<u>THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN U.S. COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM
POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN</u>

by

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The Role of Public Diplomacy in U.S. Counter Violent Extremism Policy: A Case Study of Pakistan

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by

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Bachelor of Arts
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DEDICATION

My thesis is dedicated to my amazing husband Amer, and our three wonderful sons Yousuf, Akber and Mustafa. A special dedication to my grandmother, who has been a beacon of light and an inspiration to me all my life.

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I am profoundly grateful to Almighty Allah for always being my best friend.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy ....ACPD
Bureau of Counterterrorism ....CT Bureau
Cultural Cognition Thesis..CCT
Central Intelligence Agency ....CIA
Consensus-Oriented Public Diplomacy ....COPD
Consensus-Oriented Public Relations..CORP
Center for Public Diplomacy...CPD
Conflict Stabilization Operations...CSO
Counter Violent Extremism ....CVE
Democracy and Governance ....D&G
Department of Defense ....DOD
Department of Homeland Security ....DHS
Department of State ....DOS
Federally Administered Tribal Areas..FATA
Global Entrepreneurship Summit ....GES
Intelligence and Research (State Department Bureau) ....INR
Information Operations .... IO
International Visitor Leadership Program ....IVLP
Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate..ISPR
Joint PSYOP Support Element ....JPSY
Office of Transitions Initiatives ....OTI
Office of War Information ....OWI
International Relations ....IR
National Defense Authorization Act...NDAA
National Security Strategy .... NSS
Non-proliferation Treaty..NPT
Pakistan Expanded Regional Stabilization Initiative...PERSI
Pakistan Transition Initiative ....PTI
Public Affairs Officer ....PAO
Public Diplomacy... PD
Public Relations ....PR
Public Relations Society of America ....PRSA
Theory of Communicative Action ....TCA
Unarmed Aerial Vehicles...UAV
United States Information Agency... USIA
United States Agency for International Development .... USAID

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN U.S. COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM
POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

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Public diplomacy (PD) has been a crucial tool in United States' international relations,
especially since the Cold War era. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, the word PD was
synonymously used with coercive terms such as propaganda and psychological warfare.
Public diplomacy still holds these negative stereotypes. The terrorist attacks of 9/11
revived the need for PD, only this time for a radically different purpose to counter
terrorism and violent extremism. The information age, technology and changing
international affairs require that PD is viewed in a new way of strategic communication
and be practiced keeping in mind the demands of the information age stakeholders.
Currently, PD literature does not provide a definition that is widely acceptable and
without which understanding of PD suffers, consequently, the United States government
may be spending national resources wastefully. The researcher presents a framework of
PD practice, based on Burkart's (1994, 2007) consensus-oriented public relations
(COPR). Burkart (1994, 2007) is inspired by Jürgen Habermas, especially in its emphasis

on ethical considerations in communication. The researcher conducted 13 in-depth interviews with professionals and scholars with a broad range of expertise and used textual analysis of scholarly journals, books, official government reports, online texts from credible research institutes, newspapers and Senate hearings to examine the role of PD to counter violent extremism in Pakistan. The research suggested that there are inconsistencies in various U.S. agencies in how they understand and practice PD. Moreover, the study sheds light on the modern-day challenge in PD especially difficulties met in conducting PD in Pakistan which reiterates the view that PD needs a theoretical and practical overhaul. Finally, the researcher makes recommendations that will help the advancement of the profession of PD, and its role in an important mission such as the counter violent extremism (CVE).

Key words: U.S. State Department, public diplomacy, PD practitioners, PD theory, consensus-oriented PD, Jürgen Habermas, Burkart, Pakistan, terrorism, counter violent extremism.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In academic, diplomatic and political circles, diplomacy is widely accepted as a tool critical for maintaining long-lasting positive relations with foreign nations. But, a similar consensus has not been reached on the importance of public diplomacy (PD) in forging such relationships. Perhaps this is because in political science PD is often referred to as propaganda, psychological warfare or international information (Roberts, 2007). This common misperception may be limiting the field of PD in public and private view to reach its full potential as strategic statecraft (Fitzpatrick & Kosic, 2005). Tuch (1991) lamented that "among the public and even among Washington policymakers and politicians—there is little knowledge of what it is, what it can and cannot do, how it is practiced and by whom" (p.11).

To address skepticism about U.S. public diplomacy, there needs to be a clear understanding of its functions and objectives. Understanding of PD is especially essential in dealing with the distinct challenges of countering violent extremism (CVE) in Pakistan.

To understand how PD is different from traditional diplomacy, what violent extremism is, and why PD by the American government could counter it, the author

begins with laying out definitions, explanations of the concepts being used and the context in which it is used.

The most prevalent definition of PD is presented by Malone (1985) who defines it as "direct communication with foreign people, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their government" (p. 199). In the United States, PD often refers to activities such as operating cultural centers in foreign nations, student exchange programs (Fulbright Scholarships), humanitarian help and broadcast activities. In contrast, diplomacy refers to "the official channels of communication employed by the members of a system of states" (Berridge, Keens-Soper & Otte, 2001, p. 1). For example, when heads of states meet to forge political relations between one another's countries, or high level diplomats meet their counterparts in other countries to negotiate trade deals, economic partnership or promote alliances, are all diplomatic functions. This definition of diplomacy is accompanied by U.S. State Department's explanation of the functions and objectives of professional diplomats:

> Department of State diplomats have a clear mission -- to carry out the foreign policy of the President of the United States and to represent the political and economic interests of the United States around the world. Conducting foreign policy is a complex business. The peace, safety, and prosperity you enjoy are a direct result of the hard work of many skilled -- and mostly unknown -- professional diplomats. (U.S. Diplomacy Center at The U.S. Department of State, n. d., para. 2)

A similar explanation of the profession of PD and objectives such as the long-term strategic goals of PD operations, is unclear on the U.S. State Department's website. Adelman (1981) explained the difference between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy as,

> Traditional diplomacy is formal and official; public diplomacy is usually informal and engages non-officials. Traditional diplomacy is private and quiet, while public diplomacy is open and can be noisy. Traditional diplomacy seeks to avoid controversy, to smooth out differences, whereas public diplomacy tends to expose and stimulate controversy, whether artistic or intellectual or political. (p. 934).

A key distinction must be made between the often interchangeably used terms, counter violent extremism and counterterrorism. The State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism distinguishes counterterrorism as those initiatives, typically carried out by law enforcement agencies and CVE as support and engagement programs in other countries, whereas CVE is considered as one objective in the overall counterterrorism agenda (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Homeland Security) identifies violent extremists as "individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals" (Homeland Security, n.d.).

World Conditions After September 11, 2001

The world changed on September 11, 2001when terrorists killed thousands of Americans in four simultaneously organized attacks. The terrorist threat that Americans always had, became real with attacks in the United States. The question that many Americans immediately asked was, "Why do they hate us?" However, a more analytical

question was troubling the minds of officials and scholars. They asked, "What is it that would 'move men to kill but also to die'"? (Zakaria, 2011). Zakaria (2011) also writes that,

> But bin Laden and his followers are not an isolated cult like Aum Shinrikyo or the Branch Davidians or demented loners like Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber. They come out of a culture that reinforces their hostility, distrust and hatred of the West--and of America in particular. This culture does not condone terrorism, but fuels the fanaticism that is at its heart. To say that Al Qaeda is a fringe group may be reassuring, but it is false. Read the Arab press in the aftermath of the attacks, and you will detect a not-so-hidden admiration for bin Laden. Or consider this from the Pakistani newspaper, *The Nation*: "September 11 was not mindless terrorism for terrorism's sake. It was reaction and revenge, even retribution." (Zakaria, 2011, para. 3)

When Osama Bin Laden declared *holy war* on America in the name of Islam, some Americans jumped to the conclusion that the enemy was Islam. In contrast, the former President George W. Bush shunned this notion soon after 9/11. Much to the relief of traditional Muslims, he said to the U.S. Senate that Islam was not the enemy, but rather the "enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them" (Agilityman, 2010).

The phrase *violent extremism* did not exist as a category of a danger faced by the United States, but the struggle to isolate Islam and a particular kind of fanaticism that supports the ideology of terrorism began. The struggle did not end with killing Bin

Laden, and violent ideology remains an increasing threat now with the surfacing of Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) and other lone-wolf terrorists across America and Europe. The study is not concerned with the details of different kinds of terrorists, rather it is concerned with ideologies that perpetuate terrorism and what role public diplomacy might have in countering them.

Public Diplomacy to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE)

Public diplomacy is governed by U.S. foreign policy, which, since 9/11 has particularly focused on national security (National Security Strategy, 2002). When the first National Security Strategy (NSS) was published after 9/11, it identified PD as one way to counter the enemy that America was facing (National Security Strategy, 2002, p. 6). Suddenly, "The realization that foreign perceptions had domestic consequence quickly made public diplomacy a national security issue" (Zaharna, 2010, p. 4). Consequently, the U.S. Department of State (the State or State Department), the primary U.S. agency responsible for public diplomacy declared that the mission of U.S. public diplomacy is "to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world" (U.S. State Department, n.d., para. 1).

As explained before, the phrase violent extremism may not have been an established usage, but this type of activity was referred to as the "enemy of the global nature" (NSS, 2002, p. 5). To fight that elusive enemy, the U.S. would use "effective

public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism" (p. 6). Therefore, the objective for PD was to convey messages that "make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose" (NSS, 2002, p.6). To promote this view, the United States' PD initiatives use cultural exchange programs, educational programs, international broadcasting such as Voice of America (VOA), and disaster relief to harness goodwill among the citizens of other nations toward the United States and to counter extremist messaging. The goodwill extended through the programs is often quantified in the public opinion polls to measure favorability toward America such as those conducted frequently by the Pew Research Center (Kaiser, 2001 October 15; Pew Research Center, 2015).

Public diplomacy during the Cold War 9/11. During the Cold War, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was the primary agency conducting PD. But, in the late 1990s, when there was no longer the need to counter Soviet propaganda, the necessity for information dissemination was discounted. Federal funding was severely cut, and USIA was dissolved and its functions were folded into the State Department (Wadsworth, 2006).

Public diplomacy after 9/11. Since 9/11, one of the primary foci for foreign policy has been to promote national security; with this emphasis, the main purpose for public diplomacy has also shifted to national security (Kaiser, 2001). This is an ambitious

outcome assigned to PD and is not without challenges. Particularly, there are two

functional challenges for PD to achieve optimal outcomes.

First, professional PD has never been measured before (Banks, 2011) and also has

never been used before against a phenomenon such as violent extremism which means

this type of undertaking is new for public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2008; Douglas, & Neal,

2013). In fact, the last effective use of PD was information dissemination during the Cold

War to counter Soviet propaganda via media channels such as VOA and Radio Free

Europe (Gilboa, 2008). Second, currently PD operations are conducted not just by the

State Department, but often by multiple agencies such as the Department of Defense

(DOD) as overlapping or independent initiatives creating misunderstanding and

confusion about PD strategy, its functions and its scope. Therefore, it is not a surprise that

when PD was revived after 9/11 for national security there was a great deal of confusion

about its functions and objectives (Kaiser, 2001).

Public Diplomacy in Academia

Similar confusion and neglect are seen in research about the practice of PD.

Currently, in the field of international relations (IR), PD is referred to as something that

the diplomats "do" and, derisively, as a "new adjective[s] for the old noun" (Gould-

Davies, 2013, p. 2) of diplomatic function. Thus, there has not been much emphasis on

PD research, which has led to inadequate advancing of theory in PD and conceptualizing

its functions (Gregory, 2008; Lord, 1998). While IR scholars are concerned with bridging

the gap between the scholarship and the statecraft of diplomacy (George, 1993; Gould-

Davies, 2013), PD research falls under the radar. Thus PD faces an even harder challenge

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of finding its rightful place as an academic field and also a practice distinct from traditional diplomacy.

Gregory (2008) raises his concern: "Where is the academic research and where are the scholarly publications that would give meaning to a field of study?" (p. 2). Gregory (2008) calls to treat PD as an emerging academic field that should have "an achievable consensus on an analytical framework; a substantial body of relevant scholarship and practical literature" (p. 14) which will benefit the development of PD as a profession, increase shared knowledge between academics and professionals and foster acceptance of public diplomacy as a professional field. Robust academic research in public diplomacy will ultimately lead to the development of practitioners who will be skilled in understanding its functions and developing clear objectives (Gregory, 2008).

In contrast to many IR scholars, the need for understanding functions and goals of PD has not been entirely discounted by communication scholars. Zaharna (2012) asserts that public diplomacy is as much a communication phenomenon as a political one. Communication scholars view PD as a communicative behavior and have made a significant contribution to PD literature.

Referred to as the public relations (PR) function of governments, PD is often related to PR. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) argue that PR theories are transferable to PD and call scholars to "delineate and test" (p. 145) PR research in the PD field. Signitzer and Coombs (1992) further suggest that just as the PR field developed through research and theory development, public diplomacy can also benefit from a similar approach

which will facilitate its development as a professional field and contribute to its particular functions and objectives.

In the following section, the author discusses Pakistan as a suitable case study to analyze United States' PD. This case examines, the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship, Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States and whether improving PD in Pakistan may improve PD in other nations especially in CVE. But first, the research will establish why Pakistan is a suitable case study for examining the U.S. public diplomacy and the way PD has been handled in Pakistan and the challenges surround PD efforts in Pakistan.

Pakistan: A Case Study

There are two reasons for using Pakistan as a case study. First, the prevalence of terrorist groups in Pakistan is unmatched with any other democratic country in the world. The combination of political unrest, social and economic conditions in Pakistan provide fertile ground for the extremist ideology to grow and thrive. According to an India-based nonprofit called Institute for Conflict Management, there are 12 domestic terrorist groups, four extremist groups and 32 trans-national terrorist organizations in Pakistan (Institute for Conflict Management, n.d.). This is a staggering number of extremist organizations for a country 1.14 times as big as Texas. The second reason to study Pakistan is that despite little reliable data publicly available, clearly the United States has made considerable financial investment in Pakistan over the years. Despite the spending, there is no substantial evidence that the United States has a dependable relationship with Pakistan. Furthermore, the U.S. Defense Department requested $140 million in FY 2015

for Pakistan's counterinsurgency programs (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2014, April). Now, the State Department has requested $917 million budget for FY 2016 for Pakistan, out of which $334.9 million is requested for counterterrorism and CVE (U.S. Department of State, 2015, p. 148). Similarly, Figure 1shows total aid amount dispersed in Pakistan. This is a considerable amount spent in a country that holds extreme anti-American sentiment and therefore raises a question whether this money is well-spent.

Figure 1. Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers
Source: Center for Global Development, 2010

U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relations. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) opened a special report with a question about the complex history of U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

> Why is it that Pakistan has rarely disappeared for any length of time from the United States' strategic radar screen? For more than five decades, it has loomed large in one form or another, as either a staunch ally, a troublesome friend, or even a threat. Now, for the first time, it is all of these things. (Hussain, 2005, p. 2)

This statement captures the essence of the U.S.-Pakistan relations that has oscillated between excellent to poor over the past several decades since the creation of Pakistan. In 1947, when Pakistan gained independence from the British Empire and partitioned from India, the United States endorsed its Muslim identity and the ideology for its origin. America's support for Pakistan as a new Muslim state "marked a major step toward the ending of European colonial rule in Asia" (Kux, 2011, p. 4).

This friendly beginning led to Pakistan playing a vital role in mending the U.S.-Sino diplomatic relations by setting up clandestine meetings for Richard Nixon to open communication channels with China, after which Nixon "tilted" toward Pakistan in the India-Pakistan war in 1971 (Kux, 2011). Despite minor setbacks, later the relations between the two countries further improved as the United States sought a strategic partner in the region during the growing Cold War with the Communists. Pakistan welcomed the United States' military support to strengthen itself against its unrelenting enemy, India (Kronstadt, 2005).

The bilateral relationship became close after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (Kux, 2011). During this time, Pakistan assumed a key role as a U.S. proxy as it funneled arms and training to the Mujahideen (freedom fighters) against the Soviets (Kux, 2011). However, the relationship was not without consequences. During this time, two significant events happened. First, the United States inadvertently strengthened the Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which benefited neither Pakistan's democratic development nor its relationship with the United States (Zaidi, 2011). Second, the United States and Pakistan together funded and supported the Mujahideen, many of whom later became Taliban or joined Al Qaeda (Dash Kapoor, Hillary Clinton on Pakistan, 2009, video File, 1:18).

When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the bilateral relationship deteriorated as Pakistan was left to deal with the remnants of the war such as landmines along its border with Afghanistan, and millions of Afghan refugees on its territory. Soon after, in the 1990s the U.S. also sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear program which further embittered the Pakistani government. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained the U.S. actions as saying, "By the way, we don't want to have anything to do with you, in fact we are sanctioning you" (Dash Kapoor, Hillary Clinton on Pakistan, 2009, video File, 1:18).

Pakistan felt abandoned and betrayed as it was left to its own devices after the Soviets left Afghanistan (*The Dawn*, 2009). The combination of these conditions led to a chilly relationship between the two sides until the attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed their relationship one more time.

Strategic importance of Pakistan. A U.S. diplomat described the U.S.-Pakistan relations as, "a Catholic marriage: There may be problems, but divorce isn't an option" (Seib, 2011, n.p). Even though U.S. ties with Pakistan have been marked by ups and downs, it is in the United States' interest to support a stable Pakistan due to its strategic geographic location, and its critical support in the war on terrorism (Kronstadt, 2012). Internal conflicts in Pakistan and world politics have played a role in making these relations turbulent, but the countries are indispensable to each other (Zaidi, 2011). This is particularly evident in the post era 9/11 era when Pakistan's geopolitical importance became critical than before. But killing of civilians during events such as attacks from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV, or drones), and noncollaboration with Islamabad in the killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) in Pakistan have caused frustrations and disenchantment on both sides. As a result, both harbor long-standing mistrust of one another (Kronstadt, 2012). Pakistan questions U.S. commitment and reliability as a partner, and the United States accuses Pakistan of playing a double game by proclaiming support for U.S. efforts against terrorism while it provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and other extremists.

Bilateral relations are further complicated and mixed messages are sent to Pakistan when the U.S. Congress calls for sanctions on Pakistan for widespread human rights violations yet deems its cooperation critical in counterterrorism efforts (Kronsdadt, 2005; Mirahmadi, Ziad, Farooq, & Lamb, 2012).

Geo-strategic importance of Pakistan. The geo-strategic importance of Pakistan to the United States cannot be ignored. A prominent security studies expert of the

Brookings Institute, Stephen Cohen (in Shaheen, 2011) says, "While history has been unkind to Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit. It has a resource-rich area in the Northwest, people rich in the Northeast" (para. 13). The mountain range of Hindu Kush (the Durand line) creates a natural buffer against Afghanistan, Tajikistan and China. However, the country links North, South, and West Asia with each other and serves as a transit economy to these countries to access the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf (Shaheen, 2011).

Due to Pakistan's constant trepidation over India's rising economic and military power, Pakistan has refused to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Pakistan is now the third largest nuclear force in the world, (*The New York Times*, 2015) and the U.S. fears its nuclear warheads may fall into the wrong hands.

Another dimension of Pakistan's geo-strategic positioning is that it serves as the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and as a supply line for NATO forces into Afghanistan (Kronsdadt, 2015). During highly volatile situations between the countries such as when the United States mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan closed these supply lines costing the United States $100 million every month (Martinez, 2012). Therefore, the reliance on Pakistan is critical counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's domestic Problems. Long-term economic and political instability due to the law and order situation in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), conflicts in Baluchistan province, the security of nuclear weapons, and polio eradication, are some of the many challenges to fully engaging a counterterrorism agenda. These challenges have made Pakistan perpetually dependent on foreign aid especially from the United

States (Zaidi, 2011). Since 9/11, Pakistan has received more than $20 billion in economic, security, and humanitarian aid, which includes military reimbursements for conducting combat operations (Kronsdadt, 2015). Another dimension of this aid is that United States is forced to address many of Pakistan's domestic issues such as dealing with FATA, economic growth and development, and health crises, for example through USAID programs.

Despite the United States' contribution to security and development of Pakistan, one may ask why do Pakistanis hold hostile opinion of the United States? This is a complex question with a complex answer. The insight gained in exploring this hostile public opinion will also help the United States address PD challenges found in other parts of the world especially the PD challenges encountered in the Islamic corridor because many Muslim countries also have prevalence of extremist mentality and negative public opinion.

The rise of terrorism in Pakistan. At the onset of his presidency, President Barack Obama announced a comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan stating,

The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan. In the nearly eight years since 9/11, al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier. This almost certainly includes al Qaeda's leadership: Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have used this mountainous terrain as a safe haven to hide, to train terrorists, to communicate with followers, to plot attacks, and to send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan…. It is, instead, an international security

challenge of the highest order.…If there is a major attack on an Asian, European,

or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan.

The safety of people around the world is at stake.

(White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2009)

Here Obama referred to Pakistan serving as a safe haven for terrorist groups. There is

evidence that Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), political and religious groups have

exploited the nation under the veil of *Islamization* for self-interest; as a result, terrorism

has high salience in the society and has become a "part of Pakistan's existential reality"

(Roberts, 2015, p. 83). To elaborate on the roots of Islamization, Roberts (2015) further

draws on Eamon Murphy's book, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and*

Social Roots of Extremism, and relates,

Military dictator Zia al-Haq was a true believer and supported strict Islamic mores,

using Islam as a way to unify and strengthen Pakistan while he sought to legitimize

his regime and solidify his grip in power. As a counterweight to the Shia Iranian

revolution in 1979, he welcomed money from Saudi Wahhabis to fund madrassas

(Islamic seminaries), which expanded from 900 to over 33,000. He promoted

Islamists in civil service, military and judiciary circles, enforced blasphemy laws,

Islamicized education, rewrote history, and placed more power in the Inter-Service

Intelligence (ISI) directorate. (p. 84)

Extreme Islamization is one of many ways in which Islam was used to gain political

power. However, Zia's campaign was distinctive in that he presided over the most

thorough Islamization of the country which became the normative social structure of

Pakistan. Esposito (2011) explains how extreme social constructs lead to violent

behaviors and actions,

> While many religious fundamentalists or ultra-religious nationalists may not
>
> themselves be violent, their theologies and worldviews can have dangerous
>
> consequences. Religious extremists have appropriated their theological worldview
>
> to demonize "the other" as the "enemy of God" and to justify acts of terrorism;
>
> Christian extremist destruction of abortion clinics and killing of physicians,
>
> Jewish extremist assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and the
>
> massacre of Muslims at prayer in the Hebron mosque, and Muslim extremist
>
> attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and bombings from Madrid to
>
> Mindanao. (p. 384)

This statement explains that the root cause of terrorism is the extremism and describes the

trajectory of extremist behavior that becomes terrorist behavior. Additionally, it also

explains why ideas of terrorism, extremism and Islamization may often be conflated with

each other.

  Patron and a victim. Another critical element of terrorism in Pakistan is that

"Pakistan is both a patron and a victim of terror" (Riedel & Singh, 2010, p. 6). Since

9/11, more than 80,000 Pakistanis have died as a result of suicide terrorist attacks (*The

Express Tribune*, 2015), bombings, and U.S. drone attacks (Riedel, 2013). On the one

hand, Pakistanis suffer because of terrorists, and on the other hand, they tolerate their

presence in the country. Even though Pakistanis understand terrorism and extremism is

detrimental to them on many levels, they also associate the United States' war on terror

with the death of their countrymen (*The Express Tribune*, 2015).

      Terrorist/extremist groups in Pakistan. The World Organization for Resource

Development and Education is a Washington, D.C., based nonprofit, presents a

description of some of the extremist groups operating in Pakistan.

Extremist Groups Operating in Pakistan

There are dozens of well-established extremist institutions operating throughout Pakistan created by former mujahedeen or sympathizers that are functioning at five different levels:

1. Terrorist organizations that sanction jihad without official state approval, and inflict civilian casualties through the use of terror tactics such as suicide bombings. These include the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Islam, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar e-Taiba.

2. Organizations that wage jihad against military and security forces, but are opposed to the use of suicide bombings and in some cases violence against innocent civilians. These include pro-Taliban organizations and Kashmiri groups such as Al-Badr, and Al-Umar Mujahideen.

3. Sectarian militant organizations that use violence against those who do not conform to their particular belief system. These include the Sunni Sipah-e Sihaba / Lashkar e-Jhangvi and the Shi'a Sipah-e Muhammad Pakistan.

4. Fundraising and development organizations that are not directly involved in militancy but provide financial support. This includes organizations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Al–Akhtar Trust, Al-Rashid Trust, and Ummah Tamir-e Nau.

5. Non-violent Deobandi / Salafi groups who do not unconditionally condemn violent extremism. They may denounce terrorism in Pakistan but will include a caveat in their explanations (e.g. allowing for jihad in Afghanistan). These groups generally espouse an intolerant interpretation of Islam. While they might not be directly involved in militancy, they lay the ideological foundation for violence and may provide tacit support for militant outfits. These include educational, political and social-welfare organizations affiliated with Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI-F and JUI-S), and Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith. Such groups are often not considered "extremist" because they are well rooted into Pakistan's social fabric. Because these groups capitalize on political grievances (e.g. drone attacks and the war in Afghanistan), their influence in society is increasing alongside frustration with US involvement in the region.

Figure 2. Extremist Groups Operating in Pakistan
Source: Mirahmadi, H., Ziad, W., & Farooq, M., 2012.

Figure 2 describes the degree of extremism to which each organization goes to commit terrorist acts. The first three categories are those militant groups who justify violent acts as Jihad or the holy war either toward the government, ordinary civilians or people of different denominations of Islam. The following two categories either provide financial or ideological support to violence. It is no secret that extremist leaders in Pakistan use volatile language, and *us* versus *them* narrative, and use conspiracy theories to propagate anti-American sentiment in the population. Thus the extremist ideology trickle down in the ordinary public.

Classifying public diplomacy target audiences. The influence of the above mentioned groups on the general population can be understood as a threat the United States faces is from "groups and individuals that accept al-Qaʻida's agenda, whether through formal alliance, loose affiliation, or mere inspiration" (United States National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011, p. 3). In addition, a 2012 Pew Research Center poll found, that 13% of the Pakistani population sides with al Qaeda and 74% consider the United States their enemy (Pew Research Center, 2012). Combining these two statistics suggest that of the 74 % of the Pakistani population who consider the United States its enemy, 13% of those may adhere to violent ways or they may only affiliate themselves with terrorists as sub groups or act violently without group affiliations as do lone perpetrators. The remaining 61% of Pakistani population may sympathize with the violent extremist ideology or may be categorized as those who do not have violent or extremist tendentious but tolerate such ideology because they consider the United States their enemy.

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Spectrum of extremist ideology. In other words, in Pakistan, the acceptance of al

Qaeda ideology or the violent extremist organization (VEO) ideology is found on a

spectrum that varies from fully agreeing and following extremist ideology on one end, to

affiliates, to *lone perpetrators,* to *sympathizers,* and finally, to *tolerators*.


Latif's Proposed Spectrum of Violent Extremist Ideology

Spectrum of Extremism

● Tolerators ● Sympathizers ● Lone Perpetrators
● Affiliates ● Terrorists

Figure 3. Spectrum of Extremist Ideology: Terrorists – Affiliates – Lone perpetrators –
Sympathizers – Tolerators

Source: Latif's Model of the Spectrum of Extremism

Experts suggest that effective U.S. public diplomacy in Pakistan should target

non-extremist Muslims to help lessen anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Non-

extremist Muslims are individuals who are identified here as tolerators or sympathizers

along the spectrum presented in Figure 3. Wadsworth (2006) agrees that the strategic

center of gravity for outreach are the non-extremist Muslims, and if they are effectively

reached, tolerance for violent extremist organizations will lessen and weaken their

existence.

But one must wonder why would the Pakistanis tolerate or sympathize with the

extremist ideology? Although there are probably a plethora reasons for it, an analysis of

the Muslims' collective sense of identity will help explain why Pakistanis tolerate and

sympathize with extremism. Muslims have a sense of *exceptionalism* as a collective

identity and consider themselves part of a brotherhood or a community called the *Ummah*

(Hamid, 2016). Moreover, "the 'enemy' in this war has been repeatedly identified [by the

United States] by its religious identity" (Sides & Gross, 2013, p. 584) when their

collective identity is challenged, it makes them feel that *they* are the enemy of the West.

Zaharna (2012) explain this reaction, "Communication that is perceived as challenging or

violating a public's cultural identity can inadvertently trigger a backlash" (p. 25).

Sometimes, Muslim identity may also be challenged when insensitive and irresponsible

rhetoric cause feelings of hostility among Muslims. Adding words such as *Islamic*

terrorism, *Islamic radicalism*, and *Islamists* to lexicon is perceived inflammatory among

Muslims. Another example of an inflammatory vernacular term is a seemingly harmless

moderate Muslims, which can be perceived as portraying Islam as essentially *faulty* but

some moderate practice of Islam may be acceptable. Hamid (2016) explains the Western

view that may be behind this usage, "A Middle Eastern replay of the Western model—

Protestant Reformation followed by an Enlightenment in which religion is gradually

pushed into the private realm" (para 3) but further explains that this "may be an unlikely

outcome to be expected in Muslims" (para. 3).

Vlahos (2004) says that the United States messaging often has an inability to free

itself of a Eurocentric frame of reference and explains that Eurocentric views like one

explained above are perceived as disengaged from the reality of situation among these

people and is "self-referent…all about us, and what *we* [emphasis added] want" (para. 8).

Such discourse alienates Muslims and disengages them (Zaharna, 2012). Lately, mass

media has often magnified such instances, for example, the 2005 Danish printing of the

caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad, which was deemed distasteful and insolent toward

the revered figure. The feelings of being disrespected and attacked have angered the

Muslims toward those who are perceived as the enemy of the Ummah – the West and the

United States in particular. In other words, Muslims rally on a shared hostile view of the

United States, the effects of which are described by Vlahos (2004) as,

> It is not simply a question of Muslim attitudes turning sharply against the United
>
> States in the past year. More significantly, these attitudes have gelled into an
>
> Ummah-wide [community] worldview whose very anti-Americanism is now a
>
> symbol of Muslim identity and the Muslim future. (para. 13)

Pakistanis are not an exception to this phenomenon where 53 percent believe that the

United States acts in self-interest and does not listen to other countries (Pew Research

Center, 2013). Marc Sageman, a former civil service officer who was stationed in

Pakistan from 1987 to 1989, presents empirical evidence in his book *Understanding*

Terror that confirm the phenomenon. Segeman (2014) contends that even though, the

U.S. government has focused on social ills, such as poverty, ignorance and trauma as

causes for terrorism, in fact, for the vast majority "social bonds predated ideological

commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to

join the jihad" (Sageman, 2014, para. 3). Therefore, social bonds produced by exclusion

and social bonds within the Muslims create a vicious cycle that allow disengagement and

hatred to grow between the west and the Muslims.

It is with these phenomena at work that Pakistanis are patrons as well as the

victims of terrorism and despite that, they sympathize with and tolerate the terrorists

against their shared perceived enemy. The perplexity of feelings in Pakistanis can be

explained with the cultural cognition thesis proposed by Kahan and associates.

Theoretical analysis of tolerance of terrorism. Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and

Braman (2010) proposed the cultural cognition thesis (CCT) which posits that there is a

collection of "psychological mechanisms that dispose individuals selectively to credit or

dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that fit values they share with others" (Kahan et al.,

2010, p. 2). In other words, the theory explains that Pakistanis have a cultural and social

predisposition to view the United States an enemy, and therefore to avoid dissonance they

are likely to exaggerate the risk perceived by the United States and more likely to

discredit the risk that is posed by the terrorists. As a result, hostile sentiments toward the

United States in media or otherwise are more likely to resonate with them than the risk

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from terrorists. In other words, according to CCT, one's culture, or in this case their predisposition, values, and fear of dissonance will prompt them to form negative risk perceptions toward the perceived enemy and "cohere with values characteristic of groups with which they identify" (Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman, & Mandel, 2012, p. 732). Moreover, they are "psychologically disposed to believe that behavior they (and their peers) find honorable is socially beneficial and behavior they find *base* [emphasis added]*, socially detrimental" (p. 2).

After the 9/11 events when the tensions began to rise between the West and the Muslims, immediate attention was paid to mending troubled relations with the Muslim world; Pakistan was the main recipient of American PD efforts (Hussain, 2005). However, a concern remained that the United States has a "perennially troubled public diplomacy" with the Muslim world, (Zaharna, 2004, para. 4) and suggest that PD did not help make much difference.

The above discussion produces a theoretical and empirical portrait of the target audience for PD in Pakistan. Furthermore, it explains some of the reasons why examining American PD in Pakistan will help the practice of public diplomacy. The author further suggests four reasons for using Pakistan as a case study. One, the strategic importance of Pakistan as an ally in counterterrorism is undeniable, therefore, its success relies on successful PD with stakeholders in Pakistan. Second, the United States' financial investment in Pakistan is too great to carry on PD without expecting optimal results. Third, Pakistan has been a safe haven for extremists and may fall victim to ISIS recruitment ("Pakistan says no 'organized presence' of Islamic State", 2016) if

misperceptions about the United States remain in the eyes of the Pakistani public. Fourth, mending PD practices in Pakistan will improve United States relationship with publics in other Muslim nations.

So far, the author has established that the United States considers PD a viable tool for CVE. However, there is a need to advance PD as an academic field and as a profession before desirable outcomes can be expected. To address key issues within PD such as recognizing its functions and objectives, conditions surrounding PD in Pakistan were reviewed.

In chapter two, the author discusses a theoretical conceptualization of public diplomacy. Moreover, the author presents a definition of public diplomacy and the underlying theoretical assumptions and worldview behind it. Chapter three provides a historical overview of the evolution of public diplomacy as a profession and the factors that lead to the present day misunderstanding about functions and objectives of PD. With a theoretical and historical view of public diplomacy in mind, the reader will feel prepared to follow the research in chapter four where the author discusses her research methods. Chapter five includes results of the research questions and discussion of the issues raised in the interviews. Then, chapter six includes policy related recommendations based on the discussions in the previous chapters and finally the limitation of this research and suggestion for future studies.

CHAPTER TWO

Theorizing Public Diplomacy

Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) raise a valid concern that American PD messages "appear at best ineffectual — and oftentimes inflammatory" (p. 295). This statement relates to PD activities sending messages such as that of friendship, concern, and so on. Public diplomacy messages are susceptible to misinterpretations due to cultural, language and socio-political differences between senders of messages and receivers (Zaharna, 2012). This is happening with U.S. messages as they cross cultural and geographical borders, supporting Kruckeberg and Vujnovic's concern that the United States' messages are ineffective and often counterproductive. Therefore, the thesis draws on the communication literature to theorize and analyze public diplomacy to assist in improving American PD practices.

In the communication field, if there is an area of study that resembles closely with PD, it is public relations (PR). Therefore, the author makes a case for using communication and especially PR theories to come to an understanding of PD.

PD and PR

Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) defines public relations as "a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics" ("About Public Relations," n.d., para 4.). PD, however,

does not have a similar consensus on its definition. But as mentioned before, Malone's (1985) proposed definition is widely accepted and states, "Direct communication with foreign people, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their government" (p. 199).

It is noticeable that both, PD and PR invariably deal with strategic communication in critical publics that are imperative to their success. However, in diplomatic circles, a comparison between PD and PR is not received positively. The public relations profession is viewed by some as publicity or as something that involves promotion and is considered "ill-suited" to be a diplomatic endeavor (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013, p. 1). In reality, not only are the two fields similar, there is an increasing interdisciplinary scholarship. In both, there is greater emphasis on culturally sensitive practices and professionalism and ethics, all of which indicate their similar nature in communication with strategic audiences.

