


WE HAVE FOUND THE ENEMY, AND IT IS US
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT IN LEBANON, AN INTROSPECTIVE
EXAMINATION


by

Ramzi A. Zeineddine
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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George Mason University
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We Have Found the Enemy, And It Is Us
Protracted Social Conflict in Lebanon, an Introspective Examination

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Science at George Mason University

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Fall Semester 2010
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DEDICATION

To my parents who never seized to believe in me

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All actions contain within implicate and explicit motives, the subject of my thesis is no different. While the explicit motives of this research are obvious: to fulfill an academic requirement and support my candidature for the Master of Science degree, the implicit motives serve a similar yet different set of requirements. My research is an introspective research that aims to find meaning in the events that surrounded 33 years of my life. It is a requiem for all those who suffered throughout the long agonizing war years and my attempt to make sense of all the atrocities and traumas my generation and I witnessed. This work is also a completion of a mourning process and an intellectual burial ground of my anguish, anger, despair and traumas of the war. On my path of anger, rebellion, acceptance, introspection, analysis and reconciliation, I have received guidance and inspiration from countless gracious souls for which I am forever grateful. Foremost amongst them is Dr. Richard E. Rubenstein, who received me at Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) an angry student and through his lectures and debates transformed me to the peacemaker I am now. I am also grateful to many professors at the ICAR whose classes have transformed my outlook onto conflict and have taken time to provide me with helpful insights, comments and ideas that pushed me to think harder and write a better research—Dr. Karina Korostelina and Dr. Terrence Lyons. I would also like to thank my brothers Omar and Rida, whose wise advise, generosity and encouragement saw me throughout my education. My gratitude also goes to Manar, my best friend, soul mate and intellectual mind spark, whose soothing touch, gentle words, insights, encouragement kept me going while writing my research. The generosity of her soul and intellect has brought me peace and light to my life. Last but not least, many of those who have shaped my life are no longer among us, they are too many to mention by name, I hope this research would ease the void their absence have left in my life.

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ABSTRACT

WE HAVE FOUND THE ENEMY, AND IT IS US, CYCLICAL ERUPTION OF VIOLENCE IN LEBANON, AN INTROSPECTIVE EXAMINATION

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George Mason University, 2010

Thesis Director: Richard E. Rubinstein, Professor

This thesis explores how the institutionalization of identity politics in governmental practices has resulted in a protracted social conflict with cyclical eruption of violence in the Republic of Lebanon. I argue that the political effects of the sectarian wars of the 1800's have caused religious identity to become the salient social and political marker within the post independence Lebanese polity. In that direction, the incorporation of religious identity in the founding documents of the Lebanese state has institutionalized incompatible social relations and in turn has resulted in a chronic crisis of legitimacy and cyclical eruption of violence.

CHAPTER I

Research Purpose, Problem Statement and Historical Background

...We have seasonal outbursts of sectarian violence, it leaves us for a time but returns stronger.... Ooooooh! When will the secular season settle here for good?....

Ziad Rahbani, Ya Zaman El Taefiyeh

1. Research Purpose

Conflict, manifest and tacit, has been a recurring theme in Lebanese history. The purpose of this research is to relate cyclical eruption of violence in Lebanon to the legacy of sectarianism¹ and its effects on the Lebanese polity. Towards that end, the research aims to put forward an interdisciplinary analysis of the root causes and effects of sectarianism on the continued polarization and communal conflict as well as propose an intervention to move Lebanon to a post- sectarian state.

The research will be divided into five chapters. The first chapter will provide a brief history and highlight how the amalgam of social change, emergence of new communal consciousness, economic disparities, foreign intervention and rebellion resulted in the institutionalization of sectarianism as the primary political marker. Chapter two will discuss the four main domestic parties to the Lebanese conflict, how their

¹ Sectarianism refers to the Lebanese people's identification and loyalty to one's religious sect (Salient Identity) at the expense of the state (A. Zeineddine, unpublished), Sectarianism will be discussed in more details in the subsequent sections and chapters.

identities were formed, their narratives and relationship to one other. The third chapter will focus on how sectarian identity is engendered in the political discourse through the legal system. The fourth chapter will tie the previous chapters together by explaining the nature of the Lebanese conflict, how and why the parties to the conflict express themselves in sectarian terms and highlight the fact that underlying tensions are based in exclusion and dispossession of political and economic resources rather than religious dogma. Finally, based on a multicultural concept of national identity, the fifth chapter will propose an intervention for conflict transformation through “identity redefinition” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001).

2. Problem Statement

Communal/sectarian tension and distribution of political power to elevate those tensions have been a recurring theme in the last 200 years of Lebanese history. To a varying degree of success, since the days of the two *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs*² in 1843, various formulas were put forward by the Ottoman Empire, European powers and various other states³ to manage religious tensions among the Lebanese, nevertheless, one could argue that every forty years or so, Lebanon undergoes a new cycle of sectarian violence.

While there is no shortage of publications dealing with the last outburst of communal violence (1975-1991) and its domestic and international dimensions,

² *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs*, is an Ottoman provincial district, this administrative division came to be known in Lebanon as the two *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs* (Fawaz, 1995).

³ Between 1800-1916: the Ottoman Empire and various European powers mainly France, the United Kingdom, Russia, Prussia and Italy. Between 1916-1943 France and the United Kingdom. After independence Saudi Arabia, the United States, Soviet Union, France, Israel, Syria, Iran and Qatar.

Lebanon's history, the parties to the conflict, the civil war's dynamics, Lebanon's membership composition and its path to independence, publications dealing with the effects of the country's history, socio-political structures and institutions on the behavior, perception and outlook of the population are rare. In fact, when found, many of those publications deal with a particular facet of the Lebanese structure: the coexistence of primordialism and modernity (Khalaf, 1987), comparative qualitative analysis of attitudes toward confessionalism⁴ (Khashan, 1992), history of sectarianism as an expression of modernity (Madkisi, 1999) and social origins of violence in Lebanon (Johnson, 2001 and Salibi, 1990) to name a few. What is missing in the literature is an interdisciplinary analysis of the root causes and the effects of identity politics on the continued polarization and communal conflict in Lebanon. This research aims to fill the deficit by analyzing the root causes of the ascendancy of sectarianism to the top of the identity hierarchy, how it is maintained through confessionalism and its legacy on the Lebanese polity.

3. Definitions

In the broad sense of the word, sectarianism refers to the Lebanese citizens' salient identity that is based on their respective religious background, not as a denomination⁵ but as a sub-domination or sect.⁶ On a political level, sectarianism's

⁴ Refers to a political regime "that proportionally allocates political power among a country's communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population" (Harb, 2006).

⁵ A religious organization whose congregations are united in their adherence to its beliefs and practices (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2004).

political manifestation known as confessionalism, refers to a political regime “that proportionally allocates political power among a country’s communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their [perceived]⁷ percentage of the population” (Harb, 2006). When combined, sectarianism and confessionalism often produce an attitude “akin to racism”⁸ (Qabbani, 1982) that “promotes selfish exclusiveness among the ingroup and hostility toward the outgroup” (Qabbani, 1982). Since sectarian loyalty results in intolerance that degrades the other who occupies the same social space it can result in a political regime that promotes particularistic group consciousness, cultural identity and group independence at the expense of national consciousness, national identity and equal representation. In that sense, sectarianism is a complex system of interacting hostile identity groups, operating within a social setting that forms the Lebanese State. Sectarianism is located and expressed, on three levels; the behavioral, the structural and the ideological, observable on the group and political levels. For the purpose of this research I will discuss the combined effects of the three levels.

⁶ A group adhering to a distinctive doctrine or to a leader, party or faction (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2004).

⁷ I added perceived to the quotation to emphasize that last public census that mentioned religion was conducted in 1932, since then none did so, “for fear of disturbing the sectarian balance.”

⁸ A belief that race is the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race, racial prejudice or discrimination (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2004).

4. Historical Background

Political Structure in the Early 19th Century

In the early part of the 19th century Mount Lebanon⁹ was governed by a feudal or *Iqta*¹⁰ system. The *Iqta* system produced a regime in which the ‘the feudal families, who owned the land, and the peasants, who worked it were bound into a “tightly knit societies” where personal allegiances prevented conflict stemming from economic inequalities from arising (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995). The feudal lords, or *muqatajiyeh*, however were subservient to the *Emir*, or prince, who “occupied an office vested in a family” and similar to their peasants, the *muqatajiyeh* were bound to the *Emir* through familial allegiance (Khalaf, 1979). According to Khalaf, the family based allegiance and structure of the *Iqta* indicated that political legitimacy was based on “the goodwill of the *muqatajiyeh* and the personal allegiance of their followers” rather than the coercion of the *Emir* (Khalaf, 1987). Since the *muqatajiyeh* ruled over religiously mixed areas, Harik, notes that this form of allegiance was not sectarian in nature but predominantly personal (Harik, 1965). But to say it was not sectarian doesn’t mean that sectarian differences did not exist but rather another superordinate identity was in place. The traditional division between the *Qaisis* and *Yemenis* was the main dividing line between the ruling families and their peasant followers (Hourani, 1986 and Lapidous, 2002).

⁹ Mount Lebanon, is a term delineating a geographical area of the western mountain range of Lebanon, it extends 160 Km parallel to the Mediterranean coast. Politically, the northern part refers to the traditional homeland of the Christian Maronites, the southern to the Druze. Historically, up to the early 19th century, Mount Lebanon was used to refer to the northern part only, the southern part was called *Jabal al Duruz*, or the Druze Mountain. (Farah, 2000 and Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995).

¹⁰ *Iqta* is a socio-economic and political organization in which political authority and land, *muqataat*, are ruled by autonomous feudal families, *muqatajiyeh* (Khalaf, 1979).

The Peasant Uprising of 1820

During the early part of the 19th Century, Mount Lebanon witnesses a variety of social changes that dislocated the feudal relations and disrupted the balance of power between the various sects (Khalaf, 1979). In fact, the peasant uprising of 1820 provides an important indication to the social transformation already taking place in Northern Mount Lebanon during that time. The central feature of the peasant uprising was emergence of the Maronite clergy as the primary challenge to the feudal authority and its generation of a new Maronite consciousness and communal loyalties (Harik, 1965).

Up till the early 19th century, the Maronite feudal lords and clergy enjoyed a relationship of mutual benefit and support: in return for protecting the church, the clergy pledged their spiritual and material support to the feudal lords. The feudal lords however were in total control of the wealth within their districts and exercised tremendous influence within the church structure. According to Khalaf, the feudal lords not only influenced the election of patriarchs and the appointment of archbishops and bishops, but also “shared in decision making with the higher clergy... and their signature appeared on church decrees and orders alongside those of the patriarch and bishops ... to give the church orders effectiveness and political sanction” (Khalaf, 1979). This alliance of interest came to an end as a result of “new ideas and reform minded clerics (mostly graduates of the Maronite Collage of Rome established in 1584) began in the early 19th century to advocate reform measures to rationalize church bureaucracy and reorganize its economic resources” (Khalaf, 1979). As a result, the Maronite Church became “ the largest, the most organized and the wealthiest organization in Mount Lebanon” (Harik,

1965) the process also transformed the upper echelons of the church's hierarchy from exclusive preserve of the notable elites to being dominated by educated clergy of peasant background (Khalaf, 1979). During that time, the Church's presence became more visible at the local level; "priest[s] [became] the most ubiquitous and central figure[s] in the village...[they] not only entrusted with attending the communities spiritual needs...[but [were] authorized to resolve family disputes...and mediate in factional conflict and village rivalry" (Khalaf, 1979). Thusly, the Church was in favorable position to assume the spiritual and political leadership for changing the political outlook of the Maronite peasants. The transformation within the Maronite Church resulted in a new Maronite ideology that reinforced the identity and solidarity of the Maronite community within Mount Lebanon and shifted the loyalty of the peasants from one that is based on personal loyalty and kinship allegiance to the feudal lord to one that is based on loyalty to the community. By 1820, the reorganization of the Maronite church and the clergy's articulation of the new Maronite ideology has already undermined the supremacy of the feudal system and set the Church and the feudal lords on a collision course.

While the Maronites in Northern Mount Lebanon were undergoing social transformation, the Druze in Southern Mount Lebanon, remained insular to its effects. Druze society, religious or secular did not undergo a similar transformation and remained tightly knit and highly stratified with marked class distinctions based on status and kinship affiliation (Firro, 1992). Prestige was distributed among feudal elites in a formalized system sustained by elaborate forms of social protocols and rules of conduct. However, the social organization of the Druze, despite its rigidity, was not arbitrary but

rather reflected an organic continuity of tradition based on the power each of the feudal families held and their genealogy. The bond between the feudal lords and their Druze coreligionist peasants was not only sustained by mutual moral obligation inherent in personal allegiance and exchange of support for protection, endogamous ties further enforced kinship solidarity. Given this intimate association between kinship, solidarity and status it is no wonder the Druze remained unaffected by the Maronite transformation.

In 1820, the Pasha of Saida, which Mount Lebanon was part of his domain, asked the Prince of Mount Lebanon, to collect extra taxes. Prince Bashir II, fearing the Druze feudal lords, “turned to what he thought were the leaderless [districts] of the North” (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995, Makdisi, 2000, Salibi, 2008). Determined to resist additional taxes the Maronite peasants, supported by the Maronite clergy, rebelled against their feudal lords in North Mount Lebanon. In its early stages, the rebellion was successful in driving the feudal lords and their supporters out of Northern Mount Lebanon and forced Prince Bashir II into self-exile, the rebellion however failed to inspire Maronites and Druze peasants in Druze districts to join in. In 1821, after a brief exile, the feudal notables reelected Prince Bashir II as the prince of Mount Lebanon. During the same year he crushed the rebellion and reestablished the feudal order (Salibi, 2008).

It is worthwhile to note that the failed 1820 rebellion brought to the foreground three factors that in time will become permanent political features of Mount Lebanon. First, despite, the transformation of the Maronite community from being based on ties of kinship and status to being based on communal good and public interest, the impetus for social and political change remained confined to the Maronite districts of Mount Lebanon

and became essentially Maronite phenomena. Second, the Maronite Church emerged as an independent entity and proved itself to be an important player in the political arena. In fact, it was the Church rather than secular writers first defined the community's revolutionary attitude toward feudalism and articulated ideological nationalist ideas that in the future would become the source of political legitimacy; ethnicity, national homeland and confessional allegiance (Makdisi, 2000). Third, the articulation of ideological nationalism generated by the Maronite Church and the fact that Maronite and Druze peasants in southern districts did not take part in the rebellion ensured that the rebellion remained parochial not civic and subsequently lacked class under leanings.

