


ALLIANCE STRUCTURE AND TRANSFORMATION

by

Scott C. Buchanan
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy

Committee:



Jack Goldstone, Chair




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


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DEDICATION

In memory of my twin brother, James (1975-2002) and my father Wayne (1953-2009).

And

To my beautiful wife Jennifer and my daughter Rebecca, without whose love and support this dissertation would have been completed in half the time.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Air Self Defense Force	ASDF
Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel	CINCCHAN
Anti-Access/Area Denial	A2AD
Australia-New Zealand Army Corps	ANZAC
Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance	ANZUS
Bottom-Up Review	BUR
Capabilities Assessment Group	CAG
Common Security and Defense Policy	CSDP
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe	CSCE
Defense Capability Initiative	DCI
Defense Planning Committee	DPC
Democratic Party of Japan	DPJ
East Asia Strategy Review	EASR
European Community	EC
European Political Union	EPU
Ground Self Defense Force	GSDF
High Level Steering Group	HLSG
International Security Assistance Force	ISAF
Japan Self Defense Force	JSDF
Liberal Democratic Party	LDP
Major Regional Contingencies	MRC
Marine Corps Air Station	MCAS
Maritime Self Defense Force	MSDF
Mid-Term Defense Program	MTDP
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	MACV
Military Committee	MC
National Defense Program Guidelines	NDPG
National Defense Program Outlines	NDPO
North Atlantic Coordinating Council	NACC
North Atlantic Council	NAC
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters	NSHQ
Nuclear Planning Committee	NPC
People's Liberation Army Navy	PLAN
Policy Research Committee	PRC
Prague Capabilities Commitment	PCC

Quadrennial Defense Review	QDR
Revolution in Military Affairs	RMA
Security Consultative Committee	SCC
Self Defense Force.....	SDF
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	START
Strategy Review Group	SRG
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty	SEACDT
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	SEATO
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation.....	SDC
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic	SACLANT
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.....	SACEUR
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	SHAPE
United Kingdom-United States	UKUSA
United Nations	UN
United States-New Zealand	US-NZ
Weapons of Mass Destruction	WMD
Western European Union.....	WEU

ABSTRACT

ALLIANCE STRUCTURE AND TRANSFORMATION

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George Mason University, 2013

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The persistence and subsequent transformation of Cold War-era alliances have puzzled scholars for more than two decades. Using a structured, focused case study approach to examine the influences on alliance strategic decision-making processes, this dissertation argues that the transformation of alliances can be understood as a function of two processes: the first process is the tension between risk and alliance cohesion, while the second is the new patterns of interaction dynamics created by the growth of security institutions following the Cold War. Exploring these factors allow scholars to understand how interaction patterns influence decision-making processes in multilateral and bilateral alliances. After reviewing six cases, the dissertation concludes that alliance management plays a significant role in the transformation of alliances. It also concludes that multilateral alliances are more sensitive to competitive pressure from external security organizations, while bilateral alliances are more sensitive to cooperation with actors outside the alliance.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-Japan Alliance each adopted new policies signaling decisions to match alliance priorities with regional security dynamics through military innovation. In November, twenty-eight heads of state met in Lisbon, Portugal, to adopt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 2010 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security. The document committed NATO to "deploy robust military forces where and when required," and to "promote common security around the globe."¹

In December, Japan adopted its new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) to "prevent threats from emerging by improving [the] international security environment" and "to create global peace and stability and to secure human security." To do this, Japan committed to building a "Dynamic Defense Force" to supersede the "Basic Defense Force."² This new, more flexible defense policy affirmed then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan's desire to rebuild Japan's security relationship with the United States, following a very public crisis in the U.S.-Japan relationship over a military base in Okinawa.

¹ "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, Portugal, November 19, 2010.

² "Summary of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond," Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet, December 17, 2010.

These new doctrines have already been put to the test. During the Libyan revolution that began as part of the Arab Spring in December 2010 and resulted in the overthrow of Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi, NATO military forces provided significant logistical support and air cover to the rebels. Similarly, Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) have conducted anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and provided assistance in humanitarian relief operations in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor incident.

That these alliances are experiencing something of a renaissance is a phenomenon few scholars or practitioners predicted in the 1990s. Indeed, eminent neorealist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer predicted NATO's demise. Once the Soviet Union dissolved, they argued, the *raison d'être* for NATO was removed. In 1993, Waltz predicted that NATO's end was measured, if not in 'days' then in 'years.'³

Despite these predictions, NATO has expanded its membership since 1999 from sixteen nations to twenty-eight, and has increasingly demonstrated willingness to conduct out-of-area operations, including in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. It has developed new capabilities to handle these new missions, including Joint Task Forces, rapid reaction forces, Special Operations Forces, and a variety of other units designed to assist with non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, peace enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction.

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 322-45; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.

Although scholars have become increasingly interested in the transformation of NATO in recent years, few have paid attention to the transformation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, this bilateral alliance has changed significantly since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In the past decade, Japan's Self Defense Forces have deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Straits of Malacca, the Gulf of Aden, and United Nations-authorized humanitarian, peacekeeping, and antipiracy operations. It has built and operated satellite technology for security purposes, and relaxed its Three Export Control Policies in order to enhance its missile defense collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom.⁴ Japan has improved its defense relations with democratic countries in Asia, leading to dialogues between the U.S., Japan, and Australia, South Korea, and India as third-party members of trilateral dialogues. Outside of its trilateral dialogues including the United States, Japan has also engaged in trilateral dialogues with South Korea and China, demonstrating its willingness to exercise a more active and assertive security role within its immediate neighborhood.

The Problem of Alliance Adaptation and Military Transformation

Successful alliance military transformation is somewhat of an anomaly in modern international relations theory, but an important one. Theory suggests that alliances incentivize member states to maximize power or security at minimal cost, thus engaging in strategies of burden-shifting while relying primarily on deterrent capabilities.⁵ The

⁴ Andrew Oros provides an excellent discussion of the politics behind Japan's securitization of space. See Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

⁵ Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, *An Economic Theory of Alliances* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1966); Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "Collective Goods, Comparative Advantage,

absence of an existential threat in the post-Cold War era constituted something of a crisis for U.S. alliances designed to maximize deterrence-based security. Since the end of the Cold War, however, alliance actors are solving collective action problems without necessarily maximizing either security or power, and at increased cost by relying more on conventional (non-nuclear) capabilities.

In his classic *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis argues that a complete understanding of policy preferences and decision-making can only occur when both external stimuli and internal decision-making processes are understood.⁶ In response to a threat, for example, a state might choose neutrality, or it might choose to counter the threat on its own, to form an alliance with one or more other states, or to innovate its military capabilities. The purpose of each of the latter two choices is largely the same: to deter aggression, increase influence both internationally and over an ally's policies, ensure a balance in the distribution of international power, or to fight and (preferably) win wars. Michael Horowitz has argued that an actor will choose military innovation if it is capable of mobilizing the resources and absorbing the organizational changes necessary to effect military innovation.⁷ States may, however, decide that capability aggregation is a better deterrent, and form alliances.⁸ Presumably the decision to form an alliance may be made if a state is unable to marshal the financial

and Alliance Efficiency,” in *Issues of Defense Economics*, Roland McKean, ed. (New York, NY: NBER, 1967).

⁶ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁷ Michael C. Horowitz, *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁸ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).

resources or is unwilling to absorb the organizational changes necessary to effect military change. On the other hand, military transformation may obviate military alliances. In discussing the impact of nuclear weapons on alliances, Ronald Steel noted, “[t]he revolution in military technology, by undermining the need for military alliances, has also made them seem extremely perilous commitments.”⁹ How, then, do we explain alliance adaptation and transformation?

International relations scholars tend to agree on three central facets of alliances: 1) they are formed between nation-states; 2) the purpose of an alliance is to enhance security; and 3) the target of the alliance should be states outside of the alliance.¹⁰ According to George Liska, “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”¹¹ Kenneth Waltz proposed that the structural concepts of ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ explain alliance formation.¹² For realists, the dominant motive for alliance formation is security against external attack¹³, although they acknowledge that alliances may increase a state’s internal political stability or security.¹⁴

⁹ Ronald Steel, *The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe* (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1964), p. 40.

¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1960); George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Julian R. Freedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, eds., *Alliances in International Politics* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1970); Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance* (New York, NY: Wiley, 1973); Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Kent E. Calder, *Pacific Alliance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

¹¹ Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 12.

¹² Waltz credits Stephen Van Evera with suggesting the term ‘bandwagoning.’ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc, 2010), p. 126.

¹³ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987).

¹⁴ Snyder, *Alliance Politics*.

There are several advantages to alliance-forming behavior. Alliances can provide a short-term solution to a regional or global imbalance in power that may lead to instability. Through an ally's military assistance policies, alliances can be used to increase national military power and capability. In addition to the security benefits, one recent study found that alliances have higher incidence of trade between allies than with non-allied states.¹⁵

Scholars have also pointed to secondary or long-term disadvantages to alliance formation. First, the decision to form an alliance indicates a set of preferences; the decision to ally with other powers may result in lost opportunities to advance other preferences.¹⁶ Second, the economic benefits that accrue as a result of this trade generate security externalities, which may lead to imbalances in the international system.¹⁷ Second, imbalanced alliances between "first-world" and "third-world" powers may perpetuate autocratic or oppressive economic and political systems by reordering or suppressing domestic political incentives to change; Hilton Root has termed this phenomenon the "Alliance Curse."¹⁸

Allies faced with an existential crisis to their defense relationship have four broad choices to manage their alliance. The removal of the catalyzing threat, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is an example of one threat to an alliance. First, they can expand, or reduce, the membership within the alliance. For example, in 1994, President

¹⁵ Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 94-107.

¹⁶ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 904-933.

¹⁷ Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*.

¹⁸ Hilton Root, *Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2008).

Clinton suggested there was “[n]o longer a question of whether NATO would enlarge, but how and when.”¹⁹ States might choose to pursue this option to add capabilities to the alliance, increase deterrent or defense credibility or territory covered by the alliance, or influence the domestic policies of the new states. The second option is to expand, or reduce, the missions covered or conducted by the alliance. The recent decision by NATO to conduct cyber operations is an example of this.²⁰ Third, allies can choose to ignore, and therefore not react to the crisis. Finally, the allies can choose to terminate the alliance.

Although many states will choose to develop an alliance, they may also choose to transform their militaries in response to an external event. Military transformation generally occurs when new technologies are married with new forms of doctrine or organization to produce significant qualitative warfighting advantage.²¹ There is significant disagreement within the literature on the sources of transformation. Transformation may be the product of civilian political oversight²², or result from inter-service²³, or intra-service²⁴ competition for resources. It may occur because of military

¹⁹ James Goldgeier, *Not Whether, But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: Brookings University Press, 1999).

²⁰ “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” November 19, 2010.

²¹ Terms to refer to the general phenomena have changed over the decades. Originally coined the “military-technical revolution” by Andrew Krepinevich in 1992, the phenomenon has also been called the “revolution in military affairs (RMA)” and just “military revolution.” This dissertation uses the term “military transformation,” which is generally a broader term and accepts that military change can be both revolutionary and evolutionary.

²² Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

²³ Vincent Davis, *The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases* (Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, University of Denver, 1967).

²⁴ Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War:

mavericks who fight the bureaucracy and act as product champions²⁵, or it may result from a broader culture of innovation²⁶.

States have several motivations to engage in military transformation rather than to build new alliances. A leading state, such as the United States, may choose to transform its military to increase or maintain advantage in key competitive areas, such as the global commons, or to fill gaps in its warfighting capabilities, such as in irregular warfare. Allied states may choose to transform their militaries in order to ensure integration with the United States, provide a key warfighting capability not otherwise available to the alliance, or to improve its power position relative to its rivals. Potential U.S. adversaries, such as China, may choose to transform in order to counter U.S. capabilities, such as developing anti-access/area denial capabilities, or to enhance its power position relative to key interest areas, such as extending its reach in the South China Sea.

Although the subject of military transformation within an alliance has received increased scholarly attention over the past decade, particularly in context of the NATO alliance, U.S. policy-makers and scholars often relegate allied military capabilities to the realm of “niche” capabilities. U.S. allies, however, have accepted a more prominent role in international security. This dissertation uses the term alliance military transformation to describe the phenomenon of using military force, or making new capabilities available to the alliance, in a new way or in a way not described within the alliance’s charter.

Understanding Military Innovation,” *International Security* Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 134-168; Owen R. Cote, Jr., *The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine*.

²⁵ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991)

²⁶ Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

Originally designed as purely defensive alliances, NATO and Japan have evolved to develop expeditionary roles. At the 2002 Prague Summit, leaders of the NATO countries agreed to establish the NATO Rapid Reaction Force and the Allied Command Transformation. In 2006, NATO accepted the lead for security in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); that same year, the 2006 Riga Summit established the NATO Special Operations Coordinating Center, which, in 2009, became the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). Finally, but certainly not least, NATO, led by the British and French militaries, successfully supported – with U.S. assistance – the Libyan independence movement resulting from the “Arab Spring” in 2010.

Japan, meanwhile, deployed three ships in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks to provide refueling support to ships involved in Afghanistan operations; provided airlift capabilities in Iraq; and has increased its anti-piracy and humanitarian efforts and capabilities. Similarly, in its 1995 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan opened the door to conducting humanitarian operations and counter-piracy actions. The 1995 NDPG was a singularly important development in Japan’s defense policy, because it marked the first time since the end of the Second World War that Japan’s policy would allow for its military forces to have a role outside of mainland Japan.

What accounts for the post-Cold War decisions to transform alliance military capabilities? How does the degree of institutionalization influence how allies recognize, understand and shape their response to the changing international environment and influence military transformation decisions? Finally, does the degree of alliance

institutionalization influence internal and external interaction patterns? This dissertation will address these questions by looking at the development of alliance strategic doctrine policies after the Cold War in NATO and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

The Limitations of International Relations Theory

Traditional international relations theory, which was largely developed in the stable environment provided by the Cold War, generally provides poor explanations of institutional resilience or change.²⁷ International relations theory provides three structural explanations for institutional change. First, realist theory suggests that the survival of alliances, and their potential for adaptation, depends on the presence of threat. Second, neo-functionalism suggests that economic integration can lead to spillover; positive feedback from the spillover effects can lead to task absorption. Finally, institutionalist theory suggests that highly institutionalized alliances have invested significant resources in generalizable assets that can help an alliance to adapt to a changing security environment in the absence of threat. None of these theories provide a satisfactory explanation for the evolution and adaptation of bilateral alliances, nor do they suggest directions in which an alliance might adapt.

Robert Keohane has argued, “realism is particularly weak in accounting for change, especially where sources of change lie in the world political economy or in the domestic structure of states.”²⁸ Extending this argument slightly, realism, which primarily engages the debate about whether states are power or security maximizers, is also weak

²⁷ For an in-depth discussion, see Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones, eds., *Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

²⁸ Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, Robert O. Keohane, ed., (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986).

where sources of change in alliances result from dynamics of interaction between and amongst alliance partners. The transformation of military force within an alliance institution presents particular challenges for theorists. Although neorealist theory predicts the dissolution of alliances in the absence of threats, increased alliance military effectiveness also means potentially a change to the distribution of power within an alliance, with potential implications for alliance cohesion. Since many theorists suggest a high correlation between alliance cohesion and resilience, changes to internal power dynamics could also lead to the dissolution of an alliance.

In 1958, Ernst Haas developed the theory of neo-functionalism to explain his observations of integration in the European Coal and Steel Industry.²⁹ Neo-functionalism suggests that change results from institutional efficiencies. Haas argued that when political integration occurred in certain sectors, spillover effects into other industries were inevitable. In sectors where interdependence was higher, interest groups would seek political integration, leading to institutional task absorption. Spillover and positive feedback, therefore, provide strong explanations for task absorption in multilateral institutions.

Following the Cold War, scholars suggested the persistence of NATO and then its transformation related to its supporting bureaucratic structure. One explanation is that institutions will persist because of “sunk costs”: they are costly to develop, but less costly to maintain, leading to potential usefulness when circumstances change.³⁰ Another

²⁹ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).

³⁰ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

argument specific to NATO is that because the alliance maintains a large bureaucratic structure, NATO's persistence might be a result of institutional momentum.³¹ Although this explanation fails to account for change and adaptation within the alliance to new environmental conditions, it has raised a new theoretical variable: "degree of institutionalization."³² Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane have advanced the argument that highly institutionalized alliances will be more adaptable to an environment that lacks a catalyzing threat or power to balance against because "portable" institutional assets provide greater flexibility than less institutionalized alliances. This additional flexibility has allowed NATO to grow beyond the original concept of a collective defense alliance into what they term a "security institution."³³

The concept of portable institutional assets and alliance transformation support G. John Ikenberry's suggestion that successful alliance management in the post-Cold War environment has maintained the hegemonic distribution of power and the constitutional order instituted by the United States after the Second World War.³⁴ The willingness of the United States to exercise "strategic restraint" by embedding itself within its own institutions and subjecting itself to abide by the rules of the institution has reassured partners and facilitated cooperation.³⁵

³¹ Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 445-475.

³² Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³³ Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³⁴ G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

³⁵ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

The Argument, Part I: Alliance Cohesion, Risk, and Transformation

The modern military alliance represents a paradox. It is designed to simplify a security relationship between two or more allies through a formalized promise, but entails significant investment in time and resources to maintain, and is often only part of a more complex set of interconnections between the allies. The modern security relationship requires the coordination of policies, interoperability of military forces, and the synchronization of warfighting capability and military planning. When alliance cohesion fails, it often results in the degradation of the overall relationship between nations. Between the 1970s and the 1980s, the relationship between the United States and Japan degraded so catastrophically over economic issues that Japan, in order to appease its superpower ally, instituted a set of agreements, including a Facilities Improvement Program and a labor cost-sharing agreement, to supplement the Special Measures Agreement between the United States and Japan.³⁶

Modern alliances often have policies subordinate to the treaty obligations that address goals, tasks, and priorities. This dissertation uses the term “alliance strategic doctrine” to refer to these policies. In NATO, the Strategic Concept serves this function. In the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (the “Guidelines”) serve this function. Japan’s NDPG, however, serves as the basis for the formal Guidelines. Since 1995, the process leading to an approved NDPG has been characterized

³⁶ The Special Measures Agreement funds Japan’s treaty obligations. Japan created the Facility Improvement Program and the labor-sharing agreement, which also partially funds utilities costs, in 1978 out of “sympathy” for its American ally. This usage has led to the Japanese term *omoiyari yosan* (思いやり予算), or “sympathy budget.” Host Nation Support increased throughout the 1980s, and peaked in 1992. For more information on Japan’s Host Nation Support, see the U.S. Forces Japan website, <http://www.usfj.mil/>.

by a high degree of interaction between the United States and Japan, and the Guidelines subsequently reflect changes to Japan's defense policies.

Changes to alliance strategic doctrine are relatively rare because they represent fundamental alterations to security obligations. Indeed, the transformation of alliances since the end of the Cold War coincides with many of the changes to alliance strategic doctrine. This phenomenon may be explained by explicitly linking two key elements of alliances: risk tolerance and cohesion.

Changes in strategic doctrine reflect the tension between risk and cohesion. Adaptive alliances – those that are able to tolerate risk – seek to improve cohesion by coordinating security and defense policies with allies. Logically, under the alliance capability aggregation assumption, risk increases when alliances expand missions or tasks, or reduce membership. On the other hand, decisions to reduce tasks or expand membership may be related to reducing risk. In each case, the decision to change strategic doctrine and formally increase or decrease risk in the alliance may be related to cohesion. Alliances that are able to retain cohesion despite pressure to increase or decrease risk experience positive feedback, resulting in greater risk tolerance and a commensurate adaptation of the alliance relationship.

Formal changes to alliance strategic doctrine also have implications for the development of military power. Allies seeking to maintain cohesion acquire new military capabilities capable of executing the missions required by changes to the alliance strategic doctrine. For example, the creation of the NSHQ at the Riga Summit in 2006 has been regarded as a successful development within the alliance, because most NATO

allies have participated with personnel and equipment. Each participating country obtains tangible benefits through new tactics, techniques, and procedures in special operations, standardized with the United States and other NATO countries.

Following the Cold War, allies have exhibited “cohesion-seeking” traits; that is to say, they have frequently sought to coordinate policy on a wide range of security issues, resulting in new strategic doctrine. Since 1991, NATO and Japan have each revised their policies three times: NATO develops a new strategic doctrine every decade, while Japan reconciles its policy every five years. Each time, the allies have increased risk – both in policy terms and, ultimately, in capability terms – in order to preserve the alliance. Japan, for example, in 1995 expanded its legal and security frameworks to build peacekeeping capabilities within its Self Defense Forces, which enabled it to better support U.S. forces in regional contingencies and UN forces involved in non-combat peacekeeping situations.

Between allies, risk is managed through policy coordination, military planning, technology transfer, and combined training. As military capability improves, so does the willingness of politicians and diplomats to accept risk. Highly institutionalized alliances have a higher risk tolerance because their institutional forms allow for improved efficiency. Although NATO never mobilized for combat during the Cold War, it conducted numerous exercises to build combined standards and improve tactics and procedures. Following the Cold War, its institutional assets provided the necessary tolerance to accept risk by expanding into peacekeeping and crisis management missions.

Military transformation improves alliance risk tolerance by enabling allied military forces to conduct a wider array of missions more effectively. Successful

transformation results in positive feedback; allies may be more willing to accept risk by expanding missions when they believe their military forces are increasingly effective. Indeed, NATO's Libyan air campaign in 2011 using precision weapons while also conducting operations in Afghanistan might be viewed in this light.

The Argument, Part II: Complexity and Alliance Management

"Institutions," according to Christopher Daase, "exist to reduce uncertainty among interacting agents."³⁷ The end of the Cold War also witnessed a significant increase in international institutions. John Duffield notes that both the Asia-Pacific and European regions have experienced a substantial growth in the number of security institutions in the post-Cold War era, despite their uneven origins. However, the growth of these institutions has been characterized by important differences in "the degree of formalization, elaborateness, and multilateralism."³⁸

The plethora of international security institutions, a new feature of the international political environment, coincides with the evolution of older security alliances. Alliances facilitate interactions between allies, but the post-Cold War international political environment requires they also interact with numerous external actors. Interactions between international institutions over a policy issue, such as crisis management, can lead to either cooperative or competitive behaviors, as each institution seeks to demonstrate value to its membership. Building on the importance of interaction to evolution, Robert Jervis has argued that the evolution of the international system is

³⁷ Christopher Daase, "Spontaneous Institutions: Peacekeeping as an International Convention," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 251.

³⁸ John S. Duffield, "Asia Pacific Security Institutions," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 249.

best understood in terms of interactions between state and non-state actors.³⁹ These interactions produce feedback effects; positive feedback is self-amplifying when pressures reinforce a change, while negative feedback is dampening when pressures counteract changes. An arms race is one example of a positive feedback loop, because arms buildups lead to still more increases.⁴⁰ Kenneth Waltz has also argued that proximity of competition plays a role in the decision to adopt military innovations.⁴¹ Interactions between alliance partners, therefore, provide a strong explanation for changes and positive feedback effects that result in alliance adaptation. Success breeds success: complexity theorists like to say, “the rich get richer.”⁴²

Complexity theory provides an explanatory framework for how constituent members of a system interact, relate, and evolve.⁴³ The emergence of unexpected behaviors, such as the evolution of alliances, is a key attribute of complex systems. In order to understand the dynamics that lead to alliance adaptation, it is first necessary to understand the pressures that come to bear on the decision-making process. There are several ways in which institutions can interact. A simple framework for interaction is to examine the internal and external cooperative and competitive behaviors. Comparing alliances using this framework is useful because it also allows us, to some degree, to

³⁹ Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

⁴⁰ Jervis, *System Effects*. See, in particular, pp. 174-175.

⁴¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc, 2010), p. 127.

⁴² See, for example, Albert-László Barabási, *Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What it Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life* (New York, NY: Plume, 2003).

⁴³ The hypothesis that a system consisting of many interacting constituents may exhibit emergent behaviors was first proposed in a paper written in 1987. See Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Wiesenfeld, “Self Organized Criticality,” *Physical Review A*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (July 1, 1988), pp. 364-367.

remove the role of the highly institutionalized alliance and view the ways in which multilateral and bilateral alliances react to similar pressures.

By using these propositions to explore interaction patterns, we can establish the similarities and differences in which these patterns produce positive feedback effects in both multilateral alliances and bilateral alliances. There are two important implications of this argument. The first implication is that although theory has ignored internal alliance dynamics in favor of external alliance behaviors, internal dynamics may provide a better explanation for alliance survival and adaptation following the Cold War. The second implication is that if positive feedback reinforces change, then allies should interact more frequently in adaptive alliances than in non-adaptive alliances.

Overview of the Cases

The negotiations over the NATO Strategic Concept and the consultations over the Japan's NDPG are interesting, not just because change in alliance strategic doctrine is rare, but also because they reflect the character and debate of American foreign and military policy since the end of the Cold War.

NATO 1991

NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept was the product of more than a year of close negotiating between NATO allies with competing visions for the future of Europe. The negotiations that led to the Strategic Concept resulted in NATO policies to extend diplomatic liaison into former Soviet countries, and paved the way for the Partnership for Peace. Militarily, the United States used the events surrounding the end of the Cold War to press for conclusion on key arms control treaties to reduce reliance on nuclear

weapons. NATO pared back its integrated military structure, and the allies agreed to intervene in crisis management operations within NATO. Left unresolved were the questions of “out-of-area” operations and NATO expansion, although these issues would be resolved by 1999.

NATO 2010

Upon his appointment as Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen was given the mandate to develop a new Strategic Concept. He used an informal process to advance an agenda with the potential to radically reshape NATO’s missions and maintain its relevance in Europe’s future. Through the new Strategic Concept, NATO adopted new policies recognizing the cyber domain as an emerging threat area and added the mission of collective cyber defense to its portfolio of missions. Coincident with the negotiations that led to the new Strategic Concept was the expansion of NATO organizations outside the Peacetime Establishment, designed to build and execute alliance competencies and capabilities in specific areas such as special operations. The current fiscal climate may jeopardize the advances made in the development of the new Strategic Concept, as nations consider what are truly “core missions” for the alliance.

SEATO 1973-1975

The best chance for SEATO’s transformation arrived in 1973, at a time when France and Pakistan began to remove themselves from the SEATO organization. SEATO had long failed to perform as a multilateral alliance; the United States used the organization’s cover to provide unilateral security assistance aid to Vietnam. In 1973, Thailand and the Philippines sought to pare back organizational functions and reduce

missions, with the intent of maintaining the counterinsurgency functions of the organization. China's growing power in Asia, and lack of U.S. interest in maintaining a presence in Southeast Asia led to the eventual demise of the organization.

U.S.-Japan 1995

Japan's strategic evolution began after the 1991 Gulf War, for which Japan provided \$13 billion, but was embarrassed in the international community for the failure of its "checkbook diplomacy." The 1995 National Defense Program Outline (Japan changed the name of this policy document in 2004 to the National Defense Program Guidelines), reacting to the failure of its 1991 policy, emphasized increased flexibility, called for "defense forces that are capable of *effectively dealing with diverse contingencies* and that can have *appropriate flexibility* to be able to make a smooth response to an unexpected development of the situation by enhancing necessary functions and seeking for qualitative improvement while making efforts to pursue rationalization, efficiency and streamlining."⁴⁴ The NDPO emphasized Japan's role in support of the United States in the areas surrounding Japan, and its role in supporting United Nations peacekeeping missions.

U.S.-Japan 2010

In 2010, Japan began to focus on its role in the defense of Japan by outlining its concept for a Dynamic Defense Force to execute a strategy of dynamic deterrence. In support of this strategy, the NDPG called for a drastic reduction in heavy armor while increasing its submarine capabilities, and improving on mobility and command and control. Perhaps the most radical reshaping of Japan's defense policy since the end of the

⁴⁴ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005* (Tokyo, Japan, 2005), p. 20.

Second World War, the NDPG also authorized the Government of Japan to relax its three export laws, opening Japan's defense industry to non-U.S. partners.

U.S.-New Zealand 1985

With the election of the New Zealand Labour Party in 1984, the United States and New Zealand were set on a collision course of policies. New Zealand, in response to the demands of its electorate, sought to establish New Zealand as a Nuclear Free zone. The United States, under Ronald Reagan, sought to increase its nuclear capabilities and ramp up anti-Soviet rhetoric. Brinkmanship characterized negotiations between the two countries; on the one hand, New Zealand argued that the alliance was characterized by conventional, not nuclear capabilities, and on the other, the United States argued that the alliance was in the maritime domain, and New Zealand's ports should be open to all U.S. naval vessels. In 1986, the United States decided to cut off further discussions and isolate New Zealand from all previous security agreements, although New Zealand continued to allow free passage to U.S. nuclear-armed air traffic. The move hurt both sides, as New Zealand was no longer able to maintain its standards with the United States and the move allowed potential incursion by communist influence into the South Pacific.

Organization of the Dissertation

The adaptation of military alliances, as addressed above, is a difficult phenomenon to explain in international relations theory. Structural realist or neo-functional theories provide unsatisfactory answers when applied to both bilateral and multilateral alliances. To explain the phenomenon, this dissertation will leverage theories

of complexity and adaptation to build alternate explanations of the role of alliance management based on interaction and risk assessment.

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical scaffolding for this dissertation. The chapter focuses on the internal and external political and pressures on alliances to adapt to altered security environments. The argument underlying Chapter 2 is that alliance adaptability is premised on interaction between allies and develops a concept of risk based on the capability aggregation assumption, to serve as a framework for understanding how alliances may transform. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach used in this study, including the hypotheses and the case selection methodology. The case study examinations follow in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 explores the NATO and SEATO cases, while Chapter 5 examines the Japan and United States-New Zealand (ANZUS) cases. At the end of each case, a table listing each question asked of the cases will provide responses to those questions. The table developed at the end of each case will serve as the basis for the analysis in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 will conclude with policy implications and outline areas for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The problem of alliance transformation, introduced in the previous chapter, originates at the intersection of international relations, foreign policy, organizational change, and military transformation, and demonstrates a contemporary problem not easily explained by the political science literature. Although there is abundant literature on post-Cold War changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, international relations lacks a comprehensive framework for how these institutions adapt. Indeed, the issue of alliance adaptation is almost uniquely a post-Cold War phenomenon, and NATO, as the most important alliance in the current security environment, has occupied much of the attention in this area.

At the same time, irregular conflicts became an essential component of the strategic environment following the end of the Cold War. These irregular conflicts were largely the product of internal conflicts, rather than the external issues between states that dominated the landscape of the Cold War. How states, particularly the United States, defined the value of alliances changed as a result. Historically, the United States defined the value of its alliances as a function of maintaining the stability of the global order through deterrence. Today, alliances attempt to provide stability by reducing tensions within states through counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability, and reconstruction operations. NATO, for example, played a key role in Afghanistan and Iraq after

September 11, 2001, while also assisting rebels in their efforts to change the regime in Libya in 2011.

Although its evolution has faced significant obstacles, features of the international and domestic milieu created a permissible environment for the transformation of America's alliance system. First, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 against the United States generated support from both NATO countries and Japan. On September 12, 2001, for the first time in its history, NATO exercised its Article 5 power. Similarly, Japan quickly passed a special measures law and in December 2001, deployed Maritime Self Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean to refuel ships supporting operations in Afghanistan.⁴⁵

Second, no large domestic coalitions have opposed the transformation of U.S. alliances since the end of the Cold War. In 1960, for example, the United States and Japan revised and updated their security treaty, leading to fierce public opposition. During negotiations of the treaty, Kishi Nobusuke, who served as prime minister from 1957 to 1960, sought to eliminate unequal parts of the 1951 treaty, including the clause permitting U.S. intervention in domestic disturbances, an explicit U.S. security guarantee, a voice on U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and a fixed term for the treaty.⁴⁶ The Japan Socialist Party opposed the treaty and rallied hundreds of thousands of protestors during final Diet deliberations, leading to the cancellation of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's

⁴⁵ Under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, the Democratic Party of Japan allowed the Special Measures Law authorizing the refueling mission to expire in February 2010. See Martin Fackler, "Japan Ends Naval Support for Afghan War," (January 15, 2010). Retrieved on January 1, 2012 at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/world/asia/16japan.html?ref=asia>.

⁴⁶ Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York, NY: The Century Foundation, 2007), p. 237.

visit to mark the new security treaty. Although some academics, pundits, and members of the U.S. Senate have opposed continued investment in alliance capabilities, few others within the U.S. political milieu have seriously questioned the value of the alliance system.⁴⁷

Following the Cold War, America's alliances were placed in an interesting situation. On the one hand, significant changes were being demanded in mission, structure, and resources. On the other hand, institutions tend to resist change; indeed, the majority of the literature on military transformation attempts to explain how, why, and when military organizations adopt innovation.⁴⁸ As with any organization, the process of decision-making is essential to the ability of an alliance to adapt to new circumstances and transform its military capabilities. Indeed, the structure or behavior of an organization becomes secondary if the decision-making structure supported does not yield decisions. This may result either from the preferences of decision-makers or the process that supports them. A study on alliance transformation cannot be fully addressed without some attention to the decision-making process.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ With respect to opposition from members of the U.S. Senate, this was particularly in the context of the decision to expand NATO membership.

⁴⁸ More detailed discussions of the problems of introducing change, both minor and dramatic, can be found in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, NY: John Wiley, 1958); Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (New York, NY: Little, Brown, 1967); Herbert Kaufman, *The Limits of Organizational Change* (Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1971); Neal Gross, Joseph B. Giaquinta, and Marilyn Bernstein, *Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1971); and Gene W. Dalton, Paul R. Lawrence, and Larry E. Grenier, eds., *Organizational Change and Development* (New York, NY: Richard D. Irwin, 1970).

⁴⁹ The Department of Defense has increased emphasis on reforming decision-making structures, most visibly in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. See Christopher Lamb and Irving Lachow, "Reforming Pentagon Strategic Decisionmaking," *Strategic Forum*, No 221 (July 2006) and U.S. Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: January 2006).

James Pfiffner notes that, “[m]uch of the decision-making literature after World War II focused on the limitations of the rational model.”⁵⁰ Scholars found that human behavior rarely conformed to rational expected-utility models, in which policy preferences were equated to known, fixed outcomes and actors sought to maximize utility, or benefits, to achieve those outcomes. Critiques such as this gave birth to the study of other theories of decision-making, such as bounded rationality. The shift in emphasis also led to the emergence of new analytical techniques that used different methods for deconstructing problems and answering strategic questions.⁵¹ These multiple theories of decision-making are particularly important aides for understanding strategic decision-making within alliance structures.

The political structure of an alliance also plays a key role in the decision-making process. Alliance structure is a function both of the membership of the alliance and of how that membership chooses to interact with each other. Allies may choose to interact through an organization, such as NATO or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), or more directly, through a bilateral alliance structure. In the case of SEATO, which was modeled on NATO, decisions were made unanimously. The choice by France and Pakistan not to participate, therefore, was a strong component in the failures to intervene in conflicts in Laos, Thailand⁵², and South Vietnam.

The rest of this chapter is organized around three core sections. The first section reviews the logic of alliance formation and management and military transformation

⁵⁰ James P. Pfiffner, “Presidential Decision-making: Rationality, Advisory Systems, and Personality,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 2005), p. 217.

