

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COOPERATION WITH POLICE:  
EVIDENCE FROM A COMMUNITY OF GHANAIAAN IMMIGRANTS

by

Daniel K. Pryce  
A Dissertation  
Submitted to the  
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of  
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The Requirements for the Degree  
of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Criminology, Law & Society

Committee:

_____	Director
_____	
_____	
_____	
_____	Department Chairperson
_____	Program Director
_____	Dean, College of Humanities and Social Sciences
Date: _____	Summer Semester 2014 George Mason University Fairfax, VA

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By

Daniel K. Pryce  
Master of Public Administration  
George Mason University, 2007  
Bachelor of Science  
Regent University, 2005

Director: Devon Johnson, Professor  
Department of Criminology, Law & Society

Summer Semester 2014  
George Mason University  
Fairfax, VA



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## **DEDICATION**

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Allswell, to our three sons, Daniel, Jr., Abel Winston, and Andrew David, and to my mother, Rose, for their inimitable support, love, and encouragement.

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COOPERATION WITH POLICE: EVIDENCE FROM A COMMUNITY OF GHANAIAAN IMMIGRANTS**

Daniel K. Pryce, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2014

Dissertation Director: Dr. Devon Johnson

Recent scholarship examining public perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and public cooperation with the police in the United States has found that concerns about fairness (normative considerations) tend to be more powerful predictors of citizen satisfaction with the police than concerns about the police's capacity to reduce crime (instrumental considerations). Most of these studies have focused on differences in the views of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, while only a handful have examined the perspectives of different immigrant groups toward the police. To help fill this gap, especially at a time of significant growth in immigration, this dissertation investigates the relationship between procedural justice, police legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate with the police in a Ghanaian immigrant community in the United States.

This dissertation seeks to answer three questions: (1) Are the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy applicable in the Ghanaian

immigrant community? (2) What are the relative effects of normative and instrumental models of policing on perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community? (3) What are the relative effects of normative and instrumental models of policing on cooperation with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community?

Quantitative survey data from a sample of 304 Ghanaian immigrants show that police performance (effectiveness) is the primary driver of both perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community. These results suggest that instrumental concerns may be slightly more important than normative issues to this community. These results are generally supported by qualitative findings from two focus groups, but differ from the results of past research. In addition, both the quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that perceptions of the U.S. police are influenced by Ghanaian immigrants' views of the legitimacy of police in their home country. This finding suggests that the quality of policing in immigrant communities across the United States might be improved if U.S. police departments serving immigrant communities first attempt to understand how immigrants view the police in their native countries. Finally, the results indicate that common conceptualizations of perceived legitimacy may not be applicable for these respondents. As a result, scholars may need to refine the conceptualization and measurement of legitimacy in future research. The implications of these results for improving police-immigrant relations across the United States are discussed.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This dissertation evaluates the cognate concepts of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in an immigrant community in the United States. Ghanaian immigrants in the United States in general and in Alexandria, Virginia, in particular are part of a subgroup of foreign-born nationals that Mercer (1995) calls *visible minorities*. Mercer (1995) posited, “When substantial numbers of people, seen as and thought to be different, come to reside in an urban area, the adjustments and coping required are most acutely felt in a few select metropolitan areas” (p. 174). The presence of the newcomers in these large metropolitan areas leads to notable changes in culture and diversity (Mercer, 1995). Moreover, “[t]he new immigrants [bring] about important changes in urban social life, including education, health care, policing, business development, and labor markets” (Mercer, 1995, p. 169). Thus, a study of these *visible minorities*, with an emphasis in this dissertation on the Ghanaian immigrant community, is practical and significant.

Minnesota, for example, experienced a 130 percent increase in its immigrant population between 1990 and 2000, with most of the new arrivals settling in Hennepin County (Ankerfelt, Davis, & Futterer, 2011; Edgerly, 2002). This rapid demographic shift led to conflicts in the immigrant community, as well as between native-born Americans and the new arrivals (Ankerfelt et al., 2001). As the frequency of conflicts increased,

officers from the Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, Police Department (BPPD), located in Hennepin County, interviewed several people to understand the sources and nature of the conflicts (Ankerfelt et al, 2011). The BPPD discovered that the immigrants' negative experiences with the police in their home countries (see Tankebe, 2009), differing religious beliefs and social values, and a lack of understanding of the U.S. legal and law enforcement apparatus were some of the reasons for the conflicts (Ankerfelt et al., 2011). To improve the new immigrants' perceptions of the police, increase police legitimacy, and create mutual understanding between the locals and the new arrivals, the BPPD encouraged relationship building among all members of the Brooklyn Park community, provided the immigrants greater connectivity to social services, and developed better methods of communication among all parties (Ankerfelt et al., 2011).

Because most police departments historically do not assume leadership roles beyond public safety, the BPPD, the Hennepin County Probation Services, the Hennepin County Office of Multicultural Services, and the nonprofit Northwest Hennepin Human Services Council created the Joint Community Police Partnership to help integrate the newcomers (Ankerfelt et al., 2011). Evaluations of these police–community partnerships in Hennepin County showed positive results, as more than 200 police officers, 12 area local high schools, 60 nonprofit organizations, 10 health care organizations, and two local community colleges participated in joint efforts to increase understanding and reduce conflict among all members of the community (Ankerfelt et al., 2011).

As was the case in Minnesota, demographic changes in many communities across the United States may necessitate changes in how the police prevent and fight crime,

keep the peace, maintain law and order, and provide services. Central to carrying out these policing roles are several related concepts – procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police – that can improve or impede police work.

### **Studying Police–Immigrant Relations**

Citizen perceptions of the police have been studied extensively in the United States (Bowers & Robinson, 2012; Davis et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2005; Gallagher et al., 2001; Gau, 2011; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Murphy, 2009; Myrstedt & Hawk-Tourtelot, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Folger, 1980; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Tyler, 1984; Tyler, 1997), including comparative assessments of the views of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Son & Rome, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). A few studies have also evaluated citizen perceptions of the police in Ghana (Tankebe, 2008, 2009, 2010), in the United Kingdom (Bradford, 2012; Tankebe, 2013), in Australia (Hinds & Murphy, 2007), and in other parts of the world. Of the large corpus of studies of the police undertaken in the United States, however, only a handful have looked at the relationship between the police and immigrant groups, and there are no studies that have evaluated sub-Saharan African immigrants' perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police. There are at least five reasons why studying the cognate concepts of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in a sub-Saharan African immigrant community provides a contribution to the literature.

First, the extant literature shows that, in the last three decades, scholars have studied citizen perceptions of the police “among a host of subpopulations: suspects, defendants, witnesses, victims, and ordinary citizens” (Bowers & Robinson, 2012, p. 10). But empirical studies, as noted earlier, have focused mostly on citizen perceptions (Gallagher et al., 2001; Gau, 2011; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Murphy, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004), including comparative studies of White, Black, and Hispanic views of the police (Son & Rome, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). In other words, a lot of the focus has been on U.S. citizens and interracial differences in citizen perceptions of the police. Very few studies have attempted to examine procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police among immigrants, even though “the degradation of police–community relations has been most acute in immigrant communities” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 10; see also Jones & Supinski, 2010).

Second, understanding immigrant perceptions of the police in general, and Ghanaian immigrants’ perceptions of the police in particular, may help the police “to develop new strategies that will improve public attitudes, change policies that are determined to be detrimental to positive attitudes, and reinforce those behaviors that are responsible for positive behaviors” (Frank et al., 2005, p. 212). If citizens and immigrants are to continue to remain the “eyes and ears” of the police in their communities (Cordner, 1995; Goldstein, 1987; Moore, 1992; Skogan, 1994; Wycoff, 1995), then their understanding of procedural justice and police legitimacy, and their cooperation with the police must be sought, evaluated, and applied to agency decision-making by police

leaders and politicians. While I did not test actual cooperation with the police in this dissertation project, past scholarly work suggests that there is a positive association between intentions and future behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).

Third, studying procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community is important because of the negative attitudes that police sometimes associate with people with Afrocentric physiognomies (Eberhardt et al., 2006). Overall, increased policing is observed in predominantly African-American communities (Fagan & Davies, 2000; Geller & Fagan, 2010), which may not be distinguishable from communities of sub-Saharan Africans, what Davies and Fagan (2012) described as a minority subgroup within the minority population.

Fourth, a study of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community will contribute to current debates about the meaning and measurement of legitimacy in the scholarly literature. Based on Tyler's conceptualization, legitimacy has typically been measured using a combination of three subscales: trust in the police, obligation to obey the police, and affective feelings toward the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010). Recently, however, researchers have called into question both the conceptualization and the measurement of legitimacy employed by Tyler and other scholars (Gau, 2011; Maguire & Johnson, 2010; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007). For example, Tankebe (2013), in a study of 5,120 residents of London, U.K., argued that *obligation to obey* was better conceptualized and measured as a discrete concept from *legitimacy*, a view endorsed by Gau (2011) and Reisig et al.

(2007). Tankebe (2013) added, “The overall finding that obligation did not annul the influence of legitimacy demonstrates that legitimacy has effects on cooperation that are independent of obligation” (p. 126). Because this debate is important to research on procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police, this study explores whether the Tylerian model is applicable for this population. My findings should make a salient contribution to current debates in this prominent field of criminological research.

Fifth, as immigration rates have soared in recent decades (Davies & Fagan, 2012), the police have faced new challenges policing immigrants and immigrant communities. Police agencies can no longer ignore immigrant community needs and perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police, given that immigrant communities have grown in size considerably over the last thirty years. As Davies and Fagan (2012) have observed, evaluating immigrants’ perceptions of their local police agency is important for determining whether these immigrants carry with them “former experiences with and perceptions of the criminal justice systems of the countries from which they emigrated” (p. 106; see also Davis & Henderson, 2003). For example, the police in Ghana are very corrupt (Tankebe, 2009), which means that a newly arrived first-generation Ghanaian-immigrant<sup>1</sup> wife would unlikely report spousal abuse to the police if her husband assaulted her, as she may assume that the police may be operating in a manner similar to the police in her native Ghana. Thus, unearthing information about immigrants’ perceptions of policing in the United States becomes

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this dissertation project, a first-generation Ghanaian immigrant is a person born in Ghana but who immigrated to the United States. And a second-generation Ghanaian immigrant is a person born to at least one Ghanaian parent in the United States, or a person born elsewhere to at least one Ghanaian parent but who now lives in the United States.

essential to the maintenance of law and order in communities across the country.

### **Growth of Immigration to the United States**

Ghanaian immigrants in the United States form part of a larger community of immigrants from around the world that came to the United States in the last fifty years. Post-1965 waves of immigration by foreign nationals to the United States became possible after the passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, “which abolished the national origins quota system that had governed immigration since the 1920s” (Crosnoe & Lopez Turley, 2011, p. 130). Immigration to the United States is of great import to researchers, scholars, and policymakers because the U.S. population is expected to undergo monumental changes by mid-century, as Hispanic, Black, and Asian populations grow substantially and Whites are expected to become a statistical minority for the very first time (Tran et al., 2010; United States Census Bureau, 2004a). “Immigration has been identified as a predominant factor in this population shift, and it is estimated that immigrants will account for as much as 63% of the total population by 2050” (Tran et al., 2010, p. 1; see also Camarota, 2007; Day, 1996).

One out of five Blacks in metropolitan areas of the United States is an immigrant (Unnever & Gabbidon, 2013). Markedly, the percentage of Black Africans coming to the United States is increasing at a rapid rate: “41% arrived between 2000 and 2005, compared with 15% of Caribbean/Latin American blacks and 22% of all foreign born. Immigration contributed at least one-fifth (20%) of the growth in the US black population between 2001 and 2006” (Unnever & Gabbidon, 2013, p. 8; see also Benson, 2006; Kent, 2007). Notably, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are coming to the United States at a

much higher rate than migrants from other regions of the world (Rasmussen et al., 2012; see also Kent, 2007; Terrazas, 2009; Thomas, 2011), with over one million coming to the United States in the last 14 years alone (Capps, McCabe, & Fix, 2011; Rasmussen, 2012).

### **Immigration and Crime in U.S. Society**

Waves of migration to the United States have been associated with crime and other social maladies over the last several decades (Davies & Fagan, 2012; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; McDonald, 2009). These migratory patterns engendered widespread panic among citizens of the United States, as immigrants were blamed for a smorgasbord of macro-social ills, including “drugs and alcohol, gangs, delinquency, organized crime, wage suppression, and drains on public resources” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 100; see also Hagan, Levi, & Dinovitzer, 2008; Sampson, 2008). In effect, the apparent link between immigration and criminal conduct has forced some states (e.g., Arizona and California) to increase penalties for illegal immigrants who have violated the criminal code (Davies & Fagan, 2012). The link between immigration and crime thus has important social, practical, and political implications (Davies & Fagan, 2012).

An important antecedent to the contemporary study of the immigration–crime nexus was the work of social disorganization theorists who studied immigration extensively in the first few decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Bursik, 1988; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Shaw & McKay, 1943). Opposed to immigration, native-born Americans blamed the newcomers, who came from the poorer economies of Europe and settled in poverty-ridden communities (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012), for the crime problem in metropolitan areas (Davies & Fagan, 2012). Aware of the blame-the-immigrants

sentiments, Shaw and McKay's (1943) seminal work found that "the rates of delinquency remained pretty stable among Chicago's neighborhoods between 1900 and 1933, despite the dramatic changes in the composition of these neighborhoods" (p. 101).

As a result, Shaw and McKay (1943) argued that crime was not directly tied to "the racial and ethnic makeup of an area; rather, crime was related to neighborhood conditions, specifically poverty, anonymity, and heterogeneity" (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 100). Defined this way, however, social disorganization theory presents conflicting findings: on the one hand, immigrants are not predisposed to crime; on the other hand, immigrants may reside in areas of high criminal activity (Davies & Fagan, 2012).

Butcher and Piehl (1998) found that immigration was inversely related to criminal activity in several communities across the United States. Other studies have also found that immigration not only improved life in many communities, it also helped to lower criminal activity (Davies & Fagan, 2012). More importantly, Davies and Fagan (2012) have argued that immigration as a whole may not lead to more crime in U.S. communities, but the data ought to be disaggregated to study individual community patterns, as "[i]mmigrants are drawn from a wide range of diverse countries, cultures, and racial and ethnic groups" (p. 102).

### **Police–Immigrant Relationships**

Immigration patterns, while useful for studying macro-level criminal behavior, are also useful to local police agencies in their efforts at crime prevention and control. Davies and Fagan (2012) argued that social change occurs when new groups move into a community, which "undermine[s] local institutions and networks and weakens the

foundations of informal social control” (p. 103). Because immigrants tend to be “young, male, relatively poor, and uneducated” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 103; see also Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Steiner et al., 2011), they are likely to be associated with crime, a profile that they share with native-born Blacks (Steiner et al, 2011). Thus, significant demographic changes due to immigration may lead to some groups becoming the focus of local agencies of formal social control, such as the police. Davies and Fagan (2012) warned policymakers of the risk of incorrectly associating immigration with crime – with its attendant disproportionate police enforcement in immigrant communities – as it could isolate immigrants who respect the law. Davies and Fagan (2012) observed, “The potential alienation of immigrant communities – even law-abiding, cooperative individuals – from the criminal justice system can compromise safety through the loss of legitimacy and the withdrawal of citizens from cooperation with the police” (p. 120). Trust engenders cooperation with the police by individuals and groups, while cooperation engenders security in the community (Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

Immigrant communities are also of interest to police agencies (and their officers) (Stuntz, 2002) because of immigrants’ increased risk of victimization (Davies & Fagan, 2012). For example, empirical research has found that immigrants are susceptible to hate crimes (Hendricks et al., 2007), sexual violence (Decker, Raj, & Silverman, 2007), and “exploitations [by] unscrupulous landlords, bankers, financiers, and employers. Language barriers and cultural mistrust of the police may make immigrants reluctant to report crime and otherwise interact with authorities, making immigrants more open to predation” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 104).

The events of 9/11 have led to policy changes in the way communities are now policed in the United States, with local police sometimes used to enforce immigration laws (Gladstein, 2005; Jones & Supinski, 2010). This auxiliary police role has thus clouded the once-distinct roles of immigration enforcement and policing (Davies & Fagan, 2012). The change has also led to increased distrust of the police by immigrant groups, especially illegal immigrants and those of Arab descent (Jones & Supinski, 2010), resulting in a further erosion of police–community relations in immigrant neighborhoods (Jones & Supinski, 2010).

A number of studies have looked at police–immigrant relationships. For example, Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq (2010) found that both trust in and legitimacy of the police were severely eroded among Muslim immigrants<sup>2</sup> in New York City because of the fear that contact with the police could lead to forceful removal from the United States. Khashu, Busch, Latif, and Levy (2005), in their study of three immigrant communities in New York City, found that fear of deportation stemming from contact with the police, beliefs based on police and jurisprudential practices in their countries of origin, language problems, and cultural misunderstandings were some of the barriers to successful police–immigrant relationships. Chu, Song, and Dombrink (2005) found that the more contact Chinese immigrants domiciled in New York City had with the police, the less highly they rated the police. The researchers also found that Chinese immigrants’ satisfaction with the police was directly related to the quality of their contacts with New York City police officers.

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<sup>2</sup> Of those interviewed, 19% were born in the United States, whereas 81% were born overseas.

Police–immigrant relations may not, however, be interpreted independently of immigrants’ experiences in their countries of origin, as immigrants’ perceptions of their home nations’ police may affect how they perceive and evaluate U.S.-based police (Davis & Henderson, 2003). Davies and Fagan (2012) noted, “As the scale of immigration has grown, the challenges inherent in policing immigrants and immigrant communities have also begun to garner more consideration” (p. 107).

### **Citizen Perceptions of the Police: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Cooperation**

Many empirical studies have examined procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler et al., 2010). Many of these studies have explored how procedural justice policing affects citizens’ willingness to obey and cooperate with officers (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002). “If citizens perceive that the police act in a procedurally just manner – by treating people with dignity and respect, and by being fair and neutral in their actions – then the legitimacy of the police is enhanced” (Mazerolle et al., 2013, p. 2; see also Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Because legitimacy increases citizens’ willingness to obey authorities (e.g., the police), it is a key element in studies measuring voluntary cooperation, as it emphasizes citizens’ values rather than a dependence on outcomes that affect behavior (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler, 2001).

Procedural justice is woven into perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation with the police (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Procedural justice, defined as citizen participation, fairness and neutrality, dignity and respect, and

trustworthiness of motives (Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; Murphy and Cherney, 2011; Tyler, 2008; Tyler and Huo, 2002), “enhance[s] the quality of police–citizen interactions, leading citizens to be more satisfied with the interaction and outcome” (Mazerolle et al., 2013, p. 36; see also Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; McCluskey, 2003; Reiss, 1971; Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Wells, 2007). Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) seminal work has shown that procedural justice policing is a key antecedent of police legitimacy.

The empirical literature is replete with studies that emphasize two approaches to policing: the instrumental model and the normative model (Tyler et al., 2010). Proponents of the instrumental model of policing posit that “people estimate the expected costs and benefits from compliance with the law or cooperation with the police, and comply or cooperate only when the former outweigh the latter” (Tyler et al., 2010, p. 366). According to Tyler et al. (2010), there are two reasons why people cooperate from the instrumental perspective: fear of being punished for violating the law and the expectation that everyone in society will benefit when the police successfully control crime (Posner, 2007). Additionally, the fear that the police may arrest or monitor a person’s activity may compel him or her to cooperate (Tyler et al., 2010). Thus, the instrumental model is based on people’s rational assessment of the authority of the police (Tyler et al., 2010). In other words, people may obey the law out of fear that noncompliance may lead to unwanted police attention or arrest, or that compliance will provide benefits to them (Nagin, 1998; Posner, 2007; Tyler et al., 2010). While the police can elicit public cooperation by showing that they are effective crime fighters (Kelling & Coles, 1996), or that law violators will not go unpunished (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1969),

empirical studies have shown “only weak correlations between police effectiveness, risk of punishment, and compliance or cooperation” (Tyler et al., 2010, p. 369; see also Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

Conversely, the normative model of policing “emphasizes self-regulatory, normative motivations” (Tyler et al., 2010, p. 367). When police authorities are seen as legitimate, people are more likely to comply or cooperate with the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler et al., 2010). There is also a positive correlation between procedural justice and police legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Thus, behavior may be shaped by the values that people hold in society (Tyler et al., 2010). According to Tyler et al. (2010), “people obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities when they view government as legitimate and thus entitled to be obeyed” (pp. 369, 370). Because the police depend on the community for help in maintaining law and order (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997), the normative model of policing becomes important in securing compliance and cooperation from the public (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler et al., 2010). Moreover, research has shown that values play a greater role in the ability of the police to elicit cooperation from the public than instrumental considerations, such as risk of apprehension, police performance, and distributive justice (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler et al., 2010). Thus, as part of this dissertation project, I evaluate: (1) the relative effects of the normative models (procedural justice and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police; and (2) the relative effects of the normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental

models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on perceptions of cooperation with the U.S. police.

Tyler's model has dominated scholarship on procedural justice and legitimacy in the field. Recently, however, a debate has emerged about the conceptualization and measurement of legitimacy and related concepts. To speak to this debate and to learn more about how Ghanaian immigrants view the police, this dissertation seeks to answer three questions: (1) Are the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy applicable in the Ghanaian immigrant community? (2) What are the relative effects of the normative models (procedural justice and legitimacy of Ghana police<sup>3</sup>) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community? (3) What are the relative effects of the normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on cooperation with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community? In line with previous research and theory, key variables in the normative model include procedural justice, perceived legitimacy of the U.S. police, and perceived legitimacy of the Ghana police. Demographic factors (e.g., age, sex, income, and educational status) commonly used as control variables to test the process-based model of policing in criminal justice research (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002) were also included to "guard against potential spuriousness" (Resig et al., 2007, p. 1013) in the results.

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<sup>3</sup> This variable is referred to subsequently as **legitimacy Ghana**.

For the purposes of this dissertation, Ghanaian immigrants<sup>4</sup> belong to any one of the following categories: (1) naturalized U.S. citizens; (2) legal permanent residents (including the recipients of the Diversity Visa (DV-1) Lottery; (3) legal non-immigrants (temporary visa holders, such as foreign students and highly skilled workers); (4) illegal non-immigrants (those who have overstayed their visas); (5) asylees/refugees; and (6) adopted children who are now adults.

### **Organization of the Dissertation Project**

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: The *literature review* section, which discusses the main research questions and all of the hypotheses to be tested, leads into the *methodology* section. I collected original primary data, via a survey that I administered to Ghanaian immigrants in several predominantly “Ghanaian” churches<sup>5</sup> in Alexandria, Virginia. I also collected qualitative data via two focus groups to augment the findings from the survey data. The *methodology* section describes the sample and sampling procedure, presents the statistical modeling techniques, and assesses the regression models used to explore the research questions. Next is the *results* section, which reports on the findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The

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<sup>4</sup> My dissertation project on Ghanaian immigrants’ understanding of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police includes a brief description of Ghana. The country attained political independence in March 1957 after the British unified the former British colony of the Gold Coast and Togoland Trust Territory in 1956 and turned it over to Ghanaians a year later. With the clamor for independence going back a few years prior to the aforementioned landmark event of 1957, Ghana’s independence from the British in 1957 made the former the first nation in sub-Saharan Africa to attain self-rule. The country subsequently became a republic in 1960 (CIA Factbook, 2013; Ghanaweb.com, 2013; Ghana Government Portal, 2013). A coup d’état in 1966 disrupted the country’s efforts at democratic governance, after which the country was ruled by a succession of military and civilian leaders. In 1992, the country returned to multiparty democracy, and this renewed effort at democracy has continued without disruption, with a new president – the sixth in a row – elected in December 2012.

<sup>5</sup> By “Ghanaian” churches, I mean congregations that are predominantly Ghanaian in membership. One may find, however, a small number of other sub-Saharan African nationals in these congregations.

*discussion* that follows assesses the meaning of the findings, evaluates the implications of the results, outlines the limitations of the study, and suggests directions for future research. The *conclusion* section summarizes all of the information discussed in the dissertation project.

Overall, this dissertation provides timely and unique contributions to the field of criminological research. First, this dissertation, as far as I am aware, provides the first empirical study of Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police in the United States. Because immigration of foreign nationals to the United States continues to grow, studies that explore the relationship between the police and immigrants will become increasingly salient.

Second, this study evaluates an immigrant community's understanding of what policing is in a metropolitan area. The study's findings could therefore be compared to other studies in the extant literature to help explain patterns in the public's assessments of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with police in both small and large communities. My study of Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police, being the first of its kind in the United States, will lead to greater insights into how immigrant communities view the police. Thus, the findings from this dissertation add to knowledge in the criminological literature by granting police agencies access to information that may be useful in their efforts to improve policing in growing immigrant communities in the United States. Future research may also capitalize on my findings to increase understanding of police-immigrant relationships.

Third, in their study of the Muslim community in New York City, Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq (2010) stated: “The focus of our study is on variation within the Muslim community, not a comparison of Muslims to non-Muslims within the United States” (p. 4). In a similar vein, this study is intended to observe variation within the Ghanaian community, as there are several prior studies that have looked at interracial differences as far as perceptions of the police are concerned. Evaluating Ghanaian immigrants’ understanding of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police, while controlling for age, educational status, sex, gender, homeownership, income, and intergenerational differences, may reveal important information that both the police and the community of scholars may find valuable for future policing efforts.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

The empirical literature that is foundational to this literature review is a compendium of research studies available on procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in the United States (Bowers & Robinson, 2012; Davis et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2005; Gallagher et al., 2001; Gau, 2011; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Murphy, 2009; Myrstedt & Hawk-Tourtelot, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Folger, 1980; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Tyler, 1984; Tyler, 1997). Other studies have evaluated citizen perceptions of the police in Ghana (Tankebe, 2008, 2009, 2010), in the United Kingdom (Bradford, 2012; Tankebe, 2013), in Australia (Hinds & Murphy, 2007), in Slovenia (Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2012), and in other parts of the world.

Because empirical studies on procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police are generally limited to U.S. citizens and comparative assessments of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Son & Rome, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005), very little is known about immigrants' perceptions of the police in the United States. With the immigrant population in the United States projected to exceed that of the White majority by 2050 (Camarota, 2007; Day, 1996; Tran et al., 2010), studies that evaluate immigrant perceptions of the police are expected to attract a lot of attention from scholars in the

years to come. Specifically, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are coming to the United States at a much higher rate than migrants from other regions of the world (Rasmussen et al., 2012; see also Kent, 2007; Terrazas, 2009; Thomas, 2011), which means that studies evaluating sub-Saharan Africans' perceptions of the police will be vital to police–immigrant relationships.

This dissertation project is therefore important because evaluating Ghanaian immigrants' understanding of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police will allow the police to engage in new strategies for changing public attitudes toward the police for the better (Frank et al., 2005). This dissertation will also help the police to both modify negative departmental policies that are detrimental to good policing and strengthen those policies that accentuate positive conduct by the police (Frank et al., 2005). If citizens and immigrants are to become, or remain, police “informants” in their communities (Goldstein, 1987; Moore, 1992; Skogan, 1994), then their perceptions of the police must be sought, assessed, and applied to agency decision-making by police leaders and policymakers.

Immigrants' cooperation with the police is vital for improving citizen safety and increasing police efficiency. Citizens and immigrants sometimes possess information that is valuable to police agencies, and in a post-9/11 era, a tip from a citizen or immigrant can avert a terrorist plot, which is why improving police–public cooperation cannot be overemphasized. As consumers of police services, the public's assessments of police officers, police agencies, and police policies (Brudney & England, 1982; Flanagan, 1985; Parks, 1984; Percy, 1981; Whitaker, 1980) are crucial to enhancing the legitimacy of and

cooperation with the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010).

## **Legitimacy**

The provenance of the modern discussion about legitimacy can be traced to the work of Max Weber (1968). Drawing from Weber's (1968) work, Tyler (2004) has argued that "the ability to issue commands that will be obeyed did not rest solely on the possession or ability to deploy power. In addition, there were rules and authorities that people would voluntarily obey" (p. 87). According to Tyler (2004), these rules and authorities were deemed legitimate, which caused others to obey them. This definitional approach to the concept of legitimacy is the foundation for how the topic is evaluated in the social sciences in contemporary society (Tyler, 2004). Evaluating the concept of legitimacy in an industrial setting, Selznick (1969) noted that rules were expected to be legitimate, not only in the manner in which they were framed, but also in the manner in which they were deployed throughout industry by those given the authority to do so (Tyler, 2004).

According to Tyler (2004), the "importance of legitimacy has been examined on two distinct levels: first, in studies of everyday interactions with police officers; and second, on the community level, with people evaluating the characteristics of their community police force" (p. 88), whether or not the interaction with the police was personal or vicarious. The latter approach has been the more common approach in police–citizen studies (Tankebe, 2013), and this dissertation has followed the community-level approach to the study of the police. This latter approach is just as important as the former because prior research suggests, as noted earlier, that there is a positive

association between intentions and future behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).

Frank et al. (2005) emphasized that the last three decades have brought to the fore concerns about citizen attitudes toward the police; those at the forefront of these concerns include researchers, policymakers, and police administrators (Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994; Brandl & Horvath, 1991; Dean, 1980; Erez, 1984; Koenig, 1980; Mastrofski, 1981; Percy, 1986; Reisig & Correia, 1997). “Information about the basis of citizen attitudes can provide police with feedback about the performance of officers or, at a minimum, citizen perceptions of performance” (Frank et al., 2005, p. 3). Bayley (1994) has argued that some police administrators, when assessing the effectiveness of their own police departments, have taken the position that their departments cannot be any better than what the public considers them to be.

Compliance with police directives, unlike cooperation with the police, has not been tested in this dissertation, but I discuss it briefly, as research shows that legitimacy has important effects on both compliance and cooperation (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Tyler (2004) argued that a productive approach for assessing “the relationship between the police and the public is to consider how the public impacts on the effectiveness of the police in their efforts to combat crime and maintain social order” (p. 84). The ability of police officers and agencies to get the public to comply with their directives remains a key indicator of the practicality and usefulness of the police in a democratic society (Easton, 1975; Fuller, 1971; Tyler, 2004). Tyler (1990) noted that police officers’ effectiveness as agents and conduits of formal social control cannot be divorced from citizens’ obedience to police commands. “This obedience must occur both during

personal encounters between police officers and members of the public (Tyler & Huo, 2002) and in people's everyday law-related behavior (Tyler, 1990)" (as cited in Tyler, 2004, p. 85). In Western democracies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, compliance with police directives is generally not problematic (Tyler, 2004), although a small segment of the population may occasionally defy police authority, which can test officers' ability to cope with the situation (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Sherman, 1993). Empirical studies point to the fact that one out of every five citizens has attempted to defy police orders (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; McCluskey, Mastrofski, & Parks, 1999).

Although the police wield state-approved enforcement powers, which may require the occasional use of deadly force (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012), "it is difficult to gain compliance solely via the threat of use [of] force" (Tyler, 2004, p. 85; see also Tyler, 1990, 1997b, 1997c). For effective policing to occur, the police need for citizens to be both willing to accept the decisions of the police and to obey the law partly out of a willingness to do so (Easton, 1975; Parsons, 1967; Sarat, 1977; Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2004) because the police cannot be everywhere at the same time (Tyler, 2004). In other words, "the police must rely upon widespread, voluntary law-abiding behavior to allow them to concentrate their resources on those people and situations in which compliance is difficult to obtain" (Tyler, 2004, p. 85). Maguire and Johnson (2010) explained: "The notion of voluntary compliance is the defining characteristic of legitimacy. If the majority of people chose not to comply voluntarily with the law or legal authorities, formal social control institutions would be overwhelmed" (p. 705).

