOL missions. Given the theory of action, since the early experiences and organizational cultures of people help the development of defensive routines, the UNPOL environment can be viewed as a conglomeration of defensive routines because UNPOL missions are venues for the gathering of several different policing approaches. Secondly, UNPOL is a strictly bureaucratic organization with its espoused theories which are supposed to guide its activities and these include mandates, procedures, regulations, policies, best practices, lessons learned, SOPs, and other such written documents. Given the local conditions of the mission locations, and the personnel quality of UNPOL, mismatches between these espoused theories and theories in use inevitably occur. It is necessary to explore if UNPOL has the mechanisms for the detection and correction of these mismatches.

From the CoP perspective it is obvious that the UNPOL missions involve a great deal of daily (non-cannonical) practice among both UNPOL officers and between UNPOL officers and their local counterparts. The use of CoP on certain areas of policing, including DP, can be beneficial to both UNPOL itself and to local police organizations. In regard to UNPOL the in-service training efforts of UNPOL officers can be better orchestrated through CoP. By so doing the quality gap among UNPOL officers can be reduced and a shared identity can be constructed. CoP can also be used as a valuable tool for learning and identity creation between UNPOL officers and local police organizations given the training of local police organizations has been one of the most dominant roles of UNPOL since the beginning of the organization. Furthermore, the informal and oral
nature of CoP will pave the way for both UNPOL officers and local police officers to better express their experiences.

The same arguments can be repeated for the use of AI as well, especially with regard to its potential benefits at multiple streams, informality and oral nature. Given these potential benefits of CoP and AI it is important to explore the state of the application of these models in UNPOL missions.

Finally, UNPOL’s training, mentoring, monitoring and supervising activities perfectly fit in the SECI process if it is viewed from an OL perspective. UNPOL can create and transfer considerable knowledge through these activities which can help them develop the codes of policing according to the principles of DP.

In general the application of these OL theories in the UNPOL context can create benefits in three streams. First, UNPOL will become a learning organization and enhance its capacity in terms of police reform and restructuring in PCEs. UNPOL officers coming from repressive countries can transfer the knowledge and experience they gain during the mission to the police organizations in their home countries. Finally, as was noted above, the reform and restructuring of local police organizations in PCEs can be accelerated and stronger foundations can be established through the application of OL methods. The following section examines the studies that shed light on OL activities of the DPKO.

3.2. Organizational Learning and UN Peace-Keeping Operations

With respect to OL in the UN’s context it is necessary to note here that although the focus of this study is on UN’s police missions, the analysis of the OL is mostly based
on the peace-keeping operations for certain reasons. First, only a few studies (i.e., Howard, 2008) address the issue peripherally; there is no study which is primarily devoted to organizational learning in UN police missions. Secondly, it is not possible to analyze UN police missions by separating them from the larger context of peace-keeping operations when studying organizational learning. This is because other components of peace-keeping, such as the military, law enforcement system, or development are closely related to police missions and therefore would affect organizational learning.

The history of organizational learning in the UN’s peace-building operations started in 1992 with the establishment of the department of peace-keeping operations (DPKO), and the department of political affairs (DPA) under Ghali’s agenda for peace policy. As a consequence of an increased demand for peace operations, the need for organizational learning emerged in the mid-90s and the lessons learned unit was established under the DPKO by the UN in 1995. However, the unit was far from being functional for more than a decade due to several problems. The biggest problem for the lessons learned unit was insufficient funding and understaffing. Secondly, interdepartmental conflicts, especially between the department of political affairs (DPA) and department of peace-keeping operations (DPKO), inhibited exchange of knowledge between these units. Finally, the lack of collaboration between security units and humanitarian assistance units was another factor inhibiting the office of lessons learned from being effective (Benner & Rotmann, 2008).
The Brahimi report was an important milestone in the UN’s organizational learning efforts. The report supposedly attempted to “assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change” (Brahimi Report, 2000, p. 1). The report suggested that learning activities were continuously occurring in missions every day. Therefore the harvesting of lessons learned should not be limited to the post-action reports and it should be considered a duty to be fulfilled on a daily basis. Nevertheless the lessons learned unit, according to the report, was far from having the capacity to capture the accumulated experience of missions due to scarce resources (UN, 2000). The report introduced three suggestions in relation to organizational learning and knowledge management: (1) the establishment of Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) to help the Executive Committee for Peace and Security (ECPS) to organize different units that produce policy regarding peace-building operations; (2) the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) to bring together and integrate the efforts of relevant actors for better cooperation; and (3) restructuring the policy analysis and lessons learned unit into a new unit named the Peace-keeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU). Among these suggestions, only the third one could be implemented completely. Benner and Rotmann (2008) noted that after the establishment of the PBPU in 2001, organizational learning efforts of the DPKO became more organized and productive where the productivity was measured by the number of reports issued by the unit.

Another important milestone was the 2005 world summit in which the
establishment of a peace-building commission and peace-building support office (PBSO) were mandated. The PBSO was established in 2006 to “develop best practices” in peace-building operations. However, the office would not be effective due to budgetary problems, the inexperience of managers on knowledge management issues and, more importantly, interdepartmental disputes and [organizational] cultural gaps between the headquarters and field personnel. That is, although in theory there should be the exchange of knowledge regarding best practices between the headquarters and field units, the realization of this policy was mostly limited to inter-personal relationships between individuals in practice. Moreover, it was physically impossible to rotate personnel from the headquarters to the field and vice versa due to incompatible lengths of tours of duty and different characteristics of jobs in both the field and HQ (Benner & Rotmann, 2008).

The OL efforts of the DPKO are summarized in the Peace Keeping Best Practices Report (2007) of the Secretary General. This report notes “key actors, processes and technologies” used by the DPKO and the DFS to glean and codify best practices. In general, the DPKO aims to the capture and the codification of lessons learned in the field into training documents, SOPs and so forth. The ability now exists to share these via the internet or intranet so that UN’s field employees across all missions can access and easily use these tools. The report stresses that the aforementioned learning activities should be primarily and constantly conducted at the field. Moreover, the implementation process of the lessons learned into practice should be analyzed carefully in order to assess the real impact of the codified best practices and adjust the policies accordingly (UN, 2007).
Four types of actors are mentioned in the report regarding the capture and codification of best practices in peace-keeping missions. Among those, the Peace Keeping Best Practices Section is responsible for the general coordination of all activities relating to best practices; the knowledge management team coordinates the capture and analysis of the best practices from the missions, and the guidance team deals with the codification of these best practices. At the field level, at least one best practices officer is deployed per mission. According to the PKBP report (2007):

The Best Practices Officer is a resource servicing all components of a United Nations mission and has a dual role: first, connecting missions with the Departments’ headquarters (vertically) as well as with other missions (horizontally), so that his/her mission can benefit from the institutional memory and collective experience contained in the official guidance and best practices developed system-wide; and, secondly, collecting best practices from his/her own mission for the reference of colleagues in the same mission or in other missions and to feed such information into policy development projects at Headquarters (UN, 2007, Para 16).

When it comes to the key processes, the report mentions the “Best Practices Toolbox” which started in 2005. The toolbox includes four types of learning tools to capture best practices: (1) the after action review (AAR), (2) the survey of practice, (3) the end of assignment report (EAR), and (4) the handover note. AAR is a comprehensive assessment of the activities of a project scrutinizing the underlying causes, strengths and weaknesses of what happened. The survey of practice represents a quick feedback by the employees on certain activities and operational procedures. EAR is a specific review of organizational practices in terms of mandate implementation by high level officers upon
the completion of their tour of duty. Finally, the handover note is a memo written by the staff members who are preparing to finish up his/her duty to assist the incoming staff in issues related to operations (UN, 2007).

After these tools are collected by the best practices officer, they are supposed to be conveyed to the best practices section for the trend analysis which is conducted by that office on a regular basis. These analyses are then subjected to meta-analyses at the DPKO and the DFS where policy and guidance development are done based on these analyses. In the end, four types of products are created based on all the above-mentioned activities: policy directives, standard operating procedures, guidelines and manuals. There are two key technologies used for the dissemination of the end products across the UN peace-keeping system: the intranet and communities of practice. According to the report, both the intranet and the CoP were used extensively by the UN peace-keeping personnel (UN, 2007). The report states that:

Since its launch in May 2006, the Intranet has registered more than 50,000 downloads of guidance, best practices and mission documents. The United Nations Military Observers Handbook, for example, was downloaded more than 1,600 times, while an After Action Review on the response of MONUC to armed clashes in Kinshasa was consulted 455 times (Para, 29)… [Regarding the CoP] Membership already exceeds 1,450 staff members across 10 expert communities, with nearly 2,000 library documents and almost 700 direct and moderated exchanges of good practices occurring through queries and replies… (Para, 30).

Although the 2007 report of the secretary general draws an optimistic picture of the DPKO’s OL efforts, scholarly works examined below generally find that this area is
one of the DPKO’s weakest.

Among those, Howard (2008) briefly analyzes civil police missions in terms of second-level learning which she defines as the learning that occurs at the headquarters level through “lessons-learned” activities across missions. According to Howard’s comparative analysis, civil police missions cannot be accepted as a “learning” domain of the UN peace-keeping activities due to their organizational, resource and conceptual shortcomings. In terms of organizational problems, the fact that the UN’s civil police are not the best and the brightest of their national police forces was emphasized (Howard, 2008). Countries that contribute to the UN police missions want to keep their most qualified personnel in the homeland and send the less qualified ones abroad. In addition to low job skills, these personnel mostly come from undemocratic and/or repressive countries where the style of policing can be best described as “regime” policing. When it comes to the conceptual problem, the general framework of the UN civil police missions is applied to all missions with very little or no variation although the context of each operation, such as the severity of the conflict, state of institutions, social, cultural and ethnic structure, for example, might be very different. Based on these facts Howard emphasizes that:

Without a new conception of how to do civilian policing, and who will do it, we can expect UN peace-keeping operations, even the successful ones, to encounter serious problems, including paving the way for increased crime levels after the missions depart from the country, as has been the case after almost all operations, even the otherwise successful ones (Howard, 2008, p. 355).
Benner and Rotmann (2008) also emphasize that organizational learning has been one of the weaknesses of the UN peace-keeping system. They conceptualize the “infrastructure of learning” that are the collection of primary actors, tools and mechanisms necessary for catalyzing organizational learning in peace-keeping operations. According to Benner and Rotmann, it is necessary to examine “factors such as leadership, incentive structures and skills of staff as well as knowledge management practices and tools available” (p. 44).

Benner and Rotmann (2008) contend that although the increasing demand for peace-building since the late 1990s has seen sufficient opportunities for building an infrastructure to promote OL, the UN has not done an adequate job in moving the accumulation of knowledge and experience across missions. In order to develop a strong learning infrastructure “member state demand, internal recognition of learning needs, the development of the necessary skills and tools, and progressive leadership by senior and mid-level managers” are essential elements to consider (Benner & Rotmann, 2008, p.56). Also, the “learning capacity of the organization, which includes leadership skills, personnel capabilities, career opportunities, motivational factors and openness to interaction with external players, should be developed. Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that UN’s operations are mostly “context specific” and it is rather difficult to transfer the lessons learned from one case or context to another. Attempts to build a perfect peace-building model that can be applied to all missions would be futile. Therefore local factors such as effective leadership that can detect and extract local
knowledge sources and spread this knowledge rapidly across units might be a valuable tool for creating learning environments across UN’s peace-building operations.

Campbell (2007) contends that OL is crucial for successful peace-building operations. OL, according to Campbell, is the rearrangement of organizational routines based on history and new knowledge. According to Campbell, organizations learn when organizational behavior is transformed into organizational routines. Yet, organizations generally transform their most salient and concrete experiences and ignore more abstract ones. Organizations, mostly, reproduce their most easily replicable experiences rather than their best ones— they pick the “low hanging fruits”. Secondly, the definition of “success” is history dependent and individuals tend to misinterpret historical events, especially as the event recedes further into history. For example, the more recently an event has happened the more likely it is to be remembered and the more seriously it is taken. Finally, since organizations have to pursue their goals, success is defined within the framework of organizational goals. A lesson is generally considered not worth learning unless it is related to organizational goals.

Peace-building organizations therefore often evaluate their success in terms of their output rather than their outcome. The outputs are often defined in terms of the organization’s original mandate (i.e., development, security sector, conflict resolution) rather than in the language of the impact on peace, or the antecedents to peace. They often ignore the less ‘tangible’ causes or impacts of their work, even though these may be
the greatest illustrators of behavioral or institutional change. As a result, peace-building organizations do not necessarily learn lessons in relation to building peace. They may learn lessons in relation to how to deliver their services in an unstable context, but whether or not those services contribute to peace is usually unclear (Campbell, 2007 p. 25).

Finally, peace-building organizations tend to assess their criteria for success at the overall level. Interim successes are mostly not counted and therefore not considered valuable enough to extract lessons from unless the overall goal of the mission is not succeeded. Therefore, Campbell suggests that peace-building organizations adapt double loop learning to become learning organizations (Campbell, 2007).

Howard (2008) identifies three conditions of success for ‘multidimensional’ UN missions through a comparative study of ten peace-building cases. Multidimensional peace-keeping operations, according to Howard, started after the end of the cold war. Howard examines more complex peace-building operations that deal with intra-state conflicts and which aim to establish civil order as opposed to ‘traditional peace-keeping’ that focused on ending inter-state conflicts and observing peace. Success of these operations is measured first by analyzing “mandate implementation for the various tasks assigned to the mission… [and second, by exploring] the extent to which the institutions that the UN attempted to monitor, reform or create continued to function after UN guidance was withdrawn” (pp. 7-8). Howard finds that the following determine success in
multidimensional peace-building missions of the UN. First, there is the desire of the combating parties to stop the conflict along with moderately intense and consensual interest of the Security Council. Then there are political and financial support for operations. This is finally coupled with first level organizational learning at the operational rather than headquarter level. All of these conditions should be present for success in peace-building operations. Among these three conditions, organizational learning was present at each successful mission.

With respect to organizational learning, which is the primary focus of this part of this study, Howard classifies OL into two levels. The first-level OL refers to learning of the peacekeepers within the missions from the local conditions whereas the second-level learning refers to learning across missions and the application of lessons learned from one case to future missions. As was mentioned above, only first level learning is the necessary condition for successful peace-keeping operations. Then how does learning occur? Howard adopts the action based learning model that entails the shift in organizational rules or activities in order for learning to take place. Within this framework, the first level OL has four necessary but not sufficient preconditions: (1) collection and analysis of information for defining problems and their underlying causal factors; (2) coordination among different units mostly through inter-departmental meetings; (3) integration of peace-builders with the local population as much as possible, and (4) effective leadership (Howard, 2008).
This review of the literature on OL in general and OL in UN peace-keeping missions, has demonstrated that the UN’s organizational learning efforts are relatively recent and suffer from the problem of implementing knowledge into new organizational practices. Weiss (2001) summarizes why it is not always possible to translate the accumulated knowledge and experience into practice:

The governments and agencies that are supposed to learn are not monoliths. Those who conduct evaluations, draft resolutions, and make statements have not always secured political backing for their content. Competing interests then come to dominate in political and bureaucratic decision making. Moreover, even when lessons appear to have been agreed in headquarters, it can prove extremely difficult to translate them into practice on the ground (p.421).

The limited literature on the OL efforts of the UN mostly adopts the problem-oriented approach to organizational learning (Benner & Rotmann, 2008; Campbell, 2007; Howard, 2008) theoretical framework. The factors that are mentioned by these studies as the stimulators of OL in peace-building operations can be enumerated as consisting of effective leadership, high quality UN personnel, the implementation of sufficient incentives and tools for learning, inter-departmental coordination among the UN units, and effective cooperation and coordination with the UN officials and local actors. The associations between OL and these factors will be hypothesized and tested in a statistical model in the following chapters of this study.

It might be argued that the DPKO’s OL practices can be considered theoretically comprehensive on paper as they include each of the aforementioned OL approaches
through various types of tools such as CoP, and best practices officers. Yet how much of these practices are allocated to the UNPOL and whether they are sufficient are the questions that need to be answered. Secondly, it is important to determine what proportion of the knowledge management activities performed by the DPKO and DFS is specifically allocated to UNPOL with a focus on improving the practice of democratic policing. This study seeks to answer these questions in order to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the UNPOL’s OL practices which is hypothesized to pave the way for DP. The goal which follows is to propose policy alternatives. The next chapter addresses the methodology and research design of this study.
Chapter 4 Methodology

It is argued in this study that the role of UNPOL in PCEs is crucial because UNPOL can help reform and restructure local police organizations based on the principles of democratic policing. This can then establish physical security in the streets, ameliorate the perception of the demolished state authority in the eyes of citizens and have them positively conceive the idea of “change” or the start of a new era. As corollary, the implementation of the human security concept and the establishment of law and order in PCEs can be facilitated and other types of institutional reforms can be implemented more efficiently and effectively. Nevertheless, the aforementioned shortcomings related to the peace-keeping missions of the DPKO at structural, organizational and individual levels raise concerns as to the actual capability of the UNPOL in fulfilling its goals. Organizational learning can help UNPOL improve its weak areas and accelerate the implementation of DP principles, yet UNPOL’s OL efforts are not at a satisfactory level. From a public policy point of view it is necessary first to identify the factors contributing to OL and DP then to explore the root causes of problems, together with successes, in order to propose policy alternatives for the elimination of problems and the improvement of successful areas. Since the focus of this study subsumes these entire diverse spectrum of issues situated at multiple levels of analysis, this study was designed within the context
of mixed-methods research.

The survey of the existing literature showed that the number of quantitative studies on UNPOL, with regards to DP or OL are very few. In addition to that, the literature lacks individual level studies especially those conducted on field officers. The existing studies do a good job in identifying organizational and structural characteristics as well as problematic aspects of the UN policing system. However, these studies generally consist of policy analyses that do not pay attention to the analysis of the UN policing system at the individual level. Due to this fact, policy implications made by the literature are at macro level, normative, and difficult to put into practice.

As an attempt to fill these gaps, this study adopted a mixed-methods approach. Quantitative research methodology was implemented in this study to bridge the gap in the field in regard to individual level studies. Within this context, this study aims to ‘give voice’- in Ragin’s (1994) terms- to UNPOL officers for measuring their perceptions on the utility of democracy and the DP principles, their openness to learning and change, local environments of missions, and how they perceive the adequacy of UNPOL on such areas as training, working environments, and physical, social, and technical facilities. Secondly, a set of hypotheses which were developed based on the literature and put forward by this study will be tested through statistical models. These hypotheses need to be tested through quantitative data.

On the other hand, a quantitative research design at the individual level is
necessary but not sufficient for fulfilling the research objectives of this study. This is primarily due to the fact that organizational and structural elements of the UNPOL system cannot be explored comprehensively by looking from the individual level per se. Moreover, macro-level issues, policy making processes and problem areas might not be noticed by low-level officers who focus on daily routines in the field. In-depth information that might lead to the exploration of the root causes of problems or a better understanding of policy making structures needs to be developed based on the views of higher profile UNPOL officials. In addition to that, a qualitative strand is necessary to explain the findings of the quantitative data analyses and models. Therefore this study draws on qualitative methodology as well.

In sum, one purpose of this study is to fill the quantitative and individual-level gap in the field, introduce new knowledge on such issues as the personal approaches of UNPOL officers on democracy and democratic policing, organizational learning, and a set of organizational issues related to the UNPOL environment, and to test the hypotheses produced by the literature and this study. The other purpose of this research project is to explain the findings of the quantitative data analyses and to understand the organizational and structural aspects of DP and OL in UNPOL missions. Given the fact that the UN is a complex international organization with an often ad hoc bureaucracy, exploring the organizational and bureaucratic aspects of these concepts is just as important as understanding the perceptions of individual officers. This dual purpose of the study inevitably entails a mixed-methods research approach.
Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following research questions:

Q1- How do UN police officers perceive democracy and democratic policing and is there any variation in this across missions or according to the demography, experience and countries of origin of UNPOL officers?

Q2- How is DP being implemented in UNPOL missions? What are the challenges before UNPOL in implementing democratic policing principles in PCEs?

Q3- What are the factors that contribute to the perception of DP in UNPOL missions?

Q3- How do UNPOL officers perceive the convenience of UNPOL missions in terms of organizational learning?

Q4- What strategies does UNPOL try to implement at the organizational level in terms of organizational learning?

Q5- What are the factors that contribute to organizational learning in UNPOL missions?

Q6- Is there any empirical association between organizational learning and democratic policing and what are the components of this association if it exists?

The mixed-methods approach aims to take advantage of both quantitative and
qualitative research methods in that merely conducting one of the methods would be inadequate given the purposes of the study (Thashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Creswell & Clark, 2011).

In this study, first, quantitative data was collected through a web-based survey on UNPOL police officers working at ongoing UN police missions as of 2010-2011. After the completion of the quantitative data collection phase, qualitative data was collected through semi-structured face to face, telephone and e-mail interviews with policy makers at the UN headquarters and high level UN officials in the field. The majority of the interview procedure was developed based on the preliminary findings of the survey, yet some independent items were also included in the interview questionnaire. The survey and interview questionnaire are presented in the appendice A-B and C at the end of the study.

Although Creswell & Clark (2011) recommend that quantitative and qualitative procedures be applied on the same subjects, in this study a different approach was taken and the qualitative research was conducted on a different type of sample. This is primarily because this study seeks both individual and organization-level explanations regarding the topics of interest. It might be difficult to see the whole picture and understand the organizational dynamics of the operations for low-rank police officers. Therefore, the subjects for the semi-structured interviews were selected from senior officials who are supposed to have a more holistic understanding of UNPOL’s
operations. Still, these subjects were also selected from both field and headquarters to reflect the peculiarities of both contexts in the study. Secondly, the qualitative strand was not developed totally based on the findings of the quantitative strand because this study aims to present the organizational aspects of democratic policing and organizational learning in parallel to and in explanation of individual-level aspects in UNPOL missions. Thus, the qualitative strand was developed to both explain the findings of and add an organizational dimension to the quantitative strand. The following sections explain the quantitative and qualitative research designs in detail.

4.1. Quantitative Research Design

As noted earlier, democratic policing is a relatively new area which is related to both democratization and policing components. Organizational learning is the field dealing with organizational change through the implementation of new knowledge and its institutionalization. The existing literatures on democratic policing and UN’s organizational learning efforts are predominantly based on policy analyses or field studies. Moreover, due to the normative nature of the democratic policing model, the role of police officers who are physically supposed to implement the principles of DP is confined to the mere execution of what they are trained to do. Such an understanding typically ignores the commitment of line officers on these principles. However, in the case of UNPOL, how UNPOL officers approach the principles of DP and the notion of democracy and the extent of their knowledge on the DP concept are unknown. This affects how they carry this out. In addition to DP, there is no quantitative study
subsuming the entire spectrum of factors, such as working environments and physical and technical conditions of UNPOL missions, organizational learning and change in UNPOL missions, and organizational commitment of UNPOL officers and their perceptions on the UNPOL leadership. This study uses quantitative research methodology to generate new information on the above mentioned issues from several aspects. The method chosen for the creation of quantitative data was a survey conducted on UNPOL officers.

At present, few quantitative studies on democratic policing or policing in countries undergoing democratic transition exist (Crow, Shelley, Bedard, & Gertz, 2004; Karatay, 2009; Lum, 2009). Karatay (2009), for example, conducted a web-based survey on the attitudes of the Turkish National police on democratic policing. Karatay (2009) asserted that sustainable democracy can only be achieved when the police have internalized and accepted the values of democracy in a country. To test this hypothesis Ordinary Lest Squares (OLS) models were built with composite variables created from a range of individual questions in the survey. The study found that democratic development, leadership and community-oriented policing projects are the significant predictors of successful DP (Karatay, 2009). Crow et al. (2004) surveyed 70 Czech police officers to measure their attitudes about policies on such issues as crime prevention policies, police and government relations and police practices. The study found that Czech officers reflected mixed attitudes, both liberal and oppressive, on authoritarian policing practices. According to the authors, confusion triggered by the ongoing democratic transition was reflected by the views of Czech officers. In another study,
Lum (2009) conducted a survey on police managers from 22 countries in transition to democracy. The study surveyed the preferences of police managers between the utility of community oriented and zero tolerance policing models and regressed these preferences against democratization scores as measured by the Freedom House and the Polity 4 indexes of the countries in a hierarchical linear model. Lum (2009) found that police managers coming from countries with relatively higher democratization scores are more likely to appreciate the utility of community oriented policing over zero tolerance policing.

In contrast to the above cited studies, in this study the democratic policing concept was analyzed within the post-conflict context. Moreover, the police organization under study is UNPOL which is an international police organization. The democratic policing concept in this study was analyzed in relation to organizational learning which has not been examined in the context of an international organization so far. Finally, this study adopted a mixed-methods approach at both individual and organization levels of analysis to get a better perspective of the understanding and implementation of DP concept in PCEs.

This study adopted a web-based survey as the quantitative data collection method. Couper (2008) stresses that the popularity of web-based surveys has increased since the 1990s due to the spread of the internet use. It significantly lowers the cost of survey research and the data becomes almost instantaneously available for analysis. Web-based
surveys have both advantages and drawbacks. Low cost and quick data collection are the most important advantages of web surveys. In addition to these, web-based surveys minimize human errors in data entry and coding (Dillman, et al., 2009). When it comes to the drawbacks, the biggest issue is the coverage error that refers to the problem that those members in the population of a study without internet access will not have a chance to be reached by the researcher (Iarossi, 2006). Also, low response rates are another drawback of web surveys. As Dillman et al. (2009) indicated above, response rates get lower as the interaction between the interviewer and the respondent becomes more distant. Finally, web-based surveys are sensitive to the level of computer skills of the respondents. Therefore people with lower computer skills are more likely to ignore web based surveys, even if they have access to the internet (Dillman et al, 2009).

However, since the population of this study is UN police officers, it was assumed that the subjects would have a higher chance of access to the internet, at least at their work place, and higher level internet skills in comparison with the overall levels of internet access and computer skills in their home countries. As a matter of fact, having adequate computer skills is a condition the UN seeks among UNPOL candidates as the internet has become a major source of communications between headquarters and missions in the field.

4.1.1. Survey Design

This study adopted a web-based survey method for its low cost, the quick
collection of data and the minimization of errors that might stem from manual coding. The web-platform chosen for the administration of the survey was the www.surveymonkey.com website. This web site produces a unique URL link for each survey. The web site stores the responses in its databases which then can be downloaded for analysis. The survey questionnaire was first prepared for a pretest format with six sections and a total of 131 items.

According to Iarossi (2006), pretests are considered to be valuable tools for determining how the questions are understood by the respondents. Based on the findings of the pretest, ambiguities can be clarified and errors can be corrected before the final survey is administered. Regardless of the level of knowledge and experience of the research designer, ignoring a pre-test can harm the accuracy of the items in a survey questionnaire (Iarossi, 2006).

The sections of the pretest survey included: democratic policing (23 items), organizational learning (21 items), police culture and commitment (27 items), technical capacity, organizational structure and leadership (33 items), local issues (18 items), and personal information (9 items). The items were prepared based on the literature which was reviewed. In addition to the literature, a survey questionnaire on similar topics (Karatay, 2009), and the questionnaire of the “Impact of Community Policing Training and Program Implementation on Police Personnel in Arizona 1995-1998” (Haarr, 2005) study were reviewed and relevant items were used in the questionnaire. The questionnaire
included four types of measurement scales: (1) 5-point Likert scale items are the primary type of measurement used in the survey. The scale ranges as strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree and strongly agree. (2) Ordinal scales were used to measure some personal characteristics such as age, education, and tenure of respondents. (3) Open ended questions were included to take literal answers on certain issues. (4) Semantic differential scales were used for measuring the extent of satisfaction from working conditions, training and so forth. The scales ranged as intervals between 1 and 5. Moreover, an open-ended section was placed under each section asking the participants to provide additional information about the design of the survey.

The Likert scale is frequently used in social science survey designs to measure beliefs, perceptions and opinions of people. In this form of measurement subjects are given certain statements and asked to specify the extent to which they agree or disagree with that statement. Likert scales are usually equally divided into 7 interval points ranging between a pre-determined degree of disagreement to agreement. Likert scaling provides the researcher with the advantage of using fewer items to measure the strength of the subject’s belief/opinion. For example the measurement done through one five-point Likert scale item can only be repeated through five separate items, each of which indicates one degree of opinion (DeVellis, 2004).

