







STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM:  
A COMPARISON OF CUBA'S AND IRAN'S USE OF TERRORISM  
TO EXPORT IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS

by

Crystal M. Schaeffer  
A Dissertation  
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of  
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of  
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Biodefense

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## **Dedication**

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to several very important people in my life. To my parents, without their support and encouragement I would have never dreamt about beginning this endeavor to gain my Ph.D. To my husband, who provided unlimited support, love, patience, and assistance; I truly believe I am one of the luckiest women alive to have a spouse as amazing as you. Finally, to our unborn baby, without you I think I would have continued to meander down the path towards graduation, because of you I actually can claim to have finished school. Thank you everyone.

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## **Abstract**

### **STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM: A COMPARISON OF CUBA'S AND IRAN'S USE OF TERRORISM TO EXPORT IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS**

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George Mason University, 2010

Dissertation Director: Dr. Frederick Monroe

Since the Vietnam War, the definition of traditional warfare has changed from the military action that was observed in previous wars such as the Korean War, and both World Wars. Traditional warfare included accepted rules of engagement, drawn battlefield lines, and other elements that were generally expected and anticipated during wartime. Currently, the United States is involved in an 'Overseas Contingency Operation' (OCO) previously known as the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT), in which soldiers face not a Nation State, but a group of terrorists, who do not claim allegiance to any specific country. In addition to the threat of terrorists acting as individuals, as groups or as organizations, the United States is also dealing with State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST), who utilize terrorist groups to achieve their own political agenda.

One method the United States Government uses to confront this challenge by is establishing and maintaining a running list of States that sponsor terrorism. Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan are currently on this list. The list, produced by the U.S. Department of

State, is designed to enable U.S. policy makers to enforce restrictions in the form of embargos and sanctions against State Sponsors of Terrorism as a method to punish States for providing such support.

The U. S. Department of State defines SST as those who “*repeatedly provide critical support for non-state terrorist groups, who without sponsorship, would have a much more difficult time obtaining the weapons, material, and safe areas to plan, train adherents, and conduct terrorist activities.*”<sup>1</sup> Various definitions of State Sponsorship exist; however, fulfillment of a political goal remains the underlying constant. The list of State Sponsors highlights the fact that the U.S. views these nations as potential threats. Although knowing who supports terrorism is necessary, this dissertation seeks to provide a method for analyzing the characteristics of SST to provide an opportunity to gain further insight into the justifications why each nation supports terrorist activities.

This dissertation will examine the techniques that Cuba and Iran implemented in order to sponsor terrorism for the purpose of globally exporting their own ideological revolution. While analyzing these techniques, the environment that fostered both Cuba and Iran to become leading State Sponsors of Terrorism will become apparent through the examination of the root causes of the Cuban and Iranian revolutions and the conditions that existed that paved the way for Castro and Khomeini to take power. By identifying and examining the phases of State Sponsored Terrorism, an understanding of the similar

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<sup>1</sup> “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm> (accessed January 9, 2007).

sponsorship techniques that both Cuba and Iran applied during their tenure as State Sponsors will develop, highlighting the commonalities within each, and the results of each phase. Through the study of these phases of terrorism, a pattern of exploitation emerges that will enable a stronger appreciation for the history of SST and a capability to conduct trend analysis that could better establish the prediction of future actions of similar State Sponsors.

Terrorism threatens the lives of numerous innocent people on a daily basis. It is inherently successful because it fosters the fear that safety is never guaranteed; Americans learned that on September 11<sup>th</sup> as three planes collided into the World Trade Center and Pentagon and a fourth crashed en route to D.C. in Pennsylvania. State Sponsorship of Terrorism has greatly increased the lethality of terrorist acts which is why the United States has focused efforts on putting political and economic pressure on states that choose terrorism as a main component of its foreign and domestic policy. These two states, Iran and Cuba, represent only two threats facing the United States; they have the strongest history in recent years of SST. The study of these states may shed light on how to develop a better predictive model of SST behavior benefiting the U.S. in developing policy for combating terrorism.

## **Chapter One: Introduction**

### ***Background Information***

Since the Vietnam War, the definition of traditional warfare has changed from the military action that was observed in previous wars such as the Korean War, and both World Wars. Traditional warfare included accepted rules of engagement, drawn battlefield lines, and other elements that were generally expected and anticipated during wartime. Currently, the United States is involved in an 'Overseas Contingency Operation' (OCO) previously known as the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT) in which soldiers face not a Nation State, but a group of terrorists, who do not claim allegiance to any specific country. In addition to the threat of terrorists acting as individuals, as groups or as organizations, the United States is also dealing with State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST), who utilize terrorist groups to achieve their own political agenda. Due to the increased use of terrorism in recent years, traditional warfare has shifted to a more unconventional form. Unconventional warfare dates back to first century AD, when a group of Jews formed a group called the Zealots and rebelled against the Roman Empire. One sect of the Zealots, the Sicarii, also known as the 'dagger men,' are often cited as the first group of people to utilize unconventional warfare in the form of terrorism against

other Jews and Romans.<sup>2</sup> In this form of warfare, insurgents fight in cities, schools, and neighborhoods, instead of on drawn battlefield lines, targeting civilians, raising the threat of injury and death to the innocent.<sup>3</sup> With this transition to unconventional warfare, U.S. Policy makers face a significant challenge on how to properly handle situations regarding terrorists and their sponsors, to include developing new methods to proactively deal with them before an event occurs, that effectively engage them after an event, and that prevent future events from occurring.

The table below highlights the history of State Sponsored Terrorism, dating back to the Barbary Pirates in 1650. This table, compiled through several sources, mainly uses data provided by the Department of State, which maintains Pattern of Global Terrorism Reports and has tracked terrorism through more than thirty years.

**Table 1: History of State Sponsored Terrorism<sup>4</sup>**

Time	Event
1650	SST originates with the Barbary Pirates, who terrorize sailors along the North African coast. Four nations support these pirates: Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.
1801	The United States refuses to bow down to the Barbary Pirates. The Barbary Pirates remain a constant threat to the U.S., and in order to confront this threat, President Thomas Jefferson establishes the U.S. Navy to protect American ships and sailors.
1815	After the War of 1812 and Napoleonic Wars that ended in 1815, the U.S. and European Powers finally bring an end to the Pirates and Barbary States. <sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> S. Zeitlin, "Zealots and Sicarii," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 81, no. 4 (Dec., 1962): 395-98, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3265095> (accessed January 30, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> John Pike, "Military Glossary," GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020gl.htm> (accessed January 31, 2007). Unconventional Warfare (UW) has a very broad definition, but with many of the same underlying themes. This theme includes utilization of guerilla warfare tactics (military operations in hostile territory by indigenous forces), terrorist techniques, or additional nonconventional methods to achieve military victory against a force of unequal power. Also, insurgents and terrorists may be defined as people who use violence in order to achieve change in the government, the key difference is that insurgents attack military targets, while terrorists target non-military people and property to intimidate governments and society.

<sup>4</sup> *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1911th ed., s.v. "Barbary Pirates," [http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Topics/history/American\\_and\\_Military/Barbary\\_Pirates/Britannica\\_1911\\*.html](http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Topics/history/American_and_Military/Barbary_Pirates/Britannica_1911*.html) (accessed October 17, 2009).

Time	Event
1917	Lenin via the Russian Revolution modernizes SST. Lenin relies on terrorism as a valuable tool for overthrowing governments. <sup>6</sup> Through the threat and use of terrorism, Lenin is able to reshape terrorism.
1960's	SST becomes a key component of terrorism, greatly increasing its lethality.
1970's - 1980's	SST is the common factor for almost every terrorist group, serving as the main way groups receive the funding and the support necessary to survive.
1976 - 1980	Increasing dynamic of Middle Eastern SST as it becomes primary opponent fighting the Peace Process with Israel. Most of the groups supported by the Middle Eastern SST are Palestinian.
1980's	Ending SST becomes a focus of U.S. policy and that of the international community. There is a large upswing of SST attacks in the 1980s
1980 - 1981	States sponsor a majority of the terrorist attacks, mainly in the form of assassinations. Department of State (DoS) records indicate that SST greatly increased since the 1970s; counting at least 129 SST attacks. More than 80% of the total terrorist attacks are SST; 40% of these are assassinations or assassination attempts, which is more than six times the amount of assassinations or attempts by non-state supported groups.
1981	Similar level of SST attacks as in 1980. 28 People injured in SST attacks. 50% of terrorist attacks target Middle Eastern nations.
1982	Over the last decade, States directly conduct 140 terrorist attacks; 90% of these attacks occur in the last two years (1980-1982). More than 1/3 are assassinations or attempts (four times the number by non-state groups in the last three years); also more than 90% of these attacks occur in Western Europe and the Middle East. Middle Eastern terrorists are responsible for more than 85% of attacks. During this period, SST attacks became more common in Western Europe.
1983	Suicide attacks occur more frequently, as well as attacks on military bases and embassies. U.S. Embassies and the Headquarters of U.S. and French contingencies of Multi-national Forces become primary targets. More attacks take place in Western Europe and South Asia.
1984	An unprecedented level of SST attacks and active involvement by States is visible. Iran, Syria, Libya are most active this year; a majority of SST attacks were on behalf of one of these States.
Mid-1980s	SST targets suicide bombings on U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in the Middle East.
1985	Continually increasing level of support from States to terrorist activities. 93 terrorist attacks occur with State involvement: 12% of total number of international attacks; 1/3 of attacks in Western Europe had State involvement; more than 90% of SST attacks are conducted by terrorist organizations supported by Middle Eastern States.
1986	DoS Records - 70 SST attacks. States continue to sponsor terrorist groups, but this is the first year that the DoS records fewer terrorist attacks that can be attributed to State involvement. Iran, Syria, and Libya remain the most active SST, responsible for most of the attacks in regional and international arena

<sup>5</sup> John Pike, "Military Barbary Wars," GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/barbary.htm> (accessed October 9, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> "Revolutions and Terrorism," Cengage Learning, [http://academic.cengage.com/resource\\_uploads/downloads/0534643817\\_46101.doc](http://academic.cengage.com/resource_uploads/downloads/0534643817_46101.doc), (accessed October 17, 2009).

Time	Event
1987	DoS Records - incidents attributed to SST rise from 70 in 1986 to 189 in 1987, equals an upsurge of more than 170%. SST incidents are responsible for 1/3 of the total number of terrorist incidents. The most significant change in SST: Pakistan-Afghanistan sponsorship of incidents increases 338%, Iran's sponsorship expands 30%, and Iran is indicated in 44 terrorist attacks this year. Out of the 189 sponsored incidents, three countries are responsible for 94% of them (Afghanistan 127 incidents, Iran 44 incidents, and Libya 7 incidents). Of the 14 SST attacks in Western Europe, 10 were against Libyan or Iranian dissidents (compared to 1 of 11 in 1986). This change in targets from general attacks to more focused attacks on individuals by SST is a result of stronger security measures imposed by Western European governments.
1988	DoS Records - 176 SST attacks. International pressures placed on Iran, Syria, Libya causes this slight decrease. Ending SST becomes a major U.S. policy objective for President Ronald Reagan's administration.
1989	DoS Records - 58 incidents involved State sponsors, a drop of 67% from 1988. The decrease comes from the ability of States to mask their involvement and aid given to terrorist groups. Greater decline in incidents attributed to SST; mainly due to Afghanistan ending it's terrorist campaign in Pakistan
1990	DoS Records - 54 incidents involving SST. There is a continual decline, although at a slower rate. The fall of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) dramatically impacts the level of SST, especially for Cuba.
1991	Russian President Yeltsin presents an initiative of shutting off all aid to client States unless it has a commercial purpose. This has the greatest impact on Cuba, which relied heavily on aid from the Soviet Union.
1990s	A continual decline in the level of support for terrorist groups occurs each year.
2001	After a speech by President George Bush, Iran, Syria, and North Korea make limited movements to cooperate with the international communities campaign against terrorism. Iran and Syria want in both ways - to clamp down on some groups (like al-Qaeda), but to maintain support for other groups (such as Hamas and Hizbollah), claiming that these groups represent national liberation movements. After 9/11, the International Community focuses more intently on bringing a halt to terrorism, including SST.
2004	This year marks the decrease in threat from SST: Iraq is removed from the SST list and Libya and Sudan publicly make strides to stop supporting terrorism while working with other Nations to increase counter-terrorism efforts.

The above table emphasizes the longstanding history of SST, and its ability to adversely affect the stability of sovereign nations. One method The United States Government uses to confront this challenge by is establishing and maintaining a running list of States that sponsor terrorism. Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan are currently on this list. Iraq and Libya were on the list, but have recently been removed after supposedly renouncing terrorism and joining the GWOT, now OCO. North Korea was also recently



removed after verification that the country had not supported international terrorism in the last six months and has made assurances to abstain from doing so. The list, produced by the U.S. Department of State, is designed to enable U.S. policy makers to enforce restrictions in the form of embargos and sanctions against State Sponsors of Terrorism as a method to punish States for providing such support.

The U. S. Department of State defines SST as those who “*repeatedly provide critical support for non-state terrorist groups, who without sponsorship, would have a much more difficult time obtaining the weapons, material, and safe areas to plan, train adherents, and conduct terrorist activities.*”<sup>7</sup> States that continually provide such support are placed on the States Sponsor of Terrorism List and must comply with certain sections of the Export Administration Act, Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act.<sup>8</sup> SST is also defined as “*using terrorism as a tool against it’s own people, providing an establishment for terrorism, financing terrorist activities to achieve political goals, and providing the training and supplies for groups to carry out various activities.*”<sup>9</sup> Though various definitions exist, the underlying fulfillment of a political goal remains constant. For the purposes of this dissertation, State Sponsored Terrorism is defined as the funding of, the provision of aid for, and the strategic support of terrorist groups in order to achieve political goals through unconventional means. Additionally, States sponsors are divided into two groups, those that actively sponsor terrorism, and those that passively sponsor terrorism.

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<sup>7</sup> “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”

<sup>8</sup> “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”

<sup>9</sup> Michael Crawford, “Milnet Brief: State Sponsored Terrorism,” MILNET, <http://www.milnet.com/State-Sponsored-Terrorism.html> (accessed January 11, 2007); “State Sponsored Terrorism,” Terrorism Research, <http://www.terrorism-research.com/state/> (accessed January 11, 2007).

Active state sponsors directly supply terrorists with arms, money, training, and training grounds. Active sponsorship is a deliberate decision by state leaders to partake in supporting terrorist events.<sup>10</sup> This sponsorship grants terrorists ‘diplomatic immunity’, encourages their activities, and frequently entails direct government involvement in terrorist activities. Iran is a current prime example of an active sponsor of terrorism, followed by Syria in rank. Both states directly sponsor and support terrorist groups and activities, and many times both states can be linked to the same groups, activities, and motivations for supporting terrorism. Published data from the U.S. Government, evidence found after terrorist attacks, and, in some cases, the public announcement from the states identifying the groups they support provides reliable proof that states, like Iran, actively support terrorism.

Passive sponsors of terrorism, however, take a less ‘hands on’ approach with terrorist groups. While active sponsors may be directly involved from the initial planning stage to the operation of the attack, passive sponsors maintain a distant supportive role when dealing with terrorist activities. Through passive sponsorship, States allow terrorist groups all of the benefits of active sponsors without becoming involved, by providing safe havens for groups, by preventing their extradition, and by allowing terrorist activities to take place on their soil - in a sense ‘turning a blind eye’ to the actions of the groups. Passive sponsors may also offer both public and political support to terrorist groups. Cuba, once a very active SST has evolved into a leading example of a passive sponsor of terrorism. Although Cuba has not recently been directly involved in acts of terrorism, the

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<sup>10</sup> Daniel L. Byman, “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism,” *Survival* 47, no. 2 (Winter 2005/2006): page nr., <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/byman/20051216-survival.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007).

State continues to harbor terrorists, refusing to extradite them to face their charges. Cuba vocally supports terrorist groups, claiming that these groups are made up of freedom fighters. As the U.S. government continues to fight SST, the government must learn to properly deal with both active and passive sponsors. These states provide valuable support that allows terrorist groups the opportunity to orchestrate attacks on a lethal scale. Cuba and Iran are the best models to study as they represent the current leading passive and active State Sponsors of Terrorism.

### ***Statement of Problem***

The list of State Sponsors highlights the fact that the U.S. views these nations as potential threats. Although knowing who supports terrorism is necessary, having an in-depth knowledge of the characteristics of SST provides the opportunity to gain further insight into the justifications why each nation supports terrorist activities.

Both Cuba and Iran have used terrorism in order to export their ideological revolutions throughout the world. Immediately after Castro took power in 1959, Cuba began to support leftist-terrorist and guerilla groups in Latin America, South America, and Africa in order to spread Communism. After the Islamic Revolution, lead by Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran began to sponsor, support, and aid terrorist groups in the Middle East to spread their own radical version of Islam. Both revolutions began in similar ways – lead by charismatic men who were arrested and exiled only to later return triumphant after overthrowing the previous governments. Once in command, Fidel Castro and Ayatollah Khomeini then set out to assassinate all supporters and sympathizers of the former government.

This dissertation will examine the techniques that Cuba and Iran implemented in order to sponsor terrorism for the purpose of globally exporting their own ideological revolution. While analyzing these techniques, the environment that fostered both Cuba and Iran to become leading State Sponsors of Terrorism will become apparent through the examination of the root causes of the Cuban and Iranian revolutions and the conditions that existed that paved the way for Castro and Khomeini to take power. By identifying and examining the phases of State Sponsored Terrorism, an understanding of the similar sponsorship techniques that both Cuba and Iran applied during their tenure as State Sponsors will develop, highlighting the commonalities within each, and the results of each phase. Through the study of these phases of terrorism, a pattern of exploitation emerges that will enable a stronger appreciation for the history of SST and a capability to conduct trend analysis that could better establish the prediction of future actions of similar State Sponsors.

Terrorism threatens the lives of numerous innocent people on a daily basis. It is inherently successful because it fosters the fear that safety is never guaranteed; Americans learned that on September 11<sup>th</sup> as three planes collided into the World Trade Center and Pentagon and a fourth crashed en route to D.C. in Pennsylvania. State Sponsorship of Terrorism has greatly increased the lethality of terrorist acts which is why the United States has focused efforts on putting political and economic pressure on states that choose terrorism as a main component of its foreign and domestic policy. These two states, Iran and Cuba, represent only two threats facing the United States; they have the strongest history in recent years of SST. The study of these states may shed light on

how to develop a better predictive model of SST behavior benefiting the U.S. in developing policy for combating terrorism.

## Chapter Two: Literature Review

### *Typology*

The term terrorism evokes strong emotional reactions. However to understand the term, it is necessary to understand the full context of what terrorism is. This can be done in two ways, by defining terrorism, or grouping terrorism into typologies. Although there are benefits and downfalls to both methods, typologies are used in this dissertation in an attempt to understand the scope of terrorism. Typologies are often preferred over definitions because they allow a more fluid depiction of terrorism and are not hampered by the rigidity that definitions require.

Definitions usually allow less room for interpretation and are more dependent on specific details within the general definition. They are created by describing the term or object, in either an abstract or concrete manner, so that the reader can envision and understand it. Unfortunately, no two people see things in the exact same way.<sup>11</sup> Problems lie in the wording of both specific and general definitions. Simple definitions of terrorism can become so broad and vague that their application becomes insignificant, with the result that the definition “def[ies] valid generalizations about it.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Jack P. Gibbs, “Conceptualization of terrorism,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 58.

<sup>12</sup> H. H. A. Cooper, “Terrorism : the problem of definition revisited,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 2.

Researchers from the University of Leiden, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, analyzed more than 100 academic and official definitions of terrorism with the aim of identifying the main components. They found that in 83.5% of the definitions contained an element of violence, 65% mentioned political goals, 51% emphasized inflicting fear and terror, 21% mentioned the arbitrariness and indiscrimination in targeting victims, and 17.5% included the victimization of civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, or outsiders.<sup>13</sup> Schmid and Jongman also identified differences between the official and academic definitions of terrorism. They noted that official definitions had more in common with each other and possessed three similar elements: the use of violence, political objectives, and the intention of creating fear in a target population. Most of the academic definitions that Schmid and Jongman analyzed contained these the three elements as well, but overall, academic definitions were much more diverse than the official ones.<sup>14</sup> Although there are similarities within definitions, these elements are still too general and do not provide enough ground to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict.

While Schmid and Jongman separated definitions of terrorism by their environments of origin, official or academic, many other researchers have sought to identify categories of terrorism and its key components of terrorism as well. Like

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<sup>13</sup> Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency," in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 360-361.

<sup>14</sup> Merari, 360-361.

Schmid and Jongman, Thomas Badey identified two similar categories of terrorism: academic and political.<sup>15</sup>

Other components commonly found in definitions of terrorism are the requirements for politically motivated acts, violence against noncombatants, and that the terrorist act must be acted out by subnational groups and/or clandestine agents.<sup>16</sup> The last two components are highly valued in the definitions of terrorism due to the inability of victims to anticipate attack. These components are often what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence, such as guerilla warfare, or insurgency. Most of the well accepted definitions of terrorism stress two components: the objective of the terrorist act, and the means and/or methods used to carry it out. The objective is to influence government, human policy, or course of action. The means must include the use or threat of use of violence involving two targets, primary and secondary, by which the objective is achieved. The primary target is the audience that the terrorist attack is intended to influence. The secondary target is composed of victims directly impacted by the attack.<sup>17</sup> Additional definitions found in literature identify seven core characteristics of terrorism: the use or threat of use of violence, the existence of a political motive, selected targets are representative of their target category; the aim is to terrorize, and the goal is to force the

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<sup>15</sup> Alan O'Day, ed., *Dimensions of Terrorism* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), xii.

<sup>16</sup> Charles L. Ruby, "The definition of terrorism," in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 16-17.

<sup>17</sup> Daniel M. Schwartz, "Environmental terrorism: analyzing the concept," in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 41-42; Igor Primoratz, "The morality of terrorism," in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 333.



audience to modify its behavior. The method may be extreme or unusual. The terrorist act is an act of communication.<sup>18</sup>

Bruce Hoffman identified five characteristics of terrorism, two of those were just listed: the use of or threat of violence and politically motivation. The other three include an attack designed to have psychological repercussions far beyond the immediate victim or target. Also, the attack must be conducted by an organization, and perpetrated by either a non-state or subnational organization.<sup>19</sup>

Similar to difficulties identifying commonalities and accepted components of terrorism, attempts to define terrorism have proven difficult on national and international level. Western definitions of terrorism are very different from Iranian, Syrian, and other Third World country definitions.<sup>20</sup> Definitions in international law are rarely agreed upon because States want to be able to determine their own definition of terrorism and States do not want to be bound to an abstract definition that could create political problems for them later on in particular situations.<sup>21</sup> The United Nations (UN) has made numerous attempts to define terrorism, but with no success. While the UN has proposed several definitions, the first, presented at the League of Nations Convention in 1937, defined terrorism as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general

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<sup>18</sup> Rachel Monaghan, “Single-issue terrorism: a neglected phenomenon?,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 170.

<sup>19</sup> Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8.

<sup>20</sup> John Gearson, “The nature of modern terrorism,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 153; Merari, 361.

<sup>21</sup> Lt. Col. Richard J. Erickson, *Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored International Terrorism* (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1989), 32.

public,” since then, it has been unable to arrive at a consensus on the definition of terrorism.<sup>22</sup> The United States (U.S.) also has difficulty creating one accepted definition of terrorism; Congress, the Central intelligence Agency the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Departments of Justice, the Army, Defense, and State, and the Vice President’s Task Force, each have their own definition.<sup>23</sup> These variations of the definition of terrorism can often be explained by the differing objectives of each department.<sup>24</sup>

Typologies of terrorism offer several advantages over definitions because they identify the range of terrorist activities, and the levels of the problem, and response. They are broad in scope, capture a range of terrorist activities rather than a singularly defined action, allow for the scope of the problem to be introduced on a variety of levels (local, national, and international, for example); and identify levels of terrorism and therefore what level of response is deemed necessary.<sup>25</sup> They are also useful because, by classifying terrorism into groups, scholars have a more orderly field to study. This is beneficial because an understanding of the types of terrorist groups can provide insights into the manifestations and typical patterns of violence.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Larry J. Siegel, *Criminology*, 10 ed. (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing, 2008), 328; Isabelle Sommier, “‘Terrorism’ as total violence?,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O’Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 465.

<sup>23</sup> Alex P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, 2 ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 32-33.

<sup>24</sup> Gearson, 153.

<sup>25</sup> “The Criminology of Terrorism,” Huntingdon College, <http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jLewis/Outlines/TerrorWhiteCh01.htm> (accessed July 10, 2007).

<sup>26</sup> Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the curve : globalization and international terrorism,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O’Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 408.

“Typologies order a multitude of objects and/or phenomena and make them analytically manageable. The ordering criteria can be based on either empirical investigation, or theoretical considerations. In practical terms, typology building involves the categorizing of certain units of study “in accordance with a specified set of characteristics,” the object being to compress a good deal of information into a single set of terms...”<sup>27</sup> Typologies are created throughout the study, or by the systemic classification of types that have characteristics or traits in common.

Although beneficial, there are many different ways to divide terrorism into typologies. Unfortunately, there are almost as many typologies of terrorism as there are definitions, and, while some categories are commonly found in typologies, differences arise based on how acts of terrorism are classified. Terrorism is commonly divided into four basic categories: social-revolutionary, ethnic-nationalist, religious, and vigilantist.<sup>28</sup>

Social-revolutionary terrorism, also known as left-wing terrorism, is made up of acts of terrorism in the form of revenge against their parents’ generation, whom the terrorists hold responsible for failures in the world.<sup>29</sup> This type of terrorism emerged in Europe and Latin America, where there was a divide between the small population of rich citizens and the greater population of poor. The poor sought to replace the capitalistic society with a more Marxist-like society.<sup>30</sup> Social-revolutionary terrorists try to gain attention, as well as sympathy and support for their cause. These groups included the

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<sup>27</sup> Schwartz, 39

<sup>28</sup> Tore Bjørge, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, New edition ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), 144.

<sup>29</sup> Bjørge, pg. 57.

<sup>30</sup> Bjørge, pg. 56, 154-155; David J. Whittaker, ed., *The Terrorism Reader (Routledge Readers in History)*, 3 ed. (London: Routledge, 2007), 6.

Basque ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna), Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Red Army Faction, and the Tupamaros of Uruguay.<sup>31</sup>

Ethnic-nationalist terrorism arises from a group's resentment towards the dominant ethnic group and seeks to establish a new political system based upon their own ethnic background. Included are such terrorist groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Fatah, Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).<sup>32</sup> In contrast to social-revolutionary terrorists, ethnic-nationalist, or nationalist-separatists, consist of people who are carrying out the same fight against the current regime as their parents and older generations.<sup>33</sup> In order to fully understand the scope of national-separatists, it is necessary to understand the extent of their support within the population and the intensity of their attacks. This type of terrorism may evolve from social segments that are suffering from economic problems, or may arise out of territorial, linguistic, or religious reasons.<sup>34</sup>

Jerrold Post highlighted the differences in social-revolutionary terrorism and national-separatist terrorism movements in the table below.

**Table 2: Jerrold Post's Generational Pathway to Terrorism<sup>35</sup>**

Youth's Relationship to Parent	Parent's Relationship to the Regime	
	• Loyal	• Disloyal, Damaged, Dissident
• Loyal	X	✓ - <i>National-Separatist</i>
• Disloyal	✓ - <i>Social-Revolutionary</i>	X

<sup>31</sup> Whittaker, 6, 27-28; Bjørge, 56.

<sup>32</sup> Bjørge, 56.

<sup>33</sup> Bjørge, 57.

<sup>34</sup> Bjørge, 119, 125.

<sup>35</sup> Bjørge, 119, 125.

Religious terrorism, despite recent claims, is not a new phenomenon. This type of terrorism began with the Zealots from 66 – 73 A.D. in which Jewish terrorists fought against the Roman occupation of Israel. The first acts of Islamic terrorism occurred between the 11<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries in modern day Syria and Iran in which the Muslim group, 'The Assassins,' attacked Christian crusaders and Muslim officials.<sup>36</sup> This type of terrorism may be the most volatile because of deeply rooted values held by group members. It is motivated by "moral certainty, divine sanctions, and religious duty."<sup>37</sup> Bruce Hoffman believes that religious terrorist attacks are often much more lethal than secular terrorism attacks, due to "different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and the worldviews embraced by the religious terrorists."<sup>38</sup> A few examples of these types of terrorist groups are the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Hamas, Hizbollah, and Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group).<sup>39</sup>

Vigilante terrorism is typified by illegal efforts to maintain public order and takes the place of the State as the protector of its citizens.<sup>40</sup> Examples of vigilante terrorism include crime control, when the people behind the attack believe that, in order to be safe, they must take the law into their own hands. Another type of vigilante terrorism targets

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<sup>36</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.s. Policy," *Rand Review* 22, no. 2 (Winter 1998-99): page nr., <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.winter98.9/methods.html> (accessed October 2, 2007); Peter Brookes, *A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Rouge States* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 15.

<sup>37</sup> Whittaker, 21.

<sup>38</sup> Hoffman.

<sup>39</sup> Hoffman.

<sup>40</sup> Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Causes of Vigilant Political Violence: The Case of Jewish Settlers," *Civil Wars* 6, no. 3 (2003): 9-30.

groups fighting over political control. Lastly, terrorism against the regime itself occurs when the vigilantes do not believe the regime is capable of protecting its citizens.<sup>41</sup>

Additional examples of how terrorism typologies can be differentiated may be based upon their ideology; Anarchist, Marxist, Nationalist, Mercenaries, Pathological, and Neofascists. Criminal, psychic, war, and political terrorism are other examples of typologies based on types of desired end results. In the book Political Terrorism, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman identify some common bases for classifying terrorism: actor-, victim-, cause-, environment-, means-, political-orientation-, motivation-, demand-, purpose-, and target-based.<sup>42</sup> Other researchers have designed their own typologies of terrorism. Lt. Col. Vought and Lt. Col. Fraser divided terrorism into three types: state-directed, state-supported, and non-state terrorism. Amir Taheri identified five types: national, urban guerillas, old-style guerillas, publicity-seeking, and Islamic terrorists. Donald J. Hanle's typologies of terrorism have seven different classes: psychotic, criminal, mystical, revolutionary, repression (State, internal terrorism), military, and state-sponsored (the last two involve terrorism against external targets).<sup>43</sup>

Because terrorism is in a constant state of change, typologies can only describe patterns among terrorist acts, and, while they may increase the over-all knowledge of terrorism, each terrorist event must be understood on a comprehensive level, including its social, historical, and political circumstances and context.<sup>44</sup> Another concern with typologies is that they are often decided upon prematurely; scholars also complain that

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<sup>41</sup> Pedahzur, 9-30.

<sup>42</sup> Schmid, 40.

<sup>43</sup> Everett L. Wheeler, "Terrorism and military theory: an historical perspective," in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 305, 327.

<sup>44</sup> Erickson, 32.

the use of typologies sometimes requires them to mold forms of terrorism to fit the typology<sup>45</sup>. For typologies to be accurate and true to the type of terrorism, the typologies invoked must account for each group's "political motivation, origin, scope of action, and focus of attention."<sup>46</sup> Some social scientists believe that there is no typology of terrorism that amounts to a generic definition of terrorism.<sup>47</sup>

In terrorism typologies, SST is frequently found as one of the categories. SST is included in many typologies because it describes an important aspect of terrorism that greatly influences the level and lethality of the acts of terrorism and is beneficial for both the terrorist and the State. While SST is usually described as a form of political terrorism, there are many factors that need to be considered when classifying SST. Because of the wide range of capabilities that SST allows, it is necessary to investigate further this type of terrorism to identify and discern its own typologies.

Professor John H. Murphy of Villanova University identifies the need for these typologies because there are many different levels of aid those States supply: State sponsorship, support, toleration, and inaction due to an inability to act.<sup>48</sup> In this typology, State sponsorship is when a state directly uses terrorism as a weapon in place of conventional means to achieve a strategic advantage. Sponsoring terrorism allows the state to project power without accepting the risks and consequences of the attack itself. State support is when the state provides resources such as "training, arms, explosives, equipment, intelligence, safe havens, communications, travel documents, financing, and

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<sup>45</sup> Gibbs, 55.

<sup>46</sup> "The Criminology of Terrorism."

<sup>47</sup> Gibbs, 55.

<sup>48</sup> Erickson, 34.

other [forms of] logistical support” without becoming directly involved in the planning, implementation, or perpetration of the terrorist attacks. These states provide the capability without controlling the actions of the groups. The third level of such terrorism is State toleration. In this case, States are aware of terrorist groups residing within their borders, but neither support them nor suppress their terrorist activities. In this case, States and the terrorist groups often have the common understanding that the targets of attacks are in other foreign countries as a condition of remaining within the host State. The last category identified by Professor Murphy is State inaction. In this instance, the State wants to expel the terrorist group from within its borders, but does not possess the capability to do so.<sup>49</sup> Other typologies classify SST by whether they support terrorism, perpetrate terrorist attacks, or directly operate through terrorism.<sup>50</sup>

Typologies of SST can be broad, simply describing such forms as coercive diplomacy (in which the use of terrorism is overt), covert state terrorism (which utilizes clandestine state terrorism and may include private groups employed by the state), and assistance to other states and groups therein, in the form of surrogate terrorism (state support and state acquiesce to terrorism).<sup>51</sup> Other typologies can be based upon the level of control: complete control of the group; controlling recruitment, operations; close control of the group and direction of their actions; progressing to providing training, financing, and safehaven.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Erickson, 34.


<sup>50</sup> Shaul Shay, *The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 8.

<sup>51</sup> Bjørge, 207-208.

<sup>52</sup> Bjørge, 196.




Alex Schmid, J. de Graaf, and Jerrold Post designed very similar typologies of terrorism in which State and State Sponsored Terrorism are both classified under political terrorism. This typology, as it is described below, encompasses the crux of this dissertation.



**Figure 1: Schmid and de Graaf's Typology of Terrorism<sup>53</sup>**

<sup>53</sup> Schmid, 48.



**Figure 2: Jerrold Post's Version of Schmid's Typology of Terrorism<sup>54</sup>**

One typology lists political terrorism on a scale of 1 – 5, ranking the range in which States use terrorism. Level 1 is the lowest level in which the secular State does not imprison its citizens for their personal views, torture is rare and political murder is exceptionally rare. Level 5, at the other end of the scale, describes the opposite extreme in which murder, disappearances and torture are a common reality of life for members of the population that the State leaders view as enemies or threats. At this level, State leaders use terrorism as a way to fully achieve personal or ideological goals.<sup>55</sup> As SST, Cuba and Iran embody the characteristics described in level five.

Paul Wilkinson, Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, identified

<sup>54</sup> Bjørgo, 54.

<sup>55</sup> Bjørgo, 199.

three conditions in which political terrorism becomes international terrorism. SST is directly applicable to these three conditions: (1). Terrorism is directed against a foreign city or target; (2). Terrorism is directed by governments or organizations from more than one country; and, (3). Terrorism is aimed at influencing the policies of different foreign countries.<sup>56</sup>


Other typologies classify SST based upon place, purpose, or issue. When SST is classified by place, that type of terrorism is described as terrorism used by a “government against its own people or in support of international terrorism against another government.”<sup>57</sup> When included in typologies based upon purpose, SST is described as terrorism used by a Nation against another Nation or its people. And lastly, in this set of terrorism typologies, when described by issue, SST is described as terrorism used by a repressive regime against its citizens in order to enforce obedience.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Shay, 8.

<sup>57</sup> “The Criminology of Terrorism.”

<sup>58</sup> Shay, 8.



**Figure 3: Typologies of Terrorism: Place, Personality Trait, Purpose, Target, Issue<sup>59</sup>**

<sup>59</sup> "The Criminology of Terrorism."

SST Typologies can also be classified by the types of support that are offered, as well: training and operation; ideological direction; sanctuary; financing, arms, logistics; diplomatic backing; and/or organizational assistance. Training is the most common form of assistance provided by states. Levels of training range from basic techniques, like the use of explosives and small firearms, to advanced techniques like surveillance and counter-surveillance methods, or the construction of explosives. Operational aid is another form of support, which enables terrorist groups to more effectively attack targets. One end of the spectrum of providing operational aid may be giving intelligence to terrorist groups. Another extreme may be the conduct of joint operations between agents of the state and terrorists.<sup>60</sup> Ideological direction is a way that States can inspire terrorist groups to follow their example.<sup>61</sup> The Cuban Revolution and Iranian Revolution are examples of ideological direction. Ideological direction allows States to directly influence the group, shaping the group's operations, organization, objectives, and ultimately formulating its own ideology. Iran, for example, wanted to create its own Islamic Revolution and sought to build and unite terrorist groups that share the same interpretation of Islamism, most importantly that of the Guardianship of the Jurist.<sup>62</sup> Uniting and supporting these groups allowed Iran to put great emphasis on the Revolution by influencing their thoughts and actions. Sanctuary, is one of the most beneficial forms of support a State can offer terrorist groups. Sanctuary allows groups a place to plan and organize for new attacks, train and recruit new members. Groups can

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<sup>60</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 59.

<sup>61</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 64.

<sup>62</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 63.

also raise money and support from other groups and States, while benefiting from the ability to rest between terrorist attacks. Refugee camps are good examples of safe havens, or sanctuaries, offered by States. These camps allow the same benefits as other forms of sanctuary. Financial help, arms, and logistical aid comprise another grouping of support that greatly increases the vitality of terrorist groups.<sup>63</sup> Monetary aid is invaluable for terrorist groups. It helps with recruitment, a steady supply of passports real or forged, maintenance of safe houses, the creation and sustainability of logistics networks, the purchase of weapons and explosives, increases in members' pay, and further development of the terrorist group. Money also allows terrorist groups to gain support of local communities by providing basic social services that are otherwise unavailable. Hamas, for examples, receives several million dollars annually from Iran is on many foreign terrorist organization lists, won the 2006 election as the controlling political party in the Palestinian parliament.<sup>64</sup> States may also fund front companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating as a cover for terrorist groups.

State officials or diplomats can take a more active role providing this kind of assistance by acting as recruiters for new members.<sup>65</sup> In addition, States use their diplomats as another mechanism for supporting terrorists. Diplomats can endorse terrorists groups, or their causes, lending legitimacy to their causes and methods, which,

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
<sup>63</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 65-66.

<sup>64</sup> U.S. Backs Abbas After Hamas Election Win, *Mail Online*, January 26, 2006. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-375234/US-backs-Abbas-Hamas-election-win.html> (accessed October 09, 2009).

<sup>65</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 60-61.

in turn, aids recruiting new members and attracting funding. Diplomatic backing also supports the political wings of terrorist groups.<sup>66</sup>

The last of this typology of SST, organizational assistance is especially important in the early days of a terrorist group's formation. Over 90% of terrorist groups do not survive their first year, the aid of the State greatly enhances the probability of group survival. The State provides professionals to organize the group by recruiting new members, publicizing the group's cause and achievements, and advocating this group over rival groups. This type of support enhances group survival, creates a structured terrorist movement, and can unite terrorist groups to aid in creating a bigger terrorist movement that could be achieved by one small group alone. SST is very "hands on" in the initial stages of group formation.<sup>67</sup>




**Figure 4: Dan Byman's example of different types of state sponsors<sup>68</sup>**

<sup>66</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 61-62.

<sup>67</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 62-63.

<sup>68</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 11.



**Figure 5: Dan Byman's examples of specific state sponsors and terrorist groups<sup>69</sup>**

Typologies may also be classified based upon their overall level of support and interactions with the groups being supported: strong, weak, lukewarm, antagonistic, passive, or unwilling host.<sup>70</sup> Strong supporters are highly committed to the terrorist group and offer significant resources. Weak supporters are regimes that support the terrorist group, but do not have the resources to support the group as fully as desired. Lukewarm supporters are States who support the group, but take little action to directly advance the group's cause; Antagonistic supporters ostensibly help the group but do so in order to weaken the group's cause or control. Passive supporters do not directly provide aid, but knowingly turn a blind eye to the terrorist groups because citizens of the State favor the group and their cause; while unwilling hosts are regimes too weak to stop or remove the

<sup>69</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 11.

<sup>70</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 15.



terrorist group. This latter type involves States that are not actually supporters of terrorism, but victims of the terrorist groups.<sup>71</sup>

Lists like these are commonly divided into whether the State actively or passively supports and sponsors terrorism. The main difference between active or passive is if the State is directly involved or indirectly involved in terrorist activities. Another difference between active and passive sponsors is the level of control the State has over terrorist groups, as well as the level of cooperation between the State and terrorist group.<sup>72</sup> Active SST are rare and this level of support has declined greatly since the end of the Cold War.<sup>73</sup> The choice to be either an active or passive sponsor of terrorism is weighed out by States. How much are they willing to pay for their involvement in terrorist activities? What is the breaking point for whether they chose to be an active sponsor, passive sponsor, or to not support terrorism at all?<sup>74</sup>

Active sponsors chose to initiate and direct terrorist attacks, give special directions for the attack, and set the aims of the attack.<sup>75</sup> These sponsors represent the highest level of sponsorship for terrorist attacks, as government agencies are often perpetrating attacks along with terrorists themselves.<sup>76</sup> They fall into several of the previously discussed typologies: strong, weak, and lukewarm. Antagonistic supporters of terrorism are actively involved with terrorist groups.<sup>77</sup> They provide the types of support described above as well (training and operations, ideological direction, sanctuary,

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<sup>71</sup> Byman *Deadly*, 15.

<sup>72</sup> Shay, 9.

<sup>73</sup> Byman, "Passive".

<sup>74</sup> Whittaker, 270.

<sup>75</sup> Whittaker, 269.

<sup>76</sup> Whittaker, 269.

<sup>77</sup> Byman, "Passive".

financing, arms, logistics, diplomatic backing, organizational assistance). These sponsors result from a deliberate regime decision to assist terrorist groups in order to achieve its own interests, utilizing its own intelligence agencies, security forces, and other people to work with terrorists.<sup>78</sup>

Passive supporters also can make great contributions to terrorist group's cause by not acting to stop the group. States can be passive supporters by "not policing their borders, turning a blind eye to fundraising, and tolerating recruitment, these three things enhance the group's ability to build their organization, conduct operations, and survive."<sup>79</sup> Passive sponsors of terrorism are very dangerous due to their indifference to stopping terrorism; they possess the ability to do so but chose not to. Terrorist groups exchange not targeting particular areas for the sponsors 'turning a blind eye' to the groups activities.<sup>80</sup> Arrangements between States and terrorist groups are usually mutually beneficial. Like active sponsors of terrorism, passive sponsors also give support to terrorists, but usually not so high up the political chain. Terrorist groups receive support from people in society, even political parties, who are not directly affiliated with the current regime.<sup>81</sup> There are generally three reasons that States passively sponsor terrorism; 1. Domestic sympathy for the group, 2. Sense that the group poses little threat to the host government itself, and 3. There are relatively low costs of inaction or even indirect benefits.<sup>82</sup> Daniel Byman identified Venezuela as a passive sponsor of terrorism

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<sup>78</sup> Whittaker, 269.

<sup>79</sup> Byman, "Passive".

<sup>80</sup> Whittaker, pg 272.

<sup>81</sup> Byman, "Passive".

<sup>82</sup> Byman, "Passive".

by allowing FARC to freely operate within its territory.<sup>83</sup> Although terrorist groups do not directly receive assistance from these States, passive support allows weak groups to grow stronger, and strong groups to become more capable; it allows groups to develop a more effective strike capability and work with impunity within state borders.<sup>84</sup>

Like definitions, there is a large amount of redundancy found in typologies of terrorism. Also, just like the importance in determining typologies of terrorism it is equally important to determine typologies of SST. This is important because by determining typologies of SST, the ability to combat this form of terrorism will be increased. It will enable policy makers to determine which States fall into these categories and how to get states to end their sponsorship of terrorism – aiding in the Global War on Terrorism.

### ***State Sponsor of Terrorism***

The U.S. Department of State defines State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) as States that provide safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance; government agencies that are directly involved in planning and supporting terrorist activities; that use groups in support of their own goals; provide money, safe passage, and arms; provide political and material support; and allow bases and training camps on territory, as well as providing for the training camps themselves.<sup>85</sup> SST generally always increases the capabilities of terrorist groups and helps to make the movement much more lethal by providing weapons

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<sup>83</sup> Byman, “Passive”.

<sup>84</sup> Byman, “Passive”.

<sup>85</sup> “State Sponsors of Terror Overview: Country Reports on Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm> (accessed March 19, 2007).

and training.<sup>86</sup> By supporting terrorist groups, these States legitimize them, making it nearly impossible for another government to delegitimize the group.<sup>87</sup> The main difference between SST and non-state supported terrorist groups is that the terrorist attacks are committed at the benefit of the State.<sup>88</sup>

The term State Sponsors of Terrorism was created in a 1979 legislation, which required special licenses for exports to countries that the U.S. Secretary of State designates as supporting terrorist groups.<sup>89</sup> Being named a State Sponsor of Terrorism enacts a long list of legislation that enforce sanctions on the state. The legislation and other laws concerning SST will be discussed later on in the section. The U.S. List of SST is made up of a range of States from Cuba who has transformed to a state that does little more than provide haven for terrorist groups in Havana to Iran that asserts extreme control over terrorist groups in the Middle East.<sup>90</sup> States typically do not want to be associated with the term ‘sponsor of terrorism,’ States prefer terms like ‘coercive diplomacy,’ ‘aid’ to freedom fighters, ‘wars of national liberation;’ the groups supported by the State also shy away from this type of association with States, labeling the attacks they perform for the benefit of the State as ‘assistance’ to States in pursuit of international security.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 5; Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2007), 54.

<sup>87</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 73.

<sup>88</sup> David Claridge, “State terrorism? Applying a definitional model,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O’Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 114.

<sup>89</sup> Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “America and the new terrorism,” in *Dimensions of Terrorism*, ed. Alan O’Day (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 431.

<sup>90</sup> Bjørge, 192.

<sup>91</sup> Bjørge, 212.

SST, depending on how States implement support, has been linked to new forms of warfare, low intensity conflicts, protracted political warfare, surrogate warfare, proxy warfare, and an indirect form of aggression.<sup>92</sup> This association with covert or surrogate warfare was created because weaker states often use terrorism as a form of asymmetric warfare against larger, more powerful states without the risk of retribution.<sup>93</sup> SST are also frequently considered to be rogue, pariah, outlaw states, or ‘states of concern.’<sup>94</sup> There are many forms of terrorism that States use: States form their own death squads to advance the cause of the State, they provide safe havens without restrictions; fund terrorist groups; refuse to extradite terrorists to face criminal charges in other States; give money to terrorist groups directly or indirectly through front organizations like social, cultural, and charitable associations.<sup>95</sup> When the group is under a large amount of control by the State, it is effectively acting as a paramilitary group for the government.<sup>96</sup> The amount of support provided by States can be judged in many ways; one method to ascertain how much is given is by assessing the degree of support as a part of government policy and by regime capability to support terrorism.<sup>97</sup> The level of capability required to support terrorism is usually much less than that required to stop it.<sup>98</sup> With enough

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<sup>92</sup> Erickson, 44; Richardson.

<sup>93</sup> Whittaker, 6.

<sup>94</sup> Gearson, 162.

<sup>95</sup> Sue G. Mahan and Pamala L. Griset, *Terrorism in Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc, 2007), 48.

<sup>96</sup> Bjørge, 67.

<sup>97</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, pg 11-12.

<sup>98</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, pg 11-12.

resources and determination, States are capable of maintaining terrorist movements, with higher levels of damage, for longer periods of time than groups without such support.<sup>99</sup>

States possess varying degrees of control over terrorist groups from complete control, which is highly rare, to having no influence over operations performed by the terrorist group.<sup>100</sup> Iran is the most current example of a State that exercises a great degree of control over the terrorist groups it sponsors. Iran uses its own intelligence services like MOIS and IRGC to work directly with terrorists and implement some of their own terrorist attacks.<sup>101</sup> Like the range of control States have over groups, they also provide a range of support such as political support, monetary assistance, and haven that provide a safe home between attacks, a secure logistical base to train members and plan future attacks.<sup>102</sup> States sponsor terrorist groups in ways that are comparable to conflicts between ethnic-nationalist and social-revolutionary groups and national governments.<sup>103</sup>

States sponsor terrorist to help sustain the organization, bolster its political activities and aid in the implementation of violence in terrorist attacks.<sup>104</sup> States also act as mentors to the group in addition to the forms of training and organizational assistance they provide.<sup>105</sup> In part because the level of sponsorship varies so greatly, it is often very difficult to unequivocally tie States to terrorist attacks. In instances of known State

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<sup>99</sup> Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003), 222.

<sup>100</sup> Bjørge, 257

<sup>101</sup> Simon, 435.

<sup>102</sup> Whittaker, 37; Aaron Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: A Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), xiv.

<sup>103</sup> Simon, 435.

<sup>104</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 10.

<sup>105</sup> Aaron Mannes, Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Lanham, 2004, pg xiv.

involvement, the terrorists involved in the attack have usually been captured and disclose the States contribution and connection to the group and the attack.<sup>106</sup> There also must be evidence of State involvement and provision of resources beyond testimony of the terrorist.<sup>107</sup>

There are many reasons that States sponsor terrorism. One reason is that terrorism is very low in cost, especially when compared to conventional means of attaining the same goal.<sup>108</sup> The terrorist attack on 9/11 reportedly cost about \$500 thousand, which even poor states could afford.<sup>109</sup> States also support terrorism because it allows them to use proxies to achieve goals desired by the State without having to openly display their strength.<sup>110</sup> Additional obvious reasons for supporting terrorism is that it serves as a way to achieve foreign policy objectives and has the ease of deniability of involvement – such support is very difficult to prove and has a potential high payoff. In many cases, weaker States resort to using terrorism as a way to fight more powerful enemies.<sup>111</sup> States use terrorism to enhance other tools of national power as well as reinforce insurgent movements; approximately one half of all terrorist groups recognized by the United States are also insurgent groups.<sup>112</sup> States sponsor terrorism based upon mutual interests, and cooperation between the State and the terror organization may also

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<sup>106</sup> Shay, 45.