⁵¹ See Paul K. Davis, Jonathan Kulick, and Michael Egner, *Implications of Modern Decision Science for Military Decision Support Systems* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).

⁵² George Modelski, ed., *SEATO: Six Studies* (Melbourne: National Australian University, 1962).

policy imperatives. The second section addresses the role interaction and feedback play in alliance transformation. The final section addresses strategic doctrine in the NATO and U.S.-Japan alliances.

Part I: Alliance Theory and Military Transformation

The assumption that alliances are formed to aggregate capabilities, particularly for deterrence, underpins most theories of alliance formation and management.⁵³ The assumption is generally based on observations of NATO, and present interesting questions on the choices to form multilateral versus bilateral alliances. The decision to ally bilaterally suggests that capability aggregation may not be the singular goal of alliances. Victor Cha, for example, suggests that the development of the “hub and spokes” system of U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region can be understood through the concept of “powerplay,” which refers to the “construction of an asymmetric alliance designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions.”⁵⁴

The choice to integrate into multilateral alliances may also go beyond capability aggregation. G. John Ikenberry suggests that great powers may lose some measure of control when they choose to integrate themselves into multilateral institutions, but they may gain significant credibility. U.S. power and credibility, for example, is most effective when it embeds itself into the institutions it helped to create.⁵⁵

⁵³ Various studies have linked the aggregation of capabilities, particularly those used for deterrence, to cohesion between the allies. See Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 21.

⁵⁴ Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security* Vol 34, No 3 (Winter 2009/10), p. 158.

⁵⁵ G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Institutionalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 71-87; Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo,

Joseph Lepgold's analysis of NATO from 1960 to 1990 provides valuable insights into the workings of a declining hegemon. As a hegemon's power declines, he suggests, its commitments may exceed its available resources. While an increase in U.S. conventional forces in Europe is more resource intensive, an increase in nuclear deterrence leads to an increased incentive to free ride. Lepgold notes that, "a declining hegemon's relative opportunity costs will grow even if its structural power remains intact."⁵⁶ He concludes that the United States overcommitted in Europe due to a preference for the sharply defined bi-polar environment of the Cold War, and fears of European "Finlandization" (the decision by weaker countries not to adopt confrontational policies towards an opposing superpower).⁵⁷

Alliance Formation

Alliances are a central feature of international relations; scholars generally agree that it is "impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances."⁵⁸ International relations scholars have defined alliances as "*formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.*"⁵⁹ This definition highlights several important qualities of an alliance for theory. First, realists suggest that alliances are a subset of state alignments. State alignment may result from common historical background, language, or ideological

and Andrew Moravcsik, "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 1-31.

⁵⁶ Joseph Lepgold, *The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960-1990* (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 17.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 3.

⁵⁹ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. Italics in the original.

orientation. Second, alliances are formed for security reasons, either offense or defense, or to ensure neutrality under specific conditions. A growing literature focuses on reliability, or unpredictability, in the formation of alliances. Unpredictability, however, is an important feature of realist theory of alliance management. Finally, the definition focuses on the concept that states ally against outside power or threats under specific circumstances; the alliance will disintegrate when those circumstances are no longer valid. As George Liska suggests in his influential *Nations in Alliance*, “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.”⁶⁰

Realists tend to explain alliance formation as the result of three primary variables: power, threat, or interest. The relative distribution of power is a primary theoretical variable for Realists interested in explaining the structure of international politics. In order to explain Liska’s observation about alliances in structural terms, Kenneth Waltz proposed that states can choose between two distinct policies of alignment: balancing and bandwagoning.⁶¹ These rival behaviors have together become the basis for much of our understanding of alliance formation, and subsequent behavior. States seek to maximize power, or to ensure survival; they will therefore seek to bandwagon with a more powerful state in order to grow territory or maximize power. States will more often seek to balance against a hegemonic power in order to ensure survival.

Stephen Walt refines the balance of power by formulating a balance of threat hypothesis.⁶² For realists, cooperation amongst states is unusual and only occurs under

⁶⁰ Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 12.

⁶¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc, 2010), p. 126.

⁶² Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

extraordinary circumstances. Walt suggests, therefore, that state intentions matter when choosing to form an alliance. However, the choice between these policies is often constrained by the size and power of the state. Smaller powers, for example, often seek to bandwagon, rather than balance, because they are unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of a conflict. On the other hand, alignment with a stronger power may turn a losing coalition into a winning one, “because their capabilities may play a key difference in the outcome of a conflict.”⁶³

The balance of interest theory challenges the idea that security concerns underlie balancing and bandwagoning behaviors. George Liska originally proposed the concept that alliances may form as a result of “identical interests.”⁶⁴ Randall Schweller’s formulation suggests that alliances may be formed as a response to both threats and opportunities.⁶⁵ While the aim of balancing is to ensure self-preservation, thus minimizing loss, the goal of bandwagoning is to gain either power or territory.

Democratic Peace Theory offers a useful alternative explanation of alliance formation preferences to the balance of power, threat, or interest concepts. International relations scholars tend to agree that ideologically similar states are more likely to ally, and that alliances are most likely to form between states that share political, cultural, or social traits. Democratic Peace Theory focuses on democratic governance and process and studies how it affects the choices of allies; important characteristics include the level of democratic governance, such as constitutional law, representation, and the separation

⁶³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 1.

⁶⁴ Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 27.

⁶⁵ Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 74.

of powers, for those states seeking to ally with similar states.⁶⁶ This theory helps to explain NATO's expansion after the Cold War; the main justification is that NATO membership would help Eastern European countries complete the transition from communism. Michael Doyle notes, "even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."⁶⁷ Conflict between the states would be more difficult and slower because "liberal states do exercise peaceful restraints and a separate peace exists among them. And this peace provides a solid foundation for the United States' crucial alliances with the liberal powers."⁶⁸

Alliance Management

The study of alliances has a relatively short history in international politics, but a considerable amount of scholarly attention has been directed to the issue of cohesion. This may in no small part be due to the capability aggregation function of alliances. A primary assumption of most scholarship on alliances is the concept that states form alliances in order to pool resources.⁶⁹ Most scholars further assume that cohesion is a necessary condition for effectiveness. For example, studies conducted during the Cold War closely linked cohesion to alliance duration and performance, the growth of capabilities, and the credibility of deterrence. In a comprehensive assessment of cohesion, Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan define cohesion in behavioral

⁶⁶ Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol 80, No 4 (December 1986), p. 1156.

⁶⁷ Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," *International Politics and Contemporary Issues*, ed. by Robert Art and Robert Jervis (New York, NY: Longman, 2003), p. 97.

⁶⁸ Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," p. 1156.

⁶⁹ Capability aggregation is a necessary precondition for state balancing or bandwagoning behaviors, as described in Chapter 1.

terms as “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities toward those ends.”⁷⁰ This is the definition I adopt in this dissertation.

The number of actors within the alliance and its decision-making structure are closely linked to alliance cohesion. Coalitions before the First World War often suffered from poor staff coordination, dissimilar logistical and supply systems, and mismatched organizational structures – in addition to mistrust between countries and incompatible political or military goals. Napoleon once famously stated, “If I must make war, I prefer it to be against a coalition.”⁷¹ A century later, Marshal Foch remarked, “My admiration for Napoleon has shrunk since I found out what a coalition was.”⁷² As George Liska has stated, “The requirements of alliance cohesion may, but do not necessarily, coincide with those of alliance efficacy.”⁷³ With the end of the Cold War, U.S. investments in training, education, and military assistance have paid dividends as its alliance system has not only increased in membership, but has also remained relatively effective. While large alliances are generally considered less cohesive and effective than smaller alliances, NATO’s expansion and subsequent involvement in operations in Afghanistan and Libya have generated significant scholarly attention, particularly given the relatively high degree of operational success for NATO forces involved in those operations.

⁷⁰ Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance: Comparative Studies* (New York, NY: Wiley, 1973), p. 16.

⁷¹ Quoted in Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: The Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 402.

⁷² Quoted in Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 125.

⁷³ Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 116.

While cohesion would indeed seem to correlate highly with alliance performance, relaxing the alliance cohesion assumption allows for a broader range of alliance behavior. With the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union, an alliance-inducing external threat disappeared from the security landscape. North Korea did not begin to threaten Japan until its missile test in 1998, although its nuclear saber-rattling in 1993 was eye-opening. Although the allies within the U.S. alliance system (most particularly the United States) determined that the continued existence of the alliance system was of more value than its dissolution, the wide range in policy goals over roles, purpose, and force structure assured that cohesion was not high within NATO or the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

An emerging body of literature indicates that alliances perform a variety of functions beyond the scope of the capability aggregation model. Most of these arguments concern the effect of an alliance on relations between allies. Paul Schroeder, in analyzing nineteenth century-alliances, has argued that alliances were used to control partners.⁷⁴ Patricia Weitsman has demonstrated that a broader range of alliance behaviors may be explained if the alliance cohesion and capability aggregation theories are relaxed.⁷⁵ The admission of Turkey and Greece into NATO in 1952, therefore, can be explained as a rational decision to admit “dangerous allies” that did not contribute to aggregate

⁷⁴ Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1976), pp. 227-262.

⁷⁵ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Patricia A. Weitsman, “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 156-92.

capability, but whose admission to the alliance would lead to greater influence over their security policies.

The functions of military alliances are not limited to pure deterrence in peacetime. Alliances and other security institutions function to coordinate security policies across member states. NATO's Strategic Concept, for example, may be viewed as an alliance policy developed and coordinated through NATO's membership. To understand why an alliance adapts, therefore, it is necessary to understand how allies interact with one another within the context of the alliance.

Bargaining. Military alliances are forms of international cooperation that may form bodies or organizations to facilitate bargaining between the allies. Three key variables influence the outcome of international bargaining: interest, power, and the credibility of commitment.⁷⁶ Rewards accrue to powerful states with a history of unreliability: according to Glenn Snyder, a state's bargaining power is highest when its dependence is low, its commitment is loose, and its interests at stake are great. A state's benefits are likely to decrease and its costs to increase, therefore, if it is seen as a reliable partner.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 166. Also see Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice of Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 4.

⁷⁷ This point has also been recently made by Stephen Walt, "Does the U.S. Still Need to Reassure Its Allies?" *Foreign Policy Online* (December 5, 2011). Found at: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem. However, a policy of unreliability may lead potential future allies to choose not to ally with an unreliable partner, although some scholars have argued that if unreliability is an acceptable practice, then it should not impede alliance formation. For more on this discussion, see James D. Morrow, "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Arms, Alliances, and Cooperation: Formal Models and Empirical Tests (Jun., 1994), pp. 270-297 and Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 5 (Oct., 2000), pp. 686-699.

Alliance bargaining covers a large set of issues, including war planning and preparedness, burdensharing, war strategy and goals, and common military action or tactics. It also covers negotiations over whether to establish combined organizations and doctrine. Frequency and iteration of bargaining can help shape the image of the adversary, including the need for strategies to evaluate the adversary's intentions and capabilities.⁷⁸ During NATO's negotiations over the strategic concept of Flexible Response, for example, variation in threat perceptions led to diverging assessments of deterrence. The broad wording that resulted from the negotiations made it possible for the allies to develop multiple strategies for response to potential Soviet aggression.⁷⁹

Burdensharing. Burdensharing is the dominant category of alliance management theory. Initially developed in the 1960s, burdensharing can be divided into two primary models. The first model is the pure public goods model, made famous through a series of studies developed by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser. The concept is that allies contribute to a pure public good, usually deterrence, with nonrival and nonexcludable benefits. The origins of the theory can be found in Mancur Olson's *Logic of Collective Action*, in which he suggests that his theory could explain observed tendencies for large countries to "bear disproportionate shares of the burdens of multinational organizations, like the United Nations and NATO, and could help explain some of the popularity of neutralism among smaller countries."⁸⁰ In *An Economic Theory of Alliances*, Olson and Zeckhauser examine the issue of burdensharing in NATO by relying on deterrence as a

⁷⁸ Ivan Dinev Ivanov, *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2011).

⁷⁹ Ivo Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces Since 1967* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 23-38.

⁸⁰ Mancur Olson, *Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 36.

pure public good. The key limiting assumption in this study was that the marginal cost of defense was equal for all alliance partners. Their theory suggests that, particularly in multilateral alliances, one should expect to see smaller powers exploiting the capabilities provided to the alliance by larger powers. Their examination still provides the basis for much of the thinking on the problems of pure public goods in the context of alliances between large and small powers and the “free ridership” that follows.⁸¹ In a follow-on study published in 1967, Olson and Zeckhauser began to break apart some of their assumptions, particularly the marginal cost of defense across alliance partners. They found that, at times, a low-cost ally may bear a greater share of the defense burden than a larger ally if the smaller ally possesses a sufficiently high cost advantage.⁸²

In 1967, Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou designed the second model of burdensharing, called the “joint product model,” which refers to the mixture of strategic to conventional forces available to an alliance.⁸³ He became the first to develop a scenario in which goods that are public within an ally may be private within an alliance.⁸⁴ While strategic forces are generally assumed to be public to an alliance, each ally’s conventional forces are frequently not available to the alliance without the agreement of

⁸¹ Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, *An Economic Theory of Alliances* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1966); this study was also published as an article: see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” *Review of Economic Statistics*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (1966), pp. 266-79.

⁸² Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “Collective Goods, Comparative Advantage, and Alliance Efficiency,” in *Issues of Defense Economics*, Roland McKean, ed. (New York, NY: NBER, 1967). Also see Kar-yiu Wong, “Foreign Trade, Military Alliance, and Defense-Burden Sharing,” *Defense Economics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1991), pp. 83-103; and Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, “Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action,” in *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol XXXIX (September 2001), pp. 869-896.

⁸³ Joint product modelers appear to use the term “strategic forces” to denote “nuclear forces” or weapons, rather than the more recent concept of strategic forces as “long-range” (vice forward-deployed, or tactical) forces.

⁸⁴ Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou, “Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies,” *Review of Economic Statistics*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (1967), pp. 527-36.

the ally. In one study examining shifts in NATO's doctrine, Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley suggest that the strategic doctrine of an alliance can have important allocative implications by influencing the mix of joint products.⁸⁵ For example, when NATO shifted its strategic doctrine from Mutually Assured Destruction to Flexible Response, thereby shifting from a reliance on purely strategic weapons to a mixture of strategic and conventional forces, the incentive to free ride decreased.⁸⁶

Recent contributions to the literature on NATO transformation have focused on James Buchanan's club theory of goods. The club theory suggests that not all collective goods are purely public goods; under conditions where it is possible to exclude or include membership, only members of the organization will benefit from certain collective goods. The theory further assumes that property rights will be adjusted to allow for optimal exclusion (or inclusion).⁸⁷ Using this theory, Ivan Dinev Ivanov has suggested that NATO may be viewed as a club: there is a cost associated with membership, and members may accrue both collective and private benefits as a result of their membership in the alliance.⁸⁸ This theory provides a strong structural explanation of observed alliance negotiation dynamics. Alliance members may form blocs of power or "sub-clubs" of homogenous states to advance policy preferences within a bargaining environment. For example, in NATO's most recent strategic concept, homogenous sub-clubs included the

⁸⁵ Sandler and Hartley, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," p. 879.

⁸⁶ Sandler and Hartley, "Economics of Alliances." Also see James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 25, No. 1-2 (1984), pp. 83-101.

⁸⁷ James M. Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of Clubs," *Economica*, Vol 32, No 125 (Feb., 1965), pp. 1-14.

⁸⁸ Ivanov, *Transforming NATO*.

Western, Central, and Eastern blocs of NATO countries, all with differing security goals and preferences.⁸⁹

Alliance Politics. Communications in alliance management, however, requires more than just bargaining behavior. Crisis events may require an understanding of the ally's internal procedures or priorities, or risk muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed expectations, and paranoid reactions.⁹⁰ In an important early work on the role of bureaucratic politics in alliance theory, Richard Neustadt uses the Suez Crisis and the Skybolt Affair to ask how two allies can mishandle crises to the detriment of the interests of both of the allies. He explains how "longstanding institutional arrangements joined these governments at many levels," and "history and language and acquaintance added qualitative strength to those entanglements."⁹¹ Neustadt arrives at the conclusion that in alliances between friends, misperceptions can generate crises in proportion to the "intimacy of relations."⁹² He elaborates, "we were tripped up by nuances."⁹³

Beginning in the 1990s, Wallace Thies and others observed NATO's evolution from military alliance to security community. Security communities are "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some

⁸⁹ Hans Binnendijk outlined the differing security goals of these groups of nations during an interview with the author on October 30, 2011.

⁹⁰ This lesson was reinforced by Louise Richardson's subsequent analysis, in a comparative review of the events of the Suez Canal and Falklands Crises. See Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During Suez and the Falklands Crisis* (New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 1996).

⁹¹ Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 3.

⁹² Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, p. 16. For further discussion on the role of misperception in bureaucratic politics between allies, see Richardson, *When Allies Differ*; and Louise Mary Richardson, *Managing Allies and Being Managed by Alliances: Suez and the Falklands* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1989).

⁹³ Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, p. 79.

popular habits of compliance.”⁹⁴ NATO’s emergence as a security community may be attributed to the high degree of political integration in Europe. Merging the security and community concepts mean that new types of interactions will emerge in which “the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”⁹⁵ Security communities, and other forms of international cooperation wherein governments cede some form of sovereign power (for example, the World Trade Organization or the World Court), allow us to suggest that alliances may act as a “public” good when acting on behalf of member states, but member states may be “private” actors within the alliance.

Alliance Adaptation and Military Effectiveness

Since the early 1990s, a substantial literature has grown up around claims that the United States is in the early stages of a revolution in military affairs (RMA), also known as military transformation. An emerging consensus based on studies of the 1991 Gulf War is that the military’s evolution will involve “small highly skilled, rapidly deployable forces using information technologies that are more flexible and putatively much more lethal.”⁹⁶ According to the Department of Defense, the five distinctive characteristics of a transformed force include, “a force that is more expeditionary, agile, and lethal than the present force and more capable of employing operational maneuver and precision effects

⁹⁴ Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 14.

⁹⁵ Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security communities in Theoretical Perspectives,” *Security Communities*, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 6.

⁹⁶ Chris C. Demchak, “Wars of Disruption: International Competition and Information Technology-Driven Military Organizations,” *National Security in the Information Age*, Emily Goldman, ed. (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004).

capabilities to achieve victory.”⁹⁷ The U.S. Army achieves these goals through doctrinal flexibility; strategic mobility; tailorability and modularity, joint; multinational, and interagency connectivity; and versatility to function across the spectrum of conflict, to include in irregular warfare.⁹⁸

The optimism of U.S. military reform is at odds with the vast literature on organizational change and military transformation. Indeed, the literature on military transformation largely arose out of the need to address the difficulties involved in changing military organizations. Militaries are large, hierarchical, and risk-averse, and often contain large supporting bureaucracies characterized by rules and routine, repetitive action. Culture, doctrine, and pathways to promotion often stifle internal change, yet because of their organizational characteristics, militaries are often even more resistant to externally imposed change.

The search for “scapegoats” in the failure to advance military reform efforts may provide a false understanding of the policy-making process in military transformation.⁹⁹ Civilians, Generals, and Admirals lead large complex institutions with a variety of legitimate, competing demands for scarce resources. Resources often go to those areas, such as aviation, artillery, and infantry, which have recent history of significant use and success, and from which many military leaders spent the formative stages of their careers. Areas where fewer senior leaders emerge, often due to factors such as under-use in military ventures (such as civil affairs), or non-conformity with much of the rest of the

⁹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Elements of Defense Transformation* (Washington, DC: October, 2004).

⁹⁸ Adapted from TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, “Force XXI Operations,” p. 3-1. Viewed on December 29, 2011 at <http://earthops.org/tradoc525/525-5ch3.html>.

⁹⁹ Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark Mandeles, *American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999).

military (such as special operations), often receive fewer resources. This dynamic often leads to problems with “high demand-low density” assets for missions in irregular operations¹⁰⁰, and stifles innovation for future military capabilities.

The origins of the term “military revolution” can be found in 1955, when historian Michael Roberts delivered an important lecture entitled “The Military Revolution: 1560-1660,” in which he suggests Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus innovated with linear warfare, changing tactics, strategies, and force structure during the Thirty Years War. Roberts asserted that these changes resulted in a transition from mass army tactics and increased the impact of warfare upon society by an order of magnitude.¹⁰¹

Subsequently, scholars began to review the concept of the military revolution in primarily technological terms. In 1976, Geoffrey Parker suggested that Gustavus Adolphus had actually taken advantage of trends occurring more broadly in Europe, particularly new technologies and methods of preparation for war, and that while Sweden was the first to take advantage of those trends, the elements of military revolution were not peculiar to Sweden.¹⁰² Andrew Krepinevich’s 1992 causal theory of technological innovation has driven much of the subsequent research into military transformation, and

¹⁰⁰ For more on military force management, particularly since 2001, see Bernard Rostker, *America Goes to War: Managing the Force During Times of Stress and Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Institution Press, 2007).

¹⁰¹ Geoffrey Parker, “Military Revolution, 1560-1660 - A Myth?” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 48 (1976), pp. 196-214.

¹⁰² Parker, “Military Revolution, 1560-1660 - A Myth?” Parker subsequently expanded on the concept that technology plays a determining role in military revolutions; see Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, (Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1996).

opened doors into research of military change through the adoption of new technologies or changes in culture, organizations, doctrine, and tactics.¹⁰³

Technological Innovation. How technology shapes military change has been the subject of significant debate within the military history and military transformation scholarship. Although this factor is not essential to the dissertation, the military advice provided to alliance decision-makers that results in technological adoption through new doctrines or strategies plays a role in the decision-making process of an alliance strategy. Such organizational dynamics often play a role in the adoption of technology within a military. A key issue in this debate is whether a military organization accepts the changes required to adopt a new technology, or resists the adoption and implementation of the technology. Seeking to understand this dynamic, Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff have proposed the categories of technological determinism and military conservatism.¹⁰⁴

Technological determinism holds that technology follows a natural, Darwinian-like trajectory. The progression of naval technology from sail to steam to nuclear power, together with advances in naval aircraft lends an attraction to this view. Indeed, this view lies at the heart of the “arms race” concept, in which two or more states locked in intense competition vie to field more and better weaponry.¹⁰⁵

Military conservatism holds that technologists do not always win; instead, the

¹⁰³ Andrew F. Krepinevich, “From Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” *The National Interest* (September, 1994).

¹⁰⁴ Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

¹⁰⁵ See Colin S. Gray, *Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important Is Technology?* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 2001); Colin S. Gray, “Arms Races and Other Pathetic Fallacies: A Case for Deconstruction,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1996), pp. 323-335.

incentive structure of the military organization may resist change. Naval Services tend to provide the classic examples of military resistance to change. The most enduring images are those of Admiral Sir John Fisher's attempts to radically reshape the Royal Navy, resulting in the H.M.S. Dreadnought¹⁰⁶, and the U.S. Navy's decision in 1868 to reject the steam-powered *Wampanoag* in favor of the more traditional sail-powered ships.¹⁰⁷

The Diffusion of Military Effectiveness. Although technological change is important, it is rarely the defining characteristic of military innovation; instead, building on work by Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason, it is the way that militaries employ technology that generates military power and influences their diffusion patterns.¹⁰⁸ Technological innovation in an international alliance is different than military innovation in a single country. Alliances may help a state gain access to the knowledge necessary to implement the innovation, either through buying time to build the capacity to adopt, or through direct assistance from the first mover.¹⁰⁹ Technology transfer is frequently the result of a policy decision, and often results after the technology has been modified for export. Some key technologies are not considered exportable, even to the closest allies of the United States.¹¹⁰ Sometimes technology is transferred to improve the interoperability

¹⁰⁶ Nicholas A. Lambert, *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999).

¹⁰⁷ Elting E. Morison, *Men Machines and Modern Times* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).

¹⁰⁸ Michael C. Horowitz, *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 5; Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

¹⁰⁹ Horowitz, *The Diffusion of Military Power*, p. 27; Emily O. Goldman and Andrew L. Ross, "Conclusion: The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas-Theory and Practice," *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

¹¹⁰ For example, the F-22 is not designated for export to any other country (by the Obey Amendment to the FY1998 Defense Appropriations Bill), despite many political enquiries from Japan, Australia, and Britain, among others. See John T. Bennett, "Showdown Brewing Over F-22 Sales," (July 22, 2006) Retrieved on March 22, 2011 at <http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,106513,00.html>.

of allied forces. The concept of technology transfer is important to the study of international relations, however, because of its impact on the outcome of conflicts. During the Second World War, for example, the United States facilitated the British Royal Navy's power projection capabilities through technology transfer; the alliance with the United States increased the British capacity to adopt the aircraft carrier.¹¹¹

The U.S. security assistance program began in 1953 with the end of the Korean War. The United States began to transfer key technologies and train South Korean forces on the technologies in order to build indigenous capacity to assist the United States in the fight against North Korean forces. The military assistance policy followed on previous "weapons instead of armies" policies via the lend-lease program of World War II and the focus on economic aid to Greece, Turkey, and the Marshall Plan countries in the late 1940s.¹¹² Today, South Korean forces are, qualitatively, one of the best fighting forces in the world.

Since the Second World War, the United States and its allies have pursued common military standards and procedures in order to facilitate interoperability. NATO's operations in support of Libyan rebels during the Arab Spring demonstrated the fruits of standardization within the alliance. However, technological innovation challenges those very standards, and leads to what some commentators have called a "persistent capabilities gap."¹¹³ If an ally has the organizational capacity and the financial

¹¹¹ Hone, Friedman, and Mandeles, *American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941*.

¹¹² Richard M. Leighton, *Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001). Greece also received substantial military aid beginning in 1947.

¹¹³ Charles L. Barry, "Coordinating with NATO," *Transforming America's Military*, Hans Binnendijk, ed. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), p. 232.

resources to adopt the technology, then the drive to standardize technology to enhance allied interoperability is a powerful motivator to diffuse advanced technology within alliances.

Part II: Interaction and Feedback

The leading proposition on NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War environment is the concept of "institutional," or generalizable, assets. Generalizable assets, such as integrated military commands or aircraft carriers, are considered "portable," meaning they are capable of performing several functions in both major combat operations and lesser contingencies.¹¹⁴ For example, as NATO debated the concept of engaging in out-of-area missions during civil war in Yugoslavia and crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, the alliance began to increase investments in peacekeeping capabilities. Its prior investments in NATO Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) provided portable strategic capabilities, while investments in mobility and logistics provided portable capabilities for peacekeeping operations. While the United States possessed generalizable strategic and tactical capabilities, NATO countries soon began to invest in new doctrines, forces, and weapons capabilities. The implication of this theory is that alliances with institutional assets are able to strategically pivot from one mission to another, for example, from a focus on defending Europe from the Soviet Union to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. Highly institutionalized alliances have more

¹¹⁴ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735.

generalizable assets than bilateral alliances, which make them more resilient to environmental turbulence and more capable of adapting to new circumstances.¹¹⁵

Although the institutional assets theory may help to explain NATO's adaptation, it does not explain recent changes to America's bilateral alliances, such as the U.S.-Japan alliance. Indeed, while generalizable assets may provide the initial capability for an alliance to strategically pivot from one security issue to another, changing mission sets tend to shift investment strategies to more specific assets. Despite having fewer portable assets, Japan has played a key role in counterpiracy and reconstruction operations. While the United States provided significant generalizable capabilities to Japan before and after the North Korean Taepodong missile test in 1998, to include an aircraft carrier, Japan increased its investments in missile defense technology, procured Aegis radar capabilities compatible with U.S. systems, and launched four information-gathering satellites. Although variation in assets may help an alliance pivot from one issue to another, interaction patterns provide the pressures on the alliance decision-making process that result in new strategic doctrines and specific capabilities required for alliance military transformation.

Risk plays an important function in adaptability: the ability to adapt reduces risk. Adaptation, according to John Holland, is the process whereby an organism fits itself to its environment.¹¹⁶ The literature on adaptation suggests that the ability to adapt is based

¹¹⁵ Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

¹¹⁶ John H. Holland, *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1995).

on variation, interaction, and learning.¹¹⁷ The theory of biological evolution is based on ideas of competition and survival of the fittest. And yet, cooperation plays a key role in biological adaptation. For evolution or adaptation to occur, organisms within the same species must cooperate, and cooperation often occurs between species (such as symbiosis).¹¹⁸ Within the international environment, interactions between states or intergovernmental organizations such as alliances often occur through cooperation or competition on policy goals.

In alliances, the ability to adapt depends on the ability for the allies to cooperate and retain cohesiveness. According to Robert Keohane, cooperation occurs in international relations when actors adjust their behavior through a process of policy coordination.¹¹⁹ Policy coordination may accrue benefits to actors on issues of mutual interest; these benefits increase the incentive for state leaders to cooperate. Alliance cohesion results when states coordinate their policies within the context of the military alliance. While cohesion is usually a desirable goal, an alliance may choose to advance a policy goal that reduces cohesion, such as when Turkey and Greece were admitted to NATO, in order to influence their security policies and reduce tensions on the European continent.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000).

¹¹⁸ Robert Axelrod explores cooperation in biological systems using his TIT-FOR-TAT model. See Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton "The Evolution of Cooperation in Biological Systems," in *The Evolution of Cooperation* by Robert Axelrod (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984). Also see Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹¹⁹ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 51.

¹²⁰ Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*.

Interactions based on cooperation or competition can occur both internal to an alliance (to use the earlier biological example, within the species) or external to the alliance (interactions with other species). Since 2001, the Asia-Pacific region has provided several notable examples of policy coordination external to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as the security architecture of Northeast Asia has undergone a nuanced, yet profound, transformation away from the “San Francisco system.” Throughout this evolution, the United States has encouraged regional cooperative security dialogues amongst the countries of Northeast Asia, specifically Japan, South Korea, and China. Arguably, however, uncertainties created by security threats in the Asia-Pacific region have strengthened the U.S. bilateral system.

Discord, or competition, may result when actors fail to coordinate policy. Competition between intergovernmental organizations is unlikely to lead to any form of conflict, but may result in a spiral in which the competitors become increasingly involved in a policy area. The failure of early U.S. efforts to establish multilateral security organizations in Asia, most notably SEATO, can be directly attributed to the lack of policy coordination both within SEATO and between the members of ANZUS and the SEATO allies. Failure to coordinate policy between intergovernmental organizations can also result in increased expenditure of resources or even cause ‘defections’ as state actors preference one policy solution over another. This dynamic, referred to as “international

regime complexity,” can often happen when there are multiple, overlapping regimes or intergovernmental organizations with similar missions.¹²¹

Neo-functional theory suggests that institutional growth (and task absorption) depends on adaptive efficiency. Spillover effects drive positive feedback and demands for expansion of the institution. While the economic benefits of collective action drive growth in the European Union, risk tolerance drives growth in military alliances. As risk increases, so does interaction (leading to cohesion), and eventually, new policies are promulgated to explain how the alliance will mitigate risk – often through developing new capabilities, which may drive standardization and military reform efforts.

Table 1 explains the predicted internal alliance behavior. Cooperative bilateral alliances would be characterized by a high level of interaction between the allies, while in “competitive” alliances, in which the allies are unable to resolve contending policy issues, we would expect to see a low level of interaction between the allies. Similarly, we would expect to see in a cooperative highly institutionalized alliance, that allies interact frequently both through multilateral mechanisms as well as through bilateral mechanisms. Bilateral mechanisms are often used to informally discuss policy issues outside the multilateral forum. In the case of NATO, there are also multilateral methods of interacting informally. One such mechanism is the “Quad,” which was established in 1955 to ensure that France, Britain, and the United States were able to consult with West Germany on technical issues related to East Germany and intra-German relations. In 1990-1991, the allies expanded to form a temporary “Four Plus Two” arrangement to

¹²¹ Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 13-24.

discuss Germany's future in Europe – membership included France, Britain, the United States, and West Germany, plus East Germany and the Soviet Union.

Table 1: Predicted Internal Alliance Interaction Behavior

Policy Interaction	Degree of Institutionalization	
	Low	High
Cooperative	Bilateral: High Interaction Organization: None	Bilateral: High Interaction Organization: High Interaction
Competitive	Bilateral: Low Interaction Organization: None	Bilateral: Low Interaction Organization: Low Interaction

The external element of interaction, with other international institutions, also plays a key role in adaptation. Regional flashpoints in North Korea and Taiwan raise the specter of great power conflict in Northeast Asia, while Southeast Asia remains vulnerable to energy chokepoints, piracy, and terrorism. In 2008, however, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggested that increased cooperation amongst the U.S. and its security partners (“more multilateral ties than hubs and spokes”) would facilitate adaptation to the structural changes occurring in the Asia-Pacific region while ensuring the relevance of the alliances and encouraging capabilities development.¹²² This support from the United States facilitated dialogue between the U.S. and Japan, and South Korea, Australia, and India. Japan has separately engaged in Japan-South Korea-China trilateral dialogues. And with North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in

¹²² “Indonesian Council on World Affairs (Jakarta, Indonesia),” As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Jakarta, Indonesia, Monday, February 25, 2008.
<http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1218>.

2003, the Six Party Talks became the preferred multilateral forum for engagement with that state on nuclear issues.

Regional economic dynamics in Northeast Asia facilitated the increased security dialogue. With the end of the Cold War, trade relations amongst the countries in Northeast Asia grew steadily warmer, despite the bitter history of the region. Kent Calder and Min Ye have noted that “[b]etween 1990 and 2004, intraregional commerce among Japan, South Korea, and China doubled, to 12 percent of those nations’ total world trade, while transactions with the United States accounted for only 18 percent of their collective global total.”¹²³ In 1960, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the region accounted for only 4 percent of the global total. By 2011, its share of the world total had grown to about 21.4 percent, compared to 14.6 percent in the Euro Area and 23.4 percent for the North American Free Trade region.¹²⁴

Part III: Alliance Strategic Doctrine

“Military doctrines,” according to Barry Posen, “are critical components of national security policy or grand strategy.”¹²⁵ Military doctrine refers to the “subcomponent of grand strategy that deals with military means.”¹²⁶ Most current U.S. alliances also have some form of strategic doctrine. It often defines what the alliance’s goals are, and how they will be attained. The process behind developing strategic doctrine helps to coordinate policy objectives between allies. NATO’s Strategic Concept

¹²³ Kent Calder and Min Ye, *The Making of Northeast Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 9.

¹²⁴ Data sources: World Bank, www.worldbank.org; and CIA *World Factbook*, 2012, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

¹²⁵ Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 13.

¹²⁶ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*.

and the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense are two of the more prominent examples of alliance strategic doctrine.

Offense-defense theory may provide another insight into the concept of changes in strategic doctrine. Offense-defense doctrine or theory is a central concept in the international relations literature, because it plays an important causal role in international relations theory. The theory refers to the perception of states as to the relative ease of either attack or defense.¹²⁷ The concept has been used to explain the causes of war, alliance formation, crisis behavior, state size, and the structure of the international system.¹²⁸ It is an essential concept to assessing the severity of the security dilemma.¹²⁹ The theory has played a key role in nuclear and arms control policy.¹³⁰ It has also been

¹²⁷ For an excellent review of the offense-defense literature, see Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Aug., 2001), pp. 741-774

¹²⁸ Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968); Bernard Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes," in *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1976); Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), pp. 137-68.; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995) 379-414.; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (1991), pp. 475-494; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Vol 9 (1986), pp. 19-30.; Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999); George H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, (New York, NY: Wiley, 1977); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp. 58-107, Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990/91) pp. 7-57; Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987); Kenneth N. Waltz "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

¹²⁹ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978).

