THE CONDITIONS ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES, THE RED SHIRTS AND THE YELLOW SHIRTS, TO COLLABORATE IN PROMOTING THE CONCEPT OF SELF-GOVERNANCE IN CHIANG MAI, THAILAND, IN 2009-2010

by

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A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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Date: _____   Summer Semester 2019
                                                   George Mason University
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The Conditions Enabling Members of the Conflicting Parties, the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, to Collaborate in Promoting the Concept of Self-Governance in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 2009-2010

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DEDICATION

For my brave, revered, and beloved Professor Dennis J.D. Sandole.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Coalition for Chiang Mai Self-Governing ....CCMSG
Coalition for Peaceful Homeland …………………….. CPH
Internal Security Operations Command......................... ……………………………ISOC
National Council for Peace and Order......................…………………………….NCPO
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.... …………………………..NDI
People's Alliance for Democracy ....PAD
Provincial Administration Organization...PAO
People's Democratic Reform Committee ....PDRC
Peaceful Homeland Network ....PHN
Thai Council Chamber of Commerce .... TCCC
National Health Assembly ....NHA
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship ....UDD

ABSTRACT

THE CONDITIONS ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE CONFLICTING PARTIES, THE RED SHIRTS AND THE YELLOW SHIRTS, TO COLLABORATE IN PROMOTING THE CONCEPT OF SELF-GOVERNANCE IN CHIANG MAI, THAILAND, IN 2009-2010

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George Mason University, 2019

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This thesis examines the conditions leading to the collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai, Thailand through what is known as "Peaceful Homeland Network: PHN" during high tension of political color-coded conflict in 2009. The research findings indicate that there were six interrelated conditions which led to the collaboration. First, the third- party intervention proved to be critical for the collaboration. Beyond impartiality, in this case, two third-party insiders who were involved with the political conflict, had played significant roles particularly in initiating the collaboration. Second, a democratic atmosphere encouraged individuals to take part in the collaboration despite security risks. Third, the prolonged conflict had affected the Chiang Mai natives for years which encouraged them to collaborate and end the struggle of conflict. Fourth, the identity and political involvement of specific individuals influenced their decisions whether to collaborate or not. Fifth, the conflicting parties'

willing participation was vital for the collaboration. Finally, the parties realized that they had a shared vision which motivated them to continue their work for PHN on behalf of their constituents. Additionally, by recognizing PHN's effective role in alleviating violent incidents, conflicting parties remained engaged with PHN.

In addition, this thesis investigates why some disputants denied the PHN. The analysis reveals that there were four conditions leading some actors to decline to collaborate. First, some argued that the stakeholder identification process was not inclusive. Second, the timing of the collaboration did not befit some conflicting parties particularly those who were emerging leaders of the conflicting groups. Third, lack of trust was a great concern for some members of the Yellow Shirts including "fear of being labeled from the group as a traitor," a condition which prevented some disputants from taking part in the PHN. Lastly, some believed that another approach would be more effective to deal with the political color-coded conflict.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Thailand has witnessed political color-coded conflict since 2005 which transformed into a violent conflict, particularly in early 2008. However, to the surprise of many, a small group of people in Chiang Mai managed to get together through an innovative approach to resolve the conflict. They were not only able to contain the conflict, but managed it peacefully. In light of this political scenario, the main objective of this thesis is to examine the collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, in Chiang Mai, Thailand, from June, 2009 to December, 2010. That has been done by exploring answers to the following questions: what conditions and incidents stimulated the collaboration? And later, what factors fostered or undermined the collaboration?

This chapter presents the structure of the thesis, the background of the conflict, elaboration of the timeline and overview of the conflict, statement of the problem, the research questions/hypothesis, study's significance, and research methodology.

1. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis contains seven chapters as follows:

Chapter One provides a brief background of the political conflict, statement of the

problem, research questions including research hypothesis, and significance and scope of the study. This chapter also discusses research methodology, in particular, how data were collected and analyzed. It also includes the limitations of conducting the research.

Chapter Two presents the examination of the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts as well as the synthesis for future study. It also provides theoretical frameworks on theories of collaboration which are applied for the research project. Additionally, it also provides synthesis for future study.

Chapter Three presents the research finding and analysis of external conditions that led to the collaboration between the conflicting parties in Chiang Mai.

Chapter Four offers an exploration of the third-parties in terms of their background information, their roles during the collaboration, and the perceptions of the conflicting parties towards them. Discussions on impartiality and neutrality are also provided.

Chapter Five presents individual factors that determined the association or dissociation with the collaboration.

Chapter Six highlights the way forward and factors sustaining or destabilizing the collaboration.

As a part of conclusion, Chapter Seven offers a model for conflict resolution, discussion of better collaboration, and related conflict resolution policies. Also, further studies are discussed.

<h1 style="text-align:center">2. Background of the Political Conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts</h1>

2.1 Timeline of the Major Incidents during the Conflict in Bangkok and Chiang Mai

Several incidents had occurred prior to the PHN formation and its aftermath. This section, chronologically presents the incidents as follows:

2003

February: - Thai Rak Thai won the 2003 general election by landslide. Thaksin Shinawatara, the head of the party, then became the Prime Minister.

2005

September: - "Coalition for People Loving Chiang Mai" was established to examine mega-projects under Thaksin's administration.

- Sonthi Limthongkul, a business man and TV program owner, criticized Thaksin in his show called "Thailand Weekly". As the result, his program was banned from broadcasting. Sonthi started to organize his talk in many different public places. By doing this, he could politicize people to be observant of Thaksin's administration. Later, a great number of people sided with Sonthi and began the rally against Thaksin.

December: - A group of people in Chiang Mai began to question Thaksin's administration.

2006

February: - People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the Yellow Shirts was officially established and announced hosting political activities and demanded Thaksin to resign.

- PAD had the strategy to expand their network by setting up PAD in every province and major cities in the Western countries where Thai people had settled down.

- "Chiang Mai People's Alliance for Democracy" or "the Chiang Mai Yellow Shirts" was formed.

- Democrat Party boycotted the 2006 general election and did not send any candidate to contest election in April, but they still organized political activities in Chiang Mai and nationwide.

April: - Thai Rak Thai party won the April 2006 general election and set up a majority government.

- PAD had constantly held political movements against Thaksin.

September 19th:

- The military junta (Later became the Military's Council for National Security: CNS) carried out the coup and declared martial law to be implemented nationwide. Shortly, CNS appointed an interim government to govern the country.

2007

June 17th: - A group of Chiang Mai business owners gathered and publicly demanded the military government to lift the martial law.

August 19th: - The 2007 Constitutional Referendum was held and the result showed that over 50% of Thai people accepted the draft.

December: - General election took place and People's Power party won the election and Samak Sunthornvej, the head of People's Power party, became the Prime Minister.

2008

March 28th: - PAD began a new rally against Samak, the Prime Minister whom the Yellow Shirts accused as Thaksin's puppet.

August: - "Rak Chiang Mai 51" was established.

September 9th: - Samak was dismissed from the prime-ministership.

September 18th: - Somchai Wongsawas, Thaksin's brother-in-law, became the Prime Minister and the Yellow Shirts resumed their protest against Somchai.

November 24th: - The Yellow Shirts occupied two international airports in Bangkok and several main public transportations such as shutting down railway stations in southern provinces.

November 26th: - Clash between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai caused one death and two injuries.

December: - Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democratic party, became the 27th Prime Minister of Thailand.

2009

April 10-14th: - The Red Shirts began rally against Abhisist's government in Bangkok and main cities including Chiang Mai.

- The Red Shirts in Chiang Mai gathered in the front of the City Hall and demanded Abhisit to resign and called for a new general election.

Early June: - The U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai held the first forum entitled "Public Speaker project" for discussing "Political Transition and the Role of Opposition in a Democracy". The target groups of this forum were members of the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts.

Late July: - Four members from the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts began an initial talk.

August - October: - Several meetings were held to set up the Cross-groups Collaboration.

October 29th: - Peaceful Homeland Coalition (PHC) was revealed to public.

2010

Early of March: - "Coalition for Peaceful Homeland (CPH) changed their name to "Peaceful Homeland Network (PHN)".

Mid May: - Black May Riots erupted in Bangkok and several main cities in Thailand including Chiang Mai.

June: - The U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai hosted the second forum entitled "Public Speaker project" discussing "Rules of Law and Conflict Resolution".

2.2 Understanding the Conflicting Parties and their Issues

The conflict that manifested in 2005 has been ongoing and it involved several parties and issues. This section aims to give succinct background of the conflict so that it can be analyzed precisely and readers have adequate understanding of the conflict. To provide the background of the conflict, Dennis Sandole's Three Pillars Framework is utilized to map the parties in Thai political conflict known as the "Red Shirts" and the "Yellow Shirts" conflict. In this section, the pillar I conflict elements were employed to understand the parties and issues.

The question "Who are the parties?" is a critical step in mapping the conflict because misidentifying and/or non-inclusion of the parties can cause failure of the conflict intervention. Sandole (1998) has explained that parties can be individuals, groups, organizations, societies, and/or regions. In this research, parties are divided into two categories: direct parties which are based on the membership of the colors of the shirts-the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts-, and indirect parties. As for issues, Sandole explains that "issues are what parties claim to be in conflict and fight about" (1998). Within each category, the subgroups have been distinguished as state, business, and civil society including their issues.

2.2.1 Direct Parties

The Yellow Shirts. Originally, the conflict manifested due to the clash of interest between Thaksin and Sonthi. In September 2005, Sonthi began a public campaign to reveal the dark side of Thaksin and his policies. While, Sonthi enlightened the people through public speeches, the network of civil society organizations began investigating

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and criticizing Thaksin's policies since he came into power in 2001 (Pye & Wolfram, 2008). The Network of civil society decided to cooperate with Sonthi in organizing protests against Thaksin and with that purpose, on February 5th 2006, established protestors' coalition titled the "People's Alliance for Democracy: PAD" (Wankulam, 2010). The compositions of the Yellow Shirts can be classified as follows:

(1) State

Somkiet Pongpaiboon, a parliament representative and a member of the Democrat party, was one of the Yellow Shirts' leaders. Other members of the party had supported the movement since 2005. However, the Democrat Party had some incompatible policies and the Yellow Shirts' leaders were prohibited by law in mobilizing mass protests. Hence, the Party formed another network called the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). PDRC has been rallying against Yingluck Shinawatara's government since November 2013.

(2) Business

Sonthi, one of the Yellow Shirts' leaders, was a businessman. He began criticizing Thaksin due to his personal conflict related to the business. Various businessmen ranging from small business owners, medium-size investment companies, and Thai corporations became member of the Yellow Shirts. These business owners shared similar grievances with Thaksin's policies.

(3) Civil Society

Pipop Thongchai, a representative of NGOs, was one of the Yellow Shirts' leaders. He joined because several NGOs met and agreed to be a part of the Yellow

Shirts. Major General Jamlong Srimueng, a retired army officer and a former well-known politician, was one of the Yellow Shirts' leaders. His close relationship with Potirak, a respected conservative monk, encouraged the network of monk and disciples to join and became a fundamental mass of Yellow Shirts. Similarly, Somsak Gosaisuk, the president of Thai Railway Labor Union, one of the Yellow Shirts' leaders, closely engaged with the movement as a representative of the labor network.

Additional members of the Yellow Shirts were youths, university students, high to middle ranking government officers, retired officers, the royal family relatives, university lecturers, and private officers.

The Yellow Shirts' Issues. There were four main issues that the yellow raised against Thaksin as:

(1) Political Issues

a. Political Corruption and Transparency: The Yellow Shirts claimed that Thaksin and his network had corrupt policies and mega-projects, and launched policies that only benefited them.

b. Inefficiency of Checks and Balance System: Under Thaksin, the parliament and independent entities such as Constitutional Court, Anti- Corruption Committee, and Electorate Committee could not investigate the government management.

c. Unfair Election and Majority of the Red Shirts were "stupid": The Yellow Shirts claimed that Thaksin and Yingluck won elections because of vote buying. They believed that the Red Shirts were stupid, poor, with a herd mentality, so they voted

for Thaksin. To stop this cycle, the Yellow Shirts agreed that there should be appointed representatives and senators. Admittedly, vote buying existed, but it is not a significant factor in vote decision-making. This claim indicated data/belief and value issues.

(2) Abusing power and violating human's right and freedom: The Yellow Shirts claimed that Thaksin controlled the press and did not allow the press to criticize his government. The public was not allowed to investigate several violent acts, including conflict in the South. This was a realistic and relationship issue.

(3) Thaksin was a threat to the Monarchy: This claim was used to induce conflict mobilizing greater number of people.

(4) Mistake in the management of socio-economic policies: Thaksin and Yingluck's policies pushed the country towards long-term debt, they lacked financial discipline, and country's products were uncompetitive both in the domestic and international markets, but the Red Shirts believed that the populist policies benefited them. This fact illustrated their conflict in data, value, and interests.

The Red Shirts. Thaksin was overthrown by the coup, but later his political parties, Thai Rak Thai and People's Power, won the elections by a landslide but faced political rallies. Therefore, his supporters organized the mass movement, the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD or the "Red Shirts") (Chiangsan, 2011). Sporadically, the Red Shirts also politically protested against the PAD. Within the Red Shirts, there were subgroups as follow:

(1) State

Thaksin and the Red Shirts' leaders were politicians who possessed strong

power in government. Thaksin, Somchai, and Yingluck were the former Thai Prime Ministers. Thai Rak Thai was a political party that had been formed and managed by Thaksin. Moreover, his family was part of the Red Shirts.

(2) Business

They had mutual interests with Thaksin and also became members of the Red Shirts and supported the political activities. Several were small business owners.

(3) Civil Society

Several NGOs working particularly with northern and northeast regions became Red Shirts. The majority of the Red Shirts were ordinary people working as laborers, informal laborers, and farmers. Several of them were low-ranked government officers.

The Red Shirt's Issues are as follow:

(1) Political Issue

a. The elections through which the leaders Thaksin, Samank, Somchai, and Yingluck got elected were conducted democratically. Therefore, these leaders were politically legitimate. It was unfair that they were exiled by the coup. As legitimate leaders were ousted unfairly, it encouraged the conflict.

b. Unequal treatment under the Constitution and laws or Double-standard: The Red Shirts claimed that they were treated as second-class citizens and when they did something wrong, they were more rigidly punished than the Yellow Shirts. This is a realistic, structural, and relationship issue.

c. The 2007 Constitution was undemocratic because it was a result of the coup. The Red Shirts saw that the Constitution deprived their right and failed to recognize equality under constitution and laws.

(2) Security in life: They felt that Thaksin's populism policies had tangible benefits. Their claims had some base as the health and village fund policies created improved sense of social security for them.

(3) Being frustrated with the insult that they were labeled by the Yellow Shirts as "stupid, poor, and a pain" (Lueangaramsri, Archamas, Kitnukule, & Siriphol, 2012).

2.2.2 Indirect Parties

Indirect Parties were those who did not have stake in the conflict, but were concerned about its impact. They were willing to provide assistance to resolve the conflict. The following were the indirect parties and their issues.

(1) State

The Royal Thai Army: The Army vowed to play a constructive role in resolving the conflict. They would accept whichever party wins the election.

The Army felt that 1) the Monarchy was disgraced by conflicting parties who criticized the Monarchy and the Royal Family; 2) the conflict was a potential threat to the unity, order, and stability of the state; and 3) politics influenced military affairs. Their objective was to simply maintain the status quo of the Monarchy and the Army institution itself, as the King's guard and professional army (Baker & Pongpaichit, 2014, p.270-277).

