“EGYPT’S SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.”

By

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“Egypt’s Second Republic and the Muslim Brotherhood.”

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Abstract

“EGYPT’S SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.”
Ahmed Sherif Dakrory, M.S., M.A.
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Thesis Director: Dr. Derek Lutterbeck

This thesis describes the consequences of the mass uprisings in Egypt in January, 2011, that led to a revolution that still going on with all its furious events for almost three years.

When I choose this subject I was trying to understand through two years and a half, how the political scene was changing dramatically from incident to another.

When the first elected president came to power, every Egyptian had an aspiration of a new era of freedom and dignity. However, for almost a year, the new elected president along with his party of the Muslim brotherhood didn’t achieve any of those aspirations. Some argued it’s the new religious fascist regime; others argued that it’s the old forces of the former regime that’s trying to fight back the reformations, in order to still exist on the ground.
There is only one fact that I believe in and it was the driving force behind this project, it is that the Egyptian people are unpredictable, where nothing is expected or predict with Egypt and certainly after the downfall of “Morsi on July 3rd, 2013.
Introduction

Research question:

To what extent has the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to the establishment of a civilian authoritarian regime?

Introduction:

During the Egyptian revolution on 25 January 2011, all the Egyptians from different sectors of the society, different social classes, were all united for one goal, they all wanted the removal of Mubarak’s regime, they all wanted to build a new Egypt where all the Egyptians have their freedom of being represented in the government and they all wanted to have a new strong Egypt recalling by that their past pride throughout the history of Egypt.

All the protesters carried united slogans such as “be proud you are an Egyptian”, “heads up you are an Egyptian”, “one hand”, “people demand the removal of the regime” and “step-down” as a sign for Mubarak to leave his office. They were fighting against the corruption in the police institution which was one of the main sources of the main grievances of the protestors; it was the main tool of the former regime to ensure its
own interest and stability and not to ensure the security of the people as it’s supposed to be the main aim of such an institution. Another institution came to the picture during the revolution events; it was the military institution which was called to retrieve the domestic security and the order of law as a result of the total chaos in the streets following the chaotic withdrawal of the police forces and leaving the state establishments unsecured. The revolution succeeded in the removal of Mubarak’s regime but it didn’t end, the Egyptians still want to build their new state with its new institutions, but here comes the question which is who is going to lead the process of change? Can it through the democratic way of electing some who can do that?

The division between the Egyptians came when the process of who is going to lead began. Here came different demands of different parties of how the state institutions should be formed? And how the constitution should be formed?

The majority of the Egyptians are convinced even the intellectuals that Egypt is facing an ideological conflict of governing the state. However, this is the common trend now in Egypt, my research project is concentrating on whether there is a policy reformation in the state institutions or not, and if there is a change, where this change is going to lead the country to.

The military institution in Egypt acquired a very unique position in the consecutive regimes of the first republic, since it is considered the founder of the republic. This unique position is manifested in the military’s economy, which isn’t subject to any kind
of state scrutiny. Given this lack of transparency experts ranges the size of military’s economy from 5 to 15 per cent of Egypt’s gross domestic product. Furthermore, the military trials of civilians and the codes of military’s law which prohibits trying military officers accused of committing a crime in front of civilian judicial courts. Thus, the military through what would be presented in this research, reaches the extent of having its own state within the state of Egypt.

Many have argued that the military wouldn’t be willing to let the establishment of democratic regime. Their argument was based upon the claim that a new democratically elected regime would exert civilian control over the military, diminishing many of its immunities of military trials and subjecting its economy to state scrutiny, which might lead to some sort of investigations about corrupted officers, who might use these privileges for their own interests. Therefore, it was eager for me to present the military as a main primary actor in this study.

The military institution presented in the supreme military council ruled Egypt for a transitional period for more than a year. During this period, there were a lot of demonstrations from many parties which can be divided into the Islamic parties (Muslim brotherhood, Muslim Salafists) and the Secular parties (youth revolutionary movements, socialist/liberal parties), they weren’t united for the same aim because the Islamic parties were much concerned with legislative and executive elections while the other secular parties were much concerned about the transitional period as they had
their doubts that the Egyptian army isn’t willing to let secular parties take over the authority in Egypt in which this was the main goal behind the revolution to end the authoritarian rule (the rule of army generals since 1952).

Another primary actor, The Muslim brotherhood, which has proved through the last two years in many different occasions that they are able of mobilizing different sectors of the society to vote for their party in the elections through the use of the religious tool. They also proved that they are able of confronting many of the state institutions which were opposing their policies. This can lead us to identify the Muslim brotherhood as a state within the state which if it’s true would be a great threaten to the new republic of Egypt.

The Muslim brotherhood is no more a clandestine group which works under the ground but it formed its political party “the justice and freedom party”. This political party is now the governing party in Egypt which is supposed to be the one leading the process of policy reformation and fulfilling many of the demands of the revolution. However, many of the Egyptian intellectuals are demonstrating that the policies of the Muslim brotherhood are the same policies of the former regime but disguised under a ‘religious cover’. They argue that the Muslim brotherhood is not in favor of reforming state institutions in a way that could oppose its policies. They also argue that the Muslim brotherhood’s policies would lead to the establishment of a new religious dictatorship that would control the second republic in Egypt.
A democratic election brought the current president from the Muslim brotherhood party with 51 per cent in June 2012. The new president “Dr.Morsi” from the Muslim brotherhood gave promises of forming a coalition government of all political parties to be presented and this government will work on the setting of the new constitution, and also will work on managing and administrating fair elections to form the new legislative power.

The new president managed to overthrow the top leaders of the military in a famous incident. In July 2012, one of the eastern border checkpoints faced a terrorist attack resulting in the death of 16 soldiers of the Egyptian, an incident that humiliated the Egyptian military history since the Egyptian army hasn’t faced such a number of casualties in decades. Dr. Morsi overthrew the top leaders arguing that they are not capable of carrying the responsibility of the military institution. However, investigations were opened to reveal those who were responsible for the attack; no results have been issued up to this date (almost a year since the attack was done).

In November 2012, the new president issued a new constitutional declaration that gave him absolute authority creating a new pharaoh in Egypt. In this declaration, he fortified all his previous declarations and legislations from judicial supervision, also fortified the Shoura council (the lower branch of the legislative authority, majority of the Muslim brotherhood) from the any decisions from the supreme constitutional court which might dissolve it as well as the people’s assembly ( both of them were elected upon the
same unconstitutional legislation). In addition to that, he dismissed the Attorney General and replaced him by another one appointed by him directly without putting in consideration the supreme judicial council which was supposed to elect a new Attorney General as in any democratic regime.

The policy of the new elected president along with the Muslim brotherhood, created an indirect confrontation between the newly elected executive authority and the judicial authority. It was clear that the judicial authority suffered from corruption and intervention from the executive authority, in order to guarantee the security of the heads of the regime without facing any judicial trials upon breaching the law. However, the confrontation between the judicial authority and the newly elected executive authority made it impossible of carrying a gradual reformation policy that aim of restructuring the judicial branch. Thus the judicial branch will be presented as secondary actor in our study.

The new constitutional declaration faced furious anger from the opposition leading to massive protests and violent incidents. The famous protests of “El-ETHADAYA Palace” (the federal palace and the permanent residence of the president of Egypt) led to one of the most violent protests that Egypt has witnessed since the revolution in 2011. This time, the clashes weren’t between the Egyptian police and protestors but between the opposition and supporters of the new president.
The confrontation between the Muslim brotherhood and the opposition continued after this event to be more furious and violent. Thus, the brotherhood which demonstrated through the one year and half to be the major political party on the ground, given its hostile relation with the military since it was officially banned from political practicing in 1954, would for these reasons be the other main primary actors in this study.

The youth movements as secondary actors in the transition period were yet ineffective in changing any of the policies of the interim governments or the policies of the Muslim brotherhood when they acquired top leadership in June 2012. However, they continued their revolutionary wave through the continuous presence in the streets by increasing their demonstrations in almost all the governorates of Egypt. “Tamrod campaign” could be used as an example of how the youth revolutionary movements developed through almost two years of the first wave of the Egyptian revolution on the 25th of January 2011.

The Egyptian revolution was calling for a change. A change to the better where people will enjoy their freedom and being respected as full citizens of the state whatever their religion, race or ethnicity. Almost three years have passed since the revolution broke out in Egypt, and still instability in the political, economic and social sectors in the state is continuing to the worse. The Egyptian state now is facing a “stateness problem” (a problem where some accuse the others of not belonging to the same state just for their
religion or ideological belief), this might lead to the fall of the state itself. A fall that if happened will threaten the whole entire region.

**The research hypothesis:**

The Muslim brotherhood aimed at the establishment of a new civilian authoritarian regime with Islamic features obtaining legitimacy through the ballot box and the appliance of “political Islamic thoughts” as a mobilizing ideology of such a regime, assuming that the brotherhood and the military developed a collaborating relationship for two main reasons. The first is the need of the military to gain the support of the newly elected former president Morsi (representing the Muslim brotherhood) to maintain its immunities of being unchecked, the economic privileges gained from the former consecutive regimes in the first republic and its continuity in controlling Egypt’s security policy to a certain extent. The second reason would be the need of the Muslim brotherhood via the president to secure an alliance with the military institution in order to maintain political stability in strategic locations in times of mass uprisings through the military. It was considered as a win-win situation!

Through this research, we will prove the validity or the falseness of this hypothesis, by presenting materials on the Muslim brotherhood and their policies of political reformation in Egypt post revolution, along with the role of the military institution (besides the police as subordinated institution to the military one) in transition period
that preceded the revolution in January, and their role during the time where the Muslim brotherhood was in power. Both are regarded to be the main primary actors in our research project.

Two other secondary actors were affecting the roles of the primary ones in the fields of transitional justice, and this related to the judicial branch, and the revolutionary movement through the presentation of the role of “Tamrod Campaign” which lead afterwards to the down-fall of the brotherhood’s regime on the 3rd of July, 2013.

**The time framework of the study:**

The time framework will be divided into two main parts subdivided by other two parts.

The first main part will be discussing the role of the military institution in leading the transitional period; the first subdivision part began from February 2011 till January 2012 in which the military institution represented in its high supreme council led the state with both legislative and executive authority. The second subdivision part began from January 2012 till June 2012 (the elections of a new legislative body through which the brotherhood gained almost more than 40% of the parliament and the elections of presidency).

The second main part will be discussing the role of the Muslim brotherhood in leading the first year of the pre-supposed second republic in Egypt. The first subdivision part began from June 2012 till December 2012, in which the high supreme council was almost all eliminated except the current defense minister (the former head of military
intelligence), drafting a debatable constitution for Egypt accepted by 63% in a public referendum and the conflict between the former president Morsi and the judicial branch. The second subdivision part began from January 2013 to June 2013, in which it witnessed the rise in the revolutionary movement through more alienation of other political parties from presentation in the government and the role of “Tamrod campaign”.

In order to test my research hypothesis and the roles of both primary and secondary actors, I chose this time framework to give a comprehensive presentation of those actors besides testing my research hypothesis.

The research plan:

The first chapter will be a theoretical framework, in which it will present in the first part the features of the five common non-democratic regimes and a Democratic consolidated one so as to define the former regime in Egypt, understand its nature and the role of the military institution specifically as well. It is also mentioned in it the direct and indirect role of the context of the transitional periods (primary actors specifically).

In the second part, I would demonstrate some theoretical framework to understand the response of the Egyptian military to the uprising in January and to the new elected civil president, and how it affected the policies of the new regime of Morsi.

In the third part, I demonstrated some ideas of Islamic reformists in political Islam to have a theoretical framework to prove whether the Muslim brotherhood is an
ideologically based group or political social group seeking acquisition of political power through a religious mean.

In the fourth part, it will demonstrate a small identification of the Egyptian case as an introductory to the second chapter.

The second chapter will contain the material gathered on the primary actors (the brotherhood, the military and police) secondary actors (judicial branch and revolutionary youth movements) of the transitional period.

The third chapter will include two parts. The first part is for what I will conclude from applying the theoretical approach on the material gathered in the second chapter to conclude whether the transitional period is leading to a democratic or a non-democratic regime along with the second part which will contain the crucial incidents that happened throughout the two years from January 2012 till June 2013, which affect both primary and secondary actors.

The scope of the study:

My research is studying how the Muslim brotherhood tried to break the revolutionary stream through the legitimacy of the ballot box along with the Egyptian military which ruled Egypt for transition period.
Its scope is concentrated on the political aspects of the case of Egypt-post revolution; however an economic factor would enhance the validity of my hypothesis. Thus, some economic material will be presented with some details, without any detailed scope over the economic dimension of Egypt-post revolution.
Chapter one

The literature reviews

This chapter will consist of two main parts.

- The first part would demonstrate the features of democratic and non-democratic regimes, the implications of transitional periods and the role of main actors in the transitional periods of the regimes.

- The second part will discuss the response of the military to mass uprisings and its relation to the society.

- The third part would present some of the ideas of Islamic reformists in political Islam.

- The third part would present an introductory identification of the political regimes in Egypt before the revolution in 2011, as a case study in our research.

Part 1
The transition from non-democratic regimes to democratic regimes:

In countries which witness transitions from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one, in such a period we have to differentiate between democratization and liberalization as two important notions which control the transition period.

Liberalization is the process of freedom in total, but in detail it’s a mix between political, social and economic changes. Where there should be more autonomous civil society, less censorship over the media, the people participate in regulating the rules and laws. Democratization is part of the liberalization process in the political aspect. As it requires free elections to elect the executive and legislative power and that the people are the main source of power.
Therefore, in the transitions period of political regimes the process of democratization will be the main focus of study. A regime is a consolidated democratic one through:

- **Behaviorally**: when there is no social, economic or institutional actor that can achieve its objective through inappropriate means whether violence, foreign intervention or creating a non-democratic regime. In other words, when there is local actor can obtain its objective without depending on his own people.

- **Attitudinal**: when a strong majority of the people believe in the democratic procedures and institutions to govern the society.

- **Constitutional**: when all governmental and non-governmental actors are subject to the belief that resolving any internal or external conflicts through regulations and procedures which were democratically legislated by the regime.

These are the pillars on which any democratic consolidated regimes should depend on in building the political regime. However, those pillars give an implication that democratization process cannot be achieved without working on the liberalization process in two parallel paths. The behavior and the attitude of the great majority of the society will not be changed without liberating it from the previous restrictions which were imposed by the former regimes. Moreover, having the great majority of the society to participate in regulations of laws through civil society organizations cannot be
achieved without giving them their freedom to operate in a peaceful environment controlled by the democratically formatted regulations and procedures.¹

There are five main fields of which we can identify a system to be a democratic consolidated one:²

- **A free civil society:** civil society organizations are the best guarantee for the people’s rights as it has the capacity to mobilize the majority of people according to its nature (civil society groups are organized by people who just work for the collective interest of the group and the society, most of the time without political preference).

- **An independent political society:** it’s the arena which the polity competes in free elections to gain the legitimate right upon constitutional basis to exercise the executive and legitimate power in controlling the state apparatus.

- **The rule of law:** it’s the basic concept on which any democratic regime should be based upon; laws and regulations should be formulated by the people through their representatives who are elected upon constitutional basis. The constitution as a social contract between the society and the governing polity should be

¹ The discussion of the three pillars of the consolidated democracy is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter one ; pages (5-6), (the johns Hopkins university press;1996).

² The discussion of five main fields of which we can identify a system to be a democratic consolidated one is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter one ; page (14), (the johns Hopkins university press;1996).
written by the will of people. This concept should be respected and hold upon by the political and civil societies which in return guarantees their autonomy.

- **An efficient state bureaucracy (apparatus):** in order to have a democratic regime, such a regime should have the ability to exercise its power efficiently on constitutional basis and according to the law. For instance, the government should be able to apply taxes and collect them and exercise its power over those who breach the law.

- **The economic society:** it’s the set of regulations on which the economic institutions are built upon. In a democratic regime, there is no extreme economic module that can be implemented. The command economy cannot exist because it does not allow the existence of a free civil society that can have its own financing resources. On the other hand, the pure free market also cannot exist in democratic regime since it does not believe in governmental goods such as education and health care. Therefore, a democratic regime is a mixture of both types that allow the citizens to be provided with the essential goods such as education or health subsidized by the government but in the same time the state doesn’t control the economy so that it can keep a space for civil organizations or other social organizations to have its own economic projects that can help both the organization and the society as long as they are abided by the law.
Before we move to identifying the types of the non-democratic regimes, we have to understand first the different problems that face the states which can result in the establishment of non-democratic regimes.³

One of the problems that can lead to a non-democratic regime is the nation-states, multinational states, and citizenship stateness problems.

In the beginning we have to differentiate between the nation and the state. First of all a nation is the collective identification of a community of people who share common identity, culture and interest. A nation isn’t a state, it doesn’t have an organizational chart or officials and it can be scattered among different states. For instance, the Muslim nation is scattered among different states and it shares many common features that give it the identity of a nation, Islam as a religion calls for the unification of the Muslim nation “al-umma” and later will tackle the issue of “al-umma” in our research to elaborate it more.

On the other hand, a state is an organized community which lives under a political system represented in an elected government that preserves the law and order. It has an organizational chart and it’s abided by the constitution to purchase the collective interest of the society. It’s the only entity that has the exclusive legitimate right to use force for the sake of implementing the law which is known as “the weberian state”.

³ The discussion of the stateness problem is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter two; pages (20-36), (the johns Hopkins university press;1996).
A state can have a unified nation as a “nation-state” or different parts of nations and it is known as “multinational state” and here comes the problem of stateness and citizenships.

The stateness problem is identified as a failure in the state itself whether through having a part of the society under the state which is considered to be part of another nation having different ethnic group put still lives in the territorial boundary of this state without being recognized as normal citizens of the state or having a citizenship but being excluded from the electoral franchise and here comes the term of “minorities”.

In transition periods to consolidated democracy, there is a strong link between the stateness problem and the democratic transition where the question of the legitimacy of the state may be a barrier in transition to democracy.

Therefore, some argue that “nation-states” are to have a better chance in transitions to democracy than “multi-national states”. As in the former it’s a nation which made the state while the latter is a state made of nations. We discussed that the stateness problem which rise from the failure of the state to include all the communities in its society in the election franchise can be a barrier to the transition to democracy and that’s why “multi-national states” have less chances in general than the “nation-states”.

On the other hand, both can have a better chance in transitions to democracy if they granted their communities equal citizenship that gives all citizens a common ground in
which the state enforces individual rights that can be done through the combination of all the collective rights of all nationalities or minorities in the state.

**The non-democratic regimes:**

In order to determine the types of non-democratic regimes, we have demonstrated the key factors that can determine the type of the regime. But before that, we need first to know what the roots of those key factors are.

Juan J. Linz wrote in his article titled “An Authoritarian regime: Spain” that in the time before the Second World War and even just after it, there were two dominant type of regimes; the totalitarian regime on one extreme and the democratic one on the other extreme. He related to the phenomena of imperialism in this time.⁴

The two dominant types shared a common thing, on which we were having colonies all over the world and mostly in Africa, Asia and South America.

After the Second World War most of these colonies were looking for their liberation. Such an aspiration would harm the interests of the colonizers. Therefore, when the liberation movement spread all over the world after the war, it led to the emergence of a new regime “an authoritarian one”. The authoritarian regime as Linez argued is this

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regime that had its own internal logic; it’s fundamentally different from the totalitarian and democratic ones.

The fundamental difference of the authoritarian regime was based upon four key factors are; pluralism, ideology, leadership and mobilization.

Juan Linz defined the authoritarian regime as “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally-ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones”.5

This definition elaborates for us four key dimensions on which we can use in defining the type of regime that’s being studied. Although, other dimensions can be included also in determining the type of the regime governing the society, these four dimensions mentioned above summarize in an easy and clear way the framework of the political regime as it focuses on three main dimensions of any governing regime:

- The political dimension (the political leadership, political pluralism).
- Economic dimension (economic pluralism).
- Social dimension (ideology and mobilization).

5 The discussion of this definition is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter three; page 38; second paragraph, (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).
It was mentioned before that there are two types of regimes; the totalitarian and the democratic ones before and till the end of Second World War as two dominant ones. Then they were intercepted with another type of regime that emerged after the second accompanying the liberation movement in the third world countries (the colonized world).

We have to put in consideration that any regime is subjected to transition periods where the type of the regime is transformed into another new regime through a transition period that may lead to a better or a worse situation depending on the new type of the regime.

Juan J.Linez and Alfred Stepan in their book “problems in democratic transition and consolidation” stated five types of political regimes that are dominant worldwide.

The five main types of the political regimes are:

- Democratic regimes
- Authoritarian regimes
- Totalitarian regimes
- Post-totalitarian regimes
- Sultanistic regimes

In order to differentiate between those different types of regimes, we will use the four key dimensions that were presented earlier so as to have a clear identification for those
regimes. Such identification can be used in understanding the type of regime being studied in any case study.\textsuperscript{6}

1. Democratic regimes:

It allows for pluralism in the economic, social and political sectors of the society which is legally protected by the constitution and the people who are the main source of any authority in the state apparatus.

Its ideology depends on the rule of the people, having the say and the will of the people represented by free contestation for authority and the rule of law.

It allows the civil society to work in a more peaceful, secure and legal environment. It gives the right for the freedom of the people to establish social organizations that can help in mobilizing the different social factions in order to participate in the political life according to the law. Such a mobilization method tolerates the peaceful gatherings of the opposition parties.

The leadership of this type of regimes is directly elected by the people in a free and fair contestation for authority. The leader should be subject to the will of the people and within the limitations of the constitution.

\textsuperscript{6} For further discussion of the different types of non-democratic regimes see Table 3.1 (Major Modern Regime Ideal types and Their Defining Characteristics) in the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter three ; pages (44-45), (the Johns Hopkins university press;1996).
2. **Authoritarian regimes:**

In these types of regimes, pluralism can be found mostly in the economic and social sectors of the society. Even in the political sector pluralism is found but not effective. There are a lot of political parties which are isolated from the political life through undemocratic legislations that are legislated by the governing party or leadership.