Egyptian Occupation and the Uprising of 1840

In 1831 the Levant, including Mount Lebanon, came under Egyptian occupation. The Egyptian occupation of the Levant ushered “the dawn of a new era of change marked by the disintegration of feudal society and... the “opening up” of the country to foreign influences” (Khalaf, 1987). The sweeping reforms of Ibrahim Basha¹¹ exposed Mount Lebanon, for the first time, to centralized and direct foreign rule (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995) that touched almost every aspect of life. Ibrahim Basha's reforms were not completely selfish; in fact in order to continue fighting the Ottoman Empire, he needed to efficiently exploit Mount Lebanon's resources. To safe guard the movement of goods and people, Ibrahim Basha focused his reforms on economic development, religious freedoms, conscription, disarmament and taxation (Khalaf, 1987). The Egyptian reforms while lofty

¹¹ Ibrahim Basha (1789-1848) was the son of Muhamad Ali Basha of Egypt and the military ruler of the Levant between 1831 and 1841. Ibrahim Basha is known for his military prowess, which nearly brought down the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Beilan in 1832 (Farah, 2000)

and progressive, their implementation proved detrimental to the feudal system and the traditional confessional coexistence in the country. According to Salibi, those reforms were not uniformly applied and where enforced, Christians received preferential treatment and were exempt from impositions levied on Druze and Muslims (Khalaf, 1987 and Salibi, 2008)¹² that is not to say that Christians escaped all impositions but had a better chance of escaping them than the rest of the population (Salibi, 2008). Due to trade, commerce and the position the Christians occupied rose tremendously relative to the position of the rest of the population. According to Churchill, the communal disparities were most noticeable in Beirut where a small part of the population held disproportionate share of prosperity (Churchill, 2000). In Mount Lebanon the prosperity achieved by the Christians at the expense of the Druze feudal lords, who lost much of their wealth and land due to prosecution and exile, was so evident that the same persons who served the feudal lords as serfs, by the end of the Egyptian Occupation were acting as money lenders to their former feudal lords (Churchill, 2000). The economic disparity between the religious groups continued throughout the Egyptian Occupation. In Short, the reforms enacted by Ibrahim Basha and the economic transformation that ensued disrupted the delicate communal balance between the various communities in the country and deepened the antagonism between the Druze and Christians on one hand between the Christian peasants and their feudal lords on another.

¹² Many witnesses claim that the Christian community became so privileged as a result of the deferential treatment that many Druze and Muslims converted to Christianity to avoid conscription, disarmament or taxation (Churchill, 2000).

As discussed earlier, Mount Lebanon has been undergoing social conflict for generations, but neither conflict so far took the form of religious rivalry or pitted Christian against Druze, “so far, the tradition of Asylum and the sort of peaceful federation that evolved between the various communities prevented any direct clash between them” (Hourani, 1988). In addition to the widening economic disparities, the 1838 Egyptian rule, dealt the final blow to the traditional religious coexistence in the country. In 1838, the Druze in Houran, Southwestern Syria, rebelled against the Egyptian occupation, that year Ibrahim Basha asked Prince Bashir II, who was still the ruler, to send Maronite troops to quell the Druze revolution in Houran. The Houran incident was to have many reverberations; on the communal level it has increased the animosity between the Druze and the Maronites, as the Maronites are perceived to be encroaching on Druze political and military power. On a political level, by breaking the tradition of asylum, Prince Bashir II proved himself to be an instrument of Egyptian rule and signaled his inability to protect Mount Lebanon’s historical autonomy, which gained him the animosity of both the Maronites and the Druze.

In 1840, fearing the Christians’ increasing power, Ibrahim Basha ordered their disarmament along with the Druze in Mount Lebanon. Ignoring their differences, the Maronite and Druze rebelled against the Egyptian Occupation and Prince Bashir II. It is important to note here that both parties entered the rebellion with different aims; Druze wanted to regain their land and privileges confiscated by the Egyptians, while the Maronite newly formed commercial class, supported by the Church were attempting to wrestle power from the Maronite feudal lords. The rebellion failed, however “by then, the

Eastern Question was attracting the attention of the European powers. Reinforced by the London Treaty of 1840, in which they agreed to expel the Egyptian from Syria, each of the five powers sought to intervene on behalf of their chosen protégé”¹³ (Khalaf, 1979). After Ibrahim Basha refused to withdraw from the Levant, a joint Anglo-Austrian-Turkish troops deployed to Mount Lebanon and along with the rebels lodged the Egyptians out of Mount Lebanon and sent Prince Bashir II into exile.

Civil Strife 1841-1860

Following the Egyptian withdrawal and the exile of Prince Bashir II, Mount Lebanon came under direct Ottoman rule with Prince Bashir II’s cousin Bashir III as the new prince. Ill feelings between the sectarian groups, which have been brewing since the 1830’s, became more apparent as the as religious communities drifted further apart. With the growing tensions between the two communities, the Maronite-Druze confederacy that safeguarded and sustained Mount Lebanon for so long fell apart (Churchill, 2000). For the Druze, the resentment stemmed from Prince Bashir II’s confiscation of their lands and undermining their privileges and authority. The Druze peasants were disarmed, conscripted in the Egyptian army and over taxed, their feudal lords were exiled and their lands confiscated. To add insult to injury, “much of their property was now held by Christians and all their traditional rights and prerogatives-collection of taxes, maintenance of law and order and judicial authority-has been absorbed [by the ruling prince]” (Khalaf, 1979). Furthermore in an attempt to undermine feudal elites, Prince

¹³ Turkey supported the rebels to undermine Prince Bashir II and the Sunnis, Russia the Greek Orthodox, France and Austria the Catholics and Maronites, while Britain and the Ottomans protected the Druze. (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995, Khalaf, 1979 and Hourani, 1988).

Bashir III with the support of the Ottoman Empire, organized a council of twelve men to assist him in administration of justice” (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995). Both Druze and Maronite feudal elites refused the new arrangement as they regarded it as an encroachment on their traditional authority and seemed for a while to cooperate to counter Prince Bashir III’s initiative. But, when the Maronite Patriarch Yusuf Hubaysh issued a circular signed by the Maronite feudal elites calling in their coreligionists in Druze areas to assume the judicial authority traditionally held by the Druze feudal chiefs. The Druze regarded the circular as an assertion by the patriarch of his power to withdraw authority from the Druze feudal families and seized cooperation with the Maronites (Khalaf, 1987). Druze retaliation soon followed. In 1841, after a dispute over of taxes, the Druze attacked Dayr Al Qamar¹⁴ and set the town on fire, this attack ignited other sectarian clashes throughout Mount Lebanon and resulted in the dismissal of Prince Bashir III and the end of the Princedom of Mount Lebanon. While the clashes officially ended in 1842 with the establishment of the two *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs* in fact low key clashes and skirmishes continued unabated (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995) the reasons behind that will be discussed in the next section.

Arrangement of Shakib Afandi¹⁵

Following the massacres and the fall of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, the Ottoman Sultan, after consultations with the European powers, who by now were officially sanctioned by the High Porte to protect their sectarian protégés, announced the

¹⁴ Dayr el Qamar was the capital of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon between the 15th century and the 19th.

¹⁵ Shakib Afandi was the Ottoman Foreign Minister at the time.

reorganization of Mount Lebanon in 1843. In what came to be known as the Arrangement of Shakib Afandi,¹⁶ Mount Lebanon was divided into two *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs*, or districts, one Christian in the north Mount Lebanon and a Druze in the south, each headed by a *Qaim Maqqam*,¹⁷ Christian in the north and Druze in the south. Assisting the governor was a consultative council, composed of five judges¹⁸ and six consultants¹⁹ representing the religious minorities in each district. While the consultative council combined was responsible for taxation and other administrative issues, judiciary matters were the sole responsibility of the judges who had authority only over their coreligionists. All the decisions were subject to the *Qaim Maqqam*'s approval.

According to Traboulsi, the Arrangement of Shakib Afandi only served to exacerbate rather than resolve the conflict. On hand the council constituted an alternative institution to the feudal system, on the other hand, the council had no power or influence to counter the power of the feudal elites (Traboulsi, 2007) who continued to practice their traditional role. To Salibi, the two *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs* was an ill fated plan from the beginning; the arrangement was an artificial division of the mountain that aggravated sectarian conflict rather than reducing it, in fact by dividing Mount Lebanon on sectarian lines, "it was the formal organization of civil war in the country" (Salaibi, 1990).

In 1858, the civil war began as yet another peasant uprising against feudalism in Northern Mount Lebanon. In a scene reminiscent of the peasant revolt of 1820 the

¹⁶ Also known as Nizam Shakib Afandi, Laws of Shakib Afandi (Jiha, 1998).

¹⁷ *Qaim Maqqam*, the governor of the *Qaim Maqqamiyyah* or district.

¹⁸ One of each: Maronite, Druze, Roman Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Sunni Moslems (Jiha, 1998).

¹⁹ One of each: Maronite, Druze, Roman Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Sunni Moslem and Shia Moslem (Jiha, 1998).

Maronite peasants revolted against increased taxation. In the Druze districts, the Druze leadership initiated the fighting as a preemptive measure “to ward off the ... repercussions of [peasant revolt in Northern Mount Lebanon... and to overcome the political and social agitation [of Maronites living in Druze districts]” (Traboulsi, 2007). Between 1858-1860, violence between Maronite and Druze factions took the form of skirmishes and assassinations, however in 1860 violence erupted with unprecedented ferocity resulting in the worst massacres in the history of Mount Lebanon. In a span of less than four weeks, mid-May to mid-June 1860, “the Druze established their unquestionable military superiority over the Christians and left the entire mountain in their hands” (Tarazi-Fawaz, 1995). The clashes left an estimated 12,000 Christians dead, 100,000 homeless and about 4,000,000 pounds worth of property damaged²⁰ (Khalaf, 1979).

Mutasarrifate and The Reglement Organique of 1861

Similar to the process of the Shakib Afandi Arrangements, in 1861, the Ottoman Empire along with European powers, established a new administration in the mountain, called the *Mutassarifate*,²¹ in which the Mountain would be reunited and governed by a non-Lebanese Ottoman Christian, a *Mutassarif*,²² agreed upon by the Ottoman Empire and European powers. To assist the *Mutassarif*, a local administrative body composed of representatives of the six religious communities was established. The Reglement Organique also stipulated equality between all the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, the

²⁰ It is interesting to note here that I was unable to find any number of Druze casualties in any of the references I consulted.

²¹ *Mutasarrifate* is an Ottoman administrative district.

²² *Mutassarif*, governor of the *Mutassarifate*.

formation of security forces, reorganization of the judiciary and the abolishment of all feudal privileges. Although the *Mutasarrifate* era ushered in 60 years of relative peace in which the political foundations and deficiencies of the modern Lebanese state started taking shape, in fact “apart from geographical rearrangement of Mount Lebanon and the official abolishment of feudalism, which continued in other forms, the Reglement did not involve a radical redefinition or a qualitative transformation of the social order as is often suggested” (Khalaf, 1979). In fact institutionalizing confessionalism as the basis of distributing political seats in the local administrative body reinforced the Arrangement of Shakib Afandi. Given the recent mutual confessional bitterness and hostility, the confessional distribution of power, made sense at the time. However, by favoring straightforward sectarian representation over democratic, territorial or proportional, the Reglement has put in motion a political dynamic that will become the central issue over which future battles will be fought. To complicate matters, 1864 and the number of Chirsitian seats on the council were modified to 7 Christians to 5 Muslims. The *Mutasarrifate* lasted for about 60 years, till the end of the First World War, when France took mandate over Mount Lebanon.

The French Mandate

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, France took mandate over Mount Lebanon and in 1920 increased its size by adding the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon Tyr and the Beqaa Valley without any modification to the political

system.²³ The territorial expansion of Mount Lebanon tilted the percentages of religious groups in the country, further complicating the power distribution among its sectarian components. In 1926 a new constitution with provisions legitimizing France as the mandate power in the country (Qabbani, 1982) replaced the Reglement Organique. During the French mandate, which lasted from 1920 to 1943, Lebanon was torn between two ideologies; Lebanese Nationalism, with its roots in the peasant uprising of 1820 and its adherents were mostly Christians, and Arab Nationalists who supported the unification of Lebanon with Syria and its adherents mostly Muslims. Due repetitive suspension of the constitution and World War II the conflict between the two ideologies rarely manifested itself violently.

The National Pact and Independence

In 1943 as Lebanon geared toward independence from French colonial rule, the Maronites and Sunnis, the wealthiest and most powerful communities in Lebanon at the time, agreed to distribute political power in a 6:5 ratio favoring Christians. The agreement, which came to be known as the National Pact or *Al Mithaq al Watani*, is an unwritten agreement between Lebanon's first president, Bshara Al Khoury (Maronite Christian) and the first Prime Minister, Riyad Al Solh (Sunni Muslim). In an attempt to please all religious communities and guarantee their participation in the newborn state, Khoury and Solh agreed to continue allocating government posts in a confessional

²³ Since then Mount Lebanon came to be known as Small Lebanon, *Lunbnan al Sageer*, to differentiate it from Greater Lebanon, *Lubanon al Kabeer*. After Independence, the Lebanese Government dropped greater Lebanon from the name, and the country came to be known by its current name; the Republic of Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007).

manner. The core of the National Pact aimed to address the Christians' fear of being overwhelmed by the Muslim communities in Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims' fear of Western hegemony. In return for the Christian promise not to seek foreign -specifically French -protection and to accept Lebanon's "Arab face," the Muslim side agreed to recognize the independence and legitimacy of the Lebanese state in its 1920 boundaries and to renounce aspirations for union with Syria (Terry, 2008).

After Lebanon became independent in 1943, the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution in order to abolish French mandatory powers and incorporated the provisions of the National Pact.²⁴ The constitution established a parliamentary system, dividing power between Christians and Moslems on 6:5 ratio favoring Christians. The constitution, however, included fundamental provisions providing a legal framework to safeguard public and private liberties and guarantees equal protection (El Gemayel, 1985). Legally, all Lebanese enjoy equal rights under the constitution; however, article 95 of the constitution assigns governmental and administrative positions on the basis of sectarian rather than national affiliation (Qabbani, 1982 and El Gemayel, 1985). This provision effectively rendered the Lebanese political regime more of a "sectarian federation" headed by a Maronite Christian and assisted by other sects in running the affairs of the state (El Gemayel, 1985). Furthermore, by "entrusting" the executive power²⁵ to the president and stipulating that the government, which is headed by a Sunni

²⁴ Articles 1, 5, 11, 52, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95 and 102 (Jiha, 1998).

²⁵ Article 17. Executive power is entrusted to the President of the Republic which exercises it with the assistance of Ministers, according to conditions established by the present constitution.

Moslem, “assist the executive,” the constitution made the president “a true republican monarch” (El Gemayel, 1985).

The Crises of 1958

In 1958, after Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic and the fall of the Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq, Arab Nationalists in Lebanon called for the country to join the Arab union. The call to join the United Arab Republic caused a minor insurrection among Arab Nationalists, mainly in Muslim areas that prompted the Christians to take arms to defend the republic (Traboulsi, 2007). Fearing a Muslim takeover of the country, President Chamoun, invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine and called on the United States to send troops to quell the riots. By the time American troops deployed to Lebanon, the riots were nearly over. The Crises of 1958 resulted in 2,500 deaths and a shaky truce that highlighted the underlying political sentiments of the population, the fragility of the country and its potential for disintegration (Harris, 1997). In many ways, the 1958 conflict was a dry run for the collapse of the state in 1975 and proved that Lebanon did not need foreign intrusion to disintegrate into its sectarian components (Harris, 1997).

Article 55. The President of the Republic may, by motivated decree taken on favorable advice of the Council of Ministers, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, before the expiry of its term of office.

Article 53. The President of the Republic appoints and dismisses the Minister whom he designates a President for the Council of Ministers; he nominates to all posts for which the mode of appointment is not by law; he presides over national official functions.

The Civil War of 1975

In the 1970's, however, the changing demographics in Lebanon further tilted population percentages and rendered the Maronites around one-third of the population with two-thirds²⁶ of the population being Muslims. When Muslims called for a constitutional change to reflect this population change, the Christians refused, defending their position as part of the National Pact that was an essential part of the foundation of the Lebanese republic. In addition to other external factors that go beyond the scope of this research, mainly inter-Arab discord, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War the increased tension between the two groups²⁷ resulted in the eruption of communal violence in 1975.