(2) Business

The Alliance of Thai Commerce, Industry, and Banking Association: They had experienced negative impacts from the conflict. Their issues were 1) they required social stability to enhance economic activities; 2) they needed security so that their property could be protected from the damage inflicted by the violent conflict; and 3) they required political transparency bringing an end for the need to pay high amount of money to bribe the politicians.

(3) Civil society

The Student and People Network for Thailand's Reform was a network working on energy issues and government transparency for natural resources policy. Their issues were 1) socio-economic policy, especially energy and natural resources policies. In their views, the resource was unequally accessible; and 2) the political structure in place had led to corruption and capital politics.

3. Statement of the Problem

Between 2005 and 2011, Thailand had witnessed political uprising particularly in major cities of Thailand. Bangkok was a strategic place for political turmoil: the uprising of the Yellow Shirts in 2007 and 2008 against the government from Thaksin's political party, and particularly the violent protests and suppressions in April, 2009, and Black May 2010, when the Red Shirts rallied against Abhisit's administration. Violence emerged in Bangkok and several provinces. Over a hundred of people were killed, a lot were wounded, and business centers were destroyed (TRC, 2012).

Military, the academia, and the civil society had tried to intervene, but violence, conflict escalation, and coup d'état periodically occurred. Amidst this political context, the Thai people polarized into two main groups: the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts (Tajapira, 2010). Although violence was not seen in all parts of the country, political division among the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts spread all over the country. Normally, according to the Thai tradition, Thai people usually wear yellow on Monday and red on Sunday. Once people were mobilized to take political preferences, these two colors were no longer worn particularly from 2008 to 2011, as people were afraid to be attacked by the opposite side (Prachathai, 2008). Moreover, the conflict also penetrated into the family level. News from social media, newspapers, and the television showed that several husbands and wives had disputes in relation to the political issues. Consequently, several couples, and even their children and parents, faced a grave challenge in maintaining relationships amidst adverse political views (Amnuaypatatnapon, K, Wiboonponprasert, A., & Atikasawejparit, P., 2008; Suwannapho, M., Panyayong, B., & Suraaroonsamrit, B., 2012). In addition, a tight Muslim community such as in Chiang Mai was also divided into two colored camps (S. Chumsai, personal communication, June 15, 2012). Apparently, the Thai society across the country became part of the clash of different political colors.

While the conflict escalated across the country, especially in 2009 and 2010, in Chiang Mai, a small group of people including members of conflicting parties gathered and started a collaboration called "Peaceful Homeland Network: PHN." The collaboration tried to create a forum where people could come and discuss ways to

manage the conflict and return peace to their hometown. With their effort, some anticipated violent incidents were subsided. They had relentlessly attempted to put forward the concept of "Chiang Mai Self-Governing" and gradually approached the conflicting parties and the residents of Chiang Mai to be part of this effort. In the midst of this effort, political tensions resurfaced in Bangkok and also exacerbated the tensions in Chiang Mai. However, the undeterred group continued their collaboration. The Peaceful Homeland Network emerged from people's strong will to seek a resolution for their hometown conflict. As a result, the concept of Peaceful Homeland Network which was initiated in Chiang Mai has been spread to forty-five provinces.

4. Research Questions and Hypothesis

As the conflict continued and escalated repeatedly after April, 2009, in Bangkok, Chiang Mai also experienced high tensions as great number of Red Shirts from Chiang Mai went to join the protests in Bangkok, but were defeated (Pawakapan, 2011). At the same time, there were external factors that stimulated the Red Shirts to express their anger and hatred. Interestingly, the collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts emerged to alleviate the intense situation in November, 2009 in Chiang Mai. Together they proposed an alternative approach to solve the conflict. While the political conflict at the national level was ongoing, local people were able to work together to reduce violence and later promote the concept of Chiang Mai self-governing. The collaboration gradually progressed in engaging people from different groups to resolve the conflict.

This thesis paper aimed to explore how such local mechanism could promote shared vision of Chiang Mai Self-governing and convince adverse parties to the national level conflict in resolving political conflict locally. Although tensions were manifested at certain periods, this local collaboration seemed sustainable, and suggested concrete policies. To explain this phenomenon, the research question was set up as follows:

What conditions had enabled members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts to collaborate in promoting the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing since July, 2009?

The research question also investigated: a) conditions including political, social-economic, and social-cultural issues, beliefs, values, the third party, and incentives encouraging and underpinning the collaboration; b) collaborative members' and non-members' degree of being the Red Shirts/the Yellow Shirts, and their background and roles within the groups; and c) Organizational structure and management, and the collaborative process that underpinned or destabilized the collaboration.

To answer these questions, the unit of analysis is individuals, members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts who initiated and actively engaged in the collaboration, and those who declined to participate in the collaborative process, whereas groups and inter-groups would be the level of analysis.

Borrowing references from theories of collaboration and causes and conditions of conflict, I developed four hypotheses. To begin with the first one, as the collaboration emerged during the conflict had escalated and there was high level of distrust, I hypothesized that there might be a third party to bring the conflicting parties together. The second hypothesis was that the members of the conflicting parties who engaged in

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the process should be moderate Red and Yellow, not extreme or radical ones. Next, changing approach from contending to collaboration requires the turning point which catalyzed the conflicting parties to collaborate. It is therefore assumed that the turning point should be a horrendous loss that the natives could not bear as the consequences of the conflict and found more constructive approach. Lastly, in order to collaborate, the parties must have realized the interdependent goals and/or have shared vision. Without collaboration from one another, their goals shall not be accomplished.

5. Significance of the Study

The research aimed to achieve three interrelated goals:

1) to have an academic record on important constructive incident on the collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai. By doing so, it is strongly believed that the research would be a resource for other researchers/individuals to utilize, develop, and look into different aspects of collaboration. In addition, it will open room for further study,

2) to fill in the gap in the existing literatures by exploring what conditions enabled members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts to work together at the local level; and

3) to verify how well the conflict resolution theories explain this phenomenon in the Thai culture.

In addition, the research findings are expected to be useful in understanding the collaboration by exploring roles and possible outcomes of the collaborative process, including the way in which it can be addressed, and the complexities of the current political conflict in Thailand. In addition, the findings allow parties to see possibilities to

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improve their collaboration. Beyond providing the research to the actors who are part of the collaboration, the plan is to present the research to the scholar community, civil society, and the government so that they can learn from the collaboration among local people: particularly the government will have an opportunity to review the current conflict resolution practices.

The researcher believes that the lessons learned from the collaboration model in Chiang Mai could form a basis for the Thai society to develop an alternative path to foster collaboration among conflicting groups, and to construct a more peaceful society.

6. Research Methodology

In conducting exploratory research on the collaboration among the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai province, Thailand, the thesis draws upon primary data obtained through in-depth interviews from both members of the "Red Shirts" and the "Yellow Shirts." who initiated the collaboration among conflicting parties, including with those who declined to engage with cross-groups collaboration. There are few researches on the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai, particularly the research questions presented in Section Four has never been examined, therefore data collection greatly relies on interviews. In this context, grounded theory is considered as the most suitable research methodology.

Grounded theory is a research method that enables researchers to "generate or discover a theory from data systematically obtained from social research" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.2). However, the method was developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 and it has been modified overtime. Roughly, three distinct perspectives of grounded

theory are 1) Barney Glaser, 2) Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, and 3) Kathy Charmaz. The researcher selected Strauss and Corbin's version of grounded theory as a systemic methodology, yet flexible for pre-existing knowledge to influence the study. Due to applying literatures on collaboration between conflicting parties as theoretical framework, the researcher entered into the field research with some hypothesis. In addition, data collection based on the interviews inevitably raises questions on the reliability and possible distortion of the information. Hence, Strauss and Corbin's perspective can help minimize personal influence but maximize objectivity. Equally important is that the perspective suits to explore the local phenomenon in Thailand.

While conducting the research, the researcher realizes that privacy and confidentiality are critical issues. Therefore, the researcher strictly follows the research ethical guidelines. To maintain privacy and confidentiality, in this research the interviewees' identities are protected by changing their names into pseudonyms which are completely different from the real one. By doing this, the participants' identities remain confidential.

6.1 Population and Sampling

6.1.1 Population. The research aims to examine the conditions that enabled the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts to work together in promoting Chiang Mai Self-Governing, and the reasons why some members from both the camps declined to collaborate. Therefore, the target populations are persons who are member of the collaborative process called "Peaceful Homeland Network (PHN)", and non-members of the collaboration. The criterion for the first target groups is being a member of the PHN.

As for the second group, the criteria is slightly different because there are people from other provinces who came and temporally settled in Chiang Mai. These people, therefore, may not share Chiang Mai's traditional way of life. Thus, regardless of sex, occupation, religion, and ethnic background, generally a criterion for qualified target participants must be Chiang Mai natives who were born and raised, and currently resided in Chiang Mai. Another important criterion is that potential participants have to identify themselves as the members of particular color-coded groups who did not take part in the collaboration. The researcher expected to interview at least three members of each political color-coded group.

6.1.2 Sampling. To begin with the sampling of the members of the PHN, the total number of the PHN's members according to the minute of collaboration is seventeen persons. Fifteen of them are Chiang Mai natives, and two members are Lampoon natives. As the number of population is small, to capture more holistic phenomenon, the researcher aimed to interview all of them. As a result, sampling was not applied for selecting the first target group.

As for the second group, the number of non-members of the collaborative process was huge. Besides, political constraint was a major concern as the potential research participants may have denied to discuss their political views with strangers. Hence, the researcher had to apply convenience sampling for identifying the research participants. Since, that data was collected in the context of an unstable political situation, the researcher needed assistance from the members of the PHN to make a reference to people who denied being the part of the collaboration.

6.2 Data Collection

As indicated in the literature review, the research questions have never been studied, hence, as indicated above, the exploratory research extracted primary data from in-depth interviews.

6.2.1 Interview

In this research project, data have been collected from in-depth interviews and documents such as minutes, statements, newspapers, scholarly papers, and other forms of documents related to the collaborative process between the members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. As the in-depth interviews are the primary source of the data, grounded theory required rich and systemic collection. After the completion of each interview, initial data analysis was conducted helping the researcher to decide what other kinds of data were needed to make research comprehensive.

In this research project, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted between June 12th - August 5th, 2014. Each interview lasted approximately from two to three hours. After initial data analysis, follow-up interviews were carried out with some informants which approximately took one to two hours. The main research sites were mostly in Chiang Mai. However, some participants preferred to be interviewed in Bangkok, Thailand as it was convenient for them.

(a) Research Participants

The interviews started with names on the PHN's minutes which the president of the PHN provided to the researcher, and then the interviewees were contacted by phone and given an appointment for an interview. On the interview day, all related documents

including research proposals, consent forms, and school letters were presented to the participants. The interviews were carried out only after explaining and discussing the interview procedure and their concerns regarding research participation including a right to decline the request for interview. Thirty-four research participants were interviewed including the members of PHN, declining collaborative people, and the third-party.

(b) Interview Questions

In-depth interviews focused on six sets of questions. The first set of questions deals with the participants' personal backgrounds, occupation, life experiences, and their concerns for the country and its next generation's future. The second set concentrated on their political identity, and involvement, their role and relationship within the group, and perception of themselves and members of other groups. This set of question aimed to explore the degree of being a member of particular group's member, roles and relationship within their own group. Incidents encouraging members of the Red Shirts, Yellow Shirts, and people in Chiang Mai to begin the collaborative process and reasons to collaborate or to decline participation in the process were the core of the third question set. The next set of question focused on understanding about causes and condition of the conflict and their interpretation of common visions among different parties. The fifth set aimed at exploring their perception on the roles of third parties and their interpretation. The sixth set looked at their views and expectation towards the collaborative process including the legitimacy and efficiency of the collaboration as well as recommendations for bridging the divided society.

6.2.2 Document Data

Government reports, minutes, letters, and statements related to the "Red Shirts",
the "Yellow Shirts", and the collaborative activities in Chiang Mai Province were
collected. Similarly, news media such as websites, newspapers, local newspapers, local
radio stations; and scholarly papers and experts' opinions related to the conflicting parties
and the political conflict in Chiang Mai were also collected and utilized for the research.

6.3 Data Analysis

Data analysis in this research aims to explore the conditions encouraging the
collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, specific circumstances
preventing some members from participating in the collaboration, and relationships
between political attitudes and collaboration of these conflicting parties.

Since the first round of interviews were conducted from June, 12th to 15th, 2014,
they were transcribed first. All of them were from the first round interview whose initial
data analysis helped the researcher to decide what data should be collected further. All
interviews were analyzed according to Strauss and Corbin's grounded theory version.

Upon transcribing interviews, data analysis started with open coding. According
to Strauss and Corbin, open coding is a process of breaking, examining, comparing,
conceptualizing, and categorizing data. While doing open coding, the researcher used two
analytical processes, which involved making a comparison and asking questions. Next,
after labeling the raw data, they were analyzed and grouped into concepts around the
fractured data and looked for categories. Upon the completion of this process, properties
and dimensions of categories, patterns, and trends were identified. Lastly, code notes

were written, which were useful in finding gaps, deciding what data needed to be collected further, and building initial concepts.

The second step, axial coding is a key of data analysis process because all fractured data are put back together in new ways after open coding particularly, by making connections between categories" (p. 96). Since putting data back together is complicated, the coding paradigm discussed by Strauss and Corbin was helpful for the data analysis (p.27). Coding Paradigm have four components namely, conditions, interaction among the actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences, which can be used explicitly or implicitly to structure the data and to clarify relations between codes. This coding paradigm can be especially helpful during axial coding which "consists of intense analysis done around one category (p.32-34)". In the book titled Basics of Qualitative Research, Strauss and Corbin (1990) explain how to use coding paradigm to connect subcategories and components of phenomenon during axial coding phase (p.96-115). Later, Strauss also has advanced the conditional matrix as another analytic aid that sensitizes researcher to explore diversity of conditions and consequences surrounding interactions from individual to national context.

Lastly, selective coding is "a process of integrating and refining the theory by selecting the core categories systemically related to other core categories" (p. 143). In this phase, the researcher is responsible for integrating the data around a central theme, hypothesis, or story to generate a theory. Briefly, the integration requires researchers to commit to a story line in which they have to start with to identify the essence of the story, and then conceptualize the list of categories of the story line so that they can select main

abstracts that encompass the whole story. Once the core phenomenon is identified, the properties and the dimension of the core are determined, and then the next step is to relate the other categories to it as well as connect other categories to the core categories. After relating them together, analysts have to validate relationships and lay out a theory. Selective coding is similar to axial coding, in which the categories are developed in terms of their properties, dimensions, and relationships, but the integration occurs at more abstract level of analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Since grounded theory is used as research methodology, after completing interviews of at least two participants, transcribing the recorded conversations began along with notes. Next, initial data analysis process started by open coding and then regrouped the fractured data according to recurring categories and concepts. The first round of open coding assisted the researcher to organize and simply identify which parts of data answers to which question. After comparing data, gaps between the lines, time frame, and incidents emerged. This is also helpful to adjust the interview questions according to findings in the first round of interviews as well as to guide who should be interviewed further. Likewise, document data collection is analyzed by the three phases of Strauss and Corbin grounded theory. Again, in this research, pseudonyms have been used throughout the thesis to maintain participants' confidentiality and anonymity.

Since the paper is quite lengthy and to provide the details of data analysis in all chapters would make my thesis go much beyond the page-limit, some examples of how I analyzed the data with open coding, axial coding, and selective coding are presented in the following table.

