

Where's the "Public" in Public Policy: Skewed Democratic Pluralism vs. Nuanced Public
Opinion in Attitudes toward Unauthorized Immigrants

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Abstract

WHERE'S THE "PUBLIC" IN PUBLIC POLICY: SKEWED DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM VS. NUANCED PUBLIC OPINION IN ATTITUDES TOWARD UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS

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On immigration reform, the motivated minority that highly influences public policy is in dissonance with the policy preferences of the majority of Americans. In 2006, an attempt at comprehensive immigration reform whose main tenets were supported by 80 percent of Americans in a Gallup poll was defeated when anti-immigration opponents flooded the Senate switchboard with protest calls. This study, using primary data from a national telephone survey, finds that the majority of Americans views are not represented by interest groups involved in the policy debate on immigration. Americans are moderate in their viewpoint being both against the flow of unauthorized immigration while at the same time acknowledging that hard-working immigrants should be allowed to become citizens. However, for those who support stricter immigration measures, the issue is of higher salience, which provides them with more influence than the general public.

1. Introduction

When the Senate was debating Immigration Reform in June 2007, national opinion polls showed general support for the main features of the bill. A USA Today/Gallup Poll from April found only 14 percent of the population looking to deport all illegal immigrants and 78 percent favoring some path toward citizenship¹. However, the bill was defeated, in part because of a massive call-in campaign that overwhelmed the senate switchboard and shut down the phone lines. Senators perceived that public opinion was against the bill despite opinion poll data showing otherwise (Sandler, 2007). Senator DeMint said that "This vote today is really not about immigration, it's about whether we're going to listen to the American people" (Dinan, 2007).

This disconnect between the results of public opinion polls and perceptions of the senators represent competing theories of determining public opinion. Polling, representing the aggregation of individual opinions as measured by surveys, is the current methodology that most people associate with public opinion. A scientific survey relies on sampling the public in such a way that the results represent the population. An

¹ "Which comes closest to your view about what the government policy should be toward illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States? Should the government:

Require illegal immigrants to leave the United States, and not allow them to return (14%)

Require all illegal immigrants to leave the US, but allow them to return temporarily to work (6%)

Require illegal immigrants to leave the US, but allow them to return and become US citizens if they meet certain requirements over a period of time (42%)

Allow illegal immigrants to remain in the US and become US citizens if they meet certain requirements over a period of time (36%)"

alternative to polling is to gauge public opinion by only those expressing their views publicly – such as at a demonstration or by contacting their congressman. In this manner, the size of the crowd or the number of e-mails indicates how strongly those interested in the issue hold their opinion. This unrepresented method of perceiving public opinion can be swayed by a vocal minority but to politicians whose jobs rely on reelection it has face validity.

Since the call-in campaign was organized by interest groups, an alternative theory of public opinion involved is the group theory of democratic pluralism. The theory of democratic pluralism is that over time and across all issues that arise, groups will exist so that public opinion will be fully represented. This would occur through existing groups and by new groups that would form as new issues or as segments of the population who felt underrepresented began organizing them. The theory is that public opinion will be presented by these groups (Glynn, Herbst, O'Keefe, & Shapiro, 1999).

The rising influence of interest groups in policy-making has led some lawmakers to only think of issues in terms of battling interest groups (Shaiko, 2005). Moderate policy choices are not usually represented by interest groups. Interest groups tend to be more extreme in their viewpoints than the general public.

In the case of immigration, the anti-immigrant forces were very motivated to defeat the measure but there was not a corresponding group with the same level of motivation for passage of the bill. There is not an illegal immigrant lobbying group, although there are several lobbying organizations which seek to help the unauthorized immigrant within the framework of their overall priorities. These organizations were not

as motivated as the opposition since the compromise required for the bill reduced enthusiasm for the final bill. So despite overwhelming public acceptance of the bill as measured in opinion polls, the bill was defeated.

These factors lead to my hypothesis that on immigration reform, *the motivated minority that highly influences public policy is in dissonance with the policy preferences of the majority of Americans*. While a simplistic reading of the Gallup poll may easily “prove” this hypothesis, the reality is that public opinion is more nuanced than is generally measured in media polls. In a complicated policy, compromises may dilute the enthusiasm of supporters while opponents may stay motivated. In the end, the policy has widespread but lukewarm support and a small but motivated opposition.

There are three suppositions that I make about the relationship between public opinion and public policy that lead from my hypothesis to my research questions:

1. Public opinion on most issues would be normally distributed if measured on a continuum. Public opinion is generally measured against proposed policy options in either/or format which misses the nuances of a normally distributed public opinion.
2. Democratic pluralism in which the public’s views are only addressed through the formation of opposing groups fails when policy options are moderate, as policy activists are more extreme in their viewpoints than the general public.
3. Political leaders are more likely to pay attention to mass public opinion on issues salient to the public.

These suppositions lead to my research questions derived from my hypothesis:

1. Using a series of questions to measure attitudes about policies regarding unauthorized immigration issue to create a scale from tolerant to intolerant, is the public moderate or are they closer to an extreme opinion?

2. What will distribution of the responses be: normal, bimodal, etc.?
3. What factors drive extreme views on immigration: economic, cultural or other factors? What factors resonant with the majority?
4. Are attitudes about immigration related to salience? Do those with certain opinions tend to view immigration as more important?
5. Are the factors that separate extreme views versus majority views reflective of the lobbying groups involved in immigration issues?

To answer these questions, I conducted a telephone survey of 600 English-speaking adults in the United States. The survey was conducted in July 2009 by George Mason University's Center for Social Science Research. The details of the data collection are described in Chapter 5: Methodology.

2. U.S. Immigration Policy

Prior to the economic downturn of 2008, the problem of those entering the country without authorization or staying beyond their initial visas (called “undocumented” or “unauthorized” or “illegal immigrants”) was growing every year. Some estimates were that as many as 700,000 new unauthorized immigrants entered the country every year (Passel, 2005) and that there were 12 million in the country in 2007 (Noriega & Davy, 2007). There is a belief that since the downturn, many unauthorized immigrants have returned to their home country, and it seems probable that the tide of new unauthorized immigrants has lessened. The Center for Immigration Studies estimates that the unauthorized population declined 13.7 percent from the summer 2007 to the first quarter of 2009. The most current estimate is 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants (Camarota & Jensenius, 2009).

To understand the unauthorized immigration situation, this chapter will examine U.S. immigration policy using four lenses: theoretical, historical, current, and proposed reform. The theoretical lens examines the causes behind immigration from one country to another, including the initial large population movement between countries and the continued flow. The historical lens will show how and why the current immigration policy was developed. Current immigration policy is conglomeration of policies reacting to certain historical circumstances. Due to the complication of addressing the issue,

changes in policy take years of development and furtive attempts before getting through Congress. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the recent comprehensive immigration reform efforts, the first by the 109th Republican Congress and the second by the 110th Democratic Congress.

Theories on Immigration

Most policymaking occurs after a long process in which the issue is dissected by academics, think tanks, government agencies and other interested parties. In this process which Kingdon calls the “primordial soup” of policy, issues are examined at the theoretical level to assess why the problem exists (Kingdon, 2003). This section addresses the theories associated with immigration.

At the most basic level, there is the question about why across border migration occurs and what the factors that foster it are. Princeton sociologist Douglas Massey finds that

“At present, there is no single theory widely accepted by social scientists to account for the emergence and perpetuation of international migration throughout the world, only a fragmented set of theories that have developed by disciplinary boundaries. Current patterns and trends in international migration suggest, however, that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on the tools of one discipline alone, or by focusing on a single level of analysis or one conceptual model.” (Massey, 1998)

Theories about migration have two components, the initiation of migration from one country to another and then the perpetuation of migration after the initial wave.

Theories on the initiation of migration generally follow economic models.

Neo-classical Economic Model

The neo-classical economic model has several implicit propositions and assumptions:

1. International migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between countries.
2. The elimination of wage differentials will end migration.
3. Flows of human capital (highly skilled workers) respond to differences in the rate of return for human capital which is different than the wage rate. The pattern of migration for skilled workers will be distinct from that of the unskilled workers.
4. The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or influence labor markets in sending and/or receiving countries (Todaro & Maruszko, 1987).

In the neo-classical economic model as described by Todaro and Maruszko, the decision to migrate is based either on the wage differential for non-skilled labor and on wages and other human capital benefits for the skilled labor force (Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). An additional factor added by Massey is the cost of migration. The costs for migration to the United States from Mexico is significantly less than the cost of migration from Africa, therefore, migration from Mexico is far more likely than from Africa (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003). And while the cost of migration from Mexico or Canada are similar, the wage differential between the U.S. and Mexico is much greater than the wage differential between U.S. and Canada which is why there is more migration from Mexico than from Canada.

The neo-classical economic model also provides an explanation for the decline in immigrants from Europe. For the working class, the wage differential is not large enough

to warrant the change. For highly-skilled workers, there may be more incentive for human capital reasons. Therefore, the “brain drain” continued long after mass migration from Europe ended.

Group Actor Model

The neo-classical economic model at micro-level is based on an individual’s response to the economic factors – wage differential and cost of migration. Yet, these factors are the same for all people in a region but in the initiation-stage only a small fraction of the potential population migrant to different country. An additional economic theory developed in which the actors are not autonomous individuals but groups, such as a family, tribe or village. In this model, the group sends out the migrants in order to diversify risks or to accumulate capital (Stark & Bloom, 1985).

In this model, wage differentials are less influential and migration will continue if other markets in the sending countries (insurance, futures, capital and consumer credit) are absent (Massey & Zenteno, 1999). Also, international migration and local employment are not mutually exclusive possibilities as there are strong incentives for families to engage in both migration and local activities. In this model, the only way for governments to reduce the migration flow is to reduce the risks in the sending countries through programs that bolster the insurance, credit and futures markets. Policies that decrease the income disparity in the sending country will reduce migration as families do not find themselves at a relative disadvantage.

Demand Model

Another economic theory is that the prime factor for migration is a permanent demand for immigrant labor that is inherent to the economic structure of developed nations (Piore, 1979). Piore states that immigration is not caused by push factors in the sending countries (low wages or high unemployment) but by pull factors in the receiving countries, a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers. The need for foreign workers stems from some fundamental characteristics of advanced economies.

The first is “structural inflation.” Basic economic theory says that if there is a shortage of labor, wages will increase until the market reaches equilibrium. However, if the shortage is in the unskilled labor market, any wage increases at the low-end of the hierarchy will have a pushing effect on the wages of the more skilled workers and wages increases will be pushed up the hierarchy. A more fiscally sound solution to prevent inflation would be to find a new supply of unskilled workers that would prevent the wage increase at the bottom. This is why there is a need for unskilled immigrants.

Piore’s second fundamental characteristic is “hierarchical constraints on motivation.” In addition to wages, people work for the accumulation of social status. While there is always a need for the bottom rung occupations, there is insufficient motivation for native workers in advanced nations to take these positions. This is the “immigrants take jobs that Americans don’t want” argument. In the United States, two recent demographic factors that affect the availability of bottom rung jobs are the extreme decline in the number of native young adults in the baby bust era and the increase in the percentage of young people who have attended at least some college. There is no longer

an adequate supply of young adults who will work at the bottom of the economic scale. The immigrant on the other hand does not view himself as part of the receiving society, but as a member of his home community. The foreign job and the remittances sent back carry its own prestige.

Eventually, a “social labeling” occurs in which certain occupations are considered ‘immigrant jobs’ such that even during times of native unemployment and joblessness, it is difficult to recruit natives back into jobs formerly held by immigrants.

Under this model, government policies will have little influence on migration. The economy needs a new supply of low wage earners because the supply will not be filled with native workers. Native workers view the bottom rung jobs with disdain and concern about job security. The wages and job security demands that would be needed to meet the supply of jobs would have upward push on wages in the hierarchy leading to inflation. Government policy cannot reduce the demand for immigrants (Piore, 1979).

Perpetuation of Immigrants

The pioneering immigrants from sending countries into receiving countries bear a greater economic and social capital costs than those that follow. Once a critical mass of immigrants from an area has formed a community in the new country, both the capital and social costs of immigration are greatly diminished (Massey, 1998). Secondary waves of immigrants have easier entry into the job market due to the connections forged by the pioneering immigrants. Once an enclave is established, secondary wave immigrants find they do not have to give up cultural customs in the new society. Even transportation costs between the two countries become less expensive as the number of people traveling from

the sending country to the receiving country and back reach a point for profitable transits to operate. Eventually, the capital and social costs become so low that anyone from the sending community who wishes to migrate is able to migrate and the saturation point is reached.

Stopping the flow of migration once it reaches a critical mass is difficult. To do so, a government must raise the capital and social costs of migration. However, the large immigrant community will have resources to sustain an immigration flow despite government policy that smaller communities do not. Therefore the only way to stem an immigrant flow from an established community will have to be directed at that particular community which will have political costs both domestically and internationally. The United States have even more difficulty in changing this relationship due to its policy of family reunification.

Family Reunification

Surprisingly, since it is the foundation of current immigration policy, family reunification is not a subject that has generated a lot of academic research. Unlike John Kingdon's theory that policy is first born in the policy primordial soup (Kingdon, 2003), Lawrence Fuchs finds that immigration "changes were the results of laws and executive decisions largely uninformed by scholarly research. Indeed, one of the most intriguing aspects of policy-making in this field...is the extent to which decisions have been driven by political factors without much reference to research" (Fuchs, 1992).

Family reunification became the policy with the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. One of the cornerstones of the 1965 act was the removal of the

national origin quota system in favor of a more open system. Conservative Democrats were concerned that the new system would flood the U.S. with immigrants from third world countries. They came up with a concept which would allow them to say to the world that we do not discriminate against country, but that they thought would bring about the same mix of immigrants as before: family reunification (Eldredge, 2001). However, this action did not have the desired effect as by the mid-1970s, Europeans and Canadians accounted for less than half of those entering under family reunification provisions (E. W. Miller & Miller, 1996).

Jasso and Rosenzweig examined the differences in earnings between those entered the country on employment-based criteria versus those who entered through marriage. Initially, those who entered through employment-based preferences had significantly higher earnings than those entered as spouses of citizens. However, they found that employment-based immigrants had significant downward mobility in their first nine years in the U.S., while spouses had significant upward mobility during their first five years (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1995). The authors note that the downward trend of employment-based immigrants may be a regression to the mean effect since so many enter at the high end of the spectrum. As for the effect of family reunification policy, the article only examined spouses and the findings are probably not reflective of other relatives.

John Liu and his colleagues examined the role of chain migration in the Filipino population (Liu, Ong, & Rosenstein, 1991). The history of Filipino migration has two tracks. Pre-1965, Filipinos migrated to the U.S., in particular, to Hawaii as low-wage

agricultural workers. Many of these workers then migrated from Hawaii to California. Prior to 1965, Filipinos were ineligible to become naturalized American citizens. After the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, many of these Filipinos became citizens. In the late 1960s and 1970s, a new wave of Filipinos arrived. These Filipinos were better educated and filled technical jobs that were needed in the United States, such as nurses and engineers. Although each of these tracks initially relied on different modes of entry, Liu et al found that succeeding cohorts in both chains have relied on the family reunification as the mode of entry.

In 1986, Jasso and Rosenzweig conducted a study to determine the effect of family reunification by trying to determine a multiplier to use for an immigrant (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1986). The opponents of family reunification believe that chain migration can overwhelm other migration and greatly increase the size of the immigrant population in the United States. Jasso and Rosenzweig found that the actual multiplier is much lower than the potential multiplier and lower than most experts supposed. For a male immigrant who came for employment, the multiplier is 1.47 – that is each male immigrant will bring in about one and half immigrants in addition to themselves in long run. A female employment-based immigrant will bring in 1.3 more immigrants through family reunification. Liu et al questioned this result in their article because Jasso and Rosenzweig used only a cohort from 1971 for analyses and missed some changes in the law in 1976 that might affect their results, they argue that the multiplier should be larger (Liu, et al., 1991).

The last aspect of family reunification is the unintended consequence of the 1986 “amnesty.” A large number of adjusted status immigrants became citizens and they made applications to bring family members into the country under family reunification. There was an upsurge in family-reunification applications in the mid-1990s due to this process (Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007).

History of Immigration Policy

Roger Daniels wrote a history of United States immigration policy since 1882 in his book, *Guarding the Golden Door*. Daniels starts his history at 1882 because it was year of the first law that restricted immigration into the United States. The law was the Chinese Exclusion Act which prohibited Chinese workers from entering the country. It also prevented Chinese people the opportunity to become citizens. Prior to this law, there were no restrictions to entering the United States. The geographic isolation of the United States and the cost of travel prevented mass migration. In addition, 19th century policymakers viewed the mostly European immigration as a beneficial method of populating the frontier.

There have been four major immigration acts in United States history: the Immigration Act of 1924; the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952; the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965; and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Numerous other bills have added complexity to the system and changed formulas and procedures, but these four acts are the basis of immigration policy in the United States (Daniels, 2004).

The Immigration Act of 1924 permanently limited all immigration for the first time in United States history. The law set quotas for countries in Europe based on the number of immigrants from that country in the 1890 Census. The purpose of that census date was to limit the number of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe who were the most recent wave. The law also set into place the date in which the immigration numbers would switch to the 1920 Census. Fry claims this was done so that Congress would not appear to be racist, but would still control the flow from Southern and Eastern Europe (Fry, 2001). The law also stated that no one who could not become a citizen could immigrate to the country. As previous citizenship laws prevented Asians from becoming citizens, this provision in the 1924 act prohibited Asians from immigrating. The law enacted criminal penalties to transportation companies who violated immigration laws. Daniels states that “the importance of the 1924 act is hard to overemphasize” (Daniels, 2004).

The country in 1924 was gripped by xenophobia, isolationism, and a rejection of Europe. While the post-war depression was over, fears of about job-stealing immigrants willing to work cheap still remained in the populace. Higham notes that 1924 act occurred during an economic upswing and therefore was based more on nativist fears than economic factors (Higham, 1963). However, nativism was not just a lower class issue in the 1920s, the study of eugenics was prevalent which gave an intellectual backing to racist beliefs (Fry, 2001).

Daniels says that “most important, perhaps, was the beleaguered feeling of some many old-stock Protestant Americans” who believed that immigrants and their non-

Protestant cultures represented a serious threat to American values. There was a great fear of socialism, communism, and anarchism which many believed festered in the immigrant population (Daniels, 2004).

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 had three major components. First, it removed race as an exclusionary restriction for entering the country or becoming a citizen. While maintaining the quota system which gave preference to Northern European countries, more nations including all Asian countries, were given some quota numbers. Second, (being enacted in midst of the 1950s red scare), it eased the process to deport immigrants and naturalized citizens who engaged in un-American activities. Third, it established the basic framework of preferences for those entering the country that is still used today. First preference was given to those with extraordinary talents or to family members of U.S. citizens. Family preferences were broken down in stages from parents to adult children to siblings. Refugees from war or political persecution were also given special treatment. Daniels calls the 1952 act a paradox which contains elements to restrict the “wrong” kind of immigrants while at the same time liberalizing immigration to more people around the world (Daniels, 2004).

The third important immigration law was the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments. The goal of the bill was to end the national quota system. Replacing the quota system was a limitation on the total number of immigrants from each continent and a maximum of 20,000 annually per country. For the first time, there was a restriction on the number of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere. One purpose of these changes was based on foreign policy considerations. The quota system with widely

varying limits per country was viewed by foreign leaders as insulting (Zolberg, 2006). The new system equalized all countries. However, in order to pacify lawmakers afraid that the immigration mix would change too much, two changes to the preference system was made. First, parents of U.S. citizens were moved from the numerical restricted preferences to unrestricted. Second, family reunification became the dominant preference for admittance into the country. This was supposed to keep the immigrant mix similar to pre-1965 amounts (Daniels, 2004).

The most recent major immigration legislation was the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. This law provided a path to legal admittance and possible citizenship for millions of people living and working in the country who did not enter through legal means. In addition, the law required employers to check the immigration status of their workers and made it a criminal offense to knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants.

Current Immigration Policy

The culmination of these major laws and various lesser legislations has created the current immigration policy. The goals of current immigration policy are:

- To reunite families by admitting immigrants who already have family members living in the United States;
- To admit workers in high-skill occupations with strong demand for labor;
- To provide a refuge for people who face the risk of political, racial, or religious persecution in their home countries; and
- To provide admission to people from a diverse set of countries (Congressional Budget Office, 2006).

Current immigration policy offers two distinct ways for noncitizens to enter the United States lawfully: permanent (or immigrant) admission and temporary (or

nonimmigrant) admission. People granted permanent admission are formally classified as lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and receive a green card. LPRs are eligible to work in the United States and eventually may apply for U.S. citizenship.

The second path to lawful admission is temporary admission, which is granted to foreign citizens who seek entry to the United States for a limited time and for a specific purpose (such as tourism, diplomacy, temporary work, or study). The government definition for those admitted on a temporary basis is “nonimmigrant.” Only nonimmigrants with a specific type of visa may be permitted to work in the United States. For example, most student visas only allow the student to work at the institution where they are studying. Nonimmigrants are not eligible for citizenship through naturalization; those wishing to remain in the United States permanently must apply for permanent admission (Congressional Budget Office, 2006).

Family Reunification

More legal immigrants arrive each year through family reunification provisions. There are two classes: unrestricted and restricted: In keeping with the objective of family reunification, the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens—spouses, parents of citizens ages 21 and older, and unmarried children under 21—are admitted without numerical limitation (unrestricted). In 2006, about 580,000 immediate relatives of U.S. citizens were admitted, accounting for 46 percent of all permanent admissions (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007). Immediate relatives of citizens have generally accounted for the largest share of permanent immigrant admissions.

In addition to their immediate relatives, U.S. citizens can sponsor other relatives for permanent admission under the family sponsored preference program, which is subject to numerical limits. Under that program, admission is governed by a system of ordered preferences:

- First preference: Unmarried adult (ages 21 and older) sons and daughters of U.S. citizens
- Second preference: Spouses and dependent children of LPRs; unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs
- Third preference: Married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens
- Fourth preference: Siblings of adult U.S. citizens (Congressional Budget Office, 2006).

The various preference categories under the family-sponsored program have different numerical limits. Unused visas in each category may be passed to the next-lower preference category, and unused visas in the lowest preference category are passed on to the first category. Actual admissions often fall short of the established ceilings—for instance, the 214,000 people admitted in 2004 compare with a total ceiling for all family-based categories of 226,000 visas—because of either low demand for visas or processing backlogs that sometimes affect the number of admissions granted each year (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). In 2006, the family-sponsored visas nearly reached its ceiling (about 222,000 were granted). Which means 63 percent, almost two-thirds, of legal immigrants in 2006 were related to people in the United States between the unrestricted and restricted family programs (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007).

Employment-Based Preferences

The second goal of the current immigration policy, according to a Congressional Budget Office report, is “to admit workers in occupations with strong demand for labor” (Congressional Budget Office, 2006). However, employment-based preferences are not strictly tied to labor demand. According the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration webpage, there are four preference groups in the employment-based category:

1. Priority workers
2. Professionals with advanced degrees or persons with exceptional abilities
3. Skilled or professional labor
4. Special immigrants (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2008b)

It is noticeable in their headings that labor-demand is not a category, nor does the need for unskilled labor factor into employment-based preferences.

The first preference group are for those with "extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim and whose achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation" (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2008b). Nobel Prize winners are instantly granted preference. Superstar athletes, artist, musicians and movie stars fall into the category. Top scientists and chief executive officers of major corporations are given easy entry into the country. The numbers of people granted EB-1 status fluctuates each year and is strictly dependent on the number of applicants. In 2005, there were 64,700 priority workers while in 2003, the number was only 14,500. (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007)

The second-preference group is professionals with advanced degrees or persons with exceptional abilities. If the EB-1 group is the superstars, this category is for the rising stars or the potential stars. These are “members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and those who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, arts or business will substantially benefit the national economy, cultural or educational interests or welfare of the United States”(U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2008b). Physicians may apply under this criterion if they agree to go to areas designated by the Department of Health and Human Services as being underserved by native doctors. Others applying under this group must have a job offer and their employers or potential employers file a petition for the foreign worker. For this category, the employer does not have to specify that native citizen was not available for the job. This category is subject to national quotas and therefore applicants from countries with already high immigrant populations such as India, China, the Philippines and Mexico may have to wait if the quotas are filled (E. W. Miller & Miller, 1996).

The third category is for most other employment-based immigrants. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services breaks this category into three subgroups: 1) those with at least two years of skilled labor experience; 2) those with a bachelor’s degree and 3) “other workers with less than two years experience, such as an unskilled worker who can perform labor for which qualified workers are not available in the United States” (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2008b). The other workers are put into a different queue than other two categories which has lead to a large backlog for unskilled workers compared to the skilled labor.

The fourth preference group is for foreign religious leaders and for employees of U.S. embassies abroad.

Refugees and Asylees

The United States accepts refugees when the persons is unable to return to their home country because of fear of persecution due to their religion, race, nationality, membership in a particular social group or because of political opinion. The President may decide on the groups who are eligible for refugee status (8 CFR Part 207.1). The official distinction between a refugee and an asylee is that a refugee seeks entry to the U.S. from another country while an asylee is already in the country and seeks asylum (E. W. Miller & Miller, 1996). The bulk of the statutes concerning refugees and asylees come from international treaties. Chief among these is the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention). Accordingly, the country is bound by the requirements of that Convention, including its definition of a refugee. Under the Refugee Convention, a refugee is any person with a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Of these five bases for refugee status, political opinion and membership in a social group have dominated policymaking, administrative decisions, and litigation in the United States (Okeke & Nafziger, 2006).

There is little dissention about the U.S. rules and regulations, only about the politics of who is considered eligible under the system during a presidential term. During the Reagan administration, refugees were allowed from Nicaragua but not El Salvador because that was the regime the president was supporting (Rosenblum & Salehyan,

2004). Some immigration opponents think the asylum laws are overused by unauthorized immigrants as an easier path toward legalization (Eldredge, 2001).

Diversity Program

Each year, the Diversity Lottery Program makes 55,000 immigrant visas available through a lottery to people who come from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. The State Department holds the lottery every year, and randomly selects approximately 110,000 applicants from all qualified entries. The lottery selects twice as many people as the number of visas that will be issued because they have found that many did not complete the process. Once 55,000 visas have been issued, the program is closed for the year. Diversity Lottery Program recipients become legal permanent residents and are also allowed to bring their spouse and any unmarried children under the age of 21 to the United States (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2008a).

Recent Reform Efforts

While the passage of major immigration legislation is rare, immigration reform is a constant legislative issue. During each Congressional session for the past 10 years, about 35 bills about immigration reform have received enough congressional action to receive some “floor action”, that is, some vote or legislative activity outside of the committee-level. Every Congress has reviewed immigration and has held hearings on immigration reform.²

² Review of data from www.thomas.gov

In December 2005, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4437, “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act.” The name of the act offers a clue as to why this immigration reform act would be passed by the House when so many recent bills did not. It was linkage of antiterrorism with unauthorized immigration control. This is a concept that Kingdon calls “coupling,” which is tying the issue with another more popular issue that would provide the incentive for the passage (Kingdon, 2003).

The main provisions were:

- Increased funding for building barriers along Mexican border
- Change illegal presence from a civil offense to a criminal offense. (Bruno, et al., 2006)
- Classify churches, charities, social-service agencies and other groups that help immigrants as smugglers (Bahadur, 2006).

These harsh provisions of the House bill activated pro-immigrant factions to marshal opposition as the bill moved to the Senate. As the Senate began debate, immigrants began holding rallies and demonstrations across the country. The purpose of the rallies was to demonstrate to the American public that immigrants are not criminals and are important to the American system. The rallies and demonstrations in the spring of 2006 were unexpected and became a focusing event that raised the issue of immigration in the public realm.

The first rally was a Minuteman march in early February. Following this rally, immigrants in Philadelphia held a “day without immigrants” rally in Philadelphia on February 14. The goal of this rally was to raise awareness of the role of the immigrant in

the workplace. Immigrants were encouraged to take the day off of work to show important immigrants are to the Philadelphia community. Pennsylvania Senator Specter was the committee chair for the immigration bill (Bahadur, 2006).

On March 1, several Catholic bishops and cardinals included the pending legislation as part of their Ash Wednesday sermons. The Catholic leaders were particularly concerned with a portion of the house bill that would criminalize those who helped unauthorized immigrants. Since many unauthorized immigrants are Catholic, Catholic churches have become a major resource for immigrants (Prengaman, 2006).

After that, protests were held throughout the country. In March, the demonstrations were locally organized, often through the Spanish radio stations and other Spanish media. Table 2-1 shows the dates and estimated crowds that these rallies drew. The demonstrations were so widespread and so large but because they came out of the Spanish-language media, the mainstream media's initial response was surprise.

In June 2006, the Senate passed an Immigration Reform bill that was significantly different than the bill that passed the House in December. The House Republicans felt that immigration issue could be used in the Midterm elections of November 2006 and so a conference committee to reconcile the two bills was never formed (Mayer, 2007).

Table 2-1: Major Immigrant Demonstrations in 2006

Feb. 8	Minutemen in DC est. 200
Feb. 14	Philadelphia “Day without an Immigrant” est. 2,000
March 8	Washington DC, est. 30,000
March 10	Chicago, est. 100,000
March 23	Milwaukee, est. 15,000
March 24	Phoenix, est. 20,000 Atlanta, est. 20,000
March 25	Los Angeles, “La Gran Marcha” est. 500,000 Denver, est. 50,000 Cleveland, est. 20,000
March 26	Columbus, est. 7,000
March 27	Detroit, est. 50,000
March 29	Nashville, est. 9,000
April 1	New York City, 10,000
April 9	Dallas, est. 350,000 San Diego, est. 50,000 Minneapolis/St. Paul est. 40,000 Des Moines est. 8,000
April 10	Protests in 102 cities nationwide Atlanta, est. 50,000 Boston, est. 2,000 Charleston, SC est. 4,000 Fort Myers, est. 75,000 Grand Junction, CO est. 3,000 Indianapolis, est. 20,000 Las Vegas, est. 3,000 Phoenix, est. 100,000 New York City, est. 100,000 Oakland, est. 10,000 Salt Lake City, est. 15,000 San Antonio, est. 18,000 San Jose, CA est. 25,000 Seattle, est. 25,000
May 1	“Great American Boycott” Chicago, est. 400,000 Protests of more than 10,000 reported in dozens of cities.

Source: AP stories reported in LexisNexis

The midterm elections changed the control of Congress from Republican to Democratic. During the first session of the 110th Congress, a bipartisan group of Senators developed broad immigration reform legislation with the active involvement of the Bush Administration. This legislation combined border security and interior enforcement provisions with provisions on temporary workers, permanent admissions, and unauthorized aliens.

The highlights of the 2007 Comprehensive Immigration Reform bill were:

- **Border Security and Immigration Enforcement:** the bill included increases in border patrol personnel and equipment and an increase in DHS trial attorneys for immigration court. It would increase the number of detention centers for deportation. It would require entries into the country to provide fingerprints and a variety of other provisions to prevent illegal entry and ease deportation.
- **Work Authorization Verification:** creates a new internet-based system for employers to verify the eligibility of workers for work. Includes penalties for an employer or a subcontractor who knowingly hire or continues to employ an alien who is not authorized to work.
- **Creation of a Temporary Worker Program:** the bill provides for 200,000 entries each year as temporary workers. Temporary workers will be allowed to enter for two years and application can be renewed two times for a six-year period. Visas will be granted only if they are matched to a willing employer. A second program will allow temporary agricultural workers for up to 10-month stays in the US. Agricultural associations can submit applications for their members (i.e., each farm does not have to work the system but can use a farm bureau that will handle the processing for its members).
- **Merit Based System:** the green card process would change to a merit-based system that places those with the most highly desired skills at the front of the line. The bill caps the number of parents of U.S. citizens which are currently unrestricted and restricts other extended-family immigration. The diversity program would be disbanded.
- **Current Unauthorized Population:** Unauthorized immigrants currently living in the U.S. can apply for a special Z visa during a one-year sign-up

period. The unauthorized applicant would have to pay a fine and pass a background check. The Z visa would last for four years and could be renewed one time. Those seeking permanent status would have to apply in the home country.