The second type of measurement used in this study is semantic differential scales. These scales have two ends identified with two opposite adjectives (i.e., friendly-hostile,
satisfactory-dissatisfactory) and the semantic distance between the two ends is divided into a certain number of intervals to construct an interval scale. Hence, the respondent can specify the degree of his/her opinion/belief/attitude and the phenomenon can be measured more accurately (DeVellis, 2004). Both Likert and semantic differential scales are appropriate for computing composite variables that can then be included in subsequent analysis of the survey data (DeVellis, 2004).

Upon the approval from the Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB) of George Mason University, the pretest was given to a group of UNPOL officers. 66 respondents took the pilot survey and based on the feedback from the pilot study, several revisions were made to the questionnaire. Within this frame, 5-point semantic differential scales were replaced with 10-point ones to obtain better accuracy and more variance in the responses. The wording of several items was clarified and the order of certain sections and items were changed. The final questionnaire also included the same seven sections and four types of scales; however, the number of items was reduced from 131 to 116 due to the number of survey dropouts (13 %) and negative comments about the length of the pilot survey. Finally, since the current UN peace-keeping missions have two official languages, English and French, the English version of the survey questionnaire was translated into French and another web link was created for the French version of the survey.
4.1.2. Sampling Strategy

The population of this study was the UN police officers actively serving in a UN police mission. Nevertheless some respondents who have recently finished their missions, especially from the UNMIK (UN mission in Kosovo), also took the survey. The unit of analysis for the survey is individual. Based on these factors, two sampling strategies had been proposed. The primary strategy was a stratified simple random sample of the population where the stratification would have been done based on the population of the missions. This initial strategy entailed obtaining the list including names and e-mail addresses of each and every police officer deployed in order to randomly select a pre-determined size of sample from each mission proportional to the size of the mission. However, such a list could not be obtained from most of the missions due to bureaucratic and technical obstacles. Therefore an alternative non-probability convenience and snowball sampling strategy was used to collect data for this study.

Babbie (2007) notes that non-probability sampling refers to “any techniques in which samples are selected in someway not suggested by probability theory” (p.183). This study used the following sampling procedure: eleven currently ongoing UN peace-keeping operations with police components- MINURCAT, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNFICYP, UNMIBH, UNMIK, UNMIT, UNMIS, UNMIL and UNOCI- were contacted via e-mail and telephone and asked for permission for the distribution of the survey links to the entire population of police officers. Among those UNMIT, MINUSTAH and UNOCI missions distributed the survey links to their officers via e-mail
and respondents from other missions were contacted via e-mail groups. Personal contacts of the author were used and those who had been already contacted were encouraged to contact fellow officers on missions in a form of snowball sampling. Three waves of emails were sent to these contacts to enhance the participation rate. It is also important to note here that each invitation email asked the target person to forward the invitation email with the links to the URL addresses of the surveys to his or her colleagues working at a UNPOL mission. The distribution of the survey link to UNPOL missions was done by e-mails and e-mail groups formed by UNPOL officers mostly by their nationalities (i.e., Yahoo group of Pakistani officers serving at UNMIT). Data collection for the survey lasted for 16 weeks.

Given the above procedure, such a sampling strategy might be called *ad hoc*, yet it can be considered a merger of convenience and snowball sampling techniques. Convenience sampling can be defined as a non-probability sampling method in which the researcher recruits the sample whom he or she can reach relatively easily and at a reasonable cost. Since such a sampling technique would not be representative of the population the researcher cannot generalize his or her findings on the entire population (Babbie, 2007). Snowball sampling is another nonprobability sampling method in which the researcher starts with recruiting a small number of subjects and asks them to name others who might be included in the study. By so doing, the number of samples is supposed to increase as the researcher contacts with those who were referenced by the initial subjects (Babbie, 2007). In this study, three out of eleven missions distributed the
survey link to the entire e-mail lists at hand, so for these three missions (UNMIT, MONUSCO and MINUSTAH) the entire subpopulations could be reached. For other missions, though, as described earlier, personal contacts, and email groups were used to get the initial contacts (convenience sampling) and then they were asked to forward the survey links to their colleagues in their networks (snowball sampling). At the end of the data collection phase, a total of 308 respondents had started the survey whereas 63 (20 %) dropped out at some sections of the survey. It is obvious that the sampling strategy lacks representative power, therefore external validity, for the population. However, the results of this study present new information on a wholly different viewpoint as an approach based on surveying individual UNPOL officers in each mission on a wide range of issues. The current sample of 308 UNPOL officers comprises individuals from 43 different nations that are working or have recently worked at 10 different UNPOL missions.

A set of suggestions are made by survey research scholars (Dillman et al. 2009; Couper, 2008; Iarossi, 2006) to enhance response rates. Given that this study adopted the web-based survey mode, first, multiple waves of e-mails were sent. Second, the image of the waving UN flag was placed in the survey page and the page was designed in the colors of the UNPOL. Third, e-mail invitations were mostly done using the name of the person rather than to an entire group.

When the data collection phase was finished, a total of 308 responses had been collected of which 268 were in the English version and 40 were in the French version. 63
had dropped out (20 %) at some point in the survey. Since the number of invitation e-mails sent is unknown-due to e-mail forwarding- it is impossible to identify the definite response rate. However, a rough estimation can be made based on the number of known e-mails sent and the population of the groups to which the e-mails were sent. According to this calculation, a response rate of approximately 32 % was achieved.

4.1.3. Statistical Models and Hypotheses

Given the objectives of this study, two types of OLS models were developed. The first model attempts to identify the primary predictors of OL in UNPOL missions. Within this context two policy variables, leadership and local factors and three control variables were used. In addition to these variables, age, gender, tenure, region, the duration of deployment, education, rank and mission dummies were included in the model. The model of OL in UNPOL missions tests the following hypotheses:

H1: UNPOL officers will have a higher level of perceived OL as they believe that they are managed through effective leadership.

H2: UNPOL officers will have a higher level of perceived OL as they develop closer relationships with local actors.

The second OLS model, democratic policing through organizational learning includes OL, leadership and local actors as policy variables, and, satisfaction with training, physical and technical conditions, and the geographical region of the officer as organizational control variables. The model also includes the same demographic control
variables with the model of OL. The following hypotheses were tested through the model:

H3: UNPOL officers will have higher commitment to the principles of DP as they have higher levels of perceived OL in UNPOL missions.

H4: UNPOL officers will have higher commitment to the principles of DP as they develop closer relationships with local actors.

4.1.4. Definitions and Measurements of Variables

The survey examined both the perception of democratic policing by the UN police and factors affecting organizational learning in UNPOL missions. Hence, the study has two dependent variables: the perceived adherence of UNPOL officers to democratic policing, referred to as dempercept, and the perceived level of organizational learning, referred to as learning. In terms of explanatory variables, perceived values regarding effective leadership, and local factors were extracted from the literature as the primary factors affecting OL in PCEs. In addition to these policy variables, data were collected on the perceived satisfaction from training, technical and physical conditions in the missions as organizational control variables. Finally, a set of demographic variables such as age, gender, rank, nationality, tenure, mission, country of the respondent and education were included to describe the respondents and to control for individual characteristics of subjects during the data analysis phase.
4.1.4.1. Dependent variables

Dempercept is defined based on the DP principles noted above by Bayley (2006) and Pino & Wiatrowski (2006). Democratic policing, within the post-conflict context, can be defined as a new policing paradigm that demarcates the borders of policing according to the universally accepted norms of democracy and human rights and implements the principles of accountability, transparency, and community oriented policing in the policing field. Thus police organizations can be considered “democratic” to the extent that they adopt these principles.

In order to capture the concept, 13 items were applied measuring such components of DP as accountability, transparency, and adherence to: the rule of law, human rights, subordination to civil authority, community policing, and equal treatment to citizens. Among these, 4 items (1 is related to accountability, 1 to community policing and 1 to democratic regimes and to the rule of law) were negatively worded. In addition to the 13 items, a set of four more items were added to provide more information on the DP concept. These 4 items measure the perceptions of UNPOL officers on democracy as a form of government, the notion of human security, the degree of familiarity with the concept of DP by the subject, and the perceived value of the service the respondent contributes in the mission.

The second dependent variable for this study is the perceived level of organizational learning in UNPOL missions. This study adopts the frequently accepted definition of organizational learning which is acquisition, adoption and implementation
of new knowledge for changing organizational rules and behaviors (Benner & Rottnan, 2008). The study, however, also collected the opinions of UNPOL officers on different approaches to OL. Within this frame, the respondents were asked to indicate their satisfaction with access to the internet, TV and libraries/books with three items measured in 10-point scales, ranging between totally dissatisfied and totally satisfied. This section was meant to measure the satisfaction from access to information. Secondly, 10 items were included to capture the perceptions of UNPOL officers on the convenience and support of the organization for learning and change (7 items), and personal commitment to learning and change (3 items) using 5-point Likert scales. Finally, four items were applied to measure the would-be benefit of basic OL methods through 10-point scales.

4.1.4.2 Explanatory variables

Given the two dependent variables, two statistical models were built. The first model was developed to explain the factors contributing to perceived organizational learning in UNPOL missions. Given the literature surveyed, effective leadership, job skills of the staff (Benner & Rotmann, 2008; Howard, 2008), incentive structures, internal identification and recognition of learning needs, tools and organizational practices necessary for learning (Benner & Rotmann, 2008), and integration with local population and actors (Howard, 2008) were identified as the primary building blocks for OL in PCEs. Among these, effective leadership, training, physical and technical conditions and integration with the local actors were included in the model of OL in UNPOL missions.
The second model was built to explore the factors contributing to the perceived adherence of UNPOL officers to democratic policing in general and organizational learning as a specific factor of democratic policing in UNPOL missions. O’Neil (2005) mentioned the importance of a “diagnostic approach” -which entails the application of organizational learning principles -for effective policing in PCE. Other elements of democratic policing discussed in that literature were included in the model as controlling factors. These factors are effective leadership (O’Neil, 2005; Bayley, 2006; Neild, 2001), gaining the support of local actors (Bayley, 1997; Marenin, 2005; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007), and the adequacy of training (Bayley, 1997; Neild, 2001; Mobeké, 2005; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).

**Leadership**

The perception of UNPOL officers on effective leadership was considered to be a significant facilitator of organizational learning in PCEs. Leadership has several aspects and theories. Yet this study seeks for “transformational leadership”. Drodge and Murphy (2002) note that “Transformational leaders are characterized by the ability to motivate followers to strive toward and achieve their visionary goals through a process of idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration” (p. 423). This variable measures whether the UN police officers’ feelings about their supervisors are congruent with the above definition. Within this frame, 9 items, two of which were negatively worded, were used to measure the perceived level of
effective leadership in UNPOL missions.

Local conditions

The perception of UNPOL officers on local conditions have been determined to be very important for both organizational learning and democratic policing. Local conditions in relation to UNPOL missions were measured from different perspectives. First, respondents were asked which out of a set of certain characteristics was the most important to have in common with UNPOL officers and the local population. These characteristics are language, religion, race, history, border, and culture. Then they were asked which of these characteristics they physically had in common with the local population. Next, a set of Likert-scale items were applied to get the perceptions of UNPOL officers on certain local issues. Finally, four semantic differential scale items ranging between friendly and hostile were used to get the opinions of UNPOL officers on local citizens, police, media and politicians. Since the literature emphasizes developing close relationships with certain local actors, the final scale was turned into a composite variable to be used in the OLS models.

Three variables: the perceived adequacy of in service training, technical conditions and physical conditions were measured in this study for two purposes. First these concepts give information about the degree of satisfaction in life and working environment in UNPOL missions. Second, these variables were included in OLS models as control variables. 10-point scales were used to measure each item and composite
variables were constructed following factor analyses.

**The perceived satisfaction with training**

Training was conceptualized as the training given by the UN to UNPOL officers regarding DP as measured in terms of in-service training sessions (in general), debriefings, human-rights training, democratic policing training and training on the local factors of the target country.

**The perceived satisfaction with handling of technical and physical conditions**

Technical conditions are the logistics component of policing in UNPOL missions. This variable was defined as equipment and personnel allocated for the fulfillment of operations. Technical conditions were measured by vehicles, computers, information systems, electronic communication devices and technical personnel. Finally, *satisfaction with physical conditions* scale consists of items measuring the satisfaction of the subject with his/her salary, buildings (police stations), housing facilities, and social, welfare and recreational facilities.

**4.1.4.3. Demographic variables**

Nine demographic variables, mission, age, gender, rank, marital status, tenure, duration of deployment, education, and nationality were included in the study.

*Mission* is a categorical variable indicating the mission the respondent was dispatched. *Nationality* is another categorical variable indicating the home country of the
respondent. The country variable then was categorized based on the geographical regions of the countries and the region variable was generated. This variable includes North America, Africa, Europe, Middle East, Asia, Brazil, Turkey and Australia regions. Yet Australia and North America categories were merged in the analyses because of their cultural similarity. Age is an interval variable measuring the current age group of the respondent. Rank is an interval variable indicating the current rank of the respondent in his/her country’s police force. Since nominal expressions of ranks are rather different across countries, this variable was measured in numbers indicating the rank of the respondent in number of steps above the lowest rank in his/her national police force. Tenure is an interval variable indicating how many years of work experience the respondent had when he/she started the first mission. Duration of deployment is a measure of how many months the respondent worked for the UN mission. Gender is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the respondent coded 1 for males and 0 for females. Marital status is a categorical variable indicating the marital status of the respondent. The variable included married, single, widowed and divorced categories. Finally, education is an interval variable measuring how many years of school work the respondent completed.

4.2. Qualitative Research Design

The scope of quantitative research can be inadequate if the researcher attempts to develop a deeper understanding of the underlying causal relationships in the area being studied. Qualitative research can provide the researcher with elaborate context and depth
when there is what is in effect between group variance as might occur in different missions with different leadership styles in different parts of the world (Ragin, 1994). In this study the survey of UNPOL officers was designed to reveal the perceptions of UNPOL officers on DP principles, level of OL in the missions, effective leadership, physical environment and several other characteristics. The quantitative research methodology was referred to for exploring general patterns that lead to certain conclusions. Still, these patterns need deeper understanding from an organizational point of view. Within this context, qualitative data was collected through open ended items in the survey and semi-structured interviews with individuals who have a broader scope and capability of policy-making on the phenomena that are examined in this study. Such a mixed-methods approach was necessary for increasing the validity of the study, explaining the quantitative findings of the study and having a better understanding of the roots of relationships revealed by the survey.

Serí’s study (2005) can be considered an example for the application of qualitative methodology on democratic policing. Serí argued that the proficiency of the police in terms of the principles of democracy can be understood by identifying the narratives that form the practice on the ground. Serí found evidence supporting this argument through a comparative analysis of 70 interviews with officers from several South American countries, the UK and the US.
4.2.1. Data Collection Procedure for the Qualitative Phase

In this study, the qualitative data were collected through two procedures: (1) three open ended items implemented in the survey on UNPOL officers, and (2) semi-structured interviews with 14 UN officials. In addition to these, two short statements by the UNPOL police adviser, Ann Marie Orrler, made on 20 October 2009\textsuperscript{13} and 23 April 2010\textsuperscript{14}, were used as qualitative data because these statements were giving the details of UNPOL’s future policy orientations which are closely relevant to the focus of this study. These statements of the police commissioner were made in video recorded press conferences that can be accessed via the internet.

As to the first category of qualitative data, in the survey the subjects (UNPOL officers) were asked to mention, the factors that motived and demotivated them the most using three words. A total of 177 subjects (57\%) responded to the two motivation-related items. In addition to these two items, subjects were allowed to mention their additional thoughts, suggestions and complaints in the written format at the end of the survey. 98 subjects (32\%) gave written comments.

The second category of the qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with 14 UN officials. The semi-structured interview technique is a frequently used qualitative research technique by social scientists. This method is conducted by

\textsuperscript{13} \text{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGOBlnGSS9s}

\textsuperscript{14} \text{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwYtYS61MEY}
asking previously prepared open-ended questions, contrary to structured interviews, in a sequence determined by the researcher. The aim is to extract as much relevant information as possible. Therefore the researcher can intervene if the subject digresses from the focus of the question, contrary to non-structured interviews (Harrel & Bradley, 2009). The semi-structured interview method is an elicitation technique that allows the researcher to adjust the direction and depth of the interview in parallel with the subject’s area of expertise. Nonetheless, since similar questions are asked to all of the subjects, the researcher can make comparisons and seek for patterns throughout the interviews (Bernard & Ryan, 2010).

The procedure for semi-structured interviews started after the pilot study of the survey was completed and the data analyses were run. The interview questionnaire was developed partly based on the preliminary findings of the survey. The sample selection criterion involved those who were working as managers at the UNPOL headquarters, mission commanders, deputy mission commanders and officers from the office of peace-keeping best practices unit of the DPKO. Within this framework, 27 relevant people were contacted via emails and telephone. Most of the top managers replied that they were too busy to join the study and they suggested the author contact their deputies instead. Only the police chief of the UNMIS mission agreed to join the study- alas via email. Therefore, the referenced officials were also contacted and at the end of the process 14 interviews had been conducted. Six of the interviews were face to face at the UNPOL headquarters in New York in November 2010, 2 participants sent their written replies to the
questionnaire via email and six interviews were conducted on the phone. The table below presents personal and professional information about the 14 interviewees as well as type of the interviews. The subject numbers in column 1 of the table will be used to identify the interviewee when quotations will be used in chapter six. All of the interviews- except for the two e-mail interviews- were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim by the author.

Table 4.1 Interview types and subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject nr</th>
<th>Post/Mission</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Int. Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Deputy Police Advisor</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (PD)</td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Mission Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (PD)</td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Mission Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (PD)</td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Mission Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (PD)</td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>Mission Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (PD)</td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (PD)</td>
<td>Face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>Knowledge Management Coordinator</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>HQ (DPKO)</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8</td>
<td>Training Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>Training Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S10</td>
<td>Training Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td>Training Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S12</td>
<td>Deputy Police Commander</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S13</td>
<td>Police Commander</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S14</td>
<td>Deputy Police Commander</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Analyses of the qualitative data

The qualitative data analyses were run following the procedures described by Bernard and Ryan (2010). First, each audio record of the interviews was transcribed verbatim by the author. Then the transcripts were printed out and read to identify themes that fall into the focus of this study. After the first round of coding, 96 themes were identified under seven major categories. In the second round of the coding process, computer software, NVivo 8™, was used and each theme was reanalyzed based on the transcripts categorized in the previous coding phase. After this round the order and context of some themes were rearranged. After the second round of coding the previously identified seven major categories were reduced to four and the total number of sub-themes was reduced to 76. The major themes and their sub themes were organizational learning, democratic policing, training and the working environment in UNPOL.

The data were re-examined then, and the quotations which exhibited the strongest contribution to the core concepts of the study were identified. When quotations from interviews were embedded in the text in the following sections the subject numbers assigned to each interviewee in table 4.1. (Ranging between S-1 and S-14) were used to identify the interviewee.

Major Code Categories

Based on the qualitative analyses, the working environment category was comprised of a set of internal and external factors that affect the motivation of UNPOL officers and
the operations of UNPOL. The factors shaping UNPOL’s working environment are motivational factors and local conditions. The second major category is training which is comprised of the sub-themes of the training of UNPOL officers and local police forces, doctrinal issues and challenges. The third major category is OL. Feedback mechanisms, the international working environment, communities of practice, appreciative inquiry and challenges of OL were identified as the primary sub-themes of OL. The final major category is DP. The general perception of DP in UNPOL, the application of DP in UNPOL, future issues and challenges with respect to DP emerged as the sub-themes under the category of DP. It is important to note here that although the challenges in each category were presented separately, most of these challenges are common for all other domains of UNPOL operations.

4.2.2. Concepts Covered in the Interviews

The qualitative part of this study attempts to first explain the survey findings from the organizational aspect and second, to explore the organizational strategies of the DPKO in general and the UNPOL in specific about democratic policing, organizational learning, working conditions, training (both the training given by the UN to the UNPOL officers and training provided by UNPOL officers to local police organizations), and motivational factors in UNPOL missions. Within this frame, the variables included in the quantitative part of the study were also included in the qualitative part. In addition to that, specific findings of the survey regarding job skills of UNPOL officers and the levels of democracy in the countries from where the UNPOL officers dominantly come from were
included in the study. The qualitative part specially focused on the underlying procedures, biggest challenges, success and failures of the UNPOL system on the aforementioned concepts.

Two types of qualitative data analyses were used. The open ended survey questions were analyzed using the word count method. The interview transcripts were analyzed to find out thematic patterns. Finally, quantitative and qualitative data analyses were conducted separately and the findings were merged and discussed together in the “Conclusions” chapter of the study.

4.3. Issues RELATED to the Validity and Reliability of the Study

Validity refers to whether a phenomenon is measured as it is meant to be measured by the researcher (King, Keohanne, & Verba, 1994). Yin (2009) quotes three types of validity from Kidder and Judd (1986, pp. 26-29):

Construct validity: constructing or creating operational measures which appear to reflect the concepts being studied. Internal validity (for explanatory or causal studies only and not for descriptive or exploratory studies) seeks to establish a causal relationship and distinguish them from spurious relationships. External validity refers to defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized (p.40).

Among those, in order to build internal validity, control variables were included in statistical models and statistical tests of significance were applied. External validity, on the other hand, cannot be claimed to have been established because the expected sampling strategy and stratified random sampling, could not have been rigorously
implemented. It should be noted here that although several attempts were made to expand the sample size, bureaucratic obstacles and lack of cooperation from some missions led to the limited sample size. Therefore, special attention was paid to the construct validity of the study. In order to enhance construct validity, this study conducted a pretest of the questionnaire on 66 subjects in order to detect logical errors, ambiguities and wording of the items. Additionally, the wording of the items was kept as short and simple as possible. A statement stressing that the confidentiality of the responses would be assured was added in the introduction part of the survey. Also, a few items were negatively worded in each section. Composite variables were computed after factor analyses as well. Finally, the questionnaire was translated into French in order to minimize the language-related ambiguities and give francophone UNPOL officers the chance to participate in the study. French is the second official language of UNPOL missions and some of UNPOL officers are more comfortable with French rather than English.

Yin (2009) asserts that using multiple sources of evidence is a way of improving the level of validity. For this purpose, this study referred to both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection to reveal a deeper understanding of the phenomena at stake. Furthermore, secondary data from various resources were used when necessary to fact check and corroborate subjective data. Finally, multiple items were asked on the same construct, especially those that are crucial to the study, to ensure that the respondent understood the core of the issue.
Reliability has two different aspects. The first aspect of reliability means “applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the same measure…” Reliable measures also produce the same results when applied by different researchers” (King, et al., 1994, pp. 25-26). Thus the same procedures are supposed to generate the same results, regardless of the applier, for a study to be reliable. Yin (2009) asserts that appropriate documentation is necessary to provide the opportunity for other scholars to reproduce the results. According to a second perspective, reliability refers to “the question of whether respondents are consistent or stable in their answers” (Groves et al., 2004, p.261). In the survey field, two methods were used to measure the reliability of a study. The first method is called “repeated interviews with the same respondent” which refers to applying the same items to the same subjects at different times and measuring the difference between the results. The second method is “using multiple indicators of the same subject”. This method entails the application of different items with the same underlying concept. The consistency of the responses then are measured through the calculation of the Cronbach’s alpha statistic which ranges between 0 and 1 where the reliability of the scale increases as the Cronbach’s alpha score gets closer to 1(Groves et.al., 2004, pp. 264-265). In more detail the alpha statistic is calculated “by specifying the portion of total variance for the item set that is unique, subtracting this from 1 to determine the proportion that is communal and multiplying by a correlation factor to adjust for the number of elements contributing to earlier computations.” (DeVellis, 2004, pp. 35-36).
In this study all interview protocols were documented so that other researchers can test the reproducibility of the results. Also, multiple indicators were used to measure the relevant variables and concepts; and Cronbach’s alpha statistics were calculated before the analysis of each scale and after the construction of each composite variable following the factor analyses conducted in this study.
Chapter 5 Quantitative Data Analyses

This study adopted a mixed-methods approach. Within this framework, first quantitative data analyses are presented in this chapter and qualitative data analyses are discussed in the next chapter. The results are synthesized in the conclusions chapter. This chapter analyzes the data collected from 308 UN police officers through a web-based survey. First, the descriptive statistics of the sample is presented. Second, perceptions of UN police officers on democratic policing principles, organizational learning, leadership, local factors, physical and technical conditions and training were tabulated and then composite variables representing each of the above factors were constructed based on the results of exploratory factor analyses. Finally, the models of perceived organizational learning and democratic policing in UNPOL missions were constructed and tested. The statistical software STATA MP 10™ was used for all of the quantitative analyses ran in this study.

5.1. Description of the Survey Sample

The survey has 308 subjects including missing values due to drop outs or items with no responses. The distribution of the sample across missions is shown below:
The largest number of respondents of the sample are from UNMIT (23%) followed by MINUSTAH (18%), UNOCI (12.3%) and UNMIK (11%). In addition to that it must be noted that 58 subjects (19%) served in two different missions and 8 (2.6%) served in three different missions. Since MINURCAT and UMBIH missions have very few respondents, these two missions were excluded from analyses that compared missions.

UNPOL officers from 43 different countries participated in the study. Of 244 subjects who identified their countries, 97 (39.75%) come from Turkey, 31 (12.7%) come from the Philippines, 10 (4.1%) come from Cameroon, 9 (3.69%) come from Pakistan, 8 (3.28%) come from Brazil, 7 (2.87%) come from Canada, 6 (2.46%) come from Niger, and 25 (2.05%) individual officers come from the US, Portugal, Benin, Bangladesh and Australia (5 officers from each country). In terms of the regional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Sample Percent</th>
<th>Population Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMBIH</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>27.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>38.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>43.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>66.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>73.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12.34</td>
<td>85.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>92.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distribution, 41.4% of the sample are from the Middle East (note that Turkey alone accounts for almost 40% within this amount), 22.5% from Asia, 5.7% from Europe, 19.2% from Africa, 4.9% from N. America, 3.2% from S. America and 2% from Australia.

Rank, tenure, and duration of deployment were measured as features of service in UNPOL. In terms of tenure, 15.5% of the sample has 1-5 years of tenure, 32.5% has 6-10 years, 21.8% has 11-15 years and 12.3% has 16-20 years of tenure. The rank variable is problematic because the sample is multi-national and each country has a different police ranking structure. Therefore the respondents were asked to specify their ranks in terms of numbers where the lowest rank is measured by 1 and each step up in ranks is an integer high. According to this scale, the largest group in the sample (38%) has ranks between the 4th and 6th levels in their police organizations. 23% of the sample are at 1-3rd rank level. The duration of deployment was measured in months. 15.3% of the sample was deployed for 1-6 months, 35% was deployed for 7-12 months, 15.3% for 13-18 months, 18.43% for 19-24 months and 16% for 25 and more months.

Gender, age, marital status and education levels of UNPOL officers were measured to capture demographic characteristics of the sample. Within this frame: 95.3% of the sample is male and 4.7% is female. The population rate (total rate of female UNPOL officers) for females is 8% as of 2010. 72% of the sample is married, 24% are single and 3% are divorced. The age distribution of the sample is as follows: 31% are in
the 31-35 age group, 27 % are 36-40, and 17 % are 41-45. In other words almost 75% of the sample is between the ages of 31 and 45. Finally, the average length of education of officers in the sample is 10 years; the median length of education is 9 years, with a standard deviation of 3.8. Almost 3 % of the sample has 16 years or more education.

In addition to the professional and demographic characteristics, subjects were also asked about their motivations for joining UNPOL. They were also asked about what they felt were the minimum years of service necessary in UNPOL missions for UNPOL officers to perform effectively. The results are analyzed and discussed below.

Figure 5.1 describes that UNPOL officers’ highest motivation in joining UNPOL is humanitarianism (21.4 %) followed by the desire to gain international experience (18.8 %), career advancement (18.1 %), and money (15.9).
The duration of service for effective policing in UNPOL missions was identified as controversial in the literature. The typical one-year period of service is criticized and considered too short for both the performance of effective policing and the creation of
institutional memory in UNPOL missions (Mobekk, 2005; Benner et al., 2008; Durch, 2010). The chart presented below shows that of the UNPOL officers that responded in this study, 49.3% stated that a minimum of two years of service was necessary to acquire the experience necessary to perform effectively in UNPOL missions. 19.6% reported that the minimum amount of service should be three years and only 16.4% stated that it should be one year. Mission by mission comparisons demonstrate that two years of minimum service is the most preferred minimum duration of service across all missions.