Table 1.1 Examples of Data Analysis: Third-Party Intervention

Open Coding	Axial Coding	Selective Coding
-…the U.S. has <u>bias</u>. -…the U.S. <u>did not take sides</u>. -…I felt that he is <u>sincere</u>… -...Arun is <u>nice and impartial</u>. -…I <u>trust</u> him that he would <u>do with good intention</u>. -…He <u>never says</u> he supports Thaksin or Phua Thai Party. -…He has <u>good intention to intervene the conflict</u>. -I have <u>known him since I was very young</u>. -…He and I are <u>friends</u>. - …He is <u>open-minded</u> to <u>listen to the Red Shirts</u>.	Behaviors vs. Personal thoughts, Mind/Intention, Political views Neutral Characteristics Past Experiences Social Values, Decency, Credibility Friendship Trust Impartiality Having an interest in the conflict	Impartiality seems more necessary than neutrality in this context. It also shows that trust and friendship can substitute neutrality. Trust and Trustbuilding Social Status/Values/ Influence on Third-Party's Credibility Having prior relationship between the conflictants and third-party matters. Insider and impartial are required features for the third-party in this case.

6.4 Limitations

While conducting the interviews, the researcher faced three main difficulties.

First, the unfolding political circumstances marred with the coup made it challenging.

Several potential research participants were afraid to be interviewed as they knew the

researcher. Besides, they suspected that the researcher was working for the military junta

and disguised as a researcher to take in-depth information from them. The researcher had

faced these challenges during early June when she decided to go to Chiang Mai to

establish relationships with research participants prior to the interview. Fortunately,

relationships with some key members of the collaboration went well, after they found that the researcher was a master student working independently from the military and government. As a result, skeptical participants allowed the researcher to interview them. Researcher's identity as a government officer working for the Ministry of Interior, was perceived as an obstacle. Some were afraid to provide in-depth data; many questions were not answered. Conversely, some participants were willing to frankly share their stories as they perceived that the researcher was honest and believed that the research would be useful lesson learned for the society.

Second, the coup not only made it challenging to carry out the research but its main objective to dissect the "colored" politics, added additional difficulties. The military ordered these politicians, political figures and leaders (both from national and local levels) of both the Red and Yellow camps to summons and detained them in the military camp. Therefore, in Chiang Mai which is considered as a base of the Red Shirts movement, several leaders of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts leaders could not be reached during the first month when the researcher was conducting the field research. As many prominent political leaders have been watched by the military, they refused to give an interview after reviewing the research questions. Though several of them agreed to give an interview, they avoided answering some sensitive questions regarding their political identities, monarchy, and current political issues.

Lastly, the research relied heavily on oral history and participants' memories, so many incidents and details, which were inaccurate, were excluded. This is because the collaborative process had started since mid-2009 and there have been no official records

or documents about the collaboration at the early stages. Most of the research participants could not identify precisely about the time line and relevant incidents. After reexamining, the researcher had to select concurrent data and then analyzed it. Therefore, the research may have incomplete aspects or explanations of the collaboration, which is opened for further study.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

This chapter has two main purposes. Firstly, it aims to examine research done on the political color-coded conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirt so that the researcher can elucidate the gap in the literature and utilize its relevant findings/analysis for the research. The result reveals that several aspects of those researches can be useful and developed into further argument. Additionally, it confirms that there is no previous study on the collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai. This is presented in the first section of the chapter two. Secondly, it aims to review and discuss the theoretical framework - mostly the theories on collaboration - which are applied to explain the origin and dynamics of collaboration between the two conflicting parties - the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts - in promoting self-governing in Chiang Mai as well as to verify its worthiness in a different cultural context.

2.1. Research on the Red Shirts –Yellow Shirts Conflict

Protracted political conflict has erupted since 2005 and still ongoing. Therefore, studies related to the conflict needed to be examined. Based on existing studies related to those conflicting parties and reconciliation process as well as relevant theories of conflict, the studies can be categorized into three groups: 1) causes and condition of the conflict,

2) identification of who the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts are; and 3) Resolution of the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts.

2.1.1. Studies on Causes and Conditions of the Conflict

The literatures on the causes and conditions of the Thai political color-coded conflict have two main approaches: structure and elite dominance, and masses as agents. Both schools of thoughts agree that the deep root causes of the conflict are social inequality wherein underprivileged group of people are deprived of some basic political rights and are unequally treated within the framework of liberal capitalism, an economic model that benefits some groups, but deprives other groups. However, there are controversial arguments on the dominant roles of conflicting leaders and ordinary people who acted as agents in the conflict. This will be discussed further.

Structure and Elite Dominance Approach. To start with the first group, Tejapira's study on "War between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts (2010)" which investigates the conflict from class analysis and political-economic perspective, illustrates that the phenomenon of the political color-coded conflict is a result of the clash of elites. By applying class conflict theory to explain the conflict, Tejapira explains that the Red Shirts movement is an alliance of the new elites (Tycoon Thaksin and his network) with rural peasants, and urbanized poor people. On the contrary, the Yellow Shirts is the alliance between the old elites, established middle class residing in cities and their client groups. The primary cause of conflict is the state's incompetency in regulating the socioeconomic-political structure to create equal opportunity for the Thai people. He also points out that Thaksin populism policies are meaningful to the poor and this led a great

number of them to become Thaksin's supporters. Thaksin had absolute power in his

administration, and the check and balance was ineffective which led the Yellow Shirts to

feel frustrated and demand Thaksin to resign. However, Thaksin gained strong support

from the Red Shirts and won the 2006 election. Consequently, the Yellow Shirts had to

seek alternative solution beyond general election to remove Thaksin and his influence out

of the politics. That is why the Yellow Shirts denied election in which the Red Shirts

could not accept as it is not only their rights, but also a mean to express their existence in

this society.

Similarly, Hewison (2008) explains the rise of the Yellow Shirts as the clash of

elites within the ruling-class that led to a royalist campaign. The campaign projected

Thaksin a threat to the economy, and the ideological (hearts and minds of the mass) and

political interests of the royalist and conservative elites. (p. 205-207). In the same

manner, Nelson (2011) argues that the Red Shirts see the coup of 2006 as the main cause

of conflict. As the military has been attempting to limit Thaksin's power and supporting

the Democratic Party to be the government, the Red Shirts will protest against them until

the opposition politicians come to power. For the Red Shirts, their political and security

needs are threatened and suppressed by the coup.

Phongpaichit & Baker (2008) explain that Thaksin's populism policy gained

tremendous support from a mass of people who needed social security welfare. On the

other hand, established middle class and elites did not agree with these policies since they

considered that the populism policies rather caused negative long-term outcomes and

they did not gain benefits from these policies. This provoked the middle class to join the

Yellow Shirts movement. They viewed that it threatened the ability of key sections of the middle class to influence politics – businessmen through money, bureaucrats through position and tradition, and media and intellectuals through command of public space (p.77-81). Pye & Schaffar (2008), in "the 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: An analysis" argue that conflict was not simply one between a pro-poor, populist premier supported by the mass of the rural poor against an urban, royalist elite. Instead, the authors argue that the anti-Thaksin movement was rooted in the contradictory nature of Thaksin's project itself, which combined populist programs with a deeper restructuring of Thai capitalism. Inherent contradictions explain the dynamics involved in the emergence of the Yellows Shirts (p.39).

These studies provide the analyses of political and socio-economic structure which strongly tied with basic human needs, as root causes of the conflict. However, these analyses are concentrated on the roles of two competing elite groups by explaining that even the leaders of both groups have strong mass support, mostly masses of both the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts are mobilized in order to strive for elites' interests. In other words, the literature of this school provides the explanation that though the masses of two conflicting groups constantly participate in political activities, the main factor determining demanding issues, strategies, when and where to mobilize, even stopping political unrests depends on the elites' decisions (leaders of both groups).

Masses Act as Agents Approach. This school argues that the first approach especially the works of Tejapira ignores the roles and political determination of ordinary people by concluding that elites are dominant. Therefore, the Red Shirts, the Yellow

Shirts movement at individual level were examined based on the question that how the movements emerged and mobilized.

Regarding the Red Shirts movement, Thabchumpon & Duncan (2012) illustrate reasons of the Red Shirts' uprising during 2010 in "Urbanized Villagers in the 2010 Thai Redshirt Protests" by examining social status, life conditions, and expectations of protesters. They analyze the relationship between leaders within the group, ideology of each leader and strategies in mobilizing mass protest.

As for the Yellow Shirts movement, in "Political Roles of the Thai Middle Class in People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) under Thaksin Regime" (2010), Wankulam explains that the legitimacy crisis under Thaksin's premiership, during 2001-2006 led to the emergence of the Yellow Shirts' movement. She applies Erick Olin Wright's neo-class theory as theoretical framework to explore the middle class in Thai politics and to discuss how they gathered against Thaksin. She finds that the impact of Thaksin's policies on the interests of many people is the main factor driving people to take collective action on demanding Thaksin to step down. Analyzing the conflict through class struggle, the author states that middle class people who were negatively impacted by Thaksin's administration were likely to become members of the Yellow Shirts' movement. Her paper also explains the role and social status of the Yellow Shirts and how the leaders mobilized resources to sustain the protest. Overall, the research is useful for the research thesis because it provides evidence-based analysis of the Yellow Shirts within a big picture and also illuminates the importance of political positions, values, interests, as well as the social status of the Yellow Shirts leaders.

2.1.2. Studies on Identification of the Conflicting Parties

Roughly, these political members are distinguished by the color of their clothes, some sets of ideas, and political activities. However, there is no adequate explanation of their socioeconomic backgrounds, political thoughts/ideologies, and their understandings including their roles in the conflict. This results in the misunderstanding surrounded to both the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. The Red Shirts, for instance, are portrayed as poor and naive. Hence, they went to protest because they were hired from Thaksin. Similarly, the Yellow Shirts are seen as middle class or upper class who despise Thaksin protesters. Consequently, Thai scholars initiated a research project to examine "who are the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts?"

One branch of this project, Sathiramai (2012) studied thirteen groups of the Red Shirts who resided in Chiang Mai, Prachinburi, Sra Keaw, Ubolratchathani, and Nakorn Srithammarat. As per geography, Chiang Mai is located in the northern part while Prachinburi and Sra Keaw are in the eastern part of Thailand. Ubolratchathani is in the north-east whereas Nakorn Srithammarat is in the south. These provinces had high proportion vote for Thaksin except Nakorn Srithammarat. He also studied two groups of the Yellow Shirts who lived in Lampoon which is located near Chiang Mai and Bangkok. Based on the result of an in-depth focus group discussion, Sathiramai categorizes the Red Shirts into three types based on their political ideology and personal appreciation of Thaksin. The first type is the Red Shirts who admire Thaksin and benefit from the populism policy. The second type is the Liberal Reds who are admirers of Thaksin's policies, but uphold election as a critical component of democracy. The third group is

called the Republic Reds who are similar to the second group, but deny the constitutional monarchy under a parliamentary system. As per the Yellow Shirts, Sathiramai found that two common traits of the Yellow Shirts: they are loyal to the King and despise Thaksin. According to his study, the Yellow Shirts can be classified into two types: the middle-class Yellow Shirts and the ordinary Yellow Shirts who work in agricultural sector but dislike Thaksin.

Similarly, Manachotepong (2012) conducted a survey research project to investigate who the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts are. The target groups who responded to the questionnaires were residents of Bangkok, Ayutthaya, Pissanulok, Udornthani, and Nakorn Srithammarat. Both Bangkok and Ayutthaya are in the central part of the country. Pissanulok is a province located in the north whereas Udonthani is in the northeast. She found that political attitudes, occupation, governmental policies, educational level, and understanding about social welfare are the determining factors that account for being the Red Shirts' and Yellow Shirts. Her study reveals that there are at least four different subgroups of the Red Shirts whereas there are three subgroups of the Yellow Shirts.

Both studies reveal that the Red Shirts are not united as one: they have diverse backgrounds in age, occupation, and class. In addition, the Red Shirts' members are not only the poor, but also middle class and some of them are wealthy people. However, the researchers acknowledge that though members of the Red Shirts are a mix of low, middle, and upper classes, the majority of them are much more underprivileged in terms

of opportunities in good education, healthcare services, life security, and stable jobs, compared to the Yellow Shirts.

While Manachotepong conducted a survey and analyzed the findings to explain a whole picture of the members of the two conflicting parties at national scale, Lueangaramsri, Archamas, Kitnukule, & Siriphol (2012) did a focus study on the Red Shirts groups in Chiang Mai. When comparing their findings to other studies, Lueangaramsri et al. (2012) found that the work of Tejapira and Pongpaichit & Baker greatly concentrated on the roles of elites and economic-based approach. They argue that these influential studies point out that the fraction between the old elite (old establishment upper class) and the new (emerging upper class from economic tycoon) is major conflict driver. In order to strife power, the elites have to cooperate with their allies and draw the mass as a mean to achieve their goals. In this sense, Lueangaramsri et al. consider that these explanations devalue the ordinary people's experiences that cultivate the Red Shirts to act as agent in the conflict.

Lueangaramsri et al. agree with Tejapira and Eiawsriwong that elites have strong influences in Thai political economy and economic changes in the countryside are the main factors driving people to have a high level of political awareness. However, they argue that the Red Shirts as agents who desired to take part in the political movement is left out in current studies. Lueangaramsri points out that local media like radio and the red television channels are channels for local people to connect to the outside world (Outside Chiang Mai and even Thailand). Moreover, past experiences in the struggle with huge agricultural industries on environmental issues for their well-being encouraged

people to be active citizens involved in political engagement. They also found that the

onset of the Red Shirts movement in Chiang Mai emerged from the middle class living in

the center of Chiang Mai.

The research-projects have great value to provide important aspects of the Red

Shirts, but the studies are limited in particular groups which are demographically discrete

and distinct from other groups. Further studies on other factors at individual level such as

a process and dynamic of becoming a member of particular group, is vital to explain the

conflict. Questions in terms of geography should be examined. For instance, how people

in different parts of the country become Red Shirts? What are the differences/similarities

between the Red Shirts who are from south and the northeast?

2.1.3. Studies on Resolution of the Political Conflict

Since, the conflict has lasted for many years, several stakeholders: government

representatives, academics, and civil society have been trying to handle the conflict.

Hence, it is important to explore how the conflict has been managed/resolved by who and

how. After examining, I find that there are some studies on resolution that propose

recommendation to handle the conflict.

Apart from conflict management by security officers and a regular justice system,

the King Prajadhipok's Institute's Research Project on National Reconciliation addresses

the key concept of reconciliation and analyzes the case studies of countries whose peace

processes were accomplished in transforming conflicts. The history of political regimes is

provided along with the analyses of the causes of conflict. The researchers gathered

public opinion on the appropriate ways to pursue reconciliation, but the interviewees did

not include the conflicting parties or people who suffered from the conflict.

In the aftermath of the Black May, 2010, Abhisit's government issued the

regulation of the office of Minister on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of

Thailand (2010) to be responsible for seeking truth and proposing recommendation

regarding the political color-coded conflict. The committee consists of nine persons who

were considered as credible. For instance, Mr. Kanit Na Nakorn, the chair committee, is a

former attorney general. He also served as a dean of law faculty at Thammasart

university and deputy-party leader of Thai Rak Thai party. Mr. Kittipong Kityarak, a

former permanent secretary for the ministry of justice, was one of the committees. Within

the designated time frame of two -year operation starting from 17 July 2010 - 16 July

2012, the committee invited stakeholders and carried in-depth interviews in order to

reveal the truth, analyze the root causes of the conflict, and examine what had happened

throughout the upheavals in Bangkok and main cities related to the conflict. Additionally,

the committee invited key figures such as Kofi Anan to observe the process and advice

the committee.