The discussion of police legitimacy goes beyond the expectation that citizens would willingly comply with the law; it also includes the salient aspect of “public cooperation to the success of police efforts to fight crime by preventing crime and disorder and bringing offenders to account for wrongdoing” (Tyler, 2004, p. 85; see also Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Tyler (2004) explained further this need for public cooperation:

The public supports the police by helping to identify criminals and by reporting crimes. In addition, members of the public help the police by joining together in informal efforts to combat crime and address community problems, whether it is by working in ‘neighborhood watch’ organizations or by attending community-police meetings. As was the case with compliance, these cooperative efforts are largely voluntary in character, and the police are not generally in a position to reward members of the public for their aid. Instead, the police rely on willing public cooperation with police efforts to control crime and community disorder. (p. 85)

Legitimacy, therefore, is that salient element that an authority possesses that makes others “feel obligated to voluntarily defer to that ... authority. In other words, a legitimate authority is one that is regarded by people as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed by others” (Skogan & Frydl, 2004, p. 297). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) defined legitimacy as “a property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed” (p. 514). In other words, legitimacy encompasses an “acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into line with the dictates of an external authority” (Tyler, 1990, p. 25). The feelings to oblige to the dictates of this external authority do not just depend on

that authority's ability to enforce compliance via the instruments of force, but also to that unique social embodiment that makes compliance possible because people feel that the institution ought to be obeyed (Beetham, 1991; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996). As a result, legitimacy becomes an important social embodiment into which the police can tap to gain the compliance and cooperation of citizens (French & Raven, 1959; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

### **Procedural Justice**

Procedural justice theory suggests that citizens' satisfaction during their encounters with authorities, including the police, depends more on the process than on the outcome of the encounters (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Thus, "a citizen who is arrested by a police officer is likely to believe s/he was fairly treated if s/he feels listened to and treated with respect – despite being arrested" (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009, p. 273). When members of the public believe that the police deal with them in a fair manner, they are more likely to trust the police, hold the police in higher confidence, and support and cooperate with the police, all of which enhance the legitimacy of police officers and police agencies (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Wells, 2007). These findings show that "not only does procedural justice shape satisfaction, but it can also shape one's perception of the legitimacy of authority" (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009, p. 273).

Procedural justice, disaggregated into its two subscales of quality of decision-making and quality of treatment, significantly predicted police legitimacy in a number of

studies (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Thus, the argument can be made that both subscales of procedural justice are relevant to how procedural justice is conceptualized and measured. The literature on procedural justice suggests that the legitimacy of the police is intertwined with how citizens evaluate the manner in which police powers are exercised and deployed. In other words, procedural justice-based processes are quite “distinct from judgments about the effectiveness, valence, or fairness of the outcomes of those activities” (Tyler, 2004, p. 91). Tied closely to how citizens assess police legitimacy is citizens’ assessment of procedural justice in everyday police work. Prior studies incorporating different types of authority, including the police, teachers, politicians, and judges, show strong support for the element of procedural justice (Tyler, 2004). Even in studies of individuals, procedural-justice elements in the relationship between authority figures and citizens are tied to the willingness of citizens to voluntarily defer to the decisions of those authority figures (Kitzman & Emery, 1993; Lind et al, 1993). Tyler and Huo (2002) argued that “procedural-justice judgments shaped people’s willingness to accept the decisions made by police officers and are more important than are judgments about the favorability or fairness of the outcomes of the encounter” (Tyler, 2004, p. 92).

According to Gau, Corsaro, Stewart, and Brunson (2012), procedural justice is “a social-psychological concept” (p. 333). This concept encompasses the perceptions, judgments, and opinions of citizens, and it is influenced by actual police behavior (Murphy, 2009a; Tyler & Folger, 1980) as well as by some features of the personalities and dispositions of citizens (Gau et al., 2012; Piquero, Gomez-Smith, & Langton, 2004;

Wolfe, 2011). Gau et al. (2012) argued that the logic that underpins procedural justice is quite simple, and that this social-psychological concept plays a salient role in citizens' interactions with the police.

The police represent the norm of formal social control in society, and their street-level decision-making has consequences. In the performance of their daily duties, the police are called upon to delineate orderly behavior from disorderly behavior (Gau et al., 2012), and this policing mechanism can be ambiguous and subjective (Duneier, 1999). However, police authorities can exploit these ambiguities and subjectivities to full advantage by “maintain[ing] the dignity of the person being designated as disorderly and reduc[ing] the likelihood that he or she will feel a sense of indignation, anger, or both” (Gau et al., 2012, p. 334). Police judgments that were deemed to be procedurally fair thus may obviate the alienation of the individual involved, even if that individual did not agree with the decision of the officer.

Procedural justice, research suggests, may go beyond simply securing the cooperation of members of the public in their encounters with the police. It also has the potential to enhance the safety of both the police and the public (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Traditional policing methods have generally amplified the instrumental model, which seeks to create credible risks in the minds of members of the public that they would be apprehended and sanctioned if they broke the law (Bowers & Robinson, 2012; Meares, 2000). This instrumental approach places police officers in a position of dominance, which may result in ordinary people – the weaker parties – complying and cooperating out of fear (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Other studies do not

corroborate this finding, however. Pruitt and Rubin (1986) and Lawler, Ford, and Blegen (1988) argued that the use of power tactics by the police may be matched by a similar display from members of the public, which may lead to an escalation as hostility builds (Pruitt, 1981; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Thus, procedural justice is not just about eliciting cooperation with the police; it is also about increasing the safety of all involved in a police–citizen encounter.

Axelrod (1984) posited that a procedural justice-based approach to policing does not mean that the police should capitulate in the face of threats or insubordination, but that the police should always attempt to begin police–citizen encounters from the perspective of cooperation, jettisoning this approach only if the individual involved in the encounter employs aggression rather than cooperation. This way, a “procedural justice-based approach to policing [would allow] the police to focus on controlling crime without alienating the public” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 520).

According to Tyler (2004), empirical studies have delineated a number of elements that determine how citizens rate the procedural-justice process. One element is participation in the process. People tend to see an encounter as more procedurally fair when they are allowed to explain their circumstances and share their opinions about the matter to the authority figure(s). This participation element may explain why, for instance, mediation tends to be well received by all parties involved (Adler, Hensler, & Nelson, 1983; McEwen & Maiman, 1981), whereas settlement conferences tend to have results that displease some or all of the parties involved (Lind et al., 1990). These findings suggest that the police should allow individuals to share their grievances before

decisions are made by the officers (Tyler, 2004). In effect, the outcome of the matter may be less important to an individual (Heinz & Kerstetter, 1979) than the fact that he or she was listened to before the officer made a final decision (Conley & O'Barr, 1990).

A second element is neutrality. "People think that decisions are being more fairly made when authorities are unbiased and make their decisions using objective indicators, not personal views. As a consequence, evidence of evenhandedness and objectivity enhances perceived fairness" (Tyler, 2004, p. 94). In other words, people want to see that the process is impartial, and that no one is given undue advantage during the process, which then increases the chances that the outcome will be acceptable to all the parties involved.

A third element that undergirds procedural-justice considerations is that people want to be treated in a dignified and respectful manner (Tyler, 2004). People do not want their self-worth trampled upon by authority figures (e.g., the police), so they are likely to observe keenly the way they are treated during interactions with these authority figures (Tyler, 2004). Notably, the "quality of interpersonal treatment is consistently found to be a distinct element of fairness, separate from the quality of the decision-making process" (Tyler, 2004, p. 94).

A fourth element of procedural justice holds that "people feel that procedures are fairer when they trust the motives of decision makers. If, for example, people believe that authorities care about their well-being and are considering their needs and concerns, they view procedures as fairer" (Tyler, 2004, p. 95). Because people generally do not possess the same expertise as authority figures, they come to depend upon their subjective

measure of the authority's sincerity and benevolence. As such, police officers can increase their trustworthiness in the eyes of members of the public by "explaining their decisions and justifying and accounting for their conduct in ways that make clear their concern about giving attention to people's needs" (Tyler, 2004, p. 95).

### **Cooperation with the Police**

Citizen cooperation with the police is as fundamental to successful policing as the concepts of procedural justice policing and police legitimacy (Tankebe, 2013). Tyler (2005) elucidated the need for "voluntary cooperation from members of the public with police efforts to combat crime and community problems, arguing that it is much more difficult for legal authorities to effectively manage the problems of community crime control without public cooperation" (p. 322; see also Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). Essentially, public cooperation with police is tied to both trust and confidence in the police (Tyler, 2005).

Tyler (2005) argued that trust could be either institutional or motive-based. Institutional trust refers to the "beliefs about the degree to which the police are honest and care for members of the communities they police" (Tyler, 2005, p. 324). Public opinion polls generally capture this strand of trust among members of the public (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Motive-based trust "involves inferences about the motives and intentions of the police and reflects the concept of fiduciary trust, which is central to the discussions among legal scholars" (Tyler, 2005, p. 325; see also Tyler & Huo, 2002). For example, Tyler and Huo (2002) found that, among both White and minority members of the public, motive-based trust had a significant impact on how well these community members

voluntarily accepted the decisions of the police.

Tankebe (2013) argued that legitimacy influences the public's willingness to cooperate with the police (see also Engel, 2005; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In some cases, however, official law might be in conflict with cultural beliefs, leading to the absence of "shared values" (Tankebe, 2013), a phenomenon that Wilson (1993) attributed to the rise in universalism – that is, "the idea that all human beings are of equal worth and, therefore, are entitled to equal respect and treatment" (Tankebe, 2013, p. 110). Tyler (2005) found that Blacks expressed lower levels of trust in the police than did Whites. Murphy and Cherney (2012b) found that ethnic minorities cooperated less with the police than did their White counterparts.

Tankebe (2009) found that, in Ghana, "perceived police effectiveness was the main factor that determined cooperation [with the police]" (Tankebe, 2013, p. 113). In a London, U.K., study, Bradford (2012) observed that both procedural justice and effectiveness were significant predictors of cooperation with the police. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) also found in their first study, prior to 9/11, that effectiveness significantly impacted cooperation with the police, although the researchers did not find a similar result in their second, post-9/11 study. In Slovenia, Reisig, Tankebe, and Mesko (2012) found that "effectiveness in tackling crime and disorder influenced cooperation with the police" (p. 113). Finally, Murphy and Cherney (2012b), in their Australian study, found that perceived legitimacy of the law had a significant impact on citizens' cooperation with the police. As stated earlier, I test the relative effects of legitimacy and legitimacy Ghana (normative models) and risk, performance, and distributive justice (instrumental

models) on cooperation with the police. Because different studies have produced different results so far (see, for example, Reisig et al., 2012; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2009, 2013), this dissertation contributes to knowledge about the relative impacts of the normative and instrumental models of policing on cooperation with the police.

### **Models of Policing (Instrumental and Normative)**

Prior research has shown that the police can reduce disorder and prevent crime via two types of policing models: instrumental and normative (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010; Tyler, 2006b). The instrumental model addresses people's estimates of "the expected costs and benefits from ... cooperation with the police, and [people will] ... cooperate only when the former outweigh the latter" (Tyler et al., 2010, p. 366). The normative model suggests that people "cooperate when they believe authorities are legitimate and entitled to be obeyed" (Tyler et al., 2010, p. 366; see also Tyler, 2007, 2008).

#### **Instrumental Model of Policing:**

Traditional policing methods tend to emphasize the instrumental model, which creates credible risks in the minds of community members that they would be arrested and punished if they violate the criminal code (Bowers & Robinson, 2012; Meares, 2000). The instrumental model largely suggests that people cooperate with the police because the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of not doing so (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010). "Two reasons for cooperation from this perspective," according to Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq (2010), "are fear of punishment and the expectation of individual or

communal benefits flowing from successful police efforts to control crime” (p. 366; see also Posner, 2007). The instrumental model of policing prods members of the public to cooperate, especially if they expect that a lack of cooperation would lead to unwanted attention from the police (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010). Presently, “[e]mpirical research in the ordinary policing context finds only weak correlations between police effectiveness, risk of punishment, and compliance or cooperation” (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010, p. 369; see also Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

Evidence suggests that the instrumental model of policing is inadequate to explain public cooperation (Tyler, 2004). While the threat of punishment has an effect on compliance, research shows that this effect is quite small (Nagin, 1998). For example, in a study of how deterrence affects drug use, MacCoun (1993) found that the estimates of severity and certainty of punishment accounted for only 5 percent in the changes in drug-related behavior. MacCoun’s (1993) study was similar to prior work by Paternoster (1987) and Paternoster et al. (1983), in which the perception of the certainty of punishment had virtually no effect on inhibiting criminal behavior. The absence of a strong relationship between the risk of being caught and the commission of crime explains why “deterrence is an inadequate basis for securing compliance with the law” (Tyler, 2004, p. 86). In other words, the absence of a strong relationship between the risk of apprehension and punishment explains the inability of the police to instill a sufficient level of deterrence in criminals to increase conformity to law-abiding behavior (Robinson & Darley, 1995, 1997; Ross, 1982; Tyler, 2004).

Tankebe (2009) argued, however, that the instrumental model of policing had a

significant effect on citizen cooperation with the police in Ghana, a postcolonial society, where police brutality and police corruption are rife. In a 2009 survey of 450 households in Accra, Ghana, Tankebe (2009) found that police effectiveness was the primary antecedent of cooperation, and that procedural justice, a normative concept, did not predict cooperation. In other words, the relationship between procedural justice and cooperation was not statistically significant in the Ghanaian context. According to Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sargeant, and Manning (2013), “Tankebe’s (2009) research demonstrates that procedural justice might not be the fundamental *modus operandi* for all police in all cultural contexts – police performance or effectiveness may also be important” (p. 248). Because of Tankebe’s (2009) findings, I test police performance as an independent (instrumental) variable in my regression models, and I also measure the relative effects of the normative and instrumental models of policing on both legitimacy and cooperation with the police.

### **Normative Model of Policing:**

This model, unlike the instrumental model, highlights “self-regulatory, normative motivations. It posits that people comply and cooperate when they believe authorities are legitimate and entitled to be obeyed” (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010, pp. 366, 367; see also Tyler, 2007, 2008). Current empirical evidence suggests that a positive assessment of the legitimacy of authority figures will lead to a positive response from the public regarding the decisions of those authority figures (Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010).

Research also ties the legitimacy of institutions to the normative concept of procedural justice (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler, Schulhofer, &

Huq, 2010). Bowers and Robinson (2012) argued, “[P]rocedure is legitimacy’s starting point. People come to obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities because they perceive their legal institutions to operate fairly” (p. 214). Bowers and Robinson (2012) added, “In this way, perceptions of procedural fairness facilitate a kind of normative, as opposed to purely instrumental, crime control” (p. 214). In other words, citizens obey the law not because of fear from the state – and its agents of coercion – but because they feel they ought to do so (see Bowers & Robinson, 2012). Tyler et al. (2010) argued that “the effectiveness of police responses, and the anticipation of a trade-off between cooperation and unwelcome policing – all grounds for instrumental judgments about policing – are less important than perceived legitimacy or procedural justice in shaping cooperation” (p. 368). In other words, the normative model of policing portends a stronger approach for eliciting police–public cooperation and partnership than the instrumental model does.

Police innovations and the way police services are presently dispensed may have led, in recent years, to widespread decreases in crime in U.S. metropolitan areas (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Silverman, 1999). There have also been improvements in police professionalism (including fewer complaints against the police) and fewer reports of the use of excessive force against citizens (Tyler, 2004). In spite of the improvements noted above, research studies have consistently shown that police performance is not always a significant factor in eliciting public cooperation (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010). In other words, instrumental considerations of policing are insufficient to make citizens internalize the values they need to obey the law and cooperate with the police.

There is pervasive support by the public for police legitimacy – “the belief that the police are entitled to call upon the public to follow the law and help combat crime and that members of the public have an obligation to engage in cooperative behaviors” (Tyler, 2004, pp. 86, 87). As a result, legitimacy remains a critical component of the policing apparatus. Bowers and Robinson (2012) stated this argument in a slightly different way:

Tyler has argued persuasively that the law’s legitimacy (or at least a perception of it) is critical to a well-functioning criminal justice system and to public safety more generally. Specifically, effective crime control depends on volitional deference to substantive law and to its enforcement and adjudication. (p. 4)

Tankebe (2013) discussed the relationship between legitimacy and procedural justice and how legitimacy becomes a conduit for explaining compliance and cooperation with law enforcement, prisons, and other branches of government (Engel, 2005; Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd, 2011; Liebling, with Arnold, 2004; Murphy and Cherney, 2012a, 2012b; Reisig, Bratton, and Gertz, 2007; Reisig, Wolfe, and Holtfreter, 2011; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). There are differences among the racial groups, however. Three decades of studies of police perceptions demonstrate that “racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to distrust the police than Whites” (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009, p. 273; see also Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005). Racial and ethnic minorities are also more likely to withhold cooperation from the police when a crime is committed (Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009; Tyler, 2005).

### **Prior Empirical Studies on Procedural Justice, Police Legitimacy, and Cooperation with the Police:**

In a London, U.K., study in which Tankebe (2013) used secondary data to

investigate the relative influence of legitimacy and feelings of obligation on the willingness of that city's residents to cooperate with the police, he found: (1) a positive association between legitimacy and cooperation after using a composite measure of legitimacy; (2) that citizens' perceptions of police lawfulness and procedural fairness were the main determinants of the effect of legitimacy on cooperation with the police; and (3) that there were racial differences in the willingness to cooperate with the police. This last finding is salient because it supports previous findings about the impact of race on cooperation with the police (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Son & Rome, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005).

In a Cincinnati, Ohio, study in which Frank, Smith, and Novak (2005) used primary data to measure citizen attitudes toward the city's police, they found that: (1) respondents in the study, in line with prior research, "reported generally favorable global attitudes toward the police. Also consistent with much of the previous research, there was not a consistent pattern across all social groups as African Americans expressed less favorable attitudes than White respondents" (p. 222). Frank et al. (2005) also found variations in attitudes toward the police based on differences in education and income, and whether the respondent was a homeowner or a renter. Contact with police also had an impact on general attitudes toward the police. "Overall, the findings ... suggest that police agencies may be able to influence the attitudes of a substantial portion of citizens through their conduct" (p. 224).

In their landmark study of New York City residents, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) used survey data to evaluate the "legitimacy of the [New York City Police Department]

in the eyes of the public ... because it is the fulcrum of the relationship between the police and the public” (p. 516). In the first study, which took place in 2001 but before the horrific events of 9/11, the views of 586 New Yorkers were evaluated. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that legitimacy influenced compliance with the police, and compliance was also influenced by “ethnicity, income, and gender, with whites, the well off, and female respondents more likely to comply with the law” (p. 526). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) also found that “[p]erceptions of police legitimacy and evaluations of police performance predicted citizen cooperation with the police” (p. 526). In the second study, which evaluated the views of 1,653 New York City residents in 2002, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that legitimacy and estimates of risk influenced citizens’ willingness to comply with the law. Perceptions of police legitimacy and risk estimates also influenced citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the police. Additionally, the police were more likely to receive cooperation from New York City residents who were older, more educated, and had higher incomes (Tyler & Sunshine, 2003). Finally, “African Americans, older respondents, higher-income respondents, and women were likely to indicate lower levels of legitimacy” (Tyler & Sunshine, 2003, p. 530).

In a different study, Tyler (2005) used data from a sample of 1,653 New Yorkers (550 Whites, 455 Blacks, 410 Hispanics, and 210 other-ethnicity non-White residents) to test the effect of trust on cooperation with the police. Tyler (2005) found that the three forms of cooperation<sup>6</sup> had a mean correlation of 0.26, which suggested that there was “a general cooperative orientation toward the police” (p. 333). White respondents reported

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<sup>6</sup> Tyler (2005) measured cooperation as: (1) willingness to work with the police, (2) willingness to work with the community, and (3) institutional support for the police department.

higher cooperation with the police than minority respondents did, however (Tyler, 2005). Employing structural equation modeling techniques in which cooperation (using the composite measure) was the dependent variable and institutional trust, motive-based trust, distributive justice, performance measures, and respondent demographics the independent variables, Tyler (2005) found that “institutional trust, motive-based trust, performance in fighting crime, and sanctioning risk, age, and income” (p. 333) were the major predictors of cooperation with the police. In other words, trust shaped cooperation and each strand of trust also had an independent impact on cooperation with the police (Tyler, 2005).

Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq (2010) interviewed a sample of Muslim Americans in New York City to measure their views on cooperation with the police to fight terrorism in a post-9/11 environment. This study evaluated “the relative importance of normative and instrumental mechanisms in the previously understudied context of policing against terrorism within domestic U.S. Muslim communities” (Tyler et al., 2010, p. 367). After surveying 300 Muslim Americans living within five boroughs in New York City, Tyler et al. (2010) found that “legitimacy was linked to both general cooperation and willingness to alert the police. And the two forms of cooperation were related” (p. 379). Tyler et al. (2010) also found that “procedural justice shapes cooperation directly and also indirectly through its influence on legitimacy. This identification of a central role for procedural justice parallels prior findings in the area of everyday policing” (p. 385). Tyler et al. (2010) noted further that cooperation was not strongly tied to police presence, and that there was no link between religiosity and cooperation with the police.

The aforementioned empirical studies form part of a larger corpus of extant literature on citizen perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police. These studies play an important role in efforts to learn about minority and ethnic populations vis-à-vis their evaluations of the perceptions of the police. Equally important is the need to find out about perceptions of the police among immigrant groups. This dissertation project accomplishes this goal by focusing on Ghanaian immigrants in Alexandria, Virginia. In other words, Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police become an important first step in learning about immigrant perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police. Future research should evaluate perceptions of the police among the various immigrant communities, and between immigrants and native-born Americans.

### **The Conceptualization and Measurement of Legitimacy**

Scholars have recently raised questions about both the conceptualization of legitimacy (Tankebe, 2013) and the methodology employed to test it in prior research (Reisig et al., 2007). For example, Tankebe (2013) argued that *obligation to obey* was better conceptualized as a discrete concept from *legitimacy* (Gau, 2011; Reisig et al., 2007), and that the relationship between legitimacy and cooperation appeared to be independent of the influence of obligation. Tankebe (2013) thus suggested that obligation to obey and legitimacy were discrete constructs, rather than the former being a subconstruct of the latter (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Because Tyler and colleagues had repeatedly used *trust* and *obligation to obey* as subconstructs of legitimacy, I tested in this dissertation project Tankebe's (2013) argument that only the subconstruct of trust

appeared to have a significant effect on cooperation. Tankebe (2013) posited that “obligation was a broader concept to be explained in part by legitimacy” (p. 113), so I not only assessed the influence of legitimacy on cooperation, I also assessed Tankebe’s (2013) claim of “conceptual distinctiveness” (pp. 113, 114) between *obligation to obey* and *legitimacy*. I accomplished this goal by employing exploratory factor analysis and regression analysis to explain the empirical relationship between legitimacy, obligation to obey, and cooperation.

### **Calls for Refinement of Operationalization of Variables**

Recent criminological studies have begun to question the construct and discriminant validity of the concepts of procedural justice and police legitimacy (Gau, 2011; Maguire & Johnson, 2010; Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2013). Gau (2011) argued that procedural justice consists of four constructs: the attitudinal (perceptions of procedural justice and police legitimacy) and the behavioral (cooperation with the police and compliance with the law) (see p. 489). Gau (2011) noted, however, that the psychometric properties of both the attitudinal and behavioral elements have continued to be measured incorrectly, and thus need constant refining to increase the convergent and discriminant validity of the concepts. Gau (2011) noted further that if procedural justice and legitimacy were separate constructs, then they would have both convergent validity (that is, each will be a unidimensional construct) and discriminant validity (that is, the constructs will be independent of each other). In other words, the best way to determine if these constructs are “internally consistent and externally distinct” (Gau, 2011, p. 489) is for researchers to continue to conduct empirical studies to evaluate these claims. To

achieve this goal, research must continue to improve upon the scales currently in use for measuring the procedural justice and legitimacy constructs (Reisig et al., 2007), as Gau (2011) has argued that procedural justice and legitimacy were not empirically distinguishable.

Procedural justice and legitimacy, as presently measured, tend to exhibit low discriminant validity, which affects the conclusions drawn from research studies that examine the relationship between the two constructs (Gau, 2011). Gau (2011) also bemoaned the over-reliance on correlation values and alpha coefficients to construct procedural justice and legitimacy scales. She argued that these tests, in and of themselves, should be used only as the first series of tests to measure the two constructs. “A pressing problem facing existing procedural justice and police legitimacy scales is the absence of rigorous examinations ensuring convergent and discriminant validity within and among these constructs, respectively” (Gau, 2011, p. 491). Bollen (1989) added that convergent validity and discriminant validity are significant in any effort to accurately measure latent constructs. While Cronbach’s alpha is widely used to determine the internal consistency of a construct, it is unable to correctly assess unidimensionality (Cortina, 1993; Schmitt, 1996), “so a high alpha is no assurance that a particular scale taps one and only one latent construct” (Gau, 2011, p. 491).

Although “[c]oefficient alpha is commonly used to determine the degree to which scale items are correlated” (Reisig et al., 2007, p. 1009), the alpha value increases as more items are added to the scale (Green, Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977; Reisig et al., 2007). According to Cortina (1993), a researcher cannot ignore the number of items used to

construct a scale when interpreting coefficient alpha, as a scale with a larger number of items will have a larger alpha value and a lower inter-item correlation than a scale with a smaller number of items (see also Carmines & Zeller, 1979). There are two important methods for identifying the problem of discriminant validity (Maguire & Johnson, 2013, *unpublished manuscript*). The first method involves “inspect[ing] the correlations between factors” (Maguire & Johnson, 2013, p. 12). If the factor correlation is greater than .80 or .85, then discriminant validity may be problematic (Brown, 2006; Maguire & Johnson, 2013). The second method involves “compar[ing] the average variance extracted (AVE) within factors to the shared variation between factors” (Maguire & Johnson, 2013, p. 13; see also Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The AVE is “‘the average amount of variation that a latent construct is able to explain in the observed variables to which it is theoretically related’ and is calculated by computing the mean of the squared loadings for each factor” (Farrell, 2010, p. 324, as cited in Maguire & Johnson, 2013). To obtain the shared variance between any two factors, the correlations between them must be squared (Maguire & Johnson, 2013). Discriminant validity is not a problem provided “‘the AVE for each construct is greater than its shared variance with any other construct’” (Farrell, 2010, p. 325, as cited in Maguire & Johnson, 2013).

In a study of procedural justice and police legitimacy using a sample of college students in Southern California, Gau (2011) “affirmed that obligation to obey does not fit in the same factor with trust in the police. The confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) showed that obligation to obey was a construct all of its own” (p. 495). Gau (2011) also concluded from CFA “the absence of discriminant validity between the trust subconstruct

of legitimacy and the two subconstructs of procedural justice (quality of treatment and quality of decision making)” (p. 495). When Gau (2011) used regression models to measure cooperation with the police and compliance with the law, she observed that procedural justice was an antecedent of obligation to obey (which has been measured as a subconstruct of legitimacy (see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler et al., 2010)), and obligation to obey significantly predicted cooperation with the police and compliance with the law.

Tankebe (2013), in a study of 5,120 residents of London, U.K., also argued that *obligation to obey* was better conceptualized as a discrete concept from *legitimacy*, a view supported by Gau (2011) and Reisig et al. (2007), and that “legitimacy has effects on cooperation that are independent of obligation” (p. 126). Tankebe (2013) reasoned that legitimacy was better measured by the subconstructs of police lawfulness, procedural fairness, police distributive fairness, and police effectiveness. He then tested the relationship between legitimacy and cooperation with police using both the discrete subconstructs and the composite construct of legitimacy. After omitting effectiveness from the model to form a three-factor model of procedural fairness, police distributive fairness, and police lawfulness, Tankebe (2013) concluded that the original model, which also contained the fourth subconstruct of police lawfulness, was the better of the two constructs of police legitimacy. Overall, Tankebe (2013) suggested that obligation to obey and legitimacy were discrete constructs, rather than the former being a subconstruct of the latter (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Tankebe (2013) also concluded that procedural fairness, distributive fairness, lawfulness, and effectiveness were actually components of

legitimacy, not predictors of the same, as had been the norm in criminological research.

As a result, I tested the differing arguments about legitimacy by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) and Tankebe (2013): the former consider both *trust* and *obligation to obey* as measures of police legitimacy, whereas the latter considers *obligation to obey* to be independent of *legitimacy*. For example, Tyler (1990), Tyler & Huo (2002), and Sunshine and Tyler (2003) all argued that legitimacy includes some combination of *trust*, *obligation to obey*, and *affective feelings* toward the police. Relatedly, Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq (2010) noted that *legitimacy* includes *trust* and *obligation to obey*. Although Tyler et al. (2010) acknowledged other researchers' argument that measuring *legitimacy* as both *trust* and *obligation to obey* is problematic, they countered that "because our overall goal is to predict behavior, we use a combined index of legitimacy that includes both trust and obligation for our analysis" (p. 367). These differing arguments thus make a compelling case to test the individual influence of each legitimacy subscale on cooperation with the police alongside the influence of the composite legitimacy scale on cooperation with the police (Reisig et al., 2007).

### **The Current Study**

This dissertation uses citizen surveys and focus groups to examine perceptions of the police in a Ghanaian immigrant community. Specifically, I explore Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of procedural justice policing and police legitimacy, and their willingness to cooperate with the police. This dissertation addresses the following research questions: (1) *Are the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy applicable in the Ghanaian immigrant community?* (2) *What*

*are the relative effects of the normative models (procedural justice and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community? (3) What are the relative effects of the normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on cooperation with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community?*

### **Model 1:**

Model 1 examines how procedural justice affects police legitimacy, and generally reflects Tyler's process-based model of policing. Specifically, I employ regression analyses using the following variables: procedural justice, perceived legitimacy of Ghana police, performance, risk, distributive justice, and respondent demographics to predict legitimacy of U.S. police. Additionally, I test the relative effects of procedural justice and legitimacy Ghana (normative models) and risk, performance, and distributive fairness (instrumental models) on Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the U.S. police.

According to Sunshine and Tyler (2003), a "procedural justice-based approach to policing has numerous advantages over an instrumental approach – i.e., an approach that links cooperation to risk, performance, and/or distributive fairness" (p. 519). One advantage, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) proffered, is the innate motivation to obey the law that is a byproduct of legitimacy. People's willingness to defer to police commands means that they will be more tolerant of police intrusiveness, which helps the police carry

out their “regulatory role more effectively and efficiently” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 519). Because the normative models have shown greater effect than the instrumental models in citizen surveys in the United States, it is important to test these models in immigrant communities to find out if these attitudes toward the police are replicated beyond the community of U.S. citizens. The control variables in Model 1 are age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States. Legitimacy is the dependent variable (see Figure 1).

**Model 1 (Hypotheses Tested):**

H<sub>1</sub>: The effect of procedural justice should exceed the effect of risk, performance, or distributive justice in determining perceptions of police legitimacy.

H<sub>2</sub>: Older Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to younger Ghanaian immigrants.

H<sub>3</sub>: Better-educated Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to their less educated counterparts.

H<sub>4</sub>: Female Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to view the police as legitimate compared to male Ghanaian immigrants.

H<sub>5</sub>: Ghanaian homeowners are more likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to Ghanaian renters.

H<sub>6</sub>: The higher a Ghanaian immigrant’s income, the less likely that he or she will view the police as legitimate.

H<sub>7</sub>: First-generation Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to view the police as legitimate compared to second-generation Ghanaian immigrants.