No distinctive ideology can be found for authoritarian regimes. However, it depends on the context where the governing elites are performing their political power. For instance, many countries in the Arab world in 1960s were governed by the ideology that’s assumed by the consensus of the top leadership as in Egypt during 1960s “Nasserism”.

Mobilization in the authoritarian regimes is weaker than that in totalitarian regimes. As in authoritarian regime the leader depending on his charismatic speeches can depend on mobilizing the emotions of the masses rather than mobilizing the masses for the sake of a certain belief or ideology.

The top leadership of the authoritarian regime could be a personal leadership such as “Nasser” in Egypt and “Castro” in Cuba. Furthermore, it could be concentrated in a small group of people in the governing elite class. They govern according to regulations and rules that are legislated through non-democratically elected representatives who reflect the interests of the governing elite or the leader of the regime not the society.
3. **Totalitarian regimes:**

Pluralism does not exist in any totalitarian regimes. One party governs the whole state which has the monopoly of all branches of authorities in the state. The official party in this type of regimes controls the economic, social and political sectors of the whole society.

One ideology controls the totalitarian regimes. This ideology tries to achieve utopian state in which all the sectors of the society should believe in and act upon it. It governs the consensus of the official party of the regime and all the individuals who are part of the state apparatus. No law or regulation can oppose or contradict with this ideology.

Mobilization in totalitarian regime is the most extensive in the five different types of regimes mentioned above. Totalitarian regimes are able to mobilize incredible masses of all factions of the society. It depends on mobilizing both the intellectual and the emotional sides of the masses.

The top leadership in the totalitarian regimes is given limitless authorities in all the sectors of the state. It’s often charismatic and able to mobilize the masses by their enthusiastic speeches. The official party is the only source for the leadership of such a type of regime. For instance, “Hitler” in Germany and “Stalin” in the Soviet Union are considered to be leaders of such a type of regime.
4. **Post-totalitarian regime:**

The post-totalitarian regime is different from both totalitarian regimes and authoritarian ones. However, it shares some similarities with the totalitarian regime in one of its phases. The post-totalitarian regimes encompass three phases in its development.

The first phase is the “Early post-totalitarian regime” in which it shares the same pluralism restrictions, utopian ideology and intensive mobilization but restricted leadership in which the leader is still from the official party but is being checked by the official party institution.7

The second phase is the “frozen post-totalitarian regime” in which it allows pluralism in the economic and social sectors of the society but still being supervised by the official party that controls the regime. It gives a space for a civil society to exist and operates in a limited political space being controlled by the official party.

The third phase is the “mature post-totalitarian regime” in which it witnesses the most significant change in the emergence of a new phenomenon in this phase. The “social pluralism” which creates opposition organizations in the civil society, also accompanied by economic pluralism in which the state planned economy co-exists with some open-market conditions. This economic pluralism creates a new social class known by the “red

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7 The discussion of the phases of the post-totalitarian regimes are driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter three; pages (42-43), (the Johns Hopkins university press;1996).
bourgeoisie”. Those red bourgeoisies are state managers in the economic sector who are opposing some of the state planned economy policies generated by the official party. However, still the official party is the dominating actor in the political sector of the society.

5. Sultanistic regimes:8

This type of regime dates back to the Ottoman Empire. Pluralism in this type of regime is prohibited in the political sector. However, pluralism in the social and economic sectors is allowed but under the supervision of the sultan. It’s the extreme form of “patrimonialism”, which means that all the state authorities flow from the hands of the sultan.

Max weber defined this type of regime in his book titled “economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology”, as “Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, Sultanism tend to arise whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master...where domination... operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism.”

The sultan in the Islamic history acquires the absolute secular power in the state, while the Caliphate acquires both the secular and religious power in the Islamic state. The ideology in this type of regime mostly depends on the religious or sacred beliefs in

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8 The discussion of the Sultanistic regime is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter three ; pages (52-54), (the Johns Hopkins university press;1996).
which the symbols of such a belief are in the hands of the top leadership of this type of regime.

The mobilization in the sultanistic regime is different from that in the totalitarian regime. It’s not extensive and institutionalized as in the totalitarian regime and that’s because of the absence of a clear ideology. However, mobilization occurs in the sultanistic regime through some unorganized or un-institutionalized groups which are directly related to the leader of this type of regime. For instance, the political clashes in Iran in 2009 and the use of the some Para-state groups to control the angry mobs is a clear example of the mobilization in this type of regimes.

The leadership in the sultanistic regime is similar to that in the totalitarian one in the aspects of the authority given to them. However, the presence of a clear distinctive ideology in the totalitarian regime gives a legitimate base for the authority of the leader. In addition to that, if we compared the leadership in the authoritarian regimes with that in the sultanistic one, we would find that authoritarian leaders depend on some stronger bureaucratic institutions of state corrupted officials such as the police or the military. In contrast, the sultan or the top leader of the sultanistic regime depends on some personal or relatives to acquire top positions in state apparatus to guarantee their loyalty to his leadership.
The implications of transitional periods:

The transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one has a lot of implications of the former on the latter.

Earlier, we mentioned the five types of regimes known by almost all of the polities. Now, we need to demonstrate the implications of termination of one regime on another type of regime (not always from a non-democratic to a democratic one), assuming that democratic consolidated regimes are not in transition to another type of regime as it is seen by many political thinkers as valuable in its concepts and sufficient for having the best type that includes the majority of the society in the political process.

Although democratic regimes are seen as the best module of regimes up till now, modern democracy now is being questioned of whether it’s still sufficient in engaging the masses in the political process or not.

For instance, the economic crisis in Spain, Greece and Italy are putting such a type of regime into question. Moreover, the events of Seattle in 1999 and how the police responded to such demonstrations aggressively and how the media was biased in their coverage of the demonstrations, is still a question that needs more elaboration to understand the shift paradigm that’s undergoing now in the world politics.

It is not our question here in the research to question the efficiency of the democratic regimes as the best type of regimes. However, we are discussing transition periods of
regimes and it is reasonable to point out the current arguments about modern democracies in the Western world specifically. We mentioned the western world specifically because it is the region where the dominant regimes are the democratically consolidated regime.

We have demonstrated earlier the four types of non-democratic regimes, and now we would demonstrate the implications of such regimes on the transition period through three main tools:

- **The interim governments**: The interim governments cannot be proposed by a non-democratic regime, so whether through a military hierarchal, non-hierarchal coup or mass protests that can lead to regime collapse.

  In application of this implication in transition from a former non-democratic regime to a democratic one, we find different circumstances according to the type of the non-democratic regime such as:

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9 The discussion of the interim governments is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter four; pages (58) table 4.2, no.2, (the Johns Hopkins University press; 1996).
**In authoritarian regimes**, it is possible to have an interim government in this type of regime because of the presence of political, social and economic pluralism. However, such pluralism isn’t effective but maybe by time it develops and attracts more factions of the society in civil organizations that can manage to hold mass uprisings and put down the regime. Moreover, personal authoritarian rule is as weak as when the top leadership falls or dies, then the regime most probably collapse or replaced by the same type while a small group governs. Therefore, transition periods of interim governments should be dedicated to the calls of the mass protests and should be under pressure or it may manage to act on revolutionary policy and ignore the demands of the masses, leading to a new non-democratic regime.

**In totalitarian regimes**, it is very rare to have an interim government that will be organizing free elections. Interim governments in this type of regimes are a result of crisis that hits the official party or the top leadership. However, leaders of interim governments may seek to be elected to have legitimized base to rule and this doesn’t ensure a democratic rule.

**In post totalitarian regimes**, this type of regimes as we have stated earlier has three phases, in the “Mature port-totalitarian regimes”, interim governments are most likely to happen given the emergence of the “red bourgeoisie” and this could lead to have a government headed by the opposition even if they are from the former regime. In both
“Early post-totalitarian” and “Frozen post totalitarian” regimes, interim governments can only happen through mass uprisings which might lead to regime collapse.

**In sultanistic regimes,** interim governments in this type of regimes, isn’t to be assured that it’s working on the transition of the regime to a democratic one, putting in consideration the lack of autonomy of the political society in type of regime. It was mentioned before that the sultan or the top leadership in type of regime depends on relatives or some of those of the elite social classes who are loyal to him to be granted the top positions in state apparatus. Those small groups who are loyal to the sultan may in mass uprisings rebel against the sultan and demand their will to change the regime into democratic one so as to be presented in the interim governments. Therefore, for a democratic transition to be successful in this type of regimes, international and domestic pressure should be maintained to pressure the interim governments to hold free elections.

- **Out-setting from ruling by a hierarchal led military:**

**In authoritarian regime,** in case of a mass uprising or any other condition that could lead the military institution overthrow the government which is “military-related”. “military-related” means that the governments in this type of regime are somehow

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10 The discussion of the Out-setting from ruling by a hierarchal led military is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter four; pages (59) table 4.2, no.4, (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).
related and gain its support from the military institution. Therefore, in case there is a mass uprising accompanied by international pressure can force the military to overthrow the government and call for “elections” to elect the new government. The military institution in this case is facing domestic and international threats in the same time over its institution, so in order to protect the institution and protect its coherence; it will be obvious that the military can give up its government.

For instance, in the case of Egypt post-revolution, the supreme council of armed forces which led the country after the fall of Mubarak’s regime, faced domestic pressure in regards to the continuous massive protests, along with international pressure when the international community supported the demands of the protests, leaving the military with no choice rather than forcing Mubarak to step down. The main reason behind this is that the military favored to sustain its position as the state’s most powerful institution, in addition to overcoming the international pressure over the state itself.

In the other regimes, the case of the direct intervention of the military institution is not likely to happen at all in those regimes. For instance, in the totalitarian regime, the official party acquired the revolutionary role through its ideology and the leader who has a very effective role leaving the military institution as an ineffective part of the policies in the regime.

In addition to that, the post totalitarian regime faces the same conditions in its early stage as the totalitarian one.
Moreover, the sultanistic regime, all the authorities flow from the sultan as the source of all the authorities in the state. In this condition, the military institution is loyal to the sultan not the state and unlikely to overthrow the sultan. However, in the time of crisis, the military can intervene to overthrow the sultan and establish a personal authoritarian rule but that depends on the characters of certain leaders in the military.

For example, “Mustafa Atatürk” and the overthrow of the sultan with the establishment of the republic of turkey gives an example of how military personals can intervene to overthrow a sultanistic regime in time of crisis as the defeat of the ottoman empire in the first world war.

**The context of the transitional periods:**

We have demonstrated above, the implications of non-democratic regime on the transition periods. However, we have to demonstrate the role of the domestic and international context through which the transitional periods occur.

The effect of the context of the transitional periods is demonstrated through presenting the role of the domestic actors and international actors (international influence on the context of the transitional periods).
The domestic condition:  

1. The direct role is presented through:

   - A Hierarchical military:

This actor exists only in the authoritarian type of regimes. In this case, the officer corps is seen to be the main influential actor in the state apparatus. In which other institutions will working for the sake of the military institution and under its supervision. Therefore, the military institution became the main institution in state, this means that other institutions still exist and functioning but not as important as the military one. The officer corps becomes integrated in many top positions in the government or the state apparatus. For instance, military officers may be granted the positions of governors, diplomats or even ministers in the government.

Thus, the military acquires a prerogative domain of controlling all the state apparatus as for its role being the defender of the state. A hierarchal military means that the military is structure is cohered; higher ranks are the leadership of the military institution. Thus, such a military even if suffered a defeat couldn’t tolerate any attempt to civilian punishment for the leadership of the military. For instance, Argentine (A hierarchal military) and Greece (A non-hierarchal military) after both suffering from a defeat on the hands of a foreign power, both sacrificed their military governments.  

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11 The discussion of the actors in the transitional periods is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter five; pages (66 to 71), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).
Here we need to understand the difference between the military as an institution and the military as a government. For officers’ corps, the military as an institution is more valuable in regards to its coherence, and its exclusive role and resources as the most powerful state apparatus. In case of Egypt, the military has its own economy out of the state’s scrutiny, something which cannot be sacrificed for sake of having a civilian control in regards to democratic transition.

On the other hand, the military as a government could be a government appointed and headed by the military’s leadership (Hierarchical) could be sacrificed more easily than the military as institution. For example, when the supreme council in Egypt faced a lot of domestic pressure to dissolve his first appointed interim government, the military actually responded to such a demand.

If we get back to the former example of argentine and Greece, the difference was in the structure of the military; however, both sacrificed their military packed governments. But when argentine was witnessing military trials for its leadership upon their human rights violations (detention and oppression), the military as an institution assumed that such trials are considered to be as an attack over the military itself that was almost leading to the collapse of the whole democratic process. As for the Egyptian case, the

\[13\] The former example is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter four; page (191; third paragraph; the sixth line), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).
supreme council of armed forces committed some human rights violations manifested in the military trials of some political activists and using brutal force that led to the death of a considerable number of protestors. Even when a new democratically elected president, was assumed of proposing those high rank officers to trials upon breaching the law, He didn’t do so. As the Muslim brotherhood were much aware that this might lead to a military rebellion against the new born regime, an issue that blew up the whole transitional justice process.\textsuperscript{14}

Before I get into the Greece case, we need to illustrate the definition of non-hierarchal military.

**A Non-Hierarchal military as Government:**

A non-hierarchal military leading the regime means that a military packed government is led by middle and small ranks of the military. Thus, a military packed government leading is the regime can be dissolved more easily than that of a hierarchical one, because the military as an institution might tolerate such an action as a punishment to those middle ranks officers for violating the hierarchical values and norms of the institution itself.

\textsuperscript{13}The former example is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter four; page (193; fourth paragraph), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).

\textsuperscript{14}Such an issue of human rights violations will be illustrated more in the following chapters, as also as the Muslim brotherhood’s position from this issue. Later, we would present the level of institutionalism of the military institution in Egypt to clarify the importance of the hierarchal norms.
Back to the former example of Greece, the military as an institution tolerated the imprisonment of the non-hierarchical leaders of the military packed government, because it was seen as a reconsolidation of the military’s Hierarchy.\textsuperscript{15}

This grape our attention to the concept that middle and small ranks in the military are less associated to the governing elite in an authoritarian rule. However, they are still having common interests with the previous regime. Therefore, the incentive for a non-hierarchical military leading the regime to support democratic transition is behind the will of the middle and small ranks in the military to re-establish its institution and replace its higher command. This can be done through the opportunity of having a democratic transition and a new government that would be more willing to replace the higher command of the military institution which was directly associated with the former regime.

\textsuperscript{15} The former example is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter four; page (193; fourth paragraph), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).
This means that democratic control of the military institution in transition from authoritarian regimes is the main task for democratic consolidation.

- **Civilian leadership:**

  Civilian led regimes are more likely to negotiate and initiate a reformation pact which can help in transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one.

  Civilian leaderships are much more linked to the society than the military or the sultanistic leaders in the other regimes. However, civilian leaders as for their integration in the society, they can manage to win the elections by non-democratic means because of their access channels to some effective factions in the society.

  Therefore, also civilian leadership cannot be guaranteed to fairly supervise the transition to democratic regimes. This requires the efficiency of the civil society and to be granted political freedom to help in mobilizing the society if the civilian leadership deviated from the transition to democratic regime.

- **Sultanistic leadership:**

  In this type of regimes, the main actors in the transition periods are hard to define them. However, the personalization of the regime in the sultan and the fusion of private and public affairs in the hand of the sultan, gives a very good opportunity to a democratic transition once the regime collapses.
The sultanistic regimes may face a crisis internally or externally that might lead to its collapse, whether through direct violence towards the ruling family of the sultan by assassination or mass uprisings of the society. Moreover, armed revolution is also to be put in consideration, even if the army leaders are from the ruling family, but still some middle or small ranks in the army in the time of sultanistic crisis may rebel against the sultan leading to the collapse of the regime.

2. **The indirect role is presented through:**

The political economy of any regime can determine its fate. It is more likely to have a transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one, assuming that most of the democratic regimes have more economic development than the non-democratic ones. A sustained economic development may lead to the growth of the middle class, which increases the aspirations of this class to have more democratic reforms.

This creates a very complicated challenge for the transitional periods. In which the regime in transition, even if democratically elected, will have to deal with the economic problems that arise from the collapse of the previous regime. If such a challenge created a block in the transitional period, then the democratically elected government may face a breakdown that can lead to its collapse. This collapse may lead to the restoration of

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16 The discussion of the political economy is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter five; pages (77 till 81), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996).
the previous regime arguing that the only solution for the economic problems is a non-democratic alternative.

The international situation in the transitional periods.  

No one can deny the importance of the international context on the transitional periods of political regimes. The international influence on the political regime can lead to some changes in the nature of the regime.

International influence can be done through three main means. Firstly, indirect intervention can be by the international community through imposing economic sanctions to pressure the regime to do more reforms. This is done through imposing sanctions on national banks, financial corporations linked with investments in the political regime being pressured and preventing the

Secondly, the international community can also impose political sanctions by isolating the regime from the international community though postponing its membership in the international organizations.

Thirdly, the direct intervention of the international community can be done through the security council of the United Nations. In this case, armed conflicts that results in human crisis such as ethnic cleansing or mass atrocities can be prevented though armed

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17 The discussion of the international context is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter five; pages (73 till 76), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996)
intervention by the Security Council in the areas of conflict. For instance, “the Libyan war 2011” when “Gaddafi” used his militias to prevent the mass uprising against his regime, the security council ordered direct intervention by the “NATO” to help stop these militias from performing mass atrocities against the people of Libya.

The concept of “zeitgeist” is a German word that refers to the concept of “the spirit of times”. In which the concept demonstrate the fact that democracy as an ideology or a type of regime is the dominant now in the international arena. Such a type of regime is seen to be the best module that every polity should apply. However, no one can guarantee that it’s the best module in our world, it’s just because it’s the age of democracy and that’s why according to the concept of “spirit of times” that democracy is seen to be the best module. In the times when socialism was being applied in many polities in the world, it was because of the “spirit of times” where socialism was a one dominant ideology at that time.¹⁸

The concept of “diffusion” gives an illustration of the domino effect. When a polity is sharing common culture, history, ideology or even language with other polities in the same region then once one of those polities faces a transition in its political regime, other regimes will be affected and may faces the same changes. This concept demonstrates the domino effect in which one polity is one domino sharing common

¹⁸ The discussion of the concept of “zeitgeist” is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter five; page (74; third paragraph), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996)
characteristics with other polities (other dominos), and once one domino falls, then most probably other dominos will fall.¹⁹

¹⁹ The discussion of the concepts of “Diffusion” is driven from the book titled, “Problems of democratic transition and consolidation; southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”, By Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, Chapter five; page (76;second paragraph), (the johns Hopkins university press; 1996)
Part II

In this part of the chapter, we would demonstrate the level of institutionalism of the military institutions in general with their relations to the society, as a factor that can help in determining the features of the transitional periods.

Two main factors affect the relation between the society and the military institution:

1. **Institutionalism**: it is a form of governance in which there is clear set of rules to regulate the affairs of a certain institution.

2. **Patrimonialism**: it is a form of governance in which the rules that regulates the affairs of the institution, are set by the leader of the institution as all the power flows directly from the leader.

Amos Perlmutter defines the state in which political decision making is heavenly influenced by the military institution, as “praetoriansim”, whether it’s directly governed by a “military governor” or indirectly influence the political process by “military arbitrator”.  

Since our research is going to tackle Egypt post-revolution, therefore we are going to present three different types of civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa, as identified by “Mehran kamrava”.

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20 The argument of Amos was driven from the book titled “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance.”, By Derek Lutterbeck, Page 11; first paragraph, Published by The Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.
The three types of civil-military relations represented by “Mehran” are:²¹

1. **Autocratic officer-politician:** in which former military leaders acquire the top leadership of the state.

2. **Tribally dependent monarchies:** in which the organized armed forces are distributed between the official army of the state not well trained or equipped, because such types of monarchies require the absolute loyalty of the armed forces to the ruling family, thus they don’t depend on the official army which normally recruits its officers from many factions of the society, which may not be loyal to the ruling tribe or family. As a result, another branch is well trained and equipped with modern weaponries is established to assure the security of the ruling family against mass uprisings. Such a branch could be the named under the national or royals guards and recruits its members from the ruling tribe, other loyal tribes or foreign mercenaries which are more loyal to the source of money. For instance, some Arab gulf monarchies as Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

3. **Dual militaries:** This type differs from the tribal monarchy, in which they are less dependent on tribal loyalty but rather on the main stream ideology, mostly exists in totalitarian or sultanistic regimes. However, it could be close in structure to the tribal monarchy armies, as in addition to the official army of the

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²¹ Those three types were driven from the book titled “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance.”, By Derek Lutterbeck, Page 12-13, Published by The Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.
state, there are equivalent armed forces or organized militias to secure the regime from any domestic disturbance. For instance, the “revolutionary guards in Iran” which is loyal to the top leadership of Iranian republic and their Para-military branch “the basage” which proved their loyalty in the oppressing the opposition demonstrations in Iran in 2009.

In time of mass uprisings, the military institution and especially in non-democratic regimes are in the position of question.

The response of the military institution to mass uprisings is affected by two main factors:

- **The relation between the military institution and the political regime:**

  In which how far the military institution is integrated in the political process and how far the military institution is institutionalized.

  “Eva Bellin” identified the relation between the military and the political regime depending on the institutionalization process of the military institution.\(^{22}\)

  To institutionalize the military institution is to have a defined set of rules and regulations that guides the career paths of the military officers and their promotion criteria, in which promotion of the officers is not dependent on their political loyalty to

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\(^{22}\) The argument of Eva Bellin was driven from the book titled “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance.”, By Derek Lutterbeck, page 13; last paragraph, Published by The Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.
the political regime or the ruling class, but rather on their performances and career achievements.

This would create a separation between the regime and the institution, in which the institution would have its own separate identity, and builds its legitimacy on the efficiency of purchasing the national interests as a whole, and not just the interests of the political regime.