Later, the Commission (2012) provided a report on the Political Conflict and

Violence which had specific details of events during political violence, data on victims,

and narratives from victims, witnesses, and protesters. The report also proposed a

roadmap for reparations, restoring justice, and reconciliation. According to the regulation,

the proposed policies and recommendation from the committee shall be obliged and

implemented. In fact, public and members of both parties criticized that the committee

sided with one side of the conflict. The Yellow Shirts, for example, argued that research participants were not inclusive because it excluded some victims such as the Yellow Shirts who died and injured during the political unrest in October, 2007. On one hand, the Red Shirts criticized that the committee's report repeatedly created the Red Shirts as evils who employed violence and heavy weapon against the military and the opponent (Banchanont, 2017).

Though, in terms of recommendation, the commission presented solutions to address the conflict, the report did not provide an analysis of the dynamics of conflict and perceptions/understandings of conflicting parties.

Unfortunately, these worthy recommendations were not effectively implemented. During Yingluck's administration, some policies on paying compensation to the victims of the conflict were implemented. Contrastingly, elites and governments especially from non-Thaksin connection did not seriously consider how to implement some of the proposed recommendation, they rather reinforced the concept of unity. Looking at the main concept of unity to solve the political crisis, it can be said that conflict management and resolution mechanism in Thailand are problematic.

Chachavalpongpun (2010), in "Unity as a Discourse in Thailand's Polarized Politics" has argued that once the conflict has escalated and reached in stalemate, there are always requests for unity from several group of people especially elites. In the paper, Chachavalpongpun outlines how the concept of unity has been developed and utilized in Thai society. Since the period of forming a modern state, King Chulalongkorn, who reigned from 1986-1910, had promoted nationalism to confront the western empires

(Baker & Pongpaichit, 2014). And later on elites have been reinforcing unity to strengthen country as well as maintaining their status quo. The author argues that elites' defined unity has been used as a political tool, therefore, disunity concepts, ideas, and activities challenging the elite's status quo or threatening social unity are labeled as improper and should be prohibited. Once, the conflict became more intense, the elite reinforced unity through media, educational system, and bureaucratic mechanism. On the ground, the concept of unity usually has been enforced and reinforced by bureaucratic mechanism. The unity policy rigidly was applied in provinces that have a high percentage of voters for Thai Rak Thai Party (Thaksin and his connection). The downside of unity is to suppress the conflict and ignore the problem especially under the current situation in which the military junta does not allow people, even scholars, to express their different political ideas in public.

In sum, the studies discussed the causes of the political conflict as well as proposed recommendations on how to handle the conflict based on succinct analysis of the causes of the conflict. However, the studies did not deal with the perceptions of conflicting parties at the local level. What is lacking in the existing literature is an explanation of the dynamics of the Red and Yellow shirts movement in terms of specific demography and perceptions and understanding about the political conflict experienced by the local people. In addition, there is no study on how the conflicting groups collaborate in Chiang Mai. Therefore, the proposed research on collaboration between the two conflicting parties could fill these gaps.

2.1.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

The aforementioned review identifies three main categories: the causes and conditions of protracted conflict; the identification of conflicting parties; and the resolutions for the Thai political conflict. These categories are part of the research questions, thus are fundamental to the research.

Firstly, with regards to the root causes of conflict, the existing studies focus on the intergroup conflict particularly the Red Shirts. Therefore, in-depth analysis from the Yellow Shirts' perspective in relation to structural violence with a particular focus on cultural violence is needed to clearly understand the root causes of the conflict.

According to Johan Galtung's Triangle of violence, it comprises of three types of violence which are direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence, and each component is highly interdependent. Unlike, "direct/physical violence which is the most visible and having actors who commit the violence, structural violence is a form of violence where in some social structures/institutions may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs (1969, p.167-191)". Classism, nationalism, and elitism are some examples of structural violence. In this sense, structural violence is a root cause of social injustice and inequality. Next, Galtung defines "cultural as aspects of culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form (1990, p.291)". He further explains that six aspects of cultural violence are religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science, and formal science (logic, mathematics).

In this light, it is vital to comprehend the causes and conditions of the political color-coded conflict through the lens of Galtung's violence because the conflict between

the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts has components of structural violence and cultural violence. Some forms of the violence emerged in the following chapters. By doing so, Thai society will be fully equipped with thorough knowledge and explanation of the conflict enabling it to approach the conflict more constructively and sustainably.

The scholar such as Tejapira (2010) indeed provides an analysis of structural causes of conflict but still do not examine the dynamics of the conflict where the feelings of hostility were developed and deeply divided the Thai people. Additionally, the dynamics of the conflict constantly evolves, yet there is not adequate study to keep up with such changes.

Secondly, many existing researches emphasize on the impact and opinions based on the perceptions of the one side of the conflict. In reality, the conflict has affected several groups of Thai people, so it is important to capture the overall societal impact and explain the Thai political situation. Therefore, expanding the sample groups to stakeholders is crucial to comprehend the conflict.

Thirdly, some studies provide recommendations for sustainable resolution of the conflict in terms of socioeconomic and political policy rather than focused on a specific aspect of dealing with issues related to violence such as social justice, inequality of income distribution, and reforming the political structure. However, the recommendations are too broad and impractical. Therefore, there is an urgent need for future studies on specific details of each policy and how it might be implemented.

Forth, almost all researches explain the political conflict from social movement and mobilization perspective, but rarely employ conflict theories in examining the

phenomena. At the national level, it can be seen that some researches exploring socioeconomic condition like inequality, insecurity and basic needs in accessing to healthcare, education, employment, as a structural cause of conflict. On the other hand, drivers of the conflict at the individual and group level have yet to be examined.

Finally, what is lacking in the existing Thai literatures is an explanation of the dynamics of the Red and Yellow shirts movement in terms of specific demography and perceptions and understanding about the political conflict held by local people. In addition, there is no study on how the conflicting groups collaborate in Chiang Mai province. Therefore, my research on collaboration between the two conflicting parties aims to address some of these gaps.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

Referring to the previous section, it can be stated that most researches concentrate on the causes and conditions of the conflict, but this research rather focuses on the resolution process. Therefore, an overview and summary of theories on collaboration are presented first. Then the discussion on applying theories to explain the research is provided.

Echoing from reality, collaboration can take place either during or post-conflict. Looking at Sandole's metaphor on fire, it is urgent to contain fire (violence and mitigate conflicts) and then third party/conflictants can work together to prevent conflict turning into violence. In this sense, collaboration (regardless of its forms/types) cannot be free from the influence of the conflict. Thus, this research examines what conflict environment (escalation, de-escalation, polarization) make conflicting parties to

collaborate, how it affects collaboration, and what conditions keep parties embedded in conflicts.

Before delving into collaboration, this terminology should be discussed in relation to cooperation since the two terms have similarities and differences. Extracting from literatures, it is found that the two terminologies have same meaning: "at least two individuals/groups/organizations work together to achieve a mutual goal (Bratton & Tumin, 2012; Deutsch, 2014)". However, there are distinctions between cooperation and collaboration based on degrees of trust, goals, and sharing resources. For example, cooperation needs lower trust when compared to collaboration which requires a high level of trust. In terms of goals, parties realize that their goals are interdependent with others, so it is necessary to cooperate in order to achieve their goals. However, parties do not develop shared goals. Briefly, since having low level of trust and limit of shared goals, cooperation is limited on sharing information and does not establish a new organization which parties can work closely. On the other hand, collaboration is developed with a high level of trust and a shared vision among parties. As a result, in order to achieve the shared vision, parties in collaborative process usually establish a new organization which requires high level of commitment and sharing resources such as human, information, and budget. In other words, thinking in terms of a project, cooperation is a state of parties are working on parts of an overlapping project while collaboration is at least two parties are working closely in the same project.

As the fundamental meaning of the two terminologies are nuanced, collaboration, in this paper, is used as an umbrella term. Sometimes cooperation and collaboration are used interchangeably.

Theories of Collaboration

Since the beginning of civilization, human beings have developed the ability to cooperate in order to survive under difficult conditions. As such, cooperation has become a fundamental way to maximize the outcome instead of pursuing individually. However, competition is increasingly countering the collaboration as incompatible interests divide us often resulting into violence and chaos. Amidst all of the chaos of conflicts and violence, scholars and individuals alike, have come to learn that the only way out is through collaboration and cooperation. Thus, all approaches to conflicts whether conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation have collaboration as an underlying concept. In this sense, conflict resolution theorists, and practitioners who wish to see a better situation, perceive that in order to make conflicts constructive and healthier, bringing conflicting parties to collaborate is a key requirement. However, I acknowledge that some time mutual collaboration has led the brutal conflict in the world. Cooperation among Axis-Germany, Italy, and Japan, for instance, led to the World War II. Hence, the research emphasizes on positive aspects of collaboration leading to peaceful society.

Morton Deutsch, a pioneer scholar in cooperation-competition theory, states that in human relationships, cooperation and competition are like two sides of a coin: while humans are cooperating, sometimes they are competing (2014, p. 5-7). In conflict,

especially, parties surely have mixed motives and interests, and these can be both compatible and incompatible. As a result, parties somehow need to be competitive to obtain their non-compromised interests and employing the competitive approach will not always generate a negative outcome. Rather, constructive competition in cooperation is useful for acquiring one's interests. Additionally, scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution acknowledge that human beings generally have five conflict styles: accommodation, avoidance, confrontation, compromising, and collaboration (Sandole, 2011). Undoubtedly, collaboration is the most sustainable style of conflict orientation, but to bring conflicting parties to work together is very challenging.

Looking at the political conflict in Thailand, as discussed previously, the conflict has deeply divided Thai people. It has greatly affected several social dimensions ranging from national to family levels. Several healthy relationships among family members have turned to be sour relationship because of the conflict. Every time the conflict escalated, it repeatedly left scar and wound to victims as well as members of society as a whole. This inevitably undermined social development as fear and hatred has spread throughout the community. Chiang Mai, the main province of the north region, also struggled with the conflict for several years. Especially, aftermath of turmoil in April 2009 and their opponent, Abhisit was still prime minister, he promised to visit Chiang Mai in November the same year. This aroused the Red Shirts to prepare rallying against him by announcing and provoking the members to join the activity immediately once Abhisit's arrival to Chiang Mai (Aun, P. personal communication, July 22, 2014). As officials anticipated that there must be confrontation and violence was likely to reoccur, and the residents

were anxious about the situation. At that time, the situation in Chiang Mai was unsettled, and several embassies such as Australia, United States of America, and Taiwan, warned their citizens not to visit Thailand until situation was stable (Posttoday, 2009). The huge cleavage in Chiang Mai challenged to initiate collaboration among the conflicting parties. Interestingly, the collaboration could begin in such cleavage and high escalation circumstance. Hence, to explore the conditions that encouraged the collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts is needed.

After reviewing literature on this subject matter, the critical components that can lead to collaboration between incompatible are 1) the ripe moment, 2) willing participation, 3) third-party intervention, 4) perceiving an interdependent goal and a shared vision, 5) platform for constant interactions, 6) trust, and 7) efficiency of a collaborative process. In the following parts, brief reviews and discussions on each component including its contribution to the research are presented.

2.2.1. The Ripe Moment

The ripe moment is considered as an appropriate time to start collaboration between conflicting parties. However, to identify what contributes to the ripe moment is still very debatable. William Zartman (2008) concludes from his conflict case studies that the ripe moment emerges when conflicting parties perceive two basic realities. The first is a mutually hurting stalemate where conflicting parties find themselves stuck in a deadlock that prevents either party from achieving their goals. Zartman also argues that when disputants are in a costly and painful deadlock and realize that they cannot escape by escalating the conflict, they tend to find alternative solutions. The second one that

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Zartman identified was a mutually acceptable way out, where both sides foresee that negotiation is possible as it can provide a satisfactory outcome for both sides (1995, p. 16-17; 2008, p. 232-235).

Similarly, drawing from the experiences on environmental conflicts, Barbara Grey, another prominent scholar in collaboration theory, agrees that a protracted stalemate is an incentive to induce collaboration (p. 29-33). Larry Susskind (cited in Zartman, 2013) also explains that conducting conflict assessment (situation assessment) is a critical step for environmental conflict resolution. Thus, one of the core functions of conducting conflict assessment is to examine whether a conflict is at the ripe moment for intervention. In the work of Lucy Moore (2013), a mediator who has an expertise in environmental conflict resolution, shares her experiences that the ripe moment is important as it usually leads towards progress in constructive resolution.

Pruitt (2005) too agrees that a mutually hurting stalemate is an essential condition for the onset of conflict de-escalation and collaboration, but solely the situation is not sufficient. Pruitt, then, proposes the theory called "Readiness Theory" which adds an additional three precondition factors to the ripeness theory. These factors are optimism, motivation, and third-party intervention. According to Pruitt, readiness is more of a variable because optimism is a state where conflicting parties must be willing to break down the stalemate and a perception of possibility that working with the opponent will move to a mutual agreement. However, optimism considerably depends on trust that needs to be developed throughout the process (p. 253-255). Similarly, Deutsch implicitly refer the ripe moment to the positive attitudes toward others. He further argues that all

human beings have the capacity to respond positively which means the readiness to accept other's influence and decisions (Pruitt, 2005, p. 5-6). The next factor for Pruitt's readiness theory is motivation, which is subjective depending on the parties' perception of a conflict that is counterproductive. The perception on a conflict that is viewed as costly, makes parties want to escape from the conflict (2005, p.255-257).

These theories are useful as a guide to investigate what the ripe moment for the two conflicting groups in Chiang Mai to start the collaborative process. In addition, they help to explore the motives underlying their decisions to join the process.

2.2.2 Willing Participation

Willingness to participate in a collaborative process is critical for successful collaboration (Sanker, 2012; Grey, 1989). As many scholars and practitioners in the field echo including all components of collaboration provided in later section, collaboration begins when parties agree to attend collaborative process. It means if parties are not free to make decisions, they may not work closely with the opposite party. A collaborative process requires a high level of commitment, so only willing participation can keep parties motivated. Consequently, without willingness to participate, collaboration cannot exist. The importance of this component in collaboration guided the researcher to question research participants on their wills and explore the will of conflicting parties who are related to conflict resolution policy under Prayuth's administration. And then, analyses of these two scenarios are discussed and recommendations are provided in the last chapter.

2.2.3 Third-Party Intervention

Pruitt's readiness theory and Deutsch concur that third-party intervention plays an important role in enhancing these two mindsets and catalysts collaboration. In the same manner, Zartman's perception of a mutually hurting stalemate and way out are both objective and subjective, therefore, there is a room for the third-party intervention.

Pruitt (2005) emphasizes that third-party intervention is a critical factor to initiate and foster collaboration. He defines the third-party "as a person who is not a disputant and tries to assist them in ending their conflict (p.227)." Pruitt sees that quite often, negotiations between parties fail because they are lacking not only asymmetry in power, resources, and, capacity, but they also fail to realize their motives and optimism. Hence, third party has a role to make parties ready for collaboration by enhancing parties' motive and optimism. Third-party, according to Pruitt, can initiate collaboration by putting pressure on disputants to deal with a conflict, creating a platform where disputants can collaborate, build capacity and support for long-term collaboration (ibid).

Looking at the research, considering high tension prior to the creation of the collaboration, the researcher therefore, formulates the hypothesis that there must be the third-party intervention in the collaborative process. To explain this phenomenon, the theories of third-party intervention have been applied to investigate who they were, who involved with the process, and what their roles were regarding this matter. To understand the third-party who took part in the PHN, types and roles of third-party were also examined.