¹³⁰ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York, NY: 20th Century Fund, 1961); Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); "Mandate for

used to explain historical outcomes, including the origins of World War I and the mismatch in that war between doctrine and capabilities.¹³¹ Finally, it plays an important role in the development of military capabilities that lead to changes in the distribution of military power. Although a military might choose a defensive doctrine, most scholars believe that most military transformation occurs when a state employs an offensive doctrine.¹³²

NATO's Strategic Doctrine

For many observers of international politics, the end of the Cold War in 1989 followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 spelled the end for America's alliances. Despite the misgivings of many foreign policy experts, NATO formally extended membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on March 12, 1999.¹³³ In his definitive work on the U.S. decision to expand NATO membership, James Goldgeier suggests that "[o]ne could just as easily have expected NATO to dissolve as to expand when the deliberations over its future began."¹³⁴

To U.S. officials debating the future of NATO shortly after the end of the Cold War, "out-of-area" operations were an essential element to any decision to maintain the alliance.¹³⁵ In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO declared that it would respond to crises

Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," Palais Liechtenstein, Vienna, Austria, (January 10, 1989), reprinted in *Arms Control Today* (March 1989), pp. 18-19.

¹³¹ Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

¹³² Ibid; Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*; Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹³³ See, for example, George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," *New York Times* (February 5, 1997), p. A23.

¹³⁴ James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether, But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 3.

¹³⁵ Sebastian Mayer, "Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), pp. 308-333.

beyond its borders whenever its members' collective interests are at risk.¹³⁶ Despite U.S. preferences, NATO's decision to engage in expeditionary operations was not a foregone conclusion; many NATO members preferred to maintain an alliance devoted to the defense and security of Europe. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty articulates the territorial limits to the Article 5 provision of "armed attack." According to Article 6, the territorial limits are defined as "the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."¹³⁷

Defining the strategic goals and developing appropriate political and military strategies and plans are crucial processes for NATO alliance partners, and the structure of the alliance and interaction patterns between allies were crucial in the debates over these two key policy issues. With the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, President Mitterand of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany advanced a Franco-German proposal for a European-only military capability. Viewed by the United States and the United Kingdom as a potential competitor institution to NATO, the United States first sought to incorporate the concept as a "European Brigade" within the NATO structure, and then to merge it with the Western European Union (WEU) – a sister organization with a history of cooperating with NATO.

¹³⁶ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. (April 24, 1999). Retrieved on December 11, 2011 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹³⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949. The text of the treaty can be found at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

NATO's decision-making structure is divided into civilian and military processes. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprised of the Permanent Representatives of the member states, is the supreme decision-making body within the alliance. In 1966, when France withdrew from the integrated military structure – but remained a part of the political structure through participation in the NAC – NATO established a Defense Planning Committee (DPC), equal to the NAC in decision-making authority for all non-nuclear force structure and planning requirements and a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which makes all decisions regarding nuclear force structure and force posture. In 2009, France rejoined the integrated military structure, and one year later, the NAC dissolved the DPC and absorbed its force structure responsibilities. Military advice is provided through the Military Committee (MC) to the NAC, which makes decisions on all MC proposals. Proposals are developed through numerous working-level committees with diverse responsibilities such as forces, resources, armaments, nuclear and logistics defense planning.

NATO's Secretary General plays a unique role in the alliance decision-making process. Traditionally a European diplomat, the Secretary General promotes consensus among the allies, and therefore assumes a very public role as the principal advocate for unity within the alliance. Secretary Generals also exert influence over various processes to a greater or lesser degree. For example, Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General, played a crucial role in the development of NATO as an organization by creating the international staff, but was a quiet leader often unable to promote consultation among the

allies, as during the Suez Canal crisis.¹³⁸ On the other hand, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2010 played a much more integral role in the Strategic Concept's development than previous Secretary Generals. The Secretary General also plays a key organizational role as the chair of the NAC, the NPG, and the DPC throughout its existence.

In recent years, NATO has not only established new institutional structures to develop and coordinate special operations policy and doctrine within the alliance, but it has also established new structures to generate and disseminate intelligence to alliance forces. In 2003, NATO established the Allied Command Transformation to ensure the dissemination of doctrine, best practices, and lessons learned. Perhaps more significantly, NATO established the NATO Response Force, intended to provide organic military capability to the NATO organization with standardized equipment, tactics, and capabilities, to ensure rapid reaction to emerging contingencies.

Japan's Strategic Doctrine

Expeditionary operations also did not come easily to Japan, given its post-war resistance to building military capability – a policy that stemmed from the U.S.-imposed Article 9 of the Japan's constitution, which prohibited the development of offensive military power.¹³⁹ Although the U.S.-Japan Alliance has developed fewer structures than

¹³⁸ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* (Columbia, MS: University of Missouri Press, 2006).

¹³⁹ Kenneth Pyle termed this policy the "Yoshida Doctrine" after former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The policy was to devote those resources that would otherwise have gone to generating military power to economic development, and rely on the U.S. guarantee for military protection.

NATO, its strategic direction has also shifted significantly, particularly since 2001.¹⁴⁰ In the wake of the 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile test, Japan quickly altered long-standing security policies related to export controls of missile technology. Exceptions to Japan's ban on exporting military technology were made specifically to facilitate interaction with the United States on a combined missile defense capability.¹⁴¹ As a result, Japan is currently the United States' closest missile defense partner, co-developing the Standard Missile – 3 (SM-3).¹⁴² Japan has further deployed its Maritime Self-Defense Forces to engage in anti-piracy operations in the Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden, and its Ground Self Defense Forces in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations (non-combat) globally.¹⁴³

Throughout much of the Cold War, Japan's grand strategy rested on what became known as the "Yoshida Doctrine", named after its primary architect, Shigeru Yoshida, Japan's first post-Second World War prime minister.¹⁴⁴ The concept grounded "mercantilist realism" into domestic institutions, relied on a strongly export-driven economy, and resisted U.S. pressure to increase Japanese contributions to the alliance.

¹⁴⁰ These changes are noted extensively in Daniel M. Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006) and Yuki Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectation?* (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2008).

¹⁴¹ Michael Green, "The Challenges of Managing US-Japan Security Relations After the Cold War," *New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations*, Gerald L. Curtis, ed. (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000).

¹⁴² Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008) and Missile Defense Agency, "Joint Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Flight Test Successful," *MDA News Release*, October 29, 2010. Retrieved on January 4, 2012 from <http://www.mda.mil/news/10news0016.html>.

¹⁴³ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 2006* (Tokyo Japan: Japan Defense Agency, 2006).

¹⁴⁴ Pyle, *Japan Rising*, pp. 212, 256-262.

The Yoshida Doctrine formed the basic parameters of Japan's foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's grand strategy, security policy, military doctrine, and defense capabilities have undergone a significant transformation. Japan scholars have strongly debated the origins of these changes. Kenneth Pyle hypothesizes an "outside-in" approach, and documents the international pressures leading to this unraveling. Japan, he observes, has realigned itself five times since the mid-19th century to take advantage of the prevailing international system: the collapse of the Sinocentric system, the beginning of the American system after World War I, the disintegration of the U.S. system in the 1930s (and Japan's resulting attempt to create its own order), the U.S.-dominated order after World War II, and the end of the Cold War.¹⁴⁵ In Pyle's view, Yasuhiro Nakasone was the only Prime Minister during the Cold War capable of successfully shifting Japan's defense strategy; his failure, and the subsequent loss of the LDP in the 1993 elections, demonstrate that it was only the demise of the Cold War international structure that provided the opportunity and motivation for Japan to increase its defense capabilities.

Richard Samuels, on the other hand, suggests that the Yoshida Doctrine has frayed due to a more complex set of domestic pressures. He argues that change in Japan's security policy is "overdetermined" by multiple catalysts: international events, domestic political struggles, societal change, institutional change, and the transformation of the

¹⁴⁵ Pyle, *Japan Rising*, p. 28.

U.S. defense establishment and policy.¹⁴⁶ Samuels states that “none [of the changes in Japan’s security policy] is the direct result of shifts in global or regional balances of power, and each is related to domestic political competition.” He further suggests that a strategic consensus will emerge through the “blurring” of domestic politics and foreign threats, which will complicate policy choices. Unlike Pyle, Samuels views the 1980s not as a failure to disengage from the Yoshida Doctrine, but rather as a “strategic slicing” of the “pacifist loaf.”¹⁴⁷

Japan’s evolving security policies and strategies over the past twenty years can be viewed as a reaction to both international and domestic pressure. Japan’s actions in the 1991 Gulf War led to significant embarrassment and new legislation that allowed Japan to depart from the Yoshida Doctrine; security issues, such as engagement in United Nations peacekeeping missions, became a more substantive topic on the Japanese foreign policy agenda. Despite a \$13 billion contribution to support the United Nations coalition in Iraq, Japan’s failure to provide troops led foreign nations to deride Japan’s contributions as “checkbook diplomacy.” This stinging criticism led, in June 1992, to the passage of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill, which ended the ban on sending Self Defense Forces abroad, but limited their participation to logistical and humanitarian support to UN operations, monitoring elections, and providing aid to civil administration.¹⁴⁸ Changes in Japan’s security agenda accelerated after the 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile test, as Japan began to participate more fully in bilateral

¹⁴⁶ Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 64.

¹⁴⁷ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, p. 71.

¹⁴⁸ These events are detailed in Pyle, *Japan Rising*, pp. 290-293.

security cooperation with the United States. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 led Japan to deploy its military forces abroad for the first time since the Second World War—a deployment that did not escape the notice of its Asian neighbors. Finally, since initial discussions in 2003 with South Korea, Japan has begun to engage in trilateral security dialogues, expanding its range of security cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, India, and China.

Japan's domestic political situation is a key factor in interactions with its alliance partner. After Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi left office in 2006 after a long five-year term, Japanese politics remained unsettled, with six Prime Ministers over six years. Japan's political situation resulted in historic political shifts, none more evident than the landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) victory over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 2009. This shift resulted in a new majority party in the Japanese Diet for the first time since the formation of the LDP in 1955. U.S.-Japan relations became strained over DPJ departures from agreements made by the LDP with the U.S. Government, none more evident than the replacement facility for a Marine Corps base in Okinawa.¹⁴⁹

Negotiations between the United States and Japan are often complex, and frequently involve domestic factions within Japan. In addressing American trade strategies in dealing with Japan, Leonard Schoppa argues that *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) has the power to influence Japanese policy outcomes. *Gaiatsu*, however, works best when

¹⁴⁹ Yuka Hayashi, "Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama Resigns; Search for New Leader Begins." *The Wall Street Journal* (2 June 2010). Retrieved on January 4, 2012 from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704875604575281292285208862.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.

Japan's domestic political arena "offers opportunities for employing these strategies that take advantage of divisions of opinion and interest on the Japanese side."¹⁵⁰

Chapter Summary

The evolution of military alliances has corresponded with changes to the overarching structure of the international environment and altered dynamics in the military environment. On the one hand, the international environment has experienced a rapid and significant growth in the quantity and type of security institutions, each with a their own policy interests. At the same time, exponential advances in military capabilities through technological innovation have enabled more efficient and effective military operations.

Alliance adaptation occurs when two or more allies within an alliance agree to formally alter the boundaries of their original agreement, leading to new policies and capabilities. These agreements often result from deep tensions between allies over the breadth and scope of the security alliance. Initially, the allies may be so deeply divided that they are unable to coordinate their policies on specific issues, and may advance alternative policy solutions to a problem. The methods in which allies interact with each other and with external security institutions may drive the allies to coordinate policies and evolve new military capabilities.

Military dynamics in the security environment also play a role in the transformation of alliances. On the one hand, the direction of military transformation to improve precision, communication, and networking capabilities lead to improved

¹⁵⁰ Leonard J. Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 6.

lethality and long-distance strike capabilities, which are qualities often sought in major combat operations and deterrence. On the other hand, the direction of warfare over the past twenty years is toward the low-end of the conflict spectrum, in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations, where desirable qualities include the ability to work for long periods with local, indigenous security forces through training, assistance, and advice.

The ability to tolerate risk and to subsequently coordinate policy in order to maintain cohesion is thus a paramount quality of adaptive alliances. The altered landscape of the international political arena and the security actors demand a commensurate change in interaction patterns, which influences alliance decision-making. The next chapter will outline the methodology and the questions asked of each case, which will help us to discern patterns of interaction in adaptive alliances.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

In the case studies, I explore, by the method of controlled comparison, questions about the conditions under which alliances adapt. Using the case studies, I make two different kinds of comparisons: I compare different time periods in the same alliances, and I compare different forms of alliances (multilateral versus bilateral) in similar circumstances. The purpose is to obtain patterns of interaction and alliance adaptation that may help inform policy choices.

The independent variable in this dissertation is interaction. The dependent variable in the dissertation is the success or failure of the alliance to adapt. These variables frame the causal and caused phenomenon of the hypotheses. The arrow diagram in Table 1 outlines the independent variable (IV), the intervening variables (IntV), and the dependent variable (DV) used in the dissertation.

Table 2: Variables




IV		IntV		DV
Interaction		1. Degree of institutionalization 2. Competition outside the alliance 3. Competition inside the alliance 4. Cooperation outside the alliance 5. Cooperation inside the alliance 6. Transformation of the military of an ally within the alliance	 	Alliance adaptation

Table 2 graphically presents a causal chain based on the argument (interaction leads to alliance adaptation). The table is used to develop the general hypotheses for the dissertation, outlined in Table 3.

Table 3: Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Proposition
Hypothesis One	Alliance adaptation is more likely when there is a high degree of institutionalization within the alliance.
Hypothesis Two	Alliance adaptation is more likely when the alliance is in competition for resources with an external international institution over a set of security issues.
Hypothesis Three	Alliance adaptation is more likely when allies within the alliance are in competition over a set of security issues.
Hypothesis Four	Alliance adaptation is more likely when the alliance cooperates with external international partners on a set of security issues.
Hypothesis Five	Alliance adaptation is more likely when allies within the alliance cooperate on a set of security issues.
Hypothesis Six	Alliance adaptation is more likely when the military of an ally within the alliance is transforming.

The dissertation follows a “structured, focused case study” approach, which requires that the same questions be asked of each case. The following questions are asked:

- Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?
- Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?
- Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?
- Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?
- Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?
- Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?

Following each case, results will be coded “yes” to indicate the intervening variable was a positive factor in the case; “no” to indicate that the intervening variable was present in the case, but was not a positive factor; and “NP” to indicate that the intervening variable was not present in the case. Although the purpose of developing the tables is to highlight patterns in the cases and to facilitate analysis, the results are interactive, and not necessarily either additive or prescriptive.

This dissertation measures alliance adaptation primarily by examining changes to alliance strategic doctrine. Not all alliances, however, produce formal strategic concepts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Therefore, measuring change through examination of documents is only one possible measure, but is unlikely to provide any real precision. Identifying change is more important to this study. Possible measures of change include:

- Setting new goals: This may involve dramatic redefinition of goals or minor revision to existing goals that have significant impact.
- Reorganization or change in the military structure: This may involve the realignment of internal organizations for efficiencies, or the development of new organizations intended to guide the development and execution of a goal or initiative.
- Changes in output or performance: A change in the output or performance of an organization may be the result of changes elsewhere in the system. The degree of observed change may not always be proportional to the resources invested to bring about the change.

- Changes in decision-making processes: Pressure for change may bring about differences in the decision-making process.

The most powerful explanation for the adaptation of highly institutionalized alliances is the theory of asset variability. Because highly institutionalized assets have high variability in their assets, they have increased flexibility in shifting between missions and ensuring relevance to their membership.¹⁵¹ The argument this dissertation makes is that although asset variability facilitates alliance adaptation and military transformation in highly institutionalized assets, the concept plays less of a role in bilateral alliances, in which the only assets available to the alliance are those provided by each of the members. These assets may be limited. The strategic doctrine of a bilateral alliance, therefore, plays a significant role in resource allocation and transformation of bilateral alliance military power.

Structured, Focused Case Study Approach

Despite the growth in the literature over the past 20 years grappling with NATO's persistence and adaptability, the scholarship lacks a comprehensive study that integrates transformation of both multilateral and bilateral alliances into a comprehensive explanatory framework. This dissertation seeks to fill that theoretical lacuna through a structured focused comparison of alliance change in both NATO and Japan. It will also contrast two cases (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and United States-New Zealand (ANZUS)) in which similar international circumstances existed and the alliances failed to change. By focusing on the link between interaction and adaptability in

¹⁵¹ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735.

alliance strategic concept policy development, this study will attempt to answer the question of how policy makers can efficiently influence alliance military transformation.

The dissertation employs a structured, focused comparison of multiple cases as the study approach, primarily examining changes in strategic doctrine decision-making in the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the NATO alliance. The dissertation also employs two null cases – SEATO and ANZUS. Data obtained from the case studies will help us to determine if there are universal characteristics in environmental or organizational conditions (with minor variations) in the way in which modern alliances transform. By examining methods of interactions between alliance partners during these transition periods, we may also be able to develop new understandings and theories of alliance management.

Qualitative research routinely uses what Clifford Geertz refers to as “thick description,” that is, interpretive work that focuses on the meaning of behavior to the actors involved.¹⁵² David Collier, Henry Brady, and Jason Seawright distinguish between “thick description” and “thick analysis,” which is research that focuses closely on the details of cases. According to the authors, it is the detailed knowledge that is associated with thick analysis that is a major source of “leverage” for qualitative research.¹⁵³ Although Charles Ragin distinguishes between case-oriented research and variable-

¹⁵² Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in Clifford Geertz, ed., *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973).

¹⁵³ David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, “Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View in Methodology,” in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

oriented research, qualitative research is often oriented in terms of variables.¹⁵⁴ This dissertation will utilize this variable-oriented case study model across multiple cases.

The multiple case study approach can be particularly powerful in the attempt to identify and explore phenomena that may be generalizable across cases.¹⁵⁵ The method allows investigators to develop theory by investigating phenomena across a broader range of events. The genesis of the structured, focused case study method was to discourage decision-makers from relying on a single historical example in dealing with a new case.¹⁵⁶

It is necessary in any case study to distinguish between *environmental factors* and *actions* that result in a phenomenon.¹⁵⁷ For example, the Soviet Union's internal contradictions in the late 1980s made its collapse possible, and even inevitable. Yet it was President Mikhail Gorbachev's mismanagement of the crisis and his relations with the Supreme Soviet that resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although it is necessary to describe the environmental factors to put changes in context, the method of structured, focused cases requires a focus on the decision process leading to changes in alliance strategic doctrine.

The case studies selected for this dissertation are enumerated in Table 4.

¹⁵⁴ Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987). Also see *ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Andrew Abbot, "What do cases do? Some notes on activity in sociological analysis," in *What Is A Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*, Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, eds. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

¹⁵⁶ Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., (New York: Free Press, 1979).

¹⁵⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Table 4: Case Studies

Case	Expected Internal Behavior
1. U.S.-Japan Alliance, 2010	Low Institutionalization, Cooperative
2. U.S.-Japan Alliance, 1994	Low Institutionalization, Cooperative
3. U.S.-New Zealand, 1985	Low Institutionalization, Competitive
4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010	Highly Institutionalized, Cooperative
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1991	Highly Institutionalized, Cooperative
6. Southeast Treaty Organization, 1973-1975	Highly Institutionalized, Competitive

Case Selection Methodology

The case selection methodology follows John Stuart Mill's criteria for "methods of difference," in which the cases have the same general characteristics and different values on the study variables.¹⁵⁸ Comparing the processes that lead to change in alliance strategic doctrine in both multilateral alliances to bilateral alliances will allow us to assess the role of institutional/organizational factors in alliances and illuminate the role of transformational drivers in producing military change in alliances.¹⁵⁹

In addition to following Mill's criteria, I selected the cases of alliance doctrinal change post-World War II for two reasons. First, these cases provide variation in the explanatory variables – both in degree of organization associated with the alliance and in the types of interaction. Given the research questions, the most important characteristic for the case studies used in the dissertation is that they must have experienced a shift in their strategic doctrines (except for the null cases). The null cases were chosen for their similar characteristics, with the notable difference that the alliance was unable to adapt.

¹⁵⁸ John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, ed., J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).

¹⁵⁹ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Second, the cases selected highlight alliances under great stress. Between 1989 and 1991, for example, with the reunification of Germany and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the future of the NATO alliance was in doubt. Selecting cases where the alliance is under stress is designed to confront the most powerful alternative explanations from the realist and institutionalist schools on their own terms. The cases have to provide adequate explanation for the alliance management argument, but must also provide relatively easy explanation for the alternatives. For the negative cases chosen in this dissertation, the conditions for change must be similar to the conditions for positive cases. This allows for a more in-depth examination of specific practices and policies.

Data Collection

The research primarily employs qualitative case study methods, developed according to the methods outlined in John Lewis Gaddis' *The Landscape of History*.¹⁶⁰ Gaddis suggests that the process of history is similar, in some ways, to the process of natural science.¹⁶¹ Using the science of complexity, Gaddis suggests that although micro-level phenomena are "for the most part, *linear* in character" the macro-level behavior of history "is *non-linear*."¹⁶² Researchers should then understand that case studies are:

- Sensitive to initial conditions (the outcome of the micro-level behavior is dependent on where you start in the case);
- Fractals of history (a metaphor for understanding how behaviors that start at the bottom relate to macro-level behaviors);

¹⁶⁰ Gaddis, *The Landscape of History*.

¹⁶¹ Gaddis, *The Landscape of History*, pp. 68-70.

¹⁶² Gaddis, *The Landscape of History*, pp. 75-76. Italics in the original.

- Subject to self-organization (patterns underlie behavior in a complex adaptive system).

The qualitative data collection methods combine a variety of methods, including a survey of primary and secondary source material and a semi-structured interview format (Appendix 1). The interviews were used to gather data on the policy process and decisions from the 2010 changes to alliance strategic doctrines that are not otherwise available. The semi-structured format provided freedom to probe and formulate follow-up questions. Interviewees were determined based on two criteria: first, they represent national-level elites in alliance policy-making and they are experts on the issue of alliance strategic policy. Interviewees meeting these criteria are primarily government representatives at the U.S. National Security Council, and the U.S. Department of State or the Office of the Secretary of Defense and their foreign counterparts in NATO, individual NATO countries, or Japan.

NATO 1991

Data collection for this case entailed a combination of archival material and secondary source materials written by individuals directly involved in the decision process. Archival material was collected at the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. Because the 25-year limit for declassification has not been reached at this point, many of the decision materials remain classified. In these cases, secondary source materials (particularly the memoirs of President Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, and Robert Hutchings) were used to supplement analysis of the primary sources.

NATO 2010

This case study also primarily relied on interviews with key U.S. and NATO officials. Other primary source material included NATO publications. Secondary sources were used where necessary to elaborate on environmental factors that influenced the decision-making process.

SEATO 1973-1975

Primary source data collection for this case study began with the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, particularly *FRUS 1952-1954* and *FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976*. Analyses of these primary source documents were supplemented with secondary source materials.

U.S.-Japan Alliance 1994

This case study relied primarily on secondary source material, particularly that written by Japanese scholars interested in Japan's defense policymaking process. Secondary source material written by the U.S. officials involved in discussions with the Government of Japan was also used to address the logic and process underlying the U.S. position.

U.S.-Japan Alliance 2010

Data for this case study, especially that relating to the decision-making process and logics underlying the decisions, were primarily gathered through interviews with U.S. and Japanese governmental officials. Other primary source material included Government of Japan and Ministry of Defense primary documents, such as the annual *Defense of Japan* white paper. Secondary sources were used where necessary to elaborate on environmental factors that influenced the decision-making process.

U.S.-New Zealand 1985

Data collection for this case relied primarily on secondary source materials collected from published academic books and articles.

Limitations and Qualifications

There is little doubt that studying post-Cold War alliance transformation poses numerous methodological challenges. While the structured, focused case study method may allow patterns to be discerned from more than one case, the method requires the investigator to undertake the research with a specific objective in mind; the method does not allow for all interesting aspects of a case to be explored.¹⁶³ Second, the treatment of each case must align with a framework developed and used to advance the theoretical interest of the investigator. Third, the problem of comparative approach in attempting to assess the linkage between interaction and alliance adaptation is the paucity of historical analogies to the current alliance system's scope, durability, and levels of commitment that could render a basis for comparison. Fourth, the dissertation does not cover every case of alliance adaptation, and it does not cover every factor motivating changes within alliance decision-making processes. Instead, the dissertation focuses on changes to alliance strategic doctrine; the underlying decisions that led to those changes; and the factors that influenced the decision-making process. Fifth, the dissertation is limited to English language documentary sources; it does not include an investigation into sources in Japanese, the non-English European languages, or the many languages of the members of the SEATO alliance.

¹⁶³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

CHAPTER FOUR: MULTILATERAL CASE STUDIES

Overview

Between 1989 and 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) survival was by no means assured. During that period, European leaders grappled with questions of which institutions best provided for European security. On one side, Atlanticists such as the United Kingdom desired a strong relationship with the United States, while on the other side the Europeanists, particularly France, desired an independent security identity. The debates presented three major options: transform NATO, establish new Western European security institutions, or realign the security capabilities of the existing European multilateral institutions. With the failure of European capabilities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Yugoslavia, by 1998 it became clear to NATO observers that the alliance would survive well into the 21st century. Because of its flexibility, the 1991 Strategic Concept set the stage for NATO's adaptation and success throughout the 1990s.

Until 1991, NATO policy and force structure was designed to defend its member states and deter Soviet aggression. It accomplished this through a combination of strategic (nuclear) and conventional forces.¹⁶⁴ The 1991 Strategic Concept announcing the transformation of the alliance marked the beginning of a complete switch in NATO

¹⁶⁴ The term 'strategic forces' has held a variety of meanings over the decades. Most frequently, it is used to describe either long-range forces or nuclear weapons.

policy. Throughout the 1990s, NATO increased emphasis on nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control while decreasing its capability to provide defense and deterrence to its member states. At the same time, dialogue with former adversaries led to the creation of the Partnership for Peace and eventually, in 1999, to the first round of Post-Cold War NATO expansion. The combination of policies led many scholars to conceive that NATO was evolving from a traditional alliance towards a ‘security community.’¹⁶⁵

The 1999 Strategic Concept continued the discussions that remained unresolved from the 1991 Strategic Concept. Politically, NATO’s survival depended on new policies for Article 6, allowing it to go ‘out-of-area.’ Operationally, experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated that combat forces needed to be capable of conducting operations throughout a spectrum of scenarios, from humanitarian and peacekeeping operations to war. The 1999 Summit also marked the beginning of NATO’s Open Door policy, expanding the alliance from its Cold War 16-nation membership to its current 28-nation membership. The political issues influencing the development of the 1999 Strategic Concept therefore responded to the sense that the alliance needed to catch up with the rapidly evolving nature of the security environment.

Beginning in the mid-1990s when the U.S. military forces began to feel the crunch of post-Cold War budget cuts, NATO members began to discuss the need to develop common conventional capabilities. At the Washington summit in 1999, NATO

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).

leaders approved the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which identified five key capability areas and created a High-Level Steering Group (HLSG) to oversee, coordinate, prioritize, and integrate the efforts of various NATO committees. The capability areas identified by NATO leaders included effective engagement, deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, and command, control, and communications.¹⁶⁶ With NATO member defense budgets underfunded for much of the 1990s into the early 2000s, however, progress on capabilities development remained a source of significant concern. By 2002, NATO leaders adopted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to replace the DCI.

On September 11, 2001, al-Qa`ida terrorists attacked the United States, prompting NATO to exercise Article 5 for the first time in its history. NATO quickly shifted from an “alliance in being” to an “alliance in doing.” By November 2001, the U.S. had begun to conduct irregular warfare operations in Afghanistan. Over the next year, the Bush Administration began to make the case for an Iraq intervention, citing intelligence assessments that then-President Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.¹⁶⁷ President George W. Bush further argued that Iraq was part of an ‘Axis of Evil’ linking that country to North Korea and Iran.¹⁶⁸ In March 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq and removed Saddam Hussein from power, with President Bush marking the end of major combat operations in May 2003, and the beginning of an irregular conflict that

¹⁶⁶ Fact Sheet: NATO on Defense Capabilities Initiative, released by NATO at the Washington Summit on April 24, 1999.

¹⁶⁷ Secretary of State Colin Powell stated the Bush Administration’s case before the United Nations Security Council. See “Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation,” CNN (February 5, 2003) at http://articles.cnn.com/2003-02-05/us/sprj.irq.powell.transcript_1_genuine-acceptance-iraq-one-last-chance-disarmament-obligations?_s=PM:US.

¹⁶⁸ President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002.

continued until the last U.S. troops withdrew in December 2011. Although the allies supported operations in Afghanistan, the question of intervention in Iraq deeply divided the NATO allies, with France and Germany as the most vocal opponents. In 2006, NATO's International Security Assistance Force took operational command of international forces in Afghanistan, conducting primarily counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and reconstruction operations.

Although NATO had begun to explore more non-traditional roles in the late 1990s, moving away from its traditional role as a military alliance towards a new role as a security institution, it wasn't until 2007 that NATO became closely involved with non-traditional threats. With the growing ubiquity of the Internet and other communications technologies in commerce, cybersecurity also rose as a major concern for most Western countries. In 2007, Russia engaged in cyberattacks against Estonia, prompting that country to engage in a sustained effort to improve NATO's cyber policies and capabilities. Additionally, growing concerns about the availability of oil and other natural energy resources driven by Russian policies prompted the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 to issue a report on "NATO's Role in Energy Security," which facilitated NATO participation in maritime security in the Gulf of Aden. The continued focus on capabilities and operations, together with an expanded membership with a wide range of security concerns led, in 2010, to NATO's adoption of a new Strategic Concept which called for a transformation of NATO forces by 2020, with a focus on emerging security challenges.

While NATO was able to adapt despite changing circumstances, the demise of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was certain by 1975. Rent by internal disagreements, the alliance remained paralyzed during crises in Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia. Beginning soon after the Manila Pact was signed, ANZUS treaty members, rather than SEATO membership made major alliance decisions. SEATO, the symbol of previous Administrations' foreign policy, fell out of favor in the United States when Richard Nixon won the 1968 election. The 1972 elections in each of the three ANZUS treaty nations marked a turning point for the alliance. The liberal Labour Party, which sought closer economic ties with China, won the elections in both Australia and New Zealand making the organization expendable. Despite efforts by Thailand and the Philippines to restructure and transform the alliance from 1973 to 1975, the alliance had fallen out of favor and conflicted with other foreign policy preferences amongst each of the members, leaving SEATO without advocacy. On June 30, 1977, the alliance formally dissolved.

NATO Decision-making Structure and Processes

The beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 also marked the beginnings of NATO's organizational development – the first evolution in the NATO alliance. Responding to North Korean military advances, the United States called for greater military coordination among the NATO allies. The U.S. pressure resulted in the December 19, 1950 appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the position of

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).¹⁶⁹ In his memoirs, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson remarks that, “[in July, 1950] both the Germans and the French, looking with apprehension at the sixty thousand East German police and twenty-seven Russian divisions also in East Germany, with more behind them, found little comfort in NATO’s twelve ill-equipped and uncoordinated divisions with little air support.”¹⁷⁰ Eisenhower’s Second World War exploits in Europe and his international reputation, along with his close ties to European politicians gave him outstanding qualifications to be the first SACEUR. Throughout Eisenhower’s tenure as SACEUR, he advanced the development of integrated defense planning amongst the allies and expanded the military bureaucracy. Although Eisenhower exercised significant influence – indeed, the position of SACEUR came to be viewed as the single most influential individual within the alliance – the degree of influence exercised by individual SACEURs varied throughout the Cold War.¹⁷¹

The appointment of a Secretary General to oversee the political integration of the alliance did not occur until the appointment of Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay to the post on April 4, 1952. The requirement for “integrated defense” made political integration a difficult task. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson characterized it, “The North Atlantic Alliance was a body – or more accurately twelve bodies – without a head.”¹⁷² The beginnings of the NATO organization produced a system of committees that met, but

¹⁶⁹ General Eisenhower’s appointment also marked the first time a military commander was “dual-hatted,” as he was also named Commander, U.S. Forces Europe.

¹⁷⁰ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co, 1969), p. 436.

¹⁷¹ Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969), 61-62.

¹⁷² Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 397.

failed to produce “continuing or authoritative direction.”¹⁷³ While the Secretary General’s responsibilities were unclear at the beginning of his tenure, by the end of Lord Ismay’s tenure his most important role was to chair the North Atlantic Council (NAC). As chair of the NAC, the Secretary General wields considerable influence over the alliance and its priorities by convening the NAC and setting its agenda.

With the end of the Cold War, a significant transformation and role reversal occurred between the Secretary General and the SACEUR. As the international environment increased in political upheaval at the same time that the threat of major combat operations was decreasing, the role of the Secretary General grew in prominence. Manfred Wörner, who became NATO’s seventh Secretary General on July 1, 1988, and served until 1994, guided NATO’s post-Cold War transition. Among the challenges Wörner confronted as NATO’s political leader, two of the most important included the end of the Cold War and NATO’s search for relevance, and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia’s secession and subsequent “ten-day war” in which it gained its independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991 triggered independence movements in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Between 1992 and 1993, reports surfaced about widespread human rights violations in Bosnia, including civilian deaths, prisoner of war camps, and rapes.¹⁷⁴ Manfred Wörner played a critical role in shaping NATO’s policies and response to both of these challenges.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 397.

¹⁷⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 18.

¹⁷⁵ The Yugoslavian crisis became the first challenge to the 1991 Strategic Concept. Further details on Manfred Wörner’s role in managing NATO’s response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia can be found in

NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept

At the Rome Summit of NATO member states, held on November 7-8, 1991, the Heads of State and Government issued a new NATO Strategic Concept, the first since NATO adopted the strategy of Flexible Response in 1967. The process took 16 months and twelve drafts, and one of Europe's most important countries, France, chose to participate in the Strategy Review Group's drafting process only after it became evident that major political decisions affecting Europe's future were being made in its absence.¹⁷⁶ The process entailed close coordination amongst NATO's formal process led by NATO Assistant Secretary General Michael Legge, the U.S. European strategy review process led by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, and the military strategy to operationalize the political strategy led by the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Vigliek Eide.

The eventual agreement on a new Strategic Concept began at the London Summit of July 5-6, 1990, when the Heads of State and Government articulated a vision of a "Transformed North Atlantic Alliance." At the urging of U.S. President George H.W. Bush, NATO leaders agreed to initiate a strategic review to ensure that NATO remained relevant in the post-Cold War period. In preparation for the Summit, President Bush sent a letter to his NATO colleagues laying out a set of proposals for NATO's future role, including the need for a new NATO strategy. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. position was that fundamental elements of NATO strategy needed to be re-

Ryan C. Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* (Columbia, MI: University of Missouri Press, 2006).

¹⁷⁶ Michael Legge, *The Making of NATO's New Strategy*, Web Edition, No. 6, Vol. 39 (Dec. 1991), pp. 9-14; Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 61.

examined, particularly the concepts of forward defense and flexible response.¹⁷⁷ NATO leaders agreed with President Bush's suggestion, and announced the establishment of the NATO Strategy Review.