- **Trigger:** the temporary worker and Z visa would not be implemented until the certain provisions of the border protection and enforcement part of the bill are implemented.

On June 28, 2007, the Senate voted on a motion to invoke cloture on S. 1639, which, if approved, would have ultimately brought the bill to a vote. The cloture motion failed, however, on a vote of 46 to 53, and the Senate Majority Leader pulled the bill from the Senate floor (Bruno, Wasem, Siskin, Nunez-Neto, & Haddal, 2008). On the day of the Senate vote, the anti-immigrant activists were able to generate enough phone calls that it shut down the Senate switchboard (Sandler, 2007).

The vote on cloture did not fall along party lines as 12 Republicans voted for cloture and 15 Democrats and Independent Bernie Sanders voted nay. The Democrat nays included some of the most liberal Senators such as Harkin, Stabenow and Sanders which indicates that there was some dissatisfaction on the left about compromises made to produce a moderate bill.

The voting on the final bill was very political as Arlen Specter reported that senators changed votes 23 times in attempt to gain political advantage (Dinan, 2007). Senator Brownback changed his vote midway through the vote to nay midway through the voting when he became certain that it was not going to pass. Table 2-2 shows the senators whose votes changed between the passage of S.2611 in 2006 and the failure of S.1639 in 2007.

Table 2-2: Senators Changing Votes on Immigration Reform from 2006 to 2007

Democrats Changing from Yea to Nay	Republicans Changing from Yea to Nay	2007 Freshmen Senators Voting Nay	Republican Changing from Nay to Yea
Baucus (MT) Bayh (IN) Bingaman (NM) Harkin (IA) Landrieu (LA) Pryor (AR)	Brownback (KS) Coleman (MN) Collins (ME) Domenici (NM) McConnell (KY) Murkowski (AK) Smith (OR) Stevens (AK) Voinovich (OH) Warner (VA)	Barrasso (R-WY) Brown (D-OH) Corker (R-TN) McCaskill (D-MO) Sanders (I-VT) Tester (D-MT) Webb (D-VA)	Kyl (AZ)

3. Public Opinion and Public Policy

In his summary of the literature on public opinion and public policy, Burstein (2003) finds three concepts are generally accepted: “1) public opinion influences public policy; 2) the more salient an issue to the public, the stronger the relationship; and 3) that the relationship is threatened by the power of interest groups, political parties and economic elites.” The first and third points are often debated normatively as policymakers are accused of either being too beholden to poll results or to special interests. Pollster George Gallup finds that members of Congress do not follow polls because a well-organized minority which can get votes for a candidate has far more influence than simple numerical majorities. The problem, as Gallup sees it, is that “well-organized minorities can and do thwart the will of the majority” (Gallup, 1980).

On the other hand, the theory of democratic pluralism is the public opinion is expressed through the formation of groups. Interest groups are collections of individuals or organizations who seek to influence public policy (Rozell, Wilcox, & Madland, 2006). Normatively, over time and across all issues that arise, groups will exist so that public opinion will be fully represented. This would occur through existing groups and by new groups that would form as new issues or as segments of the population who felt underrepresented began organizing them (Glynn, et al., 1999).

Historical and Theoretical

The debate about the role of public opinion in policy-making goes back to founding of the United States at the Constitutional Convention. The founders were influenced by the Englishman Edmund Burke, a parliament minister, who viewed representation using two models: delegate and trustee. To Burke, the delegate would represent his constituent's desires in parliament and, in essence, vote according to public opinion. Burke's preferred alternative was to act as trustee, which he meant that he would vote, not according to the whims of public opinion, but in the best interest of his constituent's and to the country as he saw fit (Burke & Stanlis, 2000).

In the United States, the distinction between delegate and trustee was implanted into the Constitution. The House of Representatives with its constant elections would remain close to the people and often act as delegates to their districts, while senators were removed from the electorate with longer terms, and prior to the 17th amendment non-direct election, and could act as trustees. This was an important element to Madison as he described the features and the role of the House and Senate in the Federalist Papers (Madison, 1992 [1788]). In Federalist 57, Madison states "the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people." But the Senate according to Madison is to protect "against the force of the immediate representatives of the people" (Federalist 63) which may "yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions" (Federalist 62). This duality allows policy to be both responsive to public opinion and protected from public opinion.

Prior to the advances of scientific surveys in the second-half of the twentieth century, representatives relied on insufficient means to determine the desires of their constituents. Representatives relied on letters and telegrams to their offices, town hall meetings, newspaper reports, and their contacts with their own supporters and friends. Miller and Stokes (1963) found most Congress members did not vote in accordance with the opinions of their constituency but rather tended to vote based on their own policy preferences. This would seem to indicate that representatives were acting as trustees rather delegates. However, Miller and Stokes also found that Congress members often believed they were acting on the desires of their constituency. So they were voting on policy not based on the public's desires but on their perception of public opinion. In theory, this disconnect might be detrimental to a representatives' career, however Miller and Stokes found the communications problems occur both ways as the district is mostly unaware of their Congress members' voting record.

The normative model for the relationship between public opinion and public opinion is what Norman Luttbeg describes as a coercive mode. In coercive models, the public applies pressure, either real or potential electoral pressure, to force lawmakers to enact the desired policies (Luttbeg, 1981). When enough Americans are dissatisfied with the status quo, the balance of power shifts through elections. Incumbent representatives tend to minimize controversial positions to ensure reelection (Wlezien, 2004). For the most part, this means that public opinion matters only to the most salient issues of the day: the economy, war, civil rights and other major national issues.

However, legislative elections are not typically national referendums, but a series of local elections with differing levels of salience for any issue in each district.

Immigration is just such an issue. Johnson, Ferrell and Guinn described immigration as a local issue based on national policy (Johnson, Farrell, & Guinn, 1997). Immigrants tend to congregate in enclaves so that some local communities have to deal with a large number of immigrants while most communities do not. However, local communities do not have the means to control the inflow of immigrants as immigration policy is set by the national government.

According to U.S. Census Bureau estimates, 12.5 percent of the population of the United States in 2007 was foreign born.³ However, the distribution of this population varies tremendously from zero percent in Simpson County, Mississippi to more than half of the population of Dade County, Florida.⁴ The average foreign-born percentage for a county is 5.1 percent and the median is 3.0, so the foreign-born population is concentrated in a small number of counties. More than 90 percent of U.S. counties have less than the U.S. average percent of foreign-born residents.

This concentration means that for some politicians, immigration issues are extremely salient for their constituents, but for most others, it is not. This difference of importance to constituents is hardly unique to immigration. Other issues debated at the national stage but with varying degrees of local interest include urban policy, agriculture subsidies, federal land use, transportation, and disaster relief.

³ American Factfinder, based on American Community Survey estimates for 2007, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFacts?_submenuId=factsheet_1&_sse=on, accessed on August 21, 2009.

⁴ American Community Survey, 3-year county estimates.

For most policy issues therefore, only a few representatives will have real coercive electoral pressure. Without coercive pressure, public opinion should have less influence on policy-making. Harwood Childs found that “the relationship between public opinion and public policy varies greatly from issue to issue. The influence of public opinion varies from virtually no influence to enormous influence. Influence may be exerted quickly or slowly, it may change over time or remain constant, and its impact may be direct or indirect” (Childs, 1965). While this initial conclusion appears to be a non-finding, Childs also notes that extent of the influence depends on a number of factors including: the degree of agreement within the public; the intensity with which opinions are held; and the extent of organized support for and against the public position. He also notes the clarity and simplicity of the issue is important.

Childs defines public opinion as being a negative influence in policy debates in two major ways. In the first way, public opinion tends to influence policy-makers through dissatisfaction with existing policies, rather than a public groundswell for positive action. Public opinion for progressive policies is a rally against the status quo. Another aspect of the negative influence of public opinion is that policy-makers use the knowledge of the public’s tolerances to constrain the policy options because the public would not accept some solutions. Officials are reluctant to take a stand in the face of probable widespread, popular disapproval.

Childs defines the relationship between public opinion and public policy as two-way, cyclical and dynamic. Public opinion not only influences policy, but policy

influences opinion. Once a policy decision is made, there is a tendency for public opinion to accept it.

As general policies become more specific and the implications of the policies become clearer, public opinion often changes. A clamor for change can be muted when the specifics are discussed as a majority opinion is subdivided into those who oppose differing aspects of the policy. Because of this, Childs who is a strong supporter of public opinion in policy-making, advocates leaving the public out of the details:

“The general public is especially competent, probably more competent than any other group—elitist, expert, or otherwise—to determine the basic ends of public policy, to choose top policy-makers, to appraise the results of public policy, and to say what, in the final analysis is fair, just, and moral. On the other hand, the general public is not competent to determine the best means for attaining specific goals, to answer technical questions, to prescribe remedies for political, social, and economic ills, and to deal with specialized issues far removed from the everyday experience and understanding of the people in general. (Childs, 1965)

Literature Review

The relationship between public opinion and policy-making is not clearly defined. Most research shows that, in general, policy-makers follow public opinion (Monroe, 1979; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 2004), some research that policy-makers ignore public opinion (Korpi, 1989) and others find that policy elites drive public opinion toward their viewpoint rather than the other way around (Kingdon, 2003; Zaller, 1992). In addition, some argue that “public opinion” is an artifact of measurement and does not really exist (Bishop, 2005).

Norman Luttbeg outlines the theoretical models of the political linkages between the public and policy-makers in two broad groups: coercive models and noncoercive models (Luttbeg, 1981). In coercive models, the public applies pressure, either real or potential electoral pressure, to force lawmakers to enact the desired policies. Luttbeg defines these models as:

- **Rational-Actor Model:** Public exerts pressure electorally. Representatives must enact policy demands of the public or the public will elect some else who will enact those policies.
- **Political Parties Model:** The political parties act as an intermediary between the public and the representative. The public holds the party responsible for the policies to be enacted. The parties therefore exert pressure on the lawmakers to follow the party line or to enact policies for the good of the party.
- **Pressure Group Model:** In this model, the public expresses itself to lawmakers by gathering in groups: business groups, labor unions and interest groups. These groups influence lawmakers through money or electorally to support the policy of the group. These pressure groups have more influence than individuals.

It is not necessary for the public to coerce public officials to do their will.

Noncoercive models explain how public policy can reflect public opinion without a direct threat to the policy-maker. The two noncoercive models offered by Luttbeg are:

- **Belief-Sharing Model:** In this model, policy-makers are not acting to heed the desires of the electorate but are acting on their own beliefs. However, the lawmaker was elected because the lawmaker shares the same beliefs as his or her constituency. This model reflects the theory of some political scientists who maintain that elections are about the candidates' values and not about issues (which would be the rational actor model).
- **Role-playing model:** In this model, representatives act as their constituency's delegate. Lawmakers respond to policy decisions by anticipating the desire of the district. This is differentiated from the rational actor model because the lawmaker is not responding to pressure by the public, but is proactively producing policy that the representative believes his or her constituency desires.

Glynn, Herbst, O'Keefe and Shapiro's book *Public Opinion* includes a chapter on "Public Opinion and Policymaking" which was co-authored with Lawrence R. Jacobs (Glynn, et al., 1999). In the chapter Glynn et al. present theories of the linkage between public opinion and policy that echo Luttbeg's models:

- **Political processes** – leaders are held accountable by elections to do the will of the people. Leaders have to anticipate public opinion in their decision-making in order to survive the next election.
- **Shared opinions** – the voters elect leaders who are similar to themselves in enough ways that the leaders share the opinions of those who elect them.

- **Social pressure** – leaders feel they have to vote the preferences of the constituents even if it is not what the leader would do on his or her own.
- **Interest groups** – interest groups provide the means that leaders gauge the public's opinion and interest.

Glynn et al. posit three causal impacts of public opinion on policy: public opinion exerts strong pressure to direct government policy; public opinion is ignored in government policymaking; or public opinion constrains public policy. While elections and social pressure may influence policymakers, Glynn cites the role of class in limiting the influence of public opinion by observing that policymaking is dominated by powerful elites. The connections that elites have in the policymaking arena, in addition to the money they can provide for electoral purposes, can thwart public opinion. The authors note that one of the surest ways that elites prevent public opinion from affecting policymaking in a specific area is by keeping the issue off the public's agenda and changing policy with as low as profile as possible. The concept that public opinion constrains policy is based on the idea that some policy options will be unpalatable to the public despite other advantages. Most policies have a range of options available. The public may not be knowledgeable enough to separate the options in the most cases, but some options the public will not accept.

Elaine Sharp adds to theories by examining sequential aspect of the linkage by looking at the continuing relationship after a policy is enacted (Sharp, 1999). In most instances, once a law is created, the issue is removed from the public agenda for a time

- **Thermostatic Sequence:** Public policy responds to public opinion, and then public opinion provides feedback in which public opinion adjusts to the policy change. Like a thermostat that's been adjusted when it's too cold, the change may make it too hot. The public might respond to a progressive change by becoming more conservative on an issue.
- **Policy Learning Sequence:** As knowledge increases, both policy and public opinion respond to new information. A prime example of this sequence would be policies on global warming. Initially, scientists and environmentalists lobbied about global warming, but the public was unresponsive, uninterested and, perhaps, skeptical. However, as new information emerged, the public has become more aware and less skeptical, which encourages policy responses.
- **Path Dependence:** Once some policies have been enacted, the policy choices in that area are reduced. The policy choices are dependent on the first policy. Post-debate on the merits of the initial policy are not relevant to the current policy decision. For example, a shift in opinion on whether the US should have invaded Iraq is uninformative for the current US policies options in Iraq.
- **Solution Becomes the Problem:** This is related to the path dependence in that a once popular solution becomes institutionalized into the bureaucracy, so that when thermostatic effect changes opinion against the policy, the bureaucratic institution becomes difficult to change.

- **Broken Thermostat:** In this case, the public does not appear to acknowledge the changes in policy and does not modify its request for more spending or tougher sanctions based on the change in policy.

Empirical Studies

One of the first studies that examined the effect of public opinion on policy was by Miller and Stokes who examined Congress members votes versus their constituencies' opinions (Miller & Stokes, 1963). The study included interviews with incumbent Congress members, their nonincumbent opponent (if any) and a sample of constituents in 116 congressional districts. The survey included the Congress members' perception of their district's opinions as well as their own viewpoints on a series of topics. In essence, the study was testing the difference between the coercive Rational Actor Model and the noncoercive Role Playing model in which members act as delegates and try to anticipate the desires of their constituency.

Miller and Stokes' findings were that Rational Actor model was an insufficient explanation as Congress members did not vote in accordance with the opinions of their constituency. While the representatives tended to vote based on their own policy preferences (fulfilling the Shared-Belief model), the members often believed they were acting on the desires of their constituency and therefore acting in the Role-Playing model. The authors point out that this indicates a communications breakdown between the Congress member and the district, but the communications problems occur both ways as the district is mostly unaware of their Congress members' voting record.

The relationship between the public and Congress was different based on the policy being discussed. In the area of civil rights, the congress member often voted based on their perceptions of the districts' opinion. However, in the social welfare domain, the dominant model was the Political Parties model. Miller and Stokes posit that social welfare was the main differentiating factor between the two parties at that time. Parties recruited candidates who shared their viewpoint on social welfare and the public took their cues on candidates viewpoints based on party identification. If public views of social welfare changed, it was more likely to result in a change of Congress members than a change in the Congress members vote.

Robert Erikson reexamined Miller and Stokes data to look at other factors that might account for the discrepancy between public opinion and members voting (Erikson, 1978). What he found was that there was sampling and weighting problems with the data in which small number of constituents in some districts were give an inordinate amount of weight which causes variance problems in the statistical calculations. He also discovered that the party representativeness variable was suppressed by the influence of the electoral loser. The correlations between Democratic or Republican candidates increase when only winners are examined. As a corollary, the correlations go down when only Democratic or Republican losers are examined. In other words, winning party members are more similar than their party brethren running in opposing party strongholds. With this recalculation, Erikson found that political parties play an intermediating role in the relationship between public preferences and policy outputs.

And when controlling for the party relationship, the direct effects of constituency opinions became significant in determining members voting behavior.

There have been three major empirical studies on the influence of public opinion on public policy most often cited by authors in this field. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro examined public opinion and policy data for the United States from 1935 to 1979 (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Alan Monroe examined the relationship by using national surveys to compare public opinion and policy outcomes for 500 issues from 1980 to 1993 (Monroe, 1998). The third study used a different methodology. Stimson, MacKuen and Erickson examined the policy activity for the House, Senate, presidency and Supreme Court separately from 1956 to 1993. Their study adds election outcomes as an intermediary effect between public opinion and policy change (Stimson, Mackuen, & Erikson, 1995).

The starting point of Page and Shapiro's book, *The Rational Public*, concerns the methodological implications raised by Converse in his work on "non-attitudes." Converse found that respondents on panel surveys often answered the same policy questions differently during different waves of the panel. Converse found that opinions varied randomly in direction and that respondents answer questions "as though flipping a coin" (Converse, 1970). Converse attributed the random responses to people have no real attitudes on the matter but felt obliged to give an answer during the survey. Converse questioned the validity of opinion surveys to address non-salient policies.

Page and Shapiro argue that while individual responses will vary, the variation that Converse found was statistically random such that by aggregation the variation will

still fall around the mean of all respondents. They show that attitudes across surveys and time are stable except when there is true change in the population over a policy.

Page and Shapiro's methodology was to examine national survey questions that were asked more than once so that they could measure opinion change. After identifying opinion change, they checked for policy changes on the same issues (Page & Shapiro, 1992).

They found substantial congruence between opinion and policy especially when opinion changes were large and sustained and the issues were salient. An extraordinary event can cause a short term change in opinion but will not have the policy effect of a sustained change in opinion. For example, the arrest of Saddam Hussein had a short term impact on the approval of the War in Iraq but it was not sustained. Large and sustained changes in opinion will be noticed by lawmakers and will be hard to dismiss. Lawmakers will have to react to large and sustained changes in public opinion.

Their results showed that there was congruence between opinion change and policy change 66 percent of the time – and 90 percent of the time when opinion change was large and sustained. For directionality, their results showed that opinion changed before the policy which suggests that opinion changes are important causes of policy change.

In terms of Luttbeg's models, Page and Shapiro's results show policy-makers follow public opinion. However, the manner in which policy is affected by public opinion is not part of their study. Therefore while it seems implicit that Page and Shapiro's hypothesis might refer to the rational-actor model, there is nothing explicit in their

research that would rule out the noncoercive models such as the share-beliefs leading to policy change.

Monroe is cautious about Page and Shapiro's congruent methodology. First, he points out that there was statistically significant opinion change on only half of the issues they studied. Also, the congruency methodology can produce some erroneous results. He offers the following example: "Suppose that public support for increasing some government program drops from 90 percent to 80 percent. A reduction in that activity would be the congruent response, even though that would be at odds with the preferences of a large popular majority" (Monroe, 1998).

Monroe's methodology uses a consistency methodology in which the response from a survey at one point in time and compares the distribution of public opinion with the policy outcome. Monroe had used the same methodology in an earlier study of policies from 1960 to 1979 (Monroe, 1979).

He found that policy outcomes were consistent with the preferences of public majorities 55 percent of the time. Consistency was highest with foreign policy decisions with 67 percent agreement between public opinion and policy. This marks a decline from an overall 63 percent consistency for the 1960-79 period.

The results showed that a key reason for policy not being consistent with public opinion is that there is a bias toward the status quo in the political process – that is, policy change is difficult due to the nature of United States political system. Monroe suggests that this difficulty in producing policy change increased over time and is the root cause of the decline in consistency over time. He hypothesizes that the divided government of the

Reagan-Bush presidency and the increased ideological conflict are factors in the difficulty to produce policy changes.

Monroe confirms Page and Shapiro's finding that public salience is a key factor in producing policy change and opinion and policy congruence. Issues of high salience to the public will be addressed by lawmakers.

In terms of Luttbeg's model, Monroe finds recent evidence that the political party model might be contributing to the lessening congruence between opinion and policy. Ideological differences between the parties are mitigating the public's influence on policy-makers.

Stimson, MacKuen and Erickson used a different methodology for identifying public opinion. Instead of examining individual survey questions, the authors created a composite measure Domestic Policy Mood. The authors claim that the Mood is "the major policy dimension underlying expressed preferences over policy alternatives in the survey research record. It is properly interpreted as left vs. right – more specifically, as global preferences for a larger, more active federal government as opposed to a smaller, more passive one across the sphere of all domestic policy controversies" (Stimson, et al., 1995). To measure election outcomes, Stimson et al measure seat turnover in each house. In measuring policy changes, the authors used congressional votes and categorized them broadly as to whether the policy moved in a more expansive (liberal) direction or in a more conservative one. Therefore the policy variable is analogous to the national mood variable.

Their first-cut analysis for the House of Representatives shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between changes in public mood and public policy with a coefficient of 0.85 – meaning that a ten percentage point change in public mood produces an 8.5 percentage point change in public policy. This indicates that the House of Representatives is receptive to public opinion. However, there is not a statistical connection between public mood and election results in the House. This indicates that changes in public opinion do not affect election results. High incumbency reelection rates reduce the variability of the measure and other factors, like the midterm election factor, play a significant part which reduces the possibility that opinion changes effect election results. Putting election results in the same model as public opinion produces independent effects. Each percentage increase in the number of Democrats in the House increases the liberal agenda by 0.48. And there is a one-to-one ratio of opinion on policy when controlling for election changes.

The results for the Senate reflect the political reality. Conceptually, Senators should react less directly to public opinion than the House with its continuous elections. Also, only one third of the Senate is up for election in every two year cycle. Theoretically, a shift in national opinion might be driven by regional factors, which would be imperfectly captured by any given Senate election. However, Senators do not enjoy the same incumbency reelection advantage House members have. House members' districts tend to be politically homogenous, often set up through districting to be politically safe, while Senators have to be elected by their entire state. Senators also

face opponents with greater name recognition than house opponents. Therefore, they might be more likely to be concerned about the public mood.

Indeed, the first-cut analysis shows a 1.18 coefficient in the Senate for public opinion's effect on policy. And public opinion does influence election outcomes with a coefficient of 1.02 which means that every change in public mood is worth one senate seat. When election results and public opinion are both in the model, the election results hold a significant change in policy and public opinion becomes insignificant. In other words, public opinion produces change in the election which produces a change in policy.

The hypothesis of Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson is that there is a dynamic relationship between public opinion, elections and public policy. One of their findings is that House members anticipate public mood changes and can incorporate policy changes outside of election pressure. In the Luttbeg models, this would fit the Role-playing Model where the relationship is noncoercive but the lawmakers follow public opinion.

On the Senate side, the coercive force is more persuasive as policy changes are more from the result of election results than in the direct influence of public opinion. In the Senate, the rational actor model is the dominant model, but the political parties model is also present in how a change in party composition of the Senate changes the policy outcomes and public opinion affects electoral outcomes.

Comprehensive Overviews

Two recent studies have attempted to consolidate the various studies on the responsiveness of lawmakers to public opinion. Jeff Manza and Fay Lomax Cook examined the literature by the three different results of studies: the high impact of public

opinion on policy; the low impact; and a contingent view of the impact of opinion on policy (Manza & Cook, 2002). Paul Burstein started with the assumption that public opinion affects policy but tried to find answers in previous studies to the amount of impact and under what conditions did the impact occur (Burstein, 2003).

After reviewing the various studies, Manza and Cook cautiously concluded that public opinion affected policy “sometimes.” But they did feel that three conclusions could be drawn from the literature:

- Where measured public opinion expresses a coherent mood or view on a particular policy question in a way that is recognizable by political elites, it is more likely than not that policy will move in the direction of public opinion.
- The combination of contradictory public views on many key policy issues and the capacity of political elites to shape or direct citizen’s views significantly reduces the independent causal effect of public opinion.
- Although policy will tend to follow public opinion more often than not, there is sufficiently wide variation in the extent of responsiveness across different issues and different points in time to warrant increased scholarly attention to examining the institutional and political sources of variation.

The authors point out that although policy will tend to follow public opinion, there is still substantial room for politicians and policy entrepreneurs to maneuver policy in ways that are not visible to the public. For example, a prescription drug policy may satiate the public’s desire for change while still benefiting the pharmaceutical industry.

Manza and Cook are comprehensive in their review and point out how various studies reflect each of Luttbeg's coercive models by either the direct influence of public opinion on lawmakers or through the intercession of political parties or interest groups.

Burstein starts from the premise that these three concepts are generally accepted: public opinion influences public policy; the more salient an issue to the public, the stronger the relationship; and that the relationship is threatened by the power of interest groups, political parties and economic elites. He reviews the literature to determine five follow-up questions:

1. How much impact does public opinion have on public policy?
2. How much does the impact of opinion on policy increase as the importance of an issue to the public increases?
3. To what extent do interest groups, social movement organizations, political parties and elites influence policy even when opposed by public opinion?
4. Has government responsiveness to public opinion changed over time?
5. How generalizable are our findings about the impact of opinion on policy?

He attempts to answer these questions by reviewing a number of studies – most which do not address these questions directly. Only one question can he put numbers to, “how much impact,” where he finds that public opinion affects policy three-quarters of the time that its impact is gauged and opinion has a substantial impact at least a third of the time. However, a few years later, he questions this result by stating that impact of public opinion is estimated too high because non-salient issues don't even get addressed in surveys, so there is no influence of public opinion on most issues (Burstein, 2006).

His follow-up article does reinforce his conclusions on the second question. Salience has a large impact of the influence of public opinion on public policy. Highly salient issues will be addressed by lawmakers or there may be electoral consequences.

Interestingly, Burstein finds that the impact of public opinion remains substantial even when in opposition to powerful interest groups. However, he cautions that the paucity of data on this subject may not make this finding reliable. More research is needed on this subject. In fact, lack of studies lead to the answers to his fourth and fifth questions to be inconclusive.

Countering Arguments about Public Opinion

When considering the impact of public opinion on public policy, it is important to recognize the counterarguments. For this paper, three dissenting opinions are presented. The first two arguments are related. For George Bishop, much of public opinion is an artifact of the opinion polls that force people to answer questions that they don't think about in ways that force responses to a predetermined outcome (Bishop, 2005). John Zaller provides an explanation on how poll respondents make up their opinions by using the cognitive information available to them. Zaller argues that elites and the media have direct influence on providing these cognitive markers that lead to public opinion (Zaller, 1992). The last counterargument is from John Kingdon who posits that public opinion has only a minor influence on policymaking and that other political actors are much more influential (Kingdon, 2003).

In his book, *The Illusion of Public Opinion*, George Bishop finds that public opinion is defined as "what the polls says." He argues that the polls are not producing an

accurate reflection of public opinion because of methodological issues, such as forcing people to state their opinion when they are ignorant of the issue.

Bishop's model begins with the public ignorance of public affairs. The two inputs to the model are "question ambiguity" and the "question form, wording, and context." These three elements add up to an illusion. Ask ignorant survey respondents an ambiguous question and Bishop argues you will get an answer that means nothing. In the same manner, ignorant respondents will use whatever information is provided in the question (form and wording) or previous questions (context) to provide an answer.

John Zaller in his book, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, also questions the validity of surveys in measuring public opinion (Zaller, 1992). Like Bishop, he believes that the average person does not have fixed opinions on most topics but will create opinions on the fly when asked. Opinion is based on the interactive effects of four types of variables: intensity of political communication, the person's attention to politics, their political predispositions (such as values), and the "accidental factors that make considerations momentarily salient to people, such as news reports or questionnaire construction."

Zaller's theory is based on four premises:

1. Individuals differ in the attention to politics and exposure to elite sources of political information;
2. People react critically to political communication only to the extent that they have knowledge;
3. People rarely have fixed attitudes on specific issues, but will construct preference statements as they confront each issue raised;

4. In constructing these preference statements, people make use of ideas that are most immediately salient to them.

The four axiom model reduces down to two main ideas. First, individuals do not process true attitudes in the usual sense of the term on most political issues, but a series of “considerations” that are rather poorly integrated. The second main idea is that an interaction between political awareness and political predispositions is fundamental to the process by which people use information from the political environment to form opinions. Those who are most politically aware tend to have strong political predispositions and are more resilient to new information. Those who have a weak political predisposition and would be more easily swayed are also the hardest to reach with information about politics.

John Kingdon finds that policy-makers acknowledge that public opinion sometimes affects policy-making but often times do not. When an issue is being raised in public opinion polls as being important to be addressed, it will move up on the agenda of the lawmakers. However, Kingdon points out that often the reason an issue is raised in public awareness is because there are some politicians who have been campaigning for its cause and it has captured the public attention. In other words, public opinion did not put the item on the policy-maker’s agenda, but the policy-maker had put it on the public’s agenda.

Kingdon acknowledges the constraining aspect of public opinion. Some policy options will not be viable because the general public will be against it. On the positive side, potential public interest can help spur governmental action. Transportation

deregulation occurred first in the airline industry because airline ticket prices and schedules would be more salient to the general public than trucking deregulation.

Dimensions of Public Opinion

Public opinion on public policy issues is usually determined using dyadic measures (“Do you support this policy?”). Yet support for a policy is dependent on the conditions and terms which can sway that support depending on how the policy is presented. This moves the measurement from a ratio percentage to a continuum which best measured by indices using multiple questions (Davis & Hinich, 1966).

An example of a policy issue often viewed as dyadic but has more nuanced public opinion dimension is abortion. Public opinion on abortion is between the two extreme opinions expressed by those who consider themselves pro-life and those who consider themselves pro-choice. Americans value both individual freedom and fetal life. Data from the General Social Survey which lists several scenarios for obtaining an abortion from the most open (a woman can choose to have an abortion if she is married and doesn’t want more children) to the most restrictive (abortions should only be performed to save the mother’s life). Most respondents fall between the two extremes (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992).

Political scientists examining elections using a probabilistic voting theory have posited a “policy space” in which the public is distributed and that candidates have to position themselves on policy issues as close to the median as possible to ensure the maximum number of votes (Coughlin, 1992). The theory was initially developed by Downs (Downs, 1957) applying economic theories to voting behavior and is often

referred as Downsian spatial theory. While Downs used a unidimensional scale for policy, others have found that a multidimensional scale is more powerful in probabilistic models – figure 3-1 is the typical base used in describing the model (Hinich & Pollard, 1981; G. Miller & Schofield, 2003; Scammon & Wattenberg, 1970; Shafer & Claggett, 1995). For example, using this two-dimensional space, pro-labor and socially conservative were classified as “Reagan Democrats” in the 1980s (Lacy & Paolino, 1998). The multidimensionality of policy opinions adds complexity to models that try to measure voting behavior.




Figure 3-1: Two-dimensional policy space

The Downsian theory of party convergence breaks down in the partisan era. Politicians are not moving to the political center but to the political extremes. Fiorina shows that this is not an artifact of the public becoming more divided, but that the American political parties are not trying to maximize votes by trying to capture the center, but by appealing to their base (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2006). Activists have always been more extreme in their policy views than the public. Even in the 1950s it was shown that party activists are more extreme in their policy views than regular party members (McClosky, Hoffmann, & O'Hara, 1960). Therefore, in order to appeal to activists, policymakers need to move away from the median of public opinion. This process occurs in part because the political parties have become differentiated by the issue positions, which was far less true in the past. So while public opinion on the issues has been stable on many issues, the public has been gradually sorted into parties based on their policy preferences (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008). Another aspect is the political participation through voting and contributions is stronger among activists than the general public. Probabilistic voting models show that politicians are more successful when appealing to activists than when moving to the policy median (Schofield & Miller, 2007).

Pluralism and Public Opinion

The theory of pluralism is that American policymaking is accomplished through the resolution of group conflict. Ordinary citizens do not participate directly in policy except through elections. Instead, citizens participate indirectly through membership in groups or by identifying with groups supporting their goals (Petracca, 1992). Over time

and across all issues that arise, groups will exist so that public opinion will be fully represented. This would occur through existing groups and by new groups that would form as new issues or as segments of the population who felt underrepresented began organizing them (Glynn, et al., 1999). Group formation is a basic tenet of pluralism. It is argued that if a social interest manifests itself, a corresponding political organization will be forthcoming (Truman, 1951). The balance among groups both assures political stability and achieves the public good (Dahl, 1956).

From the 1960s to the mid-1990s there was a significant growth in the number of interest groups in Washington (although there has been a leveling off recently) (Berry & Wilcox, 2007). The growth has made the theory of pluralism more relevant now than when it was first developed in the 1950s (Jordan, 1990).

