

A Study in Direct Democracy: The Citizen Initiative
& the Determinants of Voter Behavior

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Abstract

A STUDY IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE CITIZEN INITIATIVE & THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTER BEHAVIOR

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This research looked at the use of citizen initiatives in the American states to identify trends in voter behavior. The findings indicate that voters structure their choices on ballot measures with at least one thought in mind: to hold government actors and institutions accountable. While there are many factors that affect the electoral fate of an initiative, it appears that reforming government is paramount, given the prevalence of governance reforms during the period under scrutiny. This priority is often construed as a conservative bias in favor of limited government; however, the prevalence of successful policy measures that expand the size or scope of government suggests that this is not the case. Rather, two different dynamics are in play—one that tends to limit the discretion of government officials and another that tends to expand the policy scope of government.

Chapter One: Inquiry

Introduction

Historically, support for direct democracy in the United States has been fueled by disenchantment with representative government. As public distrust in and frustration with elected officials and political institutions have increased, as was the case in the early twentieth century and the post-Watergate era, a populist voice that decries special interests and demands political reform has emerged with the professed aim of making government more responsive to the will of the people. Today, the institution of direct democracy is the subject of as much debate as it was almost a century ago when it was first considered and adopted by a score of American states. While many still embrace it as a means of returning government to the people, many have concluded that the risks to our political process are too great or that it no longer serves the public interest. Indeed, much of the literature suggests that “the politics of the initiative and referendum have come full circle. Where once the Progressives called upon direct democracy to reform representative political processes, now the cure is subject to the same iniquities it was created to avoid” (Braunstein 2004, 5).

Much of the research on direct democracy has attempted to draw conclusions about the legitimacy of the institution from limited and anecdotal data sets, making any

findings vulnerable to considerable bias. Concerns and even abuses of the initiative and referenda process have dominated the literature, causing many to believe that its effect is dramatic and pervasive in the states in which it is exercised. The evidence, however, suggests that it plays an important but more limited role that remains well within the mainstream.¹ When compared to the number of bills passed by legislatures, approved ballot measures represent not more than a fraction of one percent. And, this assumes that all such measures are duly implemented and enforced, not reinterpreted by recalcitrant officials, mediated or repealed by subsequent legislative acts, or nullified by the courts (Gerber et al. 2001; Matsusaka 2004).

Still, to the extent such concerns are legitimate, they must be examined in context. While abuses and grievances illustrate that direct democracy, like its representative counterpart, can be a messy business, they do not necessarily negate its legitimacy as a political institution. And, given the wide variation in its implementation, it is possible that some states derive more benefit (or harm) from direct democracy than others.² Braunstein (2004) advances the role of context in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of this institution—that “different institutional arrangements, political culture values and social capital resources are likely to have a significant impact on how direct democracy is practiced” (147).

¹ For example, California ranked third in spending per capita in 1977, the year prior to the passage of Proposition 13, but ranked fourth ten years later (Matsusaka 2004).

² This view is consistent with Donovan and Bowler (1998b) who maintain that flaws in direct democracy are more likely related to the procedural requirements adopted for its use as opposed to any inherent flaws in the institution itself.

In order to evaluate direct democracy fairly, it must not be considered as a substitute to the legislative process as much as a mechanism through which the weaknesses of representative democracy can be corrected (Briffault 1985). While direct democracy in the United States was born of frustration with representative government, it was never intended to replace our representative institutions. Rather, by complementing our existing system, it was thought that policymakers would be more responsive to the will of the majority. And, in the event they were not, a sufficient number of frustrated citizens would be empowered to take corrective action, subject to certain conditions and considerable restrictions. Thus, it was by design that direct democracy has played a limited role in the jurisdictions that have adopted it. As such, its contribution and, ultimately, its legitimacy as an institution must be evaluated from this perspective.

A common approach to evaluating the effects of direct democracy is to look for policy variation between those states that have adopted some form of the institution and those that have not. By looking at the net effect of policy decisions (e.g., spending, taxation), it is assumed that differences between the groups may be attributed to the independent variable, 'direct democracy,' assuming a degree of uniformity among the states and that the other factors that drive policy outcomes have been identified and

controlled.³ From this perspective, it is the existence of the institution in a given state that matters and not the nature of the ballot measures that are approved or considered.

Lost in this type of analysis is whether states that have adopted the mechanisms of direct democracy produce policies that are consistent with the desires of voters or what those desires may be. Fundamental to these concerns is the knowledge of what motivates citizens in direct democracy states to act outside of the conventional legislative process—a question explored below.

Research Questions & Hypotheses

The present study examined the characteristics of citizen initiatives that were proposed and enacted by voters in initiative states. A review of the literature on the initiative process revealed that, while considerable attention has been paid to external factors that influence voter behavior, such as spending, competency, and bias, few researchers have looked at the content of ballot measures across states and time—and none on a national scale—to determine whether certain ideological criteria play an important role in determining the ballot choices of citizens across a variety of policy dimensions.⁴ Do voters look to the initiative primarily to implement their policy choices or to institute governance reforms? How do these measures affect the scope,

³ Even so, this approach may understate the impact of direct democracy if the indirect effect—the degree to which the existence of the initiative and/or referendum affects the behavior of legislators and causes them to alter their choices—is not accounted for in the analysis (Gerber 1996; 1998).

⁴ A notable exception is Braunstein (2004) who relies on more complete data sets in an effort to identify trends and tendencies in voter behavior, and upon which this dissertation builds. However, he restricts much of his analysis to a three-state sample and not the entire population of ballot measures considered during the period in question.

discretion, or accountability of government? Do voters structure their choices according to scope, subject matter, or political, economic, and social considerations? This research endeavors to address these questions by relying upon an extensive data set representing all initiative states during the period of analysis, and examining each measure that qualified for the ballot, along with relevant demographic data, in order to identify trends in voting behavior.

Hypothesis One (H1) examines the type of proposals that are qualified and approved by voters. Policy mandates bypass the normal legislative process and require government to implement or administer the public policy preferences of the prevailing majority. In this manner, new policy initiatives or changes to existing ones can be realized. Governance reforms, on the other hand, impose changes on the institutions and processes of government, affecting the autonomy or discretion of government actors and institutions to make decisions on policy and other matters within their purview. In this manner, the people can effectively regulate the behavior of government.

Tolbert (1996) examined the linkage between the adoption of governance reforms and measures of populism from 1978-1994. Linking the concept of reform with the ballot initiative, Braunstein (2004) reviewed each measure that qualified in three states from 1964-2000 to determine whether it sought to reform the governmental or political process. While he found that only some 22 percent of initiatives were reform-oriented, excluded from this analysis was the matter of policy discretion, a change

which is as much of a governance reform as any procedural modification. In addition, neither researcher addressed the policy dimension of initiatives. H1 addresses both concerns in assessing the frequency and adoption of policy proposals versus governance reforms, as follows:

H1: Voters use the ballot initiative to adopt governance reforms more frequently than policy mandates.

The acceptance of H1 would indicate that the use of the initiative process today is consistent with its provenance: to make governmental institutions more reflective of and accountable to the will of the people. The rejection of H1 would indicate that voters are more interested in securing policy benefits than in reforming the institutions and processes of government, suggesting a shift away from the reform orientation of earlier years and a greater focus on specific policy differences. Alternatively, it could reflect the capture of the initiative process by special interests that have been unable to secure their interests in the conventional governmental process.

Hypothesis Two (H2) focuses on the intended scope of citizen initiatives. While the mechanisms of direct democracy were established in order to advance the interests of reformers over those of the political and business classes, the modern-day initiative process has been the focus of much criticism in the literature for enabling wealthy, narrow interests to advance their agendas at the expense of the public interest. To test the validity of this charge, Braunstein (2004) examined the initiatives from three states to determine whether the costs or benefits of each proposal accrued to a particular

segment of the population or the public at-large. While only 36 percent of the measures were inclusive in nature, these measures were adopted over 18 percent more often than their exclusive counterparts, suggesting that concern over special interest capture is overstated when the rate of adoption is considered. Given the limited nature of the sample and the potential over-inclusiveness of the criterion he used, however, it is unclear whether these findings are representative of the entire population of initiative states. Accordingly, H2 tests this assumption:

H2: Voters prefer ballot initiatives that are inclusive in nature, regardless of policy type.

The acceptance of H2 would support Braunstein's conclusions and cast doubt on the warnings in much of the early literature. The rejection of H2 would indicate that Braunstein's sample or methodology is suspect and the literature's counsel may be warranted.

Hypothesis Three (H3) looks at the effect of the initiative process on accountability in government. O'Donnell (1999) established a conceptual framework for analyzing mechanisms of oversight and control in democratic systems. Vertical accountability is exercised by citizens with respect to state actors while horizontal accountability is exercised by state actors with respect to other state actors. In the context of the ballot initiative, vertical accountability refers to reforms that affect the extent to which government is answerable directly to citizens for its actions. This concept includes electoral procedures that enforce the popular will as it relates to

candidates and policy decisions, involves the representativeness of the process, or affects the locus of decision-making authority vis-à-vis the people. Horizontal accountability refers to the ability of governmental institutions to monitor and check the actions of each other. In order to determine the extent to which the initiative process affects government accountability, H3 tests the following claim:

H3: Governance reforms tend to expand the accountability of governmental institutions and actors.

Hypothesis Four (H4) examines the effect of the ballot initiative on the discretion of governmental actors and institutions. Governance reforms can affect both process and policy discretion. Process reforms affect discretion by imposing procedural changes to the decision-making or other functional processes of government, but do not affect the substance of decisions. Policy discretion is affected by modifying policymaking authority or imposing policy requirements in decision-making. By determining the extent to which the ballot initiative is used to affect government's discretion, H4 provides further granularity as to the intended purpose of governance reform initiatives, as follows:

H4: Governance reforms tend to limit the discretion of government institutions.

Hypothesis Five (H5) focuses on the effect of the initiative process on the role of citizens in the policymaking process. While H4 accounts for changes in state discretion, it does not capture whether such decision-making authority is delegated to government actors or reserved to the people. Given that the citizen initiative seeks to either reform

government institutions or effectively overrule the decisions of government officials, it seems logical to assume that voters will prefer reforms that provide them with greater input into the policymaking process as opposed to those that limit their participation and consent. Accordingly, H5 states the following:

H5: Reform measures tend to expand the role of citizens in the policymaking process.

Hypothesis Six (H6) looks at the effect of the ballot initiative on the scope and resources of government. While direct democracy reforms were instituted at the turn of the twentieth century to overcome a conservative bias in government that resisted policy changes demanded by the people, the initiative process over the past few decades has served primarily to counter more liberal interests that seek to expand the role of government. In a look at several respected sources of opinion data,⁵ Matsusaka (2004) determined that a majority of the public favored reductions in government spending from 1975-2000, indicating that cuts effected by the initiative were consistent with the popular will and not a result of special interest subversion.⁶ Indeed, citizens from initiative states were more likely to think that spending was ‘about right,’ reflecting greater satisfaction with spending policies adopted by or subject to the initiative as compared with those from non-initiative states. In order to determine

⁵ These sources included the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the National Election Studies (NES), Los Angeles Times/ABC News, and USC/Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics.

⁶ Peltzman’s study of gubernatorial elections and state spending from 1950-88 (1992) seems to support this view. He found that governors who presided over increases in spending tended to lose votes in their reelection bids—a loss of 0.25 percent for each one percent increase in spending.

whether the initiative process has had a liberal or conservative effect on government policies over the past thirty years, H6 tests the following:

H6: Ballot initiatives tend to limit the scope or resources of government.

To test H6, the current research chose 'programs and services' and 'regulation' as proxies for determining the scope of government, and 'revenue' as a proxy for determining the amount of resources available to government. These proxies included policy mandates that directly affect these factors, as well as governance reforms that affect the ability of government actors to make policy decisions on their own.

In the case of each hypothesis, initiative and policy type and effect, subject matter, and a variety of political, social, and economic factors were tested in order to determine their effect, if any, on the qualification and adoption of the ballot initiatives that are the focus of the present study. It was anticipated that the testing of these hypotheses would shed light on the characteristics of the use of direct democracy in the American states.

The Emergence of Direct Democracy in the States

The tension between political participation and preserving democratic freedoms has long been the subject of intense scrutiny and passionate debate, from America's founding to this very day. At the heart of the matter is how to balance the interests and desires of the majority without compromising the rights of minorities. As students of history, the Framers feared the excesses and instability of pure democracy, and opted

instead to form a republic, a form of democratic government in which policy decisions were insulated from the masses by representative institutions. Madison explained in Federalist 10 that

A pure democracy, by which I mean, a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction....Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths.... A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1788).

Critics of direct democracy often seize upon these words and argue that, by bypassing the representative element, the ballot initiative undermines the principles of American democracy—that absent the legislative process, which facilitates compromise between competing interests, the delicate balance between majority and minority interests is upset. While checks and balances between the branches of government are not affected by direct legislative devices and the courts have ruled that the federal Constitution does not preclude the exercise of legislative power by the people,⁷ the question remains as to whether mechanisms of direct democracy are compatible with the vision of our Founders. Unfortunately, the answer is unclear as even the Framers themselves seemed to disagree. While they all embraced popular consent and

⁷ As a matter of law, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Pacific States Tel. & Te. Co. v. Oregon* 223 U.S. 118 (1912) that questions raised under the Guaranty Clause are political in nature and “nonjusticiable.”

representation as essential elements, there was no consensus on how that consent should manifest itself in the republic they created.

The Federalists, led by Washington, Adams,⁸ and Hamilton, favored the delegation of authority to 'capable men of stature' and a minimal role for the common man to be exercised through restricted suffrage. Concerned with the dangers of limiting participation, the Anti-Federalists, led by Jefferson, Henry, and Paine, advocated a more direct role for the people. From the Anti-Federalist perspective, unless the people retained "sufficient control over those entrusted with the powers of their government" (Jefferson in letter to M. van der Kemp, 1812, quoted in Bergh 1907), infringements upon and deprivations of liberty were sure to occur. In order to gain ratification by the states, Madison devised a compromise framework of government that would represent the interests of the people but only through mediating institutions that constrained the popular will and enabled the wise and virtuous to govern. Despite their differences, Cronin (1989) noted that all of the Framers "opposed widespread and continuous public participation in the conduct and operations of government decision making" (8).⁹ Thus,

⁸ Matsusaka (2004) references the work of Wood (1998) which quotes Adams as saying that "he 'never understood' what a republic meant, and 'no other man ever did or ever will.'" This suggests that Adams did not have a position on this issue, yet the historical record seems clear that he aligned himself with the Federalist camp on these and other matters.

⁹ Cronin (1989) claims that the Framers viewed regular elections as "sufficient to render elected officials sensitive to the public's wishes" (8). However, the system of government they designed allowed the voters of that time to choose only their representative in the House chamber. All other elected offices were chosen indirectly and thus not likely to be sensitive to the public at-large. He also claims that the Framers rejected direct democracy beyond the community as it was impractical for a large nation. Yet, this argument does not necessarily translate to the states, many of which have been conducting ballot elections for almost one hundred years now.

it was generally agreed that the role of the citizen was not to initiate policy but to regulate government by electing representatives and consenting to changes in its constitutional authority.

This consensus went largely unchallenged until the late nineteenth century when the rapid pace of urbanization and industrialization in America gave rise to conditions that sowed the seeds of discontent and political mobilization. A mass migration from rural areas to urban centers, that began with the Civil War and continued through the 1920s, caused the policy priorities of many working-class Americans to shift toward government services that were needed to cope with the challenges of city life, such as fire and police protection, public health concerns, and education. First on the scene were the Populists, whose call for government to enact policies to reverse or ameliorate the social and economic disruptions of industrialization fell largely on deaf ears, leading them to champion reforms that enabled citizens to bypass, overrule, or remove their elected representatives. Some ten years later, the Progressive movement emerged in the western states with an agenda to promote middle-class interests and values and eliminate corruption in government. While the Progressives did not share the Populists' anti-industrial goals, they each embraced a host of governance reforms that would enable citizens to challenge the political machines and corporate interests they viewed as having corrupted the political process. They believed that through these procedural reforms, political equality and the promise of the American system could be restored. As such, these reforms were not intended to replace representative government, but

make it more accountable and responsive to the will of the people (Braunstein 2004; Cronin 1989; Donovan and Bowler 1998a; Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 2004; Piott 2003).

A revisionist view of the motivations behind the Populist and Progressive movements suggests that their agendas were no less self-interested than those that they targeted. According to these historians, the coalitions sought not to pursue an objective 'public interest' or even strengthen the democratic character of the political process as much as to gain control of the political process—like any other interest. Some even contend that their efforts to institute reform were driven by a desire to dilute the political clout of immigrant, minority, and urban populations which were growing increasingly influential in governing circles (Bowler, Donovan, and Tolbert 1998; Braunstein 2004; Matsusaka 2004). As such, these reforms should not be viewed in a sacred light, but recognized for the political legerdemain it represented.

Which perspective is more accurate is difficult to ascertain. What is clear is that these groups had considerable success in getting reluctant legislatures to enact governance reforms that provided the people with a more direct role in the political process. Among these reforms were direct democracy devices which enabled citizens to act as a collective legislature and translate their will directly into policy.

Laboratories of Direct Democracy

The birth of direct democracy in the United States occurred in 1893 when the California legislature approved a measure that provided for the initiative process at the

county level. Nebraska was the first state to extend the process to its counties and cities in 1897, while San Francisco and Vallejo, California, were the first cities to adopt it the following year. In 1898, South Dakota voters went to the polls to approve a constitutional amendment that provided for the ballot initiative and popular referendum. After over a decade of resistance by the major political parties, the election of a Populist governor in 1897, who had made these reforms the centerpiece of his campaign, appears to have persuaded legislators to accede to the demands of the people and allow the measure to be placed on the ballot. In the 20 years that followed, 19 additional states adopted the initiative at the state and local levels. While most were western states, all geographic regions of the country were represented. Today, 24 states and the District of Columbia allow their citizens to initiate legislation to a greater or lesser degree, subject to a wide variety of restrictions particular to each state. Comprehensive information on municipalities is surprisingly unavailable; however, it appears that the initiative process is available in at least 94 of 117 of the largest American cities.

There is considerable variation among the states as to the type and content of the measures that can be initiated and the requirements for certification and passage, as reflected in Table 1. Most states provide their citizens with a direct path to initiating proposals (i.e., the ‘direct’ initiative), but a few limit the process to statutes or constitutional amendments. Three states—Maine, Massachusetts, and Mississippi—require all measures to be routed through the legislature before they may appear on

the ballot. This ‘indirect’ initiative allows legislators an opportunity to pass a substantially similar measure into law or offer an alternative for consideration by the voters.¹⁰ About half of initiative states impose no substantive restrictions on the nature of the policies that may be addressed; however, most do limit interference in the critical operations of governments and judicial concerns. Policy restrictions in those states that have them generally involve appropriations and revenue, as well as matters of public safety.¹¹ Many states also impose a single-subject rule, which, in the absence of specific legislative criteria, has provided the courts with a discretionary veto that can be issued under almost any rationale (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998). Accordingly, judicial interpretation of this restriction has been wide-ranging and inconsistent.

Table 1: Initiative Type & Subject Matter Restrictions by State

State	Adopted	Type	Single Subject	Content	Revenue	Spending
Alaska	1956	IDS	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Arizona	1911	DC, DS	Yes	No	No	No
Arkansas	1910	DC, DS	No	No	No	No
California	1911	DC, DS	Yes	No	No	No
Colorado	1912	DC, DS	Yes ^E	No	No	No
Florida	1972	DC	Yes ^F	No	No	No
Idaho	1912	DS	No	No	No	No
Illinois	1970	DC	No	Yes ^G	Yes	Yes
Maine	1908	IDS	No	No	No	No

¹⁰ Only Massachusetts requires the legislature to approve an initiative’s placement on the ballot, providing legislators with the ability to prevent any measure from being considered by the people. This happened recently when citizens submitted a proposed constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, and the legislature refused to place the measure on the ballot.

¹¹ Uniquely, Illinois restricts initiatives to a single subject: the alteration of the legislative process. Given this restriction and the interpretation by the Illinois courts that any such initiative must make structural and procedural changes, it is not surprising that only one initiative has made it to the ballot since 1974.

Massachusetts	1918	IDC, IDS	No	Yes	No	Yes
Michigan	1908	DC, IDS	No	No	No	No
Mississippi	1914/92 ^A	IDC	No	Yes	No	No
Missouri	1908	DC, DS	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Montana	1906/72 ^B	DC, DS	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Nebraska	1912	DC, DS	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Nevada	1912	DC, IDS	No	Yes	No	Yes
North Dakota	1914	DC, DS	No	No	No	No
Ohio	1912	DC, IDS	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Oklahoma	1907	DC, DS	Yes	No	No	No
Oregon	1902	DC, DS	Yes	No	No	No
South Dakota	1898	DC, DS ^D	No	No	No	No
Utah	1900/17 ^C	DS, IDS	No	No	No	No
Washington	1912	DS, IDS	No	No	No	No
Wyoming	1968	IDS	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Type: DC=Direct Constitutional, DS=Direct Statutory, IDC=Indirect Constitutional, IDS=Indirect Statutory ^A Mississippi adopted the statutory initiative in 1914, but it was invalidated by the courts. ^B Montana adopted the statutory initiative in 1906 and the constitutional initiative in 1972. ^C Utah adopted the initiative in 1900, but was not implemented by the Legislature until 1917. ^D South Dakota adopted the direct statutory initiative in lieu of the indirect initiative in 1988. ^E Colorado adopted a single subject rule in 1995. ^F Florida exempts tax limitations from the single subject rule. ^G Illinois' initiative applies only to the election, organization, & procedures of the legislative branch.						

A host of procedural requirements, listed in Table 2, apply to the initial phases of the initiative process. In order to be certified for the ballot, initiative sponsors must meet the state's signature requirement. The number of signatures required is typically defined by law as a set percentage of the voter turnout for governor or, in a few cases, other offices in the last general election, ranging from a low of five percent to a high of 15 percent. A few states, however, use other criteria, such as total voter turnout, the number of registered voters, and the number of votes cast in the last presidential election. Among those states that provide for both constitutional and statutory initiatives, all but one (Nevada) require greater margins for constitutional amendments

than for statutory enactments.¹² In addition, these signature requirements must be met within the circulation period defined by law. All but five states limit the amount of time that a petition can be circulated, though this period can range from as little as 90 days to as much as two years. Finally, about half of the initiative states impose some form of geographic distribution requirement on the signatures collected to ensure that a proposal enjoys broad support across a state, not just in certain areas. As a result, the task of qualifying a ballot measure may be more or less arduous, depending on the jurisdiction. States with larger populations, significant signature requirements, and shorter circulation periods require considerable financial, organizational, and human resources to overcome these hurdles.

Table 2: Initiative Signature Requirements & Circulation Periods by State

State	Constitutional	Statutory	Distribution	Circulation
Alaska	n/a	10 % GE	Yes	12 months
Arizona	15% G	n/a	No	20 months
Arkansas	10% G	8% G	Yes	Unlimited
California	8% G	5% G	No	150 days
Colorado	5% SS ^A	5% SS ^A	No	6 months
Florida	8% PR	n/a	Yes	48 months
Idaho	n/a	6% RV ^B	Yes ^C	18 months
Illinois	8% G	n/a	No	18 months
Maine	n/a	10% G	No	12 months

¹² Despite this difference, there is no distinction between the two types of measures in terms of what can be enacted. Accordingly, policy decisions are often enshrined in the state constitution, in addition to matters of governance. While it may be a bit easier to certify a statutory initiative, the costs of mobilization for any initiative drive would appear to dictate that a constitutional initiative is preferred in any state where it is available, given the relatively small increase in signatures required and the increased difficulty associated with amending or repealing such a measure once ratified.

Massachusetts	3% G	3.5% G ^D	Yes	64 days
Michigan	10% G	8 % G	No	180 days
Mississippi	12% G	n/a	Yes	12 months
Missouri	~5.3% G ^E	~3.3% G ^E	Yes ^E	18 months
Montana	10% G	5% G	Yes	12 months
Nebraska	10% RV ^F	7% RV ^F	Yes	12 months
Nevada	10% GE	10% GE	Yes	11/10 months
North Dakota	4% P ^G	2% P ^G	No	12 months
Ohio	10% G	6% G	Yes	Unlimited
Oklahoma	15% V ^H	8% V ^H	No	90 days
Oregon	8% G	6% G	No	24 months
South Dakota	10% G	5% G	No	12 months
Utah	n/a	10%G	Yes	Unlimited
Washington	n/a	8% G	No	6/10 months
Wyoming	n/a	15% GE	Yes	18 months

Basis: G=Governor, SS=Secretary of State, PR=President, GE=General Election, RV=Registered Voters, P=Population, V=Variable
^A Colorado reduced its requirement from 8% in 1982.
^B Idaho changed its requirement from 10% Governor in 1997.
^C A federal court ruled Idaho's distribution requirement unconstitutional in 2002.
^D Massachusetts also requires approval by 25% of all legislators in two consecutive sessions to qualify for the ballot.
^E Missouri's requirements apply to the distribution requirement, not the state as a whole.
^F Nebraska's basis changed from 'Governor' in 1994 pursuant to a state court ruling.
^G North Dakota changed its requirement from 20,000 & 10,000 voters, respectively, in 1978.
^H Oklahoma's basis is the state office receiving the most votes in the last general election.

Adoption requirements also vary from state to state. Most states require a majority of those votes cast on the measure while some require larger margins, such as a majority of those voting in an election, supermajorities for certain subject matters, or dual criteria that require a certain percentage of overall turnout and a simple majority. Two states have adopted unique criteria for passage: Nevada requires a simple majority vote in two consecutive elections while Oregon provides that any measure which imposes a supermajority requirement on the passage of future measures must be

adopted by that same margin. While most states require that initiatives be considered in general elections, several provide for inclusion in primary and special elections. Finally, some states impose restrictions on the refiling of defeated measures and the ability of the legislature to amend or repeal those that have been adopted by the people. These criteria are summarized in Table 3.


Table 3: Adoption, Refiling, & Amendment Criteria by State

State	Election Type	Approval Requirements	Refiling Restrictions	Legislative Restrictions
Alaska	G, P, S	Majority	No	2 years to repeal
Arizona	G	Majority	No	3/4 vote to amend, no repeal ^A
Arkansas	G	Majority	No	2/3 vote to amend or repeal
California	G, P, S	Majority	No	Cannot amend or repeal
Colorado	G	Majority	No	
Florida	G	Majority ^B	No	
Idaho	G	Majority ^C	No	
Illinois	G	3/5 or majority of all voters	No	
Maine	G	Majority	No	
Massachusetts	G	Majority & 30% of all voters	2 cycles	
Michigan	G	Majority	No	3/4 vote to amend or repeal
Mississippi	G	Majority & 40% of all voters	2 years	
Missouri	G	Majority	No	
Montana	G	Majority	No	
Nebraska	G	Majority & 35% of all voters	3 years	
Nevada	G	Majority in consecutive elections	No	3 years to amend or repeal
North Dakota	G, P, S	Majority	Yes ^D	2/3 vote to amend or repeal for 7 years
Ohio	G	Majority	No	
Oklahoma	G, P, S	Majority	3 years	
Oregon	G	Majority ^E	No	
South Dakota	G	Majority	No	
Utah	G	Majority ^F	2 years	Cannot repeal ^G
Washington	G	Majority & 1/3 of all voters ^H	No	2/3 vote to amend or repeal for 2 years

Wyoming	G	Majority of all voters	5 years	Cannot repeal for 2 years
Election Type: G=General, P=Primary, S=Special ^A The Arizona legislature can only amend to further the purpose of the initiative. ^B Florida requires a 2/3 majority for approval of new taxes or fees (1998). ^C Idaho changed its requirement from a majority of votes cast for Governor in 1982. ^D North Dakota restricts bond issues to two elections in 12 months. ^E An initiative that imposes a supermajority requirement on any matter requires the same margin to pass (2000). ^F Utah requires a 2/3 majority for approval of wildlife issues. ^G Utah's restriction is statutory in nature, so it could be repealed by the legislature. ^H Washington requires a 60% margin for approval of gambling issues.				