H<sub>8</sub>: The higher Ghanaian immigrants rate procedural fairness, the greater will be their perceptions of the legitimacy of the police.

H<sub>9</sub>: Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to view the Ghana police as legitimate compared to the U.S. police.

### **Background to Hypotheses Tested**

Hypothesis 1: Previous research has shown that procedural justice is a more powerful predictor of police legitimacy than performance (Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Reisig et al. (2007) also found that “procedural justice was an important determinant of legitimacy, and the effect of distributive [justice] on legitimacy was much weaker relative to procedural justice” (p. 1024). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found no effect of estimates of risk on legitimacy. I hypothesize therefore that the effect of procedural justice should exceed the effect of risk, performance, or distributive justice in determining perceptions of police legitimacy.

Hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 are informed by prior research (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that, comparatively, “older respondents, higher-income respondents, and women were likely to indicate lower levels of legitimacy” (p. 530).

Hypothesis 3 is informed by prior research (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013<sup>7</sup>; Thompson & Lee, 2004). According to Sunshine and Tyler (2003), “[m]ore highly educated respondents were likely to indicate lower levels of legitimacy” (p. 527).


Hypothesis 5 is informed by prior research (Frank et al., 2005; Tankebe, 2013). For

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<sup>7</sup> This study was conducted in Ghana, which is different from Tankebe’s study in London the same year.

example, Frank et al. (2005) found that homeowners expressed more favorable attitudes toward the police than did renters. Frank et al. (2005) argued that attitude measures on citizen surveys that measure perceptions of the police are tied to police legitimacy, including both the “legitimacy of the police institution and police authority” (p. 211).

Hypothesis 7 is informed by prior research (Tankebe, 2009): Ghana’s postcolonial style of policing, which is “characterized by abuse, violence, intimidation, and widespread corruption” (Tankebe, 2009, p. 1271), means that first-generation Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than their second-generation counterparts to harbor greater distrust of the police (Ankerfelt et al., 2011). Hypothesis 8 is informed by prior research (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). “Procedural justice-based policing is based on the expectation that, when people view legal authority as legitimate, they voluntarily follow the law” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 523). Hypothesis 9 is informed by prior research (Tankebe, 2008, 2009): Ghana’s postcolonial style of policing, which still manifests itself in the form of citizen abuse and intimidation, means that Ghanaians are less likely to view the Ghana police as legitimate compared to the U.S. police, and that their views will have an impact on their perceptions of the legitimacy of the U.S. police.



**Figure 1: Conceptual Model<sup>8</sup> (Dependent Variable: Legitimacy of U.S. Police)**

<sup>8</sup> + Denotes a normative model; ++ Denotes an instrumental model; +++ Denotes a control variable

**Model 2:**

Model 2 explores how legitimacy, in turn, affects Ghanaian immigrants' willingness to cooperate with the police. I employ regression analyses using the following variables: legitimacy<sup>9</sup>, legitimacy Ghana<sup>10</sup>, performance, risk, distributive justice, and respondent demographics to predict cooperation. Additionally, I test the relative effects of legitimacy and legitimacy Ghana (normative models) and risk, performance, and distributive justice (instrumental models) on Ghanaian immigrants' willingness to cooperate with the U.S. police. The control variables in Model 2 are age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States. Cooperation is the dependent variable (see Figure 2).

**Model 2: (Hypotheses Tested):**

H<sub>10</sub>: The higher Ghanaian immigrants rate police legitimacy, the greater will be their willingness to cooperate with the police.

H<sub>11</sub>: The effect of the perceptions of legitimacy should exceed the effect of risk, performance, or distributive justice in willingness to cooperate with the police.

H<sub>12</sub>: Older Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than younger Ghanaian immigrants to cooperate with the police.

H<sub>13</sub>: Better-educated Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than their less educated counterparts to cooperate with the police.

H<sub>14</sub>: Female Ghanaian immigrants are less likely than their male counterparts to

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<sup>9</sup> This is a measure of the legitimacy of U.S. police, as compared to the legitimacy of the Ghana police.

<sup>10</sup> As noted earlier, this is a measure of Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the Ghana police.

cooperate with the police.

H<sub>15</sub>: Ghanaian homeowners are more likely than Ghanaian renters to cooperate with the police.

H<sub>16</sub>: The higher a Ghanaian immigrant's income, the greater the likelihood that he or she will cooperate with the police.

H<sub>17</sub>: First-generation Ghanaian immigrants are less likely than their second-generation counterparts to cooperate with the police.

H<sub>18</sub>: The higher Ghanaian immigrants rate the legitimacy of the Ghana police, the greater will be their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. police.


### **Background to Hypotheses Tested**

Hypothesis 10 is informed by prior research (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2001). Tankebe (2013) found that "the more people perceived the police to be legitimate, the more willing they were to cooperate with them" (p. 121). I hypothesize therefore that the higher Ghanaian immigrants rate police legitimacy, the greater will be their willingness to cooperate with the police. Hypothesis 11, which states that legitimacy plays a greater role in predicting cooperation than instrumental considerations (e.g., risk, performance, and distributive fairness), is informed by prior research (Gau, 2011; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Tyler et al., 2010).

Hypotheses 12, 13, and 16 are informed by prior research (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that "[a]ge, education, and income impacted

cooperation, with older, higher-education, and higher-income respondents more likely to cooperate with the police” (p. 530). Hypothesis 14 is informed by prior research (Gau, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). “[O]lder respondents, higher-income respondents, and women were likely to indicate lower levels of legitimacy” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 530). Because legitimacy is directly linked to cooperation with the police (Gau et al., 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001; Tyler et al., 2010), I hypothesize that women were less likely to cooperate with the police than were men.

Hypothesis 15 is informed by prior research (Tankebe, 2013). According to Tankebe (2013), “[o]ne individual-level variable that consistently predicted cooperation was home ownership status; specifically, people who lived in rented accommodation were less willing to cooperate with the police than those who reported owning or buying their homes” (p. 123). Hypothesis 17 is informed by prior research (Tankebe, 2009): First-generation Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than their second-generation counterparts to harbor greater distrust of the police, so first-generation Ghanaian immigrants are less likely than second-generation Ghanaian immigrants to cooperate with the police. Hypothesis 18 is informed by prior research (Tankebe, 2009). Because Ghana is a postcolonial society, the legitimacy of its police is expected to be lower than the legitimacy of the U.S. police. However, I hypothesize that the higher Ghanaian immigrants rate the legitimacy of the Ghana police, the greater will be their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. police.



**Figure 2: Conceptual Model<sup>11</sup> (Dependent Variable: Cooperation)**

<sup>11</sup> + Denotes a normative model; ++ Denotes an instrumental model; +++ Denotes a control variable

### **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY**

This project uses citizen surveys and focus groups to examine police perceptions in the Ghanaian immigrant community. Specifically, this study is focused on perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate with the police.

Citizen attitude surveys are a good indicator of how well the police are doing in the community (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Frank et al., 2005). Frank et al. (2005) noted:

Information about the basis of citizen attitudes can provide police with feedback about the performance of officers or, at a minimum, citizen perceptions of performance. Thus, surveys can act as a mechanism for holding the police accountable and may ultimately enhance the perceived legitimacy of the police. (p. 207)

Citizen attitude surveys are important to both police leaders and politicians because they are straightforward and convincing (Frank et al., 2005). Bayley (1994) argued that some police leaders depend partly on survey data to evaluate their own departments, as these leaders are convinced that “the police force is as good as the public thinks” (p. 99). This methodology section explores in greater detail Ghanaian immigrants’ perceptions of the police, by examining the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy, as well as the effect of legitimacy on cooperation with the police, with instrumental considerations (risk, performance, and distributive justice) employed to test the relative effects of procedural justice and legitimacy on the dependent variables.

In addition to surveys, I also conducted two focus groups to help explore participants' deeper experiences and anecdotes. This approach is intended to illuminate focus group participants' understanding of the cognate concepts of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police that a cross-sectional quantitative survey dataset alone is generally unable to capture. These rich experiential statements help to elucidate respondents' nuanced understanding of the issues that undergird police-immigrant relationships, and may help to improve the overall relationship between the police and *visible minorities* (Mercer, 1995) in the larger community. In other words, the focus groups would shed more light on issues such as police effectiveness, obligation, and trust that were assessed on the closed-ended survey.

Using qualitative data to explore societal issues undergirds the contemporary use of focus groups (Asbury, 1995). As Asbury (1995) observed, "Focus groups are a data collection technique that capitalizes on the interaction within a group to elicit rich experiential data" (p. 414). Merton (1987) added that collecting and analyzing qualitative data "may help us gain an enlarged sociological and psychological understanding in whatsoever sphere of human experience" (p. 565). Ultimately, a focus group depends on the rich experiences that come from the interaction of group members "to stimulate the thinking and thus the verbal contributions of the participants, and to provide the researcher with rich, detailed perspectives that could not be obtained through other methodological strategies" (Asbury, 1995, p. 415; see also Krueger, 1994; Morgan, 1993).

More importantly, Asbury (1995) noted that a focus group study might be

essential if the researcher seeks to understand fully “some issue from the perspective of a specific population, or has reason to believe that previous treatments of that issue have not sufficiently included the essential perspective, or both” (p. 415). Because the cognate concepts of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police have been studied primarily using quantitative approaches, which may miss some of the nuances in attitudes, I combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in this dissertation. By doing so, I am able to provide a richer, fuller interpretation of Ghanaian immigrants’ views of the police than either methodology alone could provide.

**Population:**

The immigrant population from Africa residing in Alexandria, Virginia, has grown significantly in recent years. According to the Alexandria City Government (2010):

Although the black and African American population has remained roughly the same proportion of the total population of the City since 1980, both the location and the makeup of this population has changed in those 30 years. Emigration from Africa to the U.S. grew rapidly in the 1990s as political turmoil spread in that continent, and since the 2000 census, the City’s black and African American population has included a substantial share of people born in Africa. Africa was the region of birth of 8,695 people, 27% of Alexandria’s foreign-born population, based on the 2006–2010 5-year average American Community Survey sample data. (p. 10)

Notably, the African population in the City of Alexandria grew from 8,695 in 2010 to 9,537 in 2012 (American Community Survey, 2012). Of the nearly 146,300

people residing in the City of Alexandria today, 32,625 (or 22.3%) are Black (this number includes both native-born and foreign-born residents). It is important to note that 24.5% of Alexandria City residents is foreign born (American Community Survey, 2012), which makes the city an ideal place for studying Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police. While Alexandria City's *visible minorities* include nationals from an exhaustive list of African nations, the population from Ghana in the City of Alexandria is one of the largest in this category, accounting for 1,209 of the 9,537 people who had emigrated from the African continent (2013 projection by the American Community Survey, 2012).

There are a number of reasons for the sharp growth in emigration from Africa. For example, approximately 50% of all immigrants who received green cards through the Diversity Visa Lottery program in 2010 were African immigrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2011). Passed into law by the Immigration Act of 1990, the U.S. Diversity Visa Lottery program offers people from nations with traditionally low rates of migration to the United States the chance to seek permanent residence via a lottery "administered by the U.S. Department of State. The African born [alone] accounted for 48.0 percent (or 23,903) of the 49,763 persons who obtained legal permanent residence through the program in 2010" (Migration Policy Institute, 2011, p. 1).

While Diversity Visa Lottery recipients account for only a small percentage of individuals who receive permanent residence in the United States every year, just "(4.8 percent in 2010), diversity immigrants from five African countries – Ethiopia (3,987), Egypt (3,447), Nigeria (2,937), Kenya (2,279), and Ghana (2,086) – collectively accounted for 14.5 percent of all Africans who obtained legal permanent residence in

2010” (Migration Policy Institute, 2011, p. 1). Remarkably, with 27.1% of Alexandria City’s foreign-born population from Africa, Alexandria City has more than seven times the national average of the African population (Alexandria City Government, 2012), which makes the city an ideal place to study the relationship between an immigrant community (in this case, the Ghanaian community) and the police.

According to the Migration Policy Institute (2011), in 2010 alone:

101,355 African immigrants obtained green cards, accounting for 9.7 percent of all immigrants granted legal permanent residence. The foreign born from Africa gained legal permanent residence through varying routes: 48.3 percent obtained green cards through family relationships, 23.6 percent through the US diversity immigrant visa program, 22.3 percent as refugees or asylees; 5.2 percent through employment, and 0.6 through other routes. (p. 1)

These data on the burgeoning African population in the United States should make the study of police–immigrant relationships in small and large communities across the United States an important policy goal in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Sampling Method:**

Most attempts at sampling hidden, or hard-to-reach, populations use one of two techniques: targeted sampling or time-space sampling (Muhib et al., 2001; Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004). Time-space sampling, the more refined of the two approaches, uses “ethnographic fieldwork ... to construct a sampling frame identifying times when members of the target population gather at specific locations – for example, Tuesday afternoon from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. at a specific park” (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004, pp. 198, 199). The sampling frame is thus the totality of the venue-time-space segments

(Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004). As Muhib et al. (2001) have noted, time-space sampling “uses ethnographic information to reach the population of interest, and the sampling procedure allows quantitative inference to the larger population” (p. 217). Time-space techniques primarily attempt to recruit survey respondents at places where they are likely to gather (Muhib et al., 2001). Researchers then enquire of them, at these locations, their experiences relevant to the survey (Muhib et al., 2001).

Following the time-space sampling technique, I identified several venues and times at which a large number of Ghanaian immigrants would gather. I drew samples from eight Ghanaian churches because Ghanaian churches are the best places to find large numbers of Ghanaians at any point in time to measure their perceptions of the police. Most Ghanaian churches hold their primary weekly church service on Sundays between 9:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. I identified the eight churches for inclusion in the research using the Google search engine – and I had visited at least one of the churches in the past. I placed phone calls to all eight churches between mid-September and early November 2013 and made initial contact with many of the leaders of these congregations, after which I sent formal letters<sup>12</sup> requesting permission to survey their members for my dissertation project. To properly gauge the size of each congregation, I attended services at five of the eight churches; I also met face to face with the pastors of the remaining three churches.

Using the time-space method described above, the cross-sectional data for this

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<sup>12</sup> All eight pastors – and churches – received my letter requesting their participation in the study.

dissertation came from a nonrandom, convenience sample of 304<sup>13</sup> Ghanaian immigrants<sup>14</sup> who worship in these eight predominantly Ghanaian churches in Alexandria City and who are at least 18 years of age.<sup>15</sup> The unit of analysis is the individual. I took a convenience sample from these Ghanaian churches for the purpose of sample collection, which, although not a random sample, should reduce coverage error (Dillman, 2000), as “71.2 percent of the [Ghanaian] population profess the Christian faith, followed by Islam (17.6%). Only a small proportion of the population either adhere to traditional religion (5.2%) or are not affiliated to any religion (5.3%)” (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012, p. 20). In other words, seven out of ten Ghanaians in the City of Alexandria are likely to identify themselves as Christian.

While professing to be a follower of a religion does not imply that an individual attends regular religious services, I was aware that a large number of Ghanaians attended church in Alexandria City. My assertion was based on personal experience: I had in the past visited a number of these churches during Sunday services and observed quite a large number of Ghanaian worshipers. Using only churches for my survey, however, meant that my sample contained some bias, because non-Christians and those who do not attend church were left out of my survey. Some prior research studies found a significant

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<sup>13</sup> Comrey and Lee (1992) suggested that a sample size of 100 is poor, 200 is fair, 300 is good, 500 is very good, and 1,000 or more is excellent.

<sup>14</sup> The term “immigrants” consists of first-generation and second-generation Ghanaian immigrants in the City of Alexandria, Virginia. This term, as used in this research, also encompasses (1) naturalized U.S. citizens; (2) legal permanent residents (including the recipients of the Diversity Visa Lottery); (3) legal non-immigrants (temporary visa holders, such as foreign students and highly skilled workers); (4) illegal non-immigrants (those who have overstayed their visas); (5) asylees/refugees; and (6) adopted children who are now adults.

<sup>15</sup> I have employed pseudonyms for the churches in fulfillment of the anonymity that I promised each of the pastors of the eight churches. On the contrary, my dissertation committee members are aware of the churches’ real names.

negative relationship between religiosity and legitimacy (Napier & Tyler, 2008; Skitka & Mullen, 2002), but other studies found no significant relationship between the two variables (Tyler et al., 2010).

In their New York City study evaluating Muslim Americans’<sup>16</sup> perceptions of the confluence of police legitimacy, cooperation with police, and anti-terrorism efforts, Tyler et al. (2010) did not find a significant relationship between religiosity and general cooperation or a willingness to report threats of terrorism to the police. There was also no statistically significant relationship between religiosity and legitimacy. Tyler et al. (2010) further concluded that “religiosity, cultural differences, and political background have at best weak connections with cooperation” (p. 369). I argue, therefore, that religiosity may not play a statistically significant role in Ghanaian immigrants’ perceptions of police legitimacy. A second source of bias was my inability to survey all known predominantly Ghanaian churches in Alexandria City, but only the eight that I identified for this project. As a result, members of those churches not included in my list were unable to share their perceptions of the police. However, as Muhib et al. (2001) have argued, time-space sampling procedure allows quantitative inference to the larger population.

Despite the potential bias in my sample, there are other reasons my survey of churches was an appropriate strategy. First, very few pro-Ghana(ian) social organizations exist in Alexandria, Virginia, and even those that I know of are not well organized. Second, these non-religious, social organizations meet only a few times a year, whereas Ghanaian churches hold two or three services each week. Finally, these predominantly

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<sup>16</sup> Of those who participated in the study, 19% were born in the United States, whereas 81% were born outside the United States.

Ghanaian churches retain fairly stable membership, an important consideration for my choice of churches for the project.

Tankebe (2010) justified the use of a convenience sample to measure public confidence in the police in Accra, Ghana. He argued that a convenience sample, rather than a representative one, was more appropriate for his study because the middle class in Ghanaian society, the focus of the survey, was more likely to identify police misconduct and to possess greater knowledge about police–citizen relationships than the general population did. Tankebe’s (2010) other reason was that the views of the middle class, which Rothschild (1977) called “auxiliary power centers,” were far more essential to authorities than the views of those occupying a lower tier in society. I argue, therefore, that my choice of a convenience sample for this study was appropriate, because Ghanaians in Alexandria, Virginia are generally members of the middle class.

Research on immigrant communities has been scant because of the language barriers that researchers sometimes face when attempting to survey members of immigrant groups. Ghana is an English-speaking country, so the survey respondents did not experience any problems with being able to read and provide answers to the questions on the survey questionnaire. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2012), “[c]ompared with the 2000 census data, the level of literacy has increased tremendously. The percentage of the population aged 15 years and older reported as literate increased from 54.1 percent in 2000 to 71.5 percent in 2010” (p. 21). In addition, a large proportion (67.1%) of the population can read and write (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). In line with *immigrant selectivity* theory, which is “the degree to which pre-migration

circumstances affect the likelihood of migration in ways that create advantages or disadvantages for immigrants in the new country” (Crosnoe & Lopez Turley, 2011, p. 136), Ghanaians in Alexandria City were likely to be more educated than their peers in Ghana and to easily understand and answer the survey questions.

Crosnoe and Lopez Turley (2011) have argued that one type of immigrant selectivity concerns the educational background of new immigrants, compared to those they have left behind in their home countries. Research by Feliciano (2005) found that “for all but one (Puerto Rico) of thirty-two countries and territories, immigrants to the United States were more educated than their peers who remained in their country of origin” (Crosnoe & Lopez Turley, 2011, p. 136). For example, a seeker of the Diversity Visa must possess a minimum of a high school diploma (U.S. Department of State, 2013), which means that the selection process itself would exclude a percentage of the population from entering the United States with a Diversity Visa. While the Diversity Visa forms only a small percentage of the avenues Ghanaians use to enter the United States, it represents a poignant example of the selectivity phenomenon noted by Crosnoe and Lopez Turley. Thus, this selectivity phenomenon would have carried over to the Ghanaian population<sup>17</sup> in Alexandria City.

### **Development of the Survey Instrument**

Scholars spend considerable time learning how to measure variables, which is why anyone interested in measuring a set of variables in new research should first review what had been done successfully in the past (Pallant, 2010; Weisburd & Britt, 2010). As a

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<sup>17</sup> Approximately 87% of my sample had a minimum of a high school diploma (see p. 74 of this project).

result, the development of the survey instrument (shown in Appendix A) was based on prior research.

The items intended to measure legitimacy of the U.S. police, legitimacy of the Ghana police, willingness to cooperate with police, distributive justice and procedural justice were adapted from Tankebe (2009), and Reisig et al. (2007). All are methodologically refined versions of scales used by Tyler and colleagues in previous research. Items intended to measure risk of sanctioning and performance in fighting crime were taken from Sunshine and Tyler (2003). In addition, the survey instrument included items measuring demographic characteristics (e.g., age, sex, income, and educational status) that are commonly used as control variables to test the process-based model of policing in criminal justice research (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004).

**Legitimacy:** Based on prior research by Tankebe (2009), who refined Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) scales, I included items to measure *obligation to obey* the directives of the police and *trust* in the institution of policing. I asked respondents to indicate their agreement to eight items on a four-point Likert-type scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly agree.<sup>18</sup> Items were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *obligation to obey* and *trust*. The survey questions, taken from Tankebe (2009), are:

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<sup>18</sup> There is a debate about whether a fifth category – “neither agree nor disagree” – is appropriate for improving the balance of the scale. Dillman (2000) argued that it is essential, but most of the research studies in this area have not included this category (Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2013), perhaps to avoid having respondents select a category that provides no opinions. Thus, to make my research comparable to others, I used the four-point Likert-type scale.

**Obligation:**

In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (1) You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong.
- (2) You should do what the police tell you to do even if you don't understand why the order was given.
- (3) You should do what the police tell you to do even if you disagree with the police's order.
- (4) You should always do what the police tell you to do even if you don't like the way the police treat you.

**Trust:**

In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (5) The police are trustworthy.
- (6) I have confidence in the police.
- (7) The police are usually honest.
- (8) The police always act within the law.

**Cooperation:**

Five items on the survey were included to measure willingness to cooperate with the police (adapted from Tankebe, 2009). A four-point Likert-type scale – (1) very unlikely, (2) unlikely, (3) likely, and (4) very likely – was employed to measure this variable. The items were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *cooperation*.

In general, how likely are you to:

- (1) Call the police to report a crime in your neighborhood.

- (2) Help the police with information on a suspected criminal.
- (3) Help the police with information to solve a crime.
- (4) Report suspicious activity in your neighborhood to the police.
- (5) Volunteer to attend a community meeting to discuss crime in your neighborhood.

### **Independent Variables:**

#### **Risk of Sanctioning:**

This variable is defined as “the perceived likelihood of being caught and punished for breaking the law” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 544). The following six items, adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003), were used to measure the risk of sanctioning on a four-point Likert-type scale – (1) very unlikely, (2) unlikely, (3) likely, and (4) very likely.

The items were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *risk*.

In general, do you think it is likely or unlikely that you would be caught and punished if you:

- (1) Parked your car illegally.
- (2) Disposed of trash illegally.
- (3) Made noise at night.
- (4) Sped or broke traffic laws.
- (5) Purchased stolen items on the street.
- (6) Used drugs such as marijuana and cocaine in public places.

#### **Performance in Fighting Crime:**

Performance by the police in fighting crime was measured using a four-point Likert-

type scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly agree. The items were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *performance*<sup>19</sup>. In general, do you agree or disagree that the police are effective at:

- (1) Controlling gang violence.
- (2) Controlling drugs.
- (3) Controlling gun violence.
- (4) Controlling burglary.
- (5) Responding quickly to calls for assistance from victims of crime.
- (6) Assisting victims of crime.

**Distributive Justice:**

This variable, defined as the fair distribution of police services among all members of the community (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), was measured using a four-point Likert-type scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly agree. The items, adapted from Reisig et al. (2007), were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *distributive justice*.

In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (1) The police provide the same quality of service to all people.
- (2) The police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people.
- (3) The police make sure people receive outcomes they deserve under the law.
- (4) The police give minorities less help because of their race (reverse scored).
- (5) The police provide better services to wealthier citizens (reverse scored).

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<sup>19</sup> The items were adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003), but I used a different type of Likert scale to measure this variable.

**Procedural Justice:**

Based on prior research (Reisig et al., 2007), I included eight items in the questionnaire to measure the two key components of procedural justice: Quality of Treatment (4 questions) and Quality of Decision Making (4 questions). I used the following four-point Likert-type scale – (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly agree – to measure this variable. The items were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *quality of treatment* and *quality of decision making*.

**Quality of Treatment:**

In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (1) The police treat people with respect.
- (2) The police treat people fairly.
- (3) The police respect people's rights.
- (4) The police are courteous to people they come into contact with.

**Quality of Decision Making:**

In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (5) The police make decisions based upon facts.
- (6) The police explain their decisions to the people they deal with.
- (7) The police make decisions based on their own personal opinions (reverse scored).
- (8) The police consider the views of the people involved before making their decisions.

**Legitimacy Ghana:**

Four items, adapted from Tankebe (2009), were intended to measure perceptions of the legitimacy of the police in Ghana, and mirror those used to measure the legitimacy of the

U.S. police above. This four-item variable was measured using a four-point Likert-type scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, and (4) strongly agree. The items were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *legitimacy Ghana*.

In general do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- (1) The Ghana police are trustworthy.
- (2) I have confidence in the Ghana police.
- (3) The Ghana police are usually honest.
- (4) The Ghana police always act within the law.

### **Control Variables:**

Past studies have shown that demographic factors are important to the study of perceptions of the police (Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Miller, 2006a, 2006b, Gau et al., 2012; Scaglione & Condon, 1980; Triplett, Sun, & Gainey, 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). For example, Reisig et al. (2007) argued that they included control variables in their study to “guard against potential spuriousness” (p. 1013). As a result, the questionnaire included several items to measure key control variables, including:

- (1) **Age in Years:** Age was measured as a continuous variable.
- (2) **Educational Level:** This was an ordinal measure: (1) Less than high school diploma, (2) High school diploma/equivalency, (3) Associate’s degree, (4) Bachelor’s degree, (5) Postgraduate or professional degree.
- (3) **Gender:** This was a dummy variable: Females = 0, Males = 1.
- (4) **Income:** This was an ordinal measure, adapted from Tyler and Wakslak (2004): (1)

Less than \$20,000, (2) \$20,000 – \$29,999, (3) \$30,000 – \$39,999, (4) \$40,000 – \$49,999, (5) \$50,000 – \$74,999, (6) \$75,000 – \$99,999, and (7) \$100,000 or higher.

**(5) Homeownership:** This was a dummy variable: Renter = 0, Homeowner = 1.

**(6) Intergenerational status:** This was a dummy variable: Born in Ghana to at least one Ghanaian parent = 0; Born in the United States to at least one Ghanaian parent/ Born elsewhere to at least one Ghanaian parent but you now live in the United States = 1.

**(7) Length of residence in the United States:** Length of stay in the United States was measured as a continuous variable. This variable captured the variability in Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police based on length of stay in the United States.

I pre-tested the survey questions at a predominantly Ghanaian church based in Fairfax Station, Virginia. None of the ten members who took the survey reported any problems with the structure, length, and wording of the questionnaire, which allowed me to proceed with data collection a week later.

### **Survey Administration and Respondent Characteristics**

The process of survey delivery began on January 19, 2014 and ended on February 16, 2014. Eligible respondents were given the survey questionnaire (see Appendix A) at the end of church service; they required 10 to 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Each participant received \$3.00 in cash for participating in the survey.

While I did not test ethnic group differences in Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police, due to the relatively small sample size, I expected to build trust with the respondents because I speak the languages of two of the largest ethnic groups in the

country: the Akan and the Ewe.<sup>20</sup> Building trust, I now believe, increased the percentage of Ghanaians who responded to the survey questionnaire. I did not collect names, addresses, and phone numbers of respondents, which also helped to increase trust between both parties and to assure the participants that their responses will not be traced back to them. This approach very likely increased the number of respondents who completed the survey.

Research has shown that engaging survey respondents in conversation before an in-person delivery and gathering of completed questionnaires elicits response rates as high as 75% (Dillman, 2000), whereas in-person delivery without any prior explanations from the researcher only averages a 38% response rate (Dillman, Dolsen, & Machlis, 1995). Research has also shown that when an individual agrees to perform a small task (foot-in-the-door), he or she is likely to agree to perform a greater, more demanding assignment at a later time (DeJong, 1979; Dillman, 2000; Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Reingen & Kernan, 1977). In other words, explaining to my participants beforehand the importance of the survey and getting their assent to complete it may have led to a higher rate of completion. Getting the respondents to complete the surveys on the spot, rather than my receiving them by mail, also eliminated the likelihood of responses not getting mailed at all, or responses getting lost in the mail. Dillman (2000) recommends the use of a prepared introductory speech to ensure uniformity in message delivery at all locations: “The purpose of a prepared rather than extemporaneous introduction is to keep the questionnaire completion environment the same for all groups” (p. 254). I therefore

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<sup>20</sup> The Akans are the predominant ethnic group in Ghana (47.5%), followed by the Mole Dagbani (16.6%), the Ewe (13.9%), the Ga-Dangme (7.4%), and the Mande (1.1%) (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012, p. 19).

began the surveys with the same introductory speech (Dillman, 2000) at many of the churches before distributing the survey questionnaire to eligible research participants.

Table 1 below shows a summary of the data that I collected at the eight predominantly Ghanaian churches that participated in my survey. A total of 304 respondents completed the survey.

**Table 1**

<b>Name of Church</b>	<b>Data Collection Date</b>	<b>Data Collection Time</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
Church A <sup>21</sup>	1/19/2014	12:30 p.m.	66
Church B	1/19/2014	3:00 p.m.	13
Church C	1/25/2014	1:00 p.m.	66
Church D	1/26/2014	10:00 a.m.	27
Church E	1/26/2014	1:00 p.m.	8
Church F	2/2/2014	10:00 a.m.	15
Church G	2/9/2014	10:00 a.m.	60
Church H	2/16/2014	12:00 p.m.	49
<b>Total Number of Respondents</b>			<b>304</b>

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<sup>21</sup> The number of respondents from each church is a reflection of that church's size. For example, I obtained a 100% response rate at Church B, as there were only 13 adults in the congregation.

The sample<sup>22</sup> included 54% (n = 155) women and 46% (n = 132) men, aged 18 to 69 years (mean = 40.26, standard deviation = 13.35). Respondents' annual household incomes varied considerably, with the majority (82%; n = 214) reporting incomes less than \$50,000. Below is a breakdown of the participants' annual household incomes: Less than \$20,000 (27.2%; n = 71), \$20,000 to \$29,999 (19.2%; n = 50), \$30,000 to \$39,999 (21.1%; n = 55), \$40,000 to \$49,999 (14.6%; n = 38), \$50,000 to \$74,999 (13%; n = 34), \$75,000 to \$99,999 (2.3%; n = 6), and \$100,000 or higher (2.7%; n = 7). Of the participants, 77% were renters (n = 208) and 23% were homeowners (n = 63). As for educational attainment, 13.1% (n = 36) had less than a high school diploma, 35.6% (n = 98) had a high school diploma/equivalency, 22.9% (n = 63) had an associate's degree, 17.5% (n = 48) had a bachelor's degree, and 10.9% (n = 30) had a postgraduate or professional degree. 95% (n = 264) of the participants were born in Ghana to at least one Ghanaian parent, 2.9% (n = 8) were born in the United States to at least one Ghanaian parent, and 2.2% (n = 6) were born elsewhere (not in the United States or Ghana) to at least one Ghanaian parent. Finally, the survey participants had lived in the United States between 1 and 44 years, with slightly more than 50% of this number having lived in the United States for 10 years or fewer.