This growth is due in part to the balkanization of interests from large unified interests to specialized groups with a narrower focus. In order to affect policy, these groups have to work together by building coalitions to address the broader issue while at the same time looking out for their niche portion of the policy (Salisbury, 1992). Issue-oriented groups are more likely to build coalitions than industry or occupation groups (Hojnacki, 1997). However, interest groups are often intensely ideological, especially in the early stages of a policy development, when they are competing with other groups to set the agenda. Activist leaders are reluctant to compromise. Over time, the more successful movements will become moderate as they are maintaining their victories (Browne, 1990; Rozell, et al., 2006).

The pluralism theory is that the entirety of public opinion will be represented by these groups. One criticism of pluralism is that there is an upper-class bias because the business class and moneyed interests have the means and access to be more successful in lobbying (Schattschneider, 1960). Robert Dole used to say that there is no “Food stamps PAC” (Wilcox & Kim, 2005). However, the number of citizens groups and organizations devoted to welfare and the poor exploded in the last quarter of the twentieth century which has reduced the unequal representation (Graziano, 2001). The caveat being that even groups devoted to helping the underclass, the membership in the organization is not underclass. Common Cause for one is overwhelming upper-middle class in its membership (Ornstein & Elder, 1978). These surrogate groups representing the poor may not always advocate the best policy as their own experiences and perceptions are different than those for whom they are advocating. A more troubling possibility is that these surrogates may have group interests that are in conflict with the actual needs of their supposed constituents (Hays, 2001).

Another problem, already adumbrated, with pluralism is that moderate policy choices are not usually represented by interest groups. A recent study used Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores to classify the ideology of interest groups in a matter used to measure Congress. In this scoring system, a 1 score is very conservative and a -1 score is very liberal. Of the 72 interest groups who had data from 1997 to 2006,

only three had moderate scores between 0.25 and -0.25: American Legion (0.227); Consumers Union (-0.211); and the American for the Arts (-0.230) (McKay, 2008).⁵

This is the disconnect between public opinion as expressed through pluralism compared to aggregated opinion. When opinion is discerned using indices, the public is shown to be moderate and willing to find a compromise solution to policy problems, but interest groups are not moderate and unwilling to compromise until they have achieved substantive victories. Therefore, the public's more moderate positions will not be reflected through pluralism.

Moderate Public vs. Polarized Activists

The theme of Morris Fiorina's book *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America* (2006) is that the American populace is not deeply divided on political issues but that the political participants have become more polarized. He gives four contributing factors to why there is a perception that America is divided: 1) confusing closely divided with deeply divided; 2) political activists are not normal people; 3) the media; and 4) confusing positions with choices. He contends that the sorting of parties on ideological lines gives the impression that the recent close elections are an indication a sign of a deep split. However, he hypothesizes that aggregating individual ideology will result in a bell shaped curve, a normal distribution. Voters tend to vote for the candidate that they perceive is closer to their position. He cites Goldwater in 1964 and McGovern in 1972 as examples where one party's candidate is perceived as more extreme in their

⁵ The Arab-American Institute averaged close to 0 in the study, but that is due to a large swing in the ratings from very conservative to very liberal over issues on the War on Terror.

viewpoint and therefore loses badly. However in recent elections, both parties have nominated candidates closer to the viewpoints of activists than the public which has resulted in close elections and the perception of a divided country. The media has been complicit in generating this perception since it is a “better story” than “America is moderate in its beliefs.”

An alternative theory for the difference between a moderate public and polarized activists is that public is poorly informed on issues and most people’s attitudes would change when given more information. This theory concludes that since activists are better informed on a subject that their opinion should have more influence in policy (Althaus, 2003).

Fiorina examined data from the National Election Survey and the General Social Survey and found evidence of the moderation of the general public and of voters in political and economic ideology and attitudes on cultural issues such as abortion and homosexuality. This study extends the research into the public’s opinion on immigration issues.

4. Opinion on Immigration Policy

This chapter focuses on public opinion on U.S. immigration policy. As shown in the previous chapter, there are two lenses to view public opinion: pluralism and aggregation of individual opinions. For the pluralism view of public opinion, the groups involved in lobbying for immigration will be detailed. A review of public opinion on immigration policy using aggregated opinion requires two types of studies: media polls providing snapshots of public opinion at a particular moment in time; and academic studies which examine the factors that determine those opinions. This chapter addresses both types of studies.

Immigration policy and public opinion about it has many dimensions such as national security, foreign policy, nativism, cultural diversity, economic opportunity, job competition, labor unions, bilingualism, taxes, government services and fairness. Each of these affects some segment of the populace more than others. On most of these factors, unauthorized immigrants are viewed negatively by the public.

Schneider and Ingram classified the political capital of population segments by looking at their placement on a plane with one scale corresponding to the political influence the other scale social constructions using a subjective “deserving/undeserving” classification as shown in figure 4-1 (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). For example, children have little political power but are seen as deserving. Gun owners may be viewed as




Figure 4-1: Power and social constructs of policy beneficiaries

undeserving but have political power. Unauthorized immigrants have the unfortunate position as having little political power and being seen as undeserving. In Schneider and Ingram's framework, they fall into the deviant category. In policymaking, the benefits for policies supporting deviants are very risky while punishment of deviants yields substantial political payoffs.

In order to make sense of the variety of opinions about immigration, Tichenor divides the public into four groups by dividing the political parties into pro- and anti-immigration factions.

- **Cosmopolitans** – pro-immigration liberals whose concern is about immigrants' status as second-class persons.
- **Economic protectionists** – anti-immigration pro-labor who are concerned about immigrants' effect in communities when it comes to jobs, education and health care.

- **Free-marketers**– pro-immigration business interests who believe that growth depends on a supply of cheap, unskilled labor.
- **Border hawks** – anti-immigration conservatives who view illegal immigration in terms of national security, rule of law, public education and social services (Tichenor, 2009).

The political problem that Tichenor describes is that each of these groups views the immigration issue from different perspectives and concerns. A story of Mexicans dying in the Arizona trying to enter the country will raise empathetic concern in Cosmopolitans while Border Hawks will see justice being served for those attempting to enter the country illegally. Economic Protectionists think that sanctioning employers will effectively reduce the demand for unauthorized immigrants while Border Hawks do want to punish Americans just non-Americans. Free Marketers desire the cheap labor that immigrants provide while Cosmopolitans despise employers for exploitation. Tichenor does not believe it is possible to develop immigration reform because of these diverse opinions.

Public Opinion through Interest Groups

According to pluralism, groups exist across the issue spectrum so that public opinion is fully represented. This would occur through existing groups and by new groups that would form as new issues or as segments of the population who felt underrepresented began organizing them. Public opinion will be presented by these groups and this appears to be true for immigration policy. Immigration lobbying consists of some organizations with broad agendas and several groups being formed just to address the immigration issue.

The Hill newspaper in 2006 listed the top immigration lobbyists and the organizations they represent. While the article focused on the individual lobbyists who are not the focus of this study, each is identified with a particular group, so the list can serve as a first cut at creating a list of influential organizations in the immigration debate.

The groups identified were both pro- and anti-immigrant organizations:

- National Council of La Raza (NCLR)
- National Immigration Forum
- Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC)
- U.S. Council of Bishops
- Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
- Agriculture Coalition for Immigration Reform (ACIR)
- Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)
- NumbersUSA.com (The Hill Staff, 2006)

Think tanks are also involved in immigration policy including the Brookings Institute (Mann & West, 2009), American Enterprise Institute (Noriega & Davy, 2007), the Cato Institute (Harper, 2008), Council of Foreign Relations (Alden, Bush, & McLarty III, 2009), RAND (Ortiz, Pfleeger, Balakrishnan, & Miceli, 2006) and the Urban Institute (Zimmerman, 2008). All of the above produced reports addressing policy concerning unauthorized immigrants. There are a few think tanks that exclusively study immigration issues. The Center for Immigration Studies states that it follows a “pro-immigrant, low-immigration vision.”⁶ The Immigration Policy Center, which is part of the American Immigration Law Foundation, provides data to counter the anti-immigration arguments.

There is no shortage of groups trying to influence immigration policy. Table 4-1 provides information on the major immigration groups and their goals in immigration

⁶ <http://www.cis.org/About> accessed on September 12, 2009

policy. All the information presented in table 4-1 comes directly from the organizations' websites. Given the complexity of immigration, each of these groups has a slightly different agenda. Industry groups are looking for immigrant labor. Hispanic organizations support a path for citizenship, preserve family reunification, and prevent anti-immigrant policies from becoming discriminatory to Hispanics. Some groups are looking for an absolute reduction in immigration, or to preserve the English language and traditional American institutions.

Table 4-1: Organizations in the Immigration Policy Debate

Organization	Organization Description	Immigration Policy Position
AGRICULTURE COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM (ACIR)	Organization of agriculture businesses	Without an adequate agriculture workforce, we are in serious danger of losing control of our food supply—many of our nation's farm families will fail, U.S. farms will foreclose, and will continue to move labor-intensive agriculture production offshore.
CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES	The nation's only think tank devoted exclusively to research and policy analysis of the economic, social, demographic, fiscal, and other impacts of immigration on the United States.	The Center is animated by a pro-immigrant, low-immigration vision which seeks fewer immigrants but a warmer welcome for those admitted.

ESSENTIAL WORKER IMMIGRATION COALITION (EWIC)	A coalition of businesses, trade associations, and other organizations from across the industry spectrum concerned with the shortage of both lesser skilled and unskilled ("essential worker") labor.	EWIC supports policies that facilitate the employment of essential workers by U.S. companies and organizations. Current immigration law largely prevents the hiring of foreign essential workers. EWIC supports reform of US immigration policy to facilitate a sustainable workforce for the American economy while ensuring our national security and prosperity.
FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM (FAIR)	A national, nonprofit, public-interest, membership organization of concerned citizens who share a common belief that our nation's immigration policies must be reformed to serve the national interest.	FAIR seeks to improve border security, to stop illegal immigration, and to promote immigration levels consistent with the national interest—more traditional rates of about 300,000 a year.
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER	The research arm of the American Immigration Law Foundation with a mission to provide policymakers, academics, the media, and the general public with access to accurate information about the effects of immigration on the U.S. economy and society.	The current immigration system is outdated and broken. The problem is complex, and a comprehensive, national solution is necessary. The U.S. needs a fair, practical solution that addresses the underlying causes of undocumented immigration and creates a new, national legal immigration system for the 21st century.

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS	Largest and oldest Hispanic Organization in the United States. LULAC advances the economic condition, educational attainment, political influence, health and civil rights of Hispanic Americans	Reduce the backlog of individuals seeking residency and restructure the naturalization process in a manner that is streamlined, consistent, fair, and equitable; Include a family reunification component and a pathway to legalization for 11 million persons seeking documentation; Ensure strong worker protections are in place before any "guest worker" type provisions are considered; Address our enforcement needs in a manner that is just, and consistent with our existing due process and civil rights laws.
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND	Promotes equality and justice through litigation, advocacy, public policy, and community education in the areas of employment, immigrants' rights, voting rights, education, and language rights.	Restore the rule of law and enhance security; Provide a pathway to citizenship; Employment verification system that is accurate and timely; Promote citizenship and civic participation and help local communities
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE	Provides analysis, development, and evaluation of migration and refugee policies at the local, national, and international levels	Fair, smart, transparent, and rights-based immigration and refugee policies can promote social cohesion, economic vitality, and national security. Given the opportunity, immigrants become net contributors and create new social and economic assets.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LATINO ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS	Organization promoting the participation of Latinos in the American political process.	Provide law-abiding, taxpaying immigrant workers and their families with an opportunity to pursue U.S. citizenship.; Reunite families and reduce immigration backlogs; Temporary worker program must provide workers with full labor and civil rights protections; Provide a meaningful opportunity for immigrant students to pursue a college education; Promote the civic integration of newcomers.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA (NCLR)	The largest national Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States – works to improve opportunities for Hispanic Americans.	Encourage immigration policies that are fair and nondiscriminatory, to encourage family reunification, and to enact necessary reforms to the current immigration system.
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM	The leading immigrant advocacy organization in the country with a mission to advocate for the value of immigrants and immigration to the nation.	Create US immigration policy that honors our nation’s ideals, protects human dignity, reflects our country’s economic demands, celebrates family unity and provides opportunities for progress.
NUMBERSUSA.COM	Website that provide actions that could be taken by concerned citizens to solve the immigration problem and create a better future for America	NumbersUSA.com's goal of reducing annual legal and illegal immigration to more traditional levels
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION (SEIU)	The fastest-growing union in North America, 2.1 million members work in three service industry divisions: Health Care, Public Services, Property Services	SEIU believes that two basic facts need to drive immigration reform: 1) the current system is broken and needs to be scrapped and 2) the problem of uncontrolled immigration cannot be resolved piecemeal. SEIU believes that any reform of the immigration laws must include the following elements: Earned Legalization; Provide for a Future Flow of Immigrant Workers; Enhanced Enforcement of Labor Laws; Family Unification; Secure Borders; Due Process Protections; Immigrant Integration; Bi-lateral Partnerships with Immigrant Producing Countries.

U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS	The purpose of the Conference is to promote the greater good which the Church offers humankind, especially through forms and programs of the apostolate fittingly adapted to the circumstances of time and place.	We urge respect and observance of all just laws, and we do not approve or encourage the illegal entry of anyone into our country. From a humanitarian perspective, however, our fellow human beings, who migrate to support their families, continue to suffer at the hands of immigration policies that separate them from family members and drive them into remote parts of the American desert, sometimes to their deaths. This suffering should not continue.
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These groups are fairly easily sorted into Tichenor's categories for immigration opinion as shown in Table 4-2. The categorization by this author is based on subjectively interpreting the information that groups placed on their websites as found in Table 4-1. Tichenor's description of the groups are that: Cosmopolitans are concerned with the ethical treatment of unauthorized immigrants; Economic Protectionists are concerned about American workforce and seek employer sanctions as a solution; Free Marketers are pro-immigration as it provides a needed supply of workers; and the Border Hawks seek restrictive and punitive immigration laws.

Table 4-2: Organizations by Policy Orientation

Policy Orientation	Organization
Cosmopolitans	League of United Latin American Citizens Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund Migration Policy Institute National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials National Council of La Raza (NCLR) National Immigration Forum U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
Economic Protectionists	Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
Free Marketers	Agriculture Coalition For Immigration Reform (ACIR) Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC) Immigration Policy Center
Border Hawks	Center for Immigration Studies Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) NUMBERSUSA.COM

The number of organizations with varying viewpoints supports the pluralist assumption that groups will arise to assert their political agenda. The diversity of agendas on both sides of the issue suggest that movements are still in the beginning stages of development with each organization striving to insert its particular agenda in the policy-development, competing with ideological comrades as much with policy opponents. Therefore, the activist leaders are more strident and less willing to compromise as it might cede influence to another ideologically similar organization in which it competes for members or funding. When compromise occurs, it reduces the passion of activists to support the final measure. Therefore, the passion of those on the other side of the ideological debate overwhelms the groups involved in the compromise (Salisbury, 1992).

This phenomenon was apparent in changing fortunes of immigration reform. In 2006, after the anti-immigrant bill passed in the House of Representatives, immigrants were motivated to demonstrate across the country to influence Congress on the importance of immigrants to their states. Interestingly, most of these demonstrations were not organized by any of the national organizations listed in table 4-1, but local organizations such as the Pennsylvania Immigration and Citizenship Coalition which organized the first of these demonstrations in Philadelphia on February 14, 2006 (Bahadur, 2006).

After the party change in Congress, a Democratic-controlled Senate produced their own comprehensive immigration reform bill in 2007. This bill was developed by Senator Kennedy behind closed doors. According to The Washington Post, pro-immigration policy groups were actively involved in reaching a compromise solution. The paper reported that the National Council of La Raza, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Immigration Forum, National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, and League of United Latin American Citizens were present at the meetings (Williams & Weisman, 2007).

The compromise bill contained provisions such as removal of parents from the unrestricted immigration class and having in-country immigrants return to their home country to apply for visas that immigration advocates opposed but were known to be essential to gain support for the bill from undecided legislators. These compromises reduced the passion of the groups. Demetrios Papademetriou, president of the Migration

Policy Institute, admitted "Pro-immigrant and ethnic groups could not deliver a unified message of support for the bill. They were deeply divided" (Pear, 2007).

On the other hand, opponents of the bill were inspired to do whatever it took to defeat the bill. Conservative talk radio and television personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck and Lou Dobbs repeatedly asked their audiences to take action and directed them to websites such as NumbersUSA.com to facilitate in the communications. NumbersUSA recorded 1.5 million faxes sent through its system to Senate offices during the weeks of debate (Dinan, 2007). The anti-immigrant groups were able to get enough people to call their Senators on the day of the cloture debate that the Senate switchboard was overwhelmed and had to shut down.

Senators repeatedly talked about pressure from voters swaying the day. Senator Jim DeMint, Republican of South Carolina, said: "The American people won today. They care enough for their country to get mad and to fight for it. Americans made phone calls and sent letters and convinced the Senate to stop this bill" (Pear & Hulse, 2007). Another senator who supported a similar bill in 2006 but did not vote for cloture in 2007 told one pro-immigrant lobbyist that their side didn't bring out the troops.⁷

The perception that the public was opposed to the bill despite media polls that showed large majorities in support of the main provisions highlight the different perceptions that can arise when using pluralism as the lens to view public opinion. In pluralism, passion is confused with salience. An impassioned group is perceived as being

⁷ From an informational conversation with a National Council of La Raza lobbyist Cecilia Munoz on August 19, 2008.

important because it might affect the outcome of the next election. However, the passion is artifact of the particular point in the legislative process. Passion is easier to manufacture in opposition to the particulars of a bill than it is to engender support. That passion may not translate into electoral decisions as time passes.

Media Polls

An impassionate view of public opinion can be gleamed through surveys. The most widely viewed surveys are media polls which are commissioned by news organizations that provide public opinion statistics for topical subjects in the news. If a topic is considered newsworthy then the media will seek public opinion on that topic. In the case of immigration in the twenty-first century, immigration has been worthy for a few general questions on surveys throughout the decade, and in 2006 and 2007, immigration was a large enough policy issue to warrant more questions.

This section reviews media survey questions on immigration and notes some of the survey methodological issues that might affect responses. Survey researchers know that responses are susceptible to changes in wording, to response order effects and to question-order (Fowler, 2002; Frey, 1983; Groves, 1989; Groves & Lyberg, 1988; Nathan, 2001; Schuman & Presser, 1981; Sudman, Bradburn, & Schwarz, 1996; Tourangeau, Rasinski, & Rips, 2000). Responses can vary significantly based on the order questions are asked. All the data for this section comes from survey questions accessed from The Roper Center for Public Opinion, University of Connecticut.

The Pew Hispanic Center reviewed the major media polls and found that:

- The public appears almost evenly divided on whether immigration overall is good for the country or not.
- Americans are split over levels of legal immigration. Significant minorities of roughly a third or more favor the opposite approaches of keeping legal immigration at its present levels or decreasing it. A smaller share favors increasing legal immigration.
- A significant majority of Americans see illegal immigration as a very serious problem and most others see it at least as a serious problem.
- A majority of Americans believes that illegal immigrants are taking jobs Americans do not want.
- A majority of Americans appears to favor measures that would allow illegal immigrants currently in the U.S. to remain in the country either as permanent residents and eventual citizens or as temporary workers who will have to go home eventually. When those options are presented, only a minority favors deporting all illegal migrants or otherwise forcing them to go home.
- Americans generally express greater confidence in Democrats on immigration issues than Republicans. (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006)

A decade before, Schuck summarized the survey evidence as “Americans like immigrants more than they like immigration, prefer legal immigrants to illegal ones, prefer refugees to other immigrants, support immigrant’s access to educational and health benefits but not to welfare or Social Security, and feel that immigrants’ distinctive cultures have contributed positively to American life and that diversity continues to strengthen American society today. At the same time, they overwhelmingly resist any conception of multiculturalism that discourages immigrants from learning and using the English language” (Schuck, 1998). Even with the increase in immigration in the 21st century, both authorized and unauthorized, the results of recent surveys confirm Schuck’s description of public attitudes.

Table 4-3: Variations in Responses and Question-wording about Legal Immigration Levels.

	Increased	Decreased	Stay Same	DK
CBS News/New York Times Poll [July, 2008] Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?	23%	32%	38%	7%
CBS News/New York Times Poll [May, 2007]	20%	35%	39%	6%
CBS News/New York Times Poll [March, 2007]	18%	48%	30%	4%
CBS News/New York Times Poll [May, 2006]	22%	34%	39%	5%
Pew Hispanic Center Immigration Poll [February, 2006]	17%	40%	37%	6%
Gallup Poll [June, 2008] Thinking now about immigrants--that is, people who come from other countries to live here in the United States...In your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?	18%	39%	39%	3%
Gallup Poll [June, 2007]	16%	45%	35%	4%
Gallup/USA Today Poll [April, 2006]	15%	47%	35%	4%
Gallup Poll [June, 2006] In your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?	17%	39%	42%	2%
Democracy Corps Poll [April, 2006] In your view, should immigration be increased, decreased or kept at its present level?	11%	40%	42%	7%
Quinnipiac University Poll [February, 2006] As you may know, immigrants to the United States can be here legally---that is, they have been legally admitted to the country and are allowed to live and work here, or they can be here illegally. Such immigrants are sometimes called 'undocumented' because they do not have papers allowing them to live and work here. Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?	24%	39%	33%	4%

Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

A common question used to establish a baseline in a multiple series of questions about immigration is something like “Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?” This question provides little insight into the public opinion about immigration since there is no context to why people think level immigration levels should change.

There is a question-wording effect that can be seen in Table 4-3. The CBS News/New York Times Poll (CBS/NYT) and the Pew Hispanic Center Immigration Poll asked about “legal” immigration while Gallup did specify about legal immigration and referenced only “immigration.” Asking about “legal immigration,” the plurality says that legal immigration should stay at the present level and a greater percentage say that immigration should be increased. However, when asked about immigration without a modifier, the plurality changes to an opinion that immigration should decrease. This indicates that respondents will differentiate between legal and illegal immigration but when confronted with undefined term of immigration will answer while thinking of both kinds of immigration.

The response to the baseline question is often cited by opponents of immigrants to show that the public is against immigration (Lee, 1998). Schuck points out that the public has always thought that the immigration levels of their day were too high. He reports that in the 50 years that Gallup has versions of this question the answers have remained consistent with only a small percentage looking for increased immigration and the plurality looking for restrictions or maintenance of current levels (Schuck, 2007).

Table 4-4: Variations in Responses and Question-wording about Illegal Immigration Levels.

	Increased	Decreased	Stay Same	DK
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll [January, 2008] Would you like to see the number of illegal immigrants currently in this country increased, decreased, or remain the same?	5%	65%	29%	1%
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll [October, 2007]	7%	69%	22%	2%
CNN Poll [October, 2006]	5%	67%	27%	1%
CNN Poll [June, 2006]	2%	67%	26%	6%

Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

The results shown in Table 4-4 are that about two-thirds of Americans would like to see the number of illegal immigrants decrease. But this question has a false choice at its core. The two to seven percent of people responding that they would like to see *illegal* immigration increased would have to be farmers or other business owners relying on cheap labor, coyotes or foreign-born who want to see their friends and relatives come to the U.S. If this question were used in tandem (or in a split ballot) with the legal immigration question, it might provide some insight on how much distinction respondents make between legal and illegal immigration. However, CNN doesn't ask about legal immigration and CBS doesn't ask the same question about illegal immigration.

In July 2008, both the Pew Research Center and the Time/Abt SRBI Poll asked a question about the importance of the immigration issue in deciding presidential vote. As shown in Table 4-5, the responses between the two polls were similar. The Time poll had

one more category above the top category for extremely important. This addition does not appear to change the response propensity of those who think that immigration is somewhat important or less important. It appears that extra category does add information by breaking down the “very important” category.

Table 4-5: Importance of Immigration on Election Decision

Pew Research Center	Time/Abt SRBI
In making your decision about who to vote for this fall (2008), will the issue of...immigration be very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?	(Here are some issues in the news these days. Please tell me how important the issue is to you personally in voting in this year's (2008) presidential election.) Is...immigration an issue that is extremely important to you, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not important at all?
Very important – 52%	Extremely important – 21% Very important – 36%
Somewhat important – 33%	Somewhat important – 31%
Not too important – 10%	Not too important – 6%
Not important at all – 4%	Not at all important – 4%
Don't know/no answer – 1%	Don't know/no answer – 1%

Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

One solution to the problem of illegal entry into the United States that is presumed to have public support is increased border protection along the Mexican border. Money to build more fencing and electronic surveillance on the border was included in both Senate and House versions of the bill in 2006. The 2007 bill included an increase in border patrol personnel and equipment. However, public support appears to be evenly divided. Two Democracy Corps polls of likely voters found 43 percent support in 2006 and 44 percent support in 2007 (with 52 percent opposed in both polls). A Pew Hispanic Center poll of all adults in February 2006 found that 56 percent support building a fence

on the Mexican border (with 40 percent opposed). However, when asked to compare three solutions for the perceived effectiveness of reducing the number of illegal aliens crossing the Mexican-US border, the Pew poll found that:

- 33 percent think increasing the number of border patrol agents;
- 9 percent think building more fences; and
- 49 percent think increasing the penalties for employers hiring unauthorized immigrants.

Another dimension of public opinion on immigration is the perception that immigrants are taking jobs away from Americans. However, most Americans think that illegal immigrants are not in competition with the American workforce but that they are taking jobs that Americans don't want. Table 4-6 on the next page shows that a variety of polls ask this question in a choice question – “Which comes closer to your view?”

The data from these questions show an unmistakable polling house effect. The answers on the Gallup Poll are skewed toward immigrants taking jobs that Americans don't want by 10 to 15 percentage points. Gallup asks about “low-paying” jobs that Americans don't want. None of the other organizations qualify the jobs that way, only referring to them as “jobs that Americans don't want.” The qualification makes a large difference in the results. By thinking in terms of low-paying jobs, more people are willing to cede those jobs to immigrants.

Table 4-6: Take Jobs American Workers Want or Don't Want

	Take jobs from American workers	Take jobs Americans don't want	Neither/Both/ No opinion
Gallup Poll [June, 2008] Which comes closer to your view--illegal immigrants mostly take jobs that American workers want, or illegal immigrants mostly take low-paying jobs Americans don't want?	15%	79%	7%
Gallup Poll [June, 2006]	17	74	10
Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll [June, 2007] Do you think illegal immigrants mostly take jobs that nobody wants, or do they mostly take jobs away from Americans who need them?	27	54	11 – both 6 – DK
Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll [June, 2006]	27	51	17 – both 5 – DK
Pew Hispanic Center Immigration Poll [February, 2006] Do you think the immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want? (If Both, ask:) Well, which do most of them do?	24	65	5 – both 6 – DK
ABC News/Washington Post Poll [April, 2006] Overall do you think illegal immigrants take jobs that other people want, or take jobs that other people don't want?	29	68	3
CBS News/New York Times Poll [May, 2007] Do you think illegal immigrants coming to this country today take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?	30	59	9 – both 2 – DK
CBS News/New York Times Poll [May, 2006]	36	53	9 – both 2 – DK
CBS News Poll [April, 2006] (half-sample)	34	53	11 – both 2 – DK
CBS News Poll [April, 2006] (half-sample) Do you think <i>legal</i> immigrants coming to this country today take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?	29	55	7 – both 9 – DK
CBS News Poll [January, 2006]	35	48	11 – both 6 – DK

Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

An ABC News/Washington Post poll in April 2006 placed the concept of illegal immigrants taking jobs in the context of other concerns about illegal immigrants. The question read:

“Which if any of the following do you see as the biggest concern about illegal immigrants? Is it that they broke the law to get here, they take jobs from legal residents, they threaten national security, they use more public services than they pay for in taxes, or something else?”

- 18% - They broke the law to get here
- 14% - They take jobs from legal residents
- 9% - They threaten national security
- 34 % - They use more public services than they pay for in taxes
- 4% - Something else
- 14% - All equally (volunteered)
- 6% - No concerns (volunteered)
- 1% - No opinion

This question really gets at the issue of what the concerns are about unauthorized immigrants. For more than one-third of the respondents (or about half, if one includes the 14% who say all equally), the biggest concern is that they use more public services than they pay for in taxes. This concern is a real public policy issue. Public services such as health centers, hospitals and schools have to be provided to everyone. Communities with large immigrant populations tend to have smaller tax bases and struggle to provide these services.

What can be seen from the top two responses to the question is that Americans believe in fairness. It is not fair that illegal immigrants have come into the country without following the rules. It is not fair that they receive benefits beyond what they pay in taxes. The response shows that the issue is fairness and not jobs nor national security.

Table 4-7: Effect on Community of Legal and Illegal Immigrants

Would you say that (legal/illegal) immigrants who live in your community have had a mainly positive or a mainly negative impact on community life, or haven't they affected it one way or the other? (If Positive/Negative, ask:) Do you feel strongly about that, or not so strongly?		
	Legal Immigrants	Illegal Immigrants
Positive-strongly	32%	13%
Positive-not so strongly	14	8
Negative-not so strongly	4	13
Negative-strongly	8	23
No impact	31	29
No immigrants in community	3	5
Don't know	8	9

Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

The Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll used a different approach to get at the concerns about immigrants. First, they asked specifically about immigrants in the community. There was two series of questions, one about legal immigrants and one about illegal immigrants. The results shown in Table 4-7 reveal that most respondents think legal immigrants have a positive impact on their community while illegal immigrants have a negative impact. About one-third of respondents report that neither have an impact on their community (or that their community has no immigrants).

The follow-up question in the Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll was asked of only those who felt that immigrants of either type had a negative impact on the community. They were asked to specify the negative impact on their community. In this case, the jobs taken from Americans became the number one response with 35 percent of the subgroup. "Crime/gangs/drugs" was second with 30 percent. Impact on social services was third with 19 percent and the fourth most common response was schools with 12 percent. Adding social services and schools together to measure services paid

through taxes, it shows 31 percent which is still less than those who specified jobs. This follow-up was completely open-ended which allowed the respondents to give any answer. Only three percent provided responses about cultural differences.

The cultural dimension of opinion about immigration is less defined. Some surveys try to measure nativist sentiment, but there is not a standard question that can be compared across surveys.

Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll found an evenly divided country by asking, “I’m going to read a list of possible concerns some people have expressed over illegal immigration. For each one, please tell me if you are very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned or not at all concerned about it....Change the culture of the country”

29%	Very concerned
25	Somewhat concerned
23	Not very concerned
21	Not at all concerned
2	Don't know

This nearly 50/50 split can also been found in questions where respondents choose between two statements where one statement expresses nativism viewpoints. An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll in 2006 found a perfect division (45 percent each) between those who said that “immigration helps the United States more that it hurts it” than those who said that “immigration hurts the United States more than it helps it.”

Pew Research’s 2006 Immigration Study found that 48% of respondents felt that “The growing numbers of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American

value and culture” and 45% believed that “The growing numbers of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.”

In November 2007, the Democracy Corps did a survey asking respondents to choose between these statements. First statement: I admire illegal immigrants for what they have overcome to get here. Second statement: I disapprove of illegal immigrants because of their lack of desire to assimilate and become part of the US culture. A follow-up question measured the intensity of the choice.

The results found:

21%	First statement strongly
17	First statement not strongly
15	Second statement not strongly
38	Second statement strongly
6	Neither (Vol.)
2	Don't know/Refused

A previous Democracy Corps survey in 2006 found that 54 percent agreed with the statement that “Our country was founded by immigrants and we benefit from the diversity of immigration.” And that 40 percent felt that “Immigration has gone too far and many of today's immigrants are not learning the language or assimilating into American culture.” With this question, both sides felt strongly about their choice with 45% of the total sample feeling strongly about the first statement and 30% feeling strongly about the second one.

The problem with statement choice questions is that two responses need to be measuring the same phenomenon for the results to make analytical sense. In the Pew

question, the statements appear to be on the same topic. However, in the Democracy Corps questions, the statements are addressing different topics.

So while the results show that there is a sizable population who are worried about immigrants' assimilation, it is difficult to measure its impact on opinion within a single question.