2.2.3.1 Typologies and Roles of the Third-Party. Scholars and practitioners in the conflict resolution field agree that to resolve conflicts, several types and roles of third-party are required. In the work of James Laue (1987), third parties are classified into five types; activist, advocate, mediator, researcher, and enforcer. To solve conflicts successfully, one mediator hardly achieves this goal. Hence, it requires other third parties to interact in order to support the conflict resolution process. The researcher, for instance, who studies and understands the conflict, can provide succinct explanations of the conflict so that a mediator or convener can utilize the result.

Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Tracks Framework (cited in Sandole, 2011) also provides another lens to understand the third-party. The framework consists of nine tracks as follows: Track I Government; Track II Nongovernment/ Professional; Track III Business; Track IV Private Citizen; Track V Research, Training, and Education; Track VI Activism; Track VII Religion; Track VIII Funding; and Track IX Media (p.52-54). Deadly conflict in Syria is a good example of requiring multi-tracks to elevate the conflict. To suppress the violence, track 1 especially international government is necessary to protect civilians from brutal attacks. At the same time, track IX media also have to increase awareness on humanitarian crisis in Syria so that private citizens and business sector could contribute to those in needs.

Looking at outsider and insider third-party, several typologies of third-party provided above present them as the outsiders to the conflict. On the other hand, scholars and practitioners claim that insider third parties can play significant roles in conflicts. Extracting from conflict cases in Africa, William Ury (2000) develops the concept of

"Third Sides" which constitute outsiders, insiders, and inner insiders as a powerful mechanism to resolve conflict. First of all, outsiders, according to Ury, can be friends, families, communities, and even international communities who are not involved with the conflict, but care and take actions to affect the conflict. Conversely, insiders are from ordinary people to governments who have a stake in the conflicts. Ury discusses that a pair of insiders is the most effective third party. One side of insider third party can be perceived as neutral whereas both insiders can be more balanced. Lastly, inner insiders are key conflicting parties whose heart and attitudes toward conflicts have changed and have strong wills to make the conflict better (p.18-22). Ury classifies third side' roles into three clusters of ten roles: 1) prevent conflict which consists of provider, teacher, and bridge-builder; 2) resolve conflict which has mediator, arbiter, equalizer, and healer; and 3) contain conflict that needs witness, referee, and peacekeeper (ibid, p.190-96).

Similarly, Paul Wehr & John Paul Lederach introduce an insider-impartial mediator type in "Mediating Conflict in Central America (1991)." They learned from their personal involvement in Esquipulas case and Nicaragua mediation that mediators can be insider-partial. The authors argue that neutrality is not what disputants in Central America are looking for because the disputants want some assistance from interveners. As such, they value trust –based mediation that mediators have connectedness and relationships with them. As a result, they advocate concept of insider-impartial mediators to take leading roles in conflict intervention.

Later, Lederach (1997) also developed the Leadership Model, which is based on the insider-impartial interveners to illustrate that leadership of peacebuilders occurs at

three different levels: top level, the middle-range, and grassroots. Government, politicians, military, and sometimes religious leaders are actors at the top level who are perceived as prominent and powerful actors. The actors at the middle level can be ethnic leaders; respected heads of business, agriculture, education, and humanitarian organizations; or internationally known public figures. Lederach discusses that the middle range leaders are important in peacebuilding because they have relationships with both the top and the grassroots leaders. The third level is grassroots leadership, which represents the masses and operates directly with them. The actors include local leaders, leaders of indigenous groups, NGOs (p. 37-43).

Literature on third-party intervention not only provided lens to examine the third parties who took part in the PHN, but also expanded perspectives of third party in terms of outside and insider third party. The idea of insider third-party allowed the researcher to explore inclusively on their backgrounds including their roles in the conflict.

2.2.3.2 Neutrality or Impartiality. To achieve conflict resolution, several types of third parties are necessary. While taking part in conflict, third-party has to gain trust and credibility so that to uphold the principles of neutrality and impartiality throughout their interventions is important. However, these principles are also debatable because these terminologies can be problematic. Bernard Mayer (2004) argues that neutrality is hard to define because understandings of the word are varied in each social setting (p.83). Secondly, a preferred type of a mediator is also different depending on cultural context. In Central America, for example, disputants look for insider-partial mediator whereas

some disputants in other places look for outsider-neutral (Wehr & Lederach, 1991).

Therefore, this part examines these definitions and implication in practice.

Neutrality. According to Wehr & Lederach, neutrality means mediators do not have any connection or commitment to either side in the conflict. This implies that mediators have to maintain distance with conflicting parties and are involved with conflict parties only during a mediation process (1991, p.86-7). Echoing Wehr & Lederach's notion of neutrality, Rachel Field (as cited in Regina,2000, p.34) discusses two components: having no prior relationships with disputants and no interest in an outcome of conflict; and a lack of bias and judgment toward either side of conflicting parties. Robert Benjamin, a mediator, (as cited in Maiese, 2005) further elaborates neutrality. For him, mediators are persons who do not have relationship with parties outside a mediation process; lack of interest in outcome of conflict; are indifferent to parties' welfare; have no attempt to change power differences; and do not intervene the substances of conflicts.

Neutrality, according to Mayer, is difficult to nail down and it is not good for mediators to identify herself or himself as neutral because people are always suspicious of neutrality (ibid, p.17). Mayer discusses further that in some cultures, neutrality is considered as inactive and cowardly behavior. To go beyond the limitation of neutrality, Mayer considers impartiality is very significant for mediators.

Impartiality. Looking at professions in conflict resolution, most organizations provide specific guidance for mediators and in that guidance; impartiality is defined in the standards. For instance, the Colorado Council of Mediation Organization, Society of

Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the National Association define impartiality as "Freedom from favoritism and bias in either word or action and involves a commitment to aid all parties as opposed to a single party in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement (Heisterkamp, 2006, p. 302)."

Similarly, many organizations in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) like the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts' Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation provide a definition of impartiality as "freedom from favoritism or bias in word or action (1998, p. 269-271)." In the same manner, legal professionals state that "impartiality means freedom from favoritism, bias, or prejudice (American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, Association for Conflict Resolution, 2005, Standard II)."

Put simply, impartiality is an absence of bias, favoritism, or prejudice in words, actions, and appearance to either side. More importantly, impartial mediators have the ability to assist and empower all conflicting parties especially weak parties so that they have adequate capacity to reach satisfied agreements.

These concepts of neutrality and impartiality are useful for the research as it provides a framework to examine how these qualifications played roles in the collaborative process. In addition, as the research is in different cultural setting, the concepts have allowed the researcher to see in what way the conflicting parties in Chiang Mai understood neutrality/impartiality, how they perceived the third party, and how well it explained the conflict in Thailand.

2.2.4. An Interdependent Goal and a Shared Vision

Upon the parties' realization that without the opponent's cooperation one of the parties can achieve their goals, they are likely to work together. Prior going for field research, the researcher believed that there must be an interdependent goal or a shared vision among the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts who were engaged in the collaboration. Hence, literatures on an interdependent goal and a shared vision were reviewed, and it revealed that not only scholars but also the practitioners in CAR agreed that these two elements are essential for collaboration. According to Deutsch (2006), generally there are two types of interdependent goals: positive and negative. Deutsch points out that when perceiving the interdependence goals have positive linkages, parties involved in certain situations are likely to cooperate and try implementing actions to improve the chance to achieve their goals. Conversely, if parties perceive negative linkage of their interdependent goals, they tend to choose win-lose scenario (p.4). Often, Deutsch finds that parties seem to see independent goals and resist cooperating with the opponent. He suggests that third party have to reframe conflicts as a mutual problem and let parties see interdependent goals.

Likewise, Stephen M. Walt (1985) elaborates that sometimes even competitive states have to cooperate with the opponents since these states realize that their goals are interdependent. According to Walt's Balance of Threat Theory, states start to cooperate because they perceive that they have common threats. In order to survive, states have to cooperate with others even hostile ones, in order to defeat their common enemies.

To conceive an interdependence goal is critical for encouraging cooperation because when individual parties create interdependence with others, they are more likely to cooperate. For the purpose of this research, three terminologies: common ground, reciprocity, and interdependent goal are used interchangeably.

Perceiving interdependent goal for conflicting parties is important for a durable collaboration. If parties cannot develop the goal as a shared vision, deeper engagement in a collaborative process is rather a challenge. Bratton and Tumin discuss in "Collaborate or Perish" (2012) that a vision will lead the effective way people can work together to accomplish that vision. Therefore, it should be creative and broad enough to capture people's imagination and passion and inspire people to make it real (p.39-62). Likewise, Axelrod (1984) concludes that it is essential to "enlarge the shadow of the future (p. 126-132)" because if parties perceive that a vision is truly important to them, they will continue the cooperation. He further discusses that cooperation can be made stable by 1) making interactions more durable; and 2) making parties interact more constantly (ibid, p. 129-130).

Additionally, Grey (1989) and Sanker (2012) emphasize that having a common purpose is vital for collaboration. When parties have a common and meaningful purpose, it enables people to work together and get them committed to a process. However, a shared vision does not need to emerge prior to collaboration, but rather should be mutually developed during the early stages of collaboration.

Exploration of these concepts allowed the researcher to look for interdependent goals/shared visions among members of the collaboration.

2.2.5. Platform for Constant Interactions

The key factor for cooperation is the continued interaction between the parties. As Axelrod emphasizes that "cooperation can emerge from small cluster of discriminating individuals, as long as these individuals have even a small proportion of their interaction with each other (p.68)." He considers that the foundation of cooperation is strength of friendships that allows reciprocal interactions between parties to learn and teach each other on how to cooperate. This indicates that constructing a platform for constant interactions between conflicting parties is important. In addition, Axelrod asserts that for the further sustaining cooperation, constructing hierarchy or organization will allow cooperation to be more efficient. To build this safe platform, a third party has to pay great attention to the fact that disputants need to have a place to discuss and later work together. Being cognizant with Axelrod's conclusion, Bratton and Tumin (2012) discuss that continuing interactions establishes a platform that they define as a place consisting of either a physical or visual space where people can gather and share knowledge while working together (p.98-131). However, people have to realize that they cannot solely build a platform; they have to secure the platform and provide infrastructure so that people can use the platform mutually. In this sense, having a platform means an establishment of a new organization, which has specific missions, resources, and responsibilities for moving toward mutual goals.

2.2.6. Trust and Distrust

2.2.6.1 Trust. Trust is a crucial condition for emerging and fostering collaboration because it allows individuals to willingly share information, thoughts and, experiences, and working with others. Inevitably, as relationships develop and change over time, so does the nature of trust and distrust in those relationships. In cases of the political conflict between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, trust is severely destroyed, yet the collaboration could be imitated. Hence, it was interesting and worthy to examine how they could rebuild trust and maintained it throughout the collaborative process.

To do so, this part examines literature on the meaning of trust and how to build trust and manage trust and mistrust which has been applied in the analysis of the case.

Danise Rousseau et al (1998) study trust across disciplines and find that "trust is having confident expectation and a willingness to be vulnerable (p.394-5)." In order to build trust, Rousseau et al conclude that making parties conceive mutual risks and interdependence are factors for building trust.

Stemming from positive expectation, Roy Lewiki and Carolyn Wiethof (2000) see that trust "as an individual's belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another (p. 87)." In contrast, distrust is defined as an active negative expectation regarding another. Lekiwi and Wiethof explain that trust and distrust have the same two initial sources which rest on gain-loss calculation and identification.

Russell Hardin (2006) also defines trust as an encapsulated interest. According to the definition, trust comprises expectations of X to Y that Y will do what X wants, Y

does X wants as it produces shared interests, and reasons for Y to do according to X to maintain relationship or X has influence over Y.

Despite the fact that these definitions have different focus, it can be concluded that trust is an expectation of others' behaviors, and a willingness to accept vulnerable outcomes resulting from others' actions and decisions.

2.2.6.2 Distrust. Similarly, distrust, according to Lewicki and Tomlinson (2014), is a confident expectation that others' motive, willingness, and behaviors conflict with interests that one expects. Interestingly, under the same relationship, trust and distrust are co-existent because a relationship is multifaceted, and each facet has different forms of interaction that allow parties to know each other. Thus, they argue that to improve trust, it is important to separate trust and distrust on specific facet of relationship. Then develop trust from facet that both parties share or have prior good relationships. Trust and distrust function to make actors express their abilities of being rational actors who can manage social complexity and uncertainty. Trust helps relieving social uncertainty and complexity by making preferred behaviors likely to occur, whereas distrust reduce uncertainty by making non-preferred behaviors visible.

Overall, the theoretical framework of these variable relationships helped the researcher to understand how each participant developed trust and distrust throughout the PHN collaborative process. It also allowed the researcher to examine new perspectives on the roles of trust and distrust affecting members to decide whether to collaborate or decline.

2.2.7. Efficiency of the Collaborative Process

Sustaining a collaboration process is a critical challenge. The existing literatures on collaboration repeatedly mention three clusters of conditions as essential components for successful collaboration: the meaningful participation, the legitimacy of collaborative process, and the economics of collaboration.

2.2.7.1 The Meaningful Participation. A collaborative process is likely to be effective and worthwhile when participants acknowledge that a process can satisfy their fundamental interests by addressing problems through the inclusion of representatives from all related parties. Thus, inclusiveness, representativeness, satisfaction with fundamental interests, and new organization driving toward shared goals are key components of a meaningful participation. In this context, inclusiveness is a core principle for identifying appropriate participants. Emphasizing the importance of inclusivity, Leach and Grey argue that an ability to bring all related stakeholders to participate in the process, allows them to understand problems comprehensively. Moreover, beyond feeling worthwhile to participate in a process, participants also look for procedural fairness (1989, p.64-68; 2012, p. 153-155).

Secondly, representativeness of stakeholders is vital. Having representatives who receive consent from members of their groups will enhance the process and make it more meaningful because they have the authority to make a decision on behalf of their groups and have adequate skills to represent their constituency effectively (ibid, p. 150-152). Furthermore, Bratton and Tumin discuss that successful collaboration requires the right people (p.170-173). Though, they do not discuss explicitly representativeness, they value

bringing people of all groups who have different strengths and characteristic to support

collaboration. The principle of representation also enhances a sense of ownerships

among participants which is helpful to propose innovative solutions suited to their

problems.

Thirdly, a collaborative process is more effective if all participants are satisfied

with achieving their fundamental interests. While participants have various interests, their

interests may have common ground and depend on one another. To move various

interests to a shared vision requires time for the participants to understand their interests,

understand others' interests, and create new interests that satisfy all participants (a shared

vison). For doing so, Leach (2012) argues that "putting yourself in their shoes" supports

mutual understanding. Similarly, Axelrod discusses that "enlarging the shadow of the

future and teaching people to care about each other" help promoting cooperation (2006,

p.126-136).

Lastly, assembling teamwork as a new structure for collaboration is important.

Under the new team, participants will be clearly specified with well-defined

responsibilities and share resources.

2.2.7.2 The Legitimacy of the Collaborative Process. Leach, Grey, and Mitchell

argue that people keep engaging with collaborative process if they see that the process is

fair. The components of fair procedure are participants' perceptions of receiving equal

treatment with respect and civility. Procedure is perceived as just by the participants

when it will result in great acceptance of outcome and high level of compliance (p.160).

When participants perceive a process as unfair, they are more likely to decline any

collaboration. To create just procedure, participants and third parties who usually play an important role as a mediator or facilitator, have to establish a fair and transparent decision making process and comply to it strictly.

