






CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION:  
WHEN THE MILITARY DROPS RIFLES AND PICKS UP WRENCHES

by

Edi Jurkovic  
A Thesis  
Submitted to the  
Graduate Faculty  
of  
George Mason University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
The Requirements for the Degree  
of  
Master of Science  
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Committee:

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Date: 05/02/2013

Spring Semester 2013  
George Mason University  
Fairfax, VA

Civil-Military Cooperation:  
When The Military Drops Rifles and Picks Up Wrenches

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of  
Science in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University

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## **DEDICATION**

This is dedicated to my loving wife Melissa, who is always next to me, supporting and helping me. I also dedicate it to all of my family and friends who have had faith in me even when I challenged my own decisions. Thank you all.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the many friends, relatives, and supporters who have made this happen. My loving wife, Melissa, assisted me in my research by giving me suggestions and my father-in-law helped me with editing. Drs. Simmons, Sandole, and the other members of my committee were of invaluable help in their substantive guidance.

Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.  
–Mao Tse-Tung  
*On Guerrilla Warfare*, 1937

Effective civil-military relationships that are fully consistent with our Constitution and the powerful role the United States will continue to play in the international arena are essential for the future security and welfare of all Americans.  
–General Barry R. McCaffrey  
Foreword, *American Civil-Military Relations*, 2009

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Allied Joint Publication.....	AJP
Area of Responsibility .....	AoR
Austrian Development Agency.....	ADA
Civil Affairs .....	CA
Civil Affairs Operations.....	CAO
Civil-Military Operations.....	CMO
Civil-Military Cooperation .....	CIMIC
Communities Without Boundaries International .....	CWBI
Conflict Analysis and Resolution .....	CAR
Counterinsurgency .....	COIN
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.....	DDR
Governmental Organization.....	GO
Hand Over Take Over .....	HOTO
Humanitarian Assistance Organization.....	HAO
International Criminal Court.....	ICC
International Organization .....	IO
Internally Displaced Persons.....	IDPs
Law of Armed Conflict .....	LOAC
Military Decision Making Process.....	MDMP
Non-Governmental Organization.....	NGO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization .....	NATO
Peace Support Operation.....	PSO
Rules of Engagement .....	RoE
Security Sector Reform.....	SSR
United Kingdom.....	UK
United Nations .....	UN
United Nations Children’s Fund .....	UNICEF
United Nations Civil Military Coordination .....	UN-CMCoord
United Nations Secretary General .....	UN SG
United Nations Security Council .....	UNSC
World Health Organization.....	WHO
World War II.....	WWII

## **ABSTRACT**

### **CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: WHEN THE MILITARY DROPS RIFLES AND PICKS UP WRENCHES**

Edi Jurkovic, M.S.

George Mason University, 2013

Thesis Director: Dr. Solon Simmons

This pilot study explores civilian and military understanding of the procedures, role, and necessity of civil-military cooperation. It identifies obstacles to cooperation and divergent views between civilian humanitarian assistance organizations and the military on whether and how to overcome those obstacles. The study is designed to provide a new contribution to academic literature, which thus far has focused little on civil-military cooperation despite its record of success in peacebuilding and peacekeeping in post-conflict areas.

## INTRODUCTION

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)<sup>1</sup> is by no means new in the annals of human conflict. But for the commanding officer of a unit deployed in a conflict or post-conflict area it is both extremely important and largely unexplored. Military commanders of professional armies are normally competent in the art of war and in the conduct of battle but generally have little training or experience in managing the peace. But the truth is that, just as he must know about his adversaries in battle, the commander also must know about and be able to work with the local civilian population and civilian agencies in his area of responsibility (AoR).

The concept of civil-military cooperation has existed since ancient military forces were used for the occupation of new territories. Alexander the Great used the military to create new cities, such as Alexandria in Egypt, where the local civilian population and most of his demobilized veterans could settle, and his active forces could find a safe base.

Later, the Roman Empire continued that practice for centuries. In addition to their combat duties, Roman soldiers conducted civilian engineering<sup>2</sup> of roads and bridges during wartime to increase mobility. In peacetime, they built infrastructure as part of their training, to stay accustomed to hard labor and often to win the hearts and minds of

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this study, CIMIC will refer to the general practice of civil-military cooperation, rather than the official NATO term.

<sup>2</sup> “The Roman Army,” accessed October 29, 2012, <http://www.roman-empire.net/army/army.html>;  
“Armies, War, and Society in the West, Ca.300-ca.600,” accessed October 29, 2012, [http://usna.edu/Users/history/abels/hh381/late\\_roman\\_barbarian\\_militaries.htm](http://usna.edu/Users/history/abels/hh381/late_roman_barbarian_militaries.htm).

conquered nations by showing them some of the benefits of being part of the Empire. As Bryan Barabas stated, “During his military career, Julius Caesar had a bridge constructed in ten days to cross the Rhine River.”<sup>3</sup> And the bridge stayed for the locals to use long after the Roman Army departed.

During and immediately following World War II (WWII), military forces took over civilian responsibilities where they did not exist or were not effective. General Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall that he had a bigger problem with civil administration than with his enemies:

“ The sooner I can get rid of the questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live 10 years each week, of which at least 9 are absorbed in political and economic matters (...) and what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply shortage. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town.....”<sup>4</sup>

Later the U.S army was involved in governing occupied Germany and Japan because there were no other adequate options, and once again the military was required to fulfill what were routinely thought of as civilian responsibilities.<sup>5</sup>

Even though militaries have long helped civil society in administrating, engineering, logistics, and humanitarian relief, the term Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) was coined only recently. After NATO intervened in the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, it was clear that someone needed to step in and fill the gaps in civilian structures and agencies. International, non-governmental, and governmental

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<sup>3</sup> “Roman Engineering Achievements,” accessed October 29, 2012, <http://www.personal.psu.edu/bxb5052/roman.html>.

<sup>4</sup> “FM 3-05.401 Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,” September 23, 2003, chap. 4, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-05-401/index.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, “The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany,” 1990, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Occ-GY/index.htm#contents>.

organizations (IOs, NGOs, and GOs) were either late in arriving or lacked the span of control necessary to immediately fill these gaps, and thus it fell to NATO forces to deal directly with existing civilian institutions. As the implementation of the Dayton Accords progressed, international civilian organizations became a tool that enabled military forces to cooperate with what civilian structures existed.<sup>6</sup> After a somewhat rocky start, NATO forces and civilian institutions achieved a remarkably effective degree of cooperation and collegiality. But this was largely the result of ad hoc and personality-dependent measures. NATO leaders recognized that, if civilian-military operations were to be effective in the future, it was necessary to institutionalize structures, functions, processes and procedures.

Thus, following the success of this cooperation in sustaining peace and rebuilding infrastructure, NATO established CIMIC as an integral part of its operations. Other nations and organizations followed suit. Different nations use different terms for CIMIC; in the United States, the term is Civilian Affairs (CA)<sup>7</sup> or Civil Military Affairs (CMA),<sup>8</sup> and the UN has UN Civil Military Co-ordination (UN-CMCoord),<sup>9</sup> for example.

So why is CIMIC so important? As we have seen throughout the millennia of warfare, conflict is both complicated and sometimes intractable. Academia, the UN, and humanitarian workers refer to the fragmentation of sovereign states and emerging local

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<sup>6</sup> "NATO Review No. 1, 1998, P. 22-25", n.d., <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-07.htm>.

<sup>7</sup> Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - FM 3-05.401 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003); "Civil Affairs Positions," Marine Corps Gazette 92, no. 2 (February 2008): 4; Civil Affairs Operations - FM 3-05.40 (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 2006).

<sup>8</sup> Civil Affairs Operations - FM 3-05.40.

<sup>9</sup> UN OCHA, *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*, E 1.0 (United Nations, 2007).

and regional conflicts as complex emergencies.<sup>10</sup> A complex emergency is defined as the combination of internal conflict with large-scale displacements of people, mass famine or food shortage, and fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions. Often, complex emergencies are exacerbated by natural disasters.<sup>11</sup> These are the sorts of multi-dimensional crises that demand the highest degree of integration of military and civilian efforts and programs.

It is worth noting that CIMIC was not created for military philanthropy. From the military perspective, the main goal of effective CIMIC is to complete the military's mission of conflict resolution on terms favorable to the nation. But the military cannot complete its mission without leaving behind a stable, secure and benign environment. CIMIC allows the military to transition its responsibilities from warfighting to peace operations to withdrawal by successfully transitioning conflict resolution and institution building to civilian organizations and authorities.

The formal definition of CIMIC underscores this dynamic. According to Allied Joint Publication 3.4.9., the role of CIMIC is “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> S. J. H. Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?* (Brill Academic Pub, 2008), [http://www.amazon.com/Civil-Military-Cooperation-Response-Complex-Emergency/dp/9004163271/ref=sr\\_1\\_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338064483&sr=1-5](http://www.amazon.com/Civil-Military-Cooperation-Response-Complex-Emergency/dp/9004163271/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338064483&sr=1-5).

<sup>11</sup> “WHO | Complex Emergencies,” *WHO*, accessed February 11, 2013, [http://www.who.int/environmental\\_health\\_emergencies/complex\\_emergencies/en/](http://www.who.int/environmental_health_emergencies/complex_emergencies/en/).

<sup>12</sup> “Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation Ratification Draft (AJP-3.4.9)” (NATO Standardization Agency (NSA)), [http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/ajp\\_3.4.9\\_civmilcoop\\_ratification\\_draft.pdf](http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/ajp_3.4.9_civmilcoop_ratification_draft.pdf).

Beyond warfighting, CIMIC is also essential in addressing the military's responsibilities to support civilian institutions in cases of national emergencies and natural disasters. After Hurricane Katrina, U.S. land, air, and maritime military units played a crucial role in providing help to people in need, including building shelters, providing medical assistance, airlifting materials and moving people to a safe area, supplying food and water to those who were stranded, and producing fresh water.<sup>13</sup>

Balancing the need to help civilians with the need to carry out military duties, especially in Peace Support Operations (PSO), can be difficult. CIMIC has been criticized for the "militarization" of humanitarian and development aid and interfering with the work of NGOs. While this criticism is sometimes true, it also fails to recognize the realities on the ground. Former UN Secretary General (UNSG) Dag Hammarskjöld said of PSO more than 50 years ago, *"It's no job for a soldier, but only a soldier can do it."*<sup>14</sup>

CIMIC, however, is not only a job for the military; civilians must participate, too. Only with the effective marriage of civilian and military efforts can all parties complete their tasks quickly without duplication while minimizing animosity within the local population.

However, most Humanitarian Assistance Organizations (HAOs) and the majority of militaries do not understand the need for comprehensive integration of efforts, often operating in their own paradigm with little desire for, or experience in, cooperation. If the United States, the United Nations, and the international community are to become

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<sup>13</sup> Jean- Loup Samaan and Laurent Verneuil, "Civil–Military Relations in Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study on Crisis Management in Natural Disaster Response," in : *Enhancing Transatlantic Governance on Disaster Relief and Preparedness*, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> James V. Arbuckle, "NATO Review," 2007, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/analysis1.html>.



more effective in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, then militaries and civilian organizations must institutionalize CIMIC in a comprehensive and visionary manner, building capabilities through focused programs that emphasize people, training, organization, doctrine, equipment and leaders – all trained and ready for the complexities of building the peace.

### **Research Problem**

In conflict and post-conflict areas, many levels of conflict operations and prevention are necessary. First of all, we want to stop the fighting and provide immediate humanitarian relief. Over the longer term, however, we want to build the institutions, procedures and dialogues necessary to prevent conflict from re-emerging. This second task is, by its very nature, far more complex than the first and demands imaginative and pragmatic integration of efforts by the military and civilian organizations.

Precedent suggests that the combination of civilian and military efforts is an effective path to stopping conflict and preventing its resumption. The Balkans conflicts, Afghanistan, Iraq, and others show that synergy between civilians and military forces involved in PSO are a necessity. Yet there is considerable institutional resistance to effecting such cooperation; it is not always clear to the military why it should drop its weapons and pick up shovels, helping locals rather than fighting an enemy. Moreover, militaries are not routinely trained in peace support operations to the degree that they are prepared to conduct combat operations.