Use of the initiative process has varied across states and regions. As Figure 1 illustrates, Oregon has seen the most initiatives on its ballots (since 1904), but California has emerged as the leader in modern times; Wyoming has had the least. Except for North Dakota, the states that most heavily rely on the initiative are located in the West. This regional variation may result from the adoption of the initiative in western states at a time when their political institutions were in their infancy and reliance on direct legislation became a part of the newly-defined political culture (Price 1975). In a look at the national variation of initiative use, Banducci (1998a) determined that structural, political, and cultural factors explained different state experiences, to wit: divided government, interest group strength, and legislative professionalism co-vary positively with initiative use while the difficulty of ballot qualification co-varies negatively; political parties and party competitiveness were found not to have any effect. Earlier, Price (1975) had found that weak political parties, strong interest groups, and less onerous signature requirements were associated with higher initiative use. More recently, Braunstein (2004) found that the effect of population size and diversity to be

inconclusive, with large and diverse California ranking first, as expected, but smaller and more homogeneous Oregon and Maine ranking second on initiatives and referenda, respectively.




Source: Initiative & Referendum Institute

Figure 1: Initiative Use by State, 1904-2007

The frequency of initiative use has also varied over time, as shown in Figure 2. The Progressive era (1904-1940) saw more measures qualify (767) than in any other period. During the Second World War and the days of post-war expansion that followed (1942-1976), the use of the initiative declined by over 56% to just 434.¹³ The contemporary period following California's tax revolt (1978-2000) saw a substantial increase in the number of measures that qualified to a level nearly that of the

¹³ It is interesting to note that, during the 1960s, less than 90 initiatives appeared on the ballot nationwide.

Progressive period (763). A more focused look at decennial periods, beginning in 1962, found that 97 initiatives appeared on statewide ballots nationally, but that that number had more than tripled to 291 from in the period ending in 1993. Reasons attributed to this modern-day increase are the decline of political parties, the emergence of single-issue interest groups, the advent of computerized databases to target supporters (Braunstein 2004; Matsusaka 2004), the rise of petition management firms that enable well-funded groups to qualify measures more easily (Magleby 1984) as well as facilitate such strategies as the counter-initiative to defeat an opponent's initiative (Banducci 1998a; Donovan and Bowler 1998a), and the instructive nature of California's Proposition 13, a watershed event in the modern direct democracy movement (Braunstein 2004; Matsusaka 2004).



Source: Initiative & Referendum Institute

Figure 2: Initiative Use by Decade, 1904-2004

There is disagreement as to the Zeitgeist behind this resurgence. Some contend that it reflects increased distrust in government and a desire for greater accountability while others take a more optimistic view that increased citizen interest and engagement in the policy process is consistent with populist democratic values and the exercise of popular sovereignty (Braunstein 2004). A minority even believe that this increase results from responsible lawmaking by legislatures in rejecting measures that are impractical and/or benefit special interests (McCuan et al. 1998)! An alternative explanation that is not reflected in the literature begins with the decline in initiative use that preceded the increase. If the decline was precipitated by the emergence of the national government as the principal player in policymaking that began with the war effort and continued with an expansion of powers and programs that shifted the focus of the people to Washington, then this could, in part, explain why initiative use surged in the 1980s and continued to rise through the end of the century. The political climate that brought Ronald Reagan to office saw the national government as too large and unresponsive, and this set the stage for efforts to devolve power and responsibilities to the states. A review of initiatives proposed during this time reveals that many address federal matters relating to state rights and representation. It is possible, then, that this conservative orientation could explain at least part of the surge in the initiative activity in question.

Finally, while the use of initiatives has ebbed and flowed over time, the issues addressed and the rate at which these measures are adopted have not significantly

varied (Ernst 2000). From 1901 through 2000, 41 percent of statewide initiatives passed nationwide. Voter support during all three periods remained fairly consistent, although the contemporary period did attract the highest average turnout (by about three percent as compared with the other periods), perhaps in response to the lack of trust in government that emerged in the wake of the Watergate scandal (Braunstein 2004).

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter reviews the various lines of inquiry that have been pursued relative to study of direct democracy as it is practiced in the American states. As scant attention has been paid by the literature to the effect of the initiative process on the scope, discretion, or accountability of government, it was not possible to relate much of the existing research directly to the hypotheses framed above. Rather, the work done in such areas as campaign spending, voter competency, and minority rights pertains to this study only indirectly, given that the type of measures which qualified for the ballot and were adopted by the people relates to and may shed light upon its legitimacy. For example, an assessment of the inclusive or exclusive nature of approved initiatives in a given state or subject might reveal whether voters were influenced by special interests or acted with a specific purpose in mind (e.g., discrimination). While such a determination may not be conclusive, it could identify problems in the literature and provide a context for greater understanding of voter behavior vis-à-vis the citizen initiative.

The Effect of Direct Democracy: Policy Variation between the States

Philosophically, the need or desire for direct democracy is premised upon the expectation that public policy in those states that have adopted it will better reflect—and policymakers will be more responsive to—the will of the majority (Briffault 1985). This is achieved both directly and indirectly—by intervening in the policymaking process or by pressuring legislators and limiting their ability to logroll.¹⁴ This view suggests that policy outcomes are affected by the institutions a state adopts—that the legislative process may produce different policies than those adopted by initiative (Riker 1982; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988).¹⁵ It is expected, therefore, that policy decisions in direct democracy states are more likely to be aligned with voter preferences than those in other states, and that identifiable differences between the states will accrue.

A wealth of literature has emerged over the past fifty years on the rationality of the uninformed voter (Downs 1957) and developing a sophisticated theory of interest group politics (Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) which posits that competition between such groups is determinative of policy outcomes. Interest groups that are the most effective at using their resources to mobilize uninformed voters are most likely to win at the polls—even if the majority suffers as a result (Lohmann 1998; Matsusaka

¹⁴ It is thought that logrolling can build legislative majorities for policies that cannot mobilize popular support (Matsusaka 2004).

¹⁵ A competing theory extrapolates from the work of March and Olson (1984) and posits that political institutions may actually affect the formation of policy preferences and attitudes as opposed to simply aggregating preferences differently and affecting the outcomes in this manner.

1995). This dynamic would seem to apply to ballot measure campaigns as much as it does candidate elections, though groups may be more effective at influencing one or the other. However, the existence of direct democracy in a given jurisdiction may cause policy to shift toward majority rule by influencing legislators and providing a means by which to constrain their behavior when they stray too far from the preferences of their constituents (Kalt and Zupan 1984; Kau and Rubin 1979; Matsusaka 1992; Peltzman 1984). In this manner, legislative logrolling may be scrutinized by the voters (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981) and issue bundling, as it relates to candidate preference, may be partially disaggregated (Besley and Coate 2000).

Matsusaka (2004) set forth a framework for understanding the effect of initiatives from the perspective of competition. He observed that the initiative process lowers the cost for policy entrepreneurs to enter the legislative market and puts pressure on representatives to adopt policies that are aligned with the majority. By introducing competition into the legislative process, voter preferences on specific issues are conveyed to lawmakers, enabling them to be more faithful in representing the views of their constituencies.¹⁶ However, when voter preferences remain uncertain, representatives may wind up adopting more extreme positions closer to their own views or that are advocated by interest groups in an effort to deter an initiative challenge.

¹⁶ Alternatively, the initiative process may promote policy innovation by enabling policy entrepreneurs to bypass resistant legislatures and unresponsive party structures and present their ideas directly to the voters. Candidate elections cannot achieve either result as a clear choice is often not provided to voters given the major parties' tendency to converge on policy positions embraced by the median voter.

From this perspective, “the power of interest groups arises through their ability to distort representative behavior, not through an ability to dominate initiative elections” (Matsusaka and McCarty 2001, 415).

The literature indicates that interest groups are particularly effective at influencing the fiscal decisions of the legislature, resulting in spending policies which may deviate from the median voter preference (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Niskanen 1971). If legislators are likely to act in their self-interest (Mayhew 1974), absent a populist mechanism by which limits may be imposed to constrain such behavior, many scholars agree that greater spending is likely to result (Briffault 1985; Denzau, Mackay, and Weaver 1981). However, Lascher, et al. (1996), in a survey of state budgets and voter preferences, found no evidence that spending policy was more responsive to public opinion in initiative states, aside from a modest link to AFDC spending and gambling policy.¹⁷ And, Zax (1989) observed that state spending is significantly higher in states that allow for the direct statutory initiative, explaining that it may enable voters to second-guess or ‘reprimand’ legislators when popular items are not included in the budget.

In a study of state fiscal policy from 1970-2000, Matsusaka (2004) found that the combined size of state and local government (as measured by revenue and expenditure)

¹⁷ Donovan and Bowler (1998b) independently reviewed this data and suggested that it may actually reflect less policy responsiveness to voter preferences on AFDC, Medicaid, and education, and even attributed a possible conservative bias to direct legislation.

in initiative states was about four percent less than in non-initiative states.¹⁸ Further analysis revealed that state spending accounted for all of the reduction—some 12 percent—while local spending actually increased. More specifically, the presence of the initiative was associated with a five percent reduction in taxes and no change in charges at the state level, but a 14 percent hike in charges and no change in taxes at the municipal level. Thus, it appears that the initiative effectively shifted the disbursement of funds from state to local governments, thereby promoting decentralization, and resulted in limits on the redistribution of wealth by causing states, as a whole, to rely less on taxes and more on charges.¹⁹ These findings would seem to contradict the charge of many critics that the effect of the initiative is irresponsible policymaking—that voters tend to increase spending and cut taxes without regard to fiscal needs or constraints.

In a broader policy context but more limited timeframe, Gerber (1999) found that the differences between initiative and non-initiative states were few but significant. In the area of tax policy, 74 percent of initiative states taxed personal income as opposed to 96 percent of non-initiative states. However, there was no significant difference in the percentage of tax revenues from this source, on average, between the groups in those states that had an income tax. Initiative states also spent a greater

¹⁸ These findings were tested against various measures of citizen ideology to ensure it was the initiative that was responsible for the observed differences and not the conservative nature of the states that had adopted the initiative. All measures were found to have little or no effect (Matsusaka 2004).

¹⁹ Matsusaka (2004) also found that the easier it was to qualify a measure for the ballot in a given state (in terms of the signature requirement), the greater the impact it had on a state's fiscal policy.

portion of their revenue on highway and natural resource issues but less on hospitals. Spending on education, welfare, health, corrections, and police was not affected by the initiative. These findings would appear to challenge the critic's view that funding alone drives results, given that transportation and environment are principal areas of focus and spending by economic groups yet only the increase in highway spending is favorable to their interests.

Related to any policy variations among the states are the institutional reforms that affect the political process in each state. These 'governance policies' modify the rules under which political decisions are made, often by imposing procedural constraints on the exercise of government functions and authority, such as limits on taxes, spending, and office tenure. Whereas policy mandates cause a shift in policy direction within a defined policy space, governance policies often redefine the space itself, thereby modifying the set of possible choices from which a policy decision can be made (Shepsle and Weingast 1994). In this manner, voter preferences, as expressed during an election cycle, may be transformed into ongoing and permanent restrictions on the legislative and regulatory process, affecting substantive policy decisions and outcomes into the future.²⁰ The literature suggests that direct democracy states are more likely to adopt governance policies than their non-populist counterparts (Donovan and Bowler

²⁰ While more recent reforms, such as California's Proposition 13 readily come to mind, Populist and Progressive era reforms, such as women's suffrage, the Australian ballot, direct primaries, direct election of senators, and even direct legislation itself, further reveal the impact of procedural changes on our institutions of government and future policy choices. Many of these have even served as the vehicle upon which new reforms have been adopted (Tolbert 1998).

1998a; Tolbert 1998), and that they are more likely to do so when initiative use is high (Tolbert 1998).²¹ Tolbert (1998) sees initiative use as a measure of the populist climate in a state, and shows that this climate affects institutions which, in turn, shape policy choices, either indirectly through the legislature or directly by initiative. Since political ‘outsiders’ do not share the same incentives as legislators, the policy choices of direct democracy states are likely to diverge from non-populist states over time (Donovan and Bowler 1998b).

While citizens generally look upon these efforts to regulate government and hold it accountable as consistent with democratic values, policymakers often see them as unwarranted and even dangerous infringements of their authority that complicate the effective stewardship of the state. Donovan and Bowler (1998b) see a potential for irresponsible policymaking in direct democracy states, given that conflicting preferences may give rise to situations where tax cuts and spending increases are supported simultaneously. If constraints on the legislature’s ability to modify tax policy are adopted, spending is likely to deviate from the median voter preference over time, unless long-term debt is substituted for revenue as an end-run around these restrictions (Donovan and Bowler 1998b). While debt limits may also be imposed by initiative, it appears that voters generally prefer debt financing to increased taxes or reduced spending since they often approve the bond referenda that are placed on the ballot. As

²¹ For example, term limits exist in 23 of 24 initiative states and in only three of 26 non-initiative states. Opinion polls reflect rather uniform support for governance measures nationwide, indicating that this relationship is not a spurious one based on exogenous variables (Tolbert 1998).

a result, it would appear that direct democracy states might experience higher levels of indebtedness, though the historical record is inconclusive and the findings of Matsusaka (2004) contrast with this reasoning.²² Alternatively or in combination, fiscal constraints may also cause legislatures to make spending trade-offs that are most favorable to influential constituencies at the expense of those which have the least access to the political process.

Gains in productivity have also been attributed to direct democracy. Blomberg, et al. (2001) found that output per worker was higher in initiative states, and estimated that non-initiative states “wasted” 20 percent more in government spending than those that had the initiative. Feld and Savioz (1997) observed that output per capita was higher in Swiss cantons that had the initiative versus those that did not. And, in the realm of social policy, Gerber (1999) determined that initiative states are significantly more likely to adopt the death penalty and a parental consent requirement for teenage abortions.²³ She posits that these differences reflect the indirect influence that direct legislation has on policy outcomes within the legislative process, given that “interest groups in those states are able to pressure the state legislature to pass laws they favor

²² All states have adopted balanced budget requirements that effectively limit the amount of debt that can be incurred. Accordingly, this criticism of direct democracy would be muted if yet another limitation on government brought about by direct policymaking forced legislators to limit spending. However, legislators have found creative ways to end-run these constraints, such as the issuance of non-guaranteed debt, and often convince voters to approve of borrowing in lieu of cutting government programs (Bahl and Duncombe 1993; Clingermayer and Wood 1995).

²³ She notes the strength of this relationship varies according to signature requirements and professionalism of legislatures, both of which have a negative effect on the likelihood.

by threatening to propose majority-preferred initiatives that the legislature opposes” (Gerber 1999, 131).

The Ideology of Direct Democracy: Liberal or Conservative?

A review of the literature indicates that direct democracy has had a largely conservative influence on public policy during the last few decades. The initiative is associated with a reduction in total government spending, limits on redistributive policies by shifting spending from state to local governments, and a greater reliance on user fees (as opposed to taxes) than non-populist states (Matsusaka 2004). It has had the largest impact on spending in states with heterogeneous populations and a Democratic governor and legislature. As both major parties appear to spend more than the voters desire when either monopolizes both branches of government, direct democracy provides voters with the ability to reduce spending—by as much \$211 per capita during Democratic control (Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). In terms of tax policy, initiative states are less progressive than other states (Lascher Jr., Hagen, and Rochlin 1996).²⁴

While these observations suggest a possible conservative bias to direct legislation, history reveals that direct democracy actually increased the size of government in the early part of the twentieth century. In his study of the period 1902-

²⁴ Dwyre, et al. (1994) claimed that weak political parties and direct democracy, to the extent they strengthen the hand of the elite and limit the access and influence of the rank-and-file, produce a less progressive tax structure.

42, Matsusaka (2004) found that both taxing and spending increased in initiative states by roughly six and eight percent, respectively; more so in states that make it easier to qualify measures for the ballot. He concluded, therefore, that the initiative is not an ideologically biased device—that it does not favor liberal or conservative causes but rather promotes the interests of the majority. It does so directly through the adoption of qualified measures and indirectly by pressuring representatives, when voter preferences are uncertain, into supporting policies that are similar enough to proposed initiatives to deter interest in the passage of such measures.²⁵

Matsusaka rejects the ‘Leviathan’ construct (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Niskanen 1971)—that government takes on a life of its own and continues to expand against the wishes of the people—of those who embrace direct democracy as a means by which to rein in government, noting that citizens have resorted to the institution to increase *and* decrease spending during the last century. He similarly rejects the median voter theory—that competition drives candidates to support policies that are favorable to as many voters as possible—as unable to account for the fiscal policy differences between initiative and non-initiative states (Downs 1957), and the interest group theory—that competition drives candidates to support policies that are favorable to those groups that can deliver the most votes—as unable to adequately explain the

²⁵ The model indicates that “the effect of the initiative is conditional on the amount of uncertainty about voter preferences and the degree of divergence between voter and representative preferences” (Matsusaka and McCarty 2001, 444).

extent of the policy gap, its convergence over time, or the political cost in votes for increased spending (Peltzman 1992).

Instead, Matsusaka (2004) offered a model to explain the “periodic divergences between the policies of initiative and non-initiative states and the tendency of policies in initiative states to more accurately reflect the majority view” (92). According to this theory, frictions in the representation process cause elected officials to make policy decisions that are not aligned with their constituents’ preferences. The initiative enables voters to realign policies with their preferences whereas, absent the initiative, voters must rely on the slower and indirect means of elections to alter the behavior of their representatives. This difference results in policy divergences for periods of about five years, after which the gap narrows and often disappears (Matsusaka 2004).

While “the liberal tendency of legislatures in the last thirty years seems contrary to the wishes of the majority,” Matsusaka (2004) argued “the fact that citizens sometimes want more spending than their representatives deliver, as in the early twentieth century, weighs against the popular ‘leviathan’ theory...” (74). This would seem to reject the possibility that changes in the political environment have resulted in a fundamental ideological shift. Yet one version of the Leviathan attributes the growth of government to bureaucracies, which seek to maximize budgets in order to increase or maintain prestige and power and are enabled by politicians who desire to expand government for their own benefit (Niskanen 1971). Direct democracy may allow voters to intervene in this dynamic and cut spending to levels consistent with the will of the

majority. Since the massive growth of the federal bureaucracy did not occur until World War II, it is possible that the period examined does not account for this theory, and that the people are inclined and enabled through the use of ballot measures to limit this growth in the size and scope of government—a possibility that this dissertation explores in the next chapter.

Matsusaka (2004) credited the rise of direct democracy at the beginning of the twentieth century to a shift in population from rural to urban areas, gerrymandering, and representative apportionment not based on the ‘one man, one vote’ principle that resulted in a disproportionate influence of rural interests in the legislature and an unwillingness to respond to the needs of the new urban majority. In initiative states, city dwellers were able to mobilize their numerical advantage and approve directly various expenditures that the legislature would not. This view is supported by the subject matter of ballot measures considered at that time—a disproportionate number focused on issues of importance and concern to urban voters, including representation. Since these events were brought about by a reaction to malapportionment, a circumstance that no longer applies, given the landmark ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in *Reynolds v. Simms* and the reverse migration of people from the cities, it is possible that the use of direct democracy during this era in pursuit of ‘liberal’ policy goals in the context of small government footprints bears little relation to the situation as it exists today. Thus, the impetus behind ballot measures to cut spending in direct democracy states during the latter part of the twentieth century may be more than just

a temporal shift in the popular mood toward conservatism, but a reflection of the people's ideological views toward government.

Using Direct Democracy: Explaining Variations among the States

The requirements and restrictions adopted by the states to regulate the initiative process play a significant role in determining the effect of the institution.²⁶ Indeed, there is general consensus in the literature that the more difficult it is to qualify and adopt a ballot measure, the less impact direct democracy will have on the policymaking process (Banducci 1998a; Boehmke 2002; Boehmke 2005; Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998).²⁷ As there is substantial variation among the 26 direct democracy states in the structural rules that are imposed, it is not surprising that the number of measures that qualify for the ballot and which are ultimately adopted vary significantly from state to state.²⁸

The most formidable obstacle to qualifying a measure for the ballot is the signature requirement. While most states tie the number of signatures required to a percentage of the voter turnout for some elective office in the last election, this

²⁶ These include signature requirements, geographic distribution requirements, circulation periods, subject matter limitations, election type, adoption requirements, and refiling restrictions—all of which are discussed at length in the first chapter.

²⁷ The conclusion of Tolbert, et al. (1998), that “the stringency of a state’s petition requirement is...inversely related to the frequency of measures qualifying for the ballot” (28) is consistent with the findings of nearly all studies, save one: Price (1975) found evidence that the relationship may actually be positive.

²⁸ Price (1975) argues that western states may have become more accustomed to the use of direct democracy in their political process due to the immature nature of their political institutions, customs, and traditions when the Progressive movement came to fruition, just a few decades after their admission into the union. Cronin (1989) also credits the Populist movement which was flourishing at that time.

quantity can vary considerably from as little as 12,687 (or 2 percent of the population) for statutory initiatives in North Dakota to as many as 611,009 (or 3.5 percent of the population) for constitutional initiatives in Florida. And, fifteen states have adopted some form of a geographic distribution requirement that imposes a floor or ceiling on the number of signatures that must be collected from political sub-divisions of the state, thereby ensuring broader support for a measure but further complicating the signature gathering process.²⁹ Of course, all this must be achieved within the defined circulation period—which also varies widely—or else the petitions expire and the process of collection must be repeated for another election cycle. Most studies appear to agree that states with greater signature requirements experience fewer initiatives on their ballots. Banducci (1998a) found that “for every increase of 2,000 signatures required per day, the number of initiatives on the ballot is predicted to decline by over 3” (116). Boehmke (2005) observed a similar trend in total and for all issue areas except for governmental process. Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) determined that distribution requirements were twice as effective in depressing initiative use as the total number of signatures required, but that circulation deadlines did not have an impact.

Subject matter limitations also vary from state to state. Some impose minimal constraints to protect the public safety and the continuity of government while others

²⁹ Recently, however, geographic distribution requirements in Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah have been stayed or overturned by various state and federal courts for violating the equal protection provision of the federal constitutional and the ‘one citizen, one vote’ principle affirmed in *Reynolds v Simms* (1964), the effect of which may result in an anti-urban bias (Kehler and Stern 1995).

set forth a list of subjects that are prohibited from consideration. Many states have adopted a single-subject rule that requires initiatives to be limited to a one subject in its focus. While its purpose was ostensibly to avoid omnibus initiatives that might confuse voters and prevent the legislative practice of logrolling (Gerber 1999; Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998), there is little agreement as to what constitutes a single subject when it comes to most policy matters. This has provided the courts in several states, such as California and Florida, with “discretionary veto power” (42) to block virtually any initiative that is challenged (Gerber 1999; Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998). Interestingly, Boehmke (2005) found that a single-subject requirement may actually increase initiative use.

Political factors may also explain variations in the use of direct democracy. Divided government may result in legislative gridlock or institutional conflict, causing frustrated voters and interest groups to rely more heavily on the initiative process. Banducci (1998a) determined that initiative use increased by approximately half a unit per election cycle when different parties control the legislature and the executive. Price (1975), however, found no evidence that legislative failure is associated with initiative use, but rather that voter contentment was correlated with more initiatives. Party control may reflect ideological differences in the majority party’s policy agenda, which may or may not correspond with the preferences of the majority of voters, as expressed by the initiative process. Boehmke (2005) found that liberal states experience more initiatives in total and in all areas but for the morality-related, whereas states with

Republican-controlled legislatures experience fewer initiatives, especially in the area of taxation.

Professionalism in a state's legislature tends to result in more competitive seats that force legislators to cater to interest groups in an effort to raise sufficient contributions to run a successful campaign. The desire to avoid conflicts between these interests may result in legislative inertia, and cause such groups to pursue extra-legislative alternatives (Banducci 1998a). In addition, more professionalism appears to be associated with greater public dissatisfaction which may drive initiative use, given that the agendas of professional legislatures tend to be more ambitious than their more amateur counterparts and since conflict and failure is more likely in such circumstances (Banducci 1998a; Squire 1993). Consistent with these views, Banducci (1998a) found that initiative use increased by almost three for every one-unit change in legislative professionalism. However, Boehmke (2005) concluded that states with more professional legislatures experience fewer (tax) initiatives per election cycle, reflecting perhaps a greater ability to forge compromises that benefit the collective majority.

Weak political parties and strong interest groups may also related to initiative use, given the lack of party cues and the resources—both human and financial—that interests can bring to bear on the signature-gathering process and subsequent ballot measure campaigns. Boehmke (2005) found that initiative use increased with the number of citizen groups in a state while more economic groups actually depressed the frequency of initiatives. Not only was the effect for citizens groups significantly larger in

scale, it was correlated with initiatives related to government, taxation, and the environment, whereas economic groups affected only government measures. Since weak parties have been associated with strong interest groups, initiative use may increase in states with weak parties (Banducci 1998a; Dwyre et al. 1994; Price 1975). Party competition causes parties to cater to groups that will bring them electoral advantage and take positions that are more aligned with the median voter, resulting in fewer initiatives (Banducci 1998a; Key 1966). While Banducci (1998a) determined that states with strong interest groups experience an additional two-thirds of one initiative per election cycle, party competition and strength were not correlated.

Economic and social conditions may also be associated with the use of ballot measures. Citizens may more frequently resort to the initiative in times of economic hardship or discontent as a way of protesting or changing current policies. Indeed, more initiatives appear on the ballot when a state experiences budget shortfalls (Boehmke 2005). Uncertainty in voter preferences brought about by large and heterogeneous populations (as measured by urban-rural parity) may confound elected leaders in terms of a policy response and cause voters to seek extra-legislative solutions (Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). Supporting this view, Boehmke (2005) found that more racially diverse states experience more initiatives, all relating to government and taxation.

The Faces of Direct Democracy: Initiatives & the Issues They Address

A review of the literature on direct democracy reveals that few studies have seriously explored the relationship between support for ballot measures and subject matter. Since most research tends to focus on individual policy areas, a few election cycles, or one or a few states, it cannot provide a sufficient basis upon which to identify ideological trends or consistency across any of these parameters. Nonetheless, a review of what has been done provides some context for this dissertation.

First, a state's usage of direct democracy clearly varies by subject matter. Based on a three state sample, Braunstein (2004) found that the frequency of tax and revenue measures was greater in California—perhaps given the legacy of Proposition 13—while measures related to government regulation and public morality were far more prevalent in Colorado and South Dakota—perhaps given the more homogeneous nature of these states. South Dakotan ballot measures were concentrated on few subjects and a greater proportion focused on the environment than in the other two states—suggesting less division and conflict in many areas, such as business regulation, social services, and education. Racial diversity had a negative effect on government process referenda but it did not appear to affect the frequency of similar initiatives.

In his study of early direct democracy in California, Crouch (1943) observed that the first measures addressed economic and moral issues. By the 1920s, the primary focus was on administrative reorganization; during the 1930s, economic concerns reemerged. Tallian (1977), in her review of California initiatives over a 60-year period

beginning in 1912, found that measures relating to government and the political process, public morality, the economy, and regulatory policy were more common than any other. Peak initiative use occurred during the first thirty years, and declined considerably in all subject areas after 1949. This evolution is consistent with an era of industrialization and its attendant challenges, followed by a post-war boom that shifted attention away from government and matters of public policy. The increased use of this franchise beginning in the late 1970s, when economic malaise was ubiquitous, follows this trend (Braunstein 2004).³⁰ Civil rights and environmental issues almost never appeared on the ballot until the 1960s and 1970s, respectively, but are now among the most frequently appearing subjects on the ballot (Tallian 1977).