Immigration is a complex issue and the solution for the current immigration problem will require a complex solution. Complex solutions are difficult to ask about in public opinion polls which are conducted by telephone with people varying degrees of knowledge about the issue. The 2007 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill had many aspects that were interconnected in such ways that each part was needed for the whole to succeed. Public opinion questions were asked about each part in isolation from the whole. This illustrates one of the core problems with measuring public opinion on a complex legislative issue.

A major question in the immigration problem is what to do about the 12 million illegal immigrants already living in the United States. Here is where question-wording and limited response options have a major influence on the interpretation of public opinion.

A March 2006 Time Magazine Poll asked "Do you favor or oppose deporting all illegal immigrants back to their home countries?" This extreme solution found 47 percent in favor and 49 percent opposed. However, when NBC/Wall Street Journal asked in the next month, "If you had to make a choice, would you favor deporting immigrants in America who are not legal citizens and do not have work permits, or would you favor

allowing these immigrants to stay in America as long as they pass a security check, meet certain conditions and pay taxes?” With this question, only 35 percent would deport them and 61 percent would allow them to stay.

Also in April 2006, USA Today/Gallup asked the question with three options: deport all illegal immigrants, allow illegal immigrants to remain and work for a short time, or allow illegal immigrants to remain in the U.S. and become citizens but only if they meet certain requirements over a period of time? With three options the deportation option was only approved by 18 percent, with 17 percent allowing for a limited time and 63 percent saying that should remain.

These three polls that were taken within weeks of each other show that public opinion for deportation ranges from 47 percent to 18 percent. The discrepancy is based on the alternatives to deportation that are presented. Without an alternative, deportation is acceptable to more people than when deportation is compared to a reasonable alternative. Conversely, support for unauthorized immigrants remaining in the United States increases if there are restrictions, background checks or time limits.

The opponents of the bill were quick to label the plan to transfer some illegal immigrants to legal status as “amnesty.” Pew Research did a split sample design to show the effect that the language has on respondents. The results in Table 4-8 show that using the word “amnesty” reduced support by 8 percentage points.

Table 4-8: Split Sample Test on the Term “Amnesty”

	Favor	Oppose	Don’t Know
Thinking about immigrants who are currently living in the US illegally...Do you favor or oppose providing amnesty to illegal immigrants currently in the country if they pass background checks, pay fines, and have jobs?	50%	42	8
Thinking about immigrants who are currently living in the US illegally...Do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the country to gain legal citizenship if they pass background checks, pay fines, and have jobs?	58%	35	7

Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

Academic Literature

Compared to the large number of media polls which asked about public opinion on immigration issues, there is a relatively paucity of academic papers on the subject.

Espenshade and Hampstead examined data from a CBS News/NY Times Poll. They found several aspects that explained attitudes toward immigrants. First they found that lower educated and poorer respondents who might compete with immigrants for the low-wage jobs have a stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. Second, they found that respondents with close cultural ties to Hispanics and Asians are more pro-immigrant. Third, those with economic anxiety were more likely to fear immigrants. Fourth, those who felt that the economy is likely to grow supported immigration. Fifth, social and political alienation manifests in a mistrust of others, especially immigrants, and finally, those who hold isolationist attitudes for U.S. policy also wish to reduce immigration (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996).

Citrin et al, using data from the 1992 and 1994 National Election Survey, examined the effects of adverse economic conditions on the opposition to immigration.

They found that personal economic factors had little impact on views toward immigration, but that beliefs about the national economy, desire for tax relief and generalized views about the major immigration groups were significant drivers of anti-immigration sentiment (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997).

Fetzer used survey data from France, Germany and the United States to test the effects of economic self-interest and marginality on attitudes toward immigrants. For the United States, Fetzer used data from a CBS News/New York Times poll and a Los Angeles Times exit poll. The exit poll was from the election that included Proposition 187 which severely limited state funds for us by immigrants. The results were that economic self-interest was only a marginal factor but that cultural values were the leading cause of attitudes toward immigrants in all three countries (Fetzer, 2000).

Chandler and Tsai used the General Social Survey to examine attitudes toward immigrants. They found that perceived cultural threats, especially to the English language, are extremely influential on opinions about immigrants. Economic outlook was also a factor. Political ideology, age and sex were also significant with conservatives being strongly anti-immigration and young people being pro-immigration. Females were more anti-immigrant than males, but they noted that this finding was inconsistent with previous studies. Chandler and Tsai study focused on attitudes toward legal immigrants because in the GSS, the survey question about illegal immigrants had too little variation since “almost everyone is opposed to it” (Chandler & Tsai, 2001).

Wilson takes a different approach by viewing attitudes toward immigration using group threat theory. The threats are to the “group” rather personal self-interest. This

theory explains why economic self-interest is often not a factor in immigration attitudes while perception of the national economy is significant. On the cultural side, it is less a matter of anti-immigrant prejudice than a fear of change in their perceptions of America (Wilson, 2001).

Brader and his colleagues conducted experiments in which found opposition to immigration increased among white respondents when presented news about the costs of immigration featured Latino immigrants than when the news featured European immigrants. They conclude that group cues trigger emotions and that these emotions drive opposition. Opposition is not based on the perceived severity of immigration, but by the threat of Latino immigration (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008).

Knoll examined data from the Pew Research Center's 2006 Immigration Survey to study the influence of religion on immigration attitudes. He found that church attendance increased liberal attitudes towards immigration and that marginalized religions will be more tolerant but that there was no difference among major U.S. religions when controlling for church attendance (Knoll, 2009). Controls variables that are significant in the models include liberal ideology, Democratic voter, higher education, female and positive attitudes about the national economy. Contact with non-English speakers reduced the liberal attitude toward immigration while having friends with foreign-born increased the liberalism.

Barkan reviewed California Field Polls from 1982 to 1998 to examine Californian's views toward issues surrounding immigrants including amnesty for undocumented workers, national identity cards and job competition. Education proved to

be the most salient variable dividing respondents across the polls, religion second, strong political ideology third and Latino/non-Latino fourth. Barkan describes the demographic findings as “a split could be most dramatically characterized to have repeatedly emerged between strongly conservative, Protestant, non-Latino (and usually older) Republicans, on the one hand, and liberal Democrats together with Catholics, less educated, lower income, Latino (and usually younger) voters, on the other” (Barkan, 2003).

Barkan finds in the multi-survey review of Californians, not a stable consensus, but persistent divisions regarding attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. He finds a both a strain of nativist attitudes but also a concurrent vein of toleration of the growing ethnic diversity.

Discussion

Examining the data on American attitudes about immigration using the opinion/policy theories in chapter 3 yields several intriguing results.

Childs contends that extent of the influence depends on a number of factors including: the degree of agreement within the public; the intensity with which opinions are held; and the extent of organized support for and against the public position. He also notes the clarity and simplicity of the issue is important.

Immigration under Childs’ criteria is mixed in the extent that public opinion will influence public policy. There is general agreement among the public that unauthorized immigration is a problem that needs to be addressed. Opinions about immigration are stable over time which suggests that the public’s opinions on the topic are entrenched. However, the issue has not risen to one of the most important problems in the country or

as a major issue for choosing federal officials. Most importantly, the issue lacks clarity and simplicity which makes it less likely for public opinion to influence policy.

Childs notes that public opinion influences policy in two major ways. In the first way, public opinion tends to influence policy-makers through dissatisfaction rather than a public groundswell for positive action. Public opinion for progressive policies is, in essence, dissatisfaction with existing policies. Another aspect of the negative influence of public opinion is that policy-makers use the knowledge of the public's tolerances to constrain the policy options because the public would not accept some solutions. This leads to Childs' second point which is that officials are reluctant to take a stand in the face of probable widespread, popular disapproval.

These two influences are at work in the most recent immigration reform efforts. The great dissatisfaction with the current influx of unauthorized immigrants had led to reform bills in the last two Congresses. Immigration reform will remain on the policy agenda because of the public's dissatisfaction with the current situation. However, there is also unlikely to be comprehensive immigration reform because the negative backlash of large subgroups to most policy solutions constrains policymakers in finding successful policy options.

This dissonance between the public's desire to change the current policy environment and the public's constraints on possible policy solutions lead Childs to this conclusion that public should determine "the basic ends of public policy." On the other hand, the general public is "not competent to determine the best means for attaining specific goals, to answer technical questions." For the immigration reform, this would

mean that the public opinion sets the broad guidelines that current illegal immigrants should be treated fairly and be allowed to become authorized somehow rather than deporting everyone. The details of operationalizing the process in the forms of fines, or returning to the home country, or other details, should be not held to public review as “specialized issues [are] far removed from the everyday experience and understanding of the people in general” (Childs, 1965).

The literature shows that anti-immigration attitudes can arise from a number of factors, but demographic variables such as political ideology, education, age, income and religion are consistently statistically significant (Barkan, 2003; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citrin, et al., 1997; Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Fetzer, 2000; Wilson, 2001). The other factors that have been found to relate to anti-immigrant attitudes are economic factors, and cultural or “nativist” factors. Pro-immigrant attitudes have been found to be related to people who are highly educated, in white-collar occupations, who have lived abroad, and who reject ethnocentrism (Haubert & Fussell, 2006).

Economic Factors

Previous studies have established that economic factors have only a moderate effect on attitudes toward immigration and that perceptions of the national economy rather than personal financial situation are the differentiating factors. Espenshade and Hampstead (1995) found that lower educated and poorer respondents who might compete with immigrants for the low-wage jobs have a stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. Also, those with economic anxiety were more likely to fear immigrants. Citrin et al. (1997) found that personal economic factors had little impact on views toward immigration, but

beliefs about the national economy and desire for tax relief fueled anti-immigrant feelings. Fetzer (2000) confirmed that economic self-interest was only a marginal factor.

A second economic factor affecting attitudes toward illegal immigrant is an ideological fiscally conservative viewpoint. Conservatives are more likely than other respondents to be swayed by arguments that illegal immigrants do not pay their fair share of taxes or that they use too many public resources.

Cultural or Nativist Attitudes

Nativism is the focus of the native-born population on the differences between its culture and the culture of the immigrant population. Nativists fear the potential changes to their lifestyle that incoming populations bring. Chandler and Tsai (2001) found that perceived cultural threats, especially to the English language, are extremely influential to opinions about immigrants.

Nativists often view themselves as pro-American and looking to protect the America that they know. Samuel Huntington views the influx of immigrants as a challenge to our national identity. The current trend towards multiculturalism and transnationalism are at odds with the earlier immigration waves in which acculturation and assimilation were the goals (Huntington, 2004). This sentiment was earlier espoused by Lawrence Auster whose main argument for reducing immigration is to stem the tide of multiculturalism which he believes is dismantling America's unitary national identity (Auster, 1994). Fukuyama disagrees. Fukuyama states that unlike West European democracies or Japan, the American national identity has never been directly linked to ethnicity or religion. American nationality is based on concepts like freedom and

equality (Fukuyama, 1994). Citrin and Wright find that a liberal conception of American identity is based on egalitarianism, individualism, patriotism, and speaking English. The element of society that feels a cultural threat to national identity due to immigration will oppose every aspect of immigration (Citrin & Wright, 2009).

Other Factors

Other factors have less consistent occurrences in surveys but sometimes emerge in the literature. Some urban communities link gang activities to immigrants and therefore associate crime with immigrants (Gale, Rothenberg Pack, & Potter, 2002). On the other hand, one study finds that rural communities tend to be anti-immigrant when a new immigrant group arrives, showing the same fear of crime cited in urban studies (Fennelly & Federico, 2008). Attempts to link immigration issues with terrorism has generally not resonated with the public, as the illegal immigrants are usually perceived as Mexican while terrorists are perceived as Muslim (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006).

Moderating Factors

Some factors moderate attitudes toward immigrants. On the economic front, beliefs about immigrants taking jobs that Americans don't want or beliefs that immigrants fill the bottom rung of the economic ladder which allows native born workers to move up gives some people more positive views about immigrants.

A recent article found that those who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to support liberal immigration reform policies. Members of minority religions, notably Jews and Latter-day Saints, are also more likely to empathize with the

plight of undocumented immigrants and support liberal immigration reform measures (Knoll, 2009).

Another moderating factor is contacts with immigrants. Gordon Allport in his seminal book *The Nature of Prejudice* said that prejudice is reduced when respondents have more contact with other races as equals working on a common goal (Allport, 1954). In this context, contacts with immigrants in non-equal roles as occurs when being a customer being served by immigrant workers in the retail or hospitality industries would not moderate attitudes but contacts with immigrants as equals such as co-worshippers, co-workers or friends will moderate attitudes. While neighbors may have equal economic status, they are not working toward a common goal and the differences between cultures may stimulate animosity such that contacts as neighbors will not reduce prejudice and moderate attitudes toward immigrants.

Public Opinion's Influence on Immigration Policy

Burstein's summary of public opinion's relationship on public policy was that opinion does influence policy but the relationship is threatened by the power of the interest groups and political elites. The defeat of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill in 2007 is an example of interest groups trumping opinion as Burstein found in other studies. Gallup polling data at the time of 2007 debate showed overwhelming support for the main concepts of the reform bill, but interest groups were able to motivate their members to contact Congress to override public opinion.

Salience is the other factor that Burstein, as well as Page and Shapiro among others, found that influences whether policy follows opinion. The Gallup data on the most important problem facing the country showed a growing concern over immigration in 2006 and 2007 while Congress was debating the issue which lessened when Congress was not debating the issue. This shows that a large source of the salience of the immigration issue was due to the debate.

The purpose of this study is to address the disconnect between aggregated public opinion on immigration and the perception of public opinion based on interest groups. The compromises of the most recent bill diluted the enthusiasm of supporters while opponents may stay motivated. In the end, the reform policy has widespread but lukewarm support and a small but motivated opposition.

I derived three suppositions from the literature that will inform analysis from this study:

1. From Fiorina, public opinion on most issues would be normally distributed if measured on a continuum.
2. From Ornstein & Elder and Rozell et al., democratic pluralism as theory of opinion representation is skewed on both sides of the ideological scale with the middle position underrepresented. As McClosky shown, activists are more extreme in their opinions than the general public.
3. From Burstein, Childs and Page & Shapiro: Political leaders are more likely to pay attention to mass public opinion on issues salient to the public.

5. Methodology

The data for this study is from a national telephone survey funded by a grant from Adirondack Communications of Fairfax County, Virginia. The survey asked respondents their opinions about the important policy issues of the day and then went into depth about immigration policy issues and attitudes about immigrants. The entire questionnaire with exact question-wording and response percentages is found in Appendix A. One of the goals of the questionnaire was to be inclusive of all ideologies. So while individual questions might have an ideological slant, they are balanced by other questions which slant the other way. This balance is important as Zaller points out that respondents pick up clues from the questions being asked and may unconsciously respond to questions based on those cues (Zaller, 1992).

Immigration Policy Scale

The dependent variable in the analysis is a scale based on the response to seven items about how to deal with unauthorized immigrants. My theory of a nuanced public opinion on unauthorized immigration requires a series of questions that have not been asked on other surveys. Most survey questions on unauthorized immigration ask about a narrow range of options that tends to limit the discussion of public opinion to those options. By including a broader range of responses, the series can show that opinion is not binary. Respondents can also respond in seemingly contradictory ways because they

might support either position conditionally. This scale's distribution is examined univariately to establish that opinions are not bimodal, but are more nuanced. Further analysis uses the analytical scale in bivariate and multivariate analysis as the dependent variable to determine what factors separate extreme opinion from moderate opinion.

While these questions are based on questions from other surveys, as a series they have not been asked in a national survey before. The series asks respondents the extent to which they agree or disagree to differing policy options about unauthorized immigrants. The policy options run the gamut from jailing unauthorized immigrants to having open borders and allowing everyone who wants to come to the US to enter legally. The exact questions are listed below. These questions were pretested in an earlier survey of Virginia registered voters and modified to scale correctly.

For each of the following statements tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or if you are not sure.

- 1) Unauthorized immigrants should be arrested and put into jail to deter others from entering the country illegally.**
- 2) All unauthorized immigrants should be deported immediately.**
- 3) Unauthorized immigrants should have no access to government services including health facilities**
- 4) Unauthorized immigrants working in the US should never be allowed to become citizens.**
- 5) There should be procedures such as fees and background checks that will allow some unauthorized immigrants to become authorized.**
- 6) Unauthorized immigrants who have jobs should be able to become citizens if they want to.**
- 7) Anyone who wants to be a United States citizen should be allowed to come to the United States**

Explanatory Variables

To answer the third research question about what underlying factors separate viewpoints of those with extreme opinions about immigration and more moderate viewpoints, the questionnaire included a number of questions.

First are the demographic differences, the questionnaire included demographic questions such as gender, age, race, education, income, employment status, marital status and children in the household. Income is recorded in \$25,000 ranges from zero to \$150,000, with the top category being more than \$150,000.

For ideological differences, the questionnaire included questions on ideology (conservative, moderate or liberal) on both social and economic issues. These items included follow-ups on intensity of liberal and conservatives views or on the leanings of moderate to produce 7-point ideological scales. Similarly, the question on political party was followed with strength of party identity for Republicans and Democrats and leaning party for Independents to produce the standard 7-point party id variable. Members of other political parties are not included on the 7-point scale.

To test the potential effect of religion on attitudes, there are two main religion questions. The first is identifying religious affiliation and the second measures church attendance. The basic affiliation question has a follow-up question to identify those that consider themselves fundamentalist, evangelical or orthodox.

The questionnaire includes a 20-question attitudes series to determine what drives views on unauthorized immigration policy. Most of the questions below have been asked

on other surveys, sometimes in a forced choice (which of these two statements are closest to your viewpoint), others in the same agree/disagree format.

The 20-question series includes both positive and negative attitudes about immigrants and immigration. There is one question that turns a complaint about unauthorized immigrants into a positive statement: “Most illegal immigrants pay taxes on their earnings.” This is mix of positive and negative statements that tends to prevent a survey phenomenon called agreement acquiescence where cognitively lazy respondents will agree to all statements (Tourangeau, et al., 2000). To prevent question-order effects, the questions were asked in random order.

The series does not have an explicit middle category between agree and disagree. There is disagreement among survey methodologists about the use of middle categories. Studies have shown that up to 25 percent will gravitate toward a middle position if given the choice (Schuman & Presser, 1981). However, on agreement scales, the typical middle position is often “neither agree nor disagree” which is not linguistically a middle position. If a person neither agrees nor disagrees to a statement it is because they either don’t care or are unsure. For this study, I used an implicit middle category by always including “not sure” as a valid and stated response. The “not sure” response had a distribution from 1% to 25% on the various questions with a median of 9%. For more than half the questions, 90 percent of respondents provided an opinion. But for some questions where they did not have opinions, some respondents were willing to say they were not sure.

For each of the following statements tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or if you are not sure.

- 1. America is a unique place because of the influence of so many diverse cultures.**
- 2. America needs to control illegal immigration to prevent terrorist attacks.**
- 3. Children of illegal immigrants are a burden and financial drain on the public school system.**
- 4. The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values**
- 5. How Americans treat immigrants can have foreign policy implications.**
- 6. I am worried that America is becoming too Hispanic.**
- 7. The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.**
- 8. I avoid stores and restaurants that have too many foreign customers.**
- 9. Immigrant children are more likely to be in gangs than American children.**
- 10. Immigrants take jobs away from Americans because they will work for less money.**
- 11. I get upset when workers at stores or restaurants can't speak English fluently.**
- 12. Foreign-born children in school slow down the learning for other children in their classes.**
- 13. Many anti-immigrant leaders are associated with white supremacists and other hate groups.**
- 14. Many immigrants just want to live off the U.S. welfare system.**
- 15. Most illegal immigrants pay taxes on their earnings.**
- 16. Most immigrants don't want to become American.**
- 17. Most jobs that immigrants have are jobs that Americans don't want to do.**
- 18. If they lived here for years, immigrants should be required to become US citizens**
- 19. There are too many people living in the U.S.**
- 20. Today's immigrants are less likely to be assimilated than earlier generations.**

Another explanatory variable collected in the survey is attitudes about American values. One issue found in polls and articulated by Huntington is that some Americans are concerned that too many immigrants will affect "American values." However, there is not a definition of what poll respondents mean when they answer the question about American values. To identify what people think about American values, I created a

series of questions on American values based on Lipset's five words that describe the American ideology: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire (Lipset, 1997).

There is a lot of talk these days about American values. I am going to read a list of items and I'd like you to tell me how important each item is as part of the American values, extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important:

- 1) Individual freedom**
- 2) Free market economy**
- 3) Equal opportunity**
- 4) Rewarding hard work**
- 5) Morality**
- 6) Justice**
- 7) Economic opportunity**

8) Which value do you think most represents American values? (List above)

As expected, when asked individually, each value is thought to be very important. It is the final question that is used analytically. However, it is important that respondents have an opportunity to express the importance item before asking them to choose the most important otherwise a large number might feel obligated to express the importance of more than one or all of the items and would not give a single response (Sudman, et al., 1996). To reduce question-order effects, the first seven questions were asked in random order and the response order in the final question was rotated.

Another factor that may affect responses is the amount of contact that respondents have with the foreign-born in areas where they are equals. According to Allport's contact hypothesis, such interaction would tend to reduce prejudice. To address this issue, contact with foreign-born was addressed in a couple of ways. For individuals, those who work

were asked if they worked with anyone who is foreign-born. However, under Allport's contact theory, having foreign-born menial workers in a company will not reduce prejudice. The contact needs to be among equals. So the follow-up questions to address this were to determine if they worked for foreign-born bosses or if foreign-born people worked at the same level as they did. A second question asked if they had neighbors who are foreign-born. Again, a neighbor can have a positive or negative effect on opinions. The follow-up question asked about how many of their neighbors were foreign-born. The final direct question was about having friends who are foreign-born.

The indirect measure of contact was to add Census data to the survey results. Each respondent provided their zip code. Census data for zip codes is limited, so I matched zip codes with the county using data from the United States Post Office. For zip codes that cross county lines, I used the county that the Post Office identified as the primary county. From the Census Bureau, I downloaded American Community Survey data for 2007 which used three-year (2005-2007) compilation estimates for counties with small populations. Data included percent foreign-born and percent Hispanic. To test the effect of foreign-born population growth, I downloaded the same variables from the 2000 Census. These variables were matched by zip codes to the survey data.

To determine the salience of unauthorized immigration on the general public, I asked questions about the three most important problems facing the U.S. and then followed up with a question about the importance of some specific problems including illegal immigration, health care, global warming, and reducing taxes. Previous studies has shown that while people say that illegal immigration is a very important problem

when asked about it directly, it is not often mentioned when asked to name the most pressing problems in the United States. In this survey, if a problem was cited by a respondent as one of the top three problems, the specific question was not asked but it was recorded as being extremely important to that respondent.

Survey Methodology

This study was a national telephone survey of approximately 600 U.S. residents conducted in July, 2009 by the Center for Social Science Research at George Mason University. Phone numbers were drawn using a random digit dial (RDD) methodology to ensure inclusion of listed and unlisted numbers. The sample population was English-speaking adults living in households with landline telephones. In households with more than one adult, a random adult was chosen to complete the interview.

There were 597 complete cases and an additional 39 partial cases. The response rate using the AAPOR 4 calculation is 21.5%. Due to variation of non-response among different demographic groups, the data has been weighted to reflect the U.S. population in sex, race and age using data from the March 2009 Current Population Survey.

The study of survey methodology is the study of error in the statistical sense. Robert Groves in his book, *Survey Errors and Survey Costs*, emphasizes that there are two types of statistical error that can occur in a survey design: variance and bias (Groves, 1989). Variance is the naturally occurring error that comes from using a subset of the total population. The difference between the subset and total population that occurs randomly simply because we are using a subset is the variance. Bias is a systematic error

that occurs because of the methods that we use to distill the subset. Using an unbiased method, the mean of all possible subsets would be the population mean. Using a biased method, the mean of all possible subsets would not produce the population mean, but population mean plus (or minus) the bias in the system.

In survey methodology, the sources of error are usually discussed in two major categories: sampling error and nonsampling error. Sampling error is the error that occurs because of the subset properties. Sampling error is usually reported in media surveys as “the margin of error.” The media will report that the margin of error on a question is “plus or minus 4 percentage points.” Nonsampling error is the error that occurs in all other aspects of the survey such as nonresponse error, question-wording, question order effects, interviewer effects, data editing or data entry errors. Unlike sampling errors there is not an easy formula for calculating nonsampling error. Also, bias is more likely to occur with nonsampling errors than with sampling errors (Groves, 1989).

Sample Design

The goal of survey sampling is to create a subgroup of the total target population that can represent the population on the questions to be addressed. In this study the target population was United States residents. However, for cost reduction reasons, several decisions were made that made the sampling population different from the target population.

Because of the time shift required to interview respondents in Alaska and Hawaii, these states were not included in the sample design. The populations of these states make

up only 0.65% of the population of the United States.⁸ In a sample of 600, only four respondents would be expected to be from these states, so any bias from excluding these states is minimal. Hawaii has a higher than average foreign born population at nearly 17% of the population, most of whom are Asian or Pacific Islander (the U.S. foreign-born population percentage is 12.5%). Alaska is less than average at 6.7%.

The survey was conducted only among English-speaking residents. The survey instrument was not translated into other languages. Current Census Bureau estimates that 8.6% of the population over the age of 5 years old “speaks English less than ‘very well.’” Excluding these people is a known bias to the study of immigration since an overwhelmingly large portion of this group is immigrants.

Another cost/bias tradeoff was that the survey was conducted using only “landline” telephones. Cellular phone numbers were not included in the sample. In the last quarter of the 20th century, the household telephone penetration rate in the United States was 96 percent. The households most likely not to have telephones were those were extremely poor. However, the extremely poor tend not to be voters, so a sample using telephones for a political poll in the late 1900s would closely match the target population (Thornberry & Massey, 1988). In the last ten years, however, household telephone usage has dropped due to a number of people, largely young adults, who only use cell phones (Keeter, Kennedy, Clark, Thompson, & Mokrzycki, 2007). In addition, there is a growing number of people who are *mostly* reachable only by cell phone,

⁸ All data cited in this section comes from the Census Bureau’s American Factfinder website: <http://factfinder.census.gov> accessed on September 15, 2009.

estimated at 15 percent by researchers at the National Center for Health Statistics (Blumberg & Luke, 2008). That is, these persons have access to landline household phone but they are unlikely to answer it unless the caller-id clearly indicates that it is someone they know.

So a telephone survey using only household landlines has a bias against cell-phone only households and people who mostly use their cell phone. However, the cost of adding cellular numbers to a telephone sample is more than buying a different sample list. A very large proportion of numbers from a cellular sample will be duplicative of the sample in the household sample. Most cellular phone users also have a household phone. There are two ways to deal with the problem. The first is to only interview cell-phone respondents that don't have a household phone. This would require interviewers to make many calls to cell-phones that would not be in the sample to simply screen them out. This is unproductive and expensive. The second option is to interview these people and then determine a method to determine their probability of being selected in the household sample. This has a statistical cost. An important part of survey sampling is that every respondent has a known probability of selection. By having two avenues for being included in the sample, it complicates this formula (Lavrakas, Shuttles, Steeh, & Fienberg, 2007).

These cost tradeoffs made the final sampling population for this survey as "English-speaking adults living in households with landline telephones in the 48 contiguous United States."

Random Digit Dialing (RDD)

The telephones for this study were purchased from Marketing Systems Group from their random digit dialing (RDD) sampling frame. In the purest form, telephone numbers for the sample are generated randomly from all possible telephone numbers. The problem with pure-RDD is that most telephone numbers are not used by households. In sparsely populated areas, whole prefixes are not used at all. In large cities, businesses use the majority of numbers. Pure RDD sampling is inefficient (Lepkowski, 1988).

However, since prior to the 1980 break-up, AT&T held a monopoly on phone service in the United States. AT&T, and after the break-up the regional Bell telephone companies, distributed numbers in series, so that residential numbers are clumped together and business numbers are clumped together. Therefore, once a residential number was found, then other residential numbers were generally in same 100 hundred block (i.e., within a prefix, residential numbers will share the first two digits of suffix). With this framework, two sampling designs were developed: list-assisted design, and the two stage RDD design.

In the list-assisted design, telephone numbers are randomly drawn from a list – usually a telephone directory. Then a list is created by adding and subtracting from that number to create a new list. This list will probably include listed numbers, unlisted numbers and unused numbers. The advantage of list-assisted design is that it is easy to generate and there is a high likelihood of generating useable numbers. The disadvantages of a list-assisted design grew over time as the telecommunications system and usage changed. First, there are disproportional listed number rates based on geography which

means that for some areas, 100-blocks which have residential phone numbers may not have any listed numbers in those blocks. Second, before the cell phone phenomenon, many households had multiple phone lines and adjacent numbers were given to the same household which added complexity and affected the probability of selection. More recently, the portability of phone numbers has created situations blocks that supposedly are set aside for cell phones have numbers that have transferred to landlines but fall out of the sample.

The two stage RDD design was developed by Warren Mitofsky and modified by Joseph Waksberg and became known as the Mitofsky-Waksberg design (Lepkowski, 1988). The first stage uses pure RDD design to find working household numbers. The second stage generates random numbers within the 100 block to add more high probability residential numbers to the sample. The problem with the design is that there is still a cluster effect and that collecting the first stage numbers is more expensive than using the list-assisted design. The advantage is that is more efficient than a pure RDD-design and it produces less bias than a list-assisted design.

“Clustering” occurs in sampling because it is much more cost-efficient to collect data from people (or phone numbers) that are close to one another. In a list-assisted design or Mitofsky-Waksberg design, collecting 10 or more numbers from a known residential number has significant cost savings through avoiding numbers which may not be useable. While cost-efficient, clustering has a statistical cost. Since people who have number close to one another may have important characteristics similar to each other than would occur if the sample were totally random, the statistical variance in the sample is

reduced from a true random sample. To adjust for this, there is a formula that increases the sample variance due to the “design effect” (Kish, 1965).

However, entrepreneurship entered telephone survey sampling to help reduce this clustering effect. Sampling vendors such Marketing Systems Group does the first stage sampling. These sample vendors then sell the second stage samples to multiple clients so that no single client is using a cluster design. The high costs of the first stage RDD is spread among multiple clients and there is no statistical costs for the design (Lavrakas, 1987).

Data Collection

Data collection was conducted by paid and trained interviewers by the Center for Social Science Research at George Mason University. Each interviewer completed training required by the Human Subjects Review Board⁹. The survey was field-tested on July 6, 2009 for any problem questions and to ensure that interviews were about 10 minutes in length. Since there were no problems arising from the field test, these 40 cases were included in the study. The main data collection period ran from July 9 to July 31.

The survey was conducted in a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) laboratory. The data collection instrument is programmed in special CATI software. The features of the CATI software include directing follow-up questions and the ability to skip questions based on previous answers. An advantage of the follow-up question is that it is possible to get more detailed responses from people on a telephone. For example, income was asked in two questions: first if the household income was above or below

⁹ Data collection approved by GMU’s Human Subject Review Board : protocol #6395.

\$75,000 and then depending on the answer, a follow-up question asked about smaller increments. This allows a more detailed response without having to read a long list of categories. Similarly, after asking for political party, Republicans (and Democrats) were asked if they were strong partisans, while Independents were asked if they tended to vote for Republicans or Democrats more often. This allows the creation of a 7-point party id variable. Only respondents who report they are working are later asked if they work with anybody who is foreign-born. Another advantage of the CATI software is that questions and response categories can be randomized. This allows some control over question order and response order effects by changing the order for each interview.

For the interviewer, the CATI software's sample management brings up the telephone number to be called. The interviewer gets the respondent's consent to conduct the interview and begins the interview. Each question is presented on the screen and the interviewer enters the data directly into the computer which reduces data entry errors – it doesn't eliminated data entry errors, as interviewers do make mistakes.

The sample management software records the outcome of each telephone call. Each number is called five times or until a final disposition is reached. Final dispositions are a completed interview, a "hard" refusal, or an ineligible number. Non-final dispositions are those that will be called back: answering machines, busy, no answer or a "soft" refusal. Interviewers distinguish between a "hard" refusal and a "soft" refusal as a subjective indication of the likelihood of someone who says "no" to complete the survey at different time. Calling back a soft refusal often results in a completed survey because the first call occurred when the potential respondent didn't have time to complete the

survey. Often the callback can legitimize the interview as being more important. After 5 attempts, the number is completed and a final disposition is determined based on the outcome that provides the most information. For example, if the last call attempt was a “no answer” but a previous attempt was a soft refusal, then the previous attempt shows that it was an eligible household and that becomes the final disposition. Table 5-1 shows the final disposition codes for the data collection.