The post-Dayton situation in Bosnia illustrates the sine qua non of CIMIC. In fulfilling the terms of the Dayton Accords, NATO surged overwhelming forces into Bosnia; tanks stood on virtually every street corner. This demonstration of both military strength and political will proved able to stop the conflict and ensure that all sides adhered to the terms of the Accords.

But that was not enough. NATO forces quickly found that to keep the war from recurring required equipping the local population with the basic tools for survival and governance. And that, in turn, necessitated cooperation with NGOs, IOs, GOs, and local governing structures. This synergy arguably resulted in fewer casualties and higher success of the mission. It also demonstrated that civilians need to cooperate with the military in achieving their mutual goals, just as the military must recognize the valuable and unique contributions of the civilian sector.

While the “softer side” of military forces is often welcomed, especially as they provide logistical support, transportation, and medical resources, many HAOs have expressed reluctance toward military engagement in these activities, assessing that security forces undermine humanitarian work.

Misunderstanding and mistrust exist on both sides, especially because civilians often see the military as crude prototypes of Rambo, and the military sees civilians as tree huggers with no sense of security. To be sure, many steps toward institutionalizing effective CIMIC have already been taken within the military and, to a lesser extent, in certain civilian organizations. Indeed, the military began to participate in CIMIC as a direct link with HAOs, and HAOs started realizing the importance of cooperation.

However, in practice, the situation is much more complicated, and cooperation is often fraught with hurdles. As Rietjens stated, “The most effective cooperation is at the lower level, up to the battalion commander and his civilian counterpart;”<sup>15</sup> But, because junior military leaders are not well trained in PSO and have to learn as they go, their knowledge and experience is often lost when their unit rotates out of the combat zones. New units led by new commanders assume responsibility for the area and must learn hard-won lessons all over again. While some military units apply new operational approaches effectively, others repeat previous mistakes, requiring the new staff to reinvent the wheel and try to catch up with the other key actors in the field, losing valuable time and faith from the local population. In the end, most of the knowledge is anecdotal and stays at the bottom or mid-level and is not always put into practice at the strategic level of military structures.<sup>16</sup>

Common obstacles to CIMIC include competing priorities, budgetary constraints, and the involvement of local human resources. Experience in Afghanistan has shown that cooperation between the military and HAOs is effective only if implemented at every level, not just at the working level. Additionally, this model would need to be institutionalized in such a way that every nation participating in a PSO applies the same principles of CIMIC, yet agile enough that it could be adjusted to the situation on the ground and the capabilities of the contributors.

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<sup>15</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

<sup>16</sup> Author was conducting training regarding CIMIC with Operational Command of Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where junior officers easily accepted cooperation, while most of the Generals were very skeptical toward the “NATO’s new toy”.

## Background

Louise Diamond and John McDonald described a system of interconnecting “tracks” that shape the way that peace is achieved in the international system, identifying the various actors and relationships that shape the peacemaking process and stressing the importance of a multi-track approach.<sup>17</sup> Diamond and McDonald defined peacebuilding as creating the tangible and intangible conditions to enable a conflict-riddled system to become a peaceful system. Effective peacebuilding requires political arrangements in which all local actors can operate; mid-level economic, military, and community infrastructure through which peace can be implemented over the long term; and a solid social foundation.<sup>18</sup> This study suggests that civil-military cooperation is essential to achieving each element of peacebuilding and that HAOs and the military are key components of the multi-track approach that Diamond and McDonald advocated.

Every time all elements in the field have cooperated, the tasks have been completed more quickly and successfully. Complex emergencies require an integrated approach; all actors need to trust each other to help achieve their mutual goals. Both sides of the CIMIC equation also need to understand that their basic missions are different. At the most fundamental level, the objective of the HAOs is to help people in need. The overarching mission of the military is to achieve the national goals identified by civilian leaders. Both HAOs and the military need to understand and respect each

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<sup>17</sup> James Notter and Louise Diamond, “Occasional Paper: Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice” (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, October 1996), <http://www.imtd.org/publications/occasional-papers/building-peace-and-transforming-conflict-multi-track-diplomacy-in-practice/>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

other's missions and to find ways to ensure that their respective missions are achieved through cooperation and collegiality.

One of the most important elements of cooperation, aside from mutual trust, is the sharing of information. Mockaitis (2004) stated:

Accurate information on the local situation is vital to the success of both humanitarian and military missions. Such information should be exchanged as freely as possible. However, many IOs and NGOs complain the security briefings often provide them with little useful information, and that when they request more detail, the military responds with: "That information is classified." Any military must at times withhold information for security reasons. However, soldiers almost automatically fall back on the "classified" rule, even when the information requested will not compromise security or sources. Soldiers should also understand that although IOs and NGOs desire to assist them, they cannot always reveal confidential information.<sup>19</sup>

Second, it is important to use forces, military or civilian, that can meet the requirements in the field, rather than simply deploying a certain number of people. A particular infantry unit may be essential in combat, but if that same unit lacks language and cultural training, its use in a PSO can hinder rather than help building sustainable peace.

The same applies to HAO personnel as well. According to Franke:

All personnel should receive extensive CIMIC training prior to deployment (including clearly articulated mandates and objectives) that sensitizes them to area and culture specific mission objectives and, more generally, to the dangers confronted by civilian aid workers when the lines between civilian and military spheres become blurred.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Civil-military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo* (U.S. Army War College, 2004), [http://www.amazon.com/Civil-military-Cooperation-Peace-Operations-Kosovo/dp/1584871687/ref=sr\\_1\\_8?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338064483&sr=1-8](http://www.amazon.com/Civil-military-Cooperation-Peace-Operations-Kosovo/dp/1584871687/ref=sr_1_8?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338064483&sr=1-8).

<sup>20</sup> Volker Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2006), [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11\\_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf).

Finally, CIMIC policies and procedures need to be trained to – and tested - prior to deployment, especially in complex emergencies. Mutual training of military and HAO personnel prior to deployment by applying real life scenarios can determine whether those policies and procedures are practical and applicable, and it can show each side that the other is able to contribute and willing to cooperate. As Mockaitis and Gourlay said, training together can build mutual trust and faith, and once deployed both sides are already accustomed to each other's way of operating.<sup>21</sup>

### **Purpose of This Study**

The purpose of this study is to identify roadblocks to cooperation between civilians and the military in PSO, given the many cases in which such cooperation has demonstrated to be essential requirements for successful conflict resolution. This study also seeks to identify ways to bring both sides to the table, not because of the needs of their respective organizations but because of people in need, who stand to lose the most from the lack of civil-military cooperation. This study is intended to be a useful resource for scholars who seek a practical example of the importance of a multi-track approach to peacebuilding, as well as for members of HAOs and military, who generally are seeking ways to cut costs and maximize the efficiency of their deployments.<sup>22</sup> Both sides therefore stand to benefit from effective civil-military cooperation.

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<sup>21</sup> Mockaitis, *Civil-military Cooperation in Peace Operations*; Catriona Gourlay, *Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions* (Disarmament Forum, 2000).

<sup>22</sup> Larry Shaughnessy, "One Soldier, One Year: \$850,000 and Rising" (February 28, 2012), <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/28/one-soldier-one-year-850000-and-rising/>; Amy Belasco, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues*, CRS Report for Congress, July 2, 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf>.

## **Research Questions**

How willing are civilian structures to cooperate with legitimate military structures, and vice versa, to provide help to people in need through PSO?

What moves can the military take to establish itself as a stronger partner for civilian counterparts, and vice versa?

Do humanitarian organizations operating in a post-conflict area understand the goals of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)?

Is there a difference in the mindset and training that military and civilians from Humanitarian Assistance Organizations undergo? If so, how does it manifest itself on the ground?

Is there competition between the military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations, and if so, how does that affect their ability to help the local population?

## Significance to the Field

In a time of numerous conflicts across the globe, the role of the military as a peacekeeping and peace-building force and a complement to civilian PSO efforts is highly important. Beyond the need for military force to stop a conflict, the military plays a crucial role in providing security as the peacebuilding process unfolds and building a sustainable infrastructure that can provide for lasting peace.<sup>23</sup>

The theory of “three block war”<sup>24</sup> highlights that military forces conduct combat operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian work at the same time, but in different parts of the conflict area, underscoring the importance of the military in PSO. However, humanitarian and diplomatic organizations operate in the same space with the military, sometimes doing similar jobs. Aiding the local population is more difficult without civil-military cooperation, especially when animosity exists between those two elements of PSO. One of the consequences is the duplication of aid or providing aid to a region where it is not needed and depriving another area where the aid is crucial. Lack of cooperation can prolong the misery of a post-conflict area and slow its recovery and sustainable development.

The classic example of this sort of institutional schism is the bridge over the gorge. The military wants to blow up the bridge in order to deny the enemy the ability to move its forces rapidly across the battle space. HAOs insist that the bridge remain intact

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<sup>23</sup> Notter and Diamond, “Occasional Paper: Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice.”

<sup>24</sup> Max Boot, and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Beyond the 3-block War,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/beyond-3-block-war/p10204>.



because it is essential to bring food to markets. Different missions force different perspectives.

Conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) practitioners often are directly or indirectly involved in conflict and post-conflict areas as members of humanitarian agencies, advisers to the military, or academics doing research. Practitioners are called upon to find the best *modus operandi* that will maximize the efficiency of resources, both human and material, and complete their tasks in the shortest period of time.

This study has significant implications for the discipline of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. As CAR matures and expands its intellectual influence, a growing number of CAR students will emerge as practitioners in the field. Many will become directly or indirectly involved with HAOs, while others will work for governments through the military, the State Department or Foreign Ministry, or other agencies that assist populations abroad. By bringing the seemingly unrelated military and civilian entities closer and providing new generations of CAR practitioners with new tools, the length of time it takes to learn and apply new knowledge could be shortened, which would not only enable practitioners to adjust more quickly in the field but also benefit local populations struggling to recover from war.

The goal of this study, therefore, is to identify the obstacles to civil-military cooperation and suggest ways to overcome them. The study aims to give CAR practitioners and scholars a new understanding of the importance of this cooperation and how it can be applied in areas where military and civilian structures operate in the same battle and peacebuilding space.

## **Definitions**

### **Actors within Civil-Military Cooperation**

Numerous actors operate as a part of CIMIC, but the most prominent are the military (international, coalition, and/or local), NGOs (non-profit and for-profit), GOs, IOs, host nations, and the media. For the purposes of this study, the term “civilian” will refer not to the local population but to the national and international HAOs. This study will refer to the local population as “people in need,” since these are the people to whom most organizations provide aid. The term “military” will refer only to international or coalition forces deployed in the area of operation as part of PSO forces. It will not refer to the national or local military or to any security structure in the host country.

### **Humanitarian Assistance Organizations (HAOs)**

Modern HAOs do not just deliver humanitarian aid (providing food and water, shelter, medical assistance, etc.); they also advocate for the disenfranchised and minorities, provide legal assistance, promote human rights, and even engage in scientific projects. HAOs are usually divided into three main groups:<sup>25</sup> IOs, NGOs, and GOs.

- International organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are formed by intergovernmental agreements and operate at an international level. They can be part of umbrella organizations

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<sup>25</sup> Hugo Slim, “The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 3 (1996).

such as the UN, or they can be independent and recognized by other nations and organizations.<sup>26</sup>

- Non-governmental organizations such as CARE<sup>27</sup> usually operate outside the scope of any government. Even though NGOs can be the recipients of funds and grants from governments, they do not advocate a particular political stance for those governments. Their spectrum of activity generally includes providing humanitarian assistance, advocating for the disempowered, serving as human rights observers, and protecting indigenous animal life forms. Usually NGOs fall into two categories: mandated (officially recognized by the lead international organization), or non-mandated (not recognized by an IO but can be sub-contracted by an IO or another mandated NGO).<sup>28</sup>
- Governmental organizations, such as the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), are designed to provide humanitarian assistance. Many, including scholars, see organizations that are part of the non-governmental sector as de facto governmental organizations.