Figure 5.2 Minimum duration of service according to UNPOL officers necessary for effective policing in UNPOL missions
5.2. UNPOL Officers’ Perception on Democratic Policing Principles

This section of the study presents the analyses of the survey with respect to democratic policing principles. The democratic policing section of the survey was comprised of 17 items, measuring the perceptions of UNPOL officers about DP. These items were derived from the major areas identified by the DP literature. The items were measured using 5-point Likert scales scored as -2 for strong disagreement with the phrase, -1 for disagreement, 0 for neither agreement nor disagreement, 1 for agreement, and 2 for strong agreement. Phrases describing DP principles were constructed from the definitions of Bayley (2001) and Pino and Wiatrowski (2006). The questionnaire developed by Karatay (2009) and Haarr (2005) were referred to in the development of the DP scale for the survey. Within this framework, the components of DP scale are: accountability (4 items), transparency, and adherence to: rule of law, human rights, civil authority, and community policing and equal treatment to citizens. Among these, 4 items (1 related to accountability, 1 related to community policing, 1 related to democratic regimes and 1 to rule of law) were negatively worded. Finally, three items were included in this section to measure perceptions of UNPOL officers on such areas as democracy, human security, the importance of the police in PCE; and one item was included to measure the acquaintance of the subject with the democratic policing concept.

Dillman et al. (2009) put great emphasis on the importance of the very first item

---

15 All of the items that are mentioned to be measured in Likert scale in this study were coded as explained here
in the questionnaire for focusing the interest of the subject in completing the questionnaire. The very first item of the survey was “police plays a very important role in democratization of post-conflict countries”. This item was included in the survey questionnaire for two reasons: first, to measure how UNPOL officers perceive the importance of the job they perform for the UN in PCEs. The second reason for the inclusion of this item in the survey was to recognize the importance of the job the subject is performing for the UN and having him/her involved in the rest of the survey. The analyses of this section start with these four complementary items that are isolated from the rest of the scale.

Table 5.2 The percentage distribution of answers to the complementary items of the DP scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>*S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1- Police plays a very important role in democratization of post-conflict countries</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2- Security of citizens is more important than security of state</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3- I know a lot about the democratic policing concept</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V17- Democracy is the best type of government</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*S.A. = Strongly Agree; A. = Agree; N. = Neither agree nor disagree; D. = Disagree; S.D. = Strongly Disagree

\[16\] The summation of row percentages in the result tables do not add up to 100 due to missing values throughout the study

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The analysis of the table above reveals that UNPOL officers have strongly positive perceptions of the items under study. 94% of respondents believe that the role of police in PCEs is very important. 83.7% of the sample expressed strong support for democracy as a political system. The only item with some variation is the one with the human security notion. Nevertheless, 68.5% of the respondents support the notion, 13% are against it and 16% are neutral. Finally, slightly more than 82% of the respondents indicate that they are acquainted with the democratic policing concept (29.9% are strongly acquainted and 52.6% are acquainted with it). 3% indicated little or no acquaintance and 11% indicated somewhat acquaintance with the concept. It is important to note here that a total of 14% of the respondents, report they do not have enough knowledge on the democratic policing concept.

The next section discusses the 13 items measuring the perception of the UNPOL officers about democratic policing.

5.2.1. The Democratic Policing Scale

In this study the concept of democratic policing within the context of PCEs was measured through 13 variables. An exploratory factor analysis was run to determine if there is an underlying factor structure of these variables. Then the items were analyzed separately based on the factors on which they were loaded into.

Factor analysis of the democratic policing scale is presented below. Given the factorizability tests, the items are appropriate for factor analysis. Barlett’s test of
sphericity tests the null hypothesis that the items are not inter-correlated. Therefore the null hypothesis should be rejected in order to conduct a factor analysis with a given matrix (Dziuban & Shirkey, 1974). In terms of the DP scale, the null hypothesis of inter-item independence can be rejected given the test score below. The Keiser-Meyer- Olkin (KMO) test of sampling adequacy calculates the KMO statistic through inter-item and partial correlations. The statistic can range between 0 and 1 where values closer to 1 indicate better factorizability. Kaiser’s interpretation of the statistic is as follows: .90-1 indicates “marvelous” factorizability, .80-.90 indicates “meritorious”, .70-.80 “middling”, .60-.70 “mediocre”, .50-.60 “miserable” and below .50 is “unacceptable” (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2006). The DP scale has a KMO score of .78 which indicates a near meritorious factorizability of its items. Finally, a Cronbach’s alpha score of .73 shows adequate inter-item reliability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test of sphericity</th>
<th>KMO Statistic</th>
<th>Cronbach’s alpha (std)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi2</td>
<td>517.7</td>
<td>.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 The results of the test of sphericity for the DP scale
Table 5.4 Factor extraction for the DP scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor1</td>
<td>3.23290</td>
<td>1.70896</td>
<td>0.2487</td>
<td>.2487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor2</td>
<td>1.52394</td>
<td>0.43121</td>
<td>0.1172</td>
<td>.3659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor3</td>
<td>1.09273</td>
<td>0.16433</td>
<td>0.0841</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N= 273

Table 5.5 Factor loadings (> .40) of the DP scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Var.</th>
<th>Fctr1</th>
<th>Fctr2</th>
<th>Fctr3</th>
<th>Uniqns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v4</td>
<td>0.4241</td>
<td>0.5630</td>
<td>0.3733</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5</td>
<td>0.4504</td>
<td>0.5871</td>
<td>0.3946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v6</td>
<td>0.6204</td>
<td>0.5043</td>
<td>0.6138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v7</td>
<td>0.6101</td>
<td>0.6163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v8</td>
<td>0.6037</td>
<td>0.5734</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v10</td>
<td>0.5030</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v11</td>
<td>0.5820</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v12</td>
<td>0.5620</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5721</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v13</td>
<td>0.4211</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v14</td>
<td>0.6036</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v15</td>
<td>-0.4274</td>
<td>0.4976</td>
<td>0.5598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v16</td>
<td>0.6131</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5537</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the above factor analysis, the 13 items loaded into three factors; however, factor 3 is comprised by items 4 and 5 that also load highly onto factor-1. Similarly item 15 loads highly onto both factors 1 and 2. Nevertheless, an examination of the scree plot demonstrates that factor-3 can be considered where the elbow starts. At this
point, although an oblique-promax rotation can be considered an appropriate way (Thompson, 2004) such a procedure is not followed in this study because a rotation is meant to fit the variables into the retained factors. Yet in this study the decision of how many factors to extract was made based on the factor loadings, screeplots and contextual relevance. Given the scree plot, two factors are clearly visible whereas the third factor is very close to the starting point of the elbow. When the items are analyzed in terms of context, the items constructing factor two are those with negative wording items. Those who agree with these statements can be considered cynical to certain principles of DP. All of the other items, on the other hand, refer to certain principles of democratic policing. Hence, at the factor extraction phase items 4 and 5 that had higher absolute loadings in factor 3 were considered under factor 1. Factor 1 has an Eigen value of 3.23 and explanatory power of .25; the loadings range between .42 and .63. As a matter of fact, item total correlations and standardized alpha coefficients, presented in the following part of this section, show that these two items can be included in the democratic policing scale.
Figure 5.3 The Scree-plot of the DP scale items

Table 5.6 The Percentage distribution of the answers of the DP scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V4-Police should take citizens’ opinions when developing security strategies</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5-Police should be subordinate to civilian authority</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6-Citizen feedback evaluating police performance will increase police efficiency</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V7-There should be mechanisms within police organizations where citizens can apply to inform police misconduct</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8-There should be external mechanisms (out of police organizations) where citizens can apply to inform police misconduct</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9-Police cannot work effectively if they have to give account of everything they do</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Strong Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strong Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10- Indicators of police performance should be publicly available</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V11-Police-Community cooperation is an important element of effective policing (for example: reducing crimes)</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12-Police should work within the limits of the human rights principles</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13- Laws always back (protect more than necessary) criminals</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14- Police should primarily fight with crimes rather than conducting community policing activities</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V15-Democratic regimes prevent police from being effective</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16-Police should behave equally to everyone without discriminating based on race, gender or religion</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table demonstrates that there is strong support on every component of democratic policing by UNPOL officers. Strong support, especially on items related to accountability, transparency and community oriented policing is a significant indicator of positive reaction on democratic policing among UNPOL officers. When these items are analyzed one by one, the strongest support of the UNPOL officers is shown in favor of the non-discriminatory treatment (86 % strongly agree and 10.7 % agree), working within the limits of human rights principles (70.1 % strongly agree and 24 % agree), and police-community cooperation (65.9 % strongly agree and 28.6 % agree).

Based on the factor analysis and contextual analysis of the democratic policing scale one composite variable, dempercept, representing the perceptions of UNPOL
One of the primary objectives of this study was to shed light on the perceptions of UNPOL officers on DP and its components and whether or not these perceptions vary across missions and other characteristics. So far it was found that UNPOL officers predominantly positively view the DP concept and its main components. This section of the study analyzes whether these positive views vary across missions. The geographical origins of officers may also provide insights into what affects the nature of the support. The relationship between demographic characteristics of UNPOL officers and democratic policing is analyzed within the OLS model in the final part of this section.

Firstly, mean graphs were used to examine the distribution of demographic characteristics of UNPOL officers against the mean values of the dempercept variable. Secondly analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run in order to assess the statistical significance of these variations.

The first graph below displays the relationship of the personal characteristics of UNPOL officers against the dempercept variable. The Y axis of the graph shows the
scores of the *dempercept* variable and demographic variables are sorted on the X axis. The line which is parallel to the x axis at 1.4 point of the *dempercept* indicates the mean value of the *dempercept* variable. Hence the graph illustrates where each of the X axis variable is situated against the mean of the *dempercept* variable. Yet it should be noted that this graph does not control for the size of categories and takes the mean value only. When the chart is analyzed in terms of missions, UNMIL is the mission with the highest support on the DP scale and UNMIS is the lowest. MINUSTAH, UNOCI and UNMIS are below the mean; note though that UNMIS is at the 1.3 level which is very close to the mean, whereas UNMIL, UNMIT, MONUSCO, and UNMIK are above the mean of *dempercept*. Thus it can be concluded that the variation across missions in terms of democratic policing perception ranges between 1.3 and 1.6 points where the mean is 1.4. This result shows that the magnitude of the variation across missions is relatively small. When it comes to the relationship between the DP perceptions and the geographical origins of UNPOL officers, the range is even smaller except for officers coming from the Middle East. The distribution of regions across the mean of the DP scale ranges between 1.3 and 1.5 except for the Middle East region—with four observations only.
In order to identify the statistical significance of the above chart, an analysis of variance was run using the *dempercept* as the dependent variable and *mission* and *region* as categorical variables. Table 5.8 below displays the means of the *dempercept* variable across the categories of missions and regions. The statistical significance of the table will be tested through an ANOVA model.
Table 5.7 Cross-tabulations of missions by regions by the dempercept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>MINU</th>
<th>STAH</th>
<th>UNAM</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>UNMI</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>UNMI</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>UNO</th>
<th>CI</th>
<th>MONU</th>
<th>SCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.Americ a-</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.467</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.444</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8 The ANOVA table for mission and regions by dempercept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Partial SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>4.67912863</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.141791777</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.7122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission1</td>
<td>.714565217</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.102080745</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.7560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>2.0878257</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.347970951</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.0613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission1x region</td>
<td>3.58972055</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.170939074</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.4444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>32.4312839</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>.16803774</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The *dempercept* variable was computed by averaging 9 ordinal items measuring democratic policing. The *dempercept* variable was transformed by squaring because of the heteroscedasticity problem with the original variable. The factors are the missions and geographical regions from where the subject comes. An interaction variable between *mission* and *region* was also included in the model.

The model fails to reject the null hypothesis. The mean of the dempercept variable is equal to zero across the categories of mission and region factors (F = .84 and P = .71). Similarly when the factors and their interaction are analyzed separately, neither missions nor regions nor their interaction produced statistically significant variance of the dempercept variable across its categories.

A series of tests were run after the ANOVA analysis to test for heteroskedasticity, the distribution of errors, and the distribution of errors across fitted values. The distribution of the residuals was not normal. The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity failed to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance, yet the plot of residuals against fitted values showed that the tests results were mostly due to a few outliers and there was no significant problem for heteroscedasticity.

Considering the above results indicating that some of the assumptions of ANOVA were violated (i.e., categorical variables do not have equal number of sample sizes, or the
distribution of residuals was not normal) a non-parametric alternative test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, was also conducted with the same model. The Kruskal-Wallis test does not require normality and is an acceptable alternative to ANOVA. This test “uses only the ordinal information in the data, since its formula is based on ranking the observations and comparing mean ranks for the various groups. *It is particularly useful for small samples in which the effects of severe departures from normality may be influential* [italics added]” (Agresti & Finlay, 1999, p. 474). Thus, in addition to the ANOVA, a series of Kruskal-Wallis tests were run with dempercept, mission and region factors. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are congruent with those of ANOVA. That is, the mean values of the dempercept variable did not vary significantly different from zero both across missions and regions of UNPOL officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kruskal-Wallis Test</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi 2</td>
<td>36.566</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.6872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi2 with ties</td>
<td>37.738</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.5757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, this study found that at the individual level there is rather strong support for democratic policing and its components across UNPOL officers regardless of
missions and regions from where UNPOL officers come. It should be noted that these perceptions were not evaluated against any behavioral data about how the UNPOL officers actually carried out policing. As a matter of fact, the qualitative part of this study attempts to explore the situation in practice. The relationship between democratic policing and demographic and professional characteristics such as tenure, age gender, education, rank, and so forth is analyzed in “the democratic policing through organizational learning” model. The next section analyzes organizational learning and the factors contributing to it from the perspectives of UNPOL officers.

5. 3. UNPOL Officers’ Perception on Organizational Learning in UNPOL Missions

The nature and effectiveness of organizational learning was measured from different aspects in this study. These are satisfaction with access to information, organizational and environmental convenience for learning and change, personal tendencies in learning and change and perceived benefit of major organizational learning practices. In addition, three factors relating to organizational learning function -effective leadership, organizational commitment, and local factors-were also examined. Then, training and the proficiency of physical and technical factors were analyzed as control variables. These factors were analyzed separately following exploratory factor analyses. Finally, a linear regression model of organizational learning in UNPOL missions in post-conflict environments was built and analyzed to test the related hypotheses.
5.3.1. The Perception of Organizational Learning

Access to information and the benefit of OL methods were measured with 10-point scales where 1 indicates the minimum level of satisfaction/perceived benefit and 10 indicates the maximum. Personal and organizational aspects of OL were measured with the same 5-point Likert scale explained earlier. A principle component factor analysis was run to explore if these four aspects were distinct or if useful factors could be constructed from the data. The results are presented below.

Table 5.10 The test of Sphericity results for the OL scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factorizability of the Organizational Learning Scale</th>
<th>Test of sphericity</th>
<th>KMO Statistic</th>
<th>Cronebach’s alpha (standardized)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chi2</td>
<td>1071.1</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>.7335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tests for the factorizability of the 17 items showed that a factor analysis can be run using these items. A principle components factor analysis was run using the 17 items. The 17 items loaded into five different factors as shown below.

Table 5.11 Factor extraction for the OL scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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When the factor loadings after the varimax rotation were analyzed, access to information, perceived benefit of OL methods, personal commitment to OL and change and organizational aspects of OL perfectly loaded into the five different factors. The fifth
factor, on the other hand, was comprised of items that state negative statements about the ease of organizational change in UNPOL missions. Below, each of the items was analyzed separately according to the factors they load into.

5.3.2 UNPOL Officers’ Perceived Satisfaction with Access to Information

The satisfaction with access to information concept was measured through three items with a 10 point scale where 1 indicates that the subject is totally dissatisfied with access to the source of information and 10 indicates total satisfaction. Within this frame, access to the internet, TV, and libraries/books were assess by the UNPOL officers. The results are demonstrated below.

Table 5.13 The perceived satisfaction from access to information in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>accstointernet</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accstotv</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accstobooks</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In general, it is apparent from the box-cox graphics that UNPOL officers are satisfied with access to the internet. The satisfaction diminishes in terms of access to TV and access to libraries or books. When the access to information items are analyzed against missions through box plot graphics a general satisfaction is seen across all the missions in terms of access to the internet and a general dissatisfaction is valid in terms of access to books. Still MONUSCO and UNMIL are the missions with the lowest satisfaction densities on access to books. These results show that access to information is satisfactory in terms of access to the internet, not satisfactory in terms of access to books and moderately satisfactory as to access to TV across UNPOL missions.
5.3.3 UNPOL Officers’ Perception on the Benefit of the Major OL Techniques

A second factor was comprised of items asking UNPOL officers about the perceived benefit of the four types of activities. These four activities are supposed to measure the three major types of OL: communities of practice, problem-oriented learning, and appreciative inquiry. The scale ranges between 1 indicating that the method is totally useless and 10 indicating that the method is totally useful. The results presented below show that in general UNPOL officers find these OL methods useful.

Table 5.14 The perceived benefit of major OL methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v33 Anonymous surveys through which police officers can note problems and best practices regarding the work</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v34 Virtual (internet or intranet) or paper based platforms for police officers to inform problems and suggest solutions</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v35 Informal meetings with 8-10 officers to talk about their stories of best experiences they gain during the missions</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v36 Internet/intranet groups through which police officers can informally share their stories on the field with friends in other missions</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.4 UNPOL Officers’ Perception of Organizational Convenience for Learning

A third factor comprised of 5 items was the perceived organizational convenience for learning and change. When the distribution of each item is analyzed separately, 74% of UNPOL officers (28.6% strongly agree and 45.6% agree) think that their working environment facilitates learning; 73.1% believe that they gained new knowledge during the mission; 66.6% think (26.3 strongly agree) that their approach to policing was changed thanks to the new knowledge and experience they gained during the mission; 52.6% find their colleagues open to changes (11.7 strongly agree and 40.9 agree); and 52% disagree that the knowledge and experience they gained during the mission was wasted due to the inertia of UNPOL. Still, a total of 20.1% agree (7.1% strongly agree) and 20.8% are not decided on item 25 which states that the knowledge and experience the officer gained during the mission was wasted. In addition to that a total of 15.9% disagree (3.6% strongly disagree) and 22.4 are not decided about the statement that UNPOL officers are open to change. These findings show that UNPOL missions provide convenient environments for learning to such an extent that it alters a significant number of UNPOL officers’ approach to policing.

Table 5.15 Organizational Convenience for Learning in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V22- The working environment in the UN police mission provides</th>
<th>S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fourth factor was constructed with three items, each of which indicates organizational inconvenience for change. When these items were analyzed separately, a total of 50.6\% agree with the statement “it is very difficult to change the rules, procedures and codes of policing in UNPOL missions” (13.3 strongly agree) whereas only 14.3\% disagree. In a large bureaucracy such as the UN one cannot expect to easily change its organizational procedures. The other two items contain negative statements about the impact of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure of the UNPOL on learning. The findings of this study showed that only 21.8\% of respondents agree (3.2 strongly agree) with the statement whereas 57.1\% disagree (15.9\% strongly). Thus, at least at the officer level there is no significant unrest in terms of working with officers from different nationalities across UNPOL. Finally, a third item stated that there is conflict
between the HQ and the field in terms of implementing new ideas into practice—another oft-stated argument. The results show that the majority of respondents (37 %) are not decided on this item probably due to their lack of knowledge on the procedures of headquarters. Still, 27 % agree and 27.8 % disagree with this statement.

Table 5.16 Organizational inconvenience for change in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V26- It is very difficult to change the rules, procedures or codes of policing in the UN police missions</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V27- Working with police officers from different cultures during the mission makes it difficult to adapt in the working environment</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V29- There is conflict between the UN headquarters (New York) and fields in terms of implementing new ideas and applications in the police missions</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final factor was comprised of items measuring the personal tendencies of UNPOL officers about learning and change. Respondents emphasize their strong willingness to trying new ideas (81.5 %); their investigating the root causes of problems (85.1 %); and suggesting solutions to superiors (78.6 %).
Table 5.17 Personal commitment of UNPOL officers in learning and change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V30 I like trying new ideas at work</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V31 When I encounter a problem, I investigate and try to correct the</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>underlying causes of the problem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V32 When I encounter problems I always suggest solutions to my</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>superiors police missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, the findings demonstrated above show that UNPOL officers are individually eager about learning and change. In addition, in UNPOL missions the multinational working environment is not perceived to be an inhibitor for learning. Furthermore, UNPOL officers are predominantly pleased with access to the internet whereas they are not satisfied with access to books or TV. Finally, there is strong support for the application of major OL methods across UNPOL officers. Therefore, it can be argued that both the organizational and individualistic conditions are conducive for learning in UNPOL missions and that UNPOL can improve its level of organizational learning if it puts OL methods into practice.

The third factor with items measuring organizational convenience for learning was computed into a new variable, learn, by computing the average of the five items-v22 through v25 and v28. The learn variable ranges between -2 and 2 with the mean of .77, median of 1 and standard deviation of .82. The scale has an average inter-item correlation
of .50 and standardized Cronbach’s alpha score of .867. The distribution of the learn variable across missions are presented below.

![Figure 5.6 Organizational Convenience for Learning by missions](image)

The box-plot graphs illustrate that the distribution of the learn variable across missions is around the median value of 1 for all of the missions. It can therefore be argued that UNPOL missions present adequate opportunities for organizational learning.
In the following sections organizational factors facilitating OL in PCEs will be analyzed. Within this framework a model of OL in UNPOL missions will be built and tested.

5.4. UNPOL Officers’ Perception of Working Environment and Leadership

A second important component of OL in PCEs is effective leadership. 13 items, measured in 5-point Likert scales, were included in the survey to measure the perceptions of UNPOL officers on these issues. The table below shows that these items are suitable for factor analysis.

The results of the PCF analysis demonstrate that the 13 items loaded into 3 different factors. As expected, factor 1 was composed by the items measuring leadership; factor 2 was composed by the items related to the working environment and the final factor was formed by two negatively worded items on leadership.

Table 5.18 Percentage distribution for the working environment scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V69 I have had a comfortable and convenient working environment during the mission</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V70 The definitions of my duties are clear enough. So I know what I am supposed to do at work</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Four out of the 13 items loaded into factor 2. When these factors are analyzed separately, more than 50% of the respondents are pleased with their working environment on all of the four items. The most interesting response is that a total of 64.6% of respondents think that the definition of duties is clear enough. When it comes to the other end, 15.2% of respondents (1.6 strongly) find their working environments inconvenient and 17.9% are not decided on this topic. Given the above results, it can be argued that UNPOL officers are pleased with their working environment and operation of duties in general. The 9 remaining items of this section were related to leadership. As was seen above, the positively stated 7 items strongly loaded into the same factor and the 2 negatively worded items loaded into another.

| V71 | In general I am pleased with the operation of duties and tasks in the mission | 14.9 | 44.2 | 15.9 | 6.5 | 2.9 |
| V72 | My job in the mission gives me the opportunity to be creative in my work | 21.1 | 35.1 | 14.9 | 10.7 | 2.3 |

Table 5.19 Percentage distribution for the leadership scale

| V73 | My Superiors (police chiefs/commanders) are open to changes | 13.3 | 29.9 | 22.4 | 13.6 | 5.2 |
| V74 | My Superiors encourage the personnel to express their opinions without hesitation during the mission | 15.3 | 30.8 | 20.1 | 11.4 | 6.5 |
| V75 | My superiors encourage the personnel to use discretion when necessary | 11.4 | 32.5 | 21.4 | 12.3 | 5.5 |
| V76 | My superiors in the mission are open to developing informal relations with their staff | 10.1 | 32.8 | 24.4 | 12.3 | 3.9 |
The analysis of the leadership items reveals that for around 40 percent of the respondents perceive their leadership positively. From a different aspect, however, the strong support on organizational environment diminishes by around 10% when it comes to leadership. The strongest support (46.1% strongly agree and agree) is shown on the statement of My Superiors encourage the personnel to express their opinions without hesitation during the mission.

The analysis of the final two items—that loaded into the 3rd factor with negatively worded statements shows that the respondents are divided. Of the respondents, 37.9% believe that they have much more knowledge and experience than their supervisors and 48.2% think that the distribution of high-level posts is done based on political factors rather than merit.

Based on the above results, a composite variable was computed by averaging the scores of items 73 through 81. The coding of items 80 and 81 were reversed before the
computation. The new variable, named *Leadership*, ranges between -2 and 2 with the mean of .14, median of .22 and standard deviation of .81. The new scale has an inter-item correlation of .457 and standardized alpha score of .884.

5. 5. UNPOL Officers’ Perception of Local Factors

Local factors were also emphasized as very important in terms of both learning and DP in PCEs. This several different aspects of the phenomenon were measured using different scales. Within this frame, first, the respondents were asked which of a number of characteristics (religion, border, history, culture, language and race) they consider the most important to have in common with the local population and UNPOL officers. Second, they were asked which of the above characteristics they actually have in common with the local population of the mission they serve in. Thirdly, the respondents were asked about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements. Finally, the perceived friendliness of local police, citizens, media and politicians with the UNPOL officers was measured on a 10 point scale ranging between hostile and friendly. These categories will be analyzed separately below.

In terms of the first category, 39.5 % of respondents reported language, followed by culture (30.67 %) and religion (15.97) to be the most important factors to have in common with the local population.

Which of the below characteristics do you think is the most important to have in common with the local people of the country you work during the UN mission?
Table 5.20 The most important perceived common factor between UNPOL officers and local population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cum.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>15.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>23.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>27.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>29.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>39.50</td>
<td>69.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>30.67</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which of the below characteristics did you have in common with the local people of the country you work during the UN mission¹⁷?

![Shared characteristics between UNPOL officers and Local populations](image)

Figure 5.7 Shared Characteristics between UNPOL officers and local population

When it comes to the physically shared characteristics, religion, culture, language

¹⁷ The range of 0 to 140 on the Y axis refers to the number of respondents.

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and history respectively are the most common characteristics shared between the local populations and UNPOL officers. About 22% of respondents have no common characteristics with the local populations they serve in.

Ten items using two different types of scales measured the characteristics between the UNPOL officers and local population. A Principle Components Factor Analysis was run using these 10 items.

According to the PCF analysis, the 10 items loaded onto three different factors. The first factor (Eigen value 2.77, proportion .28) was comprised the four items measuring the perceived friendliness of local actors on a 10 point scale.

Table 5.21 Percentage distribution of local factors in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V92 Presence of common values (religion, language, ethnicity) between the UN police and local population is very important for effective policing in post-conflict countries</th>
<th>*S.A. (%)</th>
<th>A. (%)</th>
<th>N. (%)</th>
<th>D. (%)</th>
<th>S. D. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| V93 The UN uses the local media very effectively to gain the support of local people | 8.1       | 20.5  | 27.6  | 21.4  | 4.2      |
| V94 Local police in my mission cannot be trusted             | 6.8       | 20.1  | 20.5  | 28.3  | 6.5      |
| V95 Local politicians’ intervention in the police work hindered police from communicating with the local people | 8.8       | 28.6  | 26.3  | 12.7  | 4.2      |
The second group of six items measured the different aspects of the local atmosphere. It is important to note here that although these items loaded into two factors, the contextual analysis of items do not let us make inferences in terms determining a variable name. When these items were analyzed separately, a majority of the respondents (54.8 %) think that having common values with the local population is important for effective policing whereas 15 % disagrees with this statement. In terms of the relationship between the UN and local media, the respondents are divided into three groups: 28.6 % agree that the UN uses local media effectively to gain the support of local people whereas 25.6 % disagrees and 27.6 % is not decided. 26.9 % of the UNPOL officers responding think that the local police cannot be trusted and 15.6 think that local citizens cannot be trusted. Finally, 37.4 % think that local politicians have a negative impact on the operations of UNPOL and 39.6 % think that severity of conflict prevents UNPOL officers from developing positive relations with local citizens.

The final element in the analysis of local factors is the perceived level of friendliness of local citizens, police, media and politicians with UNPOL.

How would you identify the attitude of the following local groups on the UN police?
Table 5.22 The perceived friendliness of local actors in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Citizens</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Politicians</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Media</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents predominantly have positive perceptions in terms of the attitude of the four local actors. Still, local citizens are considered the most friendly group and local politicians are the least according to the mean scores.