At the eve of the outbreak of communal conflict in 1975, Lebanese were divided between two main political blocks; the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the umbrella organization representing the left wing organizations, Arab Nationalist and Muslim groups, fighting to change the political system and the Maronite-oriented right wing groups called the Lebanese Front (LF), seeking to maintain the status quo. Economically, the disparities also reflected a similar schism; "Christian dominance in [business and] industry was highly visible... had a larger middle class, higher literacy rate and were more involved in the public sector activities, companies and banking" (Abul-Husn, 1998). In a scene that mirrors previous out breaks of violence in the country,

²⁶ The percentages are widely accepted estimates since there has been no formal census that mentions religious affiliation since 1932.

²⁷ In fact a better description of the two groups would be Lebanese Nationalists and Pan-Arab Nationalist, more over many Christians were part of the Pan-Arab Nationalist camp as numerous Muslims were part of the Lebanese Nationalist camp.

the conflict did not initially erupt due to sectarian tension but rather due to demands for more accurate political representation and better economic access (Traboulsi, 2007) and later transformed into a sectarian conflict. While it holds true that, during the first two years of the civil war (1975-1977), the conflict was easily recognizable as class conflict (Johnson, 2002), the fact that economic and political power in Lebanon is inter-linked with sectarian privileges ensures that every out burst of conflict will eventually transform into a sectarian one. In that direction, as neither party was able to end the conflict to its advantage and as the conflict dragged on, ideological persuasions disintegrated into sectarian ones. In time, as Lebanon receded into civil war, many countries including, the United States, Soviet Union, France, Israel, Syria, either took part in the fighting, mediated or occupied parts of the country. The violence continued until the Lebanese parliament met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, and agreed on a formula to redistribute political power and end the civil war in 1989. However, the war continued till 1991.

The Taif Agreement and the Second Republic of Lebanon

The Taif Agreement, also known as the National Reconciliation Charter, is an arrangement that introduced constitutional and political reforms to end the Lebanese civil war. The deliberations took place by the surviving members of the of the 1972 Parliament in Taif, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and their results were later incorporated into the constitution. In essence the Taif Agreement recreated the Lebanese confessional system with few modifications (Traboulsi, 2007), and in the tradition of other peace initiatives the agreement was successful in ending the hostilities, but not resolving the conflict. In that

direction, while, the agreement transferred some of the presidential powers to the council of ministers, divided sectarian representation equally between Christians and Moslems, called for the end of the confessional system but confirmed the sectarian affiliation of the presidency, the prime ministry and speaker of the parliament,²⁸ it “fell short of providing all inclusive conflict resolution mechanism to Lebanon’s sectarian loyalties” (Abul-Husn, 1998). While a big part of the Taif Agreement’s success could be easily traced back to Syrian military dominance of the country, the agreement itself however presented a viable formula to manage coexistence between the warring sectarian groups. Like the National Pact, the architects of the Taif Agreement were well aware of the saliency of the sectarian loyalties and they aimed to find a formula to manage them. The agreement did just so without any modifications to reduce animosity or establish conditions to phase out sectarianism. By retaining confessionalism as the foundation of communal relations, the Taif agreement, for the time being, sedated the sectarian interests without solving any of the underlying problems that caused conflict. At the time of writing this research, sectarianism continuous to be an important issue with pivotal implications for the country; for if at any point in time the conditions that resulted in the peaceful termination of the conflict change, the underlying sectarian tensions might result in a new episode of violent conflict.

²⁸ Articles: 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 30, 33, 44, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 80, 85, 86 and 95 (Jiha, 1998).

Conclusion

Communal tensions and conflict has characterized the history of Lebanon since the early part of the 19th century. My research aims to analyze the root causes of sectarian/communal tensions, its legacy on the country and provide an intervention to move Lebanon beyond the sectarian state.

As discussed in the sections above, Lebanon has been plagued by a series of overlapping conflicts that the peasant rebellion of 1820 served as a trigger event for. The direct causes of the conflict have consistently been centered on the position of authority and access to government rewards-demands that not sectarian in nature, however due to the inter-linkage between authority and sectarian privileges, conflict has consistently turned confessional. In that light, we can discern that the Lebanese conflict has gone through 4 phases:

Phase 1, between 1800-1840, the conflict was between the Maronite peasant and clergy on one hand and the Maronite feudal lords on another. During this face of the conflict, the Maronite society was transformed from one that is based on personal loyalty and kinship allegiance to the feudal lord to one that is based on loyalty to the community. This transformation resulted in a new Maronite nationalism that reinforced the identity and solidarity of the Maronite community within Mount Lebanon.

Phase 2, between 1840-1860, the conflict spilt to religiously mixed areas in southern Mount Lebanon where power was in the hands of the Druze. During this phase the conflict assumed a sectarian character as Christians began encroaching on Druze

power. The erosion of Druze power and subsequent clashes between the two communities engendered sectarianism and animosity between the parties to the conflict.

Phase 3, between 1860-1943, confessionalism became the foundation of communal relations; political power was divided on sectarian basis and it was further institutionalized in the National Pact, the cornerstone of the postcolonial Lebanese state.

Phase 4, between 1943-Present, due to the inadaptability of the Lebanese political system, the changing demographics in the country, the regional and international power shifts caused the breaking down of the Lebanese state in 1975 and its resurrection in 1990.

Finally, before moving to discuss the four main domestic parties to the Lebanese conflict, it is worthwhile to highlight that the conflict process and the determining factors behind violence were primarily social and political. As discussed earlier the amalgam of social change, new communal consciousness, the fall of the *Iqta'* system, economic disparities, foreign intervention and rebellion resulted in a power struggle between the communities.

CHAPTER II

Sects, History and Social Identity

For better or worse, this is a region filled with the victims of victims. Its people will always play the game of chicken and egg, chasing history in circles and pining for victory... always on the battlefield ready to fight or defend.

Manar Fawakhry, *Winds of Change in the Holocaust Museum*

1. Introduction

According to Harik “the major cleavages in the Lebanese society runs along sectarian lines...Lebanon is a segmentary society in so far as it is composed of diverse communities ... characterized by distinct sense of Identity” (Khashan, 1992). Khashan argues that “it would injudicious to refer to Lebanese as a people...the inhabitants of country are merely a plurality of peoples...having little, or nothing, in common.” Following a similar idea, Abul-Husn, describes the Lebanese society as “consist[ing] of several social systems that exist side by side...but void of a central value system and widespread acculturation.”²⁹ In the previous chapter, we have seen how Lebanese history is an amalgam of social change, separate communal consciousness, economic disparities, foreign intervention and rebellion, formed not by a single dominating community, but

²⁹ Cultural modification of an individual, group, or people by adapting to or borrowing traits from another culture, merging of cultures as a result of prolonged contact (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2004).

rather an uneasy union of mainly four different sects.³⁰ For the Maronites, its was a culmination of a communal struggle that started in the 1800's (Abu Khalil), for the Druze it was their only option following their failure to capitalize on their military gains in 1860 (Harb al Jabal), for the Sunni it was a compromise that kept them the most powerful Muslim group in the country (Zimar, 2000), as for the Shia, it was a favorable choice to join a state composed of many minority groups rather than joining a Sunni dominated state; Syria (Zisser, 2000). In the previous chapter I discussed how sectarian sentiments were precariously managed for 32 years after independence before they resurfaced again and resulted in the communal eruption of violence in 1975, beginning with a brief discussion of social identity, in this chapter I will expand on the four main domestic parties to the Lebanese conflict, how their identities were formed, their narratives and relationship to one other.

2. Social Identities, its Salience and Construction

To think of Lebanon, one should think of communalism, sectarianism and identity groups. What is identity and how is formed? How does it contribute group cohesion and can become a causing factor of violence? In the following section, I will discuss social identity, its construction and salience while relating the concepts to Lebanese history.

Identity is a “collective psychological conception” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001), socially constructed by people, or elites, to further a certain idea.

³⁰ Although the Lebanese government officially recognizes 18 sects, the main actors in Lebanese history and politics have been Maronites, Sunnis, Shia and Druze (Salibi, 2003 and Traboulsi, 2007).

“People are a nation if they perceive themselves to be as such and are prepared to invest energy and make sacrifices in terms of that perception” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001). But to regard identity as a social construction does not “imply that [it is] manufactured out of nothing” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001). According to Kelman “identity construction draws on a variety of authentic elements held in common within a group” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001) such as “chosen glories and traumas” (Volkan, 1997), common language, history, customs, religion, cultural expressions and aspirations (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001 and Issacs, 1975). For example, the Druze regard their ability to muster political power that is far more than their numerical value as a chosen glory; for the Sunni, their perceived inheritance of the legacy of the successive Islamic empires in the Levant; for the Maronite it is their position at the helm the only Christian dominated state in the Middle East is matter of pride, and for the Shia their narrative of oppression and survival against all odds.

Social identity is the membership in a social group, the ingroup: Druze, Shia, Maronite, Sunni, and the emotional involvement and loyalty to and belief in the sameness with the ingroup. Ingroup identity is formed as a result of its member’s perceived commonalities, narratives and its comparison with the “Other” or the outgroup. Membership in a social group, according to Korostelina, serves “five functions; increase self esteem, increase social status, personal safety, group support and recognition.” For the members of the four sectarian groups, sectarian identity provides a source of grounding and protection, as any insult to a member of the ingroup, at the local level, is usually translated to an insult to the whole ingroup. Sectarian membership also provides

the scale to which the ingroup measures itself *vis a vis* the other, and formulates their perception of what each group is entitled to politically and socially.

Salient identity, Maronite, Shia, Druze and Sunni, is defined as the most “important identity for the individual” (Korostelina, 2007). Striker argues that “if an identity becomes salient for a long time it becomes the central identity” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001). In the case of Lebanon, identity groups are based on the religious sect where the salient identity is located and expressed in one’s identification and loyalty to one’s religious sub-dominion. Group Identity ‘connects individuals to the group... defines their worldviews, interests, articulates collective memories and symbolically connects the past and the present’ (Ross, 2007). According to Ross, in ‘linking the past and the present,’ group identity “reinforces social categories that organize behavior, increase sense of common fate, expectations of common treatment, joint fears of extension/survival, beliefs about self worth dignity, recognition.”

To Stern, social identity, including the attachment to a group starts at the earliest stages of the life cycle. For Eriksen, “kinship [real, factious or metaphoric] is an important organizing principle for most societies in the world and lot of what passes as ethnicity at local level is really kinship” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001). In addition to its symbolic dimension, kinship performs an important social action; it demarks ingroup boundaries and sets social organization. For example, the Druze’s intimate association between kinship, solidarity and status kept the Druze peasants fiercely loyal to their feudal lords and were not affected by the Maronite uprising in 1820.

Two main theories postulate the formation of group identity; “primordial” and “constructivism.” Primordial identity formation theory stipulates that the group has always existed and stems from a common ancestor or creation myth and thus “the group is natural, inevitable and unchanging” (Mattern, 2004). In that direction primordialism suggests that identities are pre-given and in turn these identities set the boundaries between what is the in and out group. Constructivism on the other hand, argues that identities are a social construction, “based on interest maximization... as a motivating principle for group action” (Ross, 2007). In that direction, Constructivism ‘emphasizes group formation and solidarity as the result of cost-benefit function rather than solely a sentimental attachment (Ross, 2007). Despite the different theories of group formation, identity groups are the “end result of a ...[natural evolution]... historical continuity, geographical reality, a myth of common beginning and other shared events” all strung together under a protective tent with the leader, the prototype, as the tent pole, holding the group together and defending it (Volkan, 1998). The sectarian elite families in the country are of two kinds; land-based power elites that are continuation of the Ottoman feudal order like the Maronite Khazen family, the Druze Jumblatt and Arslan families as well as urban elites who gained power from business and financial endeavors like the Hariri family, Shiha family and Tueni family.

Identity as Factor for Violence

Under shared stress identity groups “regress” and “fall back on a primitive behavior” as they see their environment as more violent than it is while expecting the

others to be more powerful (Volkan, 1998). In his article “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict” Gagnon, argues that “domestic political and economic power changes in the status quo” causes ethnic violence and elites who feel most threatened by that change will “construct individual interests in terms of the threat to the group.” If threatened, Gagnon, explains, elites seek to preserve their powerbase in the domestic arena by “appealing to the material and non-material values of... those actors whose support is necessary to ... maintain power” (Gagnon, 1994). In 1860, fearing Maronite rebellion in Southern Mount Lebanon, the Druze feudal lords, preempted the revolt by calling on their coreligionists to attack the Maronites in Druze districts.

According to Gagnon, “the challenge for the elites [is] express[ing] their interests in the “language” of the collective interest.” But in a country like Lebanon, where the founding creation myth emphasizes the minority status of its religious components, where the delineation between the present and past is blurred (Salibi, 1990), territorial base is already defined (Toft, 2005) and threats, perceived or real, is continuously present, confessional elites do not need much effort to mobilize their constituents. Kaufman provides two processes for ethnic conflict escalation; elite-led and mass-led. Kaufman defines mass-led as when an event galvanizes the masses and causes an ethnic movement to emerge -similar to the Peasant Up Rising of 1820, while elite-led as when elites harness ethnic symbols, entitlement and/or fear to mobilize their ingroup (Kaufman, 2009) as when the Maronite Patriarch Yusuf Hubaysh called upon the Maronites in Druze areas to assume the judicial authority traditionally held by the Druze feudal chiefs in 1841. Furthermore, In Lebanon where the patron-client relationship is based on “group

identification” and defines social, economical and political behavior Kaufman’s elite-led model provides a better approach to explaining cyclical eruption of violence. Faced by threats from the outgroup sectarian elites mobilize their already charged constituents to defend the ingroup, their position, rights, entitlements and by extension the prototype.

Toward that end, confessional elites continuously frame their arguments against the confessional other in a language that stresses confessional hostility “identifying the out groups with enemies” (Kaufman, 2001), emphasizes the unique qualities of the ingroup, military strength for the Druze and piousness for the Maronites for example, and justifies future acts of hostilities in terms of self defense in face of “ethnic extinction.” (Kaufman, 2001). In fact one of the prevailing myths of the civil war (1975-1990) that the Druze and Moslems wanted “to throw the Christians in the sea” (Joseph Abu Kalil, 1998 and Endary, 1985) similarly, Druze believed that the Maronites wanted to expel the Druze to Houran³¹ (Harb Al Jabal, 1985).

2. Sects, Narratives and Outlook

In the previous section, we have seen how identity is socially constructed from commonalities among the ingroup and in many instances manipulated by the elites to further personal interests, protect/defend, enhance the cohesion and/or increase the privileges of the ingroup. Guided by the theories mentioned in the previous portion of the research as my frame work, in this section, I will discuss when and how these groups

³¹ A predominantly Druze area in Southwestern Syria and the location of the first Maronite-Druze war in 1838, see Chapter I for more information.

began articulating their distinct consciousness and what factors contributed to their unique development. Beginning with the Maronites, I will also explore the effects of the sects' historical development on the attitudes outlook and political behavior of the four main identity groups. Power analysis and relationships to other sects will be dealt with in the section that follows.

The Maronites

The Maronites who take their name from an early fifth century ascetic monk named Saint Maroun, appeared in the sixth century in present day Northern Syria. Due to prosecution by other Christian sects in the Orontes Valley, the Maronite community found refuge in the rugged impassable mountains for northern Mount Lebanon. In their newly found refuge, the Maronites developed the sect into an “independent community [and a] nation” (Dao, 1986). Throughout this initial stage of the Maronite development, common religion was the only bond providing cohesion among the peasants of the highland (Aulas, 1985). However, by the eighth century, the basic tenets of their nationhood were solidified with “land, population, civilization and separate identity” (Dao, 1986).