Skepticism about PR as well as PD arises from some valid concerns about the gaffes that have been made in United States' PD but these are leading to the direction PD must take to be more effective. Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) proposed that the United States should stay away from "propaganda or market-oriented advocacy" and instead it should "practice true public diplomacy, which should rely not only on political theory and the theories of international relations, but also on theories and models of public relations that are based on two-way symmetrical communications and community-building" (p. 296).

Fitzpatrick, Fullerton and Kendrick (2013) also support the convergence of PR

and PD, and agree with their three overlapping functions suggested by L'Etang (2006) which are "representational (rhetoric, oratory, advocacy), dialogic (negotiation, peacemaking) and advisory (counseling)" (p. 2).

Ironically, despite being kept in professional and scholarly siloes, the two fields have a shared history of juxtaposition with concepts as propaganda, spinning, promotion, publicity tools and so on. These conceptual similarities also suggest that the two fields are misunderstood professionally, and subsequently, their practical convergence is undermined.

However, as mentioned before that Zaharna (2009) argues that PD being a political function, is also a communication function. Therefore, furthering collaborative scholarship in PD and PR academics and practitioner circles will advance the field by adopting practices that will increase its effectiveness in larger foreign policy arena (Gregory, 2008; Proedrou & Frangonikolopoulos, 2012). The author contends that with increased collaboration, the scholarship in PD will benefit and professionalism in PD will also increase. Gregory (2008) and Zaharna (2012) also agree that when the fields are recognized as strategic communication functions with publics, they will have to mindfully rely on ethical and cultural considerations and thus increase their professional footings.

The strong connections in scholarship and professionalism of PD and PR have not been widely recognized yet. However, Signitzer and Wamser (2006) recognize the convergence of the two fields and lamented that the divide is due to different entities being involved such as governments and diplomats in PD, and corporations and

nonprofits in PR. Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick (2013) say that a review of the PD

scholarship between 1990 and 2010 by Vanc and Fitzpatrick (2012) suggested that

"public relations concepts can be not only transferred to public diplomacy scholarship but

applied, tested and recommended as workable theoretical frameworks in the academic

and practical domains of public diplomacy" (in Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013,

p. 4).

A review of emerging definitions and scope of activities in PD will benefit from

PR scholarship and practices. Therefore, PR can help us clarify the functions and

objectives of PD.

Conceptualizing Public Diplomacy

A long debated conceptual issue in foreign policy among academics and

politicians is the conflict between idealism and realism. Idealism suggests that public

diplomacy ought to be based on foreign policy objectives that take into account rights and

responsibilities, self-reflection and secular morality (Pratt, 1933), whereas realism relies

on short-term, achievable and imminent goals. These schools of thoughts on U.S. foreign

policy ultimately influence public diplomacy operations as they offer different public

diplomacy goals and have left practitioners and academics with no "agreed-upon

understanding of its definition and boundaries" (Lee & Ayhan, 2015, p. 1).

However, there are some noticeable similarities in the definitions presented by

scholars which can be divided into two groups based on what Lee and Ayhan (2015) refer

to as the boundaries of PD or their sphere of influence. The author differentiates them as

state-centered or comprehensive definitions.

State-centered definitions of PD. The definitions in this category are those

where the state or the country, is the primary actor of PD functions. Public diplomacy is

considered an official statecraft and takes place between government and publics of

another country (Lee & Ayhan, 2015; McPhail, 2011). The objective of PD by many of

these definitions is linked to the states' foreign policy. Analysis of many Cold War era

definitions of PD demonstrate this line of thinking. Malone's (1985) definition falls in

this category.

Comprehensive definitions of PD. This set of definitions is more "appreciative

of both new actors and new objectives, activities and strategies" (Lee & Ayhan, 2015, p.

1) beyond the state. These are more inclusive of the non-state actors in the PD realm, a

broader range of objectives, and driven by the globalization and technological

advancements (Lee & Ayhan, 2015). Many of the post 9/11 definitions are based on

relational, networks and collaborative approaches. For example, Tuch (1990) defines PD

as "a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring

about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well

as its national goals and policies" (p. 3). According to Waller (2007) PD is "the art of

communicating with foreign publics to influence international perceptions, attitudes and

policies" (p. 19). Sharp (2005) defines PD as a process, "the process by which direct

relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the

values of those being represented" (p. 106). Gilboa (2008) contends that the goal of PD is

to create a favorable image of the organizing country's policies, actions, and political and

economic systems. The definitions mentioned above, explain the goal of PD; however,

they do not satisfactorily address either the scope or function of PD.

Similarly, according to Hassman (2008), achieving a favorable opinion among publics of another nation "entails expanding dialogue among the nation's citizens, establishing relationships among different communities, and understanding their varied cultures and needs" (in Avraham, 2013, p. 1351). Gregory adheres to a definition that is also comprehensive. Gregory (2011) considers PD the "instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values" (p. 353).

Close look at the above mentioned definition, the author notices that these are sender focused. Moreover, they all have a serious shortcoming; these definitions either do not address values in conducting PD such as the state-centered definitions that focus on the state's self-interest or do not adequately address values for example, definitions that consider one PD actor as more dominant than the other. Zaharna, et al. (2013) argue that in PD, states that assume the role of organizers of PD consider control over communication with their publics. The author contends that if public diplomacy is to advance as a profession and have decision-making authority in the statecraft, the practice of PD must be based in values of equality and mutuality. Another dimension of values is the existence of a code of ethics, however that discussion is outside the scope of this paper.

The differences in definitions are important to describe to propose a definition that removes the flaws noticed in existing definitions.

Before the author suggests a new definition of PD, let's discuss the bases for the author's line of thinking.

The author believes that for a theory to provide actionable propositions and give decision-making ability to the practitioners, it must be strategic and be based in values. The discussion on values will follow, but first we will start with the concept of strategy. Botan (in press) explains that often the word strategy is used as a buzz word to signify some tactical use of expertise, but this is an erroneous view. In the communication field and as a methodology, strategy refers to research-based campaigns, especially when the research involves "what publics think and feel about our relationships with them" (Botan, in press, p. 15). Public focus does not end here, in fact, "strategy begins and ends with publics" (Botan, in press, p. 34). Botan means to say that often a PR campaign is initiated due to a need expressed by publics; they are the ones who later accept the messages sent through PR campaigns or reject them. Meanwhile, organization tend to tweak their campaigns to the desires of their publics and finally measure the success of the campaigns in the satisfaction of their stakeholders.

The same understanding of strategic thinking can be applied to PD where every PD initiative is centered on the publics. It may seem an illogical way of thinking for an initiative that is based on the interest of government to advance its foreign policy. However, Zaharna, et al. (2013) suggest otherwise. The authors call it the *connective*

mindshift, which refers to the changing methods and needs of human beings connecting with each other. They write:

> We live in an interconnected world where many of the complex challenges that societies now face straddle borders and continents. Equally, the communities that make up these societies communicate through a wide range of networks. These networks pivot around multiple hubs, and influence flows in multiple directions. As a result of this complexity, public diplomacy will increasingly adopt an approach based on genuine cooperation and collaboration with these interconnected communities. Relational strategies will not be a public diplomacy add-on but a core imperative. We call this shift in public diplomacy the *connective mindshift*. (Zaharna, et al., 2013, p. 1)

Two technological advancements have affected these processes. First, dramatically advanced communication platforms have created multiple groups of highly connected publics. Second, these communication platforms empowered the publics with influence. Hence, power flows in multiple directions in a highly connective manner. This shift in power-center therefore requires that the PD initiatives be based "on genuine cooperation and collaboration" (Zaharna, et al., 2013, p. 1).

Moreover, Botan (in press) emphasizes the *cocreational* role of the publics in creation of meaning in any public communication. He posits that communication, by its nature, is constitutive, therefore, meaning in successful strategic communication is always cocreated with publics. Publics assign meaning to communication and

communicating organizations will incorporate publics' assigned meaning to their future communication.

It is with Botan's proposed understanding of strategy and cocreational methodology, and Zaharna et al.'s (2013) proposed connective mindshift framework that the author advances a new theoretical perspective on PD that defines the function, goal and the sphere of influence of public diplomacy is also value-driven. Hence, the researcher defines PD as strategic communication with multiple stakeholders of a state, with the intent to achieve consensus on sharing cultural and ideological interests between the organizer and the stakeholders to favorably affect the public opinion of the organizing country.

The author refers to PD as strategic communication which aligns with the comprehensive approach described earlier. According to this definition, non-state bodies may also be potential players or partners in PD. Moreover, expanding the audience beyond *citizens of other countries* to *stakeholders*, allows focus on the organizing state's domestic population which Kirkpatrick (2010) explains had been the *neglected mandate* of PD for more than a half century. Kirkpatrick (2010) writes that communicating with United States' citizens about other countries, nations and cultures is equally important in effective PD. In addition, the researcher particularly emphasizes the dual role diaspora communities can play as ambassadors of both countries.

With the proposed definition, first, the author puts stakeholders or the publics at the front and center of PD operation, following the strategic view of communication by Botan. Second, the definition is neither sender-centered nor strictly goal-centered. In fact,

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consensus-building acknowledges the *connective mindshift* that incorporates the

relational and collaborative approach, and the importance of human networks so the

organizers can gain and maintain their credibility among their publics. Moreover, the

definition puts the burden of ethics on the organizing body by encouraging change in

public opinion via relational approach instead of propaganda.

       The proposed definition emphasizes consensus-building in PD. A brief

discussion on consensus-building will come up later in this chapter, but first, the

researcher will use four categories to assess of the definitions described above to

see whether or not the definitions prescribe goals for PD, a specific function of

PD and produce a clear scope of the function of PD, such as the actors involved.

Lastly, I will examine if the definition is values driven or not. A stocktaking of

these definitions is presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Stocktaking of Public Diplomacy Definitions

Definition	Goals	Function	Scope	Values
Tuch	•	•		
Waller	•	•		
Sharp	•	•		
Malone	•	•		
Gilboa	•	•		
Hassman	•	•	•	
Gregory	•	•	•	
Latif's Consensus-Building Definition of PD	•	•	•	•

The author's definition expands on the earlier definitions of public diplomacy in three ways.

First, keeping with the comprehensive definitions, the author's definition helps include a broad range of bodies that are typically not recognized as PD actors in U.S. government such as private global institutions and nonprofits; the inclusion of bodies other than the state expands the scope of PD so these bodies act as actors or partners in PD. In today's globalized world, governments often rely on and benefit from the private sector and nonprofit sector. For example, Sesame Workshop (known in the United States as the Sesame Street) often address challenging tasks as girls' literacy and talking about HIV, as it represents the United States in 147 countries through it children show (Our initiatives, 2016, n.p.). Second, as mentioned before, effective PD is not strictly sender-oriented, the stakeholders' benefit is equally important. Third, the proposed definition contends that PD should be non-exploitive and be based on achieving a consensus between the organizer and stakeholders rather than changing their minds which they may perceive as a threat and a challenge to their cultural and ideological norms (Zaharna, 2009).

The author discusses consensus which will elaborate on the idea proposed in PD.

Theoretical Structure of Consensus-oriented PD

The researcher has established that PR literature can contribute to further develop PD literature; therefore, Burkart's (1994, 2007) consensus-oriented public relations (COPR) model was found particularly relevant as it addresses two important realities in PD: One, communication incompatibility between players either due to difference in

language, culture, or ideologies, and two, conflict that might exist between them. Burkart (2007) suggests that COPR model, the central claim of the COPR model is *understanding* as the core for communication process and evaluation of the messaging.

Burkart (1994, 2007) draws on Habermas' (1984) theory of communicative action (TCA) which is a critical theory of social communication. "Critical theories ultimately aim to aid the members of a society to become more liberated, responsible, and enlightened agents by exposing and overcoming the forms of individual, social, and political domination that unduly constrain autonomy of thought and freedom of thought" (Burleson & Kline, 1979, p. 413). Habermas' (1984) TCA is criticized for being a utopian ideal unattainable in real world situations. However, Burkart argues that TCA provides valuable insight in the concept of "understanding" and to systematically analyze "questioning" or doubt in stakeholders to build consensus on issues (Burkart, 2007).

Burkart (2007) took the notion of consensus-building to public relations in situations of high conflict and advanced the consensus-oriented public relations (COPR) model for planning and evaluation of PR. COPR argues:

> In cases of a high chance of conflict, companies and organizations are forced to present good arguments for communicating their interests and ideas—in other words: they must make the public understand their actions. Therefore, in the view of COPR, understanding plays an important role within the public relations management process. (Burkart, 2007, p. 250)

Therefore, the author now uses Habermas' (1948) TCA and Burkart's (1994, 2007) work to elaborate on achieving consensus on the culture and ideological interests between the organizer and the stakeholders in PD.

Latif's Consensus-oriented Model of PD

Applying the organizational principles to United States' PD, the consensus-oriented public diplomacy (COPD) model provides a suitable model for PD especially for U.S. public diplomacy in gaining positive public opinion in countries where the conflict level is high and there is low understanding of the PD missions.

Tsasis (2009) contended that people often have competing goals and interests where often the more powerful entity tries to dominate the relationship, however, Habermas discourages the exercise of power and privilege of the elites in a communicative action (Bolton, 2005) when goals and interests may be different. This view aligns with the understanding of stakeholders' strategic importance as the primary driver for communication.

Burkart (2007) further explained that conflicting goals and interest may cause individuals to act violently and irrationally but Habermas "wants to demonstrate that, as a measure for the solution of social conflicts, violence can be replaced by the rational consensus of responsible citizens" (in Burkart, 2007, p. 249). Thus, a practical implication of consensus is its ability to prevent skepticism and violence.

Burleson and Kline (1979) explained that Habermas considered "background consensus" to be prerequisite in consensus building process. Khakimova-Storie (2015) said that there are three aspects of organizational relationships with its stakeholders:

antecedents, strategies and outcomes. These antecedents "can be social and cultural norms, collective perceptions and expectations, needs for resources, perceptions of uncertain environment, and legal/voluntary necessity" (Khakimova-Storie, 2015, p. 315). Khakimova-Storie (2015) explained that antecedents are the reasons organizations choose to start communication with publics and further suggested that for relationship to fully flourish, antecedents that the publics consider to start a relationship are equally important as those who initiate PD. Keeping this understudying in mind, in PD, when these antecedents are met, publics will engage in relationship-building willingly and will reciprocate the relationship-building process. Therefore, for consensus-building this inclination is strengthened with understanding and listening among the partners to each other's culture and social and political ideology.

The consensus oriented model pushes the symmetrical model past what Botan and Taylor (2004) call merely "a procedural way for organizations to listen or solicit feedback from relevant publics" (p. 653) and requires reciprocated effort to understand publics' culture and ideology. This reminds us again that consensus can only be achieved when parties offer and take an interest in equal and mutual understanding, and advance relationship building on mutually agreeable terms. Therefore, in PD consensus treats each partner as equal in power distribution and that PD initiates be based on mutually agreeable terms.

With this view in mind, Burkart's (2007) model specifically pertains to United States' PD in the counterterrorism and national security realm. In countries such as Pakistan, where negative perceptions for the United States exist among stakeholders,

CORP can be applied to address the negative public opinion of these stakeholders. As explained earlier through Kahan's (210, 2012) cultural cognitive theory, one reason for this negative public opinion is that Pakistani publics may be unwilling to work on understanding the United States' messages because America is the perceived enemy. According to the idea of consensus-building in PD, United States can offer information about its cultural and ideological views as well as make conscious effort to understand Pakistan's cultural and ideological views, so there is consensus on common interests especially such as CVE. For example, the American English Language Programs in Pakistan as an antidote to extremism may benefit from idea of consensus. It is believed that English literacy will enhance exposure to Western media and ultimately reject extremism (Embassy of the United States in Islamabad, n.d.). These efforts are often countered with negativity by Pakistani elites as well as ordinary citizens as over-emphasis on speaking English is a reminder of Colonialism in Pakistan (Saleem & Rizvi, 2011). On the other hand, the same can be achieved if Pakistani culture is used to promote these ideas. For example, elements of Pakistan's indigenous culture such as the *Qawwali* music and poetry in the *Sufi* tradition has been "the most powerful and popular vehicle for spiritual and cultural uplift of the masses…[as] it bypasses indoctrination, bigotry, sectarianism, and liberates, emancipates, empowers" against extremist and violent ideology (Schneider & Rumi, 2016, para. 3). The author argue that is the antithesis to extremism, it fosters "love for humans, communal harmony and tolerance…[as] part of lived faith and culture" (para. 5). In a consensus oriented PD, U.S. may realize that

Pakistan's culture inherently opposes extremism and will identify and promote ways from within Pakistani culture that support CVE mission.

According to this discussion, the author also argues that consensus-oriented model of PD helps in redefining the scope of PD to encompass private sector, for example, international corporations specifically brands that represent "Americanism" such as Coca-Cola (Azaryahu, 2000). In case of Pakistan, while such brands may represent Americanism in other countries, they also accommodate culturally sensitive messages such as incorporating Pakistan's cricket culture and recognizing religious celebrations in their advertisements. Similarly, Coca Cola Corporation sponsored musical show called the Coke Studio is very popular in Pakistan that promotes both classical Pakistani and Western pop music. Therefore, Coca Cola is received with high regard in Pakistani citizens.

The consensus building PD can be summed up as a two-way symmetrical engagement between the organizer or its representative, and its publics, to mutually create understanding of each other to achieve equally beneficial goals. Figure 4, (based on Burkart's model of COPR) shows that the organizer of PD offers some information, and the publics in return seek further information creating a communicative process of back and forth information seeking and presenting information.

During the information seeking, the partners want to establish trust among each other. Habermas's (1984) TCA stressed "validity of certain quasi-universal demands in order to achieve understanding" (in Burkart, 2007, p. 254). These demands (also discussed as antecedents and background consensus) among the partners of the

communication process are understood as trust factors which are based on intelligibility of communication, truth of what is being said, sincerity of intentions and legitimacy of upholding social norms (Burleson & Kline, 1979). "As long as this background consensus remains undisturbed, what Habermas terms 'communicative action' can proceed nonproblematically" (Burleson & Kline, 1979, p. 417).

Putting these trust factors in view of PD, they can be understood as follows:

Intelligibility. Habermas (1984) described this as the ability to use and understand language (e.g. Urdu, English, etc.). In PD, intelligibility can be applied to the rules of engagement, and having acumen of cultural diversity, and other elements of cultural and behavioral norms.

Truth. Truth refers to the connection between statements and corresponding realities of the natural and social world. In PD realm, truth is about the existence of which the partner also accepts or the shared realities. For example, when partners acknowledge each other's realities, hardships and grievances with each other.

Sincerity/Trustworthiness. Sincerity or the trustworthiness is being honest about one's intentions and not misleading the partner in a relationship.

Legitimacy. To Habermas, legitimacy meant to act in accordance with mutually accepted values and norms. In PD realm, legitimacy may be achieved when the organizer's intentions are authentic and clear.

In conducting PD, the stakeholders are particularly interested in the truthfulness of the message, the trustworthiness of the communicator and legitimacy of the interest in the relationship building, and thus consensus on reciprocity can be gained.

Following is a model developed by the author to illustrate the concept.

Latif's Model of Consensus-oriented Public Diplomacy
### PD communication based on consensus

Country Officials/Organizations of PD		Recepient Population
Intelligible	⟷	Intelligible
Truthfulness of Messages	⟷	Truthfulness of Messages
Sincerity	⟷	Sincerity
Legitimacy	⟷	Legitimacy

Consensus

Figure 4

PD Model of Consensus-oriented PD

So far, the author has discussed how different definitions have had a different

focus and that they have lacked in some aspects to fully encapsulate the emerging role of

PD, especially in the United States's mission in CVE. The author offered a definition of PD and an explanation of clear goals, functions, scope and values in PD.

Latif's definition of PD. Public diplomacy is strategic communication with multiple stakeholders of a state, with the intent to achieve consensus on sharing cultural and ideological interests between the organizer and the stakeholders to favorably affect the public opinion of the organizing country.

Therefore, it offers the following distinctive elements:

Goals. The goal of PD is to develop human networks.

Functions. The function of PD is to gain consensus between the organizer and stakeholders instead of emphasizing to change the stakeholders' minds, especially in high-conflict relations.

Scope. This definition offers a larger scope of PD actors and activities by partnering sub-state and non-state actors in PD activities. Moreover, actions that are meant to increase favorable opinion of America are deemed PD. These actions may be in nonprofit sectors; such as humanitarian aid by Bill and Malinda Gates Foundation, organizational such as Coca Cola increasing awareness of Americanism or involving Pakistani diaspora communities in engaging with Pakistanis.

Values. Finally, Latif's definition is based on Habermas' ideals of consensus building in stakeholders.

The following chapter provides background for the varied definitions that have emerged in the PD realm and discusses some of the conditions that triggered the understanding of PD in the last century.

CHAPTER THREE

Public Diplomacy: Evolution from a Phrase to a Profession

The term public diplomacy did not exist in the American lexicon until recently, and as a result has not obtained a definitive meaning and an interpretation of what the profession entails. Particularly, "since 9/11, public diplomacy has emerged as a critical, but little understood, component of foreign policy" (Schneider, 2009, n. p.).

Therefore, in this chapter, the author talks about the evolution of PD in the United States. Not only does the author discuss some of the historical events that shaped PD but more importantly, the author explains how these events led PD to be viewed as a strategically important profession. Also, keeping in mind the definitions from the previous chapter, this chapter will help explain the existence of inconsistencies in definitions of PD.

First, we start with the first known use of PD, when it was used as *a term*, which meant to do diplomacy *publicly*.

Becoming a Term

A former U.S. diplomat and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Edmund Gullion, is generally credited to have coined the term "public diplomacy" in the mid 1960s to distance a special kind of diplomacy from the heavily negative "propaganda." However, the earliest inception is found in the London *Times* in

1856 to criticize the role of statesmen such as the U.S. President Franklin Peirce. The *Times* remarked in an editorial that, "'if they have to make, as they conceive, a certain impression upon us, they have also to set an example for their own people, and there are few examples so catching as those of public diplomacy'" (Cull, 2009, p. 2). Over a dozen years later, the *New York Times* quoted Representative Samuel S. Cox in a congressional debate in 1871 that he believed that diplomacy should be "open, public diplomacy" (Cull, 2009, p. 2).

To this point, the words "public diplomacy" had been used as part of a phrase to describe the way diplomacy should be carried out which was to do it openly and in public's eye. However, since the turn of the century, there have been four distinct eras in the use of how public diplomacy has been used. Each of the eras use PD to represent a different meaning and indicates different functions for PD.

The first era. During and after the World War I, as the U.S. government was engaging in many intricate international diplomatic relations, U.S. citizens demanded knowledge of these engagements and that the diplomacy be conducted openly and publicly. Other words such as open diplomacy were also used, but public diplomacy found more traction and was accepted internationally (Cull, 2009). President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points speech of January 8, 1918, to promote world peace also recognized the need for *openness* in keeping the public aware of diplomatic activities (Cull, 2009). So in this era, public diplomacy was still used as a phrase to refer to inclusion of citizens through transparency in traditional diplomacy and other governmental affairs.

However, the Wilsonian idealism of openness "became increasingly remote from the realities of the deteriorating international scene" and by the onset of the World War II, the words were hardly used in any context (Cull, 2009, p. 4).

The second era. The second era in the transition of PD began after the World War II, continued through the Cold War and lasted until 9/11. Diplomatic relations had lost their essence of idealism, meanwhile, public rhetoric was overcome by closely related concepts such as propaganda, international relations, psychological warfare, and public affairs (Cull, 2009; Gilboa, 2008). Eisenhower made clear before taking oath that he was not afraid of "psychological warfare, 'the struggle for the minds and wills of men,'" as a central focus of his national security plan (Armstrong, 2009, p. 64). Also, during this time, diplomatic practices started to be scrutinized through mass media and public opinion (Gilboa, 2008).

Note that, PD is still used as term which means to keep the diplomatic realm open to domestic publics. Also, important to note is that as the public demanded transparency in diplomacy of the U.S. government, it also started to shape PD activities as we see in the increased use of propaganda. Therefore, the target audience for PD started to emerge as those mostly affected by consequences of the diplomatic actions–the domestic citizens.

Later when United States Information Agency (USIA) was established in 1953, its mission clearly stated its purpose and function to be directed toward the international public, however, the words public diplomacy was not included in the mission statement. "The mission of USIA is to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the U.S. national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans

and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad" (USIA Brochure, "Electronic research collection," 1999, p. 5).[1] Cull (2009) notes that "by 1952 the usage of the term 'public diplomacy' noticeably shifted toward the realm of international information and propaganda" (p. 5). However, a decade after USIA was created officials needed to reframe its purpose distinct from "the anodyne term information or malignant term propaganda" and Gullion's term "public diplomacy" fit the bill to give "a respectable identity to the USIA career officers" (Cull, 2008, p. 6). This is also when one may notice "public diplomacy" began to emerge as a term used to describe the practice of information flow away from domestic public to international audiences. In fact, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, known as the "Smith-Mundt Act" for its Congressional sponsors, vehemently prevented U.S. propaganda for the consumption of publics inside of the United States (Fitzpatrick, 2010). Furthermore, the term started to be used in scholarship, journalism and congressional hearings more often as it started to be associated with foreign policy agenda (Cull, 2008).

Later in this era, the effects of presidential political motives can be seen on PD. The President Regan established the Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD) to promote support in the U.S. publics for Contra rebels in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas party government. The administration and OPD were accused of "the white propaganda" program for the covert efforts to promote support for the rebels in Nicaragua (Parry & Kornbluh,1988).

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[1] USIA Brochure (1999, September). This web site is an archive of the former USIA site as it stood in September 1999, and is now maintained as part of the Electronic Research Collection of historic State Department materials by the federal depository library at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Retrieved from http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/

The establishment of OPD has two important historical and professional implications that are notable in the discussion of PD function and objectives. First, the White House's use of a department named public diplomacy when used for outright negative propaganda, added to the negative connotations associated with the words public diplomacy. Second, the target audience for this PD department was domestic U.S. population, thus adding to the confusion of objectives of PD. Recalling from Malone (1985) and Tuch (1990), both isolate "foreign" publics as the target audience of PD. Therefore, once again, PD was left with perplexing ideas.

During the early 1990s, in the wake of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the foreign policy shifted to the Clinton administration's economic enlargement and expanding markets "became a key public diplomacy campaign inside the halls of the U.S. Information Agency, and for a time our telling became a model of selling, particularly America's know-how and prowess in economics and business" (Snow, 2009, p. 5). The remarkable element of the Clinton administration's PD was the exertion of "American Exceptionalism." Although, seemingly innocuous, exceptionalism carries some assumptions such as that "the United States' moral superiority, its unique democratic and revolutionary origins, its political system, social organization, cultural and religious heritage….[and that] its values serve to legitimize its policies" (Duffey, 2009, p. 338); the perception of those "triumphalistic assumptions at the core of American exceptionalism…have been a major obstacle to effective public diplomacy" (Duffey, 2009, p. 330).

Even though, one notices that PD was undermined by political agendas and setbacks such as the dissolution of USIA in 1999, events in this era established the present-day understanding of public diplomacy as a profession used for engaging with citizens to gain positive public opinion.

The third era. U.S. public diplomacy's third era immediately followed the events of 9/11. "Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or -- if you really want to be blunt -- propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance" (Holbrooke, 2001, para. 1). Holbrook aptly describes the attitudes with which the United States pursued PD during this time — with still a confused understand of its functions and its objectives. The United States was desperate to address, "why do they hate us?" The words "public diplomacy" were revived and became a relevant term in the official rhetoric for intentional engagement with foreign publics. The audience, this time, was specifically the Middle Eastern Muslims to counter terrorism and the Bush administration quickly adopted PD to "build bridges" between the Middle East and the United States (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003).

Snow (2009) identifies the initial knee-jerk PD undertakings as crisis-driven and writes:

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. government emphasized a public diplomacy based on some communication theories that have since been challenged. First, communications strategies put in place were crisis-driven and self-preservation oriented, some with very ominous sounding names, and many of

which had a very short shelf life. These included Coalition Information Centers (CICs), the White House Office of Global Communications (OGC), and the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) and Total Information Awareness (TIA) at the Department of Defense. These efforts, some more successful than others, were designed to get out more information and to better coordinate information about the U.S. response to 9/11. They are based on the premise that more information leads to better communication. In other words, "they" hate us because they do not understand us. If "they" just knew more about us— if we made a stronger case for ourselves and our position through increasing information about us— then the better off all would be. "They" would like us more. (p. 7)

Evident form this quote, this is sender-centered thinking on part of the United States.

During this time, the State Department started to assert itself as the leader in PD and "began to roll back the presence of the Pentagon in the field" (Cull, 2013, p. 15). In 2005, President George W. Bush's appointee, Karen Hughes, who had spent significant years in marketing and campaigning, was appointed as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Hughes is credited with adopting practices such as increased independence for the officials and heavy shift toward the use of Web 2.0 platforms such as blogs and online platforms, and media coverage (Cull, 2013, p. 15). Despite that, Hughes was accused of adopting propaganda-esque practices toward the Iraq war, perhaps due to her professional background in marketing. Hughes' strategies incorporated multi-media platforms to reach domestic and international audiences and were somewhat in keeping with Zaharna et al.'s (2013) ideal of connective mindshift.

Also during this time, contrary to Cull's implication that the State Department was the major actor in PD, Armstrong (2009) contends that,

By the time of 9/11, the de facto "owner" of foreign engagement outside of cultural exchanges was widely understood to be the Defense Department under former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. With discussions, and hesitancy, on "military operations other than war" the Defense Department was often the face of the U.S. through humanitarian aid missions and stability operations. It is noteworthy that after 9/11, Rumsfeld was frequently asked about the need for the United States Information Agency while the Secretaries of State during Rumsfeld's tenure rarely were. (p. 66)

The above examples show how each one of the departments approached PD differently, but more importantly, it points to the lack of agreement on who was responsible for PD and how it should have been conducted.

Going beyond the debate about which department performed PD function or who was more effective, it is more important to note that the practice of public diplomacy emerged as a description of a profession, a profession that actively engaged with the publics and focused on, "'building bridges' by filling information gaps between the Middle East and United States, i.e., messages that give Middle East citizens more of us and more of what we see as America: music, entertainment and Hollywood dream-factory movies" (Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005, p. 299). However, the overzealous PD still led to another failure as PD in Muslim countries was conducted "without any

sensitivity to the fact that this is exactly how these people interpret cultural imperialism" (Kruckeberg & Vujnovic, 2005, p. 299).

This era is not completely marked by failures, but the mix of success and failure in PD during the third era was noticed by academics and prominent contributions were made in PD theory building, especially by communication scholars. Public diplomacy emerged as field of research with interest from scholars in interdisciplinary studies, practitioners, and corporate and governmental officials. Similarly, institutions such as the University of Southern California's (USC) Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD) was established in 2003 which has developed noteworthy scholarship on PD. Snow and Taylor (2009) also affirm that "since 9/11, prominent Washington, D.C.-based organizations inside and outside government have published scores of reports and white papers, formed crisis communication task forces, or promoted new public diplomacy initiatives" (p. ix), however, these contributions have been mainly advisory in nature without considerable influence.

Zaharna et al. (2103) note that the reactive nature of PD may have a historical reason:

> In the U.S. historical experience, public diplomacy evolved during the ebb and flow of war. Dating back to the American Revolution, U.S. public diplomacy [type work] has followed a recognizable pattern. It initiates public diplomacy activities with the start of war, intensifies them during hostilities, and then abruptly ends them at the close of war. (p. 3)

So when the "War on Terror" in the post-9/11era accompanied by changes in the United States' foreign policy, came to forefront especially relating to terrorism, there were some challenges. The post-Afghanistan/Iraq invasion situation in PD was eloquently described by Armstrong (2009) as, "American public diplomacy wears combat boots" (p. 63). The metaphor of *combat boots* refers to many issues in today's undertaking of United States' PD. The first problem is that the DOD is put in position of performing PD operations which it is not meant to perform. Second, the U.S. government initiates PD after conflicts arise and therefore, the function of PD becomes mitigation or conflict resolution. Third, PD is imposed on publics without their will or consent.

The fourth era. Marked by global changes the author advances this as the connective PD era. Gilboa (2008) contends that post 9/11 era is influenced by three interrelated revolutions that took place in "mass communication, politics, and international relations" (p. 56). Also as discussed in the previous chapter, Zaharna et al. (2013) refer to the demands of this era as the *connective mindshift* marked by relationships, networks and collaborations in PD. Gregory's (2013) analysis sufficiently explains the evolution of PD that "diplomacy increasingly takes place in layers above, below, and beyond the state. There is more diplomacy in civil society, and more civil society in diplomacy. Diplomacy is more transparent. Its pace has accelerated" (p. 5).

During the transition in this phase, global communication actors such as mass media, globalized news networks, social media, became "capable of broadcasting, often live, almost every significant development in world events to almost every place on the globe" (Gilboa, 2008, p. 56). Also, revolutions in political systems transformed societies

from autocracies to democracies as seen in the *Arab Spring* and "transformed the goals and means of foreign policy" (Gilboa, 2008, p. 56). These three global changes are interconnected by "states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), communities, firms, and even individuals with ample opportunities to exchange ideas about world affairs" (Gilboa, 2008, p. 56).

The remarkable shift in this era is that the publics emerge both as the primary audience and also the actors in the PD arena and became more dialogic and interactive (Proedrou & Frangonikolopoulos, 2012). Through social media and citizen journalism, public opinion became more consequential than it had even been. Here, the researcher also brings to attention a more involved role of non-state actors in exchange of information and ideas, thus exploring the occurrence of PD in both, a broader number of actors and a broader number of target audiences. For example, Olle Wästberg, a Swedish government official explained, "Frankly, IKEA is doing more for the image of Sweden than all governmental efforts combined" (Wästberg, 2010, para. 1).

These are signs of an evolving profession that takes place on international scope. However, PD cannot be advanced as a profession unless some gaps are filled between the theoretical understanding and practice of PD. Gilboa (2008) explains that these gaps are:

> Existing research in public diplomacy suffers from several major weaknesses. Most studies are historical, and they mostly deal with the U.S. experiences during the Cold War. Historical accounts of public diplomacy are significant, especially if they are analytical and not just anecdotal, but their contribution to the

development of theory and methodology in public diplomacy has been limited. (p.

3)

A snapshot of the American PD initiatives show that at least the following four agencies claim to participate in public diplomacy role, which adds to the confusion of PD functions and objectives.

The United States' Public Diplomacy

The State Department. Primarily, the State Department runs PD through its Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The following bureaus and offices report to the Under Secretary of Public Affairs.

- Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)

- Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)

- Bureau of Public Affairs (PA)

- Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC)

- Office of Policy, Planning and Resources (R/PPR)

(U.S. Department of State, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, n.d.)

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) advances a twofold purpose of furthering the United States' interests. It helps the State Department with development programs such as civilian foreign aid such as loans and grants acquisition, and also humanitarian assistance during natural and man-made disasters, healthcare improvement and improving democratic processes (USAID, 2015).

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is a body of bipartisan private citizens that oversees all U.S. international broadcast television and radio channels around the world in 61 languages. It is comprised of the federally funded Voice of America and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti); there are also three nonprofit grantee organizations - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa), and Radio Free Asia. BBG also interact with audiences via social media. The programs under BBG are legally mandated to be accurate, objective and comprehensive (Broadcasting Board of Governors, n.d.)