<sup>107</sup> Claridge, 114

<sup>108</sup> Bjørge, 193-4.

<sup>109</sup> Mannes, xiv.

<sup>110</sup> Richardson, 5.

<sup>111</sup> Bjørge, 5.

<sup>112</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 22-23.

be based upon religious beliefs, ideological reasons, political identity, or other interests.<sup>113</sup>

Daniel Byman identified three reasons that he believes States chose to sponsor terrorism: strategic concerns, ideology, and domestic politics. Strategic reasons are often the most important, terrorism serves as one more way that States can influence neighboring States and is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities; terrorism allows States another method of pressuring the international community to bend to their way of thinking.<sup>114</sup> Iran does not want the Middle East Peace Process to succeed, as a method to prevent the peace process from continuing, Iran uses Hizballah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups it sponsors to slow or halt the process.<sup>115</sup> Terrorism also serves as a way to achieve many of the regimes objectives – domestic and ideologically based.<sup>116</sup> Iran uses terrorism to kill dissidents overseas to achieve domestic goals and to export Islamism.<sup>117</sup> Similarly, the Castro regime hunted dissidents in the years after Fidel took control and then proceeded to support communist revolutions and likeminded terrorist groups to spread their own ideology. These reasons for supporting terrorism are often complimentary and not contradictory, advancing international political and strategic positions, advancing their ideology, and reinforce their position at home may each play parts in a States decision to sponsor terrorism.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Whittaker, 36; Shay, 9

<sup>114</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, pg. 4-5.

<sup>115</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, pg. 4-5.

<sup>116</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 26.

<sup>117</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 5.

<sup>118</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 36.



Strategic reasons that States support terrorism include destabilizing and/or weakening neighbors, projecting power, changing regimes in other States, and shaping opposition.<sup>119</sup> These motivations often have the longest shelf life of the three reasons that Daniel Byman identified. He ranks these motivations in the following order of most to least common: destabilizing neighbors, projecting power, changing regimes, and shaping opposition.<sup>120</sup> Using terrorism as a tool against neighboring States is a common way to expand the States borders, punish enemy States, and enhance conventional military campaigns in a time of war. Iran uses terrorism to weaken regimes that do not support their own ideology for an Islamic Revolution.<sup>121</sup> Weaker States often use terrorism to project power because they do not have the ability to use conventional means to do so.<sup>122</sup> States often support terrorism because they believe that the goals they seek are unattainable through conventional means; legal methods means unacceptable losses for the State, because of this States often view terrorism as their only option.<sup>123</sup> Terrorism is another way to remove enemy regimes and replacing them with regimes sympathetic to the State's regime.<sup>124</sup> In 1981 Iran supported the terrorist group Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain in an attempt to over throw the ruling family, they supported the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq in an effort to replace the regime with one similar to that in Iran.<sup>125</sup> Lastly, States use terrorist groups as a way to voice their opinion

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<sup>119</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 26.

<sup>120</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 32.

<sup>121</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 37.

<sup>122</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 38.

<sup>123</sup> Gibbs, 62.

<sup>124</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 38-9.

<sup>125</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 38-9.

against other regimes. Cuba did this while supporting leftist guerilla and terrorist groups in Latin America.

Strategic reasons and Ideological reasons are often closely linked. Ideology often is a motivating factor in the decision to sponsor terrorism, and strategic motives are also part and parcel with the decision to do so.<sup>126</sup> States also claim ideological reasons for sponsoring terrorism when the true reasons are mainly strategic in origin.<sup>127</sup> Ideological reasons that influence a State's decision to sponsor terrorism include enhancing international prestige and exporting its political system.<sup>128</sup> States and the groups they chose to sponsor often possess similar ideological beliefs; this makes the decision to sponsor particular groups easier for States as they believe they have the same end goals in common. States use terrorist groups as their proxies to promote and spread their political system and ideology; they may also sponsor particular groups because the State believes that the group will gain control of that state and then spread their shared ideology to the public.<sup>129</sup> By supporting groups that share ideology with the State, it is a convenient way to spread that ideology, especially if they are revolutionary.<sup>130</sup> Ideology and exporting the Islamic Revolution is one of the main reasons that Iran supports terrorism, by utilizing terrorism Iran is able to effect more States than possible using conventional means. States that claim international prestige as their main reason for sponsoring terrorism often are less directly and actively involved in terrorist groups.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 45-6.

<sup>127</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 47.

<sup>128</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 26.

<sup>129</sup> Whittaker, pg. 37.

<sup>130</sup> Whittaker, pg. 268.

<sup>131</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 43.

Domestic Politics is another reason that State's choose to support terrorism as a way to provide aid to kin and military aid.<sup>132</sup> If a State believes people of similar ethnic or religious backgrounds are being oppressed, that State may chose to sponsor terrorism as a way to come to their aid. This also is a benefit for the State's political position, particularly if it is viewed as coming to the rescue of an group under a tyrannical regime.<sup>133</sup>

Many States have a combination of all three of these reasons: domestic, ideological, and strategic. Identifying types of support is another way of identifying reasons behind SST. In contrast to States that use terrorism to enhance their domestic policies, ideology, and strategic reasons, States may also support and sponsor terrorism in order to act as a source of restraint and to prevent influence from outside sources. Syria uses terrorism to maintain control of the Palestinian movement in order to prevent the movement from disturbing the regimes domestic standing.<sup>134</sup>

States also serve as sources of restraint against the terrorist groups, States often use the value of sponsorship against groups in order to manipulate their activities. States may do this when they fear that the chance of reprisal from target States is high.<sup>135</sup> Iran, a State whom through sponsorship usually greatly enhances the capabilities of terrorist groups, also uses sponsorship to control the activities of terrorist groups. After the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, Iran stopped supporting attacks by Persian Gulf Shi'a groups on U.S. forces because the regime feared that they had stepped beyond the line

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<sup>132</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 26.

<sup>133</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 47.

<sup>134</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 49.

<sup>135</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 50-51.

between confrontation and provocation. Iran was concerned that this attack may cause the U.S. to increase political, economic, and possibly military sanctions against the State.<sup>136</sup> In another example of Iran's use of terrorism as a method of restraint, after the Gulf War in 1991, Iran did not support the SCIRI, preventing them from launching an all-out attempt to remove Sadaam Hussein from power; Iran did this because it feared confrontation from the U.S. and other Coalition Forces.<sup>137</sup> Syria also wielded a high level of control over groups they sponsor. Depending on the status of the Peace Process with Israel, Syria used terrorist groups to make sure that this progress did not make much headway. Syria would reign in groups when the Peace Process was not progressing and then release groups to do as much damage as possible when the Process was moving forward.<sup>138</sup> States may also use restraint because they do not view the group as trustworthy.

States also restrain the activities of terrorist groups in order to save their reputation. Often, States who offer open and extensive support to terrorist groups that are highly active brings a high level of international scrutiny. Since 1986 the U.S. Department of State has noted Syria's attempts to distance itself from direct involvement in terrorist activities. While Syria is still actively involved in sponsoring terrorist groups, it has limited proxy activities on it's own soil and instead uses Lebanon as a base of supporting the groups.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 50-51.

<sup>137</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 50-51.

<sup>138</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 51.

<sup>139</sup> Byman, *Deadly*, 51-52.

Sponsoring terrorism is also viewed as the most cost effective way to achieve goals pursued by the State.<sup>140</sup> Additionally to being viewed as cheap, terrorism is also viewed as a low risk way to achieve the State's objectives.<sup>141</sup> States believe that terrorism will be more effective than conventional means as a way to silence or remove a threat.<sup>142</sup> Brian Jenkins believes that modern, conventional warfare is becoming too expensive, destructive, and impractical.<sup>143</sup> States use terrorism because it is an "efficient, convenient, and generally discrete weapon for attaining State interest in the international realm."<sup>144</sup> For States that do not have the money to launch a conventional war, they find that the high leverage and low cost of terrorism allows them to obtain the desired impact that is not available through modern forms of warfare.<sup>145</sup> The low risk and cost and the high leverage ratio is greatly weighed by States, it should come as no surprise that weaker states would chose terrorism when fighting stronger states.<sup>146</sup> States often use terrorism in order to avoid direct confrontations with stronger States that would normally win. Terrorism is low risk because it is difficult to prove and has a high degree of deniability, because of this there is a potentially high payoff for States.<sup>147</sup>

In addition to weighing the risk/benefit ratio, States also consider three other things when considering sponsoring terrorist groups. These are if terrorism will lead to the preferred outcome, calculate the chance that the terrorist attack will cause the

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<sup>140</sup> Claridge, 122.

<sup>141</sup> Erickson, 43.

<sup>142</sup> Bjørge, 201.

<sup>143</sup> Erickson, 43; Richardson, 37.

<sup>144</sup> Richardson, 37.

<sup>145</sup> Erickson, 43.

<sup>146</sup> Bjørge, 194; Richardson, 269-270.

<sup>147</sup> Richardson, 51; Bjørge, 193-195.

outcome, and how much cost the State will incur by sponsoring terrorism.<sup>148</sup> When considering these things, the State is actually making a rational choice for terrorism regardless of the objective they seek. They choose terrorism because the State views itself as powerless against other states; the legal, conventional means that they have available are not enough when compared to the conventional means of the State they want to attack.<sup>149</sup> This sense of being powerless increases the perception that terrorism is much more effective. The State also believes that while they are powerless if they chose to use conventional means, they are highly confident of their strength and probability of success when they use terrorism to achieve their goals.<sup>150</sup> This confidence comes from determining the ability to command the terrorist group and their resources as well as the vulnerability of the target group.<sup>151</sup>

Three other factors come into play when States are deciding to sponsor terrorism. These are the past use and success of terrorism, the level of control the State believes it will possess, and the degree of defenselessness of the target population to terrorism.<sup>152</sup> These factors also include response costs imposed by the target population and the domestic and international audience to the terrorist attack and production cost which includes economic and psychological costs.<sup>153</sup> States generally want to avoid the response cost, or if unavoidable, keep it at a minimum. States try to insulate themselves from any form of retaliation and strive to create an environment in which they are

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<sup>148</sup> Bjørge, 201.

<sup>149</sup> Bjørge, 201.

<sup>150</sup> Bjørge, 201.

<sup>151</sup> Bjørge, 203.

<sup>152</sup> Bjørge, 204.

<sup>153</sup> Bjørge, 205.

immune to international pressure.<sup>154</sup> States also avoid response costs through covert actions that reduce the likelihood of retaliation; reclusive States succeed in this because they do not draw attention to their actions.<sup>155</sup> Other conditions and variables come into play when deciding to sponsor terrorism.<sup>156</sup> There are situational conditions, concerning political traits of the target, as well as structural conditions, concerning the regimes relationship with the target and with the international community. Variables are also important because they are conditions that influence the regimes disposition toward the use of terrorism and violence.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Bjørge, 206.

<sup>155</sup> Bjørge, 206.

<sup>156</sup> Bjørge, 205.

<sup>157</sup> Bjørge, 205.

### **Chapter Three: Methodology**

The 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism states “State sponsorship of terrorism continued to undermine efforts to reduce terrorism. Iran remained the most significant state sponsor of terrorism. Iran has long employed terrorism to advance its key national security and foreign policy interests, which include regime survival, regional dominance, opposition to Arab-Israeli peace, and countering western influence, particularly in the Middle East. Iran continues to rely primarily on its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force to clandestinely cultivate and support terrorist and Islamic militant groups abroad, including: Lebanese Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups such as HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), certain Iraqi Shia militant groups, and Islamic militants in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere.”<sup>158</sup>

For the past several decades, Iran has been the most active sponsor of terrorism, this dissertation seeks to identify how Iran attained this title through the study of another country, Cuba, once the main focus of U.S. policy against State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST). Cuba, was historically a very active sponsor of terrorism from the Revolution when Castro came to power through fall of the Soviet Union, became one of the first states to use terrorist groups to achieve political goals. Both Iran and Cuba began

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<sup>158</sup> “Chapter 1 Country Reports On Terrorism 2008: Strategic Assessment,” U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122411.htm> (accessed September 29, 2009).



sponsoring terrorism after radical leaders took control and both globally exported their ideologies, Islamism and Communism, through the use of terrorism. Did Iran follow the Cuban example for sponsoring terrorism? The answer to this question will prove valuable; if Iran and Cuba followed the same phases, or patterns, in utilization of terrorism a model may be developed to assist in the prediction of similar actions by revolutionary SSTs.

Methodology is an integral component of a dissertation because it defines the processes used when researching and provides validation of results. “Comparative historical analysis has a long and distinguished history in the social sciences... Even when social science began to organize itself into separate disciplines in the early twentieth century, comparative and historical investigation maintained a leading position, figuring prominently in the research of such eminent scholars as Otto Hintze, Max Weber, and Marc Bloch.”<sup>159</sup> Mahoney and Rueschemeyer suggest in their book, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences that “comparative historical analysis is best considered part of a long-standing intellectual project oriented toward the explanation of substantively important outcomes”.<sup>160</sup> Specifically related to this dissertation, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer identify historical analysis of revolutions has “led to steady progress and knowledge accumulation”.<sup>161</sup> In his book Case Study

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<sup>159</sup> James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas,” in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.

<sup>160</sup> Mahoney, 6.

<sup>161</sup> Jack A. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulations in the Study of Revolutions,” in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 42.

Research Design, Robert K. Yin identified “...the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena.”<sup>162</sup> He further elaborated, stating, “Histories are the preferred strategy when there is virtually no access or control....Histories can, of course, be done about contemporary events; in this situation, the strategy begins to overlap with that of the case study.”<sup>163</sup> This is important for this dissertation because it focuses on approximately the last fifty years for each state. Table 2 outlines how Yin identifies criteria for various research strategies. This figure compares five main research methodologies and specifically highlights similarities between histories and case studies in two out of three categories. A historical analysis of each state’s current employment of terrorism is an integral part of the dissertation as this represents the current status of each state.

**Table 3: Comparison of Methodologies<sup>164</sup>**

Strategy	Form of Research Question	Requires Control of Behavioral Events?	Focuses on Contemporary Events?
Experiment	How, why?	Yes	Yes
Survey	Who, what, where, how many, how much?	No	Yes
Archival analysis	Who, what, where, how many, how much?	No	Yes/No
History	How, why?	No	No
Case Study	How, why?	No	Yes

In his book, Strategies of Casual Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis, James Mahoney states “comparative historical analysts employ a wide range of strategies

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<sup>162</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Third Edition, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol 5*, 3rd ed., (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc, 2002).

<sup>163</sup> Yin, 7.

<sup>164</sup> Yin, 5.

of casual assessment in their substantive research. These strategies encompass both methodologies for juxtaposing cases with one another and methodologies for analyzing processes that take place within individual cases..<sup>165</sup> Mahoney went on to identify different strategies used in comparative historical analysis, nominal, ordinal, and within-case strategies.<sup>166</sup> This dissertation implements both within-case and nominal analysis strategies. The within-case method focuses on comparisons within each state's sponsorship of terrorism, and the nominal strategy compares Iran's sponsorship to that of Cuba's.<sup>167</sup> Using both these methods not only allows for an in-depth comparison within each state to identify critical aspects of their sponsorship of terrorism, but also enables a top-level comparison between Iran and Cuba to determine if Iran followed Cuba's approach to sponsoring terrorism. "Nominal (or categorical) comparison entails the use of categories that are mutually exclusive...and collectively exhaustive. Examples of these categories in comparative historical research include various regime classifications (e.g., democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes), typologies of different states, (e.g., conservative, liberal, and social-democratic welfare states), and countless dichotomous variables (e.g., revolution versus nonrevolution). Because vivid labels can be attached to nominal categories, comparative historical analysts often summarize their arguments with this kind of comparison."<sup>168</sup> Boolean algebra, a form of nominal research methods, "allows the analyst to treat several different combinations of variables as the

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<sup>165</sup> James Mahoney, ed., "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 337.

<sup>166</sup> Mahoney, "Strategies," 338.

<sup>167</sup> Mahoney, "Strategies," 338.

<sup>168</sup> Mahoney, "Strategies," 339.

causes of an outcome...and provides a logical basis for identifying combinations of casual factors that are sufficient for the occurrence of an outcome.<sup>169</sup> Boolean analysis is used in the comparison of each state's utilization of terrorism. The following categories have been used in order to conduct within-case and nominal analytical comparisons between Iran and Cuba: existence of political instability of the state, creation/exasperation of political instability of other states, provision of training, ties to terrorist groups, ties to nations, meetings with terrorist groups, meetings with nations, provision of direct government support, political support, provision of weapons, spread of support across the globe, and passive support. Through the study of these categories, phases of state sponsorship of terrorism emerge. The level of success and type of sponsorship granted are key in identifying which phase of terrorism a state is in. This dissertation identifies three phases of SST; phase one, the introductory phase in which a nation first begins to utilize terrorism as a tool for achieving foreign and domestic policy and exportation of ideology, phase two, the refinement phase in which a nation hones its use of terrorism to become increasingly effective, and phase three, the passive phase, in which a nation no longer is able to provide active levels of support and instead passively provides sanctuary and political support. Utilizing the categories identified above, Cuba and Iran will be studied according to particular phases in their history as State Sponsors; in order to do so, government publications and other publications will be used as the main data sources for this dissertation.

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<sup>169</sup> Mahoney, "Strategies," 343.

In the next two chapters, a chronological study of each state's utilization of terrorism will be provided to fully identify sponsorship. Cuba will be analyzed initially, studying the economic and political climate before Castro took power, the successive years as the utilization of terrorism was developed and refined, and the present, studying Cuba's passive sponsorship of terrorism. Within this chapter, trends in Cuban sponsorship will be identified and analyzed to determine reasons for why its use of terrorism succeeded or failed and why use of terrorism increased or decreased. The method in which Iran will be analyzed will be the same as those for Cuba; Khomeini's rise to power, utilization of terrorism, and the current status of Iran as a SST. The methods serve as the constant factor, while the only variable is the state being studied. The following chapter of the dissertation will nominally analyze the two states, identifying commonalities and differences between the two, seeking to determine the extent of which Iran followed the Cuban template of State Sponsored Terrorism.

## **Chapter Four: Cuba**

### ***Fidel Castro's Rise to Power***

Cuba's history is marred with numerous revolts against authority. For more than 150 years, Cubans have fought for autonomy, freedom, and the right to choose their own form of governance. In the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Cubans revolted against Spanish rule, later against U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs, and eventually against their own government. Frustration with a corrupt political system, a poor and instable economy, inability to enhance one's social status, and a historical precedence for revolution, set the stage Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959.

The first major revolt occurred in 1868 against Spain in an effort to gain independence. Skirmishes like this continued against Spain throughout the remaining 19<sup>th</sup> century, all of which failed. It was not until the Spanish-American War in 1898 when, with assistance from the U.S., Cuba was granted its independence from Spain. Although an independent nation, Cuba was not an entirely sovereign nation until May 29, 1934 when the Platt Amendment was finally abrogated, marking the end of the U.S. direct

involvement in Cuban affairs.<sup>170</sup> During those 30 years, while unhappy with U.S. involvement, both political parties in Cuba made ready use of the neighboring nation as an asset.

Post Spanish-American War, economic conditions in Cuba worsened. Coupled with the election of power hungry presidents, Cuba was primed for another revolution. The desire for revolution began during the term of President Gerardo Machado (1924 – 1933) who used “brutal tactics” to retain power.”<sup>171</sup> Machado was removed from the Presidency in 1933 and replaced by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes. Cespedes was often seen as a pawn of the U.S., resentment towards him and the continual U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs, caused sentiments for change to grow. The revolution of 1933, which later came to be known as the “thwarted revolution,” failed because it did not find a solution to the economic and political problems.<sup>172</sup> Although a failure to bring about change in the Cuban Government, this revolution drastically altered Cuba’s future. In particular, students became keenly aware of the potential to cause drastic change through revolution. Another result was the weakened U.S. involvement in Cuban economy; the most important aspect, however, was the emergence of a government ruled through the Cuban army.

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<sup>170</sup> David Trask, “The World of 1898: The Spanish American War,” U.S. Library of Congress: Hispanic Division, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/> (accessed February 16, 2009); Larry James Bockman, “The Spirit of Moncada: Fidel Castro's Rise to Power 1953 - 1959,” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/BLJ.htm> (accessed February 16, 2009); While Cuba was granted independence from Spain in the Treaty of Paris, signed 10 December 1898, it did not gain total sovereignty. The Platt Amendment, passed by the United States Government, disclaimed “any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island... [granting] the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty...” Trask.

<sup>171</sup> Bockman.

<sup>172</sup> Bockman.

Prior to Fidel Castro's rise to power, Cuba was lead by Ruben Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar. Batista had a long history in Cuba, with the exception of eight years (1944 – 1952), he had retained political power via mock elections, bloodless coups, and controlled the political environment either from behind the scenes using presidents with his same view point, or in for fore ground as president himself from 1934 up until 1959.<sup>173</sup> He had come to power after the “thwarted revolution” of 1933, proclaiming himself as Chief of the armed forces.<sup>174</sup> Batista wrote the Constitution of 1940 which defined the role of the president and outlined civil and economic liberties, however never fully enforced it while in office.<sup>175</sup>

Batista came to represent a time in Cuba's history that centered on corruption, organized crime, and brute violence against any dissident. During his reign, Havana came to be known as ‘Latin Las Vegas’ and a popular place for America's Mafioso to flourish without impunity<sup>176</sup>. After an eight year hiatus, Batista's second rise to power came three months before upcoming elections, on March 10, 1952. The level of corruption within the government continued to grow as did the drug and gambling business. Batista ruled with violence, and the level of unrest among the low and middle class grew.

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<sup>173</sup> Jerry A Sierra, “Batista,” historyofcuba.com, <http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/batista.htm> (accessed February 15, 2009). During this time, the United States revoked the Platt Amendment and the economy continued to worsen and corruption grew amongst political leaders.

<sup>174</sup> Bockman.

<sup>175</sup> Bockman; The Constitution of 1940 represented the aspirations of the 1933 revolt. Cuba had a constitution reflecting Cuban ideals and philosophy. It provided for many civil liberties and social welfare, it defined the governments role in social and economic development. In addition, workers rights were established, including minimum wages and job tenure and guaranteed paid vacations. Additionally, the Constitution of 1940 outlined the favoring of using Cuban nationals when establishing new industries. This Constitution identified Cuba as a communist nation.

<sup>176</sup> Sierra, “Batista”; Jerry A Sierra, “Cuba in the 1950s: An Introduction,” historyofcuba.com, <http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/havana/fifties.htm> (accessed February 15, 2009).



One year later on July 26, 1953, the unrest reached a boiling point when several hundred rebels, including Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, attacked the Moncada army barracks; the rebels were no match for Cuban soldiers and the attack failed. Batista ordered General Martin Tamayo, of the Oriente Province, to kill ten rebels for every soldier killed. The remaining rebels, including the Castro brothers, were tried and sentenced to 15 years in prison.<sup>177</sup> During his imprisonment, Castro gained greater popularity among Cubans as the speech he made during his trial, “History will absolve me,” was published and spread throughout the island.<sup>178</sup>

The riots and attacks against the Cuban government did not stop with the failed attack against Moncada army barracks. Instead of creating an environment of fear to halt the rising insurrection, Batista’s strong-arm rule intensified the number of riots and demonstrations against his rule. Violence was met with violence as many rioters, the majority of which were students, were murdered by military police during demonstrations against the government. Batista’s use of violence only created greater levels of unease and desire for revolution.<sup>179</sup>

Revolution was becoming more of a reality as rebels congregated in Mexico, where Fidel and Raul Castro sought refuge after Batista granted the early release of the jailed Moncada rebels on June 24, 1955.<sup>180</sup> Although Batista released the Castro brothers

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<sup>177</sup> Sierra, “Batista”; Sierra, “Cuba”; General Tamayo did not completely fulfill the order sent to him by Batista, instead of killing the 190 rebels that would have met the ten-to-one requirement, he assassinated only an additional fifty-nine.

<sup>178</sup> Jerry A Sierra, “Timetable History of Cuba: Before the Revolution,” [historyofcuba.com, http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl3.htm](http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl3.htm) (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>179</sup> Sierra, “Batista”; Sierra, “Cuba”.

<sup>180</sup> Sierra, “Cuba”.

in an attempt to smooth sentiments from the general public, the road to revolution was paved leading up to January 1, 1959.

On November 25, 1956, the Castro brothers, along with Ernesto Che Guevara, boarded a yacht, the Granma, and head for Cuba to launch another armed revolution against Batista's government.<sup>181</sup> The rebels' journey was not smooth. They were forced to land in a different location than initially planned, Las Coloradas, and betrayed by their guide on December 5, who lead the rebels into a trap of awaiting Batista's soldiers. Only 12 of the original 82 men survived and made it to the Sierra Maestra Mountains.<sup>182</sup>

While Castro and his men trekked to the city of Purial, in the Sierra Maestra mountains, Frank País, leader of terrorist group the July-26-Movement, lead 300 men in an attack against police headquarters, the Customs office, and harbor headquarters in Santiago de Cuba. País also met with the July-26-Movement to discuss providing supplies to Castro and his supporters.<sup>183</sup> As news of Castro's arrival in Cuba spread, increasing numbers of confrontations between citizens and the police erupted. Batista's troops fought back, which resulted in the deaths of many students, and heightened the fervor to remove Batista from power.

The rebels mounted a successful attack on January 17, 1957 against a small army garrison at the La Plata river, and was victorious in the first major battle on the El Uvero garrison outside of the Sierra Maestra range fueling the revolution. Batista met each

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<sup>181</sup> Jerry A Sierra, "The Landing of the Granma," [historyofcuba.com](http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/granma.htm), <http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/granma.htm> (accessed February 15, 2009).

<sup>182</sup> Those 12 men included: Fidel and Raul Castro, Che Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos, Juam Almeida, Efigenio Amerjeiras, Ciro Redondo, Julio Diaz, Calixto Garcia, Luis Crespo, Jose Ponce, and Universo Sanchez. Sierra, "Landing"; Sierra, "Timetable".

<sup>183</sup> Sierra, "Timetable History of Cuba: Before".

battle with increased violence. Many rebels were gunned down and arrested in events such as the 7 Humboldt Street massacre and death of Frank País, a vital Castro ally, to whom he supplied more than 24 automatic weapons and several thousand rounds of ammunition.<sup>184</sup>

The Battle of Jique, July 11 – 21, 1958, marked a turning point in the war. Castro was able to build on this momentum, and continue successes in the revolution all the way to Havana on January 1, 1959 when Batista, his family and closest associates fled the island.<sup>185</sup> On 7 January 1959, when Fidel Castro rode into Havana, he brought with him hope for a better Cuba, without repression, free from the vices of gambling, and the violence that Batista had come to represent for many Cubans.

The period of time before Castro took power was that of a repressive government that cared more for the lining of it's own pockets than the citizens of it's nation.<sup>186</sup> Castro capitalized upon this opportunity, created more unrest, and in a few short years provoked a revolution, and produced a communist state with a large degree of support from fellow Cubans. He had all of the ingredients necessary to take control: support of the population, a highly unpopular President, a weak economy that had relied on other nations for stability for too long, a very poor population that lived in a time where the rich became richer and the poor became poorer.

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<sup>184</sup> Sierra, "Landing".

<sup>185</sup> Sierra, "Landing".

<sup>186</sup> Batista reportedly had a fair share of all the income from the casinos in Cuba, approximately 30 percent from Hotel Nacional, the Montmartre Club and others. Sierra, "Batista".

### *Castro's Cuba*

When Fidel Castro overthrew Batista in 1959, the population expected a dramatic change in the socio-economic conditions they had suffered with for decades. He represented a symbol of hope for lower class Cubans, and proclaimed, "This time the revolution will not be frustrated! This time, fortunately for Cuba, the revolution will achieve its true objective. It will not be like 1898, when the Americans came and made themselves masters of the country."<sup>187</sup> The hope for a new Cuba quickly began to fade as Cuban's would grow to see that the revolution they had supported was not going to bring about the change desired, and in fact, they had only traded one tyrant for another.

Castro surrounded himself with loyal followers, like his brother, Raul Castro, and filled government positions with like-minded ideologies.<sup>188</sup> Once protected by a cabinet of supporters, Castro's first mission was to eliminate all dissidents and supporters of the Batista regime. Within two weeks of taking power, Castro had 75 men, former policemen and supporters of the previous government, executed; within three months, 483 individuals were executed by firing squads for war crimes.<sup>189</sup> The vigor with which he pursued Batista supporters was not met with support of the population; editorial reports appeared in Cuban newspapers calling for the executions to stop and women began to protest in the streets.

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<sup>187</sup> Jerry Sierra, "Timetable History of Cuba: After the Revolution," [historyofcuba.com](http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl4.htm), <http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/time/timetbl4.htm> (accessed March 6, 2009).

<sup>188</sup> Raul was appointed Defense Minister, a title that was eventually changed to Minister of the Armed Forces.

<sup>189</sup> Sierra, "Timetable History of Cuba: After".

Even men who fought along side Castro during the revolution were at risk of being targeted, Huber Matos, resigned from his post as commander of Camagüey province when he saw Castro turning Cuba into a Communist nation. He was arrested and charged with treason in October of 1960, sentenced to 20 years in prison that December. Matos was not the only Cuban and leader of the revolution who began to question Castro's leadership and leanings toward communism. The intensity with which he took power spilled into how he ran the country. Castro was determined to secure his place as Cuba's leader; the sole crime many people committed was questioning Castro.<sup>190</sup>

He also immediately set out on expanding the communist revolution throughout the western hemisphere and the world. In 1964, Castro hosted the Conference of Latin American Communist Parties to form a united effort to actively support the guerilla efforts in Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay, Colombia, Honduras and Haiti.<sup>191</sup> Shortly after this Conference, Castro became eager to spread communism in a new, more violent fashion. In 1966 he formed OSPAAAL, the Asia-Africa-Latin America People's Solidarity Organization to promote revolution in the three continents. One year later, he formed OLAS, the Latin American Solidarity Organization, which specifically promoted violence and terrorism in Latin America.<sup>192</sup> Castro was not content to sit on the sidelines

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<sup>190</sup> Jerry A Sierra, "Who Is Huber Matos?" [historyofcuba.com](http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/havana/HMatos.htm), <http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/havana/HMatos.htm> (accessed March 6, 2009).

<sup>191</sup> Eugene Pons, "Castro and Terrorism: A Chronology 1959 - 1967," Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/terrorism/castro-terrorism-pons.htm> (accessed April 24, 2009); Mujal-Leon Eusebio, ed., *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship* (Winchester, MA: Routledge, 1989), 128; Jamie Suchlicki, "A Short Biography of Fidel Castro," *derkeiler.com* no. 74 (April 7, 2006): page nr., <http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.cuba/2006-04/msg00568.html> (accessed April 24, 2009).

<sup>192</sup> Suchlicki.

and act only as an observer as groups struggled to turn their country into a communist state.

Cuban support of terrorism can be divided into three distinct phases; the early years of support in the 1960s, the 1970s through early 1990s, and post fall of the Soviet Union. High levels of activity but low levels of success characterized the first decade of Cuban support for terrorism. This first phase involved heavy Cuban support that was not provided in a way to successfully and fully benefit the terrorist groups. The second phase, from the 1970s up until the fall of the Soviet Union, represents a time when Cuba honed it's support so that it was most beneficial for Cuba and the groups it supported. During this time, Cuba had much more success in fomenting Communist revolutions throughout the world. The last phase, after the fall of the Soviet Union to the present, represents a time in which Cuba no longer has the support from it's closest ally, ideologically and monetarily. Cuba's economy relied on Soviet money and without it, Cuba had to re-focus on supporting itself. This time is when overt support diminished and passive support became supreme.

### ***Phase One: Cuban Terrorism - 1960's***

Fidel Castro acknowledged that without grass roots support his revolution would never succeed. One vital aspect of this support was his use of the terrorist group July 26<sup>th</sup> Organization, which granted him numerous successes against Batista's army.<sup>193</sup> Due to the triumph of revolution, in large part possible due to utilization of terrorist groups,

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<sup>193</sup> Roger Fontaine, "Cuba's Terrorist Connection," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1988/06/Cubas-Terrorist-Connection> (accessed December 1, 2008).

Castro recognized the advantage that terrorist groups posed, and made an important decision to continue supporting groups to achieve similar successful results. During the first decade of rule, Castro placed high emphasis on the importance on the use of guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics. Hundreds of pro-Castro Latin Americans were provided training in Cuban camps on guerilla tactics; these pseudo-soldiers were then sent back to infiltrate their home countries, like the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Chile, and Guatemala to continue teaching the same techniques to larger numbers of communist revolutionaries.<sup>194</sup> During this time, Cuba began its sponsorship of terrorism by supporting revolutions in hopes to create like-minded allies in the Western Hemisphere, to establish training camps and support networks for various terrorist groups, and to create arms of the government dedicated to spreading Communism.

As the communist ideology spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, so did revolutions. Seeking to establish similar governments, Cuban presence during these revolutions was a constant. As communism spread, Fidel and Raul Castro believed that anti-Americanism would spread as well. Poor socio-economic and political conditions plagued Western nations which the Castro brothers hoped to capitalize on in order to establish like-minded nations. Cuba supported various revolutions throughout the Western Hemisphere; including Guatemala, Venezuela, and Bolivia.

Cesar Montes and Luis Turcios Lima, two Guatemalan's trained in Cuba, wanted to jumpstart a similar revolution in Guatemala as that in Cuba. The two men began an aggressive and deadly terrorist campaign against their government, however attempts for

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<sup>194</sup> Pons.

revolution were not successful. Disheartened by the initial failure, Montes went on to organize terrorist organization, the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) in Guatemala, and later joined the Farabundo Marti National Front (FMLN) and participate in the El Salvadorian civil war in the 1980s.<sup>195</sup>

Cuba was also resolutely determined to establish another communist nation in Venezuela. From 1960 to 1963, Cuba fully supported the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional / Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) to overthrow the democratic regime of Rómulo Bentacourt.<sup>196</sup> The acts of terrorism that occurred in Venezuela during this time were of the bloodiest ever in Latin American history.<sup>197</sup> In November 1963, security forces on Venezuela's northwest coast found four tons of weapons and arms. The weapons, of Belgian, Italian, and American manufacture, were traced to sales made to the Castro government in 1959 or were from stocks left over from the Batista era. The arms had been smuggled from Cuba aboard a boat belonging to the Cuban National Institute of 'Agrarian Reform. Intending to ruin Venezuela's December elections, Castro-trained terrorists threatened voters with death if they showed up at the polls.<sup>198</sup> In July of 1967, Castro encouraged Venezuelan terrorists to continue the fight against the government. In response, the FALN kidnapped and murdered brother of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. The Venezuelan Communist Party, PCV, however

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<sup>195</sup> Pons.

<sup>196</sup> Pons; Fontaine.

<sup>197</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>198</sup> Fontaine.



denounced the slaying prompting Castro to accuse the PCV for betraying the revolution and post the FALNs statement in the Cuban newspaper.<sup>199</sup>

In Bolivia, Che Guevara led an attempt to overthrow the Bolivian government with guerillas who received a majority of their training from Cuba.<sup>200</sup> Across the globe, in Zanzibar, Cuban support for revolution achieved its first immediate success when Cuban trained John Okello succeeded in overthrowing the government to establish the “People’s Republic of Zanzibar” in 1964.<sup>201</sup>

### ***Spread of Support***

During his first decade in power, Fidel Castro set out to establish Communist movements through out the West and create allies among terrorist groups; even though they did not support the same ideology, they supported the same method to achieve similar goals. He sought to perpetuate the use of terrorism by providing training to African leaders from Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Spanish Guinea, Tanganyika and Zanzibar.<sup>202</sup> Castro also sent his brother Raul and Che Guevara to the Middle East to express sympathy towards the Palestinian cause and establish relations with the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).<sup>203</sup> Through out 1960 and 1961, Cuba provided official and public support for FLN. This support was provided through weapons, shelter, medical and educational services, as well as training in intelligence and counter-intelligence.<sup>204</sup> Raul Castro and Che Guevara also met with

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<sup>199</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>200</sup> Pons.

<sup>201</sup> Pons.

<sup>202</sup> Pons.

<sup>203</sup> Pons.

<sup>204</sup> Pons.

members of African Liberation Movements based out of Cairo.<sup>205</sup> Cuba and Syria developed a close relationship through mutual support of Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (FATAH) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).<sup>206</sup> Support for FATAH first began in 1965 when contacts were made in Algiers and Damascus.<sup>207</sup> Cuba welcomed the founding of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and routinely sent weapons to the NLF in South Yemen via Cairo.<sup>208</sup> Castro sent Cuban agents on fact-finding missions through both North and South Yemen in 1967 and 1968.<sup>209</sup> Also in 1968, Castro provided military instructors and advisors to Palestinian bases in Jordan to train Palestinian group Fedayeen.<sup>210</sup> Later in 1969, Cuba began military and political cooperation with Somalia's Said Barre.<sup>211</sup>

In addition to providing training and support to various terrorist groups, Castro also established branches within the government who's sole purpose was to support the use of terrorism to achieve political goals. Several of these groups, the National Liberation Directorate (DLN), Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI), and the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), were created to install the belief that violence was an ends to a mean; to establish communist revolutions throughout the world and fight North American Imperialism.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Pons.

<sup>206</sup> Pons.

<sup>207</sup> Pons.

<sup>208</sup> Pons.

<sup>209</sup> Pons.

<sup>210</sup> Pons.

<sup>211</sup> Pons.

<sup>212</sup> Pons .

### *America Department*

Originally established as the National Liberation Directorate (DLN), the America Department (DA) served as a branch of the government under direct control of Castro. The DA ensured the logistics of creating and maintaining networks to provide supplies and weapons to terrorist groups, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.<sup>213</sup> Led by a close confidant of Castro, Manuel Piñeiro Losada, "Barbaroja," the DA was created as a driving force to provide worldwide support to terrorist groups. It was in charge of the terrorist training camps in Cuba and the covert movement of personnel and material from the island, as well as a propaganda apparatus.<sup>214</sup> It centralized control over Cuban activities for supporting national liberation movements, planning and coordinating terrorist training camps, establishing networks for the covert movement of people and material from Cuba, and acted as a propaganda apparatus.<sup>215</sup> DA agents were limited in number and worked primarily from Cuba, with less than 300 spread to selected countries in the Western Hemisphere and were responsible for Castro's most prominent successes.<sup>216</sup> Agents are assigned to each mission with Cuban involvement; depending on the level of importance to Castro the number of agents ranged from two or three up to six.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Pons.

<sup>214</sup> Pons; Manuel Piñeiro Losada was a confidant of Fidel Castro's dating back to the Sierra Maestre during the beginning of the Revolution.

<sup>215</sup> Pons.

<sup>216</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>217</sup> Orlando Castro Hidalgo, *Spy For Fidel The thrilling true story of the highest-ranking intelligence officer to defect from Castro's Cuba*, Miami: E.A. Seemann Publishing Inc, 1971, 39-40.

### ***Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI)***

Established in 1961 with help from the Soviet Union, the DGI is the oldest, largest, and most renowned of all of Castro's intelligence services. The DGI is active worldwide, providing support to terrorists and employs more than six times the amount of personnel as the DA (more than 2,000 officers), dedicated to collecting and analyzing data, conducting espionage and counterintelligence activities around the world.<sup>218</sup> These agents work under diplomatic cover, utilizing Cuban Embassies as their home base; while operating under complete autonomy for the rest of the Embassy.<sup>219</sup>

Ever the visionary, Castro did not limit his dream of establishing Communist states only to the Western Hemisphere. He published French Marxist journalist Regis Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution*, which promoted guerilla warfare in Latin America. Cuba translated Debray's book into multiple languages and widely distributed it across the West.<sup>220</sup>

Although a massive effort was put forth by Cuba to overthrow current regimes, support for violence in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Bolivia were not successful and only produced violence and suffering. By 1968, Castro's mismanagement of the Cuban economy and continually failed expeditions in South America and the Caribbean brought his regime to the brink of collapse; by the spring of that year Cuba signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union essentially ceding sovereignty in exchange for

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<sup>218</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>219</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>220</sup> Pons.

economic aid.<sup>221</sup> Although grass roots support worked for Castro, utilizing the same techniques in the 1960's did not provide the same success in attempting to overthrow governments through terrorism. Instead of allowing a communist regime to take control, Cuban support of revolutions led to military regimes coming into power in Latin American Countries.<sup>222</sup> Approximately 80 percent of the Cuban supported insurgencies during this phase were rurally based.<sup>223</sup> For Castro, however, the experiment in outright terror was not a complete loss. The Cuban leader learned from the tactics use by groups such as bombing and use of the machine gun by the terrorist groups Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros and applied that knowledge during Phase Two of Cuba's sponsorship of terrorism. Although, the terrorists did not win or even come close to a measurable victory, they managed to undermine the regimes they were fighting, preparing them for a future generation of revolutionaries.<sup>224</sup> The first phase in Cuban terrorism occurred during the first ten years of Castro's reign in Cuba. Although not greatly successful, utilization of terrorism during this phase continued to prove that terrorism was a valuable tool to export of the Communist ideology. Castro believed in the benefit of supporting terrorism and refocused efforts to do so during the second phase to ensure that the success missed in the first phase would be present.

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<sup>221</sup> Timothy Ashby, "A Nine-Point Strategy For Dealing with Castro," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/latinamerica/bg472.cfm> (accessed December 1, 2008).

<sup>222</sup> Pons.

<sup>223</sup> Pons.

<sup>224</sup> Fontaine.

### ***Phase Two: Rise of Sponsorship of Terrorism - 1970s – Fall of the Soviet Union***

Cuban support for terrorism during this period was based off improving the minor successes achieved during the 1960s. Propaganda, increasing anti-American sentiments, terrorist training camps, and global support of terrorist states and groups grew exponentially during this period. One success Cuba focused on was its use of terrorists in Venezuela to create an unstable region. In 1975, the Castro utilized propaganda to reprint Marighellas terrorist minimanual in the Cuban Communist Party's daily Granma.<sup>225</sup> Cuba relied on propaganda to openly support terrorism and shy away from events that would tie Castro directly to terrorist sponsorship and events. While he did not openly endorse such groups, the propaganda groups he employed were very active in supporting groups such as the Uruguayan Tupamaros, Brazil's Carlos Marighella, and the Chilean Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionaria.<sup>226</sup> During this time, Cuba also focused on expanding anti-American sentiments; Cuba chose to support positions opposite that of the United States, such as the "Steadfastness Front" which was against the Camp David Accord. Castro also fought the U.S. attempts to resolve Latin American debt during the mid 1980s, as resolving the debt would diminish his hopes of spreading Communism through the area.<sup>227</sup>

Castro continued to jail any opponents to his regime, by 1976 more than 15,000 political prisoners were in Cuban jails.<sup>228</sup> The Constitution of 1940, which Castro implemented early in the beginning of his reign, aided his ability to control Cuba's

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<sup>225</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>226</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>227</sup> Ashby.

<sup>228</sup> Ashby.

population. The Constitution made any violation of goal or idea of the state punishable by law; this enabled Castro to imprison anyone who spoke against or represented something in contradiction to the state, including writers and political and religious dissenters.<sup>229</sup>

Fear mongering tactics became more expansive. The DA, created in 1974, was part of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee, and although subordinate to the Departamento General de Relaciones Extenoms (DGRE), remained under the direct and immediate control of Castro.<sup>230</sup> The DLN, which was reorganized into the DA in, centralized control over Cuban activities for supporting guerilla and terrorist training camps, logistical networks for movement of personnel and material, and served as a propaganda apparatus.<sup>231</sup> The DA operated a weapons pipeline, providing arms and munitions to the FMLN during the late 1970s and early 1980s while the FMLN attempted to gain power in El Salvador.<sup>232</sup> In 1978 the DA established a complicated gun running network that transversed at least two Central American countries before arriving in Nicaragua to aid Sandinista rebels. When the Sandinistas took power, the same network was used to smuggle arms into El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. U.S. Analysts believe that DA officers in Panama also aided in receiving arms shipments.<sup>233</sup> DA agent Armando Ulises Estrada helped unify Sandinista factions fighting in Somoza. The Cuban Ambassador, also a DA agent, was directly involved in subversive efforts of the Maurice Bishop regime, involved in the planning to destabilize the eastern Caribbean by shipping

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<sup>229</sup> Ashby.

<sup>230</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>231</sup> Pons.

<sup>232</sup> Pons.

<sup>233</sup> Pons.

clandestine arms to leftist regions.<sup>234</sup> DA agents were the vital component of Cuba's subversive arm of the government and key component of the success Cuba achieved during Phase Two. Through this department, Cuba's communist party empowered friendly groups to achieve power in Latin America and Africa.<sup>235</sup>

While continuing to jail opponents, Castro increased propaganda to foster support for communism. In 1970 a 'Mini Manual for Revolutionaries' was published by LASO. The 'Mini Manual' was written by Carlos Marighella, and provided detailed instructions in topics such as terror tactics and kidnapping; the book was distributed throughout the world by Cuba.<sup>236</sup>

During this time, Castro ramped up the training of terrorists in Cuban camps. Some people attended on their own accord, others were brought to Cuba upon false advertisement. Colin Dennis was one example of this process. Lured to Cuba in the summer of 1980 on the promise of 'no strings' travel to the island, he was taken to a camp in the western part of the island and trained for eight weeks how to use various weapons and assault techniques for use against government buildings like banks and police stations. Out of the group of trainees, Dennis was chosen and tasked with the assignment to return to Jamaica to fight its anti-communist government.<sup>237</sup> Another example is of Juan DeDios, brought to Cuba from Venezuela under the pretense of working as a technician, but instead was taught similar techniques as Dennis and instruction in explosives, destroying factories and killing policemen. Castro wanted

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<sup>234</sup> Pons.

<sup>235</sup> Suchliki.

<sup>236</sup> Pons.

<sup>237</sup> Fontaine.



DeDios, and men like him to return to Venezuela to attack the democratic government. DeDios escaped the Cuban camps by faking epileptic attacks; while in the hospital he made contact with the Venezuelan consulate who aided his return home.<sup>238</sup>

Cuban training camps were not solely located within the country. Castro established camps throughout the world. One such camp, located in Canada provided training to members of the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party received training in both Canada and Cuba, where they learned how to use weapons and explosives.<sup>239</sup> Castro did not hide the fact that training camps were recruiting and training terrorists. In June of 1981, Paulino Castillo, from Guatemala told reporters that he attended a seven-month training program in Cuba focused on both rural guerilla tactics and urban terrorism.<sup>240</sup>

### ***Cuban Sponsorship of Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere***

Castro began a campaign to ramp up terrorism in the Western Hemisphere by increasing support to local terrorist groups. Support and sponsorship of these groups was always based on the disruption of the current government to pave the way for creation of a communist state. One such group, the Tupamaros based out of Uruguay received such support.<sup>241</sup> By 1985, Castro was able to fully utilize sponsorship and support of terrorist groups to incite violent revolutions throughout Latin America.

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<sup>238</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>239</sup> Pons.

<sup>240</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>241</sup> Pons.

From 1968 through 1975, the DA established a network for channeling weapons and supplies to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.<sup>242</sup> The April 19<sup>th</sup> Movement (M19), a Colombian terrorist group known for violence such as the capturing the Dominican Embassy and Justice building in Bogota and assassination of several Colombian judges, also received support from Castro's government.<sup>243</sup> The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) received advanced weapons and demolition training from Cuba. Using this training, the MRTA attacked the U.S. Embassy in the capitol of Peru in 1984. The U.S. Ambassador's home was also attacked in Lima in 1985 as well as the Texaco offices that same year.<sup>244</sup> In September 1981, Cinchoneros, supported by Cuba, seized control of the Chamber of Commerce building in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, holding cabinet ministers and business leaders hostage demanding the release of fellow tourists. By supporting groups like the Cinchoneros, Cuba was able to forge a network of terrorist groups to combine efforts rather than fighting amongst themselves. This attack spurred on insurgencies in Guatemala.<sup>245</sup>

Cuba established safehouses in many countries, provided shelter for terrorists and stopping points for the funneling of weapons to groups. One safehouse was raided in San Jose, Costa Rica, in March 1982. The police found a large collection of weapons and were able to determine that these weapons were destined for El Salvador. Police arrested nine terrorists, the group of four Salvadorians, two Nicaraguans, one Chilean, one Costa Rican, and an Argentinean made up the Cuban network. Although unable to find direct

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<sup>242</sup> Pons.

<sup>243</sup> Pons.

<sup>244</sup> Pons.

<sup>245</sup> Fontaine.

evidence, police did determine that the group, sponsored and established by Cuba as arms runners, had been receiving support for many years.<sup>246</sup>

From 1983 through 1990, Cuba utilized its DA to fund terrorist groups. Cuba also utilized individuals to provide support and finance these groups. Jorge Massetti, in particular, acted as a foundation from where Cuba distributed finances. Through Massetti, Castro provided thousands of dollars and weapons to Chilean group, MIR. Puerto Rican group, the Machetero received Cuban funds to perform terrorist activities.<sup>247</sup> Cuba not only funded groups from its own pockets, but also had agents rob Mexican banks to provide that money to Latin American groups operating out of the country.<sup>248</sup> Cuba directed terrorist activities from the safety of its own borders; in early 1989 General Patricio de la Guardia directed Jorge Massetti to blow up the U.S. transmission balloon of TV Martí, located in the Florida Keys.<sup>249</sup> Cuba also established connections with terrorist groups in areas outside of Latin America; by 1985 Cuba maintained a strong connection with Colombia's drug dealers and black market groups in order to enhance its ability to send supplies and weapons to terrorist groups.<sup>250</sup>

### ***Chilean Weapons Cache***

Evidence of the extent of Cuban involvement with Latin American terrorist groups came in early August of 1986 upon the discovery of a large weapons cache along the Chilean coast. On August 6, 1986 Chilean security forces near Carrizal Bajo

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<sup>246</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>247</sup> Pons; The Macheteros hijacked a Wells Fargo truck in Connecticut in September 1983 and stole \$7.2 million.