Table 5-1: Final Disposition Code of the Sample

Final outcome	Number
Interviews	
Complete	597
Partial	39
Refusals	
Male	403
Female	750
Unknown	217
Non-contact: Eligible	
Answering machine	795
No one over 18 at home	7
Non-contact: Unknown Eligibility	
Ring – no answer	679
Busy	166
Ineligible	
Language/deaf	114
Business line	345
Computer/fax line	354
Non-working number	1970
Other	16

In order to get some information on those who refuse to do the survey, interviewers recorded the gender of those who refused the survey. However, as shown in Table 5-1, there were 271 refusals whose gender was unknown. These are mostly final dispositions of those who were soft refusals (whose gender was not recorded). This lead

to an interesting result as shown in Table 5-2: for this sampling population, females (63%) are more likely to be contacted than males (37%). Males (39%) are slightly more likely to complete a public policy survey than females (32%). This result is not unusual as in households with more than one adult, the woman is more likely to answer the phone than the man (Groves & Lyberg, 1988). Also, single males are the most difficult to reach (Groves, 2002).

Table 5-2: Refusals and Completes by Sex

	Refused	Complete	Cooperation Rate	Contact by Sex
Male	403	259	39.1%	37.5%
Female	750	355	32.1%	62.5%
Total	1153	614	34.7%	100%

Note: Table does not include results of those with unknown gender either because survey was terminated prior to asking about gender; or the final disposition did not include the gender.

To counter the gender effect of answering the telephone, the survey used a within-household respondent selection technique to randomly determine the person to be interviewed in multi-adult households. Simply interviewing the person who answers the phone will skew the sample towards those who are home and who are more likely to answer the phone. There are several methods to select a random respondent in the household (Groves, 1989; Groves, et al., 1988; Lavrakas, 1987; Lepkowski, 1988; Link & Oldendick, 1999), unfortunately the most statistically accurate methods require intrusive questions about the household at the beginning of the survey when interviewers want to build trust. This survey used a non-intrusive method developed by Westat. Since

85 percent of households have only one or two eligible adults, the variation first determines if the screening respondent will be selected for the interview using a randomization method by the computer. In a two adult household, if the screening respondent is not selected, then the other adult is asked to do the interview. In households with more than two adults, then the person besides the screening respondent who had the most recent birthday is selected (Rizzo, Brick, & Park, 2004).

Within-household respondent selection will reduce the bias associated with answering patterns in multiple adult households, but it comes with a cost: a reduction in the response rate. The household has double the opportunity to refuse to do the survey.

One of the most common measure of a survey's quality is to look at the response rate – the percentage of sampled units who complete the survey. A survey with a higher response rate is assumed to be better than one with a lower response rate. However, this is a misconception since nonresponse is often randomly distributed. Efforts to raise response rates by methods that create a difference between respondents and nonrespondents actually increases the bias of the results (Groves, 1989).

Response Rate

The calculation of response rates in telephone surveys is not as straight-forward as it might seem at first. Surveys that report a high response rate often are reporting the cooperation rate which is easier to calculate. The cooperation rate is the ratio between those who answered the survey over the number of people who answered plus refused. What is missing in the calculation is the number of households in which there was no contact. No contact in telephone surveys occur when the calls are only answered by an

answering machines/voice mail, the line is always busy, or when the line produces a ring but no one answers. Telephone numbers that are considered ineligible are not included in the denominator of response rates. Ineligibles might include business numbers, fax numbers, disconnected numbers and as well as households that have language barriers to completing the study. One difficulty in accessing response rates is that there are some respondents who don't finish the survey – called “partials.” These partials may or may not be considered interviews.

Another difficulty in calculating a true response rate is that a call that is never answered has an unknown eligibility. Assuming that all no answers are eligible will unnecessarily produce a lower response rate than truly occurred. Conversely, treating all no answers as ineligible will inflate the response rate. The third option is to estimate how many of these of unknown eligibility telephone numbers are households. There are several methods (Smith, 2003) for estimating potential eligibles but the most straightforward is to calculate the proportion of known eligible/ineligible in the same survey and use that proportion for the unknown eligibilities. For example, if 75 percent of those contacted were eligible then 75 percent of those with unknown eligibility are included in the denominator of the response rate.

The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) produce standard definitions to aid in reporting of response rates using these three methods of dealing with unknown eligibility plus the two different ways of handling partials. AAPOR thus presents six formulas for calculating response rates (American Association

for Public Opinion Research, 2008). This report uses AAPOR response rate 4. The formula for this is:

$$RR4 = \frac{(I + P)}{(I + P) + (R + NC) + e(UH)}$$

RR = Response rate

NC = Non-contact

I = Complete interview

UH = Unknown if household

P = Partial interview

e = Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

R = Refusal and break-off

Inserting the numbers from Table 5-1 into this formula yields a response rate of 21.5% using AAPOR response rate 4. The “e” is estimated at 0.50 because there are 2808 cases who are known to be eligible and 2799 ineligible phone numbers.

$$RR4 = \frac{(597 + 39)}{(597 + 39) + (1370 + 802) + .50(845)} = .215$$

This response rate reflects the difficulty in conducting telephone surveys in the 21st century. Technologies such as caller ID, call blocking, and answering machines have created formidable and widespread barriers to contact. The majority of American households now have answering machines, caller ID, or both, and substantial numbers of households use them to screen out unwanted calls. Many survey professionals report anecdotally that telephone response rates have plummeted over the last decade or so. (Tourangeau, 2004)

Non-response Bias

For statistical purposes, it is better for respondents and nonrespondents to be as similar as possible. The problem arising from non-response is that the sample design breaks down and the selection probabilities are changed in an unknown way. To the extent that non-respondents are not missing at random, the result is that any survey estimators will be potentially biased (Holt & Elliot, 1991).

Telephone surveys have an established bias on three basic demographics: gender, age and race. Some studies have found nonresponse differences on education, employment status and urban-rural, but these are often correlated with gender, age and race (Nathan, 2001).

As discussed earlier, women are more likely to answer the telephone in multiple adult households. Among single adult households, women are also more likely to answer the phone than men. Age effects found in the literature are more nuanced. Early studies of large samples found the elderly less likely to answer telephone surveys than in-person interviews (Groves & Lyberg, 1988). As telecommunications technology changes, younger generations become more difficult to survey as they are more likely to screen calls (Link & Oldendick, 1999; Oldendick & Link, 1994) and use cell phones rather than landlines (Blumberg & Luke, 2007).

The necessary caution of the biases of telephone surveys should not lead to a wholesale rejection of the method of collecting public opinion. A study conducted by Keeter et al showed that on most variables important to political surveys, there was very little difference between using the standard political poll methodology used in this study

and the more comprehensive method used by well-funded research centers (Keeter, Miller, Kohut, Groves, & Presser, 2000).

Post-stratification and Imputation

Survey researchers attempt to nullify any bias by weighting the data on known parameters. Obviously, the question researchers are trying to address can be adjusted because the true population is unknown (if it is known, it would not be a research question). However, adjustments on known parameters that are correlated with the research question can reduce the bias.

This weighting process is called poststratification as data are weighted to proportion to cells (strata) of data. The process weights the sample so that proportions of the sample match the proportion in population based on ancillary sources of information. Poststratification requires: (a) information on the proportions of the population in the available strata; and (b) information for classifying the sample cases into the same strata (Kish, 1965). The justification for poststratification is that it is conditionally unbiased and leads to efficiency gains (Holt & Smith, 1979). Furthermore, as well as correcting for non-response bias the method carries an additional correction for coverage deficiencies so long as the population proportions are accurate and do not suffer from the same deficiencies as the survey being analyzed (Holt & Elliot, 1991). Groves cautions that “this procedure often ignores the fact that the survey data and the census data may be subject to measurement errors, that definitions of concepts might differ, and that other survey statistics might be subject to nonresponse error even if the demographic statistics are not” (Groves, 1989)

Poststratification is aimed at reducing nonresponse bias, and it is often accompanied by an increase in variance. This change in variance due to weighting affects the power of statistical tests and can affect the ability to detect statistical differences (Kish, 1965). The statistical software Stata has the ability to account for poststratification weights in their procedures for analysis of survey data (Hamilton, 2006).

While these weighting adjustments are often seen as a bias-variance trade-off, some survey statisticians claim this is an oversimplification: “nonresponse weighting can in fact lead to a reduction in variance as well as bias. A covariate for a weighting adjustment must have two characteristics to reduce nonresponse bias – it needs to be related to the probability of response, and it needs to be related to the survey outcome. If the latter is true, then weighting can reduce, not increase, sampling variance” (Little & Vartivarian, 2005).

A comparison of the responses to this survey on gender, race and age to national estimates from the Current Population Survey from the same month of data collection is shown in table 5-3. As expected, there is a significant difference between the survey proportions and the Census Bureau estimates. These differences likely create a bias in the estimators for analytical variables. Adjusting the data for these demographic variables will make our results more representative of the target population.

Table 5-3: Comparison of Survey Results to Current Population Survey (CPS) Estimates

Demographic	Survey Proportion	CPS Proportion
Male	42.6	48.8
Female	56.5	51.2
Missing	0.9	
White	80.3	70.1
Black	6.3	9.8
Hispanic	3.7	11.8
Asian	1.0	4.1
Native American	1.9	1.1
Multiracial	3.4	2.2
Other	1.5	0.9
Refused	1.8	
18-34	13.1	12.6
35-44	15.1	36.6
45-54	20.2	34.4
55-64	24.1	8.7
65 or older	26.7	7.7
Refused	0.8	

To account for missing data in the stratification variables, imputation was implemented. In imputation, data is inserted by estimation procedures that use other data available for analysis. Most of the missing data in these cases came from either incomplete interviews or refusal to answer the question of race or age. For gender and age, data was imputed using a discriminate analysis based on the answers to issues important to the respondent and attitudes on American values. These questions are of least analytic importance to the main hypothesis of the study and do not confound the analysis by using dependent variables to determine independent variables' imputed values. The race variable was imputed using the zip code of the respondent and a random number generator. The main county of each zip code was coded using the zip code

definition provided by the United States Post Office. If zip code was not collected, mostly from incomplete surveys, the phone number was used using a back-up directory at whitepages.com. Using Census Bureau data for counties from the most recent American Community Survey, the percentage of each race in that county was used as the chance for the imputation. For example, if the missing data came from Arlington, Virginia there would have a 64% chance being imputed as white, 16% chance as being imputed as Hispanic, 8% chance for African-American, 8% Asian and 3% for multiracial using a random number generator.

The Census data is available by subgroups including breaking down each race by gender and age group. This allows for direct proportions for each subgroup such as white males between the ages of 18 and 34. However, the question for race is not the same in the survey as is used by the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau captures Hispanic in a separate variable for ethnicity. This complicates the matching between the survey variables and the data available from the Census Bureau on race with the age and gender.

Another complication is that weighting adjustments from small cell sizes causes instability in the variance estimators (Kim, Li, & Valliant, 2007). Therefore it is necessary to collapse small cells in the poststratification process. Because of the small number of Hispanics among survey respondents combined with the way race and ethnicity data is captured by the Census Bureau, the race categories for poststratification are reduced to White, Black and Other with Hispanics classified as White and multiracial classified as other. Even then, several cells needed additional collapsing which is shown in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4: Cells Counts from Survey with Collapsing Groups Highlighted

Age	White Male	Black Male	Other Male	White Female	Black Female	Other Female
18 to 34	23	3	7	35	5	5
35 to 44	35	1	7	37	3	6
45 to 54	42	5	5	66	4	4
55 to 64	56	2	6	67	9	3
65 +	47	1	7	90	7	4
Total (592)	203	12	32	295	28	22

The final poststratification weight for each subgroup is shown in table 5-5.

Poststratification weights used in the Strata software program are generated by the program. Each case is classified into a group, for example white males ages 18 to 34 are group 1. Black males ages 18 to 44 are group 2 because two groups were collapsed. Linked to each group is a separate variable which is the population total for that group. Strata calculates a weight for the group by calculating the population proportion and the sample proportion and making the weight the amount that sample proportion needs to be adjusted to equal the population proportion.

Table 5-5: Poststratification weights

Age	White Male	Black Male	Other Male	White Female	Black Female	Other Female
18 to 34	3.14	4.44	1.07	1.96	2.60	1.11
35 to 44	1.27		0.63	1.18		
45 to 54	1.12		0.70	0.72		
55 to 64	0.65		0.39	0.56	0.96	
65 +	0.77	1.67	0.30	0.53	0.72	0.73

Analysis Using Weighted Data

Proportions and means in this analysis use estimators weighted by poststratification. The statistical tests such as chi-square, t-test and ANOVAs use weighted estimators and adjusted variances. The exception is that statistical tests of differences based on variables used in poststratification use non-weighted data. However, since multiple variables are used for stratification, the estimators presented in tables in Chapter 6 are the weighted estimators.

The use of weighted data in modeling has been debated by many survey statisticians over the past 40 years (E. S. Lee & Forthofer, 2006). In theory, a model should not need to use weighted data. The relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is unrelated to the value of the estimator of the dependent variable, biased or unbiased. In fact, weighted analysis can be heavily influenced by observations with extremely large weights. For this reason, unweighted observations are used in procedures such as factor analysis which is based on correlations between variables and not on variations on the estimator. On the other hand, in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the variance from estimator is a key component in the mathematical structure of the procedure. Using unweighted observations will use biased estimators, while weighted data may greatly increase the variance. The solution is to use a procedure called design-weighted least squares (E. S. Lee & Forthofer, 2006). This analysis is performed in Stata using the `svyregress` command (Hamilton, 2006).

Data Analysis

The analysis plan that produced the results presented in the next chapter uses an immigration policy scale created from the seven questions that address policies regarding unauthorized immigrants as the dependent variable. Creating scales from individual questions is a common practice in the social sciences. One reason for this is that measurement error averages out when individual scores are summed to obtain a total score (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Second, an individual item can only categorize people into a relatively small number of groups. An individual item cannot discriminate among fine degrees of an attribute. McIver and Carmines (1981) say, “It is very unlikely that a single item can fully represent a complex theoretical concept or any specific attribute for that matter” (McIver & Carmines, 1981).

The two criteria that multi-items scales should satisfy are validity and reliability. Validity is the appropriateness of the scale for the concept it is supposed to be measuring. Reliability refers to the consistency in measurement, that same measurements can be repeated over time. There are several ways to measure the reliability of a scale:

- **Test-retest reliability:** correlations between scores of a scale administered at two points in time;
- **Alternate-forms reliability:** correlation between two different scales that measure the same underlying dimension.
- **Internal-consistency reliability:** correlation among the items in a scale, usually measured by Cronbach’s alpha (McIver & Carmines, 1981; Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003; Spector, 1992; Weller & Romney, 1990).

There are three strategies generally used to create multi-item scales: additive scaling, factor-based scaling and effect-proportional scaling (Treiman, 2009). Effect-

proportional scaling is used when there is a non-linear relationship between an independent variable and dependent variable. This is not an issue in this study.

An additive scale is a simple equation that combines the variables in a manner that is easily interpretable and replicable in future studies by other researchers. An additive scale needs to be tested for internal-consistency reliability and items which are weakly correlated have to be removed from the scale.

Factor-based scaling addresses two concerns about additive scales: 1) does the proposed scale represent a single dimension and 2) are the individual items contributing roughly same amount to the scale. A factor analysis is used to determine the number of factors, or dimensions, are represented by the items and whether each item contributes to the scale. If there is more than one factor, only the items loading in main factor should be used (or multiple scales can be created). Even in a single factor solution, the factor loadings will determine if an item is unnecessary in the scale. A factor-based scale is created by standardizing the variables and averaging them. Factor scores derived from the factor analysis are not used for scales because they are based on the particular sample. If the scale is replicated on a different data set the correlations between the scale and other variables will likely be significantly smaller. Factor-based scaling using equally weighted items is less subject to cross-sample shrinkage and therefore is more test-retest reliable (Treiman, 2009).

To create the immigration policy scale, the responses were initially coded on a 1 to 5 with 1 for strongly agree, 2 for agree, 4 for disagree and 5 for strongly disagree. Those who say “not sure” are coded as the middle position (3). As stated earlier, “not

sure” is cognitively the same as other researchers “neither agree nor disagree” middle category. A factor analysis found the items formed a single factor with all items loading more than 0.45 (see Appendix C for full output). The factor analysis showed that three items were negatively related to the other four. The first four questions were reversed scaled so that averaging the seven items result in a scale in which the highest score supports the restrictive immigration policy options while the lowest score represents the most lenient.

To test the applicability of combining these variables into a scale, the test for reliability is the Cronbach alpha. For this scale, the Cronbach alpha is 0.739 which in the psychometric literature is considered reliable (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).

The scale was created in Stata using the EGEN command with ROWMEAN which produces a scale using the mean of the scale items. If there is missing data in any item it produces the mean of the remaining items. Using the implicit “not sure” as a valid response, there were only 13 cases with a missing response on any of the items of the 607 respondents who answered this series of questions.

Independent Variables

The demographic variables available for analysis are sex, age, race, income, education, employment status, marital status, children in household and religion. Race, employment status, religious affiliation and marital status are categorical variables. For analysis in the model, each is coded into multiple dummy variables of either 1 or 0 for each response. For modeling purposes, the dummy variable for the response category with the highest frequency is not used in the model and becomes the comparison value

for the other groups. Statistically, this generally provides the most power and reduces multicollinearity. It also makes the interpretation understandable in that differences discovered are in comparison to the majority or pluralistic response category. The potential downside of this analytical approach occurs when two response categories are different from each other but neither is statistically different than the comparison variable. Unless one hypothesized a priori about this difference though, using the data to determine comparison values is, statistically-speaking, unprincipled. In the analysis, the comparison group for race is White and other (including Asian), and the comparison group for employment status is full-time worker.

Age is captured as a continuous variable based on the respondents answering of year of birth and subtracting year of birth from 2009. Since the survey was conducted in July, this method means that half the sample age's is off by a year, a bias that will not have a significant impact on the analysis. Attitudes differences among generations can be attributed to two factors; life stages and generational differences. Life stages find attitudes changes as people mature through child-rearing and financial status. Life stages effects would result in a linear progression that occurs as one matures.

Generational effects, as stated by Mannheim (Mannheim, 1952) are developed by an imprinting of a common bond on a particular age cohort within a population. This imprinting will occur during the time that a cohort is becoming aware of world events – between the ages of 15 and 25 (Delli Carpini, 1986). If the events are especially significant to a particular age cohort, they can create cleavages between the generations. Generations may develop distinctive attitudes on questions such as racial equality which

distinguish them from others generations (Andolina & Mayer, 2003). To determine if there are generational effects, the analysis requires collapsing the data in cohorts and reporting not on age, but on year of birth. The difference between cohorts may not be linear as it is not age that is the factor but the imprinting. Statistically, there is more power in using a continuous variable such as age rather than cohort group as a categorical variable, but if age's relationship is non-linear then generational analysis might be more appropriate.

Household income was collected in survey in categorical format with \$25,000 increments from \$0 to \$150,000 with the highest category being those that have household income more than \$150,000. For analysis purposes, this is an ordinal variable.

Education was captured as the highest degree earned with "some college but no degree" being the exception. Differentiation was made for those with a post-high school achievement that is less than a four-year degree such as an associate's degree or technical training. Postgraduate degrees were classified as masters, professional and doctorate, but there was not a category for certificate or specialist training. Respondents determined which category best matched their educational attainment. These educational responses can be used as an ordinal variable. Also, the data can be recoded into a "years in school" variable by assigning values such as 12 for high school and 16 for bachelor's degree. This transformation aids in interpreting regression slopes so that each unit measured is a year in school. However, the transformation introduces non-sampling error into the equation as the "years in school" estimator is biased because there are varying years requirement

for many degrees based on the program, school and occupational standards. Despite these problems, “years in school” is used in the regression models.

Religion is measured with two dimensions: affiliation and participation. Most Americans identify themselves as being associated with a religion but a majority does not attend services regularly (Hout & Fischer, 2002). The rise of non-denominational Christianity has hampered surveys in attempting to classify religious affiliation as many do not consider themselves Protestant and do not respond to that category in surveys (Alwin, Felson, Walker, & Tufis, 2006). For this survey, the response options were Catholic, Mormon or other Christian; Jewish, Muslim or other religion, or no formal religious affiliation. A follow-up question asked if they considered themselves fundamentalist, evangelical or orthodox. The non-Catholic, non-Mormon Christians are separated into two groups: evangelical Christian and non-evangelical Christian. Non-evangelical Christian, or mainline Christian, is the comparison group in analysis using dummy variables.

To reduce the 20 items on attitudes about immigrants to the latent factors, a principal component analysis was performed using an oblique rotation to create three factor-score variables. The factor score variables were created from the factor analysis. Each score is a normalized variable with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. These scores are used as independent variables in the analysis. There were five items that were not sorted completely into the main factors. These items were removed from the analysis, so the final solution was based on 15-items. The five items unrelated to the underlying factors of the other variables are:

- Many anti-immigrant leaders are associated with white supremacists and other hate groups.
- Most jobs that immigrants have are jobs that Americans don't want to do.
- There are too many people living in the U.S.
- Today's immigrants are less likely to be assimilated than earlier generations.
- If they lived here for years, immigrants should be required to become US citizens.

The three factors, whose principle loadings are shown in Table 5-6, account for 48 percent of the variation among the 15-items. The factors appear to fall into these categories: 1) Anti-immigrant reasoning; 2) Diversity; 3) Transnational reasoning.

It was hoped that the factor analysis would separate the anti-immigrant reasoning items into economic and cultural factors but that did not occur. The first factor contains most of the items that express negative attitudes about immigrants. This factor accounts for 26 percent of the factor variation.¹⁰

The second factor's main loadings are three items dealing with diversity. Two items are positive items about diversity, while the third is reversed scored, is about avoiding establishments with "too many foreign customers." This factor explains 13 percent of the variance among items.¹¹

¹⁰ The Cronbach alpha measures the reliability if an additive scale is used instead of a factor score. For the 10 principle items in the first score is the alpha is 0.844.

¹¹ Cronbach alpha for additive scale using these three items is 0.610

Table 5-6: Factor Loadings for the Attitude Items

	1 Anti	2 Diversity	3 Transnational
Children of illegal immigrants are a burden and financial drain on the public school system.	0.772		
Immigrants take jobs away from Americans because they will work for less money.	0.650		
Foreign-born children in school slow down the learning for other children in their classes.	0.632		
Many immigrants just want to live off the US welfare system	0.613		
Most illegal immigrants pay taxes on their earnings.	-0.604		
I get upset when workers at stores or restaurants can't speak English fluently.	0.584		
America needs to control illegal immigration to prevent terrorist attacks	0.577		
Immigrant children are more likely to be in gangs than American children.	0.558		
I am worried that America is becoming too Hispanic	0.543		
The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values	0.529		
I enjoy going to restaurants with food from different cultures.		0.787	
I avoid stores and restaurants that have too many foreign customers.		-0.714	
America is a unique place because of the influence of so many diverse cultures		0.660	
Most immigrants don't want to become Americans.			0.768
How Americans treat immigrants can have foreign policy implications.			-0.646

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

The third factor is labeled as Transnational reasoning because the two items imply a relationship between the immigrant and their home country. If “immigrants don’t want to become Americans,” then it is implied that they desire to retain ties to their homeland. This factor accounts for an additional 9 percent of the variation¹²

Bivariate Analysis

The immigration policy scale is the variable of interest in the analysis. Using the scale as a continuous variable, the scale is analyzed bivariate using ANOVA to test for difference in the mean among categorical subgroups. The correlation between the scale and continuous variables is tested to find significant relationships.

The bivariate analysis provides background but the relationships found could be spurious because it is not accounting for other related variables. An example is that differences in employment status may simply be an age-related factor in that retirees are older and students are younger. Therefore the focus of the findings is on the multivariate models using design-weighted least squares regression.

Multivariate Analysis

For this analysis, variables were added to the model in stages based on theories and hypothesis, as opposed to the statistical technique of stepwise regression. The models are attempted to determine what factors account for opinions on immigration attitudes with the immigration policy scale as the dependent value. In each model, all the independent variables for that model are analyzed. In subsequent models, the non-significant predictors of the previous model are removed and the next set of variables is

¹² Spearman Brown formula of reliability of a two-item scale for these items is 0.27

added. The new model is tested as whole against the previous model by comparing the increase in r^2 . If the new model is not significantly different, the old model is used as a base. If it is significantly different than the new model is used as a base but the non-significant individual predictors are removed. Categorical variables with multiple responses use dummy variables. The models tested are:

- Model 1: Demographics and Ideology and Political Party
- Model 2: add Religion
- Model 3: add Geography and Contact
- Model 4: add Attitudes
- Model 5: add American Values
- Model 6: add Salience

Regression analysis is based on a few assumptions about the data that need to be tested. Multicollinearity among the independent variables can affect the model because regression attempts to estimate the independent effects of each predictor. If the predictors have too much of their variance in common, there is not enough independent variation to make an accurate estimate. This causes the coefficients to become unreliable and might shift drastically with small changes in the sample or the model. To test for this problem, I examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The VIF is an index which measures how much the variance of a coefficient is increased because of collinearity. The rule of thumb is that a VIF of more than 5 is a magnitude that causes concern (Gujarati, 2003). The VIF is reported on all the models in Chapter 6.

A second concern is heteroskedasticity, which is a relationship between the model and its residuals. A regression assumption is that error associated with the predictor is constant. However, it is not unusual for there to be a relationship between the value of the

variable and the magnitude of the variance. The classic example is the relationship between income and savings. As income increases people have more discretionary income and more choices about how to dispose that income and thus a higher variability (Gujarati, 2003). The test for heteroskedasticity used in this study is the Breusch-Pagen test. The Breusch-Pagen procedure uses a regression function to predict the residuals of the model using the same predictor variables as the original model. It tests this model's estimate sum of squares using a Chi-square statistic. If the Breusch-Pagen value exceeds the critical chi-square value, then one can reject the hypothesis of homoskedasticity (Breusch & Pagan, 1979).

6. Research Findings

The central hypothesis of this dissertation is: *On immigration reform, the motivated minority that highly influences public policy is in dissonance with the policy preferences of the majority of Americans.* In this chapter, the results of the national survey are used to test this hypothesis. The responses to each individual question in the survey are presented in Appendix B.

There are three suppositions that I derived from the literature presented in previous chapters that lead to my research question:

1. Public opinion on most issues would be normally distributed if measured on a continuum. Public opinion is generally measured against proposed policy options in either/or format which misses the nuances of a normally distributed public opinion.
2. Democratic pluralism in which the public's views are only addressed through the formation of opposing groups fails when policy options are moderate as policy activists are more extreme in their viewpoints than the general public.
3. Political leaders are more likely to pay attention to mass public opinion on issues salient to the public.

These suppositions lead to my research questions derived from my hypothesis:

1. Using a series of questions to measure attitudes about policies regarding unauthorized immigration issue to create a scale from tolerant to intolerant, is public moderate or are they closer to an extreme opinion?
2. What will distribution of the responses be: normal, bimodal, etc.?
3. What factors drive extreme views on immigration: economic, cultural or other factors? What factors resonant with the majority?
4. Are attitudes about immigration related to salience? Do those with certain opinions tend to view immigration as more important?
5. Are the factors that separate extreme views versus majority views reflective of the lobbying groups involved in immigration issues?

Immigration Policy Scale

1. *Using a series of questions to measure attitudes about policies regarding unauthorized immigration issue to create a scale from tolerant to intolerant, is the public moderate or are they closer to an extreme opinion?*
2. *What will distribution of the responses be: normal, bimodal, etc.?*

The seven questions that form the immigration policy scale asked respondents how strongly they agree or disagree with policy options toward unauthorized immigrants. Each question was asked separately which allowed for logical, or grammatical, inconsistencies. For example, most respondents (81%) agreed that there should be procedures that will allow “the best unauthorized immigrants to become authorized” at the same time that more than half agree that “all unauthorized immigrants should be deported immediately.” This type of inconsistency can lead to competing claims by advocates of public support for their position. Survey methodologists suggest several

explanations for these inconsistencies such as respondents desire to provide additional information in subsequent questions (Tourangeau, et al., 2000) or respondents not having a well-formed opinion but feeling obligated to response (Bishop, 2005) and using the cues from the question to provide a response (Zaller, 1992). Because of the potential question-order effect, professional survey ethics require the disclosure of all of the questions and the order (American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1997). The responses for each individual question are shown in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1: Agreement to policy options for dealing with unauthorized immigrants

Response to Immigration	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Sure
Unauthorized immigrants should be arrested and put into jail to deter others from entering the country. (n=602)	16.8%	26.1	36.1	14.5	6.5
All unauthorized immigrants should be deported immediately. (n=604)	27.6%	30.7	24.7	12.1	5.0
Unauthorized immigrants should have no access to government services including health facilities. (n=605)	35.1%	27.3	25.7	7.7	4.1
Unauthorized immigrants working in the U.S. should never be allowed to become citizens. (n=605)	10.7%	13.0	51.3	20.4	4.6
There should be procedures such as fees and background checks that will allow the best unauthorized immigrants to become authorized. (n=604)	26.1%	54.5	11.7	3.8	4.0
Unauthorized immigrants who have jobs should be able to become citizens if they want to. (n=606)	13.3%	49.4	23.0	9.7	4.6
Anyone who wants to be a United States citizen should be allowed to come to the United States. (n=603)	6.3%	29.0	38.7	19.0	7.0

The combining of these questions into a scale provides a more complete picture of opinion than any single question can provide. The procedures for producing this scale are outlined in chapter 5. The scale has a range of 1 to 5 placing respondents who desire the strictest policies against unauthorized immigrants at the high end of the scale. Those who are “strict but” are lower on the scale. On the other end of the scale, are those who are most lenient toward unauthorized immigrants. The middle of the scale are those who are neither supportive of strict nor lenient treatment.




Figure 6-1: Distribution of Immigration Policy Scale




Figure 6-2: Q-Q plot of Immigration Policy Scale for Normal Distribution

The scale has a mean of 2.92 with standard deviation of 0.80. The distribution of the responses is shown in Figure 6-1 with a normal curve for the parameters superimposed on the histogram of the responses. The distribution appears to be close to normality.

To test whether this distribution is normal, a Quartile-to-Quartile plot (Q-Q plot) was constructed. The Q-Q plot, or normal probability plot, is a graphical technique for normality testing: assessing whether or not a data set is approximately normally distributed. The data are plotted against a theoretical normal distribution in such a way that the points should form an approximate straight line. Departures from this straight line

indicate departures from normality (Gujarati, 2003). The Q-Q plot shown in Figure 6-2 shows quite clearly that this distribution is close to normal.

This normal distribution supports my supposition that public opinion on policy issues is normally distributed. Policy advocates who only see the issue as a duality miss the complexity in which the public debate the issue. In fact, on this scale, public opinion is clearly centrist supporting neither strict nor lenient policies more strongly.

Determinants of Immigration Policy Attitudes

3. *What factors drive extreme views on immigration? What factors resonant with the majority?*

Many factors can affect the opinion about immigration policy as shown in Chapter 4. To answer research question 3, the immigration policy scale is tested against a range of factors, first bivariate and then multivariate.

Demographics

Previous studies have found that demographic variables such as education, age, income are consistently statistically significant in immigration attitudes. The results in Table 6-2 show there are demographic effects. There are not significant differences in policy attitudes based on gender, income and children in the household.

It is not surprising that Hispanics are significantly more lenient in their attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants than other races with a mean score of 2.25. Hispanics are the only racial group that is significantly different than the other groups using Tukey contrast post hoc test in the ANOVA analysis.

The difference in attitudes by age and education are not linear. In education, the most lenient are those with a non-professional graduate degree and those with less than a high school education. On the other end of the scale are those with professional degree and those with an associate or technical training. Nearly 40 percent of survey respondents with less than a high school education are Hispanic which explains why that group is so much more lenient. However, non-Hispanics with less than a high school diploma average 2.80 on the immigration policy scale which is still significantly lenient. This suggests that the uneducated are not viewing unauthorized immigrants as competitors for their jobs. Another explanation is that the uneducated have more contact with immigrants as equals and therefore are less prejudiced toward immigrants than those who do not have contact.