Department of Defense (DOD). According to Joint Publication 3-13 (2006), also called JP 3-13, the Department of Defense (DOD) often takes on PD operations to gain and maintain informational superiority in the physical, informational and cognitive dimensions of the warfare (JP 3-13, 2006).

Information operations. The purpose of information operations (IO) specialty is also described as the U.S. forces to gain and maintain the informational upper hand in physical, informational, and cognitive warfare (JP 3-13, 2006). The Joint (2006) categorizes IO practices in three capabilities.

Core capabilities. Core capabilities are divided into five capabilities, which are: psychological operations (PSYOP) which officially changed to change to Military Information Support Operations (MISO), military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) (JP 3-13, 2006, pp. ix-x).

Supporting capabilities. Capabilities supporting IO include securing and handling information via practice called information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. "These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO" (JP 3-13, 2006, p. x).

Related capabilities. The purpose of these capabilities is not always regulated by IO; however, they work in coordination with core IO operations. These include three main functions: public affairs (PA), civil- military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy (JP 3-13, 2006, p. x).

In this chapter, the author briefly described how United States public diplomacy has evolved from public's demand to make accessible state-diplomacy to public view, to when it was used as a term to soften the negative connotations with propaganda. During the few years following end of the Cold War, PD was forgotten about as United States began to assume moral superiority over other nations and finally after 9/11 when PD was revived. Frequently, the United States lack of interest in other nations and cultures left it bewildered about how to communicate with them.

The study is an exploratory study of the of U.S. public diplomacy, especially to understand its impact on CEV. The author uses Pakistan as a case study to determine the effectiveness of PD in a country where violent extremist ideology has been on the rise (Laub, 2013) and positive public opinion of the United States has gone up and down (Pew Research Center, 2009).

This chapter has shown that there is vast inconsistency in how PD is defined, described, understood and practiced between different disciplines in academia, different U.S. agencies and between practitioners of different generations. In addition, the paucity of literature on PD, has resulted in a lack of conceptualization of PD practices.

Therefore, the researcher posits that the lack of agreement on what PD is and lack of understanding and a conceptual framework may be contributing factors to ineffectiveness of PD especially now that it is used to avoid wars with other countries and terrorist attacks on the United States. This is a challenging time for public diplomacy and the U.S. government must rid itself of inconsistencies within the government to realize the potential with which PD can help in averting wars and future terrorist attacks. With that in mind, the researcher presents the following questions.

Research Questions

RQ1: What is the United States' public diplomacy strategy in Pakistan?

RQ2: What do the experts think are some challenges faced in conducting PD, specifically in Pakistan?

RQ3: What do the experts consider to be successes and failures of U.S. public diplomacy in Pakistan?

CHAPTER FOUR

Method

Participants

To address research questions, a broad sample of individuals was selected with expertise in PD, CVE and U.S.-Pakistan relations. In-depth interviews were conducted with 13 scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy working in the areas of United States government (the State and the Defense departments), counterterrorism, non-profits/think tank and academia. A convenience snowballing sampling method was used to select scholars, professionals and practitioners in public diplomacy and counterterrorism experts in the academic community, U.S. government and nonprofit sectors. Twelve participants have advanced degrees such as a Ph.D. or an M.A. degree, and one is attending graduate school.

The rationale for choosing participants from this population included:

1. their professional or academic expertise in areas of public diplomacy, counterterrorism or international relations

2. their experience in conflict resolution

3. their knowledge in public diplomacy

4. their knowledge in foreign policy or international relations

5. their knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations and Pakistan's internal situation

All participants are mid-level to high-level in their respective careers. Of the 13 participants, all are U.S. citizens except one who is a Pakistani citizen and a legal resident of the United States. One participant is a U.S. born citizen of Pakistani descent with loose family ties to Pakistan. All participants have extensive travel experience in Pakistan or Asia, except one.

Table 2

Participants' Credentials

Participants	Pakistan Experts	PD Practitioners	Counterterrorism/ CVE Experts	Academic	U.S. Government	Nonprofit	Think Tank	U.S. Foreign Policy
A			•	•				
B		•	•		•			
C	•	•			•			•
D	•	•	•		•			•
E	•	•	•	•	•			•
F	•			•		•	•	
G				•			•	•
H	•					•		
I	•	•	•			•		
J				•			•	•
K	•			•	•	•	•	•
L	•			•				•
M		•		•	•	•	•	•

Explanation of criteria

The criteria for selecting participants are as follows:

Pakistan expert. The designation, Pakistan expert means that the participant has extensive knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relationship, foreign policy related to Pakistan, CVE or PD expertise in Pakistan.

Practitioner in PD. Public diplomacy practitioners are those who have experience in PD programs. Participant H and I, both of whom have conducted PR programs with Pakistanis as the State Department's contractors. However, they had different ideas about whether their work classifies as PD or not. The researcher has classified them according to their wishes.

Counterterrorism/CVE expert. Since CVE is a subset of counterterrorism efforts, experts in CVE are also experts in counterterrorism.

Academia. Participants who work in academic settings in foreign policy, PD, counterterrorism/CVE or Pakistan are noted in this category.

U.S. government. Only participants who have worked full time for the U.S. government agencies are included. Of the six participants listed in this category, four work or have worked for the State Department (Participant M has also worked for USIA) and two work for DOD.

Nonprofits and think tanks. Although many Washington, D.C. area think tanks are nonprofits, the reason for differentiation is to indicate that some conduct research through think tanks or by conducting workshops/engagement programs through the State Department as contracted nonprofits.

U.S. foreign policy. Participants in this category are those who regularly participate in U.S. foreign policy making or have testified in U.S. Senate Committee hearings relating to PD, CVE or Pakistan.

The search for participants started several months before the interviews were conducted. The author identified potential participants from connections on LinkedIn and their recommendations. Furthermore, the author searched LinkedIn and other internet sites for D.C.-based think tanks for subject-area scholars and requested them to participate in the study. LinkedIn was used as a method to stay in touch with the potential participants over a period of several months.

Finding participants was a particularly challenging task since there are not many experts with expertise in all three main dimensions of the research study: CVE, PD and U.S.-Pakistan relations. Counter violent extremism is a relatively novel idea; there is a scarcity of PD theory and understanding of PD practices, and those who are experts in U.S.- Pakistan relationship may not be interested in or have expertise in PD, making it difficult to select participants who could cover all aspects of the inquiry. The author selected participants who are experts and experienced in at one of the three dimensions of PD explored in this study.

The author used qualitative interview methodology for this research. George Mason University deemed the research "exempt" from IRB protocol. However, the author conducted the interviews in the fashion designed for IRB approval. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who gave insight into the different dimensions of the issues surrounding the role PD plays in CVE in Pakistan. Since

participants varied in their expertise, the questions posed to them in interviews were tailored to them, for example, Participant C (see Table 2) is directly connected to PD work in Pakistan, however, does not have theoretical expertise in PD. Similarly, Participant M is a renowned expert in PD, has worked for the U.S.I.A., think tanks and academia, but does not have expertise in PD in Pakistan. Nevertheless, he could answer questions related to Pakistan but was instrumental in understanding the role PD can play in international relations. For this reason, interview questions for each interview were tailored to stimulate an in-depth discussion on at least one of the main aspects of the research. Moreover, textual analysis of scholarly journals, books, official government reports, online texts from credible research institutes (leftist, bi-partisan and rightist), newspapers and Senate hearings were used to triangulate the validity of answers given by the interviewees.

Design

Using an interpretive lens, this study is a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy. An interpretive approach was found to be the most suitable because the research is focused on the varied and distinctive perspectives of individuals to understand the complexity of United States' PD in a precarious situation. The interview comprised open-ended questions in an unstructured format. The interviewees were encouraged to speak freely and at length that they wished.

Scholarly journals, books, official government reports, online texts from credible research institutes (leftist, bi-partisan and rightist), newspapers and Senate hearings were analyzed as secondary sources.

Procedures

The study consisted of 13 participants in all. Of these, 11 participants were interviewed face-to-face and two were interviewed on the phone. Consent forms were emailed to the interviewees for their review. There were nine interviewees who agreed to be recorded and quoted, two allowed being quoted but did not agree to record the interviews, and two current State Department officials did not allow recording, quoting or notetaking during the interviews. A personal voice recording device was used to record interviews. Of the nine recorded interviews, eight are transcribed and attached in Appendix C, and one is used for background only and not transcribed. All interviews were conducted at a location that the participants selected, such as their offices, at a café or the two phone interviews were conducted and recorded via the app called TapeACall.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out by presenting a set of open-ended questions tailored to each interviewee's expertise and interest areas. The open-ended questions were posed to triangulate the information known from other literature; this approach also helped with identifying new issues and themes during the interviews. For example, the current internal socio-political situation of Pakistan was not an intended topic of research, but repeatedly arose during the interviews.

The interviews lasted approximately 25 minutes to more than an hour. During these interviews, the participants were also observed in their level of expressions, body language, and enthusiasm.

In assessing the responses, the researcher first grouped the responses to the research questions posed above. Some of these answers were answered directly, while some others had to be extrapolated from the discussion. For example, when asked about the challenges of PD in Pakistan, interviewees had different views and did not always point to the same set of challenges. In other instances, the challenges were discussed as the "current situation" or "negative experiences." The answers were evaluated for accuracy through comparison with available secondary data. Once the research questions were analyzed, the data were examined for the most prominent themes used in the responses.

CHAPTER FIVE

Results and Discussion

Following are the research questions that were advanced to understand United States' PD particularly in the context of countering violent extremism in Pakistan. Discussion provides a holistic view of answers given by the participants.

Research Questions

RQ1: What is the United States' public diplomacy strategy in Pakistan?

RQ2: What do the experts think are some challenges faced in conducting PD, specifically in Pakistan?

RQ3: What do the experts consider to be successes and failures of U.S. public diplomacy in Pakistan?

RQ1 and discussion

The first research question was about the United States' PD strategy in Pakistan. The research suggests that there may be no consistent PD strategy for Pakistan across different agencies. In fact, the analysis suggests that there may not be a unified view of public diplomacy and how it should be approached. The study participants mentioned programs, but their interest or knowledge seemed limited to the ones that they had been a part of. This indicated that little emphasis is paid to strategically consolidating resources and efforts in PD strategy in Pakistan. Despite not getting a clear answer about a current

PD strategy in Pakistan, some of the ongoing programs were pointed out and the interviews gave insight into how PD is addressed in the United States government.

Some responses gathered from the research are:

Reducing anti-Americanism. "The American government's interest is to have a positive view of America among the Pakistani public. I think there are enough polls that show that is not the case right now" (Participant H, Appendix C, p. 135). Thus, many of the PD programs in Pakistan seem to be addressing anti-Americanism by forming positive perception of America in Pakistan.

The topic of perception of the United States in Pakistan was discussed as public opinion. The researcher differentiates between public opinion of the United States and perception of the United States as a qualitative and a quantitative shift in public attitudes. Perceptions are the general trends in how the United States is portrayed in everyday discussions and national dialogue; public opinion is the scientific data collected on mental frameworks of favorable, non-favorable or neutral perceptions through a credible research body such as the Pew Research Center. Since general perceptions eventually lead to the change in mental frameworks, for this reason, the researcher considers both terms the same and infers that the goal of CVE programs is to change public opinion about the United States in the Pakistani publics. It is also noteworthy that the U.S. supported mass media campaigns that highlight ill effects of extremism and raise awareness of the bloodshed that extremism causes are "popular programs that were very effective" (Participant E, Appendix C, p. 131) and regarded as symbols of patriotism among Pakistanis. However, these are not overtly U.S. projects and do not seem to have a

direct effect on public attitude toward the United States. This suggests that U.S. can

implement PD and more specifically CVE programs without them being about changing

the public opinion about America. American foreign policy. Participant E said about

U.S. PD messages that, "that's how we would get the word out about our policy"

(Appendix C, p. 126). Participant M contends that PD "is an instrument used to

understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior, it is an instrument used to influence thought

and mobilize action" (Appendix C, p. 158). The emphasis on "influence thought and

mobilize action" reflects on the advocacy role of PD. Similarly, Participant G describes

PD actors as those who participate "in the global arena to *project* [emphasis added]

images, advocate causes and mediate differences of identities" (Appendix D, p. 176).

Participant L also commented that in "public diplomacy you're really trying to sell a

story about who you are or what you want or what you're doing in a place. So, you're not

really trying to win a negotiation" (Appendix C, p. 154). Despite his earlier comment that

PD is a tool that influences thought and mobilizes action, Participant M complicated

conversation stating, "I certainly don't think that good public diplomacy overcomes bad

policy" (Appendix C, p. 165). These statements raise questions about whether the

primary function of the American PD is to advocate U.S. policies, to offset negative

opinions caused by some unfavorable policies or is it to promote relationships.

Contrary to communication scholars a political science professor in South Asian

studies, Participant L, explained PD as something that is "for propaganda, I guess. Let's

see, propaganda" (Appendix C, p. 151). Participant L's statement points to a common

perception that Participant M described as "IR [international relations] departments don't do much with diplomatic studies" (Appendix C, p. 162).

Other issues surrounding the strategy are:

Tactics. The focus of the discussions revolved around the on-going programs in Pakistan. For example, Participant E talked about engaging publics on Facebook, conducting cultural shows and Fulbright Scholarships, etc. as ways of engagement.

Target audience. Participant E explained that the target audience for PD in Pakistan is not those that are extremist in their views but rather the "very large swath in-between, which is the *great undecided* [emphasis added]. Or the *great uncommitted*, [emphasis added] and that's really what the focus of a lot of our PD is," (Participant E, p. 131). In contrast, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2010) recommends three distinct target audiences. First, the general public; second, the elites such as the religious leaders and journalists; third, government officials. The report suggests that aiming PD at the those thought-leaders and decision-makers who already have a positive perception of the United States, will create a "spillover effect" (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2010, p. 42). Lin, F., Chang, T., & Zhang, X. (2015) explain that spillover effect happens when a certain idea that is on the agenda of some people, often the elites, and then cascades down to the mainstream population. Spillover effect is often associated with diffusion of ideas, and with the long-term diffusion of ideology (Mathers, & Pfetsch, 1991); therefore, making it appropriate method to bring change from within the Pakistani population. The Advisory Commission's view on the target audience is different from that offered by Participant E.

It is not clear why there is a disparity between the two.

Participant H and I talked about the involved role of diaspora communities in relationship building. "They [the diaspora community] see an alignment of interests and opportunity. And usually in America, it's the diaspora community that really support it" (Participant H, Appendix C, p. 145). The researcher finds this finding interesting because it is unlike the Cold War era practices where the PD audience was limited to transnational publics. The Pakistani diaspora may potentially be a useful stakeholder in American PD. Fitzpatrick (2010) writes that when the Congress for U.S. Public Diplomacy laid out the mission for PD more than half a century ago, it had a dual mandate "one focused on helping people abroad understand U.S. policies, ideas and values (the foreign mandate) and the other focused on enhancing Americans' understanding of other nations' policies, ideas and values (the domestic mandate)" (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 5). After World War II, when the United States' propaganda laden PD took an *activist* approach (Adelman, 1981), Smith-Mundt prevented U.S. propaganda for the consumption of publics inside of the United States (Fitzpatrick, 2010). But after many years of debate and realizing that the information flow is inevitable in this internet age, therefore, this contingency is outdated and raises suspicions, policymakers removed the restriction on domestic PD in 2013. Meanwhile, Smith-Mundth had prevented progress within the country, an Australian study shows that countries such as Canada, Norway, Finland, India, China, South Korea and Nigeria have adopted methods of one-way information dissemination, dialogue and face-to-face integrations to keep domestic audiences up-to-date and involved in policy decisions and their implications (Conley-Taylor, Abbasov, Gibson, &

Teo, 2012). Similarly, countries such as Namibia have programs that introduce youth to their policies and educate the public on developments abroad (Conley-Taylor et al., 2012). The U.S. Department of State has a similar program by the name of Foreign Affairs Campus Coordinator Program exists to promote awareness of foreign affairs on college campuses but it does not address policy issues and it is not clear how impactful the program has been (U.S. State Department, n.d.).

   Time duration of PD campaigns. Another important strategy related issue is the duration of the programs i.e., whether PD is long-term or short-term oriented. Participant H said, "America has multiple parallel tracks of work happening…. PD track works to emphasize the investment-oriented work" (Participant H, Appendix C, p. 140-141). Participant H's statement reiterates the goal of PD is a change in public opinion and also points out that PD programs are intended to yield results in the long-term. Participant E said that in the State Department's International Visitor's Program, participants who "come to the states and see how it works, that experience stays with them throughout their whole professional career, so the payoff comes much later. We have a lot of people that are ministers in Pakistan who have been in the program" (Appendix C, p. 132).

   An important difference between PD conducted by the State and DOD was discussed. Often, the Defense Department's PD is short-term and action-oriented, such as when DOD deploys troops for disaster relief. It is important to note this difference because DOD can change perception of the United States in the short term. As noted by Participant H, DOD's action-oriented efforts "are visible and those are remembered, especially by those who are affected [by a calamity], but the longer-term development

work tends to be difficult to get attention" (Appendix C, p. 141). In contrast, the State Department has programs whether message-focused such as the cultural exchange programs, or action-oriented such as the annual Global Entrepreneurship Summit (GES), are almost exclusively long-term plans. Participant E said that due to the State Department's lower budget, it is unable to practice action-oriented work to the same level as DOD. He further lamented that because "actions speak louder than words, and if the Defense Department is quick to act in response to a disaster, that sends a message. And very often those messages are heard much better than anything anybody could say" (Participant E, Appendix C, p. 131). However, it should be noted that historically, the DOD's work may have spiked the positive perceptions about the United States in Pakistanis, it is quick to go down with any diplomatic or military setback.

Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith A McHale, described the PD plan in Pakistan as "four broad goals: expand media outreach, counter extremist propaganda, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people ties" (SFRC Subcommittee on International Operations, 2010, para. 25). Analysis suggests that programs under PD strategy in Pakistan are ultimately geared toward CVE. However, there are some *CVE-specific* programs that overtly and explicitly address CVE in Pakistan.

Four different types of programs are operational in Pakistan.

First, the United States' PD is aimed at Pakistani media to strengthen relations with them to encourage unbiased reporting on U.S. foreign policies and current events. Public Affairs Office (PAO) in the Information, Research and Communication office in

Embassy of the United States in Islamabad is the head of this department that actively engages media and "assist(s) the Pakistani public in understanding the United States and its policies" (Embassy of the United States, Information, Research and Communication, n.d., para 1).

Second, PD is aimed at building economic and social development to encourage the role of civil society. The Pakistan Transition Initiative (PTI) was started in 2007 and works with Pakistani government ministries, community and private groups to provide development opportunities to residents "to develop skills, reinforce values of tolerance and mutual respect, and develop counter-narratives" for the purpose of CVE (USAID, 2016, para 13).

Third, under the U.S. Education and Cultural Exchange Programs, United States emphasizes cultural exchange and educational programs for Pakistani teachers and youth with a vision that a better-educated population is likely to follow international media, have exposure to objective ideas and therefore will be less likely to fall victim to extremist ideology. Participant E confirmed that Pakistan is the recipient of the largest portion of these funds (Appendix C, p. 138). Under this objective, many educational programs exist. Some of these are described briefly.

English language programs. Many initiatives have started under this objective. For example, English language teaching programs at the U.S. Embassy, Islamabad and an online program that allows people to play video games that teach them English, and scholarships are offered for underprivileged children where they "gain an appreciation for American democratic values, increase their ability to participate successfully in the socio-

economic development of their country, and gain the ability to compete for and participate in future U.S. exchange and study programs"(Embassy of the United States, English Language Programs, n.d., para 7).

Lincoln Corners. There are 17 Lincoln Corners established in Pakistan, mainly in urban Universities. "Lincoln Corners are multi-media resource centers, where visitors can connect, practice their English, and learn about America in many different ways" (Embassy of the United States, Lincoln Corners, n.d., para 1).

Study and exchange programs: Programs such as the Fulbright Scholarships are part of such initiatives.

The fourth type of initiatives are CVE-specific programs such as the DOS's Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) office's initiatives that help make curriculum for madrasas, encourage peaceful coexistence with minorities and protecting human rights in Pakistan (Mirahmadi, et al., 2015).

Interestingly, the list of programs above is not comprehensive and came from a variety of think tank reports and U.S. government websites. This indicates a lack of consistent and strategic vision across various agencies and may cause a significant negative consequence. Without a comprehensive list of all initiatives, interagency coordination and integration of programs between different agencies is difficult and may cause the United States to overspend on redundant planning and implementation of PD programs. For example, DOD initiated a cyber-combat plan to fight CVE by promoting internet connectivity and mass production of solar powered laptops which was "torpedoed

by a rival within the Pentagon," and a similar initiative was carried out by the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa via the Joint PSYOP Support Element (JPSY) (Cull, 2013, p. 13). Similarly, "the Government Accountability Office report determined that there was significant overlap among the BBG's languages services and that the BBG did not systematically consider the financial cost of overlap" (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013).

Discussion. Participants C and D, practitioners of PD in the U.S. State Department, showed little interest in theoretical understanding of PD which suggests that there is a lack of knowledge about PD theory among the practitioners. This is problematic as the former Vice President of Applied Research on Conflict at USIP points out that "the lack of a clear definition for CVE not only leads to conflicting and counterproductive programs but also makes it hard to evaluate the CVE agenda as a whole." (Mirahmadi, et al., 2015, p. 9). This vicious cycle of lack of definition, understanding, consistency and implementation in CVE and United States' PD can be broken if two valuable lessons are noted from the discussion above. First, government agencies quite often partner with quasi-government agencies such as the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and private organizations to develop, implement and evaluate programs yet by the classical definition of PD, these organizations are not recognized as partners in PD. Second, despite that the traditional definition of PD suggests that PD is aimed to ultimately change the minds of people so they can positively affect their government policies toward the United States, this is not particularly true of the PD initiatives in Pakistan, especially concerning CVE. For example, the initiatives and programs are aimed at the attitude of

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the publics and not public changing its government's policies. Recognizing this inconsistency with how PD is defined, will be useful for the State Department to move toward defining its PD in future and will help tailor its strategic vision in programs accordingly.

A limitation of this set of participants is that not all participants were able to answer RQ 1 either due to lack of experience in directly working in PD in Pakistan, or were unable to answer because of official restriction on providing the answers. To counter this hurdle, official and non-official reputable sources were used to fully understand the United States' PD strategy in Pakistan. Moreover, the United States' PD is discussed through the perspectives of scholars who do not have direct experience with PD in Pakistan.

RQ 2 and discussion

The second question was about the challenges faced in conducting PD in Pakistan. Not surprisingly, the topic of challenges often came up before the question was raised and often one challenge seems to feed other challenges.

The challenges that were discussed were about the deficit of training, and lack of emphasis on research and evaluation. Safety of U.S. officials is also a big concern for officials in Pakistan. These concerns often limit their official rotations in a country like Pakistan to one to two years which becomes a challenge in creating and maintaining relationships and finishing PD initiatives and restrict access to far-off places. Also, there appears to be a lack of clarity on the role non-profits and U.S. agencies play in PD, particularly the DOD's role. Budgetary constraints appear to be one cause of this

confusion which arises when DOD is abundantly funded by several executive initiatives

to undertake many humanitarian and reconstruction missions; whereas the State

Department, which is responsible for PD, lacks resources to undertake these programs.

One of the most difficult challenges in conducting PD occurs when there is an

expectation that PD will successfully advocate unfavorable U.S. foreign policies.

Moreover, Pakistan's political unrest, pseudo-democracy and socio-economic problems

also hinder PD operations.

Some of the challenges faced by PD programs are:

Training. A repetitive theme among challenges was the training and readiness of

the respective PD and PA officials of the State Department and DOD. Participant B said

about PA training in the military that, "[PA] training was specifically designed for the

reconstruction teams, but most of the scenario training wasn't very realistic. The people

playing locals were belligerent, confrontational and just not realistic of what we *actually*

[emphasis added] saw…. they were unrealistically belligerent" (Appendix C, p. 120).

Participant E said that PD officers get a one-year training in language of their upcoming

country of appointment but may or may not have much training in PD or about the

culture of the country. Participant E said that "it is very hard to learn the culture without

learning the language…It's like you are showing you are making the effort and crossing

the halfway line." (Appendix C, p. 134). But Participant G said about language training

that it may not be enough to truly connect with the publics because "culture is

multilayered, multidimensional, and deeply embedded" and language alone cannot make

one understand the cultural norms and expectation in publics (Appendix D, Participant G,

p. 182). Participant J, who has advised and consulted for the Foreign Service Institute, mentioned that "public diplomacy training in the State Department is getting better, it can use improvement, but it is better than before" (Appendix D, p. 176).

      Measurement and evaluation. Participant M pointed out a serious short sightedness in evaluation methods; Participant M said that the United States must first "need to distinguish between the evaluation of efficiency and evaluation of outcomes" (Appendix C, p. 174). In other words, he pointed out the difference between outputs and outcomes. Participant H expressed that "it's both an art, and a science" (Appendix C, p. 142) for which there is no established matrix or a baseline, especially in CVE (Banks, 2011). The latest use of PD was during the Cold War, however, it is unclear to what degree PD had been successful during that time (Kelly, 2007). Other trends in evaluation of PD may also be seriously flawed. For example, Banks (2011) noticed that often the "opponent's 'counter-measures'" are calculated as a sign of PD success (p. 48). These counter-measures can range from something as pesky as resisting PD initiatives, but these measures can also be violent or deadly such as violence or threat of violence. Responses of participants on the question of evaluation measures of PD initiatives and practices were vague and arbitrary. Some measures mentioned by participants were Facebook likes, scientific and unscientific feedback from participants such as surveys or showing gratitude for being invited to cultural events, ability of foreign service officers to engage with the audience in local languages, attending events and some as vague as being able to make friends in Pakistan.

Moreover, Participant H's analysis of PD being an art and a science points to the difficulty of its measurement for those who do not have expertise. Some programs that are expected to yield results in the long run, may never be evaluated because of change in focus of the agencies or change in administration. During conversations with the participants, the researcher sensed that the primary reason agencies invested time or effort in the evaluation was to secure funding in the following years for these programs rather than improvement of the programs. Banks (2014) agrees that this can be a dangerous trend because this motivation may lead to "inaction, fudging, or even burying the results of a less than-stellar-evaluation" (p. 14). A retired U.S. ambassador said that many times program evaluations are resisted because the failure of a program may be considered a professional failure by officials; however, he thought that the attitude is changing in the younger PD officials. Lord (1998) lamented that "Empirical research and sophisticated analytical studies are needed in a field that is today even more of an academic and policy orphan than it was in the past" (p. 49). Even though, Lord's sentiment was aimed at the state of PD after the fall of the Soviet empire, it still holds true. This may be due to a chicken and egg situation between theory and practice of PD that appears to exists between them.

Budget. Budget issues may affect the functional aspects of PD and also the strategic side of PD. Budget restraints may also play a part in resisting evaluation. Budget allocated to research and evaluation is often small especially when compared to other types of communication campaigns such as PR campaigns. Depending on the campaign, PR professionals often allocate from five to 15 percent of the campaign budget to

formative and summative research. Brown, Hensman, and Bhandari (2015) note in the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report that the State and BBG spend more or less one percent of their PD budget on research and evaluation, and USAID spends about three percent which are quite low by the standards determined by PR practitioners.

Strategic direction. Participant K said referring to a consistent and theoretical framework that "what America lacks is a coherent vision for how to approach the world" (Appendix C, p. 147). Participants C and D did not think theory was relevant to their work in PD and CVE. However, Participant E's views were different saying that while theoretical framework is necessary, it can sometimes be "hard to translate for some people into actual action, so it's a challenge" (Appendix C, p. 128).

Participant J (Appendix D, p.128) stated that there is not much convergence between theory and practice of PD. Five of the remaining participants also agreed on the lack of convergence between theory and practice; however, their views on whether theory facilitates practice or if practice facilitates theory, were different. For example, referring to the paucity of scholarship in PD, Participant E lamented that "most fields have journals that are associated with them, for example, with media studies, you can find three or four journals that focus on media studies so if you read those journals, you know what is happening in the field. That is a lot harder in PD" (Appendix C, p. 127). In fact, he mentioned that there is only one PD related peer-reviewed scholarly journal that he knew of and his institution (a mid-Atlantic university) where he teaches, does not even subscribe to it.

Participant M, seemed to have a clear answer to the question of convergence. He

explained that "scholars need to pay more attention to what practitioners do. There's a

whole logic called practice theory" (Appendix C, p. 168). Practice theory is a grand

theory often applied in fields such as organizational studies, marketing and human

resource management, to name a few. Practice theory seeks to solve the problematics that

exists between seemingly irreconcilable ideas (Walther, 2014), such as practice based in

theory or theory founded in practice. Wiseman (2015) further explains that in any field of

practice "when practitioners share these practices….as standardized, competent,

patterned behavior, a *community of practice* [emphasis added] is formed" (p. 317). When

these practices are conceptualized as consistent, replicable and dependable practices,

stemming from human agency, a structure for practice is formed. Practice theory in

United States' PD may allow the evolution of PD practice to occur as United States'

deals with an environment of rapidly changing international affairs. It can also be noticed

that practice theory tends to weed out undesirable practices which can act as a valuable

evaluation method for PD practices.

It seems that the practitioners' willingness to contribute to scholarly work, and

scholars' willingness to practice will contribute to theory-building. This suggests that the

profession of PD is evolving and ready to develop into a profession grounded in scholarly

work. This process will solve a difficulty felt in the effectiveness of PD across the U.S.

government. Participant E pointed out that it is not only a challenge but an underlying

issue in American PD, which is not having a PD strategy across different U.S. agencies.

Pakistan's internal unrest. Pakistan's internal unrest cause a domino effect of many challenges for the success of PD programs and performance of PD practices; for example, it affects the evaluation of programs, raises safety concerns and burdens the allocated budget for these programs.

In many hard-to-reach or unsafe-to-travel places in Pakistan, USAID contract consultants evaluate whether resources are spent appropriately and results are achieved. These results show that there is waste, fraud, and abuse in the administration of the USAID programs. Supplies such as canned foods and medicines often end up on black markets. The researcher observed that the problem is so widespread that USAID regularly advertises a toll-free phone number on Pakistani television networks to report abuse or misuse of USAID resources.

Participant E discussed safety concerns in Pakistan. He explained that embassy staff in high-threat locales such as Pakistan cannot bring their families with them, and that means they are not asked to stay longer than one-year rotations. The challenge with that is:

> [With] the short-term assignments you have, the harder it is to really know the country. Because any time you visit a country, you are spending the first several months just getting acclimatized, you know, learning who the important people are, learning the language, etc., and you just start to get comfortable about a year into the assignment. If your assignment is only a year long, you leave right when you are getting effective. The normal assignment in the State Department is three years. So probably you are most effective in your second year and maybe the last

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few months, you are sort of thinking about your next assignment but at least, the second year and a half is where you are at your peak. You have gotten to know the contacts, you know what you want to accomplish, you sort of master the language to a certain extent. I think that it is a problem when you have more short-term assignments because if a country is real dangerous, you don't want to bring your family. But you cannot keep somebody separated from their family for [more than] a year, and that is a problem. (Participant E, Appendix C, p. 133-134)

The weak infrastructure of Pakistan makes mobility of resources difficult, the law and order situation makes some programs dangerous to conduct and for officials to mingle openly with Pakistanis. A retired U.S. Ambassador (personal communication, nonparticipant) jokingly said about the safety of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad that it has a built-in budget for reconstruction "because they know that sooner or later the protestors will show up and damage some part of the embassy."

Roles of U.S. agencies. Another challenge that participant of the study mentioned was the unclear and often conflicting roles U.S. agencies have in PD.

According to the DOD official, Participant K, the challenge within the State Department is that the DOD is put in situations to take on PD functions that it is not willing to accept. Participant K said:

Struggling with declining budgets, the State Department does not have enough people and resources to do the sorts of things in the area of violent extremism that one would hope. For example, state stabilization. You want to stabilize a state before it becomes an ungoverned area. [The] State Department, by extension

USAID, does not have the resources or the skills to do those sorts of things. Since

the Iraq and Afghanistan wars began, we have seen an assumption of many State

[Department]-like function by the Defense Department. So in Afghanistan, for

example, you not only have US troops fighting, but you know they were also

digging wells, and they are building schools. Those are development activities,

but because the State Department had a dearth of people, [it lacks the] capacity to

plan strategically for these issues. There has been this perception at the State

[Department] that DOD has assumed more of what one would call development

function. DOD does not welcome that at all. They want to divest of that. Even

though they both agree, the State [Department] does not have the capacity to do

so. (Appendix C, p. 150)

This is an interesting statement because it speaks of the unwelcomed role DOD

has been given in PD. Participant E also mentioned that the State Department has a

smaller budget allocated to it than the DOD, and even a smaller portion of the budget

goes to PD initiatives. Inadequate funding at the program level and manpower are

concerns for the State Department. After World War II, a legal framework emerged for

the specific roles of the State Department and DOD, where State was responsible for

overseeing and giving direction to DOD's military and security assistance programs.

However, "over the years, congressional directives and executive actions have modified,

shaped, and refined State Department and DOD roles and responsibilities" (Serafino,

2016, p. i). Especially under the Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) and the

annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), DOD receives funding that far

surpasses that of the entire operation of the State Department (Serafino, 2016). Some

policymakers are calling for Title 10 reforms to "simplify the complex legal and

bureaucratic regime—the plethora of very specific authorities with differing interagency

collaboration requirement—which makes effective and timely planning difficult"

(Serafino, 2016, p. 23).

Armstrong (2009) recalled that "by the time of 9/11, the de facto 'owner' of

foreign engagement outside of cultural exchanges was widely understood to be the

Defense Department under former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. With

discussions, and hesitancy, on 'military operations other than war,' the Defense

Department was often the face of the U.S. through humanitarian aid missions and

stability operations" (Armstrong, 2009, p. 63). Lord (2008) thinks that this is a risky trend

as he further suggested,

> The message foreign publics receive – not the message the U.S. sends – changes
>
> when the Pentagon is the messenger. Putting our military, not civilians, at the
>
> forefront of U.S. global communications undercuts the likelihood of success,
>
> distorts priorities, and undermines the effectiveness of US civilian agencies. In
>
> most circumstances, the Department of Defense (DOD) should not serve as the
>
> most visible face of the United States overseas. This is particularly true in areas
>
> where the public feels threatened by American power. (para. 2).

This is perhaps what Matthew Armstrong meant when he lamented that American public

diplomacy wears combat boots (Armstrong, 2009). It also points out that often the United

States mobilizes its PD after military actions have taken place and an expectation that PD

will "stop them from coming here to kill us" (Zaharna, 2010). Furthermore, this discussion suggests role of the Defense Department in PD initiatives is a double-edged sword. The capabilities DOD has, such as a vast amount of funds, allows it to be readily available for humanitarian and stability operation. However, these initiatives come with a high price-tag as well, putting a fiscal drain on the federal budget. Thus, when U.S. priorities change and shift to other conflicts, long-term and high-cost missions are withdrawn, often with devastating consequences. For example, as mentioned earlier, the Secretary Clinton acknowledged in a Senate hearing that the United States helped Pakistan train Afghan Mujahideen but when in 1989, the Soviets withdrew forces from Afghanistan, "we said thank you very much" and left Pakistanis to deal with the influx of Mujahideen (*The Dawn*, 2009, para. 6). At the time, it seemed the objective was achieved when the Soviets left Afghanistan, but swift U.S. exit from the region resulted in Pakistan becoming resentful of having to deal with the consequences of the war such as the Afghan immigrants in Pakistan, and the Mujahideen turning anti-America.