Figure 5.8 The perceived friendliness of local actors in UNPOL missions by missions
The response rate is less on the items of local media and politicians probably because not every single UNPOL officer encounters local politicians or media members frequently during their services. When the distributions of local police and citizens are analyzed across missions it is apparent that local citizens are perceived as friendly across all missions. On the other hand, the perceptions of UNPOL officers about the local police vary across missions. There are relatively high perceptions of hostility of the local police in the UNAMID and UNOCI missions.

Finally, the friendliness scale was developed to be the representative variable for local factors. The new composite variable, *local*, ranges between 1 and 10 with the mean of 6.71, median of 7 and standard deviation of 2.2. The scale has an average inter-item correlation of .566 and standardized Cronbach’s alpha score of .84.

In addition to the factors that are considered to have an impact on OL, such factors as training, technical and physical conditions were included in the model as control variables. It is also important to learn about the perceptions of UNPOL officers on these issues. All of these items are measured on 10 point scales where 1 indicates total dissatisfaction and 10 indicates total satisfaction with the item. Also, the items presented below loaded into these three categories (training, physical conditions and technical conditions) following PCF analyses.
5.6. UNPOL Officers’ Perception of Training

Table 5.23 The perceived satisfaction from training in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inservice</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debrief</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hrights</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>localfct</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dempoltrn</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The satisfaction of UNPOL officers on five types of training—inservice training, debriefings, human rights training, training on local factors, and training on democratic policing—were measured in the training category. The results show that in general there is more than a moderate level of satisfaction on all of the categories. The relatively highest satisfaction is derived from human rights (6.95) training and the lowest satisfaction is from training on democratic policing (6.19). A composite variable was computed by averaging out these scores. The distribution of the train variable was mostly uniform across missions.

5.7. The Perceived Adequacy of Physical and Technical Factors
Table 5.24 Perceived satisfaction from physical conditions in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>salary</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buildings</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>housing</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialfcl</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The physical conditions category includes four items measuring the satisfaction of the subject with his/her salary, buildings (police stations, offices and the like), housing units in which they live when not on duty and social facilities. As demonstrated above, respondents are satisfied the most with their salaries (7.4) whereas the least satisfaction is with social facilities (5.79).

5. 8. The Perceived Adequacy of Technical Factors

The satisfaction of UNPOL officers with the technical conditions in mission environments was measured in terms of vehicles, computers, information systems, communications systems and technical personnel. In general, there is strong satisfaction with all of the technical facilities. The highest satisfaction is with communications systems (7.74) and the lowest satisfaction is with technical personnel (6.94).

Table 5.25 Perceived satisfaction from technical conditions in UNPOL missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vehicles</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>computers</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infosys</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Items measuring satisfaction with technical and physical conditions were computed into two new variables: technical, and physical that were computed by averaging out the items in each category.

5. 9. A Model of Perceived OL in UNPOL Missions

The findings of the survey showed that UNPOL officers have positive perceptions on their organizational learning, organizational commitment, effective leadership, working environment, local factors, training, technical and physical conditions. At this section, a model of perceived organizational learning in UNPOL missions was built and then analyzed.

The model tests the impact of local factors and leadership on organizational learning, controlling for satisfaction with training, technical and physical conditions, and the demographic characteristics of the subjects in UNPOL missions through an OLS regression analysis. The model of perceived OL in UNPOL missions was formed by organizational learning (learn) as the response variable; leadership and local factors as policy variables; training, physical and technical conditions as organizational control variables. Age, gender, rank, duration of deployment, education, and mission dummies were used as demographic control variables. Among those, learn, leadership, local, training, technical, and physical are composite variables each of which were computed
after a factor analysis. *Gender* and *mission* variables are dummy variables coded between 0 and 1, *age*, *rank*, *deployment* and *education* variables are ordinal.

Hutcheson & Sofroniou (2006) note that each complex statistical analysis should start with data screening. They enumerate certain procedures to follow for data screening. According to them, summary statistics are important in terms of identifying discrepancies with the data that might stem from coding errors. After the examination of summary statistics, a series of plots and tests should be run in order to check for linearity and normality and to detect outliers. Once violations of these assumptions are detected then appropriate transformations should be applied and the screening process should be repeated.

This approach was followed in this study. The preliminary screening of the data showed that all of the variables were in proper ranges; there were no extremely high or low standard deviation scores in the data. Yet an examination of the linearity between the dependent and independent variables showed that some relationships were not linear. A series of transformations were applied on the response variable and relevant independent variables. The first transformation was applied to the *Learn* variable by squaring the values of the *learn* variable. The current variable measuring organizational learning perceptions of UNPOL officers ranges between 1 and 25 with the mean value of 14.9 and standard deviation of 5.68. After the transformation of the response variable a new scatterplot matrix was created, according to this matrix, three of the independent
variables, *physical*, *local* and *training*, also required transformations. After these transformations were conducted, another scatterplot matrix was run using the transformed variables. The relationships were rendered much more linear through the transformations, however, the squared local variable and square rooted physical variables had several outliers and the logged training variable had a few outliers. Given the relatively small sample size of the dataset it was considered that even a few outliers would significantly affect the results. Therefore the few outliers on the *technical* (five observations) and logged *training* variable (nine observations) were taken out by recoding into missing values. Other variables were left without transformation since the transformations did not ameliorate the problem of non-linearity. After the transformations the regression equation is shaped as follows:

\[
\text{Learn}^2 = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Leadership} + \beta_2 \text{local} + \beta_3 \ln(\text{training}) + \beta_4 \text{physical} \\
\quad + \beta_5 \text{technical} + \beta_6 \text{rank} + \beta_7 \text{education} + \beta_8 \text{age} + \beta_9 \text{mdeployed} \\
\quad + \beta_{10} \text{gender} + \beta_{11-20}(\text{missions 1} - 9) + \varepsilon
\]

Variables included in the model are demonstrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learn(squared)</td>
<td>Perceived organizational convenience for learning and change</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Perceived</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>.137</td>
<td>.809</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.26 The summary statistics of the variables to be included in the OLS models
The OLS regression model of OL in UNPOL missions was run using the data gathered though the survey and the results are shown in table 5.47 below. When the OLS model is analyzed, the model as a whole accounts for .49 of the total variance in the squared learning variable. Also, the model is statistically significant (F= 9.98, P=0.000).
Table 5.27 Goodness of fit statistics for the organizational learning OLS model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>216</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>3296.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>173.52</td>
<td>F(19, 196)</td>
<td>9.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>3408.2</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>17.34</td>
<td>Prob &gt; F</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6705.11</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>31.18</td>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.4917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adj R-sqrd</td>
<td>0.4424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to the analysis of the coefficients, only one policy variable, leadership ($\beta = 2.827$; standardized $\beta = .41$) is positively and moderately correlated with learning. A one standard deviation increase in the effective leadership scale is associated with a .41 standard deviation increase in learning controlling for other variables. No significant relationship was found between the local and learn variables. With respect to the control variables, satisfaction with training ($\beta = 3.067$; standardized $\beta = .265$); technical conditions ($\beta = .4352$; standardized $\beta = .152$); and duration of deployment ($\beta = .433$ standardized; $\beta = .105$) are positively, but weakly associated with the learning scale. Finally, none of the demographic control variables or mission dummies (not shown in the table) was significantly associated with the learn variable in the model—probably due to the multi-national characteristic of the sample.
In addition to the OLS model (model-1), three\textsuperscript{18} additional models were also run using the same variables with different types of analyses. An OLS with robust errors (model-2) is appropriate for models with mild violations of the basic assumptions such as normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Regression with robust standard errors calculates the Huber-White sandwich statistic to standardize the errors. Coefficients are not affected by this analysis (Hamilton, 2006). Robust regression, (model-3), follows “an iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) procedure” to estimate robust regression statistics. The IRLS procedure starts with an OLS regression as the first iteration, then observations with large Cooks D values (Cooks D$\geq$1) are omitted from the model, then each case is assigned with a weight disproportional to the magnitude of its residual. Finally, several iterations of the weighted least squares procedure are run. Therefore, the procedure is meant to deal with outliers, non-normality and non-linearity. In robust regression both coefficients and standard errors might change in comparison to OLS (Hamilton, 2006). Median regression, (model-4), calculates the change in the median of the dependent variable -instead of the mean- given the changes in independent variables. This analysis is primarily used to reduce the impact of Y outliers on the model (Hamilton, 2006).

\textsuperscript{18} As a matter of fact ordered probit and ordered logit models were also built. In both models organizational commitment and leadership variable was positively associated with the learning variable but the results are not shown here.
Table 5.28 The results of regression models for the organizational learning model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model-1</th>
<th>Model-2 OLS with robust std errors</th>
<th>Model-3 Robust Regression</th>
<th>Model-4 Median Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Learn</td>
<td>Learn</td>
<td>Learn</td>
<td>Learn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>2.827*** [.41]</td>
<td>2.827***</td>
<td>3.165***</td>
<td>3.408***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.448)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logtrain</td>
<td>3.067*** [.265]</td>
<td>3.067***</td>
<td>3.161***</td>
<td>2.838***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.832)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.856)</td>
<td>(0.735)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>physical</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical</td>
<td>0.435** [.152]</td>
<td>0.435**</td>
<td>0.375*</td>
<td>0.570***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rank5</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>-0.0985</td>
<td>-0.0985</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mdeployed</td>
<td>0.433* [.106]</td>
<td>0.433**</td>
<td>0.380*</td>
<td>0.318*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>1.955</td>
<td>2.197*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.471)</td>
<td>(1.547)</td>
<td>(1.514)</td>
<td>(1.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educ3</td>
<td>-0.0109</td>
<td>-0.0109</td>
<td>-0.0898</td>
<td>-0.0274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.403)</td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.923</td>
<td>3.923</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.875)</td>
<td>(3.025)</td>
<td>(2.958)</td>
<td>(2.417)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = P < .10  ** = P < .05  ***= P < .001
-Standard coefficients in brackets
As illustrated above, neither statistical significances nor the direction of leadership, training, technical and mdeployed variables differ significantly across the models.

The model of perceived OL in UNPOL missions can be summed up as follows: leadership is the strongest predictor of the quality of OL in UNPOL missions. In addition to that satisfactory training and adequate technical conditions are important to a lesser degree for the convenience of organizational learning in UNPOL missions. Finally, the duration of deployment is positively, yet weakly associated with the degree of perceived organizational learning.

Given these results only one of the hypotheses were supported by the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Supported/ Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: UNPOL officers will have a higher level of perceived OL as they believe that they are managed through effective leadership.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: UNPOL officers will have a higher level of perceived OL as they develop closer relationships with local actors.</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.9.1. Post-Regression Diagnostics

As was mentioned before, an OLS model has certain assumptions that should be tested before and after the model is run. Post-regression diagnostics involve tests for heteroscedasticity, omitted variable test, analyses based on distributions of residuals and fitted values and test for multicolinearity (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2006). These tests were run for the OLS model (model-1). Because the coefficients and standard errors of the models do not vary significantly across different types of models that control for the violation of the major assumptions of OLS models, it can be assumed that no significant problems will emerge, especially in terms of normality, heteroscedasticity and linearity of the model. When the related tests were run, the results were parallel to these expectations. The post-regression diagnostic tests and graphs are presented below.

First, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity failed to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance (\(\text{chi} = 1.23, P=.2676\)). The second test is the omitted variable test. The omitted variable test, uses the powers of fitted values of the dependent variable to test the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables. When the test was run the null hypothesis failed to be rejected (\(F=.13, P=.93\)). With respect to the diagnostic plots, first two new variables were generated out of the regression residuals and fitted values. Second, the histogram of the residuals is analyzed and the distribution of residuals was found to be roughly normal. Then, the leverage versus squared residual plot, which is used to detect observations that have extreme impacts on the model, also showed no indication of concern. The only problematic plot
seemed to be the distribution of residuals versus fitted values. This plot assumes the constant distribution of residuals. Yet some observations may be spoiling the constant variance of errors versus fitted values. Nevertheless, given the results of the robust regression and the test of heteroscedasticity, it is felt that the results were not significantly affected from these observations. The graphical presentations of these tests are presented below.

Figure 5.9 The leverage vs. squared normalized residuals plot
Figure 5.10 The fitted values vs. residuals plot

Figure 5.11 The distribution of residuals for the organizational learning model
Finally, the model was checked for multicollinearity which occurs when high levels of correlation between two or more independent variables exist in a multiple regression model. When checking for multicollinearity the first step is generally to create a correlation matrix of the explanatory variables to be used in the model. Although there is not a scientifically proven threshold, correlations equal to or greater than .8 is generally accepted to be an indication of strong multicollinearity. Nevertheless, pairwise correlation matrix generally cannot detect situations in which multiple independent variables jointly account for the variation in another independent variable. In order to detect this problem $R^2$, tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics are calculated (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2006). $R^2$ refers to “the squared multiple correlation coefficient between a given independent variable, $X_i$, and other explanatory variables”; tolerance statistic of an independent variable $X_i$ is $1 - R^2_i$; and VIF statistic is $1 / \text{tolerance}$. Thus, VIF values equal to or greater than 5 or tolerance values equal to or less than .2 indicate strong multicollinearity (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 2006, p. 83).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>VIF</th>
<th>1/VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>m7</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>0.235718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m3</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>0.290698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m5</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.322252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m9</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.389155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m8</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.433921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m6</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.435809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m4</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>0.445184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The abovementioned threshold values were not violated in the OL model. Therefore the explanatory variables included in the OL model did not yield to multicollinearity at the problematic levels given the results below. The 10 variables with the largest VIF and tolerance scores were presented above. Next, a final OLS model will be built in order to predict the association between organizational learning and democratic policing.

5.10. A model of Perceived Democratic Policing through Organizational Learning

The primary thesis put forward in this study is that democratic policing and organization learning are theoretically and empirically related. The final statistical model is an attempt to test whether this exists in reality. It was assumed in this study that democratic policing principles can be put into practice much more easily and effectively in an organization with an environment where learning takes place. The summary statistics of the variables included in the perceived democratic policing model were presented below.
Table 5.30 Variables to be included in the democratic policing OLS model*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dem3</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2.173139</td>
<td>1.084874</td>
<td>0.012346</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learn</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>0.771603</td>
<td>0.82333</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

*Note that the variables that were included in the model of OL were not shown again

The OLS model was formed with the dempercept as the dependent variable and learn and local as the policy variables. The same organizational and demographic control variables that had been used in the previous model were used in this model as well. It should be noted here that although leadership was emphasized as an important element for DP in UNPOL missions (O’Neil, 2005; Bayley, 2006) this variable was not included in the model due to the strong correlation between the learn and leadership variables found in the previous model. Also, given the high correlation between the age and tenure variables only the age variable was included in the OL model. The tenure variable was included in the model since the relationship between the tenure and democratic policing are controversial (Karatay, 2009). The data screening process showed that the dependent
variable, *dempercept*, required transformation into the squared form. A new variable called *Dempercept2* was created by squaring the *dempercept* variable. After this transformation was completed another graph matrix of the variables was run. The explanatory variables either did not require transformation or transformations did not correct their problems.

The formula of the OLS model for democratic policing is as follows:

\[
Dempercept^2 = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{learn} + \beta_2 \text{local} + \beta_3 \text{training} + \beta_4 \text{physical} + \beta_5 \text{technical}
\]
\[
+ \beta_6 \text{rank} + \beta_7 \text{education} + \beta_8 \text{ytenure} + \beta_{21-27}(\text{regions 1 - 6}) + \epsilon
\]

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Multiple statistical models were run for the perceived democratic policing model. The OLS model accounts for .20 of the variance in the squared dempercept variable and the model is statistically significant (F= 1.82; P=.013). When it comes to the coefficients, the model shows that perceived organizational learning is positively associated with perceived democratic policing. The level of correlation is low though. That is, a one standard deviation increase in the OL scale is associated with a .184 standard deviation increase in the democratic policing scale controlling for other variables. When it comes to the control variables, tenure has significant explanatory power on democratic policing. That is a one standard deviation increase in the tenure scale is associated with a .188 standard deviation increase in the perceived democratic policing scale controlling for other variables. In terms of gender, males are .24 more likely to have higher scores on the squared perceived DP scale in comparison to females. In terms of missions, the MONUSCO mission was dropped from the analysis for comparison. According to the results, only the UNMHIH and UNOCI missions have significant coefficients in comparison to the MONUSCO. Both missions have lower DP scores in comparison to MONUSCO. Finally, in terms of the geographical regions of the UNPOL officers, the Turkey category was dropped from the analysis for comparison. At this domain, only Africa and the Middle East regions have significant coefficients in comparison to Turkey. Both of these regions scored lower on the DP scale in comparison to Turkey.

In conclusion, this study found that perceived organizational learning has a
consistent and small effect on perceived democratic policing. In addition to that as the
tenure of officers’ becomes longer they are more inclined to accept democratic policing
principles. Also, as found in the ANOVA analyses, neither missions nor regional
backgrounds of UNPOL officers demonstrated significant variation with respect to views
toward democratic policing.
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<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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</table>

* = P < .10 **= p < .05 ***= P < .001

Standard coefficients in brackets
Based on the above results only one of the hypotheses was supported by the data

<table>
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<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Supported/ Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>H3: UNPOL officers will have higher commitment to the principles of DP as they have higher levels of perceived OL in UNPOL missions.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4: UNPOL officers will have higher commitment to the principles of DP as they develop closer relationships with local actors.</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
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</table>

The same post-regression diagnostics were applied to the model of perceived democratic policing as well. According to these analyses, the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity failed to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance (Chi2= 1.07, P= .30). However the residuals versus fitted values plot showed that the distribution is not constant due to the outliers. Secondly, the omitted variable test (Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of the dependent variable) failed to reject the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables (F= .59, P= .62). Thirdly, the distribution of residuals was not perfectly normal and the leverage versus squared residuals plot showed more problematic cases in comparison to the previous model of OL. Finally, multicollinearity was not found to be a problem in the model (mean VIF= 2.06 and the largest VIF= 4.7). The post-regression diagnostics show that
the results of the DP model should be approached cautiously. The plots are demonstrated below.

![Distribution of residuals for the democratic policing model](image)

Figure 5.12 The distribution of residuals for the democratic policing model
Figure 5.13 The Residuals vs. fitted values plot for the DP model

Figure 5.14 The leverage vs. squared residuals plot for the DP model
Chapter 6  Qualitative Data Analyses

The previous chapter presented the findings of the survey on UNPOL officers regarding their perceptions on democratic policing and organizational learning. This chapter presents qualitative evidence on the same issues in order to explain the findings of the previous chapter and to form an in-depth understanding of these phenomena at the organizational level$^{19}$.

The presentation of the findings extracted from the qualitative data analyses starts from the environmental factors which affect the entire UNPOL system. Then training, organizational learning and democratic policing categories are analyzed respectively. Qualitative findings are analyzed in relation to the quantitative findings presented in chapter five. Within this framework the explanation of the empirical link between the perceived OL and DP found in the previous chapter is presented at the end of this chapter. The elaboration between the qualitative and quantitative findings in comparison to the literature will be done in the next chapter.

While the qualitative findings are presented, first the findings are noted by citing

$^{19}$ In this study, two types of symbols were used while presenting quotations from the interviews. Statements in brackets and italics, //, indicate the probes or questions of the author during the interview. Phrases in normal brackets,[]], were used to complete simple gaps made by the respondent in his/her reply.
all of the subjects who made similar statements in parenthesis followed by $S\#$ for subject number. The subject numbers are those demonstrated in the first column of table 4.1. Then the presentation of these findings was bolstered with actual data by presenting direct quotations. This method of presenting qualitative findings is called telling and showing and described by Biddle and Locke (2007).

6.1 The Working Environment of UNPOL Missions

The working environment of UNPOL missions contains elements that are out of UNPOL officers’ control yet directly affect their performance. The working environment category consists of the motivational factors and local conditions sub-categories. Identifying the major components of UNPOL’s working environment can help us understand the organizational and environmental factors which affect training, democratic policing and organizational learning activities of UNPOL.

The motivational factors sub-category was formed by elements which positively and negatively affect the job performance of UNPOL officers. These factors were identified through a set of open-ended items directed in the survey of UNPOL officers; and a different set of items applied to UNPOL officials during the interviews. Based on these instruments, a set of motivation enhancing and diminishing factors were identified and examined below.

Local Conditions, on the other hand, were identified as a set of local factors that affect UNPOL’s operations. As it can be expected, local factors came out as large scale
problems that have deep roots in the history, culture and traditions of post-conflict countries. The major elements identified within the domain of local conditions were the military-oriented mindsets of local people and authorities, power relations, and lack of legal infrastructure. In addition to these, several other factors were also identified and addressed below.

6.1.1. Motivational Factors

Motivational factors came out in two categories as motivation enhancers and diminishers. Survey subjects were asked to note three factors that enhance and three factors that diminish their motivations in UNPOL missions. Based on the findings of the survey, the interviewees were then asked to comment on the findings of these survey items.

Motivation Enhancing Factors in UNPOL Missions

Based on the analysis of the 177 open ended responses, the primary set of factors that enhance the motivation of UNPOL officers were identified as humanitarianism, (helping out those in need and working for peace) (33 %); cultural diversity (21 %); gaining international experience (12 %); good working conditions (11 %); money (10 %); promotion (6 %) and other factors such as adventure or vacation hours (7 %). When interviewees were asked to comment about these findings, they unanimously agreed with these findings.
Motivation Diminishing Factors in UNPOL Missions

When it comes to the motivation diminishing factors, bad working and living conditions including such issues as stress, problems with superiors, bureaucracy, lack of authority (40%); discrimination and nepotism in terms of the distribution of posts within UNPOL (18%); nonchalance of some colleagues (13.5%) and other issues such as homesickness and short duration of service were underlined by UNPOL officers in the survey.

Discrimination and Nepotism

Among the motivation diminishing factors enumerated above, discrimination and nepotism came out as the major theme of the other open-ended section which was placed at the very end of the survey to collect additional comments and thoughts of respondents on any relevant area. The following excerpt written by a survey respondent is a comprehensive example of discrimination claims:

The police officers from strongest countries… were having highest posts although their merit was not adequate. There was real discrimination against those whose countries were not strong enough in the world politics…Besides, because of their countries' political power, they could not have been blamed for their lack of knowledge, experience and leadership.

Although the interviewees unanimously acknowledged the motivation enhancers as mentioned above, they mostly objected to the claims of discrimination and nepotism (S# 1-2-3-5-6-8-11-12-13-14). They argued that these allegations were due to jealousy or prejudice. Another counter-argument raised by the high level officials was the “national
balance policy” of the UN. The national balance policy is applied across all of the UN’s departments to prevent the occupation of posts in any single unit by compatriots of a single nation (S# 1-2-3-5-11-13-14). It was also stressed that all high level posts were advertised to everyone and each capable officer had a fair chance of getting appointed to a certain post. The following are a few excerpts from these arguments by UNPOL officials.

The police commissioner of UNMIS (S-13) noted that:

… As all posts are being advertised and filled as per the laid down ‘Directives’ and being followed fully, except in cases when vacancies are to be filled depending on skills of a particular individual. Apart from this, gender balance is also being maintained. To ensure the welfare of the personnel postings are done in buddy pairs selected by the contingent commanders. Further, all the Contingent Commanders are being copied the same so that they can also inform their contingent members...

Another respondent from the HQ (S-5) mentioned the following statement with regard to the national balance policy

… Missions try to have equal representation in the mission and that at times conflicts with the skills that you have…for example people [the leadership] will not put the officer of the same country on the same two positions. For example if the police commissioner is from one country the deputy commissioner will not be from the same country … [because] it is possible that they both [can] be incapable. So it is more to do with the equal representation that the UN tries to keep up within the system also.

Given these, it can be argued that some UNPOL officers feel somehow discriminated in terms of the distribution of posts in UNPOL. Yet, the UN set clear
mechanisms that provide a fair chance of competition for vacant positions, and prevent
the domination of any single department by citizens of any single nation.

**Nonchalant UNPOL Officers as a Motivation Diminishing Factor**

The second motivation diminishing factor came out of the survey was nonchalant
UNPOL officers. Interviewees accepted the presence of such officers in UNPOL
missions, yet it was not viewed to be at an alarming level. It was repeatedly mentioned
that officers who do not pay much attention to work can be found in any organization and
that UNPOL was not an exception (S# 1-2-3-6-8-14). Another argument was that the
work load of the post the officer occupies might affect his or her job performance. The
following statement by the UNMIL deputy police commissioner (S-14) is an illustrative
example of the issue.

> Unfortunately there are some people who come to UN missions with the sole
objective …to be in a very relax position or situation and at the end of the month
they collect the MSA [salary] and put it in their pocket. They do not care how
much input they gave to the system and how much effort they put into building
the capacity of the national counterparts who made us to be here. That is a reality
in the mission. The way also the UN operates is that you cannot just resume those
people away but efforts are also being undertaken within the mission to make sure
every possibility we have we remind people the purpose why we are here…

A mission manager (S-3) states that the position of the officer might play an
important role in his/her job performance:

> It varies from position to position. For example, if you work at the operations,
there will be a lot of work but if you go to another unit the level of work will be
less. So it depends on the peer, post and position where you work in terms of the
work people do.
In conclusion, the international working environment, helping people in need in PCEs and good working conditions were found as the top motivational factors in UNPOL missions. On the other hand, if we put aside the generic issues of stress, bad living conditions and the like, discrimination and the existence of colleagues who do not pay much attention to work emerged as the major motivation diminishing factors. Although the motivation enhancers were acknowledged by UNPOL officials, especially the discrimination issue was strictly rejected. The existence of nonchalant officers was accepted but as a prevalent and alarming problem of UNPOL. These findings shed some light on the organizational environment in which UNPOL officers work and live. The other component of UNPOL’s working environment is local factors and conditions which is presented below.

6.1.2. Local Conditions

Local conditions account for a different set of factors affecting UNPOL’s operations. As it can be expected local factors mostly inhibit the operation of UNPOL duties in PCEs. Local conditions in mission environments emerged as vicious problems that are entrenched in the traditions, history and culture of host countries. It was frequently mentioned by interviewees that coping with the host country-related problems exceeded the scope and limits of UNPOL because these problems need long-term strategies and large amounts of budget. UNPOL, however, has a narrow scope and short-term focus because it deals with peace-keeping rather than peace-building (S# 1-2-3-4-6-
Therefore, the strategy UNPOL follows is to develop capacity of the local police as much as possible and pass the responsibility of dealing with the local challenges to peace-building units such as the DPA.

Within this category, local traditions and mindsets of local actors (citizens and state officials) were pointed by far as the biggest problem to be solved. Power relationships within post-conflict countries were also identified as an important factor affecting UNPOL’s operations. In addition to these, well known problems of PCEs such as corruption and accountability problems in the host country governments, instability at political and legal systems, and finally poor physical and legal infrastructure were mentioned as the local factors that form the working environment of UNPOL (S# 1-2-3-4-6-7-8-11-12-14).

The Mindset of Local Actors with Respect to the Police

The most important problem within the local conditions domain emerged as the negative perception of the police in the eyes of local actors in PCEs. It is important to note here that local actors involve both citizens and statesmen. In such environments the image of uniform is traditionally associated with the military—which is associated with force and power. It was often emphasized by interviewees that having been exposed to civil war or other types of conflict, people in post-conflict environments seek refuge in “more powerful” actors which is the military (S# 1-2-4-6-8-14). As far as the role and responsibilities of UNPOL in these environments are concerned, UNPOL has to
introduce and prepare the local police as “the” security actor in the post-conflict era and it is rather intuitive to see how difficult a duty this is. Since the internal security system has been occupied either by the military or militarized type of police in most post-conflict countries, it is an ordeal for UNPOL to substitute the civil police as the provider of internal security and the representative of the state authority for the military (S# 1-2-4-6-7-8-14). The challenge for UNPOL, thus, is mentioned to be building up a positive image for the police and have the public understand and appreciate the importance of the police for them.

The following statement from the legal adviser (S-6) elaborates on several aspects of this challenge.