On the other hand, “Patrimonialism” is the opposite of “institutionalism”, in which the military institution would be characterized by its corruption and political loyalty to the regime in power.

The “professionality” in patrimonialism doesn’t exist in which the promotion and recruitment are based on the political loyalty and not the efficiency in work.

The military institution or security institutions in patrimonialism, are in position of achieving interests of the political regime or the ruling elite, rather than that of the whole of the society.

Therefore, a high level of institutionalism of the military institution would make it more open to political reform movements, while a low level of institutionalism (high patrimonialism) would lead to the objection of the military or security apparatus to political reform movements, since in this case the institution’s interests and identity is attached with the political regime, and the abolition of the regime means the downfall of these institutions as well.
The relation between the military institution and the society: This factor focuses on the type of the army itself, whether it is a conscripted army, a professional army or a mixture of both types. Thus, it reflects the link between the officer corps and the society itself.

Conscripted armies: they are armies in which recruitment of most of its soldiers and reserve forces is based on the general conscription. Thus, creates a stronger link to the society in whole than that of the professional army.

Professional armies: they are armies which depend in their recruitment on the professionality of its officers, might recruit foreign soldiers as well. This type of armies are more separated from the society, since they accept foreign soldiers, moreover they are found more in tribal and dual militaries typologies which recruit their members from certain loyal tribes or parties in connection with the regime.

23 The difference between both types of armies is driven from the book titled “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance.”, By Derek Lutterbeck, Page 15-16-17, Published by The Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.
There are two main schools regarding the military professionality and conscription:  

According to Samuel Huntington, there should be applied a certain form of military professionalism to ensure the civilian control over the military institution so as to ensure its non-engagement in the political sphere. In which the officer corps are considered to be a separated field out of the society, discipline and commitment are their guiding rules and the professional use of force is the base on which they were recruited.

On the other hand, Morris Janowitz argued that the separation between the civil and military spheres, since this would lead to the separation between the aspirations of the society and the military institution. He argued that “general conscription” is favored, as this system leads to the ‘convergence’ between the society and the military. It creates a strong organic link between the civil society and the military institution, since it will permit civilians to be a part of the military for a period of time of their service.

Arguments were lighted in the issues of conscripted and professional armies. However, conscripted armies are more likely not to oppose a popular uprising than the professional armies.

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24 Those two schools were presented in the book titled “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance.”, By Derek Lutterbeck, page 9, Published by The Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.
A framework of the theoretical analysis:

We demonstrated above some theoretical analysis of the typologies of the civil-military relations and the factors guiding the responses of the military and security apparatus to mass uprisings in the society. Thus, we can present a simple framework for analyzing the civil-military relations to be used in understanding our case study of Egypt post-revolution. However, it essential to relate this to the “low political culture” states which are mainly the developing countries, in which state institutions are not efficiently performing their duties or lack popular legitimacy since the majority of the society doesn’t participate in the executive or legislative elections or if they participated, their will is tampered.

In time of mass uprisings, the military and security apparatus which have a low level of institutionalism (corruption, political favourism), and a weak link with the majority of the society (the recruitment in these institutions is mainly based on political loyalty of a certain tribe or group and foreign soldiers are allowed to serve).

They are more likely to oppose any reform movements that are being promoted through popular uprisings, which are most likely crushed by the military and security forces.

25 The definition of the law political culture states is driven from the book titled “Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance.”, By Derek Lutterbeck, Page 10; second paragraph, Published by The Geneva centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.
In contrast, the military and security apparatus which have a high or a considerable level of institutionalism (expertise use of force, a clear set of rules and regulations), and strong link with the society (through general conscription, and embedding the social interests in the institutions).

They are more likely to be opened to mass uprisings calling for reform movements of the political regime, since the expectations and values of the society are embed in the institutions, thus such institutions even if they have a considerable level of institutionalism (spread of corruption without political loyalty) will not let these institutions to oppose mass uprisings, and may in return just be neutral to popular uprisings of the society.

We have to grape attention to the level of institutionalism and its importance in the responses of military and security forces towards mass uprisings. The very low institutionalization that may occur in such institutions may lead to its collapse, since these institutions lack a bureaucratic organization and recruitment criteria upon which their members are chosen. Thus in time of mass uprisings and the chaos resulting from the resistance of these uprisings, this might lead to the collapse or the split between military and security forces.

As mentioned above, we presented the different types of armies according to their relation to both the political regimes and their respective societies. Reflecting this on our case study, we need to give a good brief on the nature of the Egyptian military
institution as a primary actor in our research, before we go on presenting its role in the transition period and Muslim brotherhood’s regime.
The earlier Islamic reformists:

The roots of the ideology of “political Islam” dates back to the nineteenth century, when Islamic reformists began to write their political theories with connection to the Islamic teachings and rules.

A leading Islamic intellectual named “Jamal Al Din Al Afghani” raised many questions about the European domination of the Muslim world, the high illiteracy rates, collective ignorance in the Muslim countries and the irrational governance of the cascade empires that controlled the Muslim world for hundreds of years (the dynasties empires as the Ottoman Empire).

His teachings affected many scholars and many of his students. His disciple “Muhammad Abdu” a student of “Jamal Al Din Al Afghani” was influenced by Afghani’s teachings. He was graduated from Al-Azhar (the leading Islamic university in the Muslim world) and he was known for his interest in Islamic philosophy.

He introduced many terms in political Islam as “Islamic modernity” in which he introduced his views about how to modernize the Islamic philosophy (which

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26 The discussion of earlier Islamic reformists is driven from the book titled, “The Struggle for Egypt”, By Steven A.Cook, Chapter one; pages (16 till 18), (Oxford University Press; 2012).
enlightenment in that field had stopped from the time of “Ibn-Rushd”), he argued that the European educational, political and social reforms are the source of development in the western world, and that our intellectuals should try to adopt what suit us from these reforms to achieve developments in those aspects.

He didn’t want to implant the European law onto the Muslim society. However, he wanted to create a system of ideas and principles that can bring together Islam with modernity.

Abduh, Al-Afghani and other Islamic reformists were convinced that the European political, economic and social systems are much more developed than that applied in the Muslim world. For them, the main reason behind the spread of ignorance, poverty and underdevelopment in the Muslim world, was the tyranny of the Muslim leadership, the injustice and the enlightenment that stopped in the Muslim world centuries ago.

They argued that the western civilization was inspired by the Muslim teachings and philosophy that build the Muslim civilization in their golden ages. Therefore, they didn’t hate the European systems but they were inspired by them. However, “Al-Afghani” and other Islamic reformists demonstrated that the European systems had some incompatible rules that clash with some of the “Islamic shari’a”.

They were convinced by the fact that reforms that were done by some Muslim leaders as “Khedive Ismail” undertook in Egypt in the nineteenth century. These reforms created a wide range of problems with the shari’a laws not because they were
incompatible but because they ill-equipped to deal with these reforms. The inefficiency of the teachings of Islamic sharia was due to the breakdown of enlightenment in field of developing the sharia laws. Muhammad Abdu argued that western perceptions about the development of their societies shouldn’t be implemented directly in the Islamic societies. However, western perceptions should be re-interpreted and reformed to suit the Islamic teaching and culture in the Muslim world.

Rashid Rida, one of Muhammad Abdu’s students, was more occupied with the centrality of Islam behind the development in the Muslim world. He argued that the teachings of the Quran and of the prophet Muhammad should be the backbone of any reforms that would be implemented in the Islamic societies as he was more convinced by the direct connection between the healthy development of the society and the Islamic principles. However, he was still inspired by the approach of the western technological development that created an industrial revolution in the western societies.

Ahmed Lutfi EL sayeed is another student of Muhammad Abdu, whose thoughts were on the contrary with Rashid Rida. Although He believed that a religious society is preferable than a non-religious one in which he argues that it is healthy to have a trustful relationship between the governor and the governed, he didn’t assume that the superiority of an Islamic society to a non-Islamic one. He proved his argument by demonstrating the status of most of the Islamic societies at that time in comparison to
other western societies which were in a far more developmental stage than the Islamic ones.

El Sayeed was more occupied by the debate of Islam and nationalism that spread in the Muslim world in the nineteenth century particularly in the khedive age of Egypt (Egypt under the rule of Muhammad Ali’s sons).

His argument would enrich our debate in one of the parts of this project that the Muslim brotherhood, as a social and political group occupied by the ideology of political Islam, would face the “Statness problem” which was presented earlier in the first part of this chapter.

He argued that Islam and nationalism contradicts with each other, in which the Islamic teachings promotes for the concept of “AL-umma” (the Muslim nation) as all Muslim societies are one nation and one state with one identity. However, nationalism promotes the concept of nation-states in which the people are given a social identity plus citizenship of the state they belong to. Later, in the second chapter will elaborate more on the social identity problem that faces the Muslim brotherhood in post revolution Egypt in particular.
The contemporary Islamic reformists:27

The earlier Islamic reformists in the nineteenth century attributed the collective ignorance and the spread of corruption in the Islamic polities to the corruption of Muslim leaders, which paved the way for European domination of the Muslim world.

On the contrary, contemporary Islamic reformists, who emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century, were much more hostile to the European domination of the Muslim world for three main reasons:

Firstly, the expansion of the colonized Muslim states by the European superpowers. Secondly, as a result of the first, was the direct integration of the European culture in the Muslim world and implementation of European traditions that contradicts with some of the Islamic sharia laws. Finally, the domination of the European powers lead to the subordination of the Muslim nation under the European hegemony, which became absolute after the defeat of the ottoman caliphate in the First World War (the Islamic top leader).

These three reasons were enough to convince the Islamic reformists at that time that the western nations are both oppressive and culturally threatening to the existence of the Muslim nation.

27 The discussion of contemporary Islamic reformists is driven from the book titled, “Egyptian Politics; The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule”, By Maye Kassem, Chapter five; pages (134 till 137), (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; 2004).
The earliest Islamic reformists had scientifically approached the deficiency in the Muslim nations. On the other side, the later Islamic reformists of the last century were more hostile to the European culture due to the direct colonization of the Muslim world.

One of the defects of the thoughts of the earliest Islamic reformists is that their thoughts were respectable socially but not politically since those reformists failed to establish a social group that can implement these thoughts in the political struggle to abolish the European domination.

This defect was avoided by on the later Islamic reformist of the last century. “Hassan Al-Banna”, who established the Muslim brotherhood in 1928, organized a very compatible group that targeted the social, political and economic sectors of the Islamic society in Egypt.

The Muslim brotherhood began to target the society in Egypt in three different fields. The social field was through the spread literacy-diminishing projects, the economic field through charitable projects and the political field through addressing some national issues as the Jewish state in Palestine and the British evacuation from Egypt.

The Muslim brotherhood was an excellent implementation to the later Islamic reformist’s ideas (Hassan Al Banna), an example which was much more needed for the earliest Islamic reformist’s thoughts to be implemented.
Later, in the second chapter, we will elaborate more on the establishment of the Muslim brotherhood, their ideology, their politics, the problems they face in the contemporary Egyptian society and the their role in political struggle in post-revolution Egypt till they acquired the political power in June 2012.
Part IV

In this part, we demonstrate the features of the political regime in Egypt before the revolution in January 2011, as a case study of our approach in the research. Our approach is a mixture of transitional periods of political regimes which faces political Islam as an ideology presented in one or more political groups.

Egypt is a very special case, from the declaration of the republic in 1952 till the revolution in 2011; the consecutive political had very special features that cannot give a certain type of a political regime.

In order to elaborate more on the special nature of the former political regimes in Egypt, we will present the three consecutive regimes that came into power with application of the features of the political regimes mentioned earlier.

In Nasser’s regime, such a regime can be identified neither as an authoritarian regime nor as a perfect totalitarian regime.

In 1950s, when Nasser acquired the presidency of Egypt in 1954, his regime was much more to be tolerated as a totalitarian one, in which political pluralism was prohibited; one official party rules “the Arab socialist union” to promote for the Arab nationalist movement with a socialist nature. The ideology that controlled this period of time wasn’t a distinctive one.
Although most of the reforms adopted by Nasser were of a socialist perspective, socialism wasn’t adopted at the heart of the regime. He redistributed the wealth and performed some extensive reforms in social and economic fields. Moreover, this made Nasser’s popularity increase among the vast majority of the Egyptians who suffered injustice in the distribution of wealth.

Nasser was a very charismatic leader, he called for the unity of the Arab world, and he fought the colonization in all the Arab countries and even in Africa. He fought for the national purpose of Egypt through taking serious decisions as “the nationalization of the Suez canal” confronting by that decision France and Britain in the same time. This led him to have an extensive mobilization effect on almost all the Egyptians and Arabs.

He was the top leader of both the state and the official party, he had almost all the state apparatus in his hand and he even sometimes combined between the position of the president and the prime minister.

After the defeat of 1967, his regime changed to be more as a personal authoritarian regime. Still the official party was in power but some student movements have risen and engaged in the political life. For instance, the students protests against the inappropriate trials that the commanders of the Egyptian air forces were facing as a result of the defeat.
He was still the top leader with all the powers in his hand but he lost his ability to mobilize the majority of the society. His regime lost the credibility of having a distinctive ideology after the defeat of 1967 till he died in 1970.

When Sadat acquired power in 1970, he introduced political pluralism in 1975 and then he tried to apply the liberal policies in the economic sector, which resulted in mass uprising after the increase in the prices of essential food products. However, the inefficiency in his economic policies was to be blamed and not the ideology itself. He didn’t have any mobilization effect after he clashed with the political Islamic groups after the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. However, he was still acquiring almost all the authorities in the state, yet his regime was to be identified as a personal authoritarian regime.

After Sadat was assassinated in 1981, Mubarak his deputy and a former air force commander in the war of October 1973, acquired the presidency. Mubarak was a much less charismatic than Nasser and Sadat. The country was facing a wide range of terrorist attacks, public disorder that followed Sadat's assassination. However, Mubarak wanted to strengthen his regime and continue in power. Thus, he appointed those who are the most influential in the main state institutions particularly the army, police and the governing party, creating the perfect authoritarian regime.

In Mubarak’ regime, political pluralism flourished more but in effective due to the laws and legislations that helped the members of the governing party (The National
Democratic party) to acquire the majority in the legislative authority. Political Islamic groups such as the Muslim brotherhood were given the chance to participate in the elections and even acquire about almost 85 seats in the elections of 2005.

There was no distinctive ideology at all in Mubarak’s regime. Rather a kind of many debates about liberalism and political Islam in which the civil society was engaged without having any serious effect by this debate on the regime or even the governing elites.

Mobilization in Mubarak’s regime was weaker than in Nasser or Sadat’s regime, due to his less charismatic character and the way of giving his speeches.

The top leader was Mubarak. However, from 1990s till the collapse of his regime in February 2011, small group were acquiring the control of almost all the state apparatus. This small group of officials, politicians and business men had strong ties to whether Mubarak or his family and particularly his son who was being prepared to succeed his dad in power.

After this small identification of the Egyptian case, it was important to understand the nature of the regimes that governed Egypt in its first republic. In order to identify its implications on the transitional period and even on political Islam particularly the Muslim brotherhood who acquired the presidency of Egypt in June 2012.
Chapter two

The main actors in Egypt post-revolution

Part I:

In this part will be discussing the main participants in the political contest in Egypt after 25th January, 2011.

-The Muslim brotherhood as a primary participant

In this part of the chapter, we will present the organizational chart of the Muslim brotherhood. In order to study any political or social group, we have to understand first its organizational chart and the relations of power in this group.

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The organizational chart:

- General guide
  - Consultative assembly
  - Guidance council
  - Vice-guide
    - Deputy
      - Secretariat and secretary general
        - General headquarters
          - General secretariat
            - Technical operation
            - Field Apparatus
              - Sections
              - Committees
                - Administrative office
                  - District
                  - Branch
                  - Family
The sections are divided into:

- Propagation of the message- to work on the spread of the goals of the brotherhood.
- Labor- to have the members of those who work in factories, etc.
- Peasant- to have members in the rural areas.
- Family- to be concerned with the life of every family member of the brotherhood.
- Students- mainly approaching student unions.
- Liaison with the Islamic world- ties with other Islamic circles all over the neighboring region.
- Bodily training- performing sports for members of the society.
- Professions- syndicates and promote membership to professional classes
- Press and translation- the establishment of a journal for the society to communicate with the all the factions of the Egyptian society.

The committees are divided into: (we will just focus on the financial one):

- Financial
- Policy
- Legal
- Statistics
-The General Guide (El Morsheed El’am):^29

It’s the position of the top leader of the Muslim brotherhood; the general guide has to be a member of the consultative assembly for five years. He has to be thirty lunar years of age (the lunar calendar is the Islamic calendar). He was regarded to be the guardian of the laws and principles of the Muslim brotherhood, and preserve the interests of the whole society of the brotherhood. He has to have an educational degree, known for his morality and efficient in his career.

All the members of the society including particularly the “consultative assembly” should declare their loyalty to the new general guide. Three quarters of the consultative assembly has to vote for the candidate to be a general guide with attendance of four-fifths of the assembly.

The general guide can be dismissed of office if he abused his duties or misused his authorities. The consultative assembly should gather four-fifths of its members and three quarters have to vote for this action.

The General Guidance Council:30

The council is composed of 15 members, nine from Cairo, three from provinces and three appointed by the council itself from the consultative assembly. Candidates for the council should be thirty lunar years of age and members of the consultative assembly for at least three years. They should be known for their knowledge, values and practicality. A secretary general and a treasurer are chosen from among the nice elected councillors.

A committee is formed from among the consultative assembly to count the votes of the members of the consultative assembly for the candidates of the guidance council. An ousting of a one of those members is an internal affair of the council to be decided by three-quarters of the members present in the meeting for such a purpose.

The council heads and supervise the administration of the operations of the society of the Muslim brotherhood and formulate and executes the policies of the brotherhood, the council is regarded to be the executive authority in a state.

-The consultative assembly:  

Members of the assembly are about 150. Candidates for the assembly should be at least twenty five lunar years of age and at least five years of active membership in the society of the Muslim brotherhood. Each year ten members are to be renewed for the expiration of their terms. Candidates of this assembly are to be related to regional representation (representatives from different provisions and governorates in Egypt).

Its function is similar to the function of the legislative authority in the state, in which it supervises the activities of the society of the brotherhood, discussing the budget of the society and engages in the elections of the general guidance council.

-Technical operations:

This part is to be considered the main body of the society of the Muslim brotherhood, where members of the society perform different tasks aiming to fulfill the goals of the society. It is supervised by the guidance council and located in the general headquarters and the head of each group is appointed by the general council or the general guide.

This part as it was shown in the organizational chart is divided between:


• **Committees:** divided into six committees as in the organizational chart, it is concern is the facilitation of the work inside the society of the brotherhood.

• **Sections:** divided into nine sections, these sections are to be directly concerned with the training and the orientation of the members of the society. Two of these sections will be elaborated more in which:

1. **The section for liaison with the Islamic world:** It’s aimed to be responsible for the linkage between the society of the brotherhood and the outside society of the state mainly the Muslim societies in the Muslim world, performing a propaganda through different communication means to spread the message of the brotherhood in the Muslim countries, and perform studies on the main challenges that face the Islamic world. The means of this section are the delegations to other parts of the Muslim world, exchange of missionaries from these parts in co-operation and the establishment of abroad offices in the geographical areas of Islam.

2. **The students sections:** this section is responsible for creating the “Islamic atmosphere” in the Egyptian school system, this can be through the direct engage by students who are members of the society in the student unions in the different schools and universities in Egypt.
I have chosen those two specific sections out of the nine for two different reasons:

1. The first reason is to prove that the society of the Muslim brotherhood is not only exclusive for Egypt. However, its aims to be spread all over the Islamic world and that’s through the section of liaison with the Islamic world as the cornerstone for the whole society to establish different branches of the brotherhood throughout the globe. It’s to prove that the Muslim brotherhood isn’t a local but also an international organization.

2. The second reason is to demonstrate the fact that the brotherhood is rooted in the students’ movements in Egypt since its establishment. This articulates the fact that the brotherhood has many intellectuals and may have participated in many student uprisings that Egypt has witnessed throughout its history. Later it will give an explanation of the co-operation between the consecutive regimes that governed Egypt in its first republic and the brotherhood particularly the state security apparatus, which in fact indirectly controlled the elections of the students unions in the national universities since 1970s, which also elaborates the approval of this apparatus for brotherhood students to enter these unions.
The Field Apparatus: 33

It is the administrative unites through which the high command of the society of the brotherhood give its orders to its followers and members. It’s considered to be the action unites. It’s divided into the administrative offices in accordance to the division of the Egyptian governorates. These administrative offices are divided into districts and the branches which contain the families of the society members.

After presentation the organizational structure of the society of the Muslim brotherhood, we have to present the conditions and regulations of the membership in the brotherhood since its establishment to understand the roots of the relation between the member and the society leaders and apparatus.

Membership in the brotherhood: 34

Membership in the brotherhood is divided into three main categories, depending on the extent of the relation between the member and the society.

The first category is the “tentative membership”, it is the category of those who are not acquired a full membership in the brotherhood, in other words it’s the person willing to

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33 The discussion of the field apparatus of the brotherhood is found in the book titled “The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood”, By Richard P. Mitchell, chapter five; page; 175 (second paragraph) to 176 (end of the first paragraph), (Oxford university press London; 1969).

be a member of the society but still under observation by the brotherhood to test his/her fulfillment of the duties and obligations of the membership.

The second category is the “active membership”, it the second phase in which the provisional member is being requested by the branch to which he or she belongs, to make the “oath” (Al Bay’a; a promise of loyalty in Islam in which the caliphate gains his legitimacy by “al bay’a” from the Muslim society to govern) which fulfills the member’s loyalty to the rights and duties of the brotherhood, confidence in the leadership of the society and compliance to “obey absolutely!”.