The combination of these issues often raises questions about the strategic nature of DOD operations. Participant I expressed skepticism about DOD stating:

It is also funny to think that you can actually train a soldier in sympathy, and empathy, and humility, and these emotions because then they cannot fight. So it is really impractical when they say that 'we need our soldiers to understand humility.' You cannot really do that. Because you are training them to go out and kill and fight. And if you teach too many emotional responses, you are going to have them falling out of ranks and disobeying. But the most important part of the

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strategy for the Army is to have your boot force go in, accomplish the mission and

come out. So when the Defense Department sends these task forces of soldiers as

Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO) to help with on ongoing issues, for

economic development and healthcare, and so on, it doesn't work too well.

(Appendix C, p. 150).

The skepticism does not always come from outside; Participants H and I work in

nonprofit sectors who have facilitated the State Department's work in PD. Participant H

did not consider their work as participating in PD, "We maintain our independence very,

very, very carefully" (Appendix C, p. 143). However, Participant I is adamantly about

their nonprofit being a partners in American PD, "The State Department uses nonprofits

like us as partners all the time. (Appendix C, p. 154). Similarly, another form of

skepticism arises when military practitioners too are "going through the drill" without

believing or understanding their motives. Army Col. Paul Yingling, who has served three

rotations in Iraq, expressed that, "What we do as I.O. [information officers] is almost

gimmicky…Doing posters, fliers or radio ads. These things are unserious'" (Brook &

Locker, 2012, para. 3).

Skepticism may come from a lack of strategy and direction America has for PD.

Kelly (2009) points out the dichotomous model of the United States PD, where it has

served either an *advocacy role* or an *advisory role*. The advocacy role takes place "where

policy has been made and public diplomats are dispatched for its articulation and

defense" (p. 82). In contrast, in the advisory role, "presence helps to ensure that local

concerns have been considered prior to policy implementation" (Kelly, 2009, p. 82). This

what Edward Murrow had referred to as being part of the take offs and crash landings;

however, PD has often been used in an advocacy role in the United States. The frustration

over a constant advocacy role has made reconciliation over the disbanding of USIA easy

for some Washingtonians. Participant M spoke of his views on USIA's dissolution,

"While it had a lot of programming overseas, it was a marginal player in Washington"

(Appendix C, p. 166). Some are skeptical of PD altogether, for example, Participant H

said, "Although, I think the PD efforts should happen. I think their reach is limited"

(Appendix C, p. 141).

    Foreign policy. A critical challenge that PD encounters in Pakistan is the

unpopular U.S. foreign policies and other diplomatic conflicts such as the drone attacks

in territories of Pakistan. Participant E said,

> It is so obvious, but people do not talk about it, if our policy is popular, then the
>
> PD officials are going to have an easy job. If our policies are incredibly
>
> unpopular, then we are going to have a hard time. And so I think there are
>
> countries where more or less the publics aligns with what the U.S. is trying to do,
>
> but when their publics are against us in general, that is when things flare up, and
>
> we have a very rough time. (Appendix C, Participant L. p. 130)

Similarly, USAID supported the anti-polio campaign in Pakistan which suffered

greatly when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was found to have financed a

clandestine health campaign to locate Osama Bin Laden's whereabouts in Pakistan (Shah,

2011).

    The disconnection between U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy is a threat to

the long-term sustainability of many PD programs. Peterson (2002) states that,

> "An essential starting point is to recognize that U.S. foreign policy is weakened
> by a failure to include public diplomacy systematically in the formulation and
> implementation of policy. The motivation for such inclusion is not simply to win
> popularity or to drive U.S. policy by forging foreign public approval. Rather,
> public diplomacy is important because foreign attitudes and understanding can
> affect the success or failure of initiatives" (para. 13).

Lack of trust. Another challenge in conducting PD in Pakistan is the lack of trust between the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan and the United States have a long history of failing each other; therefore, trust remains a major cause of many failed diplomatic and PD efforts. Participant K stated that the U.S.-Pakistan unsteady relationship had caused lack of trust between them and explained that trust could be rebuilt in three different ways. First, trust may develop from a legal perspective such as trade agreements, security agreements or coups. Second, trust forms through people-to-people contacts and third, through support in times of need, but support has to be consistent and "*that* [emphasis added] more than anything else is a measuring stick, by how deeply countries trust one another" (Appendix C, p. 148).

In 2002, the Pentagon abandoned its newly formed Office of Strategic Influence, after reports that it would distribute false information to foreign media (Merle, 2005). Such actions discredit the PD efforts, makes the world community question U.S. intentions, and the target audience loses trust. Consequently, conspiracy theories arise that are hard to discredit. For example, the researcher knows that it is not uncommon to

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hear on Pakistani television networks that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were sanctioned by

the United States government as an excuse to enter Iraq. Similarly, Talhami (2004) says

that many Muslims and Arabs express fear that the United States' War on Terror is in fact

intended to weaken the Muslim world. Lack of trust harms both, the United States and

Pakistan, and they pay a price in a weakened relationship among them.

> The problem is more than a peculiar domestic phenomenon for Pakistan. It has
>
> grown into a narrative of national victimhood that is a nearly impenetrable barrier
>
> to any candid discussion of the problems here. In turn, it is one of the principal
>
> obstacles for the United States in its effort to build a stronger alliance with a
>
> country to which it gives more than a billion dollars a year in aid. (Tavernise,
>
> 2010)

This may be one reason why many policies toward Pakistan are made in secrecy

(Tavernise, 2010). Lack of trust, conspiracy theories, and secrecy, seems to be a vicious

cycle that is hard to break out of for U.S. and Pakistan.

Similarly, lack of trust may be adding to fiscal burden on the United States as

Limerick and Cunninton (1993) suggest that lack of trust causes added stress on financial

and human resources. For example, due to lack of trust, organizations may indulge in

added bureaucratic steps and contingency plans to offset sudden change of plans. All

these additional plans require more human and financial resources (Limerick &

Cunninton, 1993)

During the conversations with any of the participants, an interesting observation is

that no mention of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) was

made. This commission advises all agencies related to PD and their initiatives in the U.S. government. Combined with the fact that many recommendations presented by ACPD over the past many years have not been implemented, indicates that this body is not utilized properly and that the agencies are resistant to change. For example, the commission's 2005 annual report has recommended increased partnership with the private sector but these recommendations, among many others, have not produced much change (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005).

RQ 3 and discussion

The third research question in the interviews was about successes and failures that have happened in the United States' PD. The success of PD programs revolved around different matrixes on social media such as Facebook "likes," Fulbright Scholarships, and the International Visitor's Program. But the failures of U.S. public diplomacy are noticeably intertwined with political matters and traditional diplomacy. Also, the list of failures may seem longer and more unsettling than successes, but future may not be bleak. In speaking with the participants, they were optimistic about the U.S.- Pakistan relationship and CVE efforts. They thought, that many problems can be resolved. A very visible proof of this is also present in Pakistani publics. Safiya (2010) notes that despite cynicism, the mood in a room full of Pakistani youth suddenly lightened up when she, an American official, engaged with them and shared with them that she is a fan of Pakistani rock band *Junoon.* The group of young Pakistanis also seemed to be captivated by the possibility that President Obama may know how to cook *kheema* (minced beef) and *daal* (lentils), courtesy of his Pakistani college roommate (Safiya, 2010).

Participants talked about success and failure; however, it is noteworthy that successes stories were tinted with failures and vice versa.

Success. Participant E talked about engaging youth on social media. The U.S. embassy's webmaster started a Facebook series where he would post scenic pictures and page visitors would guess whether an image was U.S. scenery or a Pakistani scenery. The embassy's page has received one million "likes." But he lamented that "if you have only a handful of people in the embassy, you can't really engage in a dialogue with millions of people" (Appendix C, p. 137). Participant E mentioned funding filmmakers who produce documentaries about the suffering of families who were victims of terrorism in Pakistan (Appendix C, p. 136). Similarly, collaboration with the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR), the public affairs counterpart agency in Pakistan military, has helped produce teledramas, music videos, and documentaries as CVE engagement which "have come to dominate the mainstream media landscape" (BBC, 2015). Similarly, Participant E noted that after video campaign that highlighted the atrocities caused by the Taliban, the negative public opinions about the Taliban "went through the roof" (Appendix C, p. 136) and the shows were very popular. However, it is not clear whether these shows are influencing the intended target audience.

Participant E confirmed that Pakistan is the recipient of the largest number of Fulbright Scholarships and the International Visitor's Program invitations from the United States. Participant E elaborated on the long-term effect on the Fulbright scholar is that when they go back to Pakistan and after observing how things work in the United States, they try to implement those ideas in Pakistan. In fact, he said that there is a long-

term outcome of Fulbright scholarships, as many Pakistani ministers are individuals who at one point had been Fulbright Scholars in the United States (Appendix C, p. 132). A former Fulbright scholar from Pakistan lightheartedly lamented that on return to Pakistan, often scholars lose credibility as they are referred to as the CIA informant or that they have been "brainwashed by the Americans" and their advice is silenced by saying, "don't be such an American" (Personal communication, non-participant). However, on a serious note, this individual regretted that the United States does not accept reciprocal student exchange offers which make official and also ordinary Pakistanis suspicious of the programs (personal communication, non-participant interviewee). Fisher (2010) says that American PD often focuses on "inviting others in" rather than getting out and engaging as a peer" (p. 15). Fisher (2010) further argues that staying behind the high walls of the U.S. embassies will not help rather "there are times when going to the bazaar rather than building a cathedral has great potential" (p. 15). [2]

> Pakistani scholars go to the United States, and they teach classes, they create curricula. It is certainly a win-win situation. If you want to talk about a problem, if you want to keep the same program in mind. It's hard to have a two-way exchange. That's one of the general problems with working in Pakistan. We send hundreds of people to the States, but we cannot send hundreds of Americans to Pakistan because of the security situation. So it's harder to have real two-way exchanges, which is your goal. So I think there is security situation has hampered the true exchange capacity with Pakistan. (Appendix C, p. 137)

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[2] Metaphor used by Eric Raymond (2011) in his book *The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary.*

Another issue which the participants did not mention but may be perpetuating a social injustice issue in Pakistan is that these programs are often aimed at particular youth that may belong to an already empowered class of Pakistani citizens. For example, "what we do is identify people who we think are going to rise to prominent position in their country" (Participant E, Appendix C, p. 132). The problem with this is that this may be one reason for rampant conspiracy theories and that this may not be strategically wise to focus on a particular socio-economic demographic.

Participant H talked from his experience in the nonprofit world. He mentioned program-level success such as when participants in their programs later take initiatives to work on joint ventures or develop life-long relationships in each other's countries. Participant H discussed his experiences while traveling in Pakistan, recounting that often people start out with negative sentiments about America, but then they would follow up with admiration for the U.S. justice system and opportunities. Participants H said that there were two important determinants of positive interactions. First, "whether there have been previous interactions or not" (Appendix C, p. 142). Second, Participant H has noticed that Pakistanis can have a more of a favorable view of Americans than Americans may have of them "because many Pakistanis have left and gone to America or gone to Europe, there are a very few Americans who have gone to Pakistan, there is very limited experience Americans have with Pakistan (Appendix C, p. 142). Participant H's experience reiterates two important elements of positive long-term relationships: Consistency and a two-way communication pattern. As discussed earlier, Participant J said that introducing Americans to other nations and outside cultures is the forgotten

mandate of PD (Appendix D, p. 181). Participant H further said that usually "it's the diaspora community that really supports it" (Appendix C, p. 145) the "rebuilding and then maintaining the relationships, people know each other and they understand each other and are not afraid of each other. And they *see* an alignment of interests and opportunity." (Appendix C, p. 148).

Failure. No discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations can take place without discussing the highly contentious and highly debated U.S drone attacks (unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs). Participant E talked about a PD failure when U.S. airstrikes accidently killed 26 Pakistani soldiers. Participant E said that not being able to respond appropriately to the public's immediate concerns due to simultaneous control of the State Department and the Defense Department over messages made it tough to do damage control. Participant E regretted that it "was the toughest time in my career where people were literally hostile" (Appendix C, p. 130). These attacks anger human rights organizations, military commanders, and civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2013), on the U.S. side and on Pakistan's. A terrorism watch organization shows that between 2004 and mid-2016, there have been 424 drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2016). The drone strikes are blamed for an escalation of extremism and physical retaliation, or what is called the "blowback effect." For example, American counterinsurgency experts David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum explain what is considered the "blowback" effect that "every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have

increased" (Kilcullen & Exum, 2009, para. 8). Similarly, 63 percent of Pakistanis

consider the drone attacks "never justifiable" (Pew Research Center, 2014). But, after

conducting 147 interviews with locals in FATA areas where the drones actually strike,

and citizen's lives are impacted, Shah (2016) argues that they "approve of drone attacks

because they viscerally hate the militants" (para. 9) and contrary to the prevalent view,

Shah's research does not support blowback thesis. It is hard to say whether the U.S. drone

attacks represent success or failure but the United States has failed to justify its actions to

Pakistanis.

In addition, Participant F pointed out that, contrary to conventional wisdom,

despite no change in frequency of drone strikes and other U.S. policies, the Pakistani

government manipulates public opinion for 'manufactured warmth' toward the United

States" when it is in the Pakistan's interest "because they are fighting the enemy for

Pakistan, for them in the tribal areas and Afghanistan" (Appendix C, p. 138). This

example shows two important occurrences. First, public opinion in Pakistan may be

shaped by the state agenda, and it uses public outrage to its political advantage. However,

this situation is not unique to Pakistan. Some may argue that it may also be the case in the

United States due to media agenda setting. Being mindful of the body that manipulates

public opinion and what its motivation might be, can be useful. Second, this example

indicates a failure in PD and CVE at the strategic level. For years, U.S. policy on drone

strikes has been criticized internally (Shane, 2015) based on a thesis supported by

opinions and insufficient facts. Meanwhile, public outrage caused by the policy may have

pushed many PD efforts backwards in Pakistan as evident by sudden surge in public

opinion after drone attacks against the United States or after big PD failures (Shah, 2016).

Another PD failure followed Operation Neptune Spear, the U.S. military

operation to kill Osama Bin Laden or commonly known as the OBL raid. This instance

stifled diplomatic and PD progress in Pakistan. A Pakistani surgeon, Dr. Shakil Afridi,

carried out a CIA-funded health care campaign to discover Bin Laden's whereabouts

which resulted in his killing; however, when Dr. Afridi's involvement was discovered by

Pakistani authorities, he was accused of treason and sentenced to 23-year incarceration.

This incident caused two major setbacks for PD in Pakistan. First, it created resentment

for the United States among Pakistanis. While the United States was pointing a finger at

Pakistan for hiding Bin Laden for five years, Pakistan was furious over having a U.S.

military operation on its soil without its knowledge (Shah, 2011). The Pakistani public

was outraged at the CIA for not protecting the Pakistani informant and at the Pakistani

government for imprisoning Dr. Afridi. Second, this operation jeopardized health

campaigns and the safety of health workers in Pakistan. The CIA's involvement fueled

conspiracy theories by extremists about all campaigns that were associated with the

United States in any way. As a result, immunization campaigns especially the "End Polio

– Pakistan" campaign that is sponsored by Organization (WHO) and U.S. nonprofits

suffered when parents refused to let their children get immunized (End Polio Pakistan,

n.d.). Moreover, the safety of healthcare workers was greatly jeopardized and many lost

lives while performing their duties (Hayat, 2012; McKay, 2015; Shah, 2011).

Consequently, these circumstances also caused a blow to USAID health care campaigns

and relief efforts, to the degree that USAID had to pull their logo off their campaigns and other relief supplies, and the safety of its employees was in jeopardy (Ward, 2010).

The researcher noticed a failure in American PD that has gone unnoticed by the participants of the study which concerns identifying the target audience. Participants have described key stakeholders differently. A plausible reason for this is that some participants may have in mind a CVE-target audience in mind while others may have non-CVE related target audience in mind. For example, Participant E talked about the "great undecided" and "the great uncommitted" who are not already polarized (Appendix C, p. 13), whereas, Participant H talked about entrepreneurs and the elites as the target audience.

However, a critical aspect of determining a target audience that still needs improvement to support better PD is the audience analysis in American intelligence bureaus. According to Sageman (2004), the government's terrorism research is done in secrecy, albeit for legitimate national security reasons, without a rigorous peer review and a cross-disciplinary analysis. This process "may be flawed and reach conclusions that are deleterious in their practice implications (p. ix). He says, "The competition and the collaboration that mark the scientific method are mostly absent in the government, lending officials to unwarranted sense of confidence in their analyses" (Sageman, 2004, p. ix). Questions such as "why do they hate us?" still seem unanswered and suggest that audience analysis is either neglected or has not been addressed properly especially those aspects of it that pertain to how people communicate. In the case of Pakistanis, often their Muslim identity is recognized, lumping the entire Muslim world as one monolithic group.

But other equally important idiosyncrasies are not recognized. For example, consider the aftermath of colonialism on these nations. Tylor and Kent (2005) contend that the Colonial rule left Asian nations' struggling to create their national identity and as a result nation-building effort suffered. The aftereffects of colonialism are especially pertinent in Pakistan as it still struggles to fight sectarianism and ethnic identities hindering the nation-building process.

With this background, a paradigm shift away from tactless rhetoric and Eurocentric views in PD campaigns is an essential starting point. Xie (1997) wrote about the issues of *postcolonialism* saying that "Simon During defines 'postcolonialism' as 'the need, in nations or groups which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity uncontaminated by universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images'" (p.7). These views often require multidisciplinary study to uncover as these remain in society at a subconscious level. Salisu (2004) further explains that independence from colonialism "has not always resulted in the anticipated changes. In some countries, once the common enemy in form of the colonial masters was rid of, local differences manifested, sometimes resulting in bitter wars" (para. 3). Since the creation of Pakistan as a country, a national identity crisis among the Pakistani public is evident. For example, Pakistan's creation as a country, split ethnic groups between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran and India; therefore, national identity is created and promoted through adherence to Islamic identity (Ahmer, 2014). Furthermore, Zaharna (2012) contends that "for nations who experienced the pain and humiliation of foreign colonial intrusion and domination of their internal affairs, public diplomacy may not be

perceived as benign or welcomed (p. 25).

Similarly, Pakistanis may be less receptive to the English language due to the "language myth." Mustafa (2012) explains that English was used in the colonial times to create societal homogeneity, and the effects of it are that the learning of the mother tongue is perceived analogous to backwardness. Similarly, the existence of the societal elites that retain positions of liaisons between the government and the masses are permanent parts of the society (Blood, 1995). Saleem and Rizvi (2011) place blame on the high power distance of the British imperial rulers. They say that despite the fact that the Mughal Empire in the subcontinent had weakened by the late nineteenth century and probably would have been conquered by a neighboring ruler, but they would not have upset the local cultures, unlike the British who disrupted the local traditions and did not mingle with the locals (Saleem & Rizvi, 2011). Therefore, the British kept a high power distance between themselves and the public which still exists between the public and the government. These historical events have created an aversion to outsiders and elites in general. The effects of postcolonialism on Pakistan are that it is still an unintegrated nation of disrupted ethnic groups that has a nation building process in its future. When PD is perceived as a cultural imposition from the United States, it is undesirable to masses and to elites alike. The rejection of the U.S. culture may be heightened despite incongruence within their various cultures. Taylor and Kent (2005) makes sense of this situation explaining that "individuals and nations understand themselves in relation to others, and in relation to what they are *not* [emphasis added]" (p. 342). Rejecting

American goodwill and PD may be a way for Pakistanis to feel and act as a unified nation.

One more dimension of audience analysis that is often neglected is that Pakistan has a high context culture where the effectiveness of PD relies on communication surrounding the communication of U.S.-Pakistan PD relationships, such as diplomatic relations, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan's archenemy, India, U.S. foreign policy, and other international phenomena. Telhami (2004) says that ignoring issues in Muslim world such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and engaging in operations such as Iraqi war speaks of American insincerity of sentiments and inconsistency in actions that publics find offensive and inexcusable.

CHAPTER SIX

Policy Recommendations, Future Research and Limitations

This is a preliminary research that is focused on communication dimension of United States' PD and the communication issues that surround it. The author now presents some of the communication related deductions based on the interviews and literature review and follows with recommendations for policy and practice. These are:

1. The current nature of PD is caught in the USIA's Cold War-based axiom, "Telling America's Story to the World." The most recent rhetoric used such as changing minds and building bridges, still holds the non-dialogic and asymmetrical patterns of PD of the Cold War era. Practitioners and scholars have paid special attention to PD and made strides in American PD from the narrow state-centered, state-based definition of PD to more expansive and comprehensive way of defining public diplomacy particularly including non-state and quasi-governmental bodies as PD actors and partners. A dialogic approach to relationship building in PD is essential.

2. Moreover, public diplomacy is a shared work between the State Department and other agencies such as DOD, BBG, and USAID, often with some, little or no coordination with the State Department.

3. There is little understanding of PD within the U.S. government and as a result, it is not part of the comprehensive strategic vision of United States' foreign policy. This may be why there is less than adequate training for PD officers in the State Department and their professional trajectory suffers. The State in particular, and DOD does not have high ranking officials in the PD or PA track such as Career Ambassadors (Brown, Hensman, & Bhandari,2015), and two, three or four star Generals (Personal communication, non-participants). Moreover, PA officers' role is often seen as a spokesperson and does not have the authority to put out messages without going through a time-consuming bureaucratic process of authorizations (personal communication, nonparticipant).

There is sufficient consensus among scholars and practitioners that PD apparatus in the United States government needs an overhaul. Conventional wisdom substantiates that PD is essential to communicate with the world, but for PD to succeed, it must be grounded in a coherent definition and a coordinating framework. The need for defining PD has not gone unnoticed in practitioners and academics who has made remarkable progress in its advancement. However, real change will occur when it initiates from within the State Department. Therefore, the researcher recommends that the State Department commissions an internal study with the help of practitioners and multidisciplinary academics who, while being mindful of the national security issues and intricacies of the structural challenges faced during an overhaul of PD, will advance a theory-based definition of the new public diplomacy. Having a consistent understanding

of PD inside the State Department will ripple through other agencies; the State

Department can specify lines of authority, demand accountability, enhance

professionalism in practitioners, provide guidelines for ethical behavior, increase

professional advancement and strengthen its decision-making ability. This body will also

outline the challenges that lie ahead in current and future policies and thus be an inter-

agency advisory body to all federal agencies particularly the National Security Council.

This body will also have a role in creating non-state partners and harness their appeal in

stakeholders.

1. The United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD)
   comes closest to a body that presents advice to all agencies on their PD
   and PA work, but this body does not have authoritative status. Moreover, a
   biographical analysis of the APCD's six current member profiles shows
   that none of them have direct PD experience either professionally or
   academically.

The researcher's analysis is not meant to suggest that their advice is faulty; the

reports put out by ACPD have insightful perspective on PD work and their

recommendations address many issues related to PD. However, for ACPD to be an

authoritative body, it must be part of policy making process to ensure that policymakers

are aware of the various policy implications in PD audiences and to present policy

alternatives under considerations. They must also help policymakers, diplomats and other

PD actors to persuasively articulate policies in stakeholders and their implications on

future stakeholders.

2. Public diplomacy has never been tasked with counterterrorism and CVE

   before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, so there is not sufficient empirical data

   and experience to promptly address these issues (Zaharna, 2010), but the

   future of PD cannot be addressed with obsolete methods of PD practice.

Lessons should be noted at every stage in the process of CVE. There is a clarity
that comes with looking in hindsight. But since PD has never been undertaken for CVE
messages, it is critical that rigorous research and analysis procedures, and the findings are
distributed through inter-agency collaboration. However, the State Department's in-house
research bureau, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) may not be dependable for
reliable PD related research because as the State Department website suggests that INR
primarily handles intelligence data and thus its direct research in other countries may be
not be favored by outside governments or citizens. Moreover, research and evaluation
gathered by INR has often been accused of *tunnel-visioned* analysis as suggested by
Sageman (2004). Therefore, advisory bodies and quasi-governmental institutions such as
think tanks' research should be officially and systematically absorbed for INR
consumption.

Similarly, another important lesson to be learned is about communication with
stakeholders. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rhetoric of PD in the United States
changed to "building bridges," telling America's story, but the non-dialogic and
asymmetrical patterns of PD remains the basis for communication. Speaking of repeating
mistakes in PD rhetoric, Participant G asked, "But what if they don't like America's
story? What if they don't want to hear America's story?" (Appendix D, p. 176). More

emphasis should be placed on a paradigm shift of learning addressing how the outside world perceives the United States especially the counterterrorism and CVE audiences.

The researcher observed that the initiatives in CVE particularly suffer in Pakistan due to:

      a. Isolated and competing PD programs in Pakistan

      b. Lack of trust in U.S.-Pakistan relationships and perception of insincerity in the United States' actions.

      c. A deficit of audience analysis of Pakistanis.

      d. Diplomats and embassy officials have short-term rotations which often make it difficult for them to see through the end of the initiatives they have started.

1. There is more emphasis on outputs rather than outcomes of PD. For example, when a health campaign is run, the evaluation of the program may focus on the number of people that were treated rather than how people perceived the efforts or how it helped lay the ground for better relationship building in future.

2. There is not enough audience analysis done to address the CVE stakeholders appropriately.

3. There is little realization of the importance of non-state PD in the United States government, for example through transnational organizations and citizen diplomacy.

The author reiterates that the consensus-oriented framework for PD should be adopted to encourage building trusting relationships. Moreover, the researcher presses, that the "last three feet" that Edward R. Murrow described as crucial to engagement, be filled with people who can show superior ethical and altruistic standards. In conducting PD and particularly to counter violent extremism, non-governmental bodies and nonprofits are often deemed more trusting. Nonprofits such as Bill and Malinda Gates Foundation and the Rotary Foundation were especially influential when USAID had to pull their logo from the polio campaign in Pakistan (Ward, 2010). Moreover, Fulbright scholarships to U.S. citizens should be extended, so they travel to Pakistan to learn about research topics such as ancient modes of agriculture, archeology, calligraphy, fine arts and cultural studies. Through non-state partners, programs such as infrastructure development can be encouraged where young American professionals can participate in infrastructure development, wind and solar power plants to facilitate the nation-building process. Reciprocated exchange in human interaction can restore trust and help communicate and renegotiate the relationship between the two countries.

Lastly, the researcher points out that although there is an emphasis on prevention of violent extremism, those efforts have not been successful. Therefore, the researcher recommends that there should be a PD initiative in Pakistan that helps terrorist and extremist defectors reenter and assimilate in civil society. For years, Germany has supported neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists through a program called Exit-Deutschland to re-enter the civil society and has now started a program called "Hayat-Germany" that helps ISIS defectors the same way (Temple-Raston, 2016). A similar

program in Pakistan where individuals often feel trapped in extremist ideology, may be just the type of support needed to bring them back in the civil society. It may seem like a difficult task but The CAUSE model presented by Rowan (1994) may be able to address issues that will facilitate such high-risk and high-consequence communication. The model introduces five possible sources of tension in communication and proposes that when these tensions are anticipated and addressed by communicators, the communication is likely to improve during tense situations. These five causes explained in the context of PD and indexed as CAUSE are:

- Lack of *Confidence* in the organizer of PD's competencies and motives

- Lack of *Awareness* about steps for safety, security, etc.

- Lack of *Understanding* about complexities such as cultures, language, etc.

- Lack of *Satisfaction* with solutions for example, whether the solutions presented are mutually beneficial and accpteable to audience.

- Lack of *Enactment* for example, addrssing issues that may prevent change such as fear or feelings of betrayal, etc.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

This thesis is not by any means a comprehensive study of United States' PD but in this research, the researcher has tried to point out both the potential as well the shortcomings of PD. This research was limited by many factors such as the shortage of time and resources. These limitations also contributed to accessing participants who could be deemed scholars of all three dimensions of the study, namely U.S.-Pakistan relationship, PD, and CVE.

One limitation of this study is the small sample size. The researcher recommends that in the future, a larger sample size is used. Furthermore, it will be beneficial to future researchers to include a quantitative aspect to this research such as doing a survey to assess Latif's model of PD with Habermas' trust factors (intelligibility, truth, sincerity/trustworthiness, legitimacy) may affect the message delivery and contribute to reciprocity in the relationship building.

This research combines two studies, one of the United States' PD and one of its role in CVE. However, comprehension of one part was not going to be possible without a detailed discussion of the other. The author attempted to lay out some significant issues that can help future researchers focus acutely on one or the other.

Two imperative discussions that are missing in this research are the roles of broadcast and social media, and soft power. Discussion of the media is not included because of the vastness of that topic and the abundance of the historical events that have taken place in this arena. Moreover, the researcher considers them non-strategic initiatives so the quality of the discussion was not affected without this discussion. Future researchers will benefit from using the COPD framework as an analytical lens in media studies. Moreover, this research lacks mention of Joseph Nye's soft power except in passing, which may be less forgivable of a *faux pas* to some readers. Nye (2008) said that soft power is "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment" (p. 94). The word "attraction" suggests that the practice of soft power relies on existing favorable opinion, which in the author's view may be similar to having a good reputation, therefore, making the concept more

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appropriate in non-contentious times and relationships. In fact, a case can be made that overemphasis on the use of soft power in contentious relationships can even have adverse effects on PD, but future researcher can prove or disprove this view.

Another critical limitation of this study is that it is one-sided study of how U.S. PD may be improved to support CVE missions. In reality, no matter how well intentioned the PD initiatives may be, their success depends on the reciprocity on the same level of sincere effort; PD is neither the silver bullet needed that will mend U.S.-Pakistan relationships nor is its failure the only reason for less than an amicable relationship between the two countries. But researchers are encouraged to further research in PD to create relationships between the two nations that can endure political and diplomatic failures that are bound to happen from time to time.

As mentioned earlier in the study, the author recommends that future studies incorporate the role of diaspora communities in PD as they "play a dual role and have a dual stake in making relationships better" (Appendix Participant J, p. 175).

In conclusion, this research may raise more questions than it answers but hopefully, it helps get one step closer to discovery of a course of action that offers optimal results. It is true that vision is 20/20 in retrospect, but for such a clarity, there needs to be a deliberate reflection. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Advisor, has reportedly said that America may have harmed its reputation in communicating with the world, but it is in a never ending battle, and there is no victory or defeat (Gardels, 2004). America may have had failures in the past, but there is too much at stake not to take a concerned, thoughtful, open and altruistic world-centric examination

of its PD and its policies. The author recognizes that the changes suggested are long-term

solutions for imminent problems but administrations tend to make changes that are

achievable in the short-term. Even though call for changes in PD is not recent, further

emphasis in academia on this critical issue can be the driving force that will make the

U.S. government realize that PD is in need of a renaissance.

APPENDICES

Appendix A
The Role of Public Diplomacy in U.S. Counter Violent Extremism Policy:
A Case Study of Pakistan
Farah Latif
George Mason University
Participant Introduction and Qualifications

Participant A
Participant A is a terrorism expert with many years of experience in higher education. Participant A was helpful in underdoing the what comprise terrorism, roots of terrorism, different ways in which terrorists work, recruit and how the U.S. government combat terrorists and terrorism. Participant was also instrumental in understanding how terrorists propagate violent extremism. This meeting took place in a public location.

Participant B
Participant B is a public affairs officer in the United States Airforce. He has extensive experience in the field engaging with citizens in Afghanistan and Qatar on three different deployments. He was selected as a practitioner and as a subject matter expert. This meeting took place in a public location.

Participant C
Participant C is a Department of State public diplomacy officer who deals directly with Pakistan. This meeting took place in their office in the State Department. Due to the sensitive nature of information and the work their office does, the interview was strictly off the record. Quoting, using their name or note taking was not encouraged.

Participant D
Participant D is a Department of counter violent extremism officer who deals directly with Pakistan. This meeting took place in their office in the State Department. Due to the sensitive nature of information and the work their office does, the interview was strictly off the record. Quoting, using their name or note taking was not encouraged.

Participant E
Participant E is a senior U.S. Department of State diplomat who has had three rotations in Pakistan in different capacities, the last one as the Communications Director for the US

Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. He has a deep connection to Pakistan since his early career as an academic and a Fulbright Scholar in Pakistan. Currently he is on a sabbatical at George Washington University, Elliot School of International Affairs teaching courses on public diplomacy.

Participant F
Participant F is a policy analyst, journalist and a scholar from Pakistan who is a scholar in residence at Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY. Participant F has served as a fellow at New America Foundation, United States Institute of Peace and National Endowment for Democracy and Jinnah Institute (in Pakistan). Raza is also a regular commentator for several publications on policy and current affairs related journals and Newspapers. His academic papers have covered topics such as federalism, public policy choices, access to justice, citizen rights. In March 2014, he narrowly survived an assassination attempt in Pakistan.

Participant G
Participant G is an associate professor at American University, Washington, D.C. In addition to teaching strategic communication for more than 25 years, Participant G has advised on communication projects for multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, diplomatic missions and international organizations, including the United Nations, World Bank and NATO. Participant G has repeatedly testified before the U.S. Congress and has addressed diplomatic audiences and military personnel in the United States and Europe on cross-cultural communication and public diplomacy. Participant J is a fellow at the University of Southern California, Center on public Diplomacy.

Participant H
Participant H is currently a Sales and Business Development Executive. He is the Co-Founder and Executive Vice President of Convergence. Convergence creates environments where people and groups can move from conflict to collaborative problem solving, leveraging their collective resources to implement breakthrough solutions. He also directed a project on U.S-Pakistan relations in partnership with the Consensus Building Institute. Over five years, Convergence forged relationships between 200+ leaders from the U.S. and Pakistan resulting in new partnerships and programs.

Participant I
Participant I: Participant I a foreign affairs specialist and a licensed mediator with expertise in international and inter-group conflict management and transformation. She also produces game theory based multimedia conflict simulation workshop trainings, host online web broadcasts, and is a public speaker. Participant I has consulted on several State Department programs working with students and entrepreneurs from Pakistan.

Participant J
Participant J is a senior associate dean for academic affairs and professor at American University, Washington D.C. Participant J is an internationally-recognized scholar in public relations and public diplomacy and has authored several well-recognized books on Public diplomacy. Their research has been published in leading scholarly journals in communications and diplomacy, and serves as co-editor of the Palgrave Macmillan Book Series on Global Public Diplomacy and serves on the international advisory boards of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy Magazine. Participant J is a fellow at the University of Southern California, Center on public Diplomacy.

Participant K
Participant K is a Department of Defense, senior policy analyst. Participant is a scholar and an adjunct professor at Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Participant K has also served for several years in the United States military. Participant K has testified in the U.S. Congress on many occasions on U.S. policy related issues.

Participant L
Participant L is an Assistant Professor at the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. Participant L's main research interests lie in nationalism, international security, and South Asia. Their work has appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as Conflict, Security, and Development and International Organization, and has received generous support from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Mellon Foundation, the Stanton Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace

Participant M
Participant M is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's Master of Foreign Service Program and at George Washington University's School of Media and Public Affairs and Elliott School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on public diplomacy, media, and foreign affairs. Participant M was director of the University's Public Diplomacy Institute from 2005-2008. Participant M is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University teaching a course on public diplomacy in the Master of Foreign Service Program. Participant M also teaches strategic communication at the US Naval War College. Before retiring from government, he taught on the faculty of the National Defense University and served as Executive Director of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. He has written articles and book chapters on public diplomacy and participated in study groups led by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board and the Public Diplomacy Council.