<sup>248</sup> Pons.

<sup>249</sup> Pons.

<sup>250</sup> Ashby.

discovered the first of eight weapons caches along the northern coast. On the same day, four members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) were arrested in conjunction with the discovery. The members stated that similar arms deliveries had been arriving since the beginning of the year. The first cache held 342 assault rifles; over the next two weeks additional caches were found. The second cache, a concrete reinforced vault was found under an old hotel in Vallenar; it contained 1,320 assault rifles, one million rounds of ammunition, approximately 900 anti-tank rockets, 315 Soviet bloc rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades, and an additional 200,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. Many of the weapons recovered from the arms caches were manufactured in the U.S. during the Vietnam War; more than 3,000 M-16 rifles, 167 disposable anti-tank rocket launchers, and almost two million rounds of ammunition discovered were of U.S. origin. Weapons from the Soviet Bloc era were also recovered, including 114 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, nearly 2,000 grenades and igniter assemblies, 5,000 non-electric blasting caps, and additional ammunition. Upon discovery, it was clear that these weapons had been intended for long term storage, many were still in the original shipping containers. In addition to the weapons caches, underground training schools were also found in Huasco and Santiago.<sup>251</sup>

The size, composition of weapons found, as well as cost and logistical problems with delivery of the weapons indicated state sponsorship. The total scale of the weapons discovery was beyond the resources of any subnational group in the region. Cuba was identified as the leading candidate for supplying these weapons due to access to them

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<sup>251</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986*, (Washington, D.C., 1987), 12.

through allies. Similar small weapons shipments had been recovered in other Latin American countries in recent years; these shipments contained U.S. arms that had been purchased by Cuba from Vietnam and shipped by Nicaraguan terrorist groups. Overall, the volume of weapons was around seventy tons. Discovery of the weapons on the coast, the amount of weapons, and their damp, corroded condition suggested ocean delivery. Continual small-scale discoveries along other nations coastlines indicated that delivery was ongoing in the region and not a one time occurrence.<sup>252</sup>

### ***Support in the Middle East***

Although Communism was not a strong ideology or form of governance in the Middle East, Castro saw an opportunity to solidify and strengthen his position as leader of Cuba by providing support to terrorist groups outside of Central and South America. He supported groups and other SSTs in the Middle East to gain allies. These alliances were forged through a common dislike of America and similar democratic nations.

From 1968 through 1975, Cuba maintained military, political, and intelligence support for FATAH and other Palestinian organizations such as the NLF, even after other Middle Eastern nations withdrew support.<sup>253</sup> Ties to these groups grew and training of Latin American terrorists began in Lebanon, a State rife with terrorist training camps. Cuba sent agents to provide political and military support and terrorism warfare experts such as Hans Fiedler an East German, directly to South Yemen in December of 1973 to provide specialized training in Palestinian camps run by Haif Hawatmeh.<sup>254</sup> While some

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<sup>252</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*.

<sup>253</sup> Pons.

<sup>254</sup> Pons; Fontaine.

Middle Eastern countries withdrew support for groups, others joined with Cuba in diplomatic and political support. States such as Algeria, Libya, and Chad joined Cuba in support of the People's Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara and Río del Oro, Frente POLISARIO. Support from these nations rose from diplomatic and political support to an active level of military cooperation and provision of medical supplies.<sup>255</sup> Cuba cooperated with Libya in the founding of the World MATHABA in Tripoli. World MATHABA was established to provide political support and organize terrorist and revolutionary violence throughout the world.<sup>256</sup> The Palestinian Intifada led to increased diplomatic and military Cuban support for the PLO.<sup>257</sup> When the Palestinian National Authority was established, Cuban and Palestinian cooperation increased, including military, counterintelligence and intelligence.<sup>258</sup> In addition to supporting Middle Eastern terrorist groups and States with differing ideologies, Cuba also supported terrorist groups in Africa in order to expand Communism in another area of the world. In particular, Cuba supported the Congolese National Liberation Front invasion of Shala, Zaire from 1976 to 1982.<sup>259</sup>

### ***Invitation to Cuba***

While the Castro regime was busy inserting itself into conflicts throughout the world, it also invited leaders of terrorist states and groups back to Cuba. In 1970 high-level delegates from FATAH-PLO visited Cuba for the first time.<sup>260</sup> The trip led to

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<sup>255</sup> Pons.

<sup>256</sup> Pons.

<sup>257</sup> Pons.

<sup>258</sup> Pons.

<sup>259</sup> Pons.

<sup>260</sup> Ashby.

increased mutual support and was followed up by a visit from Yasser Arafat in 1974.<sup>261</sup>

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that over the course of six years, 1976 to 1982, more than 300 Palestinians were training in Cuban camps. A close aid of Arafat, Abu Iyad, confirmed these numbers in 1978 when he publicly stated that hundreds of Palestinian attended Cuban terrorist camps.<sup>262</sup> Military and political support increased during this period, Arafat attended the Sixth Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, where he signed an agreement for more military cooperation and arms supplies.<sup>263</sup>

Training camps were rife throughout the Cuban country-side during this time. The camps were attended by a wide array of people from across the globe. Among those trainees was Illich Ramirez Sanchez, also known as ‘Carlos the Jackal’, who was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks across Europe. His training consisted of urban guerilla tactics, automatic weapons, explosives, and sabotage.<sup>264</sup> In addition to the large numbers of Palestinians, several dozen Mexicans received training in terrorist and urban guerilla tactics in eastern Cuba, in Sierra del Rosario, Pinar del Rio province, and in Guanabo.<sup>265</sup>

Due to training received in Cuba, terrorist groups were able to return home and carry out attacks that otherwise would have been unsuccessful. The tactics of hostage taking resulted in the kidnapping of a successful Guatemalan business man by members of Guatemalan terrorist group EGP, who were trained in Cuba.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Pons.

<sup>262</sup> Pons.

<sup>263</sup> Pons.

<sup>264</sup> Pons.

<sup>265</sup> Pons.

<sup>266</sup> Pons.

### ***Ties that Bind***

Castro expanded his circle of friends throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Cuba's footprint on Middle Eastern soil grew exponentially. Relations between Cuba and the PLO continued to grow. Tens of Millions of dollars were loaned to Cuba by Arafat and the PLO under the condition that Cuban provided support; particularly during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during 1982.<sup>267</sup> Cuba provided military and personnel support to Syria during the Yom Kippur War and provided Libya with economic and political cooperation throughout 1974.<sup>268</sup> Ties also increased with Iraq, with whom Cuba provided military advisors.<sup>269</sup> Cuba joined the South Yemen regime, the Aden, and Ethiopian radical officers commanded by Mengistu Haile Mariam against Somolian aggression, in which Cuban support was initially limited to a small group of officers, lead by General Arnaldo Ochoa, and eventually grew to a large deployment of forces to the region. Also a part of the Cuban alliance with the Aden regime, Cuba supported a small amount of support to the Dhofaris in their struggle against the Oman monarchy.<sup>270</sup> Despite close ties with Iraq, Castro supported the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and during the Iran-Iraq War, Castro withdrew his military advisors from Baghdad in an effort to appear impartial to either side.<sup>271</sup> Outwardly, it appeared that support for Iraq continued to wane as Cuba condemned Iraq for invading Kuwait, however, after the first Gulf War, Cuba sent delegates to Iraq to gather information on U.S. combat operations in Kuwait and Iraq.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>268</sup> Pons.

<sup>269</sup> Pons.

<sup>270</sup> Pons.

<sup>271</sup> Pons.

<sup>272</sup> Pons.



### *SST Successes*

One of the most successful ventures Cuba took part in during this phase was in 1975 in Angola; Cubans rushed to the country to support communist group Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in winning control.<sup>273</sup> Two years later, in 1977, Castro dispatched 17,000 troops to Ethiopia where under aid and assistance of Russian generals, they established another communist satellite.<sup>274</sup>

South American terrorist groups began popping up across the world, posing as international terrorists, but were actually under direct pay and control of Havana. While sponsored by Cuba, members also maintained ties with their nation and would return home to fight for local communist causes. Cuba learned during this time period that successful utilization of terrorism depended on extending support outside of Latin American armed revolutionaries. In doing so, support became more focused on urban terrorism, rather than rural guerillaism.<sup>275</sup>

Castro continued to provide support to uproot democratic nations. He was met with more success in these attempts than during Phase One. Cuba provided military personnel, weapons and intelligence to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and aided a civil war in El Salvador. Africa is where Castro had his most successes. The MLPA took power in Angola, and other Cuban supported regimes took control in the region. Cuban military also trained and supplied the South-West Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) forces fighting the South African regime. Castro also

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<sup>273</sup> Pons.

<sup>274</sup> Ashby.

<sup>275</sup> Fontaine.

became actively involved in creating an environment of unrest inside the U.S. He supported the Black Panthers, Black Liberation Army, and Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Machateros. Castro continually promoted Puerto Rican Independence and sponsored terrorist and criminal acts by the group in the U.S. Cuban ties with Middle Eastern Nations also grew strongly during this time. Castro provided military and intelligence personnel to Middle Eastern groups and States during their fights against Israel. Castro openly supported the PLO, he sent troops to fight in support of Syria during the Yom Kippur War, he sent advisors and military instructors into Palestinian bases. Communist terrorist groups were not the only benefactors of his support. Castro joined Libya in the creation of terrorist movement World Mathaba, and established military cooperation with State Sponsors of Terror, Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen, as well as Polisario Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara, the PLO and many others.<sup>276</sup>

Cuba was able to achieve great successes during this time, installing pro-communist, pro-soviet regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua. As of 1985, more than 50,000 Cuban troops are serving at least sixteen countries on four continents.<sup>277</sup>

Cuban success may also be measured by the increasing U.S. stance against the Castro regime. In 1985 Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that “the overwhelming economic strength and political influence of the United States, together with the reality of its military power, [should be brought] to bear on Cuba in order to treat the problem at its

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<sup>276</sup> Suchliki.

<sup>277</sup> Ashby.

source.”<sup>278</sup> The problem Haig referred to was “Cuba’s support for violent revolution, terrorism, and the destabilization of regimes friendly to the U.S.”<sup>279</sup>

In an attempt to curb the growth of communism and exploit Cuba’s weaknesses, Secretary of State Haig proposed a Nine-Point Strategy in 1985:<sup>280</sup>

1. Aiding guerrilla forces fighting Cuban troops throughout the world
2. Recruiting anti-communist surrogates to counter the Cubans when U.S. involvement is not feasible
3. Assisting militarily counterinsurgency programs throughout the Caribbean Basin
4. Marshalling economic and educational assistance to foster democracy in the Caribbean region
5. Mounting a propaganda offensive in world and regional organizations to highlight Cuban violations of international law
6. Encouraging Latin American democracies to participate in U.S. military exercises in the Caribbean
7. Launching an ideological initiative, featuring Latin American democracies, to counter the Soviet-Cuban model of development
8. Increasing cooperation between the U.S. and Latin American governments in eradicating the narcotics trade, in which Cuba is heavily involved
9. Resurrecting the Central American Defense Council

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<sup>278</sup> Ashby.

<sup>279</sup> Ashby .

<sup>280</sup> Ashby.

In stark contrast to his first decade of rule, Fidel Castro caught the attention of western nations as a force to be reckoned with. During the second phase of terrorism, he was able to achieve several political goals of spreading communism and established a massive campaign against Western nations, particularly the United States. Through Castro, terrorist training was enhanced and skills were honed. Castro was able to provide logistical support, training and intelligence to groups in every nation in the Western Hemisphere, linked to M-19 in Colombia, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Montoneros in Argentina, and Chile's Left Revolutionary Movement (M.I.R.).<sup>281</sup> Castro dispatched tens of thousands of troops across the world; approximately 37,500 military personnel served in Africa and at least 6,000 in Nicaragua. Troops also served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Guyana, and South Yemen.<sup>282</sup>

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba also increased dramatically since the 1960s, particularly during the 1970s as Cuba and the Soviet Union deployed troops to Africa to protect pro-communist regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua ignited further turmoil in Central America and the Caribbean. Moscow and Havana worked closely together to foment armed revolts through a combination of urban terrorism and guerilla warfare.<sup>283</sup> As cooperation grew, so did Cuba's reliance on the Soviet Union, economically and politically. In 1985, Cuba's closest ally was facing its own economic and political struggles. The U.S.S.R called for Castro to create higher productivity and increased exports to Soviet Bloc states.

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<sup>281</sup> Ashby.

<sup>282</sup> Ashby.

<sup>283</sup> Fontaine.

Cuba, however did not want to comply with such demands and reports began to surface in March of 1985 that Castro was disappointed in the amount of aid proposed by the U.S.S.R, which was an estimated \$4.9 billion dollars annually.<sup>284</sup>

### ***Phase Three: Post-U.S.S.R.: Change in Support***

In December of 1991, Castro faced the biggest blow to his political career; collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuba had become dependent upon the U.S.S.R as its own economy faltered during Castro's excessive pursuit to expand reach of communist nations. After decades of receiving billions of dollars in aid, Cuba had to significantly diminish its support of terrorism and refocus on the survivability of the Castro regime. Almost immediately, active support of terrorism ceased and Castro settled for a more passive approach, entering the third phase of Cuban support for terrorism. This approach consisted of provision of safe haven and sanctuary to terrorist groups, diplomatic support, and remaining a vocal proponent and political supporter of groups. He allowed terrorist groups, such as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), to live on the island and establish headquarters in Havana. Colombian terrorist groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), as well as Puerto Rican group the Machetero Group and U.S. fugitives maintain presence in Cuba as well.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> Fontaine.

<sup>285</sup> Pons; U.S. fugitives include Black Liberation Army leader Joanne Chesimard, aka Assata Shakur who was wanted for killing a New Jersey State Police Officer, and Charlie Hill member of the Republic o New Afrika Movement wanted for murdered a New Mexico State trooper and the hijacking of TWA 727. Members of the IRA also reside in Cuba.

During the first ten years after collapse of the Soviet Union, Castro realigned his support for terrorism as a more passive form of political support. Money that was once provided to supporting terrorist groups were diverted to sustain the island. Cuba desperately needed to create revenue. Cuban citizens became greatly disillusioned with Castro and the first anti-Castro rally was held in 1994 as the economy continued to deteriorate.<sup>286</sup> In particular, the first five years after the collapse of U.S.S.R, Castro was relatively quiet, looking to appease the United Nations and reduce anti-Cuba sentiments from other nations. Later, he became a vocal opponent of Western, Democratic countries. And often took the opposite stance of these nations, proclaiming that ‘one mans terrorist, is another mans freedom fighter.’ Instead of directly supporting terrorists through use of government agencies like the DA, or DGI, he allowed terrorists and criminals to remain and transit the island for safe haven and passage. He continued to host third world militants for political training, although military training halted.<sup>287</sup> Castro also became a vocal supporter of other State Sponsors of Terrorism. He sent Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Pedro Miret Prieto to Libya, once on the Department of States SST List, in attempts to extend bilateral cooperation.<sup>288</sup>

Castro also kept close ties with terrorist groups and their state sponsors in the Middle East. In particular, he remained close with the PLO, holding military delegations in Havana and providing specialized military and intelligence training.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994*, (Washington, D.C., 1995), 20.

<sup>287</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993*, (Washington, D.C., 1994), 20.

<sup>288</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 24.

<sup>289</sup> Pons.

Cuba also continued to openly speak out against policies of the United States in the Middle East, portraying the U.S. as the main obstacle in the Arab/Israeli peace process and as the aggressor in forcing unjustified economic sanctions on Iran and Iraq. Cuba sought to discredit the U.S. and conveyed anti-American views and policies through Cuban embassies and agents, the United Nations, non-government political, religious, and cultural organizations.<sup>290</sup>

Castro's vocal support of terrorism increased during this time as it became his most lethal weapon. During the 2000 Ibero-American Summit in Panama, Castro refused to join other Ibero American heads of state in condemning ETA terrorism and chastised Mexico for supporting the Summit's stance against terrorism.<sup>291</sup> Cuban spy Alejandro Alonso, arrested in 1998 and tried in 2000, testified that he received instructions from Havana to locate areas in South Florida where people, arms, and explosives could easily be moved without notice.<sup>292</sup>

Although Castro began to focus support towards specific groups such as the FARC, ETA, and the Irish Republican Army, he also continued to build close relationships with his Middle East counterparts. While giving a speech at Tehran University on May 10, 2001, Castro vowed "the imperialist king will finally fall."<sup>293</sup> Even after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Castro placed blame for the

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<sup>290</sup> Suchliki.

<sup>291</sup> Pons.

<sup>292</sup> Pons; Michael Bowman, "Cuba Spies / Miami," GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/1998/10/981009-cuba.htm> (accessed December 1, 2008); Tracey Eaton, "Cuba's Spies Struggling but Active," Dallas Morning News, September 21, 1998. <http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y98/sep98/21e8.htm> (accessed December 1, 2008).

<sup>293</sup> Suchliki; Pons.

attacks on the U.S. He later labeled the GWOt as “worse than the original attack, militanistic, and fascist.”<sup>294</sup>

Castro utilized propaganda, characterizing terrorist attacks as legitimate national liberation movements and increased relations with North Korea and Iran.<sup>295</sup> Using relations with North Korea and Iran, Cuba was able to again boost it’s economy through ties with foes of the United States. In May of 2005 Cuba met with North Korea, holding military talks at the general staff level in Pyongyang; later in November of that year the North Korean Trade Minister visited Havana signing protocol for cooperation in areas of science and trade.<sup>296</sup> While the North Korean Trade Minister was in Havana, Cuban Foreign Minister Perez Roque visited Iran, that year Iran offered Cuba twenty million euros to invest in Biotechnology.<sup>297</sup> Although signatory to U.N. conventions on terrorism, Cuba’s actions, behaviors, and words contradict those edicts.<sup>298</sup>

While there has not been any direct evidence of sponsorship of terrorist activities, Cuba remains very vocal in support of terrorist activities, particularly those focused against the U.S. Cuba continues to grant safe haven to members of ETA, FARC, and ELN and other U.S. fugitives.<sup>299</sup> Along with allies Iran and Syria, Cuba has yet to renounce terrorism or made any efforts to stem activities of terrorist organizations; Cuba has also not utilized any of the preexisting laws against terrorism, particularly Law 93

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<sup>294</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), 63.

<sup>295</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2004*, (Washington, D.C., 2005), 88; Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2005*, (Washington, D.C., 2006), 172.

<sup>296</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 172.

<sup>297</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 172.

<sup>298</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2004*, 88.

<sup>299</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2006*, (Washington, D.C., 2007).



Against Acts of Terrorism.<sup>300</sup> Cuba also bolstered relations with Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia, nations that are also close allies of Iran. In January of 2006 Cuba hosted the first Cuba-Iran Joint Commission in Havana.<sup>301</sup> Although the nation may not be financially stable enough to continue the levels of support for terrorism, commissions like these and ties to other SST allow Cuba to continue its asymmetric fight against the United States through terrorism.

Cuba represents a nation that reaped the benefits of sponsoring terrorism for more than thirty years. Had it not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba would have continued to support violent revolution through terrorism in order to spread communism. The first phase of terrorism clearly delineated the struggles that Castro dealt with in order to exploit terrorism to achieve spread of ideology; those struggles were resolved during the second phase as Castro was able to sponsor terrorist groups to achieve political goals that would not have been possible without their actions. Iran, another nation seeking to expand its own ideology would also follow a similar pattern of phases of terrorism as its own revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini his successors would immediately recognize the benefits achieved through proxy terrorist groups.

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<sup>300</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>301</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

## **Chapter Five: Iran**

Like Cuba, Iran emerged as a threat to Western Democracy after another radical leader seized control. Ayatollah Khomeini and Fidel Castro immediately began to use terrorism as arms of their foreign government in order to globally export Islamism and Communism. The path to a leadership change for Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini was similar to that of Cuba, in which the public, and particularly in this case the mullahs (religious leaders) were anxious to remove the Shah from power due to his moderate and Western leanings. The opportunity for change arose in 1979 when Khomeini overthrew the Shah, obtaining control of and immediately altering the political climate for the country. Similarly to Cuba, Iran followed two phases in their utilization of terrorism. The first phase begins with Iran exploding onto the scene with the seizing of the U.S. Embassy and the hostage crisis in 1979, and the phase continues through 1989 with the death of Khomeini. The second phase runs from post-Khomeini (1989) to the present. Embedded within each phase are trends in the types of terrorism that Iran has utilized and continues to benefit from to achieve specific goals. Unlike Cuba, Iran has yet to enter the third phase of state sponsored terrorism –the passive phase; Iran may join Cuba in this phase if there is enough economic pressure to relinquish exporting ideology for survival of Iranians.

### ***Iran: Elements for Change***

The United States had an ally in Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who assumed the Iranian throne in 1941 during World War II (WWII) after the United States and Great Britain influenced a regime change from his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Allied Nations feared that Pahlavi leaned too closely to German ideals, unlike his son.<sup>302</sup> The Allies concern were justified due to a historically close relationship that began in the 18<sup>th</sup> century between Iran and Germany. Ties between the two nations were mutually beneficial, Germany needed oil and Iran needed industrial products and technologies.<sup>303</sup> In addition, the relationship between the two nations fostered the birth of the National Iranian Bank and Trans-Iranian Railway in the early 1900s. During World War Two, Iran presented itself as a valuable asset to the Allied Nations both economically and terrestrially. The Allies needed oil, and Iran served as a land-bridge to the Soviet Union for transfer of military equipment and supplies from the United States and Great Britain.<sup>304</sup> This land-bridge would become increasingly more important as the United States entered the Cold War with the U.S.S.R to prevent a new enemy from becoming a greater world power. 1941 was a critical time, as it was the first year that the U.S. became actively involved in Iranian affairs, supplementing the involvement of Great Britain.<sup>305</sup> Unfortunately, the new Shah's moderate leanings alienated many Iranian's

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<sup>302</sup> "History of Iran: Reza Shah Pahlavi," Iran Chamber Society, [http://www.iranchamber.com/history/reza\\_shah/reza\\_shah.php](http://www.iranchamber.com/history/reza_shah/reza_shah.php) (accessed November 9, 2009). In 1925, Reza Shah deposed Ahmad Mirza, the last Shah of the Qajar dynasty. This change in power will come into importance in a few decades as a descendant of the Qajar dynasty, Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq would temporarily replace Reza Shah's son, Shah Pahlavi as ruler of Iran.

<sup>303</sup> Shay, 188.

<sup>304</sup> Shay, 179.

<sup>305</sup> Shay, 179-180.

who held more nationalistic ideals. Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq, a leader among nationalists became outspoken against Western influence, particularly that of Great Britain, in Iranian affairs. In 1951, the Iranian Parliament voted to nationalize control of oil (aptly named the National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC). The NOIC intensified the degrading relations with Great Britain and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), formerly, Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC).<sup>306</sup> The nationalization of Iranian oil initiated the derogation of relations with other nations and permanently negatively affected the economy. The vote to nationalize the oil industry in Iran had immediate economic impacts as Great Britain froze Iranian assets and banned all exports to Iran.<sup>307</sup> Since 1908, with the formation of APOC, Great Britain controlled Iranian oil.<sup>308</sup> Control of APOC and of Iranian oil allowed Great Britain to have significant influence over Iran for decades to come. This control also created a level of tension between the two nations as Iran sought to independently control its own destiny. In 1951, in an attempt to appease anti-Western sentiments, the Shah appointed Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq as the Prime Minister of Parliament. Dr. Mossadeq seized upon growing turmoil within Iran by stripping the Shah of all governmental control. At this time, the United States was in the midst of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and feared both expansion of Communism and the benefits that the Soviet Union would reap with an oil rich ally, Iran. This set the stage to reinstate leadership inside Iran with more moderate, democratic leanings than

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<sup>306</sup> "History of Iran: Oil Nationalization," Iran Chamber Society, [http://www.iranchamber.com/history/reza\\_shah/reza\\_shah.php](http://www.iranchamber.com/history/reza_shah/reza_shah.php) (accessed November 9, 2009).

<sup>307</sup> "History of Iran: Oil."

<sup>308</sup> Shay, 179.

that of Dr. Mossadeq. In a joint effort, the United States and Great Britain set forth a plan to bring the Shah back to power in order to keep the Communists at bay.

The time leading up to the Shah regaining control of Iran was marked by extreme economic downturns and a continuing trend towards a more autocratic government. Operation Ajax (TPAJAX), codename for the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, involved both the United States and British intelligence officers and successfully reinstated the Shah while removing Dr. Mossadeq from control.<sup>309</sup> This operation cemented burgeoning anti-Western sentiments among radical Islamists who would cite this coup twenty years later in efforts to galvanize support for revolution. Similar to the situation of Cuba in the years before Fidel Castro's rise to power, Iranian citizens grew tired of Western influence in, and a depressed economy set the stage for another violent revolution.

In 1953, the Shah returned to power for another 20 years, and as the years passed he attempted to modernize Iran to become more Western. On January 9, 1963, he outlined a reform called the "White Revolution", in which he sought to attain similar popularity as Dr. Mossadeq by nationalizing land as Mossadeq did through nationalization of oil. In addition to nationalizing land, the "White Revolution" set "*goals for literacy, nationalize[d] forest and water resources....establish[ed] suffrage for women and minorities, and [created] profit sharing in industry.*"<sup>310</sup> This reform sparked division between the Iranian people, the Islamic clergy, and the Shah. The clergy and the people were against reform as it was too western and went against fundamental Islamic

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<sup>309</sup> Brookes, 194.

<sup>310</sup> Manucher Farmanfarmaian, *Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince* (New York: Random House, 1997), 366.

beliefs. Attempts to model Iran after democratic nations opened the door for an outspoken religious scholar, Rouhollah Mousavi Khomeini, to take the public stage.

### ***Rise of Ayatollah Khomeini***

Like President Batista of Cuba, the Shah was becoming increasingly unpopular and disliked throughout Iran. His policies, although generally accepted by Western nations, were believed to be a direct affront to Islamism and opened the door for radicals to seize momentum against the Shah. Khomeini came into prominence when Shah Pahlavi introduced the “White Revolution”; this reform called for equal rights, land reform, and secular education, which undermined the power of the ruling clergy, the Mullahs, and received the attention of Khomeini.<sup>311</sup> He began to attack the Shah’s policies from Qom, the spiritual center of Iran. Khomeini’s rise to power mirrored that of Fidel Castro, by gaining high levels of public support that threatened the current regime resulting in both imprisonment and exile from the country. During a speech on June 3, 1963, Khomeini threatened that if the Shah did not change his ways that the people would “*offer up thanks for his departure from the country.*”<sup>312</sup> Two days later Khomeini was arrested, and in response, massive demonstrations and riots erupted throughout Iran. On April 7, 1964, with his release from prison, Khomeini immediately re-launched his aggressive campaign against the Shah, proclaiming that the current government was illegitimate. Fearing his continual growing popularity, in November of 1964, Shah Pahlavi exiled Khomeini from Iran to Turkey for a year initially and then to Najaf,

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<sup>311</sup> Brookes, 191.

<sup>312</sup> “History of Iran: Ayatollah Khomeini,” Iran Chamber Society, [http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah\\_khomeini.php](http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah_khomeini.php) (accessed November 9, 2009); Brookes, 191.

Iraq.<sup>313</sup> From Iraq, Khomeini continued to proselytize for religious rule in Iran and began to influence early members of Hizbollah. Khomeini remained in Iraq for nearly 14 years until he was exiled to Paris, France in 1978.<sup>314</sup> As the years went on, the Shah's authoritarian actions lead to massive demonstrations throughout the 1970s. Responding to continual degrading situation, the Shah implemented martial law in September 1978, using the SAVAK, secret police, to maintain control. The growing support for Khomeini resulted in an increase in the terrorist attacks on American citizens and property. These attacks were documented by the National Foreign Assessment Center in 1978, which cited an expansion anti-U.S. sentiment.<sup>315</sup> Khomeini urged continuation of demonstrations and strikes against the Shah.<sup>316</sup> In January of 1979, fearing for his life, the Shah left Iran claiming to go on vacation, which allowed Khomeini to return and begin the Iranian Revolution.<sup>317</sup>

### ***Phase One: Iranian Revolution, 1979 - 1989***

The Iranian Revolution represents the beginning of the first phase of Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Within Phase One, several trends emerged; specifically in the first five years: the kidnapping and taking of hostages, which morphed into larger scale hijackings, the targeting of dissidents and regime opponents, and the expanding reach of Iranian terror through proxy groups in the second half of the phase. Throughout

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<sup>313</sup> "History of Iran: Ayatollah"; Brookes, 191.

<sup>314</sup> Brookes, 192.

<sup>315</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, International Terrorism in 1978 (Washington, D.C., 1979), 6.

<sup>316</sup> "Khomeini Warns of Threat to Islamic Movement," *Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa* 5, no. 8, (January 11, 1979), Foreign Broadcast Information Service, microfiche, R 10.

<sup>317</sup> Brookes, 192, 194.

Phase One, instances of these trends reveal the growing expertise of Iranian sponsorship to achieve ideological goals, which is similar to how Cuba honed its utilization of terrorism during this phase. On February 1, 1979, Khomeini established the first Islamic Republic and in a national referendum, was elected as political and religious leader for life in a landslide victory.<sup>318</sup> After the revolution, the U.S. and Iran attempted to maintain normal relations. On February 12, President Jimmy Carter stated that the United States would “respect the wishes” of Iranian citizens; in response, the Iranian Foreign Minister agreed that Iran was ready for friendly relations with the United States.<sup>319</sup> However, relations soon disintegrated, as Khomeini began violently exporting the Iranian Revolution. Iran withdrew from the Central Alliance, and cancelled the administrative agreement for economic cooperation that had been in place with the United States for the last twenty years.<sup>320</sup> Also during February of 1979, Yasser Arafat, spokesman for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) visited Tehran and established an agreement for the creation of terrorist training camps for PLO members within Iran.<sup>321</sup> During this time, Ayatollah Khomeini served as the face of Middle Eastern Terrorism, by encouraging the exportation of Islamism to all nations and the removal of all western influences from Muslim nations. This first phase of Iranian terrorism focuses around Khomeini’s reign, from 1979 to his death in 1989. In a span of ten years under his rule, Iran was linked to 171 international terrorist attacks.<sup>322</sup> Khomeini immediately implemented Sharia (Islamic) Law, by veiling women, banning alcohol, censoring

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<sup>318</sup> Brookes, 192.

<sup>319</sup> Shay, 164.

<sup>320</sup> Shay, 164.

<sup>321</sup> Mannes, 237.

<sup>322</sup> Shay, 85.



western music, nationalizing media, closing universities, and by eliminating political parties.<sup>323</sup> He also created SAVAMA (Ministry of Intelligence and National Security); an organization designed to collect intelligence and provide security services. Under the leadership of General Fardost, the SAVAMA replaced the Shah's Intelligence Service, SAVAK, members of which became targets of the revolution via imprisonment, execution, or terrorism.<sup>324</sup> SAVAMA worked hand-in-hand with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hizbollah.<sup>325</sup>

Khomeini targeted anyone whom threatened his reign, blocked the expansion of Islam, and anyone who supported Shah Pahlavi. Similarly to Castro, Khomeini began executing supporters of the previous regime immediately after obtaining power. On May 19, 1979, the U.S. publicly condemned these executions. As relations deteriorated between Iran and the U.S., Khomeini depicted Iran as the victim and the U.S. as the plunderer of Iranian wealth.<sup>326</sup> Khomeini believed that the U.S. support and hospitality towards the Shah was proof that Western policies would not change towards Iran, and he used this belief as a catalyst to energize radical parties to topple other moderate, pro-West governments.<sup>327</sup>

Throughout Iran's first phase of terrorism from 1979 - 1989, several terrorist techniques were frequently implemented: kidnapping, hijacking, and the assassination of dissidents and enemies of the state. Based on proven effectiveness, these techniques were honed and continually utilized, as Iran became an increasingly more efficient and

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<sup>323</sup> Brookes, 194.

<sup>324</sup> Shay, 29.

<sup>325</sup> Shay, 30.

<sup>326</sup> Shay, 165.

<sup>327</sup> Shay, 165.

covert sponsor of terrorism. Iranian attacks against targets within its own borders was an integral part of its use of terrorism as a policy tool for domestically promoting political goals. These internal targets were easiest to attack, but granted Iran no deniability from retaliation. Diplomatic, economic, and cultural institutions were primary targets, exemplified by the U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis and the targeting of British missionaries.<sup>328</sup> Another method preferred by the Iranian government involved the hijacking and redirecting of airplanes to Iran where Iranian terrorists would use the hostages as bargaining chips. The Iranian government would then serve as the ‘mediator’ between the terrorists and foreign nationals, effectively preventing foreign military rescue operations.<sup>329</sup>

### ***U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis***

The most prominent Iranian terrorist attack began in 1979 and continued throughout 1980, the U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis in Tehran, Iran. On 1 November 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini gave a speech calling for increased attacks against the United States and stated that November 4<sup>th</sup> would be the ideal day to begin attacks, as a way to remember the one-year anniversary of an Iranian student’s death. Three days later, the hostage crisis began and the United States Embassy in Tehran was seized and U.S. citizens were held captive for 444 days. During the takeover, Iranian streets filled with demonstrations against the U.S. as anti-U.S. sentiment expanded throughout the nation.<sup>330</sup> The captors who stormed the Embassy were actually IRGC members acting under

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<sup>328</sup> Shay, 39.

<sup>329</sup> Shay, 39.

<sup>330</sup> Shay, 40.

explicit government orders, not college students as reported by Iran. By claiming that the perpetrators were students, the Iranian government sought a 'neutral stance', in hopes for deniability of involvement.<sup>331</sup> This take-over was successful for several reasons: first, the captors were in a friendly environment, with a government that supported the terrorists. Secondly, during the seizure, Iranian security forces acted in concert with the terrorists by guarding the hostages, restricting communications, and by reinforcing demands of the terrorists instead of aiding negotiations for the release of hostages.<sup>332</sup> And finally, the initial success of the hostage crisis served as a milestone for the Iranian regime boosting fundamentalist fervor and provided a reference for future terrorist acts.<sup>333</sup> Before authorizing the release of hostages, Iran had several demands of the United States: return frozen Iranian funds, relinquish U.S. monetary demands on Iran, promise to not interfere with internal Iranian matters, and assist with the extradition of the Shah to stand trial in Iran.<sup>334</sup> The United States complied with many of Iran's requests by returning some money and by promising to remain out of Iranian internal issues. By giving in to these demands, the Embassy seizure was seen as a victory by Khomeini and proof of ability to 'bring the U.S. to its knees.'<sup>335</sup> The sense of victory was further enhanced by a failed rescue attempt on 25 April 1980.<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>331</sup> Shay, 40.

<sup>332</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1979*, (Washington, D.C., 1980), 4.

<sup>333</sup> Shay, 40.

<sup>334</sup> Shay, 40; Brookes, 194.

<sup>335</sup> Shay, 40.

<sup>336</sup> Shay, 165; "Timeline: Us-Iran Ties," BBC News: Middle East, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/3362443.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.stm) (accessed November 29, 2009).

The U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis was considered the most prominent example of terrorism against a foreign target on Iranian soil.<sup>337</sup> This success spawned additional attacks against foreigners residing inside Iranian borders. Khomeini sought to remove all Western influence in Iran and the first main target to purge was Great Britain which had been present in Iranian affairs for decades.

### **1980**

In 1980, the U.S. State Department had not yet identified Iran as sponsoring terrorist groups in spite of its radical, anti-Western policies. Many groups were, however, seeking such support and sponsorship, but Iran was preoccupied with internal political problems, socioeconomic strife, and a war with Iraq. The Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, published by the U.S. State Department did however identify the Iranian government as actively perpetrating international terrorist attacks, approximately half performed by Iranian nationals and the other half conducted directly through government officials.<sup>338</sup> Most of the attacks occurred in the Middle East and Europe in which the United States was a frequent target. Attacks against Iraqi diplomatic facilities and assassinations of Iraqi citizens were included in this count by the State Department. The years following Khomeini's election as Supreme Leader of Iran were filled with terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens across the globe.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>337</sup> Shay, 40.

<sup>338</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1980*, (Washington, D.C., 1981), 10.

<sup>339</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1980*, 7.

### ***British Missionary Targets***

The Khomeini regime, fresh off the revolution, looked to remove all indications of colonialistic and imperialistic powers within Iranian borders. Due to the extensive past with Great Britain, the nation was an obvious first target. Khomeini and his religious leaders started a campaign to remove all Angelican missionaries from the country beginning with the murder of the head of the Angelican community in Shiraz.<sup>340</sup> Spanning four months, June through October of 1980, Iranian authorities seized Christian hospitals and missionaries in Shiraz and Isfahan. The main target of these attacks was the Angelican Bishop, residing in Iran. In September of 1980, IRGC members ransacked his house and stole documents, the next month, in October, an assassination attempt missed the Bishop and injured his wife. From 1980 through 1981, British missionaries were attacked, arrested, and injured until the campaign ended when British missionaries fled Iran.<sup>341</sup>

### ***1981***

During 1981, Iran continued terrorist assaults against Iraq. Most of these attacks occurred in Lebanon and were carried out by Shiite militia members, not directly by the government. Support for terrorist attacks through radical groups increased during 1981 as State Department (DoS) records indicate that only five attacks could be linked directly to the Iranian government, whereas in 1980 the number of attacks was twenty-four. All five of the attacks directly linked to Iran occurred in Beirut and were directed towards

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<sup>340</sup> Shay, 41.

<sup>341</sup> Shay, 41.

Iraqi diplomats.<sup>342</sup> In 1981, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mussawi stated that the goal of his ministry was to ‘convey the message of revolution to the world.’<sup>343</sup> 1981 also represented a symbolic victory for Iran, as the United States and Iran met in Algeria and entered into an agreement, in which the U.S. would not block Iranian efforts to reclaim ownership of the Shah’s properties and would free \$11 Billion in frozen Iranian assets. Half of the money would be returned, and the other half would be retained to repay Iranian debts to U.S. banks, an additional one billion dollars would be kept in a fund as a guarantee that the U.S. would maintain it’s part of the agreement.<sup>344</sup>

## **1982**

Through 1982, Iran continued its use of terrorism, remaining consistent with its anti-Western policy, and furthered its support of terrorist groups such as the Iraqi Islamic Revolutionary Council (IIRC). Iran also continued to target ex-patriots, particularly those who did not agree with Khomeini’s ideals.<sup>345</sup> From 1982 to the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, approximately half of Iran’s terrorist activities were directed toward targets within the Persian Gulf States. Also during these seven years, three main goals became apparent: one, modify the Gulf States policy towards Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and end aid to Iraq; two, free terrorists incarcerated in the Gulf States or avenge their execution; and three, undermine and topple regimes to establish Islamic regimes in their place.<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>342</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1981*, (Washington, D.C., 1982), 21.

<sup>343</sup> Shay, 24.

<sup>344</sup> Shay, 166.

<sup>345</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1982*, (Washington, D.C., 1983), 14.

<sup>346</sup> Shay, 195.

### ***Genesis of Terror: Hizbollah***

Iran also focused on uniting terrorist groups together to fight for one common goal. The most important event in Iran's first phase of terrorism occurred in 1982, with the foundation of a terrorist group named Hizbollah. This group was established through direct patronage of the Revolutionary Guards; the Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi coordinated the merge of the Association of Muslim Students with Islamic Amal and additionally, incorporated al-Da'wa members in the formation of Hizbollah.<sup>347</sup> Through this group, Iran cultivated the Shiite Movement and many smaller groups.<sup>348</sup> The formation of Hizbollah received support from other Iranian supported groups, such as Fatah. In turn, Iran became more selective with which groups received support and split with the Amal militia because of the groups more secular leanings.<sup>349</sup>

1982 also marked the year of increased Iranian international involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. An International Peacekeeping Force made up of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, entered Lebanon in order to oversee the PLO withdrawal and to help stabilize the country.<sup>350</sup> Lebanon would become a very important stretch of land greatly impacted by Iranian and Syrian sponsorship of terrorism. Both countries helped the Islamic Jihad, an extension of Hizbollah, wage war against the western presence in Lebanon. Initial targets were embassies and western installations, utilizing truck bombs and kidnapping.<sup>351</sup> On July 19, 1982, Iran Pasdaran (also known as the IRGC) supported Islamic Amal in the kidnapping of David Dodge, President of

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<sup>347</sup> Shay, 62; Mannes, 146.

<sup>348</sup> Mannes, 238.

<sup>349</sup> Shay, 61.

<sup>350</sup> Mannes, 147.

<sup>351</sup> Mannes, 147.

American University in Beirut (AUB); Dodge at the time, was one of the most prominent Westerners in Lebanon. He was transferred to Iran, where Iran hoped to pressure the United States into forcing the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia to release four Iranian Embassy Officials that the militia had kidnapped.<sup>352</sup> Later in November of 1982, Islamic Amal seized a Lebanese Army Barracks and invited Iran to make use of the facility. That same month, IIRC spokesman Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Baqer Hakin, named Iran as it's primary financial backer during a press interview.<sup>353</sup> Through the 1980s, Iranian training camps grew exponentially in Lebanon as approximately one thousand Pasdaran were relocated there to train radical Shiite groups.<sup>354</sup>

Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and Medina also started riots in 1982; although the riots were intended to appear spontaneous, they were in-fact planned and orchestrated by Iranian officials in charge of the Iranian pilgrimage to the area.<sup>355</sup> From 1982 through 1983, Iran sought to renew diplomatic relations with outside nations, but the Iran-Iraq War proved to be an impassable hurdle in receiving such support.

### **1983**

Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon caused the greatest damage towards lives, property, and political stability.<sup>356</sup> In 1983, joint Hizbollah-Iran terrorist attacks were focused against the United States and France to remove their presence from Lebanon.<sup>357</sup> On April 11<sup>th</sup>, Hizbollah bombed the U.S.

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<sup>352</sup> Mannes, 147-148.

<sup>353</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1982*, 14.

<sup>354</sup> Mannes, 146.

<sup>355</sup> Shay, 196.

<sup>356</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983*, (Washington, D.C., 1984), 1.

<sup>357</sup> Shay, 68.



Embassy in Beirut and in October, Iran also supported the attacks on a U.S. Marine Barracks and a French base in Lebanon.<sup>358</sup> Suicide attacks against the U.S. in Lebanon and Kuwait led to Iranian successes in causing a high U.S. death toll, and in forcing the withdrawal of U.S. troops. These successes proved that powerful Western nations could be made to bend to Iranian will through the use of terrorism. Even though U.S. forces withdrew from Lebanon, Iran continued to kidnap citizens and hijack commercial airplanes.<sup>359</sup> The joint Iran-Hizbollah attacks proved successful as they forced peacekeeping troops to withdraw from Lebanon in 1984.<sup>360</sup>

### **French Targets**

Khomeini's regime used attacks against foreign interests as another method to expand Iran's support of terrorism. Similarly to the initial attacks against Great Britain, France found itself as the target of Iranian sponsored terrorism. Iran utilized three types of operations against France: direct terrorist attacks in Lebanon, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks on French soil. Iran sponsored Hizbollah and the Revolutionary Guards to remove French forces from Lebanon; one example of this support was the October 23, 1983 car bomb explosion at the headquarters of French forces in Beirut. This attack, and another car bomb that occurred December 12, 1983 at the French Embassy in Kuwait by al Dawa Organization lead to a reduced French presence in the Middle East.<sup>361</sup> Due to lower military presence, many French citizens were kidnapped and held hostage in order

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<sup>358</sup> Mannes, 147; Brookes, 200.

<sup>359</sup> Shay, 167.

<sup>360</sup> Mannes, 147.

<sup>361</sup> Shay, 92, 174-175.

to force France to revise its policy, pay ransoms and release Shiite terrorists held in France. Iranian expatriates in France became frequent targets also. Former Prime Minister Shahfun Bakhitiar was the target of an assassination attempt by Anis Nakash who claimed to be acting in Iran's name. He failed and was sentenced to life in prison.<sup>362</sup> Another terrorist attack occurred in France on December 13, 1983 when two explosive devices were detonated at train stations and in a rail car on an express train headed from Paris to Marseille; Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this attack.<sup>363</sup> The focused campaign against France did work in Iran's favor, by causing French troops to withdraw from Lebanon and by forcing France to comply with Iranian demands in order to end the attacks.<sup>364</sup>

Leaders of neighboring countries began to speak out against Iran and Khomeini. King Hassan of Morocco accused Khomeini of being behind the wave of riots in Morocco. As leaders began to voice complaints of Iran, terrorist groups began to claim Iranian support and sponsorship behind the attacks. The assassins of Anwar Sadat mentioned Khomeini during their trial in Egypt as being their inspiration for attacks.<sup>365</sup>

### ***Hijackings***

During 1983, Iranian involvement in hijackings became an important tool in its sponsorship of terrorism. On June 24, 1983 a Romanian plane, chartered by Libya was hijacked on its way to Greece and redirected to Libya. Amal terrorists claimed responsibility for the attacks and demanded the release of Imam Mousa al Sader.

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<sup>362</sup> Shay, 175.

<sup>363</sup> Shay, 175.

<sup>364</sup> Shay, 176.

<sup>365</sup> Shay, 27.

Another plane was hijacked on August 26, 1983; the Air France plane was hijacked by Hizbollah members in attempt to gain the release of Lebanese detainees and end military aid to Chad, Iraq, and Lebanon by Western nations.<sup>366</sup>

As ties with Western Democratic powers diminished, Iranian ties with Germany increased. From 1983 through 1984, nineteen percent of all Iranian imports were from Germany. Germany also served as a major transit base for the Iranian terrorist infrastructure as Iran felt that it could act with relative safety while within German borders.<sup>367</sup>

## **1984**

1984 marked an important year for Iranian-U.S. relations. This was the first year that Iran was listed on the Department of State's State Sponsor of Terrorism List. Becoming a member of this list immediately has economic impacts, and Iran has yet to be removed from the list. Also in the yearly report written by the State Department was the first mention of Hizbollah as a terrorist organization. Iranian terrorism did make small shifts, there were no recorded instances of sponsored terrorism in the Persian Gulf, instead terrorism activities were focused in Lebanon, particularly the Syrian controlled region called the Bekaa Valley.<sup>368</sup> Of the many groups receiving Iranian aid, Hizbollah remained at the top of Iran's list. Members received political indoctrination, training, and material support. Tehran continued to indoctrinate and train disaffected Shia from Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Similarly to Cuba, these trainees then re-infiltrated

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<sup>366</sup> Shay, 104, 174.

<sup>367</sup> Shay, 188.

<sup>368</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984*, (Washington, D.C., 1985), 4.

their home country to stand ready for future operations.<sup>369</sup> The driving focus for Iran's use of terrorism remained constant, focused on punishing the U.S. for supporting the late Shah, on punishing both the U.S. and France for supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, on removing Western presence from the Islamic world while spreading the Islamic revolution, and focused on creating like-minded fundamentalist Islamic republics throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf States.<sup>370</sup>

Iran trained Shia dissidents, established terrorist networks throughout the region, and promoted some of the most violent anti-western groups. Pro-Iranian groups often committed attacks in the name of Iran in attempts to receive aid from the State. Many of the most violent attacks against U.S. citizens occurred in Lebanon in attempt to remove their presence and create an Iran-styled Islamic republic.<sup>371</sup>

Iranian terrorism also spread into Western Europe during 1984, as expatriates became frequent targets of terrorism. In February, an exiled Iranian general and brother were killed in Paris, France. On July 31st, another Air France plane, was hijacked by three Arab men in Frankfurt and traveled to Tehran, where Iran negotiated the release of the passengers; the Islamic Organization for Release of Jerusalem claimed responsibility for the hijacking.<sup>372</sup> All passengers were released unharmed and the three terrorists surrendered to Iranian authorities.<sup>373</sup> Two additional hijackings took place by Iranian backed groups, one of which occurred over two days, December 5th and 6th involved Flight 221, which was hijacked while enroute from Dubai to Pakistan and was forced to

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<sup>369</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 11.

<sup>370</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 4.

<sup>371</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 9.

<sup>372</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 13; Shay, 104.

<sup>373</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 26.

land in Tehran. Two American passengers, working for U.S. AID, were killed and Iranian authorities negotiated for the release of remaining passengers with no objections or resistance from hijackers.<sup>374</sup> Near the end of the year in November, seven Lebanese Shia terrorists were arrested in Rome for plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy; an eighth man was arrested in Switzerland as conspirator to the attack.<sup>375</sup>

SAVAMA, the intelligence service directly linked with Hizbollah and the IRGC was reorganized and renamed VEVAK in 1984 and became the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) lead by Muhammad Kishari, who was appointed as it's first director. The original director, General Faradost was arrested a year later in 1985, charged with spying for the U.S.S.R.<sup>376</sup>

Targeting, kidnapping, and ransoming hostages remained a key component of Iranian terrorism. The position of President of American University of Beirut remained a dangerous one, as another President, Malcolm Kerr was murdered by Hizbollah in January of 1984. The next month, American and French citizens were kidnapped to pressure their respective governments to improve treatment of Shi'ite prisoners in Iraq.<sup>377</sup> On March 16th, CIA Station Chief, William Buckley, was kidnapped and subsequently murdered by Hizbollah terrorists.<sup>378</sup>

Targeting nations that arrested and placed terrorist suspects on trial was another method Iran utilized to intensify support among groups and to expand the fear of

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<sup>374</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 9, 13; Shay, 104; Mannes, 148.

<sup>375</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1984*, 13.

<sup>376</sup> Shay, 30-31.

<sup>377</sup> Mannes, 148.