### **Focus Group Administration and Respondent Characteristics**

I conducted focus groups to evaluate the cognate concepts of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with police among the *same* church-going Ghanaian immigrants I surveyed weeks earlier for several reasons. First, my face was already

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<sup>22</sup> 17 respondents did not identify their gender on the survey instrument.

familiar to these participants, so they were more likely to freely express their true perceptions of the police, without fear of betrayal or reprisal. Second, I was convinced that the focus group studies would help to garner additional, enriching information that my surveys, which I had carried out weeks earlier, had not provided because the surveys were closed-ended. For example, I expected the focus group participants to share their views of the police in a way that a closed-ended survey would not be able to provide. Third, the focus groups allowed the participants and me to hear, in the participants' own voices, the assessments of and responses to the questions I asked, which some qualitative researchers consider essential in this line of research (Mishler, 1986).

The interview protocol for the focus groups is in Appendix B. Questions in the focus group mirrored those on the survey and focused on questions related to police effectiveness, cooperation with the police, trust in the U.S. police, trust in the Ghana police, police distributive justice, obligation to obey the police, comparative assessment of policing in the United States and Ghana, and procedural justice policing.

Because Asbury<sup>23</sup> (1995) recommended that focus group participants possess a common background that is crucial for research success as well as "be of similar cultural experience" (p. 416), I interviewed between four and ten members at one time at two of the eight churches that had participated in my survey earlier. I recorded both sessions with a voice recorder, which allowed me to actively participate in the interview process. Using a recorder also meant that I did not have to pause to take lengthy notes, which would have affected my ability to both connect properly with the study participants and

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<sup>23</sup> According to Asbury (1995), culture in this context goes beyond race/ethnicity to include age, gender, and socioeconomic status, among other factors.

observe fully their body language and facial cues. To add to the wealth of information that I had stored on the voice recorder from the focus groups, I also made some notes, which helped in my recalling incisive and atypical comments that some of the participants had made. Finally, I transcribed all of the focus group discussions to help in identifying patterns in the responses, and to provide accurate assessments of the statements made by the participants.

A total of 13 respondents participated in two focus groups. The first focus group study took place at Church D on April 13, 2014, and the second study took place at Church G on April 19, 2014. There were 9 participants (5 men and 4 women) in the first study, and 4 participants (1 man and 3 women) in the second study. 12 of the 13 participants were born in Ghana, and only 1 participant was born in the United States; this breakdown is similar to the findings from my survey research. The participants ranged in age from 21 to 50 years; their length of stay in the U.S.A. ranged from 3 to 20 years; all are renters; their levels of education ranged from high school diploma to postgraduate degree; and their incomes ranged from \$20,000 to \$100,000. The actual first names of the participants in the first study are: Roland, Michelle, Kofi, Kenneth, John, Lydia, Efua<sup>24</sup>, Atta, and Adjoa; and the actual first names of the participants in the second study are: Annabelle, Tina, Mary, and Isaac.

## **Analysis Plan**

### **Operationalization of the Variables:**

Given the theoretical and methodological challenges to the Tylerian model of

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<sup>24</sup> Efua and Adjoa are traditional names for females; Atta and Kofi are traditional names for males.

legitimacy, the first step in my analysis was to examine the measurement properties of my variables by conducting an exploratory factor analysis.

### **Exploratory Factor Analysis**

Many authors use interchangeably the terms “factor analysis” (FA) and “principal components analysis” (PCA), as both “produce a smaller number of linear combinations of the original variables in a way that captures (or accounts for) most of the variability in the pattern of correlations” (Pallant, 2010, pp. 181, 182). There are differences between FA and PCA, however. For example, while FA employs mathematical models to estimate factors in which only the shared variance is analyzed, PCA transforms the original variables into a smaller set of variables in which all of the variance in the variables is analyzed (Pallant, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

Although FA and PCA produce results that are similar (Pallant, 2010), Stevens (1996) argued that PCA is a better choice for analyzing and producing a smaller number of variables because it is “psychometrically sound and simpler mathematically, and it avoids some of the potential problems with ‘factor indeterminacy’ associated with factor analysis” (Pallant, 2010, p. 182). Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999) argued, however, that the issue of factor indeterminacy should be irrelevant when it comes to the use of exploratory factor analysis (EFA), because “the objective is to identify common factors that account for the structure of the correlations among the measured variables. This goal does not require the computation of factor scores but rather only factor loadings and factor intercorrelations” (p. 276).

Proponents of common factor analysis argue that it is superior to PCA if the goal

is to identify latent constructs (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Fabrigar et al. (1999) added that “most measures used in psychological research contain some random error. Because EFA procedures reflect a recognition of this fact, whereas PCA does not, the common factor model is the more realistic model of the structure or correlations” (p. 276; see also Bentler & Kano, 1990). Moreover, the common factor model is testable, whereas the PCA model is not (Bentler & Kano, 1990; Fabrigar et al., 1999). Finally, the common factor model involves specific hypotheses about the data, whereas PCA does not involve specific hypotheses, which means that the former “can be fit to the data and the model rejected if the fit is poor” (Fabrigar et al., 1999, p. 276). The conceptual differences between common factor analysis and principal components analysis must therefore not be overlooked, even if both methods produce results that are similar (Fabrigar et al., 1999).

As suggested by a number of researchers, EFA is better than PCA if “the goal of the analysis is to identify latent constructs underlying measured variables” (Fabrigar et al., 1999, p. 276; see also Gorsuch, 1983; McDonald, 1985). I therefore used EFA to analyze my quantitative data in this dissertation project. Specifically, I used Principal Axis Factoring (PAF), a type of exploratory factor analysis (EFA), to analyze my data. According to Fabrigar et al. (1999):

The primary purpose of EFA is to arrive at a more parsimonious conceptual understanding of a set of measured variables by determining the number and nature of common factors needed to account for the pattern of correlations among the measured variables. That is, EFA is used when a researcher wishes to identify a set of latent constructs underlying a battery of measured variables. (pp. 274, 275)

Because my scales have ordered values, PAF was appropriate for assessing the observed correlations among the variables (Norusis, 2012). Norusis (2012) noted that PAF “is very similar to principal components analysis, except that the diagonals of the correlation matrix are replaced by estimates of the communalities, unlike in principal components where the initial communalities are all 1” (p. 418). Thus in PAF, squared multiple correlation coefficients become the initial estimates of the communalities, and based on this information, the correct number of factors are extracted (Norusis, 2010). A reestimation of the communalities from the factor loadings then takes place, and factors are again extracted with the new communality estimates replacing the old estimates, until changes in the communality estimates become negligible (Norusis, 2010).

I had initially intended to use Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) scales in measuring the concepts of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police. However, because Gau (2011), Reisig et al. (2007), and Tankebe (2009, 2013) have argued that obligation to obey should not be measured as a subconstruct of legitimacy, I decided on Tankebe’s (2009) legitimacy scale. While the Tankebe (2009) legitimacy scale<sup>25</sup> still contains the two subconstructs of trust and obligation to obey, not unlike Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) legitimacy model, I prefer the former’s legitimacy scale because it is more refined through the use of PCA, even if PCA is not the optimal methodology for scale refinement. According to Tankebe (2009), “[PCA] was employed to determine whether all items adapted from the Sunshine and Tyler study would load on the same scale in Ghana. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was

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<sup>25</sup> Tankebe (2009) excluded Sunshine & Tyler’s (2003) third legitimacy measure, cynicism toward the law, in his analysis because this measure had a low reliability score of .46.

.806, which confirms the appropriateness of the data for [PCA]” (p. 1274; see also Hutcheson & Sofronniou, 1999).

Reisig et al. (2007) also found that the composite measure of legitimacy (trust and obligation to obey) had a statistically significant effect on cooperation in their regression analyses. When the *legitimacy* scale was disaggregated into the subscales of *trust* and *obligation to obey*, however, only the former predicted cooperation with the police; the latter had no statistically significant effect on cooperation with the police. I also used Reisig et al.’s (2007) scales for *distributive justice* and *procedural justice* in my dissertation project, as the researchers have refined these scales too with factor-analytic techniques. To complete my models, I used Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) scales of *risk* and *performance*, as well as Tankebe’s (2009) *cooperation* and *legitimacy Ghana* scales. In spite of the fact that some of these scales have been refined using factor-analytic techniques, I used PAF to test all of my scales to determine if additional refinements were needed.

For any statistical analysis involving the use of EFA, the larger the sample, the better will be the results obtained (Comrey & Lee, 1992; Norusis, 2012; Pallant, 2010); a sample size of at least 150 should be sufficient for factor analysis provided that solutions have several high loading marker variables that are 0.80 or greater (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Gorsuch (1983) suggested that a sample size of 100 should be sufficient for EFA. Comrey and Lee (1992), being more specific, suggested that a sample of 100 will be considered poor, 200 will be considered fair, 300 will be considered good, 500 will be considered very good, and 1,000-plus will be considered excellent. Other scholars have

suggested that, while sample size is important, the ratio of respondents to items in the scale is perhaps more important (Nunnally, 1978; Pallant, 2010). Nunnally (1978) has recommended a ratio of 10 to 1 – “that is, ten cases for each item to be factor analysed” (Pallant, 2010, p. 183). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) have recommended even a smaller ratio: just five cases for each item being measured will be sufficient for PAF.

For EFA to succeed, the strength of the inter-item correlations should be determined (Pallant, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). If too few correlations above 0.3 are discovered, then EFA may not be ideal for analyzing the data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). For further assessment of the factorability of the data, I evaluated the Bartlett’s test of sphericity measure (Bartlett, 1954) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sampling-adequacy measure (Kaiser, 1970, 1974). EFA is appropriate if Bartlett’s test of sphericity measure is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ), and the KMO value is 0.6 or higher (range: 0 – 1) (Pallant, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).

My use of PAF helped to determine which items were most appropriate to serve as indicators of latent variables measuring the following concepts: legitimacy of U.S. police, cooperation, risk, performance, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimacy of Ghana police (Fabrigar et al., 1999). In doing so, I relied on three techniques – Kaiser’s criterion, scree test, and parallel analysis – to determine the appropriate number of factors for each scale (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Pallant, 2010). Kaiser’s criterion, “aptly named the eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion, suggests that only factors that account for variances greater than 1 should be included” (Norusis, 2012, p. 416). The Cattell’s scree test (Cattell, 1966) shows graphically the eigenvalues of the

factors, and all factors above the break (or elbow) in the graph are the ones contributing the most to the variance in the dataset (Pallant, 2010). Horn's parallel analysis (Horn, 1965), which is becoming widely used in the social sciences (Choi, Fuqua, & Griffin, 2001; Stober, 1998), entails the comparison of eigenvalue sizes with those obtained from a random dataset<sup>26</sup> of the same size, with only values that exceed the corresponding eigenvalues in the random dataset retained for analysis (Pallant, 2010). Some scholars have even argued that Horn's parallel analysis provides greater accuracy than either a scree test or Kaiser's criterion (Hubbard & Allen, 1987; Zwick & Velicer, 1986). For example, Matsunaga (2010) argued, "[R]esearchers running an EFA should utilize parallel analysis" (p. 107).

After determining the number of items ideal for my legitimacy of U.S. police, cooperation, risk, performance, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimacy of Ghana police scales, I rotated the factors, using the Direct Oblimin approach, which is an oblique-rotation technique (Pallant, 2010). Matsunaga (2010) noted that the "orthogonal-versus-oblique" debate (Comrey & Lee, 1992; Fabrigar et al., 1999) remains unresolved among scholars, but he contended that oblique rotations are more appropriate for EFA for at least two reasons. First, almost all phenomena in social science research are related to one another, so "imposing an orthogonal factor solution is likely to result in biasing the reality" (Matsunaga, 2010, p. 107). Second, if the factors are unrelated, EFA using oblique rotation will help reveal the problem. Rotation "does not change the underlying

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<sup>26</sup> This procedure involved the use of a list of eigenvalues provided in the **Total Variance Explained** table and information from the statistical program, MonteCarloPA.exe (Marley Watkins, 2000). This program generated 100 sets of random data of the same size as my real data. It then calculated the average eigenvalues for these 100 randomly generated samples for direct comparison with my own data. Any value from my own data greater than the criterion value from parallel analysis was retained, and vice versa.

solution – rather, it presents the pattern of loadings in a manner that is easier to interpret” (Pallant, 2010, p. 184). Once the rotations were completed, I found a “simple structure” (Norusis, 2012; Thurstone, 1947), which showed how strongly each variable loaded on a single factor, with each factor representing several strongly loading variables (Pallant, 2010).

### **Assumptions<sup>27</sup> for Factor Analysis:**

- 1. *Sample Size:*** A minimum of 150 respondents is considered appropriate for factor analysis to proceed.
- 2. *Factorability of the Correlation Matrix:*** The correlation matrix should show values of 0.3 or greater. Bartlett’s sphericity measure should be statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). Also, the KMO value must be at least 0.6 (range: 0 – 1).
- 3. *Linearity:*** Because factor-analytic procedures are based on correlation, it is assumed that the relationship between variables is linear. A KMO value closer to 1 means that the partial correlation coefficients are small, compared to the ordinary correlation coefficients, which indicates that the variables are linearly related (Norusis, 2012).
- 4. *Outliers:*** Factor-analytic procedures are susceptible to the presence of outliers.

### **Appropriateness of Use of Principal Axis Factoring**

First, Fabrigar et al. (1999) have argued that exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is a better statistical method than PCA “when a researcher wishes to identify a set of latent constructs underlying a battery of measured variables” (p. 275). Because my dissertation evaluated latent constructs, I argue that PAF was a more appropriate method than PCA

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<sup>27</sup> These assumptions for factor analysis were taken from Pallant (2010).

for my study. Fabrigar et al. (1999) added, “If the goal is to arrive at a parsimonious representation of the associations among measured variables, EFA can be an appropriate form of analysis. If the goal is data reduction, principal components analysis (PCA) is more appropriate” (p. 275).

Second, in spite of Fabrigar et al.’s (1999) preference for EFA over PCA, they acknowledged that “some methodologists have argued that PCA is a reasonable substitute for analyses of common factors and might even be superior” (p. 275; see also Velicer & Jackson, 1990a, 1990b). In fact, several methodologists have argued that PCA and EFA produce results that are very similar (Pallant, 2010; Velicer, 1977; Velicer & Jackson, 1990a; Velicer, Peacock, & Jackson, 1982). While PCA and EFA may produce similar results, the results will differ in some contexts (Bentler & Kano, 1990; Gorsuch, 1988, 1990; Fabrigar et al., 1999; Widaman, 1990, 1993). As Fabrigar et al. (1999) have argued, differences in results from PCA and EFA are likely to occur “when communalities are low (e.g., .40) and there are a modest number of measured variables (e.g., three) per factor” (p. 276; see also Widaman, 1993). In general, communalities of .70 or higher would lead to “accurate population parameters [even] with samples as small as 100” (Fabrigar et al., 1999, p. 274).

Third, Fabrigar et al. (1999) performed a systematic review of articles published from 1991 to 1995 in the two foremost journals in psychology: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* and *Journal of Applied Psychology*. Fabrigar et al. (1999) selected these journals for two reasons: (1) they represent two areas of psychology (personality-social psychology and industrial-organizational psychology, respectively) in which EFA

has been widely used, and (2) they are the most notable journals in their respective fields, which means that one would expect articles found in these publications to have met the basic standards of methodological rigor. Notably, some of these articles used EFA for analysis, but the majority of the articles used PCA. Fabrigar et al. (1999) observed:

Approximately half of the published applications reported using the PCA method. This method was used despite the fact that in the vast majority of these articles, the primary goal was to identify latent constructs underlying measured variables rather than data reduction per se. In contrast, only about 20% of analyses used some form of EFA (with some type of principal factors analysis accounting for three out of every four articles using factor analysis). (p. 292)

Fabrigar et al. (1999) argued, however, that the prevalence of PCA in the extant literature is not a justification for its continued misuse as a factor-analytic technique. Fabrigar et al. (1999) offered three reasons for the limited use of factor analysis in the extant literature. First, some scholars find the methodology behind EFA complicated, so they avoid it altogether. Second, conducting analyses according to tradition has been a bane of methodological rigor in the social sciences. Fabrigar et al. (1999) noted that some scholars conduct analyses in a manner that is similar to what had been done in the past because: (a) they want to produce comparable results, (b) they assume that just because so many others have used a particular method means that it is correct, and (c) they want to avoid problems in the peer review process. Finally, the major statistical programs in use today may not all have the procedures needed to conduct research, which limits a researcher's knowledge base and restricts him or her to the use of procedures that may not be suitable for certain analytic techniques.

Overall, Matsunaga (2010) argued that PCA should not be used as a substitute for EFA. For example, PCA is “designed to summarize the observed data with as little a loss of information as possible, not to identify unobservable latent factors underlying the variations and covariances of the variables” (p. 107; see also Kim & Mueller, 1978).

### **Multivariate Regression Models**

Model 1 (see Figure 1) examined respondent judgments and how these affect police legitimacy. Specifically, I employed regression analyses using the following variables: procedural justice, legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, distributive justice, as well as respondent demographics to predict police legitimacy. In other words, I evaluated the relative effects of procedural justice and legitimacy Ghana (normative models) and risk, performance, and distributive fairness (instrumental models) on the legitimacy of the U.S. police. The control variables included in this model are age, educational level, sex, income, homeownership, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States.

Model 2 (see Figure 2) examined respondent judgments and how these affect cooperation with the U.S. police. Specifically, I employed regression analyses using the following variables: legitimacy, legitimacy Ghana, risk, performance, distributive justice, as well as respondent demographics to predict cooperation with the police. In other words, I evaluated the relative effects of legitimacy and legitimacy Ghana (normative models) and risk, performance, and distributive fairness (instrumental models) on cooperation with the police. The control variables included in this model are age,

educational level, sex, income, homeownership, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States.

I had intended, but was unable, to test the separate impacts of the subconstructs of legitimacy (trust and obligation to obey) on cooperation with the police, due to the results of the exploratory factor analysis that I performed (see the *Results* section of this dissertation). (For differing arguments on what subconstructs constitute legitimacy in criminological research, see Gau, 2011; Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013.)

I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to test both models, because each dependent variable is continuous and at least one independent variable is also continuous in either model (Pallant, 2010; Weisburd & Britt, 2010). The use of regression analyses to test both models accomplished two things: (1) to help determine the relative influence that each independent variable has on the dependent variable, and (2) to help reach the conclusion that the influence of any one independent variable is independent of the influence of the other independent variables in the equation (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). I also tested the effects of the control variables in my models, as noted in the research hypotheses.

Assumptions for successful OLS regression include an adequate sample size, and the absence of multicollinearity and outliers. Additionally, I checked the data for normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals; all the assumptions were met when I factor-analyzed my variables. To answer the second and third research questions, I introduced the control variables – age, education, sex, home ownership,

income, generational differences, and length of stay in the U.S. – after which I employed hierarchical multiple regression. This process requires that the dependent variable (legitimacy of U.S. police in Model 1 and cooperation in Model 2) be moved into the regression model, followed by the control variables, and then the independent variables (Pallant, 2010). In addition to results from the regression analyses, I also used independent-samples t-tests and analysis-of-variance tests to examine several hypotheses in the current study, after converting age (measured as a continuous variable in the regression models) into three groups and collapsing income from seven to five groups.

### **Independent-Samples T-Test for Measuring Group Differences**

I employed independent-samples t-tests to test group differences, and thus tested some of the hypotheses. I used independent-samples t-test to test  $H_4$  (female Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to male Ghanaian immigrants),  $H_5$  (Ghanaian homeowners are more likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to Ghanaian renters), and  $H_7$  (first-generation Ghanaians are less likely to view the police as legitimate compared to second-generation Ghanaians). For all three hypotheses, the continuous, dependent variable is legitimacy. I used the same procedure to test  $H_{14}$  (female Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to cooperate with the police compared to male Ghanaian immigrants),  $H_{15}$  (Ghanaian homeowners are more likely than Ghanaian renters to cooperate with the police), and  $H_{17}$  (first-generation Ghanaian immigrants are less likely than their second-generation counterparts to cooperate with the police). For the latter three hypotheses, the continuous, dependent variable is cooperation.

### **One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for Measuring Group Differences**

“One-way between-groups ANOVA is used when you have one independent (grouping) variable with three or more levels (groups) and one dependent continuous variable” (Pallant, 2010, p. 250). I employed ANOVA to test H<sub>2</sub> (older Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to younger Ghanaian immigrants), H<sub>3</sub> (better-educated Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to their less educated counterparts), and H<sub>6</sub> (the higher a Ghanaian immigrant’s income, the less likely that he or she will view the police as legitimate). The dependent variable for all three hypotheses is legitimacy. I also employed ANOVA to test H<sub>12</sub> (older Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than younger Ghanaian immigrants to cooperate with the police), H<sub>13</sub> (better-educated Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than their less educated counterparts to cooperate with the police), and H<sub>16</sub> (the higher a Ghanaian immigrant’s income, the greater the likelihood that he or she will cooperate with the police). The dependent variable for the latter three hypotheses is cooperation.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS**

I begin by examining descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis, and then turn to exploratory factor analysis to refine my measures and answer Research Question 1. Next, I conduct multivariate analyses to understand the factors that influence perceptions of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with police (Research Questions 2 and 3). Finally, I describe some of the key findings from my qualitative focus groups.

Descriptive statistics for the items measuring cooperation, risk of sanctioning, performance (effectiveness), legitimacy of U.S. police (trust and obligation to obey), distributive justice, procedural justice (quality of treatment and quality of decision-making), and legitimacy of Ghana police are shown in Table 2. As indicated by the mean values, respondents in this sample, for example, reported a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. police, but they had little trust in the legitimacy of the Ghana police.

**Table 2**

<b>Items</b>	<b>Responses</b>	<b>Range</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>SD</b>
<b><i>Cooperation</i></b>				
Call the police to report a crime in your neighborhood.	287	1 – 4	3.29	.812
Help the police with information on a suspected criminal.	280	1 – 4	3.26	.795
Help the police with information to solve a crime.	279	1 – 4	3.29	.789
Report suspicious activity in your neighborhood to police.	278	1 – 4	3.32	.808
Volunteer to attend a community meeting to discuss crime.	280	1 – 4	3.03	.822
<b><i>Risk of Sanctioning</i></b>				
If I park my car illegally, I expect to get caught and punished.	285	1 – 4	3.04	.926
If I illegally dispose of trash, I expect to get caught and punished.	281	1 – 4	2.86	.976
If I make noise at night, I expect to get caught and punished.	282	1 – 4	2.83	.932
If I speed or break traffic laws, I expect to get caught and punished.	280	1 – 4	3.16	.941
If I purchase stolen items on the street, I expect to get caught and punished.	279	1 – 4	2.92	1.095
If I use drugs such as marijuana and cocaine, I expect to get caught and punished.	281	1 – 4	3.10	1.153
<b><i>Performance</i></b>				
The police are effective at controlling gang violence.	284	1 – 4	3.15	.784
The police are effective at controlling drugs.	282	1 – 4	3.02	.789
The police are effective at controlling gun violence.	280	1 – 4	2.99	.844
The police are effective at controlling burglary.	274	1 – 4	3.07	.807
The police are effective at responding to calls for assistance from victims of crime.	282	1 – 4	3.20	.788
The police are effective at assisting victims of crime.	282	1 – 4	3.10	.762
<b><i>Legitimacy (Trust)</i></b>				
The police are trustworthy.	292	1 – 4	2.78	.822
I have confidence in the police.	286	1 – 4	2.74	.818
The police are usually honest.	281	1 – 4	2.51	.802
The police always act within the law.	284	1 – 4	2.61	.828
<b><i>Legitimacy (Obligation)</i></b>				
You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong.	288	1 – 4	2.18	.946
You should do what the police tell you to do even if you don't understand why the order was given.	286	1 – 4	2.33	.986
You should do what the police tell you to do even if you disagree with the police's order.	287	1 – 4	2.40	.977
You should always do what the police tell you to do even if you don't like the way the police treat you.	287	1 – 4	2.43	.947

**Table 2 Continued**

Items	Responses	Range	M	SD
<b><i>Distributive Justice</i></b>				
The police provide the same quality of service to all people.	290	1 – 4	2.28	.968
The police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people.	294	1 – 4	2.50	.873
The police make sure people receive outcomes they deserve under the law.	282	1 – 4	2.71	.797
The police give minorities less help because of their race. <sup>28</sup>	287	1 – 4	2.14	.981
The police provide better services to wealthier citizens. <sup>29</sup>	289	1 – 4	2.08	.934
<b><i>Procedural Justice (Quality of Treatment)</i></b>				
The police treat people with respect.	294	1 – 4	2.70	.793
The police treat people fairly.	289	1 – 4	2.46	.873
The police respect people's rights.	286	1 – 4	2.75	.816
The police are courteous to people they come into contact with.	286	1 – 4	2.87	.773
<b><i>Procedural Justice (Quality of Decision Making)</i></b>				
The police make decisions based upon facts.	291	1 – 4	2.82	.770
The police explain their decisions to the people they deal with.	284	1 – 4	2.82	.742
The police make decisions based on their own personal opinions. <sup>30</sup>	290	1 – 4	2.35	.860
The police consider the views of the people involved before making their decisions.	287	1 – 4	2.63	.863
<b><i>Legitimacy of Ghana Police</i></b>				
The Ghana police are trustworthy.	285	1 – 4	1.90	.896
I have confidence in the Ghana police.	280	1 – 4	1.99	.948
The Ghana police are usually honest.	280	1 – 4	1.87	.872
The Ghana police always act within the law.	282	1 – 4	1.92	.905

The response set for the cooperation and risk of sanctioning items (see Table 2) ranged from 1 = *very unlikely* to 4 = *very likely*. The scales were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *cooperation* and *risk of sanctioning*. In addition, the

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<sup>28</sup> Reverse coded.

<sup>29</sup> Reverse coded.

<sup>30</sup> Reverse coded.

response set for the performance, legitimacy, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimacy Ghana items ranged from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 4 = *strongly agree*. The scales were coded so that higher scores reflected higher levels of *performance, legitimacy of U.S. police, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimacy of Ghana police*.

### **Research Question 1:**

*Are the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy applicable in the Ghanaian immigrant community?*

In order to test the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures used in this study, I began by constructing additive scales of the nine concepts outlined in Table 2, which are mostly based on Tyler's model and conceptualization. Cronbach's Alpha for *cooperation* is .871, and that for *risk* is .934. Also, Cronbach's Alpha values for *performance, trust, obligation, and distributive justice* are .919, .842, .877, and .616, respectively. Finally, Cronbach's Alpha for *procedural justice* is .835, and that for *legitimacy Ghana* is .935. As a result, all the scales have very good internal consistency, and hence convergent validity, except for *distributive justice* (alpha = .616).

I next explored the correlations among factors and found a high correlation between two scales, which indicates a lack of discriminant validity. Given these results and reflecting the theoretical and measurement debates in the field about the conceptualization and measurement of legitimacy, I next conducted an exploratory factor analysis. Because my first research question addresses concerns about the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy in the Ghanaian immigrant community (that is, whether *trust* and *obligation to obey* are both

subconstructs of the legitimacy variable), I included the two legitimacy subconstructs as separate variables in the correlation matrix.

Table 3 shows a very high correlation (.879) between the trust and procedural justice items, which points to the absence of discriminant validity between the variables. According to Maguire and Johnson (2010), “A typical strategy for dealing with highly correlated factors with poor discriminant validity is to combine them into a single factor” (p. 716) – that is, any two factors with a correlation value greater than .85 (Brown 2006, Gau, 2011). As Gau (2011) has observed, “Discriminant validity is present when the correlations among manifest indicators of a single construct are greater than the correlations between those items and the items representing other latent factors” (p. 491). Generally speaking, a set of variables conceptualized as measuring the same latent factor should hang together as a single unit, but each variable should also be distinguishable from indicators that define other factors (Gau, 2011). To assess scale homogeneity, as a result, I simultaneously factor-analyzed all of the items measuring cooperation, risk of sanctioning, performance, trust, obligation to obey, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimacy Ghana.

**Table 3****Bivariate Correlations of the Original Independent and Dependent Variables**

<b>Scale items</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>
1. Cooperation	1							
2. Risk of Sanctioning	.178	1						
3. Performance	.477	.093	1					
4. Trust	.45	.147	.512	1				
5. Obligation	.14	-.052	.097	.24	1			
6. Distributive justice	-.097	-.026	.087	.079	-.105	1		
7. Legitimacy Ghana	.101	-.013	.076	.174	.082	.093	1	
8. Procedural Justice	.45	.146	.536	.879	.232	.107	.228	1

**Refining the Variables Using Exploratory Factor Analysis**


I used Principal Axis Factoring (with Direct Oblimin rotation) to extract the variables for cooperation, risk of sanctioning, performance, legitimacy (trust and obligation to obey), distributive justice, procedural justice (quality of treatment and quality of decision making), and legitimacy Ghana. From Table 4, and using Kaiser's criterion, only the first eight factors recorded eigenvalues above 1 (11.257, 4.567, 3.387, 2.945, 2.635, 1.999, 1.486, and 1.019), but only the first seven factors are useful for the goals of this dissertation. These seven factors explain a total of 67.33 percent of the variance.

**Table 4**

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Initial Eigenvalues</b>		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Variance</b>	<b>Cumulative %</b>
<b>1</b>	11.257	26.803	26.803
<b>2</b>	4.567	10.875	37.678
<b>3</b>	3.387	8.065	45.743
<b>4</b>	2.945	7.012	52.755
<b>5</b>	2.635	6.273	59.028
<b>6</b>	1.999	4.760	63.788
<b>7</b>	1.486	3.538	67.326

### **Cattell's Scree Test:**

The scree plot (Figure 3) shows that a seven-factor extraction is appropriate for the factor-analyzed variables.



**Figure 3**

### **Horn's Parallel Analysis:**

Parallel analysis is now considered essential for factor analysis (Choi et al., 2001; Matsunaga, 2010; Stober, 1998), as “[r]esearch shows that [parallel analysis] often provides one of the most accurate factor extraction methods” (Matsunaga, 2010, p. 107).

Indeed, “[t]his approach to identifying the correct number of [factors] to retain has been shown to be the most accurate, with both Kaiser’s criterion and Cattell’s scree test tending to overestimate the number of [factors]” (Pallant, 2010, p. 184). The Monte Carlo PCA output (Table 5) shows the number of items for the variables (42), the sample size (304), and the number of iterations performed (100) to generate sets of random data of the same size as my real data file (42 items x 304 cases) (Pallant, 2010). The Monte Carlo PCA then calculated the eigenvalues for these 100 randomly generated samples. Comparing the eigenvalues generated by SPSS with the corresponding values from the Monte Carlo PCA results, only the first seven values in SPSS are greater than their corresponding values in the Monte Carlo PCA data, which justifies the decision to retain only seven factors for analysis.