The Role of Public Diplomacy in U.S. Counter Violent Extremism Policy:
A Case Study of Pakistan
Farah Latif
George Mason University
Proposed Questions to Participants

BY: FARAH LATIF

Hello, my name is Farah Latif. I appreciate your time and having an interview with me today.

For U.S. government officials:
Thank you for completing the consent form. As we discussed before, the purpose of interview is to understand the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy and its effectiveness in countering violent extremism.

1. Have you been directly involved in public diplomacy? If yes, how long?
2. How do you define public diplomacy?
3. What are some examples of public diplomacy that you have observed or been involved with?
4. How are the goals and objectives of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy objectives similar and different?
5. Have you been directly involved in public diplomacy? If yes, how long?
6. How do you define public diplomacy?
7. What is the United States' public diplomacy strategy in Pakistan?
8. What do the experts think are some challenges faced in conducting PD, specifically in Pakistan?
9. What do the experts consider to be successes and failures of U.S. public diplomacy in Pakistan?
10. What are some examples of public diplomacy that you have observed or been involved with?
11. How are the goals and objectives of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy objectives similar and different?
   Questions for experts on U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

Thank you for completing the consent form. As we discussed before, the purpose of interview is to understand the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy and its effectiveness in countering violent extremism.

1. What are the highlights of U.S.-Pakistan relationship?

2. What are some ineffective examples of public diplomacy in Pakistan?
3. Why do you think the effective instances were effective?
4. Why do you think the ineffective ones were ineffective?
5. How is effectiveness determined in public diplomacy?
6. Is increase in positive public perception a direct goal of public diplomacy?
7. What are some of the obstacles in carrying public diplomacy initiatives in Pakistan?
8. What are the limitation of public diplomacy in Pakistan?

Questions for experts in foreign relations:
Thank you for completing the consent form. As we discussed before, the purpose of interview is to understand the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy and its effectiveness in countering violent extremism.
1. Have you been directly involved in foreign policy? If yes, how long?
2. How do you define U.S. foreign policy?
3. What are the main objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan and the region overall?
4. What factors guide U.S. foreign policy?

Questions for experts on terrorism:
Thank you for completing the consent form. As we discussed before, the purpose of interview is to understand the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy and its effectiveness in countering violent extremism.
1. How long have you been involved with analyzing terrorism?
2. What are some unique characteristics of terrorist mentality?
3. What do you believe is the terrorist appeal to the youth?
4. What roles does the U.S. public diplomacy have in CVE?

Questions for academics and scholars in public diplomacy:
Thank you for completing the consent form. As we discussed before, the purpose of interview is to understand the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy and its role in countering violent extremism.
1. How do you define public diplomacy?
2. What are the issues in public diplomacy?
3. What is the effectiveness of the State Department in conducting public diplomacy?
4. Is the public diplomacy theory and practice up to date with the contemporary issues in foreign relations?
5. What is the relationship between foreign policy and public diplomacy?

Closing:
Thank you for your time today. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns about our interview today. You may email me at Latif.farah@gmail.com or at 703-XXX-

XXXX. If it is alright with you, may I get in touch with you via email if I have any clarifying questions.

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Farah Latif
George Mason University

Participant D

Researcher: Would you please tell me about yourself, your career, can you tell me a little bit about where you've served, what you have done? (Question about PD experience).

Participant B: So, I originally enlisted in the Air Force in 2002. I had been out of high school for not quite a year. I had started to go to college for a little bit and decided not to do that. So I enlisted in 2002 and from 2002-04 served as a computer maintenance technician, my formal title was computers cryptographic and switching technician. So I worked on a variety of electronic equipment. So, I did that in Germany from 2002-2004 and our unit deployed fairly often, but I didn't during that time because I wasn't fully trained. From there, I was picked to go to the Air Force prep school for a year and followed on to the air force academy from 2004-2009. My current rank is captain, and I've deployed to Afghanistan in 2011, and recently to Qatar in the spring of this year from January to July in 2011.

Researcher: How long have you been a public affairs officer? Were there any challenges communicating with people who spoke a different language, what were your experiences like?

Participant B: Since 2009 [6 years] to present, I've served as a public affairs officer in the Air Force. Even when I was enlisted I was stationed in Germany. I lived in the German economy. Even there I had to adapt to a different culture. In Germany, the hours for things are different, things aren't 24 hours, everyone moves at a different pace, and so understanding and blending American expectations with living in the German economy with their expectations was somewhat a challenge. But that is a little bit more familiar because it is still a western society. when I deployed to Afghanistan in 2011, we had received a fair amount of training before we left on how their society is different, specifically when talking to them face to face. A lot of what we were there to do was to help develop the provinces in Afghanistan. Mine was the Kunar province in Eastern Afghanistan, and our job was to meet with the district governor and governor's staff. In our training they had to explain to us that we would have to have a lot more patience than dealing with western counterparts because their culture was one where you don't necessarily just say "We'll have a meeting" and then it gets done. It's a process of maybe, we'll see, we'll come to a consensus. There's a much stronger relationship building aspect to it, and with dealing with those differences, we had to adapt a lot to what their culture was versus going in and imposing our culture and that was one of the aspects of the counterinsurgency operations and doctrine that was in place at the time was that we go in and adapt to them, speak at their level versus trying to enforce our Western way of

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life. In some ways we were successful, in some ways less. One of the biggest challenges is while we were trying to adapt to their culture, we needed to operate on our timeline. There were a lot of conflicts built into the system in that way.

Researcher: During your training, do you think the training was adequate in giving you a good, fair glimpse of what you were about to encounter? Or was that *just* a glimpse, a very good one or somewhere in-between?

Participant B: I think it wasn't very good with one exception, **our training was specifically designed for the construction teams, but most of the scenario training wasn't very realistic. The people playing locals were belligerent, confrontational and just not realistic of what we actually saw. They were a lot like the people playing media in our class simulation. They were unrealistically belligerent** to what they thought they should be playing.

So, the exception that I mentioned was that we had two linguists actually from Afghanistan. There were people who had likely had served as local linguists but were good enough that they got essentially their paperwork to come to the U.S. and work here either a visa or a green card, or I don't know exactly what the process is. But they would come over and they were hired essentially as contractors to be linguists for the training in the training and throughout our training which was three months long. And so, they were the ones who best imparted expectations of what we planned to see when we got to Afghanistan. One was actually from the province we were going to, so that was very helpful but that was by chance that wasn't by design. We actually traveled to Afghanistan while we were there and met with us which was pretty interesting. Being a local, he could travel, and people won't notice but that's just a weird thing to think of. But to those two, Hadi and Akbar were their names, were actually very good in helping us understand. Hadi in particular he would actually say "you're being an idiot," to the actors. He would join the actors in the training, saying "this would never happen you're not preparing them," which was very fun. It seems they were sort of protective of us because they wanted us to succeed and they wanted us to understand, which was interesting but the training itself was not very well designed in the way that military training is supposed to. It's something to fulfill a requirement but it isn't. Often times it really can't be, because of either funding restraints or time constraints or lack of understanding that we have in the military. I know in recent years we've worked to get more anthropologists, for instance, to help come into organizations and doctrine on higher levels and help us understand what is it like to go into another society. And what we need to do as a military to function well in that society so if were going into a place like Afghanistan, you know we have to understand in retrospect that we are going to be seen as invaders, and we have to overcome that. So, how do we do that and what are the ways and what do we show? Now in Iraq, is a different place, people think it's all the same place because it's all the Middle East. Well obviously, most people who have any awareness of that region know that's very not true. Even a 100-mile difference makes a - there is a huge contrast for one culture to another. So, people are starting to understand that we need to understand our target audience effectively, so it's much like communication in that way. But the

ways that we implement them are still very top-down directive, because that's the nature of the military. We haven't adapted to agile, adaptive ways to function other societies and international culture, and honestly because we've never had to. American Military has been the most powerful since the end of World War II when you've always been able to get your way, why would you change the way you were doing things, until it stopped working; it takes a crisis for things to change and that's what Iraq and Afghanistan were for us, they were crises in the way we were doing things and people started to realize we can't operate the way we always have.

Researcher: Are these crisis situations for the US government?

Participant B: It depends on your definition of crisis. So usually, people think of crisis as something immediate, something with very disastrous consequences if handled immediately. I don't think it is crisis in this sense, because it is not as immediate. Our presence in Afghanistan is much, much, much smaller than it once was. Our presence in Iraq is still much small in the way we are conducting our operations is very different in the Iraq war.

So it is not really a crisis. Most of the things that I hear about our operations against ISIS right now in Iraq are mostly by media or politicians. It doesn't seem to be permeating the public awareness that much; they're much more interested in the Republican insanity, and in popular culture, in general. It's that people aren't very interested in the topic because there aren't a lot of people on the ground. So the chances that anyone has some connections to the military is less than it was even five years ago. I don't think it's a crisis in that very small sense of the definition. In the longer term, it is very much the focus of national defense strategy because instability is bad for economies, not just ours and therefore our strategy is one that aims to reduce instability.

Now how you do that is very much up to your interpretation of how to use political tools, like DIME, Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Those are generally considered the four powers of a government.

Researcher: I thought there were three?

Participant B: Some people might consider diplomatic and informational as the same, but they are different. In American culture, because our military has been so powerful and historically effective, it's a large, easy to wield tool. Something that is very capable, we can deploy anywhere in the world, in a very short amount of time to react to situations, but it's not always the best tool to wield. One of the reasons people like to use it is because it's measurable. You can send it in, subdue a problem, kill enemies, and show something has happened. When you're using diplomacy, and you're funding informational programs to promote freedom of press that's harder to measure. How much impact does that have on instability in that country or if you're working on economic business grants and small business grants in Iraq, so the people can rebuild the business and people can have jobs, it's going to reduce instability, but it will take much longer. So people are less likely to invest in uncertain things than poorly executed but certain things. It comes down to the American sense of instant gratification. The military

is a hammer; we swing that hammer the problem goes down for a period of time but what might happen in smashing something is that it spreads it out over a bigger region. This has happened in Iraq. Was taking Saddam's reign down a good thing? I don't know. No one does, because how do you measure that? In instability, in the sense that they were essentially engaging in genocide against their own people, the Kurdish. What are the long-term repercussions? 20 years after we got Saddam out of there, it was still very unstable and a lot of people are going to die because of that. Or, how about this, you take the 100-year look, and maybe all of the Middle East winds up being more stable and more democratic in a more traditional sense in that the governments are representative and end up making a more stable society. We don't know that. And it's impossible to tell which if what America did was the right thing or not. But anyways that gets at some of the pieces of applying those things.

Researcher: One thing I'm really curious about is public opinion. If you were to compare the public opinion of U.S. in Germany, a Western country to public opinion of U.S. in an Asian country whether it be Afghanistan or Iraq or if there are even differences within those hemispheres. Do you have any ideas on how they may be different? What was your perception on the German's public opinion of America? How would you describe it and how has the U.S. PD changed helped it strategically?

Participant B: So, the last piece of your question is my favorite part so I'll hit that part later. So remind me if I don't hit that the piece on whether the American government can do anything. They are very different-- between Western and Middle Eastern societies. The Germans are fairly established of their opinions, but they also have access to opinions opposed to Afghanistan where they don't. Institutional memory in Germany is far less deep than in Afghanistan. Stories in Afghanistan are passed down generation to generation in very isolated communities, so they remember things from 100s of years ago, whereas, people in German are much more focused on the past two years, whereas Americans are focused on yesterday or today. So there is very much a difference in perception, and a lot varies by generation, particularly in Germany. But even a little in Afghanistan or Iraq. In Germany, it also depends on the area which you live.

I lived around Bengdalem, which is near Triar. It's a much smaller base with much smaller communities surrounding it, and the communities appreciate us much more than the German communities appreciating Ramstein, which is a much bigger base and is a much bigger community. So it seems Ramstein is seen as an incursion upon German sovereignty because it the largest American population outside America. There are more than 100,000 Americans living in that area; most people don't realize that. It's a small city of Americans living in Germany. So the cultural perceptions are very different between the two areas. Contrast that to… even to… we once did an exercise in Netherlands, and we drove through this Dutch town, smaller town, and there were people outside waving to us like we just liberated them from World War II. So that was the Dutch perception of us. So it's interesting to see there but I think for the most part, people understand what Americans are doing there.

Germany has become, I think a little more hostile in the last few years particularly after Snowden because they're big on privacy and so... became an issue for them and I think they're also very big on not going into world politics at least from the military perspective. And so having us there, and using Germany as a platform for some of our fighter aircraft, I think gives them some concern. The Eastern Bloc countries are more than happy to take basis and support from US. In Place like Poland to Ukraine, like that because they're afraid of Russia. And so their proximity to a threat is greater, whereas, Germany is secure and stable. What has been happening for more than ten years is that we realize we can get rid of bases in Germany and looking to move the other places in Europe. Now contrasting that to Iraq or whatever, especially after both the Iran-Iraq war and Iran revolution. And a variety of what most people would see or what most people in that region would see is American meddling, so America doesn't have a very good reputation in the Middle East. We are seen as self-interested, in the oil which honestly is true. Any country is going to be interested in what benefits them. What I don't think they realize that America has a larger view, literally, in a document that you can go out and read in some of the national strategy and subsets of that, the national defense strategy and the national military strategy. You can go out read what is the point of the military. Some people think there's some other secret subversive, you know, meaning to the U.S. military there really isn't.

People in the military, I mean for a great example of that, is that people in the military say the number one threat right now to the U.S. is climate change. Not because climate change is going to create a huge tidal wave to wipe out the Eastern United States but because it creates instability in poor countries which makes them vulnerable to terrorist groups, which then becomes a threat to our way of life. The military is much broader in scope and idealism than people realize. We're not always used that way, but we follow our guiding document. In places like Afghanistan, we're seen more as invaders, much like the Russian, and only there for self-interest. My personal opinion on Afghanistan is that we are actually succeeding. Not because of our military victories, although that plays a part, it's more in the sense that we showed Afghanistan there is an alternative to the way that they operate. We have connected them to the outside world, opened up information channels, media, a governmental channel for communication. There is still corruption, tribalism, all the things we think are problems in Afghanistan. But they have now seen a better life. They have seen it can be better. I have seen that in their faces, especially the younger people, around 20-25. I don't think they don't know it yet, I don't think they fully understand, but I think when those people grow up to their 40-50s and become leaders they are going to understand what they can be. What they end up doing with it is up for question, I've seen reports that ISIS is moving into Afghanistan and using it as a base of operation.

So there will be more challenges there, and people will say we failed because we didn't completely inoculate Afghanistan against terrorist ideals. But I don't think that's true. I think Afghanistan was one of the most isolated places on Earth. I know that because right

behind where our base was there was a tiny, I don't even know if it was a village it was more like a homestead for extended family who didn't even speak the local language. They were a pocket of ethnicity so old they weren't even Afghani necessarily.

Places in Afghanistan had people that looked like they were Irish. Red beard, red hair, I mistook him for a Westerner, even though he was in the traditional garb. He was a media person. They have media by the way, TV crews even in our province which was fairly small and more remote so I started talking to him and he didn't understand what I was saying because he was couldn't speak English, but he seriously looked like he was from Scotland or Ireland. I mean there were places *that* old in Afghanistan that had never been touched by other cultures, for example, the Pashtuns in the country. I think now that we've been there we've at least opened them up to the world. I think it's good that we've left. For better or for worse we may have to go back again, and I hope it'll be part of a coalition if that does happen but I think that regardless of what happens they will have a chance at a better life because we've been able to show it to them. We went in there, they thought we were invaders, we changed the way we did things, so that we were more on their level and they started to realize, they started to work with us more. Now granted, a lot of it was them getting money from us, like a lot. But a lot of that doesn't go directly to the people, so we weren't just handing out money to people on the street, but they were realizing that things were getting better; roads are actually working, people were able to use their cell phones, they could connect to data, they are growing markets, they can get small business loan to start a business they want to do. It's the small things that are going to make an impact in the long run. That goes back to my earlier point on diplomacy. We did that through the military. That could have been done through diplomacy, and if you've ever seen the movie Charlie Wilson's War if that was even remotely true, we could have done it decades ago by injecting the smallest amount of investment. And that's the way I would think that this is an investment in a more stable future. That's what foreign aid is supposed to be. A lot of the times it's dealt through with corruption, and it's hard to manage, and a lot of the time the military brings a little bit of directness to the process. Now, I think the military is fairly trusted. People are still going to be wary of us because we are military, but on the ground, people trust soldiers more than they do diplomats. Diplomats are always seen as two-faced and slimy, and I met some of our diplomats, they're really good people, but that's the perception of diplomats. People assume military people are less educated, and in some cases that may be true, that we're less educated, but also that we're just more blunt, because we're more blunt in how we do things. If we give you money to do this thing, we're probably going to give you money, and you better damn well do that thing. So, I think that there are ways to partner between military and diplomacy, and I think we should do a whole lot more. What's unfortunate is that the military is funded something like one hundred times what the State department is funded. Or even a thousand times, it's a huge difference. So that's my perception of how we're perceived in those places. I think we're actually making gains. I think we have to slow the pace. With the Iraq war, or this one, the war on

ISIS, we're very much working at the pace of the Iraqis. People have criticized "well why aren't you doing more, why aren't you doing whatever" well because the Iraqis haven't asked us to. They still hold their country, it's still a sovereign country, and we operate in their airspace and on their ground at their behalf. I think that's the right way to do it, and they're welcome to find other partners like Iran or Russia, and they'll see there are differences operating with those countries, and us. So I think we're starting to understand how the path works. Honestly, I think we're taking a much more Far East path of thinking. We're starting to think in much longer terms. At least, I hope so. I hope we don't forget these lessons. In China, I once heard a General say the five-year cycle for budget, that's how we budget things. China operates on decades and centuries and dynasties. They think in longer terms. Afghanistan thinks that way as well. They think in generations, and that's not how we think and we need to understand that for the long term. Getting back to whether America can do something about it. Yes, and no. Direct action and trying to manipulate people's perceptions of us, I think are bound to fail. Supporting and fostering other elements in other societies that support similar ideals to us. Not people who like us, not people who are going to say nice things about us, but people who want freedom for their people. Groups that want representation and inclusion. Supporting those sorts of groups through diplomacy, I think is the way we bolster our own image. We don't need to go in and say how great we are, "let me show you some charts about how much we done while we were here," because no one is going to listen to that. No one is going to believe it because in a lot of those places, the governments aren't trusted, government are corrupt, and any other government is going to be even more corrupt because they are invading your country to tell you how great they are. So things like, overt propaganda I think are going to be detriment to us. However, we should be supporting elements in countries that try and fight for freedom of information. We feed those organizations legitimate global information like, "hey, this is what other countries have compared to your country, what do you want for your country?" This reminds me of a great saying I heard, "every country... for the citizens of every country have the government that they deserve." It sounds really harsh because some countries are under brutal governments. But you can change that, it may take a revolution and people might need to die. But people are in charge of the government and a lot of the time they do not realize that. And so when start opening up information and if we support groups that do that, I think people are ready to see that in the Arab revolution in the 2010-2011 people did start to see, people did start to understand there is better out there than we have been living under. I think that is the way, that America can remain strong and you know and sort of polish our image, it's not for unilateral action but partnership and economic development.

Researcher: What are the challenges in doing PD in other parts of the world? Do most Americans have a correct perception of others? Are we blind to people that are different from us?

Participant B: Yes. I think we are very much. There are a couple of aspects to that. We are very much of cultural exporter. We export our culture and, therefore, we think our culture is great but that also makes us cultural isolationists. We do not need to look at other cultures because ours provide us everything we need. I mean music, movies come from America and go other places. We look at other cultures as not as advanced, as sophisticated, as educated even though our school systems are terrible, but people do not realize that. We are very much, we are very much isolationists, we not connected to rest of the countries like Europe. Mexico which is very different but does not influence American culture that much, unless you are sort of in the southwest. And so, people in America have no idea what it means to be citizen of any other country in the world. Now with the exception of people who have immigrated to have family members who have traveled extensively, and have really taken the time to look around. People… for instance…people in Afghanistan are not intelligent because they aren't educated. I think this is very much not true, they cannot tell you how calculus works, how a phone works or computers work but they are very savvy, very sly, and they know when people are lying to them, because they deal with people they know how to band together to get things done, and they work very hard because they have to. And for us to go in and say, "oh those unleashed barbarians, let us show them how to do things," is a wrong-headed way to consider other societies. They have different values, they operate differently. For example, in America we think other countries are very inefficient because they cannot conduct business nearly as quickly as we can. But the way their businesses work is not the same as we conduct business. They rely a lot on trust, on personal relationships and this is just not how we work, it's just different. Now people will say that we make more money so that shows we are better but we also kill ourselves with work and we spend. we do not take time to vacation or spend time with our families so who has better values? I don't know. The way the Americans think about world that aren't necessarily in my case, the case; it very much depends on your perspective. There may be some objective truths if you analyzed what is good or bad. But to immediately think that we are better because more productive is not true. I do think there is a perception problem and a lot of it has to do with that our education system does not expose us to other cultures and we are physically isolated. And because of our success, because success isolates you. There is an America has essentially at the top of international politics and dominated it for a very long time. Why would we have to look elsewhere if we have everything. Everyone at the top eventually falls off; the question is how far do they fall. I think it will be smart for us to start looking outward but it will take another crisis before we do.

Researcher: What is strategy in the U.S. Airforce or the military world.

Participant B: Strategy is supposed to be a very broad overarching term that essentially identifies how we go about achieving our end goals. Our end goal is to reduce instability, so our strategy is how we go about that. We go about that by conducting counterterrorism, so finding and eliminating terrorists, where we can in the world, but also through partnerships with nations which we have many. Through joint exercises,

through development, part of which is through military and part of which is through diplomacy through the state department.

Researcher: How do you define strategy?

Participant B: To define strategy, it is the…let me put it in terms of plays, a play is a whole story, acts are the strategy they are the big sections of things that have overarching themes. And then each scene in the act is like a tactic, so that is the lower level thing that you do to advance the science or advance the act to complete the play. So, it just depends on which level they operate, it's the big movement or the actions are ideas that are ideas that you have to implement to achieve your large and long term goals.

Researcher: Is it fair to say in terms of US military strategy is very much goal driven.

Participant B: U.S. military strategy is absolutely goals driven.

Researcher: Well, thank you very much for you time and giving me the interview.

Participant E

Researcher: Hello how are you?

Participant E: Hello, how are you recording this interview?

Researcher: I am using a recording device.

Participant E: Ok, I will move a little closer.

Researcher: Would you please introduce yourself first?

Participant E: So first of all, as I said before, these will be my private opinions and not represent the US government.

I am now working at George Washington University as a PD (public diplomacy) fellow. I am still with the State Department. So, I am on loan to the George Washington University for a year or two. There are quite a few diplomats that are working on the staff. That means, it is just not theory, there is a blend of theory and practice because the practitioners or former diplomats are now teaching the courses and they can [inaudible) the theory with their practical experience. And then the theoreticians talk to us all the time and send us students in the what we think will work and what will not. I think it is sort of a nice place to be.

Researcher: What were you saying about the challenges that academia faces in advancing PD?

Participant E: So one of the challenges I have as a diplomat in the foreign service realm more than 30 years is that I come into an academic environment and then trying to see academia writes about PD. It is hard to even find periodicals that focus on PD. Now there is a journal that Nicholas Cull edits is called 'Branding' in PD, but our university does not even subscribe to that. For example, **most fields have journals that are associated with them. With media studies, you can find three or four journals that focus on media studies, so if you read those journals you know what is happening in the field. That is a lot harder in PD.** It is a very interdisciplinary field, and it is hard to find out what really what it is from an academic's point of view. So academic will write articles describing PD which to me are not public diplomacy. To me, they are public affairs. For example, PD in my definition is working with foreign audiences, its government working to educate influence, learn

about, foreign publics. Then we can report it back to headquarters, about what is happening. Some of the articles I read about PD, governments working with their own public, which to me is not public diplomacy, it is public affairs. I think there is even confusion in academia what PD is. So, there has been some very good articles. Donna Oglesby has written some good articles, describing the differences between the approaches between practitioners and theoreticians of public diplomacy, really good stuff. And so that you know we can use examples from our experience to be grounded while academics focus on the theory and they don't tell horror stories the way we tell horror stories, a lot of our teaching is using examples to illustrate the theory. A lot of academics that I see are teaching the theory per say. And I think it is **hard to translate for some people into actual action. So it is a challenge, so it is a challenge.**

Researcher: One of the most common definition of PD is engaging with publics of another country so they can influence their own governments to have a favorable opinion of United States, would you agree with this definition?

Participant E: No, I think this is a very good definition because more and more publics matter. Because publics have voices that they did not have in the past, and they have they have tools to get their messages out through social media for example. If you look back forty years ago, there was a more of a broadcasting mind-set, so the government would broadcast its messages, they would get the messages out, and that was enough. Now with the social media, anybody can broadcast a message and reach potential audiences of thousands or millions and so it is moving from a one-to-many model to many-to-many model. And in social media, the US is one voice among many. It's a great powerful voice but you know there are cases where NGOs have as much influence in certain countries in their specific issue as the US government because they throw a lot of resources at one issue. An example from Germany, which is my previous assignment, there is an NGO called 'CAMPACT,' it's an anti-globalization NGO. And they have 20 full time employees, in my understanding, whose focus is to, right now they are working to block this trade agreement, it's called T-TI (transatlantic trade and investment partnership) they are throwing 20 people at full time, and we have one webmaster in the embassy, OK, so he is working with all the issues threat the US government deals with organizations that have 20 people working on one issue. So, it is very possible the US government to be gunned by an organization on that is focusing on a narrow interest topic. So it is a very different world from what it used to be.

Researcher: Do think the state department values PD as much as it should?

Participant E: Well, that is a good question. I guess one would say, never as much as it should. If you look at the budget over the last 40 years or so, some people say that PD budget is about half what it was. And there, the idea was that at the end of the Cold War, there wasn't as much of the need for PD as now, it was sort of like the end of history argument, you can see now there are so many different challenges, ISIS being one, DAESH, you need more people focusing than before. In Germany for example, this is following the Marshal Plan, we had a huge PD budget. And it's much smaller than it was

before with the idea that Germany is no longer a problem and that what you want to do with this focus your resources where there is a problem. Afghanistan for example, gets a lot of resources. Afghanistan gets the most resources in the last couple of resources than any other country. Pakistan has been number two, I think, Iraq is right up there. So, these are countries where there is recognized that there is a huge PD challenge, so money flows in that direction. Whereas, Countries such as Germany, which are not seen as problems, has their budgets cut. The problem is that, Germany for example, is a leader in Europe, so if the public opinion shifts in certain direction, that can shape all of the Europe's public opinion. So, I think what we need to look at is not just look at throwing money at problems but sending money in the direction even though it is very good allies and fast friends because the public may be moving in a different direction than the government. I think, you have that case in many countries where there is rising anti-Americanism in the public even though the government themselves are very pro-American that is something that I think is hard to tease out because the decision maker work at the governments their focus is on the government, the policymakers in the state realm, and it is hard to separate out. When you have a public opinion that is divergent from the leader which eventually is going to result in the opinion of the new leaders. I think you have to keep in mind that the publics matter in the public opinion.

Researcher: You touched on the influence of NGOs, there is a school of thought that believe in NGOs and other non-governmental organization can or should be part of PD, how do feel about it?

Participant E: Yeah, so there are many players that influence public opinion. So I gave a very narrow definition of public diplomacy, that is the way I view it but some people view, I mean we work with NGOs a lot, giving grants, or they will come to us with proposals and we will support them even though no money changes hands but we will co-operate with an NGO on a program, so we work with them a lot. In my opinion, if an NGO does something on its own, that is not PD, PD is only when the government is working with the public abroad. But you know there are a lot of people that influence public opinion such as factor actors.

Researcher: Coca-Cola?

Participant E: Coca-Cola, exactly. Multinational companies. Bill Gates, so it has a huge impact. And I think this is a whole different topic, but it is very hard you know to separate what happens inside a country like inside the US and beyond its borders. So when Trump makes a statement that can be interpreted in a very negative way by Muslims abroad, so I have a friend, a Muslim friend whose family is now afraid to come to the States because of the statements that Trump made. So I think we have to keep in mind that in a globalized media landscape, anything is said inside a country has an impact in the world especially if people are focusing on the elections. The old borders between interior to a country and posterior are fading now.

Researcher: So where would you place certain types of non-governmental agencies, if not PD, are they partners in PD or something else?

Participant E: Yeah, they are partners, they are very often the US has to have a credible voice, OK, in some topics, NGOs have more credibility than the US government. U.S. government has the most credibility when we talk about the U.S. policy, obviously you will turn to U.S. government to find out more about the U.S. policy or what is happening internally to the US. That is our strong suite, but if you wanted to talk about counterterrorism for example and Islam, we are not the most credible voice. because it's the U.S. government saying that, not necessarily practicing Muslims. So in that case, you would want to work with an NGO, who believes that message and maybe help them get that message out if a bunch of Americans diplomats is sending out messages, saying what Islam should be, we are not going to get any traction at all. In fact, we are going to look ridiculous.

Researcher: What are the biggest challenges that you face regarding PD in Pakistan versus another Western country?

Participant E: **It is so obvious, but people do not talk about it, if our policy is popular, then the PD officials are going to have an easy job. If our policies are incredibly unpopular, then we are going to have a hard time. And so I think there are countries where more or less the publics aligns with what the U.S. is trying to do, but when their publics is against us in general, that when things flare up and we have a very rough time.** I was in Pakistan for example when 26 Pakistani soldiers were killed by U.S. forces, and it was an accident but it is very hard for the Pakistani populace to think that the U.S. can make a mistake but it was a combination of obviously U.S. government did not intend on killing Pakistani soldiers. But conspiracy minded mindset would view everything as intentional. How could a power like the United States do something like that? I think there are cases where there are real challenges and especially when the populace is coming from a different place. There is just a bigger cultural gap in areas where you have real professional medium your job is much easier. In areas where the media just does not check the fact then it is a real challenge because false stories get out and then they are picked up by everybody else and it is hard to put that genie back in the bottle.

Researcher: So how did the embassy handle that situation?

Participant E: **That was the toughest time in my career where people were literally hostile.** And I think that there are cases like that where you try to get the word out as much as you can, keeping in mind that it's not just the U.S. State Department, it's the Pentagon which has a say in what can be said. It makes it very complicated to get a focused message out if you have different U.S. agencies with different goals trying to control the message.

Researcher: How does the Defense Department craft and convey messages differently from the State Department.

Participant E: Well interesting point, I think the Defense Department is incredibly organized in terms of their messaging. So they have detailed scenarios of what to be known (inaudible), what to be asked, if asked this is what you say, this is very organized. We (the State Department) have that also, but I think that the defense department is

very good at conveying messages through actions. For example, they have a huge budget to do so. Wherever there is a natural disaster, you have the Defense go in provide aid, they have all the infrastructure, they have the helicopters, they have the ships and all that. They are incredible at providing aid, and then you see the public opinion changing toward the US. That happened in Pakistan as well when there was the earthquake; there was a lot of aid, and you see the positives for the U.S. shooting up. I was in Cyprus when there was a huge evacuation of the citizens from Lebanon, and the military was just absolutely incredible in terms of providing ships and being very helpful. I think that the Defense Department can bring resources to events that the State Department doesn't have.

Their budget is so much larger than ours. So I think that is one of their strengths, but there is less emphasis is basically the coordination between the two. Who does what? and So issues in Germany for example, if there was an issue regarding a base and the personal whether it would be increased or decreased that would largely be the Defense Department's message. We would do most of the messaging except from the narrow area that is military specific.

Researcher: Are you saying that the Defense Department has a much bigger budget allocated to PD?

Participant E: I wouldn't say that it is PD specifically, I would say that what we need to consider is that **actions speak louder than words. And if the Defense Department is quick to act in response to a disaster, that sends a message. And Very often those messages are heard much better than anything anybody could say**.

Researcher: Does the State Department focus more on PD programs or messages?

Participant E: I think we have a lot of tools at our disposal, and one of the tools is messaging, which we do and **that's how we would get the word out about our policy**. You would tweet to journalists or government officials. So that is a good way to get the hard policy, but you also want to reach youth. The Youth might not be interested in the policy, and very often, you would have a Facebook page, you know which has a different type of a message than the tweets. So the Facebook page might discuss the environmental programs in which a country has worked with you in that country. It might talk about music, tourism in the States and it may be a completely different message for a different audience. And I think it is not either or, I think you need different tools for different proposed. And I think if you move too far into messaging direction then you could lose some of your audience. One of the things we do is English teaching. So we work with ministries to improve the teaching of English, which is pretty policy free. You don't want to introduce the policy in it; you just help teachers learn English better. Once people learn English, they will have much more access to information than they once had. And they can draw their own conclusions. And it is our opinion that once they have access to information, they will draw conclusion which will more or less change their perceptions of the U.S.

Researcher: So does these programs achieve the goal of improving U.S. perception?

Participant E: Well, I think so. People who participated and one of our, you the problem is that there are so many people out there to work with that you cannot work with everybody. We have some very labor intensive and expensive such as the International Visitor Program. Where people come for two or three weeks, they go visit officials, they visit different parts of the country, many people return with different opinions. They come to the States with all kinds of preconceptions, which they realize is false. So they return completely change. So I think it is possible to change people a 180-degree if you expose them to what the U.S. really is. One of the things that surprise them is how strong U.S. families are. You know, people think U.S. people are friendly. It's different from the image they have on the television. If you watch television, you think you walk in the street, you will get shot at. And then you go to the actual cities, and you see it is a completely different story. I think that the people who go back, are ambassadors. We have lots of programs that bring people to the states, you know in Pakistan we have a very successful programs where we will bring high school kids to spend a year in a high school, and then they go back, they explain the United States to their friends has a huge impact. So I think that you can't change that.

Researcher: Are there any methods of measurement of the outcomes?

Participant E: One of the things we do is to build in assessment into the programs. So you that you really should make it an integral part of the program. One of the problems with the assessment of a program is that a lot of the programs are very long term, for example, the one I mentioned before, the International Visitor Program, **what we do is identify people who we think are going to rise to prominent position in their country,** send them to the states when they are young and have more time, it is very hard to bring a Prime minister or a head of a section of the United States for two or three weeks to learn about the states. But when they are younger they have time. In relatively early stage in their career like thirty to forty years old, they are perhaps more open. **They come to the States and see how it works, and that experience stays with them throughout their whole professional career. So the payoff comes much later. We have a lot of people that are ministers in Pakistan who have been in the program.**

I think we need to go into a long-term assessment of a program not just short term. I think it needs to be both, but if you have a program for a long time, you can access previous programs not just build that assessment with an ongoing but assess with previous programs and that will help you adjust for the future.

Researcher: Since I am focusing on counterterrorism I wonder if there are programs that are geared toward the lesser educated population and those in the more remote areas.

Participant E: That's one area where we work with local organizations which are interested in that message. **Somebody might say I want to make a documentary, showing the effects of terrorism on ordinary citizens. That can sort of change the view of the event, that actual real people are affected. And it's more of an emotional argument than rational. And so someone produces a documentary or a drama series showing how people that are blown up are affected by that. Then ordinary people view that as entertainment to a**

certain extent, but it affects their view of the issue. We hope to see this happen in Pakistan.

I think in Pakistan there is a rise in the number of shows dealing with terrorism and you see people's lives being destroyed by a bomb and I think that's the kind of message is I think is useful to get out because it is not just, you know, ideology, you are affecting mothers, father, brothers and sisters, friends, people in the market. Ordinary people's lives are being destroyed. And one needs to take that into consideration, and the hope is that the people will think about that, and that is not an anonymous person they are targeting but is a real person with emotions and family.