Initiative use throughout the states has followed a similar trend. Since 1904, government regulation and finance have topped the list of subject matters, with the period 1904-1940 experiencing the most such measures. Business regulation, welfare, education, environment, energy, and land use issues were more frequent concerns from 1942-1976. Civil rights/liberties and environmental concerns were not prevalent until 1978, at which time business regulation and education began to appear less frequently

³⁰ While Braunstein credits the economy, the visibility of California Proposition 13, and the Cold War nuclear arms race with the expanded use of direct democracy on a quasi-national scale, he does not reference the possibility of an ideological shift that caused the people to intervene in the policy process more frequently in an effort to 'correct' the policy decisions of an unresponsive legislature. This is curious considering that the framework he sets forth to explain the differences between initiative and non-initiative states is premised on this dynamic.

on the ballot (Braunstein 2004).³¹ During the 1990s, a period of heightened political tensions and distrust in government, initiative use increased further, with nearly 30 percent of all measures embracing governmental or political reform—an increase from the 19 percent of previous decades (Magleby 1994). According to Braunstein (2004), “this progression of subject issues on the ballot conforms rather well to the social and political transformations that occurred in this era of American history” (101).

In a comparative analysis of popular initiatives versus legislative referrals that qualified for the ballot nationwide from 1964-2000, Braunstein (2004) determined that over 44 percent of initiated measures were related to government, the political process, taxation, and other revenue matters, while these subjects constituted almost 73 percent of referrals. The environment, welfare, business regulation, and moral concerns were more often the subject of initiated measures than referred, but education was of equal status. In all subjects, voters generally preferred referred measures over those that were initiated.³² The approval rate of referred measures in most subject areas exceeded 66 percent, with civil rights/law and order measures being most popular, and

³¹ It is interesting to note that the initiative was not embraced as a vehicle for civil rights reform during the heyday of the civil rights movement, but afterwards. Braunstein (2004) argues that this makes sense, since initiatives are generally resorted to when the legislative process fails to address the concerns of a significant constituency and the legislatures were at the center of such reform during the 1960s and early 1970s.

³² This finding is consistent with Magleby (1984) and Bowler (1992) who found that measures placed on the ballot by the legislature are more likely to pass than those initiated by citizens. Braunstein believes that the reason legislative referenda enjoy greater support from the electorate than do initiatives has little to do with trust in elected representatives but rather the deliberation and accommodation that has already been incorporated into the referral by virtue of the legislative process. From this perspective, it would follow that referred measures would be more mainstream and palatable to the community, less likely to offend significant constituencies, and more likely to be inclusive in terms of access to benefits.

social services, civil service, and transportation concerns least. Interestingly, tax and revenue measures were approved almost 70 percent of the time. Initiative support was significantly lower, generally in the high 30 and low 40 percent range for most subject areas,³³ except for government and political process measures which were approved at a rate of over 61 percent. Education measures were the least popular initiative category with only 27 percent approval.

Multivariate analysis indicated that subject matter is significantly correlated with voting behavior, especially with respect to initiatives. Braunstein's model estimated that almost 66 percent of variance is explained, though the model is a better predictor of success than failure, at 89.6 percent and 32.6 percent respectively. Among the subject categories, national policy, education, transportation, and civil liberties appear to be of little value in explaining voter choice. When benefit accessibility—inclusive or exclusive—and source—referred or initiated—variables were included, the strength of the model increased to over 71 percent. When controls for state and population demographics were introduced into the model, its explanatory power increased but the effect and significance of the subject categories remained largely the same. For initiatives, voter turnout and racial diversity were found to be significant while year, state ideology, social capital, political competition, and state debt were not. Referred

³³ This finding is consistent with Magleby (1984) who calculated a passage rate of 40 percent for all statutory initiatives between 1898 and 1992.

measures were affected by social capital and debt—both indicators of trust—whereas voter turnout and racial composition were not significant.

Significant correlations between subject matter and the accessibility of benefits were also identified. A significant majority of government and political process measures were inclusive in their proposed effect, and they accounted for over 41 percent of the inclusive measures in the sample. Nonetheless, most initiatives were exclusive, independent of the subject matter, and most referenda were predominantly one or the other. Not surprisingly, less controversial subject areas—government and political process, revenue and taxation, and education policy—drew greater public support than more controversial matters—business and labor regulation, health, welfare and housing, civil liberties and law and order, or public morality. Initiatives constituted a greater percentage of the more controversial issues on the ballot, but their margins of victory were lower compared to legislative referenda, which less frequently addressed such divisive topics. Curiously, public morality measures drew the most support of any referred subject area and were approved almost 85 percent of the time whereas a majority (55 percent) of those that were initiated failed, perhaps reflecting a greater degree of voter trust in elected representatives or at least a better accommodation of interests in the legislative process (Braunstein 2004).³⁴

³⁴ Studies have shown that direct democracy, where available, is often the means by which controversial and divisive areas of public policy are addressed. It is thought that legislators tend to avoid such issues as it is difficult to determine majority-favored outcomes (Matsusaka 1992) and in order to maintain political

Influencing Direct Democracy: Interest Groups & Their Effect on Voter Behavior

If voters are not motivated by ideological or populist considerations in their support of ballot measures, what other factors might influence their votes and, ultimately, help to explain the policy variations that have been identified between states with direct democracy and those without? Critics of direct democracy argue that money is the primary factor, and they tend to equate funding with results. From their perspective, the initiative is a tool of the economic elite that enable well-funded groups to advance their agendas at the expense of the public interest (Broder 2000; Cronin 1989; Ellis 2002; Magleby 1984; Smith 1998; Zisk 1987). Much of the literature appears to support this conclusion in that money is generally assumed to be determinative simply because it is spent. Anecdotal evidence of well-heeled interests prevailing in this or that contest is often cited as proof that “the odds are with the big spenders...” (Cronin 1989, 116). Broder (2000), after documenting the considerable costs associated with qualifying ballot measures and waging effective campaigns, concluded that money can, in effect, buy success.

viability (Matsusaka 1992; Oakley 1994). As a result, many unresolved questions related to such controversies find their way into the courts, where the opinion of unelected judges is often substituted for elected policymakers.

Because of the arduous nature of qualifying and passing ballot measures in certain states,³⁵ professional consulting firms that specialize in drafting, signature gathering, fundraising, polling, and media relations have assumed a central role in campaigns (Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992; Broder 2000; Ellis 2002).³⁶ Tolbert, et al. (1998) reported that, during the past 25 years, nearly all measures that qualified for the ballot in California relied upon professional firms to manage its petitions. And, during the 1996 elections, only one out of the 33 measures on the ballots in California, Oregon, and Washington qualified without professional assistance (McCuan et al. 1998). While most agree that the emergence of these firms has had a significant impact on the cost of managing a successful campaign,³⁷ it has all but guaranteed the qualification of almost any measure sponsored by interests that can afford to hire them.³⁸ It is not surprising, then, that critics see direct democracy as having “paradoxically become a powerful

³⁵ In certain states, hundreds of thousands of signatures may be required to qualify a measure for the ballot. While most requirements have remained static over the years, expanding populations have vastly increased the number of signatures required.

³⁶ McCuan, et al. (1998) point to the adoption of civil service and election law reforms as responsible for creating the need for a private campaign industry by “subvert[ing] the traditional electioneering function of the party” (60).

³⁷ Owens and Wade (1986) challenged this widely-held view when they found that aggregate spending on initiative contests in California remained relatively constant from the mid-1930s to 1984 when adjusted for population growth, inflation, and the number of qualified measures. Despite concerns of uncontrolled spending limiting direct democracy’s populist connection, a review of California initiative campaigns from 1924-1984 revealed that over half involved less than \$500,000 and only 16 percent exceeded \$2 million.

³⁸ Some states passed restrictions on the costs associated with signature gathering and, in some cases, banned paid circulators altogether until the U.S. Supreme Court overturned such prohibitions in *Meyer v. Grant* (486 U.S. 414) as an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech.

instrument of wealthy interest groups rather than a popular balance against these groups” (Gerber 1999, 5).³⁹

Those who have approached this question empirically, however, have concluded that, while organized interests play a greater role in financing ballot measures than ever before, spending more does not equate to electoral success. Electoral majorities cannot be mobilized through spending alone; however, financial resources are instrumental in a measure’s defeat (Magleby 1984). A variety of studies lend support to this claim: Lowenstein (1982) found that disproportionate spending by opposition groups was correlated with a measure’s demise in 90 percent of contests;⁴⁰ Owens and Wade (1986) determined that negative spending prevailed 89 percent of the time when it exceeded affirmative spending by any margin;⁴¹ Bowler, et al. (1992) affirmed a link between opposition spending and negative voting; Magleby (1994) reported that 80 percent of measures were defeated when opposition spending equaled or exceeded affirmative expenditures; and Banducci (1998a) concluded that opposition spending has

³⁹ Ironically, many direct democracy advocates are equally critical of the use of direct legislation by special interests and the role that consulting firms play in the qualification process, preferring instead to see the initiative and referendum as grassroots tools that should be reserved for the public interest.

⁴⁰ With this spending, opponents were able to frighten or confuse voters by focusing on trivial implications of measures so that even initially popular propositions wound up failing at the polls. Owens and Wade (1986) ran this model on an even larger dataset with the same results.

⁴¹ They also concluded that “there is at best only a modest connection between campaign spending and the vote” and “that other undefined, unspecified factors are much more important than money in shaping electoral outcomes in direct legislation campaigns” (Owens and Wade 1986, 688). Bowler and Donovan (Bowler and Donovan 1998) echo this view by suggesting that voters can acquire sufficient cues from non-campaign sources to cast informed votes. However, it appears that these are the only studies that make such claims, and the limited scope of each has caused others to question these findings.

a greater impact than advocacy spending,⁴² though both face diminishing returns and larger benefits are realized at modest levels.

In an effort to explain this phenomenon, Gerber (1999) constructed a model of interest group activity which confirmed the observations of earlier studies: that money is not correlated with success, but it can be used to protect the status quo. Indeed, groups that spend vast sums in support of a measure may actually undermine their cause since voters are likely to perceive such behavior as motivated by self-interest. As such, “economic interest groups are...severely constrained in their ability to use direct legislation to the detriment of broader interests” (Gerber 1999, 6). The model suggests that voters do distinguish between measures sponsored by citizens groups and more narrow economic interests—they appear to trust more readily the former by adopting them at a much higher rate. While spending levels by citizens groups in support of initiated measures does not appear to affect vote margins or the likelihood of passage, measures that receive a majority of financial support from citizen interests pass at a substantially higher rate than those that receive majority support from economic concerns. Conversely, contributions from economic groups both in support of and in opposition to initiatives are correlated with a lower vote margin and probability of

⁴² In a departure from comparable research methodologies, she argued it was necessary to adjust for the endogenous effect of opponent spending in order to determine the true effect of advocacy spending. After manipulating the data, she found a small but significant correlation between support and money spent to promote a measure. This might help explain the findings of Owens and Wade (1986) which indicate that proponents outspent opponents on initiatives that qualified for the California ballot from 1924-1984 in 49 out of 88 times at a threshold of \$400,000; the sides were equal (25 times each) when the baseline was raised to \$2 million.

passage, and measures that receive majority opposition from such interests pass at a lower rate than their citizen interest counterparts.

Gerber concluded that “citizen and economic interest groups use direct legislation for different purposes and to different ends” (Gerber 1999, 9). According to her model, comparative resource advantages resulting from membership characteristics (i.e., individuals versus organizations) explain why citizen groups are better able to mobilize electoral majorities (and not funding) and, thus, more likely to pursue change through direct legislation, whereas economic interest groups are better equipped to mobilize financial resources (and not personnel) that can most effectively be used to preserve the status quo and/or influence the policy decisions of elected representatives. It follows then that individuals, citizen interests, and occupational groups use the largest share of their financial resources to promote initiatives while economic interests, professional groups, and businesses dedicate a similar share—but a far greater amount—to opposing them.

Boehmke (2003) determined that the effect of membership is also contingent upon resources—that while groups with greater revenue are less likely to resort to initiatives, larger membership organizations are more likely to do so, especially when they have the financial means to qualify an initiative. As citizens groups tend to meet these criteria more often than economic concerns, they are more likely to rely on the initiative process to effect change. That such groups comprise a greater percentage of the interest group population in direct democracy states and sponsor a greater number

of initiatives than their economic counterparts, which constitute a clear majority, is consistent with this view (Boehmke 2002; Boehmke 2005).

In a further challenge to the conventional wisdom of special interest capture and resource bias, Matsusaka (2004) and Braunstein (2004) argued that both special *and* public interests can benefit from minority-supported measures. They contended that even if interest groups dominate the initiative process, the rank-and-file may still be made better off if the policy objectives of these interests are not in conflict with those of the general public and the benefits of such measures are not narrowly concentrated, but spread throughout the community. Since those that do not meet this test can be rejected at the polls, the only danger is if voters can be persuaded to approve measures contrary to their own interests—a fear that is wholly unsupported by the evidence (and which is discussed in the next section). Moreover, they argued that, in order to evaluate direct democracy fairly, its benefits and dangers must not be considered in a vacuum but rather in relation to the legislative process. Thus, we should not be alarmed to find that money plays a role in direct democracy, but seek to determine the magnitude of that role relative to the legislature.⁴³

In order to determine whether policies adopted pursuant to the initiative serve the public interest, the beneficiaries must be categorized according to some objective

⁴³ It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that initiative and referendum campaigns are not subject to the campaign finance restrictions of their candidate counterparts pursuant to *National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) and *Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley*, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). Currently, no state imposes any limitation on the amount or nature of such contributions (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998).

scheme. While some scholars believe this task is impossible, since policy preferences and outcomes in a democratic society cannot be ranked objectively (Riker 1982),⁴⁴ others have nonetheless attempted to distinguish between public and special interests (Schattschneider 1960; Wilson and Banfield 1964). Toward this end, Wilson (1980) constructed what has become a well-known model of distributive politics in which regulatory policies are classified as one of four types—majoritarian, interest group, clientele, and entrepreneurial—based on the distribution of costs and benefits.

Donovan, et al. (1998) adapted this typology to identify the interests that mobilize in support or opposition to various policy concerns.⁴⁵ In a look at California initiatives from 1986-1996, they found that half of all measures (19 of 38) that benefited or were supported by diffuse constituencies were approved by voters, whereas narrow constituencies were able to pass only 14 percent of the measures they promoted, casting further doubt on the critics' charge that wealthy interests can use the initiative to advance their goals. Still, narrow interests boasted a 65 percent success rate in preventing measures they opposed from passing, reflecting a potent ability to defend the status quo against those who are promoting change. These results "illustrate that direct democracy primarily serves broad constituencies, but that broad groups face an

⁴⁴ Riker argues all advocacy reduces to competition between special interests, and that institutional rules determine the winners and losers.

⁴⁵ Narrow interests (type A) were thought to be better organized and funded, more politically influential, and focused on "protect[ing] clearly identifiable interests and seek[ing] exclusive, divisible benefits for members" (Donovan et al. 1998, 81-2), whereas diffuse constituencies (type B) were assumed to be less organized, less capable of mobilizing financial resources as rapidly, and without consensus on interests.

uphill fight if they challenge a well-organized interest” (Donovan et al. 1998, 96).⁴⁶ They also identified structural advantages in moving second (i.e., opposing vs. initiating), explaining perhaps why more than 60 percent of initiatives fail. Sponsors must bear the substantial cost associated with qualification (including paid signature gatherers and other professional campaign staff), often leaving limited resources available for the actual campaign, whereas opponents can lie in wait and preserve their funds until such time as a measure qualifies for the ballot.⁴⁷ And, advocates are faced with a skeptical public that is more likely to vote against (or not vote at all on) measures about which they are uninformed or unsure (Bowler, Donovan, and Happ 1992).

Ernst (2000) presented further evidence of the limited role played by narrow interests by extending the work of Donovan, et al. (1998). He found that the public is “likely to be predisposed against initiative campaigns that strive to secure material

⁴⁶ Interest group contests (type A vs. type A) attracted less support overall (40.5 percent vs. an average of 44.5 percent), were less likely to pass (14 percent vs. 41.5 percent overall), and most often resulted in a stalemate “where vast amounts of money are spent but few measures are passed” (Donovan et al. 1998, 86). Ballot measures in client contests (type A proponent vs. type B opponent) attracted extremely low voter support (28.1 percent) and only one unusual measure passed (14 percent), refuting the notion that resources alone are determinative. Entrepreneurial contests (type B proponent vs. type A opponent) constituted 26 percent of the measures, attracted a level of voter support comparable to all initiatives, and passed at a rate of 35 percent, demonstrating that type B constituencies often succeed in passing initiatives despite type A opposition. Finally, majoritarian contests (type B vs. type B), which are often characterized by controversy but lesser degrees of spending and professional management, constituted 47 percent of the measures, drew a 51.7 percent share of voter support, and passed 58 percent of the time, far higher than the overall average (Donovan et al. 1998).

⁴⁷ Opposition counter-initiatives that undermine support for and effectively ‘kill’ initiatives are cited in the literature as a potent weapon against change, though such measures generally concede something of value to the other side. Banducci (1998a) found that ballot measures challenged by counterproposals receive, on average, six percent more votes cast against them when spending levels are equivalent, offering some evidence that the counter-initiative may be an effective tool for the opposition. It should be noted, however, that her study identified only 37 counterproposals in 12 election cycles, 27 of which were offered in two elections.

benefits for a narrow segment of society” (Ernst 2000, x) and will support broader interests over narrow interests unless voters are exposed to a one-sided campaign that effectively counters their predisposition. According to this view, broader interests need not match the spending of narrow interests, but rather simply convey a message that reassures and reinforces the views already held by the electorate. This suggests that interest group typology plays a significant role in the fate of initiatives, independent of spending. A review of all statewide initiative contests from 1898-1996 revealed that narrow-material interests use the institution sparingly against broader interests (i.e., 10 percent or less of all measures) and are at a distinct disadvantage when they do, prevailing less than 29 percent of the time. Rather, most narrow-interest measures appear to challenge other narrow interests—contests in which spending is critical—and not the broader public interest.

Braunstein (2004) modified the scope of the Wilson typology to focus on the accessibility of benefits as opposed to their actual distribution.⁴⁸ In a three-state study of ballot measures from 1964-2000, he found that voters preferred inclusive measures over exclusive ones, reform measures over policy mandates, measures that increase citizen decision-making authority over those that are neutral or constrain it, and

⁴⁸ He classified as ‘inclusive’ those measures whose benefits—both economic and non-economic—are accessible to the entire community; those whose benefits are accessible to only segments of the community he labeled ‘exclusive.’ He concluded that “if identifiable segments of the community are excluded from proposed benefits, then by definition, only special interests—as opposed to public interests understood in the most general terms—stand to benefit” (Braunstein 2004, 48). In other words, inclusive measures are associated more with the public interest than are exclusive measures which tend to be more redistributive in effect.

measures referred by the legislature over those initiated by the public—even though legislative referrals more often sought to limit citizen authority whereas initiated measures were more likely to expand it. These findings reflect a clear ‘public interest’ policy preference, some tension between the electors and the elected in their preferred approach to reform, and yet a greater degree of trust in elected representatives than the sponsors of initiatives and popular referenda.⁴⁹ This suggests a rather sophisticated ability by voters to differentiate between subtle but important characteristics in matters of public policy, and dispels the myth that special interests are routinely able to subjugate the public interest. With over half of the measures that qualified for the ballot inclusive, it appears that narrow economic interests were not able to eliminate access to the ballot by ‘public interests’ nor fool voters into adopting measures against their own interests.⁵⁰

Braunstein’s findings also suggest that voters may be sensitive to the funding sources of qualified measures in that they approved almost 70 percent of those that were majority-funded by individuals while less than 38 percent of organizationally-supported measures were adopted. Voter approval was most likely for measures that were both inclusive and funded by individuals whereas measures that were exclusive

⁴⁹ Braunstein notes that these observations are consistent with Wilson’s prediction that majoritarian issues are the least likely to be the subject of interest group activity, and that this might translate to greater electoral support. However, the fact that over two-thirds of legislative referrals were inclusive might also explain this preference.

⁵⁰ Interestingly, Matsusaka (1992) determined that policy questions involving resource distribution and preferences were more likely to be decided by initiative than those related to efficiency or “good government” reforms, a finding that is somewhat at odds with Braunstein (2004) in that distributional measures are not generally inclusive.

and funded by organizations were most often rejected, reflecting a clear preference for citizen support which casts doubt on the pervasive concerns of special interest capture that dominate the literature. Opposition spending had a far greater effect on exclusive measures than it did inclusive ones, “suggesting that the substantive type of a measure may have greater impact on final votes than the source or amount of funding it receives” (Braunstein 2004, 91).

In terms of policy content, Braunstein found that organizations were most active in funding measures in the areas of business and labor regulation, government and political process, and tax and revenue policy whereas individual spending focused primarily on measures relating to government and political process, civil liberties, and welfare. In all other areas, organizations provided a majority of the resources spent in support of such measures, suggesting that subject matter is an important consideration in attracting funding. Indeed, a weak, albeit significant, relationship was found between subject matter and spending in support of ballot measures, but not for spending in opposition.

Similarly, Gerber (1999), in a study of eight states from 1988-1992, determined that economic interests dedicated the greatest share of their contributions on measures relating to revenue and taxation, environment, and health and welfare, and opposition

funding exceeded support by a significant margin.⁵¹ Citizen interests focused primarily on environment, government and political process, health and welfare, and education.⁵² Overall, economic interests substantially outspent citizen interests in every area except education, gambling/morality, and government and political process. However, measures in the subject areas most often pursued by citizens groups constituted the greatest share of successful measures and were adopted at the highest rates, while those in the areas most often pursued by economic interests made up the greatest share of failed measures and were adopted at significantly lower rates.⁵³ It is tempting to credit campaign spending or effectiveness with explaining these trends; however, they might also reflect the predisposition of voters to support or oppose certain policy areas. This raises the possibility of marginal returns on spending that vary by subject matter—both in support of and opposition to measures that qualify for the ballot (Owens and Wade 1986). In any event, it appears “the laws that pass by direct legislation largely reflect the interests of citizen groups” and “the fears of critics who believe economic interest groups dominate direct legislation outcomes” are largely unfounded (Gerber 1999, 120).

⁵¹ Transportation and government and political process were the only areas in which economic support funding was dominant. Business and labor concerns leaned only slightly in favor of support, suggesting a strong interest in maintaining the status quo in this area.

⁵² Citizen opposition spending outpaced support by a considerable margin in the areas of revenue and taxation, health and welfare, and gambling/morality. Citizen support was dominant only in environment and education.

⁵³ Environment was an outlier in that it is not dominated by either citizen or economic interests. As it draws support from both groups, depending on the measure, it makes sense that its passage rate is in-between the two groups.

Trusting Direct Democracy: Are Voters Sufficiently Informed?

Underlying the concern that special interests unduly influence direct democracy elections is the perception that voters are unable to make informed decisions on the policy matters that are presented to them. “Many direct legislation propositions are complex, technical, and unfamiliar” (Gerber 1999, 17) and, but for those that incite controversy, a voter is unlikely to have heard of—much less be knowledgeable about—any of them (Donovan and Bowler 1998a). Thus, the critics contend that “the majority of the ballot measures are decided by voters who cannot comprehend the printed description, who [may] have only heard about the measure from a single source, and who are ignorant about the measure except at the highly emotional level of television advertising” (Magleby 1984, 197-8). This suggests that the choice of many voters may be essentially capricious (Mueller 1969), with some making “snap judgments” and others “play[ing] a form of Russian roulette, casting affirmative and negative votes at random” (Magleby 1984, 198).⁵⁴

Even more troubling are studies which indicate that citizens can be manipulated to vote in a manner inconsistent with their interests (Durand 1972; Lowery and Sigelman 1981; Mueller 1969; Wolfinger and Greenstein 1968). This raises the concern that resource bias may be a greater factor with regard to initiatives than in candidate

⁵⁴ Alternatively, citizens may choose not to vote on one or more propositions, resulting in fewer votes cast on these measures than the rest of the ballot. Magleby (1984) found that voters in certain socioeconomic, demographic, and political groups are more likely to drop-off than others, and that as much as 15% of the vote can be lost in some California contests, raising concerns of bias in participation.

elections “where variables such as candidate charisma, incumbency, party identification, and general media coverage can mitigate differences in financial resources” (Braunstein 2004, 77). Since most voters still rely on traditional media outlets for most of the information they acquire on ballot measures, sponsors must have the financial means to pursue an effective media campaign if they are to be successful (Gerber 1999).

A large body of research indicates that voter attitudes are shaped by the opinions of the political elite. Campaign intensity, political awareness, and the amount of message exposure are all catalysts in this equation, determining the extent to which a voter’s policy preferences are affected (Converse 1964; Key 1966; Popkin 1991).⁵⁵ When elite opinion is divided, partisans respond to the messages with which they identify and resist those of a contrary partisan or ideological nature (Zaller 1992). When there is consensus, the effect of endorsements is even greater (Magleby 1984).

Though certain cues may be absent in direct democracy campaigns, a similar dynamic appears to be in play. Research indicates that voters are able to gain a substantive understanding of ballot measures by relying on other cues that provide them with sufficient information to cast informed votes. Endorsements by politicians, interest groups, and the media may serve as proxies for party identification and other partisan cues that are typically an important source of guidance for voters in candidate

⁵⁵ Somewhat counter-intuitively, it is the moderately-informed individual who is most likely to be affected, since the well-informed are most likely to have formed stable opinions on political issues and to view matters from an ideological perspective (Converse 1964; Stimson 1975), and the least-informed are less likely to be exposed to such messages at all (Converse 1962).

elections. Lupia (1994) observed that the substantively uninformed can accurately determine where their self-interest lies by availing themselves of the expertise of others and voting according to the endorsements of those they trust and respect.⁵⁶ Bowler and Donovan (1994) found that elite cues enable voters to process their positions on measures consistent with their ideological and partisan preferences—even when targeted with large volumes of contradictory information. Gerber and Lupia (1995) determined that competitive campaigns improve a voter's ability to cast 'informed votes' by enhancing the credibility of a measure's advocates, given the risk of being caught in a lie. Based on these and other studies, many scholars have concluded that voters are able to process relevant political information in a timely and sophisticated manner, determine accurately where their economic interests lie, and vote accordingly (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Filer and Kenny 1980; Kahn 2002; Kahn and Matsusaka 1997; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).⁵⁷

The literature also suggests that direct democracy can stimulate interest in the political process and promote higher degrees of political knowledge by raising the visibility of qualified issues and promoting debate and participation in the electoral system (Barber 1984; Butler and Ranney 1994). The exposure to ballot measure campaigns may also be instructive for imparting lessons of good citizenship as well as

⁵⁶ Voter knowledge of the industry preference was key in making an 'informed' decision.

⁵⁷ In response, some critics have raised the question of unintended consequences, claiming that even if voters are able to determine their interests in the short-term, they are not able to anticipate the long-term implications of their choices. However, it can hardly be said that this condition, if true, applies to ballot elections any more than it does candidate elections. Indeed, it is the nature of the political beast.

information on important policy matters (Macpherson 1977). Tolbert, et al. (2003) found that voters in direct democracy states appear to invest more in the political process, as reflected by higher voter turnout, increases in the number of political contributions, and greater issue awareness. They concluded that, by enabling voters to curb the faithless behavior of their elected representatives, the initiative process may actually build trust in government.⁵⁸

Still, it appears that voters are risk averse in their approach to direct legislation. By looking at aggregate election returns, Lowenstein (1982) and Ernst (2000) concluded that campaigns waged against ballot measures (i.e., to preserve the status quo) are more likely to be successful than those that support them (i.e., proposing change). Survey research by Bowler and Donovan (1998) indicated that voters tend to oppose measures when they are uncertain as to their effect. This suggests that voters are not easily manipulated into supporting measures that they do not understand, despite the concerns of many who believe that money dictates results. Indeed, ballot and issue complexity appears to strengthen this phenomenon, with voters more likely to reject proposals when they are numerous (Bowler and Donovan 1998) or difficult to understand (Ernst 2000). So, while voters are “not as competent as we would like them to be, [they are]...not as ill informed or irrational as critics often insist” (Cronin 1989, 87). Of course, since competency relates as much to electing representatives as it does

⁵⁸ The finding that direct democracy is positively correlated with social capital (Braunstein 2004) would appear to facilitate this dynamic, though it is unclear whether it is the beneficiary or the contributor.

to adopting ballot measures, it cannot be considered a flaw of direct democracy but a characteristic of the democratic process itself.