The main challenge in PCEs is mentality… You are in countries that were occupied. Or in countries where there was a confusion about what is a police officer [and] what is a military personnel; in countries where police officers swap uniforms; in countries where there are militias that are being demobilized, trained and reintegrated into regular security services with their own mindsets. So the first challenge is [to build up] the proper mindset in countries where you have minister of interior who were former military officers. So getting them to understand that police work is [conducted] first and foremost with civilian members. It is something that is very very far fetched. It is not something that they really get across. [Is there any difference between the countries where the situation is worse in terms of more inclination to the military?] From my experience… in all countries the inclination to the military is obvious… because I have been in most of PCEs and regardless of the cultural [and] historical background [or] regardless of the size of the country the inclination is toward the military, [or] the military type of police. The one common denominator is the fact that most countries, by responsive police, they interpret the responsive in terms of force and not by responsive police in terms of service…
Power Relations

Another important local factor affecting UNPOL in PCEs is the entrenched power relations in host countries. First of all, in PCCs the political instability reshapes regional power relations and creates several regional power figures or war lords. It is then a challenge for UNPOL to fulfill its operations without getting into conflict with these power figures (S# 1-2-3-4-6-8-11-12-14). A mission manager (S-2) gives a striking example from Liberia regarding the impact of regional power figures on UNPOL’s operations (italics added):

Usually when the UN comes up to the post-conflict countries, the country has its own heritage the habits... history, [and] traditions. For example, talking about Liberia, there is some kind of a conflict between democratic legislation and traditional legislation. In some cases, those war-lords exist in Africa. Sometimes the police officers they know that there is a murder somewhere in a remote village, they refuse to go saying that look there is a war-lord and if I show up there then he will just damn me and my family will die and so on... This is what I heard when I was in Liberia with some visits... So you can imagine how difficult it is to break this mentality, to make this reform and restructuring and show them the democratic way at least to build up some democratic model of policing. Probably this bends some structures which will be extremely difficult because these are positions, salaries you know and so on.

Secondly, the reform-restructuring activities of the UN mostly threaten the vested interests of certain powerful actors in post-conflict countries and those who feel disadvantaged do their best to obstruct the UN’s activities. In this domain, bureaucrats and statespersons whose vested interests are threatened by the UN were stressed to be the primary sources of challenge (S#1-2-3-4-8). Another mission manager (S-4) describes
this challenge as follows:

I mean, definitely policing issue is a power issue in any society. Security, you talk about policing [it is all about] power, balance of power, balance of authorities. So when you try to shake [their power or] balance of authorities by involving the democratic principles: the representativeness, accountability, proper rule of law; you are shaking somebody's authority; you are challenging somebody's dominance as the UN. Because those people [were] very powerful; they have been able to play the games according to their terms. These people will be a challenge [to the UN]… Why do not people [local authorities in PCEs] want to implement accountability measures? Because, they have been able to pocket all the money that they get from the national resources…So these are very fundamental challenges.

In summary, an array of problems which are common in PCEs such as corruption, the lack of physical and legal infrastructure and the like were also identified within the local conditions domain, but these will not be elaborated further. Local conditions create rooted problems that entail long-term efforts and large amounts of budget to be dealt with. It is obvious that the “peace-keeping” department in which UNPOL operates does not have the capacity to cope with such ‘fundamental challenges’. Identifying these factors is crucial before getting into the exploration and evaluation of UNPOL’s performance in terms of training, DP and OL.

6.2. Training

Training is one of the primary functions of UNPOL since the beginning of the UN’s police missions. In the survey, items on training were limited to the training of UNPOL officers. The issue was examined from two perspectives at this part of the study: the training given to UNPOL officers by the UN, and the training given by UNPOL
officers to host country police officers. The training category contains four sub-themes: the training of UNPOL officers, the training of local police officers, doctrinal issues in training, and challenges of training.

6.2.1. The Training of UNPOL Officers

The types of training given to UNPOL officers are: pre-deployment training, induction training, and in service training. These training sessions are not given to enhance the knowledge or skills of UNPOL officers on policing issues because it is assumed that if an officer is hired by UNPOL this means he or she already meets the job criteria of UNPOL. Pre-deployment and induction training courses are given as an orientation to the local environment and working conditions and rules and procedures of UNPOL.

Pre-deployment Training

Pre-deployment training, by definition, is supposed to be given by police contributing countries to incipient UNPOL officers before seconding them to a particular mission. The UN’s role in pre-deployment training is currently limited to developing curriculum and course materials for the use of police contributing countries. The primary function of pre-deployment training is to mentally prepare the incipient UNPOL officers for the conditions of the post-conflict environment they will be deployed in; to communicate the rules, regulations and procedures of the UN and UNPOL with them; and to form a common understanding of the basic concepts such as human rights, gender
issues, sexual harassment, democratic policing and the like. By so doing, pre-deployment training aims to alleviate the differences stemming from the cultural, ethnic or geographical backgrounds of UNPOL officers (S# 1-2-3-6-8).

It was frequently emphasized by the UN officials that the peace keeping best practices section in the headquarters developed 7 to 10 standardized tools containing the materials for pre-deployment training which can be accessed online by PCCs. In addition, it was reported that the UN established regional training centers in such countries as Ghana, Germany, Canada and Sweden to train international peace-keeping forces. Nevertheless, the majority of police contributing countries do not give pre-deployment training to the officers whom they will second to an UNPOL mission. Moreover, the UN cannot force the police contributing countries to give this training. The deputy police adviser (S-1) summarizes the state of pre-deployment training as follows:

Pre-deployment training is the responsibility of the home government… The UN's role is [to] develop the pre-deployment training curriculum and send it to the host country. It is up to the host country whether to implement it or not. And we cannot impose on it. We have taken the opportunity at every occasion to push the governments to do it. But the results show only 35% of them [apply the pre-deployment training].

**Induction Training**

The second type of training given to UNPOL officers is induction training which is given by UNPOL as soon as newcomer UNPOL officers are deployed in the mission area. Induction training is given for 7 to 10 days and it aims to help UNPOL officers
adapt to the local conditions as well as UNPOL’s mandate, SOP and other procedures. When it comes to the effectiveness of induction training, it is important to note that induction training and pre-deployment training are not designed to enhance the job skills of UNPOL officers because (on paper) the UN hires officers who are supposed to have high job skills. Thus, neither pre-deployment nor induction training are meant for capacity building or enhancing for UNPOL officers. They rather aim 1- to prepare UNPOL officers for the local conditions, 2- to establish a common understanding of the basic concepts of UN policing, and 3- to teach the mandate and other official procedures of the UN and UNPOL to the officers (S# 1-2-3-4-8-9-11-12-14). Deputy police commissioner of the UNMIL mission (S-14) stated about induction training that:

Once you are at the mission you undergo a training called “induction training” for one week or two weeks. During the induction training the mission concepts of operations, mission mandate implementation is spelled out to everybody. Delivery [in terms of induction training] … are also [made] at least to have a common understanding of how to monitor, mentor and advise our local counterparts. I will not say we have 100 % achieved to have commonality but things have really improved over time...

6.2.2. Training Given by UNPOL Officers to Local Police Officers

Training the host country police officers has been one of the primary roles of UNPOL in almost every single mission since the beginning of the second-generation UNPOL missions. The interviews revealed that the training of the local police is conducted at different levels ranging from police chiefs to line officers. The training curriculum of each mission is developed after the detection of the lacking areas of local
police organizations. According to the needs of the local police organization, a large array of training—such as traffic management, crowd management, criminal investigation, crime scene investigation, community policing, gender training, and human rights training—are given by UNPOL officers to their local counterparts. UNPOL also orchestrates the training in national police academies of host countries and in some missions considerable capacity building was achieved (S# 1-3-5-6-8-9-11-12-14). The deputy police commander from UNMIL (S-14) mentioned, for example, that they transferred the entire range of operations of training in the Liberia Police Academy to the Liberian police.

Regarding the training of host country police forces by UNPOL, a senior training manager at UNMIT (S-9) stated that:

For local police: Training focuses on basic policing (police ethics and discipline, human rights, legal provisions, disciplinary regulations/procedures, patrol procedures, crime scene management, etc.); specialized (GBV Investigation Course, Traffic Management, Crowd Control, Close Security Protection, etc); advanced leadership and management courses; and in-service training (refresher courses). Training follows the guidelines set by the DPKO (e.g., certification courses), results of technical assessments, and organizational needs and priorities. While evaluations are done right after each course, impact evaluations are done in terms of how the security sector/law enforcement side is performing (e.g., community perception survey, technical assessments, etc.) and how the goals and objectives of the mission are met.

6.2.3. Challenges in the Training Activities of UNPOL

Five types of challenges emerged related to the training activities of UNPOL: the language barrier, the lack of a common doctrine for training courses, the mentality of the
host country governments and police services, low quality of local police officers, and low quality UNPOL officers. Since most of these challenges were examined in different parts of this chapter only the language barrier and the lack of doctrine problems are examined in detail at this section.

**The Language Barrier**

The language barrier refers to the problem whereby the UNPOL officer as the trainer cannot communicate with the trainees in their language. The language problem emerged as one of the biggest challenges UNPOL faces in terms of training. In order to overcome this challenge, UNPOL do their best to hire officers who can directly communicate in the local language of the country of deployment. Language assistants and translators are also hired by UNPOL to bridge the communication gap between the trainers and the trainees when necessary (S# 3-6-8-11-12). A couple of examples from UNAMID and UNMIT missions can better explain the situation with respect to the language barrier.

First of all, the mission manager responsible for the UNMIT mission at the headquarters (S-3) emphasized the importance of having officers with local language skills and the UN’s efforts in terms of hiring such officers as follows:

The first issue is language. I mean, if you want to have a good training you must know the language also. So the issue is to find those officers who are good officers in terms of their [policing] skills and who also can speak the language. Because this gives an added advantage if you compare to the officers who have skills but not language and request for an interpreter. And it becomes a
problem… In often cases the host countries are the ones who say that “we need somebody who can communicate well with us”. So it is one of the primary considerations to finding the best officers with language skills.

When it comes to the field, a senior training officer at UNAMID (S-12) stated that interpreters might be beneficial when direct communication with the local counterparts is impossible.

Training locals is somehow a problem due to the language barrier… I wish we were able to communicate with them directly, but it is not easy for us to understand them and them to understand us and we have to rely on the language assistants. The problem is real but at least we are getting somewhere.

The Lack of Doctrine

Another sub-theme emerged as a challenge related to training is the lack of doctrine. This problem is primarily related to the training of UNPOL officers. UNPOL officers have to meet certain criteria of UNPOL to be hired. As a consequence of this, UNPOL officers are considered to have proper policing skills and do not need to get further training. It was stressed by UNPOL officials though that when the cultural diversity in UNPOL missions and the overall level of democracy and democratic policing in PCCs are concerned, it is obvious that UNPOL needs to develop a master strategy to standardize the training process and minimize the negative impacts of cultural diversity among UNPOL officers (S# 1-2-3-4-6). It was also mentioned, however, that UNPOL is aware of the problem and trying to create solutions. A mission manager (S-3) spelled out the problem in practice as follows:
1- …we are still yet to go to that level to have our own guidelines for police department. What the police do is, when they have to do local training regimes they do prepare training regimes on the basis of the needs of the local country. But sometimes there is definitely a [void] since we do not have standardized modules, standardized things. Each of the officers that comes from various countries they try to bring their own flavor into it and try to implement it on our context. So there is definitely a need for harmonization and bringing some standardization.

The reactions of the police division regarding this problem were mentioned by another mission manager (S-2) as follows:

The Police Division tries to unify those methods of policing and we are already working on certain strategies and policies. It is an ongoing process in order to propose some unique models and methods of UN policing in the field… OK this is what we do from our side and we realize that.

Other challenges in training are the well-known problems related to the quality of UNPOL officers, receptivity of the local counterparts to the training and the mentality of the local governments especially in the post-training period. Although the issue was already examined earlier in section 6.1.2, the following striking example given by the deputy police adviser (S-1) illustrates the lack of commitment by host governments in PCEs in terms of training:

… people are trained by the UN police but at the end of the day we do not know what happens [to them]. Example, they finish the training and they are not doing the police work, or they are not paid or they are not given the uniform. I remember in one of our missions, 60,000 or 45,000 police personnel were trained in Congo and we still do not have the record of what happened to those Congolese police.

In conclusion, the findings presented above are related to the mechanical and
logistical aspects of the training activities conducted by UNPOL. These findings reveal that UNPOL’s training efforts are affected by the working conditions in UNPOL missions such as personnel quality, logistical support and local conditions. Yet the functional value of training was emphasized in response to the questions on democratic policing and organizational learning. That is, training was mentioned to be the major instrument through which UNPOL conveys the message of democratic policing. Training was also mentioned to be the practical platforms of organizational learning activities.

6.3. Organizational Learning in UNPOL Missions

The findings presented in the previous chapter with respect to OL showed that UNPOL officers believe that they gain considerable new knowledge and experience in missions, effective leadership and longer duration of service are facilitators of learning in missions and a convenient learning environment in missions is associated with augmented obedience in the principles of DP. In this chapter, OL in UNPOL missions was examined from an organizational standpoint to explain the findings of the quantitative strand and explore the strategies and activities of UNPOL, the DPKO or the UN at the organizational level.

In general, interviewees admitted that UNPOL officers gain considerable amounts of new knowledge and experience thanks to the multi-national environment of the missions and the “international” type of policing which is rather different from the type of policing they conduct in their home countries (S# 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-12-14). As to
the collection and refinement of this accumulation of knowledge, several different tools are used by the DPKO and UNPOL. Some of these tools are, end of assignment reports, end of mission reports, and after action reviews. It should be noted, though, that most of these are general tools the DPKO uses within the entire peace-keeping system (only partially on UNPOL). Other methods of OL, such as communities of practice and appreciative inquiry are not used by UNPOL. However, the potential utilities of these methods are commonly admitted by UNPOL officials.

Although there is an increasing interest in the knowledge management and organizational learning issues in the DPKO, the Lessons Learned and Best Practices Unit is mentioned by the knowledge management officer at the headquarters (S-7) to be understaffed and suffering from the lack of understanding in the value of the job they are dealing with. In addition to budgetary and personnel problems, the short duration of service was pointed as an important obstacle for developing institutional memory in UNPOL missions. In order to take care of OL activities, UNPOL implements peace-keeping best practices officers in each UNPOL with permanent posts.

Finally, the international working environment of UNPOL missions and effective leadership emerged as the primary elements of OL in UNPOL missions.

The general application of OL activities in the DPKO was elaborated by the knowledge management coordinator (S-7) below. Note that these strategies and applications subsume all areas of peace keeping operations in which UNPOL is only one
The whole purpose here in best practices is what we call institution strengthening cycle. Thereby, the lessons that emerged from the field should be turned into some form of guidance where applicable, which could be turned in some form of training which can permeate back into the field, they evaluate it and then you have a self-perpetuating cycle. So in this particular case, a clear example, we had a mission whereby following after action reviews we detected challenges— I would use the word areas of improvement—which could be turned into strengthening institutional learning. [Based on] the results of this after action review, the so-called areas of improvement were refined and turned into the guidance [and] led to a change [in the existing] guidance regarding the particular area of improvement [and] then sent back to all missions. So what we have here is a learning tool knowledge management tool leading to the extraction of the issues, leading to its institutional validation, leading to its training and application. …So we use our learning tools which are leading to this institution cycle and then we also have best practices officers in the field who act as cultivators of learning environment… Human resources we use the institutional framework, and also evaluation that looks and assesses from how the whole process is working. Of course there will be states, the ideal state is where every area gasps, knowledge gaps would be addressed but you know this is a never ending game because one experience leads a new lesson learned a new lesson learned lead, should be some outcome you know, some replication. So we work on the principle that extracts lessons [and] knowledge especially the ones that can be replicated directly to help the institutional learning process you know.

The training manager of the UNMIT mission (S-8) summarized the application of these strategies in UNPOL missions as follows:

Honestly not so much best practices [with respect to UNPOL]. I do not want to put it officially but the best practices are structured more on collecting knowledge in civilian area of UN missions, [not policing or military?] not coming through policing. …There is not enough integration of police officers coming here with UN mission, there is not enough support from civilian side. But there are good examples of this developing, but it is not a rule. Integration of civilian side with police officers with UNPOL is expected and needed.

The organizational learning category contains the themes of feedback
mechanisms, the international environment in missions, institutional memory, peace-
bUILDING best practices, appreciative inquiry, communities of practice and challenges in
OL.

6.3.1. Feedback Mechanisms

Feedback mechanisms within the UNPOL structure were identified as a set of
formal mechanisms and informal practices through which problems or best practices are
collected and conveyed to the leadership. These tools are surveys of practice, end of
assignment reports, lessons-learned best practices reports, and town hall meetings with
UNPOL officers, and walk-in hours of the police commissioner. When problems are
detected, the police division generally holds ad-hoc working groups to intervene in the
situation. The role of mission leadership is crucial in terms of the set up and operation of
feedback mechanisms in missions (S# 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14).

Surveys of Practice

The generic tools of surveys or suggestion boxes are not systematically used in
UNPOL missions. Still, the knowledge management department of the DPKO conducts
‘surveys of practice’ on each UN official on ground. The knowledge management official
from the DPKO (S-7) stated that:

… We use [surveys of practice] quite effectively in civil affairs. Whereby we are
working to know how different missions carry that certain practice which could
then inform the organization to come up with an institutional policy. So we use
the survey of practice which is a snapshot how different missions take that
activity and convert it into institutional know-how. [Are you conducting these
surveys on police as well?] This is for every peace keeper which is civilian, military or police. To us, every peace keeper is a knowledge asset every person who is in the mission or in HQ is learning.

Some of these tools are systematic, such as end of assignment reports and after action reviews. End of assignment reports are written by senior staff and professional post holders when they finish their terms in the mission. In the knowledge management officer’s (S-7) words:

... End of assignment reports focus on senior mission staff, but also staff who is being there for a long time ... The whole idea is to get the experiences, good practices, lessons they picked up during their experience there, and then use that to see if it can be replicated [in order to] build up institutional know-how. In some cases these lessons can lead into policies and guidance, in other aspects, they transfer it to other missions. There are cases whereby practice in one mission is replicated in several other missions and there has been substantive support areas [that] led to improvement efficiency and refinement ... A police commissioner in one mission who worked out how to engage local authorities, how to build capacity [can be] used by another police commissioner to build upon.

**End of Assignment Reports and Lessons-Learned Best Practices Reports**

End of assignment reports are written by the senior level officers. Field officers, on the other hand, are also supposed to leave end of mission reports. Yet, it was stated that generally this cannot be put into practice given the high volume of personnel circulation and difficulties in terms of the analysis of the reports by the police division due to understaff. Lessons-learned best practices reports were also mentioned to be important common tools for the detection of problems and best practices and the improvement of the weak areas.
Town Hall Meetings and Walk-In Hours

Apart from these standard mechanisms, each mission might form certain procedures for the communication of problems in practice. In the UNMIS mission, for example, the police commissioner (S-13) noted that

Town Hall meetings are held on every Saturday and all UNPOL available at the MHQ and in transit attend the same, here all information is shared and problems if any are aired and possible solutions are worked out. Regular Conferences between the UNPOL leadership and all Team Sites/Sectors are held and all updates are taken.

Another important feedback mechanism that emerged as a theme is the open door policy (walk-in hours) of police commissioners. This practice was mentioned to be applied in many missions. The deputy police commissioner of the UNMIL mission (S-14) outlined this mechanism as follows:

… we have the "open door policy" where individuals are allowed to office walk-in, see the commissioner and [speak of] their issues. And people in this position [can] also come along with any suggestions that seem to be [logical] and beneficent to summon recommendation. Particularly, on every given Thursday, under the direction of the police commissioner, we have open meetings sometimes one hour or two hours ... there are all the people in leadership action and it is also expected in these meetings to assist the senior leadership to be aware of the issues that need some focus and attention.

Other mechanisms that were also mentioned for problem detection are seminars, meetings and small programs based on the needs of missions (S# 1-2-3-6).
Problem Detection and Intervention by the Headquarters

At the headquarters level, problems are detected primarily through performance indicators, analysis of daily reports from missions, and field visits by mission managers. The intervention strategies of the police division consist of ad-hoc workshops or small meetings with the related actors(S# 1-2-3-4-6-7-8-14). A comprehensive example was given by a mission manager of UNMIL (S-2) as to the conduct of problem detection and intervention by the police division:

For example I am dealing with Liberia primarily. So in Liberia one or one and a half year ago, one of the main problems was high rate of armed robberies ... we identified the problem with the help of the mission; we saw the reports, and it was [making] an [negative] impact on the performance of the local police in that country. And of course having that big number means that even the UN police is not efficiently assisting the local police. So one of the measures which we took: for example, we sent a team of experts which assisted the local police to develop [a] 5-year strategic plan. Combating armed robberies or any other crimes was one of the segments of that plan. So these actions enabled them to develop series of projects, ask the donors’ assistance, and start implementing that. I am not going to [give] the details, but for example compared to the last year, armed robberies decreased by 56 %, you can imagine, so it is notable.

As noted above, the most frequently used method of intervention by the police division is ad-hoc working groups that comprise of members from the police division (HQ), UNPOL mission (field) and host country authorities and other relevant organizations.

Leadership

Leadership emerged as the most powerful element in terms of the constitution and
the utilization of feedback mechanisms on the ground. There was strong consensus among UNPOL officials on the importance of the attitude of mission leadership in terms of the formation of procedures for the facilitation of problem detection (S# 1-2-3-4-6-7-8-10-13-14). This finding concurs with the finding of the model of organizational learning in UNPOL where effective leadership was found to be the strongest predictor of learning in UNPOL missions. With respect to the importance of leadership a training manager from UNMIL (S-10) noted that:

There is strong emphasis here on strong leadership, responsibility and accountability. And that way … we try to foster dialogue in line a lot with the UN core values. We want to see people in leadership positions working closely with the [personnel] including feedback with monitoring performance through also giving guidance. So it should be at every level all the way up. So we try to facilitate the situation where people in leadership position take that responsibility seriously.

6.3.2. International Working Environment as a Facilitator of Learning in Missions

As presented in the previous chapter of this study, the majority of UNPOL officers (73.1%) indicated that they have gained new knowledge and experience during their service in the mission. As a matter of fact, this finding is not surprising when the culturally diverse working environment and the type of policing in UNPOL missions are concerned. The working environment in UNPOL missions is quite different from that of UNPOL officers’ home countries and it is normal to learn a lot in such an environment. The most notable facilitator of gaining experience and learning in UNPOL missions was
repeatedly pointed to be the international working environment of UNPOL missions. The multi-cultural environment of UNPOL has three consequences in terms of learning. First, the international working environment in UNPOL missions provides UNPOL officers with different methods and approaches in the practicing of policing activities (S# 1-2-3-4-6-8-9-12-13-14). Second, such an environment also leads local police to learn from these different sources of policing. The training manager of UNMIT (S-8), for example, noted that:

They learn [different] cultures, different behaviors and views, different social structures. So it is always good for police officers to see how the world is different. [They] see that different people have human feelings social needs, [and different] policing context [which might broaden their narrow worldview]. [They make] discussions about how certain procedures are conducted] in their countries. This is something which police officers who are coming for the mission do. They are coming back to their units [home country units] with much richer experience and knowledge.

Finally, this system creates an opportunity for UNPOL officers coming from developing countries, where several principles of democracy are violated, to convey the accumulation of their mission experiences with appropriate types of policing to their home countries. Thus, UNPOL missions have the potential to carry the message of democratic policing to both post-conflict countries and the police contributing countries, where democratic policing is far from being applied.

The deputy police commissioner of UNMIL (S-14), for example, stated that:

…They [UNPOL officers who go back to their home countries upon the
completion of their service] already transfer a lot of good examples from other colleagues that they have been working with. [For] example [in] Liberia you will have police from 40 nations, and they are learning from [each other]. They are sharing information and they take [their gain of knowledge] back. Especially for those developing countries, we see a lot of investment by those people serving in the mission on its own. So, I am not complaining that we are getting people from developing countries. It is two-way they contribute, as well as they gain, when they return home. So that is very very important for us now what are we getting out of those people …

This finding, which concurs with the finding of the survey, is contrary to what has been put forward by the literature regarding the international environment of UNPOL missions and will be examined comprehensively in the next chapter of this study.

6.3.3. Institutional Memory

Another theme that emerged in terms of organizational learning is institutional memory. As a matter of fact UNPOL officials generally perceive of the term ‘organizational learning’ as institutional memory (S# 1-2-3-4-8-14). Thus what is repeatedly emphasized in this theme was the duration of service and professionalization. Since the short duration of service, which is one year, yields to loss of institutional memory, professionalization of the UNPOL staff was suggested as the strategy to keep institutional memory in UNPOL missions.

The senior training manager of UNMIT for example (S-8) stated in terms of institutional memory that:

The problem of missions is lack of institutional memory because police officers are coming and leaving; then you are starting from the beginning. So that is why
the role of professional staff is to build institutional memory, to keep experience and achievements of former police officers … And that is the idea that…people staying longer than 1 year. [It should be] at least 2 years and optimally 3 years. It could be done by [either] sending police officers for longer missions or sending professionals. I don’t know which of these solutions will work.

A set of actors and tools are also used for building up institutional memory. The most prominent actor is best practices officers as mentioned earlier in this section. BPOs are dispatched in each mission to collect the lessons learned and best practices, detect most replicable ones and propose changes in organizational guidance. Best practices officers normally work under the Peace-keeping Best Practices Unit, yet UNPOL also plans to hire such officers for each mission (S# 1-2-7-8-11-13). Another mechanism used to build up institutional memory is the filing system (S# 2-3-14); and another one is the early deployment of successors at the leadership posts. The incoming commanders at both the HQ and field missions are deployed to their posts one month earlier so that they work with their predecessor and share knowledge and experience during this period (S-2).

6.3.4. Communities of Practices and Appreciative Inquiry in UNPOL

Communities of Practice in UNPOL

The interviews revealed that although CoP exist within certain units of the DPKO, such as the Rule of Law or Security Sector Reform units, the Police Division currently does not have a CoP. It is important to note, though, that the utility of CoP is commonly admitted (S# 1-2-3-4-5-6-8-11). With regard to the inexistence of CoP in UNPOL,
different ideas were mentioned. While some officials mentioned that police officers are not so eager to get involved in CoP because they “like to keep things secret”; some stated that UNPOL lacks the strategic framework to establish and maintain a CoP. A mission manager (S-3), who is a member of the Rule of Law CoP in the DPKO, for example, stated that:

It [CoP for UNPOL] should be; but I do not [think so]… Every mission is more focused in its mission [work routine] and they are not linked together in a bigger framework at a strategic level. Even in strategic policy development, we are still at the phase of developing doctrine. So it has not progressed to that level that there is a CoP established for the [police] missions. I am subscribed to that [the CoP for rule of law] but I have no time to respond (Laughing). But I am reading...

Finally some officials viewed CoP to be at the strategic level and difficult to put in practice. The short duration of service, high rate of personnel circulation and routine workload in UNPOL missions were also mentioned as factors that would complicate the application of CoP in UNPOL (S# 3-6-8). The following statement from the senior training officer in UNMIT (S-8), who is a member of the CoP for SSR, summarizes these arguments:

I think, so far, nothing so much about [CoP for] policing. This community is very good but sometimes they are discussing the issues from too high level, abstract level. They are not coming to practice; they are discussing from institution development, state level, from the level of very political. So some more exchange on practical level on practical experience would be needed. [Can you say it would be good for police also?] You know, for police it is difficult because police are coming here for [a short duration of time]. So they [might] not always have a view, time and practice to be involved. Some police officers in districts have even less time, but you know if you have 1,000 police officers you will find some of them who will be involved.
Appreciative Inquiry and UNPOL Missions

The situation in terms of the application of AI in UNPOL missions is similar to that of CoP. AI is acknowledged as a valuable tool which is yet to be applied in UN police missions. The primary reasons for not using AI are arguably the lack of knowledge and interest in the issue among the police leadership, and routine work load in mission areas (S# 1-3-7-8-9). AI is a specific concept and we cannot expect UNPOL officials to know much about it. One training manager from UNMIT (S-9), for example, stated that:

I also come from Academia, but the realities in the field are totally different to allow for academic exercise, such as AI. For example, it’s phased-paced, too many deadlines, very heterogeneous groups in terms of level of education. It can be done, all right, but I would welcome other UN units or departments in charge of organizational learning matters to do that. AI, however, is introduced as a concept in our leadership and management course as a form of motivational tool.