In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "*forward defence*" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "*flexible response*" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.¹⁷⁸

As leaders at the London Summit clearly recognized, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked only the beginning of momentous change on the European continent. On the heels of the London Summit in 1990 swiftly followed four major events with implications for the future of Europe and the transformation of NATO. First, in August, Iraqi troops under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The United States responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by building up troop presence in Saudi Arabia under the code name Operation Desert Shield; this operation transitioned in January 1991 to a United Nations-mandated, U.S.-led coalition war on Iraq in what became known as Operation Desert Storm. Although not a NATO operation, most NATO allies provided support to the operation. While the Gulf War demonstrated the effectiveness of NATO military structures and response capabilities, it also demonstrated the limited effectiveness of the European institutional structures to respond to the crisis.

¹⁷⁷ Briefing by National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft and Chief of Staff John Sununu, the Shawmut Inn, Kennebunkport Maine, July 3, 1990.

¹⁷⁸ Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration"), July 5-6, 1990. Italics in the original.

The second event, the October 1990 reunification of East and West Germany, increased the pressure within Europe to develop a common foreign and defense policy, and to embed the newly unified Germany into European institutional frameworks. Contrary to the predictions of Realist theorists, the Soviet Union chose not to oppose Germany's reunification.¹⁷⁹ Instead, as John Gerard Ruggie states, the Soviet Union was "betting that a united Germany firmly embedded in a broader Western institutional matrix would pose far less of a security threat than a neutral Germany tugged in different directions in the center of Europe."¹⁸⁰ Internally, the Soviet Union was dealing with a variety of domestic issues, as tensions rose between President Mikhail Gorbachev and the legislative Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Additionally, Gorbachev became increasingly preoccupied with Boris Yeltsin's growing prominence in the Communist party, and with the breakaway republics of the Soviet Union.

The third and fourth events in this chain were the February 1991 disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the failed *coup d'état* in the Soviet Union in August 1991. Together, these events resulted in political and social upheaval that led to the demise of the Soviet Union. The implications of these events transformed the nature of international power relationships, and particularly Europe's position in the structure of great power politics. No longer was Europe squeezed between two superpowers vying for pre-eminence on the European continent; it now sought to develop its own common security identity.

¹⁷⁹ See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* (Summer 1990); and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* (Spring 1990).

¹⁸⁰ John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 4.

Decision-making in the development of the 1991 Strategic Concept followed three separate paths: the NATO Strategic Review Group (SRG), the U.S. European Strategy Review, and the Military Committee's force restructuring process. The SRG process sought to build a strategy capable of reorienting the alliance from a purely defensive posture to include crisis management, as a result of early lessons from the Yugoslavian conflict. The U.S. process sought to transform NATO while ensuring that it remained the pre-eminent security institution in Europe. Finally, the NATO Military Committee prepared new concepts for the structure, management, and command and control of forces assigned to NATO, in support of the political agreements resulting from the SRG process.

An Alliance Divided

International events served to exacerbate pre-existing fissures within the alliance. While the leaders of most NATO countries believed the alliance would continue to provide value, the stage was set for a trans-Atlantic debate over NATO's role. Atlanticists, led by the United Kingdom and the United States, sought to maintain NATO's role within Europe. Europeanists, led by France, sought to develop an independent security identity, embedding a unified Germany within European political and security institutions. NATO officials, supported by the United States, recognized the need to support the Franco-German effort, but were publicly ambiguous about these efforts. At Rome, for example, NATO announced a key objective would be to strengthen the "European pillar." The Rome communiqué further welcomed the growth of the Western European Union (WEU) "both as the defense component of the process of

European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.”¹⁸¹ NATO officials were quick to point out, however, that WEU members had confirmed “the Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of the Allies under the Washington Treaty.”¹⁸²

With one pillar of NATO planted firmly in North America and the other in Europe, the relationship between NATO and the development of a purely European security identity has been long and complex. The concept of a purely European defense capability was one of the earliest security options in post-war Europe. On March 17, 1948, the governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration, and Collective Self-Defense in Brussels, Belgium, establishing the WEU. The WEU, however, was a political arrangement without a security pillar. In August 1950, the French Premier, René Pleven, proposed to form a multinational European army based on lessons learned from the Korean War, in what became known as the Pleven Plan. Under the Pleven Plan, Germany, not then a party to the Atlantic Treaty, would contribute troops alongside other European powers as part of a European Defence Community. Two important events occurred by 1954, when plans to establish the new defense community failed to materialize. First, the Pleven Plan failed, and second, the Paris Agreements of October 1954 established the WEU, with membership including Italy and West Germany.

¹⁸¹ “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation,” issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, November 7-8, 1991, reprinted in *NATO Review*, February 1992, p. 20.

¹⁸² “Communiqué Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session,” December 19, 1991, Reprinted in *NATO Review*, February 1992, p. 28.

Despite the failure of the Pleven Plan, the history of French preference for a purely European defense capability has continued to influence French resistance to NATO's role.

Most NATO allies supported the U.S. position of transforming the NATO alliance; the debate, therefore, centered on policies to accomplish this goal. President Bush sought to focus Western attention on Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁸³ To accomplish this goal, the United States advanced a recommendation to maintain NATO at the center of European security affairs and broaden the scope of the alliance by establishing regular diplomatic liaison with Central and Eastern European countries. France, however, sought to marginalize NATO and its diplomatic liaison program while strengthening other European institutions, preferably with German participation.

France's resistance to NATO's continued existence and transformation derived largely from its own security policy – a policy that, ironically, benefitted from NATO's existence throughout the Cold War. France's position was hardly surprising; the principal elements of its defense policy dated to Charles de Gaulle's term as the first President of the Fifth Republic. The 'Gaullist model' was centered on national independence and backed by an autonomous nuclear capability (the *force de frappe*).¹⁸⁴ It achieved the first objective by withdrawing from NATO's command structure in 1966. Although this policy served France well throughout the Cold War, France's lack of participation in NATO decision-making after the Cold War led to decisions in May 1991 to establish a

¹⁸³ Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

¹⁸⁴ Anand Menon, "Explaining Defence Policy: The Mitterand Years," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 279-299.

NATO Rapid Reaction Force and shift to more multilateral units. France achieved its second objective, despite limited funds for defense, by prioritizing investment in nuclear weapons through successive defense budgets, which resulted in the world's third-largest nuclear force.¹⁸⁵

European and North American leaders began to consider options to accommodate the development of an independent European security identity. While Europeans generally agreed with expanding political and security integration, they differed in approaches to its structure and the implications for NATO. The spectrum of options ranged from the French proposal to terminate NATO and create a purely European security capability through the evolution of specific institutions, to the U.S. proposal to expand Europe's role in the NATO alliance via a 'European Caucus.' In the end, NATO allies chose a middle option, which included expanding the security role of a European institution while establishing an organic relationship with NATO to avoid duplication.¹⁸⁶

Most experts within the Bush Administration cautiously accepted that a European security identity would likely proceed "with or without" the help of the United States; therefore, "[t]he U.S. should seek to transform NATO, however needed, so that NATO retains its primacy among other Europe-only structures."¹⁸⁷ The solution for the United States and most of its NATO allies was to approach the post-Cold War security architecture as a system of interlocking institutions.¹⁸⁸ After the fall of the Berlin Wall,

¹⁸⁵ Menon, "Explaining Defence Policy: The Mitterand Years," p. 282.

¹⁸⁶ See Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War*.

¹⁸⁷ NATO's Future, Political Track of the Strategy Review, Questions to Ask Ourselves; October 22, 1990; NATO – Strategy [5]; Heather Wilson Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

¹⁸⁸ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*.

the question of NATO's future role was inextricably tied to the question of the development of a common European security identity. As President Mitterrand of France pushed a European agenda, the NATO membership grappled with which institutions were most appropriate to expand capability and capacity for a security capability.

The three principal European institutions contending with NATO for a security role included the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC), and the WEU. At the London Summit in July 1990, NATO members strengthened the CSCE by establishing new institutions for crisis management. The roles of these new institutions were left undefined, however, leading to different perspectives amongst the allies. While the United States viewed the new CSCE institutions as consultative bodies, its NATO allies sought to give the CSCE a more active role in managing crises and resolving conflicts. In order to avoid the perception of competition between the CSCE and NATO, U.S. officials recommended taking a "complementary institutions" position.¹⁸⁹ The position of the U.S. Government would be that NATO should continue to expand regular diplomatic liaison to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a position also supported by Russia, while the CSCE engaged in "democracy building" within those countries.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ Cable to the Secretary of State from U.S. Mission, USNATO; NATO and CSCE, a Complementary Action Plan for the Rome Summit; October 15, 1991. Publicly, in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Stephen Hadley explained, "Politically, NATO must determine its relationship to other European institutions like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), and the European Community (EC)." See Statement of Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, *The Two-Plus-Four Agreement: Implications for NATO*, (October 4, 1990).

¹⁹⁰ Cable to the Secretary of State from U.S. Mission, USNATO; NATO and CSCE, a Complementary Action Plan for the Rome Summit.

Following an agreement by the EC Heads of Government and State in Maastricht on December 9-10, 1991, the member governments signed the Treaty on European Union on February 7, 1992. The treaty's ratification resolved the political competition between the EC and the WEU by explicitly linking the two institutions. Meanwhile, France pushed the EC and the WEU as potential contenders with NATO as the premier institution in European security affairs. The development of a security institution within the EC largely came about as a result of the EC Ministerial meeting in December 1990, at which the Ministers addressed the future of European security. Largely because of its institutional linkages to both the EC and to NATO, both the United States and the Europeans – including the French – supported the WEU option. The concept was for “[t]he WEU [to] become both the European pillar of the Alliance and the defense pillar of the European Political Union (EPU).”¹⁹¹

For many scholars of military transformation, the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War marks the beginning of what is considered to be a modern revolution in military affairs, commensurate with the development of the blitzkrieg and the aircraft carrier. The overwhelming success of U.S.-led coalition air forces in the Persian Gulf conflict in January 1991 through communications and precision-guided munitions enabled decisive ground operations in February. The performance of U.S. troops in a conventional conflict also reassured U.S. leaders; while seeking to limit the most dangerous weapons in the

¹⁹¹ Memorandum from David Gompert to Brent Scowcroft, September 30, 1991; NATO; Gompert, David C., Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX. Also see Memorandum for the President from Brent Scowcroft, NATO and European Integration, March 11, 1991; NATO; Gompert, David C., Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

U.S. inventory, U.S. forces demonstrated significant military effectiveness in remote and austere environments.

Although U.S. forces met with much success in the Gulf War, European forces were less successful. The disparity led to greater tensions by March 1991 between Atlanticists and Europeanists. The solution for Atlanticists was simple: remaining within the NATO alliance would assure closer coordination, sharing of military technology, and combined planning and training, resulting in increased European capabilities. Paradoxically, Europeanists took away a different lesson. They argued their uneven performance was proof of the need for common foreign and security policies within the EC.¹⁹²

Policy and Strategy

The complexity of the security environment after the fall of the Berlin Wall is indicative of the difficulties facing NATO leaders as they considered the future of their alliance. Strategically, NATO leadership had three questions to answer if the alliance were to survive. First, what new relationship should NATO forge with the former Soviet Union? Second, what roles would NATO play in the future security environment, both within Europe and outside of Europe? Finally, how would NATO structure itself to deal with a more ambiguous security environment?

NATO built its response to these questions by focusing on the lessons of the Harmel Report. Officially known as the “Report of the Council on Future Tasks of the Alliance,” the report was developed under the guidance of Belgian Foreign Minister

¹⁹² Memorandum for the President from Brent Scowcroft, NATO and European Integration, March 11, 1991; NATO; Gompert, David C., Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

Pierre Harmel and a group of independent experts. The Harmel Report was adopted in 1967, two days after NATO agreed to MC 14/3 (the doctrine of flexible response). The Harmel Report was a seminal document in NATO's history, undertaken in parallel with the development of MC 14/3, and provided the intellectual foundation for the strategy of flexible response by introducing the concepts of deterrence and dialogue. The report recommended the relaxation of tensions between East and West while maintaining an appropriate level of defense capability.

The new strategic concept sought to expand NATO's approach beyond the recommendations of the Harmel Report to include cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. President Bush began a series of bilateral conversations with other NATO leaders by mid-1990 to advance the concept of establishing "liaison" with former Soviet countries. While the other NATO allies soon began to support the U.S. position, France sought to create a "Federation" of former Soviet states.¹⁹³ The idea was not fully formed and largely rejected both by other members of NATO and former Soviet states in favor of the liaison program.

By June 1990, the imminent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was clear to European leaders.¹⁹⁴ As the new strategic concept declared, "[t]he security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past."¹⁹⁵ This revelation added fuel to the ongoing debates over how to engage former Soviet states.

¹⁹³ Issues Regarding Franco-German Proposal, October 2, 1991, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, David Gompert – Subject Files, NATO: NATO Summit [2].

¹⁹⁴ Reportedly, the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian representatives in particular were supportive of dissolving the Warsaw Pact. See Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic, June 11, 1990.

¹⁹⁵ The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov., 1991 (1991 Strategic Concept).

On one hand, the Bush Administration believed that going “out-of-area” was important to European security and NATO’s future. NATO leaders debated policies for “out-of-area” operations and NATO expansion. Indeed, the Strategic Concept remarks, “[t]he stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf War has shown.”¹⁹⁶ The Rome documents did not commit NATO to these controversial policies, however, but instead, NATO leadership decided to “reach out to former enemies” and establish “regular diplomatic liaison” with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁹⁷ Institutionally, NATO established the North Atlantic Coordinating Council (NACC) as a manifestation of its promise to extend a “hand of friendship” to its former enemies. The NACC served as a consultative body for former Soviet countries, initially focusing on residual issues such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltics, the situation in Yugoslavia, and regional conflicts occurring in former Soviet states. The NACC led to the Partnership for Peace effort, which paved a way for former Soviet states to gain entry to NATO.¹⁹⁸

Arms control became another controversial, but important symbol of NATO’s new cooperation with the Soviet Union after the Cold War. The Lance nuclear missile system played an early and symbolic role of the U.S. commitment to forge friendlier ties with the former Soviet Union. In 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which required the withdrawal of Lance missile systems from Europe. The primary agenda item at the NATO Summit in May

¹⁹⁶ 1991 Strategic Concept.

¹⁹⁷ The London Declaration, July 5-6, 1990.

¹⁹⁸ For more details on the NACC, see The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (archived) at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-111DE51E-BB627330/natolive/topics_69344.htm.

1989, President Bush publicly signaled his commitment to NATO transformation and developing friendlier ties with the Soviet Union by announcing his decision on May 3, 1990 to cancel the follow-on to the Lance program and any further modernization of the nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe.¹⁹⁹ Later, on November 19, 1990, NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, one of President Bush's initiatives to reduce the burden of defense by eliminating the air superiority of NATO and the ground superiority of the Warsaw Pact.

Despite the preoccupation of most of the Bush Administration in the Persian Gulf War, President Bush and Brent Scowcroft remained engaged with the future of NATO, as evidenced by a flurry of meetings and strategy sessions with NATO counterparts and with Manfred Wörner between the London Summit in 1990 and the Rome Summit in 1991. Wörner, a known defense hawk, supported President Bush's goal of maintaining a united Germany within the NATO alliance. France initially, as usual, played the antagonist by insisting that a new treaty was necessary with the united Germany; eventually France dropped this issue. Arms control also tended to dominate these discussions, as President Bush sought to achieve broad agreement on limitations to numbers and types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START), and advanced warning capabilities (Open Skies Treaty).

Throughout the strategy review drafting process, NATO's Military Committee prepared operational concepts with which to implement the new strategy, including

¹⁹⁹ News Conference by the President, Office of the White House Press Secretary, May 3, 1990.

options for restructuring command and control.²⁰⁰ The United States insisted the SACEUR remain an American general or flag officer. The introduction of a new Franco-German corps, however, required new force sizing and structuring concepts, together with doctrines for the employment and deployment of the new units.

Although the decline of the Soviet threat was a significant factor in the Military Committee's work, the WEU/Franco-German corps played perhaps the most important role in the force sizing and structuring debates. In a surprise announcement on October 1991, French President Francois Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl launched the Franco-German corps. The Military Committee's preparations for the Franco-German corps culminated in a briefing to the North Atlantic Council in June 1991. The Military Committee developed a plan that called for three 4-star commanders below NATO Headquarters: SACEUR; Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT); and Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCCCHAN). To apportion standing multinational forces created by the incorporation of the Franco-German corps, the Military Committee divided the corps into two fighting units: one reporting to SACLANT and the other reporting to CINCCCHAN. These fighting units would maintain their command and control relationships in both peacetime and wartime. SACEUR would continue to command NATO's military structure within Europe. Among the benefits the Military Committee sought in developing this structure was the standardization of

²⁰⁰ Memorandum from Philip Zelikow for Robert Gates; October 26, 1990; NATO – Strategy [4]; Heather Wilson Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

capabilities, integrated contingency planning and exercises, and committed forces at specific alert measures.²⁰¹

Drafting the Strategic Concept

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) established the Strategy Review Group (SRG), officially known as the *Ad Hoc Group on the Review of NATO's Military Strategy*, in July 1990, less than a month after the London Summit, to act as the primary body to review and draft the new strategic concept. Early in the process, the NAC decided to split the strategic review into two tracks. A political track led directly by the NAC included French participation. Because of France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure, they did not participate in the SRG – the military track chaired by Michael Legge, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Strategy and Policy, until March 1991. The initial months witnessed significant progress in the drafting process. A first outline had been prepared in August, followed by an SRG discussion of the first draft in September. By October, the first full draft was circulated to the nations.²⁰²

As NATO leaders and experts debated these issues, the SRG continued to develop the new Strategic Concept, in close coordination with officials from the United States. In October 1990, the political track, led by U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom Raymond Seitz and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ambassador James Dobbins, prepared a set of “core security functions” for the NATO

²⁰¹ NATO Integrated Military Command Structure (briefing – undated); NATO; Gompert, David C., Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

²⁰² Legge, *The Making of NATO's New Strategy*. The contents of most of the drafts of the 1991 Strategic Concept held in the George Bush Presidential Library remain classified as of this writing.

alliance.²⁰³ This initial set of core security functions were then vetted through Robert Gates' European strategy review process. At the June 1991 Foreign Affairs Ministerial, the Ministers agreed on the core security functions, which included: "reaffirming NATO's role as the transatlantic forum for consultations and the commitment of the Alliance to stability and security in Europe; maintaining the strategic balance of forces; and deterring and defending against aggression against any Ally."²⁰⁴

The political track of the NATO Strategy Review dealt primarily with issues such as NATO's jurisdiction, competence, political structure, and military structure. In considering questions of jurisdiction, the political track focused on the core security functions and defense and security topics for the EC's common foreign and security policy. Discussions of NATO's competence centered on topics for primary or exclusive decision in NATO versus the EC, and the prerogatives for consultation and decision in areas of responsibility overlap. As discussions progressed to political structure, the nature of the questions focused on the WEU's relationship with the EC and the WEU's relationship with NATO. Finally, the political track moved to discussions of how NATO should reorganize its command structure and the WEU's relationship to military forces in Europe.²⁰⁵

Two issues impacted the SRG's preparation of the Strategic Concept. The first was the introduction of the French into the writing process in March 1991. Despite their

²⁰³ National Security Council Memorandum for Robert Gates from Philip Zelikow, October 26, 1990; NATO; Gompert, David C., Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

²⁰⁴ NATO Strategy Review (undated); Heather Wilson Files, NATO Strategy [1]; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

²⁰⁵ Issues for political side of "NATO Strategy Review"; David Gompert – Subject Files; Bush Presidential Files; Bush Presidential Library, College Station, TX.

participation, the French – in keeping with their long-standing policy – withheld from the development of sections dealing with the integrated command structure, multinational forces, and nuclear strategy. The second issue was the narrowing of differences between the U.S. and the Germans regarding threat assessment, particularly as it related to the Soviet Union. The SRG effectively served as a forum to narrow those differences, so that the Germans agreed to incorporate language on the Soviet Union's residual, but still significant nuclear and conventional forces.²⁰⁶

As NATO developed its new Strategic Concept to help guide the alliance into a new era, the Bush Administration developed its own strategic review process. Robert Gates, the Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs, soon to become the Director of Central Intelligence, assembled a high-level group of officials from across the U.S. government to facilitate this process. According to Gates, "It included the closest and most trusted advisors of [Secretary of State James] Baker, [Secretary of Defense Richard] Cheney, [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin] Powell, [National Security Advisor Brent] Scowcroft, and [Director of Central Intelligence William] Webster."²⁰⁷ Early in his Administration, President Bush expressed a preference for informal top-level decision-making forums – entitled the "core group."²⁰⁸ The European Strategy Steering Group aligned closely with the President's inclinations. The Steering Group, often referred to simply as "the Group," served both as an expanded Deputies Committee and as a mechanism to bypass the U.S. bureaucracy in order to

²⁰⁶ Issues for political side of "NATO Strategy Review."

²⁰⁷ Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 493-494.

²⁰⁸ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1998), p. 42.

reshape the NATO alliance. Contributors to the Group included Robert Zoellick, James Blackwill, Philip Zelikow, Condoleeza Rice, and Dennis Ross.²⁰⁹ Gates had direct access to President Bush, and “when we were deadlocked, it helped when I could interrupt the meeting, go to see him, and return with guidance.”²¹⁰

The Group addressed a wide variety of key questions on European security, including arms control, German reunification, the growth of the European pillar, and the development of the Franco-German corps. Although the Group tackled a variety of issues bearing on the future direction of European security, the decision to focus U.S. and Western efforts on Eastern Europe and its liberalization became an early and essential element of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy.²¹¹ There was a significant amount of overlap between the work of the Group and the work of the SRG; the result was that the Group, through the National Security Council, was able to effectively communicate key policy decisions to the U.S. Mission to NATO, enabling Ambassador William Howard Taft IV, formerly the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to effectively represent the U.S. government position on the future of NATO and European security.

Ambassador Taft was one of the members of the Bush Administration who believed that an independent European security identity was inevitable. By November 1990, as the concept gained momentum, Ambassador Taft began negotiating a paper with the “Quad Permreps” – his French, British, and German counterparts – on how to institutionalize the European pillar, without guidance from the National Security

²⁰⁹ Gates describes this group as those individuals who did the “intellectual heavy lifting.” Gates, *From the Shadows*, p. 494.

²¹⁰ Gates, *From the Shadows*, p. 494.

²¹¹ Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War*, pp. 35-40.

Council.²¹² Taft's actions forced Gates to request he desist his negotiations to give the U.S. time to develop a coherent position on the issue. Although the Group's work mostly played into the strategic arena, NATO's future force structure became a significant issue as the Group debated how to deal with the European pillar and options to incorporate the Franco-German corps as an organic NATO capability. Publicly, President Bush and members of his staff supported a strengthened European pillar. Privately, however, Bush Administration officials expressed reservations, citing potential competition with NATO's role in European security affairs.²¹³

Despite the commonality between most of the membership of the WEU and NATO, the rivalry between the United States and France may have played a role in the failure of the two institutions to coordinate policies. NATO's competition for resources grew as support for the European pillar continued among the European allies. Its performance in the conflicts in Yugoslavia and the Gulf War, however, demonstrated the continued military value of the alliance to its members. The performance of the EU conversely demonstrated the gap between European and NATO crisis management capabilities. NATO exploited this difference in the 1991 Strategic Concept, declaring the alliance would provide for "the management of crises affecting the security of its members."

²¹² National Security Council Memorandum for Robert Gates from Philip Zelikow, November 28, 1990; NATO; Gompert, David C., Files; Bush Presidential Records; Bush Presidential Library; College Station, TX.

²¹³ Memo From David Gompert to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Franco-German Proposal on European Security Identity, September 30, 1991, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, Gompert, David C., Files, NATO. Issues Regarding Franco-German Proposal, October 2, 1991, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, David Gompert – Subject Files, NATO: NATO Summit [2].

Summary

Between 1990 and 1991, the Bush Administration sought to control the size of nuclear weapons stockpiles and limit their primary means of deterrence. With the end of the Cold War and reunification of Germany, Europeans sought to improve their security cohesion through the development of a new security institution. At the same time the Bush Administration sought to transform NATO to ensure its primacy and viability as a consultative – and operational – security institution. The effectiveness of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War served to raise the military profile of the U.S. and NATO in 1991, influencing the arguments of the Atlanticists. The Persian Gulf War enhanced NATO's credibility in the minds of its member states and in the minds of individuals in the Soviet Union, who first recognized that the United States was on the cusp of a revolution in military affairs.

Table 5 below summarizes the findings of this case. Question 1, marked “yes,” reflects the role that NATO's institutional assets played in helping NATO transition from a Cold War posture to the post-Cold War environment. Additionally, the competition, or inability to coordinate policy objectives with France led to the competition between Atlanticists and Europeanists over NATO's role in European security (Question 2 is therefore marked “yes.”). Question 3 is also marked “yes,” reflecting that not all of NATO's internal policy disputes were resolved through the process. France persuaded European countries that a Europe-only solution was necessary. In February 1992, the Treaty on the European Union was signed, which linked the EC and WEU, and initiated the European Union's entry into security policies, particularly crisis management. Although France was the most outspoken of the Europeanists, many NATO members felt

that Europe should invest in its own security capability, leading to the development of the Franco-German Brigade concept. Question 4 is marked “no,” however, because although the Soviet Union cooperated with the United States on arms control, and supported the inclusion of a united Germany into European security structures, the research did not show any significant effort to cooperate with external international institutions during NATO’s transition. Instead, NATO – particularly influenced by the U.S. perspective – viewed non-NATO European institutions as potential competitors within a limited space for security resources. Question 5 is marked “yes,” because, the allies were able to coordinate many of their policies, particularly on crisis management, leading to the adoption of the Strategic Concept. Finally, Question 6 is marked “yes” because the initial stages of America’s military transformation provided additional options to the alliance beyond its deterrence role, and demonstrated significantly greater value during the Gulf War than the military capabilities provided by European institutions.

In a time of significant transformation in European and global security affairs, the efforts of Secretary General Manfred Wörner and Assistant Secretary General Michael Legge resulted in a document capable of improving cohesion amongst the allies. The processes leading to the Strategic Concept served to help resolve a variety of significant security issues, including NATO’s force structure and arrangements with other European institutions. Although the Strategic Concept proved a useful document in the short-term, it did not provide the necessary policy guidance for NATO throughout the 1990s. It was left to other processes, such as the Two-Plus-Four, to resolve the issue of German

reunification and issues such as “out-of-area” and NATO expansion remained issues until their resolution in 1999.

Table 5: Questions (1991 NATO Strategic Concept)

No.	Question	Result
1	Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
2	Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
3	Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
4	Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No
5	Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
6	Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept

On November 19, 2010, NATO's Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit adopted the New Strategic Concept, entitled *Active Engagement, Modern Defense*. The process had been set in motion more than a year earlier, at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl on April 4, 2009, when the Allied Heads of State and Government tasked the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept through the "Declaration on Alliance Security." The Heads of State and Government also directed the Secretary General to initiate the process by establishing a group of experts, whose efforts would lay the foundation for the Strategic Concept.²¹⁴

Unlike previous Strategic Concepts, the document did not reflect any significant shifts in the strategic environment. In this respect, the 2010 Strategic Concept was different than the previous post-Cold War concepts. The 1991 Strategic Concept responded to the significant events occurring in global affairs: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and the end of communism. The 1999 Strategic Concept, which addressed "out of area" operations, was developed more out of a sense that the 1991 Strategic Concept had been overtaken by events. The 1999 version, however, was inadequate to the rapidly changing security environment: only one sentence addressed the threat of terrorism.²¹⁵ Jan Peterson

²¹⁴ The text of the Declaration states, "United by this common vision of our future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit." See Declaration on Alliance Security, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4 April 2009 (Declaration on Alliance Security).

²¹⁵ Section 24 of the 1999 Strategic Concept declares "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources." See The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and

summed up the 1999 concept by saying, “[i]n 1999, terrorism barely warranted a mention, NATO had not even conceived of an out-of-area mission as ambitious as Afghanistan, and our enlargement process was only beginning.”²¹⁶ By 2009, NATO’s leaders were concerned the alliance did not possess the capabilities to accomplish the tasks required of it. In response, Secretary General Rasmussen sought to create a Strategic Concept that was anticipatory, directive, and appropriately linked the assessment of the security environment to capabilities acquisition and combined operations.²¹⁷

NATO: Losing Its Identity?

Throughout the Cold War, NATO’s primary role was to coordinate policies between allies in a multilateral defensive alliance. NATO’s outreach to its former enemies and its crisis management role in the Gulf War, the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Kosovo served to shift its identity from a defensive alliance to an emerging security community. By 1999, NATO began to implement its long-discussed policy of enlargement. In the decade between the admission of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1999 and the admission of Croatia in 2009, NATO increased by 12 members. NATO’s eastward progression, to encompass the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, was accompanied by new concepts of state-level threat and an emerging purpose for the organization.

Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., April 24, 1999 (1999 Strategic Concept). Downloaded on July 7, 2012 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.

²¹⁶ Jan Peterson, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Parliamentary View,” *NATO Review* (February 2009). Downloaded on May 27, 2012 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090203/EN/index.htm>.

²¹⁷ Author interview with NATO officials.

NATO's rapid expansion drove divisions within its membership over the organization's purpose. Regional subdivisions separated the principal security interests of NATO members. The group of nations in the eastern region of NATO worried about Russia, while the western NATO powers worried more about operations in the Middle East and expeditionary capabilities. The focus of central NATO powers centered on cooperative security.

A series of crises helped to shape policy preferences among the regional groupings of NATO members. In 2001, NATO exercised Article 5 for the first time in support of the United States after the terrorist attacks on September 11. By 2006, NATO had taken command of the mission in Afghanistan. The divisions in NATO over Afghanistan primarily centered on issues of caveats on the use of forces and the strategy of counterinsurgency. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO's operational command in Afghanistan, was established in the wake of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 in December 2001.²¹⁸ Its primary mission was to train the Afghan Security Forces, but the United States sought additional help in kinetic counterinsurgency operations; divisions over strategy between the United States and many of its key allies facilitated NATO's internal competitive pressures.

The March 2002 U.S. invasion of Iraq sparked a debate within Europe over the role of European powers in the conflict; France and Germany were strongly opposed to the war. The divisions within NATO increased, when, in January 2003, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld branded France and Germany as a "problem," and categorized

²¹⁸ NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003.

them as typical of “Old Europe.” “New Europe,” on the other hand, included the “vast numbers of other countries in Europe...with the U.S.”²¹⁹ These statements sparked immediate controversy within the U.S. and European countries, and outrage in France and Germany over the “Old Europe” remarks.²²⁰

Other crises generated interest in shifting NATO’s focus from crisis management and peacekeeping missions to encompass broader capabilities. Most significantly, a Russian cyberattack on Estonia in April 2007 shut down Estonian governmental and economic websites. Estonia volunteered to host a new NATO organization devoted to cyberdefense, and by May 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established in Tallinn.

For much of its post-Cold War history, beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, NATO had been Europe’s primary organization devoted to crisis management. This reliance began with the 1991 Strategic Concept, which provided for “the management of crises affecting the security of its members.” The 1999 Strategic Concept broadened NATO’s crisis management activities, declaring that NATO would be ready to contribute to conflict prevention and actively engage in crisis management, including in non-Article 5 (non-NATO member state) situations.²²¹

The complexity of the challenges associated with crisis management, as well as Europe’s search for a more independent security capability led it to develop new regional crisis management response institutions. In 1999, crisis management became a contested

²¹⁹ Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center, Department of Defense (January 22, 2003).

²²⁰ “Outrage at “Old Europe” Remarks,” BBC News (January 23, 2003). Downloaded on June 1, 2012 from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm>.

²²¹ 1999 Strategic Concept.

policy space when the EU established its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).²²² The CSDP was designed as the EU's alternative to NATO's crisis management capabilities. Despite efforts to build a relationship between the two organizations, primarily through the Berlin Plus arrangement, the two organizations have never cooperated well at the policy level. In 2007, for example, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer characterized the relationship between the two organizations as a "frozen conflict."²²³ Since 2001, when the ESDP was declared operational, competition has driven the dynamics of interaction between the two institutions. By June 2012, the CSDP had engaged in 25 operations on three continents since its inception in 2001; meanwhile NATO has conducted 18 operations over the same period. Through the Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO has provided many of the assets used in CSDP operations. Although the two institutions occupy the same policy space, with similar missions, there has been little formal interaction between the two institutions.²²⁴

Despite the competitive organizational pressures both internal and external to NATO, the alliance has forged lasting cooperative linkages on regional security issues with the United Nations (UN). Two recent examples demonstrate the close coordination of policies between the UN and NATO. Shortly after the UN issued Security Council

²²² The Lisbon Treaty's entry into force formally changed the name from European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). To maintain consistency, the case shall use the term CSDP.

²²³ "NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter," Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Berlin, Germany, January 29, 2007. Downloaded on July 4, 2012 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html>.

²²⁴ For a complete discussion on the ways in which NATO and the ESDP interact, or fail to interact, see Stephanie C. Hofmann, "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 45-52. Nor is this dynamic limited to crisis management; the two institutions fail to formally interact on a variety of issues important to their member states, such as energy security, although there is some level of informal interaction between NATO and EU staffs on these issues.

Resolution 1816 in 2008 condemning piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the subsequent *Maersk Alabama* incident in April 2009 in which U.S. Navy SEALs executed hostage rescue missions, the United States and NATO initiated anti-piracy operations through Combined Joint Task Force 51 and Operation Ocean Shield, respectively. More recently, in early 2011, NATO supported rebels in Libya during the so-called “Arab Spring” after the United Nations issued Security Council Resolution 1970 in February 2011, resulting in the overthrow of President Mohammad Gaddafi.

The old debate over NATO’s territorial defense and the role of the European Union in security issues, however, has remained an issue. In the anti-piracy example, NATO, the European Union (Operation Atalanta), and the United States each have independent forces conducting anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.²²⁵ Although coordination across these three forces operates smoothly at the military level, three different forces with three headquarters conducting the same mission indicates the level of competition at the political level between NATO and the European Union.

The Group of Experts

The 2010 Strategic Concept was unusual for the level of involvement of the Secretary General in the decision-making process. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary General until July 31, 2009, wanted to be involved in the development of the Strategic Concept, but knew he would not be able to oversee the entire process. To begin the overall process, Secretary General Scheffer decided to launch public debate on the concept. On July 7, 2009, he did so by holding a conference in Brussels, Belgium

²²⁵ China, Russia, India, and Japan have also provided vessels in support of anti-piracy operations.

attended by a prominent academics and policymakers. At the same time, Secretary General Scheffer also launched a website, inviting public comment and opening the Strategic Concept development process to a much greater degree of public scrutiny than any previous concept had ever been subjected.

The decision by NATO members to revise the Strategic Concept through the Strasbourg-Kehl “Declaration on Security” arrived at the same time the members of the alliance voted the Prime Minister of Denmark, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as its new Secretary General. Secretary General Rasmussen would have an opportunity early in his tenure to shape the alliance for the future. With his ascension to the post of Secretary General on August 1, 2009, he immediately initiated the process to begin development of the new concept.