## **Military**

The armed forces, composed of one or all three branches (air, land and maritime) of one or more contributing countries, intervene in crises with the authorization by the UN to implement the will of the international community. Another option is for the host

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<sup>26</sup> ICRC has an observation seat in the UN General Assembly.

<sup>27</sup> “CARE,” accessed March 11, 2013, <http://www.care.org/about/index.asp>.

<sup>28</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

country to request military assistance from another country or regional organization in a bilateral agreement.<sup>29</sup> Since the level and type of engagement varies depending on the situation in the mission area, forces are tailored for the best way of completing the mission.

In the case of a quick deployment to prevent a major violation of human rights and help to people in need, some countries and organizations such as NATO have created Rapid Reaction Forces.<sup>30</sup> The majority of those forces have logistical support or are attached to the forces of a country that can provide logistical support—usually through a Memorandum of Understanding and a Military Technical Agreement—so they can operate autonomously for a certain period of time. After a successful mission, these forces return to their home countries, or they can be reinforced with additional elements if the mission becomes protracted. Since they are tailored to specific missions, they can perform a variety of tasks. However, since all UN and/or coalition forces are composed of personnel from many different nations, their size, capabilities, competence, and professionalism can vary. As Weiss and Collins said:

Additionally, less developed countries are less able to provide their troops with what is needed for a multinational peacekeeping operation, including appropriate clothing and equipment. In the middle of Croatia's winter, Pakistani troops arrived in summer uniforms. ... In Bihac, four Bangladeshi soldiers shared a single rifle.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> "NATO Response Force (NRF)" (NATO HQ, February 2013), [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2013\\_02/20130220\\_130220-factsheet\\_nrf\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_02/20130220_130220-factsheet_nrf_en.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> Thomas George Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000).

## Host Nations

In response to complex emergencies, both military and humanitarian organizations operate in unfamiliar surroundings, often without the support of a functioning local government. Sometimes the whole government has collapsed and is non-existent, and sometimes it is hostile toward all or part of its own population, neighboring countries, or the whole region. Libya during Muammar Gaddafi's regime, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and Afghanistan under Taliban rule are key examples.

There are several key areas in which the military and HAOs interact with host governments and populations.<sup>32</sup> First, cooperation is crucial for long term success in reviving a war-torn economy and establishing or reestablishing sustainable government. Post-conflict economies usually are either in complete shambles or hindered by instability, poor infrastructure and a corrupt government. The government often is formed from the winning side, not representing all members of society, so minorities often are ignored. Nonetheless, host governments in whatever form are ultimately responsible for the security, justice and well-being of their people, so they need to be seen as serious actors by all participants in peace building and conflict resolution.<sup>33</sup>

Second, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is often an important part of stability in the host country, and effective host country military forces can be important contributors providing a secure environment in which HAOs can operate. Often, SSR requires Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) for the local military,

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<sup>32</sup> John Mackinlay, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (Brown University: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996).

<sup>33</sup> Larry Minear and Thomas George Weiss, *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

paramilitary and other armed forces and eventually the creation of modern and functional armed forces<sup>34</sup> that can take over as a guarantor of security when international forces eventually withdraw.

Third, the local population, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, often carries the most tragic personal burden of a complex emergency. The natural and humanitarian impulses of the international community are to provide immediate and significant aid to such people, particularly those in refugee camps. Such aid, however, needs to be accompanied by a resettlement and reintegration program that helps reduce long-term dependency on international aid. People in need should not only be seen as victims but must also be empowered to build up their own capabilities to feed, house and clothe themselves.<sup>35</sup>

Households often develop their own way of operating in a crisis, as did the citizens of Sarajevo, Bosnia, during the 1992-95 wartime siege, who developed intricate social connections. Aid should not damage those social connections but widen them through education. As one of the interview participants stated:

How that changed, and how Korea got to where it is today ... the answer that anyone will give you about that is education, education, education. The sense that Afghan parents do not want education for their children is absolutely wrong. You think that any farmer in rural parts of Afghanistan does not want to educate his child. He absolutely wants to educate his son and I think there are now three

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<sup>34</sup> Author of this Thesis was part of Building Integrity in Defense Establishment (BIDE), program created by NATO, UK Defense College and Amnesty International as a part of SSR development in Armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<sup>35</sup> *The Do No Harm Handbook - The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict* (Cambridge, USA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004), <http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf>; D. Hilhorst and G. Frerks, "Local Capacities for Peace: Concepts, Possibilities and Constraints, Paper Presented at the Seminar" (presented at the 'Local Capacities for Peace, Utrecht: Pax Christi, Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Disaster Studies Wageningen, 1999).

millions girls in high school, and more and more it is accepted that “yes, there is value in educating the girls.”<sup>36</sup>

Organizations, therefore, need to provide enough aid for basic existence, especially for IDPs and refugees, and at the same time provide help for the society to function sustainably on its own. According to Ritchie, “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; show him how to catch fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.”<sup>37</sup>

## **Media**

Over the last few decades, the media have become an important factor in conflict, as well as disasters both man-made and natural. Media are vital particularly for HAOs, as they use the media to promote themselves and generate more donations for their programs. Also, media coverage of human suffering generates more interest within an HAO toward a specific area; a refugee camp in Tanzania with almost no media coverage received only a fraction of HAO resources compared with Great Lakes areas Kigali and Goma, which received extensive media attention.<sup>38</sup>

Military actions are always on the media’s radar. After the highly adversarial relationship between the US media and the US military during the Vietnam War, US military personnel decided that embedded journalism would help them to win the hearts and minds not only of the local population, but compatriots at home.<sup>39</sup> During the first Iraq war, the media crew followed only a handful of units, but today the practice has

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<sup>36</sup> Interview with NGO workers, 2013.

<sup>37</sup> Anne Isabella Ritchie, “Give a Man a Fish, and You Feed Him for a Day; Show Him How to Catch Fish, and You Feed Him for a Lifetime.,” 1880, <http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/give-a-man-a-fish.html>.

<sup>38</sup> Pär Eriksson, “Civil-Military Co-ordination in Peace Support Operations – An Impossible Necessity?,” September 14, 2000, <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1469>.

<sup>39</sup> Terence Smith, “Embedded Journalists in Iraq: War Stories | PBS NewsHour | April 1, 2003,” April 1, 2003, [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june03/embeds\\_04-01.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june03/embeds_04-01.html).

expanded. Its merits are debated, and the media are not always viewed as objective.<sup>40</sup>

Nonetheless, the omnipresence of the media and the immediate global news cycle underscore the importance of a strategic communications program as an integral element of successful CIMIC operations.

## **CIMIC Definitions from Different Sources**

### **NATO Definition of CIMIC**

NATO defines CIMIC as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”<sup>41</sup>

### **UN Definition of CIMIC**

The UN refers to Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> David Ignatius, “The Dangers of Embedded Journalism, in War and Politics,” *The Washington Post*, May 2, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001100.html>.

<sup>41</sup> “Ajp 9 Nato Civil Military Co Operation Cimic Doctrine,” accessed May 26, 2012, <http://kecubung.webfactional.com/ebook/ajp-9-nato-civil-military-co-operation-cimic-doctrine.pdf>; *CIMIC Field Handbook* (Enschede, Netherlands: Civil – Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence), <http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/cfh/cimic-handbook.pdf>.

<sup>42</sup> UN OCHA, *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*.



## **EU Definition of CIMIC**

According to the EU, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”<sup>43</sup>

## **US Model of CIMIC**

The United States declares that CIMIC includes “those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and Civil Military Operations (CMO).<sup>44</sup>

## **One Academic Definition of CIMIC**

Volker Franke stated:

“Cooperation between the civilian and military elements involves integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need. At the outset, civilian and military actors share the long-term goal of promoting human security and developing the conditions for societies marked by conflict to transition back to peaceful and stable structures. Initially, civil-military relationships were formed in the field, when troops stepped in to fill gaps in

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<sup>43</sup> European Union Military Staff, *EU Concept for Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) for EU-Led Military Operations* (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008).

<sup>44</sup> *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - FM 3-05.401; Civil Affairs Operations - FM 3-05.40.*

civilian capabilities. In response to the growing complexity of operational requirements, states are increasingly recognizing the intensifying working relationship between military and civilian actors and are now developing their own doctrines specifying the nature of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).”<sup>45</sup>

## **Limitations**

This thesis is designed as a pilot study for deeper and more comprehensive future research. The number of potential participants with CIMIC experience is limited, so the sample size is relatively small. Therefore, this study has limited external validity, so its findings might not be able to be generalized widely. Also, the research design does not lend well to a control group, so it might have reduced internal validity. Notwithstanding these concerns, this study is intended to provide a starting point for further research and a series of conclusions that have considerable face validity.

Finally, since this study focuses on participants’ personal experiences and institutionalized memories, there is the possibility of embedded biases toward one or the other side. This limitation could be minimized with a larger sample size.

## **Ethical Considerations**

Participation in this study was strictly voluntary. All personal interviews were stored on an external hard drive to which only the researcher had access. Confidentiality of participants was guaranteed throughout the study, and any information that could reveal a participant’s identity was intentionally omitted unless the participant gave explicit permission for his or her name to be used. Interview questions were designed to gather information regarding participants’ personal experiences and were written with

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<sup>45</sup> Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.”

clarity and specificity, which was intended to prevent incorrect interpretations that could skew the research findings.

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

*“Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.”*

Albert Einstein

Although the concept of CIMIC is as almost old as military warfare, academic research on the topic is relatively recent and, therefore, modest. Many scholars see CIMIC as opportunity for development and explored it partially through other studies, but it has not been studied in depth. The academic literature on CIMIC is limited to a few books, dissertations, and theses, as well as a significant number of reports and individual papers. As Perito stated, much has been written about the role of the military in peacekeeping, but there are few works in the literature concerning the role of nonmilitary security.<sup>46</sup> CIMIC does, however, feed into frameworks of peacebuilding such as that outlined by Diamond and McDonald, who suggest that the path to sustainable peace is woven with interconnecting “tracks” that include both government—including military—and civilian components.<sup>47</sup>

Yet, as argued above, CIMIC is vital to long-term success in conflict resolution and, therefore, justifies comprehensive research with a methodology that can capture the essence of the problems CIMIC faces and suggest sustainable solutions. As such, CIMIC

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<sup>46</sup> Robert M Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

<sup>47</sup> Notter and Diamond, “Occasional Paper: Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice.”

can be understood as soft military intervention,<sup>48</sup> whose objective is to win hearts and minds, rather than hard intervention, which entails imposing peace through military force and—although sometimes producing a quicker solution—can prolong conflict and instability in the region over the long term. Looking at CIMIC through an academic lens can be helpful to HAOs and the military in assessing ways to approach their missions and programs.

### **Civil Military Cooperation as a Concept**

Most activities conducted by the military that are connected with CIMIC are in the context of Peace Support Operations (PSO), although CIMIC can also be conducted in a country that is not enmeshed in conflict but is recovering from a natural catastrophe.<sup>49</sup>

There is no universally accepted list of assignments by the military in humanitarian activities, but they can generally be divided into three categories, which can be drawn from the definitions of CIMIC: security, assistance to HAOs, and direct aid to people in need.

Security is the most important part of the military's role in a complex emergency. It can be divided into three subcategories<sup>50</sup>:

- Security of one's own forces (force protection)
- Security of HAOs
- Security of the host nation's people

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<sup>48</sup> Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him* □?.

<sup>49</sup> Samaan and Verneuil, "Civil–Military Relations in Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study on Crisis Management in Natural Disaster Response."

<sup>50</sup> Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations."