In their mountain refuge, the Maronites soon gained the animosity of the new Moslem rulers, as they sided with the Byzantine Empire in their attempt to dislodge the Moslem conquerors from the coastal plains. After the establishment of the Umayyad rule in the Levant, the Umayyads sent their armies “to punish the [Maronite] insurgents” (Khashan, 1992). According to Khashan, “Moslem efforts to contain the Maronites have

left a lasting mark on the relationship between the two communities.” When the Crusaders approached Syria, “the Maronites were the only community-Christian or Muslim, in the East to join their ranks and support them whole heartedly” (Kashan, 1992). The consolidation of the Mamluk rule after the end of the Crusades in the Thirteenth Century brought more punitive action against the Maronites. In that direction, Salibi notes that two enduring outcomes of the Crusades on the Maronite communities were the ‘impassioned fixation and identification with the west,’ as well as a retreat and isolation in their stronghold where the sect was able to develop its collective identity in isolation. With time the Maronites expanded south, first to Kisrwan district where they slowly replaced the Shia inhabitants and later to the southern part of Mount Lebanon where for centuries they coexisted peacefully with the Druze. Starting from the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, allowed the Maronites, under the Millet system,³² to administer their own affairs under their own religious laws and thus allowing the Maronite Church to maintain extensive control over its adherents. At the beginning of the nineteenth century a protracted social conflict erupted between the Maronites and Druze. The civil war brought the end of the Druze political power and ushered the rise the Maronite political hegemony.

The Druze

Since its formulation in Egypt in the 10th Century, the “Druze faith was met with antagonism and its followers... oppress[ed]” (Abul-Husn, 1998). Being an offshoot of

³² Under Ottoman law, a Millet is a non-Moslem group or community organized under a religious head who exercises important civil functions (El Gemayel, 1985).

Ismaili Islam, that believes among other things in the reincarnation of souls, ensured that the Druze be relegated to the status of heretics by the ruling Sunni majority (Khashan, 1992). The prosecution of Druze in Egypt and across the Islamic Empire resulted in the disappearance of communities in places like Egypt and India (Abul-Husn, 1998); however, the Druze flourished in the southern parts of Mount Lebanon. Secluded in Mount Lebanon, the Druze soon developed into a community known for its “high sense of solidarity...vigorous sense of independence” (Hiiti, 2008) with highly “organized religious and feudal hierarchies” (Abul-Husn, 1998). Like the Maronites the Druze were persecuted by the Mamluks after the consolidation of their power in 1305 AD. Despite the fact that the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I acknowledged the Druze rule in southern Mount Lebanon in 1516, the advent of the Ottoman Turks to the Levant did not decrease the persecution of the Druze by successive Sunni rulers. Between the 15th and 16th Century, the Druze population was so depleted due to punitive campaigns that the Druze feudal lords asked Maronite peasants to move to southern Mount Lebanon to work the land (Firro, 1992). “Brought together by a universalist religious opponent, both the Maronites and the Druze forged a potent alliance that did not seem to falter until the beginning of the nineteenth century” (Khashan, 1992).

The Shia

Shiasm arrived in Lebanon in the seventh century and, like the Maronites and Druze, the Shia were subject to prosecution under the successive Sunni dynasties due to their unorthodox beliefs (Abul-Husn, 1998). At first the Shia were dispersed in the eastern,

western and northern part of present day Lebanon, however continuous prosecution pushed them south where they became concentrated around a mountain in southern Lebanon called Jabal Amel. The persecution of the Shia continued under the Ottoman Empire. Many had to convert to Sunnism, and the community as a whole was forced to conform to Sunni religious doctrine (Khashan, 1992). In Jabal Amel, suffering from “weak political apparatus...and lack of military prowess...to embody the group’s interest,” the Shia had a limited political impact until their wide scale military and political mobilization in the 1970s (Khashan, 1992).

The Sunnis

With the advent of the Umayyad Armies to the Levant in 634 AD, Sunni populations began settling on the coastal areas in what is now Lebanon. Being the religion of the empire, under the subsequent Sunni Dynasties³³ the community was further enhanced (Khashan, 1992) by governmental patronage and reprisals against the Christians and non-Sunni sects. With subsequent waves of Sunni migrations to Lebanon’s coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, the Sunni were able to establish a strong community and dominate the coastal plains of present day Lebanon, for the better part of 1500 years.

3. Power Analysis

While 18 sects exist in Lebanon the main actors in Lebanese history and politics have been the Maronites, Druze, Sunnis and Shia. Earlier in the chapter I have explored

³³ Umayyads (661 A.D. -750 A.D.), Abbasids (750 A.D. -1258 A.D.), Seljuk (1037 A.D.–1194 A.D.), Mamlukes (1250 A.D. -1517 A.D.) and Ottomans (1299 A.D. -1923 A.D.)

the history of these communities; how did they form and how their unique history shaped their outlook. In this section, I will explore how each of the sect's historical development established the communities' behavioral patterns, perception of themselves, the Other and the course of inter-communal relations since the inception of Greater Lebanon in 1920. Although this section focuses on power dynamics and inter-communal relations, it is worthwhile to briefly note that intra-communal relations were rife with conflict as well. In fact, all parties to the conflict at one point or another have undergone intra-communal violence. On multiple occasions, the Maronite factions battled each other during the war³⁴ as did the Shia³⁵ the Druze and the Sunnis. However, intra-communal conflicts focused on establishing leadership over one's sect and did not constitute a challenge to the predominant inter-communal conflict narratives.

The Maronites

The Maronites attempted to preserve the power structure, institutionalized since the *Qaim Maqqamiyyah*³⁶ in 1842, which guaranteed their political and economic hegemony. The Maronites feared that any modification to the structure would return their community to the status of a protected minority under a Moslem majority rule. Furthermore, memories of the 1840 and 1860 massacres against the Maronites, only served to heighten their fear of imminent annihilation (Khazen, 1992). Regarding themselves as the fortress of Christendom amid a sea of Moslems (Salibi, 2003), the

³⁴ Safra Marina Massacre, Unification of the Christian Gun Day, July 7-8, 1980.

Ehden Massacre, June 13, 1978

³⁵ Battles of Eqlim al Tufa and Dahiyeh 1985-1990

³⁶ See Chapter 1.

Maronites feared ethnic extinction as the natality rates of Muslims increased and the emigration rate of Maronites skyrocketed. The Maronite viewed all non-Christians as backward and regarded Arab nationalism or any connection with the greater Middle East as suspect. Moreover the Maronite's passionate attachment with the West alienated the Maronites from the rest of the sectarian groups in Lebanon. In that direction, the Maronites perceived all non-Christian as "not worthy of being Lebanese... for their allegiance is else where... outside the boundaries of Lebanon and are a burden on the state" (Qabbani, 1985).

The Sunnis

With the creation of Modern Lebanon in the 1920, the traditional Sunni political elites were relegated to a secondary role. Since the Arab conquest of the Levant, the Sunnis were the ruling class and dealt with the rest of the sects from "a position of power" (Abul-Husn, 1998), but within the new state established, they lost their dominant position. With the loss of their status, according to Abul-Husn, the Sunni "lost their proximity to state positions ... and [that] decreas[ed their] access to state resources." Furthermore the loss of their status that came due to their membership in the broader Sunni community was further enforced in the National Pact which limited their loyalties and connections to the Arab and Moslem Worlds. In that direction, the Sunnis wanted to capitalize on the opportunity to gain back the privileges lost under the French colonial rule and could not obtain in the post independence state. The Sunnis viewed the Christians with suspicion, as they rejected almost every thing Arab and embraced every

thing Western, French in particular. The Druze and the Shia did not fare better with Sunnis, both were regarded as heretics and not being part of Muslim orthodoxy not qualified to be part of the government. Furthermore, by curtailing the Sunni's connection with the greater Middle East and other Arab in the region, the Maronites gained the animosity of the Sunni's for "attempting to sever the ties of identity, history, kinship and nationalism of the Arabs in Lebanon and their brethren else where" (Qabbani, 1985).

The Druze

For the Druze, who were the traditional rulers of what became known as Lebanon for a better part a millennia (Salibi, 2003), the continuous loss of power since the Ottoman rule and the subsequent marginalization in the *Mutassarifate* period and post independent state caused much concern. Although the Druze recognize their numerical minority, even compared to minor Christian sects, they have always enjoyed power and privilege that surpassed their small numbers. The Druze feared being reduced to a political position that actually reflects their numerical value, this compounded by the tacit animosity with other Moslem and non-Moslem sects, heightened their fear of being overshadowed by other sects at best or being reduced to a nonparticipating minority if other sects joint forces against the Druze. For the Druze, who shared a historical hostility toward the Muslims and who are weary of the Maronites, regarded the Sunnis' questioning their "Arabness" and the Maronite infringing on what is left of their political power as threatening to their very existence (Harb Al Jabal, 1985). Stuck between two highly hostile groups the Druze regarded all none Druze as enemies and the best way to

protect the Druze, is to “regress” and “fall back on a primitive behavior” (Volkan, 1998) where group solidarity is highly prized and fear of the outgroup is greatly emphasized.

The Shia

Suffering from centuries of Sunni marginalization, oppressed by their own feudal lords and divided by clan rivalries (Harris, 1996), the Shia entered the state of Lebanon in 1920 as a geographically peripheral and politically marginal population. However, within the new state, the Shia slowly set out to gain the power and prestige they perceived to deserve. In that direction, the Shia separated from the Sunni judicial system in 1969 and established their official religious establishment, *The Higher Shi'i Islamic Council*. In the 1970's the Shia established the *Movement of the Disinherited*³⁷ as their primary political vehicle, with time the PLO, the Lebanese National Movement and the Islamic Revolution in Iran directly and indirectly aided the rise of the Shia's political and social structures. With the entry of the Shia in full force into the Lebanese political arena, the three other sects feared the rise of Shia and regarded it as a threat to their access to state resources and therefore power *vis a vis* the other confessional groups. For this hostility the Shia despised the Maronites because the former used to work as manual laborers in farms belonging to Maronites in south Lebanon. The Shia hated the Sunnis due to the fact that the subsequent Sunni empires denied the Shia their separate Shia

³⁷ Movement of the Disinherited, *Harakat Al-Mahroumeen*, a Shia political party dedicated to fight for the legal and political right of the Shia community, then oppressed by the Shia feudal Lords and often represented by Sunni politicians. The party supported social programs for the Shia, criticized the government's neglect of southern Lebanon and promoted arming the southern Shia villagers to defend themselves against the IDF. The Movement of the Disinherited also established a military wing, Detachments of Lebanese Resistance, Afwaj Al-Moukawamah Al-Lunbaneh, which by 1978 eclipsed and took over the Movement of the Disinherited (Abou Zeineddine, Unpublished).

Identity, forced them to convert to Sunnism and denied their Arab heritage. There was no love lost between the Shia and the Druze either, since the Druze forced the Shia out of Mt. Lebanon and caused them to settle the southern parts of the country.

4. Dynamics of Political Behavior in the Post-Independence State

As we have seen in the previous sections and Chapter I, the historical progression of the Lebanese state was not formed by a single dominating community, but an uneasy union, a marriage of convenience of sorts, among the Maronites, Shia, Sunnis and Druze. According to Abul-Husn, in addition to the historical animosity between the sectarian groups, “the contrasting concepts of what is Lebanon and how the newly established state relates to each of the sects established the [different sects’] behavioral patterns... the course of [inter-communal] relations” (Abul-Husn, 1998) and subsequently the division of power within the state. In that direction, the four sects entered the newly created state with contrasting concepts of what is Lebanon, what is their relation to the Lebanese State and subsequently a different meaning of citizenship (Salibi, 1976). On one hand, the Shia and Druze were primarily concerned with ingroup preservation and continuation of their traditional way of life in relative isolation from the central government (Zisser, 2000). On the other hand, the Maronites and the Sunnis had a different concept of the state; a powerful central government and a bureaucracy permeating all facets of political life in the country (Zamir, 2000). It is worthwhile noting that this form of government was in many ways a departure from the traditional semi-autonomous mode of governance that the sects enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire and to a certain extent under the French

mandate. For the Shia and Druze, being part of the Lebanon meant living within decentralized state, retaining their group independence, traditional privileges and semi-autonomy. While the Maronites and the Sunnis, to a lesser extent shared the Shia and Druze's sentiments, still they possessed a more politically sophisticated concept of their role within the newly born state; the Lebanese state was formed as a vehicle of their political aspirations. For the Maronites it was the political manifestation of their ambition; a Christian dominated state in the Moslem and Arab Worlds, where the Christians of the Middle East can prosper unhindered by prosecution or foreign rule, for them, being Lebanese was synonymous to being Christian and Maronite. The Sunnis, in many ways mirrored the Maronite's conception of Lebanon; the Sunnis regarded themselves, as full citizens in the state that they helped create and full partners in the enterprise. It is true that the National Pact curtailed both the Maronites' Western tendencies and the Sunnis' Pan-Arab aspirations but in all the newly created state provided both communities with ample power to satisfy their ingroup needs and aspirations. As for the Shia and Druze, who did not possess a strong sense of citizenship, they were relegated to the periphery of the political structure and while they shared political power with the Sunnis and Maronites, their political power was limited in comparison and in many ways did not satisfy their needs or reflect their aspirations.

The National Pact,³⁸ the agreement that resulted in such division of power, was supposed to be an interim arrangement to override the contrasting concepts of Lebanon

³⁸ The National Pact and the Lebanese Constitution will be discussed in more details in the Chapter III.

and secure the participation of all sectarian groups in the post independence state. However, by emphasizing sectarian membership as the primary basis for government appointments, the National Pact caused sectarian identity to trump citizenship as the primary criteria for assuming governmental posts and distribution of state resources. This unintended consequence of the National Pact, given the high sense of sectarian solidarity, have emphasized sectarianism and rendered any reform of the political regime near impossible as the sects perceived changes in the domestic political power balance a direct threat to their ingroup. The failure of the Lebanese political regime to evolve beyond the conceptual bounds of the National Pact in the years following independence deepened the cleavages between sectarian groups and rendered the country “void of a central value system” (Abul-Husn, 1998) that sects can agree on or work toward.

5. Conclusion

With its elevated mountains and rugged geography, Lebanon has provided a safe haven to persecuted religious minorities like the Maronites, the Druze and the Shia. In relative seclusion from the Sunni authority occupying the coastal plains, the sects developed their separate sense of identity and outlook. While the “heretical” sects lived in relative isolation, the Sunni authorities fielded many campaigns to subdue and control the inhabitants of the mountains. Those campaigns gained the Sunnis the animosity and suspicion of the Maronites, Druze and Shia. Similarly, the inhabitants of the mountain did not share much love among each other; the Maronite and Druze pushed the Shia out of

North and South Mount Lebanon and the Druze and Maronite fought incessantly throughout the 19th Century.

In 1943, as Lebanon geared toward independence from France, the sectarian groups, agreed on an interim accord to smooth the transition to independence. While the National Pact, was successful in uniting the sectarian groups in their bid for independence, the pact failed to mitigate the animosity between the sectarian groups. In fact, the National Pact's allocation of governmental positions on sectarian basis became the theoretical foundation of division of power the post-independent state. In that direction pact resulted in the association of sectarian membership to political power and the creation of a political system that mirrors the communal divisions within the Lebanese polity. By linking political power to sectarianism, the National Pact has created a ridged political structure where any reform will be unacceptable since it threatens the effected sect's position *vis a vis* the sects.