The process that ended with the adoption of the Strategic Concept at Lisbon in November 2010 began a year earlier, in September 2009, with the initiation of the Group of Experts review. The Group of Experts review comprised the first of three phases in the development of the Strategic Concept: Reflection, Consultation, and Drafting and Negotiation. Led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the Group of Experts consisted of 12 individuals from different nations. The Group of Experts held four seminars in different countries, each focused on a different aspect of the Strategic Concept. The Secretary General attended each of the seminar sessions. The Group of Experts report, originally scheduled for public delivery to the Secretary General on May 2, 2010, was delayed due to volcanic activity in Europe until May 17, 2010. Delivery of the report initiated the consultation phase of the process. Over the next three months, the

Group of Experts and the Secretary General visited the Capitols, briefing the results of the report. During this time, Secretary General Rasmussen convened a small group of “intimates” to draft various pieces of the final Strategic Concept. Known as the “4Js” due to the number of drafters and the fact that all of their first names began with the letter “J”, the small group delivered the product to Secretary General Rasmussen in early August 2010, just before his annual holiday. During his holiday, Rasmussen reviewed and edited the document, and by the end of August, reconvened the 4Js at his Summer house to complete the first draft of the Strategic Concept. This version held up over the next several months, as the Nations reviewed the document: although minor changes were made over the next several months, there was only one version of the document until it went public.

Within the United States, the origins of the 2010 Strategic Concept may be discovered in the work of several individuals at influential think tanks. In the fall of 2008, four Washington, D.C.-based think tanks (the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, and the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University) initiated the Washington NATO Project to “spark debate before and after NATO’s 60th anniversary in April, 2009.”²²⁶ For Dr. Hans Binnendijk, the Vice President for Research at the National Defense University (NDU), and Dr. Richard Kugler, a Distinguished Research Professor at NDU,

²²⁶ Daniel Hamilton, Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, and James Townsend, *Alliance Reborn: A Transatlantic Compact for the 21st Century*, The Washington NATO Project (February 2009).

the issue of NATO's transformation began much earlier. In 2002, Binnendijk's involvement with the intellectual framework of U.S. military transformation resulted in the first in a series of white papers on the strategic challenges and capabilities required for the transformation of European and NATO forces.²²⁷ In 2008, as a part of this series of papers, Binnendijk and Kugler began to ask whether NATO should write a new Strategic Concept.

The white paper, entitled "Should NATO Write a New Strategic Concept?" outlined the history of NATO's six previous Strategic Concepts. According to Binnendijk and Kugler, "[o]nce these new strategic concepts were adopted, they played critical roles in enhancing NATO's performance in security policy and defense planning. To no small degree, NATO owes its success to its ability to formulate strategic concepts adapted to changing security conditions." For Binnendijk and Kugler, a key lesson was the use, on two occasions, of outside groups of experts to help prepare or draft previous strategic concepts.²²⁸ This finding helped to initiate the Group of Experts process used in the drafting process of the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Key policy issues for the alliance throughout the decade following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States included progress in the development of NATO's conventional capabilities, territorial defense versus expeditionary operations, and the relationship between NATO and the European Union on security issues.

²²⁷ These papers, spanning the years 2002-2008, were published in an anthology, together with papers by other influential former government officials such as David Gompert. See Hans Binnendijk and Gina Cordero, eds., *Transforming NATO: An NDU Anthology* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, December 2008).

²²⁸ Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, "Should NATO Write a New Strategic Concept?" in *Transforming NATO*.

Throughout the 1990s, NATO's preoccupation with enlargement and political issues stalled most military reforms. Politically, NATO committed to the transformation of its military forces; however, resourcing those reforms remained the most important impediment to NATO's transformation. By 2002, the most important of NATO's capability reforms, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which had been adopted at the Washington summit in 1999, had failed to deliver on its original promises. With the Prague summit in 2002, NATO sought to rectify its failure to improve its conventional capabilities by adopting three measures: the creation of the Allied Command Transformation, the NATO Response Force, and an endorsement of the Prague Capabilities Commitment to replace the DCI.

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had an early and influential voice in the Strategic Concept's development process. Although the United States strongly influenced the decision to develop the Strategic Concept, there was a broad feeling that it was time to do so as well. First, the alliance had been engaged in operations for more than a decade not covered by the 1999 Strategic Concept. NATO forces were conducting counterinsurgency, reconstruction, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, while also maintaining an anti-piracy presence off the coast of Africa. The theory of the alliance, therefore, needed to catch up with the reality. Second, there was a general feeling that the concept needed to capture what the alliance was currently doing. Finally, the Secretary General wanted to use the strategic concept as a pathway to the future.

Before stepping down from his position, Secretary General Scheffer selected Secretary Albright to lead the Group of Experts, with Mr. Jeroen van der Veer, former

CEO of Royal Dutch Shell as the Vice Chair. Rasmussen strongly supported Albright and the process given to him, and appointed ten additional members to the Group of Experts. Members of the Group of Experts included Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona of Italy, Ambassador Marie Gervais-Vidricaire of Canada, the Rt. Hon. Geoff Hoon MP of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Umit Pamir of Turkey, Ambassador Fernando Perpina-Robert Peyra of Spain, Ambassador Hans-Freidrich von Ploetz of Germany, Mr. Bruno Racine of France, Ambassador Alvis Ronis of Latvia, Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld of Poland, and Ambassador Yannis-Alexis Zepos of Greece. The composition of the Group of Experts reflected old and new NATO members, as well as Eastern, Central, and Western regions of Europe and NATO.

On September 4, 2009, Rasmussen arranged for Secretary Albright and members of the Group of Experts to meet with the North Atlantic Council for an informal exchange of views to kick off the 8-month Reflection phase. During the press briefing, Rasmussen expressed his desire to keep the process open and transparent.²²⁹ After the kickoff, Secretary Albright chose to hold seminars in four different locations, each focused on a different aspect of the Strategic Concept. Secretary Albright used a small group of intimates and experts in NATO and European affairs to assist her in organizing the seminars as well as to ensure that key personnel in the U.S. policy establishment were kept informed throughout the process. These individuals included Hans Binnendijk and Stephen Flanagan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Flanagan ensured

²²⁹ Point de presse of the Secretary General, Dr. Albright and Mr. van der Veer on September 4, 2009. Downloaded on May 27, 2012 from http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/audio/audio_2009_09/20090904_090904-pres-conf.mp3.

that members of Congress were kept informed. Binnendijk, the representative of U.S. National Security Advisor General James Jones, maintained liaison with key figures in the Executive Branch, including the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow.²³⁰

To facilitate the open dialogue Rasmussen desired, Secretary Albright built an approach using seminars to gather the informal positions of the NATO members over the course of six months, between October 2009 and March 2010. NATO's Policy Planning staff supported this process by arranging and facilitating the seminars with the host governments. Although the panel discussions remained privileged, the opening and closing remarks of the seminars were placed on the internet for interested private individuals to review. The major themes of the seminars were as follows:

- The first seminar, held on October 16, 2009 in Luxembourg, examined the core tasks and functions of the alliance. This included an examination of major changes in the security environment, NATO missions, the scope and efficiency of political consultation, and NATO's level of ambition.²³¹
- The second seminar, held on November 13, 2009 in Brdo, Slovenia, examined NATO's role in security cooperation activities with other international organizations and non-governmental organizations.
- The third seminar, held on January 14, 2010 in Oslo, Norway focused on the European security environment.

²³⁰ Ambassador Vershbow has subsequently become the Deputy Secretary General of NATO.

²³¹ NATO Website. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_57965.htm.

- The fourth seminar, held on February 22-23, 2010 in Washington, D.C., examined forces and capabilities, including defense planning and military transformation.
- A final seminar was held on March 3-4, 2010 in Helsinki, Finland, to explore methods for increasing crisis management cooperation opportunities with other international actors.

Striking a balance between “assured security” and “dynamic engagement” became a major theme of the final report of the Group of Experts. The report affirmed the core NATO precept of territorial defense while providing recommendations for the transformation and reform of its military capabilities through a focus on emerging security challenges. The Declaration on Alliance Security helped to focus the scope of some of the challenges the Group of Experts reviewed on global threats such as “terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and cyber attacks.”²³²

Throughout the Group of Experts process, during which the Allied governments consulted multilaterally through NATO processes, they also continued to consult bilaterally. In the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, the timing of NATO’s strategic review came too late to affect their seminal defense policies and capabilities, although most allies deferred their strategic review processes until after NATO had completed its review. The United States, however, issued its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February 2010, while the United Kingdom issued its Strategic Defense and Security Review in October 2010. Although U.S. and U.K. officials ensured

²³² Declaration on Alliance Security.

the Group of Experts remained informed of their efforts, mostly through the NATO Policy Planning office, bilateral consultation often proved most effective for U.S. defense officials. Indeed, as the U.S. Defense Department developed its QDR and its Nuclear Posture Review, issued in April 2010, it conducted extensive bilateral talks with allies throughout Europe on both strategic reviews.

NATO leaders and Secretary General Rasmussen utilized the informality of the Group of Experts as its strength to produce a first draft of the strategic concept. The collegiality of the seminars dampened the pre-existing fissures within NATO – exacerbated by a decade of expansion – but did not eliminate them altogether. The final report outlines a wide array of recommendations, reflecting the diverse interests of the allies. The Group of Experts reaffirmed the importance of NATO’s core commitment to collective defense while outlining the need to protect against more unconventional threats such as cyber attacks, energy, and the disruption of critical supply lines. The Group also felt there was a need to establish guidelines for out-of-area missions, citing that NATO is a regional, not a global organization. Citing that NATO is a voluntary organization, the report recommends the continuation of the Open Door policy, noting that the alliance could expand to the western Balkans, Georgia, and Ukraine. Noting the increasing scarcity of resources, another important recommendation is the continued transformation of NATO’s military capabilities from its powerful, static posture to a more mobile, flexible, and versatile posture.²³³

²³³ *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (May 17, 2010), pp. 8-12.

With the end of the seminars and delivery of the final report to Secretary General Rasmussen on May 17, 2010, Madeline Albright and other members of the Group of Experts began to visit the governments of the allied states as part of the consultation process. Throughout the development process and the consultation phase, the Group of Experts brought in key members of the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as the United Nations, the European Union, and members of the non-governmental organization community.

Drafting the Concept: The “4Js”

With the delivery of the Group of Experts report, Secretary General Rasmussen convened a small group of intimates to draft the final concept. The team consisted of Ambassador Jesper Vahr, Rasmussen’s Chief of Staff; Jeffrey Rathke, the Deputy Chief of Staff; Dr. Jamie Shea, the Head of Policy Planning; and James Appathurai, the NATO Spokesman, each of whom was assigned a section to draft. The team comprised a variety of nationalities, respectively with Denmark, the United States, Britain, and Canada each represented. The Secretary General did not want the document to read like a typical policy document; he intended the document to be clear, quotable, and an easy reference for NATO members. Rasmussen viewed the concept as a document that would facilitate the transformation of NATO, rather than a “shopping list” of interests of NATO’s member states. Rasmussen’s team was carefully and logically chosen for this purpose: the Chief of Staff was involved in all decisions; Rathke, as a Rasmussen intimate, would be able to provide the American perspective; Shea as Head of Policy Planning would

soon become the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges, a key part of the Strategic Concept; and Appathurai was the principal drafter.

Between May 17 and July 31, 2009, each member of the team drafted their sections and provided to Appathurai to integrate and smooth the final product. Ambassador Vahr, as Chief of Staff, was provided the first chop on the product. After completing revisions, the draft was provided to Secretary General Rasmussen, who took the draft and all related attachments and products with him for his month-long holiday in August. By the end of August, the team convened at the Secretary General's Summer house for a final drafting session, during which the Secretary General provided his edits to Appathurai. The result of this session was the first draft of the Strategic Concept.

The Strategic Concept recognized the regional interests of the diverse NATO members by listing collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security under its core tasks. These three themes set the tone for the rest of the concept. The inclusion of cooperative security into NATO's core tasks is new in the Strategic Concept. Although previous concepts had addressed collective defense and crisis management, the task in the new concept was to define cooperative security. The concept defines cooperative security in terms of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; the Open Door policy; partnerships; and military reform and transformation.²³⁴

The implications of rapidly evolving technologies and their uses on the battlefield, both in major combat operations and in counterinsurgency operations, was a core idea

²³⁴ Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, November 19, 2010 (2010 Strategic Concept). Downloaded from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm on May 10, 2012.

that emerged from the Group of Experts report and remained in the Strategic Concept. The transformation of NATO's military capabilities relies on the acquisition of new technologies, the development of doctrine, and the standardization of military forces. The Strategic Concept recognizes that the forces will not operate primarily in Europe, but rather, "[u]nique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually."²³⁵ The alliance, therefore, must "engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency."²³⁶

Summary

With the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO advanced a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, stating "NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction." The inability to effectively coordinate crisis management policies between NATO and CSDP clearly played a role institutionally. Crisis management issues were addressed during the Group of Experts process, and subsequently discussed informally with the European Union. Yet, the informal nature of the Group of Experts process that culminated in the Strategic Concept buffered decision-making from the tensions playing out between the two intergovernmental organizations, and the process failed to advance any coordination of crisis management policies.

²³⁵ 2010 Strategic Concept.

²³⁶ 2010 Strategic Concept.

Table 6 shows the table of questions for this case. NATO's institutions played a key, and indeed a dominating, role in the development of the strategic concept, by organizing seminars for the Group of Experts, as well as completing the final drafting process. This informal method of drafting the Strategic Concept reduced internal divisions between the NATO members. Its twenty-year competition with the European Union over security issues, particularly over crisis management, played an influential role in the expansion of NATO's crisis management capabilities and policy. The competition, it should be noted, was not exclusively the reason why NATO's crisis management policy expanded – operations in Afghanistan and Iraq drove non-kinetic concepts of crisis management. The competition should not be understated, however, since the inability of the two organizations to coordinate crisis management policy leads to each organization asserting a greater role in crisis management. Similar to the previous case study, the development of the 2010 Strategic Concept is by definition the coordination of policy. Finally, the transformation of U.S. military power continues to build additional options for the alliance; military transformation occupies a central place in the NATO Strategic Concept.

It is worth examining Question 4 in a little detail. The general hypothesis of the dissertation, based on a review of the literature, suggests that cooperation between international institutions will facilitate alliance adaptation. In 2010, unlike in 1991, there were far more institutions exerting a security role in Europe. However, they played no part in the development of the concept; rather, they were briefed on the concept after its

completion. NATO, it appears, remains sensitive to the threat of competition from other organizations.

As of this writing, the effectiveness of the strategic concept in shaping NATO's transformation remains in question. The global economic crisis that has affected both Europe and the United States has jeopardized NATO's plans for capability acquisition, as the financial situations of its member states has declined. And yet, the unusual nature of the process itself may have jeopardized the further transformation of NATO.

Secretary General Rasmussen used informal processes to gather the positions of the nations, and then a highly trusted close circle of confidantes to draft the document. In doing so, he was able to quickly produce a document that outlined emerging security threats and NATO actions to respond to those threats. Since the Secretary General did not use the traditional diplomatic process, many of the nations view it as the Secretary General's product, rather than a product of the member nations. This view may have long-term consequences in acquiring the capabilities necessary to transform the alliance.

Table 6: Questions (2010 NATO Strategic Concept)

No.	Question	Result
1	Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
2	Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
3	Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	No
4	Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No
5	Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
6	Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes

SEATO in 1973-1975

On September 8, 1954, delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines signed the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT), also known as the Manila Pact, which formed the basis of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It later extended protocol status to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, which were excluded from participating in military alliances due to agreements at the 1954 Geneva Convention. Headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand, SEATO was designed to perform two functions: first, to deter communist aggression and expansion into Southeast Asia, and second, to provide limited economic and counterinsurgency advice to its member states and protocol nations.

The seeds of SEATO's dissolution in 1977 were sown at its conception. Although historians point to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 as the termination point for SEATO, the organization never proved capable of resolving disputes between allies. The United States exacerbated the situation with a conflicting set of policy goals towards Southeast Asia. John Franklin has argued that SEATO failed not because of its failure to respond to the crisis in Vietnam, but because the Eisenhower Administration mismanaged its Asian policy.²³⁷ He argues that two visions of how to handle Asia competed for primacy in the 1950s State Department: treating Asians as equals and containing communism in Asia. Asian nations, suspicious of U.S. motives, viewed the creation of SEATO as an extension of this schizophrenic policy. The vision of self-determination

²³⁷ John K. Franklin, *The Hollow Pact: Pacific Security and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization* (Texas Christian University: Dissertation, 2006).

encouraged the view that Asian countries should be treated with respect and placed on an equal footing with other nations.²³⁸ To this end, the United States exerted pressure on the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands to end their colonial practices in Asia.

At the same time, the State Department was strongly concerned about Soviet aggression and the spread of communism. While many Asian nations, such as India, sought to maintain a policy of neutrality, the Eisenhower Administration drew stark contrasts between communist and non-communist countries. Such a worldview did not allow for neutrality, and as such, the Eisenhower Administration sought to compel Asian nations to align with the free world and reject communism. Thus, the United States undermined its own policies and provoked Asian suspicions by withholding foreign aid in exchange for concessions to U.S. policies. George Modelski stated in 1962, “The mere existence of SEATO has...helped to draw a sharper line between the aligned and the non-aligned states in this part of the world.”²³⁹

The ANZUS partners, working through ANZUS consultation meetings, developed SEATO’s major policies (including its structure) with little input from other SEATO partners. When SEATO was created only three years after ANZUS, Australia feared that the new alliance would become the focus of America’s foreign policy in Asia. After the Second World War, Australia had sought to improve the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region through an alliance with the United States. As early as 1948, Australia urged the formation of a Pacific pact in NATO’s mold, which received public support

²³⁸ This vision was enshrined in the Pacific Charter, adopted by SEATO signatories on September 8, 1954, immediately after the signature of the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

²³⁹ George Modelski, ed., *SEATO: Six Studies* (Melbourne, AUS: F.W. Cheshire, 1962), p. xv.

from both British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.²⁴⁰ In September and October 1950, Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender visited Washington, D.C., to discuss Australia's view of a peace treaty with Japan and to push the development of a Pacific pact, which persuaded U.S. leaders to the creation of ANZUS. Although ANZUS preceded SEATO by three years, its origins were in Dulles' desire develop a much broader Pacific pact.²⁴¹ During his negotiations on the U.S.-Japan treaty, Dulles began to advocate for such a pact, in which he envisioned a collective security arrangement that would cover Asia, including Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, and a renewed Japan (often referred to as the "Dulles Plan").²⁴² With SEATO's creation, Australian Minister of External Affairs Richard Casey feared the new treaty organization would compete with ANZUS for resources, and wanted reassurance that SEATO would not supersede the ANZUS Pact or reduce its importance.

On September 22, 1954, less than a month after the Manila Pact was signed, Dulles met with Casey to discuss SEATO's military planning. At this meeting, and at a subsequent meeting with New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Monroe, Dulles reassured Casey that SEATO would not supersede ANZUS. Additionally, it was agreed to arrange an ANZUS meeting to work through the details of organizing the alliance. Casey preferred this model and suggested ANZUS, "serve as a cover for what would in effect be SEATO strategic planning -- its true purpose not being publicly known -- and that 'make-

²⁴⁰ R.I.I.A., *Survey of International Affairs, 1949-1950* (London, U.K.: O.U.P., 1953), Pt. I, p. 32; Leicester C. Webb, "Australia and SEATO," in *SEATO: Six Studies*.

²⁴¹ John K. Franklin, *The Hollow Pact: Pacific Security and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization* (Texas Christian University: Dissertation, 2006), p. 55.

²⁴² U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954*, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), Part 1, p. 150.

believe' planning be undertaken bilaterally by the US with each of the other four countries."²⁴³ Dulles did not object to this model, but had no desire to engage in extensive military planning with the other allies, as he believed that deterrence was established through the treaty. Subsequently, ANZUS council meetings provided SEATO's strategic direction.

Although Dulles wanted to expand SEATO into a broader Pacific Pact, he did not develop any organizational incentives to increase SEATO's membership. In fact, SEATO's structure remained weak and under-funded, and its only critical military role was advocacy for the standardization of military capabilities through combined training exercises. With the first official meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Bangkok on February 22-25, 1955, the primary order of business was the construction of the organization. The representatives largely followed the basic outline developed by the ANZUS powers. At the top of the organization, a Council of Foreign Ministers would have final decision-making authority, and meet once per year in different locations hosted by member governments. Two subordinate organizations, the Council of Representatives, which would meet every two weeks, and the Council of Military Advisors, which would meet twice per year, would run the day-to-day business of the alliance, and provide military recommendations to the Council of Foreign Ministers, respectively. Underneath the Council of Representatives, the ministers created three specialized organizations, to meet as frequently as necessary: a Committee of Security Experts to work with Asian nations and identify sources of internal subversion from communist forces, a Committee of

²⁴³ *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, p. 940.

Economic Experts to study the impact of treaty commitments on member nations, and a Committee of Information, Culture, Education, and Labor Activities. The final committee had a broad scope of responsibility, but was specifically tasked to examine social and labor legislation in member countries.²⁴⁴

Over the next two years, the Council of Foreign Ministers modified this organizational model twice. At the second annual meeting, the ministers created a Permanent Working Group, which reported to the Council of Representatives and initially served as a policy planning staff; by the early 1960s, however, the responsibility for daily oversight of the organization began to devolve to the Permanent Working Group. The position of the Secretary-General was created at the third annual meeting, which reduced the power of both the Permanent Working Group and the Council of Representatives, although these organizations continued throughout the life of the organization.²⁴⁵

Despite efforts by the Council of Military Advisors to standardize the capabilities of SEATO's member states, the intentions of the alliance and the military capabilities available to it remained mismatched. In the case of enemy aggression, the SEACDT committed treaty members to act "in accordance with [each Party's] constitutional processes."²⁴⁶ This language, adopted from the ANZUS treaty, was necessary to circumvent the contentious Senate debates prompted by ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty.²⁴⁷ Ironically, although communist subversion of states in the region remained the

²⁴⁴ George Modelski, "SEATO: Its Function and Organization," in *SEATO: Six Studies*.

²⁴⁵ Modelski, "SEATO: Its Function and Organization," pp. 22-27.

²⁴⁶ See Article IV(1) of The South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Pacific Charter.

²⁴⁷ The Senate strongly approved the SEACDT with a vote of 86-1.

most likely scenario (and the one with which the SEACDT was primarily concerned), the organization, using American air and naval capabilities, was best equipped and organized to contend with overt communist aggression.

Although agreements between the major powers at the 1954 Geneva Convention prevented Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam from participating in military alliances, SEATO extended protocol status to these countries. The first test of SEATO's ability to support communist resistance arrived in early 1961 with the Laotian Civil War. The civil war initiated only months after a coup in Laos resulted in the formation of a new government under Prince Boon Oum. Until the *coup*, the Laotian government pursued a policy of neutrality, and did not intend to call for SEATO intervention. According to Pote Sarasin, "SEATO will continue to watch...but under no circumstances will it interfere in the internal affairs of Laos...Neutrality is a thing which we all hope Laos can preserve...a country that preserves a neutral policy is satisfactory as far as SEATO is concerned."²⁴⁸ The Boon Oum government was more receptive to aid from SEATO, but found only the United States and Thailand supportive of their request. Although the Philippines and Pakistan were sympathetic, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand refused to be drawn in to the conflict.²⁴⁹ The United States under President John Kennedy subsequently provided bilateral aid in the crisis, resulting in a *de facto* truce in May 1961.

SEATO's paralysis on the crisis in Laos, and the firm agreement between the United States and Thailand led to a joint statement that marked a turning point for the

²⁴⁸ Quoted in Modelski, "SEATO: Its Function and Organization," p. 12. From the *Bankok Post*, August 18, 1960.

²⁴⁹ Modelski, "SEATO: Its Function and Organization," p. 14.

alliance. In the joint statement, issued on March 6, 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, outlined steps for a more bilateral security arrangement. The joint statement indicated that Rusk "expressed the firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression and subversion." In an important interpretation of the SEACDT language, Rusk suggested that the Treaty obligation "is individual as well as collective."²⁵⁰ Amongst the Parties to the SEACDT, only Thailand considered SEATO crucial to its national security, and this only because the United States was party to the treaty. The joint statement marked the intention of the United States to use the treaty as justification for its actions in Southeast Asia, but do so in a bilateral way.

The Vietnam War demonstrated the willingness of the United States to use the SEATO treaty for bilateral action without consensus from its member states.²⁵¹ American intervention into Vietnam began with a small advisory program in 1950. In December 1960, Vietnamese communists resurrected the southern branch of the Viet Minh, called the National Liberation Front (NLF), which became more commonly known to foreigners as the "Viet Cong." In response, the United States in 1961 to 1962 began a massive escalation of overt military aid to the South through the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Although initial estimates suggested the intervention should not exceed 205,000 troops, by 1967 the MACV was the nucleus for an armed

²⁵⁰ The Dean Rusk-Thanat Khoman Joint Statement, Washington, D.C., March 6th, 1962.

²⁵¹ Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand supported American intervention, while Pakistan and France openly opposed military action.

force of 525,000 troops.²⁵² Although the United States used SEATO as justification to aid South Vietnam, most of its military assistance was provided on a bilateral basis.

The best chance for SEATO's transformation arrived in 1973. U.S. commitment to the region in the wake of the Vietnam conflict would prove the most formidable obstacle to SEATO's transformation. In 1968, SEATO fell into disfavor both politically and publicly within the United States with Richard Nixon's election promises to withdraw from Vietnam. The 1969 Nixon Doctrine called for a withdrawal of active U.S. political and military presence in Southeast Asia. The Paris Agreements of January 27, 1973 permitted American withdrawal from Vietnam, prompting concern from Thailand and the Philippines. These two SEATO members feared that disbanding the organization would signify a reduced U.S. commitment to the region, and persuaded the United States not to withdraw from the treaty by proposing changes to SEATO's structure and functions.

In 1973, at the behest of Thailand and the Philippines, SEATO decided to abolish the military planning office. The decision, developed during a visit to Manila by Thai Foreign Minister Chatichai on July 18-21, was affirmed at the eighteenth SEATO Council Meeting in New York on September 28, 1973. The organization had, since the late 1960s, been orienting its work increasingly towards counterinsurgency and economic

²⁵² The literature on the Vietnam War is immense, and will not be recounted here. For a good overview of events surrounding the conflict, see David Joel Steinberg, *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*, Revised 3rd ed. (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), particularly pages 353-364.

assistance. With the dissolution of the military planning office, SEATO acted primarily as an agency for counterinsurgency and military assistance.²⁵³

Despite these efforts, several members lost interest in the alliance.²⁵⁴ The United States was in the midst of détente with the Soviet Union. Doubts about the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia encouraged Thailand and the Philippines to forge closer ties with China. The organization had long been considered moribund; as relations with China improved, SEATO was increasingly regarded as an anachronism.²⁵⁵ The Australian Labour government, led by Prime Minister Edward Whitlam, appeared likely to abandon SEATO until his visit with President Nixon in July 1973.²⁵⁶ On August 26, 1975, Thailand and the Philippines issued a joint communiqué declaring that SEATO should be phased out. On September 24, 1975, the remaining powers associated with SEATO affirmed the decision for a two-year “phase-out” of the organization, although the SEACDT remained. This decision was generally lauded as a victory for détente.

Despite its general ineffectiveness as a military alliance, the victory of the liberal Labour Party in the 1972 Prime Ministerial elections in Australia and New Zealand marked the beginning of SEATO’s end. Together, these two countries sought to establish diplomatic ties with China, and were willing to sacrifice SEATO in order to accomplish

²⁵³ Leszek Buszynski, “SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It Was Abolished,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Sep., 1981), pp. 287-296.; Les Buszynski, “Thailand and the Manila Pact,” *The World Today*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 1980), pp. 45-51.

²⁵⁴ Buszynski, “SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It Was Abolished.”

²⁵⁵ Alejandro M. Fernandez, “The Philippines and the United States Today,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1976), pp. 269-308.

²⁵⁶ According to a briefing for the President, “He [Whitlam] is deeply opposed to anything resembling containment or confrontation,” and stated “We shall be charting a new course with less emphasis on military pacts.” Quoted from Department of State Briefing Paper, Australian-American Political/Security Relationships, General Issues, Gerald R. Ford Vice Presidential Papers, January 11, 1974 – Australian Deputy Prime Minister Lance Barnard, January 1974.

this goal. Pakistan withdrew in 1972, while France withdrew financial support beginning in 1975. With interest in maintaining the alliance waning, in 1975 the leaders of Thailand and the Philippines announced the organization should be “phased out to make it accord with the new realities of the region.”²⁵⁷ On June 22, 1977, the final SEATO Council of Representatives met with representation from all current members including France, and officially disbanded the alliance effective June 30, 1977.²⁵⁸

Summary

While SEATO provided many cultural benefits to the nations of Southeast Asia, it was clearly a military failure. The organization lacked a unifying command structure, and although it brought the Americans into Southeast Asia, it proved incapable of containing the spread of communism. These issues were exacerbated by the small amount of influence the Asian countries had in the decision process. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (along with Britain, the unofficial member of ANZUS), dominated SEATO’s decision-making process by making key decisions for SEATO at ANZUS meetings. This model failed to allow the small Asian powers in the alliance to influence key decisions.

Table 7 summarizes the questions asked of the SEATO case study. Unlike NATO, SEATO’s organization did not facilitate its adaptation. Indeed, the only attempted adaptation to the alliance was to the organization supporting the alliance, rather than the policies of the alliance. The failure of SEATO to transform aligns with traditional political science theory; without an external threat, it disintegrated. In the waning days of

²⁵⁷ *New York Times* (July 25, 1975). Quoted in Henry T. Nash, *American Foreign Policy: A Search for Security*, 3rd edition (Chicago, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1985), p. 252.

²⁵⁸ Nash, *American Foreign Policy*.

the SEATO alliance, its membership decreased, it reduced organizational infrastructure, and yet was still unable to achieve internal cohesion. The organization suffered from a lack of interest amongst the membership, particularly Pakistan, France, and the United States. With the announcement of the Nixon doctrine that Pacific allies should be expected to defend themselves, and the growth of Chinese influence in the region, the failure of the alliance to resolve its internal issues led to its termination. The United States was not yet transforming its conventional military capability; in the middle of the 1970s, nuclear deterrence remained the most effective U.S. policy. The elimination of SEATO, therefore, aligned closely with the policy of détente with the Soviet Union.

For its effectiveness, the alliance relied on vague U.S. promises and uncertain commitments; although it was a collective defense treaty, the United States provided the vast majority of the troops. SEATO did not develop a corresponding doctrine similar to NATO's Strategic Concept. The organization, therefore, rather than working to achieve common goals within the region, was relegated to improving standardization amongst the military capabilities of its member Parties.

Table 7: Questions (SEATO)

No.	Question	Result
1	Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	No
2	Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
3	Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
4	Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No
5	Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No
6	Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	No

Chapter Summary

Each of the three multilateral alliance case studies reviewed in this chapter demonstrates the challenges of reconciling the purpose of the alliance. The allies, particularly those who belong to more than one intergovernmental organization, must decide which organization optimizes operational effectiveness and efficiency. When the allies are unable to reconcile policies between multiple organizations, each organization adapts to the more competitive policy space.

While military transformation clearly played a role in the adaptation of the alliance in two of the cases reviewed, only the 2010 Strategic Concept attempted to focus the direction of military transformation for the alliance. The technological seeds of military transformation planted in the late 1980s swayed European allies as the United States and NATO demonstrated significant military value over competitor organizations during the 1991 Gulf War. However, the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept did not attempt to transform NATO's military capabilities further, and focused on efforts to solidify the future of the organization in post-Cold War Europe.

The conclusions above hold true for SEATO as well as NATO. The inability to reconcile the purpose of the organization, in part due to the fact that only Thailand considered SEATO crucial to its own national security left the alliance adrift shortly after its formation. Attempts to transform the alliance in 1973 foundered, in part because of significant internal competition and no external competition. ANZUS dominated the decision-making processes, and was therefore – despite Australia's initial fears – the trilateral alliance neither cooperated nor competed with SEATO for security pre-eminence in Southeast Asia. Failing to develop a cohesive vision for security or provide a

credible security alternative in Southeast Asia, the organization was allowed to die in 1977.

CHAPTER FIVE: BILATERAL CASE STUDIES

Overview

Over the past two decades, Japan has quietly transformed the instruments of its national power – in particular its Self Defense Forces (SDF). It has done so with explicit approval and, more important, the assistance of its United States ally and other partners. In 1995, Japan published its second National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which emphasized the role of Japanese forces within the context of United Nations peacekeeping missions and assistance to the United States in responding to regional contingencies. With the publication of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2010, Japan announced a new policy to field a force capable of engaging in dynamic deterrence, replacing the Basic Defense Force policy established in 1957. Even more importantly, if less reported, was Japan's December 2010 relaxation of the Three Export Principles. Perhaps most surprising is that the Government of Japan has changed its Cold War defense posture so dramatically with minimal controversy from domestic or international sources.

The Government of Japan's response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 became a significant source of controversy and internal tension amongst Japanese politicians. To support its U.S. ally, the Japanese government, led by the Liberal Democratic Party and supported by its coalition allies (the Komeito and New Conservative parties), passed its anti-terrorism bill, which went into effect in November

2001. The political tension stemmed from Japan's interpretations of Article 9 of its Constitution, and its understanding of its rights under international law, as articulated in the United Nations charter.²⁵⁹ Until the 2010 NDPG, Japan's defense policy was to adhere to the minimum defense capability as articulated in the 1976 NDPO to exercise individual self-defense. Politicians have long prohibited the SDF from engaging in collective self-defense with allies or partners, however, since this would necessarily exceed the threshold of minimum defense capability. The antiterrorism controversy stemmed from the concept that sending the SDF overseas to provide logistical support in the Indian Ocean was also considered beyond the "minimum self-defense" threshold. The dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean in logistical support of combat operations meant the SDF deployed troops for the first time since the SDF was formed in 1954.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution proclaims:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (House of Councilors, ed., 1969, pp. 5-6)

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self- defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. (Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, San Francisco, 1945, pp. 10-11)

²⁶⁰ Some Japanese consider the overseas dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April 1991 as part of wartime operations (therefore violating Article 9 without a special authorization law), although the dispatch occurred after the end of combat operations. Takao Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2010).

The evolution of security relations between the United States and Japan has historically been a function of Japan's own military development. The early evolution of Japan's forces, however, would not have occurred without consistent outside pressure from Washington. When the 1960 Treaty (the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) was signed the SDF had been in existence for only six years. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Americans were determined to stamp out all forms of militarism in Japan, including its capacity to wage war, by revolutionizing its political, social, and economic structures. During the U.S. Occupation of Japan, U.S. forces provided both international and domestic security functions for the Japanese. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, which precipitated the Cold War in the Pacific, U.S. military planners began to reconsider the need for a Japanese military capability. Almost as soon as first U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951, U.S. Government leaders began to pressure Japan to build its own security forces. Under this pressure, Japan reorganized its Police Reserve Agency into the Japanese National Safety Agency in 1952. In 1954, the National Safety Agency further evolved into the Japan Defense Agency and the SDF. Although the forces were in existence, Japan did not articulate a need for a defensive capability until it reorganized the JSDF through the Basic Defense Policy in 1957.