Central to the issue of voter competence is political ideology. This construct assumes that a semi-coherent set of beliefs structure one's thinking with regard to policy preferences which, in turn, guide the voter in his ballot choices—that “voters are not empty vessels to be filled indiscriminately by clever media campaigns...” (Ernst 2000, 85). Many scholars believe that few citizens are politically sophisticated enough to have “attitudes on issues that are consistent with one another and that reflect some underlying ideological predisposition” (Banducci 1998b, 134). And, since most studies on voting behavior have focused on single issues and isolated variables to explain a voter's decision to support or oppose a given ballot measure, they tend to be of limited use in explaining choices beyond that particular focus.

Still, some research does indicate that political ideology may play an important role in influencing voting behavior across a variety of policy dimensions. Just as attitude consistency and ideology are related to voting behavior in candidate elections (Levitin and Miller 1979; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Stimson 1975), a number of studies suggest that many voters structure their ballot choices along ideological lines. Kuklinski, et al. (1982) established that ‘core values’—a variable that incorporated political ideology—had the greatest influence on voters' choices not only on the measure in question but on policy issues in general. Lowery and Sigelman (1981) determined that ideology, and not economic considerations, explained the success of

California's Proposition 13. Magleby (1984) found that ideology was a better predictor of voter preference in seven out of ten California ballot measures than any other variable, regardless of the issue. Similarly, Lupia (1992) observed that party identification (which, in the absence of an ideology variable, would capture its effect) was significant in over two-thirds of their sample of 42 California initiatives. Banducci (1998b) determined that party-line voters in candidate elections tended to cast their votes on ballot measures according to a consistent ideological construct. And, Salvanto (Salvanto 2000) found that many voters may adopt a 'candidate-centered' voting strategy in which they link their votes on initiatives to political parties and high-profile candidates for office who take strong positions for or against such measures. Given these findings, it appears that ideological reasoning may underlie the choices of many voters, and that the notion that citizens cast their votes indiscriminately on ballot measures may be exaggerated.

Minorities & Direct Democracy: Imposing a Tyranny of the Majority?

Another concern posed by direct democracy is its effect on the rights of minorities. While it is clear that direct legislation promotes majority rule and lacks some of the procedural elements of the legislative process, the question remains whether the initiative, by empowering the majority, undermines the interests of minorities. Critics argue the mechanisms of direct democracy are fundamentally incompatible with our deliberative system, but offer little more than anecdotal examples to support their

position. So, while the literature is dominated by those who contend that policies adopted via direct democracy are more hostile to minority interests (Bell, Jr. 1978; Butler and Ranney 1994; Cronin 1989; Eule 1990; Fountaine 1988; Gamble 1997; Gunn 1981; Linde 1993; Magleby 1984), those who have approached this issue empirically have found little hard evidence to support this conclusion (Donovan and Bowler 1998a,b; Frey and Goette 1998). In either event, the strengthening of majority rule does not necessarily equate to a tyranny of the majority, provided certain protections are in place.⁵⁹

As students of history, the Framers recognized the danger of democratic excesses and that mass opinion, unmediated or unbounded by institutions, could pose a serious threat to the minority. In Federalist 51, Madison warned that:

It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other parts. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1788).

And, in Federalist 10, he observed that in democratic forms of government, “measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor

⁵⁹ Eule (1990) notes that judges in many direct democracy states are subject to some type of voter review which may discourage them ruling in favor of minorities. Gamble (1997) claims that while the courts are willing to check the excesses of the legislature, they are more likely to be deferent to the people’s will as expressed through direct democracy. However, Donovan and Bowler (Donovan and Bowler 1998a) observe that state and federal courts have overturned, in whole or in part, almost every measure that critics charge as abusive of minorities, and Emrey (2002) found no difference in the invalidation rate between elected and appointed judges.

party, but by superior force of an interested and overbearing majority” (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1788).

For this reason, the Framers devised a system of national government that was divided in its powers and bound by a constitution. Its representative elements were largely indirect, and each institution was designed to check the others. The states were left to govern themselves, subject to certain requirements and restrictions, thereby limiting the power of the national authority. They believed that this arrangement would dilute the power of factions and protect minority interests against encroachment by the majority. “Extend the sphere,” said Madison, “and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens” (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1788).

More than a hundred years later, direct democracy, in its various iterations, was embraced by the Populist and Progressive movements as a means by which the power of narrow economic interests in the legislative process could be curtailed and the public interest advanced. By involving the people directly in the process of policymaking, it was argued that civic virtue would be instilled and voter interest sustained.⁶⁰ However, if political elites play an important role in promoting democratic values and advancing virtuous policy alternatives in the legislative process, as many scholars contend, then

⁶⁰ A revisionist view more recently advanced in the literature is that the Populist and Progressive ‘majorities’ were coalitions of special interests themselves who sought to wrest control of the political process from those who preceded them (Gerber 1999).

direct democracy may pose a risk to minorities—and the stability of the political process itself—in that the moderating influence and broader perspective of policymakers (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Stouffer 1955) is replaced by the one-dimensional focus of a ballot measure’s principals, regardless of the ramifications. Indeed, it may even invite the elites to demagogue the issue and use it as a platform to further their political ambitions, resulting in heightened tensions and polarization.

Critics argue that compromises effected through the conventional legislative process are more likely to accommodate minority interests since direct legislation lacks the multiple points of access that minority groups rely upon to be heard. Cain (1992) notes that legislators from racial minority-dominated districts have been influential in securing favorable policy outcomes for their constituents and that direct democracy could threaten continued progress.⁶¹ Some perceive a racial or ethnic bias, and claim that direct legislation enables upper-middle-class white voters, who are threatened by the growing numbers and influence of minorities, to limit or reverse such gains and/or prevent the legislature from adopting minority-oriented policies in the future.⁶² Supporters, however, point out that the existence of direct democracy creates an

⁶¹ Tax limitations are often cited as an example of how direct legislation can hurt the interests of minorities by reducing the amount of revenue collected by the state and forcing legislators to slash spending. It is argued that these cuts disproportionately affect redistributive programs, leaving minorities vulnerable to the whims of the majority (Gerber 1999). However, this presumes that such programs should not be cut—that they should somehow be protected despite the priorities assigned to them by both the people and their elected representatives in the political process. Such a position would appear to be normative or ideological in character, and difficult to sustain in any objective analysis.

⁶² Studies linking the size of the white population and the number of registered Republicans with higher approval levels for selected policy outcomes emanating from direct legislation at the state and county level are cited to support this claim (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1998).

additional point of access to the policy process that can be used by groups that do not enjoy the influence of moneyed interests in the legislature. In direct democracy states, policy conflicts can be resolved outside of the legislative process in a setting that neutralizes party politics, and in which legislative ‘outsiders’ can compete and win against well-connected ‘insiders.’

A common approach to assessing the effect of direct democracy on minorities rests on the concept of tolerance. Much of the literature appears to conflate support for measures that would deny some type of benefit to minority groups as intolerance motivated by a perceived animus. It is claimed that this “impulse” can be mediated by the devotion of “significant cognitive resources to the consideration of the broader implications of the proposed repression” if one’s “commitment to democratic norms” prevails over selfish and ignoble urges (Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler 1998, 229-30).⁶³ No allowance is made for principled disagreement on any level, nor is the self-interest of minorities themselves even considered; rather it is established that reason prevails when the minority position is adopted while darker, more primitive motivations are attributed when it is not.

⁶³ This reasoning is questionably taken from studies that focused on the public’s tolerance of outcast groups (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978), such as Communists (Stouffer 1955) and Nazis (Gibson and Bingham 1985), as expressed by the protection of their fundamental rights, and applied to issues of government largesse that pertain to minorities who are largely integrated into our society, enjoy the same constitutional protections of their inalienable rights as any citizen, and wield considerable influence (or who have many who are sympathetic to their views) in the political, commercial, academic, and entertainment arenas.

Leaving objectivity aside, it is questionable whether the specific examples chosen—often the most contentious measures on the ballot in any state—are representative of the universe of initiatives that qualified for the ballot. For example, Donovan and Bowler (1998b) noted that the sample that Gamble (1997) used to show that the initiative facilitates anti-minority policies is neither random nor representative, but rather an amalgamation of high profile cases at the local and state levels.⁶⁴ Yet, even if we assume the sample is not biased, the impact of direct democracy cannot credibly be measured in a vacuum; rather it must be compared to the policy output of legislators to determine its relative effect on minority rights. Indeed, Cronin (1989) notes that legislatures have adopted policies that have been considered to be offensive to minority rights. Most research, to the extent it reaches beyond the anecdotal, does not consider this legislative baseline.

Another criticism leveled against direct democracy is that campaigns might have a negative effect on public attitudes toward any group that is the target of a ballot measure (Bell, Jr. 1978; Fountaine 1988; Goetz 1987; Gunn 1981; Linde 1989; Linde 1993). This concern is predicated upon research that indicates policy preferences may be shaped by the institutional process by which such issues are considered (Gerber and Jackson 1993; March and Olsen 1984). Some evidence suggests that shifts in opinion about groups and policy preferences that are the subject of initiatives are correlated

⁶⁴ The use of local cases suggests that a lack of diversity may be a factor in Gamble's inflated findings, consistent with the size and scale arguments of Madison, raising both substantive and methodological concerns over her approach.

with party positions and tend to move towards intolerance (Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler 1998). As such, minorities may be subject to ‘unfair scrutiny’ as a result of direct legislation and their public image may suffer. Attitudes toward racial policy are said to be particularly malleable and more vulnerable to shifts toward intolerance (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Such an effect, if true, would be lasting, whether or not the measure was approved or even overturned by the courts. From this perspective, the mere existence of initiatives which are said to target minorities can be stigmatizing and breed increased tensions in society, regardless of their actual policy implications (Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler 1998).

However, these researchers do not appear to provide for the possibility that voters might make an informed choice to support such measures for reasons unrelated to intolerance or that scrutiny of certain practices may be justified. That voters are more likely to be swayed by conservative arguments in favor of limiting government benefits than liberal ones supporting their expansion (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991)—an ideological tendency that is tested in the following chapters—is presumed to be problematic, revealing an inherent bias toward liberal social policy. As the literature agrees that ballot measure campaigns cause voters to reconsider their uncertain policy preferences when confronted with information relating to specific proposals (Gerber and Jackson 1993; Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler 1998), this point of view appears to suggest that it would be preferable for voters to be left ignorant of such policy concerns since they cannot be trusted to process this information ‘properly.’ Such an analysis

would seem to be rooted more in ideological bias than objectivity in that it effectively discounts the legitimacy of any policy outcome that is perceived by the researcher to be intolerant. Indeed, an alternative interpretation holds that changes in public opinion regarding minorities that are the subject of initiatives are the result of resentment for the benefits either proposed or currently provided, and that defeating such proposals or successfully prohibiting future benefits actually changes one's opinion in favor of such group (Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler 1998).

Despite the critics, opinion polls suggest that these concerns are not shared by racial minorities since large majorities within these groups support direct democracy. Matsusaka (2004) explains that most ballot measures address issues that are not racially-focused and draw significant support from a cross-section of races. As such, members of racial groups may actually find themselves in the majority on economic and social concerns. For example, Hajnal, et al. (2002) found that black, Latino, and Asian voters were only about 1 percent less likely than white voters to be on the prevailing side in their study of 51 California ballot measures. Still, other non-racial minorities, such as business, the wealthy, and unpopular social groups, may be at risk of being targeted by a hostile majority. Indeed, the Framers feared one such scenario which they referred to as the 'leveling effect,' the notion that if persons without means were enfranchised, policies of wealth redistribution would result.

Under certain conditions, minorities may actually enjoy an advantage in ballot issue elections. When voter turnout is low or drop-off is high, minority voting blocs may

be of sufficient strength to prevail by a plurality, particularly in states that allow for such measures to be considered in odd-year or primary elections with their significantly lower turnout and more activist composition.⁶⁵ Accordingly, the existence of direct democracy may, at times, challenge majority rule by advancing minority interests when the conventional legislative process will not. Of course, certain groups (e.g., children and the elderly) have achieved such privileged political status in our society that measures which shift the tax burden or redistribute wealth in their favor are often successful (Sears and Citrin 1985), despite the costs to the very majority and constituent minorities that approve them.

⁶⁵ However, research by Banducci (1998a) and Bowler, et al. (1992) casts doubt on the hypothesis that ballot measures in primaries are more likely to pass, given that primary voters are more informed and fewer 'no' votes are likely to be cast absent many less-informed and confused voters.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Introduction

This research examines the characteristics of citizen initiatives that qualify for the ballot and are enacted by the voters in the American states. It endeavors to determine whether voters structure their ballot choices according to certain ideological considerations by creating an extensive data set representing the 24 initiative states, and scrutinizing each measure considered during the period of analysis in order to identify trends in voting behavior.

All citizen initiatives that appeared on state ballots from 1974-2004 were examined.⁶⁶ This period was selected in order to observe how direct democracy has been used since the watershed events of the 1970s that changed the political culture, beginning with Watergate at the national level and proceeding to the tax revolt in California that led to Proposition 13 and the resurgence of direct democracy as a means by which to make government more accountable. Information on each initiative and its fate at the polls was gathered from the electoral authorities of each state, whenever possible, and supplemented by material available online from the Inter-University

⁶⁶ Citizen-initiated referenda (i.e., measures to repeal laws enacted by the legislature) and referred measures (i.e., those submitted to the voters by their legislatures) were not examined as the former were found to be far too few in number to be instructive and the latter are the byproduct of the traditional legislative process and its actors.

Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 1995),⁶⁷ the Initiative and Referendum Institute (IRI 2007)⁶⁸ and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL 2007).⁶⁹ These data included the state of origin; election year and type; measure type, title, and description; and result.

Empirical Model & Dependent Variable

To test the stated hypotheses about the relationship between measure types and voting behavior, each initiative was classified according to the characteristics referenced below. In each case, the dependent variable was the electoral fate of those measures that appeared on the ballot, coded as '1' for approved and '0' for rejected by the voters. Bivariate correlation was used to measure the variation between the dependent variable and an assortment of independent variables so that patterns of qualification and electoral support could be observed. Logistic regression was also employed to measure the effect of some characteristics on the probability of passage. Together, these two statistical approaches enable one to predict the kinds of measures that are more likely to succeed and under what conditions.

⁶⁷ This data collection (ICPSR Study 6) contains the ballot measure language and election returns at the county and state levels from the mid-nineteenth century to the late twentieth century for primary and general elections on statewide referenda, constitutional amendments, state House/Senate joint resolutions, and initiated measures.

⁶⁸ This summary lists the statewide initiatives that qualified for the ballot from 1904 to 2001, along with measure descriptions, subject categories, and electoral results. However, it was found to be incomplete in some cases.

⁶⁹ This database contains information on many of the measures that have qualified for the statewide ballot from 1902 to the present. However, it was found to be incomplete and inaccurate in many instances.

It should be noted that tests of statistical significance, while included in the analysis, are not strictly relevant to the measures of association used in the present study, given that population parameters, and not sample statistics, were evaluated. Thus, the correlations identified herein are empirical in nature, and need not be estimated by means of probability testing.⁷⁰ However, the use of inferential statistics in this situation finds support in the literature if the purpose is to identify meaningful (i.e., sizable) relationships that require explanation (Kish 1959).⁷¹ As such, ‘statistical significance’ was employed as an indicator of the importance of the extant association as opposed to whether it exists in the population.

Independent Variables

Initiative Characteristics

Each qualified initiative was characterized according to the variables listed in the following tables, and assigned a value based upon a careful reading and consideration of its official title and description.⁷² This language, as opposed to the actual text of the proposed measure, was used since most voters tend to rely upon these summaries (or other accounts that probably relied upon them) to determine how to vote. Very few voters were likely to have committed the time necessary to locate and read the text of

⁷⁰ An additional benefit of testing the entire population is that multicollinearity concerns are rendered moot, given that the logit coefficients are not estimates and, thus, standard errors do not apply.

⁷¹ Kish (1959) argues that “significance should stand for meaning and refer to substantive matter. The statistical tests merely answer the question: Is there a big enough relationship here which needs explanation...” (336-7)?

⁷² In the event that the official title and description were not available, the particulars of the initiative were derived from summaries available from the other sources referenced.

qualified measures, much less understand the legalese in which most measures are written. In addition, the availability of the actual language of each measure was sporadic and limited, the older the ballot. By examining the entire population of qualified measures that appeared on the ballot in every state from 1974-2004, the types of measures preferred by voters was able to be determined in each state and nationally.

Initiative Type

Initiatives were classified as constitutional or statutory, and as direct or indirect, reflecting the mechanism by which the measures gained access to the ballot. A direct initiative qualifies directly for the ballot whereas an indirect measure is first submitted to the legislature for its consideration, and only reaches the ballot if legislators refuse to approve it.⁷³ In general, statutory initiatives are easier to qualify for the ballot than constitutional initiatives, though not all initiative states provide for both types of measures.⁷⁴ Initiative sponsors are likely to seek constitutional status, whenever possible, in order to enshrine their effort as a constitutional right or mandate, and protect it from repeal or amendment by the legislature. Alternatively, states that provide for statutory initiatives might experience a greater number of ballot measures than those that do not. Dummy variables were created for each initiative type, as listed

⁷³ In some states that provide for indirect initiatives, an initiative may be withheld if a substantially similar measure is passed by the legislature.

⁷⁴ Colorado and Nevada provide for both types of initiatives, but their qualifying criteria are the same.

in Table 4, and measures coded as follows: '0' if constitutional in nature or '1' if statutory; '0' if direct or '1' if indirect.

Table 4: Initiative Type

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Legislative Type	951	1.410095	.4921094	1	2
Ballot Access Type	951	1.167192	.3733439	1	2

Initiative Scope

Initiatives were examined to determine whether their policy or governance effects accrued to a particular group or segment of the population or served the public at-large. Though Braunstein (2004) addressed this concept in his study, the criterion he used to categorize the initiatives in his sample was often unable to account for the various and sometimes competing interests that many initiatives affect, resulting in a false positive for inclusiveness. He defines as 'inclusive' those measures that benefit or have the potential to benefit the entire community. This raises questions as to what constitutes such a potential, to wit: if, at a given point in time, a citizen does not bear the cost or cannot access the benefit of a measure, or is not treated equally, does it qualify as inclusive or exclusive? And does the repeal of an exclusive benefit constitute an inclusive or exclusive measure? For example, children's services do not benefit those who are childless, yet each person theoretically has the potential to have a child. Similarly, welfare or unemployment benefits are not accessible by those who are not sufficiently poor or employed, yet all citizens who lose their jobs have the potential to

benefit from such measures. The matter of regulation poses an additional difficulty in that the decision to regulate a private sector industry or behavior will almost certainly benefit one group—even if it is the majority—at the expense of another. Can this effect be legitimately ignored simply if all citizens are said to benefit for such an action? Yet another factor is the effect of governance changes which do not make policy but can affect how policy is made or the ranges of choices available to government.

Table 5: Initiative Scope

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Citizen Scope	951	1.106204	.3082606	1	2
Citizen Impact	951	1.62776	.4836562	1	2
Business Impact	951	-.148265	.5089666	-1	1

In an effort to address these concerns and differentiate between types of inclusiveness, the present research adopted a more comprehensive approach. Each initiative was assessed according to the three criteria listed in Table 5:

Citizen scope addresses whether the benefit or burden generated by the initiative applied—at least potentially—to the entire community. While those who did not desire to partake of the benefit or did not engage in the behavior that was to be regulated would not be affected, they nevertheless remained eligible. This variable was coded ‘1’ if the effect was inclusive and ‘2’ if it was exclusive.

Citizen impact looks at whether the benefit or burden is evenly or unevenly distributed. In this manner, policies that had a disproportionate effect on one or more

segments of the community were able to be identified. This variable was coded '1' if the effect evenly distributed and '2' if unevenly distributed.

Business impact assessed whether a measure benefited or burdened the business sector. Such an indicator enabled the present study to determine the extent to which the initiative process is used by special interests to gain discrete benefits or by citizens to shift the costs of desired benefits onto the business community. This variable was coded '-1' if a burden was imposed, '0' if there was no discernable effect, and '+1' if a benefit resulted.

Proposal Type

Initiatives were analyzed to determine the type of proposal—policy and/or governance—they imposed on government. Policy mandates bypass the normal legislative process to enable the people to make policy decisions directly while governance reforms modify the institutions and processes of government. Braunstein (2004) focused on the concept of 'reform' in his three-state sample, but did not address the policy effects of initiatives, or the matter of discretion in his analysis. In an effort to address this deficit, the present study employed additional variables to discern the structural type and discretionary effects of ballot initiatives (see below). Whereas previous analyses have defined governance mandates more narrowly and included only those initiatives that impose procedural reforms on political institutions, this study adopted a more expansive view—that changes in an institution's discretion are as much a governance matter as changes in process—and looked at both kinds of reform.

Accordingly, a policy decision made by initiative could include a governance component that delegates limited discretion to other institutions in executing the mandate of the voters. This practice is commonly employed by the legislature when it delegates certain authority to the executive consistent with the policy it has adopted. In these instances, measures were coded as containing both policy and governance requirements. In all cases, an initiative may implement new policy initiatives, amend existing ones, or modify existing processes and discretion. Dummy variables were created for these types, as listed in Table 6, and coded ‘1’ if the proposal type applied to the measure and ‘0’ if it did not.

Table 6: Proposal Type

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Policy Mandate	951	.6498423	.4772702	0	1
Governance Reform	951	.4605678	.4987049	0	1
State Governance Reform	951	.362776	.481054	0	1
Local Governance Reform	951	.1409043	.3481059	0	1

Official Discretion

Proposed governance reforms were examined to determine their effect on the discretion of government actors and institutions. While discretion refers generally to the freedom to act or the power to decide, the discretion of each institution may differ according to its role and function. State constitutions reserve to the legislature full discretion to act on matters of policy and government administration within its authority, whereas the executive and judiciary are limited in their discretion as to how

and when they may act by constitutional and statutory authority. Thus, a change in legislative discretion generally reflects a change in policy authority, whereas discretion vis-à-vis other institutions of government may or may not be policy-related. It follows then that constraints on the legislature must be imposed by constitutional amendment⁷⁵ while governance reforms of other institutions can be implemented by policy and governance decisions of the legislature (or the people through the initiative).⁷⁶

Discretion can be affected in a variety of ways. First, institutional authority can be modified either permanently or conditionally, subject to the boundaries and criteria that are imposed by reforms. Second, institutional processes can be modified to alter the manner in and basis upon which decisions to exercise authority are made. Such decision criteria set the terms for how and when the institution can act, and may include approval margins and policy or performance standards. By way of contrast and example, an authority reform might impose a cap on tax increases while a process reform might require a super-majority to approve an increase.

⁷⁵ In some states, ballot initiatives have succeeded in protecting statutes from amendment or repeal by the legislature for either a defined period of time or, in some cases, ever. This effectively makes them the legislative equivalent of constitutional amendments, and complicates any study of the initiative process. For the purpose of statistical analysis, the distinction between statutes and amendments is preserved, though the results are parsed in relation to this characteristic in the discussion.

⁷⁶ The courts may effectively compel governance reform by interpreting constitutional and statutory law, but such rulings are supposed to resolve ambiguities in the law and result from cases or controversies, not as a matter of discretion.

Not all governance reforms affect discretion, however. While all initiatives infringe on the autonomy of government institutions by establishing policy or imposing various types of reform, one must be careful not to confuse decisions made by voters as to what policies government will pursue with changing the ability of and manner in which institutions can make decisions for themselves. This distinction is critical to understanding the difference between policy mandates and governance reforms—the latter affects an institution’s discretion to make decisions and exercise authority in the future whereas the former does not. Variables were created for each jurisdiction—state and local—and overall, as listed in Table 7, and coded ‘-1’ if the measure reduced discretion, ‘0’ if there was no discernable effect, or ‘+1’ if it provided for greater discretion.

Table 7: Official Discretion

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Discretion	951	-.1430074	.4407541	-1	1
State Discretion	951	-.1177708	.40368	-1	1
Local Discretion	951	-.0557308	.2791835	-1	1

Citizen Discretion

Proposed governance reforms were examined to determine their effect on the degree of citizen control over the decisions (and actions) of state and local government. Increasingly, citizens are resorting to the initiative process not only to implement policy priorities, but to expand their role in the policy process. One such mechanism is to require citizen consent of certain policy decisions, enabling legislators to initiate policy

but not enact it into law. Other approaches include expanded citizen nullification of enacted laws, increased initiative authority, legislative restrictions on amending or repealing citizen-initiated measures, and changes in representation and voting schemes.

In each case where a change in citizen discretion was identified, it was categorized according to the mechanisms referenced above. Ordinal variables were created for each type, as listed in Table 8, and coded ‘-1’ if the measure reduced control, ‘0’ if there was no discernable effect, or ‘+1’ if it provided for greater control.

Table 8: Citizen Discretion

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total Discretion	951	.0872766	.2897477	-1	1
Consent Requirement	951	.0799159	.2751581	-1	1

Accountability Type

Proposed governance reforms were examined to determine their effect on governmental accountability. Vertical accountability refers to reforms that affect the extent to which government is answerable directly to citizens for its actions. This concept includes electoral mechanisms that enforce the will of the people as it relates to candidates and policy decisions, as well as the powers of local government that affect the locus of decision-making authority. Horizontal accountability encompasses measures that affect the ability of governmental institutions to monitor and check the powers and actions of each other. Ordinal variables were created for each type, as

listed in Table 9, and coded ‘-1’ if the measure reduced accountability, ‘0’ if there was no discernable effect, or ‘+1’ if it made government more accountable.

Table 9: Accountability Type

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Horizontal	951	.022082	.1470277	0	1
Vertical	951	.1072555	.3229143	-1	1

Subject Matter

Initiatives were categorized according to the general subject matter typology listed in Table 4. In many ways, it is similar to those previously employed in the literature by Tallian (1977), Gerber (1999), Magleby (1994), and Braunstein (2004), and was adopted in order to provide a basis of comparison with these previous studies. However, the present study’s approach, given its focus on process, improved on previous research designs by assigning procedural changes to the policy area to which it applied, as opposed to relegating all process matters to the Government and Political Process category. Thus, a procedural reform, such as requiring a super-majority to raise taxes, was classified more meaningfully as *Fiscal* instead of grouped together generally as a process item. In this manner, the policy effects of process reforms could be evaluated.

States are likely to differ in the frequency with which each subject was addressed, given their different compositions, needs, and cultures. This frequency may also vary over time. Each subject is also likely to draw support and opposition from

sizable constituencies in each state, with no category uniformly rejected by the voters. A categorical variable was created for bivariate analysis, along with dummy variables for each category for multivariate scrutiny, as listed in Table 10, coded '1' if it applied to the measure or '0' if not.

Table 10: Subject Matter

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Subject (categorical)	951	4.330179	3.327133	1	14
Government Operations	951	.1976866	.398464	0	1
Fiscal	951	.2039958	.4031779	0	1
Economic Regulation	951	.1104101	.3135651	0	1
Public Morality	951	.1493165	.3565877	0	1
Criminal Justice	951	.0357518	.1857685	0	1
Civil Rights	951	.022082	.1470277	0	1
Health & Welfare	951	.0336488	.1804183	0	1
Resources & Environment	951	.1230284	.3286426	0	1
Animal Welfare	951	.022082	.1470277	0	1
Transportation	951	.0136698	.1161772	0	1
Education	951	.0389064	.1934737	0	1
Miscellaneous	951	.0031546	.0561064	0	1
National Policy	951	.0115668	.1069814	0	1
Multiple Subjects	951	.0189274	.1363405	0	1

Policy Effect

Initiatives were examined to determine their effect on the policy types listed in Table 11. Collectively, these variables served as proxies for determining changes in the scope and resources of government. The *General Spending* category addresses spending requirements that were not related to specific programs and services. Ordinal variables were created for each type, and coded '-1' if the measure reduced the scope of the policy type, '0' if there was no discernable effect, or '+1' if it expanded the scope.