<sup>378</sup> Mannes, 148; "Frontline: Target America: Terrorist Attacks on America, 1979 -1988," PBS, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html> (accessed December 19, 2009).

attempting to stop terrorism by neighboring states. On February 11, 1984, twenty-one suspects were put on trial in Kuwait. The trial ended the next month on March 27th in which three terrorists were sentenced to death, while the remaining were sentenced to life in prison. Iran and Shiite terrorists targeted Kuwait to force the release of those terrorists. Iran eventually won out after Kuwait released the terrorists when Iraq invaded in 1990.<sup>379</sup>

In an effort to destabilize the political structure of neighboring countries, Iran utilized terrorist groups to create tension between citizens and the government. In November of 1984, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of causing riots started by Shiite extremists, which led to the deaths of twenty and the arrests of thousands. The riots began because the Shiite ministry sought a more equal distribution of oil, which is the backbone of the economy for many nations in the Middle East. After accusing Iran of backing the riots, Bahrain ceased air traffic between the states and prohibited economic ties with the nation.<sup>380</sup> Ties between the nations would continue to deteriorate over the next four years. Iran, still to this day, claims that it possesses historical ownership over Bahrain. Tensions have fluctuated ever since Bahrain gained independence and because Bahrain supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and because it appears to be a pro-U.S. nations. Another reason for increased tension is the large Shiite minority in Bahrain that is hostile to the regime and seeks similar Islamic revolution.<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>379</sup> Shay, 202-204.

<sup>380</sup> Shay, 205.

<sup>381</sup> Shay, 205.

## **1985**

Leading into and throughout 1985, France remained a target of Iran. Several attacks by the Palestinian terrorist group Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (FARL), lead by George Ibrahim Abhallah, specifically targeted French citizens. Although it is impossible to prove an Iranian connection to this group, evidence of support arise from demands by Iran and Shiite terrorists to release the FARL leader a from French prison after his arrest.<sup>382</sup>

In 1985, export of revolution remained Ayatollah Khomeini's central tenet using terrorism as primary means to advance objectives. Iran continued to use networks of diplomatic and cultural missions to support and direct involvement of the government and of senior officials in terrorist operations.<sup>383</sup> The level of support for terrorist activities remained high but declined slightly from record levels of 1984. The toll the war with Iraq was causing on the Iranian economy was the main reason for this decline of activity. The Department of State counted thirty terrorist attacks by groups with established ties to Iran, although direct Iranian involvement cannot be established.<sup>384</sup> Iraq, the U.S., and France remained primary targets of terrorism.

Economic problems caused Iran to reduce direct involvement in terrorist activities and instead, pursue more realistic foreign policy. Emphasis on ideological reasons to continue exportation of the Islamic Revolution decreased, and several groups that once received more support became increasingly more independent of Tehran. Tehran still

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<sup>382</sup> Shay, 275.

<sup>383</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985*, (Washington, D.C., 1986), 7.

<sup>384</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 6.

served as inspiration for many groups, and these groups continued to serve Iran's foreign policy goals.<sup>385</sup> Hizbollah and Dawa Party remained the most active Iranian supported terrorist groups, conducting many international attacks in 1985. Iran continued to support radical Shia terrorist groups in Lebanon, Iraq and throughout the Persian Gulf. These groups acted in support of Iranian interests without formal coordination from the government.<sup>386</sup>

Hizbollah's campaign of kidnapping Westerners continued throughout 1985; approximately one dozen people were kidnapped in Lebanon.<sup>387</sup> In 1984, Jeremy Levin and Reverend Benjamin Weir had been kidnapped and released. Peter Kilburn was kidnapped in 1984 and William Buckley was killed in 1985. In 1985, three additional U.S. citizens were kidnapped as well as eight French citizens.<sup>388</sup> On March 22<sup>nd</sup>, three French Embassy employees were kidnapped by Hizbollah as an attempt to pressure France into curtailing its arms sales to Iraq and to repay an Iranian loan made to the French government, relinquished by the Shah.<sup>389</sup>

Kuwait remained a prime target of terrorism as Iran sought the release of seventeen Shia terrorists jailed in connection with the bombings of U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait in December of 1983. Iran also continued to punish Kuwait for supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War as well as garnish support from hard-lined Arabian States to gain additional political and monetary support.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>385</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 7.

<sup>386</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 18.

<sup>387</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 18.

<sup>388</sup> Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1985, pg. 18

<sup>389</sup> Mannes, 149.

<sup>390</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 20.



On May 25<sup>th</sup>, an Iranian supported terrorist group, the Dawa Party bombed the motorcade of the Amir of Kuwait killing six and injuring twelve. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility and claimed that the bombing was in response to Kuwait's failure to release Shia terrorists.<sup>391</sup> One month later on June 17<sup>th</sup> Islamic Jihad Organization, lead by Imad Murianiya, (another pseudo name for Hizbollah) hijacked a TWA flight en-route from Athens to Rome. Both Amal and Hizbollah worked together with Iran during the hijacking of the TWA flight.<sup>392</sup> The Reagan Administration responded that they would not yield to terrorists and made it clear to Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah that if any hostages were harmed there would be an immediate harsh response by the U.S. Twelve days later on the 29<sup>th</sup> Hizbollah released the hostages. The next day on June 30<sup>th</sup>, Israel released three hundred Shiite terrorists.<sup>393</sup>

Iran's targeting of France, kidnapping of citizens and bombings in Paris, paid off by 1986 as France agreed to make monetary payments to Iran.<sup>394</sup> Iran's targeting of U.S. citizens also paid off, from August 1985 through November of 1986, the two nations were involved in clandestine negotiations, weapons in return for release of hostages and cessation of taking hostages.<sup>395</sup> The U.S. sought release of William Buckley and other U.S. hostages. The first consignment of weapons was "Taw" anti-tank missiles; at the same time, September 14<sup>th</sup> 1985, Hizbollah released Benjamin Weir. The U.S. had expected more hostages to be released and one month later, William Buckley was

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<sup>391</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 20-21, 36.

<sup>392</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1985*, 20-21; Shay, 63.

<sup>393</sup> Shay, 104-105.

<sup>394</sup> Mannes, 161-162.

<sup>395</sup> Mannes, 149.

executed by Islamic Jihad.<sup>396</sup> The U.S. delivery of weapons backfired. Iran also targeted British citizens. Hizbollah (Islamic Jihad) kidnapped Geoffrey Nash on March 14<sup>th</sup> and Brian Lewick on the 15<sup>th</sup>. Both men were released within two weeks, Nash on the 27<sup>th</sup> and Lewick on the 30<sup>th</sup>. Two month later, on May 27<sup>th</sup> Dennis Holtz was kidnapped and murdered. Unlike France and the U.S., Great Britain and Kuwait did not yield to any extortion demands.<sup>397</sup>

## **1986**

Targets of Iranian terror spread in the beginning of 1986. Iranian leadership viewed the use of terrorism as a successful method of spreading foreign policy. The Persian Gulf remained high on the radar, by deterring states from aiding Iraq in the on-going war, by induce the states to support oil policies favored by Iran, and by radicalizing the Shia populations.<sup>398</sup> Iran continued to use terrorism as an instrument to drive Western influences from the Middle East and eliminate opponents of Khomeini regime overseas. As Iran honed it's use of terrorism, less attacks became more attributable to the country as the nation became more covert in its efforts. The Department of State determined that the decrease in overt activities did not indicate a decrease in willingness to utilize terrorism.<sup>399</sup>

Iran also continued recruiting and training Shia terrorists, providing religious indoctrination as well as training in military and terrorist tactics, sending back to home states. Most of the terrorist attacks that can be linked to Iranian support were perpetrated

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<sup>396</sup> Shay, 119.

<sup>397</sup> Shay, 122-123, 181.

<sup>398</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 9.

<sup>399</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 9.

by Iranian trained and sponsored radicals.<sup>400</sup> Most of the training continued to occur in Lebanon as well as most of the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Iranian supported groups. Tehran recruited Shia dissidents from neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iraq, providing these dissidents military training inside Iran.<sup>401</sup> In 1986, Iran placed a direct effort into expanding terrorist networkd in Europe, Africa and Asia, by utilizing local Islamic communities, religious, and cultural institutions. Iran emphasized using its diplomatic service to bolster capabilities to conduct and support terrorist activities beyond the nation's current reach in the Middle East.<sup>402</sup> Tehran provided significant support to Hizbollah to continue the radical Shia movement across the Middle East. Hizbollah maintained a campaign of kidnapping western citizens and conducting terrorist attacks against Western interests, particularly the U.S. and France.<sup>403</sup> Iran maintained significant influence over Hizbollah's activities, providing substantial training and weapons to the group.

Iran's goal of spreading its terrorist network succeeded in 1986, by spreading into Western Europe. Iran was suspected of sponsoring several attacks, but was not implicated in conjunction with the mass casualty attacks that occurred in Europe associated with the Arab and Palestinian terror. French police did suspect Hizbollah as being the mastermind behind a series of bombing attacks in Paris during September of 1986. The Khomeini regime began a violent campaign targeting dissidents whom had been supporters of the Shah. In Paris, one attempt to assassinate former Admiral Madani

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<sup>400</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 9 – 10 .

<sup>401</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>402</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>403</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

was aborted in January, and several months later in April, the exiled leader Masud Rajavi's home was bombed.<sup>404</sup> Also in October of 1986, former Army Colonel was murdered in Istanbul.<sup>405</sup> Unfortunately there were no suspects in any of the three attacks.

Iran also sought more control over the oil industry in the Middle East, particularly regarding OPEC. As part of its attempts to control the industry, Iran used terror to pressure the Persian Gulf to cut production. Prior to the July 19<sup>th</sup> OPEC meeting, there were several bombings at Kuwaiti oil installations tied to Iranian backed terror groups.<sup>406</sup> Five similar attacks crippled Kuwait's oil industry for weeks. Iran potentially used these attacks to serve a dual purpose: one to influence oil producing states and two to reduce Kuwait's support of Iraq. These attacks occurred in June of 1986; five bombs exploded near crude oil tank farms and near oil wells in Kuwait City.<sup>407</sup> Additional attacks occurred at the Saudi and Kuwait air offices in Vienna and Karachi, respectively in the past year, coinciding with a warning to Riyadh and other Arab oil producing states to cut production and boost oil prices.<sup>408</sup> Iran was known to have assets among native Kuwaiti Shia and foreign workers in the community. Several of these assets are suspected to have worked in the Defense or Oil Ministries or within the oil industry in Kuwait.<sup>409</sup>

Kidnappings remained a main terrorism practice for Iranian supported groups. The Revolutionary Justice Organization (RJO, another covername for Hizbollah)

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<sup>404</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 13.

<sup>405</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 13.

<sup>406</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 23.

<sup>407</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>408</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>409</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 23.

abducted a four person French TV crew in March of 1986.<sup>410</sup> Three of the hostages were released after France and Iran settled several bilateral issues, particularly pre-Khomeini debts. RJO also claimed responsibility for kidnapping Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracey in September and October of 1986. Another faction of Hizbollah continued to hold Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland hostage, who were kidnapped in 1985.<sup>411</sup> In 1986, Hizbollah leaders made several public statements emphasizing that Tehran is a key member in any hostage negotiations.<sup>412</sup> Iran provided monetary aid and logistical support to many of the Hizbollah factions implicated in these kidnappings. IRGC units in Lebanon are also suspected as being involved in the continued detention of Western Hostages.<sup>413</sup> Beginning in 1986 and through 1989, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Iran's Minister of Interior, provided support for Hizbollah.<sup>414</sup>

The IRGC expanded its role in the support and direct involvement of terrorist activities. It primarily focused on protecting and promoting the interests of Islamic Republic and act as it's military arm. This includes the army, navy, and air units and was an essential element of the Iranian armed forces. Both military and civilian aspects of the IRGC were responsible for exporting revolution, and was directly involved in the planned and execution of terrorist activities.<sup>415</sup> Through Iran's own agencies, diplomatic, and intelligence organizations the IRGC supported, sponsored, and conducted terrorist

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<sup>410</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 21.

<sup>411</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>412</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 21.

<sup>413</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 20, 22.

<sup>414</sup> Mannes, 161.

<sup>415</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 22.

attacks.<sup>416</sup> The IRGC sought to promote revolutionary Islam, eliminate of opponents of the Khomeini Regime, and sought to advance Tehran's foreign policy goals. Limited amounts of evidence link IRGC members to terrorist attacks in Europe and the Persian Gulf. Representative Guards were assigned to diplomatic missions and were kept on call as a terrorism resource overseas.<sup>417</sup> Additionally, when evidence was lacking to prove Iranian involvement in terrorist attacks in Lebanon, a vast amount of evidence existed connecting of IRGC involvement with Hizbollah.<sup>418</sup> Another directive is to establish another Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Tehran desired to make Hizbollah a unified movement under Iran's complete direction, and to accomplish this goal, Iran utilized the IRGC to support, direct, and control operations. Iran dedicated several hundred IRGC members to provide military training and logistical support to Hizbollah members from the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.<sup>419</sup>

On Christmas Day in 1986, another Iraqi airliner was hijacked and crashed in Saudi Arabia. Several groups, including Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, but the actual perpetrator remains undetermined. The operation may have been timed to coincide with a meeting of Iraqi opposition groups meeting in Tehran from the 24<sup>th</sup> through the 28<sup>th</sup> of December, although Iran denied any involvement in the hijacking.<sup>420</sup>

Attacks against French interests continued. An Iranian backed faction in Lebanon is suspected for the murder of French Military Attache in Beirut, in September of 1986,

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<sup>416</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 22.

<sup>417</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 22.

<sup>418</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 22.

<sup>419</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 22.

<sup>420</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 24.

and for an attack against another French Contingency of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in South Lebanon.<sup>421</sup>

Bahrain arrested a couple dozen terrorists from the group Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) who was supported by Iran and was committed to the overthrow of the Bahraini ruling family. The group potentially has several thousand members and maintains overseas branches, but has not conducted a successful attack since the arrest of these members. This was only a small success for Bahrain in 1986 as Iran spurred a wave of terrorism and violence in the nation against foreign residents and workers.<sup>422</sup>

The United States continued making consignments of weapons to Iran in hopes of return of hostages. On July 26, 1986, another hostage, Lawrence Martin Jenky, was released from captivity in Lebanon. Islamic Jihad claimed Jenky was released as a sign of goodwill but in reality, Iran had received a shipment of weapons a few weeks earlier on July 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>.<sup>423</sup> A final weapons shipment was delivered in October and a month later on November 2<sup>nd</sup> Iran released David Jacobs. This agreement of exchange of weapons for hostages exposed Iran's involvement in the kidnapping of hostages as well Iran's ability to control sponsored terrorist groups.<sup>424</sup>

France also dealt with Iran as an effort to have hostages released. After the four TV crewmembers were kidnapped in June of 1986, France expelled hundreds of members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), including the leader Masoud Rajavi as part

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<sup>421</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>422</sup> Shay, 205.

<sup>423</sup> Shay, 119.

<sup>424</sup> Shay, 120.

of French payment to Iran, resulting in the return of two of the hostages.<sup>425</sup> In November of 1986, another hostage was released after France made a payment of \$330 Million to Iran. The remaining hostage was released on November 27, 1986, after France withdrew charges against Wahid Gorgi, an Iranian terrorist involved in a series of attacks in France during 1986.<sup>426</sup> By giving into Iran's demands, France enabled and encouraged Iran and Hizbollah to activate terror networks against France until most of Iran's demands, politically, economically, and militarily were met.<sup>427</sup>

Of the groups supported in 1986, the groups identified by the State Department were: Supreme Assembly for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain, Islamic Dawa Party (with branches in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon), and Organization for Islamic Revolution in Arabian Peninsula.<sup>428</sup>

## **1987**

Iranian involvement in Middle Eastern terrorism particularly utilization of Hizbollah was substantial in 1987. U.S. Department of State believes that the majority of Iranian leadership deemed terrorism as an acceptable policy option and viewed it as a major weapon in dealing with powerful nations like the United States and Persian Gulf.<sup>429</sup> Many leaders publicly stated that Shia terrorism against U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut was the motivation for U.S. forces to withdraw and ultimately lead to an ideological win for Iran. Although leaders agreed on utilization of terrorism, not all agreed upon specific

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<sup>425</sup> Shay, 121. MEK is a militanistic group opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran and frequently a target of Iranian terrorism.

<sup>426</sup> Shay, 121.

<sup>427</sup> Shay, 122.

<sup>428</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1986*, 10.

<sup>429</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987*, (Washington, D.C., 1988), 35-36.



operations that Iran frequently condones.<sup>430</sup> In 1987, U.S. increased military involvement in the Gulf causing Iran to formulate contingency plans for anti-U.S. terror operations in the summer.<sup>431</sup> Beginning in January, Iran stepped up support for international terrorism via state agents and surrogate groups. Iran did so through several methods; terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other moderate Arab States in both the Persian Gulf and Europe, assassination of dissidents in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, West Germany, Turkey, and Pakistan, ordering the kidnapping of U.S. journalist Charles Glass, and beginning a worldwide search to identify potential U.S. targets for terrorist attacks.<sup>432</sup>

Iran continued to recruit terrorists of varying religions in the Persian Gulf training in tactics and subversion. The Persian Gulf remained a central target of Iranian terrorism, particularly Bahrain. Iran trained a Bahrainian oil engineer to sabotage the only oil refinery in the country and carry out other anti-Bahrain attacks. Fortunately, Bahrain authorities arrested the individual in December of 1987 before many of those attacks could be carried out.<sup>433</sup> Near by country Turkey requested that Iranian consular officials leave the country in connection with the treason case involving Abu Nidal Group.<sup>434</sup> In contrast to more covert methods of utilizing terrorism, Iran's threats against Kuwait remained overt and blatantly obvious, tensions peaked in 1987 during the Oil Tanker War. This war also greatly impacted the already degraded relations between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. targeted Iranian interests and vessels, Iran retaliated via surrogate

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<sup>430</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 35.

<sup>431</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

<sup>432</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 35.

<sup>433</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

<sup>434</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 26.

terrorists attacks against U.S. targets included kidnapping.<sup>435</sup> Kuwaiti authorities arrested twelve terrorist suspects in early 1987; the suspects were mainly Kuwaiti Shia from prominent families with ties to Iran. The arrests may have slightly impacted Iranian capabilities to roust terrorist activities, but Tehran still had important assets in East Province of Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf.<sup>436</sup> During interrogations of the twelve terrorists, information was revealed that a branch of Hizbollah in Kuwait had helped Shiite opposition organizations in Bahrain to smuggle weapons into Kuwait.<sup>437</sup>

Iran supported groups including Hizbollah, the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Republic of Iraq, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, IFLB, and Islamic Call Party (Dawa) branches in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon.<sup>438</sup> In December, leader of the PFLP-GC, Jibril, met with Iran's Foreign Minister purportedly seeking new sources of support and discussed creation of an Islamic Organization to liberate Palestine; a few months later in 1988, the PFLP-GC began cooperating with Hizbollah in Lebanon.<sup>439</sup> Additionally, many attacks that occurred in the Persian Gulf are believed to have occurred without explicit direction from Iran but acted upon by approval or in principle.<sup>440</sup>

Cooperation between Iran and Hizbollah remained high in 1987, similarly to previous years. Hizbollah remained dedicated to the creation of Iranian style Islamic

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<sup>435</sup> Shay, 169.

<sup>436</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 23.

<sup>437</sup> Shay, 205.

<sup>438</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

<sup>439</sup> Mannes, 325.

<sup>440</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

Republic in Iran.<sup>441</sup> Iran continued to provide substantial support and assistance to the group, retaining significant influence over the group, particularly in the taking of hostages.<sup>442</sup> The IRGC continued to work with Hizbollah, extensively out of Lebanon, and particularly the Bekaa Valley. For extremists in Lebanon, Khomeini remained the model of Islamic Revolutionary Ideals.<sup>443</sup> Iranian use of kidnappings as a bargaining chip continued in 1987.<sup>444</sup> U.K. citizens remained targets of kidnapping by Hizbollah who captured Terry White, a cleric attempting to free Western hostages in Lebanon. White was ultimately released in 1991.

Ayatollah Khomeini made sure that the elimination of regime opponents at home and abroad was a major goal of terrorist acts. Through this direction, dissidents were hunted down and killed in Europe, the U.S., Middle East, and Asia; many anti-Khomeini leaders, Pakistani religious and political figures were the targets of assassination attempts.<sup>445</sup> The former chief pilot for Rafsanjani, who at the time was the Speaker Iranian Assembly, defected to Europe and was shot in West Germany. In total, seven were murdered and two were threatened in Europe.<sup>446</sup> In July, Iran agents attacked dissidents in four houses in Karachi and Quetta with automatic weapons, only a few were arrested. Those arrested disclosed that Iran may have discouraged from additional attacks that year.<sup>447</sup>

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<sup>441</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 44-45.

<sup>442</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 35-36, 44-45, Iran provided money, training, weapons, explosives, and political, diplomatic and organizations aid.

<sup>443</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

<sup>444</sup> Shay, 181.

<sup>445</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 28.

<sup>446</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

<sup>447</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 28.

In addition to targeting of dissidents, leaders within Iran called for the overthrow of the Saudi ruling family after an Iran-instigated clash during the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca in July of 1987, where approximately four to six hundred pilgrims were killed, including Iranians.<sup>448</sup> Hundreds of Iranians were killed during the incident; the resulting call for overthrow included revenge for those who died in July, as well as ending Saudi control over Islamic Holy Places within Saudi Arabia. Iran responded with harsh condemnation of Saudi Arabia, igniting a terrorist campaign against the nation and their interests worldwide.<sup>449</sup> In September of 1987, a Saudi bank was bombed in which a pro-Iranian terrorist group was suspected of being responsible.<sup>450</sup>

Clashes between Iran and France continued in 1987 as a five month stand-off began, coined the Embassy War. An Iran Embassy employee was suspected in aiding the terrorists responsible for the 1986 Paris bombing campaign and providing refuge in the Iran Embassy in Paris. Paris police raided the embassy leading to the blockade of the French Embassy in Tehran by Iranian police.<sup>451</sup> Iran fostered a terror network with Hizbollah in France that was involved in approximately twelve attacks against the country. The network was headed by Fuad Ali Salah, a Tunisian with French citizenship. The sites chosen for attacks lead to indiscriminate killings to influence the French government to cave to demands for release of the FARL leader, release of Anis Nakash,

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<sup>448</sup> Shay, 197.

<sup>449</sup> Shay, 197.

<sup>450</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 36.

<sup>451</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 21.

Roijan Garbidjan, an Armenian terrorist, and change French policy and stop aid to Iraq in the ongoing Iran-Iraq War.<sup>452</sup>

On July 24<sup>th</sup>, an AirAfric plane was hijacked en route from the Congo to Paris and diverted to Geneva, Switzerland. An unknown organization claimed responsibility threatened to kill U.S. and French hostages if French authorities did not end the siege on Iran Embassy in Paris. The ease of hijacking this plane indicated that the reach of Iranian terrorism extended into Africa.<sup>453</sup> Hijacker Ali Muhammad Hairi was arrested and sentenced.<sup>454</sup> These demands echoed similar demands from Hizbollah and Iran.<sup>455</sup> The standoff ultimately ended when arrangements were made for the departure of both Iran employees and French diplomats. In November, two French hostages were released from captivity in Lebanon and France scheduled additional repayments of debt owed to Iran pre-Khomeini. France also expelled additional Iranian dissidents and began additional arms sales to Iran.<sup>456</sup> The next two years, 1987-1989, were also very tense between Iran and Switzerland as several attacks and kidnappings involving Swiss citizens in order to obtain the release of terrorists.<sup>457</sup>

## **1988**

In 1988, Iran continued to garnish attention for sponsoring terrorist activities. In July, the United States confided in France that they had reason to suspect that Iran's ambassador to France was directly connected to the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis that took

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<sup>452</sup> Shay, 175-176.

<sup>453</sup> Shay, 47.

<sup>454</sup> Shay, 47, 191.

<sup>455</sup> Shay, 106.

<sup>456</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1987*, 21.

<sup>457</sup> Shay, 191.

place from 1979 to 1981.<sup>458</sup> France also faced continual struggles against Iran's long reach, in early 1988, three French hostages were released after France released Mohammed Muhadjer, a member of Lebanese Hizbollah. The coincidental timing of release of hostages and prisoners, in addition to France resuming diplomatic relations with Iran as well as repaying portions of debt raised speculation that the Chirac government again gave into Iranian demands.<sup>459</sup>

Although Iran continued to use terrorism to influence Western nations, it did temporarily cull back its involvement after ending war with Iraq. The war with Iraq was very expensive and Iran needed to open up opportunities to recover economically through assistance from the West. The U.N cease fire that Iran and Iraq agreed to in July of 1988 also contributed to a decrease in Iranian terror against western interests and Persian Gulf targets. A sign of this decrease is noted in the Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report in 1988 citing forty-five terrorist attacks with links to Iran in 1987, higher than the number in 1988 which only noted 32 such attacks.<sup>460</sup> Of the thirty-two attacks, most were targeted against moderate Persian Gulf States. Additionally, the Department of State noted a drop in attacks in Kuwait from seventeen in 1987 to five in 1988. Pro-Iranian Shia Kuwaitis and Iranian citizens were the main perpetrators of these international attacks.<sup>461</sup>

Iran used terrorism as an integral tool in foreign policy and maintaining significant hold over terrorist groups. Through direction by the Ayatollah Khomeini,

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<sup>458</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988*, (Washington, D.C., 1989), 26.

<sup>459</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 26.

<sup>460</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 7.

<sup>461</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 13.

Iran actively disseminated the Islamic Revolution through Sunni Organizations.<sup>462</sup> Iran encouraged violence against Saudi Arabian interests in retaliation for the riots during the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1987; 1988 marked a shift in focus of terrorism from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia.<sup>463</sup> The attacks against Saudi Arabia grew out of revenge for the 275 Iranians who died during the pilgrimage and the restrictions placed on Iranian attendance to future pilgrimages.<sup>464</sup> Iran publicly declared outrage as the nation announced commitment to retaliation, overthrow of the ruling Saudi Family, and end to Saudi rule over Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia.<sup>465</sup> Several attacks were focused against the Saudi National Airline. Pro-Iranian terrorists are suspected in being behind the attempted murder of three Saudi teachers in Lagos, Nigeria in March. On October 25<sup>th</sup> a Saudi diplomat was assassinated in Ankara, Turkey. Two months later on the 27<sup>th</sup> of December in Karachi, Pakistan there was an assassination attempt on another Saudi Diplomat.<sup>466</sup>

Iran may have decreased direct involvement in terrorist attacks, but it's influence over groups did not diminish, nor did it's active support of many groups. Hizbollah continued to receive substantial support in the form of training, money, weapons, explosives, political and diplomatic support and organizational aid. Hizbollah's Chief of Security, Imad Mughniyah, was suspected of directing Hizbollah members to hijack a Kuwaiti airplane in attempt to gain the release of seventeen Shia terrorists held in Kuwait; Iran was suspected with complicity.<sup>467</sup> On April 5, 1988 a Boeing 747 was

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<sup>462</sup> Shay, 76.

<sup>463</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 44.

<sup>464</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.

<sup>465</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.

<sup>466</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.

<sup>467</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 8.

hijacked from Thailand while en route to Kuwait and forced to land in Mashad Iran. Iranian Parliament Chairman Rafsanjani promised safe haven to the hijackers in return for release of the hostages.<sup>468</sup> The lack of arrests for attacks that took place during the year indicated that training provided by Iran was very successful. Even if Iran was not directly involved in the planning of taking the plane hostage, it at a minimum provided a friendly environment for the terrorists while at the Mashad Airport, airport authorities were aware of the flights arrival despite radio silence on Flight 422. Iranian officials are also suspected of allowing additional Hizbollah members with more weapons to board the plane while at Mashad.<sup>469</sup> Targets of terrorism continued to the domestic opponents of Shia's and government representatives that were deemed as dangerous to Iran. Involvement between Iran and Hizbollah, although mutually beneficial, impacted Iran's ability to gain acceptance as a legitimate and responsible member of the international community. The prolonged detention of hostages in Beirut, often directly tied to Iranian involvement either as acting as intermediary negotiator or directly complicit was one cause that prevented acceptance.<sup>470</sup> Iran did help to arrange release of German hostage Rudolf Cordes in September. Although it helped gain this release, Iran remained suspected of involvement in the kidnapping of United Nations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, a U.S. Marine and Ralph Schray, a Lebanese businessman was kidnapped on January 27, 1988.<sup>472</sup>

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<sup>468</sup> Shay, 106-107.

<sup>469</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 44-45.

<sup>470</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.

<sup>471</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.

<sup>472</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.



Although Iran still maintained the targeting of exiled opponents of the regime as a key focus of the regime, there was only one acknowledged attack against an Iranian dissident involving an arson attack in West Germany against an Iranian owner that sold anti-Khomeini videotapes.<sup>473</sup> There was an also attempted kidnapping of a dissident in Turkey in 1988.

Turkey took a more active stance against terrorists, increasing the number of counter-terrorist prosecutions in 1988. Turkey expelled four Iranian diplomats expelled from and [ut two Iranian nationals on trial for the attempted kidnapping of an anti-Khomeini activist. They were sentenced in 1989.<sup>474</sup> Iran provided limited support to Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) an active terrorist group operating out of Turkey.<sup>475</sup>

The spread of Iran's terrorist network continued into Africa in 1988. A stash of weapons was found in the apartment of a Lebanese Shiite in Abidjan. During the interrogation the man revealed that the weapons had been hidden in holy books and smuggled in from Lebanon to the Ivory Coast for use in terrorist attacks<sup>476</sup>

Due to the conflict between Hizbollah and Amal, Iran decreased support to Amal and continued to back Hizbollah. In the spring of 1988 Hizbollah finally defeated Amal in Beirut, with assistance from Iran.<sup>477</sup> Additionally, Iran support for PFLP-GC increased. On July 3, 1988, an American Airliner was shot down; the U.S. suspected that Iran paid the PFLP-GC for the attack in retaliation for the accidental downing of Iranian

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<sup>473</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 45.

<sup>474</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 32.

<sup>475</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 73.

<sup>476</sup> Shay, 47.

<sup>477</sup> Mannes, 150-151.

Airliner by a U.S. Warship.<sup>478</sup> Iran and the PFLF-GC were also suspected of involvement in the Lockerbie disaster in 1988.<sup>479</sup> On December 30, 1988 terrorist group Guards of the Islamic Republic initially claimed responsibility for the Lockerbie attack threatening additional attacks against U.S. citizens and interests if the U.S. would not banish the Shah.<sup>480</sup>

## **1989**

Iranian terrorism trends from 1988 and previous years flowed into 1989. Overall the number of terrorist attacks increased during this year, as Iran continued to provide significant support to Shia groups in Lebanon, particularly Hizbollah who received money, training, and weapons. Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani made a public statement calling Palestinians to kill U.S. and Western citizens in retaliation for Palestinians that were killed during the uprising in occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Rafsanjani also publicly encouraged hijacking planes and blowing up factories.<sup>481</sup> Iran also fostered new terrorist groups linked to Palestinian fundamentalist causes, expanded contacts with extremists in Lebanon, and supported attacks against Israeli, U.S., Western and modern Arab interests.<sup>482</sup> Reports suggesting PFLP-GC and Iranian involvement in the Pan-Am

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<sup>478</sup> Mannes, 325.

<sup>479</sup> Whittaker, 108; Shay, 108. On 7 July 1997 the German prosecutor handling interrogations began investigating testimony describing Iranian involvement from Abdul Hassan Masbakhi, a former Iran Intelligence Agent. He testified that Iran planned the attack in retaliation for the downing of Iranian passenger plane in July of 1988 and that Iran requested assistance from Libya in carrying out the attack.

<sup>480</sup> Shay, 108.

<sup>481</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989*, (Washington, D.C., 1990), 46.

<sup>482</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46.

103 bombing continued to swirl in 1989.<sup>483</sup> The Department of State reported that Iran sponsored twenty-eight terrorist attacks this year, down from thirty-two the previous year. Most of these were in conjunction with attacks against Salman Rushdie, continued attacks against Saudi Arabia, and targeting of dissidents.<sup>484</sup> The decrease was potentially due to increasingly selective targeting and successful attacks with less evidence that linked Iran to the attack. Iran continued to use its intelligence services to facilitate and coordinate terrorist attacks.<sup>485</sup>

The campaign against dissidents was possibly spurred due to fears regarding pending leadership transition after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June.<sup>486</sup> The number of attacks increased in 1989; the three successful attacks, likely planned and carried out by Iranian Intelligence Officers, resulted in the death of five people; three in Austria on June 4<sup>th</sup>, one in the United Arab Emirates also on June 4<sup>th</sup>, and one in Cyprus on the 28<sup>th</sup> of August.<sup>487</sup>

An offshoot related to the targeting of dissidents was the targeting of Salman Rushdie. Rushdie, an Indian and citizen of the Great Britain since 1968, wrote a book called “The Satanic Versus,” which portrays the Koran as a story and not religious truth, describing the Prophet Muhammad as a false prophet and in-fact a hallucinating man who found his wives in brothels.<sup>488</sup> Attacks directed towards Rushdie and his supporters

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<sup>483</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 47.

<sup>484</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 43, 46.

<sup>485</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46.

<sup>486</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46.

<sup>487</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46, 50-51.

<sup>488</sup> Shay, 182.

accounted for a major proportion of attacks in the Middle East and Western Europe.<sup>489</sup>

This book incited rage and assaulted the Islamic religion resulting in several attacks against bookstores in the United States, Italy, and Greece where the book was sold.<sup>490</sup> On February 14<sup>th</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against Salman Rushdie calling for his death and prevention of any distribution of his book. This fatwa divided the Muslim community, most were united against distribution of the book but not the fatwa; those clerics that supported the decree were frequently Iranian or members of Hizbollah.<sup>491</sup>

Religious leaders that did not agree with the fatwa also faced peril as they became viewed as enemies of Khomeini and targets of attacks. On March 20<sup>th</sup> two Muslim clerics were murdered in Brussels after one of them expressed opposition to the death threat sentence against Rushdie. The “Organization of the True Soldiers” claimed responsibility citing that the clerics were traitors to Islam.<sup>492</sup> The fatwa demonstrated Iran’s willingness to forgo international relations with economically wealthier countries to fulfill the regimes ideals and principles.<sup>493</sup> Because Rushdie was a citizen of Great Britain and continued to live in the country, Great Britain was at the receiving end of most of the terrorist attacks. In total there were eighteen incidents related to the book, six took place in London where the book was sold, and three against British Council Library buildings in Pakistan that occurred in February and March in Islamabad, Peshwar, and Karachi during business hours; one Pakistani security guard was killed as a result.<sup>494</sup> Two other attacks against

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<sup>489</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 9, Shay, pg. 182.

<sup>490</sup> Shay, 170, 182, 184.

<sup>491</sup> Shay, 182.

<sup>492</sup> Shay, 184.

<sup>493</sup> Shay, 184.

<sup>494</sup> Shay, 75, 184; Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 32, 38.

British targets took place, one in Turkey and another in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia against language centers.<sup>495</sup> In response to the terrorist attacks, the United Kingdom announced that any action against British citizens or others due to the fatwa Ayatollah Khomeini placed against Salman Rushdie, the U.K. would hold Iran personally responsible.<sup>496</sup> Riots in Pakistan and India broke out over the book. The Department of State believes that Iran was directly involved in the coordination and planning of the attacks. Within the United States, three incidents of international terrorism took place against bookstores in New York and California where the book was sold.<sup>497</sup> Responding to the religious ruling in February, leader of the PFLP-GC, Ahmed Jibril, offered to carry out the execution.<sup>498</sup>

In 1989, two bombs exploded in Mecca during the hajj. During interrogation, Shia terrorist confessed that they had been recruited, trained, and supported by Iran.<sup>499</sup> Saudi Arabia, charged and executed sixteen Kuwaiti Shia's convicted during the 1989 bombing of the Hajj (the pilgrimage). These actions attracted more attention from Iran due.<sup>500</sup> Some of the Shiite terrorists confessed that there was an affiliation existed between their organization and the Iranian Embassy in Kuwait, which provided aid in order to perpetrate the attack.<sup>501</sup> Saudi Arabia, although bearing the brunt of many terrorist attacks, refused to cave to Iranian demands, went ahead with the execution. After these executions leaders from both Iran and Hizbollah made public statements

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<sup>495</sup> Shay, 184.

<sup>496</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 32.

<sup>497</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 23.

<sup>498</sup> Shay, 75.

<sup>499</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46-47.

<sup>500</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 43.

<sup>501</sup> Shay, 197.

calling for revenge of the deaths of the terrorists had just been executed.<sup>502</sup> These statements lead to an increase in attacks against Saudi Arabia. On October 14<sup>th</sup> the Saudi Airlines office in Lahore, Pakistan was damaged by a bomb; two days later on the 16<sup>th</sup> a Saudi military attaché in Ankara, Turkey was injured when a bomb exploded under the seat of the car. Later in November two other attacks against Saudi interests occurred, one on the first of November in which a Saudi official in Beirut, Lebanon was assassinated by three gunmen. Islamic Jihad (an extension of Hizbollah) claimed responsibility for this attack. Closer to the end of the month on the 24<sup>th</sup>, another Saudi official responsible for coordinating aid in Pakistan for the Afghanistan was assassinated.<sup>503</sup>

Indications arose that Iran utilized Hizbollah to expand its terrorist network. In 1989, Iran attempted to smuggle weapons and explosives into Africa and Europe via two shipments. These shipments were important because they represented the transition from Phase One and beginning of a trend that Iran frequently utilized in Phase Two. Both shipments were interceded by authorities before reaching their final destination. The first was overtaken by Cypriot authorities, seized a shipment set on course for Monrovia, Liberia. On board were packages of jam, containing explosives, grenades, and detonators.<sup>504</sup> A second shipment, was seized on November 23<sup>rd</sup> in Valencia, Spain. Authorities arrested eight radical individuals, including three Hizbollah members. This

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<sup>502</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46-47.

<sup>503</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 47.

<sup>504</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 15.

shipment also utilized food products to hide explosives, grenades, and detonators. Both shipments originated in Sidon, Lebanon.<sup>505</sup>

Collaboration with the PFLP-GC continued in 1989. On September 19<sup>th</sup> a French, UTA passenger plane exploded over Niger. The device was similar in design to the one used in the ‘Delckamony Affair’ and took place while tensions between France, Iran, and Hizbollah were high. Tensions resulted from France’s support for General Michael Unn, who was anti-Syria and anti-Iran in ideology, the presence of French naval ships in Lebanon, and the Hizbollah threats for more attacks if France did stop supporting General Unn and remove ships from Lebanon. Even though there were similarities in bomb design there was no proof linking the PFLP-GC to the attack, only that Iran, Hizbollah, and PFLP-GC were in the middle of discussions at that time. Eventually Libya came to be blamed for bombing the UTA plane, and the deaths of 171 individuals.<sup>506</sup>

Kidnapping also remained high on Iran’s list of successful methods of exploiting terrorism. In November of 1989, Turkish press reported that two Iranian kidnappers attempted to smuggle an anti-Khomeini dissident back into Iran from Turkey in the trunk of their car a month before in October. The two men, Iranian diplomats were later released due to inherent immunity that prevented their prosecution and sent back to Iran where they both approximately one year in prison.<sup>507</sup> In contrast to this attempted kidnapping, kidnapping of foreigners in Lebanon ceased in 1989. This is apparently due

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<sup>505</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 15.

<sup>506</sup> Shay, 47, 75, 107.

<sup>507</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 32.

to the end of the Iran-Iraq War and hopes to improve relations with Western countries from an economic standpoint.<sup>508</sup>

PIJ began to receive increasingly more support from Iran. The group identified with Iran's position opposing peace between Palestine and Israel. By the end of the 1980s Iran began providing military and political aid and money to the group either directly to the group or through proxies located in Syria, Lebanon, including Hizbollah members.<sup>509</sup>

The United States, although not a direct target in many of the terrorist attacks that occurred in 1989, released \$567 million dollars in frozen assets as a continual part of clandestine negotiations in exchange for the release of hostages.<sup>510</sup> It was not until 1991 and 1992 when the last of the hostages were released due to mediation via a special United Nations envoy.<sup>511</sup>

Iran's sponsorship of terrorism declined in the number of attacks the United States could directly tie back to the country since 1987. This did not indicate that Iran lessened the amount of support, but rather that it had found other methods to do so without increasing attention to the government. The more covert methods for sponsorship through proxies does not diminish the potential for an increase in terrorist operations. Relations between Iran and neighboring countries remained tense after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. The rivalry that grew from that war, from the desire to expand the Islamic Revolution, and from the fact that Iran was forging closer ties to very radical terrorist

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<sup>508</sup> Shay, 72.

<sup>509</sup> Shay, 76.

<sup>510</sup> Mannes, 149.

<sup>511</sup> Shay, 72.



groups, like the PFLP-GC, PIJ, PKK, and Hizbollah could ignite increased terrorist attacks in the Middle East.<sup>512</sup> The support that Iran provided these groups ranged from small amounts of aid to extensive amounts of money, training, explosives, political and diplomatic, and organizational aid.<sup>513</sup>

Khomeini's death in 1989 forced Iran to face the inevitable transition to new leadership in the state. Under his reign, Iran, similarly to Cuba, began to use terrorism en masse during the first ten years. Iran's use of terrorism exploded in the beginning years, but unlike Cuba, Iran was much more successful in the beginning possibly due to the religious stance, which garnished a greater following than that of the communist ideology, and that Iran had access to a substantially larger amount of money. As Iran exited the first phase and entered the second of State Sponsored Terrorism, sponsorship became more precise providing specific types of aid to groups in order to reach desired results. The trends observed in this phase, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, targeting of dissidents, and the expansion of the terror network indicated that Iran tested many techniques to find out how to best achieve political and foreign policy goals. Each brought varying amounts of success but only a few were maintained into Phase Two of Iranian terrorism.

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<sup>512</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 5, 9, 59-62, 64, 75.

<sup>513</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 59-62, 64, 75.

## ***Phase Two: Expansion of an Empire***

***1990***

After Khomeini's death, the future of Iran momentarily seemed up in the air. An era of terrorism began by Khomeini ended abruptly with his passing; however the utilization of terrorism proved to remain the key tool Iran would use to achieve national and foreign policy objectives. A few trends observed in Phase One carried over into Phase Two, which commenced after Khomeini's death; particularly the targeting of dissidents. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie proved to have lasting fervor as one of the last declarations by Khomeini, many within and supported by the government vowed to carry it out. Holding large meetings and conferences, preventing the Middle East Peace Process, elimination of Israel and removal of western influence, particularly that of the U.S. also maintained prominence as an objective of Iranian terrorism. New to Phase Two were bulk provision of advanced weapons through covert shipments, an increase in ties to terrorist groups and direct involvement in their activities, as well as an obvious shift in focus of terrorism targets. Iran turned its attention in the start of Phase Two towards expanding its reach through proxy groups to the Western hemisphere. Later, as Iran cultivated alliances with current and potential SSTs, Cuba and Venezuela respectively, it also focused renewed attention on the turbulent nation, Iraq. Similarly to those trends in the first phase; these indicate the value that terrorism posed to Iran and motivations behind utilization. As Iran began to hone its sponsorship of terrorism in the beginning of 1990, it still held on to methods that had brought monetary and ideological success. Key components that carried over into the second phase were attacks against Saudi interests

and officials, kidnapping, targeting of dissidents, and supporting radical groups such as the PIJ and PJLP-GC.<sup>514</sup> Iran provided increasing and continual support, advice, and assistance to an ever growing number of terrorist groups in efforts to strengthen relations with Muslim extremists.<sup>515</sup> This was due in part to reaction to the loss of the nation's leader and rebound after transition to new leadership emerged. The number of terrorist attacks attributable to Iran however, dropped in 1990 from twenty-four attacks in 1989 to ten.<sup>516</sup> This did not indicate that Iran was less involved in terrorist activities, but actually an increase in the country's capabilities and ability to covertly support and perpetrate such acts. Although the number of attacks dropped, relations Iran had with terrorist groups were nurtured during the beginning years of its second phase of terrorism.

One trend that carried over from Phase One was the taking hostages. By 1990, Iran still supported Hizbollah's holding of fourteen Western hostages, six of which were American, and three, including Lieutenant Colonel Higgins, were feared dead. Initially, Western Nations hoped that newly elected President Rafsanjani was the key to enhanced relations; this desire was echoed by a report published on February 22<sup>nd</sup> in the Tehran Times reflecting his view that hostages should be released without preconditions. Two months later in response to this report, its proxy group released Frank Reed and Robert Polhill, which was a positive turn in the kidnapping of Western citizens.<sup>517</sup> However, in contradiction to his February 22<sup>nd</sup> statement, the release of any hostages during this time received hard criticism from Iranian and Hizbollah hardliners who questioned what

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<sup>514</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990*, (Washington, D.C., 1991), 33

<sup>515</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33.

<sup>516</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33.

<sup>517</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 25, 33.

benefit there was in the release of a hostage without a form of payment. This position regarding the value of hostages reflected the fact that Iran was the key to release of hostages. Clearly Iranian hardliners won out as no other hostages were released that year and new press reports indicated that Iran was seeking additional reward before any more would be freed.<sup>518</sup>

As it had in the past, France again caved to Iranian demands in order to obtain the release of hostages in 1990. On July 27, 1990, President Mitterrand pardoned five pro-Iranian terrorists, expelling them from the country, one of the five was Anis Naccache, a Lebanese man who was serving life in prison for the murder of a policeman in 1982 and wounding of three others in an assassination attempt on former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar. According to press reports this French deal was in attempt to garnish the release of French and other Western hostages still being held in Lebanon.<sup>519</sup> However, France did not benefit from the deal as the targeting of dissidents living in France continued as well.

Another methodology of Iranian terror was the targeting of dissidents, which was aggressively advocated in Phase Two. In September 1990, an Iranian Kurdish woman was killed by a letter bomb apparently intended for her husband, chairman of the Kurdish Independence Party in Sweden. Swedish authorities could not officially determine who was responsible for the attack even though her husband told police that he was under constant threat from Iran. Members of the local Kurdish community

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<sup>518</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33.

<sup>519</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 10.

condemned the attack.<sup>520</sup> The next month, on October 23<sup>rd</sup> the leader of Flag of Freedom Organization, an Iranian dissident group was assassinated in his apartment in Paris, France. Iranian government agents were suspected of involvement.<sup>521</sup>

Attacks against dissidents continued to spread throughout Europe. One occurred in Switzerland with the assassination of Kazem Radjavi, who was the brother to Massoud Radjavi, the leader of the large dissident group, the Mujahadeen. Iranian hit squads descended across continents, particularly Europe, to target and eliminate regime enemies. Evidence found during the investigation of Radjavi's death indicated that at least one Iranian office was involved. It was later determined that the thirteen suspects had mostly traveled together to Switzerland, all on official Iranian passports, additionally, the passports and tickets to the country were all obtained at the same time. The Swiss government condemned the attacks and called upon the Iranian Embassy Officer to do the same.<sup>522</sup> Instead, the Iranian Government objected to the way La Suisse portrayed and reported the murder and implication of official Iranian involvement.<sup>523</sup> The Iranian Embassy filed suit against Swiss newspaper La Suisse under Article 296 of the Swiss Penal Code citing that law prohibited insults to a foreign state, chief executive, diplomatic representative, or to the government. Attacks against dissidents were not solely located in Europe; a fourth attack against dissidents occurred in 1990 against a person residing in Pakistan.<sup>524</sup>

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<sup>520</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 15.

<sup>521</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 47.

<sup>522</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 15.

<sup>523</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 15.

<sup>524</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33.

The fatwa against Salman Rushdie did not end with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Instead, Rushdie proved to be the most sought after dissident by Iranian leaders and the country's supported terrorist groups, who wanted to fulfill this for Khomeini. However, Great Britain did renew diplomatic relations in 1990 that had been severed a year before in 1989 in objection to Iran's death threat against the author.<sup>525</sup>

Relations with Persian Gulf States did not flourish during the 1990s. Prior to the Iraqi Invasion, Kuwait expressed concern regarding the Iranian terrorist threat mainly due to the increasingly influence Iran had over Kuwaiti Shia.<sup>526</sup> In response to the growing threat, four Kuwaiti Shia were put on trial, in May of 1990, for subversive activities including attempted bombings of the Kuwait Airway Building, which occurred in 1988 and 1987; one of the accused men was also reportedly involved in the 1989 Haj bombing in Mecca. Iran severely condemned and criticized the trial, which provided evidence to the concern of the expanding reach over and influence on the Kuwaiti Shia. Eventually all four were acquitted on all counts on June 18<sup>th</sup>.<sup>527</sup> As Iranian influence grew, it tried to infiltrate Kuwait with more Iranian citizens to increase its level of control. Large numbers began pouring into Kuwait, mainly by sea; most were captured and expelled within days of entry.<sup>528</sup>

As Iran became more comfortable in its role as SST, it continued to host large conferences for leaders and members of supported terrorist organizations. Frequently leaders, such as Ahmad Jibril of the PFLP-GC and other prominent Hizbollah members

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<sup>525</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 17, 33.

<sup>526</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 29.

<sup>527</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 29.

<sup>528</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 29.

would visit the country. In December 1990, Tehran hosted the World Conference on Palestine to gain increasing influence over Islamic affairs and the Palestinian movement. Leaders from groups such as Saiqa, Hamas, Hizbollah, and PIJ attended.<sup>529</sup>

Support for such groups continued to grow in all aspects including that of money, arms, and training. By the early 1990s the IRGC and Hizbollah were working in concert to provide training to groups such as the IG and al-Jihad out of bases in Sudan.<sup>530</sup> These ties and direct connections would continue throughout Phase Two. Iran provided varying levels of support to groups such as Hizbollah, which traditionally received the largest amount of aid, money, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and logistical support. Other groups received varying amounts of sponsorship from the PKK which generally received safe haven to the PIJ and PFLP-GC which fall between the two.<sup>531</sup> Intelligence officers in Iranian Embassies throughout the world acted to covertly provide protection via diplomatic pouch to terrorists, conveying many forms of aid including weapons.<sup>532</sup>

Similarly to Phase One, Iran continued to foster alliances with similarly minded nations. As such, Iranian relations with Sudan grew in 1990, especially after the National Islamic Front, lead by Hassan al Turabi, reinforced its status as the dominant entity in the new Sudanese regime. By October of 1990, the level of diplomatic relations between the two nations had risen the point at which each nation had dispatched its own

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<sup>529</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33-34.