The obligations on the person willing to be a member in the brotherhood is; his age to be not less than eighteen years old, to be able to understand the ideology of the brotherhood and his commitment to pay dues. This drives his to an important field in the society which is the finance.

The finance of the brotherhood is dependent on the financial resources of the brotherhood. This means that the brotherhood is self-financed, in which fees of membership, contributions by the members of the society and the financial enterprises owned by members of the brotherhood, are to be the main source of financing the brotherhood projects and expenditures.\(^{35}\)

\(^{35}\) The discussion of the Finance of the brotherhood is found in the book titled “The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood”, By Richard P.Mitchell, chapter five; page; 180 (last paragraph) till 181 (First paragraph), (Oxford university press London; 1969).
This drives us to an important notice, in which the brotherhood since its establishment was seeking its independency to purchase its own articulated aims and purposes, rejecting any external pressure. However, in the next parts of the paragraphs, we will discuss more how this principle changed when the brotherhood spread in many Muslim countries seeking more financial support from even supporters who aren’t to be considered a part of the brotherhood as members or even leaders. 36

The context of origination of the Muslim brotherhood: 37

We have demonstrated in the first chapter the roots of political Islam in the modern history, In order to recognize the roots of the brotherhood. However, these political Islamic thoughts by the modern Islamic reformists of the twenty century and among them the founder of the brotherhood “Hassan Al-Banna”, don’t present the purpose behind the establishment of such an organization.

36 This elaborates the globalism of the organization of the Muslim brotherhood, named “El tanzeem el dawly” in order to understand that the local organization is not acquiring a self-determination factor in shaping the political system in Egypt post revolution. This is a link for further information on that global organization, An article titled “The Global muslim brotherhood; Myth or Reality”, By Lorenzo Vidino, (Published by Homeland security policy Institute, George Washington university, March 2nd, 2011). http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Issue%20Brief%20Global%20Muslim%20Brotherhood.pdf

37 The discussion of the context of the brotherhood is found in the book titled “The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood”, By Richard P.Mitchell, chapter seven; page 210 till page 214 (First paragraph) then from page 217 (third paragraph) to page 218 (first paragraph) then page 224 (last paragraph) to page 227 (first paragraph), (Oxford university press London; 1969).
The Muslim brotherhood was established as a result of the western domination resulting in the colonization of almost all the Muslim world particularly the Arab world (the home of Islam). Thus, the brotherhood was considered to be a mean of salvation from such domination by the western colonial powers. However, this wasn’t the only reason behind the establishment of this brotherhood as we will elaborate later in this part of the chapter.

The problem, of which the Muslim world suffered from, is manifested in the history of the evolution of the Muslim empire since the death of the prophet “Mohammed”.

After the death of the prophet, the Muslim state was ruled by orthodox caliphates (the four followers of the prophet), in which the caliphate or the leader was chosen by the people through (Al Bay ‘a), the people were the source of all authorities and the leader was chosen upon his qualifications. The period of the orthodox caliphates was known for high degree in equality of rights and duties and the state’s treasury was in the service of the people and not the leader.

When the transition of political control happened with the fall of the state of orthodox caliphates and the Umayyad period (the house of Mu’awiya became in power) began, the caliphate became an absolute monarchy. In which the position of the caliphate was inherited in the family of Mu’awiya. This was the time, in which the tribalism of the Arabs was re-launched with an Islamic taste. This was followed in the Abbasid period till the Ottoman Empire. With the rise of tribalism again, morals were diminishing, the
power of the people was disintegrated and the inherited monarchy became a divine right for the ruler. Moreover, within this period of consecutive Islamic empire from the Umayyad to the ottomans, the enlightenment in the Islamic thought was rigid. “Al-Azhar” was the leading university in studying Islamic thought and graduating Muslim sheikhs and Islamic intellectuals.

The medieval system of learning in “Al-Azhar” was the main reason behind the fall back of this university. The absence of new techniques in research and learning, the old technique of learning as to depend on memory not reasoning (as reasoning was the main reason behind the rise of western civilization or any civilization) and the non-renewal of the textbooks, were the main reason behind the fall back of such a university.

We have mentioned earlier, that the western domination or colonization wasn’t the only reason behind the roots of the establishment of the brotherhood. Thus, the context of which social classes were living in the land of origin of the brotherhood (Egypt) is another reason behind this organization.

In Egypt, in the beginning of the twenty century, there were two kinds of imperialism, the first as normal was the British occupation of Egypt since 1889 and the second is the internal or domestic occupation. This internal factor is demonstrated in; firstly the carelessness of the domestic forces to fight the imperial forces and being concerned over acquiring the political authority, secondly which is worst as the treason of some of
the domestic forces to the will of the Egyptian society to free itself from any external domination (when khedive Tawfiq handed Egypt to Britain to protect his throne from the revolution of the army against him in “Urabi revolution”).

In addition to that, the internal factor was also demonstrated in the misdistribution of wealth and land, and the foreign economic exploitation resulting in the increase of the scale of the poverty social classes in a wide range.

These factors led to the introduction of European laws and other incoming ideologies besides capitalism which was already implemented in its extreme case in monarchical Egypt, was communism as a salvation ideology from the brutality of extreme capitalism. Both introduced the Egyptian intellectuals to the ideas of citizen freedom and economic equality and both were witnessed in the Islamic history of “orthodox caliphates”. Thus, Al-Banna claimed that with the return to Islamic state of the orthodox caliphates, Muslims could purchase both ideas introduced earlier with avoiding the common feature in the western civilization, which is materialism.

Such a situation in which Egypt was suffering from at that time, created a corrupted environment that can positively and negatively affect the efforts to restructure the society itself. The rigid situation in Egypt resulted in the disability of the nation to produce and the corruption of the society’s character and morals.

This corrupted context was the environment from which the Muslim brotherhood was established within.
The ideology of the Muslim brotherhood:  

Hassan Al-Banna argued that the return to the Islamic glory in the time of the orthodox caliphates is the only way for the salvation of the Muslim world “Al-umma” from the western domination.

The purpose of the Muslim brotherhood as “Al-Banna” argued should be based upon the re-creation of the Islamic order “Al Nizam Al islami”. This drives us to the argument of the nature of the Islamic order. The common dominator in all arguments over the definition of the Islamic order is the “sharia law” which gives a special nature to the Muslim world away from any external influence over the Muslim societies.

The distinction between an “Islamic order” and “a Muslim state” could be related to the “rule of the caliphate” which existed in the Islamic history in its consecutive empires from the orthodox caliphates to the Ottoman Empire. However, we have to differentiate between the “Islamic order” and a “Muslim state”.

Two main elements were expressed by “Al-Banna” and his followers in the brotherhood about the “Islamic order” which differentiate it from the Muslim state.

The first main element is the definition of sharia and its validity for modern times, it’s an obligation on every Muslim to live by what “Allah” (God) has ordered in the Quran. Al-

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38 The discussion of the ideology of the brotherhood is found in the book titled “The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood”, By Richard P.Mitchell, chapter eight; page; 234 (last paragraph) till 250 (first paragraph), (Oxford university press London; 1969).
Banna didn’t give a concrete definition of what’s the sharia or what school of law the brotherhood should be guided with (As there are four school of laws in Islam since the four imams who interpreted the Quran from the early beginning of Islam). However, Al-Banna didn’t go in details about the sharia laws; he argued that such a question can lead to a division in the brotherhood society.

The sharia laws are laws that regulate the affairs of the Muslim societies in political, social and economic aspects. Sharia is a product of Islamic intellectuals who tried to interpretate the Islamic text “Quran” and the quotes of the Prophet, in order to understand and articulate laws and regulations to guide the daily life of Muslim societies. Thus, interpretation could differ from a time to time and this proves that sharia laws are valid for all the times.

The second element about the “Islamic order” is the question of the separation between the Mosque and the state, this drove us to the notion of “cultural identity” for the Muslim society.

Al-Banna and his followers (Hudaybi and Awda) argued that laws and regulations that are implemented in Egypt, are somehow in agreement with many of the general
However, the demands for the implementation of sharia raised the question of identity.

For Al-banna, the implementation of sharia gives a special characteristic to the Muslim nation apart from the western domination. This special characteristic is main defining element for the cultural identity of the Muslim society. Thus, only in the western culture, there exists a religious class of clerks and priests, from which the western world suffered from integration of religion into politics leading to the spread of corruption in both the state and the religious institution, this doesn’t exist in the culture of the Muslims because of the non-existence of a hierarchy in the Islamic religious institution.

Moreover, Al-Banna argued that the people in Islam are the source if authority and they are the one who selects their leaders and ousts them if they violate the laws.

Although the integration of religion in politics in the Muslim world was different, such a difference was in the appearance only. Along the Islamic history from the Umayyad period to the Ottoman Empire, caliphates acquired both the religious and the political authority leading to the corruption of the Muslim societies and its underdevelopment.

We have demonstrated these facts earlier in the context part. However, such an argument wasn’t revisited by the intellectuals of the brotherhood.

39 The discussion of the argument of both (Hudyabi and Awada) is found in the book titled “The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood”, By Richard P. Mitchell, chapter eight; page; 241 (last paragraph) till 242), (Oxford university press London; 1969).
Thus, intellectuals of the brotherhood such as “Sayed Qutb” didn’t argue about the integration of religion in politics. However, they were much concerned about the salvation of the Muslim society from western domination through the return to Islam. They argued that Islam in itself doesn’t only guide the relation between man and God but moreover a relations between a man and a man.

The “islamic state” comes from within the “Islamic order”. The difference is that the establishment of Islamic order leades to the existence of an Islamic state.

The brotherhood intellectuals like “Qutb” argued that the Islamic state should be founded on the Quran as the constitution. The people are source of authority and the ruler is abiding by the teachings of the Quran. However, the Quran didn’t specify a certain way of electing the officials of the state, brotherhood intellectuals argued it could be done through “Ahl Al-shura”, in which they nominate the official and then present it to the people and the people elect him through “Al bay’ a”.  

The concept of “consultation of the people” through their representatives “ahl al shura” contradicts with each other. As such representatives are to be elected and such a way of electing them was not defined in Islam leaving it to the age of time. This creates another problem of how to elect them.

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In addition to that, Al-Banna suggested in his writings that those to be elected for “ahl al shura” should be whether legalists or those who experienced leadership such as heads of families and tribes. This concept excludes a vast majority of the people to be elected in “Ahl al shura” who could be scientists and not legalists or heads of families, and this violates also a main concept in Islam which is the “Equality between the people”.

The political structure for the “Islamic state” was expressed in the writings of “Al-Banna” and “Qutb” with little difference between them.

“Al-Banna” set two main goals for the brotherhood when it integrated into political sphere. The first goal was the abolishment of the party system in Egypt because some interpretation to Islamic texts and thought, viewed the party system as a source of evil that leads to the disintegration of the Islamic society into different parties that threaten the coherence of the society itself.

The second goal was the mean to restore the Islamic system of governance in the time of orthodox caliphates. This was done through Al-Banna’s efforts to establish relations with other Islamic circles in the Arab neighborhood countries, so as to establish sub-organizations to the brotherhood in these countries that believe in the same goal in order to retrieve the idea of the Islamic caliphate. The notion of “Al-uamma” was the basic concept through which the Muslims should be concerned with, in order to retrieve the time of caliphate (to unite the Muslims in one state).
“Sayeed Qutb” had some distinctive ideas than “Al-Banna”. He was sent for a scholarship to Wilson teachers’ college in the United States, to study the teaching methods of the western civilization. In his book “The America I have seen”, he described the status of the American state as being in “Jahiliyya” (it’s the time of ignorance when the Arabs were living before Islam was sent, it demonstrates a time of moral declination, injustice and sexual discrimination). He praised the economic and scientific development in America. However, he viewed the materialism and individualism in the American culture as the main source of social injustice and racism (the black Americans). Thus, he described the American system of governance and any other political system that doesn’t implement the Islamic texts and teachings, as to be living in time of “Jahiliyya”.

These thoughts and ideas expressed by the brotherhood’s leaders and intellectuals, were put aside or paused since the brotherhood’s integration into the political process in Egypt during Sadat’ regime, and their participation in the legislative elections in Mubarak’s regime from 1980s till the last elections held on November 2010 that preceded the revolution of January 2011. Such a change in the political thought of the brotherhood created an insincere relationship between the brotherhood and other political opposition movements in Egypt.

The insincere relationship was deepened more when the brotherhood took power through their presidential candidate Morsi in June 2012, who widened the gap between
other political forces in Egypt and the brotherhood. This will be illustrated more through the presentation of the decisions taken by Morsi that alienated the other political parties in Egypt. Such an alienation can be justified through Al-Banna’s ideas about the evil of the multi-party political system.

**The integration of the Muslim brotherhood in the political process:**

The economic downfall of the Egyptian state that began after the defeat of 1967 during Nasser’s regime, continued through of Sadat’s regime and Mubarak’s regime was the gate for the brotherhood to get integrated in the political process in Egypt. The downfall of the economy in Egypt was contributed by the involvement of more than three major wars in just twenty years in 1956, 1967 and 1973, led the country’s external debt to reach US$ 5.7 billion in 1977. 41

The enormous increase in the external debt that reached US$ 46 billion in 1990s (during Mubarak’s regime) was due to the spread of systemic corruption in the state’s institutions and the dependence on foreign loans from the IMF. However, the debt relief by cutting US$ 20 billion through Egypt’s engagement in the Gulf war of 1991,

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41 The discussion of the economic performance of the Egyptian state is found in the book titled “The Muslim Brotherhood And Egypt’s Succession Crisis; The politics of Liberalization And Reform In the Middle East”, By Mohammed Zahid, chapter three; page 40 till 42 (First paragraph), (Oxford university press London; 1969).
didn’t contribute to fighting the economic corruption or a significant change in the state’s economic policy, rather it contributed to more stability for Mubarak’s regime.\textsuperscript{42}

The bad performance of the Egyptian economy led to the gradual withdrawal of the state from providing the socio-economic services, and being replaced by NGOS who performed this task instead of the government.

This wasn’t to be contributed to the beginning of political liberalization process. However, the state continued to exert more control over the political space. As such a withdrawal created a historical chance for the Muslim brotherhood to expand and resist the Egyptian government’s coercion, through gaining more popularity amongst the vast majority of the Egyptian society (mainly in the middle and lower social classes affected by the performance of the government in providing socio-economic services).

Two main factors led to the expansion of the Muslim brotherhood and strengthened its ties with various factions of the Egyptian society.\textsuperscript{43}

The first main factor was providing socio-economic services to the people such as education and health care with lower prices; leading the majority of the poor class to be

\textsuperscript{42} The discussion of the foreign debt of the Egyptian state is found in the book titled “The Muslim Brotherhood And Egypt’s Succession Crisis; The politics of Liberalization And Reform In the Middle East”, By Mohammed Zahid, chapter three; page; 44 (second paragrah), (Oxford university press London; 1969).

\textsuperscript{43} The discussion of those two factors is found in the book titled “The Muslim Brotherhood And Egypt’s Succession Crisis; The politics of Liberalization And Reform In the Middle East”, By Mohammed Zahid, chapter four; page; 70 till 71 (first paragrah), (Oxford university press London; 1969).
in strong ties with the brotherhood (this class presents the vast majority of the Egyptian society since its bad economic performance led to the growth of such a class).

The second main factor was the use of the mosque in requirement of new members in the Egyptian society. The role of the mosque can't be interfered from the state as much as the political sphere, leaving the mosque as the most suitable place that out of state coercive policy to a certain degree.

The Muslim brotherhood took the elections for professional candidates as the first step to get integrated into the political process. The financial problems, corruption and the fighting between the conflicting political parties over the control of the syndicates, paved the road for the brotherhood to propose new candidates for the purpose of restructuring new efficient syndicates that can exert some pressure over the government.\textsuperscript{44}

According to “Amr Choubky” (a researcher in the al Ahram political and strategic studies, in an interview may, 2004) stated “The professional class had become dissatisfied with the performance of the syndicates board in dealing with their economic, social and political concerns”. \textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} The discussion of the integration of the brotherhood in the syndicates elections is found in the book titled “The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis; The politics of Liberalization and Reform in the Middle East”, By Mohammed Zahid, chapter six; page; 109 till 112, (Oxford university press London; 1969).
This was the channel, though which the brotherhood introduced the new generation in its society out to the Egyptian society. Latter in the part of the politics within the brotherhood, it will present the conflict between the old and the new generation in the brotherhood, which became clearer in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution rooted since the split of some leading members from the society in 1995.

The Muslim brotherhood’s candidates stressed on the issues of emergency law and political corruption in Egypt through an Islamic slogan “Islam is the solution” to mobilize a good majority in the elections of the medical, engineering and lawyers syndicates.

They used these syndicates to provide some socio-economic services to the society, the incident of the earthquake in Egypt in 1992, show the real weight of the brotherhood and their efforts in this crisis.

This led the Egyptian government to alienate the roles of the syndicates through laws and regulations that undermine the efforts of these syndicates (association’s law 100).  

The introduction to syndicates elections was a just a gateway for brotherhood to be integrated into the legislative elections. They went into alliances with other political parties even liberal ones to run the elections on their lists, the elections of legislative authority in 1986 witnessed a historical victory for the brotherhood then in 2005.

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45 The quotation of “Dr.choubaky” is found in the book titled “The Muslim Brotherhood And Egypt’s Succession Crisis; The politics of Liberalization And Reform In the Middle East”, By Mohammed Zahid, chapter six; page;109(fourth paragraph), (Oxford university press London; 1969).

46 The discussion of the association’s law of the Egyptian state is found in the book titled “The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis; The politics of Liberalization and Reform in the Middle East”, By Mohammed Zahid, chapter six; page; 120(Oxford university press London; 1969).
securing 80 seats, and in 2010 with the last legislative elections, the Muslim brotherhood decided to participate in the beginning and then withdrew from the second round, when they realized that the National democratic party of Mubarak’s not going to let the absolute majority in the parliament out of its hand.

**The politics within the Muslim brotherhood:**

Imam “Hassan Al-Banna” an Egyptian religious and political thinker, graduated from Al-Azhar University in Cairo (the leading religious university in the Muslim world). He studied the “Sharia law” and came with the idea of the establishment of the Muslim brotherhood. He argued that the Egyptian society as an Islamic society has been corrupted through the British colonization of Egypt since 1882 and no development would occur to this society without curing it from that disease. He came with the idea of establishing a new social group that would implement the teaching of the “prophet Muhammad” and the Koran in their social interactions. In addition to that, this social group would raise their children on the same teaching mentioned. By applying this, the Muslim brotherhood would be the core of the new Muslim society that should replace the current Egyptian society in the aim of restoring the caliphate.

Al-Banna established the brotherhood in 1922. He became the first general guide of the brotherhood and he worked through the first 15 years following the establishment of the group to promote for its ideas. Then the 1940s marked the beginning of the engagement of the brotherhood in the political life in Egypt. He wanted also to secure
himself from any insurgency in the brotherhood against his leadership so he created the “secret apparatus”. This apparatus was formed from young men who will be well trained of carrying arms and weapons and it will also be responsible besides securing the leadership of Al-Banna to carry attacks against British forces and the Egyptian government (the Egyptian became a target when it ordered the dissolution of the brotherhood when the brotherhood was seen as no more beneficial for the king).47

A very important incident brought the “secret apparatus” into the main body of the Muslim brotherhood. It was when his brother in law “Abd el hakim Abdin” was accused of violating the rules of the Muslim brotherhood and they called for dismissing him from the group. Al Banna was afraid that if Abidin was found guilty by the consultative assembly this would be a scandal for him personally and would lead to the end of his leadership so he dismissed those who accused Abidin from the brotherhood. Later when the prime minister of the Egyptian government was assassinated and the brotherhood was accused, Al-Banna accused those who were dismissed from the brotherhood of assassination the Prime Minister. However, the Egyptian government responded by assassinating Hassan Al-Banna creating the philosophy of martyr in brotherhood since then.48


The secret apparatus was integrated in the brotherhood since the year 1949 which marks the death of Al-Banna that also marks the great split in the brotherhood between those who favors the use of more violence against the government and the society and those who favors the peaceful means in promoting the brotherhood to lead the Egyptian state. In 1954, an attempt by one of the Muslim brotherhood members to assassinate President Nasser made the Egyptian state in a direct confrontation with the brotherhood. The following years witnessed massive arrests and prosecutions of the leaders of the brotherhood.

A famous religious leader named “Sayyed Qutub” was arrested and prosecuted in 1966. He was known by “the father of violent Islamism” and he had a great impact on the ideologies of the leaders of the brotherhood who were accompanying him in the prison. Egypt’s current president Mohamed Morsi described “Qutub” as a thinker “who liberates the mind and touches the heart” and who offers “a real version of Islam that we are looking for”. However, others who split from the brotherhood were against the teachings of Qutub.49

From the time of 1970s, when the brotherhood members were freed from the prisons by President Anwar Al-sadat, it was time when the reinterpretation of the teachings of the spiritual leaders of the brotherhood began. Since then, the brotherhood became a moderate Islamic movement led by a political stream known by the “reformists” such as

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49 The bibliography about “Qutub” is driven from an article titled “The father of violent Islamism”, By Max Rodenbeck, (page 2, last paragraph), Published by (The New York Review of Books In May 9, 2013).
the former general guide of the brotherhood “Omar el telmsany”. But this political stream didn’t last for long because of the assassination of the “Sadat” in 1981 and massive arrests of the leaders of the brotherhood. However, the investigations proved that the brotherhood wasn’t in a relation of those who planned the assassination. This opened the door for the conservative stream in the brotherhood known by “Al-Qutbyeen” or the “Qutbists” to take control of the top positions of the brotherhood. They managed to provide the brotherhood members to a certain extent a more peaceful environment to promote for the brotherhood in many sectors of the society such as national universities through opening communication channels of the former regime in Egypt led by “Mubarak”. This made the former regime less hostile to the brotherhood and also gained more popularity and support from the members of the brotherhood who either part of the other political stream or floating between both streams.50

The struggle between the two political streams within the brotherhood is still going on and it is noticed by the various splits of many members and leaders from the brotherhood lately such as “Abd el Moneim Abo el Fottouh” who ran the presidential election on his own and managed to gain about three million votes.