Table 11: Policy Effect

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
General Revenue	951	.0315457	.5058121	-1	1
Tax Revenue	951	-.0368034	.4251463	-1	1
General Spending	951	-.0031546	.2449286	-1	1
Programs & Services	951	.1051525	.3634408	-1	1
Economic Regulation	951	.108307	.3944942	-1	1
Social Regulation	951	.0757098	.5453622	-1	1

Policy Constraint

Proposed governance reforms were examined to determine their effect on the policy types listed in Table 12. Policy constraints differ from policy effects in that they do not make policy decisions, but rather affect the discretion of government and the procedures by which such decisions can be made. In some cases, when constraints impose requirements or limitations on the government's ability to make policy choices, existing policy decisions may also be affected.⁷⁷ For example, a tax ceiling not only constrains the legislature but may also reduce the current tax rate as if it were a policy mandate. Ordinal variables were created for each type, and were coded '-1' if the measure inhibits expansion of the policy type, '0' if there was no discernable effect, or '+1' if it facilitates expansion.

Table 12: Policy Constraint

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
General Revenue	951	-.0725552	.2865286	-1	1

⁷⁷ While it is arguable that minimum funding requirements are effectively the equivalent of policy decisions to fund certain priorities, the focus of such measures are to constrain the legislature in its decision-making. As such, they were categorized as policy constraints.

Tax Revenue	951	-.06204	.2499256	-1	1
General Spending	951	-.0073607	.1167475	-1	1
Programs & Services	951	-.0157729	.1478385	-1	1
Economic Regulation	951	-.0105152	.1118968	-1	1
Social Regulation	951	-.0315457	.19209	-1	1

Political Attributes

To control for the political attributes of initiative states, a variety of indicators were evaluated. These data and their sources are listed in Table 13.

Table 13: Political Attributes & Control Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Democratic Legislature	930	.4354839	.496087	0	1	NCSL (2007)
Democratic Governor	951	.5205047	.4998422	0	1	NCSL (2007)
Interparty Competition	744	.8866304	.0801692	.622	1	King (1989) Bibby (1996,9)
Legislative Insulation	951	4.009464	2.004971	1	9	Bowler (2004)
Legislative Professionalism	951	.355735	.2400406	.074	.9	King (2000)
Citizen Ideology	885	49.68341	12.50983	9.25101	93.9119	Berry (1998)
Institutional Ideology	885	49.87908	21.54947	1.66667	95.0417	Berry (1998)

Party Control

States which exhibited greater Democratic tendencies were expected to support initiatives that expand government more often than those with Republican affinities. Alternatively, when Democrats control the institutions of government, the people may resort to ballot measures in an effort to check further government expansion.⁷⁸ Since the legislative process poses institutional and political barriers to limiting the scope of

⁷⁸ Matsusaka (2004) found that voters in direct democracy states use the initiative to reduce spending by larger amounts under Democratic control than Republican.

government, direct democracy may be a more viable avenue toward realizing this goal.⁷⁹ Dummy variables were created to account for Democratic control of the executive and legislative branches during each election cycle, according to data furnished by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL),⁸⁰ and coded '1' if the party held the gubernatorial seat or controlled both chambers of the legislature, and '0' when it did not.

Party Competition

Greater party competitiveness may cause political parties to rely more on interest group support and avoid taking politically risky positions on the left or right. This convergence on the median voter preference could alienate their activist base, and cause more groups to act extra-legislatively. Alternatively, competitiveness among polarized parties might cause the interests of incumbents to diverge from that of the median voter, resulting in either institutional paralysis or the adoption of positions outside of the mainstream (Matsusaka and McCarty 2001). This may catalyze direct action to overrule the legislature or bypass the resultant gridlock. Since rolling back government programs or regulation tends to engender strong opposition by partisan loyalists, citizens may be more likely to resort to direct democracy in pursuit of this goal. However, since parties often initiate reforms in an effort to gain political advantage in a

⁷⁹ Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) found evidence to suggest that “when one party controls all of the government, the legislature’s preferences might be more extreme than the median voter’s” (442).

⁸⁰ Tim Storey, an NCSL staffer, graciously provided these data from internal resources.

competitive environment, the perceived need for citizen-initiated measures may be minimized if voters are convinced that such proposals have value. An index of interparty competition, originally developed by Ranney (1965) and modified and updated by King (1989) and Bibby (and his colleagues) (1996; 1999), was employed, with states ranked, by irregular periods ranging from 1970-1998, on an interval scale of '0.5-1.0, with '0.5' reflecting no competition and '1.0' perfect competition.

Legislative Insulation

The extent to which legislatures are insulated from the mechanisms of direct democracy is an important consideration in determining its effects. Legislatures that have a greater ability to ignore the will of voters and bypass their instructions (in the form of initiatives) may be more susceptible to special interests, and may motivate citizens to support ballot measures that institute reform and limit government. An index of legislative insulation, developed by Bowler and Donovan (2004) and modified for use in a time-series analysis, was employed. States were ranked, by election cycle, on an ordinal scale of 1-10, with higher scores reflecting greater insulation from the effects of ballot measures.

Legislative Professionalism

Greater degrees of legislative professionalism may lend themselves to expanding the scale or scope of government, given that career legislators are more likely to reach compromise on and derive benefit from 'bigger government' than citizen-legislators

who are ‘just visiting.’⁸¹ In addition, interest groups are likely to play a more essential role, considering the ongoing need for funding reelection bids. This agenda-driven orientation would clearly inure to the cause of ‘big government.’ Of course, if public opinion is not in step with professional legislatures on certain issues, then direct democracy is the clearest route toward overruling the political elite, especially if both parties view more government as the solution.⁸² Greater professionalism may also result in a greater number of citizen-initiated reform measures due to special interest capture in the legislature. Accordingly, an index of legislative professionalism, originally developed by Squire (1992) and modified by King (2000), was employed, with states ranked, by decade, on a scale of 0-1, ‘0’ reflecting no professionalism and ‘1’ the highest degree of professionalism.

Citizen & Institutional Ideology

States with more conservative electorates were expected to support initiatives that limit government more often than those with more liberal constituencies. Liberal populations, on the other hand, may embrace the initiative as a means to expand programs, services, and the scope of regulation when elected officials will not. Similarly,

⁸¹ Term limits and legislative professionalism are in some sense negatively correlated in that limitations on tenure may reduce the level of professionalism. However, given that (1) most of these restrictions were adopted within the past 15 years, (2) the restrictions of many early-adopting states are no longer in effect due to repeal or court action, and (3) those of later adopters did not impact incumbents until recently, term limits have had a minimal effect on the composition of legislatures during the focus of this study and were not included as a variable.

⁸² Indeed, Matsusaka (2004) makes reference to the use of direct democracy to “unbundle” issues that are combined in candidate elections.

voters in states with more liberal governments may seek to restrict policymaking authority or roll back the scope of policy initiatives. Indices of citizen and institutional ideology, developed by Berry, et al. (Berry et al. 1998) and updated by the authors,⁸³ are employed, with states ranked, by election cycle, on a scale of 0-100, with '0' reflecting most conservative and '100' most liberal.

Social Characteristics

To control for the social characteristics of ballot initiative states, a variety of indicators were evaluated. These data and their sources are listed in Table 14.

Table 14: Social Characteristics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Region (categorical)	951	3.404837	.943196	1	4	U.S. Census
East	951	.0830705	.2761339	0	1	U.S. Census
South	951	.0746583	.2629774	0	1	U.S. Census
Midwest	951	.1966351	.3976632	0	1	U.S. Census
West	951	.6456362	.4785718	0	1	U.S. Census
Population (per cap)	951	7790044	1.00e+07	341063	3.59e+07	U.S. Census
Urban Population %	951	73.42366	14.75788	40.2	94.4	U.S. Census
Social Capital	916	.3550002	.6344868	-1.429857	1.70693	Putnam (2000)

Region

To capture the cultural effects of geography as they relate to initiative use and adoption, initiative states were categorized according to one of four geographic regions as listed in Table 15. Most of the literature employs a single variable to denote

⁸³ These updated indices in a variety of formats are available for download from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Study 188) at <http://icpsr.org>.

southern states. Only Matsusaka (2004) went further by assigning another to western states, given that direct democracy has been largely a western phenomenon. The variable was coded categorically and dichotomously to explore this possibility.

Table 15: Regional Categories

East	Maine, Massachusetts
South	Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, Oklahoma
Midwest	Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota
West	Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming

Demographics

Population and urbanization could account for the variation in the demand for government services and the concomitant costs and benefits. Dissatisfaction with the policy responses of elected leaders may prompt citizens to bypass the legislature and pursue solutions of their own. Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) contend that heterogeneous populations give rise to uncertainty among interest groups and legislators with regard to voter preferences, leading to policy decisions that may be more extreme and subject to greater scrutiny vis-à-vis direct democracy. They found that larger populations and greater urban-rural parity were correlated with more initiatives. More homogeneous populations might be expected to favor inclusive measures over exclusive ones. Accordingly, the per capita population and urban

population percentage were tested for association, based on data furnished by the U.S. Census Bureau.⁸⁴

Social Capital

States with greater social capital may be more trusting of and deferent to their elected representatives when it comes to policymaking (Braunstein 2004), thereby resulting in fewer citizen-initiated reform measures and perhaps total measures overall. And, with a greater sense of community, voters may be less likely to approve exclusive measures that benefit one or more groups at the expense of others. It may also follow that citizens of states with greater social capital may take more responsibility for each other and look less to government for regulation or relief. An index of social capital, developed by Putman (2000), was employed, with states ranked on an ordinal scale with higher values reflecting greater degrees of social capital.

Economic Conditions

To control for the economic conditions of initiative states, a variety of indicators were evaluated. These data and their sources are listed in Table 16.

Table 16: Economic Conditions

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Personal Income	892	18221.34	7892.511	4200	39244	U.S. Census
State Debt	951	1571.536	1540.351	35	12790	U.S. Census
Scope of Government	778	7.024036	.9793101	3.8	8.9	Fraser Institute (2007)
Taxation	778	6.75437	.6919933	4.8	8.3	Fraser Institute (2007)

⁸⁴ The census data used in the present study is available online at <http://www.census.gov>.

Labor Market Freedom	778	6.381748	.8669543	4.3	8.8	Fraser Institute (2007)
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Personal Income

The growth in personal income may be considered an indicator of economic performance, and has been demonstrated to have a significant effect on government policy. Matsusaka (2004) found that income accounts for 98 percent of the variation in government spending from 1957-2000. However, the effect of income on direct democracy decisions has been less considered, though it does appear to have a small effect on revenue and spending levels. Accordingly, average personal income, in dollars, was included in the analysis.

State Debt

State debt may be interpreted as a measure of potential dissatisfaction with the result of government policies, which may motivate citizens to support ballot measures that seek change. As a result, state debt, per capita, was examined for its effect.

Economic Freedom

Lower levels of economic freedom may cause voters to be more supportive of reform-oriented measures, as well as those that limit government regulation. Government expenditures and transfer of wealth payments are one measure of the scope of government. Larger governments, with the resources they require and the level of services and regulation that they tend to provide, restrict economic choice by competing with the private sector. Tax rates and revenue are indicators of the burden

that is imposed on the people to shoulder government spending. As the tax burden grows, choice is restricted and economic freedom declines. Labor market freedom reflects the level of government intervention in the labor market. Increases in wage regulation, government employment, and unionization constrain private labor choices and, with it, economic freedom. Infringements on the right to choose may cause citizens to initiate and support ballot measures that limit government in some sense.⁸⁵ To test these factors of economic freedom, three indices, developed by the Fraser Institute (Karabegovic and McMahon 2008), were employed, with states ranked by election cycle on an ordinal scale of 0-10, '0' reflecting the absence of the criterion and '10' its highest possible degree.

⁸⁵ However, changes in expenditures do not appear to influence interest group mobilization (Boehmke 2002).

Chapter Four: Findings

Introduction

The present study examined all 951 citizen initiatives that have appeared on statewide ballots from 1974 to 2004. As in the past, the western states were the principal users of this device, accounting for almost two-thirds of the total. Two states, California and Oregon, led the rest with 276 measures between them. By contrast, the eastern and southern states accounted for only 16 percent during this period in which 426 measures were approved and 525 were rejected. Of these, only the southern states approved a majority of the initiatives proposed, 42 of 71. The state-by-state and regional distribution of these measures is reflected in Table 17 and Figures 3 and 4.

Table 17: Initiative Population & Approval by State, 1974-2004

State	Freq	%	Pass	%	State	Freq	%	Pass	%
Alaska	35	3.7	19	54.3	Missouri	32	3.4	17	53.1
Arizona	46	4.8	24	52.2	Montana	48	5.0	25	52.1
Arkansas	24	2.5	10	41.7	Nebraska	21	2.2	9	42.9
California	145	15.2	61	42.1	Nevada	18	1.9	8	44.4
Colorado	82	8.6	30	36.6	North Dakota	41	4.3	16	39.0
Florida	28	2.9	23	82.1	Ohio	29	3.0	6	20.1
Idaho	16	1.7	10	62.5	Oklahoma	17	1.8	9	52.9
Illinois	1	0.1	1	100	Oregon	131	13.8	50	38.2
Maine	35	3.7	17	48.6	South Dakota	33	3.5	15	45.6
Massachusetts	44	4.6	22	50.0	Utah	16	1.7	3	18.8
Michigan	30	3.2	12	40.0	Washington	70	7.4	36	51.4
Mississippi	2	0.2	0	0.0	Wyoming	7	0.7	3	42.9
					Total	951	100	426	44.8




Figure 3: Initiative Population by Region, 1974-2004




Figure 4: Electoral Result of Initiative Population by Region, 1974-2004

Fiscal matters and government operational concerns dominated the subject matter of all initiatives at 21 and 20 percent, respectively. Public morality, resources and environment, and economic regulation each constituted more than 11 percent of the remaining measures. Together, these five areas represented almost 80 percent of the initiative population. Passage rates of subject categories ranged from a high of 73 percent for criminal justice issues to a low of 31 percent for economic regulation. Only five categories exceeded a 50 percent approval rate, and only three exceeded 55 percent. Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide additional detail regarding subject matter prevalence and passage.

Multivariate analysis revealed that subject content is a significant factor in predicting the likelihood of passage. The base model reduces errors by some 14 percent, with the number of correctly predicted outcomes at almost 62 percent.⁸⁶ Half of the categories were statistically significant, indicating that they are meaningful in the context of the relationships that exist in the initiative population under scrutiny.⁸⁷ As failure is predicted at a significantly higher rate than approval (74 versus 47 percent), it is not surprising that all such variables were negatively associated, reflecting reduced odds of passage in those subject areas by margins of 50 percent or greater.

⁸⁶ The Government Operations category was dropped from the model in order to avoid the dummy variable trap. It was selected since it had the greatest frequency and variation, and because it was a unique category unrelated to policy issues. Trials using other variables improved the model by less than an additional two percent.

⁸⁷ Recall that the present study examined the entire population of citizen initiatives that qualified for the ballot between 1974 and 2004. As such, the inferential concept of statistical significance with regard to a sample did not apply, and was substituted with the 'meaningfulness' of association.




Figure 5: Initiative Population by Subject, 1974-2004




Figure 6: Electoral Result of Initiative Population by Subject, 1974-2004

Most ballot measures were statutory in nature. While some states do not allow for this type of initiative, those that do experience a greater number of measures that qualify for the ballot. However, in most states, there is little difference in terms of what can be incorporated into the constitution versus what must be statutory in nature. Though the signature threshold is generally a little higher, the benefit of constitutional status is that it cannot be amended by the legislature.⁸⁸ It is not surprising, then, that most amendments addressed governmental operations and fiscal matters, with public morality close behind. The bulk of proposed policy mandates were statutory in form, 425 to 193, whereas a majority of governance reforms were constitutional in nature, 241 to 197. Both relationships were significant and moderate in strength.

Most states provide for a direct initiative process, whereas a few allow for only indirect measures that must go through the legislature. Not surprisingly, initiative use is heaviest in direct states, constituting some 83 percent of all measures. Of even greater interest is how the type of process affects the type of measure that reaches the ballot. Governance reforms comprise 48 percent of measures in direct states, but only 36 percent in indirect states, whereas policy mandates constitute 63 and 74 percent, respectively. Given the weak, but significant, correlations between these variables, it is unclear whether this reflects reluctance on the part of legislators to allow for such reforms.

⁸⁸ However, two states, Arizona and California, have effectively provided citizen-approved statutes constitutional status. These super-statutes cannot be amended without the approval of the electorate.

A host of controls were introduced into the model in an effort to identify other factors that influence voter behavior. Three additional models, which included sets of economic, political, and social factors, were tested. Only the political model improved on the accuracy of the base model, reducing predictive error by almost 22 percent. However, the social and economic models also made education less significant. Only one additional variable was significant: legislative insulation. The association with this index reflects that a greater degree of control retained by the legislature over policymaking (or, alternatively, the less that the initiative process enables the people to make law themselves) appears to increase the odds of initiative approval by about 11 percent. Legislative professionalism, while not significant, appears to have a strong positive association, given that the odds of passage exceed 127 percent with a one unit increase in this index. Region was also insignificant, but indicated that the odds of passage in the east and south increased by 54 and 72 percent, respectively, relative to the west, but that the odds in the Midwest were reduced by over 17 percent. The effect of region is further examined in Figure 7 and Figure 8, as well as the hypotheses set forth below.

What follows is an effort to understand which factors motivate initiative usage by examining the characteristics of measures that are proposed and enacted by voters in initiative states. The findings for each hypothesis are presented here and discussed at length in the next chapter.




Figure 7: Initiative Subject by Region, 1974-2004




Figure 8: Electoral Result of Initiative Subject by Region, 1974-2004

Hypothesis One

H1 tests whether *voters use the ballot initiative to adopt governance reforms more frequently than policy mandates*. This is an important factor to consider in that the use of the initiative process to adopt policy decisions does not affect the operation or authority of government, whereas a focus on reforming governmental institutions will have lasting effects on how public officials proceed to govern. While referenced in the literature (Braunstein 2004; Shepsle and Weingast 1994; Tolbert 1996), no previous study has examined the initiative population as a whole to determine the type of measures that are adopted by the electorate.

The distribution of measures that qualified for the ballot indicates that policy mandates exceed governance reforms by some 20 percent, 618 to 438. However, given that a single measure may contain such a mandate and reform, the extent of overlap between the two types of proposals must be determined. Crosstabs reveal that, while policy mandates account for 508 measures and governance reforms for 328, 110 measures contain both policy types. In terms of geographic association, it comes as no surprise that western initiative states lead their brethren in policy proposals and governance reforms, given the number of measures that qualified for the ballot during the period in question. Indeed, in each case, the west exceeded the quantity of the other regions combined. A look at the subject matter reveals that policy proposals were dominated by the fiscal, public morality, economic regulation, and resources and

environment categories, whereas government operations and fiscal concerns constituted almost 64 percent of governance reforms, as would be expected.

An analysis of election results by measure type reveals that some 41 percent of initiatives that contained policy mandates were approved while governance reforms achieved an almost 46 percent passage rate. Policy mandates were, in fact, correlated with approval while those with governance reforms were not. As this relationship is weak, what makes it interesting is that it is negative, indicating that its effect is to suppress the likelihood of passage. A similarly weak but significant correlation was found by disaggregating the data, and separating out local government reforms. Further examination of relationships between content and passage determined that the highest rates of approval were consistent with their subject prevalence. Regressions containing political, social, and economic data yielded a few significant indicators when in combination, but not individually. However, the improvement in the model never exceeded five percent.

The results of these analyses support H1. While initiatives containing policy proposals were more numerous than those with governance reforms, it is the latter that were approved five percent more often. Thus, it can be said that the adoption of governance reforms are the primary aim of voters in using the initiative process.

Hypothesis Two

H2 posits that *voters prefer ballot measures that are inclusive in scope, regardless of policy type*. If ballot measures most often result in exclusive benefits or burdens, as many critics believe, then it can be said that they are the tools of special interests. While this approach has been used previously in the literature (Braunstein 2004), a review of its application revealed that it was often unable to account for the various and sometimes competing interests that initiatives can affect. Accordingly, it was necessary to evaluate each measure more precisely according to three dimensional criteria: citizen scope, citizen impact, and business impact.⁸⁹

An examination of the initiative population revealed that over 89 percent of proposed measures were inclusive in scope. This reflected that the benefit or burden that was generated by the initiative applied potentially to the entire community, though those who did not desire to partake of the benefit or did not engage in the regulated behavior would not be affected. While it is important to determine if each person could benefit or be burdened, it is equally necessary to gauge whether a policy was designed to have a disproportionate effect—either positively or negatively—on one or more segments of the community. As such, a variable to address whether this benefit or burden was evenly or unevenly distributed was included. Almost 63 percent of all measures were uneven in scope, indicating that only particular segments of the

⁸⁹ This approach is a departure from Braunstein (2004), who used only one variable in an effort to ascertain an individual's ability to access the benefits of proposed measures—often with inconsistent results. In the process, the effect of initiatives on business was disregarded.

population were likely to be the beneficiary of or be burdened by these proposed initiatives. While it is axiomatic that 100 percent of exclusive measures were unevenly applied, it is interesting to note that more than 58 percent of inclusive measures were similarly uneven in their focus. As expected, most governance reforms were inclusive (90 percent) and evenly distributed (52 percent) in their scope; policy mandates were similarly inclusive (88 percent), but unevenly distributed (75 percent), reflecting a special interest bias. Accordingly, citizen impact was significantly and moderately correlated with each policy type.

Historically, it is said that the initiative process was a powerful tool with which ordinary citizens defeated special interests, and diluted the influence of business on the governmental process. It stands to reason then that the initiative would be used by citizens to shift certain costs for their benefits onto the business sector when legislators proved reluctant to do so, given the political consequences. While most ballot measures did not appear to impact business interests, those that imposed a burden outnumbered those that secured a benefit by more than a three-to-one margin, 22 versus seven percent. Of these, over 95 percent were inclusive in scope and 43 percent evenly distributed, suggesting that a burden on business was unlikely to result in an exclusive citizen benefit but that a majority affected some at the expense of others. Business benefits appeared to magnify this disparate effect, given that only 79 percent were inclusive and 25 percent even. Still, citizen scope and impact were significantly but only weakly associated.

Having examined the scope of the initiatives that qualified for the ballot, the question remains as to whether citizens structure their voting behavior according to these characteristics. Further analysis revealed no significant relationship between citizen scope or impact and the success of a measure. While many more inclusive measures passed than exclusive, 386 versus 40, so, too, did more unevenly-distributed measures than those that were more broadly accessible, 259 versus 167. Still, inclusive measures were more successful at the polls than exclusive ones, 45 versus 40 percent, and 'even' measures were more popular than their uneven counterparts, 47 versus 43 percent. Finally, business impact was significantly, but weakly correlated. While passage was as likely as failure absent any business effect, the existence of such a benefit or burden reduced a measure's chances of success by about 16 percent.

With regard to subject matter, citizen inclusive measures were most prevalent in the fiscal, government operations, public morality, resources and environment, and economic regulation categories, while exclusive measures favored education and public morality. A significant, albeit weak, relationship exists between scope and subject. Citizen impact favored the governmental operations, fiscal, and resources and environment categories when its effects were evenly distributed, but fiscal, public morality, and economic regulation when they were not. A significant and somewhat stronger relationship was revealed in this context. Business was most burdened by measures in the resources and environment and economic regulation areas, and most

benefited by changes in public morality.⁹⁰ These observations intuitively make sense, given the characteristics of the behaviors they address.

In light of the foregoing, the disposition of H2 is unclear. While inclusive measures comprised an overwhelming majority of the initiatives that qualified for the ballot, most measures unevenly impacted the population—policy measures more so than governance reforms. However, inclusive and evenly-distributed measures were approved at a higher rate than the alternatives. Even so, more ‘uneven’ measures passed than their counterparts. Statistically, no relationships were found between scope or effect and passage. Another aspect that must be considered is how the ‘citizen impact’ criterion relates to the ‘inclusive’ criterion referenced in the hypothesis. Previous studies conflated these criteria and, thus, did not identify these conflicting trends. Accordingly, the evaluation of H2 relies on how the preference of voters is defined. These findings indicate that voters do prefer inclusive measures across-the-board, but adopt a greater number of ‘uneven’ initiatives albeit at a lower approval rate.

Hypothesis Three

H3 addresses the effects of the initiative process on government by testing whether *governance reforms tend to expand the accountability of governmental institutions and actors*. In order to assess both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of

⁹⁰ Business benefits in the public morality category derive largely from the lifting of gambling prohibitions. However, this action is generally followed by an increase in economic regulation resulting from the licensing and oversight of the gambling industry.

this concept, two variables were analyzed. While just under five percent of governance reforms sought to increase the accountability between government actors and institutions (horizontal), over 24 percent would have strengthened the connection between government officials, policy output, and the citizenry (vertical). Both criteria were significantly correlated, though the vertical dimension more strongly so than the horizontal.

Only four measures sought to reduce the level of accountability. Sixteen initiatives addressed both dimensions by implementing vertical and horizontal reforms. The most prevalent method by which to expand vertical accountability is to require citizen consent prior to the enactment of laws; however, other methods include the devolution of policy authority to local governments or changes to the electoral process that affect the nature of representation or protect its integrity (e.g., campaign finance reform).⁹¹

All 21 initiatives that sought to expand horizontal accountability were inclusive, given that such an oversight mechanism cannot be exclusive to any segment of the community. Nineteen of 21 were related to government operations.⁹² Vertical accountability measures were divided more than 3:2 in favor of 'even' as to citizen

⁹¹ While term limits are commonly considered to be a mechanism by which government institutions can be made more responsive, in point of fact, citizens actually constrain their choices by imposing such limits, and create the unenviable prospect of an unaccountable actor during the last term in office. Accordingly, term limits were not included as a factor affecting accountability.

⁹² One of the remaining two was categorized under the multiple subjects and the remaining one under economic regulation.

impact, reflecting that, in many cases, the 106 measures were either seeking the consent of the people or establishing such a requirement for a controversial action, like raising taxes or permitting gambling. Almost all of these were related to government operations, fiscal, and resource and environment matters. Some of the relationships with these variables were statistically significant, but very weak, except for horizontal accountability and subject, which was nearly moderate and negative.

An analysis of passage rates for both accountability types reveals that almost 67 percent of horizontal and 44 percent of vertical reforms that expanded these mechanisms were adopted by voters. However, only the horizontal type was weakly, but significantly, related to electoral outcome. Collectively, only 48 percent of such measures were approved. Accordingly, H3 is not supported by these findings. Most governance reforms that were contained in ballot initiatives did not affect the structural accountability of government institutions, and slightly more than half were not successful.

Hypothesis Four

H4 posits that *governance reforms tend to limit the discretion of government actors and institutions*. While all ballot initiatives limit the discretion of policymakers by enabling citizens to make decisions on matters that would otherwise be made by the legislature, governance reforms impose changes on government institutions themselves. In general, this may be accomplished in one of two manners: by modifying

the procedural requirements by which decisions are made or by affecting the policy discretion that can be exercised by an official or institution.⁹³

An analysis of the 438 governance measures revealed a moderate correlation with the matter of discretion. Thirty-three reforms would have increased government discretion while 168 sought to impose limits. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these changes affected the legislature, given that it is the repository of most policy authority. However, local governments were often the subject of these reforms, and they followed a similar trend: 12 measures sought to expand local discretion and 64 would have limited it.⁹⁴

Regionally, almost three-quarters of reforms that sought to limit discretion appeared on western ballots while the south was the only region in which a majority of discretion measures expanded government discretion. These factors were weakly and negatively correlated. A look at the subject matter revealed that almost 48 percent of discretion-limiting reforms were linked to fiscal matters; economic regulation and public morality concerns led in the number of discretion-enhancing measures. A weak relationship was found between these indicators.