A critical component that secures the legitimacy of collaboration, as described above, is the norms. According to Axelrod (1997), norms are powerful means to sustain cooperation (p.7). Social norms like punishing cooperation violators can support cooperative process because the punishment makes parties afraid of breaking an agreement (p.7-9). At the same time, social mechanism like reward also fosters parties to commit to the agreement.

Deutsch's theory of cooperative and competitive process, takes norms of cooperative behaviors seriously into account. Acting in good faith with honest and respect, empowerment, and caring for others are important to sustain a collaborative process (2014, p. 16-17).

Likewise, International Relation Liberalists believe that under the interdependent era, cooperation is possible as long as there is an international regime. Robert Keohane (1984) discusses in "After Hegemony: Cooperation and Dispute in World Economy", that international system which refers to developing agreeable norms among states can make cooperation possible.

The legitimacy of the collaboration expanded perspectives on how participants perceived the collaborative process particularly the PHN whose members had various stances and interests. The theoretical framework helped the researcher to examine what and how the norms were developed and complied during the collaboration. They were

useful to explain the dynamic of the PHN collaborative process and propose recommendation for a better collaboration.

2.2.7.3 The Economics of Collaboration. Since the collaborative process is time consuming, incentives and performance, are necessary for keeping participants engaged with the process. Leach contends that "people are motivated both by personal and collective costs and benefit of collaboration", thus providing rewards is a strategy to keep them engaged with the process. As for Wondolleck & Yaffee (1997), incentives for participants can be offered in forms of expertise, professional network, training, and even recognition of their contributions/professionalism are powerful methods to maintain their commitment (p.9-12).

As Leach points out, people are likely to accept collaboration when personal cost is low, but personal and collective benefits are greater. As a result, accomplishing high performance is important for successful collaboration. High performance requires an effective leadership and monitoring an implementation. Identifying leaders for specific responsibilities and brainstorming how to measure progress and success, will drive the performance of collaboration. Collaboration shares mutual outcomes, and when things go wrong, participants should share the blame and provide constructive feedback (Sanker, 2012, p.127). Incentives and monitoring program greatly support performance of collaborative process moving toward a shared vision in appropriate time.

In conclusion, the chapter confirms that the research on the collaboration entitled "Peaceful Homeland Network" which originated among some members of the Red Shirts

and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai has never been studied. Therefore, it is worth

examining this phenomenon by applying the collaboration theories.

CHAPTER THREE

External Conditions that Encourage Individuals to Agree or Decline to Join the Collaboration

The Peaceful Homeland Network (PHN) was originated from a small meeting of the four individuals (Two were members of the Red Shirts and another two were the Yellow Shirts) in July 2009 and gradually expanded to members of both conflicting parties. This chapter aims to examine three main points. First, the chapter discusses political landscape in Chiang Mai, and briefly mentions about the Red Shirt and the Yellow Shirts. Secondly, it investigates the conditions that encouraged the people to work together. It has revealed that long-term negative impacts on their daily life and third-party intervention were keys for constructive solution. Thirdly, like two sides of one coin, this chapter also discusses about the condition which made some individuals decline the collaboration.

3.1 Chiang Mai's Political Landscape

Undoubtedly the political and economic environments in Chiang Mai are influenced by the national environment. This part explores political context in Chiang Mai both before and during the conflict, and its impacts. Additionally, this part aims to present how the political conflict originated in Bangkok extended to Chiang Mai.

3.1.1 Political Context

Chiang Mai, Thaksin's hometown (Lueangaramsri, et al, 2012) and the main province in the northern part of Thailand has often been a witness of political turmoil, particularly from 2008 to 2010. Prior to Thaksin's debut in the political arena; candidates from the Democrat Party and other parties usually won general elections in Chiang Mai (Office of Province Election Committee Chiang Mai, 2014). However, as the time went by, voters felt bored since there was neither new innovative policy nor implementation that could greatly enhance their well-beings especially in healthcare and micro-finance support (A. Jeera, personal communication, June 13, 2014). At the same time, Thaksin formed a research team and invented policies that satisfied the majority of Thai people (Hewison, 2010). He established Thai Rak Thai Party in January, 2001 and then won the national election. In Chiang Mai, nine of ten were the representatives from Thai Rak Thai Party (ibid, 2014). Thaksin's policies and its implementation particularly the 30 Baht Universal Healthcare, OTOP, and micro-finance for all villages, generated positive outcomes for the people (ibid, 2010). As a result, Thaksin became very popular Prime Minister who was in power for entire four-year political term, and again he gained a landslide victory in the 2005 national election. During his legacy, Thaksin paid great concentration in Chiang Mai's development: several budget and mega-projects for tourism and business were designated to Chiang Mai (Netipo, 2008).

The Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai. According to the National Election Committee (2010), Chiang Mai had high percentage of Thaksin supporters. Thai Rak Thai Party which Thaksin was a head of the party won two general elections in 2001 and 2006 by

landslide. Though, Chiang Mai is Thaksin's stronghold, the anti-Thaksin movement could be established and spread its ideas to Chiang Mai people.

The interviews indicate that there are three main reasons that enabled the formation of the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai. Firstly, Chiang Mai have several social activists and active citizens who are concerned about public issues in Chiang Mai and the country. Besides, these people had potential in taking leadership roles through their involvement on public issues. In addition to the resources that it has, Chiang Mai is strategically located from where people can travel to Myanmar, Laos, and China. So, it became an important city in which government's agencies, local, consular offices, international non-governmental organizations, and several Academic institutions are based (Lekuthai, 2008). Due to these features, environment in Chiang Mai has been highly dynamic and several cross-sector organizations have been established. As a result, newcomers and the local had regular interactions and they were able to establish communication channels in order to jointly work and host activities related to public issues and the monitoring of government activities.

Secondly, Thaksin's fraudulent policies and administration was the driver of the Yellow Shirts' emergence. This is related to the first reason because those people realized that politic had significant impacts on local people, so they closely monitored governments' policies and reacted accordingly. Despite the fact that Chiang Mai natives and NGOs highly admired Thaksin and collaborated with the government to carry out implementation especially during the first few year of his term, they turned against Thaksin when his policies were carried out without local people's consents.

Some projects, however, raised great concerns among people residing in Chiang Mai. These policies/projects did not meet their needs, but rather undermined local community's strength and identity. Consequently, in the mid of 2003, there was a public movement questioning Thaksin's strong centralized administration. For example, building cable cars to Doi Chiang Dao project provoked Chiang Mai natives to take actions against the project because it would destroy nature and local values. Chiang Mai people believed that the holy spirit of King Chiang Dao would be disturbed. Eventually, the projects were suspended in September, 2005 (T. Sangtian, personal communication, June 13, 2012). Later, these people formed an organization, "Coalition for People Loving Chiang Mai" which has been acting as a watchdog on central and local authorities' policies toward environment, well-being, and culture in their hometown. The more they investigated and monitored him, the stronger they became anti-Thaksin as they believed he promoted policy level corruption (S. Chana, personal communication, July 17, 2012).

Thirdly, the Chiang Mai Yellow Shirts could be established and expanded because of having strategies and support from the PAD in Bangkok (Wankulam, 2010). Sonthi organized his public talk shows in Bangkok criticizing Thaksin and one of the five PADs (the Yellow Shirts) originated in Bangkok. His public talk shows revealed Thaksin's improper policies and administration which drew public attention. In December, 2005, S. Chana, the president of the Coalition of People loving Chiang Mai and later a leader of the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai, keenly monitored Thaksin. He contacted Sonthi's team to set equipment to broadcast the live talk show from Bangkok to Chiang Mai. After perceiving negative information about Thaksin, his colleagues, social

activists, and ordinary people and members of the Coalition of People loving Chiang Mai

continued to monitor Thaksin's administration (personal communication, July 17, 2012.

In February, 2006, the anti-Thaksin movement was established as People's

Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in Bangkok. Pipop, NGOs and social activists, were

selected as the representatives of NGOs and then he was appointed as one of the five

leaders of the Yellow Shirts. The strategies of the Yellow Shirts' movement was that the

core leading group of the organization was based in Bangkok and they had networks in

all provinces. The five prominent leaders of the Yellow Shirts in Bangkok made

decisions about time, location and strategies for mass mobilization against the opponent.

Each province had key leaders and coordinators whose responsibilities were to connect

all the Yellow Shirts in their areas, organize political activities, fund-raising, and provide

facilities to support the movement (Wankulam, 2012). Suchit and social activists like

Chana, Udom, and Sangtian, and others who were with the anti-Thaksin movement

formed the Chiang Mai Yellow Shirts (Chiang Mai, PAD). In one of the instances, Suchit

was appointed as a coordinator of the Yellow Shirts in seventeen Northern provinces and

was recognized as a leader since then (T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29,

2014).

The Chiang Mai Yellow Shirts could host political campaigns exposing Thaksin's

fraud administration, educating people, and mobilizing masses calling for Thaksin to step

down. Suchit and Chana (2014) provided information that the numbers of the Yellow

Shirts in Chiang Mai during 2006 were around 3,000-4,000. These members usually

attended political activities in public. However, after the Red Shirts were consolidated in

2008, the Chiang Mai Yellow Shirts' network and activities became limited. The number

was rather small, and several of them did not prefer to express their political views (K.

Saifon, personal communication, July 21, 2014; T. Suchit, personal communication, June

29, 2014). While attempting to expand their network and organize political activities, the

Yellow Shirts' movement was interrupted by some members of the Red Shirts.

Eventually, members of the Yellow Shirts decided to join demonstrations in Bangkok

(T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29, 2014).

The Red Shirts in Chiang Mai. The finding shows four mains reasons that

encouraged the emergence of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai. The first reason is that

Chiang Mai residents became more active throughout their interactions between people,

governments, NGOs, and outsider capitalists since 1990s. Particularly during Thaksin's

administration, the local people realized that their powers were recognized through

elective politics and Thaksin's policies because their needs, somehow, were fulfilled

under Thaksin's policies. When they perceived that the coup deprived their

representatives and their rights in election were constantly denied, these people began to

challenge the anti-Thaksin movement including the coup. Then, they gradually developed

a political identity called "Rak Chiang Mai 51" or the Red Shirts.

The second reason is frustration due to unacceptable behaviors of the anti-Thaksin

movement including the Democrat Party and the Yellow Shirts. The 2006 coup and its

negative impact on business was the third reason that stimulated local people to rise

against coup and then became the Red Shirts (S. Preecha, personal communication, June

12, 2014).

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Thaksin's reaction on the coup and the old elites is the forth reason. He was

overthrown by non-democratic method and had to flee from the two-year imprisonment.

Thaksin realized that the only way to return to Thailand was through the mobilization of

his connection and political power. The main obstacle was that the Yellow Shirts and the

old elites had denied participation in the electoral processes. The assistance from left-

wing politicians (in Thailand, the left-wing politicians refer to former university students

who took part in the anti-dictatorship movements during 1970s-1980s) was an important

factor in consolidating the Red Shirts' movement in Chiang Mai. They also connected the

local Red Shirt groups to other groups in other areas. The following are the details of

situations that had happened in Chiang Mai reflecting the three reasons behind the

emergence of Red Shirts in Chiang Mai.

Even though the political conflict became manifested as color-coded conflict

during 2008, the trace of the Red Shirts political movement had emerged after February,

2006. After Thaksin dissolved the parliament, Abhisit, the Head of the Democrat Party,

announced that his party will not nominate any candidate for the upcoming general

election in February, 2006 (Democrat Party's Statement, 2006). Instead of being involved

in the election affairs, Abhisit went to Chiang Mai and launched a campaign on

promoting the Democrat Party. This action caused discomfort among the local people

who highly admired Thaksin. They considered that Abhisit's behaviors were hypocritical:

while he was denying to be a part of the election, Abhisit still came to Chiang Mai for a

political agenda. Therefore, several Chiang Mai activists (who later became the Red

Shirts) brought local people to interrupt Abhisit's activities and compelled him to leave

Chiang Mai (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014).

It can be said that the root of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai began from the

frustration towards the Democrat Party paying a visit to Chiang Mai in February, 2006.

However, the movement did not form systematically until the outbreak of the coup in

September, 2006. Immediately, Chiang Mai people who disagreed with the coup began

distributing leaflets against the military junta (T. Pendara, July 18, 2014). Since the

situation was highly tensed, Pendara suspended his activity.

Nine months later, on the 17th of June, 2007, several tourism business

entrepreneurs gathered in front of "Tha Pear" which is an important landmark in Chiang

Mai, calling military junta to withdraw the martial law. They went out to express their

views because the number of tourists had drastically decreased after the law was

enforced. Instead of being flexible, the military suppressed these people harder since they

perceived such movement undermined order and security (Luangaramsri, 2012).

Consequently, Petchwat, a key person of the uprising on the 17th of June, 2007, was

charged and warned from hosting activities against the junta. However, Petchwat and his

colleagues who received bad treatments from the junta continued holding public forums

every Saturday discussing the political situation. By that time, Petchwat owned a

community radio wave 92.5 MHZ and used this channel to expand his ideas.

What Petchwat and his colleges had done did not greatly contribute towards the

mobilization of the people. It is only when the politics at the national level re-escalated in

March, 2008, people were mobilized. After the 2007 constitution was promulgated in

December, the People's Power Party won the 2007general election (Wankulam, 2010).

Samak, the head of the winning party, formed the majority government and became the

prime minister. This made the Yellow Shirts re-united against Samak and demanded him

to step down. They accused that Samak was a Thaksin's puppet. On the 26th of August

2008, the conflict had escalated in Bangkok, and Petchwat and the colleagues established

a group entitled "Rak Chiang Mai 51" to encounter the Yellow Shits' movement

(Lueangaramsri, 2012). Along with the formation of the Red Shirts' local organization,

on that day, there was a political campaign which several thousands of Chiang Mai

residents attended. These people talked about why the Yellow Shirts did not respect the

rules and denies others' political decisions. When the local people started questioning the

Yellow Shirts (they also referred to the elites and inequality in society) and launched

political activities, politicians from left-wing were interested in the local movement.

They, then, supported the movement by being guest speakers. Additionally, they assisted

and connected the local movement to the national level movement, so-called United

Front of Democracy against Dictatorship: UDD.

After Samak was dismissed of the premiership, Somchai, Thaksin's brother-in-

law, became the prime minister in October, 2008. The Yellow Shirts continued protests

against the government by paralyzing government's agencies including shutting down

two international airports in Bangkok and several transportation systems. Besides, they

occupied the government house to prevent Somchai from taking the oath. Later, Somchai

had to step down because People's Power Party was dissolved by the Constitutional

Court's order. This incident greatly accumulated frustration among the Red Shirts and let

Chiang Mai people become the Red Shirts who had not yet apparently taken a side (Lueangaramsri, 2012; U. Poomtam, personal communication, July 14, 2014). With the assistance from former left-wing politicians and politicians under Thaksin's party, Rak Chiang Mai 51 could organize and manage its organization. Additionally, ideas and concepts of electoral democracy, juridical inequality, and social justice which were discussed during political campaigns inspired residents of Chiang Mai to institutionalize Red Shirts' groups in their districts.

However, key leaders of the Rak Chiang Mai 51 were discreet. Later, the leaders separated and formed their own groups. Approximately, there were more than twenty-groups of the Red shirts in Chiang Mai. These key persons had their own operational strategies which oriented toward non-violence, whereas the "Rak Chiang Mai 51" usually employed violent tactics (S.Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014). Even though leaders disliked each other, when a political tension escalated, they gathered and manifested their unity in public.