50 The discussion of the conservative stream about the brotherhood is driven from an article titled “The father of violent Islamism”, By Max Rodenbeck, (page 2 till 7), Published by (The New York Review of Books In May 9, 2013).
This struggle proves that tolerance and violence can both exist in the same religious movement. What I meant by that is by applying this concept on the Muslim brotherhood in which the “Qutbists” believe that violence can also be used to reach their means and it’s validated by the religion this was proved when the clashes between opposition protesters and members of the brotherhood were violent resulting in death casualties to some of them and it was obvious when the brotherhood members clashed with the protesters violently at “Al-Athadaya” Palace which is the presidential palace. This was a response to the besieging of the opposition protesters to the palace in February 2013. On the other hand, the others who to belong to the “reformists” called themselves as “Al-Banyween” referring to the teachings of “Al banna” who always called for use of peaceful means to promote for the brotherhood. However, others who belong to that stream refer to themselves only as “reformists” claiming that even when “Al banna” was alive violence occurred.

**An overview of the brotherhood into politics:**

“Hassan Al-Banna” in his talking about the Islamic system of governance, he deliberately generalized his views within the terms “the Islamic system” without much specification as to what this meant in terms of government theories.\(^5^1\)

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\(^5^1\) This argument was driven from the book titled “The society of the Muslim brotherhood”, By Richard P.mitchell, (page; 40 second paragraph), (oxford university press London 1969).
Also “Sayyed Qutub” in his talking about the Islamic system of governance, he argued that the nature of the government, economy or the sharia laws of how they should work or even implemented aren’t important rather than just establishing the “Islamic system”. 52

These two views from two spiritual leaders who inspired almost all of the political Islamic movements represent a very ambiguous view about the nature of any proposed Islamic system of governance.

The Egyptian revolution in 2011 had a very special nature throughout the entire Egyptian history. It was a call for freedom and dignity and social welfare. These three aspects were the main slogan of the revolution which gave it a very special position in the Egyptian history. It was a revolution for a new national model of state as it didn’t call for a religious revolution as that in “Iran” in 1979. It wasn’t led by a religious leader or even a national leader. However, it was led by the young Egyptians from various political streams calling for the restoration of their dignity and their freedom that was stolen by the former authoritarian regime.

The nature of the Egyptian revolution is the main source behind the massive conflict between the political Islamic movements and other secular or national political movements in Egypt.

52. This argument was driven from an article titled “The father of violent Islamism”, By Max Rodenbeck, (page; 8, second paragraph), Published by (The New York Review of Books In May 9, 2013).
The Muslim brotherhood believes in the gradual change rather than the radical change which could lead to a huge change and they would be incapable of controlling it. This was proven through the newly approved constitution in December 2012 which wasn’t approved by almost 40% of the voters.

The leaders of the Muslim brotherhood gave a lot of promises of establishing a new democratic regime that all the Egyptians dreamt of. However, the actions of the brotherhood concerning their policies of dealing with the opposition and the freedom of media still gave the impression that the current regime is just another picture of an authoritarian regime that has a religious support. The leaders of the Muslim brotherhood is still very naïve in their political speeches. This was clear in their media discourses in which one time they praise the US support to Egypt and the other time they attack the US and call it the “Great devil” or the source of all evil in Egypt and the Muslim world.

The result of the naïve policy of the brotherhood was losing of the support from the extremist Islamic parties known by the “salafists” which were always on the side of the brotherhood in any confrontation against the secularist or the nationalist movements. This was clear when the leading political party of the “salafists” opened fire against the brotherhood in the media and accused them of trying to manipulate the state institutions by appointing leaders who are in favour of the brotherhood. not only the naïve policy of the brotherhood was the reason behind the change in the position of the
“salafists” but also the un-representation of any of the leaders of those groups in the government or any of the state institutions made them feel that they were left behind and that they need have more political pressure on the brotherhood.53

This drive us to an important question of whether the political conflict in Egypt now is about political representation in the government and acquiring political authority which none of the leaders of the Islamic movements and also the opposition movements have had before in the former regimes. In addition to that, it also proves that the Muslim brotherhood doesn’t apply the concept of pluralism which gives the right for other political parties to be represented and participate in the process of creating a new future for Egypt. However, Islam as a religion emphasis the role of “pluralism” under the concept of “Al-Shura” which means that those who are in power should incorporate others in the process of decision making. The concept of “Al-Shura” is inherited in the teachings of Prophet Mohamed and it’s proved through the history of Islam during the era of “AL-Kolafa’ EL-Rashdeen” (orthodox caliphates), it was the time when the followers of the Prophet were in power. Moreover, this drives a very complicated view about the Muslim brotherhood that they implement the role “Al-Shura” which means consultations in their own organizational chart represented in the consultative assembly. However, their policies when they are in power now in Egypt don’t imply that they believe in such a concept. This leads to a very important conclusion that the

53 The split between the Salafists and the brotherhood was expressed in an article Titled “Is it the time for a confrontation between the Brotherhood and The Salafists”, By Bashir Abd-Elfatah, (Published By El Watan-News Journal on march 3rd, 2013). http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/139411
brotherhood because of the severe repression that they faced during the last six decades of the first republic in Egypt (the first republic in Egypt is a new concept introduced lately in the Egyptian media discourses to define the state in Egypt since the establishment of the republic in 1952 to the revolution in 2011), they feel insecure towards other political groups. This can be answer for the hostility of the brotherhood towards the opposition in Egypt.

**Conclusion:**

The material above was presented to elaborate the roots of anti-pluralism in the brotherhood, through their structure and relations of power. The acceptance of others’ sharing the authority or the power is not found in the hierarchal structure of the brotherhood.

Furthermore, the presentation of the security apparatus was just a demonstration of the conservative stream that dominates the leadership of the society of the brotherhood.

In addition to that, the presentation of the integration of the brotherhood in the political process, was clear that through Mubarak’s regime, the brotherhood were neither allowed to experience any administration authority nor any of their key figures in the leadership of the brotherhood, thus this made the brotherhood inexperienced of how to administrate the state itself even if they were elected to that authority.
The presentation of the ideology of the brotherhood was important not only to view their ideological belonging to the some conservative Islamic reformists, but also to demonstrate the weakness in the ideological belief of the brotherhood itself, which couldn't identify the features of the new proposed Islamic order, whether it’s one party system or a multi-party one.

Later in the third chapter, we will demonstrate how the brotherhood intended to establish a new civilian authoritarian regime that can be considered the first step in achieving their promised Islamic state that should retrieve the glory of the Islamic domination.

Now we will present another main primary actor in the political process in Egypt. An actor that ruled Egypt for a year and a half even more than the Former elected president Morsi from the brotherhood, he was ousted by the military after a popular uprising on the 30th of June, 2013.
-The Egyptian military institution as a primary participant:

Over the last sixty years, since the establishment of the republic of Egypt, all the presidents of Egypt came from the officer corps, having been retired from the army and engaged in the political process and then appointed the president of the state through the people’s assembly. Through the first republic in Egypt, in the beginning it was a military dictatorship with military offices being appointed in top positions in the state institutions, then with the defeat of 1967, the military was gradually being pulled out from being engaged into politics.

Sadat’s regime witnessed the disengagement of the military from the political process, promoting a considerable degree of institutionalization and professionalism in the Egyptian military, leading to the considerable victory in the war 1973. After that, the military was given economic privileges and some immunities of not being charged in front of civilian courts but military ones.

Mubarak’s regime witnessed the evolving of the police state, in which the military intelligence along with the state security investigation sector recently renamed the homeland security, were in charge of assuring the stability and the continuity of the regime, and the disengagement of the military officers from the political life.

The Egyptian armed forces employ more than 2 million men, in which the military employs more than half a million as active forces, and the ministry of interior employs
about 1.7 million serving in branches as central security forces, police forces and homeland security sector.\textsuperscript{54}

Therefore, if we gave every man serving in the military or the armed forces, a family of three members then we find that there are about eight million Egyptians who are dependent on these institutions to achieve their interests, outnumbering any political party or organization in Egypt. In addition to the military owned corporations that hire hundreds of thousands, then the number might be higher than the number estimated.

The Egyptian military institution is most reputable state institution amongst the Egyptian society, leading to an unbalance in the civil-military relations in favor of the latter, and putting in consideration the condition above.

\textbf{The balkanization of the state:}\textsuperscript{55}

To illustrate the assumption above more, we need to introduce the concept of “balkanization of the state”. The military institution in Egypt since 1952 became integrated in almost all the state institutions, leaving these state institutions alone under the control of the military. Clubs for the families of both military and the police were established in almost all the governorates of Egypt, in addition to hotels in many

\textsuperscript{54} Although many resources gives another number of around 450,000 active personal for the military, it is impossible to have an official number, See “The officers Backing Egypt’s president”, by Joshua Stachern (Published by Foreign Affairs Magazine, February 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2013).

\textsuperscript{55} An article that introduces the concept of the balkanization of state titled “Egypt’s wide state reassembles itself”, By Nathan J.Brown, (Published by Foreign policy, on July 17, 2013). 

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/17/egypt_s_wide_state_reassembles_itself
resorts all over Egypt’s coastal shores. Those families sharing the same membership in clubs and hotels became in a way more related to each other, creating a cycle of power relations. In which, relatives and family members of the officers were appointed in any state corporations or government posts. Such a kind of relations between the military and other civilian families which seeks to be involved in this power relations, created a balk of the society acquiring government posts and sharing in the state’s economy, made the way clear for the “balkanization of the state” to be established.

The Egyptian military’s economy can help to enhance the notion of the “balkanization of the state”. The size of the military’s economy in Egypt has been a major question for political parties and research institutes for decades. However, we will present some materials that would give a small picture of this economy, but before we will introduce how this economy began.

When Nasser came to power, he began the process of the balkanization of the state in parallel with lowering the institutionalization of the military institution, to assure its loyalty to the regime. He appointed his loyal officers in the high command positions, crossing all the traditions of the hierarchal organization of the military in Egypt, which he himself was aware of these traditions and attracted General Mohamed Naguib to lead his coup against the corrupted king’s regime. He appointed his companion in the army coup against the king in 1952, to be the commander of the Egyptian armed forces “Abd El hakim Aimr”.
After the humiliating defeat in 1967 of the Egyptian army, institutionalization of the military increased, leading the efficient military officers to acquire the highest posts in the military. However, after the 1973, Sadat was afraid of the increase in the military’s population and especially after 1977 events of popular uprising, after the failure of some economic decisions of decreasing the prices of government subsidized commodities. He appointed his loyal generals to be at the head of the army. However, still the assassination of Anwar el Sadat leaves a question mark of how this breach of the army happened, as some of those accused in the assassination were serving in the army doing there general conscription duty!

The introduction of the economy of the military started in Nasser’s regime and continued through Sadat’s regime with the establishment of state owned “Arab organization for industry” during Nasser. Then after the considerable victory of the army in 1973, leading the army leave the battle for the politicians and with the process of peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel, Sadat introduced the national service project organization in which the ministry of defense would be doing national projects in enhancing the state’s infrastructure. The military used its own capabilities to build construction projects and other infrastructure facilities.  

56 Details on those state enterprises is found in the article titled “The military and Egypt's transformation process; Preservation of the military's reserve Domains”, By Cheriene Chams El-Dine, page 2, (Published by the German institute for international and security affairs on February, 2013).
The military’s corporations as we have mentioned some examples of them aren’t supervised by any monitoring state institution and its profits don’t go into the public treasury while being managed alone by the ministry of defense.

The military during Mubarak’s regime has been put in the background because of its breach that led to the assignation of Sadat. For Mubarak to assure the stability of his regime and the loyalty of the military institution to his rule, he began the process of monitoring the military institution through state agencies and security sectors, which were also headed by loyal officers from both the military and police institutions.\(^57\)

The control of the military of the main state’s monitoring agencies was another step in assuring the balkanization of the state. The administrative monitoring authority is a clear example of the integration of military in the civil bureaucracy.

The administrative monitoring authority was superior and overlaps the functions of the other state monitoring agencies (the central auditing organization and the administrative prosecution authority). The difference is that the former is always headed and its senior officials are drawn from the military and police institutions. The administrative monitoring authority aimed at keeping the regime’s supporters in power.

\(^{57}\) The discussion of the military during Mubarak’s regime is driven from the article titled “Above the state; the officers’ Republic in Egypt”, By Yezid Sayigh, pages 4, 5, 6, 7, (Published by CARNEGIE endowment for international peace, August, 2012.), [http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt/d412](http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt/d412)
while dismissing those who are opponent to the regime besides its official purposes of monitoring the state apparatus, on which it was officially established upon.58

Moreover, ex-military officers and latter in Mubarak’s regime, ex-police officers were appointed as governors in the local government. In which coastal and some other governorates which witnessed clashes between the police forces and the Islamists militants, were headed by ex-military or ex-police officers. They contributed in maintain the stability and the continuity of the regime.59

In addition, the general conscription duty has contributed also in the balkanization of the state. In which something like 350,000 of university students are serving in the military at any given time and the others who have primary degrees or illiterate are delivered to serve in the ministry of interior as in the Central Security Forces (CSF). This made the most skilled civilians to be serving the army and also give them the opportunity to continue as officers if they passed security clearance and administrative

58 The discussion state scrutiny apparatus is driven from the article titled “Above the state; the officers’ Republic in Egypt”, By Yezid Sayigh, page 12 (Published by CARNEGIE endowment for international peace, August, 2012.)

59 The details about the military’s deep state is driven from the article titled “Above the state; the officers’ Republic in Egypt”, By Yezid Sayigh, page 10, 11,12,13,14 (Published by CARNEGIE endowment for international peace, August, 2012.)
interviews, which on the other hand gave the chance for the sons of the officers to be future officers in the military or the police.\textsuperscript{60}

Now, we can understand more the notion of “the balkanization of the state” in which one institution has a balk of other state authorities in the hand of its officers.

The Egyptian military enjoyed a considerable level of institutionalization in which middle ranks who acquires university degrees in military science and other related fields of studies, were being promoted to the highest ranks given their security clearance as being loyal to the institution hierarchal organization.

For instance, general “Abd El-Fattah Al-Sisi” who acquires two degrees from an American and a British university, was appointed as the head of the military intelligence during Mubarak’s regime and continued in the same position during the transitional period, until being appointed as the head of the military during Morsi’s rule.

In addition, the balkanization of the state along with the general conscription duty, created a strong link with the society in general. With the economic enterprises of the military and its integration in the civilian bureaucracy, created a power of relations with the middle and the high classes of the Egyptian society, leading the Egyptian businesses and other members of the middle class who are whether members in the institution or

\textsuperscript{60} In one of the most successful Egyptian movies, based on Alaa al Aswany’s The Yacoubian building, which portrayed a young Egyptian student who applied for police academy being rejected upon security clearance and then turned to be a terrorist.
in relation with members of the institution, to have strong organic link with those businesses.

Later in the third chapter, we would present the balkanization of the state in more details as how it functions and its purpose.

**The military’s economy:**

We presented above some details about the military’s economy so as to understand the notion of the balkanization of the state. However, we need to specify and focus more on it and present some details in numbers, so as to use it in analyzing the transitional period in which the army was in power and during Morsi’s rule, and whether the army continued on its own privileges and immunities given by the former regimes or not.

The military’s economy consists of five main sectors; the annual budget that reached 5.2% of the fiscal year of 2011/2012 making around US $4.3 Billion, US military aid which is received annually upon the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and it reached

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61 The discussion of the military’s economy was driven from the article titled “The military and Egypt’s transformation process; Preservation of the military’s reserve Domains”, By Cheriene Chams El-Dine, page 2-3 (Published by the German institute for international and security affairs on February, 2013).
$1.3 billion, arms deals and the factories such as the Arab organization for industrialization (AOI) and the national service projects organization (NSPO).\textsuperscript{62}

The main reason known publicly in Egypt is that the military’s economic activity helps in making the military self-sufficient from its financial resources and relieving Egypt’s annual budget from spending a portion of it on the military. However, the military economic activity was not under any parliamentary scrutiny or the central auditing office, leaving any details about the transparency level of the military’s economy unclear.

\textbf{Military trials.}\textsuperscript{63}

The military trials of civilians in Egypt were a controversial issue that needed to be solved. According to the Egyptian former constitution of 1971, it gave the right to try civilians in front of military courts for crimes of harming the armed forces!

Moreover, military officials accused of breaching the law can only be tried in front of the military courts, in which the code of the military law only allows military officials to be subjected to the military prosecutor and not the general civilian prosecutor, which doesn’t guarantee the transparency in those kinds of military trials.

\textsuperscript{62} The numbers of the size of the military’s budget are driven from the article titled “Above the state; the officers’ Republic in Egypt”, By Yezid Sayigh, page 7; figure 1, (Published by CARNEGIE endowment for international peace, August, 2012.)

\textsuperscript{63} The discussion of the military’s trials was driven from the article titled “The military and Egypt’s transformation process; Preservation of the military’s reserve Domains”, By Cheriene Chams El-Dine, page 3-4 (Published by the German institute for international and security affairs on February, 2013).
Thus, military trials were used as a tool by the supreme council of armed forces to punish the political activists, who managed to organize demonstrations against the military’s policy of the transitional period, allowing nearly 12,000 civilians to be tried by military courts from January till the end of August, 2011.64

The police institution:65

During the end of Sadat’s regime, he tried to disintegrate the military institution gradually from the political life, leaving the economic sector of the military to be in the hand of the army and to continue having more privileges.

During Mubarak’s regime, the confrontation of the state with the Islamists militants groups, made it possible for the ministry of interior to take over the role of the military institution leaving it in the background of the picture.

In 2009, the ministry of interior (MOI) employed 1.7 million individuals, including 850,000 police personnel and administrative staff, 450,000 for the Central security forces (CSF) and 400,000 for the state security investigation sector (SSIS). The general conscription was imposed on those with primary degrees to serve in the CSF.

64 The numbers provided of the military trials was driven from the article titled “The military and Egypt’s transformation process; Preservation of the military’s reserve Domains”, By Cheriene Chams El-Dine, page 4; second paragraph (Published by the German institute for international and security affairs on February, 2013).

65 The discussion of the police institution is driven from the report titled “policies of security reform sector in Egypt”, By Daniel Brumberg and Hesham Sallam, pages 6,7,8, (Published by the US Institute of peace, 2012).
The ministry of interior was depending heavily on the CSF to oppress political and social protests. The SSIS which had limitless authorities of detaining and gathering information about political opponents of the regime was the main arm of the ministry.

The militarized nature of the MOI and other related security establishments made it in a close relation to the military institution. However, during Mubarak’s regime the annual budget of the MOI was tripled to reach after the downfall of Mubarak and during Morsi’s rule to $3.78 billion, being close to that of military. This indicates the dependency of Mubarak’s regime on the police to oppress the political opposition.

The brutality of the police was the main incentive behind the revolution of the 25 of January in 2011. The SSIS was mainly accused of arresting thousands of political activists and other Islamists activists through detaining them by the force of the emergency law, which always detention of civilians without judicial permission.

Moreover, The SSIS played a major role in affecting and deciding the appointments and promotions of officials in state institutions and marginalize those who are opposing the regime. Such an authority made the SSIS a very important sector for the former regimes to protect its continuity and stability, leading to an indirect confrontation between the SSIS on a side and the military institution on the other side (as a Guardian of the state institutions).

This was illustrated when the offices of the SSIS was broken into by the protestors on March 5, 2011, while the SCAF (the supreme council of armed forces) was in power.
Some army units were present at these offices. However, they didn’t intervene to stop the protestors from rushing into these offices, which contained classified documents about the national security!

After the humiliating withdrawal of the Egyptian police forces from the streets during the beginning of the mass uprisings and after three days from the 25th of January, 2011. The MOI received a tremendous shock that spread all over its organs. Demands for reforming the institution weren’t only from outside but from within the institution itself. Some police officers formed many initiatives for recommending reformation policies. Among those initiatives was the “police for egypt” (PFE).

The PFE recommended the withdrawal of the police from the elections process in which the police was accused of participating in elections fraud during Mubarak’s regime, the appointment of a politician for the post of minister of interior as it was always a police officer and decentralizing the police forces to the authority of governorates to increase the transparency amongst the police officers.66

In addition to that, many have called for the separation of the lately formed Homeland Security sector instead of the SSIS which was dissolved by the ministry of interior on March, 2011, also to be subjected to monitoring agencies to assure its transparency in work.

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66 The recommendations of the PEE are driven from the report titled “policies of security reform sector in Egypt”, By Daniel Brumberg and Hesham Sallam, pages 9,10, (Published by the US Institute of peace,2012).
We have presented such recommendations to understand whether there was a change in the authoritarian nature that was guiding those institutions or not. We will continue to present some recommendations on the transitional justice and the secondary actor in our research, the judicial branch.
Part II

The judicial branch as a secondary actor:

The state in Egypt has suffered from a serious deficit since its establishment in 1952 as a republic. The former regimes in Egypt as we have explained before shared a common feature of an authoritarian regime, which is the breach of the executive or the legislative branch over the authority of the judicial branch. In other words, the executive authority in Egypt to assure the continuity and stability of the regime, it had to assert a kind of control over the judicial system, whether by certain law and regulations or by a constitutional article that give the executive branch such an authority.

The main dilemma:67

The two main deficits that the judicial system in Egypt suffer from, are firstly the breach of other authorities on its authority and secondly the presence of exceptional systems of courts as the military courts.

After the revolution broke out in Egypt, many have called for the reformation of the judicial system. As the core of the deficits is the total independency of the judicial system from the executive authority.

67 The presentation of those recommendations were driven from the article titled “The juridical authority in Egypt: A call for reform and independency”, By Mahmoud Kandil, pages 5, 6, (Published by Arab Reform Initiative, Arabic version, July, 2012).
Many recommendations were given through conferences and meetings of the judges’ syndicates and initiatives. However, we will just present some selected core recommendations that focuses on the core issues of independency of the judicial branch.