Since 1960, Japan's security policy has rested on two pillars of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation: Article 5 (defense of Japan), and Article 6 (the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East). The treaty outlined the strategic bargain that served as the foundation for Japan's military strategy: in return

for a security guarantee from the United States, Japan would provide basing to facilitate U.S. power projection capabilities in East Asia. The core concept behind the strategic bargain has long remained a source of friction within the alliance. While the United States has long expected the free use of basing and facilities on Japanese soil, Japanese leaders have sought greater discretion over the types of forces based in Japan as well as their use for purposes outside Japan.

During the Cold War, Japan focused on its Article 5 responsibilities, using the Basic Defense Policy to guide force structure development. As a result, the JSDF was capable of initial response to aggression on the Japanese mainland until its U.S. ally was able to respond. These developments, however, did not translate to interoperability with U.S. forces; coordination between the uniformed militaries of each of the allies frequently occurred at a low level, often without the full knowledge of Japanese political leadership. Acting in collective self-defense with the United States remains a divisive issue within the alliance, as Japanese political leadership continues to adhere to Article 9 of its constitution.

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the hypothetical threat to Japan's national security and the *raison d'être* of the alliance became a part of the domestic debate in both the United States and Japan. Questions arose within the United States about the continued need to defend Japan, an economic superpower, while the debate within Japan centered on whether the physical presence of U.S. forces was still required to ensure Japan's national security. Relations between the two countries reached a nadir with the rape in 1995 of an Okinawan girl, prompting

protests in Okinawa and adding fuel to those arguing to reduce or eliminate the U.S. basing burden on Japan.

In November 1995, Japan revised its NDPO, and for the first time emphasized its support role to U.S. forces under Article 6 of the Treaty. The document, which is equivalent to the Quadrennial Defense Review in the United States, was the product of the Japanese Cabinet, the policy-making body reporting to the Prime Minister and comprised of his appointed ministers. Beginning with the 1995 NDPO, the document has acted as both an articulation of basic defense policy and as a “wish list” for policy objectives. In concert with the NDPO (which projects Japan’s defense policies over a ten-year horizon), the Japan Defense Agency produced its 12th Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP), which outlines the Defense “shopping list” for each 5-year interval, beginning in 1957. After the 1995 NDPO, the MTDP was tied to the Japanese Government’s characterization of the security environment through an annex to the NDPO.

In 2009, with the DPJ coalition’s historic win in the Diet and subsequent selection of Yukio Hatoyama as its first Prime Minister, the Japanese electorate signaled a general dissatisfaction with the direction of the LDP’s policies (particularly its domestic policies) and scandals that seemed to indicate a disconnection with the general population. The DPJ’s victory, and “*ad hoc*” policy process has allowed the party to advance innovative new policies that would be less likely under the LDP.²⁶¹ The DPJ took the initiative as the dominant party in both Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet to enact policies to

²⁶¹ A Japanese Ministry of Defense official used the term “*ad hoc*” several times during an interview with the author on April 10, 2012.

achieve its campaign promise to seek a more equal defense relationship with the United States, and switch its foreign policy focus from the United States to Asia.²⁶² In his resignation speech on June 2, 2010, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated, “I do not believe that it is a good idea for Japan to depend on the United States for her security for the next 50 to 100 years.”²⁶³ The 2010 NDPG reflected this shifting security orientation by articulating a shift away from Japan’s Basic Defense Force to a Dynamic Defense Force “that possesses readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility reinforced by advanced technology based on the trends of military technology and intelligence capabilities, to effectively and efficiently build, maintain, and operate defense forces.”²⁶⁴

The demise of the U.S.-New Zealand leg of the Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) alliance can be initially traced to the election of a Labour government in New Zealand, and its anti-nuclear policy. Anti-nuclear public sentiment had been building in New Zealand for more than a decade, and became a central platform of the Labour Party beginning in the late 1970s. In tit-for-tat diplomacy between allies, the United States challenged the New Zealand’s young policy of restricting port access to all nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships. The inevitable rejection of the *U.S.S. Buchanan* publicly stung the United States, whose policy was to neither confirm nor deny the presence of

²⁶² See, for example, Martin Fackler, “Japan’s Relationship with U.S. Gets a Closer Look,” *New York Times* (December 1, 2009). Downloaded on March 30, 2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02japan.html?_r=1.

²⁶³ Yukio Hatoyama, Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) Diet members emergency meeting, June 2, 2010, http://asx.pod.tv/dpj/free/2010/20100602soukai_v56.asx.

²⁶⁴ See the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011 - FY2015), Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010. Also see the National Defense Program Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2011 and beyond, approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010. Downloaded on March 1, 2012 from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html.

nuclear weapons. The deeper concern for the United States was the potential spread of the “Kiwi disease” to other U.S. allies. By 1986, the United States officially rescinded all security guarantees to New Zealand; Prime Minister David Lange responded, “New Zealand is better out of ANZUS.”²⁶⁵

Actors in Japan’s Political System

Japan follows a parliamentary political system, which fuses the role of the executive and the legislative process. The legislature, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy share the power within the Japanese system of government. The Japanese legislature, called the Diet, is often less decisive than the executive, which is how legislatures frequently act. The does not often initiate or refine public policy; rather, its role is frequently to “rubber-stamp” the decisions made by the cabinet.²⁶⁶

The cabinet initiates and approves the public policies that the Diet enacts. The chief executive – the prime minister – is also the head of the Diet, specifically, the lower house. Within the Japanese system, the Prime Minister and the cabinet are comprised of civilians, generally selected from the Diet, although some ministers of state may be selected from outside the government. Because a cabinet post is often a way to reward loyalty within the party, external selections are infrequent.

Although Japan does not have a National Security Council, it does have a forum at the Minister-level to facilitate discussion on national security issues. In 1956, the National Defense Council was established to deliberate on important matters concerning

²⁶⁵ Dora Alves, “The Changing New Zealand Defense Posture,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (April 1989), p. 363.

²⁶⁶ For detailed information on the role of the legislature within Japanese politics, see Louis D. Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, 4th ed., (Armonck, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

national defense. In 1986, the Diet passed legislation to establish a Security Council, succeeding the National Defense Council, in order to deal with responses to grave emergencies.²⁶⁷ The purpose of the Security Council is to deliberate and make recommendations on matters pertaining to security policies and important matters concerning responses to grave emergency situations, upon the Prime Minister's consultation with that body.²⁶⁸ The membership of the Security Council consists of the Prime Minister (chair); the Deputy Prime Minister; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission; and the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Communications; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Economy, Trade, and Industry; Land Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism; and Defense. The function of the Council was strengthened in 2003 with expanded membership and the establishment of a Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning to facilitate the Council's role in response to various national emergencies.

Over the course of Japan's post-Second World War history, the prime minister's position has turned over frequently. Since Junichiro Koizumi left office in 2006, six politicians have occupied the position of prime minister. Since the ascension of the Japan Defense Agency to the level of Ministry of Defense in January 2007, there have been nine Defense Ministers. Because Japan has a limited number of political appointees within the ministries, the cabinet and the Diet both rely on the career bureaucrats, giving them an enormous amount of power over public policy within the Japanese system.

²⁶⁷ Act for the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan (Act no. 71 of 1986).

²⁶⁸ The specific policies listed in the legislation include the: Basic Policy for National Defense; National Defense Program Guidelines; Basic Response Plan against Armed Attack Situations; important matters concerning responses to Armed Attack Situations, Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and SDF's operations in international peace cooperation activities; and other matters concerning national defense.

The rise of the DPJ to become the ruling party of Japan followed several difficult and tumultuous years for the long-reigning LDP, which had maintained control of Japan almost continuously since 1955. The LDP enjoyed a long period of political stability under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from 2001 to 2006. A popular and charismatic politician viewed as a political maverick, Koizumi was the only Prime Minister since 1972 to remain in office for more than five years. Despite the stability of the early part of the decade, Koizumi's successors were unable to maintain hold of the office. From 2006 to 2012, there have been six Prime Ministers (three LDP, and three DPJ), with only Naoto Kan able to maintain his hold on the office for more than a year.

The DPJ was founded in 1998 by former LDP heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa, with membership principally consisting of former members of the LDP. After its formation, the DPJ became one of the primary opposition parties in the Japanese Diet until its 2009 victory in the House of Representatives ("Lower House") election. With the DPJ's 2007 victory in the House of Councillors ("Upper House"), the LDP lost its majority for the first time since 1989 – an event that forced then-Prime Minister Sosuke Uno to resign from office. The 2007 election served as a confidence vote for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; the opposition delayed key national security legislation, such as the bill to renew the Indian Ocean Special Measures Law, which would continue the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) mission to refuel ships supporting the antiterrorism coalition in Afghanistan.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ See, for example, Brett Murphy, "Japan PM Resigns Amidst Fight over Antiterror Law Renewal," *Jurist* website (September 12, 2007). Downloaded on April 1, 2012 from http://jurist.org/jurist_search.php?q=shinzo+abe.

During the campaign, as part of its broader commitment to transforming Japan's foreign relations, the DPJ pledged to be more assertive in its relations with the United States.²⁷⁰ Shortly after his election, Yukio Hatoyama, the DPJ's first Prime Minister, quickly announced that he would develop "new directions" in Japan's foreign policy, as he sought to create a more "autonomous diplomatic strategy."²⁷¹ This included a review of what he termed "asymmetries" within the alliance, as he sought to establish an "equal relationship" with the United States. During his campaign, Hatoyama pledged to examine several sensitive security issues, including the Special Measures Law, the relocation of Futenma station, and what he termed "secret agreements" with the United States to store or transit nuclear weapons in Japan (United States and the LDP both denied Hatoyama's allegations). During meetings with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Hatoyama indicated that he would conduct an independent strategic review of the alliance – without consultations with the United States.²⁷²

The DPJ's history of being a primary opposition party did not prepare its leadership for the challenges of being the ruling party. One of the principal challenges for the DPJ's leadership, from the Prime Minister to the Cabinet-level officials, is the lack of experience in international affairs at all levels within the coalition.²⁷³ Cabinet-

²⁷⁰ See, for example, John Pomfret and Blaine Harden, "U.S. Pressures Japan on Military Package," *The Washington Post* (October 22, 2009). Downloaded on April 3, 2012 from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102100746.html>.

²⁷¹ Michael Freedman, "U.S. and Japan Disagree over Okinawa," *The Daily Beast* (October 27, 2009). Downloaded on April 3, 2012 from <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/wealth-of-nations/2009/10/27/u-s-and-japan-disagree-over-okinawa.html>.

²⁷² John Pomfret and Blaine Harden, "U.S. Pressures Japan on Military Package," *The Washington Post* (October 22, 2009). Downloaded on April 3, 2012 from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102100746.html>.

²⁷³ This was a key point of a career official in the Japanese Prime Minister's office during an interview with the author.

level officials are often selected from the ruling coalition of the Diet. Under the LDP, although most Cabinet-level officials were also Diet members, the Prime Minister often selected people with specific skill sets to serve as Cabinet officials from outside the Government of Japan. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had previously served in the private sector as a CEO. The long duration of the LDP's rule allowed them to develop relationships outside the government and made them comfortable with non-Diet members in policy positions.²⁷⁴ The DPJ's weakness in foreign affairs and defense policy matters has exacerbated the perception that Japanese politicians lack leadership because they rely too heavily on the career bureaucrats who possess deep knowledge and experience in these areas, and are unlikely to change the bureaucracy.

Japan's 1995 National Defense Program Outlines

When the first NDPO was drafted in 1976, it was purely a product of the Government of Japan, and had not been discussed in advance with the U.S. government. As a result, it presented several policies affecting the alliance that were not necessarily agreeable to the United States. For example, in 1972, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, responding to concerns from Japan's neighbors about Japan's defense buildup in the 1960s and 1970s, informed Chinese Premier Chou En-lai that Japan would limit its defense spending to 1 percent of its GNP during peacetime.²⁷⁵ During the negotiations

²⁷⁴ This point was made during an interview with the author by a career official in the Ministry of Justice.

²⁷⁵ *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* (Tokyo) (evening edition), October 7, 1972.

over the 1976 NDPO, while the Defense Agency preferred to phrase it “about” 1 percent, the Ministry of Finance preferred a 1 percent maximum.²⁷⁶

The 1976 NDPO outlined as its goals “the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime” and emphasized that “Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance.”²⁷⁷ As the scale of aggression increased, Japan counted on its U.S. ally to “[forestall] any aggression against Japan and [repel] such aggression should it occur.”²⁷⁸ Japan’s position followed the Yoshida Doctrine of minimal defense capability and allowed it to adhere closely to the SDF force structure defined in the Basic Defense Policy.

Japan’s adoption of its new NDPO in November 1995, entitled the “National Defense Program Outlines for Fiscal Year 1996 and beyond,” marked only the second time that Japan had produced the NDPO. With the adoption of the new NDPO and the subsequent issuance of a Joint Declaration on Security by President William Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), comprised of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, in June 1996 established a Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), to negotiating the revisions to the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”). The subcommittee reviewed specific issues relating to cooperation under normal circumstances, cooperation under conditions of armed attack, and cooperation in the areas surrounding Japan affecting peace and security – although the review did not

²⁷⁶ Sebata, *Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007*, p. 126.

²⁷⁷ *Defense of Japan 1989* (Tokyo, Japan, 1989), pp. 262-266.

²⁷⁸ *Defense of Japan 1989* (Tokyo, Japan, 1989), pp. 262-266.

examine specific areas as United States foreign policy has remained neutral on the dispute since departing the islands in 1972.²⁷⁹

Two major international crises following the end of the Cold War catalyzed policy changes within Japan. These crises, the Gulf War in 1991 and the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, helped to “awaken” Japan to the importance of security issues.²⁸⁰ With the end of the Cold War, Japan began to think seriously about emerging within the global political environment as a “normal power.” Japan’s response in the Gulf War tested this policy goal: despite providing \$13 billion to fund coalition efforts in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Japan was embarrassed when it was not recognized as a member of the coalition. Although it provided four mine-sweepers to the area at the conclusion of the conflict, its policy of “checkbook diplomacy” during the war was a source of international derision and widely regarded outside of Japan as a failure to meet its responsibilities by a country not only dependent upon the international system, but also a major consumer of Middle East oil with more than two-thirds of its energy originating from the region. The failure led to fundamental reconsiderations of the basic policies governing the use of the JSDF’s capabilities.

The embarrassment caused by the policy of checkbook diplomacy led to the passage of Japan’s 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, which allowed the JSDF

²⁷⁹ Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps the publicly released records of the alliance on their website. For more details on the negotiation process of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Cooperation, see the Diplomatic Bluebook for 1996 and 1997 at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html>. For details on the Guidelines, see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html>.

²⁸⁰ Both Richard Samuels and Kenneth Pyle use this term. See Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 64; and Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York, NY: The Century Foundation, 2007), p. 292.

to dispatch forces in a reconstruction role to any United Nations peacekeeping effort in a non-combat environment. Although this legislation arrived too late for participation in the Persian Gulf, it allowed Japan to begin deploying troops. For the first time since 1945, Japanese troops deployed abroad, with 700 troops joining the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia. After finding success in the Cambodian mission, Japan began to participate in other UN peacekeeping activities, such as Mozambique, Zaire, the Golan Heights, and East Timor.

After the 1991 Gulf War, the debate within Japan over security and defense issues intensified as a result of international criticism over the policy of checkbook diplomacy. As a result, in the early 1990s, the “normal nation” concept became increasingly influential. Mike Mochizuki has argued that the politicians supporting the concept were split into three groups. Ichiro Ozawa, the former LDP president, led a group arguing that Japan should actively participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The second group recommended that Japan adopt the policy to engage in collective self-defense under the Security Treaty. The third group advocated a more independent approach, by recommending Japan redefine itself as an Asian power.²⁸¹ The differences in emphasis on partnership, organization, country, or region allowed Japan to push beyond the U.S.-Japan Alliance and extend alternative logics to its security policy development.²⁸²

²⁸¹ Mike M. Mochizuki, “American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis,” *Toward a True Alliance*, ed. Mike M. Mochizuki (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 43-82.

²⁸² Akiko Fukushima, “The Merits of Alliance: A Japanese Perspective – Logic Underpins Japan’s Global and Regional Security Role,” *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, Takashi

The infighting between these factions has given rise to a literature on the bureaucratic politics theories of defense policy-making in Japan.²⁸³ Theories of bureaucratic politics, however, do not represent well the role of external pressure on the process. Indeed, one of the most noteworthy differences between the process for development of the 1976 NDPO and the 1995 NDPO was the level of cooperation between Japan and its U.S. ally. Whereas the 1976 NDPO was conducted almost entirely internal to the Government of Japan, there was a substantial amount of insight and cooperation between the two allies during the development of the 1995 successor document.

Other crises in Japan's immediate neighborhood assured that security issues would remain at the top of the agenda. The 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis highlighted Japan's unpreparedness for a military crisis on the Korean peninsula; despite nearly two decades of interaction and cooperation in alliance planning, Japan remained incapable of acting in concert with the United States.²⁸⁴ In 1993, North Korea provoked an international crisis with its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. As tensions mounted, the United States requested assistance from Japan in the event of conflict on the peninsula. The contributions requested included fuel and material for U.S. forces, ships and planes for minesweeping and intelligence gathering, and the interruption of financial flows into North Korea.²⁸⁵ Japanese officials, however, were unable to comply. The crisis was abated in the summer of 1994, when former President

Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato, eds. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 53-90.

²⁸³ Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007*.

²⁸⁴ Samuels, *Securing Japan*, p. 67.

²⁸⁵ Pyle, *Japan Rising*, p. 295.

Jimmy Carter travelled to North Korea to conclude an agreement. According to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, had Japan chosen not to provide access to bases and or provide assistance in the event of war, “It would have been the end of the alliance.”²⁸⁶

The Higuchi Report

Beginning with the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Japan Defense Agency began to consider reviewing sections of the 1976 NDPO, particularly those pertaining to the international environment. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Japanese officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency needed to justify the continued existence of the Security Treaty and maintain the defense budget. On October 1, 1993, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa decided to establish a private advisory body within the Cabinet reporting directly to him, following the process established with the 1976 NDPO. Hosokawa sought drastic reforms in defense policy, particularly reductions in the Ground Self-Defense Forces, and instructed Kazuo Aichi, Director-General of the Defense Agency, to lead the review process.

By tradition, the budget of the SDF was evenly divided amongst the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF. Hosokawa wanted to use the review process to justify reductions of one-third to one-half to the Ground SDF while maintaining the force levels of the Maritime and Air SDF. Naturally, the Ground SDF opposed a reduction, while the Defense Agency maintained a neutral position.²⁸⁷ With the political elites challenging

²⁸⁶ Don Oberdorfer, *The Changing Context of U.S.-Japan Relations* (New York, NY: Japan Society, 1998), p. 39; Pyle, *Japan Rising*, p. 296.

²⁸⁷ *Asahi Shinbun* (Tokyo), March 5, 1994; Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007*.

their force structure the SDF, particularly the Ground SDF, sought new missions to justify the maintenance of their force levels and funding.

In early 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa appointed the Advisory Group on Defense Issues (commonly known as the Higuchi Commission), with a membership comprised of scholars and industry leaders. Chaired by Mr. Hirotaro Higuchi of Asahi Breweries, Ltd, the nine-member panel first convened on February 28, 1994. Over the next four months, the panel convened 15 times to discuss a variety of issues ranging from the regional security situation, to personnel readiness, to the U.S.-Japan alliance, to peacekeeping, arms control, and intelligence issues. The final report (entitled *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*) was drafted in July and presented to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on August 12.²⁸⁸ Notably, the Higuchi Commission reaffirmed the Basic Defense Force Concept, but also noted that the military dangers Japan faced were significantly different than those faced in 1976, when the first NDPO was issued. While the Higuchi Report made a number of recommendations that would force the SDF to reorganize through force reductions, the report did not recommend arms reductions or budget reductions. Finally, although the report adhered closely to the Basic Defense Force concept, the authors clearly recognized the need to find new ways of contributing to international security if the alliance was to survive.

²⁸⁸ Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), p. 21. Appendix A of the book presents a complete translated version of the Higuchi Commission Report, formally known as the report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century," August 14, 1994.

The report suggested that Japan needed to “extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order.”²⁸⁹ The main recommendation to achieve this was to build a coherent and comprehensive strategy based on the promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale, enhancing the functions of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and strengthening the Japan Defense Agency’s information and crisis management capabilities. The report emphasized that Japan should actively participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, calling it “one of the major pillars of Japan’s security policy,” and “a major duty of the SDF.”²⁹⁰

Even as the Higuchi Commission sought to build a comprehensive new strategy for Japan, its focus on peacekeeping operations emphasized a greater alignment with the United Nations and other multilateral security cooperation forums. A key phrase in the report indicates that the authors believe “the United States no longer holds an overwhelming advantage in terms of overall national strength.”²⁹¹ The report then questions whether the United States “will be able to demonstrate leadership in multilateral cooperation....The mechanism of resolving security problems through international cooperation...is showing signs of developing little by little, both at the level of the United Nations and at the regional level.”²⁹²

Finally, the authors of the Higuchi Report were very aware of the ongoing revolution in military affairs. In a section entitled “Developments in Military Science

²⁸⁹ Higuchi Commission Report, p. 30.

²⁹⁰ Higuchi Commission Report, pp. 37-38.

²⁹¹ Higuchi Commission Report, p. 24.

²⁹² Higuchi Commission Report, pp. 24-25.

and Technology,” the Higuchi Report notes that, “[t]here has been a major shift in emphasis from conventional weapons of the heavy, large types to high-performance weapons of the precision-guidance type.”²⁹³ The report notes that the most important changes have come in the areas of “information and command/communication systems...satellites...and C3I systems.”²⁹⁴ The 1995 NDPG reflected this concept by outlining a review of Japan’s defense capabilities, which should include “recent advances in science and technology.”²⁹⁵

The Nye Initiative

Although alliance managers within the United States generally approved of Japan’s decision to expand its operational military capabilities in peacekeeping activities, there were clearly internal alliance disagreements about its policy directions. Beginning in the early 1990s, policymakers in the United States grew increasingly concerned about a perceived “drift” in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. As Japan increased its participation in multilateral activities with the United Nations after the passage of the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, Japan’s self-imposed resource constraints stretched their capabilities to work with their U.S. ally. Within the United States, alliance managers increasingly believed that the alliance would depend on closer bilateral coordination in policy and planning activities.

The “Nye Initiative,” named after Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph S. Nye, played an important role in bilateral consultations during

²⁹³ Higuchi Commission Report, p. 46.

²⁹⁴ Higuchi Commission Report, p. 46.

²⁹⁵ National Defense Program Outline in and after 1996 (1995 NDPO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 1995.

the drafting of the NDPO, and helped to frame the Joint Security Declaration between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto that led to the re-drafting of the Joint Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. Nye was particularly interested in promoting dialogue between the United States and Japan on security issues, which had been neglected in favor of trade issues within the Clinton Administration.²⁹⁶ Through the 1980s and early 1990s, trade disputes between the allies dominated the relationship between the United States and Japan. While the United States was in relative economic decline in the 1980s and early 1990s, Japan's powerful economy caused some to question why the United States was defending an economic superpower.²⁹⁷

Patrick Cronin of the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies and Michael Green of the Institute for Defense Analysis shared Nye's concerns, and played important coordinating and analytical roles throughout the consultation process. Cronin was able to closely observe the proceedings of the Higuchi Commission, and to discuss long-term defense policy and strategy with Defense Agency officials. In 1994, this close interaction and observation led to the publication of a study analyzing the Higuchi Commission's report. Their primary concerns were over the Higuchi Report's emphasis on the United Nations, multilateral defense mechanisms, and stronger autonomous defense capabilities. Indeed, Cronin and Green perceived a shift in "Momentum and energy in Japanese policy planning...away from the alliance."²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007*, p. 262.

²⁹⁷ Tatsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (Westview Special Studies on East Asia) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

²⁹⁸ Cronin and Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, p. 2.

Seeking to promote his concept of increased security dialogue, Nye wrote in an article in *Foreign Policy* magazine that “the absence of a broader institutional framework” could lead to a re-armed Japan with “‘normal’ great power status” that “will act unilaterally in ways contrary to American interests.”²⁹⁹ He argued that the bilateral relationship would benefit if the allies could move past the economic friction, and recommended that the United States should pursue her own national interests and manage Japan through multilateral cooperation on security issues.³⁰⁰ These concepts helped set the stage for consultations between the United States and Japan throughout the NDPO drafting process.

Within its own policy establishment, the Pentagon was grappling with the implications of the end of the Cold War for its commitments to allies. With the completion of the Base Force implementation and the Bottom-up Review (BUR) in 1993, the United States was undertaking serious efforts to eliminate costs. The Base Force, which began in Fiscal Year 1990, called for significant reductions to military force structure and budget authority. According to a RAND report, “The Base Force called for substantial changes in U.S. military forces, including a 25 percent reduction in force structure, an approximately 10 percent reduction in budget authority, and more than a 20 percent reduction in manpower relative to FY 1990.”³⁰¹ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin took a more systematic approach to force structure cuts through the Bottom-up Review; after analyzing four alternatives contained in the report, he chose a force structure

²⁹⁹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Coping with Japan,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 113-114.

³⁰⁰ Nye, “Coping with Japan,” pp. 96-115.

³⁰¹ David T. Orletsky and Kristen J. Leushner, *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 5.

capable of winning two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC). The BUR outlined four planning objectives:

- Defeat aggressors in MRCs;
- Maintain overseas presence;
- Conduct smaller scale intervention operations, such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief to further U.S. objectives and interests; and
- Deter attacks with WMD against U.S. territory, U.S. forces, or the territory and forces of U.S. allies.³⁰²

Behind the development of these planning objectives was the political desire to cut military force structure and achieve savings. Since the United States no longer had to fear rivalry from the Soviet Union, and no other hegemonic threat appeared likely for at least a decade, a key question was how many divisions could be eliminated and still maintain military superiority over any challenger?³⁰³

In February 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense produced the East Asia Strategy Review (EASR), the first product of the Nye Initiative. Also dubbed the “Nye Report,” the EASR committed the United States to stationing 100,000 troops in East Asia, with 45,000 stationed in Japan. The report emphasized a desire to strengthen bilateral defense planning and defense cooperation – in part a reaction to the Higuchi Report’s emphasis on multilateral and autonomous defense efforts.

³⁰² Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era* (September 2, 1993), p. 1.

³⁰³ Orletsky and Leushner, *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change*.

The release of Cronin and Green's 1994 monograph, with its title *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, unintentionally ignited a debate within Japan over whether the Nye Initiative was intended to redefine the alliance or reaffirm it.³⁰⁴ According to Yoichi Funabashi, the Nye Report set the stage for a redefinition of the Security Treaty. Specifically, Nye was concerned about China's growing power and its future role in the region; he sought to use the alliance to manage China's rise into a responsible power.³⁰⁵ As a result, cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan became a more prominent issue in the U.S.-Japan defense planning relationship. Critics, particularly the Chinese, thought that the initiative was intended to replace the existing Security Treaty, and that the SDF would be doing too much. Neither Japan's Defense Agency nor the Cabinet drafting the NDPO objected to this new element in the relationship; the mission would provide the SDF with a new task.³⁰⁶

The Joint Declaration on Security, however, "reaffirmed" rather than redefined the alliance.³⁰⁷ Importantly, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto chose to reaffirm the fundamental importance of the relationship, with new elements, rather than to replace the existing treaty. This language helped to calm the growing tensions between the allies and Japan's neighbors over Japan's security role in the Pacific.

Two events interrupted the Nye Initiative, facilitating increased media scrutiny on the utility of the alliance while providing greater urgency to the process of bilateral

³⁰⁴ Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. xii.

³⁰⁵ Yoichi Funabashi, "Nichibei Anpo Saiteigi no Zen Kaibo" (A thorough examination of the redefinition of the United States-Japan Security Treaty), *Sekai* (May 1996).

³⁰⁶ Sebata, *Japan's Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976-2007*, pp. 264-5.

³⁰⁷ "Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century," (April 17, 1996).

Downloaded from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html> on May 1, 2012.

consultation. The first was the rape of a 12 year-old Okinawan schoolgirl in September 1995 in Ginowan Prefecture near Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, followed by Chinese missile demonstrations in March 1996. The trust between the allies, built up through the bilateral dialogue established by the Nye Initiative, led to the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa to consider a variety of important initiatives, including the relocation of Futenma Station.

Drafting and Decision-making

The overall process of drafting the 1995 NDPO adhered closely to the process developed in 1976, when the NDPO was first drafted. The process is relatively simple and straightforward: the Prime Minister appoints an independent panel to review the security environment and make recommendations. The panel, usually comprised of industry leaders, academics, and one or two retired experts on Japanese security policy, then meets between ten and 15 times to produce a report which is then presented to the Prime Minister to serve as the basis for Cabinet-level discussions. The Cabinet generally convenes between ten and 15 times for high-level discussions, usually to discuss the first three or four sections of the NDPO (the first three sections of the 1995 NDPO included the Purpose, the International Security Situation, and the Security of Japan and Roles of Defense Capabilities). Parallel to the Cabinet meetings, the Ministers of the relevant agencies meet to discuss the NDPO in depth, with emphasis on the capabilities sections (which, in 1995, included the Contents of Japan's Defense Capability and Points of Note in Upgrading, Maintaining, and Operating the Defense Capability). The principal actors in these meetings are usually the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Director-General of the

Defense Agency (after 2007, the Minister of Defense), and the Minister of Finance, with occasional participation from the Minister of International Trade and Industry (after 2001, the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry).

In June 1995, the Prime Minister convened the initial meeting of the Security Council to review topics defined by the Higuchi Report. Subsequently, ten more meetings were held, although there was little debate in these forums. The Cabinet Secretariat, in consultations with the Security Council, incorporated the recommendations of the Higuchi Commission report into the NDPO by including concepts covering the “areas surrounding Japan” and Japanese peacekeeping efforts. These concepts, however, lacked detail in the NDPO, and were not backed by noteworthy changes to military capabilities. The standard process for review of the NDPG by the Security Council is shadowed by discussions between the relevant ministers. The 1995 NDPG is separated into five sections, each of which were discussed in meetings at the Security Council level, and discussed in greater detail between the relevant ministers. The LDP utilized an inclusive process that ensured all agencies and political partners were able to incorporate inputs or changes to assure equities were met. Although the 1995 NDPO broke new ground for Japan’s defense policy, Japanese officials remained cautious to significant change. The Cabinet approved an NDPO that adhered to the Basic Defense Force concept developed 1957. Although the 1995 NDPO outlined greater logistical support to the United States by the Self-Defense Forces in the event of a regional crisis, lack of details prevented adequate resources from being provided in the Annex or through the Mid-Term Defense Plan.

Summary

Until 1991, Japan had been able to avoid any serious consideration of security aspects of its foreign policy. Its embarrassment in the 1991 Gulf War led Japan to reconsider its contributions to global and regional security. With the first major decision on the direction of its security policy, Japan had to choose between improving its own military capabilities or increasing its support to external actors, particularly the United States and the United Nations. Japan opted to improve its support for its alliance partner and the United Nations. Initially, Japan's decision caused concern within the U.S. alliance management structure. This concern was alleviated through increased cooperation between the alliance partners, which resulted in the 1997 Guidelines, which improved support to U.S. operations outside the immediate areas of Japan.

Table 8 outlines the questions asked of the 1995 NDPO. Question 1 is marked "NP," since the element of institutionalization is not present in the U.S.-Japan alliance, nor does it possess institutional assets similar to NATO. Question 2 is also marked "NP," since there were no competitor institutions in Northeast Asia in 1995. Question 3 is marked "no" because the differences between the United States and Japan were resolved through dialogue. Question 4 and Question 5 are marked "yes." The U.S.-Japan alliance experienced such deep policy divisions in the early 1990s that it forced Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye to implement a regular dialogue to improve relations between the allies. Although Japan sought to develop its military support to international crises by enhancing its peacekeeping capability, it sought to do so outside of the U.S.-Japan Alliance framework, initially without consulting its U.S. ally. It instead developed a 1992 policy to support UN peacekeeping efforts, and subsequently the Higuchi Report

emphasized this aspect of Japan's defense policy to the detriment of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Finally, Question 6 is marked "no" because of the ambiguity of the role U.S. military transformation played in the case. By 1995, military transformation within the U.S. military was well underway, and the United States sought to improve its military capability as it cut equipment and personnel in response to the end of the Cold War. The role that military transformation played in this case study was to provide the United States with additional options; it was no longer solely reliant upon deterrence, but retained a significant advantage in mobility and conventional lethality. However, U.S. transformation did not seem to play a key role in Japan's decision-making process.

Whereas in 1976, Japan did not consult with the United States in the development of the NDPO, the 1995 document incorporated significant inputs from the United States. The close coordination between the allies not only allowed each ally to achieve bureaucratic goals, but the bilateral dialogue also facilitated a decision-making process that allowed allies to voice concerns and eliminate surprises in key defense policy documents. While cooperation between the allies played strongly in the decision-making process, Japan's decision to hew closely to United Nations missions also introduced an element of competition within the alliance over the role of Japan within the alliance and the role of Japan within other international organizations.

Table 8: Questions (1995 National Defense Program Outlines)

No.	Question	Result
1	Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	NP
2	Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	NP
3	Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	No
4	Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
5	Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
6	Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	No

Japan's 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines

On December 17, 2010, Japan issued its new NDPG and the supporting Mid-Term Defense Guidelines. At the same time, the Government of Japan relaxed one of its most fundamental defense policies: the Three Export Principles, effectively allowing it to negotiate and conclude arms export deals beyond its alliance with the United States. The relaxation of these principles effectively cleared the way for Japan to engage in development of technologies to be used in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In combination, the issuance of the NDPG and the relaxation of the Three Export Principles signify the most important transformation of Japan's security policy since the end of the Second World War. Through the 2010 NDPG, Japan's political leadership has demonstrated a willingness to break from the static deterrence and basic defense force of the Cold War and embrace a policy that relies on dynamic deterrence and a dynamic defense force.

Although the NDPG is usually the product of a year-long process, the 2010 NDPG resulted from a two-year long process that outlined broad domestic consensus on the concept of dynamic deterrence. Originally due in 2009, the NDPG's delayed release was made necessary by the election of the DPJ to the Lower House of the Diet and the subsequent election of Yukio Hatoyama as the DPJ's first Prime Minister. By the time Hatoyama became Prime Minister in August 2009, Tsunehisa Katsumata (Chair of the LDP-appointed advisory panel) had completed and delivered his report. Although the DPJ disregarded the report, it served as a useful reference for members of the DPJ-appointed Sato Commission the following year.