**Table 5                      Output from Horn’s Parallel Analysis**

<b>Factor Number</b>	<b>Actual Eigenvalue from Factor Analysis</b>	<b>Criterion Value from Parallel Analysis</b>	<b>Decision</b>
<b>1</b>	11.257	1.7902	Accept
<b>2</b>	4.567	1.6986	Accept
<b>3</b>	3.387	1.6323	Accept
<b>4</b>	2.945	1.5744	Accept
<b>5</b>	2.635	1.5239	Accept
<b>6</b>	1.999	1.4766	Accept
<b>7</b>	1.486	1.4305	Accept
<b>8</b>	1.019	1.3903	Reject
<b>9</b>	.894	1.3499	Reject

**Table 6**

**Direct Oblimin-Rotated Matrix for the Factor-Analyzed Variables<sup>31</sup>**

<b>Pattern Matrix<sup>a</sup></b>							
	Factor						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Call the police to report a crime in your neighborhood	.057	.011	-.055	.085	<b>.645</b>	.090	-.007
Help the police with information on a suspected criminal	.075	-.008	-.045	.055	<b>.870</b>	-.048	.011
Help the police with information to solve a crime	.012	.021	.017	-.066	<b>.815</b>	.072	-.019
Report suspicious activity in your neighborhood to the police	.023	.024	.049	-.057	<b>.741</b>	.050	-.021
Volunteer to attend a community meeting to discuss crime in your neighborhood	-.009	.052	.124	.050	<b>.517</b>	.057	-.043
The police are trustworthy	<b>.571</b>	-.065	-.016	.038	.114	.162	-.068
I have confidence in the police	<b>.671</b>	.024	.005	-.005	.087	.104	.064
The police are usually honest	<b>.762</b>	-.010	.079	.087	.096	-.091	-.026
The police always act within the law	<b>.738</b>	.090	.003	.016	-.042	.042	-.002
You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong	.038	-.059	.052	<b>.626</b>	-.003	-.045	.015
You should do what the police tell you to do even if you don't understand why the order was given	-.075	.012	.020	<b>.869</b>	.097	.028	.050
You should do what the police tell you to do even if you disagree with the police's order	.010	.007	-.030	<b>.901</b>	-.040	-.002	-.054
You should always do what the police tell you to do even if you don't like the way the police treat you	.033	.064	-.040	<b>.815</b>	-.049	.021	-.017
The police are effective at controlling gang violence	-.002	-.053	.042	-.029	.044	<b>.813</b>	-.064
The police are effective at controlling drugs	-.127	-.012	.080	.026	.049	<b>.925</b>	-.025
The police are effective at controlling gun violence	.041	-.028	.026	.001	-.059	<b>.852</b>	.016
The police are effective at controlling burglary	.020	.023	-.043	.029	.004	<b>.816</b>	.082
The police are effective at responding quickly to calls for assistance from victims of crime	.139	.073	-.036	-.029	.008	<b>.640</b>	.037
The police are effective at assisting victims of crime	.056	.024	-.065	.004	.048	<b>.633</b>	.039
The police provide the same quality of service to all people	<b>.744</b>	-.063	.007	.012	-.037	-.032	.062
The police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people	<b>.770</b>	-.011	-.010	.002	-.075	.082	-.011
The police make sure people receive outcomes they deserve under the law	<b>.741</b>	.035	-.058	-.032	.088	.043	-.042
The police give minorities less help because of their race	.004	.009	.081	-.057	-.118	-.008	<b>.561</b>
The police provide better services to wealthier citizens	-.015	-.004	-.023	.083	.056	-.003	<b>.737</b>

<sup>31</sup> Both Pattern and structure matrices must be reported for Direct Oblimin rotation. Pattern coefficients greater than an absolute value of .30 are shown in boldface type.

The police treat people with respect	<b>.766</b>	.047	.066	.033	-.025	.001	.055
The police treat people fairly	<b>.779</b>	.054	.078	-.023	-.024	-.017	.012
The police respect people's rights	<b>.698</b>	.000	.008	-.027	.117	-.002	.077
The police are courteous to people they come into contact with	<b>.640</b>	.078	-.006	-.050	.063	.081	-.017
The police make decisions based upon facts	<b>.624</b>	-.011	.039	-.005	.111	.002	.048
The police explain their decisions to the people they deal with	<b>.568</b>	-.082	-.051	.086	.019	.067	.008
The police make decisions based on their own personal opinions	.026	-.008	-.021	-.027	.026	.042	<b>.540</b>
The police consider the views of the people involved before making their decisions	<b>.423</b>	.007	.072	.118	-.039	.114	-.100
You would be caught and punished if you parked your car illegally	.015	<b>.784</b>	-.006	.076	-.095	-.014	.019
You would be caught and punished if you disposed of your trash illegally	-.034	<b>.820</b>	.018	-.034	.027	.076	.066
You would be caught and punished if you made noise at night	.010	<b>.826</b>	.016	.012	.070	-.044	-.062
You would be caught and punished if you sped or broke traffic laws	-.052	<b>.866</b>	-.024	-.007	-.033	.045	-.071
You would be caught and punished if you purchased stolen items on the street	.061	<b>.866</b>	-.005	-.016	.026	.015	.033
You would be caught and punished if you used marijuana and cocaine in public places	.022	<b>.830</b>	-.010	-.033	.050	-.073	.006
The Ghana police are trustworthy	.083	-.020	<b>.822</b>	-.038	.014	-.021	-.004
I have confidence in the Ghana police	-.064	.011	<b>.936</b>	.030	.009	.012	.006
The Ghana police are usually honest	-.009	-.014	<b>.885</b>	.061	-.018	.029	.018
The Ghana police always act within the law	.036	.010	<b>.881</b>	-.042	.001	-.003	-.007

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations.

The Pattern Matrix (Table 6) shows the rotated seven-factor solution. The table shows the item loadings on the seven factors, with 14 items loading above 0.3 on Factor 1, 6 items loading on Factor 2, 4 items loading on Factor 3, 4 items loading on Factor 4, 5 items loading on Factor 5, 6 items loading on Factor 6, and 3 items loading on Factor 7. Factor 1 is the new *legitimacy* variable. Based on conceptualizations of latent constructs from prior research, Factor 2 is *risk*, Factor 3 is *legitimacy Ghana*, Factor 4 is *obligation*

to obey, Factor 5 is *cooperation*, and Factor 6 is *performance*. Factor 7 is *distributive justice*. I justify the renaming of Factors 1 and 7 as legitimacy and distributive justice, respectively, on pages 103 – 105 of this dissertation.

**Table 7**

Structure Matrix							
	Factor						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Call the police to report a crime in your neighborhood	.361	.120	.002	.173	.703	.401	-.082
Help the police with information on a suspected criminal	.389	.127	.035	.163	.872	.374	-.098
Help the police with information to solve a crime	.347	.155	.078	.042	.849	.433	-.099
Report suspicious activity in your neighborhood to the police	.328	.147	.124	.053	.785	.396	-.096
Volunteer to attend a community meeting to discuss crime in your neighborhood	.256	.134	.202	.142	.591	.314	-.107
The police are trustworthy	.689	.029	.096	.214	.388	.479	.001
I have confidence in the police	.768	.118	.137	.169	.370	.479	.147
The police are usually honest	.788	.075	.240	.292	.359	.345	.041
The police always act within the law	.757	.171	.171	.206	.285	.417	.087
You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong	.180	-.087	.125	.638	.062	.038	-.061
You should do what the police tell you to do even if you don't understand why the order was given	.211	-.017	.097	.859	.179	.125	-.079
You should do what the police tell you to do even if you disagree with the police's order	.213	-.034	.041	.899	.068	.064	-.166
You should always do what the police tell you to do even if you don't like the way the police treat you	.230	.030	.038	.816	.077	.099	-.116
The police are effective at controlling gang violence	.417	.026	.077	.068	.399	.816	.017
The police are effective at controlling drugs	.382	.061	.113	.103	.423	.887	.043
The police are effective at controlling gun violence	.457	.042	.083	.091	.332	.849	.110
The police are effective at controlling burglary	.448	.098	.029	.105	.376	.845	.150
The police are effective at responding quickly to calls for assistance from victims of crime	.466	.147	.020	.057	.341	.715	.112
The police are effective at assisting victims of crime	.392	.095	-.016	.073	.342	.683	.093
The police provide the same quality of service to all people	.719	.008	.157	.187	.212	.327	.153
The police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people	.778	.073	.167	.206	.266	.448	.092

The police make sure people receive outcomes they deserve under the law	.775	.141	.106	.173	.396	.455	.035
The police give minorities less help because of their race	.024	-.026	.105	-.137	-.188	-.007	.588
The police provide better services to wealthier citizens	.107	-.021	.040	-.013	-.035	.088	.716
The police treat people with respect	.791	.122	.213	.217	.267	.386	.151
The police treat people fairly	.779	.132	.226	.172	.270	.372	.114
The police respect people's rights	.746	.094	.169	.157	.373	.412	.148
The police are courteous to people they come into contact with	.698	.169	.123	.126	.347	.431	.063
The police make decisions based upon facts	.678	.076	.209	.175	.362	.388	.107
The police explain their decisions to the people they deal with	.612	-.009	.103	.244	.270	.374	.062
The police make decisions based on their own personal opinions	.108	-.011	.032	-.083	-.014	.115	.546
The police consider the views of the people involved before making their decisions	.501	.055	.181	.257	.216	.327	-.048
You would be caught and punished if you parked your car illegally	.079	.766	-.033	.031	.029	.029	-.002
You would be caught and punished if you disposed of your trash illegally	.109	.827	.003	-.068	.170	.154	.046
You would be caught and punished if you made noise at night	.106	.834	-.012	-.007	.190	.062	-.097
You would be caught and punished if you sped or broke traffic laws	.040	.861	-.086	-.054	.096	.064	-.092
You would be caught and punished if you purchased stolen items on the street	.174	.879	-.012	-.034	.186	.140	.014
You would be caught and punished if you used marijuana and cocaine in public places	.088	.835	-.040	-.065	.146	.030	-.023
The Ghana police are trustworthy	.238	-.037	.844	.064	.101	.072	.068
I have confidence in the Ghana police	.153	-.028	.929	.103	.071	.042	.065
The Ghana police are usually honest	.202	-.050	.887	.139	.063	.071	.082
The Ghana police always act within the law	.212	-.017	.876	.045	.075	.058	.084

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

### Summary:

The 42 items were factor-analyzed using Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) (I used IBM SPSS version 18). Prior to performing PAF, the suitability of the data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .881, exceeding the

recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1970, 1974) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix.

Principal Axis Factoring revealed the presence of seven factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 26.8%, 10.9%, 8%, 7%, 6.3%, 4.8%, and 3.5% of the variance, respectively. An inspection of the scree plot supported a seven-factor extraction. This was further supported by the results of Horn's Parallel Analysis, which showed only seven factors with eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a randomly generated data matrix of the same size (42 items x 304 respondents). To aid in the interpretation of the seven factors, Direct Oblimin rotation was performed. The rotated solution revealed the presence of a simple structure (Thurstone, 1947), with the seven factors showing a number of strong loadings and all variables loading substantially on only one factor.

The interpretation and measurement of five of the seven scales – cooperation, risk of sanctioning, performance, legitimacy Ghana, and obligation scales – was consistent with prior research. However, the 4 trust items, 7 of 8 procedural justice items, and 3 distributive justice items all loaded together, to form a new variable that I call *legitimacy*. The decision to call this latent variable *legitimacy* is not without precedent. For example, Tankebe (2013) argued that legitimacy contains elements of both procedural justice and distributive justice. In defending the overlap between legitimacy and procedural justice, Tankebe (2013) noted, "Officers are expected to follow due process by respecting the legal rights of citizens, which include treating all parties in a case fairly and providing

them with opportunities to make a representation of their own side of the case before decisions are made” (p. 108). Moreover, in justifying the overlap between legitimacy and distributive justice, Tankebe (2013) argued that police services and security are basic public goods that are dispensed based on normative values in society. For example, if police underenforce the law by not investigating crimes committed against the poor, or if officers overpolice a community because of the racial background of its members, then the legitimacy of the police is undermined (Tankebe, 2013). As a result, Tankebe (2013) used a composite measure of legitimacy in his regression models that contained elements of procedural justice, distributive justice, and legitimacy. In other words, there is theoretical justification for my combining items from prior research that measured legitimacy, distributive justice, and procedural justice into a composite measure that I named *legitimacy* in the current study.

Also, one procedural-justice item loaded with two distributive justice items to form a new latent variable that I call *distributive justice*. Here, the composite measure of the one procedural-justice item, “Police make decisions based on their personal opinions,” and the two distributive-justice items, “The police give minorities less help because of their race” and “The police provide better services to wealthier citizens,” can be termed *distributive justice* because the items reflect the theoretical definition of this latent construct. For example, Tankebe (2013) argued that distributive justice “relates to perceptions that the *outcomes* people receive (e.g., decision to arrest or to prosecute) are fair and that the *distribution* of outcomes (as between rich/poor, different ethnic groups, male/female, etc.) is fair also” (p. 111). I argue therefore that the items measuring my

new composite measures of legitimacy and distributive justice are conceptually and methodologically justifiable.

My new legitimacy scale is thus different from how others have constructed it (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013). For example, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) have argued that trust and procedural justice are separate latent constructs. Gau (2011) noted, however, that trust loaded with procedural justice in her study, a composite measure that she called procedural justice. While Gau (2011) had chosen to call her composite measure of trust and procedural justice, procedural justice, Tankebe (2013) called the same composite measure, legitimacy. Like Tankebe (2013), I have chosen to call this composite measure, legitimacy. These differing definitions mean that researchers may arrive at differing conclusions in their attempts to measure the latent constructs of procedural justice and legitimacy. It also means that researchers' contemporary argument (see Gau, 2011; Maguire & Johnson, 2013) that procedural justice and legitimacy may not be empirically distinguishable needs more attention and critical analysis, going forward.

**Table 8**

**Bivariate Correlation Results for the Factor-Analyzed Variables**

<b>Scale items</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
1. Cooperation	1						
2. Risk of Sanctioning	.178	1					
3. Performance	.477	.093	1				
4. Legitimacy	.471	.167	.54	1			
5. Distributive justice	-.097	-.026	.087	.089	1		
6. Legitimacy Ghana	.101	-.013	.076	.207	.093	1	
7. Obligation	.14	-.052	.097	.238	-1.05	.082	1

From Table 8, there appear to be no discriminant validity problems among the factor-analyzed variables, as the largest correlation value (.54) is between *performance* and *legitimacy*. As such, the use of factor analysis has shown that the Tylerian scales of trust and procedural justice are not unique from one another, and that they ought to be combined to form a single scale to improve convergent and discriminant validity. The absence of *discriminant validity* problems between the revised, factor-analyzed variables lends support to the use of factor analysis to improve scales that measure latent constructs.

### **Improved Convergent Validity for New Legitimacy and Distributive Justice Variables**

The new *legitimacy* variable consists of the 4 trust items, 7 of 8 procedural justice items, and 3 of 5 distributive justice items. The Cronbach's Alpha for this new variable is .942, which is an improvement over the individual Cronbach's Alpha values for *trust* (.919), *procedural justice* (.835), and *distributive justice* (.616). Thus, factor analysis has helped to improve the internal consistency, and hence the convergent validity, of the new *legitimacy* variable. In addition, Cronbach's Alpha for the *distributive justice* variable increased from .616 to .640 after the variables were factor-analyzed, which shows an improvement in internal consistency, at least in this sample, over the *distributive justice* variable that had been employed in prior studies. The results from the PAF indicate that common models in the literature are not applicable for this sample. For example, Tyler treats procedural justice and legitimacy as two distinct concepts, but I find overlap between them. Moreover, Tyler conceives of legitimacy as *obligation to obey* and *trust*,

yet the results here show that these latent constructs are empirically distinct. The implications for these results are further examined in the *Discussion* section.

### **Research Question 2:**

*What are the relative effects of the normative models (procedural justice and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community?*

After subjecting all my independent and dependent variables to Principal Axis Factoring (with Direct Oblimin rotation), the original *procedural justice* items did not load as hypothesized from prior research (Reisig et al., 2007), as trust, procedural justice, and some distributive-justice items all loaded together to form a single factor. As a result, I have excluded *procedural justice*<sup>32</sup> as an independent variable from this regression analysis. As such, my use of factor analysis (Principal Axis Factoring, with Direct Oblimin rotation) has necessitated the need to modify Research Question 1 to include only the following variables: legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, distributive justice, and legitimacy of U.S. police.

### **Hierarchical Regression Model:**

The normative model (legitimacy of Ghana police) and the instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) are the independent variables and legitimacy of U.S. police is the dependent variable. The control variables are age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United


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<sup>32</sup> This scale was based on Reisig et al.'s (2007) conceptualization of procedural justice.


States.

Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure there were no violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. The correlation matrix in Table 8 indicates that there are no multicollinearity problems for the revised, factor-analyzed variables of legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, distributive justice, and legitimacy of U.S. police. None of the correlations between the dependent variable and independent variables, and between each of the independent variables, exceed .70 (Pallant, 2010), so I have retained all of the independent and dependent variables in the regression equation. Tolerance values are greater than .10 (range: .683 to .975) and all VIF values are less than 10 (range: 1.026 to 1.465), so there appear to be no multicollinearity problems in the hierarchical regression equation.


Figures 4, 5, and 6 indicate that there are no major deviations from the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals, as the regression standardized residual for the dependent variable (*new legitimacy*) appears to be normally distributed around a mean of 0 in the histogram; the points appear to lie in a reasonably straight diagonal line in the Normal P-P plot; and the standardized residuals appear to be rectangularly distributed in the Scatterplot. The maximum value for Cook's Distance is 0.131, which is well below the cutoff value of 1 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), so the data appear appropriate for regression analysis.



**Figure 4**



**Figure 5**



**Figure 6**

#### **Model Evaluation and Summary:**

Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, and distributive justice to predict perceived legitimacy of U.S. police, after controlling for age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States. Age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States were entered at Step 1, explaining 4.9% of the variance in legitimacy. After entry of legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, and distributive justice at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model (see Table 9) was 35.2%,  $F(11, 205) = 10.125$ .

**Table 9**

OLS Regression Model		
Dependent Variable: Legitimacy		
Variable	$\beta$	S.E.
Gender	.015	.074
Age	.039	.003
Place of birth	-.021	.110
Length of stay	-.111	.006
Education	.034	.032
Homeownership	.004	.088
Annual income	-.048	.026
Legitimacy Ghana	.153**	.043
Risk	.119*	.041
Performance	.506***	.054
Distributive justice	.012	.051
F Test	10.125***	
R Square	.352	
N <sup>33</sup>	248	

Entries are standardized coefficients, and S.E. values are the standard errors.

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .005$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

As indicated by the standardized coefficients in Table 9, *performance* was the primary driver of the *perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police* (beta = .506,  $p < .001$ ),

<sup>33</sup> The overall sample size in many studies involving latent constructs (e.g., Gau, 2011; Tankebe, 2009, 2013) tended to be higher than the sample size (N) of the regression models perhaps because the researchers excluded missing cases using the *listwise* or *pairwise* deletion method. For example, Gau (2011) had an overall sample size of 210 but the N for the regression analysis was only 115. Also, Tankebe (2009) had a sample size of 450, but the N for the regression analysis was only 305. The *replace with mean* option for missing data is actually discouraged by some researchers (see, for example, Reisig et al., 2007), as it tends to skew the results. As such, my regression N (248 and 272 for the first and second OLS regression models, respectively) is slightly lower than my sample N of 304 because I used *pairwise* deletion for missing data recommended by some researchers (Pallant, 2010).

followed by *legitimacy Ghana* (beta = .153,  $p < .005$ ), and *risk of sanctioning* (beta = .119,  $p < .05$ ). *Distributive justice* did not have a statistically significant relationship with legitimacy. Also, none of the control variables – age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational difference, and length of stay in the United States – had a statistically significant relationship with legitimacy in the hierarchical regression equation. Overall, police *performance* was the primary driver of perceived *legitimacy of U.S. police* in the regression model. I explore in greater detail in the *Discussion* section the significance of the findings from the regression model.

### **Research Question 3:**

*What are the relative effects of the normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on cooperation with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community?*

When I performed factor analysis, the original legitimacy scale, consisting of *trust* and *obligation to obey*, loaded as disparate constructs, which is contrary to results from prior research (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). As a result, I have included *obligation to obey* as an additional independent variable in this regression model. For example, Gau (2011), after assessing the psychometric properties of procedural justice and police legitimacy by means of Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), found that *trust* loaded with *procedural justice* (quality of treatment and quality of decision-making). Gau (2011) also noted that *obligation to obey* “consistently loaded

disparately relative to the other items. This was true whether procedural justice and legitimacy were treated as two separate constructs or as a single factor” (p. 493).

In fact, the results of my own exploratory factor analysis mirrored Gau’s (2011) findings for procedural justice and police legitimacy. Moreover, Tankebe (2013), not unlike Gau (2011), argued that “legitimacy and obligation are different issues” (p. 123). I argue therefore that the appropriateness of my use of *obligation to obey* as an independent variable in this regression model has theoretical and empirical basis.


### **Hierarchical Regression Model:**

The normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police, obligation to obey, and legitimacy of Ghana police) and the instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) are the independent variables and cooperation is the dependent variable. The control variables are age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States.


Preliminary analyses were carried out to ensure there were no violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. The correlation data shown in Table 8 confirm that there are no multicollinearity problems for the factor-analyzed variables of legitimacy of U.S. police, obligation to obey, legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, distributive justice, and cooperation. None of the correlations between the dependent variable and independent variables, and between each of the independent variables, exceed .70 (Pallant, 2010), so I have retained all of the independent and dependent variables in the regression equation. Tolerance values are greater than .10 (range: .604 to .943) and all VIF values are less than 10 (range: 1.060 to 1.481), so there

appear to be no multicollinearity problems in the hierarchical regression equation.


According to the results highlighted in Figures 7, 8, and 9, there are no major deviations from the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals, as the regression standardized residual for the dependent variable (cooperation) appears to be normally distributed around a mean of 0 in the histogram; the points appear to lie in a reasonably straight diagonal line in the Normal P-P plot; and the standardized residuals appear to be rectangularly distributed in the Scatterplot. The maximum value for Cook's Distance is 0.389, which is well below the cutoff value of 1 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), so the data appear appropriate for regression analysis.



**Figure 7**



**Figure 8**



**Figure 9**

**Table 10**

<b>OLS Regression Model (Dependent Variable: Cooperation)</b>		
<b>Variable</b>	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>S.E.</b>
Gender	.088	.078
Age	.073	.003
Place of birth	-.059	.116
Length of stay	.084	.006
Education	.053	.034
Homeownership	.077	.093
Annual income	-.060	.028
Legitimacy	.292***	.076
Obligation	-.002	.049
LegitimacyGhana	.040	.046
Risk	.087	.044
Performance	.322***	.066
Distributive justice	-.150**	.053
F Test	8.772***	
R Square	.360	
N	272	

Entries are standardized coefficients, and S.E. values are the standard errors.

\*p < .10, \*\*p < .05, \*\*\*p < .001

### **Model Evaluation and Summary:**

Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of legitimacy of U.S. police, obligation, legitimacy of Ghana police, risk, performance, and distributive justice to predict perceived willingness to cooperate with police, after controlling for age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States. Age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income,

intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States were entered at Step 1, explaining 4.6% of the variance in cooperation. After entry of legitimacy, obligation, legitimacy Ghana, risk, performance, and distributive justice at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model (see Table 10) was 36%,  $F(13, 203) = 8.77$ .

Police *performance* was the primary driver of the *willingness to cooperate with the police* (beta = .322,  $p < .001$ ), followed by *legitimacy of U.S. police* (beta = .292,  $p < .001$ ), and *distributive justice* (beta = -.15,  $p < .05$ ), although this was in the opposite direction. *Obligation to obey*, *legitimacy Ghana*, and *risk of sanctioning* did not have a statistically significant relationship with cooperation. Also, none of the control variables – age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational difference, and length of stay in the United States – had a statistically significant relationship with cooperation in the hierarchical regression equation. Overall, police *performance* was the primary driver of *willingness to cooperate with the police* in the regression model, a result that varies from previous research. I explore in greater detail in the *Discussion* section the significance of the findings from the regression model.

## Testing the 18 Hypotheses<sup>34</sup>

**Table 11**

### T-Tests and ANOVA Table Dependent Variable: Legitimacy

<b>IV<sup>35</sup></b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>T-Test or F-Test</b>	<b>p-value</b>
<b>Age</b>				F = 1.437	.240
18-32	86	2.57	.63		
33-46	80	2.72	.65		
47-69	71	2.70	.57		
<b>Education</b>				F = .854	.492
<High school	25	2.70	.68		
High school	80	2.72	.56		
Associate's	56	2.54	.58		
Bachelor's	46	2.70	.70		
Postgraduate	24	2.71	.69		
<b>Sex</b>				t = .244	.808
Female	128	2.67	.62		
Male	113	2.65	.62		
<b>Homeownership</b>				t = .701	.484
Renter	173	2.67	.60		
Owner	53	2.61	.66		
<b>Income</b>				F = 1.105	.355
<\$20,000	58	2.79	.60		
\$20,000-\$29,999	44	2.63	.58		
\$30,000-\$39,999	46	2.64	.68		
\$40,000-\$49,999	33	2.73	.67		
>\$50,000	39	2.53	.63		

<sup>34</sup> Of the 18 hypotheses, four – H<sub>2</sub>, H<sub>6</sub>, H<sub>12</sub>, and H<sub>16</sub> – had to be answered with ANOVA tests, in addition to the regression results themselves, as I had recoded age into 3 groups and income into 5 groups. Thus, I chose both the results from the regression table and ANOVA/t-tests to determine the relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables. For example, while H<sub>12</sub>, which tests the relationship between age and cooperation, was not supported by the results of the regression analysis, the relationship (for two of three age groups) became statistically significant after I recoded age into 3 groups.

<sup>35</sup> The independent variables (IV) are: age, education, gender, homeownership, and income.

**Model 1:**

**H<sub>1</sub>:** The effect of procedural justice should exceed the effect of risk, performance, or distributive justice in determining perceptions of police legitimacy.

*This hypothesis could not be tested in this dissertation, as procedural justice loaded with trust and some distributive justice items to form a new latent variable I call legitimacy.*

**H<sub>2</sub>:** Older Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to younger Ghanaian immigrants.

The survey participants ranged in age from 18 to 69 years. I have therefore decided to recode this variable into three groups: 18 to 32; 33 to 46; and 47 to 69. From Table 11, the p-value of .24 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference among the mean scores on legitimacy for the three age groups. As such, *H<sub>2</sub> is not supported by the results of the ANOVA analysis.*

**H<sub>3</sub>:** Better-educated Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to their less educated counterparts.

The p-value of .492 in Table 11 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference among the mean scores on legitimacy for the five education categories. As such, *H<sub>3</sub> is not supported by the results of the ANOVA analysis.*

**H<sub>4</sub>:** Female Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to view the police as legitimate compared to male Ghanaian immigrants.

The significance (2-tailed) value of .808 in Table 11 is greater than the criterion

significance level of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference between male and female Ghanaian immigrants. As such, *H<sub>4</sub> is not supported by the results of the independent-samples t-test.*

**H<sub>5</sub>:** Ghanaian homeowners are more likely to perceive the police as legitimate compared to Ghanaian renters.

From Table 11, the significance (2-tailed) of .484 is greater than the criterion significance value of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference between homeowners and renters. As such, *H<sub>5</sub> is not supported by the results of the independent-samples t-test.*

**H<sub>6</sub>:** The higher a Ghanaian immigrant's income, the less likely that he or she will view the police as legitimate. Income categories 5, 6, and 7 were recoded as "\$50,000 or more. As a result, the following income categories are used for the analysis: (1) Less than \$20,000; (2) \$20,000 to \$29,999; (3) \$30,000 to \$39,999; (4) \$40,000 to \$49,999; and (5) \$50,000 or greater.

From Table 11, the significance value of .355 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference among the mean scores on legitimacy for the five income groups. As such, *H<sub>6</sub> is not supported by the results of the ANOVA analysis.*

**H<sub>7</sub>:** First-generation Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to view the police as legitimate compared to second-generation Ghanaian immigrants.

*This hypothesis was not tested because the categories were too uneven for a T-test or ANOVA analysis.* For example, about 95% of the sample was born in Ghana, which

leaves the other two categories (“I was born in the United States to at least one Ghanaian parent” and “I was born elsewhere ... to at least one Ghanaian parent”) accounting for just 5% of the sample.

**H<sub>8</sub>:** The higher Ghanaian immigrants rate procedural fairness, the greater will be their perceptions of the legitimacy of the police.

*This hypothesis could not be tested in this dissertation, as procedural justice loaded with trust and some distributive-justice items to form a new latent variable I call legitimacy.*

**H<sub>9</sub>:** Ghanaian immigrants are less likely to view the Ghana police as legitimate compared to the U.S. police.

*Supported by the results of the regression analysis. However, as Ghanaian immigrants' views of the legitimacy of the Ghana police increase, so too do their views of the legitimacy of U.S. police.*

**Table 12**

**T-Tests and ANOVA Table**  
**Dependent Variable: Cooperation**

<b>IV<sup>36</sup></b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>T-Test or F-Test</b>	<b>p-value</b>
<b>Age</b>				F = 6.286	.002
18-32	90	3.06	.72		
33-46	83	3.39	.56		
47-69	82	3.00	.61		
<b>Education</b>				F = .385	.819
<High school	28	3.26	.73		
High school	87	3.21	.62		
Associate's	59	3.20	.65		
Bachelor's	46	3.23	.79		
Postgraduate	29	3.37	.56		
<b>Sex</b>				t = 1.151	.251
Female	140	3.21	.71		
Male	120	3.30	.60		
<b>Homeownership</b>				t = 1.278	.203
Renter	186	3.21	.67		
Owner	58	3.33	.66		
<b>Income</b>				F = .634	.639
<\$20,000	64	3.18	.72		
\$20,000-\$29,999	44	3.23	.63		
\$30,000-\$39,999	48	3.36	.54		
\$40,000-\$49,999	35	3.25	.65		
>\$50,000	45	3.20	.77		

**Model 2:**

**H<sub>10</sub>:** The higher Ghanaian immigrants rate police legitimacy, the greater will be their willingness to cooperate with the police.

<sup>36</sup> The independent variables (IV) are: age, education, gender, homeownership, and income.

*Supported by the results of the regression analysis.*

**H<sub>11</sub>:** The effect of the perceptions of legitimacy should exceed the effect of risk, performance, or distributive justice in willingness to cooperate with the police.

*Not supported by the results of the regression analysis: Performance was the primary driver of cooperation in the Ghanaian immigrant community.*

**H<sub>12</sub>:** Older Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than younger Ghanaian immigrants to cooperate with the police.

**Table 13**

**Multiple Comparisons (Tukey HSD)  
Dependent Variable: Cooperation**

<b>(I) Age in 3 groups</b>	<b>(J) Age in 3 groups</b>	<b>Mean Difference (I-J)</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>Significance</b>
<b>1</b> <= 32	<b>2</b> 33 – 46	-.32*	.097	.003
	<b>3</b> 47+	-.26*	.097	.020
<b>2</b> 33 – 46	<b>1</b> <= 32	.32*	.097	.003
	<b>3</b> 47+	.06	.099	.825
<b>3</b> 47+	<b>1</b> <=32	.26*	.097	.020
	<b>2</b> 33 – 46	-.06	.099	.825

\* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

The significance value of .002 in Table 12 is less than the criterion significance level of 0.05, therefore there is a significant difference somewhere among the mean scores on cooperation for the three age groups. Using the Tukey HSD test (see Table 13),

Groups 1 and 2 and Groups 1 and 3, but not Groups 2 and 3, are significantly different from one another at the  $p < .05$  level. Eta squared<sup>37</sup> (this calculates the effect size, which is the ratio of sum of squares between groups to total sum of squares) =  $5.112/107.569 = .04$ . As such, *H<sub>12</sub> is supported by the results of the ANOVA analysis*, when age is divided into three groups or categories.

**H<sub>13</sub>:** Better-educated Ghanaian immigrants are more likely than their less educated counterparts to cooperate with the police.

Because the significance value of .819 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, there is no statistically significant difference among the mean scores on cooperation for the five education categories. As such, *H<sub>13</sub> is not supported by the results of the ANOVA analysis*.