The first issue is limiting the relation between the ministry of justice as an executive authority over the judicial affairs. The ministry of justice had the authority to perform “judicial inspection”, which are investigations to be done with judges who are accused of violating the law. This gave the executive authority to punish judges who can be a source of trouble for the executive authority to continue its control over the judiciary system.

In addition to that, the president’s authorities gave him the right to appoint both the head of the supreme constitutional court and the general prosecutor should be limited, as it should be delivered to the authorities of the supreme judicial council.

The second issue is the codes of the military courts that gave the right for the president to send any to civilian to be trailed against a military court. Moreover, the rights of the military to judge any civilian in front of military courts in violations that “harm the armed forces”.

Such issues if not solved will affect the process of transitional justice, in which any state faces after a public revolution.
The transitional justice and implication on Egypt:

I will present the notion of “transitional justice” which in my perspective is the most vital tool in reconciliation periods of post conflict eras.

The transitional justice is the transitional paradigm which is in between the shift from a conflict paradigm to a peaceful one. The most crucial tool that can be used in achieving the transitional justice is the “Empirical research”. Through empirical research, one can gather a very sufficient knowledge of the past conflict through direct and indirect observation or experience.

The process of the empirical research is the first step in achieving the “transitional justice” which creates a background for those who are participating in conflict resolution. This background is the basis for understanding the reasons of the past conflict, the results of the conflict on the different scales of the society and producing means and goals of achieving justice in the post-conflict society.

My choice of “transitional justice” as a very crucial type to reach reconciliation in post conflict society was based upon the goals of this type of justice which can be

68 The discussion of the transitional justice is driven from the book titled “Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research”, edited by Hugo Van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, Audrey Chapman, chapter one By Neil Kritz Pages 14 till 20, (Published by united states institute of peace press).
implemented in mass atrocities societies or other societies that suffered from less conflict than mass atrocities.

Such goals were mentioned in one of the readings “Assessing the impact of transitional justice”, which are;

- Restoring dignity
- Common future for the society in post conflict era
- Retributive justice of those who committed crimes against the society
- Restorative justice through different regulations and procedures to punish those responsible for the crime but in the same time keep stability in the society through transforming the society from a conflicted one to a more coherent one.

After presenting those goals, one can notice that transitional justice includes two other types of justice that are on the opposite sides of a continuum. In which retributive justice is punishing individuals who directly committed crimes against the society. However, it doesn’t help in the reconstruction of the society in the post-conflict. Another type of justice was mentioned which is the restorative justice that contributes in the reconstruction and reconciliation processes of the societies in post conflict periods.

Therefore, transitional justice presents a more comprehensive approach to justice in post-conflict societies that binds the two different types on the continuum of justice.
In Egypt, when the revolution erupted in 2011, most of the top leaders of the former regime were facing trials of financial corruption, killing of protests and treason. The majority of the public opinion in Egypt was thirsty for retributive justice, a way of expressing their extreme anger towards those who put the whole country on the edge. The problem is that retributive justice in a society that suffered from oppression, discrimination and corruption will not be affective and will just satisfy the society’s need for vengeance.

Furthermore, after almost one year and a half, a new president was elected in Egypt by 51% of the voters. There were aspirations for a beginning of a new regime for political, social and cultural freedom. The country is still suffering from the effects of the revolution on the economic situation. Moreover, most of the business men and investors were linked in a way or another with the top leaders of the former regime, making them subject to questions of corruption and facing trials of exposing the public interest to instability. This led to worsen the economic situation more through closing a lot of factories and companies of those business men leading to the increase in the unemployment rate.

When the new government in Egypt tried the restorative justice methods for reconciliation with the business men, this led to the increase of the public anger who was still feeling hostile towards those business men.
Egypt has lost many of its citizens during the events of the revolutionary and the protests that followed January, 2011, which up till that date we are writing this research still protests and the number of deaths are increasing. This increases the structural violence in the society leaving this country to face an unknown future.

When the Muslim brotherhood was elected in power as president Mohamed Morsi became the president of Egypt, hopes were raised as he is the first elected president of Egypt. Through our analysis in the third chapter, we will present what Dr. Morsi did for achieving the transitional justice and reformation of the judicial branch.

**Tamrod campaign as a secondary actor:**

We are going to present a very distinguishable secondary actor, which succeeded in gathering of mass protests in all over Egypt against former president Morsi. However, there are many questions over the finance of this campaign, we will be tackling the idea itself in which its success was reflected on the ground on 30th of June.

It’s a youth movement that tried to recall the history of the Egyptian national movement against the British occupation of Egypt. In 1919, the Egyptian national movement called for mass protests against the Egyptian governor and the British occupation forces for not permitting the Egyptian delegation to attend the “Versailles conference”. This national movement had an idea of gathering the signatures of a number of the Egyptian population to give legitimacy for the delegation, in order to present the Egyptian case in
the conference. Now it’s the twenty first century and the idea is back again but in different form and purposes.  

Tamord campaign that began in 29 April in Tahrir square and finally declared in 29 June that it collected nearly 22 million signatures to call for early presidential elections. It was calling president Morsi to step down and call for early elections, as it’s a democratic solution for the political conflict in Egypt.

The main goal of this campaign:

This campaign was a recall for the main demands that was raised on the 25th January, 2011. They were calling for justice and freedom; they claimed that Morsi - during his rule- didn’t try to begin the process of transitional justice, in order to establish the state

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69 This discussion was driven from the report titled “Revolt and Revolution In Egypt: Causes and Consequences of the 2011 Egyptian Uprising”, by Steven Ditchkus and Diana Rodriguez, from page 5-16, Published By Geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa Institute, Fall 2011. (https://www.google.com.mt/search?tbm=bks&hl=en&q=Revolt+and+Revolution+In+Egypt%3A+Causes+ and+Consequences+of+the+2011+Egyptian+Uprising%28%28E2%80%9D%2C+by++Steven+Ditchkus+and+Diana+ Rodriguez#hl=en&q=Revolt+and+Revolution+In+Egypt%3A+Causes+and+Consequences+of+the+2011+Egyptian+Uprising%28%28E2%80%9D%2C+by++Steven+Ditchkus+and+Diana+Rodriguez).

70 A news article published by France 24 on the 29th of June, 2013 discusses the Tamrod Campaign’s gathering of signatures. http://www.france24.com/ar/20130629-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%99%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3
of law. However, he was accused of incompetence and of being a president of his own party!

Thus, this campaign claimed that it will try to gather as much as possible of citizens signature that would made it clear for the president that the people demand an early elections.

**Methods of Mobilization**: Tamord used variety of methods to mobilize masses in large numbers and convince them to participate. Some of these methods were:

- **Leaflets and Posters**:

  Tamord members used to put posters of either martyrs during revolution, SCAF and Morsi Reigns to remind people of them and their rights of vengeance. Very famous posters are the posters of two martyrs in Morsi reign [Hussieni Abodief - Gaber Salah], who were killed in the clashes between supporters and opponents of Morsi in December 2012 after the constitutional declaration. The poster contains only their faces shouting and below two words [Blood by blood/دم بدم]. Posters are put everywhere, especially in main underground stations [Tahrir- Ramses]( the downtown area of cairo), and in main streets and buses.⁷¹

  Regarding leaflets, they used to distribute them especially in underground metro stations, where members of Tamord usually reside to convince the public through these

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⁷¹ *A news article that discusses the ways of mobilization of Tamrod Campaign published by an Egyptian electronic journal named “Vetogate” on 27th June, 2013.*

http://www.vetogate.com/425581#.Uc8tVZwvbA
Leaflets that support their cause. These leaflets usually attack MB on their weakest points, in specific economic failures, such as diesel shortages, inflations, unemployment... etc. so as to convince people to turn against MB rule.

- **Graffiti Drawings:**

Graffiti spread greatly after the revolution, and Tamord used it in main streets and squares to mobilize people. From the Graffiti used are those quotes [Go down 30/6 for your children/اٍذٍذُل ٣٠-٦ من أجل أولادك], [Tamord 30/6/], [End of Ikhwan(brotherhood) 30/6/], [Our date to downfall Morsi/موعدنا لإسقاط مرسي].

- **Awareness campaigns in public transportation:**

It’s a very significant method as it allows them to interact with large numbers of people and deliver their message and even urge with supporters of Morsi. They usually exist in Underground stations with large numbers holding their forms and urging public to sign. Those members are always youth who are still university students or recent graduates. They are wearing Tamord T-Shirts, chanting in loud voice, and calling people to sign. They used to talk to people and ask them to sign and convince them by asking to look to the continuous electricity problems, diesel and benzene shortages, and MB businessmen fortunes.
I quote some words that I heard: "مش عاوز ولادك تعيش - عجبك يعني قطع الكهرباء اللي كل يوم [بتحصل - لسه حنشوف قطع كهربا باما في رمضان - مش شافين طوابير البنزين والسولار، مين المسئول؟]

They also tend to take the metro or buses and distribute the forms and leaflets, urging with people. Sometimes in Underground metro, group of 5 to 10 persons start to chant together and attack MB, with slogans and songs, while lifting huge banners attacking MB policies and president Morsi. This act usually lead to fierce debates inside metro as supporters of Morsi refused these, while Tamord members criticized them. The debate led to engage of ordinary passengers, who debate also about the responsibility of the current crisis, the incompetence of president or the heavy burden of the old regime. The best way to attack MB is the current economic situation in which economic policies of MB is heavily criticized. This point received wide support from passengers who are suffering from different problems, especially electricity shortages and the inflation of all good before Ramadan. They used to agree that Mb and president failed to deal with the situation and many said that they simply can't continue like for long time. This way is very effective, although it is not always peaceful, because it usually ended by mutual insults and after the Tamord members took another metro, the debate continue as fierce as it is. Also these campaigns are done in slums and "popular regions", as in downtown Cairo especially in markets, coffee shops, where members of the campaign try to convince citizens and engage in debates about the president performance and why to sign Tamord forms.
**Conclusion:**

These means of mobilization was noticed by every ordinary citizen and the government was aware of the increase in depression for the majority of the society. However, no one action was taken by the government to reduce the level of fierceness, which the people were reaching to.

Ordinary citizens are the ones who made the great differences for Tamord campaign. They simply have been subject during the past period to serious pressures that they couldn’t afford and that is way they turned against MB so quickly and decisively. This "critical block" is what Tamord tried to attract and what MB failed to convince.

In the third chapter, we will present of a full analysis with the dates and events that happened mainly in the rule of Morsi. In addition, we will also include events that occurred in the transitional period, when the army was in power. In order to analyze the role of the primary actors along with the secondary actors, that was presented in this chapter.

**Conclusion for the second chapter:**

In this chapter we presented materials on both primary and secondary actors that would help to be used in our third chapter to analyze the role of the military during the transitional period, and the role of the brotherhood in one year role of Morsi.
In third chapter, we would demonstrate through our analysis the relation between those actors the political process, and how they affected each other through the two years and a half of the study which ends with the fall of Morsi.
Chapter Three

The implications and analysis of the materials

Part 1

In this part will be clarifying the subjects presented in the previous chapters and its relation with the state itself.

How the balkanization of the Egyptian state operates:

We have presented in our first chapter a theoretical framework of some primary deficits, which occur in the transitional periods of non-democratic state to democratic states, with focus on the civil-military relations.

The case study of our research is Egypt. The republic of Egypt was established in 1952 by a military-coup praised by the public against the king, who resigned without any violent confrontations. Since then, and the state in Egypt became directly with all its state institutions under the direct leadership by military officials. It was not until, “Nasser” came to power in 1954, and then civilian heads were appointed in some state institutions.
The Egyptian state from “Nasser” along with “Sadat” till “Mubarak”, it state based on two main principles. 

Firstly, it’s the ability to grant, in which “Nasser” established a state abilities through a state owned market, to provide the social goods and services at lower prices and in many cases fully subsidized by the state. This gave the state the ability to have legitimistic bases in which it gave economic and social privileges, and in return monopolized the political process through the one official party.

Secondly, it’s the ability to oppress, in which the state was able through its state security apparatus legitimized by many regulations to oppress the political opposition, during the last three presidents of Egypt mentioned above. Such ability was also legitimized by a social support, gained through the ability to grant.

73 The discussion of ability to grant and to oppress was driven from the report titled “the police state and events of 30 June; facts and doubts”, By Mahmoud Bayomi, Published by (The Democratic Arabic center, August, 2013). http://democraticac.de/wordpress/archives/1493
During the rule of Mubarak, the foreign debt of Egypt increased tremendously. This led to the decline in the ability of the state to grant economic and social privileges. However, the state continued the use of security apparatus to oppress the political opposition. In the last two decades of Mubarak’s regime, the civil organizations including the Muslim brotherhood which had the largest share, were providing economic and social services and goods to the poor majority of the society, leading to the gradual demolishing of this ability.

On January 2011, the ability to oppress using the security forces including the central security forces (CSF) along with the State Security investigation sector (SSIS) came to the ground after three days of continuous mass demonstrations all over Egypt.

These mass demonstrations started with the middle class and some political elite figures, protesting against the oppression of the regime. Then the poor majority joined, to express its anger for its rough economic and social conditions.

With the success of the mass protests of January 2011, to topple down the former president “Mubarak”, the ability to oppress for the state was almost demolished. The continuous mass protests for more than two years and a half, was mainly targeting the continuous decline in the ability of the state to provide social and economic security to

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74 See chapter two, the paragraph of the integration of the Muslim brotherhood in the political process.
its citizens. The state security apparatus was established to primary provide security for the regime then security for the society which was just a picture portrayed by the fear of criminal groups of the large oppressive state apparatus. This picture fall after the chaotic situation that resulted in almost all the major cities of Egypt, resulting from the complete withdrawal of the police forces, and the prison break of almost eleven prisons in Egypt, the escape of 21,000 of the prisons, including the “Wady El Natron” prison where the former president Morsi was detained, who fled from the prison during the prison break.\(^7^5\)

The chaotic situation in Egypt led a rocking shock to the state institutions. Some prisoners who fled from the prisons where personals of “Hezbollah” and “Hamas” groups, this led to the state institutions to revise its perception of total hegemony over the country during the former regimes in the first republic. Such a notion of the first republic was chosen as the state itself witnessed the loss of former abilities, along with change in the primary actors’ institutions in the political process. The downfall of Mubarak led to the downfall of the police state in which security forces faced humiliated withdrawal from the streets of Egypt. The military the main player who was in the background being deviated from any direct participation in the political process, returned back to the front, when military forces were ordered to be deployed in the all

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\(^7^5\) An article named “Investigations & Interviews Of Almary-Alyoum in Two Years; Hamas broke into the prisons and Freed The Ikhwans”, Published by AlMasry-Al Youm Journal, June 23\(^{rd}\) 2013. [http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1873961](http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1873961)
the major cities. However, the military deployment didn’t completely end the chaotic situation but its participation in the streets, brought it back to the front of the picture.

On the other hand, the most organized and popularly famous, the Muslim brotherhood was brought into the front as the strongest and most organized political opposition group, given its former participation in providing social and economic goods and services, and regarding what was presented before about the participation of brotherhood in the civil society field, created a golden opportunity for the brotherhood as it has always aimed to be presented in the leadership of the country as stated by its goals and foundation purpose by its founder “Hassan Al-Banna”.

Although the Muslim brotherhood was brought to be a primary player in the political process, the military became again the head of the state on the 11th of February, 2011, when the former president Mubarak declared to step down, and handing off the leadership of the country to Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

Two main players and almost the only, were brought into the picture after the step down of Mubarak. The military with its balked state and the Muslim brotherhood with a high popularity among the many, and its highly structured society of the brother, created whether a chance of co-operation or confrontation.

Before we continue on analyzing through the political decisions regarding the transient period and during Morsi’s rule (PART II), we have to analyze the material which was presented on both primary actors in the previous chapter.
The brotherhood with its ideology and its organizational structure, created some essential problems which faced the brotherhood during the transitional period, when the army was in power, and lasted with the removal of the former president in July, 2013.

These problems were structured in the brotherhood itself. The society of brotherhood is a conservative group which believes in gradual change, along with “absolute obedience” to the leadership as a one of the principles in being a member, created a culture of obedience and subordination of the member to the leader “The General Guide”.

The principle of “absolute obedience” was preserved all over the decades since the establishment of the brotherhood, as a sign of loyalty to the brotherhood, to insure its coherence through its political struggle against the former consecutive regimes.

The second major problem, was the “Stateness” problem of the brotherhood, the main purpose of the brotherhood is the Supranationalism, through the retrieving the caliphate system of authority to reunite the whole Muslim nation. In the presentation of the structure of the brotherhood, it showed a very important committee, which was the core of the brotherhood to expand in the entire Muslim world and even the western one, “the section for liaison with the Islamic world”. The problem of Stateness here is expressed by such a globalization aspect, in which members of the brotherhood share one identity that unites them together in the society that is Islam. Their historic aim by their founder to restore the Islamic glory by establishment of the caliphate system
would create a sense of an identity barrier, a kind of separation in national loyalty between the society of the brotherhood and the main outward society in which they exist. Michael Hetcher defines the social identity in his article titled “From class to culture” as “that part of individual’s self-concept deriving from membership in groups”. (Hechter, P.419).  

From this definition, social identity is the collectivity of the individual identity of those participating in the same societal group. By the application of this definition on the Muslim brotherhood society, we find this socio-political group is being subjected to many criticisms upon their governing policy and their view of restructuring the state institutions in Egypt which in itself is ambiguous to those who aren’t a part of the Muslim brotherhood. This make it clear that the interests of the individuals who are a part of the Muslim brotherhood is in a way different from the interests of the rest who are not a part from the brotherhood but in the same time are part of the Egyptian society.

Hetcher also explains the notion of “class politics” and why the individual choose a certain social group to be a part from it than another one. In regard to the Muslim brotherhood, the founder of this group belongs to the lower class in time when Egypt was a kingdom governed by a feudal aristocratic system in which the middle class does

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76 This discussion was elaborated in the article titled “From Class to Culture”, By Michael Hechter, Published By American Journal of Sociology. 2004.
http://faculty.washington.edu/hechter/ClassToCulture.pdf
not almost exist in the Egyptian society. When nationalism rose in Egypt with the formation of the republic and with the application of the socialist ideology in Egypt, the middle class increased enormously.

Although the Muslim brotherhood suffered from great suppression from the Egyptian regime at that time, the social ground wasn’t in a position that permits the ideas of this religious group to spread. In addition to that, the greater suppression of the regime to the members of this brotherhood made them more determined to fight against the Egyptian political regime. When Mubarak became the president in 1980s, the country was suffering from a high poverty rates due to the poor performance of the Egyptian economy. With the increase in corruption in almost all of the sectors of the institutions of the state, the middle class was being decreased gradually. This gave the chance to ideology of the religious groups to spread among the Egyptian society.

The third major problem, it’s the concentration of power in the hands of the leadership of the brotherhood, especially the “General Guide” along with the “Guidance council”. However, both authorities are elected by the “consultative assembly”, the loyalty requirement for all the members to the “General Guide”, gives such a position a divine feature. The brotherhood’s structure and ideology maintained a culture of anti-pluralism through religious authority (Absolute obedience) within the society of the brotherhood, to insure the coherence of the organizational body of the brotherhood.
The fourth major problem, it’s the “chosen trauma” that guides the consciousness of the brotherhood society, since its dissolution in 1954 by “Nasser”. We have presented that the brotherhood society had suffered from oppression after such an incident during Nasser’s era. However during both Sadat and Mubarak, the brotherhood enjoyed some space to operate and engage in the political process, still it was facing some kind of oppression, but it was a given a good space to develop and increase its economic sources through supporting their business men members. For instance, “Khayart El-Shater” the current deputy of the general guide of the brotherhood, who ultimately owns three companies along with a shares in other companies, also he was the brotherhood’s primary candidate before Dr.Morsi.

This chosen trauma was used by brotherhood to dramatize their suffering, to be the base of their arguments about their inefficiency and uncleanness in their political views. When Morsi was in power, the brotherhood had the majority of the Shura council that performed the full legislative authority, until the people’s assembly being elected. Issued in May, 2013, a new law for regulating the demonstrations which was almost the same one used during Mubarak’s regime. Giving the police the authority to give permissions for demonstrations and use brutal force. Not only that but also the chosen trauma of the brotherhood, created a fear of brotherhood from other political parties of

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betrayal, therefore from the beginning of Morsi’s term, alienation of other political parties was a demand.

The last major problem, it’s a consequence of the previous ones, which is the inclusion of a culture of violence in the society of the brotherhood, as a result for the oppression of the political regime. Galtung in his article titled “cultural violence”, he defines the violence related to culture as, “any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form.” (Galtung, p.291)  

I thought that I can incorporate also galtung’s article in understanding the riots that were done by the members of the Muslim brotherhood against the protestors from the opposition. Since one of the components of culture is religion and the Muslim brotherhood is a social group which has a religious background then most of the actions of the brotherhood are justified upon religious basis.

In Islam, Allah (god) gave the people the ability to interpret the religion through using their knowledge and the philosophy of mind to understand the reason behind his commands in the Quran. However, in a society which has a high poverty rates and a poor educational system, the manipulation of individuals of the society through religious social groups can be easily done.

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http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~alexroni/IPD%202012/2012_2/Cultural%20Violence%20(Galtung).pdf
Many of the social groups in Egypt including the religious groups used the religion as a base to justify their violent acts against their opponents. For example, when the terrorist groups were spread in Egypt during the 1980s, the members of these groups used some of the writings in the Quran to justify their terrorist actions against civilians. They interpret these writings from their own perspective and they don’t listen to other religious scientists claiming that they are manipulated by the government or any other opponent. However, those extremists claimed that others are manipulated by evil powers; they just didn’t think that they themselves can also be manipulated or even brainwashed by other evil powers.