The Origins of Dynamic Deterrence

The 2010 NDPG describes the policy of the Dynamic Defense Force as follows:

Clear demonstration of national will and strong defense capabilities through such timely and tailored military operations as regular intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities (ISR), not just maintaining a certain level of defense force, is a critical element for ensuring credible deterrence and will contribute to stability in the region surrounding Japan . . . To this end, Japan needs to achieve greater performance with its defense forces through raising levels of equipment use and increasing operations tempo, placing importance on dynamic deterrence, which takes into account such an operational use of the defense forces . . . Japan will develop a Dynamic Defense Force that possesses readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility. These characteristics will be reinforced by advanced technology based on the trends of levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities.³⁰⁸

The new NDPG, the first issued under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), departed from past defense policy by outlining new goals for defense policy, particularly for “dynamic deterrence.” The concept of dynamic deterrence originated in Australian military scholarship to describe conventional military efforts to “dissuade, capabilities to neutralize or capture, credible threats to retaliate, and the ability to defend” coupled with “an explicit embrace of the use of force.”³⁰⁹ It would embrace the concept of dynamic deterrence by building a “Dynamic Defense Force” to supersede the “Basic Defense Force” policy.³¹⁰ By adopting the concept, Japanese officials explicitly recognized that in an evolving and rapidly changing security environment, its security forces required flexible, mobile, and effective defense capabilities. Through interactions with the United States and Australia in trilateral dialogues, Japan was able to evolve its concept of dynamic deterrence and apply it to the Japanese problem set. Indeed, according to a

³⁰⁸ Summary of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond (2010 NDPG), Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010, (Provisional Translation).

³⁰⁹ Michael Evans, *Conventional Deterrence in the Australian Strategic Context*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper no. 103 (Duntroon, Australia: Australian Army, 1999), 9–12.

³¹⁰ 2010 NDPG.

high-level Japanese defense official, the trilateral dialogue provided insight into his counterparts, and it was “difficult to tell where concepts included in the NDPG started and ended.”³¹¹

The Ministry of Defense began to formulate its concept of dynamic deterrence in 2008.³¹² At the time, Japan and the United States were grappling with similar concepts of irregular warfare: high-end warfare was unlikely, and lesser “gray zone” conflicts were becoming more common and likely. For Japan, whose counterterrorism policy rested on cooperation with international partners and conducting security force assistance, this meant an eventual relaxation of the Three Export Principles. On the high end of warfare, however, Japan did not possess the necessary capability to deter an attack in all areas, including the Senkaku islands, a focus area for Japanese security policy because of territorial disputes with China and Taiwan. Both the 2004 and the 2010 NDPGs emphasized the principal of improving Japan’s capability to defend itself, before relying on the U.S. ally. Given Japan’s self-imposed restrictions on kinetic deterrence, this meant increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

The Katsumata report emphasized Japan’s lack of preparation for complex contingencies, particularly in the “gray area between peace time and war time.”³¹³ This statement underscores the increasing complexity of conflict in the 21st century, including

³¹¹ Interview with Nobushige Takamizawa, former Director-General of the Defense Policy Bureau on April 12, 2012.

³¹² Sugio Takahashi, Deputy Director of the Strategic Planning Office in the Defense Policy Bureau and a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense was the principal force behind the development of the concepts of dynamic deterrence and dynamic defense. Unless otherwise noted, all information on these concepts was provided to the author during an interview on April 10, 2012.

³¹³ The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, “The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report,” (Katsumata Commission Report) (August 2009), p. 26.

Japan's experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and various counter-piracy operations. The concept of dynamic deterrence became a means of dealing with possible operations that could evolve out of peacetime operations, requiring improved monitoring of air and sea space in the areas surrounding Japan and quickly repel an intrusion if the presence of monitoring forces alone were insufficient.³¹⁴

The Sato report, which will be discussed in more detail below, contained many similarities to the concept of dynamic deterrence contained in the Katsumata report. Both reports emphasized an improvement in Japan's ISR and mobility capabilities, and posting new air, ground, and maritime SDF units in its offshore islands. Both reports also suggest changes at the strategic level; improvement in security policy coordination and information sharing became increasingly necessary as contingencies become more complex. And finally, both reports demonstrate a willingness to recommend revisions to the policy on collective self-defense, the Three Principles on Arms Exports, and the Five Principles for Japanese peace cooperation activities.

The Sato Report

In January 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama appointed Shigetaka Sato, the CEO of Keihan Electric Railway Company to chair the strategy review report. The panel's composition included a former Ambassador to Japan who is highly respected within the United States (currently the Commissioner of Nippon Professional Baseball), the President of the Institute for Developing Economies in the Japan External Trade Organization, three members with significant defense expertise in policy or academics,

³¹⁴ Katsumata Commission Report, pp. 38-39.

three law professors, and two defense-oriented think-tanks. Although the Prime Minister appointed the Commission, its members took the opportunity as a non-governmental body to consider new policies appropriate to the evolving security environment. As the Commission itself stated, “the Council reviewed Japan’s security and defense policy “without taboos,” and tried to distinguish what should be preserved from what should be revised. It is the mission of the Council to formulate a plan for Japan’s security and defense ‘in the new era.’”³¹⁵ Moreover, the members of the Commission were dedicated to building a more pro-active security policy for Japan: “The Council believes that Japan should contribute more proactively to global peace and stability and that, in fact, this proactive stance is the best way for Japan to maintain peace and prosperity.”³¹⁶

The Sato Commission report recommended that the security apparatus needed to reorient its posture and capabilities to support a “Peace-Creating Japan.” The most important implication of this recommendation was the concept of the Dynamic Defense Force to support the concept of dynamic deterrence. The concept of dynamic deterrence arose primarily from Japan’s focus on the rise of China and great power politics in Asia, increasing global and regional instability, and weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile defense. It was, however, the concept of the “gray zones” that drove the concept of dynamic deterrence. Gray zones are issues of high complexity in which conflict is not fully war nor fully peace. Included in this loose definition are confrontations over

³¹⁵ The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, “Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace Creating Nation,” (Sato Commission Report) (August 2010), p. 1.

³¹⁶ Sato Commission Report, p. 1.

territory and sovereignty and economic interests that do not escalate into war.³¹⁷ According to Sugio Takahashi, deterrence in the “gray zone” is a complex issue because conventional theory on “deterrence would fail to work in two cases: (1) the adoption of a ‘fait accompli’ strategy, in which the initiator acts to change the status quo without giving the counterpart time to respond, and (2) the ‘limited probe,’ in which the initiator tries to determine the minimum threshold at which the counterpart will activate its deterrent power.”³¹⁸

The Rise of China. The first major strategic theme of the Sato Commission Report is the rise of China and its regional ambitions. China’s maritime expansion in the East China Sea has concerned Japanese policymakers for nearly twenty years. In its 1997 White Paper, Japan noted an increase in Chinese oceanographic research vessels in and around Japanese territorial waters. In 2004, a submarine of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) encroached upon Japanese territorial waters, eliciting protests from the Japanese government. In 2005, Chinese naval vessels circled disputed gas fields in the East China Sea to which Japan also laid claim. Beginning in 2008, Chinese vessels increased their transit rate through the Tsugaru and Miyako channels. In June 2009, five Chinese vessels transited the Miyako channel, while in March 2010, six vessels, including a Louzhou-class destroyer transited the same channel. Most importantly, however, in April 2010, ten Chinese naval vessels, including Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines, navigated the Miyako channel between Okinawa

³¹⁷ 2010 NDPG.

³¹⁸ Sugio Takahashi, “Japan’s Defense Policy and the Future of the Japan-US Alliance,” (April 23, 2012). Downloaded from Nippon.com on May 8, 2012.

and the Miyako Islands to conduct exercises in the Pacific Ocean, while ship-borne Chinese helicopters flew close to monitoring Japanese ships.³¹⁹ Although the PLAN navigated through international waters, and therefore did not violate Japan's sovereignty, Japan's SDF closely watched the passage of the transiting vessels. The incident shocked the Japanese political leadership and the Ministry of Defense, providing a favorable political atmosphere for new defense concepts to be included within the NDPG.³²⁰

Japan expressed its concern with China's rise and regional ambitions in the 2004 NDPG. Although alarmist media in the West treated the China references in the NDPG as indicative of a threat, but the document made no such claim. Instead, the NDPG indicates, "We will have to remain attentive to its future actions," because China "has a major impact on regional security."³²¹ The Sato Commission expressed similar concerns; specifically, China's growth in military power is "problematic," because of its expanding capabilities, and lack of transparency or predictability in its intentions.³²²

³¹⁹ *Defense of Japan 2010* (The 2010 Japanese Defense White Paper), p. 61. Downloaded on May 7, 2012 from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html

³²⁰ The terms "surprise," "strategic shock," and "strategic opportunity" came up a number of times to describe this incident during an interview with a Japanese Ministry of Defense official on April 10, 2012.

³²¹ National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005-, Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004 (2005 NDPG). The full translation of the passage is:

"China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions."

In Japanese:

また、この地域の安全保障に大きな影響力を有する中国は、核・ミサイル戦力や海・空軍力の近代化を推進するとともに、海洋における活動範囲の拡大などを図っており、このような動向には今後も注目していく必要がある。

³²² Sato Commission Report, p. 11.

Global and Regional Instability. The negative effects of globalization and the drivers of state weakness emerge as a second major strategic theme in the Sato Report. While the 1995 NDPG made no such distinctions, the members of the Sato Commission were acutely aware of the differences between global and regional stability. The Commission members recognized that regional stability, and in particular Japan's security and prosperity, is premised on peaceful economic exchange. They then argue that as the threats emanating from failed and fragile states increase (thus jeopardizing Japan's security and prosperity), the need for policy oriented towards human security has also increased.³²³

For more than twenty years, Japan's involvement in peacekeeping operations has best been described as 'reluctant.'³²⁴ The overseas deployment of SDF has long been one of the more controversial issues in Japan's foreign policy. On one hand, Japan has sought to contribute to international peace and security, potentially enhancing its international security credentials for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. On the other hand, Article 9 of Japan's constitution renounces force as an instrument of foreign policy. After Japan's participation in complex contingencies such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and complex international disaster relief efforts in the 2004 response to the Asian Tsunami, the NDPG suggests, "Japan will participate in *international peace cooperation* activities in a more efficient and effective manner."³²⁵ As a result, Japan has

³²³ Sato Commission Report, pp. 4-5.

³²⁴ Frank A. Stengel, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Japan's Ambivalent Stance on UN Peace Operations," *In Focus* (January 2008). Downloaded on May 15, 2012 from http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/archiv/ja_aktuell/jaa_0801_fokus_stengel.pdf

³²⁵ 2010 NDPG. Italics provided for emphasis.

reconsidered its policies for involvement in peacekeeping operations, called the “Five Peacekeeping Principles.”

The Sato Report recommends that in order to achieve Japan’s goal of becoming a Peace-Creating Nation, it needs to continue to pursue the 2004 NDPG’s idea of a “multi-functional, flexible, and effective” defense force with special emphasis on two tasks: stabilization of regional and global order, effective response to a “complex contingency” in cooperation with the U.S., and seamless response in the course of development from peacetime to a state of emergency. In order to accomplish these tasks, the Sato report recommends the implementation of two initiatives: first, the development of a National Security Council, and second, enhanced joint military capability. Both recommendations, clearly patterned after key lessons within the United States, are notoriously difficult to achieve. Although Japan does, by law, have a Security Council, its composition is the Cabinet-level; because there is no staff, it is not a policy formulation or development body in the mold of the U.S. National Security Council. The formation of a National Security Council (along with constitutional revision) was a key security objective under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Junichiro Koizumi’s handpicked successor. Opposition in the Diet, coupled with a series of scandals in the Ministry of Agriculture, derailed Abe’s attempts to build this security policy-making body. The need for a mechanism to coordinate internal security policy quickly became obvious after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the subsequent U.S. involvement in stability and reconstruction operations. For example, Japan’s security cooperation and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that different Ministries needed to engage in

policy-making due to equities in finance, export control, development assistance, and mobility, among others.

Although Japan's SDF has discovered new missions in the wake of disasters and other complex contingencies, the JSDF still has challenges conceptualizing its future force structure.³²⁶ This is in part because the SDF do not act as a joint unit. The services operate as distinct ground, air, and maritime units in responding to a complex contingency. The Ground SDF, although it possesses the personnel with the appropriate capabilities and qualities necessary to conduct disaster relief, or to occupy islands to provide presence in support of the dynamic deterrence strategy, does not have the necessary mobility required, although the Air and Maritime SDF do possess these capabilities. Getting the Ground, Air, and Maritime SDF to work together is a difficult task. Sato Report recommended integrating common functions such as “command and communications, counter-cyber attacks, and transportation control” across the services.³²⁷ To achieve this, a primary recommendation is to enhance the capabilities of the Joint Staff Office. The Joint Staff Office is not an operational command and control organization; rather it primarily acts as a study shop, producing assessments. In order to enhance the SDF's operational integration and jointness, many within the Defense Ministry believe the next NDPG should implement a “Goldwater-Nichols-like” policy.³²⁸

WMD and Ballistic Missile Defense. A third major theme of the Sato Report is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile defense,

³²⁶ Yuki Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectation?* (Washington, D.C., Stimson Center, 2008).

³²⁷ Sato Commission Report, p. 38.

³²⁸ Author interview with a Japanese Ministry of Defense official.

which, since 1998, have remained top priorities for Japanese security policy. Since the 1998 Taepodong II missile test, North Korea has continued to conduct both nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Most recently, North Korea conducted a failed “satellite” launch on April 13, 2012, suspected to be a test of the Unha-3 ballistic missile.

The U.S. “nuclear umbrella” guarantee, also known as “extended deterrence” remains a key element in Japan’s security policy. Japan, therefore, is sensitive to changes in U.S. nuclear policy and stockpile. In 2010, a series of events with significant implications for the U.S. nuclear capability occurred. In April, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the START II treaty, requiring both parties to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550, and the number of delivery platforms to 700. The Nuclear Security Summit, also in April, adopted measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials held by each country to prevent the threat of nuclear terrorism. Finally, the NPT Review Conference in May adopted a final document that outlined action plans for counter-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Even as the United States has sought to reduce its nuclear capability, Japan’s neighbors in the East Asian region, particularly North Korea, have sought to increase their WMD capability, escalating concerns about nuclear proliferation and transfer and biological and chemical research and development programs.³²⁹ To counter efforts to proliferate or transfer WMD and WMD components, Japan has been involved in the

³²⁹ Japan’s concerns regarding North Korean chemical and biological programs can be found in the *Defense of Japan 2011* (The 2011 Japanese Defense White Paper). http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html.

Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort the U.S. State Department launched in 2003 that includes more than 90 countries and is designed to break up black markets for WMD and intercept WMD in transit.³³⁰

Cooperation Within the Alliance

Despite the very public split within the alliance over policies regarding the replacement of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma that resulted in Prime Minister Hatoyama's eventual resignation, the U.S. and Japanese defense bureaucracies worked closely in the development of policies and concepts eventually included in the NDPG.³³¹ Although the U.S.-Japan Alliance does not possess the highly institutionalized structure of the NATO alliance, there are a variety of structures in place to facilitate interaction at the strategic and operational levels within the United States and Japan. Key among these structures is the Security Consultative Committee (SCC – also known as the “2+2” in reference to the participants on the U.S. and Japanese sides) and the U.S. Forces Japan-led Joint Committee.

Interaction between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Japanese Ministry of Defense occurred frequently, at both senior and working levels, and through a variety of forums. Throughout the NDPG development process, senior U.S. officials met with the Sato Commission and with senior Ministry of Defense officials. Most influential during these interactions were the discussions of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), both published in early 2010. Informally, the Sato Commission met with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and

³³⁰ More detailed information on the Proliferation Security Initiative can be found on the State Department website at: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm>.

³³¹ Author interview with a U.S. State Department (and former Defense) official.

Forces, Dr. Kathleen Hicks to discuss the U.S. strategic direction as outlined in the QDR. The purpose of these visits, from the U.S. perspective, was to telegraph U.S. Defense Department policy as articulated in the 2010 QDR; this practice was not confined to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, as she and her staff also engaged both bilaterally with European partners and multilaterally with NATO. Importantly for these visits, the 2010 QDR did not radically depart from previous Defense Department policies.³³² Dr. Hicks also engaged in numerous bilateral meetings with Nobushige Takamizawa, then Director-General of the Defense Policy Bureau.³³³ There are, therefore, several similarities between the 2010 QDR, the Sato Report, and the NDPG.

The similarities between the QDR and the NDPG include the characterization of the security environment (specifically irregular warfare), the challenges posed by a rising China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities, and cyber security. Regarding the international security environment, for example, the QDR explains, "[t]hreats to our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace."³³⁴ Japan's definition of the "gray zones" is remarkably similar to the QDR statement.

The 2010 QDR also addresses the roles of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as threats in anti-access environments. The 2010 NDPG expresses similar concerns about China ("military modernization...and insufficient transparency), North Korea ("nuclear

³³² Several U.S. interviewees agreed that predictability in policy is important to relations with foreign allies and partners.

³³³ These meetings were described during interviews with both U.S. and Japanese defense officials, including Takamizawa, and members of the Sato Commission.

³³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February 2010), p. 73.

and missile issues”), and Russia (“military activities are increasingly robust”).³³⁵ Japan’s strategy to deal with the threats posed by these countries is to posture its forces in order to “promote confidence and cooperation with China and Russia.”³³⁶ The QDR similarly suggests, “The long-term presence of U.S. forces abroad reassures allies and partners of our commitment to mutual security relationships, generates enduring trust and goodwill with host nations, and increases regional and cultural expertise in the force. We cannot simply “surge” trust and relationships on demand.”³³⁷

Working-level groups focused on alliance roles and missions and on Japan’s air defense capabilities also played an important role during the development of the NDPG. Most importantly, the Roles and Missions Working Group, formed in the wake of the 2005 SCC agreement on the “Transformation and Realignment for the Future” of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, helped to foster and mature bilateral concepts for the use of military capabilities. Through the agreement of the SCC and the working group process, Japan developed new concepts for the use of its defense force, specifically to 1) effectively deter and respond to contingencies, 2) to further stabilize the security environment within the Asia-Pacific region, and 3) to improve the global security environment. These concepts became the foundation of the roles of the defense force in the 2010 NDPG.

The Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP), the programmatic document that supports the NDPG, outlined several measures to support the strategy of dynamic deterrence. The MTDP outlines five priority areas for capability development. These

³³⁵ 2010 NDPG.

³³⁶ 2010 NDPG.

³³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (February 2010), p. 63.

include: 1) strengthened jointness, 2) capabilities required for international cooperation activities, 3) enhanced intelligence functions, 4) incorporating progress in science and technology into defense capabilities, and 5) enhanced medical capabilities.³³⁸ Only two of these areas for capability development are new – the second and fifth categories. The 2004 NDPG first articulated the goals of strengthened jointness, enhanced intelligence capabilities, and progress in science and technology. Of the priority capability areas articulated in the 1995 NDPO, one included that “[e]fforts will be made to enhance technical research and development that contributes to maintaining and improving the qualitative level of Japan's defense capability to keep up with technological advances.”³³⁹

The working group process has also helped to ensure compatibility in weapons acquisition. In 2007, as the Japanese Ministry of Defense sought to procure a replacement aircraft for their aging tactical air-to-air combat fleet, the United States and Japan established a new Capabilities Assessment Group (CAG) to review the range of aircraft options, including (at Japan's request) the F-22 Raptor, which was not available for foreign sales due to the Obey Amendment.³⁴⁰ Although the United States did not sell the F-22 to Japan, the Ministry of Defense was able to upgrade their inventory of aircraft to a 5th generation fighter with the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in November 2011.

As the MTDP and Japan's participation in the CAG have shown, Japan remains strongly interested in enhancing its defense technological capabilities. Japan's 2011

³³⁸ Mid-Term Defense Program, December 17, 2010.

³³⁹ 1995 NDPO.

³⁴⁰ Author interview with a U.S. State Department official.

Defense White Paper outlines priorities for upgrading SDF capabilities, including communications, surveillance, precision weaponry, and mobility. For example, in attempting to build its intelligence network capabilities, Japan is “[e]xpanding and enhancing information cooperation and exchange with the related countries.”³⁴¹ This includes new information-sharing and surveillance arrangements with the United States, South Korea, and Australia using space-based and Predator capabilities. It is also seeking to promote research and development in medium-range surface-to-air missiles and mobile combat vehicles for the Ground SDF, air-to-surface missiles and next-generation radars for the Air SDF, and enhance the capability of Maritime SDF submarines.³⁴²

Significantly, U.S. and Japanese maritime forces have cooperated in an operational context, extending cooperation beyond the strategic and political milieu. In 2009, with piracy on the rise in the Gulf of Aden, Japan joined an international coalition of naval vessels (Combined Joint Task Force 51) in conducting anti-piracy operations, together with NATO and European Union countries. To support this operation, the Diet passed, on June 19, 2009, the “Bill on Penalization of Acts of Piracy and Measures Against Acts of Piracy” (often referred to as the “Anti-Piracy Measures Law”). Enactment of the law on July 24, 2009 meant that Japanese Maritime SDF ships could protect ships of all nations, not just those flying the Japanese flag in usual circumstances.

An Evolving Asian Security Architecture

More than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, one of the more enduring legacies has been the formal U.S. bilateral system of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

³⁴¹ 2011 *Defense White Paper*, p. 183.

³⁴² 2011 *Defense White Paper*, p. 183.

For nearly a decade, however, that formal system has evolved through informal arrangements based on interests and ideologies, often called “minilaterals.”³⁴³ Since 1957, when Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke outlined Japan’s three postwar foreign policy pillars, Japan has remained a strong advocate for East Asian multilateral relations, particularly in the economic sphere.³⁴⁴

Japan’s interest in growing multilateral security relations began shortly after North Korea’s nuclear test in 1993. In the mid-1990s, Japan sought U.S. support for its application for permanent status on the United Nations Security Council. In 2003, after North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Japan engaged multilaterally as one of the participants in the Six-Party Talks, which were designed to peacefully resolve nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned in previous chapters, after initial trilateral discussions with the United States and Australia in 2007, Japan has gone on to develop trilateral dialogues with South Korea, China, and India. In late 2007, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initiated a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, the United States, India, and Australia, which has been described as an “Asian Arc of Democracy.”³⁴⁵

The evolution of the East Asian architecture has facilitated the development of Japan’s internal strategic concepts, in both strategic and operational directions.

³⁴³ Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., *Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Security* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009).

³⁴⁴ The three pillars outlined by Prime Minister Nobusuke are: to center its foreign policy around the United Nations; to cooperate with free, democratic nations of the Western Alliance; and to identify closely with Asian nations.

³⁴⁵ For more details, see Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel, and Vikram J. Singh, *The Power of Balance: America in Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, June 2008). Also see Taipei Times, “Japanese PM Calls for ‘Arc of Freedom’ Democratic Alliance,” Taipei Times (August 23, 2007), downloaded on May 13, 2012 from <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/08/23/2003375416>.

Strategically, Japan's close involvement with Australia facilitated its adoption of the concept of dynamic deterrence. Importantly, Japan's multilateral engagement with the United States, Korea, and Australia runs deeper than its official ties. As Akiko Fukushima states, "In parallel with an increased activism in Northeast Asian multilateralism, Japanese scholars and researchers have also been active in multilateral confidence-building exercises." This, he argues, facilitates the cross-pollination of security concepts through the academic and policy communities: "Although it is difficult to quantify the impact of this 'paradiplomacy,' Japanese diplomats and officials' frequent participation in these dialogues ensures that themes addressed in first-track forums such as the [ASEAN Regional Forum] or the Six-Party Talks receive a fuller vetting around the margins."³⁴⁶

The concept of dynamic deterrence within Japan originated with the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense's equivalent to the U.S. National War College. Interviews with Ministry of Defense officials indicate the importance of the ties, both official and unofficial, with partner nations in facilitating the Japanese adoption of new defense concepts and posture surrounding dynamic deterrence. However, it was difficult for interviewees to pinpoint any particular engagement that set Japan on its path. Rather, it was the process of engagement with all parties within the minilaterals that led to the evolution of Japan's thinking about the concept since 1998.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁶ Akiko Fukushima, "Japan's Perspective on Asian Regionalism," in Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., *Asia's New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Security* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009).

³⁴⁷ Author interviews with a Japanese Ministry of Defense official and with Nobushige Takamizawa.

Drafting and Decision-making

The final NDPG and its accompanying MTDP reflected a significant change in Japan's security policy. Although initially, the DPJ considered implementing a new decision-making process, ultimately it followed the same process as each of the three previous NDPGs. Following the delivery of the Sato Report in August 2010, policies for inclusion into the final NDPG were discussed in three separate formats: the Security Council, separate discussions between the relevant ministers, and the Policy Research Committee (PRC) of the DPJ. The Security Council met on nine separate occasions between September 14 and December 17, the final meeting to approve the final NDPG. Discussions in the Security Council did not last long, generally only ½ hour out of a 2-hour meeting. Additionally, the Security Council was primarily concerned about the first four sections of the NDPG (Objective, Basic Principles, Security Environment, and Basic Policies); the final three sections (Future Defense Forces, Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability, and Additional Elements) and the appendix listing the spending plan for the SDF were primarily developed through the course of discussions between the relevant ministers.

The diplomacy and security subcommittees of the DPJ's PRC met between October 19 and November 30 to discuss the NDPG. Unlike the LDP, which required coordination across all relevant parties and agencies, the DPJ's partners generally did not want to be "implicated" in security decisions. This often freed the DPJ to make radical changes to existing security policy. Although it is generally believed that the LDP and the DPJ would have generated similar NDPGs based on the similarity of the respective independent reports, the DPJ implemented radically new policies in support of their first

NDPG. In December 2011, Japan relaxed its three export principles, leading to a landmark deal in April 2012 with Britain to engage in a combined development program.³⁴⁸ Previously, the three principles had been relaxed only for the development of missile defenses with its ally, the United States. The change in policy, however, grows the potential market for Japanese defense products, leading to a healthier defense industry, and potentially lowers the costs to the JSDF.

Technological transformation played a strong role in Japan's decision-making process, but the degree of change was tempered by its affordability. The appendix to the NDPG outlines a series of radical restructuring efforts from the 2004 NDPG to the 2010 version. While the number of regular and reserve military personnel remain similar, major equipment shifted to make the SDF a more mobile and flexible force. The submarine force expanded by 6 submarines, from 16 to 22, at the expense of 200 tanks and howitzers (a decrease from 600 to 400). Additionally, the 2010 table expands air warning and control units from seven groups to 11 groups, while also expanding surface to air missile units from three groups to six groups.³⁴⁹ While much of this defense buildup helps to implement Japan's strategy of dynamic deterrence, the buildup of submarines also counter's China's naval expansion by targeting its nascent antisubmarine warfare capabilities.

Summary

Japan has relied for its security on the United States for more than 60 years, yet its strategy, based on the 1960 treaty, requires that it be capable of defending itself until the

³⁴⁸ "Japan, Britain agree on joint arms development," *USA Today* (April 10, 2012). Downloaded on April 10, 2012 from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-04-10/japan-britain-arms/54142488/1>.

³⁴⁹ See the tables attached to the 2005 NDPG and the 2010 NDPG.

United States is able to assist. With the 2010 NDPG, the pendulum of Japan's post-Cold War defense policy swung from a focus on Japan's support to the United States and the United Nations to focus on Japan's own SDF capabilities. The 2010 NDPG provides the most concise articulation of how Japan expects to provide for its own initial defense in the event of conflict, through dynamic deterrence.

The recent divisions between the allies over MCAS Futenma were symptomatic of the differences in how the United States and Japan viewed division of labor within the alliance. The United States had long sought a more active military contribution from Japan, whereas Japan limited their military contributions in accordance with the 1960 treaty to military basing. The development of a new strategic doctrine, in which Japan takes a more active role in its own defense, is revolutionary in post-war Japan.

The transformation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2010 can be traced to three sources: competition within the alliance over MCAS Futenma, cooperation within the alliance over nuclear and conventional posture, and increased cooperation with Japan's trilateral partners, particularly with Australia. The coordination of defense policy between Japan and Australia supported U.S. goals, and helped to drive increased policy coordination within the alliance. After a period of significantly decreased cohesion within the alliance over the replacement of MCAS Futenma, which resulted in the resignation of a Prime Minister, both the United States and Japan sought to increase cohesion through other means. Japan responded in political, military, and economic ways that increased alliance cohesion in the short term and likely increases independence in the longer term.

Table 9 presents the questions for the 2010 NDPG. While alternative international partners were sparse in 1995, the past decade experienced a significant growth in the quantity and variety of security actors in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly through a variety of geometrically shaped dialogues. These dialogues did not compete for resources in any particular policy sphere, but rather enhanced cooperation and facilitated the development of new concepts. Additionally, the development of these new concepts generated a transformation in Japan's military capabilities through the acquisition of new technologies, and helped to shape force structure and management decisions.

Table 9: Questions (2010 National Defense Program Guidelines)

No.	Question	Result
1	Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	NP
2	Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	No
3	Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	No
4	Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
5	Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
6	Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes

U.S.-New Zealand (ANZUS), 1984-1986

In a surprise move in August 1986, the United States suspended its security guarantees to New Zealand, the junior partner of the tripartite ANZUS alliance also concluded with Australia in 1951. The trouble in the U.S.-New Zealand leg of ANZUS began with the election of New Zealand's fourth Labour government under David Lange in July 1984, who came into office with a policy of closing port access to nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships. Washington's long-standing policy, however, was to neither confirm nor deny whether a ship carried nuclear weapons. In February 1985, events came to a head when the Labour government refused to grant a port visit by the *U.S.S. Buchanan*, a conventionally powered guided missile destroyer capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional warheads. As tensions mounted between the allies, ANZUS cancelled planned naval exercises and the 1985 council of ANZUS foreign ministers.

The United States also initiated other punitive options to compel changes to New Zealand's policy. For example, the United States began to review the 1947 UKUSA Intelligence Agreement, which governs intelligence sharing between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. As a result, the United States ceased sharing its intelligence with New Zealand. In March 1985, agricultural interests in the U.S. Senate began to consider sanctions against New Zealand imports, prompting Secretary of State George Schultz to caution Congress against implementing formal sanctions against a friend.³⁵⁰

³⁵⁰ For more details on these incidents, see Michael Pugh, "ANZUS on the Rocks," *The World Today*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Apr., 1985), pp. 79-81.

The end of military relations between the two countries was surprising for several interrelated reasons. New Zealand had been a strong Commonwealth ally, with a long-standing tradition of supporting both U.S. and British forces in conflict. Its forces had fought in six conflicts in the twentieth century, including the Boer War, both World Wars, Korea, the Malaysian emergency, and Vietnam, a history of military involvement that earned New Zealand the nickname, 'Prussia of the Pacific.' For 35 years, the alliance played a key role in U.S. strategies to contain communist expansion. The relative isolation of both Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific, with no immediate threats to deter or protect against, facilitated both easy management of the alliance and ensured that the security guarantees of the United States were not tested. Australia, in particular, was used to provide basing for U.S. intelligence capabilities; because of these bases, Australia would become a clear target for enemy strikes in time of conflict. In each respect, the United States appeared to derive greater benefits than costs from the alliance.

At issue in the dispute were three key alliance policy issues: the independence of New Zealand's foreign policy, the degree to which New Zealand had a 'voice' in the alliance, and whether the ANZUS pact provided 'security guarantees.' New Zealand argued that its non-nuclear posture was appropriate since ANZUS was a non-nuclear pact, and the U.S. did not consider ANZUS a part of its nuclear strategy. The U.S. argued that the security guarantees provided by ANZUS allowed it to protect its allies in the manner the U.S. deemed most appropriate – which may or may not include the use of nuclear weapons. In the end, poor alliance management on both sides led to the collapse

of the U.S.-New Zealand leg of the ANZUS treaty, leading to far-reaching military and political consequences on both sides of the Pacific.

The Clash of Ideals

New Zealand's key policy issue in the dispute was the independence of its foreign policy. As the result of a snap election called by then-Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, the Labour government under Prime Minister Lange swept into office in July 1984 buoyed by anti-nuclear sentiment. In July, public support for anti-nuclear policies hovered around 64%, while public support for the ANZUS alliance remained at similar numbers, around 70%.³⁵¹ By 1985, public support for ANZUS increased to 78%.³⁵² The incompatibility of these two goals forced Lange to argue that ANZUS was a conventional alliance. According to Lange, "[s]uccessive New Zealand governments have affirmed that ANZUS is not a nuclear alliance."³⁵³

Lange's key argument was that ANZUS was not an organized alliance similar to NATO. Rather, ANZUS was a reflection of common interests as much as it was a formal military alliance. Unlike NATO, ANZUS possessed no common military command structure, civilian staff, or assigned troops. Because ANZUS required only that the allies maintain and develop their individual and collective defense capabilities to resist armed attack, consult when the security of any of the allies is threatened, and to act in accordance with constitutional processes to meet the common danger presented by an

³⁵¹ Henry S. Albinski, *ANZUS, the United States, and Pacific Security* (New York, NY: The University Press of America, 1987).

³⁵² Andrew Mack, "Crisis in the Other Alliance: ANZUS in the 1980s," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 447-472.

³⁵³ David Lange, "New Zealand's Security Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 5 (Summer 1985), pp. 1011.

armed attack, the treaty security guarantees were clearly weaker than for Europe.³⁵⁴ Additionally, the United States provided no troops to act as a “tripwire” to activate a security guarantee. Finally, the Nixon Doctrine in 1970 sent a sobering message to Australia and New Zealand that they would be expected to defend themselves in the event of a regional conflict.

New Zealand’s entry into nuclear politics began in 1971, when opposition to French nuclear testing and concerns about nuclear waste led to the creation of the South Pacific Forum.³⁵⁵ In 1972, at the height of détente between the superpowers, an element of nuclear “idealism” began to creep into its foreign policy with the election of New Zealand’s third Labour government, which advocated for a nuclear-free zone and first requested a halt to nuclear ship visits.³⁵⁶ By the early 1980s, the anti-nuclear sentiment was increasing in New Zealand, and merging with a growing advocacy for arms control.³⁵⁷ Beginning in the mid-1970s, a key topic of discussion at the Labour Party’s annual convention was whether to withdraw from ANZUS treaty or simply impose a nuclear ban. By 1978, a hard nuclear ban on ship visits became the compromise position within the Labour Party, and it was on this platform that the Labour Party ran over the next several years. The measure played on the fears of New Zealanders that the facilities

³⁵⁴ These statements comprise the essence of Articles II, III, and IV of the ANZUS Treaty, respectively. For the complete text of the ANZUS Treaty, see <http://australianpolitics.com/issues/foreign/anzus-treaty-text>.

³⁵⁵ The South Pacific Forum comprises Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.

³⁵⁶ Daniel Mulhall, “New Zealand and the Demise of ANZUS: Alliance Politics and Small-Power Idealism,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1987), pp. 61-77.

³⁵⁷ Lange, “New Zealand’s Security Policy.”

in New Zealand and Australia used for logistical and intelligence purposes as part of the ANZUS alliance increased the chances of nuclear attack.

Ronald Reagan's victory in the 1980 U.S. presidential elections exacerbated New Zealand's fears of nuclear war in the South Pacific. Reagan's idealist imagery included a 're-armed' America, capable of countering the spread of communism and the aggression of the Soviet bear. Reagan's victory clearly signaled an end to détente. In Reagan's view, détente only provided an excuse to build up defense capability while discussing agreements to limit specific weapons.³⁵⁸ A long-term strategy that played to U.S. strengths (namely, capitalism) while exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities required the willingness to outspend the Soviet Union through a rapid and significant arms build-up.