**H<sub>14</sub>:** Female Ghanaian immigrants are less likely than their male counterparts to cooperate with the police.

The significance (2-tailed) value of .251 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference between males and females. As such, *H<sub>14</sub> is not supported by the results of the independent-samples t-test*.

**H<sub>15</sub>:** Ghanaian homeowners are more likely than Ghanaian renters to cooperate with the police.

Because the significance (2-tailed) of .203 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, there is no statistically significant difference between homeowners and renters. As such, *H<sub>15</sub> is not supported by the results of the independent-*

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<sup>37</sup> According to Cohen (1988), .01 shows a small effect, .06 a medium effect, and .14 a large effect.

*samples t-test.*

**H<sub>16</sub>:** The higher a Ghanaian immigrant's income, the greater the likelihood that he or she will cooperate with the police.

The significance value of .639 is greater than the criterion significance level of 0.05, therefore there is no statistically significant difference among the mean scores on cooperation for the five income categories. As such, *H<sub>16</sub> is not supported by the results of the ANOVA analysis.*

**H<sub>17</sub>:** First-generation Ghanaian immigrants are less likely than their second-generation counterparts to cooperate with the police.

*This hypothesis was not tested because the categories were too uneven for a T-test or ANOVA analysis.* For example, about 95% of the sample was born in Ghana, which leaves the other two categories ("I was born in the United States to at least one Ghanaian parent" and "I was born elsewhere ... to at least one Ghanaian parent") accounting for just 5% of the sample.

**H<sub>18</sub>:** The higher Ghanaian immigrants rate the legitimacy of the Ghana police, the greater will be their willingness to cooperate with the police.

*Not supported by the results of the regression analysis.*

In summary, none of the demographic variables – age, educational level, sex, income, homeownership, intergenerational status, and length of stay in the United States – was statistically significantly related to the dependent variables in both regression models. The use of independent-samples t-tests and ANOVA generally confirm these findings. Overall, only one hypothesis – H<sub>12</sub> – was supported by the results of the

ANOVA test, but only after age was recoded into three groups. Two hypotheses could not be tested because there was no clear procedural justice variable after performing PAF. Finally, two hypotheses could not be tested because the groups were too uneven for an independent-samples t-test. I now turn to the key findings from my qualitative data in order to provide additional information about Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police.

### **Focus Group Findings**

Revisiting the findings from my survey data, police effectiveness was the primary driver of legitimacy of U.S. police, police effectiveness was the primary driver of willingness to cooperate with police, and trust and obligation to obey appear to be disparate constructs, and not subconstructs of police legitimacy, as generally operationalized and measured in the extant criminological literature. I employed two focus groups in order to seek a better understanding of my participants' understanding of the latent concepts of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police. The findings from my two focus groups shed more light on the findings from my survey data, which were closed-ended. Overall, if the police are going to be effective in the Ghanaian and other sub-Saharan African immigrant communities, then the police must weave together instrumental and normative considerations in their efforts at preventing and controlling crime.

#### **Effectiveness of U.S. Police:**

Because my survey results had shown that police effectiveness was the strongest predictor of both legitimacy of U.S. police and willingness to cooperate with the U.S.

police in the Ghanaian immigrant community, I asked the focus group participants questions intended to flesh out their understanding of police effectiveness. I evaluated the focus group participants' understanding of police performance by asking the following questions: (1) "Do you think that the police are effective at preventing and solving crime in your community?" (2) "Are they more effective at fighting one type of crime than another?"

In response to the first question, Isaac noted: *"For me, I think that they [the police] are doing an effective job, because I see them all around where I live; and I come to church most of the time during the night, and in the middle of the night, I also see them around. I think even their presence alone usually prevents bad people from coming around. So, I think it's a good thing."* Isaac thus noted that police presence alone was enough to deter criminal activity. Michelle provided a similar response: *"I do. I feel that, for the most part, in my community, the police are very effective [at controlling and preventing crime]."*

When I asked the respondents if they thought that the police were more effective at fighting one type of crime than another, Michelle, who nodded her head in agreement for what seemed like a full minute, responded: *"Pertaining to schools, I feel like gun control, fighting, bickering, that type of thing, between adolescents, I think that they [the police] are okay at that. But in terms of battering women in our community, and maybe, like, in our [apartment] complexes, I don't feel like they [the police] have kept that under control."* Mary observed: *"Yesterday, in my apartment complex (we have security 24 hours, but the police normally come around), and I don't know if there was a robbery,*

*but there were these young guys outside [around] midnight. When I closed from church, these young guys were outside, and it's like a police car was parked there, and these young guys were holding flashlights and moving from car to car. I was thinking, maybe, the police will, like, come and see what the guys were doing, but they [the police] were just talking, until someone screamed, and then the police rushed to [where the kids were hanging out], and the kids just ignored the officers, saying that they were just hanging out with their lovers. But if I had been on the road and, maybe, one of my lights was off, the police would stop me. You know, your light is off, and instead of a warning, some [officers] will give you a ticket. When it comes to emergencies, the police respond [well]. A gas [line] broke, not far from the church, and, within a minute, the police were there. [Their quick] response was amazing.”*

Annabelle thought that the police spend too much time issuing traffic tickets instead of focusing on more serious crimes: *“I think so, in Virginia, at least. You get the police stopping you all the time. I think that's what they're good at. They [the police] stop you for nothing, for no reason. They're doing a job, your tag is expired, but I bet you there's a robbery going on somewhere, and they need them [the police]. And they are much more effective at doing that – saving people's lives – than stopping people for and giving you a ticket for \$100. Not that I've gotten a ticket, as I've not gotten a ticket in a long time, but I see a lot of them [officers]. And when you go to another state, like New York, you don't see that – they [police officers] don't stop them [citizens] for anything. But in Virginia, there are too many traffic stops.”*

Mary added: *“Sometimes they're helpful, especially for the kids – children who*

*are outside running around. When they [the police] are around and see them [the children] like that, at least they [the police] protect them [the children]. They make sure that the children are in a safe place.”* Tina also added: *“In my community, I see police presence most of the time, so I don’t know if I have to take that to mean that they are preventing crime effectively in my community. I see them [the police] regularly.”* Overall, it appears that the focus group respondents see the police as effective in the community, but they do not believe that the police are doing enough to protect, say, battered women, who may be afraid to get the police involved for fear those of them living illegally in the United States may be deported.

#### **Cooperation with the Police:**

To evaluate the focus group respondents’ understanding of cooperation with the police, I asked the following questions: (1) “Would you call the police to report a crime you either witnessed or knew about?” (2) “What factors make you more or less likely to report a crime to the police?” There were mixed responses from the participants. Kofi was first to respond: *“Yes, I will do that because if I don’t do it, then the person who committed the crime is gonna go scot-free, so that will give the person a chance to do it again and again. So, I have to do my part as a citizen, or as a member of the community, to give the police any information that I may have.”*

Roland, on the other hand, noted that he would not cooperate with the police: *“I am not going to report anything. Like I said, the trust I had for the police is broken because of some personal experiences I had with them. If it is something that concerns another person, I will probably just mind my own business.”* It appeared that Roland is

very unhappy with the police because he believes that he was profiled on more than one occasion.

Pressed to share why he would not cooperate with the police, Roland explained<sup>38</sup>: *It was years back and there was a student who needed my help. I've mostly been teaching at the high school level. This student was getting ready for college and was preparing for a college entrance exam, so I would go to her house and tutor her. There was this time that my car broke down, so I decided to walk [in this predominantly White neighborhood], while waiting for my dad to pick me up. It was not that I was not appropriately dressed, but before I knew it, the police showed up and accused me of loitering in the neighborhood. They assumed that I was carrying drugs. But for one of the men in the house who vouched for me, and who explained to the police that I came to their house regularly to teach the young student, I could have been arrested. I feel that they [the police] have a stereotypical view of Blacks. The fact that I am a young black man does not mean that I had drugs on me. The fact that [some people in that community] saw me taking a stroll, while waiting for my father to pick me up, did not mean that I had drugs on me. Apparently, a neighbor had called the police and lied that I was loitering in the neighborhood, and that I had drugs on me. Why should the police jump to conclusions even before they investigated the complaint filed by the anonymous caller?* Based on Roland's response, the police should pay attention to concerns about how they interact with immigrant community members.

Efua, like Roland, stated that she would not cooperate with the police because the

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<sup>38</sup> I paraphrased Roland's statement for the sake of clarity and brevity. All other statements are direct quotations.

police had profiled her in the past. Efua explained: *“I had a personal experience, too. Racism plays a part in [our personal interactions with the police]. I had an experience, I was driving one day and a tanker crossed me, and we had an accident. As soon as the police [arrived], they gave me a ticket, but they let the other guy [a White male] go scot-free, without even asking me my side of the story. So, I really don’t trust the police. So, if I see something, I will just ignore it.”*

There were nuanced responses as well. For example, Michelle and Efua stated that they would report a crime only if their names would not be disclosed to the press or the public, perhaps due to fear of reprisal from the criminals involved. Michelle observed: *“Yes, I would; no, I wouldn’t. Yes, I would if I knew I would remain anonymous, if I don’t have to go to court, if my name will not be in public. No, because of racial profiling. Personally, I was born here, but because of my [dark skin] color and last name, I have not been treated [any better] because of my looks. I look African, I behave African, even though I was born in America, especially for someone like me with very dark skin. It’s like they fit you into a certain box. They expect me to have an accent and not be able to speak for myself, and do things for myself.”*

In addition, the chance to collect reward money appears to be an important factor for some Ghanaian immigrants in their willingness to report a crime to the police. Efua would cooperate if there was reward money at stake: *“Like Michelle said, if my face will not be on T.V., then I will report it. Also, if they will give me the reward money, and also not put my face on T.V.”*

One respondent even noted that cooperation with the police was important

because of the risk of terrorism in a post-9/11 America. Annabelle noted: *“Yes. I will call the police, especially in these times of terrorist activity – you just want to be careful.”*

Annabelle’s response shows that normative considerations play just as important a role as instrumental considerations in Ghanaian immigrants’ willingness to report crime and criminal activity to the police.

When pressed to identify specific crimes that would likely cause them to call the police, Mary noted that she would report domestic abuse: *“I will call for domestic abuse. If my neighbors, if every day I hear them screaming, and I don’t know what is going on, for protection, I will call [the police].”* Tina observed: *“I will call police, especially when I suspect drug deals – in my neighborhood or anywhere else – especially when I am going throughout a neighborhood and I see suspicious, potential drug dealings going on. First of all, I fear for my life – when activities like that go on, they usually end in violence, and anybody could be victimized, including myself. I, personally, try to avoid such neighborhoods, but if I happen to be a resident of the neighborhood that has the [drug] problem, I would likely call [the police].”* Isaac also shared his opinion: *“I will call the police for any suspicious activity that, in my view, is harmful to the community, or the people around. Sometimes, there may be somebody walking on the street and possessing a gun or a weapon, and then, uh, as a patriotic citizen, being in a community and living with people in the community, when you come across something like that, it is important that you let the police know, so that’s something that I will do.”*

Michelle, the only participant who was born in the United States, would generally cooperate with the police, provided her identity would be kept a secret (if she makes such

a request), and she would also not have to testify in court. Michelle also appears to blame her hesitation to cooperate with the police on racial profiling because of her dark skin color. It appears, then, that the police would garner greater cooperation from the community of Ghanaian immigrants if the police address the perceived disparities in distributive justice, in spite of group members' languid accent and dark skin color. In other words, there is a measure of belief by focus group participants that they are being singled out unfairly because of their race/ethnicity. Efua noted that her willingness to report a crime to the police would depend on the reward money available as well as the police's willingness to shield her identity. In other words, Ghanaian immigrants would cooperate with the police more if the police treat them with respect, hide their identities (depending on the severity of the crime), and pay any reward money associated with a case.

#### **Trust in the U.S. Police:**

To evaluate the focus group participants' understanding of trust in the U.S. police, I asked the following questions: (1) "Do you trust the police? Why or why not?" (2) "Is your opinion based on personal interactions with the police or based on what you hear from others in your community?" (3) "Do you think the police use their authority properly?" In response to the first question, Lydia responded, "*No, I don't trust the police. Why am I saying this? The way they [the police] give out tickets. Once they stop you, they won't listen to you. They've just stopped you, so they have to find a reason, and they will stand on that to give you a ticket for no reason. As humans, we may commit a first offense, second offense, etc., [which means that some offenses should be forgiven]. If*

*you're Black, your offense, even if it is the first one, would not be forgiven, so I don't really trust the police."* Lydia confirmed that her opinion was based on personal, rather than vicarious, experience with the police.

Tina proffered a different view, however, when asked if she trusts the police: *"Yes, I do, to some extent. Um, I believe that the police force is doing an effective job at preventing and also controlling crime. I don't know what we'll do as a community without the police, in terms of security issues, so I applaud them for that. But sometimes I watch television and I see how the police can also discriminate against certain groups of people, and, as a result of that discrimination, they [the police] end up incriminating the people and making their situation worse. For example, I've seen or witnessed or remembered [incidents] whereby some people were racially profiled, and as result, they were brutalized by the police, and in some cases the police department had to compensate [the victims]. But the brutality that they [the victims] went through cannot be compensated – no amount of money or resources can compensate them [the victims] for the brutality that they went through, so those things are some examples of things that I cannot trust the police about. But I believe that, in terms of making sure that the communities or neighborhoods are secure, in general, they [the police] are doing a good job. So, my word to the police is they should focus on the work that they profess to do, and make sure that they avoid putting people in trouble."*

Asked if they thought that the police used their authority properly, Adjoa responded: *"I think that, no, not at all. I had a coworker, you know, when I used to work the night shift. She's an African American. One time, we went to lunch at the gas station,*

*to buy something, and my friend, who was using her husband's car, and it was a Mercedes, and it had tinted windows. Shortly afterwards, my friend said to me that because I am black and I am driving a Mercedes, I can predict that the police, in a car behind us, are going to stop us. We were in our nurses' clothes, but a few minutes later, the police pulled us over, and said to her [the African American lady], 'You're not driving right.' I don't think that the police had any reason to stop us, but he [the officer] got my license, and he got her license, and ran them [through his computer], and came back and said, 'You guys should drive careful[ly].' There was no [reason] for the policeman to stop us. I know, and I witnessed it, that they [the police] use their authority for the wrong reasons."*

Annabelle provided a slightly different perspective: *"When people are aware of what their rights are, it is easier for them to trust the police. I feel like a lot of people are not aware of what their rights are. There are a lot of abused women who think because their husbands are citizens and they are not, so when they abuse them, they cannot report to the police, because they're scared that they're going to be deported, because that's what's been ingrained in their brains that, if you do, you're going to be deported. So you have a lot of women who have been abused that don't [call the police] because they are scared of it. But if you don't know what your rights are, then it is easier for you to be, like, okay, the police can come and arrest me. If you knew your rights, you'd tell them [the police], 'I am sorry, you cannot arrest me for that because you don't have any evidence.' Sometimes educating the community about what their rights are is beneficial to everyone. So I feel like knowing your rights better help you understand what you are*

*or what you're supposed to do. And I feel like the police are aware of that, and they use that to their advantage, because they know, okay, 'I know this person is Ghanaian, and this person is Ethiopian, and they don't know their rights, so I am going to use that as a benefit to myself to arrest them or make them think that they're doing something wrong.'"*

Annabelle continued: *"When it comes to the law, the lines are blurred. In a way, you feel like, 'I am the police, I have all this authority, and I can do whatever I want.' But I feel like [the police] must know that not everyone knows their rights; there are a lot of immigrants, especially in America, and most of them, no one goes and says, 'Let me study the [U.S.] Constitution and see what my rights are, so no one can come to me and arrest me for no reason.' So, not everyone knows their rights, and I feel like the community needs to be educated on that. And if they [immigrants] are not educated on that, there has to be something, and I feel like the police should not use that as something authoritative, because in Virginia especially, I see that a lot. The police feel like they're the president of the United States, that they can stop you anyhow, that they can talk to you anyhow, because 'I have a weapon, I have a gun, that I can tell you to get out of your car anytime.' As long as people are aware of their rights, this cannot happen."*

### **Trust in the Ghana Police:**

In order to illuminate the discussion about perceptions of the Ghana police, I asked the focus group participants the following questions: (1) "What are your general views of the police in Ghana?" (2) "Do you trust the police in Ghana? How do you think they treat people?" There was a strikingly derisive laughter from all the participants, which pointed to their lack of trust in the Ghana police.

In response to the first question, Michelle stated, *“I was not born in Ghana, but based on the movies I have seen, the police in Ghana are bad. They are known to take bribes.”* John had a negative view of the Ghana police as well: *“I must say that the Ghana police are corrupt. The reason is because they don’t do background checks on [Ghana police recruits] before they are hired.* (There was widespread laughter from all the participants.) *So, I don’t trust them [the Ghana police].”* Kenneth also “indicted” the Ghana police: *“In Ghana, it’s like, they select the police according to [their] structure [physique]. If you are big, tall, and strong, they [the senior police officers] send you to the Buffalo Unit [the equivalent of the S.W.A.T. team found in many police departments in the U.S.A.]. When you see them [the police], you start shaking.”*

Asked if they thought that the Ghana police treat the citizens well, Annabelle observed: *“When you’re speeding and the police stop me, in Accra or Tema<sup>39</sup>, they’re like, ‘Oh, do you have any money?’ You give them something, and you drive away, and nothing happens. Some people born here [in the U.S.] may say to the Ghana police, ‘I know my rights.’ No, you can’t do that there [in Ghana]. The rights that you have here [in the U.S.], that you know, they are beneficial to you [in the U.S.], but in Ghana, [they are not beneficial to you,] unless you know [important] people, then if they [the police] arrest you and put you in jail, someone can come and bail you out. But in Ghana, you just give them [the police] some money, and you’re good.”* Tina rejoined: *“And to add to that, even if you have not violated any traffic regulations, you still have to give them [the police] something [money].”*

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<sup>39</sup> Tema is an important port city about 30 miles from Accra, the capital city.

Annabelle continued: *“I think there’s another thing that we’re missing. Over here [in the U.S.], they [officers] get benefits, they get paid well. Everything is done right. In Ghana, it is not the same. So, it might be a culture thing, but in a way, just playing the devil’s advocate, being on the police’s side, I understand why they [Ghana police] do that, because they don’t get paid that much. So, the only money that they [Ghana police] get is the money that they get [from] stopping people. They get more money doing that than the pay that they get – they can’t live on their pay. And in a way, even though what they are doing is bad, if the government is able to look at, okay, this is how much the [Ghana] police make, maybe we should pay them more, then maybe getting bribed on the street, [fewer officers] will be doing that.”*

Tina proffered: *“We know that the police system in Ghana and most developing countries are working with less, or meager resources, in general, to the extent that some don’t have guns. I’ve been to villages where a policeman only had a uniform – his authority is the uniform, no gun, he is not armed. Sometimes they take bribes and let people go because they are not equipped with the resources, the technical know-how, and some other things that other policemen have in place in order to [effectively] combat crime. So, that has been a problem. So it is not just a cultural, or simple, issue – it is a complex issue – and it involves so many things.”*

### **Obligation to Obey the Police:**

I evaluated my focus group participants’ understanding of *obligation to obey the U.S. police* by asking the following questions: (1) “If police officers told you to do something, would you follow their orders?” (2) “Would you do what the police tell you to

do because you are afraid of what would happen if you did not (being punished or retaliated against)?” (3) “Would you do what the police tell you to do because they deserve to be obeyed due to their authority as police officers?” Most of the focus group respondents noted that they would obey the U.S. police, not because of fear of retaliation, but because the police have authority vested in them and, therefore, ought to be obeyed. Atta noted: *“I say, yes, I will follow [officers’ orders], and to add to my explanation of following [their orders], if I have an opinion, I’ll let them know.”*

When I asked the participants if they would do what the police tell them to do because of fear of what would happen if they did not, or simply because the police deserve to be obeyed because of their authority, Atta, once again, took the lead in responding: *“I will obey them and do what they are asking me to do, not because I am afraid, because I don’t believe I have any cobweb<sup>40</sup> for which reason they should profile me or put me into whatever [category] they are looking for, but because they hold authority; they are supposed to ensure peace, safety, and everything [else] in the society. I was even praying in my own house, and someone called the police to say that I was making noise. I am saying this because I believe that the police had a preconceived notion before they arrived at my door. I told them that I was praying on a prayer line – it was 5 a.m. – but the police asked me if I was drunk. I even told the police to listen to the prayer line [themselves] to affirm my position. I tried hard to let the police know that, perhaps, my voice may have gotten a bit too loud, that it was because I was praying, but they were not ready to listen to me. They made me sit down, and I was not bothered about*

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<sup>40</sup> The statement “I don’t have any cobweb” is used in everyday conversation among Ghanaians to mean that one had nothing to hide from the authorities.

*it, since I was in my own home. They even asked my friend, who was sleeping in the sofa, whether we were fighting, and he [my friend] said **no**. Finally, the officers cautioned us not to disturb the neighbors, and then left. It's bad of them [officers] to show up at my door with a preconceived mind, rather than come with an open mind, which required of them to listen to me."*

Atta was concerned that the police tend to approach sub-Saharan African immigrants with a "preconceived notion": that these immigrants are already guilty in any matter before they are provided an opportunity to explain themselves to officers. Atta insisted that it was better for the police to approach all persons with an open mind, so the police could get to the bottom of an investigation without assuming that one party was already guilty.

Asked what types of orders they would obey without asking questions, Annabelle noted that she would obey police orders during a traffic stop without asking questions, because the police could easily obtain a warrant to search her vehicle, if they wanted. Annabelle stated: *"I feel like a traffic stop; usually when they [the police] stop you – and they've done that to me once; I don't even know why – they stopped me because one of my tags had expired, and he [the officer] realized that I hadn't had any tickets. 'Oh, my goodness, you have a plus, you don't have any minuses. Can I look in the trunk of your car?' And there was nothing in my trunk to look at, so, I was like, 'Yes, you can,' because I have nothing to hide. He [the officer] looked at me and said, 'Okay, have a good day. I'll give you a warning, just make sure that your safety [inspection] is done.' Because eventually, they're going to get a warrant because they stopped you, because your [safety*

*inspection is invalid]. It all comes back to if you know your rights. Some people feel like they [the police] stopped me and did not find anything, so I am not going to allow them to look in my trunk. But they [the police] could eventually call it in, and eventually look in your trunk. If you have nothing to hide, I don't know why you shouldn't allow them [to look in your trunk]."*

Isaac also made what I thought was a noteworthy point: *"I will obey them, not that I am scared of them – I don't fear them – but I will obey them because of the law. If you have an encounter with a police officer, and it's just two of you, and there is nobody around; if you as an individual, if you try to do something, he is an officer, and he can do something to you, and use it as self-defense. In that instance, if there's no witness, he [the officer] can kill you for [no reason]. So, for me, I will just go ahead and obey their orders, but that does not mean I am scared of them."*

A review of the participants' answers reveals that, on the one hand, many would obey the police primarily because they believe that the police are a legitimate authority. On the other hand, it is difficult to rule out a "dull compulsion," (Carrabine, 2004; Tankebe, 2013), which is the proclivity "to obey the police because of fear, a sense of powerlessness, or pragmatic acquiescence" (Tankebe, 2013, p. 106), as the reason for the respondents' willingness to obey the police. While several of the respondents noted that the police ought to be obeyed because they represent legitimate authority, some of the same respondents seemed to point to the fact that the police could get their way (e.g., by finding an excuse to search a vehicle) if a citizen or community member did not obey police orders. It is possible, then, that some of my respondents may be unaware that their

willingness to obey the police may stem from a “dull compulsion,” a condition that is common in postcolonial societies and dictatorships (Tankebe, 2013), as twelve of the thirteen participants had spent considerable time in their native Ghana, a postcolonial society, before moving to the United States.

### **Comparative Policing:**

To assess and compare policing in the United States to policing in Ghana, I asked the focus group participants the following questions: (1) “How do your views about the police in Ghana influence your views about the police in the U.S. (if at all)?” (2) “Do you have more positive or more negative views of one group of officers than another?”

Roland responded to the first question, noting: *“I don’t think my views about the Ghana police have anything to do with my views [about the U.S. police]. You can see that the Ghana police behave a little bit differently from the U.S. police.”* In response to the second question, Roland stated: *“To be honest with you, [regarding] both of them, I don’t have any positive view. Because even though American police enforce the law more than the Ghana police, most of the time, I think that they [the U.S. police] take advantage of their authority, and they [are], sort of, like a vulture that pounces on prey. So, even though [the U.S. police] enforce the law better [than their Ghanaian counterparts], they have too much power. Their power should [thus] be curtailed.”* Roland, the respondent with the most negative views of the police, does not hold favorable views of either the U.S. police or the Ghana police. He admitted, however, that the U.S. police use the law to make decisions better than their Ghanaian counterparts do.

In response to both questions, Annabelle observed, matter-of-factly, that Ghana

police officers are friendlier toward light-skinned foreigners than they are toward their fellow Ghanaians, a trend she finds repulsive. She thought, however, that both corps of officers did not differ much. According to Annabelle, *“I feel like the Ghana police have changed because, [in the past], they did nothing. Now they’re doing something, and they are getting bad vibes, but eventually, I know that’s going to change. I feel like the whole inferiority complex about treating White people better because they are of a different race, so they are better off than Ghanaians, that, I think, will take a long time [to change]. Just because they [the officers] see someone of a different color, they [the police] cannot say that they [those of a different color] are good people. No, they are the ones that you have to watch out for. So when it comes to balancing, the police here [in the U.S.], they’re doing what they’re supposed to do, they’re paid well, their benefits are good. When you look at Ghana, it’s the opposite; they [Ghana police officers] are trying to do their best, but they are doing what’s best for their families; they’re looking out for themselves as well.”*

Mary’s understanding of comparative policing was captured in these words:

*“They [Ghana police and U.S. police] may be equal, but here [in the U.S.], you cannot bribe the policeman, but in Ghana, I can bribe the policeman. In Ghana, a White man can bribe a policeman with five dollars, and that will be enough for them [the police]. But here, I cannot go to an American policeman and say, ‘Get five dollars and let me go.’”*

Isaac thought that the U.S. police did a better job than their Ghanaian counterparts, however: *“I have more positive views of U.S. police than [of] Ghana police.*

*The U.S. police make me feel safer or secure, in most cases. Looking at the examples we have shared, we can see that Ghanaian police like to take bribes and it is really hard to trust them. Even though I don't trust [U.S. police] one hundred percent, I have more confidence in them than I do in the Ghanaian police.”*

My focus group findings regarding trust in the U.S. police and in the Ghana police thus mirror the findings from my survey data: The survey respondents believe that the U.S. police have greater legitimacy than their Ghanaian counterparts. However, as Ghanaian immigrants' views of the legitimacy of the Ghana police increase, so too do their views of the legitimacy of U.S. police. For example, Annabelle conceded that the U.S. police are better at doing their jobs than their Ghanaian counterparts, but she pointed to better pay and excellent benefits as two reasons for this difference in performance. Tina pointed out that she could bribe the police in Ghana, but it was unlikely that she could do the same in the United States, although she does not believe that U.S. police officers are doing a better job than their Ghanaian counterparts. Overall, the focus group respondents have a more favorable view of the U.S. police than they have of the police in Ghana, which augments my findings from the quantitative survey data.

The focus group participants' responses also lend support to the finding from my quantitative data showing a statistically significant relationship between the legitimacy of the Ghana police and the legitimacy of the U.S. police. In other words, as Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the Ghana police increase, so too do their perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. police. As one respondent noted, a person could argue with a U.S. police officer and insist on his or her rights, but Ghanaians generally

could not successfully demand their rights in a spat or street confrontation with a Ghana police officer. The lack of respect for the nation's laws by the Ghana police implies that money changing hands is usually the fastest way to "resolve" police-generated interactions with members of the public. Overall, the respondents noted that the Ghana police do not treat Ghanaian citizens well.

### **Procedural Justice Policing:**

I evaluated my focus group participants' understanding of *procedural-justice policing* by asking them to imagine that the police had stopped them for running a red light. I then asked two follow-up questions: (1) "Would it make any difference if the police listened to you first before you were issued a ticket?" (2) "How likely are you to cooperate with the police after being listened to even if you don't like the outcome?"

The respondents' answers generally support the importance of procedural-justice policing, but I was quite surprised by some of the answers. For example, in her response to the first question, Michelle noted: "*No. Because, honestly, right is right and wrong is wrong. You know you crossed the red light; this is not [the officer] anticipating it was yellow and it turned to red. You crossed a red light. So, no, listen to me or not, I was wrong. That I don't have a problem with. But when I know I haven't crossed a red light, you're [the officer's] gonna hear it from me!*"

On the one hand, Michelle believes that when people err or break the law, they ought to acknowledge their law-violating behavior, which takes the emphasis away from procedural-justice policing. On the other hand, it appears that Michelle expects the police to explain their decisions to her if she believes that she has not broken the law. It appears

therefore that procedural-justice policing is a salient factor for increasing police legitimacy, provided members of the public are allowed to explain themselves to the police, especially when they believe that they have not broken the law. In other words, when a situation is a gray area, and there is room for discretion, fair treatment may take on greater importance.

In response to the second question, Atta provided a slightly different assessment: *“I believe I will really like it [if I am listened to], in the sense that they [the police] are coming with a preconceived mind. When they [the police] listen and you tell your point of view or your side of the story, they may not take it, but at least you have aired your views. And, whatever happens, at least you’ve been listened to.”* Isaac added: *“I will cooperate with them [police] because their main job is that they are here for our security. They are protecting us. Sometimes they [the police] will be doing something wrong to us, but, at the same time, it is for our own safety. When we go to sleep, they are protecting us from so many issues. So, for us to make their job easy for them, because we as civilians also need them, I think it is important that, whatever the case may be, we should cooperate with them.”*

Atta’s comments indicate that it is important for the police to listen to members of the public, whether or not the police would accept any such explanations. If the police are willing to listen to community members they come into contact with, it will dispel the notion, at least in some immigrant communities, that the police always approach the public with preconceived ideas about who is innocent or who is guilty, et cetera. Therefore, the police would have greater legitimacy if they allow members of the public

to explain themselves, or share their points of view, when they interact with the police. Conversely, Isaac does not place any pre-conditions on why the public ought to cooperate with the police. Instead, Isaac believes that the public ought to cooperate with the police, simply because the police are responsible for protecting society from criminals. In fact, Isaac seems to suggest that minor violations of citizens' rights should be tolerated, if those violations lead to successful policing in the community.

Kenneth observed: *"I believe if I run a red light, they [police officers] stop me, just keep quiet. Even if you didn't run a red light, and they still stop you, arguing with [the officer] will worsen the case. In fact, he [the officer] is gonna charge you more – with different things. If he gives you the opportunity to talk, you just talk, you tell him your opinion. But if [the officer] does not take it [your explanation] and gives you a ticket, just take it and go to court. I believe that whatever happens [in court] will make you happy."*

Tina offered her own perspective as well: *"If they are going to give me the ticket anyway or anyhow, then I don't need any explanation from them [the police]. I know running a red light is dangerous, so if I run a red light and they give me a ticket, I don't mind. But if they [the police] can forgive me for running a red light, if they'll give me a warning for running a red light, then talking to them will be something I will appreciate. If they're going to punish me for what I did, for being guilty, then I don't need them to explain anything further. But if they are willing to listen to me, or pardon me for what I did, then communicating with me would be helpful. But sometimes people run red lights, not because of the wrong reasons; sometimes they run the red lights for something else."*

*But I know it is dangerous, and we must have a law that nobody should cross the red light. But if the police are willing to pardon me for the offense, then [the police's willingness to talk] to me would mean something to me."*

Tina's comments appear to corroborate Michelle's, who believes that the police need not emphasize her violation of the law, as long as she is aware of her own law-breaking behavior. In other words, people are able to normatively assess their own guilt, or the lack thereof, so the police may not have to go beyond a routine interaction with the public to explain law-violating behavior. Michelle noted that being listened to by the police would not matter if she knew that she had broken the law. Conversely, if, say, she did not run a red light but was pulled over for doing so, then the police could expect her to vehemently contest their decision to charge her. Atta observed that being listened to would be very important to him; the police could dispel the negative views African immigrants have of them if these immigrants were listened to during encounters with the police.