While the youngest age cohort is the most lenient, the strictest cohort is the middle cohort of 45 to 54 year olds with other three cohorts near the mean. Attitudes differences among generations can be attributed to two factors; life stages and generational differences. Since the relationship between age and immigration policy is nonlinear, perhaps generation analysis will explain the age differences better than life stage. For the 45 to 54 age group, the imprinting would have occurred between 1970 and 1989. The imprinting would have been from the time that the impact of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act would have of the number and make-up of the immigration flow to the increase of unauthorized immigration that led to the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. The younger cohort would have grown up with a larger number of immigrants as a part of their experience. Since unauthorized

immigrants tend to be younger, the younger cohorts may have more contacts with them than older cohorts, many at school. This would echo the findings of Andolina and Mayer who found greater tolerance on race issues for the post civil rights generation.

The other significant differences found on Table 6-2 may be explained by the youth effect. Since younger people are more lenient, it would explain why single people are more lenient than married people. Similarly, in employment status, the most lenient are students and part-time workers.

Table 6-2: Immigration Policy Scale by Demographics

	N	Mean	Statistical Test
Male	294	2.98	t(601) = 1.93 n.s.
Female	308	2.88	
White	445	3.02	F(6,581) = 7.03 p < .001
African-American	69	2.75	
Hispanic	40	2.25	
Asian	6	2.63	
Native American	8	3.08	
Multiracial	16	2.83	
Other	6	3.36	
18 to 34 years old	180	2.75	F(4,582) = 4.73 p < .001
35 to 44 years old	111	2.96	
45 to 54 years old	114	3.11	
55 to 64 years old	90	2.87	
65 or older	97	3.07	
Less than \$25,000	53	2.82	F(6,483) = 1.49 n.s.
\$25,000 - \$50,000	102	2.85	
\$50,000 - \$75,000	116	2.84	
\$75,000 - \$100,000	75	2.91	
\$100,000 - \$125,000	57	3.18	
\$125,000 - \$150,000	38	2.93	
More than \$150,000	49	2.99	
Less than high school diploma	21	2.41	F(7, 578) = 3.04 p = .004
HS graduate	106	3.00	
Some college	98	2.99	
Associate or technical degree	72	3.10	
Bachelor's degree	143	2.91	
Master's degree	99	2.78	
Professional degree	25	3.19	
Doctorate	21	2.80	
Working full time	321	2.93	F(6, 581) = 3.37 p = .003
Working part time	57	2.70	
Unemployed	41	3.09	
Student	27	2.52	
Retired	100	3.00	
Keeping house	29	3.03	
Other	13	3.46	
Married	357	2.99	F(5, 577) = 2.52 p = .028
Separated	6	2.84	
Divorced	35	2.89	
Widowed	29	3.16	
Living together	9	2.53	
Single	149	2.76	
Children in household	250	2.87	t(586) = 1.72 n.s.
No children in household	337	2.98	

Ideology and Religion

There are significant differences between political parties and ideology on immigration policy. Ideology was measured on two criteria: social issues and economic issues. There is high correlation between the two measures ($r=0.692$), so only one measure is used in the analysis. Social ideology has a linear relationship with the immigration policy scale so it selected as the variable. Ideology was asked in multiple questions using an unfolding method in which respondents were asked if they are conservative, moderate or liberal with a follow-up question to gauge degree of liberalness or conservativeness or which way they lean if they are moderate to create a 7-point scale for analysis. A similar 7-point scale was created on party identification. Table 6-3 shows the differences on the broader categories for both ideology and political party. Those with conservative ideology and Republicans desire stricter immigration policies while liberals and Democrats are more lenient. Moderates and Independents fall in between. When expanded to a seven-point ideology measure, the immigration policy scale shows a steady decline from extremely conservative to extremely liberal. On the party scale, there is less differentiation between strong and regular party members but there is a gradation effect between independents who lean Republican and those who lean Democratic.

Table 6-3: Immigration Policy Scale by Ideology and Political Party

	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
Conservative	219	3.19	F(2,541) = 41.26 p < .001
Moderate	194	2.94	
Liberal	114	2.41	
Republican	165	3.15	F(3,549) = 14.51 p < .001
Democrat	175	2.64	
Independent	186	3.02	
Other Party	26	3.22	

Unlike the chasms on other social issues, the differences on immigration policy among religious groups and non-religious respondents are modest. Those with no formal religion are more lenient than those with religious beliefs but there is no difference in attitudes among religions or in intensity of religion based on attendance. The slight difference for Catholics shown in table 6-4 is an artifact of the Catholicism of Hispanics. Non-Hispanic Catholics are not significantly different on immigration policy than other religious groups.

Table 6-4: Immigration Policy Scale by Religion and Religiosity

	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
Catholic	131	2.81	F(5, 566) = 2.77 p = .018
Mormon	13	3.40	
Fundamentalist Christian	94	2.98	
Non-fundamentalist Christian	214	3.02	
Other religion	39	2.89	
No formal religion	90	2.79	
How often attend services:			F(5, 568) = 2.11 n.s.
More than once a week	59	3.07	
Once a week	153	3.03	
Several times a month	73	2.88	
Less than once a month	81	2.77	
Only on holidays	59	2.95	
Never	149	2.87	

Location, Immigrant Density and Contact

In recent years, immigrants have become more geographically diverse inside the United States. Prior to 1990, six states received the bulk of unauthorized immigrants: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey. It is estimated that in 1990, more than 85 percent of unauthorized immigrants lived in those six states. Since then, there has been rapid growth in states such as Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee so that nearly 40 percent of unauthorized immigrants now live in states other than the traditional six states (Passel, 2005).

This geographic diversity is reflected in the surprising non-finding that geography has no significant impact of the immigration policy scale. Table 6-5 shows the results divided by geographic region and by Census-defined divisions within those regions.

Table 6-5: Immigration Policy Scale by Census Region and Census Division

	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
Region 1: Northeast	120	2.84	Region
New England	26	2.76	F(3,581) = 0.64 n.s.
Middle Atlantic	94	2.86	
Region 2: Midwest	154	3.01	Division
East North Central	98	3.07	F(8,576) = 1.18 n.s.
West North Central	56	2.90	
Region 3: South	195	2.94	
South Atlantic	100	2.92	
East South Central	32	2.91	
West South Central	63	3.01	
Region 4: West	118	2.87	
Mountain	36	3.14	
Pacific	82	2.76	

This non-finding lead to further analysis, first on the effect of living in a state bordering Mexico compared to the rest of the country. The results in table 6-6 show that there is no significant difference between border states and the rest of the county.

Another cut at the data examines the six states that Passel identified as being the traditional destination of unauthorized immigrants versus the rest of the country. This time there is a statistical difference but the results may be surprising. The states with longer experience with unauthorized immigrants seek more lenient policies. This suggests that longer time living with immigrants may soften the reaction to unauthorized immigrants. Similarly, those who live in communities which have a significant number of foreign-born residents, more than 10 percent of the county residents, are more lenient than those who do not have a significant foreign-born population.

Table 6-6: Immigration Policy Scale by Other Geographical Data

	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
State bordering Mexico	117	2.86	t(587) = 1.28 n.s.
Not bordering Mexico	471	2.95	
Traditional immigrant destination	208	2.84	t(587)=1.97 p=.05
Other state	380	2.97	
Metropolitan area	478	2.91	F(2,567) = 0.54 n.s.
Micropolitan area	72	2.96	
Rural	23	3.07	
More than 10% foreign born in county	215	2.77	t(563) = 2.49 p = .006
Less than 10% foreign born in county	350	3.03	

Two possible explanations for these findings are economic influence and contact theory. Economists have found that immigrants are beneficial to the local economy and that communities with fewer immigrants grow slower than communities with immigrants (Card, 2005).

Contact theory states prejudice is reduced when respondents have more contact with other races as equals working on a common goal (Allport, 1954). Contacts were measured in the survey by asking about work relationship with foreign-born workers, neighbors and friends. The results in table 6-7 show that those with foreign-born friends and neighbors are more lenient in their policy but working with foreign born has no effect on policy attitudes.

Table 6-7: Immigration Policy Scale by Contact with Immigrants

	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
Does not work with immigrants	356	2.94	F(4, 586) = 0.74 n.s.
Immigrants at lower level only	82	2.88	
Immigrants at the same level	86	3.03	
Immigrants at boss' level or above	19	2.87	
Immigrants at both boss and same level	49	2.81	
Have neighbors who are foreign born	254	2.89	t(518) = -1.81 p=.036
Do not have foreign-born neighbors	266	2.97	
Number among 10 close neighbors who are foreign born:			F(5, 540) = 0.76 n.s.
0	309	3.00	
1	61	2.80	
2	61	2.95	
3	38	3.01	
4	32	2.91	
5 or more	46	2.80	
Have friends who are foreign born	401	2.90	t(554) = -2.02 p = .022
Does not have foreign born friends	155	3.07	

Attitudes toward immigrants

Having examined the demographic, ideological and geographical influences on immigration policy attitudes, the next stage is to examine attitudes themselves. The survey included 20-items on opinions about immigrants and issues related to immigrants that have been asked by previous studies. Each question is a statement that respondents either agreed or disagreed with or they could respond that they were not sure. Unlike the policy questions in table 6-1, several questions elicited substantial “not sure” responses (see Appendix B). Similar to the variables used in the immigration policy scale, the responses were coded on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 being “strongly agree” to 5 being “strongly disagree” and a middle response being “not sure”.

Table 6-8: Attitudes positively correlated with strict immigration policy scale

Negative Statements About Immigrants	Correlation
Children of illegal immigrants are a burden and financial drain on the public school system.	0.551
Many immigrants just want to live off the U.S. welfare system.	0.509
I am worried that America is becoming too Hispanic.	0.475
Immigrants take jobs away from Americans because they will work for less money.	0.439
The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values.	0.428
I get upset when workers at stores or restaurants can't speak English fluently.	0.388
Foreign-born children in school slow down the learning for other children in their classes.	0.385
Immigrant children are more likely to be in gangs than American children.	0.374
America needs to control illegal immigration to prevent terrorist attacks.	0.346
I avoid stores and restaurants that have too many foreign customers.	0.262
Today's immigrants are less likely to be assimilated than earlier generations.	0.236
Most immigrants don't want to become Americans.	0.214
There are too many people living in the U.S.	0.178

All correlations are statistically significant with $p < .01$

All but one of these opinion questions was significantly correlated with the immigration policy scale (see tables 6-8 and 6-9). The most strongly correlated statements are that “Children of illegal immigrants are a burden and financial drain on the public school system” and “Many immigrants just want to live off the U.S. welfare system.” The high correlation of these two statements to the immigration policy scale suggests that the most important factor in determining the strictness of policy option support has to do with public money used by unauthorized immigrants. It is the use of public money that separates extreme opinions from moderate opinions more than effect of immigrants on the job market.

In the next level of correlation, two of the three items with a correlation between 0.4 and 0.5 are about cultural concerns: “I am worried that America is becoming too Hispanic” and “the growing number of newcomers...threatens traditional American customs and values.” This shows there is a cultural element also.

Table 6-9: Attitudes that are negatively correlated with immigration policy scale

	Correlation
Most illegal immigrants pay taxes on their earnings.	0.396**
America is a unique place because of the influence of so many diverse cultures.	0.288**
Most jobs that immigrants have are jobs that Americans don't want to do.	0.219**
How Americans treat immigrants can have foreign policy implications.	0.215**
I enjoy going to restaurants with food from different cultures.	0.185**
Many anti-immigrant leaders are associated with white supremacists and other hate groups.	0.099*
If they live here for years, immigrants should be required to become U.S. citizens.	0.068

** Significant with $p < .01$; * Significant with $p < .05$. Last item is not significant.

As explained in Chapter 5, three latent variables were discovered using a factor analysis on these attitude questions. The latent variables are: anti-immigrant reasoning, diversity and transnational reasoning. As shown in table 6-10, all of these factors are significantly correlated with the immigration policy scale, with anti-immigrant reasoning having a very high correlation.

Table 6-10: Correlations between factor scores and immigration policy scale

	Correlation
Factor 1: Anti-immigrant reasoning	0.636**
Factor 2: Diversity	0.254**
Factor 3: Transnational reasoning	0.225**

** Significant with $p < .001$

American Values

One of the highest correlation on the individual items was “the growing number of newcomers...threatens traditional American customs and values.” This phraseology or similar language is often used by immigration opponents to garner support for their position. On the other side of the spectrum, immigrant advocates claim that this argument is nativist and possibly racist as it is code language for “non-white, non-Protestant” (Barkan, 2003). Rather than ascribe meaning to phrase, the survey asked respondents to provide their input into what constitutes American values. After allowing them to express that many attributes are an important part of American values, respondents gave their opinion on the most important aspect of American values.

Table 6-11: Most important American value and immigration policy scale

American Value	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
Individual freedom	214	2.96	F(7,568) = 2.63 p = .011
Equal opportunity	95	2.73	
Economic opportunity	79	2.83	
Rewarding hard work	55	2.93	
Justice	42	2.73	
Morality	39	3.37	
Free market economy	35	3.10	
Other	21	3.10	

Using post hoc ANOVA contrasts, the only response that was significantly different on the immigration policy scale is “morality.” Those who think that morality is the most important value desire the strictest policy against unauthorized immigrants. This suggests that immigration may be viewed as a values issue more than an economic issue for some respondents.

Salience

4. *Are attitudes about immigration related to salience? Do those with certain opinions tend to view immigration as more important?*

To assess salience of immigration to the public and its relative importance among other issues, the issue was addressed in two manners. The very first question asked of respondents was to name the three most important problems facing the U.S. Respondents had no response prompts as the question was asked open-ended.

The survey was conducted in July 2009, during the debate over health care in Congress. The president made trips to Russia and Ghana during the data collection

period. The economy and health care were the most prominent responses. International affairs including Iran and Afghanistan did not receive a lot of attention.

Table 6-12 shows very few Americans think that immigration is the most important problem facing the country. When expanded to the top three problems, only 16 percent cite it as a concern. However, it is the fourth-most mentioned item.

Table 6-12: What is the most important problem facing the United States today? (open-ended responses non-prompted) What is the second most important problem? The third?

Problem	Top Problem	Top 3 Problem
Economy / financial crisis / Wall Street / banks / stimulus	43.3%	67.5%
Jobs / unemployment	13.9%	28.7%
Health care	12.8%	49.2%
Budget / government spending / earmarks / deficit	5.1%	11.3%
Immigration	3.3%	16.4%
Foreign policy / Iran / Middle East / Israel	1.6%	9.3%
Iraq / Afghanistan / war (not terror)	1.2%	14.9%
Education	1.1%	8.2%
Global warming / climate change	0.9%	3.6%
Terrorism / Bin Laden	0.7%	5.8%
Taxes	0.7%	3.0%
Foreclosures / housing prices	0.5%	6.4%
Energy policies / alternative energy	0.4%	4.4%
Social Security / Medicare reform	0.2%	2.0%
Environment (not global warming)	0.2%	3.1%
Other	12.4%	
Nothing	1.7%	

The most common “other” responses concerned morality (2.9%), “Obama” (2.8%), and socialism (1.0%). (n=594)

Table 6-13: Importance that policymakers address the issue.

Concern	% Extremely or Very Important
Reducing the deficit	81.8%
Health care	80.8%
Reducing dependence on foreign oil	73.3%
Illegal immigration	69.7%
Global warming	47.8%
World opinion about the U.S.	46.3%

The second prong asked respondents directly how important is it that policy makers address the issue. If immigration was not cited as a top three problem, the survey asked how important it is that illegal immigration be addressed by policy makers. The same procedure was used to ask about global warming, reducing the deficit, health care, reducing dependence on foreign oil and world opinion about the United States.

When asked directly about illegal immigration, seven of ten American thinks that is extremely or very important (table 6-13). That response taken out of context would suggest that Americans are clamoring for legislation to curb unauthorized immigration. However, only 16 percent named it as one of the top three problems. With just the six items used in the survey, three of them are considered very important by more people: reducing the deficit, health care and reducing dependence on foreign oil.

These results show that illegal immigration is considered an important issue but not an urgent issue. This suggests that the salience for the general public is high but perhaps not high enough to force policymakers to address the issue out of the fear that inaction will have electoral consequences. However, there is a dramatic difference in the

immigration policy aims of those who think it is important and those who do not as shown in table 6-13. Those who think that illegal immigration is an extremely important issue have the strictest views on immigration and the relationship between importance and policy is linear, so that those who don't think it is at all important are the most lenient. Thus, an intensity imbalance which shows there is more political reward for policy-makers to favor anti-immigrant policy and less risk. Conversely there is more risk for supporting immigration reforms and less political gain.

This result though is partially an artifact of question-wording and measuring similar concepts. The most lenient policy option measured is completely open borders, and supporters of open borders would not perceive that "illegal immigration" is a problem.

Table 6-14: Immigration policy scale by salience

How important is it that illegal immigration be addressed by policy makers?	N	Mean of Policy Scale	Statistical Test
Extremely important	179	3.26	F(5,589) = 36.96 p < .001
Very important	228	3.06	
Somewhat important	119	2.58	
Not very important	40	2.12	
Not at all important	16	1.98	
Don't know/refused	23	2.67	

Models

The bivariate relationships described above tell part of the story, but interpretations can be compromised by the interactions between variables. Therefore it is important to control for the effect of other variables using a model. This section discusses

the results of design-weight least squares regression (see Chapter 5: Methodology) for models. For this analysis, variables were added to the model in stages based on theories and hypothesis, as opposed to the statistical technique of stepwise regression. The models attempt to determine what factors account for opinions on immigration attitudes with the immigration policy scale as the dependent value. In each model, all the independent variables for that model are analyzed. In subsequent models, the non-significant predictors of the previous model are removed and the next set of variables is added. The new model is tested as whole against the previous model by comparing the increase in r^2 . If the new model is not significantly different, the old model is used as a base. If it is significantly different than the new model is used as a base but the non-significant individual predictors are removed. Categorical variables with multiple responses will use dummy variables. If only one dummy variable is significant, the other dummy variables are kept in the model to maintain the comparison value. The models tested are:

- Model 1: Demographics and Ideology and Political Party
- Model 2: add Religion
- Model 3: add Geography and Contact
- Model 4: add Attitudes
- Model 5: add American Values
- Model 6: add Salience

To ensure that any variables were dropped which would have been significant in the final model, a verification model was run with all dependent variables. This full model found no variables were inadvertently dropped. The full model can be found in Appendix C.

Table 6-15: Regression model 1

Model 1: Demographics	Beta	t	p	VIF	Model statistics
Constant	3.635				$r^2=0.171$ n=469
Race (white/other)					Breusch-Pagan $X^2=0.78$ n.s.
Black	-0.118	-0.75	0.456	1.10	
Hispanic	-0.803	-2.68	0.008	1.03	
Age	0.003	0.92	0.356	1.81	
Party ID (high=Democratic)	-0.049	-1.79	0.074	1.70	
Ideology on social issues	-0.084	-3.37	0.001	1.62	
Employment (work)					
Work Part time	-0.214	-1.74	0.104	1.10	
Student	-0.257	-1.33	0.184	1.10	
Retired	-0.066	-0.65	0.517	1.82	
Keep house	0.075	0.50	0.619	1.06	
Education	-0.018	-1.00	0.316	1.05	

The demographic model has only two significant predictors: race and ideology. Even controlling for other demographics including ideology, Hispanics have a more lenient opinion about immigration policy. The model also shows that an increase in liberal ideology is associated with leniency in immigration policy. The coefficients for the other variables are not significantly different than zero. Political party is highly correlated with ideology ($r=0.5928$) and would be a statistically significant factor when not controlling for ideology. For this analysis, political party is dropped at this stage and ideology alone is used for political attitudes. This is not an unsuspected finding as there is anti- and pro-immigration policy advocates in both political parties. However, an argument could be made for keeping party id in the model as it is close to statistically significant. Appendix C contains output for an alternative series of models in which party id remains in the model.

The demographic model accounts for 17 percent of the variance of the immigration policy scale. Multicollinearity among the predictors is modest as shown by the variance inflation factor (VIF). Heteroskedasticity of the error term is insignificant using the Breusch-Pagan X^2 test.

The second model adds religion. The expectation is that by controlling for race, the bivariate statistical finding that Catholics are more lenient would disappear and that religion variables would not add significantly to the model. However, regression model 2 shows that religion is important when analyzed multivariately. Model 2 does find that holding race constant, does make Catholic a non-significant predictor variable – but Catholic will be a significant predictor in later models.

Table 6-16: Regression model 2

Model 2: Religion	Beta	t	p	VIF	Model statistics
Constant	3.452				$r^2=0.200$ $n=536$ Breusch-Pagan $X^2=1.08$ n.s.
Race (white/other)					
Black	-0.252	-1.97	0.048	1.08	
Hispanic	-0.844	-4.06	0.000	1.03	
Ideology on social issues	-0.136	-6.49	0.000	1.22	
Church attendance	0.003	2.02	0.044	1.39	
Religion (mainline Christian)					
Catholic	-0.159	-1.52	0.129	1.31	
Mormon	0.445	1.54	0.125	1.04	
Evangelical Christian	-0.216	-2.23	0.026	1.28	
Other religion	0.061	0.43	0.666	1.13	
No formal religion	0.010	0.06	0.949	1.51	

Using dummy variables for religious denominations and using mainline Protestants (non-fundamentalist Christian) as the comparison group, shows that there is an effect based on religion. Holding race, ideology and religious affiliation constant, church attendance is a significant predictor of immigration policy. For each additional

time that a person attends a religious service, the strictness in immigration policy increases.

The surprising finding in model 2 is that being a fundamentalist Christian rather than non-fundamentalist Christian, holding ideology and church attendance constant, increases leniency on immigration. Earlier in this chapter (table 6-4), there was no significant difference between fundamentalist Christian and non-fundamentalist Christian on the immigration policy scale.

Model 3 is not shown in a table because variables associated with contact with immigrants including geographical and self-reported contacts did not contribute to model 2. In fact, the adjusted r^2 was smaller for model 3 than model 2. The variables included that turned out to be non-significant were self-reported contacts with foreign-born at work (equal status or above), the number of foreign-born neighbors and self-reported friends. Census data about the location was also tested including the log of the percentage of foreign born in the county (the log was used since the distribution of percent foreign-born is exponential), the percent change in the foreign-born population in the county from 2000 to 2007 and an interaction-term for the size of increase and the percent of the population. The interaction term was included to account for the idea that an increase from 10 percent to 20 percent in the foreign-born population would have a different effect than a change from 2 percent to 4 percent. When these variables turned out to be insignificant, the model was run again using only the dichotomous measures from table 6-6 that previously proved significant: Above/below 10 percent of county foreign born and from state with a long history of unauthorized immigrants. These

dichotomous measures also were not significant. Therefore the concept that contact with immigrants reduces the harshness of immigration policy opinion is not supported.

Adding the factor scores from the attitude items more than doubles the r^2 over the previous model. The anti-immigrant arguments have the strongest influence on the immigration policy even when controlling for ideology, race and religion. The two other attitude factors are also significant with those enjoying diversity supporting lenient immigration policy. The transnational relationship is that those who see immigrants having ties to their homeland desire a stricter immigration policy. The addition of the attitude scores does not diminish the effects of race, ideology or religion – each continues to make an impact on the immigration policy scale.

Table 6-17: Regression model 4

Model 4: Attitudes	Beta	t	p	VIF	Statistics
Constant	3.120				$r^2=0.472$ $n=516$ Breusch-Pagan $X^2=0.20$ n.s.
Race (white/other)					
Black	-0.201	-2.07	0.039	1.10	
Hispanic	-0.409	-2.13	0.034	1.07	
Ideology on social issues	-0.045	-2.36	0.019	1.45	
Church attendance	0.003	2.73	0.001	1.42	
Religion (mainline Christian)					
Catholic	-0.255	-3.21	0.001	1.32	
Mormon	0.431	1.63	0.104	1.05	
Evangelical Christian	-0.275	-4.13	0.000	1.30	
Other religion	-0.023	-0.20	0.845	1.14	
No formal religion	0.075	0.53	0.596	1.52	
Factor Scores:					
Anti-immigrant arguments	0.410	12.74	0.000	1.35	
Diversity arguments	-0.101	-3.05	0.002	1.16	
Transnational arguments	0.067	-1.97	0.049	1.16	

For the fifth model (not shown in a table), the American values dummy variables are added to model. The variables add a modest, but statistically significant, 0.018 to the r^2 . In the dummy variable model, the control group is “individual freedom” which was the most common response and whose response to immigration was close to the mean of the sample. The morality response which was intriguing in the bivariate analysis is mitigated in the regression model when controlling for other factors. The significant response is “Justice.” Those thinking that justice is the most important American value are more lenient in their attitudes when controlling for other variables.¹³ Since the results are based on the relationship to the control group, all dummy variables are maintained in the final model.

The final model (model 6) adds salience as measured by how important the respondent believes that immigration should be addressed by policymakers. The strong salience effect seen in table 6-14 is maintained even when controlling for the other variables. This shows that ideology when controlling for salience and anti-immigration attitudes is not a predictor of immigration policy attitudes. There is a high correlation between salience (0.285) and anti-immigrant attitudes (0.421) so that ideology is not providing differentiation by itself. That means that being socially conservative by itself is not an indicator that one supports stricter immigration, but that those who have anti-immigrant attitudes and feel strongly about it are socially conservative which is why ideology stayed in the model until the salience portion was added.

¹³ The significant items are an artifact of the order of entry. If values were entered into the model prior to attitudes (model 4) than morality would be significant and justice would not.

Table 6-18: Regression model 6

Model 6: Final Model	Beta	t	p	VIF	Model statistics
Constant	2.614				$r^2=0.510$ $n=485$ Breusch-Pagan $X^2=1.80$ n.s.
Race (white/other)					
Black	-0.152	-1.86	0.064	1.12	
Hispanic	-0.412	-2.24	0.025	1.10	
Ideology on social issues	-0.035	-1.84	0.066	1.47	
Church attendance	0.003	2.17	0.031	1.49	
Religion (mainline Christian)					
Catholic	-0.251	-3.06	0.002	1.37	
Mormon	0.364	1.41	0.159	1.07	
Evangelical Christian	-0.287	-4.20	0.000	1.39	
Other religion	0.032	0.30	0.762	1.14	
No formal religion	0.084	0.61	0.542	1.55	
Factor Scores:					
Anti-immigrant arguments	0.354	9.37	0.000	1.61	
Diversity arguments	-0.095	-3.03	0.003	1.16	
Transnational arguments	0.062	1.96	0.050	1.18	
American values (Individual freedom)					
Free market economy	-0.044	-0.38	0.707	1.13	
Equal opportunity	-0.076	-0.88	0.381	1.20	
Rewarding hard work	-0.085	-0.73	0.467	1.16	
Morality	0.201	1.08	0.282	1.24	
Justice	-0.408	-3.81	0.000	1.13	
Economic opportunity	-0.065	-0.83	0.405	1.19	
Salience	0.133	4.33	0.000	1.28	

Determinants of Salience

The strong influence of salience in the model of policy leads to the question – what determines why people care about immigration? Those who care the most favor stricter policy options than those who don't. For politicians, this means that there is much political capital to strict policy and little political capital in a moderate policy. Therefore it is important to determine who the people who care most about the issue are.

Running the same series of models – starting with demographics, and then adding religion followed by contact – finds a different solution than for policy. The religion

variables do not add any additional influence to the model but contact and community are predictors of importance of the issue.

The relationship between contact and salience is understandable but is unexpected based on relationships shown earlier. Salience has a high correlation with strict policy (0.285), while having friends who are foreign born produce more lenient policy tendencies. However, having friends who are foreign-born increases salience. This is counter to the syllogistic expectation but makes intuitive sense that having friends who are foreign born would raise salience on the issue and increase leniency.

Table 6-19: Regression model for salience

Salience	Beta	t	p	VIF	Model statistics
Constant	3.055				$r^2=0.195$ n=470
Female	0.285	2.65	0.008	1.05	
Race (white/other)					Breusch-Pagan $X^2=3.11$ n.s.
Black	-0.798	-4.81	0.000	1.06	
Hispanic	-0.124	-0.30	0.766	1.07	
Ideology (high=liberal)	-0.145	-5.55	0.000	1.03	
Contact					
Work as equals	-0.016	-0.14	0.892	1.09	
Number of neighbors	0.075	2.05	0.041	1.17	
Friends	0.455	3.78	0.000	1.18	
Live in state bordering Mexico	0.339	2.27	0.024	1.27	
Log of % Foreign-born in county	-0.092	-1.72	0.086	1.49	
Change in foreign-born %: 2000-07	-0.036	-0.83	0.403	1.43	
Interaction of % and change	0.036	2.08	0.038	1.52	

Another measure of potential contact is the number of foreign-born people that one may encounter in daily life as measured by the percentage of foreign-born residents in a county. The model finds that there is interaction effect between the percent of foreign-born and the percent change. As specified in Chapter 5, the percent of foreign born is measured using a log transformation to linearize the distribution. The measure for change is based on the percent change from the 2000 Census to the 2007 American Community Survey in percent foreign born in the county. The measure is normalized. The interaction measures the effect of large changes in high percentage counties. The interaction effect shows that the immigration issue is of more importance to those in communities with an increasingly large number of immigrants than it is those communities with little change in composition or those with few immigrants.

The significant demographic variables are race and gender. Women are more likely to believe that the issue is more important than men. On the other hand, blacks are much less likely to think that immigration is important even when controlling for other factors. Ideology on social issues is also a significant factor while party identification did not add independently to the model.

The last piece to add is the effect of attitudes about immigration and immigrants to determine how important it is to deal with illegal immigration. The only attitude that has influence on salience is the anti-immigrant factor. The other attitude factors, diversity and transnationalism, have no influence on salience.

The stronger the anti-immigrant opinion, the more important it is to the respondent that immigration should be addressed by policy-makers. The anti-immigrant

attitudes are such an influential factor that when controlling for its effect, most of the previous model predictors lose their influence. Race, gender and the interaction of the change and size of the community foreign-born population are not significant predictors of salience when controlling for anti-immigrant attitudes. However, ideology and having foreign-born friends maintain their predictive value, albeit with a beta of less than half the value.

Therefore, having anti-immigration attitudes drives the desire that policy-makers address unauthorized immigration. In addition, being ideological conservative also adds to salience even when controlling for attitudes.

Table 6-20: Regression model for salience with attitude factors

Salience	Beta	t	p	VIF	Model statistics
Constant	3.298				$r^2=0.2607$ n=457
Female	0.169	1.48	0.138	1.05	
Race (white/other)					Breusch-Pagan $X^2=2.97$ n.s.
Black	-0.141	-0.56	0.576	1.12	
Hispanic	0.206	-0.61	0.539	1.11	
Ideology (high=liberal)	-0.059	-2.20	0.028	1.29	
Contact					
Work as equals	0.132	1.23	0.220	1.12	
Number of neighbors	0.014	0.43	0.665	1.19	
Friends	0.268	2.72	0.007	1.20	
Live in state bordering Mexico	0.063	0.44	0.659	1.32	
Log of % Foreign-born in county	0.021	0.42	0.674	1.52	
Change in foreign-born %: 2000-07	-0.050	-1.44	0.150	1.43	
Interaction of % and change	0.059	1.86	0.064	1.51	
Factor scores:					
Anti-immigrant arguments	0.441	8.18	0.000	1.43	
Diversity arguments	-0.004	-0.08	0.937	1.22	
Transnational arguments	-0.048	-0.97	0.355	1.21	

Comparison to Pluralism

5. *Are the factors that separate extreme views versus majority views reflective of the lobbying groups involved in immigration issues?*

The analysis shows that the general public has a nuance opinion on immigration issues and would support policies that are neither too strict nor too lenient. This nuanced opinion is in contrast to the immigration activists who are lobbying Congress. Just as Cook, Jelen and Wilcox found with abortion, the public's opinion of immigration policy is between the extreme viewpoints of the immigration activists. This nuanced view also confirms the findings of Fiorina that the public is more moderate than activists.