How did the National Pact came to being and what was the rational behind it? How do the pact and the constitution emphasize sectarianism over citizenship? And how sectarian identity is engendered in the legal system? Focusing on the founding documents of the Lebanese state, in particular the National Pact, the Constitution and personal status laws, in Chapter III I will discuss the constitutional and legal framework of the Lebanese political system, its hierarchal structure, dynamics and its propensity to disenfranchise sects belonging to the lower echelon of the political structure and hinder the development of central value system.

CHAPTER III

Constitutional and Legal Basis of the Lebanese Political System

The prolonged state of death... gave me an identity and a cause, handed me... a gun ... and my chains...

Khaled Al Haber, *Halatu Ehtidaroun Tawila*

1. Constitutional and Legal Basis of the Lebanese Political System

The Lebanese political regime derives its legitimacy and authority from the Lebanese Constitution of 1926, along with its subsequent amendments, the “unwritten agreement” called the National Pact and the National Reconciliation Charter (Jiha, 1998, Bashir, 2006). The “content of the basic law, as represented by the Lebanese constitution is predominantly Napoleonic and secular,” (Jiha, 1998); however, articles 9, 10 and 95 give the constitution its sectarian character. Articles 9 and 10 guarantees to Lebanese citizens of all religious backgrounds the respect of their personal status laws and their religious education and interests. Article 95 stipulates “as a transitory measure and for the sake of even justice and concord, the communities shall be equally represented in public posts and in ministerial composition, without damage to State interest resulting therefrom” (Jiha, 1998). The presence of these articles was the result of the National Pact of 1943 and aimed to provide and maintain a balance between the sectarian groups in the

country. Despite the fact the constitution is the basis of Lebanese law (El Gemayel, 1985), it is the National Pact rather than the constitution that dictates Lebanon's political organization. Along with other legislative provisions it establishes the basis of sectarian distribution of the top governmental positions and of the legislative representation according to a confessional system based on the public census of 1932.³⁹

2. Hierarchy of Sects

According to the constitution and National Pact, the Republic of Lebanon recognizes⁴⁰ 18 religious sects⁴¹ and allocates political power to each in line with its numerical weight according to the 1932 census (El Gemayel, 1985). In that direction a hierarchy of power is created, maintained and monopolized by the "six big sects"⁴² who take the lion's share of appointed governmental posts, in the council of ministers and bureaucracy as well as in the elected legislative body. The remaining sects receive their share within their respective religious denomination proportional to its population percentage within that denomination.

³⁹ The 1932 Public Census revealed that the Maronites were the largest sect in the country about 29% and all the Christian sects combined constituted 53.7% of the population. The importance of the 1932 Public Census lies in the fact that its results were used as the basis for the division of power according to sectarian affiliation (Traboulsi, 2007).

⁴⁰ Recognition implies that these sects have the right to have their own civil status laws, religious schools "according to their own courts and traditions" and participate in the political life of the county as per Articles 9 and 10 of the Lebanese constitution (Jiha, 1998).

⁴¹ Christian sects: Catholics: Maronites, Greek (Melkite) Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Latin, Chaldean. Orthodox sects: Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Oriental Nestorians, Armenian Orthodox. Protestant sects: Evangelical, Protestant, Anglican. Moslem sects: Sunni Moslems, Shia Moslems, Druze, Alawis. Jewish Sects: Followers of Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo Synagogues (Jiha, 1998 and El Gemayel, 1985).

⁴² Maronite Christians, Roman Orthodox, Catholics, Sunnis, Shia and Druze (Jiha, 1998).

Toward that end, the religious communities represented in the government fall according to the following hierarchy:

The Primary Governmental Posts

The presidency of the republic is reserved for Christian Maronites, the post of prime minister is allocated to Sunni Muslims, the speaker of the parliament is allocated to Shia Muslims, and the deputy speaker of the house and deputy prime minister are allocated to Greek Orthodox Christians (Jiha, 1998 and El Gemayel, 1985).

The Council of Ministers

In the Council of Ministers, the Maronites, Sunnis and Shia receive equal numbers of seats while the rest of the sectarian groups receive ‘token’ seats (Traboulsi, 2007).

Legislative Council

The number of seats in the Legislative Council as follows: Maronite Christians (34), Sunni Muslims (27), Shia Muslims (27), Greek Orthodox (14), Greek Catholics (8), Druze (8), Armenian Orthodox (5), Alawites (2), Armenian Catholics (1), Protestants (1) and other Christian groups (1) (Traboulsi, 2007).

The Bureaucracy

Similar to other governmental posts the appointment and entry to the bureaucracy is regulated by article 95 of the constitution. While the head of the Armed Forces, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Deputy Foreign Minister are reserved for Maronite

Christians, the rest of the positions are divided equally among Christians and Moslems according to the following percentages: Maronites (27.5%), Orthodox (10%), Catholics (6%), other Christian sects (6.5%), Sunni Moslems (22.5%), Shia Moslems (21%) and Druze (6.5%) (Jiha, 1998, Bachir, 2006, and Traboulsi, 2007).

3. Personal Status Law

In addition to the institutionalization of a hierarchical sectarian structure within the governing bodies of the Lebanese state, articles 9 and 10⁴³ of the constitution, institute an additional distinction amongst the sectarian groups based on personal status laws. While pluralism in religious legislation and judicial authorities has its historical causes based in the Ottoman Millet System,⁴⁴ the constitution stipulates equality between all Lebanese at the same time that it institutionalizes legal distinctions based on sectarian affiliation. In that direction, each sect is legally autonomous and has its own legislative and judiciary bodies (Qabbani, 1982). Currently in Lebanon there are nine sets of personal status laws in effect (El Gemayel, 1985).

⁴³ Article 9. Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to Almighty, the State respects all creeds and guarantees and protects the free exercise, on condition that they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance respect of their personal status and their religious interests.

Article 10. Education is free so long as it is not contrary to public order and to good manners and does not touch the dignity of other creeds. No derogation shall affect the right of communities to have their schools subject to the general prescriptions on public education edicted by the state.

⁴⁴ Under Ottoman law, a *Millet* is a non-Moslem group or community organized under a religious head who exercises important civil functions. Parts of the Millet system survived in Lebanon and is still in effect in the country (El Gemayel, 1985).

4. Sectarianism as System

In the past two chapters, I have demonstrated how sectarianism is a multifaceted problem that arose from the intersection of historical grievances, social change, separate communal consciousness, economic disparities, foreign intervention and rebellion. In the previous section, I have also shown, how the effects of such a historical process resulted in a political system that sets identity groups in a hierarchy then divides and allocates power based on each community's perceived percentage of the population. In the following section, contrary to the traditional analysis of the Lebanese conflict, which locates sectarianism at the personal level, I will locate sectarianism at the system level.

Literature on the Lebanese conflict usually presents sectarianism and the resulting violence solely as a personal approach; members of an identity group act violently because they are sectarian or prejudice (Randel, 1983, Salibi 1965, Shehadi, 1988, Fisk, 2002 and Zamir, 1985) and absolving the political system from responsibility. However, Lebanese history shows, especially during the last civil war (1975-1991) that sectarian violence was committed by people of little or no religious convection against others who had little or no religious convection, but still these acts are characterized as sectarian because the perpetrators and victims are of different identity groups, Druze against Maronites or *vice versa*. Similarly, discussions during parliamentary sessions are described as sectarian if, for example, financial allocations to one geographic region are more than another, when a different identity group predominantly inhabits each region. Financial allocations to Sidon *versus* Tyre will turn to a discussion of entitlements (groups rights) between Sunnis and Shia, the predominant identity groups living in each

city respectively. Surely, there are sectarian and prejudice Druze, Maronites, Sunnis and Shia among the politicians and the members of the public, but for such events to be characterized as sectarian two conditions must hold true; the role religion plays in each case and if sectarian violence, manifest as the former example or tacit as the later are distinguishable from other forms of prejudice driven violence. In both cases, neither violence was caused by difference over religious doctrine nor it is different than other forms of violence exhibited in cases of ethnic conflict. The conflict is clearly over tangible and quantifiable assets; political dominance in Mount Lebanon and allocation of resources. However, due to the position of each identity group within the political hierarchy, Maronites on the top *versus* Druze on the bottom and Sunnis on top *versus* Shia on the bottom, what would otherwise be characterized as a problem of representation and inequality of distribution of state resources turns into a sectarian conflict due to the afore described political system.

The two examples mentioned above demonstrate that depending on the political conditions, sectarianism can function with utmost brutality or work in utmost subtlety. The commonality between both cases lies in the fact that sectarianism creates a system that demarcates entitlement between different identity groups and distinguishes between levels and grades of access to resources.

The reason behind the sectarian balancing act is the National Pact, the constitutional provisions and amendments that support it. The National Pact was supposed to be a pragmatic “interim” agreement to override divisions between Christians

and Muslims at independence,⁴⁵ however what was aimed to be an interim agreement became permanent. Its permanency created a discriminatory political system that maintains and promotes sectarianism regardless whether politicians or members of the public are sectarian or not. In order to participate in the political life of the country, citizens are required to abide by the laws of the land, and if the laws are sectarian in nature, by default the citizens act accordingly. In that direction, Identity based legislation, as present in the current constitution, reinforces sectarian privileges (group rights) over equal citizenship (individual rights) and creates a social cleavage where supposedly equal citizens⁴⁶ are afforded incongruent socio-economic and political access to state resources.

The application of laws reinforcing group rights over equal individual rights allowed sectarian elites to act as an intermediary between the individual and the government. This in turn elevated the elites to the position of protectors/guardians of the group *vis a vis* the state and the Other. By becoming the tent pole, holding the group together and defending it (Volkan, 1998) created a niche for the elites to rule over their coreligionists according to their personal interests, cloaked as the interest of the sect

⁴⁵ The core of the National Pact aimed to address the Christians' fear of being overwhelmed by the Muslim communities in Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims' fear of Western hegemony. In return for the Christian promise not to seek foreign -specifically French -protection and to accept Lebanon's "Arab face", the Muslim side agreed to recognize the independence and legitimacy of the Lebanese state in its 1920 boundaries and to renounce aspirations for union with Syria. (Terry, 2008)

⁴⁶ Article 7. All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to public charges duties, without any distinction whatever.

and gave rise to a system of clientelism⁴⁷ that perpetuates the continuation and/or recreation of the *status quo* and by extension the sectarian regime.

6. Conclusion

This chapter focused on the Lebanese political system and its hierarchal structure. Based on their perceived percentage of the population, Lebanon's three top national positions are reserved for Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shia Muslims. The deputy premiership and deputy speaker of parliament are reserved for the Greek Orthodox. The parliament, cabinet and other political bodies are divided equally between Muslims and Christians and proportionally between each sect within those two blocs. Furthermore, personal status laws introduce additional distinction among the sectarian groups.

The transformation of the National Pact to a ruling ideology (sectarian system) resulted in a chronic problem of representation and inequality in distribution of state resources. Since the political system and representation is based on percentages of population, the hierarchical nature of the Lebanese state has fixed the positions of sects within the system. In that direction, access to government resources is moderated by the acceptance of sectarian ideology and the rule of the sectarian elites. Given the fact that Representatives of each sect act as the intermediary between their coreligionists and the state, the politico-economic structure not only helped to create a "crises of legitimacy"

⁴⁷ Clientelism is a feature of the Lebanese political system and a form of patron-client relationship where by sectarian elites, in return for political support, provide their supporters with access to governmental resources and services.

but also worked as a catalyst for disenfranchised identity groups to further reinforce their relative deprivation and seek to change the *status quo*.

Changing the *status quo*, or in other terms changing the position of a sect *vis a vis* the other sects will be further discussed in the next chapter. The fourth chapter will also tie the previous chapters together and explain the nature of the Lebanese conflict, how and why the parties to the conflict express themselves in sectarian terms and highlight the fact that underlying tensions are rooted in exclusion and dispossession of political and economic resources rather than religious dogma.

CHAPTER IV

The Lebanese Conflict

[The war] will return, God willing, if you agree or not, worse than before, God willing, ... we tried to rely on you [politicians to resolve the conflict] but then decided it would be safer to put our fate in God's hands...

Ziad Rahbani, *Raje'a Bi Ezen Lah*

1. Violence and Structural Conflict

Violence, according to Galtung, is “*the cause of difference between the potential and the actual*, between what could have been and what is actual” (Galtung, 1969). In that direction “when the potential is higher than the actual is by definition *avoidable*, then violence is present.” Galtung also differentiates between “indirect violence” where “the potential level of realization is possible with a given level of insight and resources” and “direct violence” where means of realization are not withheld, but directly destroyed.” To Galtung, violence exists not only when there is a manifest conflict but can be present where there are no signs of strain on the structure (Galtung, 1969).

Structural violence occurs when groups of people are deprived of political, legal, economic or cultural rights. Structured inequalities are not only problematic because they might be invisible, as was the case in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975, but also

dangerous because they deny communal/identity groups the basic human needs (Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, eds., 2003) as well as expose dysfunctional state institutions and inequitable social structures within a state (Jeong, 2003). According to Jeong, “incompatible social relations stem from structural conditions which produce competitive interests, value differences and repress basic needs” that frequently ‘pave the way for direct violence’ (Galtung, 1969).

As discussed in previous chapters, Lebanon has been plagued by a protracted conflict since the peasant rebellion of 1820. The direct causes of the conflict have consistently been centered on the position of authority and politico-economic access that are not sectarian in nature, however due to the inter-linkage between authority and sectarian privileges, conflict has consistently turned confessional. Throughout its history, Mount Lebanon has provided a safe haven to persecuted religious minorities like the Maronites, the Druze and the Shia. In relative seclusion from the Sunni authority occupying the coastal plains, the sects developed their separate sense of identity and outlook. While the sects lived in relative isolation, the Sunni authorities fielded many campaigns to subdue and control the inhabitants of the mountains. Those campaigns gained the Sunnis the animosity and suspicion of the Maronites, Druze and Shia. Similarly, the inhabitants of the mountain did not share much love among each other; the Maronites and Druze pushed the Shia out of North and South Mount Lebanon and the Druze and Maronites fought incessantly throughout the 19th Century.

In 1943, as Lebanon prepared for independence from France, the sectarian groups agreed on an interim accord, referred to as the National Pact, to facilitate the transition to

independence. While the National Pact was successful in uniting the sectarian groups in their bid for independence, the Pact failed to mitigate the animosity and mistrust between the sectarian groups. In fact, the National Pact's allocation of governmental positions on sectarian basis became the ideological foundation of division of power in the post-independent state. Moreover, the Pact institutionalized the association of sectarian membership to political power and created a political system that mirrors the communal divisions within the Lebanese polity. By linking political power to sectarianism, the National Pact effectively created a rigid political system and institutionalized structural violence.

The transformation of the National Pact into a ruling ideology resulted in a chronic problem of representation and inequality in the distribution of state resources. Since the political system and representation are based on percentages of population, the hierarchical nature of the Lebanese state has fixed the positions of sects within the system. Hence, access to government resources became moderated by sectarian membership and its respective legal entitlements.

2. State Structure and Identity Conflict

Acerbated by structural violence, manifest or invisible, identity conflicts stem from ontological needs. Ontological needs cannot be arbitrated or negotiated because they are need based and until they are satisfied there could be no resolution to the conflict. According to Burton, the basic needs are: identity, recognition and autonomy. Azar identifies five: security, recognition, acceptance, access to political power and

economic participation. The access to and denial of basic human needs takes place among communal groups within a state (Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, eds., 2003), thus the dissatisfaction of basic needs occur because of the improper functioning of state institutions and due to inequitable political structures (Jeong, 2003).