Although the application of AI by UNPOL is very limited, best practices officers, conduct some studies based on ‘after action reviews’ which are congruent with the underlying principles of both action research and AI. An example was given by the knowledge management coordinator (S-7):

…I will give an example: there was an exercise to do, since you are interested in the police, in which community police in South Sudan started up community policing. …So the police decided to do after action review. They basically looked at the whole process of establishing this community based policing programs to look at what worked, why it worked, what lessons were learned, what the challenges were, how they could be overcome, and what could be done to improve. They held this exercise and… it involved the national police, members of civil society …You have that group not a formative way depending on how you make it complimentary to each other. And one comment from someone
triggers another comment from someone [else]. … So what we always say when we do after action review [is that] it helps you not only to bring the clues together, but it also enables you to capture ‘in the moment’. Sometimes getting the tacit [knowledge] is not the easiest. Sometimes when we do after action reviews it is easiest [while] the project is [being] done because it allows people to “capture in the moment”.

In conclusion, neither CoP nor AI is used by UNPOL. It is also interesting to find that CoP, which is used for creating knowledge out of practical experience, is viewed as ‘abstract’ and ‘non-practical’ even by members of CoP in other units of the DPKO. As it was admitted by most UNPOL officials cited above, this is a deficiency for UNPOL because it could considerably enhance its operational capabilities by applying these learning tools in such an experience-rich environment. Finally, it is impossible to see if police officers really “like to keep things secretly” without giving them the opportunity to communicate in such platforms as CoP.

6.3.5. Challenges in Organizational Learning

Since learning is a natural and continuous process, the capture, distillation and codification of what was learned entails constant efforts as well as sufficient personnel and resources. The major challenges in terms of OL in UNPOL missions are the short duration of service which is associated with the loss of institutional memory, the shortage of trained specialists who will pick up and analyze the accumulation of best practices, the lack of interest in and undervaluation of the organizational learning activities by the leadership (S# 1-2-4-6-7-10).

All of the challenges mentioned above were summarized by the knowledge
management coordinator (S-7) as follows:

Well I think the biggest challenge in knowledge management is the fact of demonstrating its value and getting that link between the individual [learning] to organizational [learning]. It is very difficult for OL to take place; there has to be conscious effort…So I think the biggest challenge for us is the never ending process. People are constantly learning and learning has no ceiling… So the constant challenge for us is that learning is an evolving process; it never stops. The challenge is to ensure that you are picking up those experiences from that police officer who has been around for 30 years and has learned so much and once he is gone, it is very difficult to replicate that. That is the challenge; getting the tacit knowledge out in the complete form and getting it used…So … I think there are 16 or 17 best practices officers or focal point plus 4 at headquarters. So you can see, 4 staff! So for 115,000 personnel [the entire population of peace keeping and building personnel working with the UN], you only have less than 25 [total number of knowledge management and best practices officers]. Now tell me, you can do the math, is that sufficient? [No]. So you can see …how do you capture experiences of 115,000 people with only less than 25 personnel? And it is a constant challenge because resources are finite yet in order to capture the in-moment experiences you can only do that if you are able to [extend] your [efforts to] everyone…

In conclusion, the quantitative findings regarding OL were supported by the qualitative data. That is, the importance of leadership and longer duration of service, as well as training, was emphasized as important factors of organizational learning in missions. In addition, the international working environment was found to be a natural platform for learning. In the organizational domain, it was found that OL is not given substantive value in the UN police missions. This is mostly due to the excessive load of routine work in the missions, the short duration of service and the scarce number of personnel dealing with the codification of best practices and lessons learned. Nevertheless, UNPOL is aware of this deficiency and takes certain steps by hiring professional best practicing officers for each mission. Finally, the association between
OL and DP, was detected in the previous chapter of this study, will be examined in the following section.

6.4 Democratic Policing in UNPOL Missions

In this study, the application of DP in UNPOL missions was examined at both individual and organizational levels. At the individual level UNPOL officers demonstrated strong support in the principles of DP regardless of their personal, professional or national characteristics, however, the strong commitment of UNPOL officers does not necessarily mean that the DP principles are implemented in UN police missions. This part of the study attempts to present new insights on the same topic from an organizational perspective.

At this part of the study, first, the general perception of DP by high level UNPOL officials is presented. Secondly the practices of UNPOL regarding DP are analyzed. Community oriented policing and colocation emerged as major themes under this category. Then, policy discussions with respect to the future of UNPOL are analyzed. Within this context, the primary issues under debate for the improvement of UNPOL operations are the professionalization of UNPOL, increasing the number of female officers in UNPOL missions and developing a role for UNPOL as early peace-builders. Finally, the challenges inhibiting UNPOL’s operations were identified and examined. These challenges emerged as structural problems, such as budget and personnel shortage, lack of a common doctrine; human resources problems, and diversity.
The only concrete example of the application of DP was found in UNMIS that developed an index of democratic policing (DPI) to evaluate the performance of the host police organization in terms of DP on a 100 point scale.

6.4.1. The General Perception of DP by UNPOL Officials

Although appreciating its underlying philosophy and admitting its value, UNPOL officials mostly view DP as an abstract and theoretical concept (S# 1-2-3-4-5-6-8-11-14). According to them, peace-keeping operations need practical strategies whereas DP principles require long-term reform and restructuring efforts—which is a concern of peace-building rather than peace keeping. In other words, the short-term focus of “peace-keeping” activities does not allow for the application of long term policies such as democratic policing on the full range. The concept of democratic policing, hence, is considered by UNPOL officials to be more suitable within the context of peace-building which starts upon the accomplishment of the peace-keeping phase. Thus, it can be argued that DP principles should be translated into more concrete and practical applications that can be physically conducted by police officers on the field in order for these principles to be embedded in the peace-keeping context.

The following statements elaborate on the finding presented above. The legal adviser’s (S-6) views are as follows:

When you take a UN police mission or a UN police component in a mission, it is a little bit like boxes in different colors and each color refers to your homeland police culture. But we are re-united into one mission where we have to advise, and we are seen as role models to national police institutions. And sometimes,
national police are inexistent. They are shattered, they are dismantled or they are simply embryonic and the only theory that keeps us together are all those DP standards. Those stand outs, you know, responsive and representative police, accountable police institutions, etc. And even though they make a lot of sense on paper, there is always a gap in implementation… DP should be the target it should not be the starting point. The starting point should be translating those DP standards into very concrete objectives and the ultimate target should be having those DP standards. But this is a rational [long-term] approach. ... in peace-keeping we are trying to find pragmatic and immediate solutions that would set the promises for something that would be more sustainable in the longer term. And that is where you get into the peace-building and different mental issues.

The training manager of the UNMIT (S-8) gives an example that embraces the above arguments:

…In the Timor-Leste situation, there is the building of a police organization from scratch almost. Because it was first started in 2000, and the implementation of the organizational culture, realistically, it is two generations [ahead] to have a police. And you know, chiefs, politicians [they] all expect to have fast results. Fast results to have a fully professional police who know how to do the job, who have organizational culture, who know when there is a meeting, they should come to meeting on time, come to the office, …[who] plan their activities, [who] plan systematically their job; that is very difficult here…

6.4.2. The Application of DP in UNPOL Missions

It was argued earlier in this study that the implementation of DP principles by the UN in post-conflict environments is crucial for the restoration of the entire state system because the police are the most salient representatives of the state authority in the eyes of citizens. Within this context, as the primary organization to design the post-conflict security system, the strategies and practices developed by the UN can play an important role in the future of police organizations in post-conflict environments.
The only actual application in terms of DP has been encountered by UNMIS through the democratic policing index (DPI) to evaluate the performance of the Southern Sudan Police Service on a 100-point scale. With regard to the DPI the police commissioner of UNMIS (S-13) noted that:

The UNPOL Reform and Restructuring Strategic Analysis Cell has been evaluating the professional capability of Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) since September 2007 through a benchmarking system developed by the Unit. The evaluation instrument (Democratic Policing Index) evaluates SSPS performance on a scale of 1-100 on core parameters associated with democratic policing. The performance status of the SSPS based on the ten core professional parameters as of 31 December 2009 registered at 29.43 (previous report 19.78) based on crafted DPI model.

In terms of the practice of DP in UNPOL missions, the most salient themes are community policing activities, training and colocation. In addition to that, local ownership and protection of civilians were also mentioned- to a lesser extent- in relation to the application of DP.

**Community-Oriented Policing in UNPOL Missions**

In the UNPOL domain, DP is perceived to be rather abstract and theoretical whereas community oriented policing (COP) is thought as the practical form of DP. That is, when the subjects were asked about DP, the examples given with respect to the practice on ground generally involved COP activities (S# 1-6-8-11-12-13-14). A theoretical implication can be made from this finding that democratic policing is not perceived as an actual type of “policing” by law enforcement officials. It is instead
accepted as a theoretical framework or evaluation criteria of a “police organization” rather than a police officer. In other words, a police officer can say “I am doing community policing” when he or she goes to schools and talks about the importance of informing crimes, for example; but he or she cannot say “I am doing democratic policing” because the DP principles have yet to be broken into solid activities. A police organization, however, can be accepted to be applying DP when it puts the principles of DP in practice at the organizational level. This then can be examined through such indexes as the DPI used by UNMIS. In the following statement, for example, the subject, a training manager at UNMIT (S-8), views DP as the theoretical base of COP:

…so first thing is just order on the streets…So police must be trained to know how to do that, they should know what human rights is, what human dignity is; they must know what DP is. And after we implement the base for DP, we could start to think about COP; we must go step by step.

The application of COP by UNPOL, in cooperation with the local police, paves the way for the improvement of police community relations and brings local citizens and local police closer to each other in PCEs. In addition, COP activities clench the legitimacy of UNPOL in the eyes of both the local police and local citizens. The following statement illustrates concrete examples of COP applications from UNAMID (S-12):

In fact, we have a lot of programs with these people [Darfur citizens]. Right now we are conducting training programs with COP volunteers in various cities… So we have individuals, we have NGOs who support us. They give them something, at least for them to see that [we] are really here for them. Right now we have that
program. In fact, on Sunday, I am leaving to one of the districts to monitor this training. And sometimes we have football matches with them. Sometimes we do a lot of competitions so that they can come closer to us. And [so that we can pass our] messages to them [the local community]... I am really happy to say that the things are changing. The police, now, they are able to understand that we are there for them. Even the locals [local citizens], they know that we are there for them.

Similarly, the UNMIS police coordinator (S-13) notes that considerable improvements were seen in police-community relations in Sudan thanks to the implementation of UNPOL’s COP project. In UNMIS police coordinator’s words:

… In Community Policing SPS Community Policing programs for improving Police- Community relations have registered an improvement, from the previous report of 36.36% to 48.48% during the period under review. The increase could be attributed to the approval by the IGP and Minister of Interior of the Community Policing Model for Southern Sudan submitted by UNPOL. This has resulted in the improvement of community policing practices of SSPS to 57.58% from the previously reported 30.30%.

**Co-location**

Another important practice conducted by UNPOL is co-location which refers to the side by side working of UNPOL officers with their local counterparts in the practice of all sorts of policing duties. Co-location is repeatedly mentioned to be very important facilitators for identifying the problematic areas of local police organizations, developing rapport with local police officers and passing the UN’s message to them (S# 6-8-11-14). The following statement from UNMIL’s deputy police commander (S-14) emphasizes the importance of co-location.

I think my view is that the most effective way is by co-location; that is a process
where we are coming closer with our local counterparts. I mean, if it requires being in the same office with them; and when they go out, also, for crime scene investigation patrols, we are in the same vehicle with them. And to institutional assessment of the local police, co-location has been seen to be very effective. We now have a very good understanding of where they are standing. And without this, the reform and restructuring idea that we have in mind is impossible because you can only rectify or improve a situation when you have a good understanding of what the issues are.

6.4.3. Future Issues

Strategic issues and long term policies that are currently under construction in UNPOL are the professionalization of UNPOL, developing the capacity of UNPOL as an “early peace-builder” and increasing the female representation in both UNPOL and local police forces.

Professionalization

An important finding of this study is that both the different nature and the growing complexity of UNPOL duties necessitate UNPOL staff who are specialized and more knowledgeable in specific areas of UNPOL operations. It was frequently mentioned that, in contemporary peace-keeping missions, even police officers with high conventional policing skills would not be beneficiary in a PCE unless they are equipped with the specific type of knowledge and expertise needed in the mission environment (S# 1-2-3-4-5-8-14). The different nature of UNPOL policing and the importance of recruiting the right types of officers were underscored by a mission manager at the HQ (S-4) as follows:

…but one thing we have to really understand… is [that] peace-keeping is not
[like] policing in your home country. Peace-keeping is completely a different ball game… Furthermore [now], we are more focused on capacity building and reform restructuring. Most of us, I mean, in my country I hardly dealt with reform restructuring [as a police officer in Nepal]…Most countries do not have reform restructuring-focused police officers. And most of the police officers want to go to streets and run after criminals. That is more challenging and more, you know, exciting than sitting down and thinking. So most of the police officers who come to the missions [are carrying the same] psychology and mindset...

Similar ideas were put forward from the field as well. The deputy police commissioner of UNMIL (S-14), for example, emphasized the need for experts due to the changing nature of UNPOL missions as follows:

Liberia mission has come to a level where we need people with certain skills and expertise. We are in capacity building and institutional development mission … [In] this mission, where the mandate implementation as capacity building and institution development particularly is concerned, we are looking for people who have knowledge [and] understanding on specialized areas. In other missions, perhaps, people just go there and [are] deployed automatically; but in Liberia how successful [a police officer] you [are at home] does not matter. We interview people before we [hire] them [lest] we have the wrong type of people we have here. Notwithstanding, I am not saying that everything is all good. I wish we had more specialized and skilled people than we have now…

Professionalization is suggested as the “way forward” in the new era of UNPOL operations. Given the statements of UNPOL officials, professionalization can be understood as both professionalizing the entire organization and increasing the number of professionals while reducing the number of normal officers. What is being aimed by the professionalization of UNPOL is to hire more qualified personnel, to keep institutional memory of the organization, and as a corollary, to perform more effective peace-keeping.
In addition to these, a very important promise of professionalization is related to the institution development for local police organizations which currently cannot be achieved by UNPOL, due to the short-term focus of peace-keeping operations. By hiring professionals, however, UNPOL will be able to accelerate the capacity-building processes and move to the institution development phase more quickly (S-1). The emphasis on the “new era” and the necessity for specialists are especially important in the sense that these specialists can be civilians rather than police officers. In this framework, it can be argued that in the near future, UNPOL might hire more civilian experts and fewer police officers (S# 1-6-8-14). Certain steps have been taken so far; for example, in UNMIT 19 professional posts were created as of 2010 but overall, it is far from reaching a sufficient volume. The biggest obstacle before the professionalization was mentioned to be budget limitations. The following statement form the legal adviser (S-6) draws the framework of the professionalization issue.

… now it is turning into a trend we are now thinking about the professionalization of the [UN] police. Not having the seconded police officers like for one year and then some country say no we do not want to give extension for that and they just take them away from the mission… Sooner or later we will have to decrease the number of police officers in the field, because these are big expenses...

UNPOL as Early Peace-Builders

As mentioned above, the future policy discussions mostly take place around the role of UNPOL as early peace-builders. Nevertheless, this issue is under discussion within UNPOL’s policy-making circles and has yet to be moved to the next level. The following
excerpt from the deputy police adviser (S-1) elaborates on the issue:

[When] we are deployed [to a mission area] as the UN police… [we have to think about] how much peace building we can do in the first instance of the peace keeping. And member states are very much concerned about it. What they say is "yes definitely you should play a role [in peace building]". But [as] the military and the police we focus on peace-keeping … Anyway, right now there is an understanding that definitely there is a role that the peace-keepers can play in the early phases of the peace building where they call it “early peace building”. And later on, once the situation is stabilized it can be further handed over to the DPA or … to the UNDP or … to a country team… or you name it.

The Gender Policy of UNPOL

A second important future policy area related to DP emerged as the gender policy of UNPOL. UNPOL plans to increase the number of female officers up to 20% of UNPOL in the short term; and to 50% in the long-run for a set of reasons. First women and children account for most of the victims in PCEs and female officers can better take care of them (S# 1-2). Second, by hiring more female officers, UNPOL aims to set a role model for host countries. Third, UNPOL also aims to restore the reputation of the “uniform” because citizens have been mostly subjected to violations by uniformed men and this negative image can be wiped out by hiring more uniformed women. Finally, UNPOL wants to fulfill the democratic policing principle that entails equal representation of genders in police forces (S# 2). The UNPOL police adviser, for example, stated in a press conference that:

The aim is to have member states raising the numbers of female officers serving in peace-keeping operations from today's 8% to 20% in five years. We
encourage member states to establish a policy that sets their contribution of female police officers at a minimum at the same percentage of female officers in their national police…The long term goal is of course to have 50-50. It is crucial to have female police officers in the PK work and the reason being, very often when we have violations in the local populations it is women and children who are the victims. And very often these crimes are carried out by men in uniform. Building the trust and get the women to speak and reach out of the local society needs other women in uniform who can build this trust and confidence in the population.

Another HQ official (S-2) made some additional points regarding the gender policy of UNPOL as follows:

… we encourage the local authorities to recruit more women. We change the mentality in their societies very often. You know, in post-conflict countries of Africa you can imagine, this is a matter of culture. Then seeing really that this is effective, this is efficient, this will really make an essential push to reach that goal as well. And of course, like following the democratic principles of policing and again equality in terms of both female and male representation this is also one of our priorities...

6.4.4. Challenges in the Implementation of DP by UNPOL

Although democratic policing is assigned in the mandates of some missions, there is always a gap between what is supposed to happen in theory and what happens in practice, and this cliché summarizes the practice of DP in the UNPOL missions. That is, although the principles of DP and the value attached to these principles are acknowledged by UNPOL officials, serious challenges were mentioned to be inhibiting UNPOL’s operations on ground. Four types of challenges emerged in terms of the implementation of DP in UNPOL missions: human resources, diversity, local country-related problems
and UNPOL-related problems. Among these, diversity is accepted as both a challenge and opportunity for learning and transferring DP messages to developing countries.

**Challenges Stemming from UNPOL**

In fact, the challenges in this category are mostly structural challenges stemming from the UN rather than UNPOL. The biggest problems within this domain were unanimously stressed to be budget and personnel shortage. Secondly, complex mandates assign several roles and responsibilities to UNPOL(S# 1-3-6). A less structural problem is the lack of doctrine -which was addressed in the examination of training in this chapter- for developing common standards, and common definitions of concepts including democratic policing. Regarding the doctrine problem, a mission manager (S-2) stated that:

> The UN on its own does not have a common method or common agreeable doctrine of international policing that we do on ground. So it [bothers] us to quite an extent in a way that each officer tends to work in a way that he has been accustomed back at home and try to implement those strategies or those actions which they have been used to.

As noted earlier in this chapter, though, it was mentioned that UNPOL is aware of this deficiency and working on it.

**Human Resources as a Challenge in UNPOL Missions**

Human resources is a problem category which cross-cuts all of the other challenges. The human resources problem has two sub categories, the quality of UNPOL
officers and the changing scope of UNPOL missions which entails expertise on specific areas of reform and restructuring.

**The Job Quality of UNPOL Officers**

The second problematic area in terms of human resources in UNPOL is the job quality of UNPOL officers. It was unanimously admitted by UNPOL officials that the majority of UNPOL officers come from developing countries and that PCCs do not want to send their successful and skillful officers to UNPOL missions. It is obvious that this finding concurs with the aforementioned arguments of the existing literature. The deputy police adviser (S-1) illustrates this problem by giving details as follows:

Now how much can we be successful as the UN police or as the UN? We have got to be frank; we can be as successful as the expertise given to us by the member states… and the police officers are mostly coming from developing countries. I mean, without discrimination or anything that is the reality. [we] get 37% from Asia, 34% from Africa, 15% from Europe 5% from Americas, and 9% from the Middle East.

At this point, a sharp distinction emerged between the policing skills of and possible misconducts or violations by UNPOL officers coming from developing countries. That is, it was repeatedly underscored that the low job quality or inadequacy of certain skills of UNPOL officers does not necessarily mean that they will commit such crimes as human rights abuses, corruption or the like (S# 1-3-4-5-8-13-14). This is primarily because the circumstances between the home country of the UNPOL officer
and the mission environment he or she is deployed to are totally different. Secondly, internal investigation mechanisms of UNPOL are strictly enforced and misconducts or violations committed by UNPOL officers are not tolerated. Thus, an officer coming from an undemocratic country might not teach democratic policing to the local counterparts due to his scant job skills. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that this officer will violate the principles of DP or be involved in misconducts. This distinction between the job skills and possible criminal behaviors of UNPOL officers coming from developing countries is an important theme that emerged out of the interviews.

A mission manager (S-3), for example stated that:

There might be difference in terms of their policing skills and what they do, but not in terms of human rights violations because we have established procedures in the missions to deal with this kind of stuff. [How about corruption?] Same with the corruption also. Because … you come from a country where the police force is corrupt, for example, and you are posted in a UN mission, that does not necessarily mean that you will do corruption there because the issue is that corruption is caused by different factors [in the home country and in the UNPOL environment]... The only thing which I agree to in this is that the officers are generally prone to use certain skills in certain ways. For example, the procedure for arrest is different [in different] countries...So it is more on policing skills that there is a variation.

With regard to the human resources problem, UNPOL applies a vetting strategy to prevent the officers with the history of certain misconduct or violations from entering in the UNPOL force. A similar vetting procedure is also applied in terms of local police recruitment (S#1-3-8-11-13). A second strategy related to the human resources problem is recruiting those officers with earlier UNPOL mission experience. This strategy
basically aims to accelerate the adaptation process of newcomers and create an “UNPOL culture” (S# 1-2-3-8-11).

**Oversight Boards**

In addition to the vetting and hiring strategies, UNPOL has mechanisms devoted to dealing with misconducts and violations by UNPOL officers. These mechanisms are *oversight boards* and *internal investigation units*. These units watch the performance of UNPOL officers and conduct investigations in the event of any violations. Also, these boards were mentioned to be important deterrents as to possible human rights abuses or other types of violations by UNPOL officers coming from undemocratic countries (S#1-3-9-11-13-14). The deputy police chief of UNMIL (S-14) summarized the function of oversight boards as follows:

> We have our oversight boards which also play significant roles in controlling and keeping an eye on the performance of the police components and other components of the UN. It really relates to things like this [human rights violations by UNPOL officers]. Then some sexual harassment, sexual based violence, rude violations of duties and responsibilities, negligence and there is list in our guidelines those first categories of cases or incidents for which the person can be reprimanded or some sanctions can be imposed on them.

**Diversity: Challenge or Chance?**

The multi-national structure of UNPOL which is dominated by officers coming from undemocratic or politically instable countries was pointed as its Achilles Hill. In the
previous chapters of this study these criticisms by scholars and analysts were addressed and it was shown that the UN recruits officers from around 85 countries where the top 10 of the PCCs were mostly undemocratic. Thus, an instant reaction to these facts is to ask how such an organization can disseminate the message of democratic policing in politically the most fragile environments of the world. The findings of the survey on UNPOL officers showed that they did not view working in nationally diverse environment as problematic.

When the same criticisms were reminded to UNPOL officials at both the HQ and field, they accepted the diversity issue as both a challenge and a good opportunity to learn for both the host country police and UNPOL officers coming from developing countries. The challenge side of the issue is primarily related to the complexity engendered by the mingling of different types of policing approaches, methods and techniques within the multi-national UNPOL environment ($S\# 1\text{-}2\text{-}3\text{-}4\text{-}6\text{-}8\text{-}9\text{-}11\text{-}13\text{-}14$). This problem was discussed previously in this chapter in relation to the UN’s failure to develop doctrine to create the blueprints of international policing in PCEs. Finally, as presented below, especially police commanders and deputy police commanders who are working on ground and directly experiencing the multi-national atmosphere stated that positive aspects of diversity outweigh negatives in UNPOL missions.

The following statement from the deputy police commissioner of the UNMIL ($S\text{-}14$) point to the problematic part of diversity which is the complexity due to the multitude
of policing approaches:

UNPOL is operating with like 99 different countries and each of these countries comes with its own experience, its own way of doing policing there with different countries. The challenge here has always been how can we form a uniform way of conducting business on the mission. I must admit that it is not easy as one will anticipate.

As mentioned above, some view the diversity issue as both a challenge and an opportunity. In terms of UNPOL officers coming from undemocratic countries, the missions can help them convey the message of democratic policing back to their home countries. The following statement from UNMIT’s training manager (S-8) underlines this argument:

Concerning police officers from countries which are not democratic, I will tell you I work here with police officers from those countries. And … you must also know one thing that peace-keeping has two advantages, first, and this is the main advantage, to bring peace to the country where the police officers serve. But the second collateral advantage is that these police officers who come here are learning. They are also learning about human rights, about human dignity, DP, and bring this knowledge back to their countries. So this is collateral, and the problem is mostly the culture of undemocratic policing is sitting mainly not in individual police officers but in organizational culture. Even the police officers from the countries where there is some evidence that policing is not democratic, the political structure of the country is not democratic,... the police officers perform, at least in my place, professionally. They are good colleagues; they know the rules of behavior, they know the rules of all human rights and how to deal with the society.

A second statement from a mission manager (S-2) underscores the learning facilitated by the multi-cultural environment of UNPOL missions:

Well, it could be taken both, frankly speaking. On the one hand, yes, this is a
unique chance to learn the experience from other countries and implement that; on the other hand, it is quite difficult to coordinate that, keep an eye on that and control that. That is why in the missions we see too many approaches, too many methods, and nobody knows what is the core [and] what the main line is.

The link between OL and DP

In the previous chapter an empirical association was found between the perceived OL and perceived adherence to DP. The qualitative findings presented above can help us explain the major elements of this link. When the common factors affecting both OL and DP in missions are analyzed, it can be seen that the international structure of UNPOL renders mission environments “natural learning platforms”. Nonetheless, the gleaning and codification of this accumulation of knowledge is problematic due to a set of factors. If the “natural” learning environment of missions can be transferred into “organizational” learning environments by applying different sorts of techniques and practices of OL, UNPOL can develop the blueprints of UN policing based on the principles of DP, update these principles constantly and turn them into concrete training materials. The system then can be disseminated to first UNPOL officers then local police officers through training. As mentioned above, the role of UNPOL as early peace-builders is under discussion among the DPKO circles. Such a strategy that places a learning UNPOL at the core can considerably accelerate these processes. This, however, needs a change in the mindset of police leadership by understanding the value of OL and creating some space to its application in their busy work load. This explains the importance of leadership which emerged as the most important predictor of learning in...
UNPOL missions.

In conclusion, although UNPOL officers exhibited considerable support for the principles of DP there are a set of fundamental obstacles for their fulfillment by UNPOL. The principles of DP cannot be considered independent from the overall socio-political situation in a country. UNPOL, on the other hand, currently operates within the short-winded peace-keeping context which makes it difficult to put the principles of DP in practice. Secondly, the principles of DP have yet to be broken into solid methods which can be applied by police officers on the ground. With its current form, DP is a concept which is related to organizational characteristics of a police organization- in fact the entire law-enforcement system. Given these factors, we could only expect UNPOL to universalize the DPI index of UNMIS across all missions in terms of the application of DP. Nevertheless, if the UNPOL leadership pays more attention to organizational learning considerable improvement can be achieved. This can help UNPOL build its role as early peace builders.
Chapter 7 Conclusions

The increase in the number of internal conflicts in the post-cold war era, plus the rise of UN-managed peace-keeping forces as the most common response of the international community to them, has rendered the UN the primary international organization of such interventions in the security domain of the world. In addition, the context of peace operations has become more complex, in some cases, involving the restoration of the entire state system of the post-conflict country (Jones et al., 2005; Lipson, 2007). In parallel with the transformation of UN peace operations, the number of personnel and of the budgets allocated for these operations have become considerably larger (Lipson, 2007).

In addition to the enhanced role and importance of the UN as an international intervener in these conflicts, the doctrinal framework of operations also changed. The introduction of the human security concept broadened the scope of the interventions and shifted the focus from state security to individual security. It interjected a set of issues such as poverty, food and health problems and social problems into the security domain (Axworthy, 1997; Bajpai, 2000). Another concept, security sector reforms within the doctrinal framework of human security, was introduced and supported by major
international development organizations such as the OECD (Wulf, 2004). The SSR concept introduced a governance approach where several statutory and non-statutory actors cooperate for the reform of the security sector. It also considers security an important component of development (Bryden & Brzoska, 2005). Such issues as transparency and accountability of security organizations, primarily the military, to the civil authorities and the operation of security organizations congruent with the democratic principles are also emphasized in SSRs (Ball, 2002a). SSR has become a crucial component of both the democratization programs of post-communist countries and post-conflict intervention strategies (Häggi, 2004; Marenin, 2005). The starting point for SSR in post-conflict environments was emphasized to be the establishment of order and security on the streets (Ball, 2002b; Brzoska & Heineman-Grüder, 2004; Marenin, 2005).