Within the dynamics of CIMIC, the military needs to provide security to the HAOs so that they can perform their activities in a secure environment and help the host nation learn to provide its own security. Certain HAOs, however, feel a sense of invulnerability and propagate their symbols and flags as a sign of humanity, independence, neutrality, and impartiality.<sup>51</sup> In some cases, though, declaring those four principles of HAOs is not enough. Some organizations that originated in certain countries, especially in the West, are immediately seen by the host nation as biased even if they are not.<sup>52</sup> They are sometimes perceived as neo-colonial forces, replacing missionaries who spread religion in the name of King and country throughout the European imperial era.

Therefore, HAOs are not inviolate and have themselves been attacked on numerous occasions. As Duffield notes, some level of military suppression is necessary so that development can follow behind and take root.<sup>53</sup> HAOs have learned, sometimes the hard way, that they must have security if they are to be able to accomplish their humanitarian missions. According to Kenneth Anderson:

At 8:30 a.m. local time on October 27, 2003, an ambulance packed with explosives rammed into security barriers outside the Red Cross headquarters in Baghdad, killing some 40 people, including two Iraqi International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employees, and leaving more than 200 wounded. The ICRC announced immediately following the

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<sup>51</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*, 18–19.

<sup>52</sup> Abby Stoddard, “With Us or Against Us? NGO Neutrality on the Line,” *Humanitarian Practice Network*, December 2003, <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-25/with-us-or-against-us-ngo-neutrality-on-the-line>; Nadia Schadow, “There Is No Neutral,” March 16, 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/16/there\\_is\\_no\\_neutral](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/16/there_is_no_neutral); Kenneth Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts,” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 17 (2004): 41–74.

<sup>53</sup> Mark R Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

attacks withdrawal of its international staff from Baghdad, thereby reducing vital programs and services to the most vulnerable segments of the population. The October suicide bombing came two months after the August 19 attack on the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Baghdad that left 23 people dead, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary General's Special Representative in Iraq. Expressing horror and consternation, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) head Mark Malloch Brown surmised on the day of the August attack: "We do this [humanitarian relief] out of vocation. We are apolitical. We were here to help the people of Iraq and help them return to self-government. Why us?"<sup>54</sup>

In some cases, HAOs hire their own security composed of local nationals, who are responsible for such missions as providing convoy protection as well as securing infrastructure and personnel. While often the most expedient solution, self-generated security often creates significant problems. In Somalia, certain NGOs hired local nationals, which brought them into confrontation with UN and US forces deployed in the area.<sup>55</sup>

According to Pugh and Williams, the most important PSO task for the military is to provide security to the host nation and HAOs and to protect them from opposing military or paramilitary forces.<sup>56</sup> Michael Pugh stated that "experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and the Great Lakes have taught that civilian organizations cannot do their job effectively without military/police operations to provide security."<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Anderson, "Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts."

<sup>55</sup> Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>56</sup> Garland H Williams, *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).

<sup>57</sup> Michael Pugh, *Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: Hegemony or Emancipation?* (London: ODI, 2001).

Beyond security, military assistance to HAOs involves activities that support HAOs in their tasks, often focused on logistical and/or technical support, such as heavy lifting, road transportation, and air lifting.<sup>58</sup> According to Bollen, “The civil-military alliance is essentially demand driven,”<sup>59</sup> which means that where demand for help, an alliance is will exist between two entities? However, the use of the military for these time-urgent requirements is not without its downsides; using the military for construction, for example, can alienate the local workforce, which often has a high unemployment rate in a post-conflict area. According to Volker Franke, “... in Somalia, the U.S. military deployed its own engineers and support troops to rebuild roads and other infrastructure at a time when Somalis desperately needed jobs.”<sup>60</sup>

Finally, direct assistance from the military to people in need is necessary when there are no appropriate HAOs to provide aid. In some cases the security situation is too unstable for HAOs to operate, so the military needs to do some of the standard work of the HAOs on top of their military duties. Ironically, HAOs often balk at the military’s efforts to protect HAOs and the host nation people, and some accuse the military of using them to achieve military or political goals.<sup>61</sup> Some assess that the military, by performing traditionally civilian tasks is hiding behind basic humanitarian principles to further military goals, thereby hindering real humanitarian work. According to Biddle and Bartolini, one humanitarian worker noted, “By pretending to be aid workers, armed

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<sup>58</sup> Dick Zandee, *Building Blocks for Peace: Civil-military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 1998); Dick Zandee, “Civil-military Interaction in Peace Operations,” *NATO HQ* 47, no. 1 (1999): 11–15; Williams, *Engineering Peace*.

<sup>59</sup> Myriame Bollen, “Working Apart Together,” 2002.

<sup>60</sup> Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.”

<sup>61</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.



forces are trying to have it both ways, to benefit from the protections accorded non-combatants while themselves remaining combatants.”<sup>62</sup> As Rietjens stated, in some cases even with numerous organizations in the area, there are gaps due to poor organization or inadequate resources.<sup>63</sup>

For its part, the military is trying to serve its purpose,<sup>64</sup> but its approach is often one-sided, focusing on the military side of the coin with limited attention to the civilian side. The military argues that its mission and associated Rules of Engagement are not sufficiently robust for deployed military forces to be flexible in a changing environment. Joulwan and Shoemaker assessed that one of the key principles of civil-military implementation is that the military RoE should be robust and realistic enough that the military can avoid “mission creep,” wherein a successful mission is expanded beyond the scope of available resources and mandates.<sup>65</sup> UN Secretary General Das Hammarskjöld coined the expression “chapter six-and-a-half” to describe a solution that lies between the peaceful settlement of disputes, spelled out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and coercive peace enforcement, outlined in Chapter VII.<sup>66</sup> He envisioned giving UN forces more options for operating in an unsafe area.

Even though HAOs generally oppose the use of force, they sometimes welcome the option for it if a threat exists. For example, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> “Ajp 9 Nato Civil Military Co Operation Cimic Doctrine.”

<sup>65</sup> George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict* (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998).

<sup>66</sup> Thomas George Weiss, *Military-civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

and NATO forces in Bosnia, due to the lack of mandate, were unable to use its military forces in order to protect a humanitarian convoy trying to enter the besieged capital.<sup>67</sup>

Following the crises in Rwanda and Bosnia, when undermanned and undermandated UN forces were overrun by local combatants and unable to protect civilians, no longer are the laws silent when the guns sound.<sup>68</sup> As Perito notes, a similar situation happened after the 1992-95 in Brcko, Bosnia, where unarmed ethnic Serb women, children, and young men—who were opposed to US intervention in Bosnia—managed to force a U.S. military platoon out of Brcko, creating instability and threatening not only international forces but other international organizations in the city.<sup>69</sup> The law now reaches every level of war, as the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague demonstrates.<sup>70</sup> The law has infiltrated even the military's decision-making process (MDMP). Before striking a target, ever-present military lawyers are expected to ensure that the proposed attack accords with the applicable Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).<sup>71</sup>

Military support to HAOs is shaped by the Rules of Engagement that all military units are given for the conduct of operations throughout the battlespace. These rules of engagement (RoE) tell the commander what targets he is allowed to engage, what constraints he must follow, what clearances he must obtain before engaging, and what

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<sup>67</sup> André Luc Beauregard, "Civil Military Cooperation in Joint Humanitarian Operations: a Case Analysis of Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda" (UMI Dissertation Services, 1998).

<sup>68</sup> Yoram Dinstein, *The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

<sup>69</sup> Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him* □?.

<sup>70</sup> Marlies Glasius, *The International Criminal Court: a Global Civil Society Achievement* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>71</sup> Brendan Groves, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations: Lessons Learned from the Azizabad Attack," *The Air Force Law Review* 65 (2010): 1–50.

means he must use to assess the results of his attack. In the context of PSO and CIMIC, rules of engagement should be shaped with input from HAOs and other civilians operating in the battlespace. Back to our “bridge” example cited above, the appropriate RoE might well say, “infrastructure targets may not be engaged without clearance from the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).”

RoE are both permissive and restrictive; the RoE that the UN peacekeepers had for peace keeping operations in Bosnia were so restrictive that they did not permit Dutch troops from preventing the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. It is possible that closer input from civilian organizations operating in the “safe zone” of Srebrenica could have provided ROE that might have prevented the slaughter of nearly 8,000 Muslim men and boys, whose bodies are still being dug up.

### **Challenges in Cooperation**

Standard obstacles to CIMIC tend to fall into six categories: cultural, organizational, operational, normative, communication, and education.

Culture. First, each organization has a unique culture. Avruch stated, “Individuals are organized in many potentially different ways in a population, by many different (and cross-cutting) criteria: for example, by kinship into families or clans; by language, race, or creed into ethnic groups; by social economic characteristics into social classes; by geographical region into political interest groups; and by occupation or institutional

memberships into unions, bureaucracies, industries, political parties and militaries.”<sup>72</sup> On a broader scale, the military and HAOs each have a distinct culture and set of goals that sometimes produce friction between them. HAOs sometimes believe that humanitarians make peace, while the military wages war, a perspective that is not altogether inaccurate. The core goals of humanitarian work distinguish it from those of the military.<sup>73</sup>

Coser’s theory of others, “ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-group, out-group,”<sup>74</sup> suggests that bringing two fundamentally different groups together is very difficult. Key differences in culture show how hard it is for the military and HAOs to fully cooperate and trust each other. Even when they are able to work together, culture colors not only their missions but the means by which those missions are fulfilled.

These cultural divides make it imperative that HAOs and the military take extraordinary measures to understand one another. That is just as important as understanding the culture of the host nation. But such cross-cultural training is generally not conducted by either the military or HAOs.

Indeed, cultural awareness training that focuses on the host nation’s culture is often offered only to CIMIC practitioners who spend most of their deployment time in contact with the local population. Others receive limited or no training in the host culture. Mockaitis wrote of an “incident in Kosovo where an American officer forced a solution

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<sup>72</sup> Kevin Avruch, *Culture & Conflict Resolution* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 19.

<sup>73</sup> Groves, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations,” 16.

<sup>74</sup> Lewis A Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* ([New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 35.

over what color to paint a youth center, leaving the NGO to spend the next month sorting out the mess.”<sup>75</sup>

Organization. Organizational challenges are often less problematic than cultural differences, but still can impede the success of a CIMIC mission. Military organizations are tailored to a specific mission before a unit deploys, with little or no flexibility to change without a change in mission. HAOs are more fluid and adaptable to a changing situation because they have little of the discipline that marks military organizations. According to Franke, “Command structures in the military are centralized and vertical with clear and well-defined lines of authority flowing hierarchically from top to bottom. The chain of command is typically structured so that it can respond quickly and promote fast and efficient decision-making.”<sup>76</sup> He also posited that, “By contrast, the organizational structure of most NGOs is horizontal and fluid based on a consensus-approach and allowing for considerable decision authority left to field operatives.”<sup>77</sup>

Lack of communication often results from a lack of understanding of another organization, even though each side has a responsibility to communicate with the other. Contacting the wrong person in an organization can result in silence, not because that organization does not want to cooperate, but because the wrong person was contacted and does not have enough training or experience or is too busy with other responsibilities to answer the question or delegate it to the right person. According to Beauregard, “Because some NGOs and militaries are unfamiliar with each other’s organization structures, they

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<sup>75</sup> Mockaitis, *Civil-military Cooperation in Peace Operations*, 17.

<sup>76</sup> Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.”

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

have difficulty establishing a compatible communications link with the appropriate contact or decision-maker.”<sup>78</sup>

Operations. Operational challenges can exist for HAOs whose mission is not clear. “Operationally, many NGOs have moved beyond the traditional relief objectives of providing food, water, shelter, and emergency health measures to monitoring human rights, substituting for local government, and encouraging the creation or reconstruction of civil society by bringing together the conflicting parties.”<sup>79</sup> This increasingly complex array of missions sometimes produces “mission creep” for which HAO’s are ill-prepared. Moreover, HAOs, especially smaller ones, do not usually strive for “unity of command,” partly because of limitations of size and resources, but also for what Robert Rubinstein named “camaraderie of command,” the mentality that all military personnel work as one because they are fighting the battle together.<sup>80</sup> Additionally, according to Duffield, HAOs’ competing agendas can create anarchy within the development sector.<sup>81</sup>

From the military side of operational challenges, most militaries will use their own resources to finish their tasks, rather than hiring from the local work force and teaching them to meet the needs of the local population. This practice can prolong the dependence of the local population on outside aid, not enabling them to learn to be self-sustainable.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Beauregard, “Civil Military Cooperation in Joint Humanitarian Operations.”