This perception is also being used by the brotherhood to legitimize its confrontation with the opposition groups, and in the direct clashes between protestors in the streets. For instance, the clashes between the protestors of brotherhood and opposition protestors at the “Federal palace” in December, 2012, were a turning point in the relation between the brotherhood and the opposition parties. This incident was regarded to be the first major clashes between civilians since the revolutionary in January.79

In the first chapter, I presented the types of non-democratic regimes; the most common feature among them is oppression through anti-pluralism. The Muslim brotherhood’s

ideology of political Islam assures such a kind of anti-pluralism. On the other hand, the military’s republic since its establishment, performed different kinds of oppression and opposed pluralism using the security apparatus and controlling the judicial branch to assure the detention of political opponents.

The Muslim brotherhood and the military are two sides of the same coin. They had to co-operate together in order for each to purchase their aims. We have presented some of the analysis of the materials gathered on the brotherhood to assure such an assumption. In addition, we need to present some the analysis of the materials gathered on the military institution, before going through analyzing some of the events of the two years and a half period of study, in order to test the validity of the research hypothesis.

The military institution as we have presented in the second chapter enjoyed many privileges and immunities, in which the military leadership would work on their preservation in the second republic phase.

The military through the process of “the balkanization of the state” became the main institution of the state. The officers enjoyed privileges of being awarded social and economic benefits, the retired high ranked officers were appointed as governors of mostly state coastal governorates and also in state owned companies, for instance the “Suez canal agency” which is headed now by a former military general “Mohab
Mameesh” as the head of the state agency of Suez Canal,\textsuperscript{80} Besides the military’s economy’s size which was explained in the second chapter, giving the officer corps almost limitless privileges given the “loyalty allowances”, access to subsidized goods and services, military social clubs and etc. regarding the “loyalty allowances” that was given to officers with the “end-service-pensions” upon retirement, so as to keep a high level of satisfaction rate and solidarity in the institution, officer who were sent to retirement would be given a higher rank than the one , he acquires upon retirement so as to increase their pensions and allowances. \textsuperscript{81}

The officer corps’ immunity was presented in the immunity from facing civil trials. The military code of rule give them this immunity and to be judged by a military judge, giving the judicial military the exclusive rights to judge military officers. Such immunity was given to any other state institution, not even the state security investigation sector’s police officers; however it was considered the backbone of Mubarak’s regime.

The military institution was aware of that the revolutionary stream is high , and they need to understand more clearly who is the most dominant groups that participated in the January uprising, given being deviated from direct participation in politics during

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\textsuperscript{80} An Article titled “Mameesh signs the lists of Employers Pensions in The Suez Canal Authority”, Published By EL Watan-News Journal, June 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2013. \url{http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/206635}

\textsuperscript{81} The discussion of loyalty allowances and end service pensions were driven from the officers caste in the article titled “Above the state; the officers’ Republic in Egypt”, By Yezid Sayigh, page 4-5, (Published by CARNEGIE endowment for international peace, August, 2012.)
Mubarak. Thus, in March 2011, the SCAF called for a constitutional referendum of the 1971 constitution.

A referendum for a constitution that was supposed to be replaced by a new constitution to meet the demands of the angry masses that came out in January 2011 was in process. The military went on calling the public to vote for a referendum of 19 articles of the former constitution. That was a remarkable incident which started the division between the political parties. The islamaists by the leadership of the brotherhood began their publication campaign for the referendum calling the public to vote for the referendum, the remarkable here was the use of religion issues to convince the masses. The isalmists claimed that if a new constitution was to be made, the second article of 1971 constitution about the Islamic sharia principles will be eliminated by the secularist parties. I, myself as a student of faculty of economics and political science, participated in awareness campaigns through the faculty to explain the referendum in a neutral side, a common question was always there, the second article was going to be replaced or not, the answer was that such an article is not in the referendum even!

The brotherhood is the source of the political Islamic movement in Egypt. They took the leadership of the Islamic political stream in this campaign. They used their chosen trauma of being oppressed, and that trusting other political parties would lead to the same destiny of alienation. Furthermore, military leaders were giving message through
TV shows and other state owned media, to accept the referendum as a further step for stability and co-operation.

The military needed to gain public legitimacy of ruling the country in transition period, so to have a more space for political maneuvers against other political actors. On the other side, the brotherhood needed to show its political weight against the other opponent political parties and within the Islamic political stream in parallel.

The referendum came out with 72% with and 18 against. Following the result by a week, the military published a new constitutional declaration with 60 articles, including the 19 articles voted for, without voting on the other 31 articles.82

This declaration was just a manifestation from the Egyptian military institution, that still the balked state is operating. However, the police institution was a competitor during the former regime with the military over the level of hegemony over other state institutions. It was defeated with its withdrawal from the streets, along with the outbreak of the SSIS offices by the angry mobs;83 it needed the military and accepted its subordination.

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Furthermore, the brotherhood showed their good intentions of co-operating with the SCAF through the transitional period until a government was elected. The brotherhood along with other Islamists began their political planning for the transitional period.

Still the youth movements, other political parties were driven away from the political picture, their demonstrations faced brutal use of force from the police along with the army.
Part II

A-The first part: (till the end of 2011):

In the first chapter in its second part, we presented a clear picture of how the military institutions in non-democratic countries respond to mass uprisings. In the case of Egypt, we presented some materials that proved the level of institutionalism and its relation with the society, as two main factors that determine the feature of such a response.

With a strong link with the society, the military leadership was sure that using brutal force against the protestors is something out of discussion, they were sure that such mass uprising even targeting the top leadership to step down, will be then eager to sustain more civilian control over the military. The military was ordered to be in the streets of Cairo, an event that didn’t occur since the 1977 incidents, it’s the first time the military is called to restore order.

The military gained its public support from the referendum, along with the Islamists support. The military formed an interim government led by “Essam Sharaf” after protests in Tahrir calling for the step down of the former prime minister appointed by Mubarak, “Shafyk” and restoring justice upon those convicted for killings of the protestors.84

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In April 8th, 2011, it was the month that witnessed the direct confrontation between military police forces and protestors. When some middle rank officers declared that the military institution is corrupted and that they will join the protests to support their fellow revolutionaries against the corrupted state’s institutions, the military responded by breaking into tahrir square, arrested those officers and clashed with the civilian protestors. Up till now, there is no clue about the destiny of those officers who were detained in military prisons.85

This proves that the military hierarchal organization will not be reformed. Furthermore, the military institution would not allow any division in its structure. It was possible that the army would use all what’s possible to prevent any internal division, whatever the price.

In May 2011, the field marshal “Tantawi” attended the ceremony of the new graduates from the police academy and gave a speech to those new graduates, urging them to restore order and law, and fight the chaos in the streets that resulted from the events of January social uprising. This event was considered a step forward to ensure the hegemony of the military over the security apparatus. The military is no longer in a competition with the police as in Mubarak’s era, the military is on the top of the state and directly involved in the political process. On the other hand, the police institution

85 A Blog Titled “Freedom for 8th April and 27th May Officers; is a public demand”, Published by Arab Times Blog. http://www.arabtimes.com/portal/article_display.cfm?ArticleID=25958
was in need of the military to reunite its organs and security apparatus that was completely destroyed after the 28th of January (The day of anger).

Furthermore, the military need the police security forces to be back again in the picture, they supreme council was aware that if they used military forces in continuous street clashes, it might lead to increasing the anger and intense feelings across the officers crops, especially those in the middle and small ranks.

The response of the police was so quick, the security forces on June 28, 2011, used tear gas against families of the “revolution’s martyrs” who gathered at a theater in the downtown of Cairo. Clashes between the police and those families occurred; it developed into massive clashes that reached Tahrir square, the first clash between civilians and police forces since January, made the youth revolutionary movements more eager to continue its demonstrations against the military leadership of the state.86

The Muslim brotherhood followed by its fellow Islamic parties, didn’t demonstrate in this incident. However, they claimed that such incidents aims to rebel against the results of the constitutional referendum of March, 2011. They went into the streets for demonstrations on July, 2011, to oppose any super constitutional articles that might be formed and declared their support for the SCAF to continue in leading the transitional period. The Islamists were aware that they needed the military and vice versa, however, they were aware that they wouldn’t allow any constitutional articles that might gave the

military a direct cause for future intervention in the political process after the transitional period.

In November and December of 2011, before the legislative elections by one month, clashes between the revolutionary movements and security forces backed by the army, was increasing tremendously. The incidents of “Mustafa Mahmoud street” witnessed the inclusion of many factions of the social movements from “football Ultras” to youth revolutionary movements supported by university students groups and other secular political parties.

The incidents began in November, was demonstrations calling for the prime minister to step down regarding his inefficacy to deal with many important issues regarding the transitional justice, managing the transitional period, and the reformation of the security apparatus which was the main cause of the revolution. The protestors decided to sit-in tahrir square, with the increase in clashes between protestors and the police, the government stepped- down and a former prime minister was called to form the new government. Then in December, the demonstrations moved to besiege the ministerial council’s building, to declare its disagreement on the new prime minister.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{87} An Article over the December incidents titled “Martyrdom of a guy shoot out in the neck during «Mohamed Mahmoud» clashes”, Published by Al-Mary AlYoum Journal, on December 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2011. \url{http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/542176}
During these incidents, the brotherhood declared that it won’t participate in such chaotic clashes, calling the public to wait for the legislative elections, in order to fulfill the demands of the masses through a legitimate state body.

During the incidents of November and December, some scholars from “Al-Azhar” university joined the protests against the supreme council of armed forces which governs the state along with its inefficient interim government, among those scholars, Sheikh “Emad Affat” who was a teacher in Al-Azhar University.⁸⁸

The brotherhood condemned the death of sheikh “Affat”, along with some other Islamic parties. In order to decrease the anger level in the streets, claiming that the next elected legislative assembly wouldn’t allow such acts and would restore justice in the society that was lost decades ago.

Before we get into the period that witnesses the election of both the legislative and executive bodies, we have to analyze the role of the military.

The supreme council of armed forces was formed out of twenty generals of the army. Field Marshall “Tantawi” wanted to assure the coherence of the military institution in the domestic and international pressure. Thus, he managed to present every branch of the military in the supreme council, represented by every branch’s chief officer.

“Tantawi” also wanted to maintain the hierarchal order of the military and that was presented in the supreme council.

We have presented in chapter one, the direct role in the domestic context in transitional periods, where the most common effective institution, was the military institution. This led us to necessity of presenting a comprehensive analysis, through structure, organization rules and its position in the political regime.

The military institution took a direct role through its supreme council, in participating in the political transition in Egypt. However, calls for keeping the military out of politics, stopped after the serious defeat in the constitutional referendum on March 2011.

The constitutional referendum was not only a tool for the military to gain public support and creating an indirect alliance with the Islamic parties, but also a dividing tool to govern with. The military used the old strategy of “Divide and Rule”, through breaking the fragile union of the different political actors that was during the mass uprising of the eighteen days. The “Fragile” union was in the political parties that weren’t prepared for the mass uprisings including the brotherhood. However, the brotherhood as we have presented before, was more experienced than any other political party or even any youth movement, regarding its past history during Mubarak and its integration into politics. Such an experience didn’t prevent the brotherhood from failing in the division.

The division wasn’t originated by the military. However, it existed in the past because of the different ideologies and past experience of the different political parties. On the
other hand, the military faced a new arriving political actor, the youth movements. The youth were the core of the mass uprising in January leading to the eruption of the revolution. This new actor didn’t acquire the same experience of the brotherhood in dealing with the political regime. However, they had the will “to change”. This will was the driving force for mobilizing the streets, and gaining public support through the 18 days of the revolution.

Being inexperienced to deal with the military institution, which on the other hand, had a long lasting experience with the Muslim brotherhood since 1952, made the confrontation between the two actors a must. The military to initiate its strategy of divide and rule, they started to side with the Islamic parties indirectly, through exchanging each other’s political support for the political decisions taken by them.

As we have explained above the youth movements were the “dynamo” of the political protests during the military leading transitional period. For the military to apply its strategy, it needed to withdraw the public support gradually away from both the brotherhood in leading the Islamic parties and the youth leading the secularist stream.

During the first six months of the transitional period, the youth protests faced brutal use of force in their marches, military trials and shutting down their headquarters. It was clear from the events mentioned above during this period, that it aimed at weakening the youth movements along with their allied political parties (which weren’t actually
effective at all) and in the meantime eliminating any kind of trust between those movements and the Islamists on the other hand.

For the supreme council to achieve such a kind of distrust, it worked on the chosen trauma of both the brotherhood and the society itself. The chosen trauma of the brotherhood was presented earlier in this chapter, but what is the chosen trauma of the Egyptian society. The Egyptian state had the ability to grand and to oppress, the basis of those two abilities, was the motherhood of the state over the society, where the state is the official provider of both security and services. The state to be an authoritarian and have the ability to oppress, it used past deterrence elements in order to suppress the majority of the society. along With the balkanization of the state, it was always the fear of foreign conspiracy likewise terrorism and Israel, that made the society approve the implementation of the emergency law during all the 30 years rule of Mubarak. That was clear, when security forces stormed into some civil organizations offices, shutting them down and accusing them of acquiring an illegal foreign finance. It was remarkable incident, those organizations were operating during Mubarak's rule and if they were a part of a conspiracy to downfall the state, it would have been the task of the security apparatus to shut them down, putting in consideration the oppressive security policy of the former regime.

The military aimed through the continuous protests of the youth and the public disorder the results from the clash between security forces and those, along with losing the
society’s trust, were the guarantor of alienating those youth movements from the political sphere.

The military in oppressing those movements used its right to bring civilians to face military trials in actions that harm the military institution. A right which was also used against some media presenters, for instance, when a TV show presenter “Reem Majjed” who works for “ONTV” channel criticized the military in its policies, she received a notice from the military attorney to attend an investigation. However, she was then released on the same day; this incident proved that military will use all its tools to maintain its public picture untouched.\(^8^9\)

The military through the first part of the transitional period, firstly assured the subordination of the state institutions especially the police, secondly created an indirect alliance with the Islamic parties (no single confrontation), thirdly gained the public support, finally weakening the youth political groups along with keeping the Islamists out of the streets.

The military had to begin its second part of its strategy in “divide and rule”, the brotherhood, the head of the Islamic parties, has be weakened also, it has to lose its

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\(^8^9\) An article titled “Reem Majid media presenter was called to testify in front of the military prosecutor”, Published by Al-Ahram journal electronic version on May, 2011. 
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/4/7/76858/%D8%AD%D9%80%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB/%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%85/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A7%AC%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%8B%3.aspx
credibility in the public sphere gradually, as what happened exactly with the youth secular movements but through different tools.

The military even been assumed to have a co-operative approach with the Muslim brotherhood, wouldn’t by anyway leave the brotherhood with its popularity in the same level as in the beginning of the revolution, because such a thing would create a threat against the military’s state. The military along with the balkanized state and its structure concerning the conscription policy did not create a state within a state; however, it created the state itself. The Egyptian society became integrated within the military, the goods and services that the military provides, the conscription policy (having university graduates to serve in military and others to serve in the police), and the integration of the military in almost all state institutions along with the heroic picture of the military since 1973, made a society for the military that constitutes a very large proportion in the Egyptian society than any other political group.

On the other hand, the brotherhood created its own society, with its ideology, the requirements of membership along with providing goods and services, became another society within the perceived military society.

All over the last sixty years since the establishment of the Egyptian republic, the relation between those two societies was built upon the subordination of the brotherhood society to the military one.
When the revolution broke out on the 25th of January, it was a harmony of political activists, most who were given high education levels in foreign universities in Cairo, the Facebook page that called for the demonstrations on that day, was initiated by the Marketing Manager of Google in Middle East, an Egyptian young activist, “Wael Ghonem”.

It was a revolution from the above, calling for more political diversity and freedom, and a need for economic and social development, that wasn’t achieved by the former regime. Then when police stations were stormed by the mobs in many governorates, it was sure that now the uprising is in the major factions of the society. For the military it had to restore its heroic picture and that was done through its role in stepping down Mubarak. The military gained the support of its society again and with the brotherhood been dealt with as the main player in the political process, it’s only left those young movements who rebelled against the former regime. The whole first year of the transitional period was targeting those young movements who faced a huge joint police and military brutality and detention.

The co-operation between brotherhood and the military, made the brotherhood assume that such a thing would promote its own society to be in the same level of that of the military and by time it would advance to dominate it.

**B-The second part: (till June 2012):**
A legislative elections were held, and by February 2012, a whole legislative branch was elected with its two main bodies (the people’s assembly and the shura council), the brotherhood achieved in both bodies, more than 40%, creating a majority in the assembly and along with other Islamic parties, they created an absolute majority that reaches 70%.

In February 2012, it witnessed a very remarkable incident, the death of 75 football fans of the Ultras groups that took place in a football match hosted in the coastal city “Port-said”. The police didn’t intervene to stop this chaos, the result was the chief of police of Port Said along with some high ranks police officers and other civilians were accused of the killing of those football fans, after some deadly clashes that took place in Cairo downtown near the ministry of interior.

The newly elected legislative branch was in a difficult situation, on the one hand, the public anger calling for step down of the ministry of interior, on the other hand, the supreme council the head of the state didn’t favor such a change. Back in November, 2011, when the ultras groups were leading the clashes between the protestors and the police that lead to the step down of the first interim government appointed by the military, the military along with the brotherhood didn’t want to let such a youth group to gain more presence in the streets, that would lead to more pressure on them.

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90 An Article titled “The High Commission announces the final results of parliament elections for the three stages”, Published by Al-Ahram journal electronic version on January 21th, 2012.  
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/162896.aspx
The incident of the football match made it clear that the brotherhood is losing its public support gradually. Given what we have presented about the brotherhood’s conservative trend that controls the society of the brotherhood, it was not expected for the brotherhood to take an action of confrontation with the corrupted state institutions at the beginning of its direct involvement in the political process, through the legislative branch.

All political parties have agreed on the law of electing the legislative branch. However, such a law was experienced before in Egypt in 1987, neither party has been aware that the constitutional court has stated to dissolve the parliament upon the unconstitutional basis of this law.

The legislative branch from the period that extended from January to June, it didn’t perform better than any other parliament of Mubarak’s era. Inefficient representatives, weak to the extent, that when the public anger increased against the second interim government, the response was lower than ever expected for a parliament being elected after a revolution that rocked the country.

Leaders of the brotherhood were claiming that the parliament couldn’t perform with its full authority, because of the constitutional declaration of the supreme council. However, one year back, the brotherhood was in full support for the constitutional referendum that gave the supreme council the legitimacy to declare the constitutional referendum along with its indirect alliance with the military.
The military achieved step by step his plan for “Divide and Rule”, the brotherhood by that time, was facing almost all the anger of the public, since it’s the first elected authority after the revolution.

In April 2012, the race for the presidency in Egypt started, and the political sphere is becoming tenser than before. On the other hand, an astonishing but predictable decision was taken by the brotherhood to participate in this race by a candidate from its leaders. This decision of the brotherhood increased the frustration of other political parties; the brotherhood after the revolution has declared that it won’t participate in the presidential elections. Such a decision that made “Dr.Abu elfutuh” to resign from the brotherhood and participate in the presidential elections, that was a part of the politics of conflict inside the brotherhood itself, as it was presented in the second chapter.

The public opinion was more furious and uncertain about what the brotherhood’s intention. The military is more satisfied by its strategy, the brotherhood is becoming more uncertain about its relation with the military and its public support. Until June came, and the supreme constitutional court ordered the dissolve of the parliament, it was second round in the presidential elections, and the brotherhood’s candidate was
facing the former prime minister of Mubarak “Shafik”, after receiving almost 5 million and half votes in the first round.\footnote{An article titled “Al-Masry Al-Youm election results show Morsy first, Shafiq second”, Published by ALMasry-ALYoum Journal on May 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2012. \url{http://warincontext.org/2012/05/25/unofficial-results-in-first-round-of-egypts-presidential-election/}}

The number of votes, the candidate of the brotherhood received, was astonishing in comparison to the … million votes that the brotherhood managed to gain in the parliamentary elections held just six months away.

The military was now sure that the brotherhood is in a difficult position. The brotherhood started its campaign by welcoming the co-ordination of the different political factions against “Shafik”. Youth revolutionary movements and other political parties went on a meeting with the brotherhood candidate, in one of Cairo’s posh hotels. \footnote{An Article titled “The Treaty of 'Fairmount' between the president and the national forces”, By Wael Kandil, Published by Soot-Belady Journal on July 7\textsuperscript{th}, 2012. \url{http://sootbelady.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?id=83de1291-8918-4caf-81ad-22e6b3605e56}}

Upon this meeting and Morsi’s promises of inclusion of all political factions, other secular parties along with most of the youth movements were in favor of supporting
Morsi for presidency, to avoid electing a former prime minister of Mubarak, who also has a military background.

The supreme council before the official date of declaring the results of the presidency elections issued a constitutional referendum, establishing a national defense council, handing the executive authority to the new elected president and keeping the legislative authority for the supreme council upon the dissolution of the parliament.

Before we get into the first year of the new born republic with its new elected president, we have to finalize the role of the military during this period.

The military managed to implement its strategy of “divide and rule”, no single group by that time, had enough popular ground to issue extraordinary decisions, that might reform the political sphere by changing the primary actors or even secondary ones. However, it’s still facing the threat of eliminating its privileges and immunities that have been gained all over the sixty years of the first republic.

Moreover, its internal coherence is being threatened due to the inefficiency in administrating the state along with the increased public anger towards the military’s policy in dealing with the protests; it was clear in the few middle ranks officers who went to participate in Tahrir square against the supreme council just after three months of revolution.
In addition to that, Field Marshal Tantawi had been in the position of the minister of defense and the general commander of the armed forces since 1992 along with some other high-ranks in the supreme council, for instance his chief of staff Samy Anan. On the other hand, General Al-Sisi who is the chief of military intelligence is ranked 67th in seniority! This just represents the huge gap between different generations of the top leaders of the army.

Furthermore, the chaotic situation in Sinai Peninsula regarding the security failure, the spread of terrorist groups and the spread of insecurity all over the major cities of Egypt, made the supreme lose not only outside the institution (the public anger) but also within the institution which might find no need for those old leaders!