Researcher: How big is the public affairs office at the U.S. embassy in Pakistan?

Participant E: One way you can look at these figures is, we have, their annual report by the Commission for Public Diplomacy, which gives the budgets for all the embassies in the world. I would look at that to see how much money is out there.

Researcher: I wanted to know in your opinion, are the PD officers and the staff well trained before they are put into those positions?

Participant E: That is a really good question. That is a really good question, alright. I think there is a challenge when you have shorter assignments like in general we do a pretty good job of training PD officers. They get the language training before they go to a country. Like when I was assigned to Turkey, I had a whole year of Turkish. Every one of my colleagues had a full year of Turkish. If you compare this to other embassies, no other embassies will get that. So we were able to speak directly to the native speakers whereas nobody else could. So I think that is a huge advantage that we have. But one of the problems is that there are more and more assignments which because they are dangerous, are only one-year long. And it makes less sense regarding resources to provide a year of language training if you only have a year assignment. And so that's a challenge. In Pakistan, there were some people that got the language training. As the person in Peshawar had Pushto. And she used to speak impeccably she had a blog and a weekly video and a weekly video where she would speak in Pushto.

Researcher: Oh, I did not know that!

Participant E: Yeah, in which where she would describe the USAID programs in Pushto.

Researcher: How can I get my hands on that?

Participant E: Turn this thing off and I will tell you about it.

Researcher: OK.

Participant E: So I think the challenge is the short-term assignments you have, the harder it is to really know the country. Because any time you visit a country, you are spending the first several months just getting acclimatized, you know, learning who the important people are, learning the language, etc. and you just start to get comfortable about a year into the assignment. If your assignment is only a year long, you leave right when you are getting effective. The normal assignment in the State Department is three years. So probably you are most effective in your second year and maybe the last few months, you are sort of thinking about your next assignment but at least, the second

year and a half is where you are at your peak. You have gotten to know the contacts, you know what you want to accomplish, you sort of master the language to a certain extent. I think that it is a problem when you have more short-term assignments because if a country is real dangerous, you don't want to bring your family. But you cannot keep somebody separated from their family for a year, and that is a problem. But you cannot keep somebody separated from their family for a year, and that is a problem. At least in the State Department. The military is a different situation.

Researcher: Does learning the language gives sufficient insight to learning the culture?

Participant E: That's a very good question. My opinion is, it is very hard to learn the culture without learning the language, I think it is possible to speak a language and not really know about the culture, but it's like a pre-requisite. I think you have to have the language to understand the culture, otherwise it is an academic exercise. It's theoretical, the difference is just huge, and so if you see somebody who speaks the language, they are talking to a very different person than if a person who doesn't speak the language. It's like you are showing you are making the effort and crossing the halfway line. I think it is huge.

Researcher: In a country such as Pakistan, have you had a lot of challenges posed by the government?

Participant E: Yes, we had real challenges with ISI. Which was literally harassing us. There would be a musical event, we had a musical event in Lahore for example, for example, and ISI was checking everybody's ID, who went into the concert hall. Well, that can discourage a person from attending. So we did have that kind of challenges.

Researcher: Can you tell me little more about the social media engagement that the embassy is doing in Pakistan?

Participant E: Let's talk about Facebook. We had a really good webmaster, really talented and he had a series, for example, where he chose a scene and the viewer had to guess whether that scene was from Pakistan or the US. Like a scene of nature for example, and people were just so curious that because they say that Pakistan is a really beautiful place and that was one series that was very successful. It was like a contest that people would have.

What the focus there was to really engage with youth and to spark dialogue. **If you have only a handful of people in the embassy you can't really engage in a dialogue with millions of people** and on the Facebook, there are a million fans in Pakistan. So what you want to do is, you know, start a dialogue where people are talking to each other for they carry the dialogue more than us because there are just too many people cut every once in a while, we can step in and in that conversation and say well, 'yes,' but add something else, a new thread. It was basically very much led by the participants. And so we would, you know post something that we thought would be of interest and a conversation would start. When we had resources to do so, we would involve in that conversation.

Researcher: How are these conversations measured?

Participant E: Yeah themes. So you know you have the analytics with Facebook and Twitter, so it was easy to see what resonates and what doesn't. And then you just adjust

accordingly. And it makes it easy to see what interests your audience. So you want to talk about what interests them. A lot of what is happening on Facebook is just engagement, and we are trying to engage, and we are not trying to shove a message down people's throat.

So you are trying to engage an it is often the case that after engagement people's opinions change. It is hard to have such strong negative feelings with someone you are engaging with on a regular basis. And that is why almost in any subject, insiders have a much more tolerant view of the outsiders who view things through a stereotypical view.

Researcher: Do these engagement program change with each new staff or administration?

Participant E: Yes, definitely, people bring their own strengths. If somebody has experience in entrepreneurship, when I was in Germany, one of the economic officers had started several companies, in fact, he had started companies which were million dollar companies, and then he quit to become a state department officer. Well, we had an entrepreneurship program working with German to improve their skill, so we used him. He was our main expert because he had practiced it. So I think that. You want to use the strengths of the staff at hand but if you don't have that strengths, so bring in speakers. So that is why we have a robust speaker program. Because we tap other people's expertise. But every officer has to follow U.S. policy without a doubt, but you can bring your own strengths on how to implement that policy. Somebody who doesn't have that experience and is taxed with a program can invite an entrepreneur from the states to conduct that program.

Researcher: Can we achieve Consensus-building on U.S. policies with publics of Pakistan, without changing their worldview?

Participant E: I don't think you always have publics that is interested in consensus. There will always be publics that ae opponents. There are two really good articles that I suggest you read, one is by Rhonda Zaharna. She has a model of a quadrant. The last one she wrote is called "going for the jugular" it describes the situation where you have a hostile public. And what happens. and it's very often the case that in a good situation that you will reach a consensus but if is often the case that you have NGOs whose, for example, whose existence depends on in opposition to something that the government is doing. If there is nothing to fight for, there is nothing to raise funds. And I think there are lot of institution whose purpose depends on the opposition. And they are not interested in consensus, and I have experienced in Germany for example. Where they are just good at what they do but their ideology is anti-globalization for example, and you are not going to convince them. And I think, I know you, they are not going to come to an accommodation either. It's an ideal, you know if you look at publics, if you want to simplify it, you have a slice of any public which is hard upon it and you are not going to convince them. Then you have on the opposite side populace which is a hard proponent, they are on your side, so you do not really, they are already on your side. Then you have a **very large swath in-between, which is like the great undecided. Or the great**

uncommitted, and that's really what the focus of a lot of our PD is. I think that you are wasting your time by trying to convince the hard opponents, they are always going to be opponents. If you have limited resources, you don't want to spend your time inviting people who are already on your side. It is good to keep contact with them, but you want to spend a lot of time spending with who are open minded. And I think in that case you will get more of an impact. if you want to measure the effectiveness of before and after, you are not going to change the needle with hard opponents at all, or proponents, but you might change with people who are uncommitted.

Researcher: My understanding is that the State does not have an internal polling system but rely on Pew and such organizations. Is this correct?

Participant E: Oh no! We have an internal polling system. Very much so. But we work with professionals. We have a huge office who does that. What we will do is, we will work with professional polling agencies and commission a poll. We have a very large office who does that.

Researcher: what is that called?

Participant E: It is called INR. Yeah. They are very good.

Researcher: A question about the Pakistani publics, do you think they have the ability to change their government's policy toward the US?

Participant E: I think so. If you look at Pakistan for example, the negatives for the Taliban spiked when the government had an anti-Taliban public affairs campaign. **Its negatives went through the roof.** The government produced movies and videos where they were associating with Pakistani soldiers and the Taliban attacking them and killing them. These were popular programs that were very effective. So I think the governments in many ways are much more credible regarding talking about the U.S. than we are. Because people view us as having our own interests. We are credible when talking about policy and changing misconceptions about the US. But just as in social media, you are much more likely to listen to a friend and open up a friend's message.

Researcher: So if I hear you correctly, the Pakistani government has a lot of influence on the population than the other way around.

Participant E: I think it goes both ways. I think that's what the elections are for. That's why the elections are very important because the government has to be accountable. In democracies, it goes both ways. Sometime the politicians play the public opinion and sometimes they can influence public opinion.

Researcher: Do you feel that internal social issues within Pakistan such as sectarianism and the 'Mullahism' do these affect PD?

Participant E: That's a very good question. I mean you can felt his hostility. I remember there were certain parts of, even in Islamabad where you could see the anti-Americanism. I mean you could hear it from the Mosques. You could hear it in the speech. the anti-American rhetoric is coming from the mosques. That influences PD. So, we are very aware of that but we have a lot of very good contacts in the religious community who were worried about the direction of that is taking.

Researcher: So can you elaborate on your contacts in the religious community?

Participant E: There are a lot of people, Imams and otherwise, who are very worried about extremism so they would speak publicly about extremism. And any time you talk to them they would list friends who had been shot, bombed or killed in another manner by extremists. That was one of the common themes anytime you talk to someone. They would mention friends who speak out against extremism. I think it takes a lot of courage to do that. But certainly in the media. Look at the, what was the name of that guy, who was killed in Islamabad, speaking against the blasphemy law.

Researcher: Salman Taseer.

Participant E: One of the problems I think in countries like Pakistan is that the penalty for speaking up against extremism can be so much higher than the penalty for speaking for extremism. If you speak for extremism nothing happens to you, but if you speak against it, you can get killed. And I think that is one of the problems in the public sphere that it is very hard, it takes an incredible amount of courage to speak out against them. and you know, people tend to play to the popular sentiment.

Researcher: If you had to give an example of a PD success and a PD fail, what would those be.

Participant E: Wow! that's a very good question. I think there are so many examples of good ones. OK, regarding good ones, we have established a lot of linkages between universities in Pakistani and Universities in the States. Faculty go in one direction. That has helped strengthen Pakistani universities, but it has also provided venues for American universities to learn more about Pakistan. **Pakistani scholars go to the United States, and they teach classes, they create curricula. It is certainly a win-win situation. If you want to talk about a problem, if you want to keep the same program in mind. It's hard to have a two-way exchange. That's one of the general problems with working in Pakistan. We send hundreds of people to the States, but we cannot send hundreds of Americans to Pakistan because of the security situation. So it's harder to have real two-way exchanges, which is your goal. So I think there is security situation has hampered the true exchange capacity with Pakistan.**

Researcher: So at this point would you say that PD efforts between Us and Pakistan are mostly asymmetrical?

Participant E: well not necessarily because what you want to do is have people who come back from the states tell their colleagues what they have experienced. So we have, for example, a lot of community service programs where the kids will go to the states and see how high schoolers work on community clean up, and then they go back, and they try to implement those programs in their own schools. Or in their own community. So in a way, it is two-way except you do not have Americans do it. You have a Pakistani sort of bringing the lessons learned in the local community. You have to make compromises, and you have to redefine by what you mean by two-way.

Researcher: So is it true that the largest Fulbright Scholarship Program is allocated to Pakistan?

Participant E: Yes, that is correct.

Researcher: I guess this concludes our interview. thank you very much for your time. May I contact you in case I need to clarify something.

Participant E: Yes, sure, thank you.

Participant F

Researcher: Shall we begin the interview.

Participant F: Sure, sure.

Researcher: So please tell me a little bit about how much in your opinion Pakistani population has influence over their government?

Participant F: They have no power. To the state, the public opinion does not matter. And when I say the state, I mean the military and ISI. The government has no power of its own. Pakistan is run by the military power even though there is a proxy government. The military has a very set agenda which is shaped by their interests and shapes the public opinions in Pakistanis. When the relations are good with the United States, media portrays it good, and when the relations with the United States are bad, public opinions go down too. In 2011, after OBL (Osama Bin Laden) raid, military was very upset. The relations were at its lowest and continued to be bad in 2012 and 2013. People were protesting American drone attacks. Drone attacks are still happening, but now the military thinks it is to their own advantage, so nobody says anything.

So there is this **"manufactured warmth" toward the United States because they are fighting the enemy for Pakistan for them in the tribal areas and Afghanistan.**

Researcher: My follow-up question is what in your opinion will influence public opinion in the United States in Pakistan? And if the United States been effective in making a positive change in public opinion through PD?

Participant F: There is nothing the United States government can do. Everything is controlled by the state. I will say this again when I say the state, I mean military and the ISI. The Pakistani government is just a proxy power. The media is a state owned one. There are many private channels with limited ability to...with freedom. The state-owned channel has no freedom, and it is the only one that is avail in all of the Pakistan. Everyone has access to it. It has 80 million viewership. This feeds news into the Urdu press which is widely read and accessible. Then comes social media with very limited impact because of many restrictions put on the use of the internet. Then comes the political movements. They have some influence, but they are limited by military too. But the religious parties, the pseudo-political religious parties are very influential. Military sides with them as well especially in the 80s after the Afghan war, it was especially in the interest of military to have a force of mujahedeen (warriors) willing to go anywhere. In the 80s was the first time when we say leaders take force. These leaders also received direct funding from the United States government to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. They (U.S.) sent weapons to fight the Soviets. America made the religious leaders in Pakistan. Now when the war was over, these Taliban were sometimes sent to Kashmir, or to India or to Bosnia.

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Researcher: You touched on the impact of social media, is social media as much impactful in Pakistan as it is in western countries?

Participant F: No, not much. There are many restrictions on social media. Not all platforms and channels are available in Pakistan but in a very limited sense, it has some impact. People still rely on state-owned TV channel for their source of information. The population is still very much rural, and only 30% population is Urban. Out of the population of 200 million, this (rural population) is a large number.

Researcher: So in that case, do you think when public opinion polls are conducted in Pakistan by independent research teams, such as PEW Research Center, these polls adequately represent the true nature of public opinion of the United States?

Participant F: These are done very accurately. Keep in mind rural population still have very easy access to mobile phones. There are some 110 million telephone connections in Pakistan. Even the most nominally educated person has used a mobile device.

Researcher: Are U.S. counterterrorism policy goals alight with Pakistani counterterrorism goals? Are they similar or are there big differences?

Participant F: Well you see Farah, Pakistan has only considered one enemy and that is India. Anything that military would do is to protect itself from India. It is now aligning itself with China. China is establishing a $46 billion economic corridor in Pakistan. There is an effort to convince the U.S. that India is siding with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Researcher: What are U.S. foreign policy failures in Pakistan?

Participant F: But going back a little bit, we must understand where the Taliban originated. When the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan, America did not want Soviet Union to succeed. ISI Pakistan selected a specific Pakistani demographic, exploited their religious sensibilities, and with the help and funding from the United States and Saudi Arabia, sent these extremists to Afghanistan, when that was over, then to Kashmir and then to Bosnia. So must understand that U.S. foreign policy has been a part of the reason for extremism to go rampant in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan became an international 'exporter of terrorism.' Pakistan is a safe haven for terrorism and a victim of it too. We are reaping the results of our actions. Pakistan has let the terrorists and the radicals thrive in this country since the 80s. they have been our "Strategic Assets" and now they have become our biggest "liabilities."

Researcher: Does Pakistani government create public opinion of its public?

When it is in the interest of the ISI, when tensions are high with India, it wants to have a partner, as I explained before, they play public opinion in their own interest.

Researcher: Thank you for answering my questions.

Participant G: My pleasure.

Participant H

Researcher: This is Farah Latif, how are you?

Participant H: How are you?

Researcher: Well, thank you for helping me out, and talking to me today.

Participant H: Of course, thank you for reaching out.

Researcher: Is the Pakistani public in a position to influence their government?

Participant H: So is the Pakistani public in a position to influence the Pakistani government? let me think! It's a complicated answer. I think on the one hand, there are many examples of roots in the Pakistani community that mobilize political action. Whether it is to promote women's issues or fair labor practices in a particular sector or it is push back against you know, perceived oppression, in support of minority rights or in support of the poor. I think that quality does exist in the Pakistan culture, it's what leads to the ability in a political leader to have a large rally. There is a fair amount of grassroots activity that takes place. And obviously in Pakistan if that kind of mobilization result in different policy outcomes and more

effective government action is challenging because the system is not yet as mature to be able to respond to these needs in a constructive way. I think the fact that in the last election, voter participation increased than any other elections that I know of, is a very good sign of how citizenry of Pakistan is more engaged and if that trend continues and particularity across the country, and not just in the urban center, then more often there is real and visible participation and pushing for an issue or against it, overtime the elected leaders and politicians pay attention the less voter participation there is the less mobilization there is, there is less attention by politicians. I think the system however is still very (thinks for a while) incomplete, there is still vast amount of work to be done in local elections format and process, there is still a lot of work to be done to dislodge the power groups and that kind of challenge, which is similar to U.S. history has evolved is the on-going challenge of a democratic society. You have power groups and you have citizens are competing for the attention and the time and the focus of the public in the time and the focus of the public sector and it require. Right now, I think on the part of citizens of real effort to not just give up hope but to get involved in there with whatever groups that are consistent with what things they think are important for them locally and also for the country. Right now I think it is difficult. There are large parts of the country that don't have to very good representation right now.

Researcher: In terms of public perceptions of the U.S. and counterterrorism policies, does the Pakistani public has influence over Pakistani government where their voice will be taken more seriously. In other words, the PD efforts in Pakistan by the U.S. government able to yield quick results or are they long term measures.

Participant H: I think PD effort is more long-term, I think in **the American government's interest is to have a positive view of America among the Pakistani public. I think there are enough polls that show that is not the case right now, but America has multiple parallel tracks of work happening, these are these are the Pakistan and the South Asia, right? PD track works to emphasize the investment-oriented work,** in education, health, helping to build power plants, to support school teachers and schools. That kind of work is more in sync with PD would encompass. It tends to be overshadowed by past relationships that are more focused on security and terrorism and so on. But at the same time that kind of work is also long term, it doesn't yield significant results quickly and it also does not have

results that are visible. These are slow changes over time. And I think it is a real question of strong influence of, it is a question of presenting one view of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from the America's perspective. And I think this is, if you speak to the folks who work on the ground there doing developing work, that what they are trained to do, that is what they are recruited to do, that's not where necessary tends to go. It does when there is a catastrophe, an earthquake, U.S. has been very involved in crisis situations, with funding and resources and people. **Those are visible and those are remembered, especially by those who are effected, but the longer term development work tends to be difficult to get attention** to, difficult to bring awareness of and **although, I think the PD efforts should happen. I think their reach is limited.**

Researcher: I would like to know more about your work with Consensus Building Institute?

Participant H: Ok, The Consensus Building Institute is based in Cambridge, MA. They are a professional organization with trained staff who provide what is called facilitation and mediation services. They help multi-stake holder groups, let's say around a bid development project, so there are community people, city and companies involved, development and local citizens and groups involved, there is local government in a particular country. And they all have different point of views, they may have different interests, they certainly need to work together but often times it's hard without helping and support for people to have productive conversation and in to hose conversations are going in a particularly good direction and people feel like that there is momentum. That's what they do, they help multi stake holder groups come to an agreement on a plan and then ability to execute that plan. What we did with them was that, they are very good at putting the right questions at the table and helping to actually facilitate the conversation, in fact many of the Americans and Pakistanis who have participated in our work in terms of the forums we have hosted, really the conversations were really positive and constructive and detailed, and did not get stuck because someone dominated or point of view was pushed too aggressively or that people were respectful and civil and everyone felt that they had a chance to be heard and could engage with each other without worrying about being attacked. That is what a good facilitator helps does. So you know, we put together, leadership retreats with Americans and Pakistanis who had similar professional's roles and responsibilities from their respective organizations wanted to have Consensus Building Institute design and facilitate those meetings. So they would maximize the opportunities for engagement and relationship building and trust building and also allow people to move past any perceptions and stereotypes and have very good and candid and respectful conversation about. How the relationship could improve in the area that they have expertise and in fact build relationships with each other. And I think when you have two countries for example, where you have different national security interests, they are from different cultures and different way of interacting and they have different assumptions about each

other maybe, opinions that maybe negative, it really makes a difference to have someone who can have both sides, have constructive dialogues. that is really what they do.

Researcher: What are some of the assumptions that Pakistanis have of Americans and Americans have of Pakistanis?

Participant H: I think It varies. I think, I have talked to ordinary Pakistanis about America and if the conversation is going well they will describe America as the land of opportunities and the land of laws, where you can work hard and get ahead. And also do well for your family, and you can get a good education. On the other side, if the conversation is not going well, they will think that America is trying to, against Islam, or against Pakistan or many of the problems in Pakistan are the fault of America, they are trying to break up Pakistan. Both of those views can be in the same person (chuckles). Usually the early part of the conversation is the more negative view and later there is more positive emerges and then they realize that the negative isn't that accurate. But you have to have a conversation because there is just some pent up negativity that is being expressed. Usually it should be expressed more with, what Pakistan can do for Pakistanis, but it tends to go for America. On the American side, most Americans don't know Pakistanis, if they do then they know that it is a country where people work hard are very entrepreneurial and business minded and you know, exhibit that American would value, hard work, family, religion, community but most people don't know. So those who don't know Pakistan have same suspicions that Americans have of all Muslims countries such as it's a risk to us, they produce terrorists, unsafe environment, they are against us, right? So again, both sets of views are there and again it depends on **whether there have been previous interactions or not**, Usually. I think more Pakistanis can have a more of a favorable view of Americans and Americans might have of a Pakistani, in general. **Because many Pakistanis have left and gone to America or gone to Europe, there are a very few Americans who have gone to Pakistan, there is very limited experience Americans have with Pakistan.** Stories they have heard from other Americans, unfortunately.

Researcher: How do you measure the effectiveness of your programs where there are interactions between American and Pakistanis? In other words, what are the outcomes you look for?

Participant H: **It's both an art and a science,** I think, first of all, we look to see, how you know how diverse, or how much participation you are able to create. Usually our meetings are 35-40 influential people. So that is always good. A conversations and a way to frame the issues that is attractive and inclusive. I think we look for feedback, form [inaudible] and from the people who participated, what they took away, how they felt, if they made new relationships, are there people that they are going to retain and stay in touch with. And did they learn something new, everyone participates writes something about what they did, that is a good sign. When people write articles in the newspapers, in a blog, or otherwise and several Americans have, they were very surprised and impressed with the quality of their interactions and how they changed

their own perceptions of the country. Then we look to see if there are any partnerships that emerge between. Are they directly between institutions that met through us and decided to work together. Or, other institutions who perused an idea that was generated in our meeting and eventually that was able to move forward. either because it was funded by those people or if they were able to secure financial support to peruse that partnership. those are the three things we look for, one the level of participation. Two, the feedback on the quality of the discussions and the relationship in the perception that changed as a result. Three, if any practical partnerships and examples of collaboration emerge out of the meeting.

Researcher: Has there been an idea or program that did not work at all?

Participant H: So far, (long pause). So far it hasn't because part of our process is to do a lot of pre-work. We, before anyone comes, we talk to them, interview them, study them, we get their ideas what they would like to talk about, what their interests and concerns are. It is incorporated in the, that input is synthesized and incorporated into the design of the discussion. People feel very respectfully treated before they come. They feel like the discussion touches on the issues they really care about. Each individually and as a group. So we haven't had a negative experience despite, of course the quality of the people matters as well. We want people to come. they can be skeptical, they can be having strong opinions, but they should keep an open mind about the other people they are meeting, and do so in a respectful manner. We never had a difficult interaction that I can think of. People are mostly just very happy to meet with each other and including, many of the Pakistanis who meeting each other for the first time.

Researcher: So these meetings are designed keeping in mind the types of concerns Participants have?

Participant H: We do not have strong views what is coming out, we have some ideas. We really let the meetings design that outcome. We do set it up so they are productive possibilities.

Researcher: Do you as a nonprofit, consider your work as U.S. public diplomacy?

Participant H: We do not actually. We take a very neutral position. We do not represent anybody. Our only focus is to help the people that participate and have very productive interactions. **We maintain our independence very, very, very carefully.** That is one of our core values. We do not have a position. Individuals may, but we do not express them. Our job is to simply create a safe space for a constructive dialogue for tangible outcomes. So we will not consider ourselves a PD organization. Like even when we are doing some of our recent work, we interact with embassies of Pakistan and US, Department of State, the foreign Ministry, we are very clear that 'you have your views, we don't represent them,' and if we are asked to represent anyone's views, we will back away from the project. Because the only way our work, works is if everybody trusts us to be neutral. And that is why we are private and non-profit and actually do not take government money. We get grants from foundations and individuals and no one group has a disproportionate advantage in "Convergence.' That is reason why people participate with us, because they

feel that they will get a fair hearing, fair opportunity to participate, even if outside of our dialogues the power dynamics are different, in our dialogues we really work hard to remove those.

Researcher: Is there anything you would like to add?

Participant H: The relationship between two countries that have a tough history, to get that relationship back on track requires a lot of work. Obviously if there is a lack of trust, negative perceptions, or if there are reasons for these to be, that work is even harder. And communication piece around this is so important because I

think government officials do take their cues from public opinion, in part but not always, obviously. And public opinion takes its cues from public officials. So if that relationship is going into a negative spiral either intentionally or just because things are reinforcing each other in negative ways, then it is very hard to break that. Sometimes, some external support is needed to break that sometimes. I think that it is very say to assign a motive to someone that does not exist, but you believe it does, and then act on that assignment. You assume they are doing things on negative intent and then you act on that assumptions. That usually means you are being... you are defending against that or trying to undermine it or subvert it. That's how relationships become very unhealthy. So I think it takes a while to overcome that. But it does require new and different leadership, sometime, fortuitous events, sometimes very deliberate and methodical diplomacy. And there is no glamour in diplomacy, and it tis steady and slow work. And I think right now it feels like things are better in U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Or as 4-5 years ago, things were pretty bad.

Researcher: Why do you think that may be. I do not know of any thing that has drastically changed since?

Participant H: I think there has been more interaction, people have been getting along, individually and they are willing to give a little more benefit of the doubt and not like speak off the cuff automatically in a negative way. There have certainly been some changes, there is...the new leadership with General Raheel, there is a new Prime Minister, there is a second election. The fact that Pakistan went through a second elections, rally made an impression here in the US. In terms of the US, we have a secretary of the State that knows Pakistan very well. A president that has had a history with Pakistan. You have more people involved in this relationship that are spending more time on it in the PD world. Americans going for two year assignments as opposed to 9 month assignments, that makes a difference. Some of the real ground work that was laid 4-5 years ago is starting to bear fruit. There is the still unglamorous work of PD even in the roughest times, some of that work is still going on. It is showing promise. So I think a lot of different factors play into it, there is no one reason but it does show that relationships can improve but you have to stick with it, you can't disengage. There are institutions that support that engage within and outside of the government are matter, that's why if you look at US-Germany, or US-UK, US-Japan, or US-China, both countries have set up institutions that supported them to promote ongoing engagement in the

terms of engagement and educational exchanges and people to people, and cultural and economic, that really, if it does not stop, it really helps support good public work. I mean U.S. and Germany, there are two major foundations that have spent the last fifty years just focused on the [inaudible]. Germany was the loser in world war II right, there was no love between the two countries, in fact they hated each other. Over fifty years those two institutions and more have really worked hard to support this. **Rebuilding and then maintaining of the relationships, people know each other and they understand each other and they are not afraid of each other. And they see an alignment of interests and opportunity. And usually in America it's the diaspora community that really supports it** such as the German American community, the Irish have theirs, Japanese community have theirs and also the foreign countries supported it. Actually they had similar efforts but right now in the US-Pakistan relationship there is not much of that external support, but if that support occurred, and developed, it can make a difference. It's a very normal formula.

Researcher: So you mention that cooperation and the relationship has to be build, and I know that U.S. has the largest Fulbright funding available for Pakistan however, I am not sure how many of U.S. students go to Pakistan on a Fulbright scholarship.

Participant H: Very few, very few, if any.

Researcher: So at this stage is there equal participation and engagement?

Participant H: The only barrier there is the perceived sense that if an American goes to Pakistan they will get hurt, right. If they did not feel that way, they would go. Americans love to travel. See new places. I think when Pakistan gets a full handle on its internal security situation and presents itself as a safe place then I think people will go. People used to travel to Pakistan in the 60s and 70s all the time. The Peace Corp. and the Rotary. They remember it very fondly but since the Afghan war and the obviously all the internal violence. I think, of course Americans stopped coming. But I don't think it is because of interest, I just think there is a lack of options. Even when we were recruiting to have Americans come, we had to overcome their fear but once we did that, everybody came, and they had a wonderful time. They really enjoyed it. And they really changed their view on the country and the people and the culture. Pakistani's have to get a handle on their law and order situation.

Researcher: Thank you for your time.

Participant H: Good luck with your work.

Participant K.

Researcher: Thank you for meeting me today.

Participant K: Even though I'm in the US government anything that I say here this afternoon are my own personal views and don't represent the views of the US government.

Farah Latif: How long have you been in this position?

Participant K: In policy? I have been there for over 10 years.

Farah Latif: Have you seen U.S. foreign policies change in major ways since you have been at the Department of Defense?

Participant K: Yes. I think US foreign policies have changed quite drastically since I have been in the OSD office of the Secretary of Defense. Ummm... When I first joined in 2004, our orientation was what was called then the Global War on Terror, we were engaged both in Iraq and Afghanistan. We were vigorously pursuing Al-Qaeda and strengthening alliances all over the world geared towards fighting the scourge of terrorism. Now as we sit here in 2016 we face a different strategic landscape. We face a situation where we have ramp down or ended our engagement in Iraq only to see the rise of a ISIL. We have thrown down our troop presence in Afghanistan. Aaa... And now we are focusing more on counter-terrorism mission and trying to work on a train/advice mission in Afghanistan when they are on national security force so that the and now we are focusing more on the counter terrorism mission and trying to work on a train advise assist mission on national security for us so that they can fight for their own security of their own the territories, itself is evolved over time so I mentioned earlier ISIL has now emerged and they are making inroads of you see not just in Syria and Iraq but also in other places include Lebanon and North-Africa and potentially in South-Asia. Our relationship with Pakistan is I think in the middle of an evolutionary change we are trying to figure out what future of bilateral us Pakistan relations will be. I think in the future counterterrorism will continue to be a key part of any US-Pakistan relationship but I think that there is also a desire to broaden the relationship to be on just counterterrorism but unfortunately that's been a bit difficult because you know because of turbulent political leadership in Pakistan because of a focus on security threats and because Pakistan's economy is not performing well in a bit challenging that is enduring and long lasting. Searching for were still in the midst of both sides are in the midst of trying to find out what is the future of US- Pakistan relationship.

Researcher: How would you define U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Participant K: The national security strategy which Obama administration at the most recent released in 2015 lays out what US objectives all are so I mean I will refer you to that document, take a look at what exactly it is, it's pretty expensive. America still sees itself as an indispensable country which can only provide the leadership that other countries cannot, however, I think in this day and age what was facing into 2016 is an environment where American leadership is increasingly being challenged I think we've seen this with Russia and insurgency in Eastern Ukraine as well as in Crimea we see it with China with the actions in the South China Sea we stand with North Korea and the fact that you know they continue to challenge you know the world by doing nuclear tests so America continues to remain, in my opinion the most powerful country in the world, you know, **what America lacks is a coherent vision for how to approach the world**. There are myriad challenges the U.S. faces, and there is no overarching foreign policy construct of how to address these various challenges. Because the challenges themselves are markedly different. You know, how you deal with Russia and China is different than how

you deal with ISIL. And you know, dealing with transnational threats as opposed to relations among states. So, how do you craft that, and that's something that in my opinion, I don't think the United States has been able to craft.

Researcher: Can you elaborate on what you mean by transnational threats?

Participant K: Just as the name suggests, those are the threats that go beyond borders, so those are threat such as terrorism where our globalized economy and our globalized transportation system, a terrorist can get on a plane in London and get off in Istanbul and walk over to Syria. These cross boundaries. Narcotics is another transnational threats, Weapons of mass destructions and the trafficking of nuclear and biological weapons.

Researcher: Are these threats perceived equally harmful across other nations as they are in the United States?

Participant K: That's a good question. For example, when I started in policy in 2004, while we were very focused on Al-Qaeda, the couple of years after as we got further and further away from 9/11 that there was a perception that Al-Qaeda was perhaps NOT as big a threat to some countries, or those that did not have the manifestation of the Al-Qaeda threat. It makes it difficult for the United States to get coalition partners to help them. Because the things with transnational threats is that you need partners to help you. Provide you intelligence, security forces, police forces to prosecute these threats. And if your partner does not see the threat the same way that you see the threat, if your ally does not think that the threat is as big a deal to them as it is to you, then you are not going to have the same exertion of effort. It is a constant challenge. So when you take one transnational threat like terrorism, think about all the terror groups that exist. A particular country, let's say that the U.S. is concerned about ISIL. If we have a partner country, where ISIL does not exist and what need a threat but they may have another terrorist threat that might be of bigger threat to them. So that the challenge comes in aligning the threat perceptions between the two countries. So that you can cooperate with the same level of effort and energy. If you do not have the same threat perceptions, the host nation may not perhaps dedicate the necessary resources, or the dedicated effort that you may need. So what counties also do is that they, let's say the United States terror threat that needs to be addressed, and the partner country that they think is greater, oftentimes, they will take the threat that they are most concerned about and link it somehow to the threat that the United States is concerned about. That is another challenge.

Researcher: Example.

Participant K: I can give you an example, not so much in terrorism terms but let's say in case of Pakistan, during the 60s and 70s, as we gave Pakistan arms, it was for the purpose of prosecuting or going against communism. And countering against soviet expansion. However, for the Pakistan is getting these weapons served the purpose of staying ahead of India, that was not the purpose the United States had in mind, when the weaponry was given to Pakistan, however, Pakistanis were very willing to basically say that we are in

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the anticommunist fight with you yet they knew that they could use these weapons against India.

Researcher: Do you think in this case Pakistan was sincere in its alliance with the United States against Soviet Union?

Participant K: Well, the Pakistanis certainly said the right things.

Researcher: Did they do the right things?

Participant K: Well, ostensibly. Especially during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan they were key partners. Ejecting the soviets form Afghanistan. I don't know sincerely is word you want to use, only because states will look for their own national interests. And so sincerity or sentiment doesn't come into it. It is a question of my national interest, is the way any state will look at the particular issue.

At least, if they are competent in the execution of their foreign policy. They will take every interaction with states and see how this can benefit them.

Researcher: How do nations build trust? How is trust perceived between nations? If we take away the notion of emotion, how do we evaluate trustworthiness of a partner?

Participant K: A number of ways. **So trust can be built in a number of ways between nations. First, let's look at it from a legal perspective, trade agreements, security agreements between countries, to cooperate on various aspects of society whether it be science and technology, cultural exchanges, whether it be... trust is built first off on just basically the mechanisms of state to state mechanisms. Beyond that, you can build trust through people to people contact. So university students coming over to the United States, or U.S. students going to that country. Fulbright scholarships, and sort of people exchanges. Then there is a third element of building trust which is basically supporting a country in its time of need, right**. And so over time this is trust is built in terms of how nations kind of assess the trustworthiness of a country, especially in times of crisis. **That more than anything else is a measuring stick, by how deeply countries trust one another.**

That's why in Pakistan's case in the 1965, the U.S. cut off arms to both India and Pakistan. But in 1971 war the United States deployed the USS enterprise to the Bay of Bengal as a signal to India not to go to West Pakistan when the East Pakistan had been lost. So there have been instances, so there is a mixed record of trust, the net result is usually a lack of trust. Because it is not consistent.

Researcher: What are the main characteristics of the United States foreign policy objectives in Pakistan?