3.2 Impacts of the Conflict in Chiang Mai

Chiang Mai had witnessed constant political unrests and the society was polarized into two distinct groups. The following table shows intensity of protest events that erupted in Chiang Mai.

Table 3.1 Statistic on Protests in Chiang Mai during 2006 - 2009

Year/Incidents	Numbers of Protests	Death	Injured
2006	At least 5	None	NA
2007	NA	None	NA
2008	At least 10	1	At least 4
2009	More than 24	None	NA

Sources: Report on the Lessons Learned from Political Unrests and Violence in
Thailand during March-May 2009, 2012
           Data collection from Newspapers during 2006-2009

The statistics clarify that in Chiang Mai, the clash between the two political

groups and aggressive protests sharply increased particularly after social polarization into

two groups- Red and Yellow. In 2009, the unrest erupted almost monthly in January,

April, May, July, and November. Inevitably, the more the frequencies of the unrest, the

greater were the impacts. Coupled with the data shared by the research participants, and

based on their perspectives, it is revealed that the conflict caused negative impacts in

several dimensions including emotions, relationships, and economic-based interests.

3.2.1 Impacts on Emotions

The result showed that the conflict had affected people's emotions. Normally,

according to their interviews, they had had peaceful lives before the conflict outbreak in

Thailand and Chiang Mai. Though they had some difficulties and challenges in their daily

lives including some disputes, those troubles were manageable and did not cause constant

problems. The conflict somehow poisoned their minds, and then they developed fears and

distrust and they could not tolerate each other anymore. Chiang Mai residents had

developed fear and distrust to those who had different political views. As a result, they

were stressed and feared to discuss about politics with others.

To have evidence supporting the analysis, the researcher extracted some relevant

quotes from the interviews. Again, as explained in the Chapter One, interviewees'

identities are protected. Consequently, all interviewees' names stated throughout the

thesis are pseudonyms. K. Wichai expressed his thought that "This conflict made me

stressed out and sometimes hopeless to envision a bright future" (personal

communication, June 16, 2014).

K. Saifon also shared her story.

> My younger sister really likes Thaksin while my mother and I don't like
> him. When we criticize Thaksin and the Red Shirts, we usually end up
> with dispute. It was so stressful. It is sad that our relationship in family has
> altered into negative way because of the conflict. (personal
> communication, July 21, 2014)

In addition, the conflict also brought about distrust and fear to many individuals.

K. Sanong, told that "I fear to reveal my political thoughts particularly in public. Even

friends and colleagues, I try not to talk about politics because I don't know their deep

thoughts. Revealing my identity would cause problems" (personal communication, July

16, 2014)

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Other interviewees including Jarunee, Taimtan, and Poomtam shared similar thoughts that the conflict made their emotions occupied with stressfulness.

3.2.2 Impacts on Relationships

Sadly, the conflict created cleavages among family members, friends, and communities. Everyone admitted that the relationships within community and workplace changed when people were polarized into two different political groups. The members in their communities had fewer interactions and some groups were against another groups. Usually, Chiang Mai natives had quite healthy relationships. Neighbors, friends, co-workers, and even family members were rather visited and discussed on political issues, but the conflict forbade them from doing so. Additionally, they were less tolerant towards the others, especially those whose political views were different. So, their relationships were distanced.

S. Chumsai illustrated the division within his community resulting from the conflict.

> It was unbelievable that even our Muslim brotherhood was divided by this color-coded conflict. This was an obstacle to carry out activities/projects which required cooperation among the community members. Members of the Red Shirts often claimed the Yellow Shirts should not receive any supports from Thaksin's populism policies. And vice versa, the Yellow Shirts retorted that the Red Shirts should not gain benefit from the Democrat Party's policies. (personal communication, July 15, 2014)

Y. Jarunee also shared that "As a community leaders and local politician, I felt regret that the relationships were impacted by the conflict. I could see the change among members in my neighborhood. The relationships were sour and they avoided talking or

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visiting others whose political views were different" (personal communication, July 20, 2014).

Additionally, the conflict put cooperation among people and activists in difficult situation. T. Suchit noted,

> When the Red Shirts had not been established yet, working with local people was rather smooth. However, after they became Red and I was Yellow, I could no longer go back to the community and work with them. Although my issues are related on land which is important to them; we could not work anymore. (personal communication, July 31, 2014)

Similar to other activists, S. Chana, the president of Coalition of Loving Chiang Mai People and the leader of the Yellow Shirts, described

> The conflict undermined the solidarity of the Coalition since several of us are anti-Thaksin while others still supports Thaksin. As a result, the group became smaller in number and then we rarely join to work together with those who have different political views. (personal communication, July 17, 2014)

3.2.3 Impacts on Economic-Based Interests

Regarding the impact on local economy, the conflict accounted for economic stagnation in Chiang Mai because the number of tourists had sharply decreased between 2007 and 2009. Chiang Mai is a popular destination not only for Thai people, but also for foreigners. According to the Travel Leisure (2010, http://www.travelandleisure.com/worldsbest/2010/cities), Chiang Mai was named as the top ten best cities in the world: Chiang Mai was ranked in the fifth and the second in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Besides, Thai business and public sectors also chose Chiang Mai as a place for hosting annual seminars, training programs, and meetings. Hence, Chiang Mai's economy greatly depends upon tourism industry.

When the conflict erupted and turned into violence, Chiang Mai appeared to the eyes of Thais and foreigners as a politically unstable place. Widely circulating chaotic image of Chiang Mai further augmented those perceptions. Several embassies warned its citizens to avoid visiting Chiang Mai and Bangkok. Consequently, much less tourists visited the province after 2007.

Table 3.2 The Numbers of Tourists visiting Chiang Mai during 2006-2010

Year	Number of Visitors
2006	5,356,326
2007	5,356,867
2008	5,313,352
2009	4,343,090
2010	NA

Source: National Statistical Office, 2014

According to the table, the year 2007 had only seen a minor increase in tourists compared to 2006. In 2008, the number dropped by 4.95% compared to the year of 2006. Similarly, in 2009 the numbers of visitors declined sharply by 22.31%. Some of the members of the PHN owned business related to tourism. They explained that their

incomes from tourism had dropped during 2007 to 2009. Therefore, for economic

stability, having a political stability in their hometown became a precondition.

Apparently, prior to the eruption of the color-coded conflict, local people residing

in Chiang Mai had quite pleasant living atmosphere. Although there were disputes on

public issues, Chiang Mai natives were able to manage them creatively. After the conflict

spread to the area, the lives of local people were affected in many dimensions. Chiang

Mai residents bore the burden of the conflict for more than two years. Eventually, a talk

between the members of the color-coded groups started and then these pioneers could

establish a collaborative network called "Coalition for Peaceful Homeland: CPH".

Following conflict, what conditions drove the members of the Red Shirts and Yellow

Shirts to collaborate was a core question that would be examined in the following parts.

3.3. Conditions Encouraging Members of Cross Color-Coded Group to Collaborate

This section explores conditions driving the PHN members to engage in the

collaboration. The interview analysis revealed that there were three external conditions

underlying their decision to collaborate with each other. First, their interests being

constantly threatened was one of the strong drivers to create solution. Coupled with the

prolonged damaged interests, a turning point for the collaboration was also investigated.

Secondly, third party intervention had played important roles at the early stage of the

collaboration. The finding showed that members of the collaboration were good

connectors for expanding the network. Lastly, the collaborative initiative could possibly

take place because of democratic atmosphere. Additionally, the finding showed that the

willing participation was an important condition allowing these members to join the PHN.

3.3.1. Their Interests Being Threatened

Their tangible and intangible interests had been threatened by the conflict. To begin with the tangible one, the chaos in Chiang Mai made visitors cancel their travel plan to Chiang Mai as foreign states warned their citizens to avoid visiting Chiang Mai and Thailand. The statistic provided in the table 3.2 has indicated that the numbers of visitors gradually decreased from 2007 to 2008, the years that had political unrest in Chiang Mai as well as the closure of international airports in Bangkok. Since tourism is related large to other activities, small business owners such as for accommodation, restaurants, coffee shops, souvenir shops, local markets, and private transportation were impacted by the prolonged conflict.

It is not only the tourism industry that faced great impacts, other investment and businesses such as exports, real estates, and selling products and retails were also affected. This drove several participants of the Coalition of Peaceful Homeland who were the representatives from the business sectors, actively engage in the collaboration during late 2009. These representatives were from the Council of Chiang Mai Industry, Association of Hotels and Accommodation in Chiang Mai, and the Thai Council Chamber of Commerce (TCCC). Besides, according to Wichai, Arun, and Yingyot, some participants were small business owners whose turnover largely depended upon the tourism industry. The conflict greatly damaged their sources of income. Consequently, they decided to join the collaborative process (personal communication, June-July, 2014).

Particularly, the Prime Minister case was directly related to the business sector as a whole. From the TCCC's perspective, the annual meeting was very important for them to discuss and brainstorm on business direction for the following year.

Normally, after finishing the meeting, the TCCC provides a report which consists of analysis of trend, challenges and directions, and recommendations for governments. Later, they would monitor and put pressure on the governments to increase the economic growth. Even though, business may not want to get involved with the conflict, they had talks with the Red Shirts so that they could hold the meeting. This reflected that economic interest was their critical motivation. In addition, the collaboration's objectives were also to restore healthy environment for the upcoming tourism season "the Loi Kratong festival", and to successfully host the TCCC's annual meeting without violence. These reasons obviously reflected their motivations to take part in the collaboration (S. Preecha, T. Sangtian, and C. Yingyot, personal communication, June-July, 2014). It is noteworthy that around two to three months after the TCCC's meeting, the representatives from business sector declined to collaborate because they avoided attaching their organizations with the Coalition of Peaceful Network. People from the business sector were very concerned on expressing their thoughts in public, especially their political views. In their eyes, the collaboration was highly involved with the political color-coded conflict.

Secondly, to protect the Chiang Mai's value was another underlying motivation. The participants of the CPH asserted that aggressive behaviors and violent conflict were undermining their values and the unique characteristics of Chiang Mai people which are

being kind and being good host to their guests. According to the interviews, the people

involving with the collaborative process expected that Chiang Mai people are nice, polite,

and always offer warm welcome to guests. The conflict severely damaged this value. An

informant told

> I never saw such turmoil in our hometown. We used to be persons
> who uphold our Lanna traditional way of life: smile, gentle, respect
> others, and warm welcome to our guests. I am sad to see that and
> want to see peaceful atmosphere returns to our community again.
> (S. Chumsai, personal communication, July 15, 2014)

Wichai asserted his thought that "I think the Red Shirts' behaviors were

unreasonable. We always are recognized as warm host. The Prime Minister is Thai. Why

the Thai people cannot come to Chiang Mai?"(personal communication, June 16, 2014).

K. Sanong exploded his thought that "The Rak Chiang Mai 51's behaviors

destroyed the image of Chiang Mai natives whose characters are polite, nice, and calm. It

is fine to protest, but do it peacefully. Threatening to hurt our guests is embarrassing"

(personal communication, July 16, 2014)

Similarly, several of them mentioned Chiang Mai's motto that "we welcome our

decent guests and greet with our warm hospitality." In addition, the name of the

collaboration, "Peaceful Homeland" which was originally the northern dialect "Ban Jum

Mueang Yen", means a home with full of peace, delight, and happiness. The members of

the collaboration brainstormed and selected the name which reflected a core purpose of

the collaboration. This indicated what the participants truly valued.

Hence, it can be concluded that the participants of the collaboration who were

Chiang Mai natives were proud of the value: good host and kind hospitality to their

guests. Besides, this value, they had close ties with the concept of safety and comfort place to live. Therefore, their motivation to participate in the collaboration was to protect the value. At the same time, the value served not only their intangible interest, but also related to their safe living conditions and benefited their business.

Thirdly, the participants of the collaboration regardless of political group, sex, and experiences were willing to see healthy situation in their hometown. They revealed that the conflict and unstable incidents in Chiang Mai had negative mental impacts on them. The more they consumed the news; they became more stressful and frustrated. Almost all of the collaborative members told that "I felt sad seeing such violence reoccurred in our community, so I think it might be good. Then I joined the collaboration with some expectation that I could understand, share and learn from others, and helped dealing with the conflict" (S. Chana, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

"I was stressed out when knowing the news about the conflict and violence in Chiang Mai. I really wanted to solve the problem" (Y. Jarunee, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

"I was frustrated with the situation. In the past we lived like brother and sister, but now we do not trust each other and are afraid to talk about politics" (K.Sanong, personal communication, July 16, 2014).

"The conflict made me feel stressed out and it also produced prolonged negative impacts in my life (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014).

Some shared,

> These people, Rak Chaing Mai 51, are Thaksin followers, they
> cause damage too much in our home and should be stopped. I do

not expect to change their political thoughts but want to understand and wish I could help improve the situation. (K. Wichai, personal communication, August 1, 2014*)*

Lastly, the collaboration members who were the leaders of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts stated that primary interest for them was to have safe place to express their political opinions and launch political activities. Chiang Mai was a base of the Red Shirts and several of them were Thaksin followers. Whenever the Yellow Shirts had a plan to organize political activities including those such as fund-raising event, public forums, or monthly meetings among its members, the Red Shirts followers came and attacked them. Some interviewees described the situation that "We could not host any political activities even public forum discussing on political problem. Whenever they (the Red Shirts) knew, and then always interrupted us with aggressive behaviors" (T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29, 2014).

As a result, mostly the Yellow Shirts activists were afraid to identify themselves and to organize collective events. The Yellow Shirts' leaders expected that the collaboration would provide them with a safe space to express their political ideas. The Red Shirts' leaders, however, did not have limitation in expressing and launching political activities in public. However, they realized that employing violent tactics by some the Red Shirts' groups did not address the conflict appropriately, but rather created more hatred and mistrust among the people.

Surprisingly, some members had common interest and agreed with some ideas of the collaboration as explained above, yet they gave different reasons for participating in the process. They told "I thought that the Peaceful Homeland network could not make a

great change towards the conflict, but I joined to share my ideas and to avoid being labeled as a non-cooperative person" (S. Chana, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

As such, it indicated that social values or norms were useful mechanisms to encourage parties to collaborate. This point was very interesting and should be examined how a community could create norms and employ it as a mean to alleviate the conflict. Unfortunately, since the issue is not in the scope of study, I, therefore, did not have an opportunity to explore closely how much such values/norm could influence individuals in conflict setting.

3.3.2 What was a Turning Point to a Collaboration?

In the article, "Turning in International Negotiation: A Comparative Analysis", Druckman provides a widely accepted definition of "the turning point as events or processes that mark passage from one stage to the next, signaling progress from earlier to later phase…" (2001, p.92). I acknowledge that the concept of ripeness (Zartman, 2008) and turning points have shared similarities as well as some differences. As Druckman (2001) points out, both concepts refer to changes but focus on different aspects. "Ripeness" is a precipitating factor leading to negotiation whereas "turning points" is a part of the negotiation process. However, in this thesis, the purpose is to investigate the conditions leading to the collaboration. Hence, a broader definition of the turning points stated above is interpreted and used to explain conditions which led to the talk between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai.

As the guiding theories in this research, it is hypothesized that there should be

a turning point that made members of both conflicting parties perceive stalemate and then decide to collaborate. Prior going into the field research, the researcher was informed that the turning point to begin the collaboration was during Prime Minister Abhisit's plan to visit Chiang Mai in November, 2009. The researcher, then, presumed this incident as a turning point and then examined it. The analysis revealed that members of the PHN had different turning points. Some did not collaborate because of being aroused by a specific incident, but rather gradually expected an opportunity/the ripe moment for making a further step.