<sup>530</sup> Mannes, 89.

<sup>531</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 16, 33, 56-58, 66-67.

<sup>532</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33.

ambassadors.<sup>533</sup> Ali Akbar Mohtashami became the Iranian Ambassador; Mohtashami had played an integral role in the U.S. Embassy invasion by the IRGC in 1979 and was a founding father of Hizbollah during his time as Ambassador in Lebanon in 1982.<sup>534</sup> This indicated the type of relationship Iran was attempting to cultivate with Sudan.

### **1991**

Throughout Phase Two, Iran continued to be a leading SST; in 1991, in a similar trend as year before, the number of terrorist attacks directly attributable to Iran decreased to only five, down from ten in 1990.<sup>535</sup> A key component to the seemingly fewer attacks linked to Iran was a change in methods of business. Terrorism continued to be approved by the highest-ranking members of the regime, but because the channels for relaying approval were more tightly controlled, the Iranian government had more deniability in attacks. Intelligence services were integrally involved in the planning and coordination of terrorist attacks, and pro-Iranian organizations acted on Iran's behalf in attacks against regime opponents.<sup>536</sup>

Iran also continued to foster and strengthen ties with extremist groups utilizing its embassies throughout the world to provide advice, money, and aid. This support became increasingly important as other nations began to withdraw support to groups due to Western pressure.<sup>537</sup> Of the groups receiving the most aid, Hizbollah remained on the top of the list. Ahmad Jibril, Hizbollah member and supporter of the PIJ made frequent trips to Iran and routinely visited leaders within the regime. Iranian ties to terrorist groups

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<sup>533</sup> Shay, 47-48.

<sup>534</sup> Shay, 48.

<sup>535</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991*, (Washington, D.C., 1992), 30.

<sup>536</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 30.

<sup>537</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 29, 31.



were developed in order to influence the Palestinian movement, halt the Middle East Peace progress, and threaten anyone who supported it.<sup>538</sup>

A special interest was placed on Palestinian terrorist organizations and militant Islamic groups during 1991. Similarly to 1990, Iran used conferences to provide ideological support and aid to maintain influence over terror groups. On October 18<sup>th</sup> Iran hosted the International Conference of Islamic Revolution in which over four hundred people attended from more than sixty countries.<sup>539</sup> From the 19<sup>th</sup> through the 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 1991, Iran held the “Intifadah and the Islamic World” to preserve such relationships. Immediately after this conference, groups in attendance issued threats to participants in the Middle East peace talks.<sup>540</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor stated on October 30<sup>th</sup> that “Those who take part in this treason will suffer the wrath of nations” in regard to the Middle East peace Process. Earlier that month Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabili, a senior cleric within the Iranian regime called upon Muslims to attack U.S. citizens and their properties as a religious duty.<sup>541</sup> Yet another conference was held in Tehran on the 30<sup>th</sup> of October, called the Madrid Conference, again in opposition to the Middle East peace process. Representatives from Palestinian and Shiite terrorist groups attended. At this conference President Rafsanjani declared a willingness to advance forces to war with Israel.<sup>542</sup>

Contrary to 1990, Iran aided in gaining the release of hostages still held by Hizbollah. This may have been spurred on by President Rafsanjani’s attempts to make

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<sup>538</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 31.

<sup>539</sup> Shay, 49.

<sup>540</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 2, 21.

<sup>541</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 31.

<sup>542</sup> Shay, 75-76.

amends with Western nations in order to stabilize and modernize the economy and gain additional foreign support; the ramifications if hostages were not released had potential to be detrimental to any support he sought.<sup>543</sup> This change in stance from continuing to hold hostages in order to negotiate their release indicated that both Hizbollah and Iran were doubting the benefits that holding hostages for long terms held.<sup>544</sup> The U.S. made no concessions to Iran during 1991. Although Iran released the hostages, the SST did not punish the captors, but instead provided new identities to more than forty former Hizbollah terrorists involved in the kidnappings in order to prevent prosecution and retaliation by Western nations.<sup>545</sup> Iran also continued to hold the upper hand in regards to exchange of hostages for terrorists, as the Iranian Ambassador to Germany threatened the fate of two German relief workers who were held hostage in attempt to gain the release of the Hammadi brother, two Hizbollah members in jail in Germany.<sup>546</sup>

Iran did negotiate with Hizbollah for the release of nine western hostages, six of whom were U.S. citizens as well as the remains of Buckley and Higgins to be returned to the U.S.<sup>547</sup> On December 4<sup>th</sup> Terry Anderson was released from captivity, effectively ending the ten year hostage crisis. During those ten years hundreds of Western citizens, U.S., French, British, and German, were kidnapped.<sup>548</sup> Through the taking of hostages, Iran was able to obtain the release of imprisoned terrorists, the release of millions in frozen assets, and in several instances, the provision of advanced weaponry.

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<sup>543</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 30.

<sup>544</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 1.

<sup>545</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 30.

<sup>546</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 30.

<sup>547</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 1.

<sup>548</sup> Mannes, 150.

Attacks in foreign countries continued in 1991 as well. Iran supported various terrorist groups in Turkey who were suspected of involvement in the March 26<sup>th</sup> carbombing in Ankara in which an Iraqi diplomat was injured and two other car bombs in October in which a U.S. service man lost his life and an Egyptian diplomat was injured.<sup>549</sup> Tehran continued to provide the PKK with support and sanctuary.<sup>550</sup>

Relations with Sudan established the previous year continued to grow. Throughout the early 1990s, extreme efforts between the two nations were made to tighten economic, political and military ties. Near the end of April 1991, from the 25<sup>th</sup> through the 28<sup>th</sup>, al Turabi created the Popular Islamic Conference (PIC) whose goal was to plan and organize radical Sunni groups against the West after the defeat of Sadaam Hussein in the Gulf War. The PIC created a permanent committee in Khartoum with representatives from fifty-five countries gathered to discuss future of the ‘battle of radical Islam’.<sup>551</sup> Iran took notice of the PIC and helped to establish headquarters for the group. Several days after the conference in Khartoum, the head of Sudan’s Intelligence Organization, Colonel el Fatah Urva visited Tehran for consultation and returned with advanced, encrypted communications equipment for use by PIC headquarters and their support entities in other countries.<sup>552</sup> PIC creator, al Turabi, attended the International Conference of Islamic Republic in October of 1991.<sup>553</sup> In May 1991, the Iranian Cultural Minister visited Khartoum to lay plans for the building of an Iranian cultural center. Since that meeting, Iranian propaganda became widespread throughout religious and

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<sup>549</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 31.

<sup>550</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 30.

<sup>551</sup> Shay, 48.

<sup>552</sup> Shay, 48.

<sup>553</sup> Shay, 49.

cultural networks in Sudan, founded directly from Iran or through Iranian patronage.<sup>554</sup> Iran sent experts and advisors to Sudan to aid in setting up an effective terrorist network; two main campuses were established to train Islamic terrorists, one in al Shambat and another in al Mazra'ah. Both sites were training camps for use of light weapons, explosives, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), night vision, and how to set ambushes.<sup>555</sup> Islamic fundamentalists flocked to Sudan from across continents, from near by Arab states, and from other Africa countries. On the December 13, 1991, Iranian President Rafsanjani visited Sudan, a demonstration of the close ties and cooperation between the nations, as Sudan became a front for the Iranian exportation of the Islamic Revolution.<sup>556</sup> Activities that were originally located only within Iran and Lebanon became common place in Sudan; conferences were held, training camps established, and funneling of provisions and activists.<sup>557</sup>

Attacks linked to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie also continued, regardless of the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini, who issued the fatwa had passed. Instead of ending the fatwa, the Iranian government increased the bounty against him to at least two million dollars. Any associate of Rushdie, seller, or translator of his book were targeted. In 1991, two translators were attacked, resulting in the injury of an Italian and death of a Japanese citizen.<sup>558</sup>

Dissidents remained high on the target list for the Iranian regime. State agents were the prime suspects in the murder of former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in

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<sup>554</sup> Shay, 48.

<sup>555</sup> Shay, 48.

<sup>556</sup> Shay, 48.

<sup>557</sup> Shay, 50.

<sup>558</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 31.

Paris, France on 6 August 1991. In response to the attack, the French Government issued international arrest warrants for Iranian officials two months later in October, one of which was for Hussein Sheikhattar the senior official in the Iranian Ministry of Telecommunications, suspected of supporting the assassination.<sup>559</sup> Later, four Iranians were arrested in France and Switzerland in connection to the murder. Other Iranians and Turkish citizens were also arrested in Turkey in connection to the crime. French President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Dumas postponed trips to Iran due to the public linkage of the Iranian government to the murder.<sup>560</sup>

## **1992**

Iran's status as a SST continued to grow; the 1992 DoS Patterns of Global Terrorism Report identified Iran as the leading state sponsor with worldwide reach.<sup>561</sup> Year after year use of terrorism allowed Iran to productively attain policy objectives, this success also garnished support from the highest levels within the government.<sup>562</sup> Iranian focus against the Middle East peace process continued; stopping advancement of the cause became a central goal in through the sponsorship of terrorism. Iran became the principle leader in the fight against the peace process and sponsor for radical Islamic and Palestinian groups providing extensive logistical support through training and weapons and monetary support.

An August 1992 meeting held in Damascus gathered together Iran's Vice President who met with the Chiefs of Hizbollah and PFLP-GC. Two months later, in

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<sup>559</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 2, 30.

<sup>560</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1991*, 8.

<sup>561</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992*, (Washington, D.C., 1993), 1.

<sup>562</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

October, Tehran hosted a series of meetings with Hizbollah and Hamas. Through these meetings, ideological support was also granted; after which, Hizbollah increased operations against Israel, including repeated use of rocket attacks against villages in Northern Israel.<sup>563</sup> Ties with Hamas also flourished as leader Musa Mohammed Abu Marzuq and Iran set up cooperative agreements in 1992.<sup>564</sup> At these meetings both agreed to a common goal; halting the peace process and coordinating attacks against Israel.<sup>565</sup> Iran and its surrogates were linked to more than twenty terrorist attacks in 1992 in which Israel was a prime target.<sup>566</sup> The U.S., although a frequent target of Iranian rhetoric, was not a victim of direct attacks in 1992. This did not, however, halt regular surveillance on U.S. missions and personnel.<sup>567</sup>

Surveillance and hunting of Iranian opposition groups also continued particularly in the U.S., Europe, and Middle East. Although there is no direct evidence, there was enough of an indication that Iran was involved in the assassination of Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) leader and three followers in Berlin in September. This circumstantial evidence of Iranian involvement was due to the close resemblance of the 1989 murder of the previous KDPI leader in Vienna.<sup>568</sup> Another dissident was stabbed to death, one month before, on August 4<sup>th</sup> in Bonn which was also very similar to the

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<sup>563</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>564</sup> Mannes, 122.

<sup>565</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 21.

<sup>566</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 21.

<sup>567</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>568</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

stabbing of former Prime Minister Bakhtiar the previous year.<sup>569</sup> Also in September, Hizbollah members killed four Kurdish members in Berlin at the request of Iran.<sup>570</sup>

### ***Mykonos Attack***

On September 18, 1992, two men entered the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin and shot and killed four Kurdish expatriates; Dr. Sadek Sharafkandi, Fathkhul Abduli, Humiyuh Ardalalah, and Nuri Dekurds.<sup>571</sup> Five years later a Berlin judge Feritiuph Kovash ruled that instructions for the assassination were directly issued by Iranian leaders via covert operations communications. Iranian leaders he identified as complicit were the president, spiritual leader, intelligence leader, and foreign policy advisor. The judge claimed that the gun used in the attack had been previously stored in the Shah's weapon depot and additional indication of Iran's complicity was that two days before the Mykonos attack a state of alert was declared by Iran forces in the Kurdish region of Iran.<sup>572</sup> This assassination and subsequent ruling provided conclusive evidence that Iran utilized terrorism to achieve foreign policy goals and eliminate anyone who posed a threat to the regime.

Iranian reach had also spread into Turkey as terrorist groups there sought Iran's support. The Turkish Islamic Jihad, a small group of men sympathetic to Tehran, had been responsible for numerous attacks against external enemies of the Islamic regime. At least eight attacks could be attributed to this group since 1985, including an October 1991 car bomb attack resulting in the death of a U.S. Service man and two June 1992 attacks

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<sup>569</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>570</sup> Mannes, 162.

<sup>571</sup> Shay, 215.

<sup>572</sup> Shay, 216.

killing an Israeli diplomat utilizing a car bomb in Ankara and a grenade attack against a synagogue a few days earlier in Istanbul.<sup>573</sup> These two attacks occurred within the first few weeks after Israeli soldiers killed the Hizbollah Chief, Musawi, in South Lebanon. Both Hizbollah and Iran vowed revenge against Israel and the United States.<sup>574</sup> Iran also retained ties with the PKK, who was responsible for hundreds of deaths of Turkish citizens in 1992.<sup>575</sup>

Sudan served as a vital ally for Iran during the year. Both countries worked together, Iran provided IRGC members to train the Sudanese military and Sudan served to promote Islamic Revolution. The Iranian Ambassador to Khartoum was involved in the U.S. Embassy takeover in 1979 and was in charge in Beirut during development of Hizbollah in Lebanon. Khartoum served as the conduit for which Tehran could contact Palestinian and North African extremists of the Sunni branch of Islam.<sup>576</sup> Ties with Sudan also reflected Iran's attempts to build relationships with non-Shia terrorist groups which greatly enhances the threats posed against Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>577</sup>

After the end of the hostage crisis, a few German citizens still remained in captivity in June 1992. Their captors stated on June 15<sup>th</sup> that the two relief workers were released in another attempt to gain the release of the Hammadi brothers, Mohammed and Abbas, Hizbollah terrorists who were still imprisoned in Germany.<sup>578</sup>

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<sup>573</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>574</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 8, 22.

<sup>575</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>576</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>577</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 12.

<sup>578</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 8.



Western nations began to actively apply pressure against Iran for supporting terrorism through the court system. In March of 1992, a French court sentenced two Iranians in absentia to five years in prison on an illegal weapons charge dating back to 1986. The two Iranians were involved in numerous terror attacks and assassinations, particularly the April 1991 assassination of Barumand and Prime Minister Bakhtiar.<sup>579</sup> An additional two Iranians were arrested in November of 1992 for the murder of MEK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) leader Kazem Rajavi in 1990.<sup>580</sup> Jordanian authorities joined Western nations in condemning Iranian involvement in terrorist activities. In 1992, Jordan accused Iran of funneling money to the Vanguard of the Islamic Youth (Shabah al-Nafeer al-Islami) through the PFLP-GC.<sup>581</sup> Also in 1992, the United States signed the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Sections 1604 and 1605 describe the ability of the President to initiate sanctions against persons and foreign countries that have been found to transfer goods and/or technology to Iran and/or Iraq that would contribute to their efforts to acquire chemical, biological, nuclear weapons as well as advanced conventional weapons.<sup>582</sup>

The fatwa for Salman Rushdie continued through 1992 by both the Iranian Parliament and Iran's Chief Justice. The reward for his death was raised to more than

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<sup>579</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>580</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22; Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

<sup>581</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 18.

<sup>582</sup> Dianne Rennack, "Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law," *Congressional Research Service* (October 21, 2005): 31, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31502.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2009); "Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/iraniraq.htm> (accessed February 10, 2010).

two million dollars.<sup>583</sup> Iran actively sought Rushdie's death and in 1992 three Iranian citizens were expelled from the United Kingdom after evidence was found that they had been attempting to organize and prepare for an attempt on Rushdie's life.<sup>584</sup>

### ***Iran Terror in the West***

On March 17<sup>th</sup>, 1992 Iran proved how far its reach actually spread. Islamic Jihad, a cover name for Hizbollah, attacked the Israel Embassy in Argentina by exploding a car bomb outside of the building. Twenty-nine people died and 242 were injured.<sup>585</sup> This attack, was the most deadly to occur in 1992. Afterwards, the Chairman of Iranian Parliament stated that "Israel would be dealt continuing blows of revenge in various areas of the world."<sup>586</sup> The investigation revealed that the attack lead by Imad Muraniya, Chief Hizbollah member, received Iranian assistance from Iran intelligence entities in Argentina to obtain the required weapons, explosives, and travel documentation for perpetrators.<sup>587</sup>

### ***1993***

During Phase Two and particularly in the beginning of the 1990s Iranian use of terrorism became much more tailored to provide for deniability in complicity with attacks. An indicator that Iran had entered the second phase of terrorism was the inability to prove its involvement in acts against the United States since 1991.<sup>588</sup> In 1993, as in 1992, the U.S. Department of state designated Iran as the most active and dangerous SST

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<sup>583</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>584</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

<sup>585</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 12, 21.

<sup>586</sup> Shay, 4.

<sup>587</sup> Shay, 96.

<sup>588</sup> Shay, pg. 169, Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

through utilization of its own agents and radical groups by the U.S. Department of State.<sup>589</sup> Iran's presence in Africa continued in Sudan but also began to spread. Also another sign that Iran had entered the second phase was its ability to continue spreading throughout Africa and the Middle East. During the early 1990s, Iran was able to extend its reach from West Africa into the Shiite concentrated areas of East Africa. West Africa continued to serve as a base for the consolidation of Iran's terrorism infrastructure on the continent, while East Africa, particularly Somalia, served as the center for terrorist activities in the region focused against the U.S. and promoting radical Islam.<sup>590</sup> Hizbollah continued attempts to develop a presence in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Benin, and Nigeria.<sup>591</sup> Attacks during this year were however more focused on areas in Pakistan and Turkey, and less on the Middle East and Western Europe.<sup>592</sup>

Dissidents remained on Iran's list of high value targets as there were hunted throughout the globe.<sup>593</sup> The body of a dissident whom had been captured in Istanbul months earlier was found in January 1993. Additionally, Iran was linked to the assassinations of four MEK members: one in Italy in March, Pakistan in June, and the third and fourth in Turkey.<sup>594</sup> Two other attacks on dissidents occurred in Turkey during August; on the 25<sup>th</sup> four terrorists dressed as Turkish Security Officials kidnapped dissident Mohammad Khaderi, two weeks later on September 4<sup>th</sup> his body was discovered on the side of the Kiurseyir Boztepe Highway. In the second attack on August 28, 1993,

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<sup>589</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 1.

<sup>590</sup> Shay, 46.

<sup>591</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 2.

<sup>592</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

<sup>593</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 14.

<sup>594</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

dissident Behram Azadfer was assassinated by terrorists in Ankara.<sup>595</sup> The June 6<sup>th</sup> attack in Karachi Pakistan was an Iranian oppositionist who was shot and killed, apparently by a member of the Intelligence Service.<sup>596</sup> It was evident by success of these attacks and the lack of retaliation that professionals perpetrated each of these attacks.<sup>597</sup>

Other commonalities in Iranian sponsorship of terrorism carried over from previous years. Although kidnapping and holding of hostages was no longer utilized, Iran remained adamantly opposed to the Middle East peace process providing money and arms to anyone who shared that view. Iran also supported targeting dissidents through terrorism, in many cases using its own intelligence service and continued to support the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.<sup>598</sup> In February, the Tehran government announced such support through Parliament, which passed a resolution endorsing it, warning that revenge would be taken on any supporter of Rushdie or his book.<sup>599</sup> Support for such resolution reverberated from Lebanon as Hizbollah again pledged support for carrying out the decree; additional fundamentalists also pledged support issuing threats to anyone involved in the process of distributing the book including journalists, vendors, printing centers, and distribution vehicles.<sup>600</sup> Support for the fatwa spread to Turkey where in July, thirty-seven people died in a fire set by anti-Rushdie demonstrators during a three month long campaign to prevent Turkish magazine from printing excerpts of the book. When the campaign against the magazine company began, the Iranian Ambassador to

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<sup>595</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 31.

<sup>596</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 5.

<sup>597</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

<sup>598</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

<sup>599</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22-23.

<sup>600</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22-23.

Turkey supported the violent actions and proclaimed that the fatwa extended beyond Iran and applied within Turkey as well.<sup>601</sup> An October 1993 attempted murder of a Norwegian publisher of his book was more than likely connected to that fatwa.<sup>602</sup>

Support for Turkish groups spread to additional groups such as the Islamic Action (Islamic Movement Organization) that was suspected by Turkish authorities for involvement of a cab bomb attack against a prominent journalist, Ugur Mumcu, in Istanbul in January 1993, and an assassination attempt on a Jewish businessman, Jak Kamhi, a few days earlier.<sup>603</sup> The next month in February, three terrorists, possibly from Islamic Action, were convicted for the bombing of the Istanbul synagogue the year before.<sup>604</sup> Support for PKK continued as well, resulting in many deaths throughout the country.

Other countries, such as Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia, increased accusations that Iran was supporting local Islamic groups in efforts to undermine governments and to spread Islamic Revolution.<sup>605</sup> Evidence supporting these accusations was provided through the spread of Iranian influence in Africa and Latin America. Egypt in particular believed that Iran and Sudan supported terrorist activities in Egypt. Cairo criticized Tehran for its role in attacks and use of Sudan to create additional terrorist breeding and training grounds.<sup>606</sup> In 1993, Iran was also implicated in terrorist attacks throughout Italy, Turkey, and Pakistan.

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<sup>601</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22-23.

<sup>602</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 21, 23.

<sup>603</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 14.

<sup>604</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 23.

<sup>605</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 14.

<sup>606</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 17.

In addition to growing accusations, multiple Iranians were arrested and tried in connection to terrorist activities. Several intelligence agents were arrested in France and Germany due to links with the murders of Iranian dissidents. In Germany, one Iranian intelligence agent was tried for involvement in the Mykonos attack on Kurdish dissidents in September of 1992. France expelled two Iranians who had been arrested the year before for the 1990 murder of MEK leader in Geneva; disregarding an extradition request by Switzerland, the two men returned to Iran.<sup>607</sup>

French courts continued to connect Iranian officials to terrorist attacks; in 1993, the French Magistrate, leading the investigation into the murder of PM Bakhtiar and his assistant near Paris in 1991, linked the murder to an Iranian intelligence agent. The magistrate held three men in prison in connection to the murder. Two of the men were directly related to high ranking Iranian officials: one was the nephew of Iranian President Rafsanjani and an employee of the Iranian embassy and the second was a nephew to the late Ayatollah Khomeini who worked as a radio correspondent.<sup>608</sup> Retaliation for the French prosecution of terrorists occurred in a dual attack on November 8<sup>th</sup> in which two grenades were thrown into the Embassy courtyard, and another grenade was thrown into the Tehran office of AirFrance. A faction of Hizbollah, Hizbollah Committee, claimed responsibility for both attacks in protest of the French government support for MEK.<sup>609</sup>

Involvement with Sudan flourished in 1993, as Iran became its main ally and supporter of the fundamentalist regime. Members of IRGC resided in the country to aid

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<sup>607</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

<sup>608</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 22.

<sup>609</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*; Shay, 41.

in training. Khartoum also became a vital thorough point for contact with various Palestinian and African terrorist networks.<sup>610</sup>

Terrorist attacks by Hizbollah grew in lethality as well in 1993. The group was responsible for several rocket attacks against northern Israel in which many were killed and injured. Iran vocally supported the attacks and encouraged more violence by rejectionist groups in the area.<sup>611</sup> Many of the attacks perpetrated by Hizbollah were based out of southern Lebanon, who while inciting terror in the region also boosted its political infrastructure in Lebanese Parliament.<sup>612</sup> From this home base in Lebanon, Hizbollah continued to advance development of a worldwide terrorism infrastructure through the guidance of Iran.

In attempts to maximize support provided to groups Iran attempted to develop a rejectionist group comprised of Hizbollah and several other Palestinian groups in Damascus to fight the on going peace process.<sup>613</sup> During a New York Times Interview in April, Fathi Shkaki pronounced that since 1987, the PIJ received aid and money from Iran. From this aid the PIJ funneled military equipment and funds through Gaza and into areas of Judea and Samaria to finance and aid campaigns and support the families of terrorist martyrs and prisoners.<sup>614</sup>

## **1994**

Underneath mounting economic pressure Iran maintained its status as the leading SST. President Rafsanjani did attempt to modify and tone down Iran's public image in

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<sup>610</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 23.

<sup>611</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 14.

<sup>612</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 23.

<sup>613</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1993*, 23.

<sup>614</sup> Shay, 77.

order to further develop economic and political ties to more stable countries in Western Europe and Japan.<sup>615</sup> Although Iran needed economic aid, sponsorship of terrorism remained at the same levels as in 1993 including the execution of six of dissidents abroad, four of which were confirmed attacks. On top of Iran's priorities were attacks against dissidents, especially the MEK and KDPI, and halting the Middle East peace process. In order to meet these objectives, Iran continued to utilize terrorist groups throughout Asia and the Middle East, spreading support to many groups varying from Secular to radical Islamic groups across North Africa and Central Asia.<sup>616</sup> Iran also spread its own intelligence services throughout these areas to ensure that terrorist attacks were properly planned and coordinated. Two areas in which these intelligence officers were used the most were the implementation of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and hunting of dissidents.

The four confirmed and two possible attacks against dissidents linked to Iran were spread across the Middle East and Europe. On January 7, 1994, a KPDI member, Taha Kirmeneh, was killed in Coru, Turkey. Three days later in Stockholm, Sweden a KDPI member was wounded after opening a letter bomb. On March 10<sup>th</sup>, the current leader of KDPI was killed in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. Nearly three months later on May 29<sup>th</sup>, two members of MEK were killed in Qabbiyah, Iraq while traveling to Baghdad. The other two attacks that were likely linked to Iran involved the June 24<sup>th</sup>, murder of Osman Khuhammed Amini in his home in Copenhagen and the November 12<sup>th</sup>, murder of Ali

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<sup>615</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 19, 20.

<sup>616</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, iv, 20.



Mohammed Assadi in Bucharest.<sup>617</sup> As attacks of dissidents continued, as did the prosecution of men arrested in connection to previous attacks. On December 6<sup>th</sup>, French courts convicted two Iranians involved in the murder of former Prime Minister Bakhitar, the third defendant, an Iranian Embassy employee was acquitted.<sup>618</sup> One of the convicted men, Khomeini's nephew was sentenced to ten years in jail while his accomplice received life in prison.<sup>619</sup> These convictions represent small successes against Iran.

The fatwa issued by Khomeini continued to have increasing support through the Iranian regime, claiming that it was a religious matter and was not a concern of the government. Terrorist groups and the IRGC vowed to carry out the death sentence and Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, head of a semi-government foundation stated that anyone who supported removal of the fatwa should also be punished.<sup>620</sup> In a possible connection, on January 4<sup>th</sup> gunshots rang out at the British Embassy in Tehran, protesting British support for Rushdie and anti-Iranian policies maintained by the nation.<sup>621</sup>

Support for terrorist groups continued to expand. Although the PKK continued to benefit from Iranian support although, in exchange for Turkey cracking down on MEK Iran turned in fourteen PKK members to the Turkish government.<sup>622</sup> Additional groups such as the Islamic Group, Hamas, Hizbollah, the Jihad Group, PIJ, and PFLP-GC continued to profit from Iranian support.<sup>623</sup>

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<sup>617</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 21.

<sup>618</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 7.

<sup>619</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 21.

<sup>620</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 21.

<sup>621</sup> Shay, 41.

<sup>622</sup> Mannes, 184.

<sup>623</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 41, 43, 46-47, 54, 56.

### ***Buenos Aires Attack***

On July 18, 1994, a car bomb ripped through Buenos Aires, Argentina. This attack against the Jewish community targeted the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AIMA) and was virtually identical to one that had occurred nearly two years before in March of 1992.<sup>624</sup> Nearly one hundred people died in this attack which was likely committed by Hizbollah.<sup>625</sup> According to a 2002 report by the Argentina Intelligence Service (SIDE) regarding this attack, the decision to attack Argentina for the second time was made in August of 1993 during a meeting of Iran's National Security Council attended by Ayatollah Khameni, President Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Valyati, Muhammad Hijazi - the man responsible for intelligence and security, and by the Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian.<sup>626</sup> The 2002 SIDE report states that the decision was based upon the success of the previous attack and in response to deteriorating relations between Iran and Argentina.<sup>627</sup> In 1998, Argentine prosecutors identified Mohsen Rabbani, the cultural attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires as being directly involved in the attack.<sup>628</sup> Argentinean President Carlos Menem had been courted by Iran but failed to provide the diplomatic and military support as requested.<sup>629</sup> The decision to attack Argentina again also came about due to the potential possibility of opening a new base of operations for both Iran and Hizbollah in the region. Ultimately, the decision to proceed with the attack again was provided in the form of a fatwa from Ayatollah

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<sup>624</sup> Mannes, 152-153; Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 21.

<sup>625</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1994*, 19.

<sup>626</sup> Shay, 97.

<sup>627</sup> Shay, 97; Mannes, 153.

<sup>628</sup> Mannes, 152-153.

<sup>629</sup> Mannes, 153.

Khameni to Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian.<sup>630</sup> Fallahian reached out to the Hizbollah Special Security Agency (SSA), lead by Imad Muraniya, to carry out the attack as a proxy to Iran.<sup>631</sup> Muraniya utilized the Iranian Embassy in Argentina to continue fortifying the network of Hizbollah members who had begun infiltrating the country since the 1980s. The Iranian Foreign Minister provided diplomatic cover and official representations to facilitate planning and orchestration of the attack, he also acted as a branch of the Intelligence Ministry. Iranian complicity, was demonstrated though the apparent prior knowledge of the attack. A sharp rise in the number of Iranian diplomatic couriers visited Argentina before the attack.<sup>632</sup> Additional evidence of knowledge of the attack was that the director of Iranian Intelligence Branch in Buenos Aires and Iranian Ambassadors in Chile and Uruguay returned home in June of 1994.<sup>633</sup> Years later, in July 2000 during a report to the New York Times a key witness in the attack stated that former Argentina President Carlos Menem was paid ten million dollars in bribes by Iran to provide cover and eliminate any suspicion that may be cast upon Iran for involvement in the attack.<sup>634</sup> This report and evidence found after the bombing did not provide Iran deniability in connection to the attack.

## ***1995***

Little, if any changes occurred in 1995 regarding Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. Iran remained leading and most active SST, providing multiple levels of support to terrorist groups. Targeting of dissidents, upholding of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie,

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<sup>630</sup> Shay, 97.

<sup>631</sup> Shay, 97.

<sup>632</sup> Shay, 98.

<sup>633</sup> Shay, 99.

<sup>634</sup> Shay, 100.

and halting the Middle East peace process remained the top trends Iran continued to focus upon during Phase Two. Hizbollah, Iran's main instrument for accomplishing objectives through terrorism was not directly tied to any attacks in 1995 that were equal to the same magnitude as the one against AIMA in 1994.<sup>635</sup> Hizbollah may have lessened the level of violence in its attacks due to mounting pressure stemming from the 1992 and 1994 attacks in Buenos Aires. As the years passed, Iran's detest for the United States grew. Iran viewed the U.S. as its main adversary, the Great Satan, increasing the risk to citizens and missions abroad.

As in previous years, Iran continued to spread support to terrorist groups as the key component in exporting the Islamic Revolution. Iran gave money, arms and training to many groups based in Lebanon, including Hizbollah, as well as Palestinian groups. Secular groups across North Africa and Central Asia also benefited from Iranian patronage. Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Islamic Group (IG), Hamas, Hizbollah, Jihad Group, PKK, PIJ, PFLP-GC grew stronger due to this support.<sup>636</sup>

In 1995 the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Iran's official news agency, reported that the Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Vaezi stated that there was an 'underlying need for the implementation of fatwa' against Salman Rushdie. He went on to declare that the fatwa could not be revoked or changed by anyone.<sup>637</sup> Some within the

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<sup>635</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995*, (Washington, D.C., 1996), 23.

<sup>636</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1995*, 23, 25, 43, 46-47, 49, 51-52, 58, 61.

<sup>637</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1995*, 25.

government, although, stated that they would not pursue achievement of the fatwa, indicating a split between factions of the government.<sup>638</sup>

A marked difference from 1994 was the increase in attacks against dissidents that were linked to Iran. There were seven confirmed murders, most of which occurred in Iraq, three more than the previous year. The targets continued to be leaders of oppositionist groups, KDPI and MEK. Many of the attacks were either planned or perpetrated by Iranian intelligence agents.<sup>639</sup> On May 17<sup>th</sup>, two MEK members were murdered in Baghdad, several weeks later two members of the Iranian Kurdish 'Toilers' Party (Komelah) were murdered in Sulaymaniyah, another city in Iraq. Later on July 10<sup>th</sup>, three MEK members were killed in Baghdad, and on September 17<sup>th</sup> another possible attack on a dissident occurred in Paris, France. This attack was against Hashem Abdollahi, the son of the chief witness in the 1994 trial in which two Iranians were convicted of murdering the former Prime Minister Bakhtiar.<sup>640</sup>

Since becoming elected, President Rafsanjani hoped to open access to capital markets to help Iran's ailing economy.<sup>641</sup> The number of attacks in Europe decreased in 1995, possibly a result of President Rafsanjani's attempts to obtain aid from wealthier nations Western European nations and Japan. The lessened attacks in Europe, however, did not carry over into the Middle East, which remained continual targets of Iran's proxies. On March 12<sup>th</sup> a car bomb was discovered and neutralized outside of the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey and on November 30<sup>th</sup> in Saudi Arabia a car bomb

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<sup>638</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1995*, 25.

<sup>639</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1995*, 24.

<sup>640</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1995*, 24.

<sup>641</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1995*, 25.

detonated near the head quarters of the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh. The November attack resulted in the deaths of seven, five of which were U.S. citizens and injuring forty-two others.<sup>642</sup> Interrogations afterwards revealed that the Islamic Saudi group, which received Iranian support, claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>643</sup> Additionally, since the mid-1990s Iran appeared to reduce the frequency and involvement in terror attacks in the Persian Gulf region; a necessity because the gulf was the main channel for exporting oil and importing of commodities required to sustain the Iranian economy.<sup>644</sup>

### **1996**

Relationships with neighboring countries dwindled, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, as knowledge of Iranian support for local terrorist groups became widespread. As an attempt to pressure Iran into giving up sponsorship and financing of terrorism, in August 1996, the U.S. signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 which imposed strict sanctions on any foreign company investing in the development of Iran and Libya's petroleum industry.<sup>645</sup> Sections five and six of this act impose and describe specific sanctions that may be placed on a country on behalf of the President if a person or company has investments in Iran that contribute to the enhancement of petroleum development.<sup>646</sup> This Act also authorizes the President to use punitive measures such as denial of Export-Import financing, export licenses, prohibition on

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<sup>642</sup> Shay, 169, 198; Mannes, 153.

<sup>643</sup> Shay, 169.

<sup>644</sup> Shay, 195.

<sup>645</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996*, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 4.

<sup>646</sup> Rennak, 29.

Government and commercial bank financing, refusing U.S. Government procurement contracts, and additional measures.<sup>647</sup>

In Kuwait a small faction of Hizbollah, known as Kuwaiti Hizbollah began to increase activity. Kuwaiti Hizbollah was also suspected of involvement with attacks against the U.S. military presence within Kuwait.<sup>648</sup> In 1996, the group allegedly assisted a Bahraini opposition group to smuggle weapons into Manama. In June, Manama authorities discovered another splinter Hizbollah group, Bahraini Hizbollah, which had been recruited and sponsored by Iran. At the time, Iran and the Bahraini Hizbollah were working together to overthrow the ruling al-Khalifa family.<sup>649</sup> Upon this discovery, diplomatic relations between the two nations became severely strained. As a result, Bahrain removed its ambassador from Tehran and immediately restricted commercial services and air transportation between the two countries.<sup>650</sup>

Iranian government representatives claimed that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie could not be revoked because the person that issued it, the late Ayatollah Khomeini was the only one that can rescind it.<sup>651</sup> The government did not attempt to remove the two million dollar reward, posted by 15 Khordad Foundation, for fulfillment of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.<sup>652</sup>

Attacks by Iranian proxies continued into 1996. Vice President Habibi met with Hamas leaders in Damascus to praise their successful February bombing of Israel,

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<sup>647</sup> Rennak, 30.

<sup>648</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 36.

<sup>649</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 41.

<sup>650</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 33, 36.

<sup>651</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 40.

<sup>652</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 41.

immediately following, Hamas bombed Israel two more times the next week.<sup>653</sup> During Phase Two, Iran chose to transport mass provisions of weapons to its proxies. This occurred in April 1996 when thirty Iranian planes landed in Damascus, Syria loaded with weapons and ammunition intended for its main surrogate, Hizbollah.<sup>654</sup> With these provisions, Hizbollah perpetrated larger attacks; this new Iranian tactic proved to be beneficial and Iran would continue to implement it for years to come. On June 25<sup>th</sup>, a truck bomb exploded near Khobar Towers, ripping through the U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia.<sup>655</sup> The Saudi investigation revealed that on Saudi Hizbollah, a Shia group with ties to Hizbollah and Iran was responsible for the attack.<sup>656</sup> Iran's relationships with terrorist groups continued to flourish, however, in the middle of 1996 Iran and Turkey entered an agreement to remove PKK members from the border region, reportedly Iran made no meaningful attempts to fulfill this agreement.<sup>657</sup> On February 15<sup>th</sup> in Fojnica, Implementation Force, (IFOR) troops found evidence of Iranian support after raiding a Bosnian-Iranian intelligence and training facility; eleven people were detained, three of which were Iranian. Search of the facility revealed not only classrooms for training terrorists, but also an extensive armory where children's toys were being altered to hold explosive devices.<sup>658</sup>

Members of Iranian opposition groups such as KDPI, MEK, and other dissidents were still within Iran's reach; at least nine were killed in 1996. On May 28<sup>th</sup>, Reza

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<sup>653</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 41.

<sup>654</sup> Mannes, 161.

<sup>655</sup> Shay, 169, 198; Mannes, 153.

<sup>656</sup> Mannes, 153.

<sup>657</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 41.

<sup>658</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 15-16.



Mazlouman, a government official under the Shah who served as the Deputy Education Minister was murdered in Paris by an Iran citizen living in Germany.<sup>659</sup> He had published writings opposing the current Iranian regime. This murderer was suspected to have ties to MOIS.<sup>660</sup> Seven others were murdered in Turkey and Northern Iraq. Speaking out against the Iranian government continued to be a death sentence for anyone brave enough to do so. On August 5<sup>th</sup> the murder of KDPI representative and delegate of 'Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Government,' Jaffar Hasso Guly, was murdered in France.<sup>661</sup>

### ***Results of Mykonos Attack***

German prosecutors leading the case against the five (four Lebanese and one Iranian) terrorists involved in the 1992 assassination of four Iranian dissidents at the Mykonos restaurant produced a valuable witness to testify. This witness, exiled former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, testified that Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the killing which was then by President Rafsanjani. Later in the trial, Abolqasem Messhahi, former Iranian intelligence officer, collaborated the former presidents statement during his testimony.<sup>662</sup> In March, an arrest warrant was issued for Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahiyan in connection with the killings.<sup>663</sup> During his summation, the prosecutor directly implicated Iran's senior leadership, specifically Ayathollah Khomeini and President Rafsanjani, for ordering and authorizing the slaying of the four Kurdish men; this resulted in massive demonstrations in front of the German Embassy in Tehran and

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<sup>659</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 15-16, 41.

<sup>660</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 41.

<sup>661</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 15-16.

<sup>662</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 18.

<sup>663</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 18; Shay, pg. 34-35.

death threats against the prosecution.<sup>664</sup> It was not until April of 1997 when guilty verdicts were issued to four of the five men involved.<sup>665</sup>

### ***Kolahdoos Shipment***

On March 14, 1996, customs authorities in Antwerp, Belgium discovered a container of weapons that belonged to the Iranian ship, *Kolahdoos*. The shipment was supposed to be of food products but upon inspection massive amounts of weapons were discovered to include mortars with wide diameter, approximately 300 millimeters in diameter, with shells of 125 kilograms each of TNT, and timing devises.<sup>666</sup> The advanced mortars were designed to have a range of approximately 700 meters. By the time Belgium authorities discovered the container and the items it held, the *Kolahdoos* was already en route to Hamburg, Germany. Upon arrival, Hamburg officials who had been notified of the ship's impending arrival arrested the crew. Officials discovered that two of the crewmates were members of the MOIS/VEVAK. The shipment, which originated from Jifort Food Inc., a Tehran food supplier, sailed from Bandar Abbas on February 23<sup>rd</sup>; it was later discovered that the President of Jifort was an active member of the IRGC.<sup>667</sup> Approximately one year before, in May of 1995, a similar mortar weapon confiscated in Iraq, the intended target was identified as leader of MEK, Massud Rajavi.<sup>668</sup> Discovery of the *Kolahdoos*, it's crew with ties to MOIS, and cover company with ties to IRGC provided solid evidence of Iran's involvement and intended provision of deadly supplies to terrorist groups.

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<sup>664</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 18, 41.

<sup>665</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1996*, 18.

<sup>666</sup> Shay, 44.

<sup>667</sup> Shay, 44.

<sup>668</sup> Shay, 44.

## 1997

Approximately thirteen murders of dissidents marked an intensely violent year for anyone opposing the Iranian regime.<sup>669</sup> The targets remained members and leaders of oppositionist groups such as the MEK and KDPI, with most of the attacks occurring in Northern Iraq. In January of 1997, an attack against the Baghdad headquarters of MEK was attempted by Iranian agents who used a similar ‘supermortar’ weapon as to the one found onboard the *Kolahdooz* the year before. This attack was deemed unsuccessful, resulting in damage to the Iraqi hospital and only one death.<sup>670</sup>

Although under a new president, Muhammad Khatami, Iran’s support for terrorism did not waiver.<sup>671</sup> Belief in the use of terrorism as a valuable tool at the highest levels in Iranian government is evidenced by the fact although presidents change, sponsorship of terrorism continued with increasing violence year after year. Iran remained the most active SST, planning and executing terrorist attacks side-by-side with its sponsored groups. Iran utilized these groups to continue attacks against Israel and the Middle East peace process. Support for the PKK grew in 1997, an insult to the agreement reached between Turkey and Iran the year before.<sup>672</sup> PKK received missiles, transportation, and medical supplies from Iran; the weapons enabled terrorists to shoot down two Turkish helicopters.<sup>673</sup>

President Khatami routinely spoke out against terrorist attacks. On January 7<sup>th</sup> during an interview with CNN he stated that attacks against non-combatants, including

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<sup>669</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997*, (Washington, D.C., 1998), 48.

<sup>670</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 48.

<sup>671</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 46, 48.

<sup>672</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 49.

<sup>673</sup> Mannes, 184.

women and children should be condemned.<sup>674</sup> Khatami and other leaders of the government also condemned terrorist attacks by Algerian and Egyptian groups; in particular, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi spoke out in November against the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) attacks on tourists in Luxor, Egypt.<sup>675</sup> The Algerian government saw through his rouse of a statement, accused Tehran of training and equipping Algerian terrorist groups.<sup>676</sup> Regardless of his public statements, President Khatami and Iran continued to provide support to groups that benefited them in the end. In the fall of 1997, Iran held yet another conference called the "Liberation Movements" in which representatives from groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah, the PIJ, and IG attended. Topics included jihad, cooperation between groups and increasing support to additional groups elsewhere.<sup>677</sup>

Salman Rushdie was not off of Iran's hitlist in 1997. President Khatami reiterated the validity of the fatwa against Rushdie, and in response, 15 Khordad Foundation, the organization that posted two million dollars as a reward increased it to two and a half million.<sup>678</sup>

Iran sponsorship for Hizbollah splinter groups also flourished. Bahraini Hizbollah, which had come into prominence in recent years, received intensive training at camps in Iran and Lebanon.<sup>679</sup> In June of 1997, eight members of this splinter group were apprehended and ultimately confessed to the March 14<sup>th</sup> attack when several Molotov

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<sup>674</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 49.

<sup>675</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 48, 49.

<sup>676</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 49.

<sup>677</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 49.

<sup>678</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 49.

<sup>679</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 41.

Cocktails were thrown into a restaurant in Bangladesh killing seven people in the resulting fire.<sup>680</sup> On July 1<sup>st</sup>, three of the eight arrested were sentenced to death while the remaining five received very lengthy prison terms to serve.<sup>681</sup> Iran maintained indirect ties to Bahraini groups, avoiding exposure to complicity in the attacks due to the close relation between Bahrain and the United States.<sup>682</sup> A similar trial took place several months before in April of 1997 when a Berlin judge found that the assassination of four oppositionists at the Mykonos restaurant followed a distinct pattern of murdering opponents that was policy accepted and approved at the highest levels, including the MOIS, Foreign Minister, President, and Supreme Leader within the Iranian government.<sup>683</sup> The court found that Iran harbored many of the terrorists and agents who undertook such attacks, one of the terrorists involved in the Mykonos attack returned to Iran and received a Mercedes for his involvement.<sup>684</sup>

## **1998**

Despite public statements condemning the violent U.S. Embassy bombings perpetrated by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, Iran continued to plan and conduct terrorist attacks and support surrogate groups.<sup>685</sup> The purposes behind sponsorship remained the same, elimination of Israel, stopping the peace process, targeting of dissidents, and exporting ideology; each of these goals were achieved through varying levels of sponsorship ranging from provision of safehaven, training, weapons, logistical,

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<sup>680</sup> Shay, 205-206.

<sup>681</sup> Shay, 206.

<sup>682</sup> Shay, 206.

<sup>683</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 11, 49.

<sup>684</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 11.

<sup>685</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998*, (Washington, D.C., 1999), 52.

and diplomatic support.<sup>686</sup> Many of the same groups continued to receive support such as Hamas, Hizbollah, and PIJ.<sup>687</sup> The PIJ, an intensely violent terrorist group reportedly received support from Iran in reference to two suicide bombings that took place in Jerusalem in early November 1998 in which twenty-one people died.<sup>688</sup> The PKK also benefited from surrogacy as well as North African groups. In April, former president Bani Sadr accused Iran of training Algerian and other terrorists.<sup>689</sup>

Outward displays of condemning terrorist attacks that began the year before carried over into 1998. Foreign Ministry spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi denounced attacks on civilians during the month of Ramadan, late December 1997 through early January 1998.<sup>690</sup> Iran also expressed sympathy for the victims of U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.<sup>691</sup> Although Iran expressed compassion for victims of these attacks, intelligence reports later indicated that immediately before the bombings approximately ten percent of all satellite phone calls from al Qaeda leaders were made to Iran.<sup>692</sup>

Opposition groups became more outspoken against Iran, accusing the nation of involvement in attacks against dissidents. The number of dissident attacks, although garnished more attention in 1998 due to higher exposed reactions, were actually fewer in number when compared to those in 1997. In a five month time span, from June to November, three groups; In the “League of the Followers of Sunna,” Sipah-e-Sahaba

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<sup>686</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 52.

<sup>687</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53.

<sup>688</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53-54.

<sup>689</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 54.

<sup>690</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1997*, 49.

<sup>691</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53.

<sup>692</sup> Mannes, 37.

Pakistan and the National Council of Resistance accused Iranian and its intelligence agents for the murder of Iranian Sunni Cleric Shaikh Nureddin Ghuraybi in Tajikistan, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan leaders Allama Shoaib Nadeem and Maulana Habibur Rehman Siddiqui and Reza Pirzadi.<sup>693</sup>

Tensions remained high between Iran and Argentina in 1998. The Iranian government expelled an Argentine attaché early in the year due to increasing criticism from Argentina. Argentina believed that Iran was partially responsible for both terrorist attacks in 1992 and 1994 that occurred in Buenos Aires against Jewish targets. After expulsion of the attaché the Argentine Government responded, requesting Tehran to reduce the number of diplomats in had in Buenos Aires down to one, equal to the number of Argentine officials left in Iran.<sup>694</sup>

Another change in course from previous years, Iran announced in 1998 that it would take no action to enforce the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. This announcement lead to increased diplomatic relations between Great Britain. Although this was a change in its public stance regarding the issue, Iran continued to claim that it is impossible to revoke the fatwa and made no effort to remove the reward for fulfillment, which was now up to \$2.8 million provided by 15 Khordad Foundation.<sup>695</sup>

Iran's intelligence agency, MOIS was linked to conducting five murders of leading writers and political activists within Iran. Due to unanticipated attention to the murders, Iran claimed that it found a cell within MOIS that had been acting without

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<sup>693</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53.

<sup>694</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 41.

<sup>695</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53.

government knowledge; members of the cell were reportedly arrested.<sup>696</sup> Additional pressure was placed upon MOIS members in 1998. In February, three members were arrested by the Committee for National Security (KNB) and expelled from Kazakhstan for illegal activities. Nine months later, the United States and Kazakhstan entered into an agreement to fight terrorism.<sup>697</sup>

### ***Alisa Flatow and the Flatow Amendment***

In March, the U.S. District Court ordered Iran to pay \$247 Million to the family of Alisa Flatow, a U.S. citizen killed in a PIJ attack in Gaza on April 9, 1995. Iran was declared responsible for the attack due to the levels of sponsorship and funding provided to PIJ, who had claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>698</sup> This case and its judgment was a key component to proving Iranian complicity in one of many terrorist attacks. It also provided a way for Congress to hold foreign SST accountable for terrorist attacks.

The Civil Liability Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, or the Flatow Amendment as it is commonly called was the 1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which enables U.S. victims of terrorism to sue states responsible for terrorist activities including torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking.<sup>699</sup> Terrorist states, and their agencies and representatives, that did not represent themselves in the case were handed large default judgments.<sup>700</sup> This act waived sovereign immunity in specific instances, creating a cause for action, and ability to hold

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<sup>696</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53.

<sup>697</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 30.

<sup>698</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1998*, 53-54; Shay, pg. 77.

<sup>699</sup> Jennifer K. Elsea, "Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism," *Congressional Research Service* (August 8, 2008): 1, 6-7, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2009).