In parallel with the advent of the human security and SSR concepts another concept, democratic policing, was also introduced. This concept can be viewed as a reformulation of the human security notion into the policing context (Marenin, 2005; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). The concept first appeared in a UN document, namely the commissioner’s guidance for democratic policing in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 (UN, 1996). The democratic policing concept was a very suitable framework for countries in transition to democracy. The most crucial principles of DP are accountability of police organizations to internal and external mechanisms, transparency, and responsiveness (Bayley, 1997, 2006; Neild, 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006;
Rule of law and the legitimacy of police organizations can also be mentioned among the principles of DP (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Since the police are the most visible actors of the state authority, they can play very important roles in the democratization of PCEs (Ferguson, 2004; Bayley, 2006). The framework that the police should adopt in such contexts is democratic policing because it supports democratic transitions (Bayley, 1997; Neild, 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).

UNPOL is the police organization of the UN which is primarily responsible for the reform-restructuring and training of the police element of a post-conflict country where a UN peace-keeping mission is situated. UNPOL’s roles and responsibilities have evolved from simply monitoring and assisting the local police organizations in the 1960s to training, mentoring, reform-restructuring and finally conducting executive law-enforcement by the end of the 1990s (Schmidl, 1998; Hansen, 2002; Durch, 2010). Thus the crucial duty of developing capacity for the local police which will provide the order and security in the streets has been the primary responsibility of UNPOL. Yet analyses of the functioning of UNPOL revealed several deficiencies of the organization. Such analyses invariably raise concerns about the capabilities and capacity of UNPOL in fulfilling these duties. Some of the frequently mentioned shortcomings of the UNPOL system include the poor democracy records of the major police contributing countries (Durch, 2010; Durch & Egland, 2010; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010), the multi-cultural environment of the missions (Boer & Emery, 1998), low job skills of UNPOL officers, particularly those from less developed countries (Sismanidis, 1997; Call & Barnett, 2000; Perito,
2005), and the incapacity of UNPOL to develop institutional memory and spread it across missions (Mobekk, 2005).

Based on the above framework, this study focused on the structure and functions of UNPOL from two perspectives. The first domain was about the implementation of DP principles in PCEs. As mentioned repeatedly throughout the study the democratic policing concept was first introduced by the IPTF report in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. It was a research objective of this study to explore the current situation in terms of the application of DP in UNPOL missions. The second focus of this study was related to the problem of institutional memory. This study argued that if the UNPOL can become a learning organization, which means that if the UNPOL can glean the tacit knowledge from its staff and convert it into institutional know-how, the implementation of DP principles will be faster, easier and much more effective when carried into the field of PCEs. Therefore a second research objective of this study was to explore the state of organizational learning in UNPOL missions.

7.1. Organizational Learning in UNPOL Missions

One of the primary deficiencies of UNPOL was its incapacity to develop institutional memory. In this study the notion of institutional memory has been expanded to the broader concept of organizational learning and it was argued that once established OL can facilitate UNPOL’s practice and implementation of DP as well as its other activities. In addition to that, this study emphasized that communities of practice (CoP) and
appreciative inquiry (AI) which are closely related to the UNPOL context for policing can be used as tools for the detection of problems and best practices. The accumulation of experiences can be extracted through such means as AI or CoP, and the extracted material can be developed into organizational procedures. By doing so, a considerable amount of organizational know-how can be conveyed to incoming officers in UNPOL missions. Furthermore, such systems can also be applied to the local police organizations through training, advising and monitoring.

No study exists in the literature examining the OL efforts of UNPOL. Nevertheless, a few studies analyzed the issue from the broader perspective of the DPKO missions which included both the military and the police. These studies (Campbell, 2007; Benner & Rotmann, 2008; Howard, 2008) assert that OL is very important for successful peace operations, yet it has been a relatively weak side of the DPKO. Also, effective leadership and good communication with the local actors were mentioned to be the most crucial factors of learning in peace operations.

This study examined OL in UNPOL missions from several aspects at both individual and organizational levels. In the quantitative phase, the perception of UNPOL officers on OL was measured through 17 survey items. In the qualitative phase, two to four issues related to OL were asked to the subjects. The following is a discussion of the findings from both quantitative and qualitative strands.
Quantitative and qualitative findings

To simplify the survey results, a principle components factor analysis was run on the 17 items related to the perceived OL. This loaded into five factors. These factors represented access to information, the perceived benefit of OL methods, personal commitment of UNPOL officers to learning and change, organizational convenience for learning. The perception of access to information in UNPOL missions was measured in terms of access to the internet, TV and libraries/books. The findings showed that there is strong satisfaction in terms of access to the internet (mean= 7.7, median= 9 on a 10-point scale), moderate satisfaction in terms of access to TV (mean= 5) and low level satisfaction in terms of access to libraries or books (mean=4.2, median= 3). The comparisons across missions showed that the same pattern was repeated across all missions. The high satisfaction from access to the internet might stem from the fact that those who joined the survey were already on the internet. Yet access to the internet is generally sufficient at least at the UN facilities in PCEs. It can be argued therefore that UNPOL officers’ access to general information is at a mediocre level across missions. Nevertheless access to TV and books can be improved especially in UNMIL and MONUSCO missions.

Secondly, the perceived benefit of four OL practices, CoP, AI, survey and suggestion boxes were measured on 10-point scales. The findings show that UNPOL officers exhibit strong support for the benefits of all these practices. The mean of the
means of these four scales is 7.83. The strongest support was shown for the item on virtual or paper-based platforms for the information of problems (mean= 8.2). The same issues were also asked in the interviews to explore if and to what extent they are applied in practice. As analyzed in the previous chapter UNPOL does not explicitly apply any of the aforementioned tools. Instead, UNPOL uses official tools such as the end of assignment reports, end of mission reports and surveys of practices. Nevertheless, the assessment of the product is not systematic and is subject to such challenges as budget limitations and the lack of personnel with the skills to analyze these reports. The most effective informal tool used for problem detection in UNPOL missions was found to be the open door policy of police commissioners, where officers can walk in at pre-determined hours of the week and mention their problems directly to the police commissioner. Neither CoP nor AI are used in UNPOL missions primarily due to the routine work load, and the lack of interest by the leadership- which may simply reflect their lack of familiarity with these powerful OL and development tools. More importantly these methods are considered “unpractical”, “too abstract”, “academic” or “at the strategic level” even by training officers. Ironically, though, both CoP and AI are methods meant for going beyond the abstract, academic or generic types of knowledge and creating practice-based knowledge through informal procedures.

Thus it can be concluded that although there is support at the officer level, OL tools are not used effectively by UNPOL at the command and management level. OL activities are viewed as the duty of the “best practices officers” only by UNPOL.
leadership. This is primarily due to lack of knowledge and interest in OL issues, and being overwhelmed in the “police mentality”. The connection between these activities and policing practice on the ground should be better understood by the UNPOL leadership. It should be noted here that the lack of interest by police leadership in strategic planning analysis was also emphasized by Bayley (1994). In addition, the general challenges of budget and personnel also pose important problems for the application of these facilities.

The third domain of OL in UNPOL is organizational convenience for learning and change. According to the results of the survey, UNPOL officers think that the UNPOL environment facilitates learning (74 %), that they do gain new knowledge during missions (73.1), that their approaches on policing changed based on the knowledge they gained during missions (66.6 %), and that their colleagues are open to changes (52.6 %). These findings indicate that the working environment in missions is perceived to be helping UNPOL officers learn and change their approaches on policing. Thus it can be argued that single-loop learning, in terms of the policing mentalities of UNPOL officers, is achieved in UNPOL missions.

From the responses given to the open ended answers in the survey and findings from the interviews, the primary factor in facilitating the learning environment in missions is the multi-national structure of the UNPOL. That is, both UNPOL officers and policy makers repeatedly stressed the positive impact of the international composition of
UNPOL missions on the improvement of officers’ policing approaches. Therefore this study found that the international working environment of UNPOL is not an inhibitor of learning in and of itself. The negative consequences of diversity are primarily due to the low quality of some UNPOL officers coming from underdeveloped or developing countries. Yet the cultural and professional diversity is a very strong facilitator of learning through the congregation of a large spectrum of techniques, tactics and approaches. This then might have positive consequences on three areas. First, the UNPOL officers in missions learn from each other. Second, host country officers learn from diverse sources. Finally, UNPOL officers coming from developing countries might transfer their knowledge and experience gains into their home countries, by transmitting new insights and more democratic approaches on policing.

Although single-loop learning is achieved, according to the survey 50.6 % of UNPOL officers think that it is difficult to change the rules and procedures in missions. Thus it can be concluded that double loop learning, in which the organizational structure as a whole is reformed in response to learning, have yet to be achieved in missions. Given the structural challenges the organization has to deal with, it would be unrealistic to expect UNPOL to achieve double-loop learning.

Finally, UNPOL officers’ personal commitments on organizational change and learning are reportedly at high levels. The survey findings showed that 81.5 % of UNPOL officers indicated that they are eager to try new ideas at work, 85.1 % and interested in
investigating the root causes of problems and 78.6% suggest solutions to their supervisors when confronted with problems. 

Another objective of this study was to identify the factors making the strongest contributions to learning in UNPOL missions. This study found that effective leadership is the strongest predictor of the perception of learning in UNPOL missions, with a standardized coefficient score of .41. Effective leadership was also emphasized throughout the interviews as the most important facilitator of learning. Also as mentioned earlier Howard (2008) and Benner and Rotmann (2008) indicated the great significance of leadership in terms of OL. Other than leadership, training (standardized r= .265), technical conditions (standardized r= .152) and duration of deployment (standardized r= .106 at .10 significance level) are positively and significantly associated with perceived OL in UNPOL missions. Nevertheless, this study could not find a significant association between learning and the perceived friendliness of local actors or with the physical conditions in mission environments. Also, none of the demographic control variables and mission dummies were found to be significant predictors of learning. The non-significant findings on the local actors and physical conditions may stem from the great variation in these variables across missions. That is, since the technical conditions such as computers, vehicles, information systems and the like are provided by the UN, it is natural to see some sort of uniformity across missions. Yet, physical conditions consist of living conditions, buildings, and so forth which are generally attached to the conditions of the host country. One of the primary factors diminishing motivations of UNPOL officers was
bad living conditions (13.5 % of responses), according to the open ended answers to in the survey. The perceived friendliness of local actors, namely local citizens, police, media and politicians, to UNPOL officers varies significantly across missions. For example, officials from the UNAMID mission stated in the interviews that the local population strongly resisted the presence of the UN in their territories. Thus the non-significant findings on physical conditions and the perceived friendliness of local actors to the UN arguably stem from the great variation across missions.

The findings of the quantitative and qualitative strands in regard to OL in UNPOL missions concur to a large extent. Leadership was mentioned as the most significant factor for creating a convenient environment for learning. Leadership is an important factor for the facilitation of the mission conditions toward learning. Training courses, on the other hand are the primary tools or platforms of learning. Nevertheless, currently three types of challenges diminish the effectiveness of UNPOL training. These challenges are the language barrier, lack of doctrine for unifying the training curriculum, and the lack of commitment from the police contributing countries as to the pre-deployment training sessions. The most important challenge among these is the lack of doctrine because the problems stemming from the cultural diversity of UNPOL officers can only be eliminated by providing a common understanding on the primary concepts of policing.

At the organizational level, OL in UNPOL missions is subject to several challenges, including the short duration of service, budget and personnel shortages, and
the lack of interest in the value of certain OL activities by the leadership. In terms of the short duration of service, as reported earlier UNPOL officers predominantly (49.3%) think that the minimum duration of service should be 2 years. Moreover, the OLS model of OL in UNPOL missions found that the duration of service in a given mission is positively associated with learning. In addition to the extension of the duration of service in missions, professionalization of UNPOL posts was repeatedly proposed by UNPOL officers as the key for developing better institutional memory.

7.2. Democratic Policing and UNPOL Missions

The principal research objectives of this study were to explore the perceptions of UNPOL officers about DP and OL and whether they vary across the nationalities, tenure, education, rank or gender of officers; and the practice of DP in UNPOL missions at the organizational level.

In this study, the perceptions of UNPOL officers on DP principles and democracy were measured with 17 Likert-scale items. First, this study found that UNPOL officers have a strongly positive commitment in the primary principles of DP. The strongest support was shown for the items on equal treatment to citizens (96.7 %– 86 % support strongly); police community cooperation (94.5 %– 65.9 % support strongly) and working within the limits of human rights (94.1 %– 70.1 % support strongly). With respect to accountability, strong support for internal accountability mechanisms (91.2 %– 57.8 % support strongly) and citizen feedback (90.6 %– 50.3 strongly support) diminished mildly
with respect to external accountability mechanisms (76.3\% - 46.1 strongly support). Four out of 17 items were negatively worded. The strong support demonstrated in the above items diminished in the negatively worded items. Yet the proportion of disagreement with the negatively worded statements outweighed that of agreement. Also, the proportion of those who are undecided increased in response to these items. This finding may be an indication of the “social desirability” bias which occurs when the subject prefers to answer a question in the commonly desirable way (Dillman et al., 2009). The study also found through ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests that UNPOL officers’ perception of DP do not vary across nationalities, or missions.

In addition to the principles of DP, the perceptions of UNPOL officers on democracy as a type of government, their acquaintance with the term democratic policing and the notion of human security were also measured in the survey. The survey demonstrated that there is strong support for democracy as the best type of government (83.7\% - 56.8\% support strongly); and for the human security notion (82.5). Interestingly enough, 82.5\% of UNPOL officers indicated that they know much about the DP concept although a total acquaintance with the concept was expected. This may be because of the general operational environment of UNPOL is based on human rights and the officers themselves are confronting the results of conflict with a mandate to implement change. The roughly 17.5\% knowledge deficiency in the DP concept at the officer level indicates that democratic policing as a concept has not been fully disseminated throughout the UNPOL system. There may also be some reservations regarding the real extent of this
support, given officer’s answers to the negatively worded items. Still, in sum, UNPOL officers strongly support the primary principles of DP, human security and democracy as a type of government.

Nonetheless, the strong commitment of UNPOL officers to the principles of DP on paper does not necessarily mean that they actually behave congruently with these principles. Therefore, the practice of DP in UNPOL missions was examined from an organizational perspective as well. The qualitative findings of this study assessed the state of DP in UNPOL missions.

First, this study found that although the concept of DP first was set forward by the UN in 1996, these principles are not implemented in the framework of UNPOL reform-restructuring activities. DP is considered an abstract and theoretical model by high level UNPOL officials. They believe the principles of DP can only be fully implemented in the long-term, whereas peace-keeping operations are short-term and need quick and pragmatic solutions.

Second, at the operational level, DP is mostly understood in terms of community-oriented policing by UNPOL officials. A significant theoretical conclusion emerges out of this finding. Democratic policing is a concept at the organization level because the principles of democratic policing such as accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law and so forth can only be implemented and measured at the organizational level. Within this context, police organizations’ DP performance can, in fact, be
evaluated through index-type tools, as found in the UNMIS example. Bruce and Neild (2005) also developed such an index for the evaluation of the South African police. However, at the operational level of DP, which refers to the actual actions of “policing” on the ground by officers, the set of specifications remains empty. Therefore in order for democratic policing to be an actual model of “policing”, the principles of DP should be broken into demonstrable and measurable behaviours and procedures, which then can be applied by police officers on the streets to guide their actions as they respond to crime incidents and interact with law abiding citizens to support a democratically determined social order. Here, it should be noted that the efforts of Wiatrowski (2012) and Karatay (2010) provide examples of what the police would do in implementing DP. However, given the comprehensive and international context of the DP concept, only international organizations, one of which is UNPOL, but also which have been accomplished by the EU, OSCE and NATO have the capacity to implement the democratic policing model.

Third, UNPOL’s activities related to the DP concept focus on community policing activities, gender policy and training. Among those, community-oriented policing is viewed as the tactical dimension of DP and commonly applied across all missions. With respect to the gender policy, UNPOL has plans to increase the representation of female officers in the UNPOL force to 50% in the long run, with significant gains to 10% or 20% female officers as soon as possible. By so doing, UNPOL seeks better handling crimes against women and children, to instigate local counterparts to recruit more female officers in their national police forces and to alter the negative perception of the
“uniform” which is associated with negative memories in the minds of citizens. Nevertheless, the 50% female representation goal in UNPOL seems unrealistic because police contributing countries do not have enough female officers in their own forces, let alone sending large numbers of female officers abroad for UNPOL missions. The scarce numbers of existing female officers are vital for their domestic needs. Thus developing a 50% female officer capacity for UNPOL would mean that the PCCs would second the great majority of their female officers to UNPOL missions. Also, the model of perceived DP in UNPOL missions showed that males are more supportive of DP principles than females—although the validity of this finding is questionable because of the small female participation in the survey.

Fourth, UNPOL’s successes in terms of democratic policing are mentioned to be the attitude change in the local actors such as the police, citizens and politicians in accepting the presence of the UN and its policies. The term co-location emerged as the most significant factor in UNPOL’s acceptance by local counterparts.

Fifth, several challenges inhibit UNPOL’s activities. The UN budget, UNPOL human resources, the lack of doctrine in UNPOL, local traditions and mindsets, and lack of infrastructure in the host country are the most salient factors at this domain. The most important challenges at the organizational domain are budget shortages and lack of physical infrastructure in the working environments. The human resource challenge is mostly related to the low job skills of some UNPOL officers. In order to cope with its
human resource problems UNPOL stipulates the PCCs to second officers with mission experience. UNPOL also applies increasingly strict vetting and interview procedures before accepting UNPOL officers. Yet given the imbalance in terms of supply and demand of officers, UNPOL inevitably recruits a substantial number of low quality and first term officers.

Sixth, as explained in the previous section, an unintended consequence of the recruitment of officers from developing countries is that these officers come to the UN missions to learn about policing and transfer that knowledge to their home countries. Many of them may not be graduates from police academies in the accepted sense of the term and their levels of education may be minimal. By the same token, the concerns about possible human rights violations, misconduct or acts of corruption by UNPOL officers in PCEs taking into consideration the levels of democracy, human rights and corruption in their home countries were mentioned to be unwarranted because both local and organizational conditions in the home country of the UNPOL officer and the mission are totally different. In addition, the internal oversight mechanisms strictly enforce the organizational standards and protocols of the UN which have no tolerance for misconduct. Therefore, it can be noted that a distinction should be made between the job skills and possible misconduct by officers coming from developing countries and their behavior while on a mission. The literature on UNPOL (Seafino, 2004; Durch, 2010; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010) considers officers coming from developing countries to be problematic in terms of job skills and the type of policing they conduct in their home
countries. This study determined, on the other hand, that the low job skills and possible misconduct or crimes of officers coming from democratically underdeveloped countries should be analyzed separately.

Seventh, the qualitative findings of this study showed that local mindsets, local traditions and local politics in post-conflict countries emerged as the biggest challenge on the ground. Most post-conflict countries come from traditions where the concept of security is associated with protecting the regime by all means. Thus the functional distinction between the military and the police are not well established and the security concept is mostly coupled with the “military” type of security in these environments. The most important challenge in such settings is to prove the value of the police and civil security activities to the public at large. Also, since the presence of the UN in a country changes the balance of power, resistance from groups who lose their previous advantages commonly take place. When these local mindsets are coupled with the local political challenges, the local conditions of the host country emerged as the biggest problem before UNPOL. Developing trust in the local population requires long-term efforts and a longer UNPOL presence in the host country to transform the security sector. Professionalization of the UNPOL force was proposed by the officers interviewed as the primary way forward for more sustainable UNPOL activities.

Eighth, it was postulated in this study that OL can be a facilitator of the implementation of DP principles in UNPOL missions. To test this hypothesis together
with other important factors of DP put forward by the literature, a model was built linking conditions for OL with DP based on the perceptions of UNPOL officers on these concepts. The findings showed that the perceived OL is positively associated with adherence to DP in post-conflict situations (standardized r= .184). In addition to learning, tenure is also positively and significantly associated with adherence to DP. The finding on tenure is important because Karatay (2009) also found that tenure is positively associated with adherence to DP. Moreover, male officers are more likely to support democratic policing principles than females. Nevertheless, the perceived satisfactions from training, physical and technical conditions, and the perceived friendliness of local actors were not significantly associated with adherence to DP. Among them the same explanation can be made on the insignificant findings of the physical and local factors.

Both physical conditions and the attitude of local actors towards the UN vary significantly across missions. The findings from the interviews showed that local factors account for the greatest proportion of the challenges affecting the activities of UNPOL. When it comes to the training and technical conditions, the findings indicate that these factors primarily affect the implementation of learning more than they affect the implementation of DP.

The qualitative part of the study explained the association found in chapter five between OL and DP based on the perceptions of UNPOL officers. The common factors that affect both the implementation of OL and DP in UNPOL missions were found in three areas. First the international working environment in UNPOL missions poses an
environmental factor that can facilitate the development of the democratic policing understanding through learning. As explained earlier, by the extraction of the rich knowledge and experience on policing through organizational learning mechanisms the blueprints of international policing can be developed. This then can be transferred through training to both post-conflict countries and police contributing countries with poor levels of democracy. Nevertheless the interest of leadership in OL activities is vital for the implementation of such a strategy.

Training of UNPOL officers is the primary tool for the implementation of DP principles through OL. Yet the crux of the training issue lies in what is being understood from the term “training” by the UNPOL leadership. Training is generally understood as the training of local police organizations by UNPOL officials. The primary argument behind this understanding is that the UN already recruits officers who are supposed to be equipped with the qualifications necessary for UNPOL policing. The same officials, on the other hand, complain about the low quality of UNPOL officers. More importantly they claim that UNPOL policing, which heavily involves reform-restructuring, capacity building and training, is “totally a different ball game” in comparison to ordinary policing. The key point then is, as frequently mentioned by UNPOL officials, the development of doctrine which will establish the basis of common standards and definitions of terms and concepts. This is crucial for the elimination of the negative aspects of diversity. Secondly, the wrong assumption that UNPOL officers are already trained should be changed and UNPOL officers should be trained based on the common
doctrinal framework.

Finally, professional staff and specialists were found to be the actors who will help promote the DP principles through OL in UNPOL missions. Given the evolution of UNPOL operations, the contemporary UNPOL policing requires specialized personnel who will stay longer in their posts and make more significant contributions to the reform-restructuring of local police organizations. By increasing the number of professionals, problems stemming from the low-skilled officers would be eliminated as well. Yet since the professionalization issue is subject to budget limitations, enhancing the quality of the existing human resources through creating a learning organization looks like a more realistic approach to follow in the short run.

Each of these three factors accounts for a different dimension of the link between OL and the implementation of DP principles in PCEs. Therefore a holistic approach which incorporates all of these dimensions simultaneously is necessary at the strategic planning phase to accomplish this transformation. Nevertheless, it was again emphasized by most UNPOL officials that the routine work load in missions strongly pushes UNPOL policy makers toward pragmatic, short-cut strategies for dealing with their problems rather than even contemplating this broader strategy of organizational change through OL.

7.3. Policy Implications and Recommendations

Given the above conclusions of this study, the following policy implications and
recommendations will be offered.

First the police play a crucial role in PCEs in terms of the establishment of a safe and secure environment on which other institution-building measures can be built consistent with democratic theory (Ferguson, 2004; Marenin, 2005, Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). UNPOL intervenes in PCEs to build physical, social, mental and organizational capacities for local (national) police organizations. Therefore UNPOL has the opportunity to design police organizations in PCEs according to the framework of modern police theory and practice. Democratic policing can be the primary framework for it is not only an emergent policing framework initially preferred by the UN but also the center of the entire democratization process (Marenin, 2005; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). This study found that although there is strong support for the principles of DP at the individual level, these principles are not effectively translated into practice at the organizational level in UNPOL. This is primarily because of the short-term context of peace-keeping within which UNPOL operates. The short-term goals of peace-keeping entail quick responses to post-conflict chaos and pragmatic solutions to problems. Since the operational aspect of DP is currently absent, it is of no pragmatic value to UNPOL while operating on ground. Contemporary peace-keeping operations are more dynamic and considered “early peace-building” operations. Therefore, a distinction should be made in terms of the operational use and doctrinal value of DP within the UNPOL context. In other words, the doctrinal deficiency in terms of both training and reform restructuring in UNPOL missions can be bridged by expanding on the principles of DP
and the translation of these principles into concrete strategies. The operational absence of DP on the other hand is somewhat compensated for by community policing activities of UNPOL. At this point organizational learning techniques can facilitate the doctrine development process as explained earlier. The expected outcome of such a strategy is the gradual transformation of the role of UNPOL from static peace-keeping to pro-active early-peace-building.

A second implication of democratic policing is theoretical. The operational deficiency of the democratic policing concept can be filled with joint police- academician studies. If the principles of DP can be broken into concrete police tactics the primary platforms of application for these tactics can be utilized effectively in PCEs.

The findings of this study imply that OL can be a significant facilitator of UNPOL’s activities and that effective leadership is crucial for the implementation and conduct of OL activities. The short duration of service, budget limitations, lack of doctrine, and the lack of knowledge and interest in the police managers on OL issues, however, inhibits UNPOL from becoming a learning organization. Therefore, first, UNPOL managers should be trained further on OL issues. These training courses do not necessarily aim at making them OL specialists. The training strategy may rather inform UNPOL managers about the value of and context for OL activities through case studies and success stories so that they take these into consideration while conducting strategic planning.
Furthermore the scope of OL should cover CoP and AI because, contrary to the perceptions of UNPOL managers, these methods are practice-based and aim at going down to the lowest level of an organization to explore and influence the situation on the ground rather than just the top layer of organizational hierarchy. OL activities do not pertain only to the best practices officers. Since learning occurs at every level and every day, a continuous effort should be important at every level of the organization. The layout and collection of raw data is a necessary but not sufficient condition for learning to occur in UNPOL missions. Knowledge management specialists who can analyze the data and convert it to useful knowledge for the organization are needed. As the knowledge management coordinator indicated previously, since learning occurs every day in missions, OL activities must be a never ending process. Yet, keeping the sustainability of OL activities is a significant problem mostly due to personnel limitations and budget shortages. Thus, the number of best practices officers and other OL specialists should be increased in UNPOL missions.

Second, the short duration of service emerged as a significant problem diminishing the effectiveness of UNPOL. UNPOL officers return to their home countries after only one year of service when they get used to the mission conditions. Ironically, the UN tries to recruit officers with earlier mission experience. UNPOL officers indicated that the minimum duration of service should be two years. UNPOL managers, on the other hand underscored, the need for increasing the number of professional posts. Finally, it was empirically found in this study that the duration of service is positively associated
with better organizational learning.

Thus, three policy alternatives emerge: first, the extension of the minimum duration of service to two or three years. A second alternative is professionalizing the entire UNPOL force which means the establishment of an UNPOL police force— as was suggested by Wiatroski and Goldstone (2010). The final alternative is a mixture of the first and second alternatives. This alternative can be put into practice by increasing the duration of service and reducing the number of individual police units (IPU) while increasing the number of professional posts. The professionalization of UNPOL is not limited to police officers. In addition to the development of institutional memory, the recruitment of more qualified professional officers will help the elimination of the human resources problem in UNPOL missions to a great extent. Given the budget limitations and the preferences of the PCCs, feasibility analyses can be conducted to find the most doable alternative.

Thirdly, the lack of doctrine emerged as a significant factor undermining both the learning facilities and DP activities of the organization. As mentioned above OL can play a very significant role in doctrine development through the extraction and codification of knowledge in missions. The development of a UN doctrine which involves the principles of DP will make three important contributions to the UNPOL policing. Firstly, it will help the formation of a common UNPOL policing strategy and doctrine. This will mitigate the negative consequences of the multinational working environment with
different policing experiences. Secondly, the local police can adopt the democratic policing principles as the building blocks of their police organizations as this will be uniformly offered by UNPOL as it carries out the police portion of SSR activities. Thirdly, UNPOL officers from developing countries might transfer the democratic type of policing procedures to their home countries and improve the state of policing in those places. This would be a latent but most beneficial opportunity. This would allow “democracy” to be adapted to local conditions in a principled manner rather than being imposed by external agencies.