In 1943, as Lebanon geared for independence from French colonial rule, the Maronites and Sunnis, the wealthiest and most powerful communities in Lebanon at the time, agreed to distribute political power in a 6:5 ratio favoring Christians.⁴⁸ Christian dominance was not only political; in fact it permeated all the economic facets of the Lebanese society as well (Gordon, 1983 and Traboulsi, 2007). According to Traboulsi, surveys conducted in the late 1950s found that the “ratio of Christians to Moslem was 10:2 in industry, 11:2 in finance and 16:2 in services” and later studies conducted in 1973, two years before the outbreak of the civil war, estimated that 75.5% of commercial firms, 67.6% of industrial firms and 71% of the banking sector was controlled by Christians (Traboulsi, 2007). Moslems on the other hand constituted 75% of the industrial working class (Gordon, 1983).

Despite the disproportionate economic and political distribution and hierarchical power structure, the First Lebanese Republic (1943-1991) survived many upheavals (1952, 1958 and 1973) until its collapse in 1975. But why had the First Lebanese Republic been able to absorb shocks earlier? And why have socio-economic disparities not pushed underprivileged sectarian groups to violence earlier? Obviously, the protracted and often violent conflict between the sectarian groups for basic needs did not

⁴⁸ See Chapters 1 and 3.

begin in 1975. As discussed in previous chapters, the conflict, in its different incarnations, dates back to the uneasy grouping of the Maronites, Shia, Sunnis and Druze into Greater Lebanon and is rooted in the collective historical memory of each group's interaction with the Other before the formation of modern Lebanon.⁴⁹

In his book *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Edward Azar describes protracted social conflict as an intractable conflict that stems from the frustration of, or the threat against a group's identity and denotes antagonistic communal relations, i.e. structural violence, rooted in racial, ethnic, religious and/or cultural differences (Azar, 1990). Protracted social conflict is characterized by the prolonged and often violent struggle between identity groups over basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political power and economic participation (Azar, 1990). Azar puts forward four preconditions that constitute the root cause of conflicts in a multiethnic, religiously diverse and postcolonial state; the “communal aspect,” the “deprivation of human needs,” “nature of the state,” and “international linkage” and identifies three process dynamics that prevent or promote conflict; “communal actions and strategies,” “state actions and strategies” and “built-in mechanisms of conflict” (Azar, 1990).

The observations highlighted so far indicate that the Lebanese conflict predominantly revolves around political participation and economic access in a multi-communal society where highly defined identity groups express their grievances collectively. In addition, the conflict takes place in a post-colonial state dominated by a

⁴⁹ See Chapters 1, 2 and 3.

loose coalition of communal groups and characterized by weak participatory institutions as well as a hierarchal system of imposed bureaucratic rule and centralized government. Given the aforementioned, Edward Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict, supported by Social Categorization Theory, provides the best tool to understand the prolonged state of conflict in Lebanon.

According to Azar, the communal aspect is the relationship of identity groups (cultural, religious or ethnic) to the state (Azar, 1984). Azar explains that members of a community always mediate their needs through their membership in the group. In a similar fashion, arguing in regards to the process of national identity formation, Korostelina states that the central problem of identity formation is based on the "interrelation between the majority and minority or between dominant and small minorities" (Korostelina, 2007). "The core issue ... is the position of ethnic minorities within the state" (Korostelina, 2007). To Azar, the relation between identity groups and the state is the core of the problem; "in many post-colonial multi-communal societies the state machinery comes to be 'dominated by a single communal group or a [loose] coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the [basic human] needs of other groups in the society' which 'strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation'" (Ramsbotham, 2005). Basic human needs according to Azar are security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (Azar, 1990). The failure to create an equitable system to address basic human needs,

compounded by the grievances suffered according to theory of relative deprivation⁵⁰ only served to push members of a social group closer together to collectively express their dissatisfaction and created “a niche for protracted social conflict.”

The Lebanese representative body is composed of and distributed among Lebanon’s various religious groups. Political elites of each sect act as the intermediary⁵¹ between members of their sectarian group and the state. The Lebanese government acknowledges 18 different religious sects and allocates government posts in a confessional manner and allocates power according to each of the sect’s perceived⁵² percentage of the population. In that direction, the Lebanese regime creates disenfranchisement where supposedly equal citizens are afforded incongruent socio-economic and political access. In that sense citizens are burdened by contradictory legislation: one that stresses equality⁵³ and another that discriminates amongst them according to their religion at birth.

The Lebanese First Republic is a perfect example of an “incompetent, parochial and fragile post-colonial state” (Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, eds., 2003) monopolized by a Maronite-Sunni coalition in perpetual tacit tug of war, each attempting to draw minor sects into their orbits. This rivalry continued to intensify in the years following independence as the sectarian groups failed to create a political ideology that

⁵⁰ Relative deprivation is “the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between [perceived] legitimate expectations and present actualities” (Schaefer, 2008).

⁵¹ Clientelism is a feature of the Lebanese political system and form of patron-client relationship where by sectarian elites, in return for political support, provide their supporters with access to governmental resources and services (Abou Zeineddine, Unpublished).

⁵² See Chapter 1, The Public census of 1932.

⁵³ Article 7. All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to public charges duties, without any distinction whatever.

goes beyond the interim agreement of the National Pact. As the sectarian groups lost faith in the “values undergirding the [Lebanese political] system” (Habermas, 1975) the Christian-Moslem rivalry resulted in a deep ideological cleavage based on religious affiliation; Christians become right-wing Lebanese nationalists while Moslems become Arab nationalists or Leftists. While the Lebanese state maintained its veneer of legal authority, the aforementioned cleavage robbed the state structure from its ability to function properly (Habermas, 1975). The crises of legitimacy also worked as a catalyst for disenfranchised identity groups to further reinforce their relative deprivation and seek to change the status quo through “international linkage.” According to Azar, “Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society” (Azar, 1990). By the mid 1960s, the Moslems realized that reforming the system through the parliament is unfeasible while the Christians came to the conclusion that if they are to stay in power they must create alliances outside the country (Randel, 1983 and Fisk, 2002). With the continuous influx of Palestinians into Lebanon since 1948, the National Front, the umbrella organization representing the left wing parties and Moslem groups who were fighting to change the political structure, used the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s presence to pressure the Maronite-oriented right wing groups called the Lebanese Front seeking to maintain the status quo. The Lebanese Front on the other hand, fearing the increase in the National Front’s power - i.e. Moslem power - sought help from the State of Israel.

The Palestinian presence in Lebanon,⁵⁴ which served as a trigger event for the re-ignition of communal violence in the country, bore many of the underlying causes of the conflict. On the surface, the civil strife was framed as conflict over the extent of Lebanon's commitment to the Palestinian Cause. To a certain degree, the aforementioned reason is true, however the Palestinian presence in Lebanon masked root causes that are domestic in origin and have been pervasive since the 19th century: The 1970's saw the changing demographics in Lebanon tilting the percentages and rendering Maronites around one-third of the population with two-thirds of the population being Moslems (Salibi, 1976 and Gordon, 1983). The fact that the Palestinian refugees are predominantly Sunni Moslems their numerical value further tilted the percentage of Christians to Moslems in the country.⁵⁵ Economically, tobacco farmers in south Lebanon and Beqaa Valley, Sunni and Shia, were in agitation over the prices the government's tobacco monopoly paid, so were the fishermen, mostly Sunni, who objected to the privatization of the fishing industry through a company that is linked to the Maronite president of the republic (Salibi, 1976 and Gordon, 1983). At the same time university students across the country were continuously demonstrating to demand better education and work

⁵⁴ It is widely accepted that the Massacre of Ain Al Rumaneh that took place on April 13, 1975 was the trigger event for the Lebanese civil war (1975-1991).

⁵⁵ It is worth mentioning here that had the Palestinians been predominantly of Christian faith, like the Armenian-Lebanese for example, they would have been immediately given the Lebanese citizenship. In fact almost all Christian Palestinians were given the Lebanese nationality. However due to the fact that the Palestinian refugees were predominantly Muslims, the Christian fear of being overwhelmed by the Muslims played a major role in making the Palestinian presence in the country "the container" of their fear (Volkan, 1998). In that direction, one could conclude that the Maronite's fear of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was not motivated by national fear, as the Maronite ideologues of the time claimed. Since the Maronites were very happy to incorporate Christian Palestinians into their fold, the Christian animosity toward the Palestinians was rather motivated by sectarianism since the rest of the Palestinians belonged to their opponent's sect, i.e Sunni.

opportunities and clashing with the police (Fisk, 2002 and Traboulsi, 2007). Politically, traditional Moslem leaders were seriously challenged by the new generation of politicians who saw the former as ineffective and out of touch with the street. Fearing the lose of their power and aiming to pull the carpet from under the new generation of politicians, the traditional Moslem politicians, called for constitutional changes to reflect the population change and demanded the increase of Moslem share in the government (Gordon, 1983). The Christians who feared the lose of their power refused, defending their position as part of the National Pact that was an essential part of the foundation of Lebanon's independence.⁵⁶ On one hand the demand for increased share in the government united the Moslem street behind the traditional leaders, on another the demand heightened the Christian fears of a Moslem take over (Randel, 1983 and Fisk, 2002). As efforts to mitigate the conflict stalled, tensions between both camps reached unprecedented heights. On April 13, 1975 after a pro-Palestinian rally a bus carrying Palestinians and Lebanese sympathizers was attacked as it passed through the Christian district of Ain Al Rumaneh. 27 passengers were killed and 19 were wounded, both the passengers and Christians, members of the Phalanges party, accused each other of opening fire first. As the news spread hostilities erupted across the country. In time, as Lebanon receded into civil war, many countries including, the United States, Soviet Union, France, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Israel and most recently Iran, either took part in the fighting, mediated or occupied parts of the country.

⁵⁶ See chapter 2 for Maronite history and chosen trauma.

It is worthwhile noting that while external parties played a substantial role in fueling the conflict, in light of the identity based power politics of the country; their role is secondary to the role played by domestic parties to the conflict. It is true that Syria and Israel occupied parts of the country and played a major role in supporting different factions against others as many other external parties did, the fact remains that, the root causes of the conflict are all home grown and could be traced back to the early part of the 19th century. That being said, one must not discount the role played by external parties in inflaming the conflict. In fact, almost all writings on Lebanon attest to contributing role played by external parties but also stress the Lebanese tradition of dragging others into their conflict (Fisk, 2002, Traboulsi, 2007, Petran, 1987, Salibi, 1965 and 1976, Khalaf, 1979, and Pintak, 1988). The goal of this research is to analyze the root causes and the effects of identity politics on the continued polarization and communal conflict in Lebanon and international linkages fall beyond the scope of this research. However, this research regards international linkages from a domestic point of view. Regarding external parties as secondary influences in comparison to domestic ones aims not to undermine the subversive influence of international parties but to emphasize the domestic nature of the conflict. In that direction, when regarding international linkages from a domestic point of view, a clearer picture emerges as to why the Lebanese conflict is susceptible to external influences.

Due to the relatively equal political and military balance of power, inability of any party to sustain mobilization for an extended period of time and force its demands upon the other parties, international linkages and alliance building with external players

becomes a necessity. In short, domestic parties to the conflict seek external alliances in order to affect the domestic balance of power. In the 19th century, France supported the Maronites and Imperial Russia the Greek Orthodox against the Druze and Sunnis, who were supported by the United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire respectively (Traboulsi, 2007, Salibi, 1965 and Khalaf, 1987). In fact Lebanon's Independence from France would have been unattainable in 1943 without British support (Zamir, 1985 and 1997). After independence the trend did not change and as the country edged closer to civil war all sects accelerated their alliance building. Moslems sought assistance from Arab states and the Soviet Union while the Christian camp sought help from Israel, United States and France. Obviously, this proves that external parties have actually acerbated the conflict and by extension played the sects to further their own interests in the country, however, the fact remains that many of those external parties were, for lack of better words, asked to intervene (Fisk, 2002, Traboulsi, 2007 and Petran, 1987). In 1976, the Maronite President Elias Sarkis asked Syria to intervene in Lebanon to stop the LNM from invading the Christian enclave and the Phalange Party asked military assistance from Israel to fight off the LNM [the who? Lebanese national movement?] and the PLO (Fisk, 2002 and Randel, 1983). In 1982, the leader of the Lebanese Forces,⁵⁷ Bachir Jumayel assisted in the Israeli invasion of 1982 in exchange for his election as a president and in 1989 General Michael Aoun asked support from Iraq to counter the Syrian influence in the country (Trabousli, 2007 and Abou Khalil, 1992). The Muslim side was not shy of

⁵⁷ Lebanese Forces, *Al Quwat Al Lubnaniyah*, began as an umbrella organization of all Christian military forces and aimed to better coordinate the military effort. In time the organization became the sole Christian fighting force in East Beirut and the *defacto* Christian Army.

asking external parties to get involved in the conflict either; depending on their ideological leanings, the Moslems asked Syria to intervene in their behalf, as well as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Iran and the US (Khalaf, 2002, Makdisi, 2000 and Pintak, 1988).

The above examples highlight the negative influence of external parties on the Lebanese conflict. However, the fact remains that the legacy of Lebanese history is an amalgamation of social change, separate communal consciousness, economic disparities, rebellions and violence. These upheavals have brought different identity groups together to attain independence, but when the state they created seized to satisfy their basic needs conflict erupted. Similar to dislocated identity groups who are unable to make sense of the social forces which caused their dislocation and blame others for their misfortunes, Lebanese tend to blame others for the calamities that befell them. This systematic denial has clouded the Lebanese from understanding what went wrong and taking responsibility for their own actions.⁵⁸ It is true that external factors contributed to the conflict and that Lebanese of different sects were humiliated, conquered, colonized and occupied and in many instances ethnically cleansed. But given the history of inter-communal politics, one has to ask how much of the conflict is the result of flaws in the Lebanese themselves and the political system they have shaped?

The question could not be answered by better than Robert Fisk, “[the] last 30

⁵⁸ During the post-civil war (1975-1991) era Lebanese developed a narrative that claimed that the civil war was the war of foreign powers on Lebanese soil, disregarding the simple and obvious fact that the Lebanese themselves actually perpetrated almost all the violence against each other.

years of war in Lebanon, the war of others in Lebanon⁵⁹....[its] always somebody else's fault. All [the others], the [war]... This is why they never learn the lesson. Because its always, the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Americans, the Israelis, everybody...but not themselves. They are pure, honest, humble, modest, beautiful people. I mean this is self-deception.... humble, modest, beautiful people. I mean this is self-deception” (Fisk, 2005). The this research probes exactly what Robert Fisk is pointing at: the domestic root causes of conflict.

Although the civil war in Lebanon officially ended in 1991 with the ratification of the National Reconciliation Charter into the constitution, none of the root causes of the conflict has been addressed. In fact by taking some of the traditional powers of the presidency, i.e. the Maronites, and distributing it between the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament, Sunnis and Shia respectively, the National Reconciliation Charter, helped reinforce sectarian solidarity and the notion that the state is unsympathetic to the sects' suffering.

3. Instrumental-Ideological Conflict

Eriksen states that “group conflict in modern society has shown...perceptions of scarcity and struggle to retain or attain hegemony or equality” (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001). The root cause of the Lebanese conflict lies in the structuralization of sectarian identity as the primary marker for socio-economic and political access within a state composed of self-perceived prosecuted religious minority groups that share little

⁵⁹ See footnote 12.

than mistrust and hostility toward each other. This problematic structure was not devised out of nothing; in fact the sectarian system dates back to 1840, was formally codified in the constitution of 1860⁶⁰ and was further asserted in the National Pact of 1943. Although the National Pact was the best possible solution to bring all groups together in order to gain independence, it was nothing more than the product of the circumstances that brought it into fruition. A closer examination of the National Pact reveals that the parties to the pact essentially realized that an instrumental-ideological conflict undergirded the animosity among the sectarian groups, but were unable to resolve it. Since they were more interested in independence from French Mandate, they decided to shelve its resolution to a future date. This in effect recreated the faulty structure and rendered the pact a catalyst for the continuation of the conflict.