⁹³ One such mechanism of reform is to require citizen consent of policy decisions prior to their implementation. However, it was excluded from this category so as to isolate the effects of reform measures on the ability of governmental institutions to initiate policy instead of conflating it with the power of approval. However, citizen discretion mechanisms are addressed in the next hypothesis.

⁹⁴ Schools were categorized separately, due their unique jurisdictions; however, only four measures addressed schools separately, three of them seeking to limit discretion.

Finally, the relationship between official discretion and voter approval was found to be significant but weak. While successful initiatives that reduced discretion (N=62) outnumbered those that increased it (N=9), another 106 discretion-limiting measures were rejected by voters. Fifty of these successful reforms were adopted in the western states while thirty limited the fiscal discretion of government. These findings support H4. Discretion-limiting reforms clearly outnumbered those that sought to expand official discretion on the ballot and were adopted more frequently. Still, a majority of such 'limiting' reforms were rejected by the people.

Hypothesis Five

H5 looks at the obverse of limiting official discretion: the expansion of direct citizen control. It tests a claim supported by the literature: that *governance reforms tend to expand the role of citizens in the policymaking process*. This can be accomplished through a variety of mechanisms, including legislative restrictions on citizen-passed measures, expanding the initiating and nullification processes, and even alternative voting and apportionment schemes; however, the adoption of citizen consent requirements is the most prevalent.

The distribution of proposed governance reform measures that affected citizen discretion reflected a clear bias: 84 would have increased discretion over policy decisions and other matters while only two sought to decrease citizen control. Seventy-five of these measures looked to require citizen consent for decisions made by

legislative bodies, while the others addressed other types of citizen controls over policymaking. However, as just over 80 percent of reform measures were not associated with citizen discretion, the relationship is of only moderate strength. At the local level, the relationship is even stronger, with 58 of 134 measures seeking to expand citizen discretion and none for limitation.

While region had no effect on the distribution of citizen discretion, subject matter did. Through the initiative process, citizens sought to expand their role in fiscal decisions (which constituted over 45 percent of such reforms), followed by government operations, public morality, and resource and environment concerns. Interestingly, no such efforts were proposed in the educational arena. Despite the trends, however, the relationship is weak due to the almost 90 percent of government operations reforms that are not aligned with the citizen discretion parameter. Not surprisingly, most of these reforms—60 of 84—attempted to amend the constitution, where permitted to do so by initiative, so that legislators could not change the rules without voter consent.

Regarding passage, no significant relationships were found. Overall, only 34 of 86 measures that affected citizen discretion were approved. All but one expanded citizen control. Even so, the distribution of these adopted measures was as expected: only one attempted to reduce the influence of citizen control over policy decisions. Most were fiscal in orientation, followed by governmental operations concerns. Of the measures approved, 19 were constitutional amendments. Locally, only 17 of 58 such measures were approved.

The results of this analysis indicate that H5 is valid. While most governance reforms were not associated with citizen discretion, almost 98 percent of those that were sought to expand the role of voters in making policy decisions. And, a full 43 percent of all local governance reforms would have similarly enhanced citizen control. Though a majority of citizen ‘enhancing’ measures were rejected by voters, the fact remains that only two measures seeking to limit citizen discretion even qualified for the ballot.

Hypothesis Six

H6 focuses on the effects of the initiative process on policymaking. It posits that *ballot measures tend to limit the scope or resources of government*. While this view finds some support in the literature (Matsusaka 2004) and is an article of faith in conservative circles (Graglia 2000), it appears that its validity may be reserved to certain periods and movements (e.g., the tax revolt during the 1980s) and controversial public morality issues (e.g., gambling, abortion). To test the hypothesis, each initiative was evaluated to determine its effect on several proxies that, when considered together, reflect the impact of the initiative process on the scope and resources of government during the period under scrutiny. In order to capture both the policy and governance effects of proposed initiatives, it was necessary to examine not only the actual effects of such measures on policy decisions, but whether they modified an institution’s process

or discretion in a manner that would affect any such decisions in the future.⁹⁵ Accordingly, a separate set of indicators was employed for each effect.

The distribution of the 244 revenue policy measures considered by voters reflects a slight bias toward raising revenue (56 percent). However, when tax policy was examined, by itself, the margin was reversed in favor of reducing taxes (60 percent of 173 measures). Though statistically insignificant, the data reflect that the Midwest was the only region in which a (slim) majority of such measures sought to increase taxes, whereas, in the East, tax-cutting initiatives outnumbered the alternative by almost a 5:1 margin. Governance reforms were clearly focused on limiting the ability of government to raise revenue. Of the 63 measures that affected tax revenue policy, 61 sought to either prohibit or make it more difficult to increase the tax burden on the people. Regional differences appeared to play no role. Policy measures that reduced revenue were uniformly inclusive, while less than a fifth of those that raised revenue were exclusive. Regardless, more than 79 percent of all revenue measures were uneven in terms of application or eligibility.

As for adoption, no relationship of any magnitude or significance was found. Overall, while 32 percent of measures that reduced the revenue burden (including bond questions) were approved, so, too, were 37 percent of measures that increased the

⁹⁵ This classification is not as dichotomous as it appears, however. Governance reforms that set a ceiling on governmental authority to tax or spend, for example, not only limited the legislature in making future tax policy, it also reduced the current tax burden. As such, it was necessary to code such measures as having both a policy effect and a governance effect.

burden. Considering tax policy alone, those measures that increased taxes were successful only 30 percent of the time, while those that reduced them remained at 32 percent. As for governance effects, all 20 of the measures that were approved limited government's discretion to raise tax revenue.

Turning to the effect of initiatives on programs and services, 136 such measures appeared on the ballot. Almost 87 percent increased the level of government services. However, 57 general spending measures—which would, in turn, affect the level of services—were also considered, with 30 seeking to cut spending levels. While most service-oriented measures in all regions sought to expand funding, 79 of 91 such measures did so in the West—a number that reflects 58 percent of all such measures nationwide. Governance measures that affected the scope of services were rare, with only 21 considered and 18 seeking to limit the expansion of services. An additional 13 measures addressed spending, of which 10 limited the discretion of policymakers to increase then-current levels. Most of these measures were of western origin. More than 73 percent of service funding and 96 percent of general spending initiatives were inclusive, while 85 and 56 percent were uneven in their eligibility, respectively.

An analysis of passage rates revealed no significant relationships. Still, the trend was clearly in favor of increased spending, with 54 of the 57 approved measures increasing government services and 15 of 24 increasing general spending. Interestingly, of the few governance reforms that were successful in the area of spending and services, all but one sought to limit government discretion.

In the area of regulation, two policy types were examined: economic regulation and social regulation. While the latter concept is broad in that it includes health, safety, the environment, and public morality concerns, it is nonetheless an accepted classification in regulatory analysis in that it separates purely economic controls from those that are geared toward affecting the quality of life. The distribution of economic regulatory measures was clearly biased, with 82 percent seeking to expand such regulation. Most social regulatory measures similarly sought to increase the level of regulation, but those that would impose limitations were better represented, with 38 percent seeking expansion. Regional differences reflected an eastern and western preference for increased social regulation, though the magnitude was far greater in the west. Almost all related governance reforms sought to limit the discretion of government in both areas, with 11 of 12 and 33 of 36 measures imposing limits on economic and social regulation, respectively. No regional differences were noted.

As before, no relationships of any significant magnitude were found between policy type and electoral result. In the case of each regulatory domain, more measures were approved that expanded the economic and social regulatory burden than reduced it, with margins of 78 percent and 63 percent, respectively. All but one of the 20 approved regulatory measures limited the discretion of government.

Given its broad scope, these findings indicate that H6 cannot be sustained. However, the clearly divergent aims and outcomes of policy mandates and governance reforms suggest that H6 should be disaggregated and each policy type considered

separately. In revenue policy, a majority of proposed policy mandates actually increased state revenues, though there was a clear preference for reducing the tax burden. Roughly equal numbers of both types of measures were adopted. However, the effects of governance reforms were uniformly to limit official discretion and the level of revenue that could be collected by officials, and all were successful. In the area of services and spending, voters were of two minds: a vast majority sought to increase funding for services, but about half of all spending measures looked to cut spending. Most governance reforms sought to limit services or spending by limiting the discretion of officials. Voter approval tilted heavily in favor of increasing spending directly, but sought to restrain government from making such decisions on its own. As for regulatory policy, mandates favored increasing both economic and social controls, but governance reforms again sought to limit official discretion. At the polls, voters approved significant majorities of mandates that expanded both types of regulations and governance measures that limited government discretion. Based on these results, it is clear that the aim of almost all governance reforms was to constrain policymakers in their ability to expand the scope and resources of government at their own discretion. At the same time, however, voters generally supported policy mandates that expanded government beyond its current scope. Accordingly, it can be said that governance reforms tend to limit the scope or resources of government, whereas policy mandates do not.

Chapter Five: Discussion

Introduction

The present study looked at the use of citizen initiatives in the American states between 1974 and 2004. It sought to identify the characteristics of those measures that qualified for the ballot and were approved in order to determine whether voters structure their ballot choices according to any underlying criteria.

First, the initiatives were examined for general characteristics. It was reaffirmed that initiative use is a regional phenomenon. While the popularity of this direct democracy device may well stem from its historical legacy on the political culture in each state, the fact remains that the western states dominate all other regions in their use of the initiative process. Subject matter was found to play a significant role in determining this frequency. Fiscal and governmental operations issues were the most popular, but public morality, resource and environment, and economic regulation were not far behind. These areas were the principal focus of most initiative activity, constituting almost 80 percent of all measures. More importantly, subject matter was found to be a significant predictor of the likelihood of passage. Such a model reduces error by 14 percent, enabling one to predict electoral outcomes at the rate of 62 percent. In most cases, these findings are generally consistent with the literature,

though differences in methodology probably account for small differences in rank order and magnitude.

Other characteristics, such as legislative type—constitutional or statutory—and process type—direct or indirect—were also addressed. Statutory initiatives are most prevalent, given that the western states and most others provide for this mechanism. However, the distinction between statute and constitutional amendment in terms of content is largely a fungible matter as it pertains to the states. What is relevant to this discussion is that almost any matter can be incorporated into the constitution, thereby protecting it from amendment by the legislature.⁹⁶ In most states, signatures requirements are a bit higher for amendments, but the costs for any initiative drive are generally substantial; thus, the task of securing more signatures may not be prohibitive, especially when balanced against the benefit of protected constitutional status. On this matter, the literature was silent.

Most initiative states provide for direct measures, and it is in these states that initiative use is highest. Several states offer some variation of an indirect process that requires proposed initiatives to be considered by the legislature prior to their appearance on the ballot. What is notable about this distinction is that more governance reforms qualify for the ballot in direct states than their counterparts—by a

⁹⁶ However, even this distinction is not absolute, given that California and Arizona have created a new class of statutes—those passed by initiative—that cannot be substantively amended without the consent of the people. Accordingly, they have all the same protections from the legislature as a constitutional amendment.

differential of 74 percent. This could reflect a lack of enthusiasm for reforming government on the part of lawmakers, though there is little support for this theory in the literature.

A variety of political, social, and economic factors were tested in multivariate analyses in an effort to explain additional variations in the use of the initiative. Only one such variable, legislative insulation (i.e., the extent to which the people are empowered to legislate through the initiative process) was 'statistically significant,' indicating a meaningful relationship between this indicator and citizen approval. In the literature, such factors as party strength and competition, legislative professionalism, fiscal indicators, and population parameters have been found to be correlated with initiative use, though they were not in the present study.⁹⁷ In each case, however, the focus was initiative use and general subject area, but not its effect. As such, it is possible that these factors promote the use of the initiative process, but are not related to initiative effect or adoption. In any event, only the political controls increased the predictive capacity of the model, suggesting that institutional conditions can affect voter behavior.

⁹⁷ They were not found to be 'statistically significant,' though this designation is not relevant as an inferential measure in the present study since the entire population of initiatives was analyzed, as explained in Chapter 3.

Discussion of Findings

Policy Type

While the literature examines many aspects of initiative use, only a few reference the concept of governance reform. Shepsle & Weingast (1994) introduced the concept of governance policies as a means by which voter preferences could be translated into changes in the governmental process. Tolbert (1996) referenced the concept of governance policies, but used only a small sample to test the relationship with populist tendencies. Braunstein (2004) addressed the issue in greater depth, but adopted a definition of governance that included only procedural reforms. In a three-state survey of initiatives (along with legislatively-referred measures), he found that voters preferred measures that reformed the political process over those that did not.

The present study approached the matter more comprehensively in two respects: first, the entire population of initiatives from all 24 states that provide for the process during the period under scrutiny was employed; and second, the concept of governance that was used included not only procedural changes, but also substantive changes in policymaking discretion. In this manner, not only would a super-majority requirement for raising taxes be considered a governance reform, so would the imposition of a tax ceiling or an outright ban. Both approaches are aimed at affecting the manner in which government functions and/or the policies it is able to adopt. In addition, this study identified which measures contained policy mandates, so that the

content of each initiative was fully recorded and considered in the case of complementary or multiple goals.

The findings with regard to policy type support the claim that governance reforms were adopted at a greater rate than policy mandates, despite the fact that measures containing mandates more often appeared on the ballot. This is important because, while policy mandates make decisions in lieu of government institutions, governance reforms change the process or discretion of the institutions themselves. In this manner, all future decisions made by government are affected. That the primary focus of such reforms was governmental operations and fiscal matters suggest that the goal of voters in adopting these measures was to make government more reflective of and accountable to the will of the people in the exercise of its given authority. This bias in favor of governance reforms is consistent with the provenance of the initiative process, and argues against the widespread concern that the mechanism has been captured by special interests. While business interests may be able to use their monetary and organizational resources to qualify initiatives that reflect their policy agenda, it appears that they are largely unable to convince voters to adopt their priorities, given the people's preference for governance reforms. This finding is consistent with the more recent literature that has found little to support the fear of special interest dominance.

Initiative Scope

Another method of exploring whether the anxiety over special interest capture is justified is to examine the effects of initiatives themselves. A number of older studies addressed this matter anecdotally and determined that money can buy success at the polls; however, the more recent literature on interest groups and initiative contests has concluded that this fear is not supported by the evidence. One focus of this research was to determine who benefits from the initiatives that are qualified and adopted by the electorate. While who sponsors an initiative may well reflect its intended beneficiary, it is not determinative or exclusive. Regardless of the sponsor, everyone can benefit from—or be burdened by—a given measure, provided its effects are widely distributed. As a result, several efforts have been made to assess the beneficiaries of ballot initiatives. Donovan, et al. (1998) found that measures which benefited narrow interests were more likely to be rejected at the polls than those that were supported by diffuse interests. Braunstein (2004) concluded that there exists a public interest preference which causes voters to prefer inclusive measures over exclusive ones. And, Ernst (2000) determined that voters support broad interests over narrow interests under most conditions.

The present study examined the concept of scope in greater detail than its predecessors. Each initiative was classified according to not one criterion but three: citizen scope, citizen impact, and business impact. This approach was chosen over a single designation scheme to avoid the problem that Braunstein (2004) encountered in

attempting to account for the various and competing interests of some initiatives with one all-encompassing value.⁹⁸ Its findings added considerable dimension to the conclusions that are found in the current literature, and challenged some of its contentions.

With regard to citizen scope, inclusive measures accounted for an overwhelming majority of those initiatives that qualified for the ballot and were adopted. The definition of inclusive in this context is that the benefit or burden generated by the measure applied potentially to the entire community. While this observation appears to be consistent with the literature, it does not account for the effect of initiatives, only the eligibility of those who could be affected.

The next criteria, citizen impact, looked to whether a measure's effect would be evenly or unevenly distributed among the community. Almost two-thirds of measures were uneven in the application of its benefit or burden among the citizenry. Thus, while a regulation may equally apply to everyone, it will disproportionately affect those who engage in the regulated certain behavior to the extent they do so. It would appear, then, that this analysis has introduced a wrinkle in the general agreement on initiative scope in the recent literature. While most initiatives provided for inclusive eligibility, a majority did not affect the community evenly in terms of their distribution. Even so, uneven measures were approved 22 percent more often than their even counterparts,

⁹⁸ A review of Braunstein's thesis revealed a number of inconsistencies in the classification scheme, as well as its application, in that he sometimes conflated the benefits and burdens among the different parties involved.

though they failed at a higher rate as well. These findings are clearly at odds with Braunstein (2004), who found that exclusive measures (i.e., those that benefited certain segments of the community over others) constituted a minority of approved measures.

The last criteria, business impact, looked at the effect of initiatives on the business sector, without regard to citizen consequences. As tax and regulatory matters often have conflicting interests, it is important to assess the impact on business independent of any other. While most measures did not affect business interests, those that did were burdened three times more often than those that benefitted. This makes sense if the initiative process is, in fact, the vehicle by which citizen interests overcame the business interests that dominated politics at the turn of the twentieth century. While legislators may be reluctant to burden business with taxes and regulations, it appears that citizens are willing to shift the costs of their priorities to the business sector through the use of the initiative process.

Based on these criteria, it is clear that business interests do not control the initiative process. However, it appears that other special interests have been successful in dominating the initiative agenda, given the uneven distribution of benefits and burdens. In the purest sense, the public interest is served by ballot measures that affect everyone equally. When initiatives benefit or burden certain segments of society but not the whole, the interests of some are advanced at the expense of others. In light of the inclusive and evenly-distributed nature of governance reforms, policy priorities and not accountability concerns were largely responsible for this result.

Structural Accountability

Structural accountability can be considered a subset of governance reform. Horizontal reforms seek to make government institutions more accountable to each other and the law, while vertical reforms look to make government more accountable to the will of the people. While horizontal reforms constituted only a fraction of proposed governance reforms, it is not the quantity of such reforms that counts but rather the effect of the two-thirds that were adopted. Indeed, most horizontal reforms instituted disclosure requirements and oversight commissions in the areas of campaign finance, ethics, and reapportionment, thereby promoting and protecting the integrity of the electoral process and governmental institutions. Once these mechanisms and bodies are established, it would be imprudent to impose further changes every few years by initiative. As such, it is likely that there will be fewer reforms of this type than any other.

Vertical reforms constituted almost a quarter of all proposed governance measures, and were adopted 45 percent of the time. This concept captured many types of governance reform, including campaign restrictions and requirements, changes in electoral and direct democracy procedures, and consent requirements for the enactment of particular types of policies. While this concept is generally geared toward strengthening the link between the electors and the elected, in the context of direct democracy, it takes on the dimension of policymaking. But if the initiative process is a mechanism by which one responds to events in order to change them, it would seem

that there is very little incentive to assume the burden of qualifying a measure if the prevailing policies enacted by the legislature and other institutions are within a policy space that is agreeable to a majority of voters. As such, its prevalence may well mirror the amount of satisfaction that voters have in their policymakers.

Policy Discretion

By definition, all ballot measures limit the discretion of government in some manner or form in that they make decisions that would have otherwise been left to official actors to decide. However, not all initiatives are created equal in this regard. While policy mandates reflect and impose voter priorities, governance reforms determine how government is to function and what powers it has at its disposal. Reforms that affect the exercisable authority of government actors or make procedural changes that affect how and when such authority can be exercised may be termed discretion reforms. In the present study, 37 percent of reforms that limited the discretion of government actors or institutions were approved by voters while those that expanded authority were adopted only 27 percent of the time.

Inversely related to official discretion is the amount of control that citizens exercise in the policymaking process. Citizen discretion comes in a variety of forms, but its most prevalent type in the period under scrutiny was citizen consent of legislative action. This mechanism enables citizens to place an active hold on any matter they collectively deem fit, thereby promoting accountability in policymaking without

removing the responsibility of elected leaders to initiate and pursue sound legislative priorities. Voters adopted some 39 percent of those reforms that expanded citizen control. Only one of two measures that limited citizen discretion was approved.

In resorting to both types of reform, initiative supporters sought to realize a singular aim: to hold official actors and institutions accountable to voter preferences, primarily in the area of policymaking. Not surprisingly, fiscal constraints were the most prevalent in terms of subject matter, reflecting a strong desire to limit official discretion as it pertains to the lifeblood of politics: taxing and spending.

Policy Effects

Pairing together the concepts of initiative scope and government accountability with the effects of policy mandates and governance reform, the present study examined each initiative to determine the effect of ballot measures on the scope and resources of government. This was accomplished through the use of three sets of proxies: revenue, program spending, and regulation. While policy effects differed from subject to subject, the intention of voters was clear with regard to governance reforms: to limit the discretion of government actors in making decisions on behalf of the people.

Voters sent mixed messages when it came to policy mandates. Revenue increases were adopted only slightly more often than revenue reductions. As for tax policy, the edge was reversed, but both hikes and cuts were adopted at nearly the same rate. The message behind spending policy and program funding was clear: spend more.

Almost all measures that increased funding were approved, as were nearly half of the measures that increased spending. And, in the case of regulation, sizable majorities of measures that expanded the regulatory burden on businesses and citizens were successful at the polls. These trends indicate that voters had little desire to rein in the scope or resources of government, raising the prospect of irresponsible policymaking—when revenue policy does not account for initiative spending and the legislature is constrained in its fiscal powers.⁹⁹

Conclusion

The findings presented herein support the proposition that voting behavior is influenced by the type and substance of citizen initiatives. Specifically, voters appear to structure their choices on ballot measures with at least one thought in mind: to hold government actors and institutions accountable. While there are many factors that affect the electoral fate of an initiative, it appears that reforming government is at the top of the list, given the prevalence of governance reforms in the initiative population during the period under study. This priority can be easily confused with a conservative bias in favor of limited government. However, a look at approved policy mandates suggests a different explanation.

⁹⁹ This observation would appear to be at odds with Matsusaka (2004), who found that spending in initiative states during a similar period was less than that in non-initiative jurisdictions and that spending cuts imposed by initiative were consistent with the popular will. However, the present study did not account for the magnitude of expenditures, which may explain at least part of this apparent contradiction.

In matters of policy, it appears that the initiative process is used by voters to achieve two different aims: to expand the scope of government consistent with the spending and regulatory priorities of their choice, but limit the ability of government to make such decisions on their behalf. While imposing limits on official discretion may constrain growth initiated by elected representatives, it may also render the legislature impotent in any effort to square conflicting policy priorities and limit out-of-control spending. If this is the case, then making policymakers more accountable to the will of the people on specific policy decisions may promote irresponsible governing. Unfortunately, citizen-initiated tax policies would appear to exacerbate this concern in that they reduce government revenue as often as they increase it, making it even more difficult to balance competing interests.

One approach to resolving this problem would be to prohibit policy priorities from attaining constitutional status.¹⁰⁰ Unlike the national constitution that provides for a framework of government and guarantees civil liberties (or negative rights), most state constitutions have incorporated positive rights that reflect a variety of policy mandates, including programs and services. As a result, what would ordinarily be considered a statutory priority often becomes a constitutional question, subject to

¹⁰⁰ California and Arizona have further complicated matters by creating 'super statutes' that cannot be amended by the legislature. As such, this approach would not entirely resolve the problem therein. While it would prevent the creation of new rights, it would substitute new entitlements that would still carry with them fiscal burdens that the legislature could not balance. Accordingly, this class of statutes must be eliminated if a meaningful distinction between statutory and constitutional law is to be preserved in these states.

judicial review and intervention. While the initiative process is not the only factor responsible for this expansion of constitutional status, it does facilitate special interests in their effort to enshrine their policy priorities with constitutional standing, preventing elected representatives from being able to balance interests in their policy deliberations. However, if the constitutional initiative were to be eliminated, then all proposed amendments would have to be initiated by the legislature—an untenable reality for those who believe that meaningful political reform cannot be accomplished by relying upon the political elite.

So, if the constitutional initiative—and the ‘super-statute’—is here to stay, an alternative would be to make it substantially more difficult to enact constitutional initiatives, thereby promoting the more easily-enacted statutory measure. Indeed, it should be noted that in all states, save Delaware, proposed constitutional amendments initiated by the legislature require super-majorities in both houses to qualify for the ballot, yet constitutional initiatives require only a majority vote in all states but Nevada, which requires approval in two consecutive elections.¹⁰¹ This change would reserve constitutional status to only the most important and uniformly popular policies and reforms.

¹⁰¹ Several states require a certain proportion of voters overall, in addition to a majority of votes on the measure, for approval, and a few even require a super-majority on specific issues. However, these are not sufficient as a means to remedy the over-reliance on constitutional status and the problems it poses, as addressed above.

Yet another option would be to restrict governance reforms to procedural changes that would make it more difficult, but not impossible, for policymakers to make certain decisions in order to balance conflicting policy priorities. In this manner, changes in tax policy or spending authority may be restricted by such procedural requirements as super-majorities and executive vetoes. Citizen consent requirements pose a unique challenge in that they are procedural, in nature, and yet remove from the legislature the ability to adopt certain policies, no matter how necessary or unanimous their support among lawmakers of all parties.¹⁰² As such, fiscal matters should be exempted from such constraints as they require the consideration of many factors unrelated to the ballot question at hand and political compromise to resolve in a responsible manner.

In the final analysis, the best way to reform government is not to impose limits on the policy discretion of legislators, but rather to hold them accountable for their decisions. This can be accomplished by making the electoral and policymaking processes fully transparent and electing lawmakers who are responsive to the will of their constituents. All this can be accomplished through the existing initiative process in most states. Ironically, efforts to limit official discretion may actually prevent our leaders from acting responsibly, and limit their accountability, not enhance it.

¹⁰² While a number of states provide for 'emergency' legislation, which allows the legislature to adopt policy measures that are prohibited by citizen-initiated law, what constitutes such an emergency and for how long such measures can survive are often the subject of litigation. This does not resolve the conflict as much as it shifts the locus of decision-making to judges, who are even less accountable to the people.

Future Research

The subject of direct democracy in America offers researchers many rich and multifaceted avenues of study. The principal component, the citizen initiative, represents not a singular entity, but a collection of 24 state processes that enable citizens to enact policies and reforms on their own behalf. The present study explored the characteristics of initiatives that appeared on state ballots nationwide from 1974 to 2004, and whether these factors affected voter behavior. However, the requirements for ballot qualification were not examined. These vary dramatically from state-to-state, and may well influence the type of measures that make it to the ballot. While the literature contains a number of studies that look at the effect of qualification requirements on initiative use, few examine its relationship to subject matter and adoption, and none could be found that explore the connection between qualification criteria and the actual effects of qualified and adopted initiatives. Such a study would shed light on whether differences in qualification requirements even matter, given the growth of a professional initiative industry that is fully mobilized to gather as many signatures as necessary to qualify almost any measure.

Another area that could be more thoroughly scrutinized is the prevalence and effect of governance reforms that result from the initiative process versus the conventional legislative process. While a few studies have looked at the issue of reform in such contexts as constitutional amendments (Braunstein 2004), controversy (Gerber 1999), and spending (Matsusaka 2004), these do not adequately address the extent to

which governance reforms, in general, rely upon the initiative process for enactment. This is another question ripe for research.

Finally, while the study of initiatives naturally focuses on those measures that qualify for the ballot and are adopted, what is generally overlooked is the role of the courts in this process. Notwithstanding the number of signatures or the margin of the vote, state and federal courts have the authority to remove any such measure from the ballot or strike it down as unconstitutional after its enactment. And, over the past few decades, this power to intervene and set aside the people's will has been used more and more frequently. As such, to presume that reforms or policies adopted by voters are implemented as intended is an unreliable premise for conducting initiative research. A few studies have attempted to address this question using very limited samples; however, none have conducted an extensive analysis nationwide, given the substantial burden it would require. Still, such an effort would prove valuable in determining the actual effects of the initiative process.