<sup>79</sup> Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.”

<sup>80</sup> Robert A. Rubinstein, “Cross-Cultural Considerations in Complex Peace Operations,” *Negotiation Journal* 19, no. 1 (2003): 29–49.

<sup>81</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*.

<sup>82</sup> Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.”

Operational costs for the military are much higher than for humanitarian workers. Many critics point out that HAOs and locals are a cheaper alternative to assistance activities than bringing in military forces. On average, for one soldier to be recruited, trained, deployed, and sustained in a mission area, with all medical and logistical support and post-mission medical and psychological treatment, the cost exceeds US\$1,000,000.<sup>83</sup> Based on an extensive data set, Durch (2003) calculated that the yearly cost of a US soldier in Afghanistan, when both direct and indirect expenses are included, is approximately US\$215,000. ACBAR (2002) stated that humanitarians usually cost a tenth of this, largely because the vast majority of humanitarians are Afghans, not expatriates. While the costs of the latter can be as high as the yearly price of a US soldier, the costs of the former are generally much lower. Both in Kosovo and Afghanistan the yearly wages of local employees of humanitarian organizations were often between US\$2,000 and US\$25,000. In both countries local laborers earned approximately US\$700 to US\$1,500 annually.<sup>84</sup>

To be sure, these comparisons are fraught with “apples and oranges” considerations, but the point is that in an ideal world, humanitarian missions would be accomplished by HAOs. The military finds itself having to execute such missions only by dint of operational requirements, security situations and the dearth of HAOs in the immediate post-conflict period.

Norms. HAOs face normative challenges when they try to pursue the four principles of humanitarian organizations: humanity, independence, neutrality, and

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<sup>83</sup> Shaughnessy, “One Soldier, One Year: \$850,000 and Rising.”

<sup>84</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*, 189.

impartiality.<sup>85</sup> The military often does not have the luxury of being impartial or neutral. In Peace Support Operations, they are sent by their own nations to ensure security in the host nation. According to Paul F. Diehl, “Traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War was authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and most generally comprised the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved.”<sup>86</sup> Although the language refers to neutrality, most UN-mandated missions are possible only if host nation agrees to accept them. Therefore, forces are neutral on the paper, but many *de facto* support the host nation.

Meanwhile, “the increasing number of attacks on NGO and ICRC staff indicate that even without military forces the traditional principles of humanitarian aid, workers are not shielded against violence and even death,” according to Weiss.<sup>87</sup>

To compound these normative issues, many HAOs avoid even the appearance of cooperation with the military, as they recognize that military missions are intended to support political and economic goals of the sending country. As Clausewitz opined, war is simply “the continuation of politics by other means.”<sup>88</sup> Cooperating too closely with the military might blur the HAOs’ attempt to appear impartial, which could cost them

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<sup>85</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

<sup>86</sup> Paul F Diehl, *International Peacekeeping: [with a New Epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia]* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

<sup>87</sup> Weiss, *Military-civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*.

<sup>88</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, James John Graham, and Frederic Natusch Maude, *On War* (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008).



their ability to administer aid to all sides without losing their credibility or coming under attack.<sup>89</sup>

David Price<sup>90</sup> suggested that militaries, as the focus of their efforts has shifted from inter-state to intra-state conflict—the latter of which requires a significant understanding of the local culture, mindsets, and history—increasingly have sought to enhance their knowledge of local culture and anthropology so as to harness them into tools for intelligence, counterinsurgency, and warfare.<sup>91</sup> According to Price, militaries often do not understand the transformative power of anthropology the way an educated social scientist might; Price’s study implies that the military—despite its manpower and resources—must rely on civilian expertise in modern post-conflict peacebuilding.<sup>92</sup>

Communications. Communication between HAOs and the military is not always clear nor conducted with the intention of sharing useful information. As Jeong said, “In the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), for example, the military expected civilian agencies to support its objective of enforcing order, while the civilian agencies wanted the military to supplement their efforts of delivering aid.”<sup>93</sup> Sharing information also can be a challenge when the military seeks to protect its information in the name of mission security; sometimes the security section in a military command will

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<sup>89</sup> Groves, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations,” 17.

<sup>90</sup> David H. Price, *Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in the Service of the Militarized State*, 1st ed (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2011).

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005).

unnecessarily classify<sup>94</sup> CIMIC material and thereby render it unable to be shared with HAO partners. Often that information could be useful for HAO activities and even safety.

Training and Education. Finally, each side must undergo extensive training and education prior to and after a deployment. Since most HAO personnel stay in a mission area much longer than military personnel, their education consists more of on-the-job training than classes prior to deployment. The process of transitioning from one HAO to another is much longer for HAOs than for the military, so institutional memory can be transferred from one to another. Also, the length of time HAO personnel remain in the host nation can help them adapt more quickly to changes on the ground. Doyle found that for the military the tour of duty for a unit lasts up to one year, much less than the tours of duty of the HAOs, who often remain in country for at least two years. The departing military staff sometimes does not have enough time to hand over all “institutional memory.” As Doyle stated:

Part of the problem is new people come in and it takes them about three months to figure out what is going on a PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] ... Projects might be better managed if there was project continuity from the incumbent to their replacement. However, since there is typically no left/right seat handoff that usually results in the new guy taking over an old, non-value-add project because he/she does not know where else to start. Or, they throw everything out and start the ‘new project of the month.’<sup>95</sup>

Doyle also stated that sometimes it takes up to five months for new staff to fully resume the work of the previous unit, which for a US army unit constitutes almost half of its deployment time, and for most other nations almost the entirety of the deployment,

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<sup>94</sup> Interview with military actors, n.d.

<sup>95</sup> Brett Doyle, “Reconstruction and Stabilization Continuity of Operation: Insights from Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams” (Peacekeeping and Stability Operation Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 4, 2012), <http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/perspective/perspectivereview.cfm?perspectiveID=12>.

which usually lasts six months.<sup>96</sup> According to Rietjens, “Civil operations, especially those of a development nature, are prepared to stay in the area for a period of five or ten years, whereas the military often have a time horizon limited to one or two years”.<sup>97</sup> Mockaitis stated, “The brevity of military tours frequently causes great frustration with humanitarian organizations.”<sup>98</sup>

Most humanitarian workers have civics training and an education in social sciences, anthropology, or similar fields, while military personnel are trained to wage war and fight the enemy.

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

<sup>98</sup> Mockaitis, *Civil-military Cooperation in Peace Operations*.

**Table 1 Factors Affecting Civil-Military Cooperation<sup>99</sup>**

	HAO	Military
Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- non-violence</li> <li>- long-term</li> <li>- transparent</li> <li>- understanding the role of military</li> <li>- volunteers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- management of violence</li> <li>- short-term, quick-impact</li> <li>- limited transparency</li> <li>- understanding the role of HAO</li> <li>- carrying out orders</li> </ul>
Organizational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- decentralized</li> <li>- fluid</li> <li>- horizontal</li> <li>- wide accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- centralized</li> <li>- hierarchical</li> <li>- vertical</li> <li>- narrow accountability</li> </ul>
Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “camaraderie of command”</li> <li>- participatory</li> <li>- often vague scope of Action</li> <li>- lower cost</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- unity of command</li> <li>- directive and coercive</li> <li>- clearly defined but strict rules of engagement</li> <li>- higher cost</li> </ul>
Normative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- humanity</li> <li>- independent</li> <li>- neutral</li> <li>- impartial</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- politically legitimized</li> <li>- partial</li> <li>- mandate-dependent</li> <li>- one-sided</li> </ul>
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- civilian language</li> <li>- sharing of information</li> <li>- keeping promises</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- military vocabulary</li> <li>- security of information</li> <li>- counting on promises</li> </ul>
Educational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- training on the job</li> <li>- flexibility</li> <li>- institutional memory</li> <li>- civic education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- pre-deployment training</li> <li>- limited flexibility</li> <li>- HOTO</li> <li>- military education</li> </ul>

## Security-Development Nexus

To increase security in the region, military and HAOs need to provide opportunity to people in need. As Duffield<sup>100</sup> stated, through development, the disaffected elements of the population can gain employment and be at less risk of alienation, which could lead them to seek refuge in crime or terrorism. Conflict and recovery are often

<sup>99</sup> Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

<sup>100</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*.

accompanied by low or nonexistent foreign direct investment, which forces the population to rely on foreign aid in the short term and local development to meet long term economic, social, and warfare requirements.<sup>101</sup> Therefore, by improving the self-reliance of the local population, militaries and HAOs involved in CIMIC help meet their basic human needs.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, according to Duffield, Hurwitz, and Peake, instability in one country often breeds instability in the region, which can and often does affect a neighboring country—even a developed state—through the spread of instability, refugees, and eventually crime, terrorism and violence.<sup>103</sup> Development is also a key element of counterinsurgency within a complex emergency in weak or failed states.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, the development of the local economy, government, security sector, and judicial sector will increase the security of weak or failed state and enable HAOs to assist people in need, as well as to enhance stability in the region.<sup>105</sup>

Peace support operations over the past two decades have been used mostly in weak or failed states such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Therefore, the most important aspect for PSOs and HAOs has been stabilization of the country and region. By improving the prospects for economic development, PSO forces have increased the security of the country and helped reduce the spillover effect not only into

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> John W Burton, *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention* (Manchester [u.a.: Manchester Univ. Press, 1997).

<sup>103</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*; Agnès Hurwitz and Gordon Peake, *Strengthening the Security- Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s*, Conference Report (New York, USA: International Peace Academy, April 2004), [http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Library/Strengthening\\_SecDev\\_Nexus\\_IPA.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Library/Strengthening_SecDev_Nexus_IPA.pdf).

<sup>104</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*; David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>105</sup> Hurwitz and Peake, *Strengthening the Security- Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s*.

neighboring countries but into Western countries as well. CIMIC also can be seen as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), which Kilcullen defines as the military, paramilitary, political, economic, administrative, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.<sup>106</sup> In a complex emergency, according to Kilcullen, “All sides engage in an extreme, rapid, complex, and continuous process of competitive adaptation,”<sup>107</sup> which means that in the security-development nexus all agencies need to develop specific measures, tailored to the environment, to suppress an insurgency and strengthen the resilience of the threatened society and government.<sup>108</sup> It is critical for the security-development nexus that the military and HAOs convince people in need that they are there to help by enhancing development and protecting the local population from an insurgency and/or crime and that it is in their interest to cooperate with PSO forces, as insurgents cannot operate without support from the local population.<sup>109</sup>

As Kilcullen stated, “The insurgents aren’t strongest where people support them; rather, people support them where they are strongest. Likewise, people support the government in areas where government presence is strongest. In other words, support follows strength, not vice versa.”<sup>110</sup> Through CIMIC activities and joint efforts, the military and HAOs can win the hearts and minds of people in need and isolate insurgents from their sources of support. They can then pin neutralize the insurgency as a source of instability and security threat in the country.

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<sup>106</sup> Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>108</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*; Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*; Hurwitz and Peake, *Strengthening the Security- Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s*.

<sup>109</sup> Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

As Colonel Robins stated in his famous speech before attacking Iraq in 2003:

“We go to liberate, not to conquer. We will not fly our flags in their country. We are entering Iraq to free a people and the only flag which will be flown in that ancient land is their own. Show respect for them.... But if you are ferocious in battle, remember to be magnanimous in victory...”