<sup>700</sup> Elsea, 1.



states accountable for their actions, hence, a foreign state may be treated as if it was a private entity, as well as their foreign militaries and intelligence agencies and representatives are liable for punitive damages.<sup>701</sup> This Act and the resulting verdict of the Alisa Flatow case served two causes; it provided a direct deterrent to states that were sponsoring terrorism and a mechanism to severely impact a state economically for financing and supporting terrorists.<sup>702</sup>

### **1999**

After the blow dealt by the Alisa Flatow case and additional factors pressuring Iran, the country attempted to moderate the nations image. However, beneath the surface, actions of state agencies, institutions, and political leaders further bolstered Iran's status as once again the leading SST.<sup>703</sup> The MOIS and IRGC continued to be intimately involved in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks as well as the provision of training, money, and political support to groups that actively seek to disrupt the Middle East peace process and attack Israel, these groups included Hamas, Hizbollah, PIJ, and PKK.<sup>704</sup> By 1999, the PKK had members in more than fifty training camps in Iran and Lebanon, with approximately 1,200 in attendance each year.<sup>705</sup> Iranian sponsorship continued to spread across the continents from North Africa into South and Central Asia.<sup>706</sup> Several reports surfaced in 1999 indicating that Iranian security forces

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<sup>701</sup> Elsea, 1-4.

<sup>702</sup> Whittaker.

<sup>703</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999* (Washington, D.C., 2000), 55.

<sup>704</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 3, 56-57.

<sup>705</sup> Mannes, 184.

<sup>706</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 57.

attacked dissidents abroad. One attack, in October, utilized a truck bomb against a MEK base near Basrah, Iraq in which both MEK and non-MEK individuals were killed.<sup>707</sup>

President Khatami proved to seamlessly operate dichotomously in different environments. Publicly, he spoke out stating that Iran was not working against the peace process, but in reality, Tehran stepped up support and encouragement for groups to bring the process to a stop. This effort particularly increased after the election of Israel's new Prime Minister Ehud Barak and resumption of Israel-Syria peace talks.<sup>708</sup> While in Damascus that May, President Khatami visited with Palestinian rejectionist leaders as a show of support for their cause. Months later, on November 9<sup>th</sup>, he held a major rally attended by representatives of many terrorist groups to demonstrate Iran's opposition to Israel and peace; at this rally Hizbollah and Palestinian Rejectionist leaders spoke out calling for jihad.<sup>709</sup> In response, terrorist leaders at the rally promised more attacks like the bombing that had occurred in Netanya a few days before.<sup>710</sup>

Also in November during the G-8 summit, an agreement was reached between members regarding the threat Iran's support for terrorist groups posed to the continuation of the peace process. Counter-terrorism experts and representatives agreed that if Iranian support continued, the peace process would be undone.<sup>711</sup>

## **2000**

February of 2000 represented an important year in the history of Iran because the moderate party won in the Majles, the lower house of Iranian Legislature. Although it

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<sup>707</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 55.

<sup>708</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 56-57.

<sup>709</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 56-57.

<sup>710</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 56-57.

<sup>711</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1999*, 5.

seemed that moderates had won, they remained outnumbered by the many remaining hard-line conservatives that prevented most reform efforts from passing.<sup>712</sup> Domestic policy changes that were occurring within Iran did nothing to halt the sponsorship for terrorism which the Department of State again identified Iran as the leading, most active and violent, SST. The targets of terrorism remained steadfastly focused on Israel, adamantly opposing the peace process, and hunting dissidents.<sup>713</sup> The fatwa, which had been in place for more than ten years, remained so, as did its growing reward for fulfillment which was at \$2.8 Million for the second year in a row.<sup>714</sup> Rhetoric against Israel grew over the last decades continued to reverberate among leadership. Labels such as ‘cancerous tumor’ and ‘illegal entity’ were attached to Israel by the highest members of the government, Ayatollah Khomeini, and President Khatami.<sup>715</sup> Expediency Council Secretary Rezai echoed these sentiments and claimed that Iran would continue its campaign against the country until it was completely destroyed.<sup>716</sup> Threats against Israel became more frequent during the year, particularly with their withdrawal from South Lebanon in May and during the Intifadah in the fall.<sup>717</sup> With Israel’s retreat, Iran prompted PIJ to increase and spread out attacks against the country.<sup>718</sup>

Groups that followed the same belief pattern benefited the most from Iranian sponsorship. Hamas, Hizbollah, PIJ, PFLP-GC and other groups continually were granted different types and levels of support. Iran once again encouraged groups to

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<sup>712</sup> Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000*, (Washington, D.C., 2001), 69.

<sup>713</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2000*, 4.

<sup>714</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2000*, 69.

<sup>715</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2000*, 69.

<sup>716</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2000*, 69.

<sup>717</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2000*, 69.

<sup>718</sup> Mannes, 201.

combine efforts against Israel and stopping the peace process, helping to plan and coordinate attacks. Other groups throughout the Persian Gulf, Africa, Turkey, and Asia benefited from support, but generally at lower levels.<sup>719</sup>

As Iran continued to sponsor terrorism, the United States continued to find ways to pressure the country into giving up such sponsorship. The Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000 was created and passed in the beginning of the new decade. This Act, allows the President to take punitive actions and sanctions against persons and companies that provide Iran with materials and technologies that enhance their ability to create weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>720</sup> The threat remains high that if Iran possessed a WMD that it would be provided to one of its proxies for use. This Act, although not directly against terrorism, is yet another way for the U.S. to limit the goods, supplies, and technologies that would otherwise be provided to Iran.

## ***2001***

Since the outbreak of the second intifadah, which began in September of 2000 and ended around February of 2005, Iran pursued more violent, overt, means to attack Israel through its own intelligence and security agencies as well as its proxies. The level of support to specific groups continued, as did the involvement of MOIS and IRGC.<sup>721</sup> Iran focused its efforts against Israel and diminished involvement in other terrorism ventures, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Central Asia. In April, Iran held a

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<sup>719</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2000*, 68-69.

<sup>720</sup> Rennak, 31-32; Matthew Rice, "Clinton Signs 'Iran Nonproliferation Act'," Arms Control Association, [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_04/irnap00](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_04/irnap00) (accessed February 11, 2010).

<sup>721</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 64.

conference focused on intensifying the ongoing Intifada, at which Hamas was represented by Khalid Mash'al.<sup>722</sup> The fatwa against Salman Rushdie continued as well in 2001.

### ***Santorini***

On May 17<sup>th</sup> the Israeli Navy captured a shipping vessel, the *Santorini* off the Gaza coast. The *Santorini*, a Lebanese boat held forty tons of Iranian weapons, including SA-7 surface to air weapons and Katyusha rockets, destined for terrorist groups PIJ, Hamas and Fatah. The crew of the *Santorini* claimed to be shipping the weapons on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), however further investigation revealed that Hizbollah, working in conjunction with Iran, not the PLFP-GC, was the motivating force behind the shipment and intimately involved in each step in the process.<sup>723</sup> The Captain of the *Santorini* further revealed that two days before the ship set sail a meeting was held with Fatah's naval officers, a Palestinian videographer, as well as Abu Allah, a Hizbollah smuggling officer and Mustaga Karum, a drug smuggler.<sup>724</sup> Hizbollah and Abu Allah invested tens of thousands in hopes for a successful operation.<sup>725</sup>

### ***Post 9-11-2001***

There was no evidence that Iran had any prior knowledge, or involvement, in the planning and execution of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C., Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and New York City. President Khatami expressed sympathy for citizens of the United States and offered initial support during Operation Enduring

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<sup>722</sup> Mannes, 138.

<sup>723</sup> Mannes, 327; Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 54; Shay, 151.

<sup>724</sup> Shay, 151.

<sup>725</sup> Shay, 151.

Freedom, which began on October 7<sup>th</sup>. Iran offered to inform U.S. soldiers if a plane went down within Iranian borders and assist the air crew in accordance with international convention. Iran additionally offered to work with U.S. and its allies at the Bonn Conference to form an Afghan Interim Authority in late 2001. During the conference it pledged to close the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent infiltration of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; despite the pledge reports began to surface that Afghans and al-Qaeda terrorists used Iran as a transit route to enter and exit Afghanistan.<sup>726</sup>

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, Sudan, a country to whom it was once intimately tied to and a strong ally of, has limited its contact with Iran and terrorist organizations, fearing that continuing such support would bring attention from the West.<sup>727</sup> Iran also altered its focus for supporting terrorism. It began to look west toward South America to continue fostering terrorist networks that had been growing since the 1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires Attacks. This continent represented a new land of opportunity for the development of a new infrastructure particularly in the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, where a large community of Muslims was developing.<sup>728</sup>

## **2002**

Although Iran had previously expressed sympathy for the United States after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, little was done to comply with the fight against terrorism; Iran remained yet again the leading SST, even providing safe haven to members of al

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<sup>726</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 64-65.

<sup>727</sup> Shay, 56.

<sup>728</sup> Shay, 56.

Qaeda.<sup>729</sup> Members of al Qaeda faced an unknown fate when in Iran, as some were turned over to the United States while others were provided sanctuary; adding to its duplicitous nature, Iran supported groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iraq that had ties to al Qaeda.<sup>730</sup> In August reports arose that Iran was helping smuggle al Qaeda gold from Afghanistan to Sudan.<sup>731</sup> While Iran made no action to stop sponsoring terrorism; it did attempt to appease to global community by joining the 1988 Protocol on Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation and five of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism in 2002.<sup>732</sup> Provision of support remained high for terrorist groups such as PLFP-GC, Hizbollah, Hamas, and PIJ. From Iran's point of view, using terrorist groups, especially Hizbollah who had been a faithful partner for years, remained the key component in creating instability for the peace process without direct evidence of the country's involvement. In the Spring of 2002, Iran began providing Hizbollah with advanced equipment, including 240mm Fajr missiles.<sup>733</sup> However, in June Iran separated its support for Hizbollah from that for PIJ.<sup>734</sup> Also as in previous years MOIS and IRGC were integrally involved in training, planning, and execution of terrorist activities. Iran continued to seek out cooperation among groups to achieve the greater goal, elimination of Israel.

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<sup>729</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 76.

<sup>730</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 77.

<sup>731</sup> Mannes, 37.

<sup>732</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 77.

<sup>733</sup> Mannes, 156.

<sup>734</sup> Mannes, 200.

### ***Karine-A***

On January 3, 2002, the *Karine-A* was captured by Israeli naval commandos. The *Karine-A*, similarly to the *Santorini*, was smuggling weapons into Gaza, and was the third ship caught smuggling weapons by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) at the port Elat.<sup>735</sup> This shipment was later determined to be a joint Iran, Hizbollah, and Palestinian Authority operation in which had fifty tons of weapons and arms including anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-personnel weapons and artillery, 122mm Katyusha rockets – capable of hitting Israel from the West Bank – were shipped from Iran and destined for terrorists in Gaza and the West Bank.<sup>736</sup> All of the markings and serial numbers were removed and altered to protect the identity of the source.<sup>737</sup> As part of the agreement with the Palestinian Authority, Iran agreed to build a hospital in Gaza, in return, the Palestinian Authority agreed to stop interfering with Hizbollah activities in the area, particularly Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.<sup>738</sup> In total, the cost of this deal was around fifteen million, plus the four hundred thousand for the purchase of *Karine-A*.<sup>739</sup> Due to the amount of money this operation cost, sole Hizbollah involvement was ruled out and Iran, Hizbollah's main sponsor was immediately suspected.

Investigations revealed that Abdel Mugarbi, a member of the Palestinian Authority, purchased the ship in Lebanon. Mugarbi turned the *Karine-A* over to Omar al Ahawi, the ships commander and naval police colonel in the Palestinian Authority. The ship set sail and joined the Iranian ferry who's riders included Iranian intelligence

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<sup>735</sup> Mannes, 283; Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 55.

<sup>736</sup> Mannes, 156, 283; Shay, 152.

<sup>737</sup> Shay, 153.

<sup>738</sup> Shay, 144.

<sup>739</sup> Shay, 152-153.



agents and the leader of Hizbollah, Imad Muraniya, at the island of Kish.<sup>740</sup> From the ferry the fifty tons of weapons and ammunition were loaded onto the *Karine-A* in special floating containers that were only manufactured in Iran. The ship was supposed to sail to Alexandria where three other smaller ships would assume control of the cargo and continue the destination to Gaza.

Initially, the Palestinian Authority denied involvement with the smuggling and accused Israel of fabricating the entire event.<sup>741</sup> Yasser Abd Rabu, representative of the Palestinian Authority, went on to try and set up its own third party investigation to prove that the smuggling of weapons was false. Hamid Rezah Asfi, spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, also denied Israel's claim of Iranian involvement further stating that there was no military cooperation between Iran and the Palestinian Authority.<sup>742</sup> However, Israeli interrogation of the crew members aboard the *Karine-A* confirmed that Iran was directly involved in supplying the weapons, Captain Omar al Akawi reaffirmed the statements of his crew.<sup>743</sup>

Al Akawi stated that in July of 2001 he was supposed to travel to Iran for a meeting regarding a 'special arrangement' but that meeting was cancelled and he was later informed that Hizbollah would handle certain portions of the shipment. Six months later, on December 9<sup>th</sup>, the *Karine-A* arrived at the Iranian island of Kish where it was loaded with weapons by Iranians. The Captain of the Palestinian Navy, Salim Mahamud al Sankari Nakib, substantiated this statement, adding that Iran filmed the loading of

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<sup>740</sup> Shay, 152.

<sup>741</sup> Shay, 152-153.

<sup>742</sup> Shay, 152-153.

<sup>743</sup> Shay, 153.

weapons into the ship.<sup>744</sup> He went on to say that prior to this event, in September of 2001, Hizbollah members trained him in deep sea diving and use of the floating containers. The same trainer was present when weapons were loaded onto *Karine-A*.<sup>745</sup> Crew member Riad Abdallah corroborated this, stating that in July of 2001 he was sent to Syria where he met Hizbollah representative Haj Bassam who ordered him to purchase the boat.<sup>746</sup>

On January 4<sup>th</sup>, Israeli Lieutenant General Shaul Mofaz held a press conference where he provided details regarding the involvement of Iran, Palestinian Authority, and terrorist groups, claiming that the discovery of this shipment was a ‘milestone in the war against terror.’<sup>747</sup> A week later, on January 10<sup>th</sup>, President Bush publicly agreed with Israel Prime Minister Sharon that discovery of this shipment provided unequivocal proof of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism and the connection between Hizbollah, Iran, and Palestinian Authority.<sup>748</sup>

## **2003**

Overt sponsorship of terrorist activities occurred with less frequency in 2003 than previous years, yet through continual sponsorship and covert activities, Iran remained the most active SST. MOIS and IRGC maintained routine involvement in supporting terrorist activities and the government also maintained opposition to the peace process, the existence of Israel and encouraged groups, such as Hizbollah and other Palestinian

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<sup>744</sup> Shay, 153.

<sup>745</sup> Shay, 153.

<sup>746</sup> Shay, 153.

<sup>747</sup> Shay, 154.

<sup>748</sup> Shay, 154-155.

rejectionist groups, to persist in attacks against both.<sup>749</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini publicly praised resistance operations and reiterated support for the wronged people of Palestine.<sup>750</sup> Following this public announcement of support, in August Tehran hosted a conference on the Palestinian Intifadah, at which government officials implicated that the success of resistance depended upon suicide operations.<sup>751</sup>

Iran began to pursue its own objectives in Iraq, which were often opposite that of Coalition efforts, and tuned instead for its own interests.<sup>752</sup> Evidence of resistance was demonstrated by Iran's refusal to provide a list of senior al Qaeda members detained in the country and would only provide names as it saw fit. Iran cited it was due to security issues, refusing also to turn terrorists over to their home country for trial.<sup>753</sup> The U.S. Department of State also reports that Iraqi individuals with ties to IRGC may have made attempts to infiltrate southern Iraq with additional help from the Iranian government. During a Friday prayer in May, IRGC member Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati encouraged Iraqis to follow the Palestinian model and participate in suicide operations against Coalition Forces.<sup>754</sup>

### ***Abu-Hassan***

Following a trend from the previous two years, Iran was again caught providing weapons to terrorists in the Gaza Strip. On May 20<sup>th</sup> the Israeli Navy intercepted an Egyptian fishing boat, the *Abu-Hassan*. Aboard, Israelis discovered weapons, fuses for

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<sup>749</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 86.

<sup>750</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 88.

<sup>751</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 88.

<sup>752</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 88.

<sup>753</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2001*, 86, 88.

<sup>754</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2003*, 88.

122 mm rockets, electronic timing units and wireless activating systems for explosives, teaching manuals including computer disks with detailed information on preparation for bombs and how-to guides for attacks, as well as a Hizbollah member who was an expert in sabotage and en route to provide training.<sup>755</sup> Interrogation revealed that the ship had left Egypt on March 16<sup>th</sup> for Beirut where Hizbollah members met the boat and loaded the cargo.<sup>756</sup>

Across the globe, the judge overseeing the trial against suspected Hizbollah sponsored bombing of the Argentine – Jewish Cultural center in 1994 issued international arrest warrants for twelve Iranian government officials, including the former Iranian Ambassador, who were assigned to Buenos Aires at the time of the attack.<sup>757</sup>

While Iran was making waves with questionable involvement in Iraq it also began to shake up Western nations with revelations of intentions to seek out nuclear power for energy. In June the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criticized Iran, claiming that the civilian nuclear plant was a cover for developing nuclear weapons. In August the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in a nuclear facility, which lead to Iran's admission that the enrichment program had developed over the past twenty years. Four months later, in December Iran agreed to suspend the HEU program and allow IAEA inspections.<sup>758</sup> In early 2004, the inspectors found many anomalies in Iran's declaration about the nuclear program which lead to a continual negotiations, sanctions, and broken Iranian promises for the next several years. Concern over a

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<sup>755</sup> Shay, 156.

<sup>756</sup> Shay, 156.

<sup>757</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 2003*, 72.

<sup>758</sup> Brookes, 197.

possible Iranian nuclear weapon stems from its aggressive anti-Israel, anti-U.S. policies as well as known support for terrorist groups. If Iran came to possess such a weapon, there is no evidence to suggest that Iran would not provide it to a proxy for use against mutual enemies.

## **2004**

The level and type of sponsorship Iran provided its surrogate groups was virtually identical to that of 2003, with the exception that Tehran became more resistant to Coalition efforts in the Middle East. Iran remained the most active sponsor, utilizing MOIS and IRGC to influence, train, and perpetrate terrorist attacks. Iran continued to refuse to identify senior al Qaeda members for sanctity of security of the country while reports persistently surfaced that Iran was providing refuge, safe transit, arms, money, and support for group members, particularly those of Muqtada al-Sadr's forces.<sup>759</sup> In particular, Iran appeared to follow policies that were different from publicly stated objectives and not aligned with the Interim Iraqi Government and Coalition.<sup>760</sup> Iran not only aided Iraqi terrorists but also spread support to Afghani groups in 2004 and into 2005.<sup>761</sup> On June 1<sup>st</sup>, Iranian newspaper, *Shark*, reported that Iran was holding a convention to recruit volunteers for self-sacrifice, the article stated that there were three options to choose from; assassination of Salman Rushdie, self-sacrifice in holy (Shiite) cities in Iraq, and attacks against Israeli forces in Palestine.<sup>762</sup>

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<sup>759</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2004*, 88-89.

<sup>760</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2004*, 89.

<sup>761</sup> Brooks, 200.

<sup>762</sup> Shay, 184.

IAEA inspections that began in early 2004 were much more intrusive than past inspections and found that the level of activity was more in conjunction with attempts to develop nuclear weapons than a nuclear energy source.<sup>763</sup> Another carry over from 2003 was the reconfirmation of the legitimacy of the international arrest warrants against Iranians and diplomats in Buenos Aires during the 1994 terrorist attack. Also included in the list of arrest warrants was a Lebanese official believed to be the head of the Hizbollah terrorist wing responsible for the attack.<sup>764</sup>

Sponsorship for terrorist groups continued as did Ayatollah Khomeini's public praise for attacks perpetrated by Palestinian rejectionist groups. Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, PIJ, al-aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and PFLP-GC were only a few of the many groups that benefited from Iranian surrogacy.<sup>765</sup> Hizbollah received gift on November 7<sup>th</sup> that proved to be advantageous, an unmanned aerial vehicle which Hizbollah used to fly into Israeli airspace.<sup>766</sup>

## **2005**

In 2005, Iran proceeded to interweave itself into Iraqi interests by providing political and ideological support to many of the terrorist groups within the country. Support remained extended many groups, particularly those that followed similar belief systems such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and PIJ.<sup>767</sup> Iran provided these terrorist groups with: sanctuary, safe haven, money, diplomatic backing, ideological support, logistical coordination, and tactical training. Consistent with the past twenty plus years, Iran

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<sup>763</sup> Brooks, 196.

<sup>764</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2004*, 84.

<sup>765</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2004*, 88-89.

<sup>766</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2004*, 88-89.

<sup>767</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 21.

remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism highlighted by elements of the government especially MOIS and IRGC, which have become integrally involved in terrorist activities within Iraq.<sup>768</sup> Iran protected terrorists remaining within its borders, shielding them from prosecution and extradition, particularly al Qaeda members, who Iran refused to identify to the United States and other Coalition partners citing security reasons.<sup>769</sup>

Iran's denial of involvement in Iraqi affairs was contradicted by reports by senior Iraqi leaders, who expressed concern over the success of the new government while Iran provided increasing money, weapons, and protection to insurgents.<sup>770</sup> In contrast to efforts to minimize involvement in Iraq, Iran did not take such a concealed effort towards Israel. Iran continued to maintain an overt role in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist attacks. Ayatollah Khomeini and new president Ahmadi-Nejad praised terrorist attacks perpetrated by Palestinian terrorist groups.<sup>771</sup>

Across the globe, the ongoing court battle in Argentina against Hizbollah terrorists continued. As the trial against terrorists involved in the 1994 Buenos Aires attack carried on, a new federal prosecutor took the reigns in February of 2005. He issued arrest warrants for high-ranking members of the Iranian government, but seven months later in September, Interpol cancelled the international arrest warrants as requested by Iran.<sup>772</sup>

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<sup>768</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 173.

<sup>769</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 173.

<sup>770</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 173.

<sup>771</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 173.

<sup>772</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2005*, 158.

The close proximity of American Forces in Iraq enhanced Iran's raw nerves regarding the controversial nuclear program, leading Iran to publicly promise to return any U.S. attack against the country.<sup>773</sup>

### ***Iran Freedom Support Act***

As an effort to combat continual Iranian progress in the developing a nuclear program, the U.S. Senate introduced the Iran Freedom Support Act on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2005 and signed into law by President Bush on September 30, 2006. This Act provided flexibility to Presidential authority to impose sanctions against countries aiding Iran's petroleum industry and enforced mandatory referral to the United Nations to request Iranian cooperation with the IAEA.<sup>774</sup> It also placed WMD sanctions upon Iran until the U.S. President could confidently certify that Iran had completely dismantled the WMD program and is committed to preventing the spread of WMD programs and weapons elsewhere.<sup>775</sup> Additionally, the IFSA removed from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act through amendment. This Act served two important functions, punish aggressive, terrorist sponsoring states, and reward those countries that no longer pursued goals via terrorism and countries that were pro-democratic entities.<sup>776</sup>

### ***2006***

As in previous years, Iran maintained its status as the world's leading SST, by continuing efforts to undermine the ongoing peace process, train, support, and perpetrate terrorist attacks; directly involving branches of the government such as IRGC and MOIS

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<sup>773</sup> Brooks, 195-196.

<sup>774</sup> Rennak, 2.

<sup>775</sup> Rennak, 2.

<sup>776</sup> Rennak, 2.



in these pursuits. In 2006, Iran spread its reach through terrorist groups and allies across the globe. In July, the Cuba-Iran Joint Commission met in Havana.<sup>777</sup> Groups in Africa, Europe, and Asia were determined to cultivate and continue ties with Iran. In April, an Azerbaijani court sentenced six men, members of the group Muvahhidun Jamaat. During the trial, the Azerbaijani Minister of National Security stated that the men had planned to travel to Iran and other nations for military training.<sup>778</sup>

Adding to the threat of SST, the CIA reported that Iran possessed chemical weapons capable of causing bleeding, blistering, and choking as well as the equipment to effectively deliver them. The report also stated that Iran simultaneously maintained an active biological weapon program.<sup>779</sup> In addition to growing concern over chemical and biological weapons programs, President Ahmadinejad announced in April that Iran had successfully enriched plutonium.<sup>780</sup>

The support Iran provided Hizbollah allowed the terrorist group to continue a violent campaign against Israel. On July 12<sup>th</sup> and over the next month, Hizbollah fired 4,000 Katyusha rockets and other weapons into Northern Israel, forcing people into bunkers and forcing Israel to respond with similar force. Israel utilized one method of combating Hizbollah, blocking all air and sea traffic to Lebanon, preventing Iran and its partner in sponsoring terrorism, Syria, from resupplying the terrorist group.<sup>781</sup>

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<sup>777</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>778</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>779</sup> Greg Bruno, "State Sponsors: Iran," *Council on Foreign Relations* (October 7, 2010): page nr., [http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/state\\_sponsors.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2Fpublication%2Flist%3Fid%3D458](http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/state_sponsors.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2Fpublication%2Flist%3Fid%3D458) (accessed October 12, 2010).

<sup>780</sup> Bruno.

<sup>781</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

Unfortunately, the blockade did not last long enough, and by the end of the year Hizbollah was able to recoup weapons and men to continue the fight.<sup>782</sup>

Iranian involvement in supporting terrorists within Iraqi borders also continued, despite pleas by President Talabani and other Senior Iraqi officials to cease.<sup>783</sup> Instead, Iran continued to use the 800-mile long border the nations shared as a conduit for smuggling terrorist, weapons, supplies, and money.<sup>784</sup> As Iran trained Shia terrorists, the lethality of their attacks increased. The IRGC provided training in building of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and gave armor piercing explosives to groups, leading to the deaths of Iraqis and Coalition Forces members.<sup>785</sup> Iran continued to protect terrorists by refusing to bring senior al Qaeda members to justice, by not identify who was within their borders, and by granting them sanctuary from extradition.<sup>786</sup>

By 2006, Iran produced hundreds of SCUD and ballistic missiles and tested the Shahab-3, a missile with range of 1300 kilometers, capable of hitting targets well within Israel and Saudi Arabia.<sup>787</sup> Inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were also in development. In March, Iran claimed to have completed successful test missiles capable of evading radar and hitting multiple targets.<sup>788</sup> As Iran expands its array of weapons,

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<sup>782</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>783</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>784</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>785</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>786</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>787</sup> Bruno.

<sup>788</sup> Bruno.

many nations fear that Iran may provide WMDs to proxy terrorist groups to carry out attacks against its enemies grows.<sup>789</sup>

The trial against terrorists involved in the July 1994 terrorist attack in Buenos Aires also continued. On October 25<sup>th</sup>, a 801-page indictment was issued charging eight Iranian officials and one Hizbollah terrorist. Judge Canicoba-Corral ratified this indictment less than a month later, continuing to charge former Iranian Ambassador Soleimanpour with involvement in the attack. On November 15<sup>th</sup> arrest warrants were submitted to INTERPOL for the nine suspects.<sup>790</sup>

Combating Iran, the U.S. identified Iranian satellite, Al-Manar, as being used by Hizbollah on March 23<sup>rd</sup>. Several months later, on September 7<sup>th</sup>, the U.S. identified company Bayt al-Mal, its leader, Husayn al-Shami (also member of Hizbollah), and another company, Yousser as providing financial support, utilizing Executive Order 13224.<sup>791</sup>

## **2007**

By 2007, Iran had established preeminence as the leading SST for almost two decades. The nation continued to use terrorism to bolster foreign policy positions, to enhance Iran's position as a strong country in the Middle East, and to act as a subversive

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<sup>789</sup> Raphael Perl, "Trends in Terrorism: 2006," *Congressional Research Service* (March 7, 2007): page nr., <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33555.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2009).

<sup>790</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2006*.

<sup>791</sup> Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2006, E.O. 13224 provides a method for combating terrorism through organizations that provide financial support to designated terrorist groups and prohibits any U.S. person from "making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be subject to this order;" "Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13224.htm> (accessed April 4, 2010).

strong arm to force its ideology across the continent and the globe. The simple act of increasing rhetoric against Israel, the United States, and other Western nations served as motivation for terrorist groups to carry out attacks that aligned with Iranian ideals. Some groups received tangible support in the form of funding, training, and weapons; with this backing these groups were able to continue to perpetrate violent acts which received great praise from Ayatollah Khameni and President Ahmadinejad.<sup>792</sup> Iranian leaders believe that the use of terrorism allows the country to control, intimidate, distract, and dissuade United States and Israeli attacks and will ultimately enable the removal of the U.S. from the Middle East.<sup>793</sup> With this ideology fueling Iranian desires to eliminate Western influences in the Middle East, Iran continued to expand its sponsorship of terrorism, enabling terrorist groups to conduct tactical operations to fulfill Iranian goals.

In July of 2007, President Ahmadinejad, the Defense Minister, and Army Chief of Staff traveled to Syria to meet with President al-Asad and the senior members of his staff. During this trip, Ahmadinejad also met with leaders of HAMAS, PIJ, PFLP, PFLP-GC, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Fatah al-Intifada, and Hizbollah.<sup>794</sup> Iran funneled support to these groups through various front organizations that have direct ties to Hizbollah. On February 20<sup>th</sup> and again on July 24<sup>th</sup>, the United States designated several organizations as providing support for Hizbollah, HAMAS, and the PIJ, pursuant to Executive Order 13224.<sup>795</sup> Groups designated as pursuant to this Executive Order were Jihad al-Bina, Martyrs Foundation and U.S. Branch Goodwill

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<sup>792</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2007*, (Washington, D.C., 2008), 172.

<sup>793</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 9.

<sup>794</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 175.

<sup>795</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 192-193.

Charitable Organization (GCO), finance firm al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH), IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Bank Saderat and all of its branches and subsidiaries, as well as individuals Qasem Aliq and Ahmad al-Shami.<sup>796</sup> IRGC-QF represented Iran's primary venue to provide support to terrorist groups, to include the Taliban. The group reportedly provides \$100 to \$200 million dollars a year to Hizbollah.<sup>797</sup>

Throughout 2007, Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs remained constant. Through Iranian support, Shia militants were able to perpetrate much stronger and more lethal attacks on Iraqis and Coalition troops. These select groups were given weapons, funding, and training to enhance the potential for successful attacks.<sup>798</sup> Iran was indirectly responsible for attacks on Coalition forces; without such support, the attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups may not have been possible. The IRGC provided many weapons and ammunitions to advance the cause of Iraqi militants, in particular, the Iranian built, advanced rockets, explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), which were capable of penetrating armored vehicles.<sup>799</sup> The success of Iranian supported militant groups within Iraq bolstered the already established Iranian resistance against Coalition efforts to extradite al Qaeda leaders for trial; Iranian leadership continued to protect senior al-Qaeda leaders within Iranian borders.

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<sup>796</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 192-195.

<sup>797</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 194.

<sup>798</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 9, 108.

<sup>799</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 173.

In additional efforts to expand its reach, Iran began to seek alliances with not only neighboring nations, but also extended into the Western Hemisphere. Iran utilized Hizbollah through diplomatic channels to promote this expansion.<sup>800</sup>

As in 2006, Iranian involvement in Azerbaijani affairs also continued into 2007. In February, Azerbaijani officials arrested fifteen citizens who claimed to be members of the Northern Madhi Army. This group primarily sought to establish another state ruled by Sharia Law, like Iran. The Northern Madhi Army members were charged with maintaining affiliations with the IRGC and receiving training in terrorist tactics in Iran and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security (MNS) reported that one of the fifteen met with IRGC officials in Qom, Iran and was offered and accepted money to continue the fight against Israel and other Western nations including the United States<sup>801</sup>

Israel, noting growing Iranian aggression, increased the use of military force, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), in northern Israel and the Golan Heights against Hizbollah and HAMAS. Israel also sought out diplomatic means, requesting help from the United Nations.<sup>802</sup> Israel remained concerned about the growing threat from Hizbollah, HAMAS and their supporters Iran and Syria. Stemming from this concern, Israel claimed that HAMAS utilized a network of tunnels within Gaza to smuggle terrorists across the

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<sup>800</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 9, 54.

<sup>801</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 55, 56.

<sup>802</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 109.

Iranian border for training in advanced terrorist techniques to continue the fight against Israeli people.<sup>803</sup>

The November 2006 decision by Argentinian Judge to issue arrest warrants for Imad Mugniyah and five Iranians, including commanders of IRGC and the former Minister of Intelligence and Security, Ali Fallahijan, was upheld on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2007 by INTERPOL's Executive Committee. Iran responded by appealing the Executive Committee's decision, but with no avail. On November 7<sup>th</sup>, INTERPOL's General Assembly upheld the March 13<sup>th</sup> decision, issuing wanted notices, Red Notices.<sup>804</sup>

### ***Western Ties***

Argentina's attempts to hold Iran accountable for the 1994 terrorist attack did not dissuade Iran from fostering relations with other South American countries that represented an opportunity to spread Iranian ideology and terrorist activities. In 2007, Bolivia continued to be high on Iran's priority list. Iran took advantage of the weak government and economy to manipulate President Daniel Ortega. In September, Bolivia announced intentions to increase diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran, and in return received a pledge of \$1.1 Billion dollars from Iran over the next five years.<sup>805</sup> Two months later in November, the Bolivian government changed visa requirements for anyone traveling through Iran, allowing visa-free entry.<sup>806</sup> In addition to relaxing required travel documentation, Bolivia also publicly supported other Iranian ventures

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<sup>803</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 113.

<sup>804</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 146.

<sup>805</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 150, 164.

<sup>806</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 164.

particularly those of Iran's nuclear ambitions, from the creation of a new energy source to uranium enrichment for military purposes.<sup>807</sup>

Another ally of Iran, Venezuela, also became more outspoken for Iranian causes. President Hugo Chavez strengthened ties with both Iran and Cuba and continued to publicly condemn the U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.<sup>808</sup> Part of this included an increase in travel frequency between Iran and Venezuela. In March, the two nations began weekly flights connecting the two state capitols and neighboring capitol in Damascus, Syria.<sup>809</sup> People traveling these flights were immune from immigration and customs at Simon Bolivar International Airport. On June 1<sup>st</sup>, JFK bombing suspect Abdul Kadir was arrested at the airport in Trinidad on a flight for Caracas with a follow on ticket to Tehran.<sup>810</sup>

## **2008**

The trends in Iranian actions and attitude towards terrorism did not waiver in 2008. Iran remained the leading SST, utilizing branches of the government and the military to further Iranian ideology by supplementing terrorist groups across the globe, particularly in the Middle East and specifically in Iraq. The IRGC-QF continued to provide clandestine support to radical militants in Iraq, enabling more violent attacks against Iraqis and Coalition Forces.<sup>811</sup> Iraqi leaders reiterated requests to high-level Iranian leaders to halt support for terrorist groups. In 2008, these requests and the potential backlash of such active support may have influence Iran; the Department of

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<sup>807</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 164.

<sup>808</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 170.

<sup>809</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2007*, 170.

<sup>810</sup> Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2007, pg. 170.

<sup>811</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism: 2008*, (Washington, D.C., 2009), 10.



State reported that attacks linked to Iran were much lower than in 2007.<sup>812</sup> Afghani insurgents and the Taliban benefited from similar support as Iran sought to expand its dominance in the Middle East and to lessen Western influence.<sup>813</sup> HAMAS, Hizbollah, PIJ, and other groups also continued to flourish from Iranian support. Iran actively supported terrorist groups that were allied with the Iranian anti-Western ideology. In November, Iran reportedly funded a HAMAS conference in Damascus, Syria.<sup>814</sup> As Iran used terrorism to further domestic and foreign policy interests, it also began to extend its military prowess in the western hemisphere and Africa.<sup>815</sup>

In 2008, Iran focused on a developing relationship with Armenia, and throughout the year, the two nations expanded mutually beneficial joint projects and increased diplomatic relations. Ties with Syria also strengthened; Iran frequently used Syria as a transit point for supplies and other provisions that were given to terrorist groups.<sup>816</sup> The relationship between Iran and Venezuela also continued to grow. Evidence of a direct connection between the two countries was discovered in November when Turkish customs officials uncovered a suspicious shipment destined for Venezuela. The ship was not carrying 'tractor parts' as claimed by the manifest, but instead had twenty-two containers filled with chemicals, specifically nitrate and sulfite, common bomb making materials.<sup>817</sup>

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<sup>812</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 116.

<sup>813</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 10.

<sup>814</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 185.

<sup>815</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 10.

<sup>816</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 185.

<sup>817</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 103.

Relations with other western nations also flourished, especially those with Nicaragua and Bolivia. Weekly flights between Iran and Venezuela continued, connecting the capitols of Damascus, Tehran, and Caracas.<sup>818</sup> Nicaragua continued to allow Iranian nationals visa-free entry into the country.<sup>819</sup> Boliva agreed to open a new Embassy in Iran and economic ties between the two were strengthened as Iran promised to aid the domestic development of agriculture and other industries. 2008 signified a period in which Iran focused on strengthening already existing foreign relationships and, by developing new ties with similarly aligned nations, also focused on expanding its ideological presence thought the globe.

Neighboring countries that were not Iranian allies found that the sovereignty of their borders was not respected as Iranian supported terrorist groups frequently used those lands as thoroughfares to and from Iran. Azerbaijan was one such nation that served as a common land route for transiting terrorists.<sup>820</sup> Across the globe, the on going court saga in Argentina continued over the 1994 AMIA bombing. On December 16<sup>th</sup> a judge attached commercial properties, owned by former Cultural Attaché Mohsen Rabbani, to the civil suit and requested that European banks freeze the assets of former president Rafsanjani and the other accused men.<sup>821</sup>

Iran, similarly to Cuba, followed a distinct pattern of terrorism. Phase One and Two of Iranian terrorism mirrored that of Cuban terrorism, although on a much grander scale. Iran remains in the second phase of terrorism, as there is not enough pressure to

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<sup>818</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 180.

<sup>819</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 173.

<sup>820</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 60.

<sup>821</sup> Department of State, *Country: 2008*, 157.

stop such support; this pressure may come in the same form as it did for Cuba, economic pressure. However, Iran has decreased the number of attacks that are directly attributable to the nation in recent years. Iran has also forged close alliances with countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, extending its influence to sovereign nations as well as terrorist groups. Iran currently has no reason to halt such sponsorship as it continues to reap successful ventures in destabilizing Western influence in the Middle East and further expansion of the Islamic ideology. The next chapter will identify specific similarities between the nations from phase to phase and provide evidence that both follow the same pattern for utilization of terrorism.

## **Chapter Six: Boolean Analysis**

The previous chapters analyzed Cuba's and Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. Each chapter identified several trends, or categories, in order to extrapolate similarities and differences between the two nations: the existence of political instability within the state, the creation of political instability in other states, ties to both large and small terrorist groups, the provision of training, the provision of weapons, meetings with terrorist groups and with nations, ties to nations, the dedication of government support to terrorism, the extension of political support, and the focus on spreading the nation's influence. Through examining the occurrences of these categories, phases of each state's sponsorship of terrorism emerges and a clear picture of both Cuba's and Iran's utilization of terrorism becomes apparent. Specifically, three phases of sponsorship of terrorism are identified. Phase one, the introductory phase in which a nation first begins to utilize terrorism as a tool for achieving foreign and domestic policy and exportation of ideology. In this phase, both Cuba and Iran struggled utilizing terrorism, which was mainly used to eliminate regime opponents and stabilize newly established forms of government. Phase Two, the refinement phase, describes a period in time which a nation hones its use of terrorism to become increasingly effective; direct government involvement in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks was much more frequent for both Iran and Cuba. Cuba fostered and supported successful revolutions in neighboring countries

while Iran ramped up massive support to proxy groups through provision of large amounts of weapons and focused on exporting Islamism. Finally, Phase Three, the passive phase, is distinguished by events in which a nation no longer is able to provide active levels of support and instead passively provides sanctuary and political support. The table below describes characteristics of each category and highlights the importance in its existence as key ingredients in both active and passive sponsorship of terrorism. Each category is defined by specific instances, or events, that can link the State with groups or other nations. The level and frequency that each category occurs is indicative for which phase of terrorism a nation is in.

**Table 4: Categories of Support**

<b>Category of Support</b>	<b>Description</b>
Create Political Instability	Through its own actions, or that of a proxy, the State creates a level of political instability in the governments of other countries. This is often part of attempts to increase influence in the country or create a diversion to the state's activities.
Ties to Groups	Links to groups to include those that committed acts of terrorism on behalf of the State. Examples of these ties are provided through public demonstration of support, allowing access to diplomatic pouch, and other forms of support.
Training	Training is a form of active sponsorship of terrorism. The state provides training to members of terrorist groups within its own camps or by sending a government employee to provide and oversee training at other camps.
Weapons	Provision of weapons to terrorist groups is another form of active support of terrorism. This level of involvement varies based on the amount of weapons and supplies provided at a time.
Meetings with Terrorist Groups	A state demonstrates support by holding meetings attended by leaders of terrorist groups as well as conferences for the masses in order to spread influence and ideology.
Ties with Nations	A state often aligns itself with other states that have the same overall ideological or political objectives. Ties with nations increases when the level of active support for terrorism decreases. Examples of these ties are provided through public demonstration of support, increasing diplomatic relations, and increasing economic and political aid.
Meetings with Nations	A state demonstrates alliance by holding meetings with fellow heads of state who support the same political objectives.

<b>Category of Support</b>	<b>Description</b>
Direct Government Support	Direct Government Support is a form of active sponsorship of terrorism, where agents of a state are directly involved in the planning and perpetration of terrorist attacks.
Political Support	A state demonstrates passive support for terrorist groups and activities by publicly supporting groups and actions. This clearly demonstrates that the state supports the group, even if it only just attempts to garnish additional support from fellow nations and like-minded people.
Passive Support	Provision of sanctuary, safe haven, or asylum to terrorist members and groups within a state's boundary; also turning a blind eye to the actions of terrorist groups.
Spread	A state spreads support to other nations and groups located in different parts of the world. This spread is integral to attempts to spread ideology.

Before Phase One began, both Cuba and Iran experienced tumultuous periods prior to their own revolutions; the existence of political instability was undeniable. This opened the door for two powerful, persuasive, and influential leaders, Fidel Castro and Ayatollah Khomeini to seize control. From this point, both nations utilized terrorism to ignite and inflame political instability in other states to increase their political power, target regime opponents, and focus on expanding their own ideology. This was often accomplished by providing direct and indirect support to terrorist groups.

This dissertation has identified Cuba as completing three phases of terrorism as described above: the initiation as a SST, the enhancement and increasing support, and finally, the economic persuasion to become a passive SST. Iran, however, has only completed the first of two phases, as opportunities to push Iran into the third phase of terrorism have not confronted the nation.

In the following three sections, three sets of tables and figures highlight the Cuban and Iranian SST activities throughout their respective phases. In the first two sections, Boolean Analysis: Cuba and Boolean Analysis: Iran, tables and figures are created from

the number of times each state provided the specific category type as defined in Table 4. The data used in creating each table and figure comes from Department of State: Country Reports on Terrorism as well as other literary sources that clearly identify each state's involvement in terrorist activities. Each event, or instance, in sponsorship of terrorism is counted only one time, even if an event occurred and was cited by more than one reference. A detailed description of each instance of support can be located in the previous Cuba and Iran chapters. In addition to depicting the types of support Cuba and Iran provided, a third set of tables and figures compare the levels of active sponsorship of terrorism to the level of passive sponsorship of terrorism. The information utilizes the same data already presented, but now groups them by level of support – active or passive. Active support comprises of training, weapons, direct government support, and the creation of political instability and also includes political support. Passive support contains the values already presented as passive support in previous tables and graphs. The third set of tables and figures demonstrates the changing levels of support given to terrorist groups and nations over the phases. The Cuba and Iran sections of Boolean analysis provide a detailed depiction of the types and levels of support provided to terrorist groups throughout the phases.

The third section, Boolean Analysis: Comparing Cuba vs. Iran takes the same three sets of figures described above and compares particular values to elicit the similarities and difference between the nations with regards to their support of terrorism.

Additionally provided are sets of scatter plots that span Cuba's and Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. Three sets of scatter plots are provided, one set for Cuba's

utilization/exploitation of each category, a second similar set identifying Iran's use of each category, and finally the third set which compiles each category into one scatter plot for Cuba and Iran respectively. These plots provide a different method for viewing the growth, or decline, of Cuba's and Iran's sponsorship of terrorism over the years, and bolsters the existence of each phase of terrorism.


### ***Boolean Analysis: Cuba***

Cuban support for terrorism distinctly followed each phase of state sponsorship of terrorism as anticipated. The levels of each type of active support increased from Phase One to Phase Two and diminished greatly in Phase Three. The types of support categorized as passive forms of support increased in the third phase; associations also change from phase to phase. As Cuba became a more proficient SST, ties to groups increased, and after an economic collapse when Cuba was in need of more powerful alliances, ties to nations became more important.


**Table 5: Cuba, Phases of SST Compared (1959 – Present)**

<b>Type of Support</b>	<b>Phase 1</b>	<b>Phase 2</b>	<b>Phase 3</b>
Create Political Instability (Pc)	2	1	1
Training (T)	9	22	0
Ties to Groups (G)	7	33	22
Ties to Nations (Gn)	0	6	15
Meetings with Nations (Mn)	1	0	3
Meetings with Terrorist Groups (Mt)	2	4	1
Direct Government Support (GS)	4	5	1
Political Support (Sp)	2	7	21
Weapons (W)	3	11	0
Passive Support (Pa)	1	15	39
Spread (S)	1	8	5







**Figure 6: Cuba, Phase One as SST (1959 - 1969)**



**Figure 7: Cuba, Phase Two as SST (1970 - 1991)**



**Figure 8: Cuba, Phase Three as SST (1992 - Present)**




**Figure 9: Cuba, Phases of Terrorism Compared**

As depicted above, the types of support Cuba provides to terrorist groups greatly increased from Phase One to Phase Two as it honed the type and success of support granted to its proxies. Phase Two also indicates a mixture of support; with active support becoming more frequent, passive support increases with an additional emphasis on political support and the granting of sanctuary to terrorist groups. Phase Three

demonstrates a dramatic collapse of active support of terrorism as the nation could no longer afford the same level of support as in the past, instead, Cuba focused mainly on passive techniques for they required the least amount of money and risk.

**Table 6: Cuba SST: Comparing Active vs. Passive Terrorism**

Type of Support	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Active	18	39	2
Passive	3	22	60




**Figure 10: Cuba SST: Comparing Active vs. Passive Terrorism**

As Cuba perfected its support for terrorism during the second phase, additional terrorist groups benefited from increasing provisions. As it continued to provide support, Cuba also realized that assistance from allied nations was critical in protecting itself from the international community and other western nations. This became more important in the third phase as Cuba could no longer afford to provide support to its proxies. Instead

the nation sought to protect itself among like-minded nations and began to affiliate with other State Sponsors of Terrorism.

**Table 7: Cuba's Changing Associations over the Phases**

Associations	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Terrorist Groups	9	37	21
Nations	4	6	18



**Figure 11: Cuba, Changing Associations over the Phases**

### ***Boolean Analysis: Iran***

Iran, similarly to Cuba, increased its level of support to terrorist groups as it entered Phase Two in 1980. Although following the same trend, Iran provided support on a much larger scale due to having much deeper economic pockets as compared to Cuba. Iran focused on exporting the Islamic Revolution during Phase One by using terrorist groups to create political instability, and while in Phase Two, Iran expanded its utilization of terrorism for the same end cause except through many other means.

Although the general number of attacks increases in each phase and also during the comparison of the first and second phases, the specific political environment within Iran causes an increase or decrease to the level of sponsorship. For example, near the end of Phase One in 1988 Iran temporarily lessened its involvement in terrorist attacks. The nation dropped to being linked to thirty-two terrorist attacks instead of the forty-five attacks that were credited to Iran the previous year.<sup>822</sup> The decrease is likely due to the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran's attempts to garnish economic assistance from Western nations. Although the overall number of attacks decreased, the target of attacks altered; Saudi Arabia found itself the frequent victim of Iran sponsored attacks.<sup>823</sup> After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 the number of attacks continued to decrease as the country had to refocus and realign support for terrorist groups; the number of attacks dropped to ten in 1990, down another fourteen from twenty-four in 1989.<sup>824</sup>

As Iran entered the second phase of SST, the number of attacks that were directly attributable to the country lessened even though the number of attacks in which agents of the government were directly involved increased. In 1992, Iranian agents and terrorists conducted more than twenty attacks against regime opponents and Israeli targets.<sup>825</sup> Later in the second phase, Iran temporarily decreased attacks against dissidents in order to improve relationships with neighboring countries.

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<sup>822</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1988*, 7.


<sup>823</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1989*, 46-47.

<sup>824</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1990*, 33.


<sup>825</sup> Department of State, *Patterns: 1992*, 22.

**Table 8: Iran, Phases of SST Compared (1979 – Present)**


Type of Support	Phase One	Phase Two
Create Political Instability (Pc)	11	19
Training (T)	0	21
Ties to Groups (G)	52	93
Ties to Nations (Gn)	0	17
Meetings with Nations (Mn)	0	0
Meetings with Terrorist Groups (Mt)	2	15
Direct Government Support (GS)	21	47
Political Support (Sp)	0	0
Weapons (W)	0	25
Passive Support (Pa)	0	17
Spread (S)	3	15



**Figure 12: Iran, Phase 1 as SST (1979 – 1989)**



**Figure 13: Iran, Phase 2 as SST (1990 – Present)**




**Figure 14: Iran SST: Phases Compared Figure**

Iran increased levels of support from Phase One to Phase Two. These types of support were provided to a wide variety of groups and without this assistance, these groups would have not been as successful as they were. Iran began to boost the levels of passive support, particularly by increasingly vocalizing its political support for the actions of terrorist groups and by harboring terrorists within its borders.

**Table 9: Iran SST: Comparing Active vs. Passive Terrorism**

Type of Support	Phase 1	Phase 2
Active	32	112
Passive	0	17




**Figure 15: Iran SST: Comparing Active vs. Passive Terrorism**

Within its growth as the leading SST, Iran provided increasing levels and types of support to many terrorist groups. Iran identified that in order to shelter itself from the International Community and other Western nations, it would need to establish stronger alliances with allies.