In 1984, leaders in both New Zealand and the United States faced elections, making it a particularly difficult time to back off election promises. President Reagan, in his second candidacy for election, continued his hard-line stance against the Soviet Union. Concerned about the policies of the Reagan Administration, New Zealanders increasingly supported anti-nuclear policies. Lange consistently argued that the New Zealand was unique and that its anti-nuclear stance only applied to its own situation; his government's policy was anti-nuclear, not anti-ANZUS. Further, although the ban focused on nuclear ships, there was no corresponding restriction on air power. By October 1984, Lange appeared to make some concessions when he suggested that nuclear powered ships might be except from the ban. This concession was not enough for the

³⁵⁸ For more on the concepts behind Reagan's strategy of containment and defeat of the Soviet Union, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), especially pp. 349-356.

United States. According to F.A. Medianski, the U.S. continued to insist on full access to New Zealand's ports for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the United States, was concerned that New Zealand's nuclear "hypersensitivity" would spill over to its other alliances, particularly with NATO, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. Second, the U.S. argued, the South Pacific constituted a maritime environment in which it operated an increasingly nuclear navy.³⁵⁹ Electoral politics forced the two sides to engage in quiet diplomacy from mid-1984 to early 1985 to try and reach a solution.³⁶⁰

Attempts to reach quiet consensus between the two sides failed. The arrival of the *U.S.S. Buchanan* signaled the progress the United States thought it had achieved. For the young New Zealand government, it was too early in its Administration to be perceived as backing off of core campaign promises. David Lange, who also served as Foreign Minister while serving as Prime Minister, exacerbated tensions between the two sides by taking the discussions public. In March 1985, Lange mounted a defense of New Zealand's policies and small state prerogatives at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and at Oxford Union, effectively ending negotiations between the two sides.

For a Reagan Administration determined to explicitly link alliance viability to port access, two related Labour Party actions served notice that the U.S.-New Zealand relationship was severed. The first was New Zealand's adoption of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty in August 1985; although the treaty bans the use, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons within the zone, it left the transit of nuclear-armed aircraft

³⁵⁹ Norman Kempster, "Shultz blasts New Zealand Port Ban," *Los Angeles Times* (August 12, 1986); William T. Tow, "The ANZUS Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), p. 120.

³⁶⁰ Albinski, *ANZUS, the United States, and Pacific Security*.

and ships to the discretion of the individual states.³⁶¹ The second action was the introduction and passage of the Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act of 1987, which implemented the Nuclear Free Zone treaty and converted the government's anti-nuclear policies into law.³⁶²

Until late June/early July 1986, the two governments pressed ahead with negotiations to resuscitate their relationship. Lange advanced the concept of allowing nuclear powered ships into port, while the U.S. government appeared willing to compromise with some variations of its “neither confirm nor deny” policy. In the end, however, despite progress, the two sides were unable to close the gap. U.S. officials argued that New Zealand sought a “free-ride” in the alliance. A Pentagon report released in mid-1986 and approved by President Reagan recommended that while New Zealand could not be written out of the existing treaty, it could be ignored. At a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in June/July 1986, U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz informed Lange that the United States would formally withdraw from its military commitments to New Zealand under the ANZUS Pact.³⁶³

Nuclear Politics and the End of ANZUS

Australia and New Zealand are extraordinarily similar geographically, historically, and politically. While both countries are geographically remote, New Zealand is isolated from sea lines of communication, and its lack of mineral resources or

³⁶¹ See the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), opened for signature on August 6, 1985, downloaded on July 5, 2012 at http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Treaty_of_Rarotonga_Text.pdf.

³⁶² The text of the law can be found at <http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1987/0086/latest/DLM115116.html>.

³⁶³ William T. Tow, “The ANZUS Dispute: Testing U.S. Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Spring, 1989), pp. 117-149.

U.S. defense facilities provide less incentive for attack by would-be aggressors. Both Australia and New Zealand are predominantly Anglo-Saxon societies that share a common British colonial heritage. The two countries often have similar views of the security environment, largely due to their geographic remoteness and shared heritage. In 1944, after close military ties extending back to the First World War, the two countries signaled their close security relationship by signing the bilateral Australia-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) Pact.

Despite their similarities, there are important differences between Australia and New Zealand that affected their security outlook. Most importantly, ANZUS originated in part because of Australia's desire to enter the top tier of states. This required being part of a multilateral alliance in which Australia could sit in council, on par with the United States. New Zealand, however, could always count on Australia in a crisis, and therefore viewed its alliance with the United States as a lower priority than its alliance with Australia. This perception allowed New Zealand to exercise a more independent foreign policy.

Membership in both ANZUS and the South Pacific Forum - two organizations with conflicting nuclear policy goals helped to shape both New Zealand and Australian views on the security environment and their regional identity, respectively. The ANZUS alliance with the United States helped to sharpen anti-Soviet and anti-communist feelings in both countries. Australia accepted the greater burden of providing intelligence bases, making it a likely target for attack in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union. New Zealand's strong affinity for its ANZUS ally justified its participation in the unpopular

Vietnam War and peacekeeping missions in support of U.S. goals. With the end of the US-NZ security relationship, Lange argued that the United States was undermining its own anti-communist strategy in the South Pacific. Shultz confirmed this was the case when he noted that the Soviet Union was advancing its influence into the South Pacific region.³⁶⁴

The South Pacific Forum, of which both Australia and New Zealand were members, grew out of environmental concerns amongst the island countries in the region in the wake of French nuclear testing. Anti-nuclear policy issues quickly became a core part of the South Pacific identity in the early 1970s, and the South Pacific Forum attempted in the mid-1970s to institute a strict Nuclear Free Zone in the region. In this first attempt to institute a Nuclear Free Zone, New Zealand and Australian loyalties to the United States through the ANZUS Pact helped to defeat the measure. By 1983, Australia reinvigorated the Nuclear Free Zone treaty with less restrictive provisions. Here, the United States once again failed in its alliance management. Although Australia invested significant time and political capital to revive a measure, which it and many other countries in the South Pacific considered important, the United States opposed the treaty. In 1985, the treaty was adopted over U.S. objections. Further, Australia managed to reject nuclear obligations without raising Washington's ire. Anti-nuclear policy in the Australian Labour Party in January/February 1985 led Australia to reject its logistical commitments to support MX missile tests planned for March 1985, and air its opposition to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States, however, did not impose

³⁶⁴ Albinski, *ANZUS, the United States, and Pacific Security*.

penalties against Australia for bowing to domestic pressures, consequently treating each of its ANZUS allies differently.

Summary

Between 1984 and 1986, New Zealand played a key role in a policy competition between the security provided by ANZUS and the environmental concerns of the South Pacific Forum. Rather than to reshape the ANZUS alliance or arrive at a policy consensus between the allies – including Australia – the United States chose to terminate its obligations to New Zealand, thus undermining its own anti-communist strategy in the South Pacific. Ironically, in 1987, the Reagan Administration began its Strategic Arms Reduction talks with the Soviet Union, aimed at reducing the levels of nuclear weapons.

Table 10 presents the results of the questions as they pertain to the U.S.-New Zealand case. ANZUS possessed no institutional structure or assets capable of helping the alliance to adapt, or to help the allies work through their divisive issues, although New Zealand's air bases continued to be used by U.S. forces potentially armed with nuclear weapons. The scarcity of intergovernmental security organizations in the Southeast Asia region in the 1980s meant that there were no institutions with which the alliance could compete or cooperate on policy issues, or impel cooperation between the allies. Interestingly, the key issue dividing the allies was the technology that generated the last revolution in military affairs – nuclear weapons.

Writing in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* in 1954, John Foster Dulles argued, “The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defense.”³⁶⁵

³⁶⁵ John Foster Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace,” *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII (April 1954), p. 355.

The collective system Dulles referred to was based on a series of multilateral and bilateral alliances. Although ANZUS was a multilateral alliance, it lacked a mediating body that could help coordinate policies between the United States and New Zealand. Competitive pressures from domestic and intergovernmental sources further proved too much for the US-NZ leg of ANZUS. Despite the inflexibility and inability to coordinate policies between the two allies, ANZUS did demonstrate a great deal of institutional flexibility; both the U.S.-Australia leg and the NZ-Australia leg persisted.³⁶⁶ Indeed, the dispute led to a radical reshaping and transformation of ANZUS, demonstrating the alliance could survive without one of its pillars.

Table 10: Questions (1984-1986 U.S.-New Zealand)

No.	Question	Result
1	Did degree of institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	NP
2	Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	No
3	Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes
4	Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No
5	Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No
6	Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes

³⁶⁶ Although, in the case of the New Zealand-Australia leg, Australia was unable to share any military technology or intelligence provided by the United States.

Chapter Summary

The cases reviewed in this chapter provide three key insights into the transformation of bilateral alliances. First, the crucial element of alliance transformation, or lack thereof, in each of the bilateral cases reviewed in this chapter is the division of labor between the bilateral allies. At the center of the disagreements between the two allies in each case was each ally's contribution to the alliance. The ability to coordinate burdensharing policies is therefore an important part of bilateral alliance transformation.

Second, although the ability to cooperate on burdensharing is crucial at the surface, the key issue in each of the cases is the tension between allied contributions to the alliance and independent defense capabilities. When allies practice good alliance management techniques, which this chapter has attempted to capture, they can often develop a common understanding of the threats and uses of the alliance, as well as arrive at a basic understanding of what each ally expects to contribute. When the allies refuse to coordinate their policies, or are unable to arrive at a common understanding, cohesion may decrease to the point of alliance termination.

Finally, whereas Chapter 4 showed that competition with other intergovernmental organizations is crucial to the transformation of multilateral alliances, the cases reviewed in this chapter show that cooperation with external organizations is most crucial. Cooperation with external organizations can serve to change the perspective within the alliance on a set of security issues, leading to further cooperation within the alliance. There are two limits to this observation. First, the alliances reviewed in this chapter are all regionally based in Asia, where there are few competing international organizations vying for primacy in security issues. Second, despite the significant, and even radical

changes to Japan's security and defense policy in the post-Cold War era, it remains constrained by its Article 9 limitations. Japan, therefore, offers only limited insight into the military transformation of bilateral alliances. However, the cases to show that when bilateral alliances cooperate with external partners (the United Nations in the first case, Australia in the second), this may provide alternate policy solutions that can help the allies to increase cohesion within the alliance.

CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS

Introduction

In August 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were formally allied to invade Poland; less than two years later, the alliance shattered and both sides engaged in bitter conflict. Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact formally ended. The alliance institutions built by the United States after the Second World War, however, have proven remarkably durable, particularly those that persisted after the end of the Cold War. These institutions have not only endured, they have adapted to new circumstances, and significantly improved both relevance and military effectiveness.

This dissertation poses three questions about the conditions under which alliances transform: What accounts for the post-Cold War decisions to transform alliance military capabilities? How does the degree of institutionalization influence how allies recognize, understand and shape their response to the changing international environment and influence military transformation decisions? Finally, does the degree of alliance institutionalization influence internal and external interaction patterns?

It is at this point worth reiterating the profound pessimism of the scholarly literature on organizational change. Scholars have argued “[b]ureaucracy takes on a life

of its own, largely unaffected by the world outside.”³⁶⁷ The concept applies to military organizations and alliances. The military transformation literature has grown out of various attempts to explain how military organizations, which are notoriously resistant to change, have successfully (or unsuccessfully) implemented changes to improve military effectiveness. Throughout the forty-year Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-Japan Alliance resisted change. Subsequently, both institutions have implemented policy changes, profound in both direction and scope that have affected alliance posture, readiness, and capabilities.

The method of structured, focused case studies requires that the same questions be asked of each of the selected cases. The table below presents a compilation of the cases and the questions asked of each case. A “Yes” response indicates that the variable under examination influenced the decision-making process. A “No” response indicates that the variable under examination was present, but did not provide a discernable influence on the decision-making process. Finally, “NP” (for Not Present) was coded for variables that were not found in the case. For example, although the United States transformed its military capabilities in 1945 with the advent of nuclear weapons, they did not play a role in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization’s decision-making process.

³⁶⁷ Daniel A. Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, *Can Organizations Change? Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1979), p. 2.

Table 11: Compilation of Cases and Questions

Questions	Cases					
	NATO 1991	NATO 2010	SEATO	Japan 1995	Japan 2010	ANZUS
Did institutionalization factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes	Yes	No	NP	NP	NP
Did external competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes	Yes	Yes	NP	No	No
Did internal competition factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Did external cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Did internal cooperation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Did military transformation factor in the outcome of the case?	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

It is important to recognize the limitations of this dissertation. The dissertation does not cover every case of alliance adaptation, and it does not cover every factor motivating changes within alliance decision-making processes. Instead, the dissertation focuses on changes to alliance strategic doctrine; the underlying decisions that led to those changes; and the factors that influenced the decision-making process. It is also important to note that strategic doctrine, whether NATO's Strategic Concept or Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), does not provide the answers to every dispute between allies, nor does it articulate every alliance policy. Alliance strategic doctrine provides a mechanism wherein allies can agree – at a policy level – to common goals and preferences, and often the means to accomplish both.

Additionally, the alliances exist in different historical, security, and organizational environments in different regions. By asking six questions of each of the cases we are presented with two results. First, there is bias in the cases, because of the inability to

control precisely for environment and circumstance. Second, however, we are able to garner insights that we might not otherwise gain by focusing more narrowly on one or two cases of alliance adaptation. This chapter assesses those insights and their implications for alliance management.

Alliance Structure and Transformation

Table 11 shows a relationship between alliance structure and external pressure. As alliance structure increases, so does the need for competition with other international actors to drive adaptation. Bilateral alliances, on the other hand, require cooperation with other international actors to evolve.

Interaction between allies played a key role in the ability of each successful alliance to adapt. Conversely, when the allies stopped interacting, and began to engage in ‘brinkmanship’ bargaining, this led to the dissolution or suspension of the alliance. Indeed, since both cooperation and competition took place within each successful alliance, then arguably interaction was more important to adaptation than the method of interaction.

Neither the interviews nor the cases provide conclusive evidence that the organization associated with multilateral alliances facilitate interaction between allies. Indeed, during the course of the interviews, each of the participants who had spent most of their professional careers working with NATO or Japan argued the case that their method of interaction was better. In the case of NATO, it was argued that the organization and working group process facilitated interaction, and that to accomplish goals, it was necessary to understand how to work the system. On the Japan account,

officials argued that working directly with counterparts facilitated dialogue. Only in one case did a U.S. official who worked with both NATO and Japan argue that bilateral engagement facilitate discussions, because “working with NATO was frustrating.”³⁶⁸

A deeper examination of the cases reveals two more relationships between structure and transformation. The first relationship relates to how multilateral alliances deal with risk. In each case of successful multilateral alliance transformation, the alliance expanded first its membership, and then its missions. In the case of SEATO, first allies departed the alliance, and then when transformation was attempted, the allies chose to reduce the organization and military missions.

The second relationship deals with how bilateral alliances deal with risk in a successful transformation. In each case, the U.S.-Japan alliance expanded its tasks or further developed its roles and missions within the alliance. In the U.S.-New Zealand case, the allies chose to reduce their respective perceived “roles.” For New Zealand, this meant denying ship visits to any nuclear-capable ship that did not announce whether it carried nuclear weapons. In the case of the United States, this meant denying New Zealand the benefit of its nuclear umbrella, and, as further punishment, denying New Zealand the benefit of a prior intelligence sharing agreement that spanned the Commonwealth nations.

Alliance Institutionalization

The first hypothesis is that highly institutionalized alliances are more likely to adapt to a new security environment than a bilateral alliance. Here, highly

³⁶⁸ Interview with a U.S. Department of Defense official.

institutionalized alliances refer to multilateral alliances supported through an organizational structure. This hypothesis was necessary to understand the role of the organization in fostering adaptation, as well as to compare highly institutionalized alliances to bilateral alliances.

The case studies provide several counter-intuitive insights into alliance adaptation. The first insight pertains to the proposition that highly institutionalized alliances possess more portable assets, and therefore are more likely to transform. Of the three most highly institutionalized alliances of the 20th Century (NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact), only NATO survived and transformed beyond its original mandate. Although SEATO was a highly institutionalized alliance, it did not adapt to the shifting circumstances of the 1970s. Indeed, in the only attempt to transform SEATO in the mid-1970s, its members sought to dismantle part of its organizational structure, rather than to re-orient the focus of the alliance. Neither did the Warsaw Pact survive the shifting political winds of the 1990s. Instead, the proposition regarding highly institutionalized alliances appears to hold true mostly for NATO.

A key proposition following the end of the Cold War was that NATO's adaptation to a new security environment resulted from its highly institutionalized nature. Because highly institutionalized alliances have more "portable" assets available, they are more likely to adapt than bilateral alliances. We therefore expect to see a "Yes" response across both NATO case studies as well as the SEATO case study. In each case, the alliance was supported by an organization headed by a Secretary General and administered through a governing council of allies. The key difference between the two

alliances is that while NATO has traditionally coordinated the “ends” and “means” of defense policy through its alliance membership by crafting strategic concepts, SEATO had no such history. Torn apart within three years of its formation by internal disagreements, with a decision-making process largely external to the organization, the alliance never developed a policy to coordinate goals, priorities, or the means to achieve its goals.

Underlying the differences between expected results and actual results are the concepts of organizational momentum and portable assets. First, the organizational momentum theory implies that an organization will either act to survive, or will otherwise resist change. Second, the portable assets theory implies that assets publicly available to the alliance may be used for multiple purposes and allow the alliance to pivot from one type of threat to another. Although a highly institutionalized alliance, the SEATO model does not align with either of these concepts. Indeed, as previously discussed, the dismantling of its organizational apparatus was SEATO’s best chance for survival. However, despite the organizational shifts within SEATO, it did not possess NATO’s common assets or a forward-based U.S. military posture, instead relying almost entirely on the U.S. security guarantee to all members of SEATO, weakened by the adoption of ANZUS language rather than NATO language.

The theory of highly institutionalized alliances is also of limited value in addressing the causes of change in bilateral alliances, or other multilateral alliances that do not possess organizational attributes. This dissertation explored two cases in which the U.S.-Japan Alliance transformed its security orientation; in neither case did current assets

play a significant role in shaping alliance choices. Instead, the adaptation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance aligned with frequent discussions at all levels of the government. More importantly, in the ANZUS case, once dialogue at the highest levels of government ceased, so did any chance that the United States and New Zealand could coordinate their respective domestic and foreign policies and preferences. This suggests an alliance is more likely to survive and adapt when commitment to the alliance is relatively high (the bargaining literature suggests that bargaining power is strongest when commitment is loose).

Cooperation

The second set of hypotheses dealt with cooperation. The dissertation examined two forms of cooperation: internal (or cohesion) and external. Across all successful case studies, internal cooperation played a key role in the ability of the alliance to develop and produce new strategic doctrines outlining common policy goals and preferences. In most cases, however, there was a period of dispute between allies before they agreed to coordinate their respective policies or preferences. The alliance literature tends to treat cohesion as a dichotomous variable; an alliance is either cohesive or it is not. Whether it is cohesive often depends on the existence of an external threat. Adaptive alliances therefore appear capable of subordinating conflicting policy preferences.

The development of a new alliance strategic doctrine is premised on the concept that there is disagreement within the alliance over a policy issue. NATO's survival was in doubt, for example, for several years following the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the 1991 Strategic Concept resulted in part because of the lack of viable alternatives to NATO;

most of the European allies wanted to keep the United States, as the most powerful partner, involved in the security of the European continent. European integration, which the United States encouraged at NATO's inception, resulted in new institutions that challenged NATO's pre-eminence in European security affairs. Three key policy issues remained unresolved until 1999, when NATO released its next strategic concept: NATO's role vis-à-vis the European Union, and two key U.S. priorities including out-of-area operations and NATO enlargement. However, the process leading to the concept delivered on the key military issues, including changes to NATO's military structure, its force posture, and its mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities.

In each case in which the alliance adapted by producing a new strategic doctrine, the allies initially were unable to coordinate on key policy issues. In the case of the 1991 Strategic Concept, the coordination on key policy issues lasted for several years following the new strategic doctrine. In most of the other successful cases, the key policy issues were resolved during the negotiations leading up to the issuance of the strategic doctrine. For example, in the lead-up to Japan's 1995 National Defense Program Outlines (NDPO), misunderstandings between the United States and Japan over Japan's emerging security orientation reduced alliance cohesion at a time when trade friction already impaired relations between the two powers. Through deliberate discussion between the United States and Japan, both sides were able to coordinate their security policies, leading to a mutually acceptable NDPO that began to radically reshape Japan's view of its role in regional security affairs.

One of the more interesting results of the research is the role of external cooperation in the transformation of bilateral alliances. Based on the data developed through the case study research, external cooperation helps bilateral alliances adapt by providing alternative perspectives and pressures in a non-threatening environment. These alternatives facilitated internal coordination of security policies within the alliance. Here again, we need to note the limitations of the study. In accordance with the structured, focused case study approach, we had to ask limited questions and were unable to pursue all interesting aspects of the cases. Also, if other cases had been selected, embedded within more institutionally dense environments, we may have seen different results.

These initial results prompted some deeper investigation into the U.S.-New Zealand case. Would “external” cooperation with Australia have prompted a different result in which the alliance could have adapted? The answer appears very likely. However, for its own domestic reasons, Australia chose not to involve itself in the dispute between the United States and New Zealand. Indeed, Australia was dealing with many of the same domestic issues as New Zealand; to align too closely with New Zealand would have alienated its U.S. ally, and to align too closely with the United States in the dispute would have alienated the ruling party from much of its domestic constituency. It appears that for purposes of economics and international prestige, the Australian Labour Party sought to develop its own way ahead with the United States. Australia’s position as the major regional power in the South Pacific and its history of hosting bases ensured different treatment from the United States.

Competition

The dissertation also examined the role of internal and external competition on alliance decision-making processes. Internal competition, or the inability for allies to coordinate their policies in such a way that it results in wasted alliance resources or reduced cohesion, plays an important role in each of the successful cases of alliance adaptation. It also plays a key role in each of the failed cases, suggesting that there is a point at which allies need to begin coordinating policies or risk alliance termination.

In June 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed concern that NATO was evolving into a “two-tiered” alliance: those members who specialize in “‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions.”³⁶⁹ His comments were prompted by the disparity of contributions to NATO operations. The United States currently contributes 22% of NATO funding across the Peacetime Infrastructure, and 75% of all NATO defense spending in 2012, up from 50% during the Cold War.³⁷⁰

Based on their respective interests and geographic location, NATO membership divided themselves into three different subgroups throughout the development of the 2010 Strategic Concept, each with a vision for the future of NATO based on their own security environment or interests. This dynamic played out through the Group of Experts process, which resulted in the decision not to reconcile the differences, but to group the security interests under three major themes, or alliance “core tasks.” The recent global

³⁶⁹ *Wall Street Journal*, Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates’s Speech on NATO’s Future (June 10, 2011). Downloaded on July 20, 2012 from <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/06/10/transcript-of-defense-secretary-gatess-speech-on-natos-future/>.

³⁷⁰ Craig Whitlock, “NATO Allies Grapple with Shrinking Defense Budgets,” *Washington Post Online* (January 29, 2012). Downloaded on July 19, 2012 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nato-allies-grapple-with-shrinking-defense-budgets/2012/01/20/gIQAKBg5aQ_story.html.

economic and financial turmoil may jeopardize NATO's ability to act on the desires of its membership. As a result, NATO has recently launched a "Smart Defense" initiative, aimed at ensuring internal coordination of defense resources amongst NATO members.

The two cases in which external competition played a decisive role - NATO in 1991 and again in 2010 – bear a close look, lest the wrong lessons be drawn for alliance management. The research shows that competition between NATO and the European Union over specific issues led to changes in alliance policy, particularly as it related to crisis management. The inability for the two organizations to reconcile their respective policies led to an "arms race" over policy, pushing the involvement of each organization into the policy space, and into direct contention with each other over policy pre-eminence and resources.

In both 1991 and 2010, strategic policy negotiations between the European Union and NATO were characterized a frigid relationship. Issuance of strategic documents, therefore, largely served to telegraph to the European Union the policy space NATO had carved out for itself (or vice versa). Of course, there is a significant overlap between NATO's membership and the membership of the European Union, enabling internal discussions between the members of both organizations. However, there is also a significant disparity in resources between the two organizations, particularly for security affairs, as the United States provides the vast majority of NATO resources.

The competitive component of relations between NATO and the European Union in 1991 was largely driven by the antagonistic nature of the relationship between the United States and France. As Europe, with France leading the way, sought to establish its

own independent security identity, the United States wanted to remain involved in European affairs. Although the United Kingdom championed NATO (while also supporting the goal of closer European integration), this competition remained unresolved until the United States provided a decisive victory over Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf War.

By 2010, on the other hand, the competition was less about the ability of the United States and France to resolve their issues than it was about the two organizations. Despite the mutual reluctance of the organizations to officially coordinate with each other, the Group of Experts did reach out to the European Union to brief them on the direction of their report.

Military Transformation

Emerging technologies, or military transformation, played a key role in the adaptation of bilateral and multilateral alliances in three of the four successful cases explored in the dissertation. Only in the case of the 1995 NDPG did emerging military technologies or reform not play a key role. This exception is understandable; in the early 1990s, Japan struggled to develop its own security identity, a non-military role that it could play beyond its own borders – the Japanese leadership remained deeply committed to the restraints of Article 9. It began to formulate a security identity by first aligning itself with the United Nations, and then by tying itself closer to its American ally. Both alignments were fundamentally political in nature, rather than military. The emerging Japanese commitment to peacekeeping missions led it to provide military capabilities in support of United Nations operations.

In the other three cases, military transformation played widely different roles. In NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept, the worth precision weapons and networked communications demonstrated through operations in the Persian Gulf reinforced the need to maintain the NATO alliance. In the development of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, the scope and direction of military reform efforts have led to a rebalancing toward increasingly conventional NATO capabilities. And new technologies and a reshaped military were expressly called for by Japan's 2010 NDPG, and are vital to enabling the concept of the dynamic defense force.

Although advancement of military technology and capabilities played a key role in confirming the value of U.S. military alliances, there was no direct connection between changes to alliance strategic doctrine and capabilities development. Instead, agreements to expand or refocus alliance missions influenced individual nation strategies and acquisitions. Timing plays a key role in the influence process; in the case of the 2010 Strategic Concept, the United States and Britain had already developed their strategic plans and acquisition strategies for the next several years, while the Concept preceded the those strategies of the smaller NATO nations.

Within NATO over the past decade, capabilities development has become a driving theme of the alliance. Here, NATO provides an example of a highly institutionalized alliance that may be capable to jointly developing and producing potentially transformational capabilities. The rapid expansion in the goals and missions of the alliance forced NATO to initiate first the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and then the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), in an effort to accomplish joint goals and build

cohesion between the allies. The PCC enhances NATO's irregular warfare capabilities by emphasizing development airlift, precision-guided munitions, secure communications, and protection from weapons of mass destruction, specifically directed to improve the NATO Response Force³⁷¹, thus adding a more direct relationship within NATO between alliance strategic doctrine and capability development. This relationship, however, is subject to the burdensharing agreements between nations, and relies on individual national support for its success.

Chapter Summary

Analysis of the forces underlying the decision-making processes across six alternate cases of successful and unsuccessful changes to alliance strategic doctrine demonstrates a relationship between external pressure and alliance structure. Multilateral alliances are sensitive to competitive pressures from other intergovernmental organizations, while bilateral alliances are more sensitive to external cooperation.

Perhaps the more interesting finding regards the role of interaction between allies. There is no clear indication whether internal coordination or competition plays a larger role in decisions to transform the alliance. Interaction does, however, play a strong role in the ability of the alliance to persist despite challenges. In the two cases of failed alliances reviewed in this dissertation, both failed, at least in part, because the allies stopped interacting.

³⁷¹ See Interview with Dr. Edgar Buckley, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on December 9, 2002. Downloaded on August 3, 2012 from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021206a.htm>.

This provides interesting insights for bargaining theory in the transformation of alliances. Whereas brinkmanship is considered a legitimate strategy to persuade allies, it may be a short-term strategy. Instead, it is those allies able to demonstrate commitment to an alliance and subordinate preferred policy preferences in favor of mutually acceptable preferences that are most likely to have success in changing the strategic direction of an alliance.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Conclusions

This dissertation has compared six case studies to determine the relationship between alliance structure and transformation. To explain adaptation and transformation in both multilateral and bilateral alliances it has developed two arguments: first, that adaptation results from the tension between risk and cohesion, and second, that new interaction patterns have developed as the security environment has grown increasingly congested, leading to new pressures on the alliance decision-making process. As the last chapter outlined, there are clear patterns of interaction in the adaptive and non-adaptive alliances analyzed in this dissertation.

An analysis of the internal dynamics of six different cases of change in alliance strategic doctrine naturally provides insights into practical aspects of alliance management. The first insight is that, of the four cases of successful alliance adaptation reviewed, three cases relied heavily on informal processes. Indeed, the process for NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept closely mirrored the typical process used to develop Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG; the process was an informal, high-level study followed by the drafting of the doctrine). This mirror-imaging of process was unintended, as none of the interviewees in either NATO or Japan were previously aware of the process used in the other alliance. It did, however, demonstrate an effective method of developing policy issues or solutions on which allies could informally work

through differences before potentially agreeing to a solution in the final strategic document.

As predicted, interaction between allies played a key role in the adaptation of alliances. When allies interacted more closely, the alliance was more likely to adapt. Before the Nye Initiative in 1994, which encouraged the allies to talk through working group settings, the U.S.-Japan Alliance appeared increasingly unviable. In the process leading to the 2010 NDPG, the United States and Japan worked closely through bilateral working groups and through trilateral groups including the Australians, which influenced the direction of Japan's Dynamic Defense Force policy.

The failure of allies in both multilateral and bilateral alliances to commit to interacting, and making joint decisions about the future of the alliance, led to the failure of the alliance. In the case of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the alliance decision-making process broke down early; SEATO's failure came from the inability of the allies to work together in the formation of alliance policy, leading to the alliance's role as an overarching rubric for unilateral U.S. action during the Vietnam War. In the case of the U.S.-New Zealand alliance, electoral politics forced brinkmanship between the allies over nuclear issues, leading them to cut off formal communications. Alliances survive only to the degree that allies are able to navigate emerging dynamics and pressures – whether internal or external to the alliance – arising from the growth of international security organizations. They adapt when the allies interact with each other and seek cohesion on policy issues.

Policy Implications

Traditionally, the study of alliances has focused on their formation and management. Termination of an alliance was assumed when the threat generating the alliance ended. As the world order imposed by the United States after the Second World War enters its seventh decade, and the structure of power shifts in international relations, the ability of U.S. international institutions to adapt to new situations will emerge as a key issue. Using theories of complexity and adaptation, this dissertation has attempted to address the lacuna by building a framework for analysis.

The results of this study suggest that a relationship exists between structure and transformation. Bilateral alliances and multilateral alliances do not react the same way to internal interaction or external pressures. An exclusive focus on either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the U.S.-Japan alliance would therefore fail to provide generalizable lessons for alliance management.

Two significant lessons emerge from this study. First, the propositions drawn from general assets theory do not hold true for all alliances. While “portable” generalizable assets, such as the NATO Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) helped to transition NATO from the Cold War to the post-Cold War environment, the focus on roles and missions helped the U.S.-Japan Alliance to transform. The implication is that significant investments in infrastructure appear unnecessary to affect the transformation of alliances.

The second lesson is that alliance transformation depends significantly on risk assessment. Whereas multilateral alliances transform by adding allies (risk reduction) or tasks (risk increase), bilateral alliances seek to focus on roles and missions as a method of

reducing risk. The implication for military transformation is that as militaries increase in effectiveness, alliances will be more willing to add tasks, therefore increasing risk in the alliance.

Finally, although the research shows that alliances are more likely to adapt when the allies remain committed to one another, this conclusion bears caution. As Hilton Root has argued, “‘support[ing] any friend at any cost’ weakens the United States as a reform agent in the eyes of client regimes.”³⁷² While the alliance itself may adapt, U.S. power and credibility declines over a policy issue when interests are too closely aligned and the U.S. fails to achieve its policy objectives. Commitment must therefore be tempered with a willingness to engage externally to bring the appropriate set of pressures to bear on the alliance.

Future Research

The research in this dissertation provides patterns of alliance behavior, but in order to develop a theoretical approach to alliance transformation, the cases need to be expanded in two important ways: increased focus on particular aspects of each case, and more cases. Historically, alliance transformation is rare. This dissertation’s focus on the decision-making process leading to changes in strategic doctrine was designed to increase the potential number of cases in the universe of alliance transformation. By adding in additional cases in alternative environments, we can better test the implications of adaptation theory on alliance change. We might also be able to supplement the limited

³⁷² Hilton Root, *The Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 210.

number of cases through an agent-based model using the hypotheses as parameters for the model and the structure of the alliances as agent-level characteristics.

A second direction for future exploration is the application of the research to alliance military effectiveness. The research into structure and transformation using adaptation theory was designed to cull out important lessons for alliance management. Yet the focus on this aspect left the implications for the spread of military effectiveness under-explored in the dissertation. This was in part a function of the structured, focused case study approach: it would only allow for certain aspects of the cases to be explored, as opposed to all interesting aspects of the cases. And yet, given the direction of warfare into irregular domains through counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, it is important to increase our understanding of the linkages between these two elements.

Finally, this dissertation evolved from an attempt to begin understanding the implications of the emerging Asia-Pacific security architecture on the future of irregular warfare operations. Increasingly, scholars are calling for the creation of new multilateral security institutions in the Asia-Pacific region – particularly in Northeast Asia. The research in this dissertation suggests that institution-building in Northeast Asia may have a negative effect on the delicate balance of current security relations: institutional competition with the U.S.-Japan Alliance may fail to generate the desired responses from Japan to engage the country more fully in security affairs. This is an aspect that requires further exploration.

APPENDIX 1

The protocol below outlines a sample of the questions used during the semi-structured interview process (the list of interviewees can be found in the “References” section).

1. Do you believe the new strategic doctrine has appropriately positioned the alliance to meet current and future threats?
2. (if yes) How did the recent crisis in the alliance affect your country’s decision to shift its strategic doctrine?
3. (if yes) Do you believe the alliance has become more cohesive as a result?
4. (if no to #1) How should the [U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea, NATO] military posture itself [deterrence-focused, expeditionary]?
5. How closely did you interact with your counterparts (in the U.S. or NATO) during the process?
6. At what level were most of the interactions with your alliance partners (senior level, working-level)?
7. How did you conduct most of your interactions with foreign counterparts?
8. How did technology transfer or cooperative technology development shape your approach?
9. How much did combined operations with your alliance partner(s) play in the decision?
10. Much of the U.S. transformation literature points towards organizational rivalry, and in some cases, collaboration, to drive military change. Did these dynamics play a role in your case?
11. How did you arrive at strategic goals for the alliance? What kind of interactions did you have with your partners?

12. Did [lack of] an institutionalized structure like NATO make interaction with your counterparts easier or harder in this process?

Probing questions may include:

1. What do you mean by that?
2. Can you explain that a bit more?

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