Losing the hearts and minds of people in need can increase insurgency and instability in the region, which will reflect on the military as well as HOAs. However, some—mainly junior—military officials have been poorly prepared to improve the security development nexus, which has resulted in destructive actions that have alienated people in need and increased insecurity for the rest of the military and HOAs.<sup>111</sup>

Only armchair political figures and generals without real experience in the field would suggest that the only way to improve an unstable environment such as a complex emergency is through strong military forces.<sup>112</sup> Military forces from the Roman Empire to Nazi Germany demonstrated the failure of militaries on their own to ensure sustainable peace and development. After Nazi Germany, expanded its territory to the east, military commanders understood the need for cooperating with the local population to establish the security-development nexus, while armchair decision makers responded to the change in the security situation with brutality and violence toward the local population.<sup>113</sup> This approach eventually led to a massive uprising, the creation of partisan/ resistance units on the east and west, and eventually the German defeat.

One of the tools that CIMIC employs is Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), whose mission is to enhance the authority of local government, promote and enhance

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

security, and facilitate humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations.<sup>114</sup> What started as a German idea in Afghanistan in 2003 was quickly adopted by coalition forces as a tool to assist the local population in an area where security did not allow HAOs to provide aid. Through improvements in security and the implementation of development projects,<sup>115</sup> PRTs created a safe area for HAOs to get involved. PRTs first were located in areas with a large degree of fighting, and where therefore staffed predominantly by military personnel but also functioned as “safe houses” for a small number of civilian experts.<sup>116</sup> However, the success of PRTs in creating safety for HAOs as well as their effective coordination of activities with HAOs led to their establishment in Iraq as well.<sup>117</sup>

The role and composition of PRTs has evolved over time to adapt to different security situations and different needs of the local population. With greater involvement of civilian experts, military personnel have been able to hand over some of the responsibility for traditionally civilian tasks, allowing the military to take on a mostly protective role. PRTs in Iraq are led and staffed mainly by U.S. State Department

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<sup>114</sup> Robert M. Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, Special Report (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, March 2007), <http://www.usip.org/publications/provincial-reconstruction-teams-iraq>; Michael J. Dziedzic and Colonel Michael K. Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*, Special Report (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, August 2005), <http://www.usip.org/publications/provincial-reconstruction-teams-military-relations-international-and-nongovernmental-organ>; Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, Special Report (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, October 2005), <http://www.usip.org/publications/us-experience-provincial-reconstruction-teams-afghanistan-lessons-identified>.

<sup>115</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*.

<sup>116</sup> Dziedzic and Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*.

<sup>117</sup> Joseph A. Christoff, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,” *GAO Reports* (2008): 1–24; Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*.



personnel, along with a limited number of military staff, who fulfill specific roles, such as serving as a liaison with the Iraqi military. Each PRT also has a specific role, tailored to local needs. While some PRTs mainly coordinate with HAOs, some focus more on quick-impact projects, as a first step in development and security. As security in a province improves, the role of PRT changes, giving more opportunities to the HAOs to help people in need.<sup>118</sup>

Therefore, the involvement of every aspect of assistance to people in need makes PSO forces more effective and can shorten the time that the military and HAOs need to operate in the country.

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<sup>118</sup> Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*; Dziedzic and Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*; Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*; Robert E. Kemp, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan," *Military Review* 91, no. 5 (October 2011): 28–36; Christoff, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq"; Craig T. Cobane, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Assistance: Comments on an Evolving Concept," *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 27, no. 4 (2005): 91–97.




Figure 1 Humanitarian Assistance Responsibilities

## Potential Solutions

The mutual lack of understanding and ineffective sharing are deeply embedded into the culture on both sides. The military is known for being a closed society, a “Band of Brothers.”<sup>119</sup> “It was a long war; it was a tough war. You fought bravely and proudly for your country. You are a special group, who found one in another a bond that exists only in combat. Brothers, who shared foxholes, help each other in dire moments. Who have seen death and suffer together ... .”<sup>120</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Stephen E Ambrose, *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

However, the role and a mission of PSO dictate openness to partnerships with HAOs. Creating space for development increases self-reliance within the local population, which boosts the security in a country undergoing a complex emergency.<sup>121</sup> Improvements in security also attract more HAOs and eventually investors, which additionally increase the level of cooperation between HAOs and the military and assists people in need.

Careful selection of CIMIC military staff from the branches that work closely with civilians has been shown to be effective. They can be partly constituted from a military–police force such as the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, Netherlands Royal Marechaussee, or the Spanish Guardia Civil.<sup>122</sup> This approach can allow for closer cooperation with local police forces; presenting the forces as a united front can improve trust from the local population and thereby allow HAOs to operate more easily in the region population. As former U.S Secretary Albright said, “Old models of peacekeeping did not meet current challenges.”<sup>123</sup>

In Rwanda, rather than directly intervening after the conflict ended, Irish soldiers and civilians were attached to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and two Irish NGOs. A unit was formed composed of specialists in engineering, medicine, logistics, security, communications, and administration. The unit experienced an unusual mixture of cultures that might have separated the military and civilian entities in similar

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<sup>121</sup> “Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World” (Department for International Development, March 2005), <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/securityforall.pdf>; Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*.

<sup>122</sup> Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him*?; Robert M. Perito, *U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations*, Special Report, 191 (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, August 2007), <http://www.usip.org/publications/us-police-peace-and-stability-operations>.

<sup>123</sup> Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him* 240.

operations, showing considerable flexibility between what sometimes have appeared to be impenetrable cultures.<sup>124</sup> Similarly, the Norwegian Refugee Council's civilian field hospital operated as an integral part of the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) from August 1995 until March 1996 and provided medical support to Rwandans, UN soldiers, UN personnel, and the NGO staff.<sup>125</sup> These examples—even though they came too late to stop the fighting—highlight the importance of understanding each other's culture, hierarchy, tasks, and training, and to create the belief that diversity within a multicultural team is a source of strength rather than a weakness.

Additionally, bi-lingual, bi-cultural advisors, who often serve as interpreters, usually remain part of CIMIC teams for a long time and, if properly utilized, can be an excellent source of institutional memory, and they can hold greater value in mentorship and guidance than a direct predecessor due to their permanence on the team.<sup>126</sup> Also, mutual training and exercises prior to deployment can ensure that leaders on both sides are trained and educated to support the establishment, management, and participation in civil-military teams, and to establish the capabilities required for success.<sup>127</sup>

More effective usage of PRTs in complex emergencies can be a tool for providing security for HAOs and increasing the development of the local capabilities.<sup>128</sup> The

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<sup>124</sup> Weiss, *Military-civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*; Perito, *U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations*.

<sup>125</sup> Weiss, *Military-civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*, 158.

<sup>126</sup> Doyle, "Reconstruction and Stabilization Continuity of Operation: Insights from Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams."

<sup>127</sup> *Development of A Competency Model For Civil-Military Teaming* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 2012), [http://pksoi.army.mil/pkm/documents/Fact%20Sheet%20Civ-Mil%20Teaming\\_013112.pdf](http://pksoi.army.mil/pkm/documents/Fact%20Sheet%20Civ-Mil%20Teaming_013112.pdf).

<sup>128</sup> Dziedzic and Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*; Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*; Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*.

combination of the military, civilians, and the local Ministry of Interior staff helps in providing humanitarian relief or reconstruction assistance. Better security through military activity and local development<sup>129</sup> minimizes the tasks of PRTs and allows them to increase cooperation with a growing number of HAOs.<sup>130</sup>

Global solidarity emphasizes mutuality and reciprocity between providers of aid while blurring the differences between them, in order to benefit people in need.<sup>131</sup> Therefore, new peace forces should integrate military and police forces but also less combatant branches to allow robust local participation in stabilization.

If these principles of CIMIC are implemented, over time the dichotomy between the military and humanitarians might be abated. Three areas of cooperation are particularly important: international law, dealing with militants who do not distinguish between military forces and HAO operators, and an increasing need for the military to take on projects for which HAOs traditionally are responsible.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*; Hurwitz and Peake, *Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s*.

<sup>130</sup> Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*; Perito, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*; Dziedzic and Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*.

<sup>131</sup> Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War*.

<sup>132</sup> Groves, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations."

Table 2 List of Competencies<sup>133</sup>

Meta-Competency	Competency
Adapts Across Organizations and Cultures	<b>1</b> Understands the cultural context of situations
	<b>2</b> Assesses new cultural environments and adjusts appropriately (cultural agility)
	<b>3</b> Understands multiple perspectives
Builds Partnering Relationships	<b>4</b> Understands capabilities of partners and systems
	<b>5</b> Establishes effective partnerships and teams
	<b>6</b> Develops positive relationships
	<b>7</b> Builds common ground and shared purpose
	<b>8</b> Manages conflict
Collaborates to Solve Problems	<b>9</b> Manages the flow of communication
	<b>10</b> Uses integrative methods for planning and problem-solving
	<b>11</b> Synchronizes tactical actions, operational objectives, and strategic goals
	<b>12</b> Applies available resources and expertise

<sup>133</sup> *Development of A Competency Model For Civil–Military Teaming.*

## METHODOLOGY

This pilot study<sup>134</sup> is qualitative in nature<sup>135</sup> with two main sources of data, one of which is a series of in-depth interviews of a targeted sample of HAO workers and military CIMIC operators or their superiors. The study includes 14 participants with experience in CIMIC in the field. The interviews provided inside stories about personal experiences in conjunction with practical examples of successes and failures in cooperation. All participants were recruited through e-mail or personal contact. The snowball effect, wherein participants suggest others to interview, helped identify further participants, since most CIMIC operators and HAO workers were able to refer colleagues with similar experiences.<sup>136</sup>

**Table 3 Number of Interviews Sought and Attained<sup>137</sup>**

	Military	HAOs
Approached institutions	3	61
Additionally approached individuals	3	0
Positive Responses	9	11
Negative Responses	0	7
Lack of Response	1	50
Institutions/Individuals Contacted in First Wave	3/2	43/0
Participants Interviewed in Person	1	5

<sup>134</sup> John W Creswell, *Research Design* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009).

<sup>135</sup> Yvonne N Bui, *How to Write a Master's Thesis* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2009); Creswell, *Research Design*.

<sup>136</sup> Creswell, *Research Design*.

<sup>137</sup> Interview with military actors; Interview with NGO workers.

□: Qualitative, Quantitative

Participants Interviewed via Skype	3	3
Participants Interviewed via E-mail	2	0
Participants Interviewed, Total	6	8

The second source of data includes press releases, journals, articles, theses and dissertations, books, and online audio-video materials on CIMIC, CMO, CMA, UN-CMCoord, humanitarian organizations, complex emergencies, PSO, and other situations in which the military could operate hand in hand with civilians to help people in need. Although these resources cannot necessarily provide as deep an understanding as interviews of actual experiences, they can identify circumstances in which HAOs and the military have worked together or been unwilling to do so. The lack of a broad repository of media reporting on CIMIC slightly complicated the research, as did the inability to access classified materials. Most of the data in this study are derived from unclassified military publications, which often highlight the positive contributions of the military in complex emergencies.

Interviews were conducted and recorded with prior consent of the participants. All participants received an informal consent form, approved by George Mason University's Human Subjects Review Board,<sup>138</sup> by e-mail prior to the interview and once more in hard copy on the day of the interview, in the case of those interviewed in person. The confidentiality of all participants was maintained. The audio recordings were

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<sup>138</sup> See appendix.



transcribed for analysis, and all audio records were stored on an external hard drive and will be deleted upon completion of this project.

Members of 61 HAOs were approached for this study. Forty-eight were contacted in the first wave, and they were selected according to whether they had served in Afghanistan. Three organizations were approached because of prior experience with the author. Another eight were contacted in a second wave, through the snowball effect. Out of 61 organizations, 11 representatives agreed to be interviewed, and eight responded that they do not have contact with the military. Therefore, about one third of the HAOs that were contacted positively or negatively responded to the invitation for an interview, while the rest—including some major organizations such as Doctors Without Borders (MSF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the ICRC, which have proven contact with the military, did not reply to the request.

On the military side, three CIMIC training centers and four personal contacts were approached. One CIMIC center did not respond, but the rest agreed to participate. One personal contact referred colleagues with more relevant experience, while three were interviewed. In total, eight HAO and six military interviews were conducted. Six interviews were conducted face-to-face, six over Skype, and two by e-mail.