Another point which is closely related to doctrine development is the training of UNPOL officers. As found in this study, UNPOL officers are considered to have the right qualifications to conduct UNPOL policing in PCEs despite having not been given any training except for the mostly ignored pre-deployment training and short Induction Training. The lack of a common training curriculum is another factor inhibiting training. Therefore, after the development of a common doctrine, UNPOL officers should be given common training sessions based on this doctrine until a satisfactory level of common understanding is achieved.

Fourth, in parallel with the findings of Karatay (2009) this study found that the adherence of police officers to the principles of DP increases as their tenure becomes longer. Therefore, UNPOL might consider paying bonuses for recruiting officers with longer tenures in UNPOL. The extra cost would likely be made up in the greater
effectiveness of the experienced officers.

Finally, the gender policy of UNPOL is important. The number of female officers is important as they address significant needs in PCEs where women and children are routinely victimized in myriad and reprehensible ways. However, the feasibility of a 50% female representation is considered to be unrealistic given the fact that the female representation is already low in national police forces of the PCCs; indeed most have female police in numbers that hardly meet domestic needs. In order to increase the proportion of females to the 50% level, PCCs would have to send most of their female officers to UNPOL. Moreover, the empirical findings, within their limits, showed that male officers are more prone to support the principles of DP. Therefore UNPOL may consider focusing their time and resources to more feasible policies and reconsider their long-term female representation strategy.

7.4. Limitations of the Study

The most significant limitation of this study is the application of convenience sampling. Due to the limitations of time and resources, the bureaucratic structure of the UN and the large scope of the study, which involved 16 ongoing missions, a probability sample could not have been drawn from the population. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized on the entire population. Due to the lack of cooperation, some of the missions could not be represented at all (i.e., the MINURCAT, UNFCYP), yet relatively sufficient numbers of participants joined from the remaining missions. The same problem was valid
for the interviews as well. Due to the difficulty of contacting with high level UNPOL officials, the respondents from the field have been recruited from only the UNMIL, UNMIT, UNAMID and UNMIS missions. Yet, the participants from the HQ, four mission managers, one legal adviser, one deputy police adviser and one knowledge management coordinator compensated for this deficiency because they knew the field very well and all of the mission managers and the deputy police adviser had several mission experiences before joining the police division of UNPOL.

Secondly, the representativeness of the sample in terms of gender was biased towards males. The population proportion for females was approximately 9% at the time of the data collection. Yet, the female proportion in the sample is 4.7%. Nevertheless, the variation of ranks, age, education and tenure of respondents may be considered sufficient.

Thirdly, the sample of this study is formed by UNPOL officers from 43 different nations. The survey was offered in the English and French languages. Therefore, issues that might rise from cultural diversity or the language skills of participants might have an impact on the validity of the study. Yet, taking into consideration this probability the survey questionnaire was developed to be as short and simple as possible. In addition to that a pilot test was applied on 66 UNPOL officers to detect the problems in the questionnaire. Based on the feedback from respondents, several changes were made in the questionnaire. Therefore, it can be claimed that the pilot helped improve the quality
and validity of the survey considerably.

Fourthly, the highly positive support on both OL and DP items in the survey might stem from social desirability bias (Dillman et al., 2009) as mentioned earlier. Given the multi-national organizational structure of the UNPOL, officers might have responded to the items in a manner which they may think is “favorable”. This possibility was taken into consideration at the design phase and negatively worded items were placed in each section to encounter this tendency. The results show that the wording of questions might have an impact on the responses yet the extent of this impact cannot be detected because each statement might be interpreted differently from different aspects. Also, the survey was not the only data collection method of this study. The validity of the responses was also cross-checked through the qualitative data and secondary sources.

Finally, drawing on the existing literature, the items measuring DP were constructed based on the most general definitions available (Bayley, 2006; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2008; Marenin, 2005) and most important components were explicitly addressed, such as accountability, transparency, rule of law and civil oversight of the police as an institution in a democratic society. Thus, the findings are subject to the problem of measuring complex phenomena such as both OL and DP through survey items and composite variables constructed through factor analyses. The two empirical models, therefore, should be treated as trial models for determining the factors contributing to OL and DP in UNPOL missions. It should be noted though, that the
findings of these models mostly concurred with and were explained by the findings of interviews. Post-regression diagnostics and multiple types of models also supported the findings of the models.

7.5. Suggestions for Future Research

This study adopted a mixed-methods approach to explore the state of OL and DP in UNPOL missions. All of the findings presented in this study are based on the data collected from UNPOL officers and managers. Other studies based on the data from local actors would contribute to the completion of the picture.

Secondly, this study attempted to collect data from all of the UNPOL missions. This was difficult to implement in terms of time and resources. Other studies ad hoc to a single mission on the same issues could produce more compact results.

Thirdly, it was found in this study that the operational aspect of DP is weak at least within the international policing context. Although DP was presented as a more developed form of community policing (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006) it has yet to be understood and implemented as an actual type of “policing”. More studies are needed, therefore, to clarify the elements of democratic policing in a form that can be applied in the field. More development of DP as a doctrine and theory which can be translated into training and developed into organizations which can support this implementation is also needed in the future.

Finally, the findings of this study produced new hypotheses that need further
testing through research and the collection of empirical data. The most important finding that needs further research is the relationship between OL and DP. Data from more representative samples would shed more light on the link found in this study.

Appendix A- The Interview Questionnaire

Human Security

The overall aim of international interventions was identified to be peace-building which refers to restoration of political, social and economic institutions of the conflict-torn country and building the state capacity to facilitate the functioning of these institutions without help from abroad. However, establishing security is a crucial precondition before launching these institutional reforms. The security paradigm also changed in parallel with the mass-democratization after the end of the cold war, the new paradigm is “human security” that was first introduced by the UNDP in 1994 in parallel with the mass democratization across the globe; later on, it was supported by major international organizations such as the OECD, EU. The notion basically emphasizes the security of individuals over security of states. Within this frame:

1- In specific, what strategies does the DPKO follow to implement the Human Security notion in PCEs? What are the factors facilitating and inhibiting the implementation of the Human security in PCEs? How successful is the DPKO’s police division in implementing this notion

Democratic Policing

As you know, the principles of democratic policing were first codified by the UN (UNCIVPOL) in the Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 and were universally accepted by several international organizations and unions shortly. Also, reforming police within the frame of democratic policing principles was considered a significant component of socio-economic development in Post Conflict Environments (PCEs). The term was also mentioned in the Brahimi report in 2000.
2-Given these facts, what would you like to say about the implementation of DP principles by the UN police in PCEs so far? What are the factors facilitating and inhibiting the implementation of the DP principals in PCEs? What are the successes (example) and failures (example) of the DPKO in terms of the implementation of the DP principals?

Organizational Structure

UN hires police officers from some 85 countries. Each of these countries has different policing applications and cultures. Also, the top 10 police contributor countries mostly have poor records in terms of Human Rights, democracy and fight with corruption.

3- How does this multi-national and multi-cultural structure of the UN police missions affect the implementation of democracy and human rights principles in PCEs?

Training

Police training is emphasized as one of the most important tools for success in PCEs. Also, most of policy recommendations focus on improving police traning.

4- Can you tell me more about the training activities of UNPOL on its police and on local police?

Environment/culture

Based on the preliminary results of my survey, the respondents mostly indicate three factors to be diminishing their motivations: 1- discrimination in distribution of posts and 2- nonchalant colleagues; On the other hand they mention gaining international experience, income, good working conditions and helping humanity as the factors to be enhancing their motivations

5- What would you say about these factors? Do you agree or disagree?
Organizational Learning: Knowledge Creation

As you know, policing is a both theoretical and practical field. In such experience-intense occupations, lots of knowledge is accumulated in the brains of the personnel. This type of knowledge is called tacit knowledge. Organizations are supposed to extract the tacit knowledge from their employees and turn it into organizational procedures, rules etc. to become learning organizations. Also, in the survey a great majority of the respondents indicated that they gained considerable knowledge and experience during their missions. In this context,

6- In general, what does the DPKO do to extract the knowledge and experience accumulated in the minds of the police officers during the mission? How does the permanent circulation of personnel affect organizational learning?

OL: Appreciative Inquiry

In the field of organizational change, there is an approach called appreciative inquiry, which aims to extract the peak experiences of employees regarding a certain topic through the 4-D cycle method. In sum, this process includes a series of workshops, that can be both informal or formal, that ideally includes every single member of the target group to tell stories about achievements and positive outcomes they have experienced in the past to reveal the blueprints of success in the organization, think about what might be the foolproof practice of the past achievements in the future, what could be done to realize these dreams and finally formation of teams to achieve this goal.

7- What would you think of the beneficiary of the AI and the 4-D cycle in the UN police missions?

OL: Communities of Practice

When the OL efforts of the DPKO is analyzed it is seen that as a consequence of the increased demand for peace operations, need for organizational learning emerged in the mid-90s, and the policy analysis and lessons learned unit was established under the DPKO in 1995. Later, in 2001, based on the suggestions mentioned in the Brahimi report, the policy analysis and lessons learned unit was restructured into a new unit named Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. In 2006, peace-building support office (PBSO) was established to develop best practices in peace-building operations. The DPKO uses an intranet based community of practice to share knowledge and experience across missions.
Given these facts, it can be argued that the DPKO tries to create and implement a strong knowledge creating mechanism through the best practices and lessons learned; and they use the community of practice as a tool.

8-How successful is the DPKO in implementation of this in practice within the police context?

**OL: Action Research**

Finally, another approach to organizational learning assumes that environments in which organizations and individuals transact are highly uncertain and continuously changing. Organizations and individuals, hence, have to learn continuously to keep up with unstable working environments. This approach define organizational learning as “a process in which members of an organization detect errors or anomalies and correct them by restructuring organizational theory of action[formal rules, procedures, mandates that are supposed to happen], embedding the results of their inquiry into organizational maps and images” Feedback mechanisms are considered organizational procedures through which errors are detected and solutions are implemented where an “error” is the mismatch between what is supposed to happen and what actually happens. The robustness of the feedback mechanisms paves the way for an organization to become a learning organization.

9- How does the feedback mechanisms work when a mismatch occurs between what is supposed to happen in mandate/rule and what actually happens in practice in police missions? How likely is it for a new policy to be implemented- replacing an existing problematic rule, procedure or application etc. -based on the feedbacks sent from low level officers?

Thanks for your cooperation.

Do you want to make any additional points or comments?


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Policing</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police plays a very important role in the democratization of post-conflict countries</td>
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<td>Security of citizens is more important than security of the state</td>
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<tr>
<td>I know a lot about the democratic policing concept</td>
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<td>Police should take citizens’ opinions when developing security strategies</td>
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<td>Police should be subordinate to civilian authority</td>
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<td>Citizen feedback evaluating police performance will increase police efficiency</td>
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<td>There should be mechanisms within police organizations where citizens can apply to inform police misconduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>There should be external mechanisms (out of police organizations) where citizens can apply to inform police misconduct</td>
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<td>Police cannot work effectively if they have to give the account of everything they do</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicators of police performance (crime rates, response rates) should be publicly available</td>
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<td>Police community cooperation is an important element of effective policing (for example: reducing crimes)</td>
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<td>Police should work within the limits of the human rights principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laws always back (protect more than necessary) criminals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police should primarily fight with crimes rather than conducting community policing activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic regimes prevent police from being effective</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

20 SA: Strongly Agree, A: Agree, N: Neither Agree nor disagree, D: Disagree, SD: Strongly Disagree
Police should behave equally to everyone without discriminating based on race, gender, or religion.

Democracy is the best type of government.

### Organizational learning

#### 2. To what extent are you satisfied or dissatisfied with access to the following information tools during your mission?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to the internet</th>
<th>Total Satisfied (10)</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to libraries/books</td>
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</table>

#### 3. How many years minimum do you think a police officer should work in a UN police mission to be effective?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Until the mission ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

| The working environment in the UN police mission provides good opportunities to learn about policing | SA | A | N | D | SD | N/A |
| I have acquired a lot of new knowledge and experience on policing during my mission |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| The knowledge and experience I gained during the UN mission helped me to change my approach on policing |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| I think the knowledge and experience I gained during the mission is wasted because the UN does nothing to extract it from me |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| It is very difficult to change the rules, procedures or codes of policing in the UN police missions |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| Working with police officers from different cultures during the mission makes it difficult to adapt in the working environment |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| My colleagues in the UN police mission are open to changes regarding the way policing is done |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| There is conflict between the UN headquarters (New York) and fields in terms of implementing new ideas and applications in the police missions |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| I like trying new ideas at work |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| When I encounter a problem, I investigate and try to correct the underlying causes of the problem |       |   |   |   |    |     |
| When I encounter problems I always suggest solutions to my superiors |       |   |   |   |    |     |

#### 5. What would you think of the benefits (usefulness) of the following activities if they were conducted by the UN to extract your knowledge and experience on peacekeeping missions?
| Anonymous surveys through which police officers can note problems and best practices regarding the work | Totally Useless (1) | Totally Useful (10) | N/A |
| Virtual (internet or intranet) or paper based platforms for police officers to inform problems and suggest solutions |  |
| Informal meetings with 8-10 officers to talk about their stories of best experiences they gain during the missions |  |
| Internet/intranet groups through which police officers can informally share their stories on the field with friends in other missions |  |

### Police Culture and Commitment

#### 6. To what extent do you think the following actions are justifiable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Always Justifiable (1)</th>
<th>Never Justifiable (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accepting expensive presents (car, house, jewelry, etc.) from citizens in return for your service</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Covering up your colleagues' misconduct (for example not informing your superiors even if you see one of your colleague torturing a suspect)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accepting small presents from citizens in return for your service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hitting a suspect to get critical information to prevent a terrorist attack</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 7. Please rank your top 3 motivations for joining in the UN police mission (Check 1 for the most important one, 2 for the second most important one and so on))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Money</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adventure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Going Abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarianism (Helping people in need)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Improving language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Please specify here</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 8. Please type in 1-3 words what increase (enhance, stimulate, promote) your motivation the most in the UN mission

#### 9. Please type in 1-3 words what decrease (diminish, minimize, curtail) your motivation the most in the UN mission

#### 10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am proud of being a member of the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>The UN employs the best police officers of their countries</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I trust in most of my colleagues at the mission
When I am not working, I always spend my time with my fellow compatriots (friends from my country) during the mission
All of my colleagues do their best at work during the mission
The UN is only a puppet of the super powers
After the conflict (war) is stopped, military can establish internal order and enforce laws better than police in post-conflict countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Capacity, Organizational Structure and Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. How much were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the following trainings during your mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-service training (in general)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debriefings (meetings evaluating how a certain job after it ends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training on the local factors (culture, language, geography, and economy of the country you are deployed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training on democratic policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. How much were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the following facilities during your mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your salary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buildings (Police stations and other facilities)</td>
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<td>Housing facilities (Where you stay)</td>
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<td>Social facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronic communication devices (Radio, phones etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical Personnel</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have had a comfortable and convenient working environment during the mission</td>
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<td>My duties are defined clearly enough. So I know what I am supposed to do at work</td>
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<tr>
<td>In general, I am pleased with the operation of duties and tasks in the mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>My job in the mission gives me the opportunity to be creative in my work</td>
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<tr>
<td>My Superiors (police chiefs/commanders) are open to changes</td>
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<td>My Superiors encourage the personnel to express their opinions without hesitation during the mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>My superiors encourage the personnel to use discretion when necessary</td>
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<tr>
<td>My superiors in the mission are open to developing informal relations with their staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am frequently given feedback by my superiors on my job performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have always felt the existence of a strong leadership at the UN police mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>My superiors know how to motivate their personnel in the duty</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that I have much more knowledge and experience on policing than my superiors in the mission</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level positions are given based on political factors rather than merit (knowledge and experience) in the UN police missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. How would you define the strictness of relations between high and low level officers in the mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strictness of relationships (hierarchy) between high and low level officers</th>
<th>Very Loose (1)</th>
<th>Very Strict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

15. Have you ever heard of the expression "ENJOY THE MISSION"?

Yes  No

16. In 1-3 words, what does the phrase "enjoy the mission" bring to your mind? (please type in)

Local Issues

17. Which of the below characteristics do you think is the most important to have in common with the local people of the country you work during the UN mission?

Religion History Race  Border Language  Culture  Other please specify here

18. Which of the below characteristics did you have in common with the local people of the country you work during the UN mission? (Please check all that apply)

Religion History Race  Border Language  Culture  Other please specify here
19. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local politicians’ intervention in the police work hindered police from communicating with the local people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local people cannot be trusted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The presence of common values (religion, language, ethnicity) between the UN police and local population is very important for effective policing in post-conflict countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local police in my mission cannot be trusted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the conflict is too severe the UN police cannot develop close relations with the local people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UN uses the local media very effectively to gain the support of local people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. How would you identify the attitude of the following local groups on the UN police?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Citizens</th>
<th>Hostile(1)</th>
<th>Friendly (10)</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personal Information

21. What mission(s) did you participate in?  

22. How many years of previous work experience did you have when you have entered the UN mission?  

23. What is your current rank? (enter 1 if you are at the the lowest rank in your police force, 2 for next to the lowest rank, so on)  

24. What age group do you belong to?  

25. What is your marital status?  

26. What is your gender?  

27. What country are you from? (Please type in)  

28. How many months have you been deployed in the mission?  

29. How many years of school have you completed?  

30. Thanks for taking the survey. Please specify below any additional thoughts regarding the survey.
## Appendix C - The Survey Questionnaire (French)

### 1. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou pas d'accord avec les déclarations suivantes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Déclaration</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La police joue un rôle très important pour la démocratisation dans les pays post-conflits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La sécurité des citoyens est plus importante que la sécurité de l'état</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Je suis très au courant du concept de maintien de l’ordre démocratique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La police devrait tenir compte des avis des citoyens quand on conçoit des stratégies sécuritaires</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La police devrait être subordonnée à l’autorité civile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les commentaires des citoyens évaluant la performance de la police augmenteront l’efficacité de la police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il devrait y avoir des mécanismes au sein des organisations de police permettant aux citoyens de déclarer la mauvaise conduite de la police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il devrait y avoir des mécanismes extérieurs (hors organisations de polices) permettant aux citoyens de déclarer la mauvaise conduite de la police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La police ne peut pas travailler efficacement si elle doit déclarer tout ce qu’elle fait</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les indicateurs de la performance de la police (taux de crimes, taux de réponse) devraient être disponibles publiquement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La coopération entre la communauté et la police est un élément important du maintien de l’ordre efficace (par exemple pour la réduction des crimes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La police devrait travailler respecter les principes des droits de l’homme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les lois soutiennent toujours (=protègent plus que nécessaire) les criminels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La police devrait se concentrer surtout sur la lutte anti crime plutôt que de mener des activités d’ilotage de la communauté</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

21 AT: Accord Total, A: Accord, N: Ni accord ni disaccord, D: Disaccord, DT: Disaccord Total
Les régimes démocratiques empêchent la police d’être efficace

La police devrait se comporter de façon égale sans discrimination envers chaque personne, quels que soient sa race, son sexe et sa religion.

La démocratie est le meilleur type de gouvernement

### Apprentissage organisationnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous satisfait ou insatisfait de l’accès aux outils d’information suivants durant votre mission?</th>
<th>Complètement Insatisfait (1)</th>
<th>Complètement Satisfait (10)</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accès à l’Internet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accès à la TV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accès aux Bibliothèques / Livres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Selon vous, combien d’années au minimum est-ce qu’un officier de maintien de l’ordre devrait travailler pour une mission de maintien de l’ordre pour être efficace?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Jusqu’à ce que la mission se termine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord ou pas d’accord avec les déclarations suivantes ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L’environnement de travail de la mission de maintien de l’ordre onusienne fournit de bonnes opportunités d’apprendre le maintien de l’ordre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J’ai acquis beaucoup de nouvelles connaissances et expériences concernant le maintien de l’ordre durant ma mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les connaissances et expériences acquises durant la mission onusienne m’ont aidé à changer mon approche de la gestion policière</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Je pense que les connaissances et l’expérience acquises durant la mission sont gaspillées parce que l’ONU ne fait rien pour en tirer parti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il est très difficile de changer les règlements, procédures et codes de maintien de l’ordre dans les missions de maintien de l’ordre onusiennes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travailler avec des officiers de police de culture différente durant la mission présente des difficultés pour s’adapter à l’environnement de travail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes collègues de la mission de maintien de l’ordre onusienne sont ouverts aux changements concernant la</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

308
façon de maintenir l’ordre
Il y a des conflits entre le quartier-général de l’ONU (New-York) et le terrain en ce qui concerne l’application de nouvelles idées et applications dans les missions de maintien de l’ordre

J’aime tester de nouvelles idées au travail
Quand je rencontre un problème, je fais des recherches et essaie de corriger les causes sous-jacentes du problème
Quand je rencontre des problèmes, je suggère toujours des solutions à mes supérieurs

5. Selon vous, quels seraient les bénéfices (l’utilité) des activités suivantes si elles étaient menées par l’ONU pour obtenir des connaissances et de l’expérience concernant les missions de maintien de la paix ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activité</th>
<th>Complètement Inutiles (1)</th>
<th>Complètement Utiles (10)</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sondages anonymes par lesquels les officiers de maintien de l’ordre peuvent noter des problèmes et meilleures pratiques concernant le travail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateformes virtuelles (inter ou intranet) ou imprimées permettant aux officiers de maintien de l’ordre d’alérer des problèmes et de proposer des solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rencontres informelles avec 8-10 officiers pour parler des meilleures expériences qu’ils ont retirées de leur mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groupes Internet/intranet par lesquels les officiers de maintien de l’ordre peuvent partager leurs histoires sur le terrain de façon informelle avec des amis d’autres missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Culture et engagement des forces de maintien de l’ordre**

6. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que les actions suivantes sont justifiables?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Toujours Justifiables (1)</th>
<th>Jamais Justifiables (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accepter des cadeaux chers (voiture, maison, bijoux etc.) des citoyens en échange de services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacher la mauvaise conduite de vos collègues (par exemple ne pas informer vos supérieurs même si vous voyez un de vos collègues torturer un suspect)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepter de petits cadeaux des citoyens en échange de vos services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frapper un suspect pour obtenir des informations vitales afin d’empêcher un attentat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Veuillez indiquer vos trois motivations principales pour rejoindre une mission de
maintien de l’ordre de l’ONU (Indiquez 1 pour la plus importante et ainsi de suite)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrière</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aventure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyages à l’étranger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarisme (Aider les gens dans le besoin)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expérience Internationale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amélioration de vos niveaux de langue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autres Veuillez spécifier ici</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Veuillez indiquer en 1 à 3 mots ce qui augmente (accroît, stimule, promeut) le plus votre motivation dans la mission de l’ONU

9. Veuillez indiquer en 1 à 3 mots ce qui décroît (baisse, diminue, limite) le plus votre motivation dans la mission de l’ONU

10. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord ou pas d’accord avec les déclarations suivantes ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AT</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>N/ A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Je suis fier d’être membre de l’ONU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’ONU emploie les meilleurs officiers de maintien de l’ordre de leurs pays</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Je fais confiance en la plupart de mes collègues de la mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quand je ne travaille pas, je passe toujours mon temps avec mes compatriotes (amis de votre pays) durant la mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tous mes collègues font de leur mieux durant la mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’ONU n’est qu’une marionnette des superpuissances</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>À la fin du conflit (guerre), l’armée peut établir l’ordre interne et appliquer les lois mieux que la police dans les pays post-conflits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capacité Technique, Structure Organisationnelle et Leadership

11. Dans quelle mesure étiez-vous satisfait ou insatisfait des formations suivantes durant votre mission ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totalement Insatisfait (1)</th>
<th>Totalement Satisfait (10)</th>
<th>N/ A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formation durant le service (en général)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyses de situations (rencontres pour évaluer un certain travail, une fois celui-ci terminé)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation en droits de l’homme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation en facteurs locaux (culture, langue, géographie et économie du pays où vous êtes déployé)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation en maintien de l’ordre démocratique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Dans quelle mesure êtiez-vous satisfait ou insatisfait des formations suivantes durant votre mission?</td>
<td>Totalement Insatisfait (1)</td>
<td>Totalement Satisfait (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votre salaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bâtiments (Commissariats ou autres centres)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logement (votre domicile)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres sociaux</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Véhicules</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinateurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systèmes d’Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyens de communication électronique (Radio, téléphones)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel technique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord ou pas d'accord avec les déclarations suivantes ?</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J’ai eu un environnement de travail confortable et pratique durant ma mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes tâches sont assez clairement définies. Donc, je sais ce que je suis censé faire au travail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En général, je suis content de la façon dont les devoirs et tâches sont accomplis dans la mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon travail dans la mission me donne l’opportunité d’être créatif dans mon travail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes supérieurs (chefs de maintien de l’ordre / commandeurs) sont ouverts aux changements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes supérieurs encouragent le personnel à exprimer leurs opinions sans hésitations durant la mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes supérieurs encouragent le personnel à être discrets le cas échéant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes supérieurs dans la mission sont ouverts aux relations informelles avec leur personnel</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes supérieurs me donnent souvent du feedback concernant ma performance au travail</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J’ai toujours eu l’impression qu’il existe un leadership fort à la mission de maintien de l’ordre de l’UN</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes supérieurs savent comment motiver leur personnel au travail</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Je crois que j’ai beaucoup plus de connaissances et d’expérience concernant le maintien de l’ordre que mes supérieurs dans la mission</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les postes de haut niveau sont octroyés sur la base de facteurs politiques plutôt que le mérite (connaissances et expérience) dans les missions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. Comment qualifieriez-vous le niveau de relations entre les officiers de haut et bas niveau de la mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations avec la hiérarchie entre les officiers de bas et haut niveau</th>
<th>Très Détesté (1)</th>
<th>Très strict (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

15. Avez-vous jamais entendu cette expression "Bonne mission" (ENJOY THE MISSION) ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUI</th>
<th>NON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

16. En 1-3 mots, que signifie pour vous l’expression « Bonne mission » ? (notez votre réponse)

Questions locales

17. Selon vous, lesquelles des caractéristiques ci-dessous sont les plus importantes à partager avec les gens de communauté du pays où vous travaillez durant votre mission ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Histoire</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Frontière</th>
<th>Langue</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Autres</th>
<th>Veuillez spécifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

18. Lesquelles des caractéristiques suivantes aviez-vous en commun avec la communauté locale du pays de votre dernière mission onusienne ? (Veuillez indiquer les réponses pertinentes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Histoire</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Frontière</th>
<th>Langue</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Autres</th>
<th>Veuillez spécifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

19. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d’accord ou pas d’accord avec les déclarations suivantes ?

| Si le conflit n’est pas trop sévère, la force de maintien de l’ordre de l’ONU peut avoir des relations proches avec la population locale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| L’ONU utilise les média locaux très efficacement pour obtenir le soutien des habitants locaux |
| La présence de valeurs communes (religion, langue, ethnicité) entre la force de maintien de l’ordre de l’ONU et la population locale est très importante pour le maintien de l’ordre efficace dans les pays postconflits |
| On ne peut pas faire confiance aux personnes locales |
| La police locale dans la mission n’est pas digne de confiance |
| L’intervention des politiciens locaux dans le travail de la police empêche la police de communiquer avec la communauté locale |

| AT | A | N | D | DT | N/A |

20. Comment caractériseriez-vous l’attitude l’attitude des groupes locaux suivants envers les forces de maintien de l’ordre de l’ONU ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostile (1)</th>
<th>Amical (10)</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Informations personnelles
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. A quelles mission(s) avez-vous participé ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Combien d’années d’expérience de travail précédente aviez-vous quand vous avez rejoint l’ONU ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Quel est votre rang actuel ? (1 si vous êtes au rang le plus bas de votre force de maintien de la paix et ainsi de suite)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. A quel group d’âge appartenez-vous ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Quel est votre statut marital ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. De quel sexe êtes-vous ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. De quel pays êtes-vous ? (Indiquez le nom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Depuis combien de mois êtes-vous déployé pour cette mission ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Combien d’années d’école avez-vous terminées ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References
References


Experts in Peace Operations. New York: UNDPKO.


Forge Press.


DFS.


Curriculum Vitae

Kutluer Karademir earned his B.A. from Turkish Police Academy in 2000. He was graduated from the Master of International Service program of the American University in 2007, and started the PhD program at the School of Public Policy in GMU the same year. He is currently working for the Turkish National Police as a major.