Participant K: So the U.S. objectives toward Pakistan quite simply, or to continue our work on counterterrorism, to be able to work with Pakistan to ensure regional stability, I think beyond that due to develop a relationship with Pakistan becomes a contributor to not only to regional security but also regional prosperity. For example, one of the things that is under consideration but has been a big initiative is the big TAPI pipeline. A gas pipeline that will go through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan to India.

But the TAPI pipeline doesn't have much of a chance of succeeding because of security in Afghanistan, because of financing, to the extent that Pakistan can be a positive forces or

stability in South- Asia that will assist the prospects for potentially, a pipeline that will provide natural gas from Turkmenistan, one of the biggest gas fields in the world to countries that need the energy like Pakistan and India. But getting from central Asia to south Asia is not easy. That is the longer term vision that the United States would like to see.

Researcher: What is the difference between the terms counter-terrorism and violent extremism? What do they imply?

Participant K: Countering violent extremism is essentially aimed at countering the ideology so trying to prevent the radicalization of youth, it is trying to shape the environment where violent extremist will not take hold. Counterterrorism gets into specific actions, related to counter terrorism actions. Such as the direct actions, special operations forces conducting raids, or shared intelligence or collecting intelligence. So there is a distinction between counter violet extremism and countering terrorism.

Researcher: Is Al-Qaeda threat as real in Pakistan as it was a decade ago?

Participant K: Well certainly, Al-Qaeda has been diminished quite a bit. Since 9/11 I mean it has been a weakened quite a bit since, or even before killing of OBL. Al-Qaeda has been incredible pressure. What the future of Al-Qaeda is, is yet to be determined Zawahiri is still alive. There may be a competition going on between Al-Qaeda and ISIL for recruits. I think it is a bit too early to tell how the threat is going to evolve. But to answer your question, yes. It is a threat still. It has to be watched.

Researcher: Can you remind us an era or a time that made relationship between U.S. and Pakistan tighter?

Participant K: After 9/11 forced the two country together by necessity. The United States made some clear conditions to Pakistan about what it expected. Are the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I think we may have seen that particular instance as more of a time when both sides were pushed together on common interests. Pakistan had no choice in that matter, in 1979 Pakistan did have a concern about the Soviet expansion so there is a pretty tight relationship since 1979 on. During the cold war, at the onset of the cold war, was very good at cultivating the United States whereas India adhered to the non-alignment movement. So Pakistan was very good at ingratiating itself with the United States through the anti-communist movement. India on the other hand, was not. Did not want to be part of the Soviet or the American block. That I think, antagonized the United States and endeared the U.S. a bit more to Pakistan.

Researcher: So you talked about DOD acting on changes in some of the foreign policy objectives. How are these changes translated across different agencies particularly the State Department? How does that alignment take place? 00:28:30]

Participant K: My personal observation is that the State has changed is **struggling with declining budgets, the State Department does not have enough people and resources to do the sorts of things in the area of violent extremism that one would hope. For example, state stabilization. You want to stabilize a state before it becomes an ungoverned area. [The] State Department, by extension USAID, does not have the**

resources or the skills to do those sorts of things. Since the Iraq and Afghanistan wars began, we have seen an assumption of many State [Department]-like function by the Defense Department. So in Afghanistan, for example, you not only have US troops fighting, but you know they were also digging wells, and they are building schools. Those are development activities, but because the State Department had a dearth of people, [it lacks the] capacity to plan strategically for these issues. There has been this perception at the State [Department] that DOD has assumed more of what one would call development function. DOD does not welcome that at all. They want to divest of that. Even though they both agree, the State [Department] does not have the capacity to do so.

Researcher: So we talked about building trust earlier, so do you think the Defense Department's function builds trust or is the State's narrative just as important in PD? Are actions more important than words?

Participant K: I think actions most definitely are going be more powerful, no question about it. An Afghan villager understands that a road was built for him, or a well was dug, they understand that. Words can be very important in making commitment. So when the U.S. president says they are going to be leaving in 2016-17, this has an impact on the overall strategic picture. People begin to see that 'hey look, if I can wait out the U.S. for a couple of years, U.S. will be gone" words do have an impact. Actions also have an impact. The two are interrelated.

Researcher: When a road is built by U.S. military in a targeted population, what is the message being sent from the perspective of a U.S. DOD personnel and what in your opinion is the message received.

Participant K: I have not been to Afghanistan so I can't say. My sense is though, that from a public perspective, there is gratitude, there is happiness, but there is also a bit of anxiety that comes in with that road or well project, because once it is built, if the Americans leave, who will be left behind to, will the road be taken over by the bad guys. Will the well be taken by Taliban? So they are also skeptical. For example, in Afghanistan one of the problems we have had is working with villagers, many of these troops are on a one-year rotation. By the time they develop a relationship with these villagers, it is time for them to leave. So the trust factor is difficult. In the Afghan society, building trust takes time. It's hard in a year. The public knows you are leaving. so why should I pay attention to you, why should I trust you.

Researcher: How do you define strategic planning?

Participant K: Strategic planning consists of three components. Ends, ways and means. The ends are the objectives; the ways are the way in which you will achieve those objectives. And the means are the tools you have at our disposal to implement those ways. That is in essence how you capture DOD strategic planning.

Researcher: In your opinion, when DOD takes an action, a development act, is it a public diplomacy effort.

Participant K: It does not strike me as a PD effort.

Researcher: What is it?

Participant K: It comes to your question of what is PD. To me PD is basically shaping the public information space. Being able to get the U.S. message out on media, social media, print media, shape people's perceptions through conferences, lectures, speeches, and other sorts of engagements about U.S. objectives in U.S. approaches. Building a road can indirectly support PD. Because if you are saying you are committed to a particular country in a PD message, yet your actions indicate otherwise, then PD message will be completely undercut.

Participant I

Researcher: Would you please Introduce yourself?

Participant I: I'm a conflict resolution practitioner. I focus on use of new-media tools in conflict resolution. I am concerned with the viral, multi-directional and mass media use. Every human being has the ability to be a citizen-journalist just using a phone, they can take a picture or movie and post it on social media to make a story about it, so it affects media and how is conflict impacted by it. I started a non-profit nine years ago called OneBlue.org, and the three things that we do are the simulation exercises where I will take a conflict interpersonal or otherwise and role play. So the State Department involved us in a situation where there were women Pakistani women who were getting internships in US and to go back to their home countries and continue the work that they had been doing in their fellowships. Because a lot of them had been going back and not utilizing the work, they had done here. They had many reasons for it either family, cultural or societal pressure or sometimes lack of motivation. So the State Department asked us to design a workshop we could address this issue. We created three fictitious characters, one was married, not married, and one was married with children. We had the participants choose who they would like to play the role of. It helped them understand the situations and obstacles they may face when they returned to Pakistan.

Researcher: Tell me about your work when you advised senator Ed Gillespie in Muslims diaspora?

Participant I: He belonged to a party that is not integrated into our community, and has had a break into the communication for many years since "Desert Storm." I helped rebuild and build those relationships. Identifying events that he should attend. Also advising him on what topics to bring up in press conferences where there was predominantly South Asian and Arab media. Making sure that his media presence was there. So I took him to Masjids, during Eid and Friday prayers. Making sure that when he did campaign outreach to them so he could understand their policy related concerns in and outside of America.

Researcher: Please tell me more about the policy work you have done?

It is in recognition of the fact that the demographics in the U.S. have changed a lot in the last 20 years and if you don't recognize that, and you don't use that, you can communicate all you like you are not reaching your constituents properly. So part of that was for the party to understand that you have to wake up to the demographics of the

area and for Muslims to wake up to realize that there is much in common with their values and their politicians.' Their values are more congruent than they think. We have this need to feel equal and accepted. There are Muslims who do not speak up and they should.

Researcher: What are the issues that Muslims are most concerned about?

Participant I: It's all, economy, healthcare, jobs, drug use, the everyday concern that every American would have but sometimes their concern area about legislations that may affect our community, in particular, it can be Islamophobia, harassment and such. We conducted surveys had town halls in the last year, in which we put a pulse on people's views, but the primary concern they had was Islamophobia. Other people were worried other things, healthcare coverage, domestic violence, how our community is not being addressed adequately, there is still this male-dominated attitude toward the abuse and stuff. Some are concerned about education.

Researcher: Considering how PD is defined, is the Muslim diaspora an audience of PD?

Participant I: PD has been particularly difficult for the United States since 9/11 and especially in a country like Pakistan. I think we fall into a pitfall of using language that is more inflammatory. We have to keep in mind, that for a country like Pakistan, people view anything coming out of a person as "the government" speaking. My time working with the State Department when I was a broadcast journalist for the State Department. They started out a new public diplomacy is where they created websites within the Embassy website that allowed people to go on chat, allowed people to share things online but it is still a little unidirectional public message because it's just a message coming out of the department that is available on the Embassy website. It was an attempt to connect people, but what they don't understand it just by the virtue of being on the Embassy website, they don't take that as transparency, and they are skeptical of it. On the other hand, it is a good attempt to show no other countries that what our positions are directly from the government point of view. People often hear about things from the newspapers, and they put their "tilt" to the story, whereas on the embassy site, it is just there. It is important that the there are people in the U.S. government at the policy level who understand that there is the use of language and terminology that 'inflames,' and 'labels' and marginalizes people. Not to be overly 'PC' [politically correct] but it is to be truly educated about what these words really mean. What is the word "Islamist?" What is this? There is no clear definition of what this term means. So these types of terms being hurled around can get offensive. Then you start to take "any" conflict in "any'" zone to do with Muslims as Islamist and throw it in that bucket, just to simplify it for ourselves. But it is not so simple. That is the thing. So we, on our end, we can get the government to understand that the terminology does not fit and also press them to be culturally more evolved and aware. I think one thing that we do really well is live in a bubble. We don't want to understand the cultural background of these terms and people in general. So when it comes time resolve a conflict, we are all about the muscle and not about the brain, we end up getting into more trouble.

So Messaging is critical in it, so when you have something on social media, it is there forever, it is memorialized forever. It is like a blueprint for everyone forever. It will also forever...you have to be careful what you use. I think Americans have to try really because there is inaudible about a world power, there is a bit of Hubris and a little bit of arrogance, and "why should I, I go the money to send some arms out there. We look like a brute force and ignorant.

Researcher: How are political messages created?

Participant I: The messages are reflective of our society, which says something about U.S. consumerism. Others are 'fed' information without the relationship being made with them.

Researcher: What is public diplomacy and who is responsible for public diplomacy?

Participant I: PD in the last 20-25 has really changed. And even the face of it has changed. Traditionally, the word itself public diplomacy to carry a lot of weight with it. It was restricted to the diplomats. It was diplomats who were taking care of the track one, track two and track three diplomacy. And it was very done at the upper echelon of the government. And now with the internet and mass communications, you realize you cannot have the upper echelons making agreements while there are masses experiencing the troubles and not being part of the solution. Grassroots NGOs started to be made, and the government started to realize that diplomacy cannot be relegated to just diplomats. It's a lot like the messaging. It's now become more of tangible to the average person. For example, I work for with the State Department, every year, the exchange unit of the State department gives me a person that I train for four months. They come from a conflict zone. That person will learn skills and we help them write a plan that they intend to execute in their native country when they go back. So that is a public/private partnership. So the State use me, a private NGO to train people to help develop their country and address conflict. With social media, anyone can write a post and have it proliferate as wide and as far. The moment a movement comes in, it is assumed to have an agenda. But with a partnership, but with the help of an NGO, who are trusted by the people and you have a much better-working solution. Whereas before, if there was no one on the ground interacting NGOs. Now with the private/public partnership model, there is implementation, there is trust, now there is efficiency and accountability and transparency and all things that did not exist before. And it's throughout the world now. That is the best way, the world bank, to UN, IMF, where they team up with organizations on the ground knowledge, and that's how it improves the public diplomacy.

Researcher: How do you describe the role of NGOs and private organizations in public diplomacy?

Participant I: **The State Department uses nonprofits like us as partners all the time**. They deal with mini NGOs all over. The State Department funds them, but this model also has its pitfalls, people may think that that NGO is a mouthpiece for the government. Unless if they have trust in the community. Every system will have its pitfalls, but this is a much better model than those existed before

Researcher: Are there U.S. PD programs that are directed toward the lesser educated rural population of Pakistan?

Participant I: The number one technology in the entire world is the mobile technology. The government also has this going on because they recognize this and so do all the NGOs and everybody is creating an app now. Because they feel that people in those remote areas can access their information through cell phones. So traditional media outlets of cable and news networks are also being accessed through an app. If you look at the Kenya conflict, there is an open source platform, it is called "Ushahidi" It was the number one platform used in Kenya to address conflict-related occurrences. For example, if there was the shortage of rice in a certain city, you can use your cell phone to text the center closest to your area gets the text and sends help that is needed. So there is all kind of technology use these days that can reach those people who have no access to education sometimes or no access to basic needs like water and food. It is amazing because of the commercial side of our existence, or the internet I suppose, people can buy cell phones much easier than food. That is a ridiculous concept, right. Sometimes, the root of the problem in places like Pakistan is a lack of education, lack of critical thinking, access to basic needs. If you turn this whole thing around, it is funny because they are using this mobile technology because they are still too worried about their bread and butter and safety and security at times. It's hard to give them these tools. It's like when do they backfire. Like in the Arab Spring, OK fine, they had Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, but do they know about democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood did not work, Sisi [the President of Egypt] not working that well.

Researcher: You mentioned a change in rhetoric? Where does it begin?

Participant I: Like everything, I think it will have to be multi-pronged. We need something called media literacy. So for the person to look at the piece of journalism and look at it as somebody's interpretation of somebody's truth. Readers should question everything. So media literacy is about critical thinking in both consumption and production of media. At the beginning after 9/11, media should be a lot of irresponsible journalism, and it also exposed the level of ignorance of the U.S. They can learn a lot form the BBC model, the UK model, where it is straight out the news. But remember, U.S. has a very commercial base to its news. Out standards of media have to go up. If journalists are being paid to write, and you and I could write a piece on foreign policy, that beats any journalists out there. You and I can publish it, put it on our Facebook; we are citizen journalists too.

Researcher: What is your understanding of strategy in public diplomacy?

Participant I: It a commercial setup of the war industry. An average soldier comes straight out of school and is trained in a tunnel vision to perform a certain duty that requires him to be focused on the life, whether it is taking a life or saving a life. So it is very high testosterone and high adrenaline. During my consulting with the Army, I found it amusing to see the Army feeling really frustrated that their soldiers are very tunnel-versioned when that's what they are trained to do. **It is also funny to think that you can actually train a soldier in sympathy, and empathy, and humility, and these emotions because then they**

cannot fight. So it is really impractical when they say that "we need our soldiers to understand humility." You cannot really do that. Because you are training them to go out and kill and fight. And if you teach too many emotional responses, you are going to have them falling out of ranks and disobeying. But the most important part of the strategy for the Army is to have your boot force go in, accomplish the mission and come out. So when the Defense Department sends these task forces of soldiers as Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO) to help with on ongoing issues, for economic development and healthcare, and so on, it doesn't work too well.

Researcher: Thank you for your time.

Participant I: Anytime.

Participant L

Researcher: If you would please, introduce yourself.

Participant L: OK, ah, is this just for class or are you publishing this, or...?

Researcher: Who knows, but I would like to use quotes so it will be permanent for a grade as my MA thesis.

Participant L: OK, you should just keep my stuff on background, because I don't want to be on record for anything, because I thought I was must talking to a student in office hours, I wasn't aware that this was like a formal interview.

Researcher: Oh OK.

Participant L: So, you can keep my stuff as background, but you can't quote me by name.

Researcher: OK, can I use quotes without your name, is that...?

Participant L: Yeah, that's fine.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: As long as you say it that's fine with me.

Researcher: OK, all right, perfect.

Participant L: I'm [Participant L], I teach at political science at George Mason.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: I've been here for four years, so my focus is in South-Asia. I work in international relations, ethnicity, nationalism type of things.

Researcher: OK, perfect. So, as I said before, I'm not very much familiar with political science theories and whatever I learn about public diplomacy is through the lens of communication studies. So, how would you define public diplomacy and how is it used?

Participant L: How would I define public diplomacy? I don't know, I never really thought about it.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: Umm, **for propaganda, I guess. Let's see, propaganda, to tell the world** what's going on, the story of what's going on. That's basically it as far as I'm concerned.

Researcher: OK. OK. Do you see particular differences in how, in the goals and objectives of diplomacy and public diplomacy?

Participant L: Well, I guess public diplomacy is aimed at the public by, you know, by the definition and diplomacy is sort of behind closed doors and amongst professional

diplomats and, you know, you're negotiating over, usually diplomacy you're negotiating over something whose job it is to negotiate over something whereas, in **public diplomacy you're really trying to sell a story about who you are or what you want or what you're doing in a place. So, you're not really, you're not really trying to win a negotiation**.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: You're resetting the stage for negotiation, but you're, you're really just trying to get other people to like you, I guess, is the difference, it's a negotiation, you're just trying to win.

Researcher: OK, so I realized when I was looking for literature on public diplomacy and international relations or political science, I, I do not see a whole lot. If I find something, it's typically in something about traditional diplomacy. Is there a lack of work in PD you think?

Participant L: You know, I, it could be a lack. I, myself, am not very familiar with such work, so certainly, you know, I'm inclined to suggest that it's not that much work, so certainly, you know, I'm inclined to suggest that there's not much work out there, but that could also be because I'm not looking for it.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: So, maybe somebody who is in that area would say there's not a lack, you know, they will tell you actually there's all this work here and look you can go find it. But I can't point you to where you can find it, because it's not my area.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: If there is work on this stuff, my guess is, it's probably going to work in terms of state propaganda.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: It's going to be in terms of things like soft power, there's a term soft power [inaudible], maybe you could look there. Messaging and frames, that's sort of more domestic, sort of social movements and inaudible, sort of mobilization and this, that usually looks at things like how you say things can affect whether you're going to get people out rioting and things like that. But that's sort of more domestic politics.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: So, more like a political party or you know, a group or an organization what have you. So, those are the two, three, yeah, so sort of the state propaganda literature, the soft power literature, and the mobilization literature is what -

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: - I would, probably my guess is you could find stuff on this. But again as I said, there's people who know this stuff way better than others.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: So, they might know better.

Researcher: So, I have a, I don't know if you are familiar with some of the works of Dr. Rhonda Zaharna she is at American University, again she talks about public diplomacy, but she is also a communication scholar, and she talks about blind spots in, in public

diplomacy and she talks about, that the [inaudible] within the United States as a [inaudible] should be targeted as public diplomacy. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Participant L: I don't really understand, I mean, I didn't really understand the question. Would you repeat that question?

Researcher: OK. So, if public diplomacy if, for at least from a communication perspective is defined as engaging with publics of other country in order for them to persuade or sway positive opinion of United States and their government, in that term she suggests that a particular [inaudible] of another country, that I would say in the United States, is a sort of a neglected audience or target audience for public diplomacy, do -

Participant L: For the American government itself?

Researcher: Yes.

Participant L: So, basically target people in your own country with public diplomacy to affect diplomacy with a third country?

Researcher: With the country of their origin.

Participant L: So, we inaudible]?

Researcher: Yes.

Participant L: I mean I guess it's pretty interesting, I've never really thought about it. I mean it's -

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: I never really thought about it in those terms.

Researcher: OK. So, um, so, I'm just going to read out some questions, we can pass if that, you don't feel like those really are your forte. Are you aware of much public diplomacy done in Pakistan since 9/11 and has the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy in Pakistan, how is that relationship?

Participant L: I'm aware of a lot of efforts that the United States has undertaken in Pakistan in the last 15 years, certainly. It's done all sorts of things to try and endear itself to the Pakistani public. Precisely deals you can find, I'm sure you can find on the internet, you know, in open-source work. But they've sort of, you know, made connections with media houses, televisions channels, you know, putting the United States, sort of, name up on any road that's being constructed or anything like that. Certainly the U.S. has tried to sell itself as a friend to the Pakistani people. How strong that relationship, so the relationship between what and what?

Researcher: The U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy, they, I mean, the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan, has public diplomacy been an effective tool in making it successful?

Participant L: No, I don't think so.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: I think it's very hard to, you know, I think it's very hard for something like this to have an effect.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: I think there's much deeper rooted, more structural factors which explain the popularity or lack thereof of a particular country and a particular, you know, public, no matter what the country is, and no matter what the public is. You know, history, geography, geopolitics, you know, foreign relations, you know, all sorts of things that go into whether a country is friendly with another country or not. At the end of the public diplomacy on the margins, maybe you know, you can make a nine, a ten, or maybe a two, or one, or maybe a four or five, but you can't really make a two or ten, or you can't make a ten or two. So, you know, maybe you can massage a little bit on the margins, but really, you know, the relationship stands for itself and if it's a sour relationship you won't - like the U.S. doesn't need to do public diplomacy -

Researcher: Right.

Participant L: - because people [inaudible] really like America for the most part. So, but there's a reason, you know, there's a reason for that, and I think it's got to do with the types of advertisement the U.S. is buying on British news channels.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: So, yeah, I mean I don't think public diplomacy has that much of an effect, to answer your question.

Researcher: OK, cool. What would you consider success or failure of public diplomacy in Pakistan if you were to point out to some occurrence or some incident?

Participant L: Success or failure is very difficult judgment to make in this case, because you know as I said, my prior beliefs would be to have very low expectations of public diplomacy.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: So, I would never really say, you know, this thing failed, because I would never expect it to succeed in the first place. So, you know, it's like, if I said a six-year-old could run 100 meters in the Olympics, you know, if the kid finishes last, I'm not going to say you failed, you know, I'm setting him up to fail. So, I really wouldn't use terms like success or failure.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: You know, I do, you know, my, I would define [inaudible] diplomacy success as you know, very bluntly, if you know, if something is unpopular and you're selling it makes it popular or something is popular and you're selling it makes it unpopular. We very rarely do things flip like that by work, you know, somebody else is saying, usually people have their opinions on that and people say stuff, and like I say sort of massage the margins, but people usually have their mind made up well before you know, the [inaudible] from 20,000 miles away.

Researcher: OK. So, I, I had this question like tailored towards public diplomacy, but I guess you've kind of answered that, but generally in political science theory, how is success measured?

Participant L: I don't know. I don't know. Success in public diplomacy or -

Researcher: Or anything, in the -

Participant L: I mean, how is success measured in political science? Gee, I wish I knew. I, that's a very, I mean, that's a very open-ended question, I can't answer that question.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: I mean it just depends on, you know, we're a very diverse field, our field is divided into four or five, you know, silos, American politics, international relations, [inaudible] politics, political theory, each for, each have their own sort of methodologies and their own theories and their own issues that they look into. Usually questions of success or failure are sort of empirical questions.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: So, more so of empirical work in policy, I would look at other [inaudible] work, but even the empirical stuff, it will be, you know, there's not going to be one causal definition of success or failure, it really depends on the question. You know somebody is doing work on, you know, third party intervention in [inaudible] or something. They might look at success as, you know, did you change the government in the country that you were intervening in, you know, and if you didn't change the government, that's failure. Or, you know, might look at it, human rights [inaudible] or something, and you know, say, you know, this was successful if human rights violations went down ten years after they signed the treaty or something. So, it really just depends on the question and what you're asking, how success and failure is defined for a particular scholar or a particular piece of scholarship. But there's no catch-all definition of success or failure in policy, there's no sort of one [inaudible] definition I can give you.

Researcher: OK. All right. I'm sorry.

Participant L: No, no, it's fine, take your time.

Researcher: I had it [inaudible] now.

Participant L: Take your time.

Researcher: I think it had, my question had something to do with sort of generally like this state of affairs in Pakistan right now and how they sort of, their political economy of Pakistan determines or drives any sort of outside intervention. I know I'm asking a very vague question -

Participant L: It is very vague.

Researcher: It's very vague. So, I guess what I have in mind is how the current state of the country may prevent or help, is it that they, we know the state of affairs, it's bad and are these conditions more conducive to outside interventions or are they kind of preventive of outside interventions in terms of U.S. [inaudible] or maybe a healthcare campaign through WHO [phonetic], still vague but a little -

Participant L: Yeah, I mean in a very broad structure, never, you know, the notion of [inaudible] is very contested. You know, intervention from other actors in politics, whether they're [inaudible] actor, like the [inaudible] or organizations like the U.N. is built into the system. It's, you know, the notion of [inaudible] talks about organized diplomacy is very [inaudible] organize diplomacy.

Researcher: OK.

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Participant L: And the idea is that, you know, the war system is built on this idea of [inaudible] that you know, in terms of OK I get to control what's in my board as a [inaudible] do all this stuff. I mean with the broad principles that are violated so regularly that, you know, that's why he calls it organized diplomacy, you know, that the system has built that into it. So, you know, all countries have external dimensions, some more than others. It again depends on a million things, state weakness, state strength, the way your... you know, your geography or history or alliances, the size of your economy, your developer, your population, or size of your population, the age of population, demography on old people, and young people, are you a rich country or are you a poor country. So, but there's not country in the world that doesn't have, other than maybe North Korea, you know, that doesn't have outside some sort of systematic, systematic outside influence in it, whether it be [inaudible] level, private actors, private firms, like [inaudible] nationals or government, states, armies, you know, whether we're talking about leader forces, ideational forces, economic forces, this is stuff is very common in international politics. There's no country that's cut off from everybody, anybody else. [inaudible] on the U.S., which is a very powerful state.

Researcher: Yeah, so Pakistani government receptive of outside interventions of that sort or...?

Participant L: Depends from who and what, yeah, and to what, to what end. You know, if China comes in and says here's a billion dollars to create a solar park or a new highway, that type of outside connection is very welcome. If, you know, the United States comes in and says, you should abandon your[inaudible] you know, you created the last 50 years in Pakistan, maybe that outside dimension at least from the Army's perspective is not welcome. So, it really just depends on what type of intervention it is, [inaudible] it is, to what end and whether the state is happy about it or not.

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: That just depends on any number of [inaudible].

Researcher: OK.

Participant L: We can speak about it general terms.

Researcher: OK, very cool. And can you please tell me one more time, the word, or the term organize -

Participant L: It's just a book, it's a book by Steven [inaudible], you can read it if you want. I mean basically his point is, you know, outside intervention is built into the system. So, there's no real concept of [inaudible] outside intervention.

Researcher: Very cool. Thank you very much. I appreciate your time.

Participant L: Of course.

Participant M

Researcher: I am a MA student.

Participant M: Oh, I thought you were working on a dissertation.

Researcher: Thesis, MA thesis, yes.

Participant M: OK, that's fine. You're a friend of my good friend Rhonda Zaharna?

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Researcher: Yes.

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: Yes.

Participant M: And did she put you on to me or...?

Researcher: No, no, no, well, I, we just met recently for the first time -

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: - and I got introduced to her through my mentor, Dr. Carl Botan [phonetic].

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: He's a communication scholar and kind of delves some into public diplomacy.

Participant M: OK. Well, this is coincidently the second time in, in two weeks that I've met with a George Mason student.

Researcher: Oh really.

Participant M: Yes. I met with a Ph.D. candidate who is writing a dissertation on China's [inaudible] institutes and her name is Diana [inaudible], I don't know if you know her. But, anyway it's coincidental because I can go years on end without talking to George Mason students and I've always been curious as to who is studying public diplomacy, who is teaching about it over there or how it comes into the George Mason curriculum. So, the only other thing I can say is I had a terrific student several years, Air Force Lieutenant and she was getting a degree I think in communications at George Mason. She wrote a brilliant paper.

Researcher: What was her name?

Participant M: Erica Yepson.

Researcher: Erica Yepson, well we have four Air Force officers come into our program every year. And they do a like an 18-month rotation, so they start in fall and graduate the next following fall.

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: Yeah.

Participant M: Well, she took my course maybe four years ago now, something like that.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: She wrote a paper on social media and U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela which the USC, University of Southern California Center for public diplomacy published as an online publication they do it about once a month, which was long-form it's about 20-30 pages. And they published her paper. It was an honors paper at George Mason when she finished up working on it. Anyway, that's my only contact with George Mason, so it's a delight to me.

Researcher: Very nice to meet you. Would you like to come in and talk to us at some time? I don't know what your schedule looks like.

Participant M: This spring it's pretty well caught up here GW, but -

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: - I enjoy talking with students and I got to American University once or twice a year, and I've never been out to George Mason.

Researcher: OK, then we're not doing our job properly.

Participant M: So, let's talk about theory, if that's what you want to talk about.

Researcher: OK, so my first question is, what is public diplomacy?

Participant M: I have a sound bite definition.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Which I used in 2008, and I've developed it over the years and it, it is a bit different from what others think of, in one sense, although the definition has been used by people like Jan Mellisen at the [inaudible] Institute. And are you getting a pickup alright? And others, so let me see if I can give you verbatim.

Researcher: OK. Actually, I have this one on my screen right now.

Participant M: And so I make the argument that public dimension of diplomacy is all the same history.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: You can go back to the bronze age and find diplomats engaging in discourse and engaging with publics. And so what I sometimes say is the Egyptians and the Greeks took Aristocrats hostage at the end of wars in part because they were treaty guarantees, but in part because they became cultural interpreters of the other society. So it was a kind of early international visitor program if you want. And you can play that out through history, but the definition that I like is not a state-centric definition.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: But it's a broader definition that picks up on the argument that diplomacy is how groups are represented and communicate with other groups that want to remain separate.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: So, you can distinguish between diplomacy and governance. You can distinguish between diplomacy and civil society and the private sector. But it's basically how groups connect and the generic concepts of diplomacy are communication, which is why communication studies are such a big part of the multi-disciplinary approach to diplomacy studies and public diplomacy. But there are other disciplines that are relevant including especially diplomacy studies. So, if you take that agreement and the argument was made famously by a University of Minnesota scholar Paul Sharpe [phonetic] and you can find him, his books and articles, but that is a core argument, he's not the only who makes that argument.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: But it's, it's where I start.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: And so my definition is today, public diplomacy and the analogous term, strategic communication, I treat those as analogous terms, so a lot of people don't. Describe an instrument.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: It's instrumental, it's a means.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Used by states, associations of states, I think European Union, I think United Nations, by states, associations of states, and some sub-state, I think cities, providences, and non-state actors, not all but some. It's an instrument used to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior. It's an instrument used to build and manage relationships. And it **is an instrument used to influence thoughts and mobilize actions, to advance their interests and values**.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: So, that's the bumper sticker.

Researcher: When you say influence does that connote persuasion?

Participant M: Yes.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Advocacy.

Researcher: Advocacy, OK.

Participant M: I'm trying to convince you of a point of view that will influence how you think and how you act.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: It may not but that's the intent.

Researcher: OK, so would consensus be, the word consensus, or the idea of consensus building play a role -

Participant M: It would play a role, absolutely, but it's not exhaustive in terms of the meaning of -

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: - diplomacy.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: It seems to me that you can think about diplomacy as groups wanting to connect and wanting to persuade each other in the context of mutual interest.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: It doesn't have to be self-interest. And in a globalizing world where so many really hard problems require solutions by multiple actors, required problem solving, not just by states, but by states in collaboration with multiple other actors, that to get win-win solutions you do need consensus on many issues. But the problem I have with a lot of the relational model people, including my good friend Rhonda [inaudible], is that they go too far down the road of this relational model -

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: - and they overlook the fact that groups engage in deeply contested political differences.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: And have different interests and that try to persuade in the context of self-interest, not just mutual interest.

Researcher: OK. So, where would that middle line be where there is part of that relational interest, but at the same political and the traditional diplomatic interest where they collide?

Participant M: It's an easy answer to say a situation.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: And it's much more difficult to say how it actually plays out in particular situations.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: And the extent to which a diplomat actor is persuasive in a contestant situation, or for that matter is persuasive in the collaborative situation. So.

Researcher: OK. Very cool. Thank you.

Participant M: I mean I could imagine India and Pakistan and having deeply contestant cross border issues -

Researcher: Oh yeah.

Participant M: In trying to persuade each other of outcomes that satisfy self-interest. I could also imagine occasional collaboration.

Researcher: Yeah, it's occasional, not often.

Participant M: It has happened.

Researcher: It has happened yes. So, you talked about public diplomacy and strategic communication as analogous, are there differences, or there, are there differences between them at all, or do you consider them to be one and the same?

Participant M: There are differences because people use the terms in different ways for institutional purposes. So, military actors, not just U.S., British and other's like strategic communication. They don't see themselves as diplomats most of the time, although I could make an argument that military to military exchanges are public diplomacy.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: And that a lot of what military actors do is diplomatic in terms of means and objectives. So, there are differences in the way people think of the terms, just as people think differently about the words propaganda.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: And public diplomacy. I could make an argument that propaganda is an analogous term. There may be some differences, great there it seems to me then between strategic communication and public diplomacy. But I think the different is are how people use the terms, how they apply them to institutional structures. But if you look at the generic aspects of both, they're analogous in - actually I am assigning this week for my class, if you look at the defense science board reports.

Researcher: Yes.

Participant M: Particularly the 2007-2008 report, you're going to find this little that I'm going to show you. This figure two, can you read it.

Researcher: Yes.

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: Thank you.

Participant M: If you look at the 12:00 item on that graph, that is not public diplomacy. Arguably, it is not strategic communication. It's what comes before you adopt the instruments of communication and diplomacy.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: That's when you decide something is politically important.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: That's when you decide something is a national interest.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Or even a common interest. It's the, it's the threshold decision that you're going to try to advance a policy or a strategy that solves a problem. That mobilizes an actor, that deals with the [inaudible] virus, that deals with terrorist organization.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Pick your strategic issue and the problem for diplomats and other actors in today's world, is that you have a whole strategic buffet, which my problem with the terrorism folks is they think a lot of them, that that is the most important and, and it dominates their priority list, disproportionate sometimes, [inaudible] but that's a digression. So if you take a look at the 12 o'clock…

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: That is when you've decided the ISIS is important, how you deal with ISIS or Russia and Ukraine. Then you go to the 1 o'clock and that is comprehension.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: That is when you decide that you need to understand, not only the issues you're going to communicate about, but the influence environment you're communicating in. The contextual environment, the cultural environment, the media environment, who are the actors, what are their interests, what are their attitudes. And it's not just casual attention. Strategy requires a deep dive into what others are thinking and doing, what are their memories, what are their cognitive frames. How do we understand from their perspective what motivates them to think and do, because that kind of deep comprehension is a necessary threshold to being a diplomatic actor?

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: I throw in the 4:00, what do I got there, yeah, that's the advisory function, a lot of people don't do that, but I argue that public diplomats particularly, have a roll with employee, that advising policymakers and political leaders on the opinion consequences with what they do. It's not to suggest the public opinion should drive policy decisions. We don't act strategically, just because people think in a certain way. Leaders have to bring a leadership quality to what they do, but understanding the public opinion, consequences of the policies they decide on and understanding the public opinion consequences of their communication strategies as a threshold matter.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Strategy is hugely important, it's underestimated how lip-service is paid to it, but over time, at least in the U.S. experience, far less in the way of resources and time and priority has been given to opinion research, media research. Finding experts on another culture, because today's diplomat cannot be an expert on multiple cultures, and certainly not on multiple issues. So, there's a lot more to be said about how you do that, but that isn't an advisory function. Then you go into 6:00 and that's where we get to, what we were just talking about. It's all of the influence, tools, and methods, it's all of the engagement or relational tools and methods ranging from communication strategies to exchange programs to connect and convene collaborative projects, to academic scholarships, to cultural diplomacy, just the whole array of what you might do in the context of that deep comprehension.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: 8:00 on that is -

Researcher: Assess?