In all interviews, participants were asked 16 open-ended questions. The interviews<sup>139</sup> were used to target participants' experience in CIMIC. Questions included, "What do you believe are the goals of CIMIC?" and "Can you give a few examples of positive cooperation between military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations?" The

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<sup>139</sup> Creswell, *Research Design*.

validity<sup>140</sup> of the findings is limited because the sample size is relatively small. However, many times participants corroborated each other's answers, which lent credence to the research design.

Since all the data came from two separate sources, the results differed slightly. While journal and media articles gave background, historical data, and case studies, with limited personal opinions captured mainly in conclusions, interviews focused on filling the gaps, giving context and personal experiences that might not be reflected in the literature.

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<sup>140</sup> Bui, *How to Write a Master's Thesis*.

## PILOT STUDY

The HAO workers interviewed have between eight and 29 years of experience in the field. Three of them also had military or paramilitary experience. All but one had served in more than one mission area, including Somalia, Congo, Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Balkans, Honduras, Sudan, Mali, and others. In general, the HAOs that agreed to participate in the study have a positive working relationship with their military counterparts; HAOs that might not work closely or effectively with the military did not respond to the invitation for an interview.

**Table 4 Mission Area Experience<sup>141</sup>**

	Military	HAOs
>10 Years	0	1
5-10 Years	1	2
2-5 Years	5	4
<2 Years	0	1

All of them identified CIMIC as mutual cooperation between HAOs and military; one participant said, “From my experience, it is all about cooperation, for the military to be able to cooperate with the civilian side, and civilians to cooperate with the military side.”<sup>142</sup> All participants agreed that neutrality is the most important principle for their respective HAOs and that they should be careful not to openly support the military, lest

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<sup>141</sup> Interview with military actors; Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>142</sup> Interview with NGO workers.

they lose their neutrality. Almost all HAO members agreed that working with the military is necessary, but they were not fully supportive of such cooperation.

**Table 5 Principles of HAO that Participants Identified as Important<sup>143</sup>**

	Military	HAOs
Neutrality	5	8
Impartiality	3	6
Independence	3	6
Humanity	3	7

HAO members identified cultural and educational differences as among the most significant obstacles to cooperation. Most saw the military as an inert and inflexible organization, aware of only a few tools and preferring to use a hammer for every task or problem they face. They also noted that the military often is not familiar with or does not respect the culture of the host nation, which can have negative repercussions for the whole mission. One participant stated:

I have a grandson who was deployed in Afghanistan, who is a wonderful kid, but at the same time, was it worth one million tax dollars for him to be in that position, with no knowledge whatsoever of the language, of the customs, of the traditions, and simply accepting that there isn't a single Afghan male where he is who would not love to take off his head? That is his attitude and he is working in one of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), so there is something fundamentally wrong with that. So the one million dollars spent to get him there, divided into three, could give \$300,000 grants to school districts and might build some strong friendships over the last decade.<sup>144</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Interview with military actors; Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>144</sup> Interview with NGO workers.

**Table 6 Obstacles that Participants Identified to Civil-Military Cooperation<sup>145</sup>**

	Military	HAOs
Culture	2	7
Flexibility	1	8
Training	0	6

The majority of HAO participants believe that deployed CIMIC military personnel were not appropriately trained for their duties, and appointing well organized and flexible operators might limit friction between HAOs and the military. According to one participant, “The Army is inert, and it strictly follows protocol without any flexibility. Everything that should [yield] positive results becomes totally negative, just to satisfy some strange protocols.”<sup>146</sup>

**Table 7 Resource Constraints Participants Identified<sup>147</sup>**

	Military	HAOs
Amount of resources	3	7
Appropriate usage of material	5	2
Duplication of activities	1	5

All HAO workers interviewed believe that the military has more resources, both material and human, than HAOs to support CIMIC, and they see that as a valuable tool in increasing cooperation; however, they do not see how those resources could be used in practice. According to one HAO worker:

For example, in South Sudan, it is well known that the military is the only institution that, when deployed, will come with complete logistic capabilities. Everyone will send scouts first. In the case of Sudan, the UN had a program regarding people who were denied movement over the White Nile and the upper part of the state in the estuary of the White and Blue Nile [but did not benefit from military assistance].<sup>148</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Interview with military actors; Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>146</sup> Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>147</sup> Interview with military actors; Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with NGO workers.

From time to time, according to the HAO participants, the military comes to an area and starts doing a similar job to that which the HAOs already cover, but the military follows its own procedures that can undermine the work the HAOs have already done. One participant noted, “We were doing legal reform in Afghan province, and the military came and started doing the same thing but in the army way, and jeopardizing everything we did in the previous six months.”<sup>149</sup> Some participants identified the biggest problem as senior military officials who are more focused on following procedures to the letter than on the mission itself.

All HAO workers believe that mutual cooperation is possible and sometimes necessary; however, better selection of personnel, education and training, and joint exercises prior to deployment with HAOs already in the host country, could be very helpful, enabling cooperation. According to one participant:

The long-term implications are that a vastly reduced military presence should hopefully result in a small number of well-indoctrinated engineers from all NATO countries working with Afghan NGOs and for-profit companies, and also special forces who have training to work inside the indigenous population. So maybe between the engineers who will give a significant amount of Dari and Pashtu training and some special forces who work within village communities, with some level of training in the local culture, such as not to look at local women or shake hands with them. NATO soldiers do not have a clue how to behave in these situations.<sup>150</sup>

Military personnel had a similar opinion but from a different perspective. Of the six who participated in the study, five were CIMIC operators, and one was a senior officer who supervised CIMIC teams.

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

**Table 8 Time of Service in CIMIC or HAOs<sup>151</sup>**

	Military	Civilian
0-5 Years	2	0
5-10 Years	3	2
10-20 Years	1	4
20+ Years	0	2

On average, military participants had served on active duty for more than ten years and had handled CIMIC responsibilities for more than three years. The majority of participants served in combat branches, such as infantry, armor, or artillery, but they underwent training to be CIMIC practitioners. All of them assessed that cooperation with HAOs was successful, with small limitations on the military side. One participant shared:

Working with international humanitarian assistance organizations in post conflict areas is something natural and paramount. Everywhere I have been deployed I have had the opportunity to work successfully with such organizations. We are complementary. In the military, even in CIMIC, you remain primarily a soldier and never forget that humanitarian assistance is not your job. You have to explain this to your civilian partners, and after that everything is clear.<sup>152</sup>

All military personnel said that they see CIMIC as a “modem” that connects HAOs with the military superior officers and that a main goal of CIMIC is to help the military contingent finish their jobs and return home more quickly. One participant explained the need to “reinforce military action by facilitating the forces’ insertion into a complex civil environment (providing force protection) and [exposing] the civilian world

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<sup>151</sup> Interview with military actors; Interview with NGO workers.

<sup>152</sup> Interview with military actors.

to other operational functions, and to speed up the exit from the crisis by supporting the civilian actors to enable them to cope with their responsibilities as soon as possible.”<sup>153</sup>

Military participants stressed that the most important elements of CIMIC are cooperation and unity. One of the participants stated that “one team, one mission” is the key to success, meaning that everyone, military and civilian, needs to work for the benefit of people in need.

They also noted that their job is to wage war but also to create a safe area for HAOs to operate, to fill in the security gap to allow others to manage other elements of peacebuilding. According to one participant, referring to Bosnia, “We did the military tasks in [about] six months, beginning in December of 1995; by June or July most of the military tasks were done. So we turned to the civilian side and said that jobs, reconstruction, etc., now had to happen in a timely way.”<sup>154</sup>

**Table 9 Areas Participants Identified as Essential to Cooperation**<sup>155</sup>

	Military	Civilian
Cooperation	6	7
Unity	4	0
Discipline	5	2
Culture	4	6
Experience	6	8

Military CIMIC practitioners said they believe that successful cooperation hinges on: “Information sharing, training, security and stabilization and control of the area, project management, security of the lines of communication, improvement and

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.; Interview with NGO workers.



achievement of acceptable general life conditions, societal stability, and [effective] planning of the transition and handover [to local authorities] phases.”<sup>156</sup>

Military personnel assessed that it is easier to cooperate with HAO personnel who work directly in the field in low-level positions, since they are more aware of the conditions on the ground and sometimes more anxious to complete their tasks. One participant noted:

What I have noticed in different areas of operation (AOO) is that it is easy to establish fruitful cooperation at the lower levels and more difficult to get it at the top levels. For instance, the heads of the HAOs are normally located in capital cities (Pristina, Abidjan, Kabul...), and their staff members are not always willing to cooperate immediately with the military. The reasons for that are that they are constrained by their doctrines and far from the realities of the terrain. On the contrary, the subordinate members of HAOs working in towns and villages all over the country are much more willing to cooperate with the military forces. They are less hampered by doctrinal considerations and understand easily the benefit they have working with the military.<sup>157</sup>

## **Results and Theory Revisited**

The results of this pilot study reflect the themes of the literature; participants stressed the importance of culture, unity of command, flexibility, and training and education as key to effective CIMIC. Participants agreed that development and education would increase stability and safety and that those objectives would be difficult to achieve if not for cooperation between the military and HAOs. All participants emphasized that the positive results of successful cooperation outweigh all jointly invested efforts. Contrary to the literature, though, participants did not identify actual projects (long term

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<sup>156</sup> Interview with military actors.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

vs. short term) as an issue, nor did they mention that the military mission and RoE have a significant impact on military engagement in the host country. The fact that participants did not raise this issue might reflect that the research methods were not designed to address it or that the sample size was small. More comprehensive research in the future might show further consonance between the data and the literature, since the data would capture a larger pool of experience.

### **Selected Answers to Research Questions**

#### **How willing do you believe civilian structures are to cooperate with legitimate military structures to provide help to people in need? Why?**

Basically, humanitarian assistance organizations are highly professional and specialized in a particular field of expertise (e.g., UNHCR cares for refugees or displaced persons, WFP is in charge of food problems, the ICRC's mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them assistance). Working with military structures is not something they consider natural and might not even think of it. The reasons for that are numerous: the cultures and goals are different; the military might be perceived as part of the conflict (or sometimes even at the origin of the conflict and thus [the cause] of the poor humanitarian situation).

**What moves can the military take to establish itself as a stronger partner for civilian counterparts, and vice versa?**

To be credible partners, the military and civilian structures have to do the following: meet and frankly discuss humanitarian issues and prove as much transparency as possible in order to solve the problems; the military has to explain what it can do to support the humanitarian effort; both parties have to deploy the concept of “a comprehensive approach” in order to be maximally efficient.

**How do difficulties in cooperation increase the price of humanitarian relief to people in need?**

They are increased through misunderstanding or mutual ignorance that may lead to a conflicting situation on the ground; implementing humanitarian aid or support without any cooperation or coordination which may result in duplication or waste; or the lack of a “comprehensive approach,” which will necessarily lead to inconsistency.

**Do humanitarian organizations operating in a post-conflict area understand the goals of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)?**

Once the aforementioned obstacles (misunderstanding, mutual ignorance, lack of cooperation) have been overcome and provided we explain to them what our goals are, there is no reason for HAOs not to understand what we do and why we do it, unless they are insincere, which may happen sometimes. Over the last 10 to 15 years, there has been an increase in occasions for humanitarian organizations to meet with CIMIC personnel

through common courses, seminars, training, etc., or in conflict areas. So they know what the goals of CIMIC are, and most of them understand what they do and why they do it.

**Is there a difference in the mindset and training that military and civilians from Humanitarian Assistance Organizations undergo? If so, how does it manifest itself on the ground?**

HAO personnel have the full freedom of intervening or not in a crisis. The military force obeys and implements the decision taken by the governments of origin; some HAO personnel (civilian agencies) receive training on site. They improve their skills during their mandate. The military force personnel receive continuous training during their service; the HAOs either do not enforce their procedures or do not have any at all. The military has a strong doctrinal body and formal procedures; HAOs are not organized to operate round the clock, including during the night. The night operating capability and round-the-clock operating system are basic requirements for any [military] force. HAOs have limited resources, while the military has manpower, vehicles, and money. The most effective way for military forces to understand the skills, knowledge, and capabilities of IOs and NGOs is to maintain relationships with them prior to entering an area of operation, and to educate them through military schools and courses that incorporate integrated training. This can provide much insight into these organisations and establish good working relationships based on trust and understanding.