Appendix: Data Tables

Introduction

Initiative Approval by Subject

Subject	Electoral Result		Pass No.	Pass %	Total No.	Total %
	Fail No.	Fail %				
Government Ops	77.0	14.7	115.0	27.0	192.0	20.2
Fiscal	121.0	23.0	77.0	18.1	198.0	20.8
Econ Regulation	74.0	14.1	34.0	8.0	108.0	11.4
Public Morality	85.0	16.2	57.0	13.4	142.0	14.9
Criminal Justice	10.0	1.9	27.0	6.3	37.0	3.9
Civil Rights	6.0	1.1	12.0	2.8	18.0	1.9
Health/Welfare	18.0	3.4	17.0	4.0	35.0	3.7
Res/Environment	79.0	15.0	40.0	9.4	119.0	12.5
Animal Welfare	9.0	1.7	11.0	2.6	20.0	2.1
Transportation	6.0	1.1	7.0	1.6	13.0	1.4
Education	23.0	4.4	14.0	3.3	37.0	3.9
Miscellaneous	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.7	3.0	0.3
National Policy	2.0	0.4	9.0	2.1	11.0	1.2
Multiple	15.0	2.9	3.0	0.7	18.0	1.9
Total	525.0	100.0	426.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(13) = 68.6137 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(13) = 71.2358 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.2686
 gamma = -0.1008 ASE = 0.043
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0662 ASE = 0.028

Initiative Subjects by Region

Subject	Region		South	South	MW	MW	West	West	Total	Total
	East	East								
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Government Ops	15.0	19.0	19.0	26.8	35.0	18.7	123.0	20.0	192.0	20.2
Fiscal	18.0	22.8	12.0	16.9	49.0	26.2	119.0	19.4	198.0	20.8
Econ Regulation	7.0	8.9	8.0	11.3	24.0	12.8	69.0	11.2	108.0	11.4
Public Morality	11.0	13.9	17.0	23.9	29.0	15.5	85.0	13.8	142.0	14.9
Criminal Justice	1.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	6.0	3.2	30.0	4.9	37.0	3.9
Civil Rights	2.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	6.0	3.2	10.0	1.6	18.0	1.9
Health/Welfare	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.8	7.0	3.7	26.0	4.2	35.0	3.7
Res/Environment	16.0	20.3	4.0	5.6	16.0	8.6	83.0	13.5	119.0	12.5
Animal Welfare	3.0	3.8	2.0	2.8	3.0	1.6	12.0	2.0	20.0	2.1
Transportation	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.8	0.0	0.0	9.0	1.5	13.0	1.4
Education	0.0	0.0	5.0	7.0	6.0	3.2	26.0	4.2	37.0	3.9
Miscellaneous	1.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	0.2	3.0	0.3
National Policy	1.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.6	7.0	1.1	11.0	1.2
Multiple Subjects	2.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	2.0	1.1	14.0	2.3	18.0	1.9
Total	79.0	100.0	71.0	100.0	187.0	100.0	614.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Approved Measures by Subject & Region

Subject	Region		South	South	MW	MW	West	West	Total	Total
	East	East								
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Government Ops	10.0	25.6	14.0	33.3	22.0	28.9	69.0	25.7	115.0	27.0
Fiscal	11.0	28.2	5.0	11.9	17.0	22.4	44.0	16.4	77.0	18.1
Econ Regulation	3.0	7.7	3.0	7.1	6.0	7.9	22.0	8.2	34.0	8.0
Public Morality	4.0	10.3	8.0	19.0	11.0	14.5	34.0	12.6	57.0	13.4
Criminal Justice	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.3	26.0	9.7	27.0	6.3
Civil Rights	1.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	6.0	7.9	5.0	1.9	12.0	2.8
Health/Welfare	0.0	0.0	2.0	4.8	2.0	2.6	13.0	4.8	17.0	4.0
Res/Environment	5.0	12.8	3.0	7.1	5.0	6.6	27.0	10.0	40.0	9.4
Animal Welfare	1.0	2.6	2.0	4.8	1.0	1.3	7.0	2.6	11.0	2.6
Transportation	2.0	5.1	2.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.1	7.0	1.6
Education	0.0	0.0	3.0	7.1	2.0	2.6	9.0	3.3	14.0	3.3
Miscellaneous	1.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.3	1.0	0.4	3.0	0.7
National Policy	1.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.6	6.0	2.2	9.0	2.1
Multiple Subjects	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.1	3.0	0.7
Total	39.0	100.0	42.0	100.0	76.0	100.0	269.0	100.0	426.0	100.0

Likelihood Estimates of Passage by Subjects with Controls

	(1) Result	(2) Result	(3) Result	(4) Result
Fiscal	-0.728*** (-3.56)	-1.059*** (-4.47)	-0.737*** (-3.41)	-0.741** (-3.05)
Econ Regulation	-1.024*** (-4.06)	-1.491*** (-5.14)	-1.133*** (-4.15)	-0.822** (-2.83)
Public Morality	-0.658** (-2.96)	-1.038*** (-3.91)	-0.695** (-2.90)	-0.682** (-2.73)
Criminal Justice	0.588 (1.46)	0.951 (1.78)	0.687 (1.62)	0.715 (1.58)
Civil Rights	0.629 (1.25)	-0.529 (-0.86)	0.229 (0.42)	0.407 (0.70)
Health/Welfare	-0.288 (-0.76)	-1.018* (-2.09)	-0.398 (-1.00)	-0.109 (-0.26)
Resources/Env	-0.943*** (-3.91)	-1.268*** (-4.67)	-1.087*** (-4.14)	-0.827** (-2.86)
Animal Welfare	-0.192 (-0.42)	-0.585 (-1.06)	0.128 (0.25)	0.192 (0.38)
Transportation	-0.134 (-0.23)	-0.169 (-0.22)	-0.191 (-0.30)	-0.444 (-0.70)
Education	-0.784* (-2.13)	-1.554** (-3.03)	-0.732 (-1.92)	-0.804 (-1.94)
National Policy	1.216 (1.53)	0.954 (1.19)	1.012 (1.24)	1.154 (1.40)
Multiple Subjects	-1.897** (-2.93)	-3.183** (-3.00)	-2.289** (-2.94)	-1.996* (-2.55)
Dem Legislature		0.0109 (0.05)		
Dem Governor		0.172 (0.90)		
Interparty Comp		-1.389 (-1.27)		
Leg Prof		0.821 (1.78)		
Leg Insulation		0.105* (2.21)		
Inst Ideology		-0.00399 (-0.81)		
East			0.436 (1.33)	

South			0.546 (1.59)	
Midwest			-0.182 (-0.87)	
Population			4.72e-09 (0.46)	
% Urban Pop			0.00340 (0.39)	
Citizen Ideology			-0.00124 (-0.16)	
Social Capital			0.163 (0.88)	
Personal Income				-0.00000213 (-0.15)
Debt				0.0000791 (1.36)
Govt Size				0.0670 (0.58)
Taxation				0.0105 (0.08)
Labor Mkt Frdm				0.163 (1.37)
_Constant	0.288 [*] (2.03)	1.228 (1.27)	-0.0312 (-0.04)	-1.446 (-1.60)
<i>N</i>	948	732	850	716

Model One

Number of obs: 948
 LR chi2(12): 58.15
 Prob > chi2: 0.0000
 Log likelihood: -622.52951
 Pseudo R2: 0.0446

Correctly classified: 61.81%

Model reduces errors in the prediction of result by 14.42%

Model predicts result=0 correctly 74% of the time

Model predicts result=1 correctly 47% of the time

Model Two

Number of obs: 732
 LR chi2(17): 83.68
 Prob > chi2: 0.0000
 Log likelihood: -461.16373
 Pseudo R2: 0.0832

Correctly classified: 65.16%

Model reduces errors in the prediction of result by 21.78%

Model predicts result=0 correctly 81% of the time

Model predicts result=1 correctly 45% of the time

Model Three

Number of obs: 850
 LR chi2(15): 64.22
 Prob > chi2: 0.0000
 Log likelihood: -550.43648
 Pseudo R2: 0.0551

Correctly classified: 62.35%

Model reduces errors in the prediction of result by 13.98%

Model predicts result=0 correctly 77% of the time

Model predicts result=1 correctly 44% of the time

Model Four

Number of obs: 716
 LR chi2(20): 46.87
 Prob > chi2: 0.0001
 Log likelihood: -468.81927
 Pseudo R2: 0.0476

Correctly classified 61.17%

Model reduces errors in the prediction of result by 13.13%

Model predicts result=0 correctly 73% of the time

Model predicts result=1 correctly 47% of the time

Initiative Subjects by Legislative Type

Subject	Legislative Type		Const No.	Const %	Total No.	Total %
	Statute No.	Statute %				
Government Ops	86.0	15.3	106.0	27.2	192.0	20.2
Fiscal	99.0	17.6	99.0	25.4	198.0	20.8
Econ Regulation	76.0	13.5	32.0	8.2	108.0	11.4
Public Morality	80.0	14.3	62.0	15.9	142.0	14.9
Criminal Justice	21.0	3.7	16.0	4.1	37.0	3.9
Civil Rights	4.0	0.7	14.0	3.6	18.0	1.9
Health/Welfare	28.0	5.0	7.0	1.8	35.0	3.7
Res/Environment	102.0	18.2	17.0	4.4	119.0	12.5
Animal Welfare	18.0	3.2	2.0	0.5	20.0	2.1
Transportation	9.0	1.6	4.0	1.0	13.0	1.4
Education	17.0	3.0	20.0	5.1	37.0	3.9
Miscellaneous	3.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.3
National Policy	9.0	1.6	2.0	0.5	11.0	1.2
Multiple Subjects	9.0	1.6	9.0	2.3	18.0	1.9
Total	561.0	100.0	390.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Policy Mandates by Legislative Type

Leg Type	Policy Mandate				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Statute	136.0	40.8	425.0	68.8	561.0	59.0
Amendment	197.0	59.2	193.0	31.2	390.0	41.0
Total	333.0	100.0	618.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 69.7764 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 69.5864 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = -0.2709
 gamma = -0.5226 ASE = 0.051
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.2709 ASE = 0.032

Governance Reforms by Legislative Type

Leg Type	Governance Reform				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Statute	364.0	71.0	197.0	45.0	561.0	59.0
Amendment	149.0	29.0	241.0	55.0	390.0	41.0
Total	513.0	100.0	438.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 65.9107 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 66.4621 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.2633
 gamma = 0.4986 ASE = 0.051
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.2633 ASE = 0.031

Policy Mandates by Initiative Type

Initiative Type	Policy Mandate				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Direct	292.0	87.7	500.0	80.9	792.0	83.3
Indirect	41.0	12.3	118.0	19.1	159.0	16.7
Total	333.0	100.0	618.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) =		7.1474	Pr = 0.008			
likelihood-ratio chi2(1) =		7.4391	Pr = 0.006			
Cramér's V =		0.0867				
gamma =		0.2539	ASE = 0.092			
Kendall's tau-b =		0.0867	ASE = 0.030			

Governance Reforms by Initiative Type

Initiative Type	Governance Reform				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Direct	411.0	80.1	381.0	87.0	792.0	83.3
Indirect	102.0	19.9	57.0	13.0	159.0	16.7
Total	513.0	100.0	438.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) =		8.0072	Pr = 0.005			
likelihood-ratio chi2(1) =		8.1272	Pr = 0.004			
Cramér's V =		-0.0918				
gamma =		-0.2478	ASE = 0.084			
Kendall's tau-b =		-0.0918	ASE = 0.032			

Hypothesis One

Policy Mandates by Subject

Subject	Policy Mandate				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Govt	179.0	53.8	13.0	2.1	192.0	20.2
Fiscal	68.0	20.4	130.0	21.0	198.0	20.8
EconReg	9.0	2.7	99.0	16.0	108.0	11.4
PubMor	19.0	5.7	123.0	19.9	142.0	14.9
CrimJus	15.0	4.5	22.0	3.6	37.0	3.9
CivRgts	2.0	0.6	16.0	2.6	18.0	1.9
HlthWlf	4.0	1.2	31.0	5.0	35.0	3.7
ResEnv	21.0	6.3	98.0	15.9	119.0	12.5
AnimWlf	0.0	0.0	20.0	3.2	20.0	2.1
Trans	1.0	0.3	12.0	1.9	13.0	1.4
Educ	13.0	3.9	24.0	3.9	37.0	3.9
Misc	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.5	3.0	0.3
NatlPly	0.0	0.0	11.0	1.8	11.0	1.2
Multiple	2.0	0.6	16.0	2.6	18.0	1.9
Total	333.0	100.0	618.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Governance Reforms by Subject

Subject	Governance Reform				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Govt	10.0	1.9	182.0	41.6	192.0	20.2
Fiscal	100.0	19.5	98.0	22.4	198.0	20.8
EconReg	80.0	15.6	28.0	6.4	108.0	11.4
PubMor	107.0	20.9	35.0	8.0	142.0	14.9
CrimJus	15.0	2.9	22.0	5.0	37.0	3.9
CivRgts	15.0	2.9	3.0	0.7	18.0	1.9
HLthWlf	28.0	5.5	7.0	1.6	35.0	3.7
ResEnv	88.0	17.2	31.0	7.1	119.0	12.5
AnimWlf	20.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	20.0	2.1
Trans	11.0	2.1	2.0	0.5	13.0	1.4
Educ	20.0	3.9	17.0	3.9	37.0	3.9
Misc	3.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.3
NatIPly	11.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	11.0	1.2
Multiple	5.0	1.0	13.0	3.0	18.0	1.9
Total	513.0	100.0	438.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Policy Mandate Approval

Result	Policy Mandate				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Fail	159.0	47.7	366.0	59.2	525.0	55.2
Pass	174.0	52.3	252.0	40.8	426.0	44.8
Total	333.0	100.0	618.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 11.5237 Pr = 0.001
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 11.5013 Pr = 0.001
 Cramér's V = -0.1101
 gamma = -0.2276 ASE = 0.065
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.1101 ASE = 0.032

Governance Reform Approval

Result	Governance Reform				Total No.	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	1 No.	1 %		
Fail	287.0	55.9	238.0	54.3	525.0	55.2
Pass	226.0	44.1	200.0	45.7	426.0	44.8
Total	513.0	100.0	438.0	100.0	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.2469 Pr = 0.619
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 0.2469 Pr = 0.619
 Cramér's V = 0.0161
 gamma = 0.0325 ASE = 0.065
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0161 ASE = 0.032

Policy Mandate Approval by Subject

Subject	Result						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Fail No.	Fail %	Fail %	Pass No.	Pass %	Pass %			
Government Ops	6.0	1.6	46.2	7.0	2.8	53.8	13.0	2.1	100.0
Fiscal	76.0	20.8	58.5	54.0	21.4	41.5	130.0	21.0	100.0
Econ Regulation	67.0	18.3	67.7	32.0	12.7	32.3	99.0	16.0	100.0
Public Morality	76.0	20.8	61.8	47.0	18.7	38.2	123.0	19.9	100.0
Criminal Justice	7.0	1.9	31.8	15.0	6.0	68.2	22.0	3.6	100.0
Civil Rights	6.0	1.6	37.5	10.0	4.0	62.5	16.0	2.6	100.0
Health/Welfare	16.0	4.4	51.6	15.0	6.0	48.4	31.0	5.0	100.0
Resources/Env	65.0	17.8	66.3	33.0	13.1	33.7	98.0	15.9	100.0
Animal Welfare	9.0	2.5	45.0	11.0	4.4	55.0	20.0	3.2	100.0
Transportation	6.0	1.6	50.0	6.0	2.4	50.0	12.0	1.9	100.0
Education	17.0	4.6	70.8	7.0	2.8	29.2	24.0	3.9	100.0
Miscellaneous	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.2	100.0	3.0	0.5	100.0
National Policy	2.0	0.5	18.2	9.0	3.6	81.8	11.0	1.8	100.0
Multiple Subjects	13.0	3.6	81.3	3.0	1.2	18.8	16.0	2.6	100.0
Total	366.0	100.0	59.2	252.0	100.0	40.8	618.0	100.0	100.0

Governance Reform Approval by Subject

Subject	Result						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Fail No.	Fail %	Fail %	Pass No.	Pass %	Pass %			
Government Ops	73.0	30.7	40.1	109.0	54.5	59.9	182.0	41.6	100.0
Fiscal	63.0	26.5	64.3	35.0	17.5	35.7	98.0	22.4	100.0
Econ Regulation	23.0	9.7	82.1	5.0	2.5	17.9	28.0	6.4	100.0
Public Morality	24.0	10.1	68.6	11.0	5.5	31.4	35.0	8.0	100.0
Criminal Justice	6.0	2.5	27.3	16.0	8.0	72.7	22.0	5.0	100.0
Civil Rights	1.0	0.4	33.3	2.0	1.0	66.7	3.0	0.7	100.0
Health/Welfare	3.0	1.3	42.9	4.0	2.0	57.1	7.0	1.6	100.0
Resources/Env	23.0	9.7	74.2	8.0	4.0	25.8	31.0	7.1	100.0
Transportation	1.0	0.4	50.0	1.0	0.5	50.0	2.0	0.5	100.0
Education	10.0	4.2	58.8	7.0	3.5	41.2	17.0	3.9	100.0
Multiple Subjects	11.0	4.6	84.6	2.0	1.0	15.4	13.0	3.0	100.0
Total	238.0	100.0	54.3	200.0	100.0	45.7	438.0	100.0	100.0

Hypothesis Two

Policy Mandates & Citizen Scope

Policy Mandate	Citizen Scope				Total No.	Total %
	Inc No.	Inc %	Exc No.	Exc %		
0	306.0	91.9	27.0	8.1	333.0	100.0
1	544.0	88.0	74.0	12.0	618.0	100.0
Total	850.0	89.4	101.0	10.6	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 3.4072 Pr = 0.065
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 3.5407 Pr = 0.060
 Cramér's V = 0.0599
 gamma = 0.2131 ASE = 0.113
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0599 ASE = 0.030

Governance Reforms & Citizen Scope

Governance Reform	Citizen Scope		Exc No.	Exc %	Total No.	Total %
	Inc No.	Inc %				
0	455.0	88.7	58.0	11.3	513.0	100.0
1	395.0	90.2	43.0	9.8	438.0	100.0
Total	850.0	89.4	101.0	10.6	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.5516 Pr = 0.458
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 0.5538 Pr = 0.457
 Cramér's V = -0.0241
 gamma = -0.0788 ASE = 0.106
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0241 ASE = 0.032

Policy Mandates & Citizen Impact

Policy Mandate	Citizen Impact		UnEv No.	UnEv %	Total No.	Total %
	Even No.	Even %				
0	201.0	60.4	132.0	39.6	333.0	100.0
1	153.0	24.8	465.0	75.2	618.0	100.0
Total	354.0	37.2	597.0	62.8	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 117.3845 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 116.6149 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.3513
 gamma = 0.6446 ASE = 0.043
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.3513 ASE = 0.031

Governance Reforms & Citizen Impact

Governance Reform	Citizen Impact		UnEv No.	UnEv %	Total No.	Total %
	Even No.	Even %				
0	127.0	24.8	386.0	75.2	513.0	100.0
1	227.0	51.8	211.0	48.2	438.0	100.0
Total	354.0	37.2	597.0	62.8	951.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 74.0927 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 74.7751 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = -0.2791
 gamma = -0.5316 ASE = 0.050
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.2791 ASE = 0.031

Initiatives by Citizen Scope & Impact

Citizen Scope	Citizen Impact			UnEv No.	UnEv %	UnEv %	Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Even No.	Even %	Even %						
Inclusive	354.0	100.0	41.6	496.0	83.1	58.4	850.0	89.4	100.0
Exclusive	0.0	0.0	0.0	101.0	16.9	100.0	101.0	10.6	100.0
Total	354.0	100.0	37.2	597.0	100.0	62.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Initiatives by Citizen Scope & Business Impact

Business Impact	Citizen Scope						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Inc No.	Inc %	Inc %	Exc No.	Exc %	Exc %			
Burden	195.0	22.9	95.6	9.0	8.9	4.4	204.0	21.5	100.0
None	605.0	71.2	88.5	79.0	78.2	11.5	684.0	71.9	100.0
Benefit	50.0	5.9	79.4	13.0	12.9	20.6	63.0	6.6	100.0
Total	850.0	100.0	89.4	101.0	100.0	10.6	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2)= 15.5625 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2)= 16.3713 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V= 0.1279
 gamma= 0.4477 ASE = 0.097
 Kendall's tau-b= 0.1232 ASE = 0.028

Initiatives by Citizen Impact & Business Impact

Business Impact	Citizen Impact						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Even No.	Even %	Even %	UnE No.	UnEv %	UnEv %			
Burden	88.0	24.9	43.1	116.0	19.4	56.9	204.0	21.5	100.0
None	250.0	70.6	36.5	434.0	72.7	63.5	684.0	71.9	100.0
Benefit	16.0	4.5	25.4	47.0	7.9	74.6	63.0	6.6	100.0
Total	354.0	100.0	37.2	597.0	100.0	62.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 6.9569 Pr = 0.031
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 7.1202 Pr = 0.028
 Cramér's V = 0.0855
 gamma = 0.1772 ASE = 0.068
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0801 ASE = 0.031

Initiatives by Citizen Scope & Approval

Result	Citizen Scope						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Inc No.	Inc %	Inc %	Exc No.	Exc %	Exc %			
Fail	464.0	54.6	88.4	61.0	60.4	11.6	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	386.0	45.4	90.6	40.0	39.6	9.4	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	850.0	100.0	89.4	101.0	100.0	10.6	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.2313 Pr = 0.267
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 1.2414 Pr = 0.265
 Cramér's V = -0.0360
 gamma = -0.1184 ASE = 0.106
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0360 ASE = 0.032

Initiatives by Citizen Impact & Approval

Result	Citizen Impact						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Even No.	Even %	Even %	UnEv No.	UnEv %	UnEv %			
Fail	187.0	35.6	52.8	338.0	64.4	56.6	525.0	100.0	55.2
Pass	167.0	39.2	47.2	259.0	60.8	43.4	426.0	100.0	44.8
Total	354.0	37.2	100.0	597.0	62.8	100.0	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 1.2919 Pr = 0.256
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 1.2905 Pr = 0.256
 Cramér's V = -0.0369
 gamma = -0.0764 ASE = 0.067
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0369 ASE = 0.032

Initiatives by Citizen Impact & Approval

Result	Business Impact									Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Brd No.	Brd %	Brd %	None No.	None %	None %	Ben No.	Ben %	Ben %			
Fail	137.0	67.2	26.1	346.0	50.6	65.9	42.0	66.7	8.0	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	67.0	32.8	15.7	338.0	49.4	79.3	21.0	33.3	4.9	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	204.0	100.0	21.5	684.0	100.0	71.9	63.0	100.0	6.6	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 21.0351 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 21.4193 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.1487
 gamma = 0.1682 ASE = 0.067
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0778 ASE = 0.031

Initiatives by Citizen Scope & Subject

Subject	Citizen Scope						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Inc No.	Inc %	Inc %	Exc No.	Exc %	Exc %			
Govt	179.0	21.1	93.2	13.0	12.9	6.8	192.0	20.2	100.0
Fiscal	186.0	21.9	93.9	12.0	11.9	6.1	198.0	20.8	100.0
EconReg	100.0	11.8	92.6	8.0	7.9	7.4	108.0	11.4	100.0
PubMor	121.0	14.2	85.2	21.0	20.8	14.8	142.0	14.9	100.0
CrimJus	33.0	3.9	89.2	4.0	4.0	10.8	37.0	3.9	100.0
CivRgts	15.0	1.8	83.3	3.0	3.0	16.7	18.0	1.9	100.0
HlthWlf	29.0	3.4	82.9	6.0	5.9	17.1	35.0	3.7	100.0
ResEnv	115.0	13.5	96.6	4.0	4.0	3.4	119.0	12.5	100.0
AnimWlf	20.0	2.4	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	2.1	100.0
Trans	12.0	1.4	92.3	1.0	1.0	7.7	13.0	1.4	100.0
Educ	11.0	1.3	29.7	26.0	25.7	70.3	37.0	3.9	100.0
Misc	3.0	0.4	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.3	100.0
NatlPly	11.0	1.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	1.2	100.0
Multiple	15.0	1.8	83.3	3.0	3.0	16.7	18.0	1.9	100.0
Total	850.0	100.0	89.4	101.0	100.0	10.6	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(13)= 163.5165 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(13)= 105.2037 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V= 0.4147
 gamma= 0.2983 ASE = 0.065
 Kendall's tau-b= 0.1254 ASE = 0.029

Initiatives by Citizen Impact & Subject

Subject	Citizen Impact						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Even No.	Even %	Even %	UnEv No.	UnEv %	UnEv %			
Govt	138.0	39.0	71.9	54.0	9.0	28.1	192.0	20.2	100.0
Fiscal	63.0	17.8	31.8	135.0	22.6	68.2	198.0	20.8	100.0
EconReg	20.0	5.6	18.5	88.0	14.7	81.5	108.0	11.4	100.0
PubMor	18.0	5.1	12.7	124.0	20.8	87.3	142.0	14.9	100.0
CrimJus	6.0	1.7	16.2	31.0	5.2	83.8	37.0	3.9	100.0
CivRgts	4.0	1.1	22.2	14.0	2.3	77.8	18.0	1.9	100.0
HlthWlf	10.0	2.8	28.6	25.0	4.2	71.4	35.0	3.7	100.0
ResEnv	70.0	19.8	58.8	49.0	8.2	41.2	119.0	12.5	100.0
AnimWlf	1.0	0.3	5.0	19.0	3.2	95.0	20.0	2.1	100.0
Trans	6.0	1.7	46.2	7.0	1.2	53.8	13.0	1.4	100.0
Educ	3.0	0.8	8.1	34.0	5.7	91.9	37.0	3.9	100.0
Misc	2.0	0.6	66.7	1.0	0.2	33.3	3.0	0.3	100.0
NatlPly	9.0	2.5	81.8	2.0	0.3	18.2	11.0	1.2	100.0
Multiple	4.0	1.1	22.2	14.0	2.3	77.8	18.0	1.9	100.0
Total	354.0	100.0	37.2	597.0	100.0	62.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(13)= 222.4832 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(13)= 233.2482 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V= 0.4837
 gamma= 0.2753 ASE = 0.046
 Kendall's tau-b= 0.1799 ASE = 0.030

Initiatives by Business Impact & Subject

Subject	Business Impact									Total No.	Total %	Total %
	Brd No.	Brd %	Brd %	None No.	None %	None %	Ben No.	Ben %	Ben %			
Govt	7.0	3.4	3.6	184.0	26.9	95.8	1.0	1.6	0.5	192.0	20.2	100.0
Fiscal	24.0	11.8	12.1	170.0	24.9	85.9	4.0	6.3	2.0	198.0	20.8	100.0
EconReg	63.0	30.9	58.3	31.0	4.5	28.7	14.0	22.2	13.0	108.0	11.4	100.0
PubMor	21.0	10.3	14.8	88.0	12.9	62.0	33.0	52.4	23.2	142.0	14.9	100.0
CrimJus	0.0	0.0	0.0	36.0	5.3	97.3	1.0	1.6	2.7	37.0	3.9	100.0
CivRgts	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	2.6	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	1.9	100.0
HlthWlf	9.0	4.4	25.7	25.0	3.7	71.4	1.0	1.6	2.9	35.0	3.7	100.0
ResEnv	70.0	34.3	58.8	44.0	6.4	37.0	5.0	7.9	4.2	119.0	12.5	100.0
AnimWlf	2.0	1.0	10.0	18.0	2.6	90.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	2.1	100.0
Trans	3.0	1.5	23.1	8.0	1.2	61.5	2.0	3.2	15.4	13.0	1.4	100.0
Educ	0.0	0.0	0.0	35.0	5.1	94.6	2.0	3.2	5.4	37.0	3.9	100.0
Misc	1.0	0.5	33.3	2.0	0.3	66.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.3	100.0
NatlPly	1.0	0.5	9.1	10.0	1.5	90.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	1.2	100.0
Multiple	3.0	1.5	16.7	15.0	2.2	83.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	1.9	100.0
Total	204.0	100.0	21.5	684.0	100.0	71.9	63.0	100.0	6.6	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(26) = 380.2484 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(26) = 370.2512 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.4471
 gamma = -0.1804 ASE = 0.034
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.1154 ASE = 0.022