**Table 10: Iran's changing associations over the phases**

Association	Phase 1	Phase 2
Nations	0	17
Groups	54	108





**Figure 16: Iran, Changing Associations over the Phases**


As expected, Iran has followed in Cuba's footsteps regarding the first two phases of terrorism. If Iran is ever going to complete Phase Two and enter Phase Three, it will more than likely follow the same trend as Cuba, by refocusing its support into a more passive form and by enhancing alliances with like-minded nations.

### ***Boolean Analysis: Comparing Iran and Cuba***


The following tables and figures demonstrate the same information that was previously depicted. Instead of comparing each nation to changes within its own phase, this section now compares the two States, the types, and levels of support provided during each phase. Generally, the below the tables and charts demonstrate the same increase or decrease in types of support. The main difference between the two is that based on Iran's financial capabilities, it was able to provide much greater levels of support than Cuba.

**Table 11: Comparing Types of Support: Iran vs. Cuba**


Type of Support	Iran: Phase 1	Cuba: Phase 1	Iran: Phase 2	Cuba: Phase 2
Pc	11	2	19	1
T	0	9	21	22
G	52	7	93	33
Gn	0	0	17	6
Mn	0	1	0	0
Mt	2	2	15	4
GS	21	4	47	5
Sp	0	2	0	7
W	0	3	25	11
Pa	0	1	17	15
S	3	1	15	8



**Figure 17: Comparing Types of Support: Iran vs. Cuba, Phase 1**




**Figure 18: Comparing Types of Support: Iran vs. Cuba, Phase 2**



**Figure 19: Comparing Types of Support: Iran vs. Cuba**

**Table 12: Active SST: Comparing Iran and Cuba**


	Active SST Phase 1	Active SST Phase 2
Iran	32	117
Cuba	18	39



**Figure 20: Comparing Active SST between Iran and Cuba**

**Table 13: Passive SST: Comparing Iran and Cuba**


	Passive SST Phase 1	Passive SST Phase 2
Iran	0	17
Cuba	3	22




**Figure 21: Comparing Passive SST between Iran and Cuba**

**Table 14: Comparing Associations: Iran vs. Cuba**


Association	Phase 1: Iran	Phase 1: Cuba	Phase 2: Iran	Phase 2: Cuba
Nations	0	4	17	6
Groups	54	9	108	37



**Figure 22: Comparing Associations: Iran vs. Cuba, Phase 1**



**Figure 23: Comparing Associations: Iran vs. Cuba, Phase 2**



**Figure 24: Comparing Associations: Iran vs. Cuba**


### *Scatter Plots*

The following scatter plots utilize the timelines identifying sponsorship of terrorism for both Cuba and Iran and the same values used to calculate the tables and figures above. These provide a different view of each category of sponsorship of terrorism along each states history as a sponsor of terrorism.


**Table 15: Comparing Cuba's Sponsorship of Terrorism by Category**

Years	Pc	T	G	Gn	Mn	Mt	GS	Sp	W	Pa	S
1960		1	1		1						1
1961		3	1				1		1		
1962											
1963			1								
1964			3			1	2	2	1	1	
1965	2										
1966						1					
1967											
1968		1							1		
1969											
1970		1	1			1				1	
1971		2	1								1
1972											

Years	Pc	T	G	Gn	Mn	Mt	GS	Sp	W	Pa	S
1973											
1974				1		1	2				
1975											
1976			1								
1977										1	
1978			1								
1979				1		1		1	1		
1980								1	2	1	
1981		1		1				2			
1982			1	1			1	4		1	
1983		1	4					1			1
1984		5	2	1				2	1	1	
1985		1	3								2
1986		1	3	1			2		4		2
1987		2	2							1	1
1988		2	4					1	2	2	1
1989			5								1
1990		2	4						1	3	
1991										1	
1992						1				2	
1993					1			2		3	1
1994			1							1	
1995										1	
1996		1	1			1				4	
1997				1						1	
1998										1	
1999										1	
2000								1		1	
2001			1					4		2	
2002				1			1	2		3	
2003	1		1					2		4	
2004								2		1	
2005			1	6	2			1		3	1
2006			3	4				2		9	
2007			4	3				3		2	3
2008			4					1		4	




**Figure 25: Cuba, Creation of Political Instability**




**Figure 26: Cuba, Provisions of Training**







**Figure 27: Cuba, Support to Groups**




**Figure 28: Cuba, Ties to Nations**




**Figure 29: Cuba, Meetings with Nations**




**Figure 30: Cuba, Meetings with Terrorist Groups**




**Figure 31: Cuba, Direct Government Support**




**Figure 32: Cuba, Political Support**




**Figure 33: Cuba, Provision of Weapons**



**Figure 34: Cuba, Passive Support**



**Figure 35: Cuba, Spread of Support**




**Figure 36: Cuba Variables Compared**


**Table 16: Comparing Iran's Sponsorship of Terrorism by Category**

Years	Pc	T	G	Gn	Mt	GS	W	Pa	S
1979	2		1			1			
1980			1			2			
1981	1								
1982			5			2			
1983	2		7						
1984	1		7			1			
1985	1		3						
1986	3		4		1	1			2
1987	2		7		1	4			
1988			11			2			1


Years	Pc	T	G	Gn	Mt	GS	W	Pa	S
1989			5			6			1
1990		1	4		2	4	1		
1991	2		2		1	4			1
1992			6		4	2			1
1993			6			4			1
1994			9			2			
1995			6						
1996	1	1	3		1	3	2		1
1997		1			1	2			
1998		1				3			
1999		1			2				
2000	1								
2001					1	1	1		
2002			2				2		
2003	1				1	2			
2004						2			
2005						1			
2006	6	4	28	3		4	5	7	2
2007	2	4	10	7	1	7	6	7	5
2008	5	8	16	6	1	6	8	3	3



**Figure 37: Iran, Creation of Political Instability**




**Figure 38: Iran, Provisions of Training**




**Figure 39: Iran, Support to Groups**







**Figure 40: Iran, Ties to Nations**




**Figure 41: Iran, Meetings with Terrorist Groups**




**Figure 42: Iran, Direct Government Support**




**Figure 43: Iran, Provision of Weapons**



**Figure 44: Iran, Passive Sponsorship of Terrorism**



**Figure 45: Iran Spread of Support**



**Figure 46: Iran Variables Compared**

## **Conclusion**

Since the 17th Century with the Barbary Pirates controlling the Mediterranean Sea and the North African coastline, States have sponsored terrorism as a means for ideological expansion. Frequently, State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) are nations that lack a strong, well trained military and that do not possess the resources available to nations such as the United States and other Western European nations. These SST are a dangerous threat as they use terrorist groups to fight battles for them, reaping the benefits without soiling their own hands. Recently, SST has become so proficient in the utilization of terrorism that the United States has had to find ways to confront the threat. One method that the United States government employs is by establishing and maintaining a list of States that sponsor terrorism; currently on this list are Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan. The U.S. Department of State defines State Sponsors of Terrorism as those who “repeatedly provide critical support for non-state terrorist groups, who without sponsorship, would have a much more difficult time obtaining the weapons, material, and safe areas to plan, train adherents, and conduct terrorist activities.”<sup>826</sup>

The list of State Sponsors highlights the fact that the U.S. views these nations as potential threats. Even though identifying who supports terrorism is necessary, knowing the characteristics of SST is also critical in order to gain a better understanding of the

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<sup>826</sup> “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”

motivations behind the sponsorship. Both Cuba and Iran have been on the SST list for more than thirty years, and both have used terrorism in order to export their ideological revolutions throughout the world. Immediately after Castro took power in 1959, Cuba began to support leftist-terrorist and guerilla groups in Latin America, South America, and Africa in order to spread Communism. After the Islamic Revolution, lead by Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran began to sponsor terrorist groups in the Middle East to spread their own radical version of Islam. Both revolutions began similarly – lead by charismatic men who were arrested and exiled only to later return triumphant after overthrowing the previous governments.

This dissertation examined the techniques that Cuba and Iran implemented in order to sponsor terrorism for the purpose of globally exporting their own ideological revolution. Through the examination of the root causes of the Cuban and Iranian revolutions and the conditions that existed that paved the way for Castro and Khomeini to take power, the environment that fostered both Cuba and Iran to become leading State Sponsors of Terrorism has become apparent. The identification and analysis of the phases of State Sponsored Terrorism has established a clear depiction of the similar sponsorship techniques that both Cuba and Iran applied during their tenure as State Sponsors, highlighting the commonalities and results of each phase. Through the study of these phases of terrorism, a pattern of exploitation emerged that develops a stronger appreciation for the history of SST and enables trend analysis to be performed, which could provide better insight into predicting future actions of similar State Sponsors of Terrorism.

This dissertation's methodology employed a comparative historical analysis, which implemented both within-case and nominal analysis strategies. The within-case method focused on comparisons within each state's sponsorship of terrorism, and the nominal strategy compares Iran's sponsorship to that of Cuba's.<sup>827</sup> Using both of these methods not only allowed for an in-depth comparison within each state to identify critical aspects of their sponsorship of terrorism, but also facilitated a top-level comparison between Iran and Cuba to determine if Iran followed Cuba's approach to sponsoring terrorism. Boolean algebra, a nominal research methodology enabled a comparison of each state's utilization of terrorism. The following categories were used in order to conduct within-case and nominal analytical comparisons between Iran and Cuba: the existence of political instability within the state, the creation of political instability in other states, ties to both large and small terrorist groups, the provision of training, the provision of weapons, meetings with terrorist groups and with nations, ties to nations, the dedication of government support to terrorism, the extension of political support, and the focus on spreading the nation's influence. Each of these categories was examined according to particular phases in Cuba and Iran's history as State Sponsors. This dissertation identified three phases of SST: Phase One, the introductory phase in which a nation first begins to utilize terrorism as a tool for achieving foreign and domestic policy and exportation of ideology; Phase Two, the refinement phase in which a nation hones its use of terrorism to become increasingly effective; and Phase Three, the passive phase, in

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<sup>827</sup> Mahoney, "Strategies," 338.

which a nation no longer is able to provide active levels of support and instead passively provides sanctuary and political support.

Cuba entered the third phase of terrorism due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting economic recession, while Iran has yet to face the same economic events and still flourishes in the second phase of terrorism. By comparing the first two phases for each nation, evidence revealed that these countries in fact followed the same patterns of support for terrorism. Growth from Phase One to Phase Two was similar, although on a larger scale for Iran. Each nation faced similar challenges and had similar successes in exporting their ideology on a global scale. These similarities exist for several reasons: both leaders came to power in the same manner, both utilized terrorist groups due to the lack of a large, strong military, and both learned from mistakes made in phase one leading to more successful second phase. With each utilizing terrorist groups, Cuba and Iran experienced growing pains as they learned which methods were more successful than others. If Iran entered the third phase of terrorism, it would be reasonable to expect similar results as those of Cuba - a quick decline in overt sponsorship that dwindles into safe haven and political support for terrorists. An evaluation of similar nations could render further evidence supporting the existence of these phases of State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Key characteristics to examine would be the evolution of radical leaders achieving power through revolutions, a desire to spread ideology, and an inability to expand through the use of a traditional military requiring the use of terrorist groups. Another key implication would be the lack of political allies to provide support for the revolutionary nation.



Terrorism has been around for centuries, utilizing fear as a tool to force change. In recent decades, the use of terrorism has come to the forefront, utilized by nations and groups to achieve change that would not be possible through conventional forms of warfare. Recent utilization of asymmetric warfare has forced the United States to adapt methods of fighting battles - fighting enemies that are not readily identifiable and in war-zones that endanger innocent bystanders. In addition to these changes, the United States is fighting terrorist groups that do not claim allegiance to a particular nation and, the most dangerous of those groups, are often sponsored by a nation with similar goals in mind. State Sponsorship of Terrorism represents a particularly lethal threat against other nations as it has proven to be a deadly weapon and enemy to fight. These nations utilize terrorism to achieve foreign and domestic policies that without would be otherwise unobtainable. By understanding the patterns and phases that States follow, anticipating the methods and future applications of terrorism improves, enabling western nations to enhance their responses to and protections against terrorist activities.

## Appendix 1: Timeline of Cuban Sponsorship of Terrorism

Note: The information below has been extracted from U.S. Department of State *Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports* and *Country Reports on Terrorism*.

<b>Phase One: 1959 - 1969</b>	
1957 - 1967	Raul Castro and Che Guevara visit Cairo and establish contacts with African liberation movements. The two leaders also visit Gaza and express support for the Palestinian cause.
	Members of Dominican Republican "Argupacion Politica Catorce de Junia" receive military training in Cuba.
	Dominicans, Guatemalans, Venezuelans, Chileans are receive training in special camps on violence and guerilla warfare and then infiltrate back to their countries. Major emphasis is placed on instructing pro-Castro Latin Americans in violence and guerilla warfare.
	Relations with Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) are established.
	Provide military training for African leaders from Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Spanish Guinea, Tangayika, and Zanzibar.
1960s	Cuba's attempts to bring revolutionary, anti-American regimes to power fail. Cuban support for guerillas and terrorist groups with Guatemala, Venezuela, and Bolivia produce violence and suffering to those countries and people. Over the next two decades, Cuban attempts to support communist movements comes with more success. This is due to help from the Soviet Union and modified tactics: Cuba used agents from the America Department (subversive arms of Cuba's Communist Party) and Armed Forces to help groups achieve power in Latin America and Africa. Military personnel provide weapons and intelligence support to the Sandinista's in Nicaragua and in Africa, Soviets and Cubans backed the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Cuba also supports South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC), both forces fighting the South African regime.
	Castro makes relentless attempts to create another Cuba in Venezuela by supporting the FALN and promoting violence and terrorism against the democratically elected regime of Romulo Betancourt.
1960-1961	Establishes relations with Algerian FLN: extend official and public support. Weapons are shipped to FLN via Morocco. Cuba provides shelter, medicine, education services and cooperation in intelligence and counter-intelligence.
	The Organization for the Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America is created (OSPAAL).
	Hosts Tri-Continental Conference (Sponsored by USSR). Goal of conference: adopt a common political strategy against colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism. Marked the beginning of international terrorism - terrorist and liberation groups from Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Latin America began to work together and build alliances. Cuba provides the organizational structure to support terrorist and anti-America groups in the Middle East and Latin America.
1964	Conference of Latin American Communist Parties held in Havana agree to actively promote the guerrilla forces in Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay, Colombia, Honduras and Haiti."

**Phase One: 1959 - 1969**

	Cuba trains Guatemalan's Cesar Montes and Luis Turcios Lima. The men lead a violent terrorist/guerilla campaign against the Guatemalan government. Later Montes organized the Ejercito Guerillero do los Pobres (EGP) in Guatemala and in the 1980's went on to join the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador.
	Castro welcomes the founding of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
	Castro creates the National Liberation Directorate (DLN) in Cuba to support revolutionary groups throughout the world. DLN was responsible for planning and coordinating Cuba's terrorist training camps in the island, covert movement of personnel and military supplies from Cuba, and serves as a propaganda apparatus.
	The Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) was created by Castro to "coordinate and foment the fight against North American imperialism." It has a permanent seat in Havana.
	Castro sends weapons via Cairo, to the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Southern Yemen.
	Cuba publishes a small book by French Marxist journalist Regis Debray <i>Revolution in the Revolution</i> , promoting guerrilla warfare in Latin America. The book is translated into various languages and distributed widely.
	Trains a group of Venezuelans, members of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in Cuba.
1967 - 1968	Cuba sends weapons to the NLF in South Yemen via Cairo. Cuban agents go on fact finding missions to North and South Yemen.
1968	Cuba sends military instructors and advisors to Palestinian bases in Jordan to train the Palestinian Fedayeen.
1968-1975	Provides training and support to Tupamaros, a terrorist group operating in Uruguay. Becomes more closely connected with FATAH-PLO and other Palestinian organizations. Latin American guerillas were trained in Lebanon. Cuba's support to these groups included counter-intelligence and intelligence training.

**Phase Two: 1970 - 1991**

1970	First high level delegation from FATAH-PLO visits Cuba. Begins supporting and training M-19.
	"Mini Manual for Revolutionaries" a book written by Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella gives precise instructions in various terror tactics, Cuba translates the book and distributed it worldwide.
1973 - 1975	Provides Syria with military support and personnel during the Yom Kippur War. Military and Intelligence Personnel is also given to Middle Eastern groups and regimes in struggle against Israel. Cuba cooperates in founding World Mathaba with Libya.
1974	The National Liberation Directorate (DLN) is reorganized into the America Department (DA) under the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee. The DA centralizes control over Cuban activities for supporting national-liberation movements and is responsible for planning and coordinating Cuba's secret guerilla training camps and networks for covert movement of personnel and material from Cuba. The DA also serves as a propaganda apparatus. Agents were involved in operations in other regions such as Europe. Castro's ally Manuel Pineiro "Barbaroja" placed in charge.
	Arafat visits Cuba.
1976 - 1982	CIA estimates that approximately 300 Palestinian terrorist train in Cuban camps. Supports the "Steadfastness Front" which is opposed the US backed Camp David accord.

<b>Phase Two: 1970 - 1991</b>	
	Illich Ramirez Sanches (Carlos the Jackel), who attended the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, trains terrorists in urban guerilla tactics, automatic weapons, explosives and sabotage in Cuba.
	Trains members of the Congolese National Liberation Front.
	Provides additional military and political support to the Palestinian cause.
1976	Cuban exile formations emerge among most active and disruptive terrorist groups on international stage.
1977	Despite Cuba's abrogation of anti-hijacking agreement with US (April 15, 1977), Havana continues to provide safe haven to hijackers and there were no successful diversions of US aircraft to the island.
1978	Abu Iyad, a close aid to Arafat, sends hundreds of Palestinian's to attend Cuban terrorist training camps.
1979	DA sets up a network funneling weapons and supplies to Sandinistas in Nicaragua. DA's second in command: Armando Ulises Estrada helped unify Sandinista factions fighting in Somoza.
	Arafat attends the 6th Non-Aligned Conference in Havana.
	Recognizes and praises the Iranian Revolution.
1980	Havana openly supports and advocates armed revolution as a mean for leftist forces to gain power in Latin America.
	Cubans play an important role in facilitating movement of men and weapons into regions.
	Provides direct support in the form of training, arms, safe haven, and advice to a wide variety of guerilla groups that partake in terrorist operations.
1981	Havana openly supports and advocates armed revolution as a mean for leftist forces to gain power in Latin America; Cuba provides direct support in the form of training, arms, and safe haven, also advises to a wide variety of groups.
	USSR and Cuba pursue long-term coordination campaign to establish sympathetic Latin American regimes. They support organizations and groups in Latin America that use terrorism as a basic technique to undermine existing regimes.
1982	Continues to promote armed revolution and support and nurture terrorist groups.
	The United States places Cuba on the State Sponsor of Terrorism List.
	Grants diplomatic and political support to Arafat during the 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon.
	Continues to work with USSR to provide money, logistical support and training to leftist forces in Latin America that conduct terrorist attacks.
	Promotes armed revolution by leftist forces in Latin America. Supports and nurtures groups that use terrorism.
	Manuel Pineiro Losada, head of America Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, reaffirms Cuban Commitment to the revolution process, including support for groups that use terrorism during the 1982 International Theoretical Conference. Pineiro stressed fundamentalist Marxist-Leninist principle of need to destroy repressive machinery of the state in order to achieve complete control, replace it with a new state, and identified timely use of arms necessary for triumph.
7-Sep-1982	Members of Cinchonero Group, a leftist guerilla group in Honduras took 105 hostages at the Chamber of Commerce Building in San Pedro Sula. They demanded release of political prisoners, repeal of antiterrorism law and expulsion of US, Israeli, Chilean and Argentinean military advisors. After the hostage crisis, the guerillas took political asylum in Cuba.
1983-1990	Jorge Massesti and the DA provide weapons and several thousand dollars to Chilean MIR.

<b>Phase Two: 1970 - 1991</b>	
	Support for Arafat and the PLO increases diplomatically and militarily due to the Palestinian Intifada. Following establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, Cuban-Palestinian military cooperation is enhanced, especially in areas of counter-intelligence and intelligence.
	Several dozen Mexican's receive training in terrorism and guerilla warfare in Sierra del Rosario, Pinar del Rio Province and in Guanabo in eastern Cuba.
	Provide advanced weapons and demolition training to MRTA in Peru.
1983	Continues to assist terrorist and insurgent organizations in Latin America, Middle East, U.S., and Africa. Supplies training, money, documents, guidance, communications, propaganda, and logistical support.
	Actively promotes contact and cooperation among disparate or antagonistic groups.
	Prime area of interest is Central America, where Cuba provides support for Sandinistas and other left wing, anti-US groups.
	In Guatemala, four groups that are under a pro-Cuban umbrella continue terrorist attacks against Guatemalan Government, economic structure and military.
1984	Provides material and logistical support to FMLN, a left wing Salvadoran insurgent group.
	Castro regime maintains large and complex subversion support apparatus - provides backing for all types of leftist revolutionaries and terrorists. Support includes everything from guns and asylum to training in the entire range of skills needed by terrorists.
	Trains a large number of insurgents from El Salvador. After receiving training, many guerillas leave to infiltrate Honduras.
1985	Cuba uses Honduran territory as a transit area to pass material to El Salvadorian insurgents.
	U.S. Department of State estimates that Cuba has provided logistical and monetary support to 1,000s of guerillas and provided military training.
	Support to Salvadorian Leftists continues.
	Colombia's M-19 long and well established relationship with the Cuban government continues.
1986	Maintains close relationship with terrorists in Chile and Colombia. Particularly close to Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) and 19th of April Movement (M-19)
1986	Terrorist groups in Latin America target more international and U.S. targets to win the favor and assistance of anti-Western states like Cuba.
Aug-1986	Security forces near Carrizal Bajo in Northern Chile discover 1 of 8 terrorist arms caches. The first had 342 assault rifles, second had more than 200,000 rounds of rifle ammo, 315 Soviet Block rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades, 1320 assault rifles, 1 million rounds ammo, about 900 anti-tank rockets, more that 3000 M-16 US-Vietnam era rifles, 114 PRG, 7 rocket launchers, and other weapons. The size, composition, cost, and logistical delivery of components indicate SST. Cuba is identified as a leading candidate for supplying the weapons because Cuba had access to both types of weapons through their allies and because smaller amounts of the same weapons were brokered from Vietnam by Cuba and provided to other Cuban based subversive groups in other Latin American countries in recent years. The total volume of weapons was around 70 tons - suggest delivery by sea, weapons and equipment were also damp and corroded by sea water. Additional similar discoveries on smaller scales indicate that arms delivery operations to deliver arms by may be ongoing.

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**Phase Two: 1970 - 1991**

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6-Aug-1986	Chilean Arms Cache, cont. - Four members of Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) are arrested same day the arms are discovered. These members state that arms deliveries had been arriving since the beginning of the year. Over the following two weeks the remaining cache's were found, most near Carrizal Bajo. Evidence indicates that the caches were intended for long term storage; one cache found in a concrete reinforced underground vault in old hotel in Vallenar contained 1,320 assault rifles, one million rounds of ammo, and around 900 anti-tank rockets. In addition to the weapons cache, an underground training school was found under an old house in Huasco. Identical schools were found south near Santiago. Many of the recovered weapons were manufactured in the US during Vietnam War, and made available by Hanoi from captured stocks. Weapons were from the also Soviet Bloc era. The majority of this material and other bloc equipment was still packed in original shipping containers.
1987	U.S. is unable to trace direct sponsorship of terrorism by Cuba, however since 1959, Cuba continues to provide a persistent level of support including training and supplying guerillas throughout the world, including Palestine. Training has become very specialized, provided safe haven, weapons, political, and monetary support to a wide range of leftist and insurgent organizations that use terrorism in Latin America, including groups from El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, and Colombia. Long standing contacts between Cuba and Puerto Rico remain.
	Provides training to Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC) and MIR - Movement of the Revolutionary Left. Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), also receives extensive training and weapons from Cuba.
	Provided training to urban-based Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) of Peru. This group concentrates on foreign targets, especially the US.
	Facilitates terrorist activity in Panama.
	Supports Haitian Liberation Organization and Parti National Democratique Progressite D'Haiti a leftist political party.
1988	Trains, arms, and provides logistical support to many leftist guerilla groups in Honduras.
	Continues to facilitate terrorist activity in Panama, effectively creating a crossroad for travel and transactions of various terrorist and insurgent groups.
	Continues to provide weapons, training, and safe haven to groups that employ terrorism. These groups are almost exclusively Latin American
	Cuba maintains a large and complex apparatus for subversion, substantially assisting guerilla movements in Latin America. Many of these leftist groups look to Castro for guidance and advice
	Continues longstanding ties with guerilla groups in Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador. Supports the FPMR, ELN, and FMLN.
	U.S. Department of State could not trace direct sponsorship of international terrorism to Cuba. Cuba provides direct support in the form of training, arms, and safe haven, money, and political support. Harbors Wiliam Morales, who has an 89 year sentence for terrorist acts, at least one Puerto Rican involved in the Wells Fargo Robbery in Connecticut in 1983, and Joanne Chesimard, leader of Black Liberation Army who murdered a NJ St. Police Officer.
1989	Cuba provides some form of support to all major guerilla groups. An undetermined number of all Colombian terrorist/guerillas travel to Cuba each year for training.
	Sponsors guerilla groups in Guatemala.
	Makes transaction and travel of terrorist groups through Panama possible.

<b>Phase Two: 1970 - 1991</b>	
	Trains and supports radical groups from around the world, including Palestinian groups, which use terrorism to advance political cause. Provides weapons, training, safe haven to mostly Latin American groups.
	Continues longstanding ties with guerilla groups in Colombia, Chile, and El Salvador.
1990	Provides safe haven for ETA terrorists that Spain wants to extradite.
	Continues to supply and support terrorist groups in El Salvador, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, and Chile. Continues to serve as haven for regional revolutionaries and provide military training, weapons, money, and guidance to subversive groups.
	The island of Cuba is a major training center and transit point for Latin American subversives and some international groups. FMLN is the primary beneficiary of Cuba's clandestine support network over the last several years. Havana was the point of origin for most of the weapons used by FMLN for insurgent and terrorist operations in El Salvador. Honduras and Guatemalan groups also received Cuban aid. In South America, Chilean radical leftist groups were favored recipients of Cuban support, although aid may have declined since Chile transitioned to Civilian rule in 1990.
	Several rebel organizations have offices and members stationed in Havana. Wounded rebels are often treated in Cuban hospitals.
	Cuban support became more important to radical groups as pro-Cuban governments in Panama and Nicaragua demised.
1991	FSU announces intent to withdraw Soviet brigade in Cuba and sharply reduce arms deliveries to Cuba.
	Due to overwhelming domestic economic problems Cuba greatly reduces and suspends training, arms, support, and shipments to terrorist groups.
	Havana downplays political ties to many groups, notably those in Honduras and Chile in hopes to upgrade diplomatic and trade relations in the region.
	Publicly backs political settlement between Salvadoran Government and FMLN, which has been a long term beneficiary of Cuban military aid and training.
	Despite economic problems, Cuba continues to provide safe haven and training for various regional and international terrorist groups. Provides limited political training to some leftist groups. There has been no information that to confirm that Cuba has closed down training camps for insurgents
1991 - 2000	Cuba shows a serious decline in SST due to economic reasons resulting from collapse of the Soviet Union.
1991-2001	ETA establishes general headquarters in Havana.
	High-level PLO military delegations including heads of intelligence visit Cuba.
	PLO leaders continue close relations with Cuban leadership, having access to specialized military and intelligence training in Cuba or Palestinian territories.
	Continue to provide safe haven to several terrorist fugitives from the U.S. including Black Liberation Arms Leader, Joanne Chesimard and Charlie Hill, member of Republic of New Afrika Movement.

<b>Phase Three: 1992 - Present</b>	
1992	Increasing economic situation and political isolation precludes any significant material and monetary assistance to the few remaining Marxist insurgencies in Latin America. He welcomes the peace accord in El Salvador and advises Guatemalan and Colombian insurgents to negotiate seriously to end the struggle and stresses the need to make peace with other insurgent leaders.
	Continues to allow insurgent offices, FARC and ELN for example, to operate in Havana
	Continues to host the 3rd World Leftist Militants and provide political training while military training seems to have stopped.
1993	Remains a supporter of international terrorism, but due to continuing economic difficulties, cannot afford to be a significant sponsor. Still provides safe haven and has not renounced political support for groups that engage in terrorism.
	Castro minimizes ties to groups in effort of upgrade diplomatic and trade relations. Although there is no evidence that Cuba directly sponsors international terrorist attacks in 1993 – the State continues to provide safe haven for members of regional and international terrorist groups.
	Adheres to United Nations mandated sanctions against Libya, but did not limit Libyan diplomatic representations as requested by the UN.
Sep-1993	Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Pedro Miret Prieto travels to Libya to expand bilateral cooperation.
1994	The first anti-regime demonstration occurs in Cuba as the economy continues to deteriorate.
	Cuba is no longer able to support armed struggles in Latin America and other parts of the world. Continues to passively support terrorism and has not renounced political support for groups engaged in international terrorist activities.
	ETA terrorists, more than forty FPMR members that escaped from Chilean prison in 1990, and Colombia's two main guerilla groups the FARC and ELN maintain representatives in Havana.
1995	Same level of political support and provision of safe haven as in 1993 and 1994. US fugitives continue to reside in Cuba.
1996	Remains in close contact with many leftist insurgent groups in Latin America. Safe haven to Basque ETA members, more than 40 FPMR members, FARC, ELN, and US fugitives.
1997	Same level of passive sponsorship of terrorism as in previous years.
	Maintains close ties to other SST.
	The Castro government focuses on generating revenue through tourism, wants to upgrade diplomatic and trade relations with other nations.
1998	Support to leftist revolutionary groups in Latin America and elsewhere remains significantly reduced. Cuba maintains close ties to other SSTs and insurgent groups. Continues to provide safe haven to international terrorist groups
1999	Continues provide safe haven to several terrorist groups and US fugitives. Maintain close ties to SST and Latin American insurgents, some groups maintain permanent presence in Cuba.
Late 1999	Cuba hosts series of meetings between Colombian Government and ELN leaders.
2000	Continues provide safe haven to several terrorist groups and US fugitives. Maintain close ties to SST and Latin American insurgents, some groups maintain permanent presence in Cuba. FARC and ELN have permanent presence on Island.
	Cuban Air Force Migs shoot down two small unarmed, civilian planes in international waters that belonged to Brothers to the Rescue a Miami based group. All occupants, including 3 U.S. citizens, were killed.



<b>Phase Three: 1992 - Present</b>	
2000	During the 2000 Ibero-American Summit in Panama, Castro refused to join the other Ibero-American heads of state in condemning the ETA terrorists and slammed Mexico for supporting the Summit's statement against terrorism
2001	Initially Castro takes an indecisive stance regarding the GWoT. A few weeks after the September 11 <sup>th</sup> attacks, in October Castro labels the US-led War on Terrorism "worse than the original attack, militanistic, and fascist.". After this statement, Castro receives ostracism, not praise, leading to a demonstration of Cuban support for international campaign against terrorism and signing all 12 UN Counter-terrorism conventions and the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism at the 2001 summit.
	Continues to denounce U.S. lead GWoT and view terrorism as legitimate revolutionary tactic.
	Continues to denounce global efforts against terrorism and asserts that the US intentionally targeted attacks against Afghan Children and Red Cross Hospitals.
	Allows more than 20 ETA terrorists to live in Cuba as 'privileged guest' and grants safe haven and support to the FARC and ELN.
	Harbors member of Sinn Fein and Cuba and Latin American IRA member as well as FPMR members wanted for murder in Chile and U.S. Fugitive Joanne Chesimard.
	Chilean government traces calls from FPMR relatives in Chile to Cuba following the 1996 prison break. Cuba refused extradition.
May-10-2001	While speaking at Tehran University, Castro vowed that the "imperialist king will finally fall".
2002	Remains opposed to US-led Coalition prosecuting GWoT. Actively critical of many associated US policies and actions.
	Sends agents to U.S. missions around the world to provide false leads designed to subvert post 9/11 investigations.
	Continues to harbor terrorists and US fugitives.
	Provides limited support and safe haven to FARC, ELN. Bogota seeks Cuban help in mediating with ELN.
	Accused IRA weapons expert resides in Cuba who was on trial in 2002 in Colombia, accused of training FARC in advanced use of explosives.
2003	Cuban delegate to the UN states that "terrorism can't be defined as including acts by legitimate national liberation movements - even if groups target innocent civilian to advance political, religious, and social agendas." Delegate further refers to the US policy toward Cuba as "acts by states to destabilize other states is a form of terrorism."
	Remains opposed to GWoT. Continues to allow ETA members to live in Cuba and provide support and safe haven to members of FARC and ELN.
	Government controlled press ran baseless reports alleging US violations of human rights.
	Propaganda claims that 'those fighting for self-determination or against foreign occupation are exercising international recognized rights and cannot be accused of terrorism.'
	Government did not extradite or request the extradition of suspected terrorists in 2003.
	Continues to provide support to designated foreign terrorist organizations and host several terrorists and dozens of US fugitives.
	Government refuses extradition to countries alleging that the receiving government couldn't provide a fair trail because charges against the accused are 'political.' Cuba uses the argument with respect to the number of fugitives from U.S. Justice.
	Castro defends harboring ETA, FARC, and ELN members as a way to help negotiation between Spain and Colombia.
Apr-2003	3 Cubans attempt to hijack a ferry bound for the U.S. Cubans executed the three under "Law Against Acts of Terrorism."

<b>Phase Three: 1992 - Present</b>	
2004	Continues to actively oppose GWOt Maintains to the UN and elsewhere that legitimate national liberation movements cannot be defined as terrorism. Has sought to characterize them as "legitimate national liberation movements" even though a number of groups intentionally target innocent civilians to advance political, religious and social agendas. Claims without evidence that it is a victim of terrorism by Cuban-Americans. Government actions and public statements are contrary to the spirit of UN conventions of terrorism that it signed. Continues to provide limited support and safe haven to Foreign Terrorist Organizations, refuses to turn over terrorist claiming trail would be political, permits ETA members to live in Cuba despite Spanish Government requests to deny them sanctuary. US fugitives still reside in Cuba.
2005	Continues oppose GWOt, publicly condemns US policies and actions. Did not attempt to track, block, or seize terrorist assets although Cuba is authorized to do so in Law 93 Against Acts of Terrorism and Instruction 19 of Superintendent of Cuba Central Bank. No new Counter-terrorism laws were enacted or Executive Orders or regulations issued in this regard. Cuban government has taken no action against al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Official state and government controlled press rarely speaks out against al-Qaeda and other FTOs. Invests heavily in Biotechnology. There is a dispute over existence and extent of offensive Bioweapons program. Government maintains friendly relations with Iran and North Korea.
2005	Iran offers Cuba \$20 Million euro-line of credit to invest in Biotechnology. Demands the return of five Cubans, convicted of espionage in the U.S. and role in Cuban Air force shoot down of two small civilian planes. Cuba states that it no longer provides safe haven to US fugitives. Wants Luid Posada Carriles returned - he plotted to kill Castro and bomb Cuban Airlines in 1976. Still provides safe haven to ETA, FARC, and ELN. There is no information on terrorist acts by these groups or others on Cuban territory.
Jan-05	Cuba-Iran Joint Commission meets in Havana.
May-05	Cuba meets with North Korea, hold military talks at the general staff level in Pyongyang.
Nov-05	North Korean trade minister visits Havana, signs protocol for cooperation in areas of science and trade
13-Nov-2005	Foreign Minister Perez Roque visits Iran.
2006	Cuba remained a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Cuba increases ties with Venezuela. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Cuba continued to publicly oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the War on Terror. To U.S. knowledge, Cuba did not attempt to track, block, or seize terrorist assets, although the authority to do so is contained in Cuba's Law 93 against Acts of Terrorism, as well as Instruction 19 of the Superintendent of the Cuban Central Bank. No new counterterrorism laws were enacted, nor were any executive orders or regulations issued in this regard.

<b>Phase Three: 1992 - Present</b>	
	To date, the Cuban government has not undertaken any counterterrorism efforts in international and regional arena or taken action against any designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
	Cuba provides safe haven to members of ETA, FARC, and the ELN, and maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.
	The Cuba-Iran Joint Commission met in Havana in January.
	The Cuban government continues to permit U.S. fugitives to live legally in Cuba and is unlikely to satisfy U.S. extradition requests for terrorists harbored in the country.
	The United States periodically requests return fugitives residing in Cuba ranging from convicted murderers, two of whom killed police officers, to numerous hijackers. In previous years, Cuba responded to requests to extradite U.S. fugitives by stating that approval would be contingent upon the U.S. returning wanted Cuban criminals
	The Cuban regime publicly demanded the return to Cuba of five of its agents convicted of espionage in the United States. The five were variously accused of being foreign intelligence agents and infiltrating U.S. military facilities, but the Cuban government continued to refer to these individuals as heroes in the fight against terrorism. One was accused of conspiracy to murder for his role in the Cuban Air Force's shooting down of two small civilian planes.
	Cuba has states that it will no longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who enter Cuba
	Continues to request that the U.S. surrender Luis Posada Carriles and three of his accomplices.
	ETA members allegedly receive safe haven in Cuba.
	Provides safe haven, medical care, and political consultation to ELN and FARC.
2007	Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism.
	Bolivia receives medical and intelligence support from Cuba.
	Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega reestablished formal diplomatic ties with Iran and is aggressively seeking to expand relations with Cuba and Venezuela.
	President Hugo Chavez persisted in his public criticism of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and deepened Venezuelan relationships with state sponsors of terrorism Iran and Cuba.
	Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
	Cuba remains opposed to U.S. counterterrorism policy, and actively and publicly condemns many associated U.S. policies and actions. The Cuban government did not attempt to track, block, or seize terrorist assets and no new counterterrorism laws were enacted, nor were any executive orders or regulations issued in this regard. Cuba continues to provide safe haven, medical care, and political consultation to members of ETA, the FARC, and the ELN and permits more than 70 U.S. fugitives to live legally in Cuba and refuses almost all U.S. requests for their return. Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Syria.
June 2007	The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission put Credit Suisse (CS), ABB, and Syngenta on its "black list" of companies suspected of indirectly sponsoring terrorist countries. Credit Suisse said that it was conducting a controlled withdrawal of its business from Cuba, North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Sudan.
2008	Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism.
	Cuba continues to publicly defend the FARC and provide safe haven to some members of terrorist organizations, though some were in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the Governments of Spain and Colombia

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**Phase Three: 1992 - Present**

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Although Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world, the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists. Members of ETA, the FARC, and the ELN remained in Cuba during 2008. Cuban authorities continued to publicly defend the FARC. However, on July 6, 2008, former Cuban President Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions. He has also condemned the FARC's mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict. The United States has no evidence of terrorist-related money laundering or terrorist financing activities in Cuba, although Cuba has one of the world's most secretive and non-transparent national banking systems. The Cuban government continues to permit some U.S. fugitives—including members of U.S. militant groups such as the Boricua Popular, or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army to live legally in Cuba. In keeping with its public declaration, the government has not provided safe haven to any new U.S. fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006.

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## Appendix 2: Timeline of Iranian Sponsorship of Terrorism

Note: The information below has been extracted from U.S. Department of State *Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports* and *Country Reports on Terrorism*.

<b>Phase One: 1979 - 1989</b>	
1/1979	Shah senses trouble. His government collapses. Leaves Iran on 'vacation' with family and never returned. Opens the door for Khomeini to return.
2/1/1979	Khomeini establishes the 1st Islamic Republic. There is a national referendum, he is elected in landslide victory. Declares Iran to be an Islamic Republic, is appointed political and religious leader for life.
	Khomeini creates SAVMA, which serves as his Intelligence Service. Its main role is international security and gathering intelligence about Iraq and acts simultaneously with IRGC and Hizbollah. The first director is General Faradost.
	Iran begins a terror campaign against Great Britain and is involved in the murder of the head of Anglican community in Shiraz.
2/1979	Arafat, spokesman for the PLO, visits Tehran. Iran sets up PLO training camps in Iran.
11/1/1979	Khomeini gives speech asking the public to increase attacks on the U.S. and states that November 4th is the most appropriate day to do so because a, Iranian student had been killed one year before.
11/4/1979	The U.S. Embassy in Tehran is taken over. Revolutionary militants demand the Shah's return from the U.S. for trial. Hostages are held for 444 days.
1979-1981	Iran supports terrorism in the Middle East, disrupting the peace process between Israel and Palestine.
Early 1980s	Khomeini sends 1,000 IRGC troops to the Bekaa Valley. The troops mission is to educate and train young Shiite extremists and mold them into the group Hizbollah.
1980	Iran is not currently identified as a SST, but the Government does perpetrate many acts of international terrorism. Many groups are actively seeking sponsorship by Iran. The U.S. Department of State identifies that at least half of the international terrorist attacks perpetrated by Iranians were carried out by Government officials. Attacks occur in the Middle East, U.S., Europe, and against diplomatic facilities and Iraqi citizens.
6-10/1980	Iranian authorities take over Christian hospitals and missions in Shiraz and Isfahan.
9/1980	IRGC members take over Bishop's house and steal documents.
10/1980	During an assassination attempt the Bishop's wife is injured.
1980-1981	British missionaries are attacked, injured, and arrested.
1980-1999	Shiite terrorist organizations and Iranian entities perpetrate 260 international terrorist attacks. This number does not include the number of Hizbollah attacks against IDF forces in Lebanon and terrorist attacks against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.
1981	The terrorist campaign against Great Britain ends; activities of Anglican churches cease and members leave Iran.
	Iranian Foreign Minister Mussawi states that his goal is to convey the message of revolution to the world.
	The Khomeini regime provides limited support to international terrorist groups.
	U.S. Department of State records indicate that 24 international terrorist attacks occur in 1981, 5 of those are by the Iranian Government. All of these attacks occur in Beirut and primarily against Iraqi diplomats.

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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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1982	Khomeini regime supports terrorist groups like the Iraqi Islamic Revolutionary Council (IIRC).
	Iran cultivates the Shiite movement.
	Iran and Syria support a specific wing of Hizbollah called Islamic Jihad wage war against the Western presence in Lebanon. Initial targets are Western Embassies and Installations using car bombs and kidnapping. International peace keeping forces (U.S., Great Britain, France, Italy) enter Lebanon to oversee the PLO withdrawal and stabilize the situation.
7/19/1982	Pasdaran (IRGC) supports Islamic Amal kidnapping of David Dodge, President of American University of Beirut, who is held hostage in Iran. Iran hopes to pressure U.S. to force Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia to release four Iranian Embassy officials.
11/1982	Islamic Amal took over Lebanese Army barracks, invites Iran to use facilities.
	IIRC spokesman, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Baqer Hakim, names Iran as it's primary financial backer during a press interview.
Late 1982	Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, coordinates the merge of Association of Muslim Students with Islamic Amal al-Dawa members to form Hizbollah.
1982-1989	Around half of Iranian terrorist attacks are directed towards targets in Persian Gulf states. Iran has three main goals: modify Gulf states policy toward Iran concerning Iran-Iraq war and end aid to Iraq; free terrorists incarcerated in Gulf states and avenge their execution; undermine and topple regimes to establish Islamic regimes.
1983	Iran's patronage for terrorism is a major factor in the Middle East. Iran uses Shia groups to attack Iraqi interests. The Dawa Party in Kuwait receives directions and training from Iran, resulting in six successful bombing attacks (12/12/83). Iran also trains Shia dissidents from Arab nations in terrorist tactics.
	Iran and Hizbollah make the decision to use terrorist attacks to remove the U.S. and France from Lebanon.
	King Hassan of Morocco accuses Khomeini of being behind the wave of riots in Morocco. Morocco believes Iran was involved because the assassins of Anwar Sadat mentioned Khomeini during their trial as inspiration for their acts.
4/11/1983	Iran supports Hizbollah bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut.
6/24/1983	In Greece, a Romanian plane chartered by Libya was hijacked. Amal members claimed responsibility. Amal hijacked the plane to gain the release of Imam Mousa al Sader.
7/1983	Iran releases David Dodge
8/26/1983	In Austria an AirFrance plane is hijacked; Hizbollah claims responsibility and seeks the release of Lebanese detainees and halt of military aid to Chad, Iraq, and Lebanon.
10/1983	Iran supports Hizbollah bombing of U.S. Marine Barracks and French Base in Lebanon.
Mid to Late 1983	As part of the Western Hostage Crisis, Hizbollah, with Iran's support, kidnaps U.S., Great Britain, and French citizens using them as bargaining chips.
1984	No Iranian SST in Persian Gulf is recorded. Tehran's long terms goals are to spread the revolution using terrorism to create like-minded Fundamental Islamic Republics in the Middle East in Persian Gulf states with large Shia populations. Iran continues to train Shia dissidents and establish terrorist infrastructures in the region.
	Peacekeeping troops withdraw from Lebanon.
	SAVAMA is reorganized and renamed to VEVAK (Ministry of Intelligence and Security) Muhammad Kishari is appointed director.

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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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	U.S. Department of State: First mention of Iran as a leading SST and first mention of Hizbollah.
	Iran wants to punish the U.S. for supporting the Shah and France for supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; wants to remove the U.S. and West influence from Islamic World.
	Iran supports some of the most vicious anti-west groups in the region.
	Hizbollah kidnaps and kills William Buckley.
	Iran spreads support to group operations in Western Europe and plot the assassination of anti-Khomeini exiles and others in Western Europe.
1/1984	Hizbollah murders new American University of Beirut President, Malcolm Kerr, a prominent scholar in Middle East in retaliation for the U.S. shelling and fighting.
2/1984	Hizbollah kidnaps American and French citizens to pressure Governments to improve the treatment of Shiite prisoners in Iraq.
	An exiled Iran general and his brother are killed in Paris, France.
7/31/1984	An AirFrance plane is hijacked while en route from Frankfurt and forced to land in Tehran. The hostages are released and the plane detonated. Three Arab hijackers were involved and the "Islamic Organization for Release of Jerusalem" claimed responsibility. Other Iranian backed groups were implicated in two other hijackings. The terrorist surrendered to Iranian authorities on 8/2/84.
11/1984	Seven Lebanese Shia are arrested in Rome for involvement in plot to attack the U.S. Embassy. Another man is arrested in Switzerland as conspirator.
12/4-6/84	Kuwait Airlines Flight 221 is hijacked en route from Dubai to Pakistan and forced to land in Tehran. 2 U.S. AID employees aboard are murdered; Iran authorities rescued hostages with no resistance from hijackers. Hizbollah claimed responsibility.
1985	Level of support provided by Iran remains high but declined from the record level in 1984.
	Groups with ties to Iran are involved in 30 terrorist attacks, although Iran could not be directly linked.
	Iraq, U.S., and France remained primary targets of Iranian sponsored terrorism; Persian Gulf states face continued threats that could escalate if Iran chose to exercise it's terrorist option.
	General Faradost is arrested and charged with espionage for the USSR.
3/22/1985	Three French Embassy employees are kidnapped by Hizbollah on Iran's behalf. The kidnapping is done in attempt to pressure France into curtailing arms sales to Iraq and repay Iranian loans made that were deposited by the Shah.
5/25/1985	al Dawa Party (supported by Iran) attacks the Amir motorcade in Kuwait with a car bomb. 6 died, 12 injured.
6/17/1985	Greece TWA flight en route from Athens to Rome is hijacked by Islamic Jihad Organization (also known as Hizbollah), led by Imad Murianiya. The Reagan administration resolved to not yield to terrorists and made it clear to Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah that harm to hostages would elicit harsh U.S. response.
6/29/1985	Hizbollah releases the hostages from the Greek TWA flight.
6/30/1985	Israel releases 300 Shiite terrorists.
8/1985-11/1985	U.S. and Iran are involved in clandestine negotiations: exchanging weapons for hostage release and cessation in taking hostages.
1985-1986	A high number of French citizens are kidnapped and a high number of bombings occur in Paris, France by Hizbollah. The attacks and kidnappings result in France making payments to Iran to get the hostages released and for cessation of attacks.

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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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1986	Fewer international terrorist events are traceable to Iran. Iran continues to recruit Shia dissidents from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE and provide military training in Iran.
	Iran tries to expand networks in Europe, Africa, and Asia using local Islamic communities, religious, and cultural institutions, and diplomatic services in order to bolster ability to conduct and support terrorist acts beyond the Middle East.
	Middle East terrorist attacks spill over to Western Europe. Iran is suspected of sponsoring terrorist attacks in Western Europe, surrogates are not implicated in spectacular, mass casualty attacks associated with Arab and Palestinian terror.
	Iranian campaigns to pressure Persian Gulf oil producing states to cut production. Iran supports bombing of several important Kuwait oil installations prior to the 7/19/86 OPEC meeting.
1986-1989	Iran's Minister of Interior, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, provides support to Hizbollah.
1/1986	Aborts attempt to assassinate former Admiral Madani in Paris, France. No suspects in this attack.
3/1986	Revolutionary Justice Organization (RJO) abduct a French, four-person TV crew. Three of whom were released after France and Iran settled pre-Khomeini, bi-lateral debt issues.
4/1986	Bomb attack in Paris, France on home of exiled leader Masud Rajavi. No suspects in this attack.
9/1986	Series of bomb attacks in Paris, France. French police believe that Hizbollah is responsible. No suspects in this attack.
9-10/1986	RJO claims responsibility for the kidnapping of Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy.
	A faction of Hizbollah continues to hold Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland hostage (kidnapped in 1985).
	Hizbollah leaders publish statement emphasizing that Tehran is a key party in any hostage negotiations.
10/1986	Former Iranian Army Colonel (dissident) murdered in Istanbul. No suspects in this attack.
12/24-26/86	Tehran holds Conference of Iraqi opposition groups. Hijacking of Iraqi Airline (12/25) may have been timed to coincide with conference.
12/25/86	A hijacked Iraqi Airline crashes in Saudi Arabia. Several groups including Islamic Jihad claim responsibility, the actual perpetrator is unknown.
1987	Iranian involvement in Middle East terrorism and support for Hizbollah is substantial.
	Elimination of regime opponents at home and abroad is a major goal of terrorist activities. Terrorist hunt down and kill dissidents in Europe, U.S., Middle East, and Asia.
	In West Germany, a defector who was the former chief pilot for Rafsanjani (at the time served as Speaker of Iranian Assembly) is shot and killed.
	In total, 7 people are murdered in Europe and 2 were threatened.
	A handful of international terrorist attacks are conducted by Iranian agents and local supporters of the Khomeini regime. Exiles Iranian dissidents and anti-Khomeini Pakistani religious and political figures are target of several assassination attempts.