According to Korostelina, ideological conflict takes place “when a dislocated community is unable rationally to make sense of the complex social forces which engender the dislocation” whereas instrumental conflict occurs “when a party perceives that the threat to its interests comes from another party” (Korostelina, 2007). Ambiguity about root causes of a community’s dislocation and making the Other the object of blame and hostility is what the National Pact inadvertently ended up accentuating. By reaffirming the division of power based on sectarian identification, the pact has in effect legitimized the hierarchy of sects and engendered the hegemony of the stronger sects over the weaker ones, thus causing chronic crises of legitimacy and engendering structural violence.

⁶⁰ See Mutasarrifate and The Reglement Organique of 1861 in Chapter 1.

It is true that the Maronites, with the help of the French, established a state that they shared with the Moslems, as agreed on in the National Pact; nevertheless, the Maronites had the final say for themselves (Salibi, 2003). One can argue that the arrangement safeguarded the Maronites and other Christian sects in Lebanon against a return to the previous situation in which they were a protected minority under Moslem domination for more than thirteen hundred years (Salibi, 2003). But one can also argue that the same arrangement has transformed the previously oppressed sect into the oppressor of another. On the other hand, since the Sunnis agreed to the National Pact and were partners in the Lebanese enterprise at inception, one can also argue that the Sunnis lost their primacy to the Maronites and were shut off from their brethren in the rest of the Arab World.⁶¹ Although the Sunnis were the most politically powerful sect among the Moslems, the heirs of the successive Islamic Caliphates were rendered of lesser rank than the Maronites in the new state. For the Shia and the Druze it was not different. Even though the Shia retained the leadership of the parliament, they were eclipsed by the Sunni power until the late 1990s. Furthermore, the Shia's political power was rarely translated into economic access, in fact up till writing this research, areas inhabited by the Shia are considered the most underdeveloped and lacking in governmental services. As for the Druze, the rulers of Mount Lebanon for more than a millennia and the first to promote the

⁶¹ In the National Pact, the Muslim side agreed to recognize the independence and legitimacy of the Lebanese state in its 1920 boundaries and to renounce aspirations for union with Syria.

idea of an independent Lebanon in the 17th century,⁶² they were relegated to the periphery of the political system.

As mentioned earlier, the National Pact was based on the natural progression of the Lebanese political system and was the best possible compromise to bring forth independence from France. While it was successful in achieving independence, it inadvertently propagated the already existing sectarian animosity by stressing sectarian identity rather than citizenship as the sole marker for political and economic access. This, in turn, transformed the conflict from a mere dispute over division of roles within the state into an instrumental-ideological conflict and therefore a sectarian one. Given the history of relations between the sects and the pattern of agreements that were previously implemented, one can conclude that in multi-ethnic and religiously diverse societies such as that in Lebanon, identity-based conflict resolution agreements will temporarily end manifest conflict but have no effect on the root causes of the conflict. In fact, under identity-based agreements, collective loyalties tend to continue looking towards the ingroup rather than towards the state. As witnessed in Lebanon, pacts remain enforceable as long as the sectarian elites are ready to negotiate their differences within its framework. But when the conditions that brought the pact into fruition change, the elites cease to abide by the pact. The reason why identity-based agreements do not resolve the conflict is four folds: First, it affords equal citizens unequal positions in society based on their religion at birth. Second, it transforms government resources and services

⁶² The Druze Prince Fakhr ad Dine II (1572–April 13, 1635) is widely accepted as the first person to articulate the independence and sovereignty of Mount Lebanon from the Ottoman Empire and is considered to be the father of Modern Lebanon (Hourani, 1988 and Hitti, 2008).

into “prizes” that provoke further competition among the sects. Third, it creates a hierarchal system of imposed bureaucratic rule and centralized government. Fourth, it legitimizes the role of the sectarian elites and confirms their position as intermediary between the state and their ingroup.

Stemming from divergence of interests, incongruity of aspirations, grievances and discord, the Lebanese conflict is the end result of unmet needs, unequal disposition of resources, discrimination and exclusion. By analyzing its different reincarnations throughout the past two centuries, this research aims to understand its root causes to devise ways to mitigate and prevent future outbursts of violence. Conflict analysis and resolution, as the name of the field implies, is of two parts; analysis and resolution. When it comes to analysis, the research primarily utilizes two theories to wade through the Lebanese conflict: Protracted Social Conflict and Social Categorization. No two theories are sufficient to understand a 200 years old conflict but when complimented by an interdisciplinary approach a clearer picture of the conflict emerges. However, when it comes to conflict resolution, unlike the plethora of theories available to guide the analysis, I found very few relevant theories that provide adequate solutions to the Lebanese version of conflict in multi-ethnic and religiously diverse societies. Granted, the Lebanese protracted conflict shares many similarities with conflict in Northern Ireland and former Yugoslavia; however, neither creating near-homogenous ethnic states (Glenny, 1996 and Rogel, 1998) nor establishing “self-government on the basis of “power-sharing of institutions” (Tonge, 2006) provides the right resolution to the Lebanese conflict. Since

requires massive population movement and demarcation of territory and the later has already been tried but not too successfully.

4. Conclusion

In Lebanon the minority-minority dynamics are based on a sectarian identification in which neither group denies the existence of the other. On the contrary, one unique feature of the Lebanese confessional system is that all sects recognize the right of others to exist but do not agree on a political representational system or on how to share resources found within the state. In his book entitled “A House of Many Mansions”, Kamal Salibi draws an excellent image of the situation: The house is the state of Lebanon and the mansions are each sect’s nearly complete autonomy from that state structure. At the same time, each sect is forced to have limited contacts with other “mansion[s]” within the “house” to gain access to state resources. In a country of self-perceived religious minorities where the last public census that mentions religious affiliation was conducted in 1932 for fear of upsetting the political balance, the Instrumental-Ideological conflict waged within a state and among identity groups that regard the state as unsympathetic to their suffering continues unabated. In order to safeguard their privileges, sects must grab as much power and garner, as much influence as they can to bolster their position *vis a vis* the Others. In that direction, despite the continuous ‘formulas’⁶³ set forward to reform the Lebanese system, one can argue that so far the reforms have drastically failed to

⁶³ I have used the term “formula” rather than peace accord or peace agreement due to the fact that almost all agreements that ended the repetitive outbursts of violence focused primarily on adjusting the percentage of sectarian representation and keeping the problematic state structure intact.

create an equitable system of governance that mitigates sectarian fears and manages sectarian interests.

Almost one century and a half after the first outburst of sectarian conflict in proto-Lebanon and 19 years after the end of the last civil war, Lebanon has not yet come to terms with the identity conflicts and structural inequalities that led to this cyclical eruption of violence. The fact that there has been no return to large-scale violence should not be interpreted as proof that wartime divisions have been healed. On the contrary, the country's sectarian divisions still run deep and are continuously manipulated for political gain. As pressures, both domestic and regional, increase on the political system, the "invisible conflict" will tilt toward "manifest conflict" and the Lebanese will find it harder to maintain the cold social peace. Resolving the Lebanese conflict requires the satisfaction of the identity and ontological needs of its sectarian composition. Satisfying these needs can only be achieved by the restructuring of the political system. Attempting to restructure the political system, if history is any guide, will most likely cause another civil war that in turn will only reinforce sectarian and communal identities.

CHAPTER V

Identity Redefinition and Peace Building Model

“Go to sleep and dream that our country actually became one! This is not a country... but a bunch of people... disunited, beaten up, divided... go sleep and keep on dreaming...”

Ziad Rahbani, Um Fout Nam

1. Conflict Transformation

“The transition from peace agreement to self enforcing management system after a civil war is an uncertain and complex undertaking” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 117). For, “if those engaged in the peace process are unable to overcome the collective fears of the future, the society will be vulnerable to increased manipulation by predators” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 117). According to Rothchild, the focal issue is “the uncertainties of institution building, where former enemies must learn to occupy the same political space and develop a stable and effective...[political] structure for durable peace” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 117). He also stresses that for the peace agreement to take root former enemies must “build on their own intra- and intergroup reciprocities and political exchange relations” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 118). He continues: “Where such a frame work takes hold the public comes to embrace new political institutions and rules of competition, the

regime can be expected to provide all sides with a stake in maintaining the agreement” and highlights that “as trust in institutions and rules of relations grow, the likelihood that the peace agreement will be successfully consolidated increases” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 118). What political arrangement can reassure minorities of their security concerns, whether perceived or real, in the short term and build impetus to commit to the implementation of the peace agreement in the long term? Simultaneously, how can state capacity be strengthened without recreating previous forms of structural violence, as is the case with Lebanon?

Rothchild provides two approaches; group-based and individual-based security-building systems (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 119). Group based security-building system, similar to the norm of peace agreements in Lebanon, “are largely a response to a political environment marked by deep-seated collective security fears ...[and where]...ethnicity and related identities are viewed... as a reflection of social interactions” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 120-121). Under these circumstances, peace agreements are built on “existing configurations of power” where power sharing institutions consist of rules that guarantee the inclusion of all parties in decision making, legislative, governmental and administrative bodies of the country (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 121). Designed to assuage identity based fears, the group based security-building system promotes “identity arithmetic” as a way for inclusion in a manner very similar to that of the National Pact which was discussed in earlier chapters. However, if Lebanese history is any clue, the group based security-building system might be successful in establishing peace in the short term, but in the

long term, the same arrangements can have destructive effects; amplifying group identities, lacking agility to deal with changing social concerns and shifting demographic patterns in society and creating conditions for conflict.

Individual-based security-building systems, on the other hand, call for “individual rights within a unitary state...[where]... sufficient power can be concentrated with the executive to ensure governmental primacy” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 128).

According to Rothchild, such arrangement “is valued for its ability to reduce the transaction costs between state and society...[and sets forth]... a legitimate ...[and equitable]...structure for future intergroup relations” (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002, p. 128). The parties to the National Pact as well as the framers of the National Reconciliation Charter were aware of the potential benefits of an individual-based security-building system on the Lebanese polity. In fact the pact states that ‘the aim of the interim agreement is to reach a state where the confessional system can be eliminated and a system of civic nationalism can be achieved’ (Jiha, 1998) and Article 95 of the 1991 Constitution clearly states that “the Chamber of Deputies ...[must]... take the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan” (Jiha, 1998).

Since the group-based security-building system has been tried to detrimental effects whereas an individual-based security-building system that promotes civic nationalism has been aspired to but not yet achieved, any restructuring of the Lebanese political system must take into consideration group-security concerns while working

towards the elimination of the confessional system. Furthermore, since “identity arithmetic” proved its failure, one cannot build a sustainable peace process on the traditional configuration of power, yet one needs to take these into consideration. Moreover, given the high level of group identification, promoting civil nationalism outright will not reap the intended results. In fact a hybrid track is the most realistic way to follow. This approach must be characterized by the following; (1) achieve a balance between group fears and collective aspirations, (2) provide parties with a stake in the future regime and incentives to achieve it and (3) validate group identity and promote civic nationalism. Toward that end an intervention based on redefining identity is the best approach to restructuring the Lebanese system and setting the conditions for a sustainable peace. Before delving into the intervention process, I will first propound identity redefinition and link it to Lederach’s peace building road map.

2. Identity Redefinition: Definition and Conflict Transformation Road Map

As discussed in Chapter III, identity is a social construct that is created from genuine and imagined facts that a group holds in common and if an identity becomes salient for a long time it becomes the central identity. Despite the rigidities of a salient identity, within that same identity lays the potential for change (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder, eds., 2001). Kelman gives two reasons for the potential identity change; since they are not resources-based, identities are not “inherently” zero-sum, and since identities are a social construction, they have a potential for “redefinition.” Arguing in regards to the process of national identity formation, Korostelina, on the other hand, states that the

central problem of identity formation is based on the “interrelation between the majority and minority or between dominant and small minorities” (Korostelina, 2007). “The core issue of national identity concept is the position of ethnic minorities within the state: whether minorities are oppressed by the majority, or have opportunities for maintaining their ethnic culture” (Korostelina, 2007). In the case of Lebanon, although the minority-minority dynamics are based on sectarian identification, neither group denies the existence of the other as I have argued earlier. In fact, one unique feature of the Lebanese confessional system is that all sects recognize the right of other sects to exist but disagree on their position within the state and the distribution of resources of the state.

Given that no denial of identity has been practiced in Lebanon, an intervention based on national homogenization or an ethnic model⁶⁴ fails to satisfy the basic human needs of the sectarian composition of the country. Instead an intervention based on a multicultural approach seems much better suited to engage the sectarian groups. Korostelina describes the multicultural concept of national identity as when people regard “their state as a society within which ethnic minorities should be guaranteed resources to maintain their ethnic culture and communities...[where all have equal rights and] opportunities to receive education,” maintain their cultural heritage, and have equal access to political and economic resources. Hence any intervention in Lebanon requires a

⁶⁴ “When people perceive their nation as having been built around a core ethnic community into which other ethnic minorities should assimilate. The nation is regarded as mono-ethnic and lingual and therefore those who have inherited or assimilated the values and attributes of the ethnic core should have higher status within the nation” (Korostelina, 2007).

change in the structure of the relationship between the sects and the state and a “redefinition” of people’s identity in order to link the citizens to the state.

According to Lederach, modern armed conflicts are primarily internal conflicts occurring between different identity groups within states characterized by underdevelopment and poverty (Lederach, 1997). Echoing Azar, Lederach states that these conflicts are also fueled by psychological and cultural factors and tend to be long standing (Lederach, 1997). To settle such conflicts, peacemakers must restructure the relationships between conflicting parties by focusing on two variables; balance of power, and awareness of conflicting interests and needs (Lederach, 2002 and 1997). For Lederach, the fundamental aim of peacemaking is to restructure relationships to produce just and peaceful relations (Lederach, 1997). Lederach notes that peace makers will face different challenges at different points in the peace building process while striving to achieve just and peaceful relations. Peacemakers should educate when awareness is low, advocate when the imbalance in power is high and mediate when awareness is high and power is balanced in order to allow negotiations to take place (Lederach, 2002 and 1997).

Toward that end, Lederach proposes a “road map” to peace built on leadership level. According to Lederach, “genuine peace building ... involves a wide range of activities and functions” including “processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict to more sustainable peaceful relationship” (Lederach, 2002). Building peace in states characterized by deep-rooted and long-standing hatred and violence requires “long term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that

society and maximizes the contribution from the outside” (Lederach, 2002). In that direction, Lederach differentiates between three levels of leadership and proposes ways of utilizing the strengths of each level to coordinate peace efforts: The top-level political elites “negotiate peace accords,” the mid-level leaders “conduct problem solving workshops, lead peace commissions, and conduct training on conflict resolution methods,” while grassroots leaders “achieve agreements to end fighting, implement policies, and set the stage to movement toward peace.”

3. Conflict Transformation: Approach, Processes and Stages

The intervention is designed in four phases and is based on economic development and cultural recognition incentives that in turn pave the way for legal and political reform. The intervention approaches peace building from the top level and grass root-level simultaneously. While it calls for outside support (the United Nations and conflict resolution experts for example), the peace building process relies on the momentum generated by the parties to the conflicts themselves. The intervention is purposely left in an outline form and does not set a time frame for its implementation because the intervention is a “road map” that must adapt to the changing circumstances of peace building. The outline is also flexible since it provides the general principles and allows the participants to devise the specific approaches to dealing with their discord.