While Tichenor's categorizations (Cosmopolitans, Border Hawks, Economic Protectionists and Free Marketers) easily defined the interest groups addressing immigration, the categories were less defined in the public. The factor analysis did not distinguish between economic or cultural arguments. Therefore it is hard to distinguish between Border Hawks and Economic Protectionists. Cultural or economic arguments are equally espoused by anti-immigrant Americans and there is not a statistically significant group who are more likely to accept economic arguments over cultural arguments.

The Cosmopolitans will score high on the diversity factor, but the Free Marketers are unidentifiable. A possibility is that Free Marketers are too few in number in the general public to be found in a sample survey but because of their disproportionate economic power, they influence the policy process under pluralism.

Summary

In addition to being centralist, the immigration policy scale was normally distributed. Normality is a common social science measurement effect but it is not usually associated to public policy where opinions are measured as simply favor or oppose a policy based on the information provided in the question. The public may support one facet but oppose a separate facet and therefore respond differently based on the information provided by question. These differences do not necessarily reflect the fickleness of the public or should be considered a question-wording bias. The questions may be measuring at different point of the policy spectrum giving different trade-offs in the public's mind. This concept that opinion is not a duality but a continuum on a scale is has been hypothesized by Fiorina, Downs and other probabilistic voting analysts but is seldom used in polls since in the end policymakers must make a yes-or-no final decision.

For immigration, the policy scale that is normally distributed shows that the vocal opposition is really a small minority. However, for that minority, the issue is much more salient than it is to the general public. Those who feel strongly about the subject are the ones seeking the strictest policy regarding unauthorized immigrants. This is a key finding as the literature shows that salience is a main component of whether policymakers follow public opinion. Since the results show a skewness in salience, it is not unreasonable for politicians to put more stock in the anti-immigration opinion.

This normality of immigration opinion contradicts Barkan who describes his findings as “a split could be most dramatically characterized to have repeatedly emerged between strongly conservative, Protestant, non-Latino (and usually older) Republicans,

on the one hand, and liberal Democrats together with Catholics, less educated, lower income, Latino (and usually younger) voters, on the other” (Barkan, 2003). In Fiorina’s terms, Barkan confused choices with positions. The split that Barkan found was based on the choices in the surveys rather than the positions actually held.

In this study, the factor analysis did not distinguish between economic or cultural arguments for opposing immigration. An argument that did differentiate concerned the immigrants’ relationship to their home country. The belief is that immigrants don’t really want to become Americans and that they want to maintain ties to their home country. This means that how we deal with immigrants has foreign-policy implications. On the other end of the spectrum, acceptance and belief in diversity was another factor derived from the attitude items. Those who like diversity desire a more lenient policy toward unauthorized immigrants.

These attitudes combined with the salience are the main predictors in the strictness of immigration policy toward unauthorized immigrants. These attitudes overrode ideology and most demographics in predicting policy opinion.

The results echo previous studies by Citrin et al. and Fetzer that have established that economic factors have only a moderate effect on attitudes toward immigration. The results do not support Espenshade and Hampstead’s finding that lower educated and poorer respondents who might compete with immigrants for the low-wage jobs have a stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. A second economic factor found in the literature is an ideological fiscally conservative viewpoint. Conservatives are more likely than other respondents to be swayed by arguments that illegal immigrants do not pay their fair share

of taxes or that they use too many public resources. In this study's model, ideology is important but disappears from the model when accounting for both the anti-immigration attitude and importance of the issue. This suggests that while anti-immigration believers will be ideologically conservative, conservatives are not necessarily anti-immigration.

The cultural aspect of immigration opinion formation found in the literature is supported by these findings. The acceptance of diversity leads to more pro-immigration sentiments. Or conversely, the fear of diversity is a factor for an anti-immigration stance. This supports the findings of Fetzer that cultural attitudes drives immigration attitudes.

The significance of the Transnational factor in the model shows that there is a portion of the populace who supports Huntington's contention that the influx of immigrants is a challenge to our national identity and that the current trend towards multiculturalism and transnationalism are at odds with the earlier immigration waves in which acculturation and assimilation were the goals. Chandler and Tsai found the cultural threats to Americans significant. This also supports Espenshade & Hampstead's finding that those supporting American isolationism are anti-immigration.

The addition of American values attitudes in the model is another indication of the importance of cultural attitudes in differentiating immigration opinion. Like Citrin & Wright, these findings show that which values an individual espouses separates opinion about immigration. For those who esteem morality above other values tend to be more anti-immigrant, while those supporting justice, when controlling for other attitudes, are more lenient.

Knoll found that religion as measured by religious affiliation and church attendance is a significant factor in immigration attitudes. And while affiliation and attendance were also significant in this model, the results were the exact opposite of Knoll. While Knoll found that those who attend religious services more frequently are more likely to support liberal immigration reform policies, the model, controlling for other factors, finds that attendance increase anti-immigrant opinion. And while both studies found Catholics as pro-immigrant, Knoll found Mormons to also support liberal immigration policies while this study found Mormons to be the least lenient.

Burstein found that public opinion generally influences policy, and the more salient an issue is to the public, the stronger the relationship, but the relationship is threatened by the power of interest groups, political parties and economic elites. Page and Shapiro state that policy will follow opinion if opinion change is large and sustained and the issue is salient. In the case of immigration, opinions have not changed and the salience is imbalanced. Public opinion about immigration issues has remained consistent even while the number of unauthorized immigrants has been increasing. However, for those concerned about immigration, the growing number of immigrants has increased the importance of the issue in their opinion and has produced the salience imbalance.

For Monroe, the incongruence of policy not being consistent with public opinion is that there is a bias toward the status quo in the political process. Baumgartner argues the bias toward status quo exists among interest groups as well. Groups that helped established the current policy have a vested interest in seeing that policy maintained and are cautious about reopening a debate in which they might lose ground (Baumgartner,

2009). The failed attempts of both a Republican and a Democratic congress to enact immigration legislation are a testament to the bias toward status quo.

In the case of immigration reform, it appears that influence of interest groups have trumped public opinion which both Manza & Cook and Burstein have found to be the overriding factor for the incongruence of policy and opinion. Interest groups were able to convince congress members that while Gallup numbers showed support for reform nationally, their own district was against it.

Luttbeg presented three coercive models for the public's influence of policy: rational actor, political party and pressure group. The rational actor model is that a lawmaker follows opinion or else risks losing his job to someone who will follow opinion. In the case of immigration reform, the rational actor model is minimal but skewed. The salience of the issue to the public is not high enough for most legislators to be affected. However, the salience is skewed toward the anti-immigration side which means there is more risk to support lenient policies than reward. A lukewarm majority will not coerce a policy.

The political party model is definitely not in play in immigration. President Bush supported immigration reform but could not compel many other Republicans. Afterward, despite objections of anti-immigration activists, reform-supporter John McCain won the Republican nomination. At the same time, 15 Democrats and one independent also voted against the most recent bill.

It is the pressure group model that best explains the relationship. Pro-immigration groups compromised and were not enthusiastic supporters. Anti-immigration groups

remained strong in opposition and were able to influence lawmakers with a massive call-in campaign. And there were no moderate advocates who could support the compromise solution which was supported by a majority of Americans. Liberal senators such as Harkin, Sanders and Stabenow did not feel pressure to support the bill from their constituencies while wavering conservatives were swayed to switch their votes against the measure by the enthusiastic campaign of the anti-immigrant faction.

Caveats

The results of this study are based on a national telephone sample of 600 respondents. Declining response rates for telephone surveys are a concern for the reliability of the results. In addition, there are coverage issues as more households do not have landline telephones and the differential between those in cell-only households and those with landlines are significant in demographics such as age, income and education. Response rates are only indicator that there may be a bias if non-responders are different than responders in the attitudes under investigation. An attempt was made during data collection to establish the difference between responders and non-responders by asking some non-responders to answer just a few questions: the most important problem facing the country; importance of addressing illegal immigration; and political party. While only 59 non-responders answered those questions, their responds were not different than the survey respondents.

A second caveat is that a sample size of 600 limits the analysis to large subgroups as smaller subgroups will not have the power for statistical significance. For example,

while the beta in the final model is large for Mormon, it is not significant. A larger sample size might increase the number of factors in the model – including interaction effects.

Lastly, the measure for salience is skewed because it asks about importance of dealing with “illegal immigration” which is the language of the border hawks. There was not a cosmopolitan salience question asking about the importance of addressing the treatment of “poor immigrants” or a free-marketer salience question about addressing a shortage of low-wage workers. This skewed question may account for the salience differential found in the study.

7. Policy Implications

The hypothesis of this study, “on immigration reform, the motivated minority that highly influences public policy is in dissonance with the policy preferences of the majority of Americans,” is supported by the findings in this study. This dissonance has several explanations. First is the influence of the interest groups on the political landscape. Second is the lack of salience of the issue, especially for those who are not anti-immigration. Third is that public opinion is conditional, complex and nuanced. Most people are not “ideologically pure.”

The large dissonance found in the immigration policy debate can be found in many issues. Democratic pluralism in the current political environment is characterized by policy being debated by groups focused on their narrow policy view. The average public opinion is between the extreme views but does not often have an advocate for its opinions in the pluralistic debates. Public opinion has influence on issues where there is large and sustained opinion change and when the subject is of noticeable importance to a large number of people.

Public Opinion is Normal; Activists Are Not Normal

The results of this study found that public opinion on immigration is more nuanced than can be measured in a dyadic support or don’t support manner. In this matter, the details are important as the general public is more nuanced in its opinion than

the activists on either side of the issue. This study found evidence that, given a robust index, aggregated opinion will have a normal distribution.

Normal distributions are a common phenomenon in human behavior and it should not be surprising to find it in opinion surveys. Yet, public opinion is rarely studied as a multi-faceted and complex subject. One reason for this is that the outcome of policymaking is a decisive yea or nay vote. Also, public opinion is usually studied in terms of elections which similarly have a decisive outcome. By missing the complexity of opinion, policymakers can overestimate the support or opposition for a position when viewed only in a dyadic manner.

The opinions of activists, on the other hand, are not normally distributive. Since activists are seldom found in the middle willingly, public opinion is not represented by groups vying for policy supremacy. A middle position is viewed as a compromise by activists, and compromise is viewed as ceding power to other organizations with which the group is competing. A middle position does not get the support of and will be attacked passionately by ideological activists. For the most recent reform effort that was anti-immigrant groups. However, the results of the survey show that this motivated minority does not represent the core of public opinion.

On immigration issues, Tichenor divided opinions in four categories based on political orientation and immigration attitudes. These groupings are apparent in the political sphere of interest groups. However, this type of distinction does not appear in the general public, the nuanced public opinion on immigration policies defies facile

attempts at categorization. A majority supports fair treatment of the existing immigrant population and the tightening of borders against future immigrants.

Move the Mountain

Probabilistic voting theory asserts that to ensure electoral support, a party needs to move towards the mean of public opinion. In the current partisan era, moving toward public opinion is not the goal. Instead, the effort is made to move the mean of public opinion toward the desired ideology. For many issues, the public does not have strong opinions and can be swayed by events, a media story, or a presidential bully pulpit to lean in a certain direction. As Zaller points out, the people most likely to be swayed by political communication are also the least likely to pay attention to the message. Also, an easily swayed public can just as easily sway back on the next news cycle.

A more cynical implication of a normally distributive continuum of opinion is that it is possible to portray a greater amount of public support for a policy by the way the policy is presented. A policy may remain rooted in the extreme while the public is asked for support on a more palpable definition. The 1994 Contract with America is a classic definition of this process as the wording for items were tested for greatest support. The policy goals of “intelligent design” activists are the same as creationists but intelligent design garners more public support simply from the language usage. After years of denouncing global warming as a concern, the Bush administration began addressing “climate change.”

A related political process is incrementalism in which proponents of a policy which does not have majority support seek small changes in which they can get public support. An example of this is when gun-law proponents banned the sales of assault weapons. Opponents of incrementalism worry about the “slippery slope” and fear that each point conceded will ultimately result in a reversal of policy. Incrementalism works to move policies closer to the center and therefore toward the mean of public opinion.

For immigration policy, the public opinion mountain is much harder to move. Gallup polling data shows that public opinion remained fairly constant as the debates raged in 2006 and 2007. This indicates that most people have set opinions about immigration are less likely to be swayed by arguments from either side.

Incrementalism on immigration issues is problematic due to the complexity and interconnectivity of the various components of immigration policy. For example, there was a large increase of unrestricted family-reunification immigration in the mid 1990s as the new citizens from the 1986 IRCA became eligible to bring their family to the country. Therefore, there is a relationship between family-reunification and a path to citizenship that may be complicated with a piecemeal attempt at immigration reform. After the comprehensive bill failed in 2007, congressional Democrats attempts to pass parts of the bill in an incremental strategy also failed.

It's Easier to Just Say No

Policymakers should remember that public opinion often constrains policy and is a negative force in policymaking and not a positive force. Support for a policy will always be tempered compared to the opposition. Every policy solution will have

elements that will cause concern to supporters which will reduce the passion for the bill compared to the opponents. Supporters may say “yes, but...” while opponents have no conditions on their reasons.

Echoing Childs’ sentiment, public opinion should guide policymakers in the broad scope of what needs to be accomplished but the details should be left to the subject matter experts. Since public opinion is not dyadic but multidimensional, advocates can develop measures that will show disapproval for an aspect of a policy even when there is support for the concept of in its entirety. This has been in evidence in the 2009 health care debates. The respondents to this survey say that addressing health care is extremely important, and yet lawmakers are finding it difficult to get support for the specifics.

In the 2007 immigration debate, the public supported the moderate position which was the compromise solution to the pro-immigration faction. The pro-immigrant forces tepidly supported the bill. The anti-immigrant side was vehemently opposed and was able to rally their troops to stop the bill. The motivated minority were able to portray that they spoke for the public because support was tempered due to compromise.

There is a bias toward the status quo in American lawmaking. Gaining support of both houses of Congress and the President makes changing laws difficult. This status quo bias works to the advantage of a motivated minority in stopping legislation.

Salience is King; but Measurement Rules

One of the overwhelming findings in the literature is the public policy follows public opinion when the issue is salient to the public. This is not surprising as the more salient issues will have a greater effect on elections. Lawmakers are wary of going

against the public's wishes if it could mean losing an election. Policymakers are less subservient to the public's stance if issue is not very important to the public.

A key finding in this study is that salience, as measured by how important the issue is, was a major predictor in the policy choice. Those who felt that issue needed to be addressed were much more likely to be seeking stricter policy. This result indicates that Senators were wise when they followed the sentiments of anti-immigrant forces that opposed the comprehensive immigration reform bill. The issue is of more salience to the opponents and therefore there is more electoral risk in going against this group than electoral gain that could be achieved from the less motivated majority. The power of single issue voters is that they are more motivated to vote and can turn a close or low-turnout election in their favor. If the majority is unlikely to vote on its opinion on a particular issue, the motivated minority has much more electoral power.

Deeper analysis does not support the conjecture that anti-immigration sentiment is strong enough to sway elections. When asked about the most important problem facing the country, immigration is mentioned as one of the top three problems by just 16 percent but 70 percent will say it is extremely or very important when asked directly about its importance. This indicates that immigration is not an issue at the top of people's minds and therefore is less likely to be an electoral issue. In 2006, the Republicans made this mistake when they decided not to have a conference committee meet to reconcile the House and Senate bills but instead to make immigration an election issue in the 2006 midterm elections. Despite rising in Gallup polls to nearly 20 percent citing illegal immigration as one of the most important problems of the country in a May 2006 poll,

the numbers fell back to a small percentage by the fall. The issue did not resonate with the electorate during the mid-term election and was a non-factor in determining voting preference.

If lawmakers are going to ignore public opinion for a motivated minority, they should understand the true level of salience to the public. For example, since April 2009 there have been “tea-party” rallies around the country about lowering taxes. Lawmakers may believe that this issue of great importance to an electorally influential group. However, in this study only 3 percent named “taxes” as one of the top three problems facing the country today (see Table 6-12). The appearance of salience does not necessary translate into electoral factors. How salience is measured and how it compares to other issues matters.

Once More unto the Breach

The recent economic downturn has slowed or reversed the flow of unauthorized immigrants into the U.S. and has reduced the urgency of reform, but has not reduced the need for to address the problem in the near future. When the flow of unauthorized immigrants increases there will probably again be pressure to deal with the issue. Therefore, it is necessary to review the lessons from the last two reform attempts.

First, the issue does not appear to be salient enough to voters to have an electoral effect. Republicans who tried to use the issue to curb the Democratic surge in the 2006 mid-term election found that the issue was of little importance to the voters. Even within the Republican Party, the anti-immigrant activists were not influential enough to prevent the nomination of McCain as the party’s presidential nominee. These two events should

lessen the importance that lawmakers place in the vocal minority opposed to lenient immigration measures.

Conversely, progressive immigration activists need to acknowledge that a majority of Americans believe that the size of the unauthorized immigrant is a problem and want to stop further entries. Addressing the conditions of the immigrant community without curtailing the immigration flow will likely find public resistance. Similarly, the 2005 attempt found that while Americans may support restrictions on immigration, they are not anti-immigrant enough to be punitive.

The finding of this study is that while public opinion is nuanced and not ideological, the political process dominated by the clash of interest groups is not moderate. Moderate solutions do not have many advocates in the political arena. Compromise solutions will generate only lukewarm acceptance while purists on both sides will work against the compromise. In the case of immigration, salience for the anti-immigration side was higher and therefore had a stronger response in the negative. Again, a realization of the relatively weak electoral influence should reduce the political power.

The tendency toward status quo of the governmental system combined with the complicated interrelatedness of issues within the policy makes immigration legislation difficult to accomplish. Ultimately, it will likely only occur when the unauthorized immigrant population once again reaches a point when the public demands a solution and that not addressing the problem will be a bigger political liability than the proposed solution.

Dealing with the Messy Middle

Fiorina accuses the media of being a contributing factor in the supposed culture war. Traditional media has considered balanced reporting to getting comments from activists of either side of the issue and ignoring the vast opinion that occurs between those two points. Following a Kerry-Bush debate in 2004, an NBC commentator said that both candidates that had established such strong and divergent positions that nobody could be undecided now, ignoring the possibility that people could disagree with both extreme positions.

New media ignores the old media's traditions of balanced reporting and have no qualms about presenting only their own point of views. Supporters of new media hail the democratization of new environment, the reality is that most bloggers are activists whose viewpoints do not differ substantially from the interest groups already lobbying. The moderating voice of the majority is not represented in the new media which reduces its claim of democratization.

The one area attempting to give voice to the spectrum of positions is aggregated public opinion as measured by surveys. The most prominent surveys are those that conducted for the media itself. In these cases, the media frames the questions to match the current debate and to find the support or opposition to proposed aspects of policy. Once again, the media misses the opportunity to explore or at least identify the middle – and often majority opinion.

Jelen, Cook and Wilcox found that 39 percent of Americans support abortion in all cases and less than 10 percent oppose abortion in all cases which means the majority

of Americans are between the two viewpoints. This would be a useful tactic to use in other political debates. In this study, 10 percent strongly disagreed that “unauthorized immigrants who have jobs should be able to become citizens if they want to.” On the other end of the spectrum, 8 percent strongly disagreed that “unauthorized immigrants should be denied all government services including health care.” This shows that the extreme opinions expressed in the media have a very low resonance in the general public. “America is moderate in its beliefs” is not sort of story to generate media sales, but reporting just how shallow the public support is for activist’s positions would enlighten the political debate. Congruence to public opinion would be stronger if the true lack of support of the vocal minority was known.

Tyranny of the Majority versus Tyranny of Special Interests

Madison argued that a representative system would reduce the effects of the vagaries of public opinion. As Sharp describes it, public opinion often works in a thermostatic sequence, wanting it colder when it gets hot and then hotter when it gets cold, but never finding the comfortable spot. It is not the thesis of this study that policymakers should slavishly follow public opinion polls and make policies that satisfy the greatest majority. Civil libertarians find that protection of the rights of minorities against the tyranny of the majority is one of the greatest strengths of the American system.

On the other hand, there is a great concern that special interests and business interests have a disproportionate influence on public policy. Policymakers are perceived as being less concerned about the public interest than in reelection. Special interests

provide campaign contributions and promise votes or threaten to withhold support or actively support the opposition. These influences make some believe that instead of a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” that we have a government that ignores the people. Yet, interest groups have a democratizing purpose in that individuals and companies who could not get their concerns to policymakers on their own can band together and show strength in numbers. The benefits of interest groups in policymaking is that all segments of the affected publics can make their concerns known to lawmakers as a policy is being developed and debated.

The hypothesis of this study, that the motivated minority that highly influences public policy is in dissonance with the policy preferences of the majority of Americans, is a concern because of the misrepresentation of public opinion undermines the ability of lawmakers to make informed policy decision. The misrepresentation of public opinion can lead vulnerable or ambitious legislators to mistakenly vote against both their own convictions and the public for electoral rationales.

Further Research

Tichenor’s article which categorizes immigration opinion based on political and economic ideology was published after the analysis plan for this study was developed. So while the analysis of this study does support his findings, a more focused empirical study on those categories would help determine if the distinctions are found in the public or just among immigration activists.

The imbalance of salience is an interesting finding that might be simply a measurement issue. Further research on the salience of the immigration issue could support the veracity of this finding.

Lastly, expanding the normality finding to a variety of policy issues will help enlighten the discourse about public opinion and its effect on public policy.

Appendix A: Questionnaire

Hello, my name is _____ and I'm calling from George Mason University. As part of a study for the School of Public Policy, we're interviewing Americans about public policy issues such as health care, immigration and the economy.

Your phone number was drawn randomly from all telephone numbers both listed and unlisted. Your participation is completely voluntary and you may stop answering at any time. Any answers you give are completely confidential.

At no time during this interview will I try to sell you anything. If you agree to participate, you will be asked questions that will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

SCREENER:

In order to get a random sample of all persons in the United States, I will need to randomly select a person in your household to complete this survey.

- A. May I speak to a member of this household who is at least 18 years old?
- B. Including yourself, how many people aged 18 or older currently live in this household?

[If one person, continue with the main survey]

[If 2 people, computer randomly chooses either respondent or the other person, if computer chooses respondent, the survey continues. If computer chooses other person in the household ask:]

- C. The computer has determined that the other adult in the household should answer the questions. Can I speak to that person, now?

[If yes, repeat informed introduction and consent above. If no ask:]

- D. I will call back later, what name should I ask for to talk with the other adult?

[If three or more people, the computer will select the respondent 1/N times. If the respondent is not selected; ask E.]

- E. The computer has randomly determined that one of the other adults in the household should be selected for the rest of the interview. Other than yourself, which adult has had the most recent birthday?
- F. Can I speak to that person now?

1. What is the most important problem facing the United States today? [DO NOT READ RESPONSES]

1. Budget / government spending/ earmarks / deficit
2. Economy / financial crisis/ Wall Street/ banks/ stimulus
3. Education
4. Energy policies/alternative energy
5. Environment
6. Foreclosures / housing
7. Foreign policy / Iraq / Israel / Middle East
8. Global warming/climate change
9. Health Care
10. Immigration
11. Iraq/War / Afghanistan
12. Jobs/Unemployment
13. Social Security
14. Taxes
15. Terrorism / Bin Laden
16. Other
17. Nothing (else)

2. What is the second most important problem?

3. What is the third most important problem?

[ROTATE QUESTIONS – SKIP QUESTIONS IF RESPONSE IF GIVEN IN 1-3] For each of these issues please tell me if you think it is extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important that it be addressed?

4. World opinion about the US
5. Health care (#8)
6. Illegal immigration (#9)
7. Reducing dependence on foreign oil (#4)
8. Improving education (#3)
9. Reducing the deficit (#1)
10. Global warming (#7)

There is a lot of talk these days about American values. I am going to read a list of items and I'd like you to tell me how important each item is as part of the American values, extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important:

11. Individual freedom
12. Free market economy
13. Equal opportunity
14. Rewarding hard work
15. Morality
16. Justice
17. Economic opportunity

18. Which of these values do you think most represents American values? (List above)

Now I am going to ask you questions about a particular political issue: Immigration. First I'm going to ask you some questions about unauthorized immigrants, sometimes referred to as illegal immigrants.

For each of the following statements tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or if you are not sure.

19. Unauthorized immigrants should be arrested and put into jail to deter others from entering the country illegally.
20. All unauthorized immigrants should be deported immediately.
21. Unauthorized immigrants should have no access to government services including health facilities
22. Unauthorized immigrants working in the US should never be allowed to become citizens.
23. There should be procedures such as fees and background checks that will allow the best unauthorized immigrants to become authorized.
24. Unauthorized immigrants who have jobs should be able to become citizens if they want to.
25. Unauthorized immigrants who have jobs should be required to become citizens.
26. Anyone who wants to be a United States citizen should be allowed to come to the United States

For each of the following statements tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or if you are not sure.

27. America is a unique place because of the influence of so many diverse cultures.
28. America needs to control illegal immigration to prevent terrorist attacks.
29. Children of illegal immigrants are a burden and financial drain on the public school system.
30. The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values
31. How Americans treat immigrants can have foreign policy implications.
32. I am worried that America is becoming too Hispanic.
33. I enjoy going to restaurants with food from different cultures
34. I avoid stores and restaurants that have too many foreign customers.
35. Immigrant children are more likely to be in gangs than American children.
36. Immigrants take jobs away from Americans because they will work for less money.
37. I get upset when workers at stores or restaurants can't speak English fluently.
38. Many anti-immigrant leaders are associated with white supremacists and other hate groups.
39. Many immigrants just want to live off the U.S. welfare system.
40. Most illegal immigrants pay taxes on their earnings.
41. Most immigrants don't want to become American.
42. Most jobs that immigrants have are jobs that Americans don't want to do.
43. If they lived here for years, immigrants should be required to become US citizens.
44. There are too many people living in the U.S.
45. Foreign-born children in school slow down the learning for other children in their classes
46. Today's immigrants are less likely to be assimilated than earlier generations.

For each of the following statements tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or if you are not sure.

47. Children of unauthorized immigrants who grew up in the United States should be considered legal residents if they get a high school diploma and either attend college or get a full-time job.
48. According to the 14th amendment, anyone born in the United States is a U.S. citizen. We should change the Constitution so that children of unauthorized immigrants born in the United States should not be considered citizens.

Moving away from immigration, I have a series of seven statements. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being strong disagreement and 5 being strong agreement, what is your opinion about the following statements?

- 49. People should be willing to help those who are less fortunate.
- 50. I would go out of my way to help someone in trouble.
- 51. I often feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
- 52. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them.
- 53. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
- 54. When I see someone treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.
- 55. In general, those in need have to learn to take care of themselves so they do not depend on others.
- 56. Next I am going to ask about your political views. When it comes to social issues, would say that your political views are (READ RESPONSES):

- 1. Extremely conservative
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Somewhat conservative
- 4. Moderate
- 5. Somewhat liberal
- 6. Liberal
- 7. Extremely liberal

- 57. And how about economic issues, are you: (READ RESPONSES)

- 1. Extremely conservative
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Somewhat conservative
- 4. Moderate
- 5. Somewhat liberal
- 6. Liberal
- 7. Extremely liberal

58. Do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, Independent or a member of some other political party?

- a. [IF REPUBLICAN] Do you consider yourself a strong Republican?
- b. [IF DEMOCRAT] Do you consider yourself a strong Democrat?
- c. [IF INDEPENDENT] Which party's candidates do you tend to vote for more often the Republican or Democratic?
 - i. Republican
 - ii. Democratic
 - iii. Both the same/Neither
- d. [IF OTHER] What party is that?

59. In what year were you born?

60. Which best describes your education level?

Do not have a high school diploma
High school graduate or GED
Some college without a degree
Associates degree or technical training
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Professional degree
Doctoral degree

61. Which of the following best describes your current work situation? Are you currently working full time, working part time, temporarily not working, a student, retired, keeping house or something else?

Working full time
Working part time
Temporarily not working
Student
Retired
Keeping house
Other
Please specify _____

62. What is your current marital status? Are you married, widowed, divorced, separated, living with a partner or single?

Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Living together
Single

63. How many children under the age of 18 live at this address?

64. Would you say you are White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American or multiracial?

White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Multiracial
Other

Please specify _____

65. What is your religious preference? Would you say that you are Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, Mormon, Christian or a member of some other religious group or do you have no formal religious affiliation?

Catholic
Mormon
Christian, non-Catholic and non-Mormon
Jewish
Muslim

Other Please specify _____

No formal religion

66. Would you describe yourself as a fundamentalist or an evangelical or orthodox, or would you not describe yourself that way?

67. Not counting weddings or funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

More than once a week
Once a week
Several times a month
Less than once a month
Only on holidays
Never

68. And how about your total household income, including all earners in your household, was it more or less than 75 thousand dollars?

If less than 60, ask "Was it"
0 to 24
25 to 49
50 to 75

If more than 75, ask "Was it"
75 to 99
100 to 124
125 to 150
More than 150

69. Which best describes your living arrangements (READ RESPONSES)

- a. Own house
- b. Rent house
- c. Own condo/apartment
- d. Rent condo/apartment
- e. Rent room
- f. Live with friends
- g. Live with relatives (parents/children)
- h. Other

70. Were you born a US citizen?

Yes
No

71. [IF YES TO Q.71 and WORKING IN Q.60 ASK:] Do you work with people who were born in another country?

a. [IF YES] Is your boss or anybody at your boss's level or above foreign-born?

b. Is anyone in your company at your level foreign-born?

72. [IF YES TO Q.71] Do you have any neighbors who were born in another country?

a. [IF YES] Of your ten closest neighbors, what is your guess about how many households have a person born in another country?

73. [IF YES to Q.71] Do you have friends who were born in another country?

74. Are you male or female? [Ask only if you can't tell from the interview]

Male

Female

That's the last question, thank you for your time.

Appendix B: Survey Results

Percentage of response for each question asked on the survey. Percentages are based on weighted and imputed responses (see Chapter 5 for details on weighting).

SCREENER:

Including yourself, how many people aged 18 or older currently live in this household?

One	29.8%
Two	41.9
Three or more	21.2

What is the most important problem facing the United States today? What is the second most important problem? What is the third most important problem?

	Most Important	Second Most Important	Third Most Important	% cited as Top 3
Economy / financial crisis/ Wall Street/ banks/ stimulus	43.3%	15.5%	6.4%	67.8%
Health Care	13.0%	24.5%	9.6%	49.1%
Jobs/Unemployment	13.6%	8.1%	5.6%	28.7%
Immigration	3.2%	6.0%	6.2%	16.2%
Iraq/War / Afghanistan	1.2%	6.5%		15.1%
Budget / government spending/ earmarks / deficit	5.2%	3.2%	2.6%	11.5%
Foreign policy / Iran / Israel / Middle East	1.6%	3.3%	4.0%	9.4%
Education	1.1%	1.7%	4.9%	8.2%
Government / Congress/ “socialism”	4.0%	3.1%	0.6%	7.7%
Lack of morality/Faithlessness	3.5%	1.9%	1.2%	6.6%
Foreclosures / housing	0.5%	2.2%	2.9%	6.4%
Terrorism / Bin Laden	0.8%	3.4%	1.4%	5.8%
Energy policies/alternative energy	0.4%	1.6%	2.1%	4.4%
Obama	2.9%	0.8%	0.2%	3.9%
Global warming/climate change	0.9%	1.1%	1.4%	3.6%
Taxes	0.7%	0.2%	2.2%	3.2%
Environment (not global warming)	0.2%	1.6%	1.1%	3.0%
Social security / Medicare reform	0	0.4%	1.3%	2.0%
Nothing (else)	1.7%	3.6%	12.8%	---
Other	2.1%	8.5%	20.3%	30.9%

For each of these issues please tell me if you think it is extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important that it be addressed?