Participant M: - assess, evaluate.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: It's another thing that gets a lot of lip service, but isn't a high priority. Law makers like to say evaluate, but they don't put much money into evaluation. Diplomatic practitioners, yes we need to evaluate, but they're much happier in putting the opportunity dollar into doing something rather than to understanding something. And so, that is, what, a statement about the priorities given to it, but most diplomatic actors would say yes we have to evaluate what we do. And then the 10:00 -

Researcher: Adapt?

Participant M: - is adapt. You tried to do something it didn't work, well, let's try again with a different strategy, which is why I don't like grand strategies, because as former President Dwight Eisenhower said, "Plans are worthless, planning is everything." And his argument is that once you try something and there is an article you may have read by Steve Cormen [phonetic] on strategic communication that makes this point brilliantly. It's adapting, it's assessing, it's readapting. And so this whole circular process, it's continuous, it's dynamic, it's iterative, and that's a long-winded response to what, I've forgotten your question. What?

Researcher: OK. No, it touched on a number of other questions that had, but especially on public opinion, but I will get to it in a little bit. So, you said, you consider public diplomacy instrumental, but I was wondering like if you would step place of public diplomacy and academia and in practice, like is there a discord between the two? Are they speaking to each other at all?

Participant M: I have a paper, I don't know if you can find it, that I wrote for the Syracuse Student Journal called Exchange.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: On this issue. And if you can't find that, I can send you a copy of it.

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Researcher: OK, thank you.

Participant M: And you might want to take a look a piece that Donna Ogalsbe [phonetic] recently in the Foreign Service Journal, I've forgotten the title. I think - oh yeah she used a cute title, it's called The Fine Kettle of Fish.

Researcher: Oh yes, I've read that one.

Participant M: All right, well she's a very good friend of mine -

Researcher: Oh yeah!

Participant M: She has a way with word titles and so forth. She did a fairly deep dive into finding out that **IR departments don't do much with diplomatic studies.** Public diplomacy got a ride, it's episodic and in the U.S. experience it's correlated with high threat context.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: You go back through U.S. history all the way to the pre-colonial times, Americans "discover public diplomacy in war time." And wars come and go and when the war is over, they back away from it and they're much happier with civil society, handling cross boarder communication usually. But in war time there's more attention paid, and so after 9/11 -

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: - Americans at least circle back, and oh yeah that was back in the Cold War wasn't, well maybe it still has relevance. And so you have practitioners writing all sorts of reports and usually they talk about structure, what happened to the U.S. Information Agency and the like. But it is an intense interest that is driven by, I think, tax is driven by lawmakers, all of a sudden discovering while they give high priority to the military instrument power and to intelligence instruments that, oh yeah, the State Department is not doing a very good job on social media with respect to ISIS, or in an earlier era, we need to beef up the Voice of America and that sort of thing. So, practitioners come and go with it. Academics do as well.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: And I find that when I, I've been teaching here since 2002, and I watch how students decide on papers. And so after 9/11 it was about the consequences of 9/11, then it was about Afghanistan, then it was about Iraq, then it was about the Arab [inaudible], now it's about ISIS, and so they tend to, as students make their way to what's hot, what's in the news and so forth. Scholars to some extent at least in the Washington area Universities where your universities are basically trade schools for people to go get a job, the scholars pay attention to these practitioner issues. But the bottom line it seems to me is that **scholars need to pay more attention to what practitioners do. There's a whole logic called practice theory.**

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: And a guy named Geoffrey Wiseman [phonetic], Geoffrey with G-e-o-f-f-r-e-y, teaches at the University of Southern California and the IR department has done some work on this, and there are others. Basically states that you can build theory by looking at what practitioners do.

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Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Practitioners look at scholars and say oh that's too theoretical. That doesn't work in the real world.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: I don't find that useful. OK, that's because scholar and practitioners take different risks and have different jobs. For a scholar if your goal is to write a paper, you, they get it right, you may get it wrong, but it if doesn't work, you write another paper. If you're a scholar the penalty for not doing good research, maybe you don't get tenure, maybe you don't get a degree, but most of the time, if you write reasonably well, you would advance in an academic profession. The practitioner takes a different kind of risk, getting it wrong in the practical world. Scholars can choose their topics, practitioners have their topics thrown at them all the time.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: And what practitioners do or don't do can have meaning for resources, it can have meaning for what people do. It can have meaning for lives lost in certain high, high intensity situations. So, they face very different challenges of risk and reward. That said, the practitioners benefit from what the scholars do and the scholars benefit from what the practitioners do. And I would like to see a little less of the distance between the two. The Director of Policy, Resources, and Planning for the other Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, is Roxanne [inaudible]. She is a senior [inaudible] served in China last overseas tour. Very bright. She took a year off and went to the [inaudible] council and she studied about urbanization, cities, the rise of big global cities, what cities mean for diplomacy.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: More than half the world now lives in big cities. It is changing how we think about diplomacy. The cities are becoming more powerful diplomatic actors. What does this mean for the state department? Well she was unusual because not that she took the year off, that's happening more often, although not as often as it should. She was unusual because she wrote a paper on it. And you can find the paper on the Atlantic Councils website. If you Google Cabral, C-a-b-r-a-l cities.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: It's a short paper, it's about six or seven pages I think. But the recommendations that she makes in there, and the recommendations that she brought back to the state department and her current work is having practical implication. So, the state department is sending more foreign services offices to cities like Seattle.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Not just to engage in sister cities programs and things like that, but how to big cities engage on climate change. How do they engage on migration issues? How do they engage on cyber issues? So, that's an example of a very talented practitioner, she went to a think tank, but a lot of them will go to military service colleges, and some of them go to universities. That's why the Air Force sends students to George Mason.

[inaudible] she thought about the drivers of change in today's world, which are rapid, which are in some ways overwhelming and it's not the world she entered the foreign service with. And so you find some of the more thoughtful foreign service officers making an argument that we need professional education as well as skills training and diplomacy. Some states value this more than others, the Canadians value it more than the U.S. The Brits value it. I don't know how Pakistan approaches this. India, I've seen evidence that some of their diplomats appreciate this. China for sure, but I don't have empirical evidence to say much across the board on that. I do know that the U.S. military values professional education enormously. Now the other resources do it, and they have the bench strength to do it. The, what they call the train and float. But they send their senior officers to the National War College, to other institutes of the national [inaudible] university, to the military service colleges, to Harvard, to Princeton, to Columbia, to George Mason, and they do it, because they recognize that their best offices need to come to terms with the world which is very different in changing rapidly from when they joined the service. And they do it, because lives are lost if they don't understand and appreciate that world. So, there is it seems that now that academics have to treat this as they would any academic program and the military has to do it as well, academic freedom is hugely important. When they take that year off or two years off to go and study, but they come back as much better practitioners. Another long-winded answer to your question.

Researcher: No, I appreciate it, thank you. So, we talked a little bit about, you talked about public opinion, so my question is, how important is public opinion of United States in another country and whether public opinion has that power, that public diplomacy, that very traditional definition of public diplomacy of sorts as it has that power to sway the government's policies or sentiment towards the United States. I'm struggling with understanding in a country such as Pakistan, where say democracy, pseudo-democracy, whether public opinion is shaped by the government or the government shapes their policies by public opinion.

Participant M: No one [inaudible].

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: I think the easy answer, but the correct answer is that it's situational again.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: **I certainly don't think that good public diplomacy overcomes bad policy.**

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: But I think good policies need to take public opinion into account, as do leaders. And I think it is true in democracies. I think it is true in [inaudible], I think it is true in authoritarian countries, of all kinds. At some level political leaders have to recognize the power of public opinion, but that said it's an old trade-off, how much do they lead, and how much do they follow. And that varies by country and by situations and by time.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: You asked about the U.S., I think it's true with any country. States are driven by interests, it's an old breakdown between vital interests and other interests, the U.S. is driven by its values. It's part of the DNA and to excess at times. Whether or not the U.S. succeeds in influencing others depends a lot on the interests of others. On the memories and experiences of others. It depends a lot on whether or not U.S. values end statements and words and pictures and ideas and symbols are congruent with what it does. So, this say-do gap is what a lot of people talk about. Say one thing and do another, it's not very persuasive. And so if the United States is triumphant about its exceptionalism, if it shows it really doesn't understand what's going on in other countries, then it isn't particularly persuasive. Where it becomes persuasive is where the other county views, it has a mutual interest in somehow aligning with the U.S. Here's an example in Pakistan, after the, was the East Africa Embassy bombings, the U.S. lobed 75 cruise missiles at Al-Qaida and Afghanistan, a couple of those missiles fell inside the boarder of Pakistan. Pakistan's military government at the time was not amused. [Inaudible] was the Deputy Secretary of State, this was back in the Clinton administration. Well he wanted to fly to [inaudible] and sort things out, let's talk about this, you know, we're sorry it happened, it was not our intent. Well, Pakistan's military said not convenient for you coming out, Mr. Deputy Secretary. [Inaudible] was the military combatant commander for the U.S. Middle East command. The U.S. military had had years of military exchanges with Pakistani's military officers. They'd come and study it, the Army War of [inaudible].

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: The Newport News War College, the National, I spent three years at the National War College, I met them when I was there.

Researcher: Oh yeah.

Participant M: Those people had gone back to Pakistan and were in positions of power in Pakistan's government at the time. [Inaudible] picked up the phone, called his friends, and the Pakistan military commend then [inaudible] was on the next plan to [inaudible]. That's an anecdote but it talks about military, to military exchanges. It talks about –
Who is the diplomatic actor? Who is taking into account the account the public opinion in other countries.

Researcher: I am particularly curious about the words you used in the title of your article, "The Rise and The Demise," demise…this sounds too definitive?

Participant M: Oh, I put quotes around it. I liked it because it rhymed. Chuckles.

Researcher: Oh, OK. Chuckles.

Participant M: I thought it might grab some attention. I wanted you to read the article. And the argument is that because it has not gone away. It has become more important. It is more central to diplomacy now. Today you still have secret negotiations, you have those with Iran. You have them with Syria today. It is much smaller part now. With more social media, greater transparency. Much more what diplomacy means is public. To keep the term 'public diplomacy' marginalizes a subset of diplomacy that has a separate career

track in the State Department. I am very much against keeping a separate career track in public diplomacy in the state department. I think we should look at diplomacy as having a much more important public dimensions.

Researcher: Would you say dissolution of the USIA was a bad one?

Participant M: It is an old issue and it still somehow comes up. Was the dissolution of Office of War Information a bad one? Was the dissolution of Committee on Information, the Creel Committee bad one. When I was in the government in the 1990s, I was opposed to it. Not because we lost the bureaucratic war, it's because I have really come to think, while USIA… **while it had a lot of programming overseas, it was a marginal player in Washington.** In today's globalizing world and in today's world of role of public diplomacy, foreign ministries are struggling with being marginalized. Much less a small independent public diplomacy agency, like the U.S. information Agency. So, I see no value in trying to bring it back.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: I see lots of value in trying to get the State Department not just to do somehow in a bureau within state what USI used to do in a couple of bureaus. But foreign ministries, whether in Pakistan or whether in UK or France, or the U.S., have got to struggle with what's their value added in a world where so many government departments and agencies carry out diplomacy across, range across borders. And they have huge comparative advantages. But they can't try to duplicate what others do better.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: They have to leverage those advantages so that others can succeed to diplomatic advantage.

Researcher: OK. So, that kind of brings me back to when we were discussing the definition of public diplomacy, if we bring in non-state actors into the arena of public diplomacy, do you see any discord between, do you see that the word diplomacy kind of implies sort of hand of government into doing this business and if that's removed, do we still call it public diplomacy or do we call them partners with the public diplomacy, how do you view that?

Participant M: Go to my website.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: On GW, you will see an article that I published recently in the [inaudible] Journal of Diplomacy, called Mapping Boundaries in Diplomacy's Public Dimension, I don't know if you've ran across that [inaudible].

Researcher: I have.

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: I've read pretty much everything, but I want to, everything sticks better when we discuss it.

Participant M: OK, well I won't ask you what I said in that article.

Researcher: No, please don't, I'll be embarrassed myself.

Participant M: I try to make the argument that -

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: - that what we've done from bilateral multilateral diplomacy to what Jeff Wiseman, again, at USC calls poly-lateral diplomacy. But that we need to distinguish between diplomacy and civil society, and we need to distinguish between diplomacy and governance. There are many more non-state actors than there used to be. Joseph [inaudible] writes about diffusion of power from the states to non-state actors, and there is a whole big literature on that. Lots of non-state actors partner with state actors, and they have for a long time. Exchange programs are managed by civil society organizations under contract. To the extent that state actors use public opinion research, they frequently contract with a commercial organization or a civil society organization. Lots of governments, not so much the U.S., but foreign governments, higher public relations firms to carry out their public diplomacy in country. So, partnering through contract or through symbolic relationships, when the, was it the New York [inaudible] went to North Korea, back when we were talking with the North Koreans. That was funded by civil society, but it wouldn't have happened if the U.S. government wasn't OK with the [inaudible]. So, you can have that kind of partnership relationship with a civil society. Lots of that going on. It's gone on for a long time. What's interesting and different, it seems to be and I think I'm a minority maybe in making this argument, but there are others who do as well, is that some non-state actors are what I call independent diplomatic actors.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Because what they do satisfies human needs and wants in terms of governance as well as diplomacy. So, my examples are the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: That's [inaudible], Red Cross, ICANN, the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers, provides governance for lots of internet regulations worldwide. These are pair actors with respect to states in terms of global governance and to the extent that they communicate and represent each other with states and cities and associations of states. You can make the argument that they are independent diplomatic actors and that's what I try to do [inaudible].

Researcher: OK, cool.

Participant M: But there are people like Jeffrey [inaudible] who argues that corporations are diplomatic actors, because they do diplomatic-like things, because they're big global entities. Because they have commercial offices in cities around the world. I distinguish between corporations they sometimes partner with governance.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: But at the end of the day firms are about profits, they're about satisfying shareholders. They're about making money. So, that we need to make a distinction between all of the ways people communicate across borders, journalists, religious organizations, and diplomatic actors. Now, I've - and I'd like your views on this, I used to say that Al-Qaida was not a diplomatic actor in the sense that it sought governance, Al-

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Qaida was way down the road from Bin Laden. He was concerned about how [inaudible] states in the Middle East gone wrong. And he certainly didn't like the U.S. ISIS is a whole different thing.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: As you well know. So, you can argue, I think, that ISIS is a diplomatic actor, in the sense that it's an independent governance actor. How successful its diplomacy is, what kind of diplomacy it has, but it does seek to engage other groups, in ways that communicate and represent.

Researcher: And quite effectively.

Participant M: Sometimes.

Researcher: Yeah.

Participant M: But it's not over.

Researcher: OK, so my question is now about organizations, or so, organizations that refuse to labeled as public diplomacy actors, even though they are in that, in that sort of in that system of public diplomacy action, what, what are your views about those, is it, is public diplomacy a choice, or is that a function?

Participant M: Give me an example.

Researcher: So, I talk to a nonprofit organization regarding this research who engage would with, with a lot of entrepreneurial exchanges with Pakistan and U.S., and set up conferences between the two countries, but when I ask them if they consider their work as public diplomacy, because they do a lot of conflict analysis and relationship building and his answer was, oh no, no, because they, he wanted to keep their objectivity and did not want to be seen as a, sort of a, an instrument of U.S. government and wanted to retain their neutrality, and so they were refusing to be part of that, part of public diplomacy, even though they are hired by the State Department to run some of the programs. So -

Participant M: I was going to say I'd agree with you, until that last sentence.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: If a non-state actor or NGO, is engaging in cross-border activity, it could be educational, it could be conflict resolution, what they're doing may be compatible with what states do, what their independence seems to be makes them non-diplomatic actors. I'm going to the International Studies Association Meetings in Atlanta in a couple of weeks. Scholars and some practitioners from around the world every year can meet in the International Studies Associations Annual meetings. All sorts of panels. Panels on public diplomacy, panels on lots of IR subjects. Those people are convening and connecting. They're building relationships. Those relationships can have very beneficial consequences for the states they come from, not diplomacy.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Religious organizations have [inaudible] and have non [inaudible] global conferences, not diplomacy. Journalists connect, not diplomacy. Now when you said this organization takes money from the United Stated government to carry out some

exchange programs, they're partnering with the public diplomacy actor and therefore I would argue they fall within this broad category of actors who are happy to partner with state actors.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: So, that if they're willing to take the money, but not the term, [inaudible].

Researcher: OK, OK.

Participant M: Now I thought you were going to talk about the broadcasters.

Researcher: OK, I am actually refusing to even go into media for this thesis, because that's a Pandora's box, I don't want to touch.

Participant M: OK, I'm not sure you can escape it.

Researcher: Yeah, I barely, I'm starting to edge away from it as much as I can.

Participant M: When is it due?

Researcher: Umm, in two months.

Participant M: Ah-huh, well, the best thesis a finished thesis, right.

Researcher: Exactly. We talked a little bit about performance indicators and in your view, what are some performance indicators for good public diplomacy?

Participant M: That's tough. I think **you need to distinguish between the evaluation of efficiency and evaluation of outcomes.**

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: You can evaluate a program in terms of how well it was run, whether it was as useful as some other program, which gets you to outcomes. You can evaluate it in terms of quantitative metrics, but I think don't be misled by that, because they used to call them inches of placement in newspapers. US [inaudible] got placement in local newspaper. You can, I used to count the number of people standing in lines to see a motion picture in Vietnam. The voice of America and BBC World Service, talk a lot about their audience numbers. US Embassies, still I think, like to talk about the number of Facebook likes they have on their social media platforms.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: Those kind of metrics, I don't find particularly persuasive. How much impact did the program have, is a much tougher thing to evaluate, and people a lot smarter than I am, understand communication methodologies, and I've sat in meetings at the State Department, at the [inaudible], where people will talk about how you evaluate a communication strategy. And you can do it with quantitative methods, you can do it with qualitative methods but it's expensive. Law makers don't put much money into it, practitioners don't either. It's a consequent, but in part because they're not all that interested in doing it. Their interest flows a lot from their budget offices, say you got do it, so we'll check that box. Exchange programs do far less then they might with longitudinal outcome evaluation. What does it mean that somebody was in a visitor's exchange programs 20 years ago?

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: What does it mean that somebody was in an international [inaudible] program. And even if you do the longitudinal it doesn't mean that somebody will act differently necessarily, particularly of interest [inaudible]. And so this is very hard stuff to measure. The fact that it matters I think almost it's, it's over time, governments have done it for a very long time, going back to Greeks and Egyptians, so there's a kind of visceral sense that people, they understand each other more, may misunderstand each other less, then it's worth the investment, but it's very hard to prove it. And it's not that there isn't value in using these methods, I'm convinced of that, even though I don't fully understand them. But I look at anti-smoking campaigns. Lots of money has gone into anti-smoking campaigns and people still smoke. So, you've got, you know, these communication strategies are certainly not predictable, I don't think looking ahead. It gets you into [inaudible] what's called process tracing, you know, looking back, a lot of people say that the South African leader, de Klerk, Fredrik de Klerk, who was an international visitor, he actually said that his visit to the United States had value. Well, that's, that's an anecdote that the international visit program people hang on the wall. And, but the fact that Tony Blair was an international visitor, did that have an affect Tony Blair on how he handled his prime ministership, I don't know.

Researcher: I can't remember the name, but I know some either Al-Qaida member or an Egyptian, someone on the terrorist list who has been on the visitor program or inaudible] but I can't remember, but I distinctly remember – mention of a known terrorist. Was it Qutb?

Participant M: Sayyyid, Qutb.

Researcher: Yes. And he had the opposite effect.

Participant M: Yeah. I think the exchange program enthusiasts need to really think hard about the fact that people go on exchange visits and often don't like what they see. And that there may be a courtesy bias when they say thank you at the airport. And then they go back and boy you know, I'm glad I don't live there. So, [inaudible] he wasn't on a U.S. funded program, but he studied at D.C. Teachers College when he was here for a short time. He went out to Colorado and went to a smaller university and was [inaudible]. And he went back and wrote [inaudible] and it was usually influential on Al-Qaida and the whole generation of radical youth.

Researcher: Do you think that kind of backfiring or boom-a-rang effect so-to-speak, does that happen with use of soft power as well?

Participant M: Well, that gets you into the whole question about what's soft power, how does it different from diplomacy.

Researcher: OK, I am very critical of it in my views, just because I think it's given more credit than there is due, it's part of public diplomacy, it's part of something that we do otherwise, it's a concept that can be utilized but only appropriately. Some of the ideals that we think we are promoting in other countries and I will just use the example of Pakistan, such as using American movies or a television series, they have a lot of times

very negative reaction in a country like Pakistan. So, I don't, I don't see the value of it, only to an extent.

Participant M: Well, those last few words are critical.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: You're absolutely right. Sensational movies can be [inaudible]. What people say and do can differ, so that the value stated are not powerful because of what the actor has done. But to say that some kinds of cross-cultural communication are not effective, isn't a reason to throw out the concept.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: So, soft power and hard power are different manifestations of power.

Researcher: Yes.

Participant M: And I've long been reasonably persuaded by a lot of nice thinking. So, I'm not, I'm biased here.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: But I do think we have to keep in mind that diplomacy is just a niche in a larger concept of soft power. So, that sources of soft power can be language. Sources of soft power can be literature. Sources of soft power - you know, I went to the Russian opera here at the Kennedy Center, I don't go to the theatre very often, but my wife drags me over to it, so this is classic Russian opera. I am a fan of Russian literature. Does that affect what I think about what I think about what Russia is doing in Ukraine or did in Chechnya. That's very hard to sort through. So, language, a space program, research laws, high quality universities, these are cultural manifestations that are tracked and our soft power, and quite separate from diplomacy. So, I don't think you can throw out soft power as a concept.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: And you do need to consider it as power.

Researcher: OK. Thank you.

Participant M: It has relationships with hard power. Hard power can be a source of soft power. People want to side with a winner. It can undercut soft power, so it has correlative relationships and adverse relationships between hard and soft.

Researcher: OK, thank you. So, my last question is mostly about Pakistan and how public diplomacy relates to Pakistan. So, I'll leave it to you how much you want to answer that or not. So, it just says what can, what can analysis and strategies and potentially the contradictions of public diplomacy in Pakistan tell us about both how success is measured in American public diplomacy and how public diplomacy efforts might be improved moving forward.

Participant M: Well, I told you I'm no expert on Pakistan. So, let me tell you a short story.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: I was in Pakistan twice.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: Once in the last 70s, when I actually was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad for three months one summer. I'm not foreign service, but I went out there for three months to work in the Embassy. And I visited the Delhi. But I also took a flight from [inaudible] and it was at the very beginning of the resumption of commercial airline travel between Pakistan and [inaudible], and I recalled the, what was it, German Fokker plane, and I think we were 50 feet above the [inaudible] and it was totally crowded. But I have a marvelous three days with the U.S. inaudible]. I went back at the end of the 90s as the faculty rep for the National War College Team, and we went to [inaudible] and we went up to Kashmere [phonetic] and I will never understand Siachen why Pakistan fight over that glacier at all.

Researcher: OK.

Participant M: But it was a good visit, then we went to Pakistan, and I recall that the cross-border, it was a famous border crossing where both sides have troops and -

Researcher: Yeah. Attari.

Participant M: That's sounds maybe right. Yeah.

Researcher: Yeah.

Participant M: And you had these very tall Pakistani uniformed officers.

Researcher: Yeah.

Participant M: The one thing I recall was the border check on the Indian side was bureaucratic beyond belief, it took us over an hour to get through, Pakistan we whizzed right through. The - we were guests of the Indian Air Force and the Pakistani Air Force, it was a military delegation and I was the only non-diplomat there. And we've, I don't want to tell you all of this, we found that the Pakistanis weren't scheduled to fly us up to their side of Cashmere, but when they found out that the Indian Air Force had flown us up to Cashmere, they decided to lay on a quick trip up to Cashmere for our delegation. It turned out there was a huge thunderstorm that afternoon, and we couldn't take off. So, never got to Pakistan. So, I recall from the border going to [inaudible] this huge super highway that Pakistan had built, but almost no cars on it. And I've always wanted to see how much more traffic there is on a big highway.

Researcher: What year was that?

Participant M: '79, no, no that would, that was the second trip, that would be '99 or something like that.

Researcher: OK, so I think there are tolls and the tolls are kept very high on purpose to keep traffic out. So, yeah.

Participant M: OK.

Researcher: There is a lot more traffic now, than the last time I was in Pakistan, was about four years ago, and I traveled extensively that trip, and yeah we had traffic.

Participant M: Yeah, OK.

Researcher: But no delays though.

Participant M: Well, the only other thing that sticks in my mind and this is also anecdotal is what a beautiful country [inaudible] and -

Researcher: That's my town.

Participant M: Is that your town?

Researcher: Yeah.

Participant M: OK. And we went up on a bus I think, we went with somebody from the Embassy. And we got out and we walked around, we had lunch at some Pakistani port they were a host of I guess of the Pakistani military, and this was in '99. At one point I wasn't in uniform but they were in theirs, they were obviously U.S. military, somebody decided it was time to get back in the bus and leave, which we did. I've always struck with how much beauty there is in that part of Pakistan and how much, both sides could benefit if the conflict wasn't there in terms of trade, tourism, it's just a beautiful spot. I don't know what all that means. It means that my personal sense is it's a beautiful country, with so much promise. I just find the, the religious driver and the memories of the separation, you know, I've, my daughter-in-law is American Indian, so my grandson is our Indian American kids. The intensity of her and her parents with memories that go back to the separation is so just so pronounced, so I don't know how you deal with those [inaudible]. I think U.S. relations with Pakistan have been very good at times. I think a lot of it has been caught up in the Afghan War. It's certainly caught up in the problems with Al-Qaida and the Northwest Frontier issues and so forth. It's caught up in the nuclear issues. It's caught up in very different interests, but very different, are very common, very common, lots of common ground it seems to be, I never knew Benazir Bhutto but I knew Peter [inaudible] through some American diplomat, and I was a college classmate of hers at Harvard.

Researcher: Oh yeah.

Participant M: And I've got this picture of Benazir Bhutto as a young student at Harvard, and she looked like any American hippy from the 1960s.

Researcher: Right, she was, she really was. Yes.

Participant M: And so, you know, there were just so many cross-border ties that matter and are valuable. And I don't know, this doesn't answer your question, but I do know that exchange programs, I talked to American diplomats who serve there, who said you know, one of the best ways to communicate in [inaudible] was to do placement in some of these pamphlets that the people in the markets put out for shoppers I guess or something like that. You know, it's not necessarily just social media. There are other ways to communicate. You talked to Tom Miller he's got a bunch more ideas.

Researcher: Right.

Participant M: So, these issues you best talk to him.

Researcher: Yeah, yeah. So, thank you so much for your time.

Participant M: I'm glad it worked out.

Researcher: It is perfect.

Appendix D
The Role of Public Diplomacy in U.S. Counter Violent Extremism Policy:
A Case Study of Pakistan
Farah Latif
George Mason University
Interview notes: Participant J and G

Interview with Participant J

This was a relatively short interview. We had communicated briefly in person and then via email before so the introduction was forgone and we quickly jumped into question answers. I asked participant J how she defined PD and what are the differences between PD and traditional diplomacy. Instead, she asked me how I understood PD. We talked

about different understandings of PD and how different scholars have defined PD based on either relativism or idealism. However, she posited that the best definition has to be the one that defines the goals/objectives the best. She gave a simple one-line distinction between PD and traditional diplomacy that "It [traditional diplomacy] is between the states." Participant J's stance on public diplomacy is that it is underappreciated, underfunded and practitioners are insufficiently trained and the biggest challenge have been lack of research-based programs. The State Department lacks the tools and funding to evaluate properly programs. There is a lack of formative or summative research. The limited research that is done is for the purpose of reporting, defending future funding and receiving accolades for success of programs. Non-governmental agents, who want to have nothing to do with being part of the US government are influencers. The State Department has an 'Office of the Private Sector Initiatives.'

Interviewer: How to define strategic communication?

Participant J: Talking about what strategic communication is in the PD realm, Participant J pointed out that to USIA officials, strategy is publicity and promotion but to DOD officials it is goal-based. However, when defined from the perspective of a PD academic, it is relational. Much like public relations. Interviewer: What are the blind spots we see in PD?

Participant J: Participant J referred me to US Advisory Commission Report 2015. The report brings up important issues and there are some blind spots, but mostly, the problem remains that there is an air of turning a blind eye to issues being brought up in the report, some even many times over the years.

Participant J said that **introducing Americans to other nations and outside cultures is the forgotten mandate of PD.**

Participant J stated that there is not much convergence between theory and practice of PD.

Interviewer: Please tell me about your ideas on the role of the diaspora in conducting PD.

Participant J: Diaspora is a critical part of the solution because **they have a dual role and, in fact, they have a dual stake in the making relationships better**. They are the critical audience because they are the internal audience as well as the external audience.

Participant J strongly advocated the role of non-state actors in PD and said that their role should be recognized and they should be utilized more effectively.

About soft power she mentioned that it is a polarizing idea and I may learn about the debate in her book. The domestic PD? If domestic PD is to "teach ourselves about the world." About diaspora she said they are both audience of both domestic PD and external PD.

Participant J was asked about the advances she has seen in US PD since the revival of PD after 9/11. She thinks that PD has not been as forgotten as it was after the fall of the Soviet Union. There is an interest in PD but there is a need for better understanding within and outside of the government. She talked about her involvement with training the foreign service officers in the State Department. She said "**Public diplomacy training**

in the State Department is getting better, it can improve but it is better than before."
Training is improving for the foreign service officers.

On her thoughts about the United States Information Agency Participant J said that its dissemination was a big mistake.

To many of the questions Participant J referred me to her book where a detailed and a discursive discussion on many of the questions I ask is available.

Interview with Participant G

This meeting took place in the participant's office at American University. We exchanged information about our backgrounds and our names. We jumped into the interview. Participant G said that traditional diplomacy is between the states, sometimes secretive but public diplomacy is different. Participant G d**escribes PD actors as "a political actor in the global arena to** *project* **[emphasis added] images, advocate causes and mediate differences of identities." She later suggested that any non-state actor that works in collaboration with the U.S. government, will be a partner in PD.**

Public diplomacy is open, non-secretive and the target audience is the ordinary public. Today's PD is relational and collaborative. The networks are in high volumes and factors make it intricate and "produce a connective mindshift. And this is its strength not a shortcoming." She offered a "feminist perspective" on PD, it is based in emotional relationships and "the nature of relations become a prism for messaging."

International relations (IR) field has only recently realized that cultural knowledge is important to public diplomacy. Culture and communication are intricately intertwined. Cultural understanding helps understand other's logic for acting a certain way. PD should be based on culturally –informed analytical framework. The United States PD is "stuck in the Cold War model of one size fits all."

Participant G talked about the shortcomings of the American PD saying that it is Eurocentric and often neglects cultural understanding of other nations. It is fixated on what we want but forgets to see what others want. After 9/11, the United States decided to tell the world America's story **"but what if they don't like America's story? What if they don't want to hear America's story?"** That was a mistake. Public diplomacy has to be relational.

Answering a question about the role of the diaspora population in the United States, she said, "Yes, yes, yes. They are the missing links to forming relationships."

Speaking of PD training Participant G said that learning the language is important but individuals may think that since they can communicate in another language, they can really understand others. In fact, cultural understand is equally if not more important. **"Culture is multilayered, multidimensional, and deeply embedded"** that teaching a language alone cannot make one understand.

Appendix E
The Role of Public Diplomacy in U.S. Counter Violent Extremism Policy:
A Case Study of Pakistan
Farah Latif
George Mason University
Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers

Source: Center for Global Development, 2010

Extremist Groups Operating in Pakistan

There are dozens of well-established extremist institutions operating throughout Pakistan created by former mujahedeen or sympathizers that are functioning at five different levels:

1. Terrorist organizations that sanction jihad without official state approval, and inflict civilian casualties through the use of terror tactics such as suicide bombings. These include the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Islam, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar e-Taiba.

2. Organizations that wage jihad against military and security forces, but are opposed to the use of suicide bombings and in some cases violence against innocent civilians. These include pro-Taliban organizations and Kashmiri groups such as Al-Badr, and Al-Umar Mujahideen.

3. Sectarian militant organizations that use violence against those who do not conform to their particular belief system. These include the Sunni Sipah-e Sihaba / Lashkar e-Jhangvi and the Shi'a Sipah-e Muhammad Pakistan.

4. Fundraising and development organizations that are not directly involved in militancy but provide financial support. This includes organizations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Al–Akhtar Trust, Al-Rashid Trust, and Ummah Tamir-e Nau.

5. Non-violent Deobandi / Salafi groups who do not unconditionally condemn violent extremism. They may denounce terrorism in Pakistan but will include a caveat in their explanations (e.g. allowing for jihad in Afghanistan). These groups generally espouse an intolerant interpretation of Islam. While they might not be directly involved in militancy, they lay the ideological foundation for violence and may provide tacit support for militant outfits. These include educational, political and social-welfare organizations affiliated with Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI-F and JUI-S), and Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith. Such groups are often not considered "extremist" because they are well rooted into Pakistan's social fabric. Because these groups capitalize on political grievances (e.g. drone attacks and the war in Afghanistan), their influence in society is increasing alongside frustration with US involvement in the region.

Figure 2. Extremist Groups Operating in Pakistan

Source: Mirahmadi et al., 2012.

Figure 3. Spectrum of Extremist Ideology: Terrorists – Affiliates – Lone perpetrators –

Sympathizers -- Tolerators

Source: Latif's Model of the Spectrum of Extremism

Latif's Model of Consensus-oriented Public Diplomacy
### PD communication based on consensus

Country Officials/Organizations of PD		Recepient Population
Intelligible	↔	Intelligible
Truthfulness of Messages	↔	Truthfulness of Messages
Sincerity	↔	Sincerity
Legitimacy	↔	Legitimacy

Consensus

Figure 4. Latif's Proposed Consensus-oriented Model of PD

Tables

Table 1

Stocktaking of Public Diplomacy Definitions

Definition	Goals	Function	Scope	Values
Tuch	•	•		
Waller	•	•		
Sharp	•	•		
Malone	•	•		
Gilboa	•	•		
Hassman	•	•	•	
Gregory	•	•	•	
Latif's Consensus-oriented Definition of PD	•	•	•	•

Table 2

Participant's Credentials

Participants	Pakistan Experts	PD Practitioners	Counterterrorism/ CVE Experts	Academic	U.S. Government	Nonprofit	Think Tank	U.S. Foreign Policy
A			●	●				
B		●	●		●			
C	●	●			●			●
D	●	●	●		●			●
E	●	●	●	●	●			●
F	●			●		●	●	
G				●			●	●
H	●					●		
I	●	●	●			●		
J				●			●	●
K	●			●	●	●	●	●
L	●			●				●
M		●		●	●	●	●	●

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BIOGRAPHY

Farah Latif grew up in Pakistan and traveled extensively in Pakistan with her family. She graduated from Jinnah College for Women, University of Peshawar, Pakistan. She received her Bachelor of Arts from George Mason University in 2014. Farah is a public relations consultant and an active Board Member of the Public Relations Society of America – National Capital Chapter (PRSA-NCC) where she serves as co-chair of the Thoth Awards Gala Committee and is the Board liaison to the University Relations Committee. Farah also holds the director of public relations position for Humanity First, U.S.A – an international nonprofit organization that provides disaster relief and sustainable assistance to communities in need of clean water, healthcare, education, and vocational skills. Farah is looking forward to her future adventure as the curator of a photo exhibition for Public Diplomacy Council that will help promote awareness of public diplomacy. She is also looking forward to teaching communication courses at GMU.

Farah does not like writing about herself in the third person.