Phase I: Economic Reform

Short Term: The Elites/the few

Level: Top-level

Conducted by: Outside parties

Goal/Aim: To provide incentives for political elites to join the new system through economic and political enticement

Economic and cultural trickle effect to the citizens

Long Term: Every one/ the many

Level: Mid-level/grass roots

Conducted by: Outside parties, elites and self-generated

Goal/Aim: To provide the majority of citizens increased access to economic resources and therefore more interest in sustaining the new system

Proposed reforms:

1. Establishing a viable social security system, national health and pension plans
2. Creating a new tax system based on progressive taxation rate
3. Encouraging and promoting light and high-tech industries and providing incentives for these industries to be based outside the capital city
4. Creating an economic stimulus plan in which the citizens could obtain long-term low interest loans from private banks and grants from the government to start new businesses
5. Building and maintaining business and high technology industrial infrastructure

6. Developing and encouraging the medical, tourism, financial and educational sectors

Lebanese identity “redefinition” is approached with economic reforms that gradually and smoothly transition identity groups into the new social patterns rather than by enforcing those new patterns upon them. The peace building model ensues with economic and cultural reforms due to the fact that it is easier at the early stages of peace building to entice the political and economic elites or prototypes⁶⁵ to champion reform by focusing on the least threatening aspects of peace building. When the prototypes, who are party to the conflict and pivotal to its resolution, ‘buy into’ peace building, since their interests will still be served by the new arrangement, they will be willing to take part in the transformation. Ensuring that the prototypes and the elites are part of the peace building process transforms two potentially problematic issues into opportunities to promote peace building and safe guard the peace process: mainly public approval and spoilers. In that direction, the intervention harnesses ingroup solidarity and loyalty to the prototype in order to gain public approval of the peace building effort. Subsequently, as the general public follows their prototype’s queue, they will be more prone to maintain the peace process and less persuaded by spoilers.

Phase II: Culture and Education

Short Term: The younger generation/ the few

⁶⁵ The prototype, according to the Social Categorizing Theory, is the leader who holds the most features of the group and what the group aspires to be and imitate (Brewer, 2003).

Level: Grassroots
Conducted by: Mid-level leaders and Outside parties
Goal/Aim: To reframe and redefine outlooks by creating a sense of citizenship equality within cultural diversity

Long Term: Society/ the many

Level: Grassroots
Conducted by: Self-Generated and assisted by grassroots and outside parties
Goal/Aim: To establish and propagate citizenship equality within cultural diversity throughout society while encouraging communities to maintain their ethno-religious and cultural heritage

Proposed reforms:

1. Reforming the public education system; history books, religious education, conflict resolution and education about the “other” and the establishment of public libraries and internet portals
2. Encouraging local cultural expression and cuisine
3. Promoting the arts and media sector and establishing public theaters and galleries
4. Encouraging the establishment of public gardens in cities
5. Promoting community and social service activities
6. Establishing sport complexes, music and dance conservatories

7. Establishing a Museum of Memory where exhibits serve as a reminder of the brutality of the civil war and which hosts peace building seminars, facilitations, publishes books and research about conflict resolution
8. Establishing a national day of reflection and remembrance

Since wealth generation and sharing will require citizens of different sects to collaborate in business endeavors, boundaries will start to shift from identity based to interest based when the economic and cultural transformation is underway. With this shift the salience of sectarian identities begins to get eroded due to the fact that all citizens have effectively equal access to resources and therefore there is less need to collectively articulate their needs. This in turn will result in the creation of a new social category that is non-sectarian and that has the potential to be equivalent to or overshadow the sectarian identity. Furthermore, cross-categorization will create a space where ingroup-outgroup differences are reduced as members of the ingroup begin to humanize and trust the Other. With the identity transformation underway, steps to enshrine the concept of citizenship equality within a cultural diverse state will ensue. The main focus of this stage is to encourage communities to validate their ethno-religious identity and promote their cultural heritage in an inclusive and non-threatening way. This process puts heavy emphasis on education and various means of cultural expression. The Lebanese educational system must be developed by reframing history books, adding conflict resolution and group identity/history into the educational curriculum. On a cultural level, regional and sub-regional cultures should be promoted through cuisine, history, literature,

poetry, art and music. Cultural promotion is very important in this phase because the majority of the Lebanese hail back from religiously mixed areas and by helping the individuals realize the cultural similarities they possess will greatly facilitate humanization of and building bridges with the Other. This process could be done in a variety of ways; by emphasizing and validating the unique contribution of each of the sects to the Lebanese state, highlighting the fact that Lebanon is composed of different types of Lebanese, although of different, they share in common much more than what differentiates them; interconnection through family ties, geographic location, cuisine, culture and love of Lebanon.

Phase III: Legal Reforms

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Short Term: | The Elites/the few |
| Level: | Top-level |
| Conducted by: | Outside parties |
| Goal/Aim: | To establish legal equality among Lebanese and eliminate confessionalism and gender discrimination |
| Long Term: | Society/ the many |
| Level: | Grassroots |
| Conducted by: | Top and Mid-level Leaders and self generated |
| Goal/Aim: | To promote legal equality among all Lebanese and eliminate religious based privileges and discrimination |

Proposed reforms:

1. Abolishing the various religious personal and civil status laws and establishing one civil status law that all Lebanese follow
2. Eliminating all mention of religious affiliation from official records and forms
3. Encouraging the formation of non-sectarian political parties

When the economic development and the shift in social identity boundaries are complete, the enactment of one civil status law that equates between Lebanese citizens regardless of religious background becomes necessary and pivotal for peace building. For when given equal rights, previously disenfranchised sectarian groups will find it less utilitarian to identify on sectarian basis. Eliminating the need for identifying on sectarian basis fulfils two important requirements in the peace building process. First it reinforces the transformations that have already taken place in Phase I and II and ensures the party to the conflict that the transformations are permanent. Second, it prepares the groundwork for political reform in Phase IV.

Phase IV: Political Reform

Level: Top-level

Conducted by: Outside parties

Goal/Aim: To establish political reforms that engenders equality, cultural diversity and representation

Proposed reforms:

1. Electing the president of the republic directly by the people
2. Developing a new electoral law that adapts to the changing demographics of the country and be based on:
 - a. A Multi-party system
 - b. Proportional representation in parliamentary elections and the formation of the cabinet
 - c. Considering Lebanon as one electoral district
 - d. Lowering the electoral age to 18
 - e. Giving the right to vote for Lebanese living abroad

In an attempt to abolish legal inequalities, In Phase IV, the theme of equal partnership in the state will be pushed further by enacting political reforms that engender equality, cultural diversity and representation. Toward that end, political reforms will focus on the system of representation; the election of deputies and the president of the republic. As discussed earlier,⁶⁶ the Lebanese electoral system is based on the ‘proportional allocation of political power according to the perceived percentage of the population’ (Harb, 2006) with the number of deputies elected according to the percentage of the sects present in each electoral district. The President on the other hand is elected by the parliament (El Gemayel, 1985, Jiha, 1998 and Qabbani, 1982). While this system, according to El Kazen

⁶⁶ See Chapters 1 and 3.

was 'able to absorb earlier shocks' and continue to function since independence with varying degree of success, by focusing on the segmentation of the citizens into its membership components and monopolizing the presidential elections by the parliament, the current system perpetuates and recreates the sectarian regime under different guises as has been witnessed in the First and Second Lebanese Republics (Traboulsi, 2007).

To create a new political system that promotes citizenship equality within cultural diversity, the intervention calls for a new system of political representation based on multiparty system,⁶⁷ proportional representation and utilizing the country as one electoral district to be enacted. Under a multiparty system politicians and political parties will have to redefine their power base not on sectarian interest but rather on sectarian diversity and therefore reframe political agendas based on the common interest of all Lebanese. Furthermore, making Lebanon one electoral district will further moderate sectarian political agendas as parties competing for power will have to appeal to constituents across the country and from all sectarian groups. To ensure proper representation of the popular vote, proportional representation will moderate entry to the parliament, the formation of the cabinet and the positions of the speaker of the parliament and the prime minister.

⁶⁷ By a multi-party system I mean an electoral system in which one or more political parties have the potential to gain power through elections alone or as a part of a coalition. In the case of Lebanon, I believe that such an electoral system, coupled with making the country into a single electoral district, will encourage constituents from different sectarian backgrounds to form new non-sectarian based political parties.

4. Conclusion

Communal tensions and conflict have characterized the history of Lebanon since the early part of the 19th century. My research analyzed the root causes of sectarian tensions and their legacy on the country then proposed an intervention to resolve conflict and move Lebanon beyond the sectarian state. One of the most interesting observations in this research is the fact that the conflict in Lebanon, though consistently turning into a confessional one, does not stem from sectarian demands but rather from political misrepresentation and unfair access to economic resource.

Throughout its history Lebanon's high mountains and impassable valleys have provided a safe haven for persecuted religious minorities like the Maronites, the Druze and the Shia. In relative seclusion from the Sunni authority occupying the coastal plains, the sects developed their separate sense of identity and outlook. While the "heretical" sects lived in relative isolation, the Sunni authorities fielded many campaigns to subdue and control the inhabitants of the mountains. Those campaigns gained the Sunnis the animosity of the Maronites, Druze and Shia. Similarly, the inhabitants of the mountain did not coexist in complete harmony; the Maronites and Druze in turn pushed the Shia out of North and South Mount Lebanon and the Druze and Maronites fought incessantly throughout the 19th Century.

During the 19th Century the amalgam of social change, the fall of the feudal (*Iqta'*) system, economic disparities, foreign intervention and rebellion dislocated the communities in Mount Lebanon and plunged them into a protracted social conflict.

Following the civil strife of 1840, confessionalism became the foundation of communal relations; political power was distributed on sectarian basis and was further institutionalized in the National Pact, the cornerstone of the postcolonial Lebanese state. The National pact of 1943 was an interim accord to smoothen the transition to independence. While the Pact was successful in uniting the sectarian groups in their bid for independence, the pact failed to mitigate the animosity among the sectarian groups. In fact, the National Pact's allocation of governmental positions on sectarian basis became the ideological foundation for the division of power in the post-independent state. In that direction the pact fortified the association of sectarian membership to political power and created a political system that mirrors the communal divisions within the Lebanese polity. Due to the inadaptability of the Lebanese political system and the changing demographics in the country, the regional and international power shifts caused the break down of the Lebanese state in 1975 and its recreation in 1990.

Unlike sectarian narratives and prevalent literature on the Lebanese conflict, this research aims at analyzing the events that institutionalized structural violence rather than focusing on the parties responsible for violence. By looking at history, social identity and group self perception, unlike the prevalent motive-based analysis, I discovered that the political effects of the sectarian wars of the 1800's have caused religious identity to become the salient social and political marker as well as the basis of distribution of political power and economic resources within the Lebanese polity. Furthermore, the incorporation of religious identity in the founding documents of the post independence Lebanese state has institutionalized structural violence and incompatible social relations

in the juncture between political participation and economic access. These incompatible social relations in turn have resulted in a chronic crisis of legitimacy and cyclical eruption of violence.

Despite the fact that parties to the conflict express themselves in sectarian terms the Lebanese conflict does not stem from religious differences but rather from the struggle between communal groups over the disposition of limited resources, access to economic power and equal political representation. The direct causes of the conflict have consistently been centered on equitable political representation and fair access to economic resources, demands that not sectarian in nature, however due to the inter-linkage between political power and sectarianism, conflict has consistently turned confessional.

Protracted social conflicts stem to redress grievances and fear generated from structural inequalities and aim to validate a group's basic identity needs. Identity driven conflicts are hard to resolve because they appear to be dormant and suddenly surface through violent outbursts of communal hostilities. Traditional methods of conflict resolution tend to be of limited value to resolve identity-based conflicts, since they are interest based and do not deal with structural inequalities or validate identity needs such as in the case of Lebanon. The lack of theories that adequately respond to resolving struggles over identity, values, claims to political equality and economic access pose a major hindrance to solving the Lebanese conflict. The proposed intervention sought to address this deficit by proposing that a total structural transformation is a necessity in order to bring forth a peaceful resolution to the Lebanese conflict. By creating a new

system that emphasizes citizenship and validates communal identities, sectarian identities will become less relevant and more malleable for redefinition. Through the redefinition and reframing of sectarian identities the Lebanese conflict might actually come to an end.

The research and intervention focuses solely on the domestic aspect of the Lebanese conflict and does not address the conflict's regional dimension. Certainly any peace initiative must take regional powers into consideration; however, since the research is focused only on internal Lebanese dynamics, the intervention does not delve into regional or international influences on the country. An implication for future researchers will be how to bring regional and international into the peace building process in a constructive manner.


APPENDIX I

Basic Identity and Outlook Differences between Sectarian Groups

| | Maronite | Sunni | Shia | Druze |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Ingroup | Maronites and other Christians | Sunni | Shia | Druze |
| Outgroup | Shia, Sunnis, Druze | Maronites, Shia, and Druze | Maronite, Sunni, Druze | Maronite, Sunni, Shia |
| Salient Identity | Maronite | Sunni | Shia | Druze |
| Secondary Identity 1 | Christian | Arab or Muslim | Arab and/or Muslim | Arab |
| Secondary Identity 2 | Lebanese | Lebanese | Lebanese | Lebanese |
| Enemy | Shia, Sunnis, Druze | Maronites, Shia, and Druze | Maronite, Sunni, Druze | Maronite, Sunni, Shia |
| Fear | Loss of Hegemony to Muslims Politico-Economic destabilization Rise of Shia Power Returning to second class citizens | Loss of Hegemony to Christians Politico-Economic destabilization Rise of Shia Power | Loss of power to Sunnis Returning to second class citizens | Loss of power to Shia Politico-Economic destabilization Rise of Shia Power Returning to second class citizens |
| Goals | Protecting traditional power and rights Liberal Economy Independence and Sovereignty with strong connections with the West | Regaining power lost after independence Liberal Economy Strong connections with the Arab and Islamic Worlds | Maintaining defacto gained power and or amending the constitution to institutionalize this power gain | Maintaining traditional power Liberal Economy Independence with strong connections with the Arab and Islamic Worlds and the West |
| Ideology | Ethno-Centric and Religious Nationalism | Primarily Arab Nationalist and/or Islamic | Vilayat al Faqih | Ethno-Centric, Religious and Arab Nationalism |
| Narrative | Ethnic Concept | Ethnic Concept | Ethnic Concept | Ethnic Concept |
| Chosen Trauma | Arab/Islamic Conquest of the Levant Rellegation to second class citizens under Arab/Islamic rule | Loss of power to Christians after Independence | Denial of Access Suppressed as heretics under Arab/Islamic rule | Suppressed as heretics under Arab/Islamic rule |
| Chosen Glory | The only Christian minority in the Middle East who still holds power Defenders of Christianity and the last bastion of Christendom in the East | Heirs of the Ottoman Empire The bastion of Arab Nationalism Defenders of Islamic Orthodoxy Most powerful Muslim sect and second most powerful in the count | Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon Resistance against continuous oppression | Proto-Lebanon was a Druze Emirate Military strength |


APPENDIX II

Republic of Lebanon, the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon and the two *Qaim Maqqamiyyahs*




Source: Farah, 2000, Traboulsi, 2007 and Fawaz, 1995.

Distribution of Religious Groups before and After the War in Lebanon



Source: Farah, 2000, Traboulsi, 2007 and Fawaz, 1995.



Source: Fisk, 2002, Traboulsi, 2007 and personal observation.

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