Hypothesis Three

Governance Reforms & Horizontal Accountability

Horizontal Accountability									
Governance Reform	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %	Total No.	Total %	Total %
0	513.0	55.2	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	513.0	53.9	100.0
1	417.0	44.8	95.2	21.0	100.0	4.8	438.0	46.1	100.0
Total	930.0	100.0	97.8	21.0	100.0	2.2	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 25.1513 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 33.1186 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.1626
 gamma = 1.0000 ASE = 0.000
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.1626 ASE = 0.018

Governance Reforms & Vertical Accountability

Vertical Accountability												
Governance Reform	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %	Total No.	Total %	Total %
0	0.0	0.0	0.0	513.0	61.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	513.0	53.9	100.0
1	4.0	100.0	0.9	328.0	39.0	74.9	106.0	100.0	24.2	438.0	46.1	100.0
Total	4.0	100.0	0.4	841.0	100.0	88.4	106.0	100.0	11.1	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 145.6869 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 187.6017 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.3914
 gamma = 0.9273 ASE = 0.036
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.3621 ASE = 0.023

Governance Reforms by Horizontal Accountability & Citizen Scope

Citizen Scope	Horizontal Accountability						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Inclusive	374.0	89.7	94.7	21.0	100.0	5.3	395.0	90.2	100.0
Exclusive	43.0	10.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	43.0	9.8	100.0
Total	417.0	100.0	95.2	21.0	100.0	4.8	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 2.4012 Pr = 0.121
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 4.4534 Pr = 0.035
 Cramér's V = -0.0740
 gamma = -1.0000 ASE = 0.000
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0740 ASE = 0.010

Governance Reforms by Horizontal Accountability & Citizen Impact

Citizen Impact	Horizontal Accountability						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Even	214.0	51.3	94.3	13.0	61.9	5.7	227.0	51.8	100.0
Uneven	203.0	48.7	96.2	8.0	38.1	3.8	211.0	48.2	100.0
Total	417.0	100.0	95.2	21.0	100.0	4.8	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8974 Pr = 0.343
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 0.9076 Pr = 0.341
 Cramér's V = -0.0453
 gamma = -0.2131 ASE = 0.220
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0453 ASE = 0.047

Governance Reforms by Vertical Accountability & Citizen Scope

Citizen Scope	Vertical Accountability									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Inclusive	4.0	100.0	1.0	291.0	88.7	73.7	100.0	94.3	25.3	395.0	90.2	100.0
Exclusive	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0	11.3	86.0	6.0	5.7	14.0	43.0	9.8	100.0
Total	4.0	100.0	0.9	328.0	100.0	74.9	106.0	100.0	24.2	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 3.2975 Pr = 0.192
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 3.9920 Pr = 0.136
 Cramér's V = 0.0868
 gamma = -0.3172 ASE = 0.191
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0716 ASE = 0.039

Governance Reforms by Vertical Accountability & Citizen Impact

Citizen Impact	Vertical Accountability									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Even	3.0	75.0	1.3	159.0	48.5	70.0	65.0	61.3	28.6	227.0	51.8	100.0
Uneven	1.0	25.0	0.5	169.0	51.5	80.1	41.0	38.7	19.4	211.0	48.2	100.0
Total	4.0	100.0	0.9	328.0	100.0	74.9	106.0	100.0	24.2	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2)= 6.1626 Pr = 0.046
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2)= 6.2482 Pr = 0.044
 Cramér's V= 0.1186
 gamma= -0.2212 ASE = 0.105
 Kendall's tau-b= -0.0971 ASE = 0.047

Governance Reforms by Horizontal Accountability & Subject

Subject	Horizontal Accountability						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Govt	163.0	39.1	89.6	19.0	90.5	10.4	182.0	41.6	100.0
Fiscal	98.0	23.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.0	22.4	100.0
EconReg	27.0	6.5	96.4	1.0	4.8	3.6	28.0	6.4	100.0
PubMor	35.0	8.4	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	35.0	8.0	100.0
CrimJus	22.0	5.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	5.0	100.0
CivRgts	3.0	0.7	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.7	100.0
HlthWlf	7.0	1.7	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	1.6	100.0
ResEnv	31.0	7.4	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	31.0	7.1	100.0
Trans	2.0	0.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.5	100.0
Educ	17.0	4.1	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	3.9	100.0
Multiple	12.0	2.9	92.3	1.0	4.8	7.7	13.0	3.0	100.0
Total	417.0	100.0	95.2	21.0	100.0	4.8	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson $\chi^2(10) = 23.8639$ Pr = 0.008
 likelihood-ratio $\chi^2(10) = 31.0735$ Pr = 0.001
 Cramér's V = 0.2334
 gamma = -0.7630 ASE = 0.156
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.1701 ASE = 0.035

Governance Reforms by Vertical Accountability & Subject

Subject	Vertical Accountability									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Govt	4.0	100.0	2.2	125.0	38.1	68.7	53.0	50.0	29.1	182.0	41.6	100.0
Fiscal	0.0	0.0	0.0	69.0	21.0	70.4	29.0	27.4	29.6	98.0	22.4	100.0
EconReg	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.0	7.9	92.9	2.0	1.9	7.1	28.0	6.4	100.0
PubMor	0.0	0.0	0.0	30.0	9.1	85.7	5.0	4.7	14.3	35.0	8.0	100.0
CrimJus	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	6.7	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	5.0	100.0
CivRgts	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.9	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.7	100.0
HlthWlf	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	2.1	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	1.6	100.0
ResEnv	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	6.1	64.5	11.0	10.4	35.5	31.0	7.1	100.0
Trans	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.6	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.5	100.0
Educ	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	5.2	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	3.9	100.0
Multiple	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	2.1	53.8	6.0	5.7	46.2	13.0	3.0	100.0
Total	4.0	100.0	0.9	328.0	100.0	74.9	106.0	100.0	24.2	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(20) = 38.4366 Pr = 0.008
 likelihood-ratio chi2(20) = 52.3979 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.2095
 gamma = -0.1637 ASE = 0.083
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0849 ASE = 0.043

Governance Reforms by Horizontal Accountability & Approval

Result	Horizontal Accountability						Total No.	Total %	Total %
	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	231.0	55.4	97.1	7.0	33.3	2.9	238.0	54.3	100.0
Pass	186.0	44.6	93.0	14.0	66.7	7.0	200.0	45.7	100.0
Total	417.0	100.0	95.2	21.0	100.0	4.8	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(1) = 3.9222 Pr = 0.048
 likelihood-ratio chi2(1) = 3.9432 Pr = 0.047
 Cramér's V = 0.0946
 gamma = 0.4259 ASE = 0.194
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0946 ASE = 0.046

Governance Reforms by Vertical Accountability & Approval

Result	Vertical Accountability											
	No.	%	%	No.	%	%	No.	%	%	No.	%	%
Fail	2.0	50.0	0.8	177.0	54.0	74.4	59.0	55.7	24.8	238.0	54.3	100.0
Pass	2.0	50.0	1.0	151.0	46.0	75.5	47.0	44.3	23.5	200.0	45.7	100.0
Total	4.0	100.0	0.9	328.0	100.0	74.9	106.0	100.0	24.2	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 0.1236 Pr = 0.940
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 0.1236 Pr = 0.940
 Cramér's V = 0.0168
 gamma = -0.0368 ASE = 0.110
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0160 ASE = 0.048

Hypothesis Four

Governance Reforms & Official Discretion

Governance Reform	Official Discretion									Total No.	Total %	Total %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
0	2.0	1.2	0.4	510.0	68.3	99.4	1.0	2.9	0.2	513.0	53.9	100.0
1	168.0	98.8	38.4	237.0	31.7	54.1	33.0	97.1	7.5	438.0	46.1	100.0
Total	170.0	100.0	17.9	747.0	100.0	78.5	34.0	100.0	3.6	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 287.8584 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 348.2330 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.5502
 gamma = -0.6642 ASE = 0.052
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.3645 ASE = 0.032

Governance Reforms by Official Discretion & Region

Off Disc	Region												Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	E No.	E %	E %	S No.	S %	S %	MW No.	MW %	MW %	W No.	W %	W %			
-1	12.0	42.9	7.1	5.0	14.7	3.0	28.0	35.0	16.7	123.0	41.6	73.2	168.0	38.4	100.0
0	14.0	50.0	5.9	21.0	61.8	8.9	44.0	55.0	18.6	158.0	53.4	66.7	237.0	54.1	100.0
1	2.0	7.1	6.1	8.0	23.5	24.2	8.0	10.0	24.2	15.0	5.1	45.5	33.0	7.5	100.0
Total	28.0	100.0	6.4	34.0	100.0	7.8	80.0	100.0	18.3	296.0	100.0	67.6	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(6) = 21.2140 Pr = 0.002
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) = 18.7703 Pr = 0.005
 Cramér's V = 0.1556
 gamma = -0.2208 ASE = 0.082
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.1189 ASE = 0.045

Governance Reforms by Official Discretion & Subject

Subject	Official Discretion									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Govt	20.0	11.9	11.0	161.0	67.9	88.5	1.0	3.0	0.5	182.0	41.6	100.0
Fiscal	80.0	47.6	81.6	13.0	5.5	13.3	5.0	15.2	5.1	98.0	22.4	100.0
EconReg	13.0	7.7	46.4	4.0	1.7	14.3	11.0	33.3	39.3	28.0	6.4	100.0
PubMor	13.0	7.7	37.1	13.0	5.5	37.1	9.0	27.3	25.7	35.0	8.0	100.0
CrimJus	6.0	3.6	27.3	16.0	6.8	72.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	5.0	100.0
CivRgts	2.0	1.2	66.7	1.0	0.4	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.7	100.0
HlthWlf	5.0	3.0	71.4	2.0	0.8	28.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	1.6	100.0
ResEnv	16.0	9.5	51.6	13.0	5.5	41.9	2.0	6.1	6.5	31.0	7.1	100.0
Trans	1.0	0.6	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	50.0	2.0	0.5	100.0
Educ	7.0	4.2	41.2	8.0	3.4	47.1	2.0	6.1	11.8	17.0	3.9	100.0
Multiple	5.0	3.0	38.5	6.0	2.5	46.2	2.0	6.1	15.4	13.0	3.0	100.0
Total	168.0	100.0	38.4	237.0	100.0	54.1	33.0	100.0	7.5	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(20) = 247.5283 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(20) = 243.9250 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.5316
 gamma = -0.2471 ASE = 0.055
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.1874 ASE = 0.042

Governance Reforms by Official Discretion & Approval

Result	Official Discretion									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	106.0	63.1	44.5	108.0	45.6	45.4	24.0	72.7	10.1	238.0	54.3	100.0
Pass	62.0	36.9	31.0	129.0	54.4	64.5	9.0	27.3	4.5	200.0	45.7	100.0
Total	168.0	100.0	38.4	237.0	100.0	54.1	33.0	100.0	7.5	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 17.0342 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 17.2964 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.1972
 gamma = 0.1607 ASE = 0.085
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0859 ASE = 0.046

Hypothesis Five

Governance Reforms & Citizen Discretion

Governance Reform	Citizen Discretion									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
0	0.0	0.0	0.0	512.0	59.3	99.8	1.0	1.2	0.2	513.0	53.9	100.0
1	2.0	100.0	0.5	352.0	40.7	80.4	84.0	98.8	19.2	438.0	46.1	100.0
Total	2.0	100.0	0.2	864.0	100.0	90.9	85.0	100.0	8.9	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 107.4300 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 133.6145 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.3361
 gamma = 0.9379 ASE = 0.036
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.3200 ASE = 0.022

Governance Reforms by Citizen Discretion & Subject

Subject	Citizen Discretion									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Govt	2.0	100.0	1.1	163.0	46.3	89.6	17.0	20.2	9.3	182.0	41.6	100.0
Fiscal	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.0	17.0	61.2	38.0	45.2	38.8	98.0	22.4	100.0
EconReg	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.0	7.4	92.9	2.0	2.4	7.1	28.0	6.4	100.0
PubMor	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.0	6.5	65.7	12.0	14.3	34.3	35.0	8.0	100.0
CrimJus	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	6.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	5.0	100.0
CivRgts	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.9	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.7	100.0
HlthWlf	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	2.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	1.6	100.0
ResEnv	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	5.7	64.5	11.0	13.1	35.5	31.0	7.1	100.0
Trans	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.6	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.5	100.0
Educ	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	4.8	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	3.9	100.0
Multiple	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	2.6	69.2	4.0	4.8	30.8	13.0	3.0	100.0
Total	2.0	100.0	0.5	352.0	100.0	80.4	84.0	100.0	19.2	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(20) = 64.3690 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(20) = 71.6216 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.2711
 gamma = 0.2155 ASE = 0.071
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.1121 ASE = 0.039

Governance Reforms by Citizen Discretion & Approval

Result	Citizen Discretion									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	1.0	50.0	0.4	186.0	52.8	78.2	51.0	60.7	21.4	238.0	54.3	100.0
Pass	1.0	50.0	0.5	166.0	47.2	83.0	33.0	39.3	16.5	200.0	45.7	100.0
Total	2.0	100.0	0.5	352.0	100.0	80.4	84.0	100.0	19.2	438.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 1.7096 Pr = 0.425
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 1.7232 Pr = 0.422
 Cramér's V = 0.0625
 gamma = -0.1573 ASE = 0.119
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0622 ASE = 0.047

Hypothesis Six

Revenue

General Revenue Policy Effect

Gen Rev Policy	No.	%	%
-1	107.0	11.3	100.0
0	707.0	74.3	100.0
1	137.0	14.4	100.0
Total	951.0	100.0	100.0

Tax Revenue Policy Effect

Tax Rev Policy	No.	%	%
-1	104.0	10.9	100.0
0	778.0	81.8	100.0
1	69.0	7.3	100.0
Total	951.0	100.0	100.0

Tax Revenue Governance Reform Effect

Tax Rev Gvn Rfm	No.	%	%
-1	61.0	6.4	100.0
0	888.0	93.4	100.0
1	2.0	0.2	100.0
Total	951.0	100.0	100.0

General Revenue Policy Effect & Citizen Scope

Citizen Scope	General Revenue Policy Effect											
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %	Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
Inclusive	104.0	97.2	12.2	634.0	89.7	74.6	112.0	81.8	13.2	850.0	89.4	100.0
Exclusive	3.0	2.8	3.0	73.0	10.3	72.3	25.0	18.2	24.8	101.0	10.6	100.0
Total	107.0	100.0	11.3	707.0	100.0	74.3	137.0	100.0	14.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 15.3494 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 16.5958 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.1270
 gamma = 0.4287 ASE = 0.088
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.1233 ASE = 0.030

General Revenue Policy Effect & Citizen Impact

Citizen Impact	General Revenue Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Even	26.0	24.3	7.3	303.0	42.9	85.6	25.0	18.2	7.1	354.0	37.2	100.0
Uneven	81.0	75.7	13.6	404.0	57.1	67.7	112.0	81.8	18.8	597.0	62.8	100.0
Total	107.0	100.0	11.3	707.0	100.0	74.3	137.0	100.0	14.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 38.3609 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 41.0976 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.2008
 gamma = 0.1272 ASE = 0.068
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0537 ASE = 0.029

Tax Revenue Policy Effect by Region

Region	Tax Revenue Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
East	14.0	13.5	17.7	62.0	8.0	78.5	3.0	4.3	3.8	79.0	8.3	100.0
South	7.0	6.7	9.9	58.0	7.5	81.7	6.0	8.7	8.5	71.0	7.5	100.0
Midwest	20.0	19.2	10.7	146.0	18.8	78.1	21.0	30.4	11.2	187.0	19.7	100.0
West	63.0	60.6	10.3	512.0	65.8	83.4	39.0	56.5	6.4	614.0	64.6	100.0
Total	104.0	100.0	10.9	778.0	100.0	81.8	69.0	100.0	7.3	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(6) = 10.4845 Pr = 0.106
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) = 9.6783 Pr = 0.139
 Cramér's V = 0.0742
 gamma = 0.0219 ASE = 0.073
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0094 ASE = 0.031

General Revenue Policy Effect & Approval

Result	General Revenue Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	73.0	68.2	13.9	366.0	51.8	69.7	86.0	62.8	16.4	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	34.0	31.8	8.0	341.0	48.2	80.0	51.0	37.2	12.0	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	107.0	100.0	11.3	707.0	100.0	74.3	137.0	100.0	14.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 13.8851 Pr = 0.001
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 14.1487 Pr = 0.001
 Cramér's V = 0.1208
 gamma = 0.0281 ASE = 0.069
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0126 ASE = 0.031

Tax Revenue Policy Effect & Approval

Result	Tax Revenue Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	71.0	68.3	13.5	406.0	52.2	77.3	48.0	69.6	9.1	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	33.0	31.7	7.7	372.0	47.8	87.3	21.0	30.4	4.9	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	104.0	100.0	10.9	778.0	100.0	81.8	69.0	100.0	7.3	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 15.8009 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 16.2258 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.1289
 gamma = 0.0518 ASE = 0.080
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0202 ASE = 0.031

Tax Revenue Governance Reform Effect & Approval

Result	Tax Revenue Governance Reform Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	41.0	67.2	7.8	482.0	54.3	91.8	2.0	100.0	0.4	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	20.0	32.8	4.7	406.0	45.7	95.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	61.0	100.0	6.4	888.0	100.0	93.4	2.0	100.0	0.2	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 5.4875 Pr = 0.064
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 6.3399 Pr = 0.042
 Cramér's V = 0.0760
 gamma = 0.2268 ASE = 0.129
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0550 ASE = 0.031

Programs & Services

Programs & Services Policy Effect by Region

Region	Programs & Services Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
East	0.0	0.0	0.0	77.0	9.4	97.5	2.0	1.7	2.5	79.0	8.3	100.0
South	4.0	22.2	5.6	55.0	6.7	77.5	12.0	10.2	16.9	71.0	7.5	100.0
Midwest	2.0	11.1	1.1	160.0	19.6	85.6	25.0	21.2	13.4	187.0	19.7	100.0
West	12.0	66.7	2.0	523.0	64.2	85.2	79.0	66.9	12.9	614.0	64.6	100.0
Total	18.0	100.0	1.9	815.0	100.0	85.7	118.0	100.0	12.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(6) = 16.8944 Pr = 0.010
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) = 19.5566 Pr = 0.003
 Cramér's V = 0.0942
 gamma = 0.0732 ASE = 0.082
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0262 ASE = 0.029

Programs & Services Governance Reform Effect by Region

Region	Programs & Services Governance Reform Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
East	0.0	0.0	0.0	79.0	8.5	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	79.0	8.3	100.0
South	3.0	16.7	4.2	67.0	7.2	94.4	1.0	33.3	1.4	71.0	7.5	100.0
Midwest	1.0	5.6	0.5	186.0	20.0	99.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	187.0	19.7	100.0
West	14.0	77.8	2.3	598.0	64.3	97.4	2.0	66.7	0.3	614.0	64.6	100.0
Total	18.0	100.0	1.9	930.0	100.0	97.8	3.0	100.0	0.3	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(6) = 9.5631 Pr = 0.144
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) = 10.8134 Pr = 0.094
 Cramér's V = 0.0709
 gamma = -0.2234 ASE = 0.220
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0310 ASE = 0.029

Programs & Services Policy Effect & Citizen Scope

Citizen Scope	Programs & Services Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Inclusive	13.0	72.2	1.5	751.0	92.1	88.4	86.0	72.9	10.1	850.0	89.4	100.0
Exclusive	5.0	27.8	5.0	64.0	7.9	63.4	32.0	27.1	31.7	101.0	10.6	100.0
Total	18.0	100.0	1.9	815.0	100.0	85.7	118.0	100.0	12.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 45.9945 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 36.1302 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.2199
 gamma = 0.4459 ASE = 0.110
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.1583 ASE = 0.046

General Spending Policy Effect & Citizen Scope

Citizen Scope	General Spending Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Inclusive	30.0	100.0	3.5	795.0	88.9	93.5	25.0	92.6	2.9	850.0	89.4	100.0
Exclusive	0.0	0.0	0.0	99.0	11.1	98.0	2.0	7.4	2.0	101.0	10.6	100.0
Total	30.0	100.0	3.2	894.0	100.0	94.0	27.0	100.0	2.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 4.0520 Pr = 0.132
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 7.2526 Pr = 0.027
 Cramér's V = 0.0653
 gamma = 0.3023 ASE = 0.157
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0322 ASE = 0.020

Programs & Services Policy Effect & Citizen Impact

Citizen Impact	Program & Service Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Even	4.0	22.2	1.1	333.0	40.9	94.1	17.0	14.4	4.8	354.0	37.2	100.0
Uneven	14.0	77.8	2.3	482.0	59.1	80.7	101.0	85.6	16.9	597.0	62.8	100.0
Total	18.0	100.0	1.9	815.0	100.0	85.7	118.0	100.0	12.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 32.6317 Pr = 0.000
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 36.7775 Pr = 0.000
 Cramér's V = 0.1852
 gamma = 0.4662 ASE = 0.084
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.1480 ASE = 0.027

General Spending Policy Effect & Citizen Impact

Citizen Impact	General Spending Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Even	14.0	46.7	4.0	334.0	37.4	94.4	6.0	22.2	1.7	354.0	37.2	100.0
Uneven	16.0	53.3	2.7	560.0	62.6	93.8	21.0	77.8	3.5	597.0	62.8	100.0
Total	30.0	100.0	3.2	894.0	100.0	94.0	27.0	100.0	2.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 3.7522 Pr = 0.153
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 3.9304 Pr = 0.140
 Cramér's V = 0.0628
 gamma = 0.2651 ASE = 0.133
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0607 ASE = 0.031

Programs & Services Policy Effect & Approval

Result	Programs & Services Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	15.0	83.3	2.9	446.0	54.7	85.0	64.0	54.2	12.2	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	3.0	16.7	0.7	369.0	45.3	86.6	54.0	45.8	12.7	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	18.0	100.0	1.9	815.0	100.0	85.7	118.0	100.0	12.4	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 5.8800 Pr = 0.053
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 6.5426 Pr = 0.038
 Cramér's V = 0.0786
 gamma = 0.0951 ASE = 0.090
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0332 ASE = 0.032

General Spending Policy Effect & Approval

Result	General Spending Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	21.0	70.0	4.0	492.0	55.0	93.7	12.0	44.4	2.3	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	9.0	30.0	2.1	402.0	45.0	94.4	15.0	55.6	3.5	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	30.0	100.0	3.2	894.0	100.0	94.0	27.0	100.0	2.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 3.9303 Pr = 0.140
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 4.0221 Pr = 0.134
 Cramér's V = 0.0643
 gamma = 0.2658 ASE = 0.130
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0630 ASE = 0.031

Programs & Services Governance Reform Effect & Approval

Result	Programs & Services Governance Reform Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	10.0	55.6	1.9	512.0	55.1	97.5	3.0	100.0	0.6	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	8.0	44.4	1.9	418.0	44.9	98.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	18.0	100.0	1.9	930.0	100.0	97.8	3.0	100.0	0.3	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 2.4438 Pr = 0.295
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 3.5742 Pr = 0.167
 Cramér's V = 0.0507
 gamma = -0.1250 ASE = 0.217
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0180 ASE = 0.032

General Spending Governance Reform Effect & Approval

Result	General Spending Governance Reform Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	7.0	70.0	1.3	516.0	55.0	98.3	2.0	66.7	0.4	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	3.0	30.0	0.7	422.0	45.0	99.1	1.0	33.3	0.2	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	10.0	100.0	1.1	938.0	100.0	98.6	3.0	100.0	0.3	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 1.0589 Pr = 0.589
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 1.0966 Pr = 0.578
 Cramér's V = 0.0334
 gamma = 0.1837 ASE = 0.278
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0206 ASE = 0.031

Regulation

Economic Regulatory Policy Effect

Econ Reg Policy	No.	%	%
-1	28.0	100.0	2.9
0	792.0	100.0	83.3
1	131.0	100.0	13.8
Total	951.0	100.0	100.0

Economic Reg Governance Reform Effect

Econ Reg Gvn Rfm	No.	%	%
-1	11.0	100.0	1.2
0	939.0	100.0	98.7
1	1.0	100.0	0.1
Total	951.0	100.0	100.0

Social Regulatory Policy Effect

Soc Reg Gvn Ply	No.	%	%
-1	33.0	100.0	3.5
0	915.0	100.0	96.2
1	3.0	100.0	0.3
Total	951.0	100.0	100.0

Social Regulatory Policy Effect by Region

Region	Social Regulation Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
East	12.0	11.1	15.2	48.0	7.2	60.8	19.0	10.6	24.1	79.0	8.3	100.0
South	11.0	10.2	15.5	50.0	7.5	70.4	10.0	5.6	14.1	71.0	7.5	100.0
Midwest	26.0	24.1	13.9	128.0	19.3	68.4	33.0	18.3	17.6	187.0	19.7	100.0
West	59.0	54.6	9.6	437.0	65.9	71.2	118.0	65.6	19.2	614.0	64.6	100.0
Total	108.0	100.0	11.4	663.0	100.0	69.7	180.0	100.0	18.9	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(6) = 8.1199 Pr = 0.229
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) = 7.9739 Pr = 0.240
 Cramér's V = 0.0653
 gamma = 0.0803 ASE = 0.061
 Kendall's tau-b = 0.0410 ASE = 0.031

Economic Regulatory Policy Effect & Approval

Result	Economic Regulation Policy Effect									Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %			
Fail	16.0	57.1	3.0	421.0	53.2	80.2	88.0	67.2	16.8	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	12.0	42.9	2.8	371.0	46.8	87.1	43.0	32.8	10.1	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	28.0	100.0	2.9	792.0	100.0	83.3	131.0	100.0	13.8	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 8.9773 Pr = 0.011
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 9.1847 Pr = 0.010
 Cramér's V = 0.0972
 gamma = -0.2210 ASE = 0.083
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0824 ASE = 0.031

Social Regulatory Policy Effect & Approval

Social Regulation Policy Effect

Result	-1 No.	-1 %	-1 %	0 No.	0 %	0 %	1 No.	1 %	1 %	Tot No.	Tot %	Tot %
Fail	68.0	63.0	13.0	345.0	52.0	65.7	112.0	62.2	21.3	525.0	55.2	100.0
Pass	40.0	37.0	9.4	318.0	48.0	74.6	68.0	37.8	16.0	426.0	44.8	100.0
Total	108.0	100.0	11.4	663.0	100.0	69.7	180.0	100.0	18.9	951.0	100.0	100.0

Pearson chi2(2) = 8.9049 Pr = 0.012
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 8.9833 Pr = 0.011
 Cramér's V = 0.0968
 gamma = -0.0404 ASE = 0.065
 Kendall's tau-b = -0.0193 ASE = 0.031

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Curriculum Vitae

For the past decade, Richard M. Schum has taught government and policy analysis at George Mason University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Volgenau School of Information Technology and Engineering. He has also collaborated in various projects for such organizations as the Office of Naval Research, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the RAND Corporation, and SRI International. Notably, he was Project Director of the National Workshop on Internet Voting, sponsored by the National Science Foundation at the behest of the White House, which studied the feasibility of online voting, and set forth a research agenda with respect to the issue.

Dr. Schum has also been the principal of a computer consulting practice, specializing in small business solutions. He has extensive experience with personal computers and networks, and is conversant with numerous software applications from both the user and design perspectives. In addition, he is technically skilled in various areas of hardware and software integration and troubleshooting, and has designed software for government and commercial applications.

Previously, Dr. Schum was Policy Research Director for a defense and technology consulting firm, and provided research, analysis, and support to such clients as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Science Board, the Pentagon's International Programs Office, and the military Services. In this capacity, he also designed software systems and interfaces, and led the testing regime. His Capitol Hill experience includes both personal and committee staff assignments, and he has served in the campaigns of congressional incumbents and challengers. He has also acted as the principal lobbyist for a trade association.

Dr. Schum earned his doctorate from the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, where he studied direct democracy and the role of technology in the electoral process. He also holds a Bachelor's degree in political science from Boston University and a Master's degree in public policy, concentrating in international security and economic policy, from the University of Maryland at College Park.