**Is there competition between the military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations, and if so, how does that affect their ability to help the local population?**

There is no competition, but there are other difficulties, such as misunderstandings and mutual ignorance, which can be overcome. Some HAOs might experience frustration when they see that, even if it is not their job, the military is able to implement humanitarian assistance, sometimes very quickly, in a much more efficient way, in remote areas.

**Validity of the Research**

The pilot study had high validity, since almost all research findings were confirmed by multiple participants from both the civilian and the military side. Not all of them used the same vocabulary to describe their experience, but they shared the vast majority of core ideas about areas that can and should improve. Data triangulation,<sup>158</sup> the corroboration of data from different sources, confirms that culture, security, organization, education, flexibility, the right personnel, and communication, mainly in information sharing, are the burning issues in CIMIC that need to be improved.

One factor that might have undermined the validity of the study is the sampling bias caused by the lack of participation of HAOs that generally do not have a positive

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<sup>158</sup> Creswell, *Research Design*.

working relationship with the military, such as Doctors Without Borders<sup>159</sup>, which propagates a message of neutrality and lack of involvement with the military. Input from these organizations might have highlighted a different set of challenges to civil-military cooperation and the reasons behind those challenges.

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<sup>159</sup> “Doctors Without Borders,” accessed March 5, 2013, <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/>.

## **DISCUSSION**

From the pilot study, it is obvious that both sides understand each other's roles. Usually there is some misunderstanding about culture and ways of operating which cause the friction between both sides. Both military CIMIC operators and HAO workers shared positive and negative experiences of cooperation efforts, and they understand the importance of collaboration. Both sides identified the most important aspect as proper personnel, cultural understanding, sufficient training and education, and openness in sharing information.

A complex emergency demands the involvement of both sides until the host nation is strong enough to take over. Military forces first create a safe area and fill in the security gap until HAOs are able to be deployed and take over the responsibility. Over time, the host nation—with the help of the military and HAOs—can become strong and take over the responsibility of managing its own country, allowing the military and later the HAOs to leave the country. Almost all participants pointed to this chain of events as the only means of successful engagement of both the military and HAOs in a complex emergency.

None of the participants assessed that there is institutional competition between HAOs and the military, since everybody has a clear understanding about the roles of each side. Some HAO workers identified competition across HAOs, but that is beyond the

scope of this study. Overall they stressed that local people in need can exploit the lack of communication between the military and HAOs, extracting from both sides more than they actually require. Additionally, contrary to what the literature suggested, only one military participant stated that the military needs to have a clear mission and flexible RoE for achieving its goals.

Both sides agreed that short-term deployments on the military side hinder the learning curve, and new operators do not have sufficient time to adjust to the situation on the ground. Each side stressed independently that flexibility in sharing information and mutual training would be beneficial for both sides, since it would give a better understanding of the region, as well as operational procedures. Both sides also agreed that it is easier to work with low level personnel than with their superiors.

The two sides failed to find common ground on the issue of unity of command and formality of the military's organization. While HAO practitioners reported that those issues are hindrances to cooperation, military participants did not identify them as major problems.

## **Limitations**

One of the main limitations in this study was the list of interview questions, which could have been expanded in a more robust study to further address the research questions. Introducing a few more closed-ended questions might elicit a bit more information, as did the question regarding institutional competition. In other questions, some participants drifted from one topic to another, losing sight of the context of the questions.



Another limitation was the number of interviewed participants. Even though a significant number of organizations were contacted, only about one third responded to the initial query, and the number of actual participants was even smaller. Additionally, the HAOs that responded generally have a strong working relationship with the military; those that do not failed to respond to the invitation to participate in the study. Their participation probably would have produced a more robust assessment of the difficulties inherent in civil-military cooperation as well as suggested remedies. However, this sample size was sufficient for confirming the themes in the literature. Time constraints limited the possibility of follow-up interviews, even though every participant indicated he or she was amenable to further discussion.

### **Recommendations for Future Research**

This study highlighted some animosity and misunderstanding between the two entities, so the topic of CIMIC provides a fertile ground for more comprehensive research. At the same time, participants recognized areas where they can cooperate, so the potential exists for progress. At the beginning, narrative mediation<sup>160</sup> could be a useful tool, although it requires a significant amount of time, which rendered it impractical for this study. However, it would probably be an effective mechanism for further research. Additionally, future research would benefit from a more robust sample, including HAOs that do not have an effective working relationship with the military.

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<sup>160</sup> John Winslade and Gerald D. Monk, *Narrative Mediation* 1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), <http://www.amazon.com/Narrative-Mediation-Approach-Conflict-Resolution/dp/0787941921>.

Another recommendation would be to conduct research through joint events, panel discussions and joint training with scenarios. Such research would be beneficial not only for the CAR field but also for future CAR practitioners, as it would bring both sides together and highlight areas for improvement in cooperation.

## **CONCLUSION**

Civil-military cooperation is not a fancy name for a spurious activity but a real need, especially in complex emergencies. This study suggests, as did Diamond and McDonald, that a multi-track approach to peacebuilding provides the most sustainable outcome. Therefore, both sides need to put aside their differences and turn toward cooperation, if not for the sake of people in need, then to speed up the process and return home or be ready to be deployed to another crisis-stricken area. With the increase of the earth's population, more crises across the globe are likely to draw in CAR practitioners. Therefore both entities need to be fully ready for maximal engagement in a crisis.

However, it will take time for both entities to understand and accept this kind of cooperation. The term CIMIC was first coined in 1998, so it is fairly new, and there are some challenges. The most significant challenge would probably be that even though the military forces of one nation might be compact and uniformed, they are not operating as a single entity, but often as part of a joint unit or contingent, mixed with other branches and other nations. In that case, CIMIC training centers should be strengthened, since the majority of CIMIC practitioners are trained in such institutions. Also, military courses and high-level education, including command schools and war colleges, should play a more prominent role in CIMIC.

On the other hand, since HAOs are not a monolith and each has its own procedures, it would be challenging to train them uniformly. Yet, since most of their personnel have attended college, introducing a CIMIC course for undergraduate and graduate students could provide a training option. Such a course could be developed in coordination with the NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence. The usage of CIMIC tools such as PRTs enhances the security-development nexus, increasing stability and security in the country and region. Fostering development and self-reliance of people in need helps keep them from feeling alienated by making them productive members of society, as Duffield suggested. That approach reduces the prospects for augmented criminal activities and insurgency.

Both sides could benefit from joint training and exercises, which would give them a solid foundation for future development in humanitarian affairs and a basis for cooperation. In this case, S-CAR as an institution whose main occupation is collaborative problem solving, peace could be the hub for the civilian side of CIMIC, bringing HAO workers and military CIMIC operators together.

## **APPENDICES**

## Human Subjects Review Board Approval



Office of Research Integrity and Assurance  
Research Hall  
4400 University Drive, MS 6D5, Fairfax, Virginia 22030  
Phone: 703-993-4121; Fax: 703-993-9590

TO: Solon Simmons, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

FROM: Aurali Dade  
Assistant Vice President, Research Compliance 

PROTOCOL NO.: 8539

PROPOSAL NO: N/A

TITLE: Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC): When Soldiers Drop Rifles and Pick Up Wrenches

DATE: February 7, 2013

Cc: Edi Jurkovic

Under George Mason University (GMU) procedures, this project was determined to be exempt by the Office of Research Integrity & Assurance (ORIA) since it falls under DHHS Exempt Category 2, research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior.

A copy of the final approved consent document is attached. Please use this stamped copy for your research.

You may proceed with data collection. **Please note that all modifications in your protocol must be submitted to the Office of Research Subject Protections for review and approval prior to implementation.** Any unanticipated problems involving risks to participants or others, including problems regarding data confidentiality must be reported to the GMU Office of Research Subject Protections.

GMU is bound by the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human subjects in research contained in The Belmont Report. Even though your data collection procedures are exempt from review by the GMU HSRB, GMU expects you to conduct your research according to the professional standards in your discipline and the ethical guidelines mandated by federal regulations.

Thank you for cooperating with the University by submitting this protocol for review. Please call me at 703-993-5381 if you have any questions.

## **Informed Consent Form**

### ***Informed Consent***

#### ***Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC): When Soldiers Drop Rifles and Pick Up Wrenches***

### **INFORMED CONSENT FORM**

#### **RESEARCH PROCEDURES**

This research is being conducted as a pilot study for my Master's thesis. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to take part in a one-on-one interview with the researcher, which will be audio taped unless you request otherwise, for approximately 30 minutes. After the interview, you might be asked to answer some voluntary follow-up questions via e-mail, telephone, or in person at a later date.

#### **RISKS**

There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this research.

#### **BENEFITS**

There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further research in conflict analysis and resolution.

#### **CONFIDENTIALITY**

The data in this study will be confidential. All records will be kept on an external hard drive that is only available to the researcher. The researcher will not use your name or identifying information in the thesis unless you specifically ask for those data to be included. All audio recordings will be stored on the same external hard drive and not available to anyone other than the researcher. Audio recordings will be destroyed upon completion of the thesis.

#### **PARTICIPATION**

Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study, there is no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. There are no costs to you or any other party.

#### **CONTACT**

This research is being conducted by Edi Jurkovic, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He may be reached at (571) 455-3856 for questions or to report a research-related problem. The faculty advisor for this research is Dr. Solon Simmons, who may be reached at [ssimmons5@gmu.edu](mailto:ssimmons5@gmu.edu) or through the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution department at (703) 993-1300. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this study.

Revised 07/2005

1 of 1

**APPROVED**  
8537  
George Mason University

## Interview Questions

- 1) How long have you been serving in your organization?
- 2) What is your nationality?
- 3) Do you have both military and civilian experience?
- 4) What do you believe are the goals of CIMIC?
- 5) Of the places you have served, where have you been involved in cooperation with both civilian and military structures?
- 6) What is your experience working with international military forces? And what is your experience working with local military forces?
- 7) What is your experience working with international Humanitarian Assistance Organizations? And what is your experience of working with local Humanitarian Assistance Organizations?
- 8) What is your view on cooperation between military and civilian Humanitarian Assistance Organizations? In your experience, has it been successful? Why or why not?
- 9) Can you give a few examples of positive cooperation between military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations?
- 10) Based on those examples, how can that cooperation be expanded?
- 11) Have you witnessed any negative situations resulting from the lack of cooperation between military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations?
- 12) What could be done to avoid those scenarios in the future?



- 13) What are the long-term implications of cooperation or lack thereof between military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations, particularly as they pertain to people in need?
- 14) Did you witness any cases of institutional competition between military and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations? If so, how did it affect their ability to help people in need?
- 15) Is there any question that I did not asked but you believe would be beneficial for my research?
- 16) Do you know anyone who would be a good participant for my research?

## RECRUITING E-MAIL

Dear XXXXXXXX:

My name is Edi Jurkovic, and I am writing my Master's thesis on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) at George Mason University's School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. I was given your name as an expert in that field, and I would be grateful if you could take a few minutes of your time to help me with my project.

My thesis will focus mainly on cooperation between military and civilian organizations in providing humanitarian aid in conflict and post-conflict areas. I would very much like to have the honor of interviewing you or someone from your organization about your experience in this field. Keeping in mind your busy schedule, I anticipate the interview would not last longer than 30 minutes, and the questions will be open-ended. If you would like, I would be happy to send you the questions beforehand. Alternatively, if you do not have time for an interview but could respond to my questions via e-mail, I would be grateful for that as well.

If you would be willing to help me with my project, please let me know when you might be available for an interview. Also, if you know of other individuals and/or organizations who have been involved in this field and would not mind putting me in touch with them, I would very much appreciate the help.

Thank you in advance. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Best regards,  
Edi Jurkovic  
Student  
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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## **CURRICULUM VITAE**

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