World opinion about the US

Extremely important	12.0%
Very important	33.6
Somewhat important	33.7
Not very important	11.5
Not at all important	8.1
Don't know	1.1

Health Care

Extremely important	58.7%
Very important	21.2
Somewhat important	12.9
Not very important	3.8
Not at all important	2.7
Don't know	0.8

Illegal immigration

Extremely important	30.4%
Very important	38.2
Somewhat important	20.4
Not very important	6.6
Not at all important	3.0
Don't know	1.4

Reducing dependency on foreign oil

Extremely important	27.4%
Very important	44.6
Somewhat important	21.3
Not very important	2.5
Not at all important	2.3
Don't know	2.0

Reducing the deficit

Extremely important	40.8%
Very important	39.1
Somewhat important	16.0
Not very important	1.7
Not at all important	0.4
Don't know	2.0

Global warming

Extremely important	18.6%
Very important	28.3
Somewhat important	25.7
Not very important	11.1
Not at all important	14.4
Don't know	2.0

There is a lot of talk these days about American values. I am going to read a list of items and I'd like you to tell me how important each item is as part of the American values, extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important:

Individual freedom

Extremely important	43.7%
Very important	47.7
Somewhat important	7.8
Not very important	0.1
Not at all important	0.7
Don't know	0.0

Free market economy

Extremely important	23.8%
Very important	40.8
Somewhat important	27.0
Not very important	3.3
Not at all important	1.6
Don't know	3.6

Equal opportunity	
Extremely important	35.7%
Very important	46.5
Somewhat important	13.9
Not very important	2.4
Not at all important	1.0
Don't know	0.6
Rewarding hard work	
Extremely important	35.7%
Very important	49.1
Somewhat important	13.3
Not very important	1.1
Not at all important	0.4
Don't know	0.5
Morality	
Extremely important	35.3%
Very important	40.1
Somewhat important	19.6
Not very important	2.3
Not at all important	1.3
Don't know	1.5
Justice	
Extremely important	41.8%
Very important	47.6
Somewhat important	7.1
Not very important	1.6
Not at all important	0.8
Don't know	1.2
Economic opportunity	
Extremely important	30.6%
Very important	51.8
Somewhat important	14.8
Not very important	1.6
Not at all important	0.4
Don't know	0.9

Which of these values do you think most represents American values?

Individual freedom	34.5%
Free market economy	5.9
Equal opportunity	16.8
Rewarding hard work	9.0
Morality	6.3
Justice	7.0
Economic opportunity	12.9
Other	3.4
Don't know	4.2

Now I am going to ask you questions about a particular political issue: Immigration. First I'm going to ask you some questions about unauthorized immigrants, sometimes referred to as illegal immigrants. For each of the following statements tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or if you are not sure.

Unauthorized immigrants should be arrested and put into jail to deter others from entering the country illegally.

Strongly agree	16.7%
Agree	25.6
Disagree	36.6
Strong disagree	14.1
Not sure	6.3
No answer	0.7

All unauthorized immigrants should be deported immediately.

Strongly agree	27.8%
Agree	30.6
Disagree	24.4
Strong disagree	11.9
Not sure	4.9
No answer	0.5

Unauthorized immigrants should have no access to government services including health facilities

Strongly agree	35.1%
Agree	27.7
Disagree	24.8
Strong disagree	7.9
Not sure	4.1

No answer	0.3
-----------	-----

Unauthorized immigrants working in the US should never be allowed to become citizens.

Strongly agree	10.8%
Agree	13.0
Disagree	51.3
Strong disagree	20.0
Not sure	4.5
No answer	0.4

There should be procedures such as fees and background checks that will allow the best unauthorized immigrants to become authorized.

Strongly agree	25.8%
Agree	54.7
Disagree	11.3
Strong disagree	3.7
Not sure	4.0
No answer	0.5

Unauthorized immigrants who have jobs should be able to become citizens if they want to.

Strongly agree	13.4%
Agree	49.3
Disagree	22.9
Strong disagree	9.7
Not sure	4.6
No answer	0.2

Anyone who wants to be a United States citizen should be allowed to come to the United States

Strongly agree	13.4%
Agree	49.3
Disagree	22.9
Strong disagree	9.7
Not sure	4.6
No answer	0.2

America is a unique place because of the influence of so many diverse cultures

Strongly agree	38.0%
Agree	51.4
Disagree	22.9
Strong disagree	5.7
Not sure	1.8
No answer	0.7

America needs to control illegal immigration to prevent terrorist attacks

Strongly agree	32.8%
Agree	42.8
Disagree	16.9
Strong disagree	2.5
Not sure	4.9
No answer	0.1

Children of illegal immigrants are a burden and financial drain on the public school system.

Strongly agree	10.4%
Agree	38.4
Disagree	32.6
Strong disagree	9.2
Not sure	9.3
No answer	0.1

The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values

Strongly agree	8.5%
Agree	29.9
Disagree	42.9
Strong disagree	12.9
Not sure	5.6
No answer	0.2

How Americans treat immigrants can have foreign policy implications.

Strongly agree	12.4%
Agree	57.6
Disagree	13.6
Strong disagree	2.8
Not sure	12.6
No answer	0.9

I am worried that America is becoming too Hispanic.

Strongly agree	6.0%
Agree	18.3
Disagree	51.8
Strong disagree	17.2
Not sure	6.2
No answer	0.6

I enjoy going to restaurants with food from different cultures.

Strongly agree	34.5%
Agree	53.8
Disagree	7.9
Strong disagree	2.0
Not sure	1.4
No answer	0.3

I avoid stores and restaurants that have too many foreign customers.

Strongly agree	1.7%
Agree	5.8
Disagree	61.4
Strong disagree	27.7
Not sure	3.2
No answer	0.2

Immigrant children are more likely to be in gangs than American children.

Strongly agree	4.1%
Agree	16.0
Disagree	50.1
Strong disagree	15.0
Not sure	14.5
No answer	0.3

Immigrants take jobs away from Americans because they will work for less money.

Strongly agree	13.6%
Agree	43.3
Disagree	31.2
Strong disagree	6.3
Not sure	5.1
No answer	0.4

I get upset when workers at stores or restaurants can't speak English fluently.

Strongly agree	19.4%
Agree	33.9
Disagree	35.0
Strong disagree	8.4
Not sure	3.0
No answer	0.2

Many anti-immigrant leaders are associated with white supremacists and other hate groups.

Strongly agree	3.4%
Agree	19.0
Disagree	42.3
Strong disagree	10.2
Not sure	24.6
No answer	0.6

Many immigrants just want to live off the US welfare system

Strongly agree	10.0%
Agree	24.2
Disagree	42.8
Strong disagree	9.5
Not sure	13.2
No answer	0.3

Most illegal immigrants pay taxes on their earnings.

Strongly agree	3.3%
Agree	20.7
Disagree	38.8
Strong disagree	15.7
Not sure	21.3
No answer	0.2

Most immigrants don't want to become Americans.

Strongly agree	2.2%
Agree	16.1
Disagree	48.9
Strong disagree	8.1
Not sure	24.2
No answer	0.5

Most jobs that immigrants have are jobs that Americans don't want to do.

Strongly agree	12.9%
Agree	40.4
Disagree	29.2
Strong disagree	10.4
Not sure	7.0
No answer	0.1

If they lived here for years, immigrants should be required to become US citizens.

Strongly agree	13.2%
Agree	50.9
Disagree	27.2
Strong disagree	3.0
Not sure	5.3
No answer	0.3

There are too many people living in the US.

Strongly agree	4.0%
Agree	21.4
Disagree	54.1
Strong disagree	10.5
Not sure	9.7
No answer	0.2

Foreign-born children in school slow down the learning for other children in their classes.

Strongly agree	8.6%
Agree	22.2
Disagree	46.0
Strong disagree	13.4
Not sure	9.1
No answer	0.6

Today's immigrants are less likely to be assimilated than earlier generations.

Strongly agree	7.9%
Agree	37.4
Disagree	33.9
Strong disagree	5.9
Not sure	14.7
No answer	0.2

Children of unauthorized immigrants who grew up in the United States should be considered legal residents if they get a high school diploma and either attend college or get a full-time job.

Strongly agree	8.6%
Agree	50.4
Disagree	28.0
Strong disagree	4.7
Not sure	7.8
No answer	0.5

According to the 14th amendment, anyone born in the United States is a US citizen. We should change the Constitution so that children of unauthorized immigrants born in the United States should not be considered citizens.

Strongly agree	9.8%
Agree	19.7
Disagree	43.9
Strong disagree	16.5
Not sure	9.1
No answer	0.9

Moving away from immigration, I have a series of seven statements about interactions with others.

People should be willing to help those who are less fortunate.

Strongly agree	36.9%
Agree	59.4
Disagree	1.2
Strong disagree	0.5
Not sure	1.4
No answer	0.5

I would go out of my way to help someone in trouble.

Strongly agree	35.4%
Agree	60.0
Disagree	2.1
Strong disagree	0.2
Not sure	2.3

I often feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.

Strongly agree	30.1%
Agree	61.4
Disagree	4.7
Strong disagree	1.0
Not sure	2.4
No answer	0.5

When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them.

Strongly agree	30.9%
Agree	61.1
Disagree	4.0
Strong disagree	0.4
Not sure	3.3
No answer	0.3

Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

Strongly agree	1.1%
Agree	16.0
Disagree	63.6
Strong disagree	14.5
Not sure	4.7
No answer	0.1

When I see someone treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.

Strongly agree	0.8%
Agree	4.4
Disagree	67.8
Strong disagree	21.8
Not sure	5.0
No answer	0.2

In general, those in need have to learn to take care of themselves so they do not depend on others.

Strongly agree	12.6%
Agree	55.4
Disagree	19.4
Strong disagree	3.7
Not sure	8.1
No answer	0.9

When it comes to social issues, would say that your political views are conservative, liberal or moderate?

Extremely conservative	15.1%
Conservative	23.3
Somewhat conservative	6.7
Moderate	21.0
Somewhat liberal	6.6
Liberal	11.8
Extremely liberal	8.4
Don't know/ no answer	7.0

When it comes to economic issues, would say that your political views are conservative, liberal or moderate?

Extremely conservative	22.8%
Conservative	23.9
Somewhat conservative	5.5
Moderate	21.2
Somewhat liberal	5.6
Liberal	8.1
Extremely liberal	4.9
Don't know/ no answer	7.9

Do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, Independent or a member of some other political party?

Republican	27.8%
Democrat	29.3
Independent	31.0
Other	4.4
Don't know/ no answer	7.4

Which best describes your education level?

No high school diploma	3.4%
High school graduate or GED	18.0
Some college without a degree	16.6
Associates degree or technical training	12.4
Bachelor's degree	24.3
Professional degree	4.1
Master's degree	17.4
Doctoral degree	3.5
Don't know / no answer	0.3

Which of the following best describes your current work situation?

Working full time	54.4%
Working part time	9.5
Temporarily not working (unemployed)	7.0
Student	4.5
Retired	17.1
Keeping house	5.2
Other	2.2
No answer	0.1

Age group

18 to 34	30.6%
35 to 44	19.2
45 to 54	18.5
55 to 64	14.9
65 to 90	16.7

What is your current marital status?

Married	60.5%
Separated	1.0
Divorced	5.7
Widowed	4.8
Living together	1.9
Never married	25.8
No answer	0.5

How many children under the age of 18 live at this address?

None	56.8%
One	17.6
Two	16.5
Three	6.5
Four or more	2.1
No answer	0.4

Would you say you are White, African-American, Hispanic, Asian, Native American or multiracial?

White	75.3%
African-American	11.7
Hispanic	6.8
Asian	1.0
Native American	1.3
Multiracial	2.9
Other	1.0

Which best describes your religion?

Catholic	22.4%
Mormon	2.2
Christian	52.7
Jewish	0.9
Muslim	0.2
Other	5.6
No formal religion	15.4
No answer	0.7

Would you describe yourself as a fundamentalist or an evangelical or orthodox, or would you not describe yourself that way?

Yes	16.1%
No	65.0
Don't know	3.5
No formal religion	15.4

Not counting weddings or funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

More than once a week	10.2%
Once a week	26.5
Several a times a week	12.6
Less than once a month	13.9
Only on holidays	10.1
Never	10.1
No formal religion	15.5
Don't know / no answer	0.9

Including all earners in your household, what is your household's income?

Less than \$25,000	9.6%
\$25,000 to \$50,000	18.3
\$50,000 to \$75,000	20.1
\$75,000 to \$100,000	13.6
\$100,000 to \$125,000	9.8
\$125,000 to \$150,000	6.7
More than \$150,000	8.6
Don't know / no answer	13.4

Which best describes your living arrangement?

Own house	71.3%
Rent house	9.2
Own condo/apartment	1.8
Rent condo/apartment	8.5
Rent room	1.2
Live with friends	0.5
Live with relatives	6.8
No answer	0.7

Gender

Male	49%
Female	50%

Citizenship

Born a US Citizen	95.4%
Naturalized citizen	3.5
Not a citizen	1.0

Questions asked only of respondents born in the US:

Do you work with people who were born in another country?

Yes	41.0%
No	21.2
Does not work	37.1
Don't know / no answer	0.7

Is your boss or anyone at your boss' level or above foreign-born?

Yes	11.7%
No	26.0
Does not work with foreigners	21.2
Does not work	37.0
Don't know	4.1

Is anyone in your company at your level foreign born?

Yes	23.8%
No	16.1
Does not work with foreigners	21.2
Does not work	37.0
Don't know	1.9

Do you have any neighbors who were born in another country?

Yes	46.0%
No	47.1
Don't know	6.9

Of your ten closest neighbors, what is your guess on how many households have a person born in another country?

None	48.0%
1 to 2	22.0
3 to 5	15.5
More than 5	5.7
Don't know / no answer	8.8

Do you have friends who were born in another country?

Yes	71.7%
No	27.6
Don't know / no answer	0.8

Appendix C: Additional Statistical Output

This appendix contains three detailed statistical output mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6: the factor analysis used to verify the immigration policy scale; a full-variable regression using all independent variables; and an alternative model series in which the variable party-id is maintained in the model. The high correlation between party-id and salience produces instability in the model as additional variables are added. Both variables are not significant in the final model.

Factor Analysis for Immigration Policy Scale

```
. factor immig1 immig2 immig3 immig4 immig5 immig6 immig7
(obs=591)
```

```
Factor analysis/correlation          Number of obs   =      591
Method: principal factors            Retained factors =       1
Rotation: (unrotated)                Number of params =       7
```

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.28336	1.79394	1.0304	1.0304
Factor2	0.48942	0.44209	0.2209	1.2513
Factor3	0.04734	0.14636	0.0214	1.2726
Factor4	-0.09902	0.03292	-0.0447	1.2279
Factor5	-0.13194	0.04608	-0.0595	1.1684
Factor6	-0.17803	0.01710	-0.0803	1.0881
Factor7	-0.19513	.	-0.0881	1.0000

```
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(21) = 1015.27 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
```

Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
immig1	0.5924	0.6491
immig2	0.7173	0.4854
immig3	0.6610	0.5630
immig4	0.7255	0.4736
immig5	-0.4726	0.6702
immig6	-0.6140	0.6230
immig7	-0.4185	0.6522

Full Model with All Variables

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic age party_id ideologs educyrs
keephouse retired student parttime catholic mormon xevang oth_rel no_rel attend_r
ln_fborn n_forborn interact1 workwimg numneigh friends anti diverse transnat vmarket
veqop vhardwork vmorality vjustice vecon salience
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	370
Number of PSUs	=	370	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	369
			F(32, 338)	=	15.32
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.5019

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.0208081	.1182098	-0.18	0.860	-.2532575	.2116413
hispanic	-.3049578	.1554999	-1.96	0.051	-.6107349	.0008193
age	-.0009791	.0033659	-0.29	0.771	-.0075979	.0056396
party_id	-.031875	.0247178	-1.29	0.198	-.0804804	.0167304
ideologs	.0162987	.0219295	0.74	0.458	-.0268237	.0594211
educyrs	.0103021	.0152672	0.67	0.500	-.0197196	.0403238
keephouse	.0779207	.132656	0.59	0.557	-.1829358	.3387772
retired	-.1727812	.0992211	-1.74	0.082	-.3678908	.0223284
student	-.1497621	.1850196	-0.81	0.419	-.5135871	.2140629
parttime	-.2062259	.096161	-2.14	0.033	-.3953182	-.0171335
catholic	-.1715035	.0893392	-1.92	0.056	-.3471813	.0041743
mormon	.1590619	.2605919	0.61	0.542	-.3533695	.6714933
xevang	-.122276	.0759693	-1.61	0.108	-.2716631	.027111
oth_rel	.0065044	.1510856	0.04	0.966	-.2905925	.3036012
no_rel	.0631894	.1762443	0.36	0.720	-.2833799	.4097587
attend_r	.0011869	.0013368	0.89	0.375	-.0014419	.0038157
ln_fborn	-.0327889	.0335756	-0.98	0.329	-.0988125	.0332347
n_forborn	-.0141198	.0222969	-0.63	0.527	-.0579648	.0297251
interact1	.0057619	.0189138	0.30	0.761	-.0314306	.0429543
workwimg	.0370257	.031543	1.17	0.241	-.0250008	.0990523
numneigh	-.0318797	.0229793	-1.39	0.166	-.0770665	.0133071
friends	-.0500707	.0702456	-0.71	0.476	-.1882025	.0880612
anti	.3445707	.0417501	8.25	0.000	.2624727	.4266687
diverse	-.0999084	.0328309	-3.04	0.003	-.1644676	-.0353492
transnat	.097939	.0392297	2.50	0.013	.0207971	.1750809
vmarket	-.1057331	.1294716	-0.82	0.415	-.3603278	.1488616
veqop	-.09116	.1061604	-0.86	0.391	-.2999152	.1175952
vhardwork	.0099902	.1179834	0.08	0.933	-.2220139	.2419943
vmorality	.3905478	.2360381	1.65	0.099	-.0736009	.8546964
vjustice	-.3083747	.1308952	-2.36	0.019	-.5657688	-.0509805
vecon	-.1325314	.0891794	-1.49	0.138	-.307895	.0428322
salience	.1418986	.0365726	3.88	0.000	.0699818	.2138153
_cons	2.581402	.3901852	6.62	0.000	1.814136	3.348667

Post Regression Estimations

```
. estat vif
```

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
retired	2.12	0.472140
age	2.09	0.479422
ideologs	2.03	0.493371
party_id	1.87	0.535358
anti	1.82	0.549328
no_rel	1.63	0.614460
attend_r	1.51	0.663517
interact1	1.50	0.665800
n_forborn	1.46	0.682903
workwimg	1.46	0.684515
ln_fborn	1.41	0.707156
salience	1.40	0.715298
catholic	1.39	0.721442
black	1.35	0.738926
xevang	1.33	0.752071
vmorality	1.32	0.755339
transnat	1.31	0.762569
friends	1.30	0.770198
veqop	1.27	0.788529
student	1.26	0.792510
educyrs	1.26	0.793772
diverse	1.25	0.798966
numneigh	1.24	0.808024
parttime	1.23	0.814384
vecon	1.22	0.817651
vmarket	1.19	0.839458
vhardwork	1.18	0.844673
hispanic	1.18	0.847297
keephouse	1.18	0.848041
vjustice	1.17	0.856043
oth_rel	1.16	0.859295
mormon	1.13	0.884957
Mean VIF	1.41	

```
. estat hettest
```

```
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of policy

chi2(1)      =      1.66
Prob > chi2   =      0.1981
```

Alternative Analytic Models (keeping Party ID)

Model 1: Demographics

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic age party_id ideologs educyrs
keephouse retired student parttime
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	469
Number of PSUs	=	469	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	468
			F(10, 459)	=	10.22
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.1712

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.1181019	.1581909	-0.75	0.456	-.4289543	.1927506
hispanic	-.8025783	.2994353	-2.68	0.008	-1.390982	-.2141742
age	.0031738	.0034315	0.92	0.356	-.0035693	.0099168
party_id	-.0490614	.0274146	-1.79	0.074	-.1029323	.0048096
ideologs	-.0843833	.0250094	-3.37	0.001	-.1335278	-.0352388
educyrs	-.0176961	.0176132	-1.00	0.316	-.0523068	.0169146
keephouse	.074595	.1500153	0.50	0.619	-.2201919	.3693818
retired	-.0661521	.101953	-0.65	0.517	-.2664945	.1341903
student	-.2568561	.1932474	-1.33	0.184	-.6365961	.1228839
parttime	-.2142528	.123207	-1.74	0.083	-.4563602	.0278546
_cons	3.634932	.375118	9.69	0.000	2.897808	4.372056

```
. estat vif
```

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
retired	1.82	0.548981
age	1.81	0.553273
party_id	1.70	0.588820
ideologs	1.62	0.618214
black	1.11	0.897253
parttime	1.10	0.905656
student	1.10	0.912138
keephouse	1.06	0.945122
educyrs	1.05	0.948935
hispanic	1.03	0.968087
Mean VIF	1.34	

```
. estat hettest
```

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of policy

chi2(1)	=	0.78
Prob > chi2	=	0.3762

Model 2: Add Religion

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic party_id ideologs catholic mormon
xevang oth_rel no_rel attend_r
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	484
Number of PSUs	=	484	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	483
			F(10, 474)	=	8.29
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.1825

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.0939044	.1516667	-0.62	0.536	-.3919123	.2041036
hispanic	-.8009927	.25349	-3.16	0.002	-1.299072	-.3029134
party_id	-.0623848	.0267194	-2.33	0.020	-.1148854	-.0098842
ideologs	-.0873094	.0244891	-3.57	0.000	-.1354277	-.039191
catholic	-.2005376	.1166309	-1.72	0.086	-.4297041	.028629
mormon	.3748775	.2987842	1.25	0.210	-.2121999	.9619549
xevang	-.2476015	.1025716	-2.41	0.016	-.4491431	-.0460598
oth_rel	-.0773618	.1691772	-0.46	0.648	-.4097761	.2550524
no_rel	.0961617	.1666658	0.58	0.564	-.2313178	.4236412
attend_r	.0031965	.001543	2.07	0.039	.0001647	.0062282
_cons	3.509847	.1224021	28.67	0.000	3.269341	3.750353

```
. estat vif
```

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
party_id	1.78	0.561843
ideologs	1.76	0.569563
no_rel	1.53	0.655327
attend_r	1.42	0.705270
catholic	1.31	0.764872
xevang	1.30	0.769438
black	1.18	0.847503
oth_rel	1.13	0.881345
hispanic	1.05	0.950982
mormon	1.05	0.954764
Mean VIF	1.35	

```
. estat hettest
```

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance

Variables: fitted values of policy

chi2(1)	=	1.05
Prob > chi2	=	0.3044

Model 3: Add Contact

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic party_id ideologs catholic mormon
xevang oth_rel no_rel attend_r ln_fborn n_forborn interact1 workwimg numneigh friends
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	426
Number of PSUs	=	426	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	425
			F(16, 410)	=	5.21
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.1793

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.0965533	.1460861	-0.66	0.509	-.3836945	.190588
hispanic	-.6142621	.2030912	-3.02	0.003	-1.01345	-.2150739
party_id	-.0688795	.0280043	-2.46	0.014	-.1239237	-.0138353
ideologs	-.084891	.0250873	-3.38	0.001	-.1342017	-.0355803
catholic	-.1737873	.1233416	-1.41	0.160	-.4162228	.0686482
mormon	.3293256	.3214919	1.02	0.306	-.3025866	.9612377
xevang	-.1840657	.1006219	-1.83	0.068	-.3818443	.0137128
oth_rel	-.0517868	.1684509	-0.31	0.759	-.3828874	.2793138
no_rel	.0692024	.1718948	0.40	0.687	-.2686674	.4070721
attend_r	.0025498	.0016407	1.55	0.121	-.0006751	.0057747
ln_fborn	-.0118577	.0399533	-0.30	0.767	-.0903883	.066673
n_forborn	-.0351659	.0321244	-1.09	0.274	-.0983084	.0279766
interact1	.0260369	.0251335	1.04	0.301	-.0233645	.0754382
workwimg	-.022915	.0328768	-0.70	0.486	-.0875363	.0417063
numneigh	-.0011067	.0282454	-0.04	0.969	-.0566247	.0544113
friends	.1168832	.0907219	1.29	0.198	-.0614362	.2952026
_cons	3.439049	.2378686	14.46	0.000	2.971504	3.906595

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
party_id	1.80	0.556291
ideologs	1.78	0.561779
no_rel	1.57	0.637714
interact1	1.46	0.683457
n_forborn	1.42	0.703750
attend_r	1.40	0.716272
catholic	1.32	0.756657
ln_fborn	1.28	0.780152
xevang	1.28	0.781589
black	1.24	0.806676
friends	1.23	0.810735
numneigh	1.20	0.832049
oth_rel	1.13	0.885695
workwimg	1.10	0.912220
hispanic	1.07	0.932595
mormon	1.06	0.944443
Mean VIF	1.33	

```
. estat hettest
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of policy

chi2(1)      =      0.29
Prob > chi2   =      0.5905
```

Model 4: Add Attitude Scores

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic party_id ideologs catholic mormon
xevang oth_rel no_rel attend_r anti diverse transnat
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	467
Number of PSUs	=	467	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	466
			F(13, 454)	=	35.59
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.4539

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.1205156	.1071569	-1.12	0.261	-.3310862	.090055
hispanic	-.4278971	.2410331	-1.78	0.077	-.9015435	.0457494
party_id	-.0408143	.0218933	-1.86	0.063	-.0838361	.0022075
ideologs	-.0147663	.0209567	-0.70	0.481	-.0559477	.0264151
catholic	-.2542109	.0832197	-3.05	0.002	-.4177432	-.0906786
mormon	.3986015	.2615995	1.52	0.128	-.1154593	.9126623
xevang	-.2717182	.0721641	-3.77	0.000	-.4135256	-.1299109
oth_rel	-.0702963	.1391434	-0.51	0.614	-.3437225	.20313
no_rel	.1456588	.1573591	0.93	0.355	-.1635624	.45488
attend_r	.0025524	.0011579	2.20	0.028	.000277	.0048278
anti	.3983117	.0331216	12.03	0.000	.3332255	.463398
diverse	-.1076172	.0343498	-3.13	0.002	-.1751169	-.0401176
transnat	.0633385	.0377807	1.68	0.094	-.0109031	.1375801
_cons	3.164353	.1042421	30.36	0.000	2.95951	3.369195

```
. estat vif
```

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
ideologs	1.97	0.508532
party_id	1.82	0.550729
no_rel	1.53	0.653117
attend_r	1.44	0.696067
anti	1.38	0.726945
catholic	1.32	0.756379
xevang	1.32	0.759101
black	1.17	0.854668
transnat	1.17	0.857200
diverse	1.15	0.867011
oth_rel	1.14	0.877121
hispanic	1.09	0.919412
mormon	1.05	0.947889
Mean VIF	1.35	

```
. estat hettest
```

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance

Variables: fitted values of policy

chi2(1) = 0.66

Prob > chi2 = 0.4169

Model 5: Add American Values

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic party_id ideologs catholic mormon
xevang oth_rel no_rel attend_r anti diverse vmarket vegop vhardwork vmorality vjustice
vecon
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	448
Number of PSUs	=	448	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	447
			F(18, 430)	=	27.38
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.4654

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.0762122	.0980357	-0.78	0.437	-.2688802	.1164559
hispanic	-.4326238	.228526	-1.89	0.059	-.8817426	.016495
party_id	-.0379589	.0210021	-1.81	0.071	-.079234	.0033163
ideologs	-.0155756	.0210671	-0.74	0.460	-.0569785	.0258273
catholic	-.2727871	.0843238	-3.23	0.001	-.4385074	-.1070667
mormon	.319015	.2698127	1.18	0.238	-.2112439	.8492739
xevang	-.2695494	.0734459	-3.67	0.000	-.4138914	-.1252073
oth_rel	-.0594459	.1310896	-0.45	0.650	-.3170743	.1981825
no_rel	.1228038	.1412033	0.87	0.385	-.1547009	.4003085
attend_r	.0020699	.0012396	1.67	0.096	-.0003663	.0045061
anti	.3983808	.0346282	11.50	0.000	.3303265	.4664351
diverse	-.1119265	.0311318	-3.60	0.000	-.1731094	-.0507437
vmarket	-.0382126	.1154965	-0.33	0.741	-.2651962	.188771
vegop	-.1131761	.0917461	-1.23	0.218	-.2934833	.0671311
vhardwork	-.0649386	.1415056	-0.46	0.647	-.3430375	.2131603
vmorality	.2549609	.2533357	1.01	0.315	-.242916	.7528378
vjustice	-.3776293	.1178494	-3.20	0.001	-.6092371	-.1460215
vecon	-.0471412	.0785691	-0.60	0.549	-.2015519	.1072695
_cons	3.212061	.1061213	30.27	0.000	3.003502	3.42062

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
ideologs	1.98	0.504546
party_id	1.86	0.536978
no_rel	1.56	0.641069
attend_r	1.51	0.663131
xevang	1.37	0.729106
catholic	1.36	0.737347
anti	1.34	0.745972
vegop	1.20	0.832387
vmorality	1.20	0.833408
black	1.19	0.838120
vecon	1.16	0.858886
oth_rel	1.16	0.859466
vjustice	1.14	0.875534
vhardwork	1.14	0.877160
vmarket	1.13	0.884760
diverse	1.11	0.899129
hispanic	1.10	0.910316
mormon	1.07	0.933959
Mean VIF	1.31	

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
chi2(1) = 1.04
Prob > chi2 = 0.3078

Model 6: Add Salience

```
. svy, vce(linearized): regress policy black hispanic party_id ideologs catholic mormon
xevang oth_rel no_rel attend_r anti diverse vmarket veqop vhardwork vmorality vjustice
vecon salience
```

Survey: Linear regression

Number of strata	=	1	Number of obs	=	440
Number of PSUs	=	440	Population size	=	224736
N. of poststrata	=	22	Design df	=	439
			F(19, 421)	=	25.57
			Prob > F	=	0.0000
			R-squared	=	0.5132

policy	Coef.	Linearized Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
black	-.0551191	.0952844	-0.58	0.563	-.2423894	.1321512
hispanic	-.4411062	.2259971	-1.95	0.052	-.8852769	.0030644
party_id	-.0334994	.021059	-1.59	0.112	-.0748884	.0078895
ideologs	-.0122564	.0210883	-0.58	0.561	-.053703	.0291902
catholic	-.262071	.0861404	-3.04	0.002	-.4313698	-.0927722
mormon	.2924068	.2712475	1.08	0.282	-.2406984	.825512
xevang	-.2662586	.073969	-3.60	0.000	-.4116359	-.1208813
oth_rel	-.0690641	.125794	-0.55	0.583	-.3162974	.1781691
no_rel	.1206476	.1467546	0.82	0.411	-.1677814	.4090765
attend_r	.001573	.0012492	1.26	0.209	-.0008822	.0040281
anti	.3515011	.0397408	8.84	0.000	.2733953	.4296069
diverse	-.1092926	.0318534	-3.43	0.001	-.1718967	-.0466885
vmarket	-.0534087	.1198667	-0.45	0.656	-.2889927	.1821753
veqop	-.0941943	.094718	-0.99	0.321	-.2803513	.0919628
vhardwork	-.0701296	.1379141	-0.51	0.611	-.3411835	.2009243
vmorality	.2733219	.2410556	1.13	0.257	-.2004445	.7470883
vjustice	-.4035395	.120082	-3.36	0.001	-.6395465	-.1675325
vecon	-.0857873	.0791741	-1.08	0.279	-.2413947	.0698201
salience	.1234927	.0333423	3.70	0.000	.0579622	.1890231
_cons	2.716039	.1642393	16.54	0.000	2.393246	3.038832

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
ideologs	1.99	0.502921
party_id	1.88	0.531864
anti	1.60	0.625310
no_rel	1.56	0.640990
attend_r	1.50	0.664895
xevang	1.38	0.725940
catholic	1.35	0.738351
salience	1.30	0.770032
black	1.21	0.827076
vmorality	1.21	0.829168
veqop	1.20	0.836778
vecon	1.17	0.854787
oth_rel	1.15	0.866079
vjustice	1.15	0.871234
vhardwork	1.14	0.875249
vmarket	1.13	0.882949
diverse	1.11	0.902611
hispanic	1.10	0.908264
mormon	1.07	0.932208
Mean VIF	1.33	

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Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
chi2(1) = 2.09
Prob > chi2 = 0.1485
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Curriculum Vitae

Ward Kay has been conducting public opinion research on public policy issues for more than 20 years. He has worked in the media, at university survey laboratories and for the federal government in the Census Bureau and the National Institutes of Health. He has a M.S. in Survey Methodology from the Joint Program of Survey Methodology (University of Maryland/University of Michigan) and a B.S. in Statistics from the University of Michigan.

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Selected Publications

Bishop, George F. (2005). *The Illusion of Public Opinion: Fact and Artifact in American Public Opinion Polls*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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