### **Police Distributive Justice:**

To gauge my focus group participants' understanding of police distributive justice, I asked the following questions: (1) "How do you think the police usually treat people in your community? Do they treat everyone equally, or give one group better treatment than another?" (2) "Do they treat people differently based on their racial or ethnic background? What about whether they are rich or poor? What about if they are an immigrant or born in the U.S.?"

In answering the first question, Michelle observed: *"I feel like a lot of Africans*

*live in communities that are Section 8, and so they [the police] automatically treat you with that Section 8 mentality. What I mean by Section 8 mentality is, they think that you're in the slums, you're never going to go to school, you're never going to get educated, you're just an African hustler who came here to get money and be gone. Au contraire. Yes, you're here to get your money, you are here to do a lot of things, but you're also here to adapt to the culture. And so you should be accepted into [the mainstream culture]. That's the only way you're going to adapt into it. Yes, there is racial profiling, but in American society, they don't see any difference [between African and African American]; we are all the same."*

Michelle continued: *"Before I open my mouth, I am not supposed to be educated, I am not supposed to be able to speak English, nothing like that. But African people are not ignorant, that's what makes me upset. In every culture, there are people who are ignorant, let's put it like that. I can give birth to a child right now, and as soon as that child enters elementary school, based only on the child's looks, I can assure you that they are going to start asking if the child needs to be in ESL<sup>41</sup> class. It happened to me as a child, although I was born here, [and did not have any language problems in kindergarten]."*

Roland, visibly angry, added: *"The point I want to make is, definitely, the police [are] very racist. The fact is that they just think that all Africans are so poor, and that we don't know where our next meal is going to come from. What's that? If an African is driving, the police [are] much more likely to stop you. But do you know how much a*

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<sup>41</sup> ESL stands for English as a Second Language.

*plane ticket from Africa to America costs? About \$2,300! Can someone who can afford a \$2,300 ticket be called poor?”*

I asked Michelle if she thought that the police treat her better than they treat Ghanaian immigrants born in Ghana. (Michelle is the only focus group participant born in the United States, and subsequently speaks English more fluently than the other participants.) She responded: *“When the police stop me, they assume, **they assume** (she repeated the last phrase slowly for emphasis), that I am African, ignorant, I can’t speak English. But when I open my mouth, I see them [the police officers] retract [as a sign of respect]. And then when they pull up my [driving] record [on their in-car computer], then they give me more respect. Supposedly, I look younger than my age – I am 28 years of age. I have been a law-abiding citizen for 28 years, but they [the police] automatically profile me. But once you have the African look, the Black look, as long as you look and sound African, I am sure that the treatment will be no different.”*

Asked if they thought that the police treat everyone equally in society, or give one group better treatment than another, Mary noted: *“They [the police] treat some people better than others. White people treat Black people different from Black people treating White people. I had a case where a White police officer came to my house, my kid was playing outside, and the officer asked, ‘Whose child is this?’ I said ‘Mine.’ The officer then asked why the child was playing by himself. I said, ‘But from the balcony to the front of the door, I am still watching the child.’ But the officer immediately called Social Services, and also called for backup, because I was arguing with him. When the African-American officer, who responded to the call for backup, asked what the matter was, I*

*explained myself. The Black officer then turned to the White officer and asked him why he reported me to Social Services. The White officer [seemingly unhappy with the Black officer's question] simply said to his fellow officer that he and I should deal with the issue! Because I was Black, the White officer was trying to treat me differently. But when the other officer, who was Black, came to the scene, perhaps his mind was different. So I think that some of them [officers] have their favorite people, and some of them too they just [mistreat] you, and don't listen to you."*

When I followed up with a question that asked the participants to show by hand if they thought that the police treat people differently based on their racial and/or ethnic background and accent, eight of nine<sup>42</sup> participants concurred. The only participant who dissented, Kenneth, noted that not all officers project a bias in their interactions with immigrants. He described how, many years ago, an officer gave his wife a verbal warning, rather than a ticket, for driving her car with only one functioning taillight.

When I specifically asked the respondents if they thought, then, that the police favor White people over Black people, Mary responded: *"I believe that some White [officers] favor their own people [Whites], and some Black [officers] also favor their own people [Blacks]."* When asked if they thought the police favor the rich over the poor, Mary observed: *"Money speaks, so the rich, who have money, will do whatever he or she can to win [his or her case]."*

Asked if they thought that immigrants were treated differently from those born in the United States, Annabelle observed: *"I don't think that [the police] treat them*

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<sup>42</sup> This discussion took place during the first focus group session.

*[immigrants] differently; I feel like they [the police] don't understand them [immigrants]. Like when they talk to them, like when they are trying to explain what the incident is, they don't take their time to say, 'Please speak slowly, I don't understand your accent, so please take your time.' Because you're not wrong when you say that [that is, 'slow down because I don't understand what you're saying']; just tell them I am not trying to be, um, offensive, but I need you to talk slowly so I can understand you. But because the other person has an American accent, they [the police] are eager to listen to that person and take their side, and the person who has the Ghanaian accent, you're thrown on the other side because you can't talk properly, and I think that's wrong."*

The responses from the focus group participants thus reveal that they do not believe that the “*outcomes* people receive (e.g., decisions to arrest or prosecute) are fair and that the *distribution* (emphasis in the original) of outcomes (as between rich/poor, different ethnic groups, male/female, etc.) is fair also” (Tankebe, 2013, p. 111). It is important to note that distributive justice did not have a statistically significant relationship with legitimacy of U.S. police in my quantitative survey data. Distributive justice predicted willingness to cooperate with police, however, although the direction of the association was negative. These issues are further addressed in the *Discussion* section of this dissertation.

The findings from my focus groups support the notion that Ghanaian immigrants view police distributive justice as the preserve of the rich and powerful, and thus an unattainable goal in their own communities. For example, Michelle observed that the police tend to assume, albeit incorrectly, that most Africans in the United States are

uneducated and beneficiaries of Section 8 housing; as a result, the police tend to look down on African immigrants. What the police forget, Michelle added, is that sub-Saharan African immigrants, like immigrants from other regions of the world, expect to assimilate into U.S. society. Sadly, however, the behavior of the police implies that these immigrants reside only on the fringes of society, which makes them susceptible to racial profiling by the police.

Some of the respondents also indicated that members of the sub-Saharan African immigrant community could expect poorer police services because they spoke with a foreign accent. One respondent noted that the rich get better services than the poor, and another respondent observed that the police have their own favorites: White officers tend to be nicer to White community members, and Black officers tend to be nicer to Black community members. Overall, the focus group respondents thought that the police provide comparatively poor services to sub-Saharan African immigrants in the United States.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION**

This dissertation assessed the cognate concepts of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with police in a Ghanaian immigrant community in the United States. I highlight three key findings from the dissertation in this section and summarize their practical and theoretical implications. These include: (1) my findings related to the conceptualization and measurement of legitimacy, (2) the impact of perceptions of the Ghana police on perceptions of U.S. police legitimacy and cooperation, and (3) the importance of police effectiveness for both perceived legitimacy and cooperation.

The extant literature has identified studies that highlight two fundamental approaches to policing: the instrumental model and the normative model (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler et al., 2010). According to Tyler et al. (2010), there are two reasons why people cooperate from the instrumental perspective: fear of punishment for law-violating behavior and the expectation that all members of society will benefit when the police successfully control crime. Thus, the instrumental model is based on people's rational calculation of police authority (Tyler et al., 2010).

The normative model, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) argued, is tethered to the inherent motivation to obey the law that is a byproduct of legitimacy. The public's willingness to defer to police commands means that the public will be more tolerant of police intrusiveness, which allows the police to perform their "regulatory role more

effectively and efficiently” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 519). Because the normative models of policing have shown greater effect than the instrumental models of policing in citizen surveys in the United States, I tested these models in the Ghanaian immigrant community to find out if these attitudes toward the police were replicated beyond the community of U.S. citizens.

According to researchers, procedural justice, a normative factor, increases police legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Procedural justice has been shown to predict perceptions of police legitimacy and cooperation with the police in prior research (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Procedural justice, defined as citizen participation, fairness and neutrality, dignity and respect, and trustworthiness of motives (Goodman-Delahunty, 2010; Murphy and Cherney, 2011; Tyler, 2008; Tyler and Huo, 2002), improves the value of police–citizen interactions, which can be very satisfying to citizens (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; McCluskey, 2003; Reiss, 1971; Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Wells, 2007). Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) important study, prior to 9/11, has shown that procedural justice policing is a key antecedent of police legitimacy.

However, based on results from my quantitative data in the current study, I have been unable to isolate a procedural-justice variable (trust loaded with procedural justice and some distributive-justice items to form a new latent variable that I named *legitimacy*). This lack of empirical distinctiveness between procedural justice and legitimacy has several important theoretical and empirical implications. First, it calls the dominant theoretical models of police legitimacy into question. The legitimacy literature indicates

that procedural justice is a key antecedent of legitimacy, which, in turn, predicts cooperation with the police. If procedural justice and legitimacy are not empirically distinguishable, then findings about the relationship between the two latent variables may need to be re-evaluated. Second, it means that I am unable to compare the influence of normative and instrumental models of policing as I originally intended.

Furthermore, I find that the dominant conceptualizations of police legitimacy – typically measured as trust and obligation to obey – do not apply to this sample of Ghanaian immigrants. Overall, the findings in the current study point to the need to continually refine the latent constructs that undergird research in this area of criminological studies, as I discuss in more detail below.

The survey results also confirm that police effectiveness is an important antecedent of both the legitimacy of U.S. police and the willingness to cooperate with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community. In addition, the findings show that instrumental factors of policing are slightly more important than normative factors of policing when it comes to Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police. Finally, the results from my quantitative data show that immigrants' views of the police in their home countries are tied to their views of the U.S. police.

### **Conceptualization and Measurement of Legitimacy**

Developed from the earlier work of Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002), Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) influential work catapulted the measurement of legitimacy – as a combination of trust and obligation to obey – to the forefront of the study of the latent constructs that undergird police–citizen relationships. Unfortunately,

however, several studies that tested the construct validity of the Sunshine-Tyler legitimacy scale concluded that *trust* and *obligation to obey* were discrete constructs. In this dissertation, I found that *trust* loaded with other variables to form a new latent construct that I named legitimacy; *obligation to obey* was a distinct latent construct from legitimacy.

Results from my factor analysis help determine if the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy are applicable in the Ghanaian immigrant community. In the current study, *trust* and *obligation to obey* appear to be disparate constructs, and not subconstructs of the legitimacy scale, as hypothesized and argued in prior research (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). After subjecting all the variables to PAF (using Direct Oblimin rotation) and parallel analysis, I obtained a seven-factor solution. The 4 items of *legitimacy of Ghana police*, the 6 items of *risk*, the 6 items of *performance*, and the 5 items of *cooperation* all loaded as expected. However, the 8 items of *procedural justice*, the 8 items of *legitimacy* (4 *trust* items and 4 *obligation to obey* items), and the 5 items of *distributive justice* did not load as expected: the 4 trust items, 7 of 8 procedural justice items, and 3 of 5 distributive justice items<sup>43</sup> all loaded together, to form a new composite measure that I named *legitimacy*, as noted earlier. Also, 1 procedural-justice item loaded with the two remaining distributive-justice items to form a

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<sup>43</sup> The three distributive justice items that loaded with trust and 7 of 8 procedural justice items are: (1) “The police make sure people receive outcomes they deserve under the law”; (2) “The police provide the same quality of service to all people”; and (3) “The police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people.”

new composite measure that I named *distributive justice*.<sup>44</sup>

More importantly, *obligation to obey* did not load with *trust*, which confirms similar findings by other researchers (Gau, 2011; Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2009, 2013). The fact that *trust* and *obligation to obey* loaded disparately should renew calls for researchers to be cautious in their conflation of trust and obligation to obey when measuring the latent construct of police legitimacy. Several scholars have already raised questions about both the conceptualization of legitimacy (Gau, 2011; Tankebe, 2013) and the methodology employed to test it in prior research (Maguire & Johnson, 2010, 2013 (*unpublished manuscript*); Reisig et al., 2007). For example, Tankebe (2013) argued that *obligation to obey* was better conceptualized as a discrete concept from *legitimacy* (Gau, 2011; Reisig et al., 2007), and that the relationship between legitimacy and cooperation was independent of the influence of obligation. Tankebe (2013) thus suggested that *obligation to obey* and *legitimacy* were discrete constructs, rather than the former being a subconstruct of the latter (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003).

Because Tyler and colleagues have repeatedly used *trust* and *obligation to obey* as subconstructs of legitimacy, I tested in this dissertation project Tankebe's (2013) argument that only the subconstruct of trust appeared to have a significant effect on cooperation. Tankebe (2013) posited, "[O]bligation was a broader concept to be explained in part by legitimacy" (p. 113), so I not only assessed the influence of

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<sup>44</sup> Correspondingly, one original procedural justice item, "The police make decisions based on their own personal opinions," loaded with the two remaining distributive justice items, (1) "The police give minorities less help because of their race," and (2) "The police provide better services to wealthier citizens," to form a new latent variable that I named *distributive justice*.

legitimacy on cooperation, I also assessed Tankebe's (2013) claim of "conceptual distinctiveness" (pp. 113, 114) between obligation to obey and legitimacy. I accomplished this goal by using exploratory factor analysis to separate all variables used in this dissertation into distinct factors, which showed that trust and obligation to obey may not be subconstructs of the legitimacy scale. Should researchers continue to measure *legitimacy* as a combination of *trust* and *obligation to obey*? The findings from this dissertation would indicate a *no* answer, although the results may be an artifact of the immigrant population surveyed for the current study.

Based on my empirical findings, I define legitimacy as a normative concept of shared values in which authority figures (e.g., the police) maintain a continual dialogue with members of the public, and that this dialogue is fluid/dynamic enough to allow those in authority to adapt to the aspirations of community members. Juxtaposed with obligation to obey, the police should not obtain legitimacy because of some heroic acts of bravery on their part in preventing or solving crime in the community, or because of citizens' fear of reprisal or retaliation. Instead, legitimacy should be normatively conferred on the police because of the shared belief that the presence of the police is beneficial to both authority figures and ordinary citizens for the prevention of crime and criminal activity. Embedded in this definition of legitimacy is the trifecta of latent concepts that undergird police–citizen studies: trust, procedural justice, and distributive justice, which is why I combined all three concepts into a composite measure of police legitimacy in this dissertation.

I argue that it is easier to distinguish between legitimacy and obligation in a

postcolonial society (or under conditions of dictatorship) than in a democratic society. For example, in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, authorities sometimes assume that they possess the normative element of legitimacy when, in fact, it is obligation to obey that is driving citizens' acquiescence to the police. The costs of citizen nonobedience (Tankebe, 2013), which could lead police and other agencies of formal social control to brutalize their fellow citizens without recourse to due process, may trump any belief that those institutions are legitimate. In democratic societies, however, legitimacy is derived from shared values in society – at least in principle.

Isaac and Annabelle, two focus group participants, appear to concede that disobeying the police may bring untoward results, and the police could interpret this sort of obedience to their orders as a measure of police legitimacy. Concerned about this lack of distinction between legitimacy and obligation, Tankebe (2013) noted:

Suppose that people feel an obligation to obey the police because of fear, a sense of powerlessness, or pragmatic acquiescence, but a police agency mistakes those feelings for widespread legitimacy. Such an agency could fail to institute the appropriate reforms to tackle faultlines in police–public relations, and it could be caught unawares by events. (p. 106)

“Dull compulsion” (Carrabine, 2004, p. 180, as cited in Tankebe, 2013), which is “commonplace under conditions of dictatorship and colonial rule where people acquiesce to those in power (that is, feel an obligation to obey them) but do not accord genuine legitimacy to them” (Tankebe, 2013, p. 106), may explain some of my focus group participants' reactions to the issue of obligation to obey the police. With twelve of thirteen respondents born and raised in their native Ghana, it is possible that what they

view as obligation to obey police orders actually stems from their fear of the consequences of disobeying police orders. Dull compulsion and legitimacy may be hard to distinguish empirically (Tankebe, 2013), but the challenge rests with criminologists to continue to refine scales that measure latent constructs in order to learn more about these constructs. “Ultimately,” Tankebe (2013) observed, “to the extent that legitimacy and obligation are conceptually distinct, conflating them can only obstruct efforts to understand both concepts” (p. 106).

I recommend, therefore, that researchers continue to refine the legitimacy scale to improve its construct validity. Undoubtedly, the Tylerian model of legitimacy has advanced knowledge in the field of police–citizen relationships, but based on this dissertation and other studies that have evaluated the process-based model of policing (Gau, 2011; Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2013), the legitimacy scale may have to be disaggregated to obviate the conflation of the discrete variables of *trust* and *obligation to obey*.

In fact, researchers are reaching differing results in police–citizen studies partly because of the use of factor-analytic techniques, which has improved assessments of convergent and discriminant validity of the scale items generally used in this line of research. In order to be successful in undertaking studies that evaluate perceptions of the police, researchers must begin with “test[ing] and calibrat[ing] survey items carefully to ensure that these items measure the concepts they are intended to measure” (Maguire & Johnson, 2013, p. 16). The use of Cronbach’s alpha values is no longer a sufficient methodological approach for isolating items that measure police legitimacy and related

concepts. Factor-analytic techniques, including exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, should become an integral part of studies in this area of criminological research, if researchers are to properly delineate the relationships among variables purported to be measuring latent constructs that undergird police–citizen relationships.

### **Relative Effects of Normative and Instrumental Models on Legitimacy of U.S. Police**

The results of this study indicate that, in the Ghanaian immigrant community, instrumental concerns are more important than normative concerns. From this regression model, *performance* was the primary driver of the *perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police* (beta = .506,  $p < .001$ ), followed by *legitimacy of Ghana police* (beta = .153,  $p < .005$ ), and *risk of sanctioning* (beta = .119,  $p < .05$ ). Findings from my quantitative survey data thus indicate that the respondents' perceptions of the legitimacy of the Ghana police are statistically significantly related to their perceptions of the legitimacy of the U.S. police, and *distributive justice* did not have a statistically significant relationship with legitimacy of U.S. police. In the current study, however, I did not find a clear *procedural justice* variable, as hypothesized and measured in the extant criminological literature.

From the results of the regression analysis, Ghanaian immigrants in the United States, apart from police effectiveness, noted that risk of sanctioning and the legitimacy of the Ghana police are important factors in their perceptions of the legitimacy of the U.S. police. In other words, Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the U.S. police are tied to perceptions of the U.S. police being able to effectively prevent and control crime (performance) as well as create credible sanctioning threats for law-

violating behavior (risk). In addition, the more favorably Ghanaian immigrants view the police in Ghana, the more likely they are to find the U.S. police to be legitimate. In other words, as Ghanaian immigrants' views of the legitimacy of the Ghana police increase, so too do their views of the legitimacy of U.S. police.

The lack of a statistically significant relationship between distributive justice and legitimacy in the current study was surprising. Intuitively, one would expect police legitimacy to decrease with the inequitable distribution of police services, and vice versa. One would also expect police legitimacy to decrease with the unfair distribution of outcomes that people receive in their interactions with the police (e.g., between Whites and Blacks), and vice versa. However, in examining the reason for the lack of statistical significance between the two latent variables, one may note that, coming from a postcolonial society, where police services generally go to the wealthy and powerful, ordinary Ghanaian citizens simply do not expect any services from the police. In a country where the rich get away with the abuse of the poor, or the rich can get away with murder by bribing the police, most citizens simply do not believe that everyone is equal before the law.

It may be tempting to argue that my survey participants are not, after all, domiciled in their native Ghana, and therefore the aforementioned argument may not apply to the entire group. It is important to note, however, that 95% of my sample was born in Ghana, so I suggest that many of them are very aware – personally or vicariously – of instances of police brutality and corruption in their home country. Additionally, having lived through the dark years of military rule, the survey participants may have had

their hopes for substantive police reform shattered, as elected leaders<sup>45</sup> have done little about police abuse and corruption. In other words, the rhetoric has not matched the reality, as those in authority have ignored the need for substantive changes in police practices and procedures that would have adequately addressed the importance of citizens' rights and the rule of law.

Overall, the lack of statistical significance between distributive justice and legitimacy may be blamed on inequalities and the fairly rigid social class system found in Ghanaian society. In a society where ordinary people believe that they should not expect the police to respond to calls from their communities, or that they should not expect the police to make decisions in their favor when they are involved in disputes with the rich, they are simply unable to connect distributive justice with police legitimacy. In fact, if Ghanaians had a Western society-type of understanding of police distributive justice, they would be perpetually angry with the authorities until changes are effected.

When I asked participants from the first focus group to show by hand if they thought that police officers generally treat people differently based on race/ethnicity and accent, eight of nine participants concurred. This finding is important because it means that the U.S. police can increase their legitimacy in Ghanaian – and other sub-Saharan African – immigrant communities by taking the time to explain their actions as well as listen attentively to these community members. In other words, the police must treat all members of society fairly as well as distribute their services equitably. With the notion that the police treat them comparatively poorly, it behooves the police to spend time in

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<sup>45</sup> Military rule ended in 1992, and civilian rule began in 1993, with six successive presidential elections held since then.

these immigrant communities to allay the fears of community members, which would, in turn, increase police legitimacy.

If the police are going to gain legitimacy in the Ghanaian immigrant community, then they must be seen as effective in dealing with crime and criminal activity in the community (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). The fact that most Ghanaian immigrants grew up in a postcolonial society may explain why they place a greater emphasis on police effectiveness than on normative factors in their perceptions of police legitimacy. As noted earlier, the Ghana police tend to be violent and abusive toward their fellow citizens (Tankebe, 2009). As a result, Ghanaians' unavoidable interactions with governmental institutions, such as the police, may explain why this immigrant population considers police legitimacy to be intricately tied to the effectiveness of the police. In a society where the police demand obedience to their commands, rather than rely on citizens' internalized values to comply and cooperate with authority figures, citizens must be careful about how they respond to police commands, which can turn very quickly to aggression against citizens, even law-abiding ones. As a result, citizens have come to rely on police effectiveness as the primary measure of the importance of the police in society.

The current study, not surprisingly, has found that police performance (effectiveness) is the primary predictor of legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community. This finding is important because, in all likelihood, it links Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of police legitimacy to their experiences with the police in their home country, Ghana. Because 95% of the participants in my study were born in Ghana, I argue that their perceptions of the U.S. police may have carried over

from their perceptions of the Ghana police, even though the participants are no longer actively domiciled in their native Ghana.

In their pre-9/11 study of the relative effects of normative and instrumental considerations on the legitimacy of the U.S. police, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that, while procedural justice was the primary driver of legitimacy, perceptions of performance and distributive justice, but not risk, were also statistically significant predictors of legitimacy. So even in the United States, citizens do not discount police effectiveness when evaluating perceptions of police legitimacy.

None of the control variables – age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational difference, and length of stay in the United States – had a statistically significant relationship with legitimacy in my hierarchical regression model. These findings are contrary to what others have found. For example, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that, comparatively, “older respondents, higher-income respondents, and women were likely to indicate lower levels of legitimacy” (p. 530). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) also noted, “More highly educated respondents were likely to indicate lower levels of legitimacy” (p. 527; see also Thompson & Lee, 2004). Additionally, homeowners are more likely than renters to perceive the police as legitimate (Frank et al., 2005; Tankebe, 2013).

The fact that none of the control variables (e.g., gender, age, homeownership, and income) in my study significantly predicted the legitimacy of the U.S. police may mean that Ghanaian immigrants hold the same views about police legitimacy or willingness to cooperate with the police. One reason may be that the survey participants are all members

of the Ghanaian community in Alexandria, VA, and thus share a similar worldview. Thus, it is possible that one might obtain results that are more heterogeneous from a different population of Ghanaian immigrants. Based on the results of factor analysis, the procedural justice–legitimacy nexus (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) could not be tested in this dissertation, as several procedural-justice items loaded with trust and some distributive-justice items to form a new composite measure: legitimacy.

As immigration rates continue to soar (Davies & Fagan, 2012), the police will face greater challenges in effectively policing immigrant communities, and police agencies and officers cannot afford to be ambivalent toward the policing needs of immigrant communities. Davies and Fagan (2012) observed that “many immigrants arrive from countries where violence, corruption, and incompetence are endemic to the police. The fear of the police that may be imported from these originating countries can pose another significant barrier to [police–public relations]” (p. 107) (see also Mears 2001). The police in Ghana are generally violent, corrupt, and incompetent (Tankebe, 2009), therefore Ghanaian immigrants may be more familiar with traditional or instrumental models of policing than they are with normative models of policing.

Research has shown that “[i]mmigrants who have experienced the police in their country of origin as ineffective or dishonest are unlikely to have confidence in the effectiveness of the police when they migrate to the United States” (Davis & Henderson, 2003, p. 566). And Conaway and Lohr (1994) have shown empirically that people’s willingness to report crime to the police is directly related to their former experiences with the police. It is therefore reasonable to argue in this dissertation that Ghanaian

immigrants' perceptions of the police in their native Ghana may have carried over to their new home in the United States. This finding is vital to policing success in sub-Saharan African immigrant communities, as it means that these immigrants need to be educated on the roles of the police in a democratic society, in order for the police to gain legitimacy in these communities.

### **Relative Effects of Normative and Instrumental Models on Cooperation with Police**

I now turn to my second regression model to answer the third research question, which examines the relative effects of the normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on cooperation with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community. Because the original legitimacy variable, consisting of *trust* and *obligation to obey*, did not load as hypothesized when factor analysis was performed, I included *obligation to obey* as an additional independent variable in this regression analysis. From this regression model, police *performance* (effectiveness) was the primary determinant of *perceptions of willingness to cooperate with the police*, followed by the *legitimacy of U.S. police* and *distributive justice*, in that order, although distributive justice was negatively associated with cooperation. *Obligation to obey*, *risk*, and *legitimacy of Ghana police* were not statistically significantly related to *cooperation*.

The focus group participants' responses may help explain why performance is the strongest predictor of willingness to cooperate with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community. For example, Isaac, a focus group participant, observed that police presence alone deters criminal activity. Michelle also noted that, for the most part, the police are

very effective at preventing crime and criminal activity in the community. Mary added that the police are effective at handling emergencies.

There were nuanced responses as well. For example, Michelle observed that the police are more effective at gun control, and at disrupting fighting and bickering among adolescents, than they are at protecting battered women. This last finding is not surprising because, as noted earlier in this dissertation, a newly arrived Ghanaian immigrant wife was unlikely to call the police to report spousal abuse as she may assume that the U.S. police are just as corrupt as the police in Ghana. As a result, not only are the police seen as effective by Ghanaian immigrants, they are seen as more effective at handling certain problems than others. In other words, the police must pay careful attention to the abuse of women in the Ghanaian immigrant community, as these women, despite their victimization, may not be forthright in narrating their situations without some prodding by the police. Here, the police should combine elements of procedural justice (especially quality of treatment) and distributive justice in dealing with battered women, as this approach would increase the willingness to cooperate with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community.

Distributive justice, defined as the outcomes that people receive (e.g., decisions to arrest or prosecute) as well as the fair distribution of police services (e.g., between Whites and Blacks) (Tankebe, 2013), was in the opposite direction because Ghanaian immigrants simply may not associate cooperation with the police with the fairness of distribution of police services. Coming from a postcolonial society where police services are generally the province of the affluent, Ghanaian immigrants may discount the

importance of distributive fairness, believing, incorrectly, that only the rich in U.S. society can expect the full range of police services.

I argue that this community's premise that only the rich can expect the full gamut of police services is incorrect, however, because in principle, everyone is equal before the law in democratic societies, such as the United States, although the police may sometimes fall short in dispensing their services equitably. Even in such cases where the police fall short, steps are generally taken to address the problem, in order to make sure that the same problem does not occur again. In other words, the police in the United States attempt to live up to their regulatory role, even if they occasionally fall short of citizen expectations. Educating immigrants to expect – and demand – police services, then, would be important to increasing their willingness to cooperate with the police.

None of the control variables – age, educational level, sex, homeownership, income, intergenerational difference, and length of stay in the United States – had a statistically significant relationship with cooperation in the hierarchical regression model. These findings are contrary to what others have found. For example, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that “[a]ge, education, and income impacted cooperation, with older, higher-education, and higher-income respondents more likely to cooperate with the police” (p. 530). When age was recoded into three groups ( $\leq 32$ , 33-46, and 47+ years) in this dissertation, however, there was a statistically significant relationship between age and cooperation. Homeownership has also been shown to predict higher levels of cooperation with the police (Tankebe, 2013). In a sense, it is reasonable to expect that homeowners, who generally have stronger ties to the community than renters, would

cooperate more with the police. Overall, the more successful the police are at preventing and solving crime in the community, the safer and more attractive the community will be to prospective homebuyers and renters.

A number of studies identify performance as a key predictor of cooperation with the police. For example, Tankebe (2009) found that, in Ghana, perceived police effectiveness was the primary driver of perceptions of cooperation with the police. In a London, U.K., study, Bradford (2012) observed that both procedural justice and effectiveness were significant predictors of cooperation with the police. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) also found in their first study, prior to 9/11, that effectiveness significantly impacted cooperation with the police, although the researchers did not find a similar result in their second, post-9/11 study. In other words, there is ample evidence in the criminological literature about the importance of effectiveness in eliciting citizen cooperation with the police, although only a few studies have found police effectiveness as the primary driver of cooperation.

In this dissertation, *obligation to obey*, *risk of sanctioning*, and *legitimacy of Ghana police* did not have a statistically significant relationship with *cooperation with police*. Other studies have also found that obligation had no influence on cooperation (Reisig et al., 2007; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2009; Tankebe, 2009). On the contrary, some researchers have found that obligation significantly predicted cooperation (Gau, 2011; Maguire & Johnson, 2013 (*unpublished manuscript*); Tankebe, 2013). As Gau (2011) has noted, the mixed results regarding the obligation–cooperation nexus may be an artifact of how legitimacy has been measured in the extant

literature – as an additive index involving institutional trust and obligation to obey. Gau (2011) has argued, “The legitimacy construct ... warrants further examination, given that one of its subscales (trust) seems to be a better predictor of the other (obligation to obey) than fellow member of a common factor” (p. 495). These differing results mean that researchers should continue to employ factor-analytic procedures to isolate correct factor loadings before any regression analyses take place.

Tankebe (2009) was the first researcher to study the differential effects of the normative and instrumental models of policing in the African context, specifically in the sub-Saharan African nation of Ghana. This dissertation is also the first research study of its kind to evaluate the perceptions of Ghanaians (in a different social, political, and geographical context) as far as the normative and instrumental factors undergirding policing in a democratic society are concerned.

The police in Ghana continue to abuse and violate the rights of Ghanaian citizens. These abuses, in turn, increase citizen distrust of the police. Not surprisingly, 95% of my sample was born in Ghana, which means that the survey participants may have transferred their negative perceptions of the police in Ghana to their perceptions of the U.S. police, as police–immigrant relationships may not be divorced from immigrants’ experiences with the police in their countries of origin (Davis & Henderson, 2003). This transference of perceptions may explain why police performance was a more prominent driver than police legitimacy in the survey participants’ perceptions of cooperation with the police, even though the study took place in the United States, and not in Ghana.