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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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	Iranian leaders call for the overthrow of Saudi Arabian ruling family after the Iran-instigated clash during the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca. Leaders want revenge for the deaths of Iranians and an to end Saudi control over the Islamic Holy places in Saudi Arabia.
	French Embassy is under siege in Tehran. Siege is eventually withdrawn because France caved to Iran's demands.
	"Embassy War" - Five month standoff between Iran and Paris. Iran Embassy employees are suspected of aiding terrorists responsible for the 1986 Paris bombing campaign by giving refuge inside the Iranian Embassy in Paris.
	Linked to 45 SST incidents.
Early 1/1987	Iran steps up support for international terrorism with State agents and/or surrogate groups. Iran attempts to pressure Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other modern Arab states in the Persian Gulf and Europe through terrorist groups. Iran allegedly orders the kidnapping of U.S. journalist Charles Glass in Lebanon. Iran is also involved in the assassination of Iranian defectors and dissidents in the UK, Switzerland, West Germany, Turkey, and Pakistan. Iran begins a world wide search to identify potential U.S. targets for terrorist attacks.
7/1987	Iranian agents attack Iranian dissidents in four houses in Karachi and one in Quetta. Used automatic weapons in the attacks. Some suspects are arrested and disclosure of Iran's intentions may have deterred Iran from carrying out further attacks in 1987.
	Hundreds of Iranians are killed in the clash during the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca.
7/24/87	In Switzerland an Air Afric plane is hijacked en route from the Congo to Paris. The plane is taken to Geneva. An unknown organization claimed responsibility and threatens to kill U.S. and French hostages if French authorities do not stop the seige of Iranian Embassy in Paris. Hizbollah member Ali Muhammad Hariri wants the release of Shiite terrorists that have been held in France since 1986. The demands and indicative of Hizbollah's and Iran's involvement in the hijacking.
9/1987	French authorities suspect that a pro-Iranian terrorist group is responsible for bombing a Saudi bank in Paris.
12/1987	Jibril, leader of the PFLP-GC, meets with Iran's Foreign Minister. PLFP-GC seeks new sources of support and discussed creating an Islamist organization to liberate Palestine.
Late 1980s	Iran expands effort to export radical Islamic ideology. Grants greater support to PIJ and decides to coincide this effort with the outbreak of the Intifada.
1988	Decides to end war with Iraq and expand ties to the west. Iran temporarily lessens involvement in terrorism although continues to include terrorism among policy tools exercising significant influence over groups that held U.S. hostages in Lebanon.
	Iran linked to 32 SST incidents, which is down from 45 in 1987. The decrease is primarily due to the end of the war and an effort to obtain economic assistance from the West.
	Made efforts to improve relations with neighboring States and the West after Iran's decision to adopt the UN cease-fire in July. This probably contributed to the drop in attacks in Kuwait (5 in 1988 compared to 17 in 1987) by pro-Iranian Shia Kuwaiti groups. Press reports indicate involvement of Iranian citizens in some of the attacks.
	Iran encourages the campaign of violence against Saudi Arabia. Violence continues in retaliation for deaths of several hundred Iranians during the 1987 pilgrimage to Mecca and against Saudi restrictions on Iranian attendance in 1988.
	Hizbollah hijacks Kuwait airliner for release of 17 Shia terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait. Iran is suspected in complicity in the hijacking.

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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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	Individual operations indicate Tehran relies on a few local Iranians and Islamic fundamentalists worldwide to carry out attacks. The lacking number of arrests made in these operations indicate that the perpetrators were well trained and disciplined.
	Continues to regard the suppression of exiled opponents of Iranian regime opponents as a key focus of terrorism. For example: Arson attempts against West Germany video store owner who sold anti-Khomeini videos; attempted kidnapping of a dissident in October 1988 in Turkey.
	PIJ is deported to Lebanon. Increases the number of contacts with Iran and Hizbollah.
	PFLP-GC begins cooperating with Hizbollah in Lebanon.
	Iran supports Hizbollah during the Hizbollah - Amal conflict.
	Iran may have been involved in the kidnapping of UN officer and U.S. Marine, Lt. Col. William Higgins.
1/27/1988	Tehran may be involved in the kidnapping of Beirut businessman Ralph Schray.
Spring 1988	Hizbollah, with Iran's help, defeats Amal in Beirut.
4/5/1988	Kuwait Air flight 422 is hijacked while en route from Thailand to Kuwait and forced to land in Mashhad, Iran. Hizbollah claims responsibility. Iran Parliament Chairman Rafsanjani promised hijackers safe haven if the hostages are released. Some elements of Iran may have provided support, at a minimum that support was providing a friendly environment at Marshhad. Airport authorities were aware of the flight's arrival despite silence on flight 422's radio. Iran officials may have allowed more Hizbollah and weapons aboard the plane at Marshhad.
7/3/1988	PLFP-GC destroys American airliner. May have been paid by Iran to avenge the accidental downing of Iranian airliner by U.S. warship.
9/1988	Iran helps to arrange the release of German hostage Rudolf Cordes in hopes to receive diplomatic and economic consideration in the future.
12/1988	Pan-Am flight explosion. PFLP-GC was initially the primary suspect. Iranian and Shiite involvement was suspected but never proven.
1989	The kidnapping of foreigners in Lebanon ceases. Apparently due to the end of the Iran-Iraq War and Iran's desire to improve relations with the U.S. and West.
	Number of sponsored incidents declines from 32 in 1988 to 28 in 1989. Iran continues to view selective use of terrorism as legitimate tool to achieve foreign policy goals. Iran intelligence services are frequently used to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks.
	Khomeini issues death threat against Salman Rushdie.
	Iran supports retaliatory attacks on Saudi Arabia in response to Riyadh's execution of 16 Kuwaiti Shia's convicted of bombing during the '89 Haj.
	Continues campaign to eliminate anti-regime dissidents. This continuation is attributed to the regime's fear that prominent dissident leaders are a significant threat to Tehran during the leadership transition after Khomeini's death. The number of attacks against dissidents in '88 was 25 and only three in 1989. These three resulted in five deaths, Three in Austria, one in UAE, and one in Cyprus. Iranian involvement suspected in the assassination of three Iranian dissidents
	Two bombs explode in Mecca during the Haj. During interrogation, Shia terrorist confesses that they were recruited, trained, and supported by Iran. Saudi Arabia executes 16 Kuwait Shia suspected in involvement of the attacks. After the execution, Iran and Hizbollah leaders issued statements denouncing the Saudi regime and call for revenge.

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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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	Number of sponsored attacks against Saudi interests increased in 1989. The attacks were traced back to the Riyadh restricting the number of Iranians in the pilgrimage to Mecca.
	Iran sponsors two explosive attacks in Saudi Arabia.
	Campaign against Salman Rushdie accounts for a majority portion of attacks of Middle Eastern origin in West Europe. U.S. Department of state believes that Iran continues to coordinate and plan attacks against businesses associated with Rushdie and his book.
	Several attacks occur in the U.S. against bookstores that sell the Rushdie book.
	Three British Council Library buildings are also attacked because they sold Rushdie's book.
	Riots occurred in Pakistan and India over Salman Rushdie and the publication and sale of his book.
	Continues to use terrorism tactics to further and advance revolutionary goals.
	Indications that Iran is using Hizbollah to reestablish it's terrorism network in Europe.
	Iran uses Hizbollah to smuggle weapons and explosives via two shipments into Africa and Europe, undoubtedly to support terrorist operations in Iran's benefit. Shipment 1: Cypriot authorities act on a tip and seize a shipment of jam bound for Monrovia, Liberia. Authorities discover that the shipment contained explosives, grenades, detonators. Shipment 2: Valencia, Spain (11/23/1989), Spanish authorities arrest eight radicals including three Hizbollah members before they were able to accept a shipment of food stuffs containing explosives, grenades, and detonators. Both shipments originated in Sidon.
2/1989	Khomeini delivers religious ruling calling for the death of Salman Rushdie because his writings are offensive to Islam. Ahmed Jibril, leader of PFLP-GC, offers to carry out execution
6/1989	Khomeini dies. Extensive support for terrorism continues.
6/4/1989	Iran dissident is assassinated in the UAE, likely by an Iranian intelligence office.
7/13/1989	Three Iranian dissidents are assassinated in Vienna. Victims are Kurdish activists, members of the Kurdish Democratic Party.
8/28/1989	One Iranian dissident is assassinated in Cyprus, likely by an Iranian intelligence officer.
9/19/1989	Niger, Africa: UTA French passenger plane explodes. Explosive device is like the one in the 'Delckamony Affair', took place during a time with high tension between France, Iran and Hizbollah. Libya is now blamed for the explosion.
10/14/1989	Saudi Airlines office in Lahore, Pakistan is damaged in bomb explosion. Attacks resulting after statements against Saudi Arabia by Iranian and Hizbollah leaders.
10/16/1989	Saudi Arabian military attache in Ankara, Turkey is injured after a bomb exploded under the seat of a car. Attacks occur after statements against Saudi Arabia are made by Iranian and Hizbollah leaders.
11/1/1989	Beirut, Lebanon: Saudi official is assassinated by three gunmen; Islamic Jihad (Hizbollah) claims responsibility. Attacks occur after statements against Saudi Arabia are made by Iranian and Hizbollah leaders.
11/1989	U.S. releases \$567 Million in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for two Americans who are released in 1990.

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**Phase One: 1979 - 1989**

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	Turkish press report that two Iranian kidnappers attempted to smuggle anti-Khomeini dissidents back to Iran from Turkey in the trunk of a car (occurred 10/88). The kidnappers were sent back to Iran where they served one year in prison. Two Iranian diplomats were involved in the kidnapping but not prosecuted because they held diplomatic immunity, they were expelled from Turkey.
11/24/1989	Pakistan: Saudi official responsible for coordinating aid to Afghanistan resistance movement is assassinated. Attacks resulting after statements against Saudi Arabia by Iranian and Hizbollah leaders.

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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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1990	Continues to use and support terrorism. The number of SST attacks drop to ten in 1990 from twenty-four in 1989.
	Continue attacks on Iranian political dissidents in Europe by official Iranian hit squads. Four Iranian dissidents are assassinated. Attacks occurred in Pakistan, Switzerland, Sweden, and France. Swiss authorities confirm official Iranian involvement in murder of Iranian dissident in Switzerland. French authorities suspect that the November murder of Iran-American dissident in Paris was by Iranian hit man.
	Use Intelligence Services to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks, use diplomatic pouch to convey weapons and money to terrorist groups.
	President Rafsanjani is elected. Rafsanjani requests a resolution to the hostage problem. Tehran times reflected his view, stating that the hostages should be freed without preconditions (2/22/90).
	Switzerland: Kazen Radjavi (brother of MEK leader Massoud Radjavi) is assassinated. Evidence indicates direct involvement of at least one official Iranian services. Thirteen suspects are arrested; most traveled together to Switzerland on official Iranian passport, all thirteen obtained their passports and airplane tickets at the same time. The Swiss Government condemns the assassination and summons the Iranian Embassy officer to express strong concern over investigation findings. The Iranian Embassy files complaint against newspaper La Suisse under Article 296 of Swiss Penal Code. Iran's Government objected to the way the newspaper published reports of the murder and implication of Iran's involvement.
	Major terrorist leaders like Jibril (PFLP-GC) and prominent members of Hizbollah frequently visit Tehran.
	Great Britain renews diplomatic relations with Iran, which ceased in 1989 after the death threat against Rushdie.
Early 1990	IRGC and Hizbollah provide training to IG and al-Jihad while based in Sudan.
4/1990	U.S. hostages Frank Reed and Robert Polhill are released after the U.S. unfroze Iranian assets.
7/27/1990	French President Mitterrand pardons pro-Iranian Lebanese terrorist Anis Naccache and four accomplices. The men were sentenced to life in prison for the murder of French policeman in 1982 and wounding of three others in the assassinations attempt of former Iranian Prime Minister Bakhitar. Foreign Minister Dumas states that the release of Nacche was part of France's effort to obtain the freedom of remaining Western hostages in Lebanon.
9/1990	Iranian-Kurdish woman is killed by letter bomb intended for her husband, chairman of the Kurdish Independence Party in Sweden was the target. Swedish authorities have not officially determined who was responsible for the attack. The husband told Swedish police that he was under constant threat from Iran. Other members of the local Kurdish community also accuse Iran for the attack.

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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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10/23/1990	Paris, France: Iranian dissident, leader of Flag of Freedom Organization is assassinated in his apartment. Iranian Government agent likely involved.
12/1990	Tehran hosts World Conference on Palestine to gain increasing influence over Islamic affairs and Palestinian movements. Leaders from groups include Saiqa, Hamas, PIJ, and Hizbollah.
1991	Continues to be a leading SST. The number of SST fell to five in 1991 from ten in 1990. Intelligence Services continue to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks, especially against regime opponents abroad. The policy of using terrorism is approved by the highest level of the regime, despite the fact that the Government routinely denies involvement in assassinations of dissidents or in terrorist attacks by pro-Iranian groups.
	Diplomatic and commercial facilities are reportedly used extensively in assassination and terrorism operations.
	During the year Iran strengthened relationship with extremist terrorists throughout the world, placing special emphasis on Palestinian groups.
8/6/1991	Paris: Former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar is murdered. Iran agents are prime suspects, four Iranians arrested in Switzerland and France.
10/1991	French magistrate issues international arrest warrant for Hussein Sheikhattar, senior official in Iranian Ministry of Telecommunications. The magistrate also issues arrest warrants for Iranians and Turks thought connected to the case. President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Dumas post-pone trips to Iran because publicity linking Iranian Government to murders.
Early 10/1991	Ayatollah Musave-Ardabili, senior cleric called on Muslims to attack U.S. citizens and properties as a religious duty.
10/19-22/1991	Iran hosts conference like Intifadah and the Islamic World to maintain contacts with many terrorist groups. Generates a large amount of rhetorical protest against Middle East peace talks. Subsequent to the conference groups, issues threats to participants in the Middle East peace talks.
10/31/1991	Ayatollah Khomeini gives speech condemning the Middle East peace process.
12/4/1991	Terry Anderson is release, ending the hostage crisis. He was the first hostage taken and the last one released. Over a ten year period Hizbollah took approximately one hundred Westerners hostages (U.S. French, Great British, German).
1992	Iranian agents and surrogate groups conduct more than twenty attacks in 1992. Prime targets are opponents to Iran's regime and Israeli interests. Principle sponsor to Islamic and Palestinian groups. Intelligence Services continue to support terrorist attacks, either directly or through extremist groups.
	Host series of high profile meetings with Hizbollah and Hamas. Iran's stated goal is to coordinate efforts against Israel and halt Arab-Israeli peace process.
	Did not carry out any attacks against U.S. targets but did conduct regular surveillance on U.S. missions and personnel.
	Tehran's leaders view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish the regimes political objectives and approve acts of terrorism at the highest level of government.
	Set up cooperative agreement with Hamas. Musa Mohammed Abu Marzuq - lead the Hamas delegation.
	Jordanian authorities accuse Iran of providing the Vanguard of the Islamic Youth (Shabab al-Nafeer al-Islami) via PFLP-GC.

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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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	Tehran is tied to several bombings and assassinations in Middle East, Europe, and Latin America despite attempts to distance itself publicly from direct involvement of terrorist acts. As a SST, Iran continues to include efforts to build closer ties to non-Shia terrorist groups which poses a significant threat in Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and Africa.
3/12/1992	Turkey: Car bomb is neutralized near the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.
3/17/1992	Beunos Aires: carbomb suicide attack against the Israeli Embassy. Islamic Jihad (Hizbollah) claims responsibility. Iran at the least had foreknowledge of the attack and was probably involved. Considered a spectacular attack, 29 died and 242 injured. This was the most deadly attack in 1992. In response to the attack the Iran Parliament Chairman stated "Israel would be dealt with continuing blows of revenge in various areas of the world."
8/1992	Iran's first Vice President meets with chief Hizbollah and PFLP-GC members in Damascus.
9/1992	Berlin: Leader of Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and three followers are assassinated. There is a strong indication that Iran is responsible; Iran asked Hizbollah to murder the Kurdish members. The killing closely resembles the '89 murder of previous KDPI leader in Vienna.
10/1992	Tehran hosts meeting with Hamas and Hizbollah. After talks, Hizbollah increased operations against Israel, including repeated use of rockets to attack villages in northern Israel.
1993	Iran sponsors attacks less frequently in the Middle East and Western Europe and more frequently in other areas especially Pakistan and Turkey. This is a change from two favorite venues.
	Iranian intelligence continues to stalk opposition members in U.S., Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
	Suspected of involvement in murder of Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu and attempted murder of Istanbul Jewish businessman Jak Kamhi.
	Linked to several assassinations of dissidents in 1993.
	Probably responsible for the assassination of four MEK members, one in Italy 3/93, one in Pakistan 6/93, two in Turkey 8/93. Professionals assassinated all of these people; no arrests have been made.
1/1993	Body of Iranian dissident found after being kidnapped months earlier in Istanbul. All of these people were assassinated by professionals, no arrests have been made.
4/1993	Fathi Shkaki noted in a New York Times interview that PIJ has been receiving monetary aid from Iran since 1987. He also noted that funds and military equipment were transferred to Gaza and areas of Judea and Samaria to finance and aid military campaigns and provides support to families of organizations martyrs, and prisoners.
6/6/1993	Karachi, Pakistan: Iranian is oppositionist shot and killed, apparently by Iran's intelligence services.
8/25/1993	Four terrorists dressed as Turkish Security Officials kidnap Iranian dissident Mohammad Khaderi. His body was found 9/4/1993 on the side of the Kiursehir Boztepe Highway.
8/28/1993	Ankara, Turkey: Iranian dissident Behram Azadfer is assassinated.
11/8/1993	Tehran, Iran: two hand grenades are thrown onto the courtyard of French Embassy. The explosives caused little damage. Hizbollah claimed responsibility, protesting the French Government's support for MEK.

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	Hand grenade thrown into the Air France office in Tehran. One French citizen injured. Hizbollah claimed responsibility, protesting the French Government's support for MEK.
1994	Iran is directly involved in planning and executing attacks and maintained the level of support for incidents as in 1993. Supports terrorist groups in attempts to halt the Middle East peace process and provides varying amounts of support to radical Islamic groups and secular groups from North African to Central Asia.
	Terrorist operations focus on Iranian dissidents, especially MEK and KDPI members. Four confirmed and two possible attacks on Iranian dissidents occurred over seas.
	President Rafsanjani tries to moderate Iran's public image and expand economic and political ties to West Europe and Japan.
	Turns fourteen PKK terrorists over to Turkey in exchange for Turkey to crackdown on MEK.
1/4/1994	Tehran, Iran: gunshots fired at the British Embassy in protest to British's anti-Iran policy.
1/7/1994	Coru, Turkey: KDPI member Taha Kirmeneh killed. One of the four confirmed attacks against an Iranian dissident.
1/10/1994	Stockholm, Sweden: KDPI member wounded by letter bomb. One of the four confirmed attacks against an Iranian dissident.
3/10/1994	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq: KDPI member is killed. One of the four confirmed attacks against Iranian an dissident.
5/29/1994	Qabhiyah, Iraq: two MEK members killed. One of the four confirmed attacks against Iranian dissidents.
6/24/1994	Copenhagen: Osman Muhammed Amini murdered. One of the two possible attacks against an Iranian dissident.
7/18/1994	Buenos Aires: Hizbollah car bomb explodes, targeting the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AIMA) Building. AIMA is a central communal organization of the Argentine Jewish community. The attack is virtually identical to the 3/1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires. Nearly 100 died. AIMA was attacked because Iran wanted diplomatic and military support from Argentina and President Carlos Menem did not provide it.
11/12/1994	Bucharest: Ali Mohammed Assadi murdered. One of the two possible attacks against an Iranian dissident.
12/6/1994	French court convicts two Iranians of involvement in the murder of former Prime Minister Bakhitar (in 1991), the third defendant; an Iranian Embassy employee was acquitted. Khomeini's nephew was one of the two men convicted; he was sentenced to 10 years in jail in connection to the murder. The second was convicted to life in prison.
1995	Iran is deeply involved in the planning and executing of terrorist attacks by it's own agents and surrogate groups.
	Escalates the assassination campaign in 1995 to seven confirmed attacks, up from four in 1994. Focuses on opposition groups MEK and KDPI. Leaders of dissent groups were the most frequent victims, most of the attacks occurred in Iraq.
	President Rafsanjani continues to promote moderate image to West Europe and Japan. He hopes to facilitate an expansion of relations. This desire probably explains why Iran reduced attacks in Europe in 1995 because Tehran wants to ensure access to the West and capital markets.

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<b>Phase Two: 1990 - Present</b>	
5/17/1995	Baghdad: Two MEK members are shot and killed.
6/5/1995	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq: Two members of the Iranian Kurdish 'Toilers' Party (Komelah) are murdered.
7/10/1995	Baghdad: Three MEK members are killed.
9/17/1995	Paris, France: Hashem Abdollah is killed. Son of chief witness in 1994 trial that convicted two Iranians to jail for the murder of former Prime Minister Bakhtiar. Possibly an anti-dissident attack.
11/13/1995	Riyadah: Saudi National Guard building is attacked by carbomb. Hizbollah suspected in conjunction with Iran in the attack. Seven killed, five were U.S. citizens, forty-two injured.
Mid-1990s	Iran supports the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan.
1996	Iran remains the premier SST. Continues to plan and execute attacks by their own agents or surrogates.
	Involved in up to eight assassinations of dissidents abroad.
	Suspected of supporting the Khobar Tower bomb in Saudi Arabia.
	Iran's Vice President Habibi meets with Hamas leaders in Damascus. Habibi praises the successful efforts following the February bombing in Israel. Hamas claims responsibility in two more bombs in Israel the following week.
	Continues to oppose the recognition of Israel and encourage the violent rejection of the Middle East peace process.
2/15/1996	Implementation Force (IFOR) troops raid a Bosnian-Iranian Intelligence training facility in Fojnica and detain eleven people (three are Iranian). The search revealed classrooms and extensive armory. Evidence of booby-trapped children's toys which indicated terrorist tactic training.
3/1996	Arrest warrant is issued for Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahiyah in connection with Mykonos Killings in Germany. Witness for the prosecution: Former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr told the court that Khomeini ordered the killing for three exiled Kurdish leaders. Former Iranian Intelligence officer Abolqasem Messhani testified also. Prosecutor implicated Iranian Senior leadership for directing the killings, which lead to demonstrations in front of the German Embassy in Tehran and threats against the prosecutor.
4/1996	Thirty Iranian planes land in Damascus loaded with weapons and ammunition intended for Hizbollah.
5/28/1996	Paris: Iranian Deputy of Education Minister that served under Shah, Reza Mazlouman, is shot and killed by an Iranian resident of Germany with suspected ties to the MOIS. Mazlouman published writings proposed to the Islamic regime in Tehran. Seven others were assassinated in Turkey and northern Iraq.
6/1996	Manama, Bahrain announces the discovery of active Bahraini cell that is recruited, trained, and supported by Iran. This revelation results in strained diplomatic relations between the two countries. Bahrain recalled diplomatic ambassadors from Tehran and restricts commercial services to air transportation between the two countries. The Kuwaiti Hizbollah, which has possible links to Iran, allegedly help Bahraini opposition groups by smuggling weapons into Manama and may have been involved in actions against U.S. military presence in Kuwait.
8/1996	U.S. signs the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Imposes sanctions on foreign companies in development of Iran or Libya's petroleum resources. The intent of the Act is to deny revenues that could be used to finance international terrorism.



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8/5/1996	Jaffar Hasso Guly, local KDPI representative and delegate of 'Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Government' is murdered.
11/1996	German prosecutors charge Supreme Leader Khomeini and President Rafsanjani with approving the Mykonos operation.
1997	Iran remains the most active SST, involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts itself or by its surrogates.
	Up to thirteen assassinations occurred in 1997, a majority of them occurred in northern Iraq, the normal targets included the MEK and KDPI.
	President Khatami is inaugurated. Although there is a new president there is no evidence that Iran's policy of using terrorism has changed.
	Iran supplies the PKK with missiles, transportation, and medical supplies. The missiles enabled the PKK to shoot down two Turkish helicopters.
1/1997	Iranian agents attempt to attack Baghdad Headquarters of the MEK using the 'supermortar' designed similar to that discovered on the Iranian ship 'Kolahdooz' by Belgian customs authorities in early 1996.
1/7/1997	During a CNN interview President Khatami agreed that terrorist attacks against noncombatants, including Israeli women and children should be condemned.
4/1997	A judge in Berlin courts found that the highest level of Iran's political leadership followed a deliberate policy of murdering political opponents living abroad. (Mykonos episode) The judge states that the Minister of Intelligence and Security, Foreign Minister, President, and Supreme Leader approved the murder. The court made clear that other participants in the murders escaped to Iran where one of them was given a Mercedes for his role in the operation.
Fall of 1997	Iran hosts a number of representatives of terrorist groups ( Hamas, Hizbollah, PIJ, IG) at a conference of "Liberation Movement." Participants discuss Jihad and establish cooperation between groups, and increase support for other groups.
10/1997	The Algerian Government accuses Tehran of training and equipping Algerian terrorist groups.
11/1997	Iran Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, publicly condemned the IG terrorist attack on tourists at Luxor, Egypt.
Late 1990s	Decreased funding in order to improve relationship with Egypt
1998	Iran conducts fewer anti-dissident attacks in 1998 than 1997.
	Despite expressing sympathy for Kenyan (Nairobi) and Tanzanian (Dar es Salaam) victims of the 8/1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, Iran's support for terrorism remains in place. According to intelligence officials, just before the bombing ten percent of satellite phone calls were between al-Qaeda leaders and Iran.
Early 1998	Government expels an Argentine attaché from Tehran in response to growing criticism in Argentina about possible official Iranian roles in the '92 and '94 attacks. The Argentine Government responds by asking Tehran to reduce the number of diplomats in Buenos Aires to one, the number of Argentine officials left in Iran.
	Foreign Minister Spokesman Mahmud Mohammed condemns vicious attacks on civilians during the Muslim month of Ramadan (occurs from late 12/97 - early 1/98) no matter who is responsible.
3/1998	U.S. District Court rules that Iran pays \$247 Million to the family of Alisa Flatow. Flatow was a U.S. citizen in PIJ carbomb attack in Gaza 1995. The court ruled Iran responsible for her death because Iran provided money to PIJ.
4/1998	During an interview former President Bani Sadr accuses Iran of training Algerian fighters, among others.

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6/1998	"League of the Followers of Sunna" accuse Iranian Intelligence agents of murdering the Iranian Sunni Cleric, Shaikh Nureddin Ghuraybi, in Tajikistan.
9/1998	Leaders of Sipah-e-Sahaba, Pakistan anti-Shia secretarian group accuse Iran of being responsible for murdering two of the organizations leaders, Allama Shoaib Nadeem and Maulana Habibur Rehman Siddiqui.
11/1998	National Council of Resistance claim that the Iranian regime kidnapped and killed Reza Pirzadi in Pakistan.
	Palestinian sources indicate that Iran supported the PIJ, who claimed responsibility of two suicide bomb attacks in Jerusalem in which 21 were injured.
Late 1998	Iran announces the discovery of a cell with in the MOIS acting without Government knowledge and reportedly arrested the cell's members. Members of MOIS may have conducted five mysterious murders or leading writers and political activists in Iran.
1999	Although there were signs of political change in Iran, actions of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active SST.
	PKK had 50 bases in Iran and Iran has trained approximately 1200 PKK terrorists/year.
5/1999	President Khatami meets with Damascus based Palestinian Rejectionist leaders while visiting Syria.
11/1999	G-8 reaches a common agreement about the threat that Iran's support for terrorist groups poses to the Middle East peace process. Counter-terrorism experts and representatives of G-8 agree that Iranian Government increases the activities and support for Hamas, Hizbollah, and PIJ to undermine the Middle East peace process.
11/9/1999	Supreme Leader Khatami sponsors a major rally in Tehran to demonstrate Iran's opposition to Israel and the peace process. At the rally, PIJ representatives praise the bombing in Netanya occurred days before and promised more attacks. Hizbollah and Palestinian Rejectionist leaders spoke at the rally to reaffirm their support for violence against Israel.
2000	Iran's involvement in terrorism focuses on support for groups opposed to Israel and the peace process.
2/2000	Moderates win in Majles elections but aggressive countermeasures by hard-lined conservatives have blocked most reform efforts.
5/2000	Iran encourages PIJ to expand attacks against Israel after their withdrawal from Lebanon.
2001	MOIS and IRGC are involved in the planning and support for terrorist acts and groups to pursue goals.
	Hardliners prevent moderates from changing policy.
	Since the outbreak of the Intifada, Iran intensified support for Palestinian groups that use violence against Israel.
	Iran reduces involvement in other forms of terrorist acts.
	There is no evidence that Iran sponsored or had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Khatami condemn the attacks and offered condolences to the U.S.
4/2001	Iran sponsors a conference on intensifying the Intifada; Khalid Mash'al represents Hamas at the conference.
5/7/2001	Israeli Navy captures the Santorini, a Lebanese smuggling boat carrying 40 tons of Iranian weapons intended for Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah in Gaza. The weapons include SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and Katyusha rockets. The crew of the Santorini said they were smuggling the weapons on the behalf of the PFLP-GC.

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2002	Iran becomes party to 1988 Protocol on Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation. Iran is party to 5 of 12 international conventions and/or protocols relating to terrorism.
1/3/2002	Israeli Naval Commandos captures the Karine-A, which was smuggling heavy weapons at port El at. Israel claims the ship had 50 tons of mainly Iranian-supplied weapons for use by militants against Israel. The ship was en route to Gaza and was a joint Iran-Hizbollah-Palestinian Authority smuggling operation. The weapons included anti-tank, anti-aircraft systems, artillery, also 122mm Katyusha rockets (items forbidden by Oslo Accords) This was the third ship smuggling weapons caught by IDF, all ships were helped by the Palestinian Authority Coast Guard.
Spring 2002	Iran provides Hizbollah with additional advanced weapons and equipment including Iranian built 240mm Fajf missiles.
6/2002	Iran separates support for Hizbollah from support for PIJ.
8/2002	Iran reportedly helps to smuggle al-Qaeda gold out of Afghanistan to Sudan.
2003	Argentinean judge issues 12 international arrest warrants for Iranian government officials assigned to Buenos Aires (the former Ambassador) and the time of the 1994 bomb. Shortly after the fall of Hussein (Iraq), individuals with ties to IRGC attempt to infiltrate south Iraq and elements of the Iranian Government helped members of Ansar al-Islam transit and find safe haven in Iran.
5/2003	During Friday prayer, Guardian Council member, Ayahollah Ahmad Jannati, encourages Iraqi's to follow the Palestinian model and participate in suicide operations against Coalition forces.
6/2003	IAEA criticizes 'civilian' nuclear power plant, believe it is a cover for a nuclear weapon program.
8/2003	IAEA find traces of highly enriched uranium in nuclear facility. Iran admits to having a developing enrichment program for more than 20 years. Iran hosts a conference on Palestinian Infitada. Iranian officials suggest continued success of Palestinian resistance dependant on suicide operations.
12/2003	Iran agrees to suspend HEU program and allow IAEA inspectors into the country.
2004	Iran pursues policies in Iraq, some of which are inconsistent with Iran's stated objective. Senior IIG (Iraq) officials are concerned. Argentinean court reaffirms arrest warrants.
2004 and 2005	Iran Undoubtedly provided support for terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Early 2004	IAEA inspectors find anomalies in Iran's declaration about it's nuclear program. Inspectors request permission to make more intrusive inspections of nuclear sites and that Iran cease it's enriching of Uranium. Iran denies any wrong doing.
11/7/2004	Iran provides Hizbollah with Unmanned Aerial Vehicle which Hizbollah subsequently flew into Israeli airspace.
Early 2005	Nervous about U.S. forces in Iraq and it's own nuclear program, Iran promised to return any U.S. attacks.
2/2005	A new Argentinian federal prosecutor for the 1994 AIMA bombing announces that Iran and Hizbollah are prime suspects.
9/2005	Interpol cancels international capture orders for twelve Iranian nationals at Iran's request.

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2006	<p>Hizballah, in combination with state sponsors of terrorism Iran and Syria, continues to undermine the elected Government of Lebanon and remains a serious security threat in the Middle East.</p>
	<p>Iran remains the most significant state sponsor of terrorism and continues to threaten its neighbors and destabilize Iraq by providing weapons, training, advice, and funding to select Iraqi Shia militants.</p>
	<p>Iran has ties to individuals and terrorist groups in Nigeria.</p>
	<p>The United States has sanctioned Chinese entities for missile and chemical weapons proliferation activities, including transfers to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.</p>
	<p>Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs announces a more comprehensive requirement for official approval of commodities exported from or transshipped through Taiwan ports to Iran and North Korea. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tightens regulations for issuing visas to nationals of North Korea and Iran.</p>
	<p>Saudi Arabia: State sponsors of terrorism, Iran and Syria, continued to play destabilizing roles in the region.</p>
	<p>Armenia's reliance on ties with neighboring Iran have dampened Armenian criticism of Iranian extremism and led to closer trade relations between the two countries. Diplomatic and trade relations with Iran are seen as a geographic and strategic necessity for the landlocked country, in light of closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the perceived risk of instability in Georgia. President Kocharian spoke out in November against the possibility of international sanctions against Iran.</p>
	<p>By the end of the year, however, Israeli security experts suggested that Hizballah had recovered much of its manpower and equipment losses through recruitment and re-supply from Syria and Iran.</p>
	<p>Iraq: Neighboring countries, specifically Iran, continue to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs by allowing, condoning, or in some cases, actively smuggling weapons, people, materials, and money to terrorist, insurgent, and militia groups inside Iraq. Iranian agents and sympathizers utilized an 800-mile long, porous border with limited security to transport goods, which increasingly included Iranian-made weapons such as IEDs or their components, which proved effective in attacks against Coalition Forces.</p>
	<p>Senior Iraqi officials, including Iraqi President Talabani, travel to Iran throughout the year encouraging the Iranian government to support Iraq's political process and to stop material support of terrorist groups and militias.</p>
	<p>Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations.</p>
	<p>Iran routinely provides safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations</p>
	<p>Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. The IRGC and MOIS are directly involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups, especially Palestinian groups with leadership cadres in Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals.</p>
	<p>Iran maintains a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity, rhetorically, operationally, and financially. Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadi-Nejad praise Palestinian terrorist operations, and Iran provides Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups - notably HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command - with extensive funding, training, and weapons.</p>

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	Iran continues to play a destabilizing role in Iraq, which appears to be inconsistent with its stated objectives regarding stability in Iraq. Iran provided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups, and weapons and training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Iranian government forces have been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah. The IRGC is linked to provided armor-piercing explosives to terrorists resulting in the deaths of Coalition Forces. The IRGC, along with Lebanese Hizballah, implements training programs for Iraqi militants in the construction and use of sophisticated IED technology. These individuals then pass on training to additional militants in Iraq.
	Iran remains unwilling to bring to justice senior AQ members it detained in 2003, and refuses to publicly identify these senior members in its custody. Iran repeatedly resists numerous calls to transfer custody of its AQ detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for interrogation or trial. Iran also continues to fail to control the activities of some al-Qaida members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
	Senior Iraqi officials continue to encourage the Iranian government to support Iraq's political process and to stop material support of terrorist groups and militias.
	Executive Order and Foreign Terrorist Organization designations support U.S. efforts to curb the financing of terrorism and encourage other nations to do the same. They internationally stigmatize and isolate designated terrorist entities and individuals. They also deter donations or contributions to, and economic transactions with, named entities and individuals. In addition, they heighten public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations and signal to other governments U.S. concerns about named entities and individuals.
	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa), Iran has exploited Al-Aqsa's lack of leadership and funds by providing aid and exerting influence over the organization.
	The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) receives some funding, weapons and training from Iran.
	Hizballah follows the religious guidance of Khomeini's successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and often acts at its behest, but it also can and does act independently. Receives training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid, from Iran
	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) militants are scattered throughout South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran.
	Kongra-Gel (KGK/PKK), has historically received safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Since 1999, Syria and Iran have cooperated with Turkey against the PKK, in a limited fashion.
	Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) receives financial assistance from Iran.
	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) is closely tied to both Syria and Iran. Receives financial support from Iran.
	Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), maintains an extensive logistical network throughout Iran.
	Turkish Hizballah is suspected of having ties with Iran, although there is not sufficient evidence to establish a link.
1/2006	The Cuba-Iran Joint Commission meets in Havana.
3/23/2006	The United States designates Al-Manar, a satellite owned or controlled by the Iran-funded Hizballah as a terrorist network.

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4/2006	Azerbaijani Serious Crimes court sentences six men in a group called Al-Muvahhidun Jamaat to prison terms ranging from ten to fifteen years. The group is convicted of purchasing illegal weapons, armed robbery, illegal border crossing, fabricating documents and resisting arrest. According to the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security, the members of the group planned to travel to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey for military training. The group was accused of planning bomb attacks on the U.S., Israeli and Russian embassies, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) building, and the National Bank of Azerbaijan; and "seeking the physical elimination of the leaders of Azerbaijan's government and security forces." (Members of the group were first arrested on July 13, 2005.)
7/12/06	Hizballah terrorists enter Israel from southern Lebanon, abduct two Israeli soldiers and kill eight others. During the next 34 days, Hizballah fired over 4,000 Katyusha rockets and other missiles into northern Israel, forcing the residents of Haifa, Nahariya, Tiberias, and other northern communities into bunkers. Hizballah also launched weaponized drones toward Israel and struck an Israeli naval vessel with an anti-ship missile. Israel responded by sending the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to attack rocket launchers and Hizballah infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon and in select areas north of the Litani River. The IAF also bombed Hizballah offices in southern Beirut, and roads, bridges, and power plants throughout Lebanon. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) artillery struck Hizballah targets in southern Lebanon and paved the way for an incursion of more than a division of mechanized and infantry forces into southern Lebanon, aimed at pushing Hizballah forces north of the Litani River and laying the groundwork for a cessation of hostilities. During this period, Israel imposed an air and sea blockade on Lebanon to prevent the resupply of Hizballah by Syria and Iran.
9/7/2006	Executive Order and Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation: the United States designate two financial companies and one individual, Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company as well as Husayn al-Shami, the head of Bayt al-Mal and a senior Hizballah leader, as providing financial support to Hizballah.
10/25/2006	The Argentine special prosecutors who investigated the July 18, 1994, terrorist bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) building that killed 85 and injured over 200 people; issues an 801-page indictment charging eight Iranian government officials and one member of Hizballah with the attack. Hizballah and Iran remained the chief suspects.
11/9/2006	Judge Canicoba-Corral ratifies the indictments and maintains charges against former Iranian Ambassador Soleimanpour. The judge issues arrest warrants for suspects in the AMIA bombing.
11/15/2006	Argentine government transmits a request to INTERPOL for new Red Notices for the nine suspects in the AMIA bombing. The year ended with action in INTERPOL pending.
2007	Iran remains the most significant state sponsor of terrorism. A critically important element of Iranian national security strategy is its ability to conduct terrorist operations abroad. Iranian leaders believe this capability helps safeguard the regime by deterring United States or Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening the United States, enhancing Iran's regional influence through intimidation, and helping to drive the United States from the Middle East. Hizballah, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, is key to Iran's terrorism strategy. Iran also continued to threaten its neighbors and destabilize Iraq by providing weapons, training, and funding to select Iraqi Shia militants. These proxy groups perpetrate violence and cause American casualties in Iraq. Hizballah, supported by Iran and Syria, continued to undermine the elected Government of Lebanon and remained a serious security threat.

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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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The Government of Iran recently began an effort to expand commercial and diplomatic ties throughout the Western Hemisphere. Iran has, in the past, used diplomatic missions to support the activities of Hizballah operatives.

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According to the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security (MNS), a local terrorist group was organized to establish a state ruled by Sharia (Islamic) law. According to published reports, the MNS said that one of the group members had met an IRGC officer in Qom, Iran, and was offered money to fight against the United States, Israel, and other Western countries. According to published reports, the group received training in Iran and Azerbaijan.

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Terrorism committed by illegal armed groups receiving weapons and training from Iran continue to endanger the security and stability of Iraq.

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Israel continues to claim that it faces threats from Hizballah, which is re-armed and financially supported by Iran.

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Israeli security sources allege that HAMAS had smuggled hundreds of terrorists from Gaza to Iran for advanced training.

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Iran seeks diplomatic relations with Bolivia.

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President Ortega publicly supports Iran's right to develop nuclear weapons.

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Iran deepens ties with Venezuela

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In March, Iran and Venezuela began weekly Iran Airlines flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas. Passengers on these flights are not subject to immigration and customs controls at Simon Bolivar International Airport. On June 1, one of the JFK Airport bombing subjects, Abdul Kadir, was arrested at the airport in Port of Spain, Trinidad, on board a flight destined for Caracas, Venezuela. He had an onward ticket to Tehran.

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Iran routinely provides safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.

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Iranian authorities continue to provide support, including weapons, training, funding, and guidance, to some Iraqi militant groups that target Coalition and Iraqi security forces and Iraqi civilians.

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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force, provides Iraqi militants with Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper rifles, automatic weapons, mortars, and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) that have a higher lethality rate than other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and are specially designed to defeat armored vehicles. The Qods Force, in concert with Lebanese Hizballah, provided training outside Iraq for Iraqi militants in the construction and use of sophisticated IED technology and other advanced weaponry. The Qods Force and Hizballah have also provided training inside Iraq. Iran's IRGC-Qods Force continued to provide weapons and financial aid to the Taliban. Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa'ida (AQ) members it has detained, and has refused to publicly identify those senior members in its custody. Iran has repeatedly resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of its AQ detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for interrogation or trial. Iran also continued to fail to control the activities of some AQ members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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	Iranian President Ahmadinejad, accompanied by the Iranian Defense Minister and the Iranian Army Chief of Staff, met with Syrian President al-Asad and other senior Syrian officials in July. During this visit, Ahmadinejad also met with Palestinian terrorist groups, including two separate meetings with the leaders of HAMAS and PIJ and a collective meeting with leaders of PFLP, PFLP-GC, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Fatah al-Intifada. Additionally, local media reported that Hizballah leader Nasrallah met with Ahmadinejad at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus. Syria and Iran worked successfully to rearm Hizballah after the July-August 2006 conflict between Hizballah and Israel.
	Iran provides funds and other aid, mostly through Hizballah facilitators, to Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
	HAMAS receives some funding, weapons, and training from Iran.
	Hizballah receives training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran.
	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) IMU militants are located in Iran.
	PIJ receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran.
	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) is closely tied to Iran, receiving financial support.
	al Qaeda Iraq the group maintains an extensive logistical network throughout Iran.
2/2007	Azerbaijani authorities arrested a group of 15 Azerbaijani citizens in Baku who called themselves the Northern Mahdi Army. The group was charged with having ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
2/20/2007	The United States designated Jihad al-Bina under Executive Order 13224 for its support to Hizballah.
7/24/2007	The United States designated the Iran-based Martyrs Foundation, including its U.S. branch, the Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO), and the finance firm al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH) under Executive Order 13224 for their support to Hizballah. Two individuals, Qasem Aliq and Ahmad al-Shami, were also designated for the role they play in Hizballah's support network.
9/2007	The Bolivian government announced the opening of diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran. The September 27 agreement pledged \$1.1 billion in Iranian assistance to Bolivia over five years
10/25/07	The United States designated the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) under Executive Order 13224 for its support to terrorist organizations. The Qods Force is a branch of IRGC that provides material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).
10/25/07	On October 25, the United States designated Bank Saderat, its branches, and subsidiaries under Executive Order 13224 for their support to terrorist organizations.
11/2007	Nicaragua: the government relaxed visa requirements for all travelers from Iran, permitting visa-free entry. The Nicaraguan government's recent decision to grant visa-free entry for Iranians created consternation among the other CA4 (Central American Four (CA4), with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, Nicaragua) members.
11/7/2007	Interpol's General Assembly voted to uphold the Executive Committee's March 13 decision and warrents were issued for the AMIA bombing



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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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2008	Iran remains the most significant state sponsor of terrorism. Iranian weapons transfers to select Taliban members in Afghanistan in 2008 continued to threaten Afghan and NATO troops operating under UN mandate and undermine stabilization efforts in that country. The Government of Iran also continued to pursue an expansion of its military ties during this period into the Western Hemisphere and parts of Africa, including through its IRGC-Qods Force.
	Armenia continues to demonstrate interest in strengthening its ties with Iran. In May, Armenia declared support for expanding joint projects in the energy and transportation sectors. This was followed by the visits of at least two cabinet-level officials to Tehran in the fall to discuss cooperation in security, political, economic, and cultural spheres. In a reciprocal visit, Armenia hosted the Deputy Secretary of Iran's Security Council in December to discuss bilateral cooperation further. As a result of the increased diplomatic activity, Armenia continued to be reluctant to participate in international efforts that criticized or placed pressure on Iran for its non-compliance on issues related to nuclear proliferation and terrorist financing
	Iran uses Azerbaijan as a land route for provide support to extremists.
	Terrorism committed by illegal armed groups receiving weapons and training from Iran continues to endanger the security and stability of Iraq, however incidents of such violence were markedly lower than in the previous year.
	The Iraqi government pressed senior Iranian leaders to end support for lethal aid to Iraqi militias, and the Iraqi army defeated extremists trained and equipped by Iran in Basra, Baghdad, and other areas.
	HAMAS and Hizballah continue to finance their terrorist activities against Israel mostly through state sponsors of terrorism Iran.
	President Daniel Ortega's 2007 decision to grant Iranian nationals visa-free entry into Nicaragua remained in effect.
	Iran and Venezuela continued weekly flights connecting Tehran and Damascus with Caracas.
	Iran has not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations and routinely provides safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.
	The Qods Force is the regime's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad. The Qods Force provides aid in the form of weapons, training, and funding to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq-based militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan
	Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, Iranian authorities continues to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding, and guidance, to Iraqi militant groups Iran's Qods Force continued to provide Iraqi militants with Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars.
	Iran remains unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa'ida members it has detained, andrefuses to publicly identify those senior members in its custody. Iran resists numerous calls to transfer custody of its al-Qa'ida detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for trial. Iran also continus to fail to control the activities of some al-Qa'ida members who fled to Iran following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
	Senior IRGC and Qods Force officials are indicted by the Government of Argentina for their alleged roles in the 1994 terrorist bombing of the Argentine Israel Mutual Association which, according to the Argentine State Prosecutor's report, was initially proposed by the Qods Force

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**Phase Two: 1990 - Present**

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	Iran uses Syria as a transit point for assistance to Hizballah, HAMAS, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others.
	Iran funded several conferences organized by HAMAS and other terrorist groups based in Syria.
	Hizballah Operations Chief Imad Mugniyah, perished in a February 12 car bombing near Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters in the Damascus neighborhood of Kafr Sousa.
	Iran strengthened ties with Syria.
	Syrian President Asad repaid a 2007 visit to Damascus by Iranian President Ahmadinejad with a visit of his own to Tehran in early August, his third visit since 2005.
	Iran provides safe haven to Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist as well as AQ-linked operatives and groups.
	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade received funds from Iran.
	Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG) maintains a presence in Iran.
	HAMAS receives some funding, weapons, and training from Iran.
	Hizballah follows the religious guidance of Khomeini's successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and is closely allied with Iran and often acts at its behest, though it also acts independently. Hizballah receives training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran
	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) frequently operations out of Iran.
	Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction receives financial assistance and training from Iran.
	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command receives financial support from Iran.
	al-Qa'ida in Iraq maintains a logistical network in Iran.
9/5/08	The Bolivian government deepens its relationship with Iran. President Evo Morales announced that Bolivia would open a new Embassy in Iran. Morales also announced that Iran would help Bolivia develop its petrochemicals, cement fabrication, and agricultural sectors. Iranian state television agreed to provide Spanish-language programming to Bolivian state television.
11/2008	Turkish customs officials at the Port of Mersin seize a suspicious Iranian shipment bound for Venezuela which contained 22 shipping containers of barrels of nitrate and sulfite chemicals, commonly used for bombs, along with dismantled laboratory equipment. Customs officials detected the equipment during a search of 22 containers manifested as "tractor parts." They were being shipped to Port of Mersin by trucks from Iran. In December, customs officials asked Turkish Atomic Energy Authority and military experts to examine the seized material. At year's end, disposition of the shipment remained undecided.
12/16/2008	At the AMIA Special Prosecutor's request, the presiding Argentine judge in a civil suit against the Iranian suspects and Hizballah orders the attachment of six commercial properties in Argentina allegedly owned by former Iran Cultural Attaché and named suspect Mohsen Rabbani. The judge also requests that select European governments freeze up to USD one million in bank accounts allegedly belonging to former Iranian President Ali Hasehmi Rafsanjani and another Iranian accused of involvement in the attacks.

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## **Curriculum Vitae**

Crystal M. Schaeffer, born in Tyler, TX, has spent the last twenty years living in the Washington, D.C. area. She attended high school in Prince William County, graduating from Osbourn Park in 2001. After which she attended Virginia Tech and received her Bachelor of Science Degree in Biology with a minor in Chemistry in December of 2004. Since then, Crystal has attended George Mason University in pursuit of her Doctoral degree, receiving a Master of Science in Biodefense along the way. Although she has spent several wonderful years at George Mason, Crystal considers herself a Hokie for life.