The youth movements developed through this period in two dimensions, the first its ability to mobilize, second its experience in street clashes with the security forces. That’s why to was essential for the project, to present two secondary actors, one who participated directly in both periods of transition (the youth movement), the second was another state authority branch (the judicial branch) that would have an important role during Morsi’s one year rule.

Finally, the transitional justice was away from the picture, only a “trial show” was made for the former president and his interior minister, who were both sentenced to life prison for being accused of the responsibility of the martyrs of the January uprising.
The rule of Morsi :( June 2012- June 2013)

On June 22, Morsi and other representatives from political parties with youth movements reached an agreement on the main principles that “Mors’s” rule would be based upon.

Three main principles out of six were the most important for our research dilemma, the first was the agreement upon refusing the latest constitutional referendum by the supreme council that was mentioned above, so as to prevent the integration of the military into politics, and the second agreement was that the constitutional foundation council should present most of the factions of the society, the third one is choosing a popular independent( no political favourism) figure to form the new government.

The first incident that started the confrontation between the brotherhood and the judicial branch, it was when Morsi ordered the return of the dissolved parliament on the 8th of august, 2012. The parliament in its first session asked “Court of Cassation” to decide whether its legal or not to continue the parliament sessions and then the court of cassation delivered the case to the “supreme constitutional court” which decided that the dissolution of the parliament is a must.9394

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Such a decision by the Supreme Court started not only an indirect confrontation between the judicial branch and the brotherhood, which will be articulated more in the next presented incidents, but also a hidden conflict between the new elected president and the supreme council headed by “Tantawi”.

On July 25th, Morsi asked former minister of irrigation to form the new government; this decision raised a debate in the public sphere, between pro and against. However, the new formed government included the head of the supreme council as the ministry of defense.

On August, during the Ramadan month, 16 soldiers were killed on the eastern borders of Egypt with Gaza strip, marking a very important incident that changed the equation of the political game in Egypt.

The result of this incident was the elimination of almost all the generals of the supreme council by referring them to retirement. The minister of defense “Tantawi” and his chief of stuff “Anan” were appointed as consultants to the president, the commander of the Air defense division appointed as head of the “AOI” (Arab organization for industrialization), the commander of the navy appointed as the head of the “Suez canal agency” and the commander of the air forces as the minister of military production.
General “Al-Sisi” was promoted and appointed minister of defense, who was the youngest in rank and age among the former supreme council. 95

Furthermore, Morsi cancelled the former constitutional declaration of the supreme council that was declared in June, 2012. By this, Morsi regained the legislative authority which was gained by the former supreme council upon the dissolution of the people’s assembly.

By that time, practically the military was deviated to a certain extent away from the political process. New leadership was appointed at the top of the military institution, with 58 years old “Al-SISI” as the general commander of the army. The most important consequence of these events was the continuation of the balkanized state, in which former military generals were appointed as heads of state enterprises, as a continuation of military’s economic empire policies. Morsi didn’t want a clash with the military; however, he was more in favor of building a new relationship with the new leaders of the army that he appointed, upon mainly the same policies of Mubarak.

In chapter one, we have articulated that a democratic transition to be achieved, it’s important to exercise some civilian control over the military institution. Following in the second chapter, we have presented the military economic priviliges, and military’s immunities through the military trials , along with the balkanized state, are matters that would be a barrier in the process of democratic transition.

Morsi and the leaders of the brotherhood were aware of these barriers, some of them even suffered from military trials during the former regime of Mubarak. However, they didn’t try to minimize or exert some civilian control over the military; this would be clear when we present the articles of the constitution concerning these issues. But before we get into the newly approved constitution, we need to present some main incidents that preceded the constitution.

Regarding the political pluralism, the brotherhood along with other Islamic political parties didn’t trust other secular parties, the newly formed cabinet in July, 2012, didn’t include any of the leaders of the secular parties, the new prime minister wasn’t political famous and didn’t show any charismatic feature in his speeches or even policies. Even youth movements were still deviated from the political process with no official presentation in the political leadership of the state. The constitutional foundation council that was formed by “Mosri” according to his new constitutional declaration of august, included only 25 percent of members who don’t belong to the Islamic political stream, while the majority was from the brotherhood leaders along with other Islamic parties, leaving no choice for other political parties and groups rather than to continue its mobilization in the street.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ An article titled “Egypt: a parliamentary committee bill recognizes the Constitution Drafting Assembly”, published by BBC Arabic version electronic gate, on June 11th, 2012. [http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/06/120602_egypt_constitutional_committee.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/06/120602_egypt_constitutional_committee.shtml)
Morsi and the brotherhood assumed that through gaining the legitimacy of the ballot box, then the road is clear for them to take extreme political decisions or alienate whoever they want. Revolutions don’t call for ballot box only; it is a call for justice, for inclusion and for development. The brotherhood seemed to misunderstand the nature of the social uprising in Egypt; it’s not experienced enough to administrate alone the state which was clear in our presentation of the history of political integration of the brotherhood in the second chapter.

In October, 2012, the supreme administrative court ordered the dissolution of the former constitutional foundation council because of its miss-presentation of different factions of the society. Morsi has ordered to deliver the legislative authority to the elected Shura council (the second legislative body) which was also facing the risk of dissolution by the supreme constitutional court, because it was elected upon the same law of that of the people’s assembly. In addition, he formed a new constitutional foundation council that still had a majority of the Islamic political stream.
In November, 2012, Morsi issued a new constitutional declaration that ended the relationship between the Islamic and the secular political groups.97

He fortified both the constitutional foundation council and the shura council against dissolution by any juridical appeal. In addition to that, he fortified all his constitutional declarations against any judicial appeal, and dismissed the former attorney general and appointed a new one by himself.

Morsi through his constitutional declaration appointed himself the new pharaoh of Egypt. He claimed that the judicial branch suffers from corruption because of the policies of the Mubarak’s regime, and that both the constitutional council and the shura council would be dissolved. This started the confrontation with the judicial branch; it was confrontation between two state authorities, his appointment of a new general attorney was widely rejected by other political factions and the judicial authorities. It was not about the old general attorney, who already failed in initiating the process of transitional justice; however, it was the way of how he was appointed. Many have called

97 An article titled “Morsi fortifies his decisions issuing a constitutional declaration and prevents the dissolution of Constitutional Assembly and Shura council”, published by Published by Al-Ahram journal electronic version on November 22nd, 2012.

http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/13/70/275479/275479/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%8A%D9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%86-%D9%82.aspx
for the independence of the judicial branch from the control of executive authority, in
order to establish the rule of law. 98

As we presented in the second chapter, the judicial branch suffered from the control of
the executive authority over it, allowing no space for any judicial appeal that might
harm the former regime of Mubarak. After the revolution, many have called to let the
supreme judicial council to be the head of the judicial authority acquiring the authority
of running the affairs of the judicial branch without any control from the executive
authority. The rule of law as we presented in chapter one, is one of the main pillars of
the democratic system, such a concept to be applied needs an independent judicial
branch.

The brotherhood didn’t stop at such a point in its confrontation with the judicial branch.
Their supports went to besiege the supreme constitutional court on December, 2012, to
prevent it from being held to issue any appeal that might dissolve the shura council.
That made it clear that the brotherhood was not ready to accept any judicial appeal that
might affect its own plan for shaping the new regime in Egypt. 99

98 An article titled “Prosecutors for "Attorney General:" What is built on falsehood is false”, published by
99 An article titled “Morsi supporters come back to besiege ‘constitutional’ ... And prevent the entry of
the President of the Court”, Published by ALMasry-ALYoum journal on December 16th, 2012.
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1317411
Such an incident made the other political parties and youth movements more furious, they began to mobilize in the streets for protests against Morsi and the brotherhood. In the same month, they organized massive protests against Morsi, and went to besiege the presidency palace, calling Morsi to withdraw the constitutional declaration of November. They decided to sit-in near the presidency palace “El-ETHADAYA Palace”, until their demands were fulfilled. The security forces that were guarding the palace, didn’t interfere with the massive numbers of protests, however, it allowed them to besiege the palace and to sit-in around the palace. Such an action was changed completely later on, when the minister of interior was replaced after this incident. On the next day, supporters of Morsi rushed into the streets surrounding the palace and clashed with the protestors who were preparing for a long sit-in.

This made it clear that political pluralism isn’t in the dictionary of the brotherhood, and that it will continue in its unpopular policy of administrating the state.

On the other hand, the military institution was aware that the brotherhood is losing day by day, through its policies, the public support. Firstly, the new minister of defense “Al-SISI” invited the minister of interior along with some high and many middle ranks of both the military and the police to attend a dinner in one of the major military clubs, to
ensured their co-operation, after a small clash between some middle rank officers from both sides. 100

Secondly, the military invited the different political factions to attend a conference of reconciliation in response to the lately clashes between protests of both the brotherhood and other secular youth movements and political parties, the secular parties welcomed the invitation, claiming that the military can play as a mediator, however, the brotherhood and other Islamic political parties refused the invitation proclaiming that this would lead to the intervention of the military in the political process, which they didn’t favor. 101

Morsi ordered the military to withdraw this invitation and the military did it what it was ordered to do. This incident proves that military was still eager to intervene; however, it didn’t favor the clash with the governing party which still acquires the majority on the ground.

A newly approved constitution on 26th December, 2012, made it clear that the military still enjoys the same immunities and privileges, which demonstrate the continuity of the old policies concerning the military. We would present some of the articles in the new

100 An article titled “AL-Sisi warns of schemes to harm the army and police together”, Published by ALMasry-ALYoum journal on November 22nd, 2012. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1260771
constitution that was formed by a constitutional council, most of its members from the Islamic parties especially the brotherhood.

Concerning the military’s economy, which we have presented some materials that describes its size and its immunity from being checked by any parliamentary council or the central auditing office, in the newly approved constitution, not a single word was included on the military’ economic activities. Even the military’s budget and matters concerning declaration of war or sending troops outside the country were to be discussed by the “national defense council” established by the article “197”. This new formed council had 6 out of its 14 members civilians, however, its decisions are to be taken by the majority of the council, which means that the military can block any decision that is seen inappropriate by the military leadership.102

Concerning the military trials, article “198”, still maintained that same previous immunities of the military, in which it gave the military the right to try civilians before military courts for crimes harming the armed forces. This means the continuity of civilians being judged by military juries, in which the brotherhood leaders suffered from during Mubarak’s regime.103

102 The discussion of the national defense council is found in the article titled “The military and Egypt's transformation process; Preservation of the military’s reserve Domains”, By Cheriene Chams El-Dine, page 6, (Published by the German institute for international and security affairs on February, 2013).

103 The discussion of the military trials is found in the article titled “The military and Egypt's transformation process; Preservation of the military’s reserve Domains”, By Cheriene Chams El-Dine, page 4; paragraph six, Published by the German institute for international and security affairs on February, 2013.
The newly approved constitution guaranteed for the military its supremacy over its own matters, in which its budget is controlled by the national defense council dominated by military ranks, its economy is still ambiguous without any official reports of its size or its contribution to the state and its immunity in the continuity of military trials. In addition to that, the incident of August, 2012 which overthrew the old ranks proved that the brotherhood would continue in the same policy of the balkanized state, which was clear of the appointment of those ex-officers in state enterprises. The brotherhood needed to satisfy the needs of the military institution to guarantee its neutrality in the political game, in order to give the brotherhood more space to maneuver and confront other political opposition parties.

During the first six months of the rule of Morsi, the public opinion was devastated of who actually runs the state, the “Absolute obedience” required from all the members of the brotherhood to the General Guide, made it clear that the General Guide “Mohamed Badie” along with the Guidance council are the actual head of the state, and Morsi’s their representative in the presidency of the state. The brotherhood itself was illegal since it was banned in 1954, and this illegality means that the brotherhood’s members, finding, trans-national activities and business are not under any scrutiny of state apparatus. The opposition’s calls for reformation of the government and the inclusion of different political factions were neglected by the presidency.
Furthermore, Morsi appointed leaders of the brotherhood and other Islamic parties along with ex-military officers as governors, continuing the same old policies of former regime. He aimed at the inclusion of brotherhood members in the balkanized state. 104

During the last six months of Morsi’s one year rule, chaos and insecurity was spreading more and more all over the country. His promises of resorting order and security during his first 100 days of rule, were not accomplished neither his other 60 promises that he promised to fulfill during those 100 days, leading to the gradual decrease in his popularity.105

The response of the political opposition parties was the establishment of “The National Salvation front” that gathered almost all the major opposition parties. This front worked on uniting the opposition parties and groups to confront the brotherhood along with its allied Islamic parties106

Another major chaotic clashes occurred between protestors and the police that took place in “Port-Said” city after the judicial appeal of convicting some football fans from the city of being responsible of the deadly clashes that occurred a year ago during the...
rule of the supreme council, Morsi responded by ordering a curfew in the Suez canal cities including port-said and deploying some military troops, the locals responded by organizing protests at night to break the curfew in an incident that proved the uncontrollable situation that the state went into.\textsuperscript{107}

It was until May, 2012, when some youth established a new campaign against Morsi. "Tamrod campaign", calling for forcing Morsi to call for an early presidential elections through gathering the signature of more than 20 million citizens to force an early elections. It is again the youth movements which were still mobilized in the streets that led to a political threat for Morsi’s rule. The response of brotherhood and their allied Islamic parties was the initiation of a confronting campaign to that of “Tamrod”, in order to assure the president’s popularity. Some clashes occurred between members of both campaigns on different occasions.

A very important incident happened in May, 2012, that led to widening the gap between the military and the president, resulting in a matter of increasing the level of mutual distrust between both of them. Seven soldiers were kidnapped in Sinai by some Jihadist groups. The military favored a military operation to free the soldiers, restore security and order, and assure the coherence of the institution by proving that the leadership of military is ready to defend its members. On the other hand, Morsi favored negotiations

\textsuperscript{107} An article titled “Port Said in the custody of the army after the withdrawal of the police”, Published by Al-Riyadh Journal on 9\textsuperscript{th} march, 2013. \url{http://www.alriyadh.com/2013/03/09/article816084.html}
with those groups through the brotherhood and other Salafist and Jihadist allied leaders, who can negotiate with the kidnappers and free the soldiers.

On May 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2012, the soldiers were released without capturing any of the kidnappers, in an incident that wasn’t clear how they were released, the next day the president went to welcome those soldiers in a military air base, thanking the continuous efforts of the military\textsuperscript{108}

June, 2012, the last month in Morsi’s rule, the president is facing international failure in solving the “Nile basin issues”, cutting-off the relations with Syria which gave an implication that Egypt might get involved in a religious war between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, domestic pressure with Tamrod reaching its target of gathering millions of signatures and calling for massive protests on the 30\textsuperscript{th} of June and the military announcing on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of June, a 7 day chance to reach a political conciliation.

The 30\textsuperscript{th} of June, massive numbers of protests across Egypt’s major cities, calling Morsi to step-down and call for early elections. The military announcing on the next day 48 hours chance, Morsi on 2\textsuperscript{nd} of July gave his speech in which he refused to step-down at

\textsuperscript{108} An article titled “Release of kidnapped Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai & press conference for the presidency on the details of editing abductees”, published by Daily-Ahram journal on May 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2013. 
http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/827/25/211395/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85.aspx
mid-night. The military intervene on the 3rd of July out-sitting Morsi, the whole country is on the edge of a massive chaos.

**Conclusion:**

The mutual distrust between the military and the brotherhood was a cornerstone in their relationship.

On the one hand, the Muslims brotherhood during the one and half rule of the supreme council was realizing that the military is forcing them indirectly to lose the public support, which clear when they were given a majority in a powerless parliament, that’s why the brotherhood ran the presidency campaign in hope of having another opportunity to prove itself, however, the brotherhood promised of not running the presidency elections. Furthermore, the continuous clashes between the youth movements and the security accompanied by the army, made the other political parties along with the youth movements distrust the brotherhood, which didn’t support them in their confrontation with the supreme council.

One the other hand, the military had different preferences from the brotherhood on the national security issues and state administration. Concerning the chaotic situation of Sinai as what happened in august, 2012 (the elimination of supreme council) and may, 2013 (the kidnap of the soldiers). The military then realized the competitive approach of the brotherhood in integrating into the balkanized state, marginalizing the army and then control it. Furthermore, concerning the control of the army, the brotherhood since
Nasser’ era was banned from participating in the army which was considered the major task of the Military intelligence (MI), putting in consideration that the newly appointed general commander of the armed forces by Morsi, was the former chief of the “MI”, General “Al-SISI”. The mindset of the military for ages was always hostile to the brotherhood, thus any co-operative relation between them can’t be achieved without the reformation of the whole institution.

Morsi and the brotherhood carried a policy which strengthened the military rather than weakening it to make it easier to control. In addition to that, the confrontation between the presidents along with the brotherhood against the judicial branch, made it more complicated for the brotherhood to stabilize the erupted political system in Egypt post-revolution. In any political system, the judicial branch is considered to be the backbone of the system, the independency of such a branch is the common feature of any non-democratic system.

The brotherhood expressed a policy of anti-pluralism, refusing to include the youth and the opposition parties in the governance process, widened the gap of distrust that already was present since the transitional period, as it was presented earlier.

Former president Morsi along with the brotherhood thought that by eliminating the leadership of the military, it would exert a kind of control over the new leadership appointed by them. The brotherhood misunderstood the level of institutionalism of the military institution, failed in understanding the mindset of the institution, the
brotherhood instead of exerting a civilian control over the military, change the officer-
corps and integrate the military’s economy into the main state economy, it went
through trying to dominate the military by the same policies of Mubarak, in order to
establish a new civilian authoritarian regime that guarantee its continuity in power.

The military’s integration in the state through the balkanization of the state, along with
its own economy and its immunities that was given to them through the old and the
newly approved constitutions, is the major black in the democratic transition of Egypt.
The chance was there for a newly elected president to exert a civilian control over the
military, ending its integration in almost all the state institutions. However, the
brotherhood favored any type of regime that can assure its continuity in power.

The brotherhood through its policy aimed at creating an initial civil authoritarian regime,
featured by; ineffective political pluralism, top leadership to be concentrated in the
hands of the leaders of the brotherhood, no distinctive ideology which was clear when
the brotherhood wasn’t sincere to the public about its own dream of establishing a new
caliphate, and a low level of mobilization that’s concerned with mobilizing its own
members.

Such a regime couldn’t be obtained through the legitimacy of the ballot box; it needs
hegemony over the state apparatus, creating mutual interests that can sustain the
stability of the regime for a long period of time. Thus, if the brotherhood could have
managed to initiate an authoritarian regime, it would have been able through its
political Islamic ideology to create a new totalitarian regime. This totalitarian regime would be mobilized by the political Islamic ideology of contemporary Islamic reformists.

That's why it was important to understand the roots of both primary parties, in order to analyze their decisions in accordance to their background. Presentation of the revolution incidents without giving detailed materials about the backgrounds of both primary and secondary actors would have been incomprehensive and hard to prove its validity.

One last important point was the economic failure of the brotherhood in administrating the state’s economy. We have presented in chapter one, how the indirect role of the economic development can lead to the fall of an elected government. The economic factor was behind the fall of the former regime in Egypt, but such a topic needs a whole research to analyze its implications.

The economic failure of Morsi was one of the consequences of the failure of his political policy. The insecure conditions lead to the decline in the foreign investments, this lead to only 2.4 per cent growth rate, the increase in the foreign debt was another consequence of these political disputes. Morsi’s policy which began by trying to get a loan from the international monetary fund, didn’t meet any public support, due to the past experience of Egypt with foreign loans. The brotherhood’s unwilling to solve the political dispute in Egypt led to more severe economic situation. The support of the brotherhood to “Hamas” group in Gaza strip which suffers from shortage in many
essential products like petrol and electricity left a big stone on the back of the brotherhood. ¹⁰⁹

The support of the brotherhood to Hamas resulted in shortage of those essential products in major cities all over Egypt, something that Tamrod campaign used in their mobilization campaign.

Morsi along with the brotherhood lacked a comprehensive economic policy. They failed to introduce any economic module that can help save the Egyptian economy from its continuous downfall.

The economic situation was not only related to the political disputes but also to the transitional justice issue. Major factions of the Egyptian society has called for the implementation of restorative justice on those business men who were connected to the former regime, and participated in the economic corruption which swept the country for the last decade. Furthermore, the calls for laws of minimum wage and determining the working hours were not in the concern of the brotherhood, as nothing was done regarding these proposed laws.

¹⁰⁹ The discussion of the economic failure is driven from an article titled “After one year of Morsi’s rule; Depressing economic indicators and deep political disputes”, By Sherif EL-yamany, (Published by Middle east journal, Arabic version, June 25ᵗʰ , 2013.)
The fail of the transitional justice in Egypt during Morsi’s rule, was a core point in the continuous political instability which in result lead to the continuity in the severe economic conditions of the country

In our research hypothesis, we assumed that through mutual co-operation between the primary actors, the brotherhood would be able to establish a civilian authoritarian regime. However, the inability of the brotherhood to sustain this kind of relationship, along with the hostility of the both secondary actors (Tamrod and the judicial authority), made it impossible for the brotherhood to sustain the top leadership of the state.

In the end, in this research, I presented the theoretical framework of which both the primary and secondary actors acted upon, along with incidents from the two and a half of the study period, to understand the political eruption in Egypt-post revolution. The fall of the first republic meant the fall of old-oppressive state institutions, the military was the institution left without being affected much with the political uprising, however, this did not mean that almost all state institutions became almost paralyzed by the inability of the state to act confronting the angry mobs in the streets.
Egypt in its second republic with the first democratically elected president, needed to shape its new state institutions to return the state itself to function. However, such a thing was not even noticed by Morsi.

Firstly, if the state institutions return to function, this would have led to the establishment of strong state institutions. Then comes the call for democratic institutions but without actual functioning state institutions, democracy was just a word used in popular speeches and conferences by the former government.
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Biography

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