Overall, my research on the intersection of performance, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police supports findings from the criminological literature that normative considerations may not always be more important than instrumental considerations as far as the public's perceptions of cooperation with the police are concerned. As with Ghanaian citizens in Ghana (Tankebe, 2009), Ghanaian immigrants in the United States are more likely to cooperate with the U.S. police if the police are perceived to be effective at controlling and preventing crime. In the Ghanaian immigrant community, this instrumental model of policing trumps police legitimacy, which has been known to be the strongest predictor of citizen cooperation with the police in many police–citizen studies (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler et al., 2010). Largely, Ghanaian immigrants have shown that both instrumental and normative factors predict their perceptions of the police, even if instrumental factors, such as police performance, play a greater role than normative considerations, such as police legitimacy, in their assessments of the police.

The results of the current study show, however, that Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) preceding argument is not a universal phenomenon, and that the specific community<sup>46</sup> in which a study takes place may determine how study participants evaluate judgments about the police. In others words, the “superiority” of normative models of policing is not a universal phenomenon, as shown by my findings in this dissertation.

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<sup>46</sup> It matters whether it is a predominantly native-born or immigrant community. It also matters in which region of the world the study takes place, as seen from a number of empirical studies.

## **Final Points**

A number of findings in this dissertation ought to be revisited in future research. First, I was unable to isolate a clear procedural justice variable using factor-analytic techniques. As a result, the absence of discriminant validity between procedural justice and legitimacy means that I have been unable to measure what I had set out to measure – that is, whether procedural justice predicts police legitimacy. Instead, I found that procedural justice loaded with trust and some distributive justice items to form a new variable that I named legitimacy. Second, the factor analysis results suggest that obligation to obey and trust may not be subconstructs of the legitimacy scale.

Gau (2011) has argued that procedural justice and legitimacy are empirically indistinguishable, a view endorsed by Tankebe (2013). Reisig et al. (2007) have also noted that procedural justice and trust possess a more common variance than trust and obligation, even though trust and obligation have generally been combined to form a composite measure of legitimacy in prior research. Reisig et al. (2007) added that when the combined legitimacy index, which had predicted cooperation in their study, was disaggregated into trust and obligation, however, only the former predicted cooperation; the latter did not. Other researchers have also found that trust and obligation to obey appeared to be constructs of their own, and not subconstructs of the legitimacy scale (Gau, 2011; Tankebe, 2013). This finding means that I had to include obligation to obey as an independent variable in my second regression model, rather than combine it with trust to form a composite measure of legitimacy. As noted earlier, obligation to obey did not predict cooperation in the current study, which is similar to what others had found

(Resig et al., 2007). This finding is notable because Tyler (2006) has argued persuasively that the obligation to obey scale is the most direct measure of legitimacy.

### **Policy Implications**

Before I offer my own recommendations about what policies would improve police–immigrant partnerships, it is important to revisit the Brooklyn Park Police Department’s (BPPD) efforts to reach immigrant community members in Hennepin County, MN. Although police departments in the past did not assume leadership roles beyond public safety, (Ankerfelt et al., 2011), the continued influx of immigrants into the United States means that police must begin to address immigrant community needs, in order to increase safety and security for all members of society.

For example, the rapid increase in the number of Minnesota’s foreign born led to religious and cultural misunderstandings between immigrants and native-born citizens (Ankerfelt et al., 2011). Coming from postcolonial societies (Tankebe, 2009), the newly arrived immigrants, mostly from Liberia and Somalia, assumed that U.S. police, like those in their native countries, were untrustworthy, corrupt, and violent (Ankerfelt et al., 2011). Thus, to increase its legitimacy in Brooklyn Park’s immigrant community, the BPPD reached out to the new arrivals by engaging in “information sharing; problem solving; and, most importantly, relationship building” (Ankerfelt et al., 2011, p. 1). The BPPD specifically provided information to the new immigrants on police roles and procedures in the community. By 2011, the BPPD had reached over 30 immigrant community groups – via churches, businesses, and nonprofit organizations (Ankerfelt et

al., 2011) – in an effort to increase police legitimacy and police–public cooperation (Tyler et al., 2010).

Benefits that redound from police–immigrant partnerships have included an increase in immigrants’ attendance at police–community events, less fear of the police among immigrants, and advice for the police on how to adapt police procedures when responding to calls in the immigrant community (Ankerfelt et al., 2011). Police agencies across the United States need to do more to reach out to immigrant communities, which is why the BPPD’s efforts should serve as a template for effective police–immigrant partnerships. In other words, the BPPD’s success should goad other police agencies across the United States to adopt similar strategies in dealing with their own burgeoning immigrant communities.

The focus group participants provided useful insights into policy implications by noting the importance of educating immigrants about differences in law and policing in the United States and their home countries. Annabelle observed that trust in the police increased with knowing one’s rights, and called for the education of immigrant community members on the limits of police powers. She further observed that a lack of knowledge of one’s rights led some immigrants to excessively fear the police, which resulted in some officers taking advantage of these immigrants’ ignorance and, occasionally, blaming them for crimes they did not commit. Annabelle added that educating immigrants about their rights would benefit the entire community. She insisted that when people know their rights, they would know what they are supposed to do.

Annabelle further observed that the police abuse their authority on a regular basis,

and likened police officers' mindset to that of the president of the United States, who wields tremendous power. In other words, Annabelle thought that the police behave as though they possess limitless power, and thus subject citizens to unnecessary traffic stops, which erodes the public's trust in the police. Efua and Lydia complained that the police issue too many tickets. As a result, I recommend that the U.S. police thoroughly explain their decisions to sub-Saharan African drivers during traffic stops, as these immigrants could wrongly assume that their dark skin color was the primary reason an officer pulled them over. Here, the police should combine elements of procedural justice and distributive justice in interacting with immigrants, which would lead to increased police legitimacy and cooperation with the police in the long term.

In addition, I suggest that the police interact formally (for example, by organizing regular forums) with Ghanaian and other sub-Saharan African immigrant communities where these community members can learn about police roles and procedures. Because many immigrants have an unfounded fear of the U.S. police, police-immigrant relationships would be improved through formal, yet friendly, interactions between both parties. These interactions, if done properly, can be cost-effective.

Moreover, I argue that many immigrants would welcome the opportunity for formal interactions with the police because they expect to assimilate in U.S. society, as clearly articulated by Michelle, one of the focus group participants. In other words, immigrants' permanent presence in the United States means that they are likely to experience contact with the police at some point in their lives, which is why developing a relationship based on trust between the police and immigrants would be vital to

successful policing in the United States.

Finally, because “a gap exists between the requirements of official law and police behavior on the beat” (Tankebe, 2013, p. 109; see also Herbert, 1998), immigrants need to be educated on the importance of reporting police abuse, without fear of reprisal or retaliation, at least in principle. The police, like other agents of formal authority, are subject to the laws of society, so it is important that immigrants, especially those with a rudimentary understanding of police roles and procedures, be educated in police–citizen meetings to empower them to report suspected police abuse. These police–immigrant partnerships can be effective at increasing immigrants’ willingness to cooperate with the police.

Based on the work of officers from the BPPD, it appears that successful police–immigrant partnerships would lead to: (a) an increase in immigrants’ willingness to interact with the police at community events; (b) less fear of the police among immigrants; (c) dialogues about how the police can respond to calls successfully in the immigrant community; and (d) a greater willingness by immigrants to cooperate with the police to combat crime and criminal activity in the community. Researchers ought to test the BPPD’s claims, however, in other communities across the United States to see if the results are replicable.

### **Future Research**

My findings in the current study thus mean that: (1) Tyler’s conceptualization of legitimacy – the dominant model in the literature – is incorrect; (2) my results are an artifact of the population that I employed in this study; (3) procedural justice and

legitimacy (trust) are, in fact, empirically indistinguishable and should be combined into a composite measure in future research; and (4) trust and obligation may not be combined into an additive scale measuring legitimacy. Overall, the current study should be replicated in other immigrant communities to find out if the results hold.

As Ghanaian immigrants assimilate the egalitarian values of their adopted country – the United States – and thus learn about the operations of the U.S. police, their views of the “superiority” of the instrumental models of policing (e.g., police performance) may be replaced by normative considerations (e.g., procedural justice). I theorize, therefore, that sub-Saharan African immigrants’ perceptions of the police in their adopted countries would straddle the perceptions of the police in their home countries and the perceptions of the police in their adopted countries. I also theorize that, as sub-Saharan African immigrants assimilate, their perceptions of the police would shift toward the predominant perceptions of the police in their adopted countries.

One of the ways that immigrant perceptions of the police would shift toward the predominant perceptions of the U.S. police is through regular dialogues between the police and immigrant groups. As the police take the initiative to interact formally with immigrant groups, strongly held, albeit negative, views of the police imported from immigrants’ home countries would be discarded in favor of more positive views of the U.S. police, which should lead to increased police–immigrant cooperation in the long run. In these trying times when terrorism has become an essential focus of agents of formal social control, no member of the community – immigrant or native-born – should be marginalized, if the police are going to continue to keep U.S. communities safe.

Going forward, I urge researchers to test the aforementioned hypotheses using longitudinal studies. Longitudinal studies are necessary to test changes in survey respondents' answers over time, so I urge scholars to test whether immigrants do, in fact, embrace perceptions of the police in their adopted countries as time passes. More importantly, if immigrants do change their perceptions, then scholars need to know what factors lead to such changes. Specifically, longitudinal studies may help to determine if educating immigrants about U.S. police roles and procedures has improved immigrant perceptions of the U.S. police.

I also urge scholars to employ both quantitative and qualitative data in their studies of the process-based model of policing, as most studies in this area of criminological research have depended too heavily on quantitative data alone. By adding qualitative data (e.g., focus groups) to quantitative surveys, researchers would be able to discover the nuances in respondents' understanding of the concepts that undergird police–citizen studies. As Asbury (1995) has observed, a focus group study might be essential if the researcher seeks increased understanding about an issue in a particular group or population. For example, researchers could employ focus groups to address the issue of comparative policing. This line of questioning would help reveal in greater detail immigrant perceptions of the U.S. police, and what changes the U.S. police would need to make to garner greater cooperation from members of the immigrant community. Due to the steady growth of immigration to the United States, the views of immigrant groups would become increasingly important for improved policing in communities across the United States.

Finally, based on the results of the current study, it appears that the police in the United States would receive greater cooperation from Ghanaian – and, by extension, African – immigrants if they emphasized their performance (effectiveness) alongside normative considerations. Because the instrumental models of policing have shown greater effect than the normative models of policing in the Ghanaian immigrant community, it would be important to test these models in other West African immigrant communities to find out if these attitudes toward the police are replicated beyond the community of Ghanaians. In other words, additional studies need to be carried out in the larger West African immigrant community (e.g., among Nigerians, Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, Togolese, and Senegalese), as well as among immigrants from other regions of the world.

### **Limitations of this Dissertation Project**

First, while using only Ghanaian churches in my project is a limitation, as some members of the overall Ghanaian population in Alexandria, Virginia were left out of my project, it represented a useful time-space method (Muhib et al., 2001) for finding the right convenience sample for my dissertation project.

A second limitation is the sampling methodology that I used for my survey. Because the Ghanaian immigrant population in Alexandria City is relatively small, using random sampling would not have been very useful. Getting as many Ghanaians as possible (in a nonrandom survey of members of churches identified earlier in this dissertation project) helped to increase the sample size, and hence the sample's statistical power.

Third, because the study looked at procedural justice, police legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate with the police in the eyes of Ghanaians who attend church in only one city, one would have to be cautious in generalizing the results to other cities, as well as to the overall U.S. immigrant population.

Fourth, it is possible that the views of sub-Saharan African immigrants would be different from, say, the views of Asian immigrants or European immigrants, so caution is required in further generalizing the results of this project beyond the sub-Saharan African immigrant community.

Fifth, my models reflected data on Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police. I cannot conclude definitively, therefore, that these models can be generalized to those Ghanaians and sub-Saharan Africans who have had direct experiences with the police. I also urge caution in generalizing my models to other legal contexts, such as prisons, jails, and courts.

Sixth, in spite of the convenience sample that I used, the findings of the current study may be generalizable to other sub-Saharan African communities in the United States because most sub-Saharan African societies: (a) share a similar history of postcolonial police practices, including police corruption and brutality; and (b) have similar cultural norms and practices.

Seventh, my dissertation did not evaluate the relative effects of other factors for cooperative behavior (e.g., self-interested calculations, habits, or fear), which limits my ability to determine how well legitimacy affects these motivations in explaining Ghanaian immigrants' willingness to cooperate with the police.

Eighth, I cannot conclude from cross-sectional data that police legitimacy leads to willingness to cooperate with the police, or vice versa (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2013). In other words, the use of cross-sectional data means that I cannot determine causality. Longitudinal studies should be employed in the future if the goal is to determine causality.

## CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This dissertation sought to answer three specific questions: (1) *Are the most common ways of conceptualizing and measuring perceived police legitimacy applicable in the Ghanaian immigrant community?* (2) *What are the relative effects of the normative models (procedural justice and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community?* (3) *What are the relative effects of the normative models (legitimacy of U.S. police and legitimacy of Ghana police) and instrumental models (risk, performance, and distributive justice) of policing on cooperation with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community?*

After subjecting original primary data from 304 Ghanaian immigrants who attend church in Alexandria, Virginia to reliability estimates, exploratory factor analysis, and regression analyses, I found that: (1) Police performance (effectiveness) is the primary driver of perceptions of legitimacy of U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community in the United States; (2) Police performance (effectiveness) is the primary driver of willingness to cooperate with the U.S. police in the Ghanaian immigrant community; (3) Immigrants' views of the U.S. police are tied to their views of the police in their countries of origin; and (4) *Trust* and *Obligation to obey* appear to be distinct constructs, and that researchers should be cautious about combining both scales into an additive scale that

measures the legitimacy of the police. I therefore urge researchers to continue to refine the legitimacy scale, via the use of advanced statistical procedures (Gau, 2011; Reisig et al., 2007), to help prevent the conflation of the discrete concepts of trust and obligation to obey in future police–citizen studies. I also evaluated the perceptions of Ghanaian immigrants via two focus group studies; the results of the focus groups were generally consistent with the survey findings.

Hundreds of studies of the police have been undertaken in the United States in the last thirty years, but most of them have focused on citizen perceptions of the police. Although a small number of these studies have assessed police–immigrant relationships, there were no studies on sub-Saharan African immigrants’ perceptions of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in the United States until now, a gap that this dissertation has attempted to fill in the extant criminological literature.

There are several reasons why researchers should continue to study the cognate concepts of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in sub-Saharan African and other immigrant communities. First, in the last three decades, researchers have studied perceptions of the police among different populations, but these studies have focused mostly on citizen perceptions (Gallagher et al., 2001; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), including comparative studies of White, Black, and Hispanic views of the police (Son & Rome, 2004; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). However, “the degradation of police–community relations has been most acute in immigrant communities” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 10); as a result, researchers should begin to focus on the study of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police among immigrants.

Second, if sub-Saharan African immigrants are to become the “eyes and ears” of the police in their communities (Goldstein, 1987; Skogan, 1994), then their understanding of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police must be sought, assessed, and applied to agency decision-making by police leaders and politicians.

Third, a study of procedural justice, police legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in sub-Saharan African immigrant communities is important because of the negative attitudes that police sometimes associate with people with Afrocentric features (Eberhardt et al., 2006). Generally, increased policing takes place in predominantly African-American communities (Fagan & Davies, 2000; Geller & Fagan, 2010), which are similar to sub-Saharan African communities. Thus, this dissertation project should help raise awareness about the dangers of alienating immigrants whose cooperation police agencies need to combat crime and threats of terrorism in communities across the United States.

Fourth, my study of procedural justice, legitimacy, and cooperation with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community should contribute to current debates about the meaning and measurement of legitimacy in the scholarly literature. Legitimacy has been conceptualized and measured as trust in the institution of policing and obligation to obey the police (Tyler et al., 2010). In recent years, however, researchers have called into question the methodologies employed by Tyler and colleagues in measuring legitimacy (Gau, 2011; Maguire & Johnson, 2010). My findings in this dissertation support the views of others: *trust* and *obligation to obey* may be disparate latent constructs.

Fifth, as Davies and Fagan (2012) have observed, evaluating immigrants’

perceptions of their local police agency is important in determining whether these immigrants are influenced by perceptions of the police in their native countries (Davis & Henderson, 2003). I found in this dissertation that Ghanaian immigrants may have carried with them “former experiences with and perceptions of the criminal justice [system of Ghana] from which they emigrated” (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 106), as the Ghanaian immigrant community considers police performance more important than police legitimacy when it comes to their perceptions of willingness to cooperate with the police. In effect, this finding should improve the performance of the U.S. police in Ghanaian and other sub-Saharan African immigrant communities across the United States.

I am not suggesting in any way, shape, or form that the normative requirements of procedural justice and police legitimacy not be considered essential. Unquestionably, procedural justice and police legitimacy are of great importance to successful policing practices in both advanced and postcolonial societies. The analysis in this dissertation has, however, revealed that instrumental considerations, such as the perceptions of police performance, are more important in shaping public cooperation with the police in the Ghanaian immigrant community, as this community members’ perceptions of the police may be intricately tied to their perceptions of the police in their native Ghana. If U.S. police officers and departments are going to be successful in the Ghanaian immigrant community, and others like it, then the police must weave together instrumental and normative models of policing to increase their chances of policing success in immigrant communities across the United States.

Overall, this dissertation has provided timely and unique contributions to the field

of criminological research. First, this dissertation, as far as I am aware, has provided the first empirical study of Ghanaian immigrants' perceptions of the police in the United States. Because immigration of foreign nationals to the United States continues to grow, research studies that examine the relationship between the police and immigrant communities will become increasingly important.

Second, in their study of the Muslim community in New York City, Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq (2010) noted that studying the variation within America's Muslim communities was more important to them than comparing Muslims to non-Muslims. Relatedly, this dissertation project was designed to observe variation within the Ghanaian immigrant community, a goal that I have achieved. Ghanaian immigrants' understanding of procedural justice, legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate with the police, while controlling for age, educational status, sex, gender, homeownership, income, and intergenerational differences, has revealed important information that both the police and the community of scholars may find valuable for future policing efforts. Future research may also capitalize on my findings to increase understanding about police-immigrant relationships.

Finally, this study may be generalizable to other sub-Saharan African immigrant communities in the United States, despite the convenience sample that I used for my data analysis, because most sub-Saharan African societies: (a) share a similar history of postcolonial police practices; and (b) have similar customs and traditions. Thus, this dissertation is an important step forward in understanding police-immigrant relationships in the United States.

## **APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT:**

### **Survey Questionnaire on Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Cooperation with Police: Evidence from a Community of Ghanaian Immigrants**

#### **PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE IN THE GHANAIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY**

##### **INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR SURVEY**

###### **RESEARCH PROCEDURES**

This research is being conducted to understand how Ghanaian immigrants view the police. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a short survey, which should take no more than 15 minutes to complete.

###### **RISKS**

There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this research.

###### **BENEFITS**

There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further research about immigrants' views of the police.

###### **CONFIDENTIALITY**

The data in this study will be confidential. Because this survey will be carried out anonymously, do not include any personally identifiable information, such as your name, address, or telephone number on the survey.

###### **PARTICIPATION**

You must be at least 18 years old to complete the survey. Everyone who receives a survey will receive \$3.00 in cash for your time and assistance. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study, there is no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled (you will be able to keep the \$3.00). There are no costs to you or any other party.

**CONTACT**

This research is being conducted by Daniel K. Pryce of George Mason University, under the direction of Professor Devon Johnson in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society. Daniel K. Pryce may be reached at (703) 870-6818, and Dr. Devon Johnson may be reached at (703) 993-8424 for questions or to report a research-related problem. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Integrity & Assurance at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research. George Mason University Human Subjects Review Board has waived the requirement for a signature on this consent form.

## PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE IN THE GHANAIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this short survey. Please answer the following questions in your own opinion and to the best of your knowledge. Remember, your answers will remain confidential and results will be reported in the aggregate. Do not write your name or other personal information on this survey.

*The first section of the survey asks about your general views of the police in the United States. Please circle one number on each row.*

### 1. In general, how satisfied are you with:

	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied
a. The police department in your city	4	3	2	1
b. The police officers who serve your neighborhood	4	3	2	1

### 2. In general, how likely are you to:

	Very Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very Unlikely
a. Call the police to report a crime in your neighborhood	4	3	2	1
b. Help the police with information on a suspected criminal	4	3	2	1
c. Help the police with information to solve a crime	4	3	2	1
d. Report suspicious activity in your neighborhood to the police	4	3	2	1
e. Volunteer to attend a community meeting to discuss crime in your neighborhood	4	3	2	1

### 3. In general, do you agree or disagree that the police are effective at:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. Controlling gang violence	4	3	2	1
b. Controlling drugs	4	3	2	1
c. Controlling gun violence	4	3	2	1

<b>d.</b> Controlling burglary	4	3	2	1
<b>e.</b> Responding quickly to calls for assistance from victims of crime	4	3	2	1
<b>f.</b> Assisting victims of crime	4	3	2	1

*The next set of questions asks for your views about police service quality in the United States. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement by circling one number on each row.*

**4. In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
<b>a.</b> The police are trustworthy	4	3	2	1
<b>b.</b> The police provide the same quality of service to all people	4	3	2	1
<b>c.</b> The police treat people with respect	4	3	2	1
<b>d.</b> I have confidence in the police	4	3	2	1
<b>e.</b> The police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people	4	3	2	1
<b>f.</b> The police treat people fairly	4	3	2	1
<b>g.</b> The police are usually honest	4	3	2	1
<b>h.</b> The police make sure people receive outcomes they deserve under the law	4	3	2	1
<b>i.</b> The police respect people's rights	4	3	2	1
<b>j.</b> The police always act within the law	4	3	2	1
<b>k.</b> The police give minorities less help because of their race	4	3	2	1
<b>l.</b> The police are courteous to people they come into contact with	4	3	2	1
<b>m.</b> The police provide better services to wealthier citizens	4	3	2	1
<b>n.</b> The police make decisions based upon facts	4	3	2	1

<b>o.</b> The police explain their decisions to the people they deal with	4	3	2	1
<b>p.</b> The police make decisions based on their own personal opinions	4	3	2	1
<b>q.</b> The police consider the views of the people involved before making their decisions.	4	3	2	1

*The next few questions ask for more of your general views about the police in the United States. Please circle one number on each row.*

**5. In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
<b>a.</b> You should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong	4	3	2	1
<b>b.</b> The police should have the right to stop and question people on the street	4	3	2	1
<b>c.</b> You should do what the police tell you to do even if you don't understand why the order was given	4	3	2	1
<b>d.</b> The police should have the power to decide which areas of the city should receive the most police protection	4	3	2	1
<b>e.</b> You should do what the police tell you to do even if you disagree with the police's order	4	3	2	1
<b>f.</b> The police are best able to decide how to deal with crime in your neighborhood because of their training and experience	4	3	2	1
<b>g.</b> You should always do what the police tell you to do even if you don't like the way the police treat you	4	3	2	1
<b>h.</b> The police should have the power to do whatever they think is needed to fight crime	4	3	2	1
<b>i.</b> The police will be able to effectively control crime if we give them enough power	4	3	2	1

*The following questions ask about your personal experiences with the police in the United States.*

	Yes	No
6. Have the police ever used insulting language toward <u>you</u> ?	1	0
7. Have the police ever used insulting language toward <u>anyone else in your household</u> ?	1	0
8. Have <u>you</u> ever been stopped by the police on the street without good reason?	1	0
9. Has <u>anyone else in your household</u> ever been stopped on the street by the police without good reason?	1	0
10. Have the police ever used excessive force against <u>you</u> ?	1	0
11. Have the police ever used excessive force against <u>anyone else in your household</u> ?	1	0

*The next section of the survey asks about the risk of being caught and punished for a variety of behaviors. Please circle one number on each row.*

**12. In general, do you think it is likely or unlikely that you would be caught and punished if you:**

	Very Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very Unlikely
a. Parked your car illegally	4	3	2	1
b. Disposed of your trash illegally	4	3	2	1
c. Made noise at night	4	3	2	1
d. Sped or broke traffic laws	4	3	2	1
e. Purchased stolen items on the street	4	3	2	1
f. Used drugs such as marijuana and cocaine in public places	4	3	2	1

*The next questions ask about your views of the police in Ghana. Please circle one number on each row.*

**13. In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements:**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a. The Ghana police are trustworthy	4	3	2	1

<b>b.</b> I have confidence in the Ghana police	4	3	2	1
<b>c.</b> The Ghana police are usually honest	4	3	2	1
<b>d.</b> The Ghana police always act within the law	4	3	2	1

*Finally, please tell us about yourself. Please check the box that applies or write in the answer.*

**14. Your gender:**     ☐ Male     ☐ Female

**15. How old are you (in years)?** \_\_\_\_\_

**16. Where were you born?**

- ☐ I was born in Ghana to at least one Ghanaian parent
- ☐ I was born in the United States to at least one Ghanaian parent
- ☐ I was born elsewhere (not in the United States or Ghana) to at least one Ghanaian parent
- ☐ Neither of my parents are Ghanaian

**17. How long have you lived in the United States (in years)?** \_\_\_\_\_

**18. Please mark your highest level of education from the list below:**

- ☐ Less than high school diploma
- ☐ High school diploma/equivalency
- ☐ Associate's degree
- ☐ Bachelor's degree
- ☐ Post graduate or professional degree

**19. Do you rent or own your current home?**

- ☐ Rent
- ☐ Own Home

**20. What is your annual income?**

- ☐ Less than \$20,000

- ☐ \$20,000 – \$29,999
- ☐ \$30,000 – \$39,999
- ☐ \$40,000 – \$49,999
- ☐ \$50,000 – \$74,999
- ☐ \$75,000 – \$99,999
- ☐ \$100, 000 or higher

***Thank you for your participation!***

## **APPENDIX B: FOCUS GROUP INSTRUMENT:**

### **PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE IN THE GHANAIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY**

#### **INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR FOCUS GROUP STUDY**

##### **RESEARCH PROCEDURES**

This research is being conducted to understand how Ghanaian immigrants view the police. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to participate in a focus group study, which should take no more than 20 minutes for each participant to complete.

##### **RISKS**

There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this research.

##### **BENEFITS**

There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further research about immigrants' views of the police.

##### **CONFIDENTIALITY**

The audiotape recording from this study will be confidential. The voice recordings will not include any personally identifiable information, such as your name, address, or telephone number.

##### **PARTICIPATION**

You must be at least 18 years old to complete the focus group study. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. There are no costs to you or any other party.

##### **CONTACT**

This research is being conducted by Daniel K. Pryce of George Mason University, under the direction of Professor Devon Johnson in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society. Daniel K. Pryce may be reached at (703) 870-6818, and Dr. Devon Johnson may be reached at (703) 993-8424 for questions or to report a research-related problem. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Integrity & Assurance

at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research. George Mason University Human Subjects Review Board has waived the requirement for a signature on this consent form.

## **PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE IN THE GHANAIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY**

### **FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL**

#### **[INTRODUCTION TO GROUP INTERVIEW SCRIPT]**

Welcome and thanks for taking the time to come here today. As part of my dissertation research, my goal is to better understand how Ghanaian immigrants view the police. Please feel free to share your point of view, even if it differs from what others have said. The range of insights you provide will help us provide useful advice on these issues.

Before we begin, let me share some ground rules. Feel free to speak up—but it is best if only one person speaks at a time, so I don't miss anything. I will be taking notes and audio taping for this same reason. If you have something to say, just gesture. Keep in mind that I am interested in negative as well as positive comments. There are no right or wrong answers, just differing points of view. Please share your point of view, even if it differs from what others have said.

I hope this sounds reasonable.

Regarding the issue of confidentiality, I ask that anything that is said in this room stays here and that you don't repeat what members of this focus group say to others. I also ask that you only use first names.

As a researcher, my confidentiality agreement to you is this: anything you say here will not be attributed to you personally. Although I am recording your comments, this is just to help me remember what was said. I will not identify you in any written report.

I will serve as the moderator for this group. In that role, I will be responsible for keeping our conversation focused on the issues. Sometimes I may not say much at all. Other times I may be more active in leading the conversation. Either way, my goal is to get useful feedback from you about your views of the police. Shall we begin?

**I want to begin by asking some general questions about your perceptions of the police. Please answer these questions in your own opinion and to the best of your knowledge.**

1) Do you think that the police are effective at preventing and solving crime in your community?

PROBE: Why or why not? Are they more effective at fighting one type of crime than another?

2) Would you call the police to report a crime you either witnessed or knew about?

PROBE: Why or why not? What factors make you more or less likely to report a crime to the police?

3) Do you trust the police?

PROBE: Why or why not? Is your opinion based on personal interactions with the police or based on what you hear from others in your community?

PROBE: Do you think the police use their authority properly? Please explain.

4) How do you think the police usually treat people in your community?

PROBE: Do they treat everyone equally, or give one group better treatment than another?

PROBE: Do they treat people differently based on their racial or ethnic background? What about whether they are rich or poor? What about if they are an immigrant or were born in the US?

5) If police officers told you to do something, would you follow their orders? Why or why not?

PROBE: Would you do what the police tell you to do because you are afraid of what would happen if you did not (being punished or retaliated against)?

PROBE: Would you do what the police tell you to do because they deserve to be obeyed due to their authority as a police officer?

**Now I'd like to change topics a bit and ask about your impressions of the police in Ghana.**

6) What are your general views of the police in Ghana?

PROBE: Do you trust the police in Ghana? How do you think they treat people?

7) How do your views about the police in Ghana influence your views about the police in the U.S. (if at all)?

PROBE: Do you have more positive or more negative views of one group of officers than another?

**Now I'd like to ask you about some different scenarios. How would you feel in the following situations?**

- 8) Imagine that you were stopped by the police for running a red light. Would it make any difference if the police listened to you first before you were issued a ticket? If *yes*, why? If *no*, why not? How likely are you to cooperate with the police after being listened to even if you don't like the outcome?

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## **BIOGRAPHY**

Daniel K. Pryce graduated from Bishop Herman Secondary School, Ghana, in June 1987. He then entered the University of Ghana in September of the following year, after completing a mandatory one-year post-secondary national service. Upon receiving a Ghana Government scholarship in early 1989, he left the University of Ghana at the end of his first year and enrolled at the Federal College of Dental Technology, Nigeria, where he received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Dental Technology in June 1993. He returned to Ghana in February 1994 and served as Head Dental Technologist at Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital, Accra, for the next twenty-six months. He became a recipient of the U.S. Diversity Visa Lottery in early 1996, and immigrated to the United States on May 6, 1996. After working in the private sector for a number of years, he enrolled at Regent University, Virginia, in May 2003, completing his second Bachelor of Science Degree in Organizational Leadership & Management in December 2004. Three weeks later, he enrolled in the Master of Public Administration program at George Mason University, completed the program in December 2006, and went back to work in the private sector. Between January and June 2005, while in the Master of Public Administration program, he served as a graduate research assistant to then-Director, Dr. Larry Walters. He began his doctoral studies in the Spring 2011 semester in the Department of Criminology, Law & Society (CLS) at George Mason University, with the eventual goal of becoming a college professor/researcher. He has since held a number of assignments in the CLS Department: as adjunct professor in the Summer 2012 semester, and as an instructor in the Fall 2013 semester. His permanent e-mail address is [dannykpryce@hotmail.com](mailto:dannykpryce@hotmail.com).