Before presenting the result, a brief detail on the incident of Abhisit's plan to visit Chiang Mai is worth discussing here. Every year, the Thai Council Chamber of Commerce (TCCC) has an annual meeting which traditionally invites the Prime Minister to deliver the opening remark (K. Wichai, personal communication, June 16, 2014). TCCC decided to hold the annual meeting of the year 2009 in Chiang Mai and expected the Prime Minister to give an opening remark on the 29th of November. After hearing this news, the Red Shirts announced that Abhisit will not come and they would do anything to prevent him from stepping into Chiang Mai. Thus, according to Wichai, the TCCC representatives were worried not only on Abhisit's possibility to come to Chiang Mai, but also their responsibility to host the meeting. Fortunately, the representatives of the private sector had participated in the collaborative meeting and voiced their concern with the Coalition of Peaceful Homeland (CPH). Members of PHN who were the Red Shirts informed how the Red Shirts prepared to rally if Abhisit would come to Chiang Mai (P. Arun, personal communication, June 14, 2014). After assessing the situation, the

representatives of TCCC notified the security services and the Prime Minister of the situation. Eventually, Abhisit canceled the plan.

The interviews revealed that the turning points for each member were different as illustrated in the table.

Table 3.3 A Turning Point of Each Individual

Members of the PHN	A Turing Point	
	Abhisit's visit Chiang Mai	Other incidents
Pioneers of the PHN	-	√
Members who joined PHN during October 2009	-	√
Members who joined PHN post October, 2009	√	-

According to the table 3.3, the attempt to initiate the constructive process had started before Abhisit's visit was planned. A small talk between the pioneers, which included four individuals on the early stage of the process, had begun since July, 2009. These initiators had thought of seeking an alternative approach to deal with the prolonged conflict because it was undermining society in many dimensions including their networks and cooperation in communities (T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29, 2014). All of the four individuals admitted that it was painful and hopelessness prevailed when the conflict periodically occurred. Though they were eager to initiate collaboration between

the two conflicting parties, they did not know how to start a dialogue (P. Arun, personal communication, June 14, 2014). Coincidently, a third- party contacted them and discussed the possibility to talk with other members of the color-coded group and then they decided to talk. Hence, the turning point for the pioneers was the third- party intervention. Details about the third-party are provided later in the chapter four.

As for the members attending the PHN during October, 2009, they revealed that having been affected by the prolonged conflict encouraged them to join the collaboration. Similar to the pioneers, they did not know where to start and whom they should talk to. Consequently, when the pioneers introduced them about the initiative, they were willing to take part in the collaborative process. Therefore, Abhisit's visiting Chiang Mai was a turning point for other members of the PHN. They admitted that the aggressive response from Rak Chiang Mai 51 towards Abhisit's visiting plan was their last straw (K. Wichai, personal communication, June 16, 2014). This was because they realized that the escalation of the conflict damaged their interests, and it was important to change from being confrontational to creative with resolution approaches (C. Yingyot, personal communication, June 15, 2014). Once these people knew about the initiative of the collaborative process, they then decided to engage in the collaboration. Hence, for these members, Abhisit's proposed trip to Chiang Mai was a turning point to seek a constructive way to alleviate the conflict and shift away from zero sum game.

Though Abhisit's visit was not a turning point for the pioneers, in fact the incident gave an opportunity to publicize the collaborative process. The responses from Rak Chiang Mai 51 in preparing rallies against Abhisit's visit such as threatening Abhisit,

verbal abuse, and stirring up people's mood made the pioneers realize that they needed to initiate their collaborative plan.

They anticipated it was a good timing to send the public message that some of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts did not prefer violent tactics, but were rather trying to find creative solutions. Coupled with the expectation that the collaboration would undermine Rak Chiang Mai 51's justification in employing violence, the pioneers and the new comers of the process then decided to publicize the collaboration plan.

Few days before the 29th of November 2009, representatives of TCCC, members of CPH, and Chiang Mai authorities and security service gave a public statement to welcome all the participants of the TCCC annual meeting. Key leaders of the Red Shirts - Rak Chiang Mai 51 - declared that those leaders were not authentically Red Shirts and did not represent the Red Shirts as a whole. Additionally, they claimed that those collaborative Red shirts were not assigned to be representatives from the group. The leaders as well as other Red Shirts were not bound with any agreement coming from that meeting (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014). Although Abhisit canceled his visit to Chiang Mai, authorities still deployed security officers to maintain orders until the meeting ended. Hence, pictures of Chiang Mai filled with security forces made several embassies give warning to their citizens to avoid visiting Chiang Mai. Shortly after the introduction of the PHN, several individuals decided to engage in the process, but some members of the PHN had to drop out from the process.

Put simply, though the turning points for them were different, the two common components were: the prolonged conflict, which was deleterious for both parties, and the

long period of bearing such consequences allowed them to identify the stalemate and look for another approach to deal with the conflict. At this point, it can be concluded that Abhisit's proposed trip to Chiang Mai took place at the ripe moment and since both parties were widely realizing that the conflict was counterproductive thus sought a way to lessen the tension and prevent further violence in their hometown. Referring back to my second hypothesis, it is correct that there must be a turning point to catalyze the collaboration between the conflicting parties.

3.3.3. Third-Party Intervention

As elaborated further in the Chapter Four, the third-party had played critical role in this collaboration. At the time the conflict was highly tense: each party's positions were different. Chiang Mai natives realized that their home was caught in a fire and they desired to restore a peaceful environment. Extracting from the interviews, the researcher found that some leaders of both sides and indirect parties were willing to discuss with the opponent on how to alleviate the conflict, but they did not know how to start. One of the Red Shirts' leaders told, "I had a thought about talking with the Yellow Shirts, but it was hard to start. At that time, I did not know the Chiang Mai Yellow Shirts in person, so Arun played a critical role in bringing us to talk" (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014).

Likewise, the leader of the Yellow Shirts described, "I am Yellow and playing a leading role in the Yellow Shirts group, I cannot go and talk with the Red Shirts. Doing so is awkward and I would lose credibility in leadership" (T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29, 2014).

Generally, members of the conflicting groups at leadership level were expected to be loyal to the group. If anyone has deviant behaviors, s/he can hardly re-integrate to the group and would be labeled as traitor or enemy. The Yellow Shirts, for example, if leaders especially at national level whether changed positions or declined to committed to the protests, s/he would be labeled as traitors and be negatively criticized. As a result, having the third parties who initiated the meeting opened a room for them to explain their actions to their group's members (T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29, 2014).

Regarding honesty and impartiality, the participants of the process, especially the leaders of both conflicting parties perceived that the third-party was impartial and honest to take part in the initiative. Chana, for instance, claimed that he doubted the U.S. because he believed that the U.S. has hidden agenda in undermining the Monarchy and supported the Red Shirts. However, his attitude toward Arun who worked for the U.S. consular was different. Chana thought that Arun had a good intention and did not take any side. He described,

> Actually, I do not really know what Arun thought and expected about the collaboration. To me, he was very nice, open-minded, and honest of what he was doing. I did not see him support the Red Shirts and I thought there was no risk for taking part in this collaborative process. (S. Chana, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

More details and discussion on the third- party intervention are provided in the Chapter Four.

3.3.4. Democratic Atmosphere

The collaborative process including all relevant activities that contributed to the PHN emerged during the period of elected governments. In other words, activities related to the collaboration from the first forum in June 2009 to the formal PHN establishment in March 2010, took place under the democratic atmosphere. Though, the political conflict sporadically escalated, the collaboration could continue and still launched activities. Conversely, after the coup in May, 2014, political activities have been prohibited. Many activists who conflicted with the military junta were detained.

Several shared that some of them were worried about negative consequences and some were afraid of taking public actions regarding the political conflict and the military junta (T. Pendara, U. Poomtam, C. Yingyot, & T. Sangtian, personal communication, June -July 2014).

Hence, the collaborative process and activities such as meetings, campaigns, and public forums have been suspended until now. Several members of the PHN as well as other interviewees shared that under such circumstances, they are afraid to take political actions because it probably causes undesired consequences.

3.3.5. Willing Participation

The result shows that everybody took part in the process willingly, not being forced to collaborate. This research result may seem normal, but it has to be pointed out that the collaboration process was critical for conflict resolution in Thailand. After the coup in May 22nd, 2014, several activists and leaders of the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts at provincial level were invited to the meeting table. And then, these leaders gave hand

shake to one another in front of security forces and some high-ranking officials in that provinces along with the promise that they would no longer be in the conflict. These incidents took place in several provinces, and it were widely spread on media such as newspapers, televisions, and Facebook.

Looking back to the research participants, all of them expressed,

"After listening to him (Jeera), I think the initiative was a good idea and I wanted to know how it work" (S. Chumsai, personal communication, July 15, 2014).

"He (Arun, the key third party) asked me of the possibility to talk with the other side. He told me that the talk would be private and confidential. I think it was a good opportunity, then I should try" (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014).

"He talked about the initiative to me, and he (Sangtian) asked me to join. I think it should provide some fruitful" (Y. Jarunee, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

Beyond, their personal interests were being undermined, several members, especially the leaders of both parties, expressed their determinations to resolve the conflict. These people had experiences in fighting for social justices for a long time. In the case of Preecha, his actions proved that he had a strong determination for a better change. At that time, once he debuted in the public that he closely engaged with the collaboration, Preecha was in a hard situation. The leader of Rak Chiang Mai 51 put pressure on him by bringing members of the Red Shirts to surround his resident and cursed him as a traitor. With his determination, Preecha still became a part of the collaboration and patiently proved himself to the collaboration and the Red Shirts.

Almost all of them desperately desired to build social justice and deliberative democracy. However, they selected different means and took side to pursue their goals. After attending in-depth discussion and deeply listening through the process, they realized that there was a need to gain support from the mass of both sides-the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. They believed that by working together the concepts of social justice and deliberative democracy would be spread to people of these political groups. Hence, they were willing to collaborate.

3.4 Conditions that Led Some to Decline to Collaborate

Amidst unstable situation, a group of people and conflicting parties started working together for seeking an alternative solution. On the contrary, several individuals did not attend the collaborative process. This section examines the reasons why some declined to collaborate. In this research, individuals who were considered as declining the collaborative process were those who did not involve with the collaboration before March, 2010. March, 2010 was set as a critical point for three reasons. The first reason was that the collaboration changed the name form "Coalition of Peaceful Homeland" to "Peaceful Homeland Network". Having an official work place and appointing a president to contact outside organizations on behalf of the collaboration formally was the second reason. Lastly, the environment in Chiang Mai after March, 2010 were far more complicated as the military highly involved with the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai and other mechanisms imposed to resolve the conflict. The finding reveals that the conditions leading to declining are as follow:

Table 3.4 The Conditions Leading to Declining in the Collaboration

Parties	Reasons			
	Non-Inclusive Identification Process	Unripe Time	Lack of Trust	Others
Members of the Red Shirts	√	√	-	√
Members of the Yellow Shirts	√	-	√	√

3.4.1. Non-Inclusive Stakeholder Identification Process

Members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts explained that non-inclusive stakeholder identification was a key reason why they did not take part in this collaborative process. Having honest and inclusive persons was critical for collaboration, yet it was a challenging step to identify parties to come to the table. At the early stage of the PHN collaboration, several members of the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts were addressed and then chosen. Due to the non-inclusive stakeholder identification, these individuals were not invited. Consequently, they did not attend the collaboration and other activities related to the collaboration during the early period of PHN.

Members of the Red Shirts. Four members of the Red Shirts were examined including Petchwat, Pendara, Pongpat and Poomtam. From all of them, only Petchwat was not be interviewed, so data about him was based on secondary data and other

informants' interviews. Two of them: Petchwat and Pendara were the provincial level

leaders whereas Pongpat was a leader of a small group of the Red Shirts. Another person,

Poomtam was a member, not a leader, of the Red Shirts who usually participated in the

political activities both in Chiang Mai and Bangkok. Due to the political instability when

the research data was being gathered in the field research in May, 2014, Pendara, Pongpat

and Poomtam could be reached and interviewed in person, but only Petchwat was not be

interviewed. Hence, data related to Petchwat heavily relies on newspapers, the Red

Shirts' website, and the interviews of other members of the Red Shirts.

Preecha, the pioneer from the Red Shirts group, revealed that during the onset of

the collaboration, Pendara was very new to the Red Shirts movement and he did not

know him well.

Likewise, T. Pendara told the same story.

> I knew that there was an imitative trying to encourage the Red
> Shirts and the Yellow Shirts to work with each other. But how
> could I take part in, I was not be invited. Moreover, at that time, I
> was quite new in the movement. (personal communication, July
> 18, 2014)

C. Pongpat also described, "I did not receive invitation to the collaborative

process" (personal communication, July 19, 2014).

Moreover, some PHN members from the Red Shirts camp informed that Pongpat

was not in the list of invitation because he was not only new to the movement which had

limited influence to others, but also his political actions were rather aggressive. (S.

Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014; S. Racha, personal communication,

June 17, 2014).

In case of Poomtam, the reason for declining the collaborative process was the same to Pendara: he was not invited and did not know Preecha and other Red Shirts who joined the collaboration. Additionally, Poomtam was not a leader of the Red Shirts Movement in Chiang Mai.

Similarly, Petchwat, the leader of Ruk Chiang Mai 51 was widely recognized as a representative of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai at that time, was not being invited to the process. According to the news, when Petchwat heard a rumor that some leaders of the Red Shirts attended a discussion with the Yellow Shirts, he condemned those leaders via the Red radio station. "We (the Red Shirts) will expel you out of Chiang Mai, if you are still cooperating with the opponent. Whoever talks to the Yellow Shirts is not the true Red" (S. Preecha, personal communication, July 23, 2014). Arun and Jeera also shared the same information as Preecha mentioned above.

Due to his aggressive position, Arun, Preecha, and other members from the Red camps anticipated that having him in the room would be counterproductive. Moreover, Petchwat's statement did affect two leaders of the Red Shirts who started joining with the collaboration. They were concerned of their safety and well-being, so finally they withdrew from the collaborative process shortly after Petchwat's reaction.

Members of the Yellow Shirts. Nine members of the Yellow Shirts were interviewed. Four of them never took part in the collaboration whereas another five started to collaborate after March, 2011. The finding also revealed that they were not involved with the collaboration because of non-inclusive stakeholder identification.

K. Saifon told, "I heard about the collaboration, but I was not being invited" (personal communication, July 21, 2014). Another six interviewees also provided the same reason that because of not being invited to the process, they did not attend the PHN. However, there were five individuals who became active members of the collaborative process after March 2010. And a brief explanation of their changes was provided in further finding.

3.4.2. Unripe Time

According to the research participants, the members of the Red Shirt explained that unripe time was a reason for declining the collaborative process. On the contrary, this unripe time did not affect the members of the Yellow Shirts.

T. Pendara claimed that the initiation of the collaboration was not in appropriate time for him. At that time, he and his colleagues were about to reshape a new Red Shirts organization in Chiang Mai, so to take part in the collaboration could generate negative impacts on his side. Pendara described that after the Red Shirts were suppressed in Black April, 2008, the mass was desperate and there was an internal conflict within the Red Shirts organization. In June of 2008, he and his colleagues could successfully establish "Red Chiang Mai or Nor Por Chor Chiang Mai" (personal communication, July 18, 2014). As a result, being involved with the collaboration, Pendara would face many troubles especially with his leadership.

Likewise, Pongpat was new to the Red Shirts and tried to create profile within the new community. Therefore, he rather declined the collaborative process. As for Poomtam, neither he was a member of the collaboration's working group nor participated

with the process at the onset of Coalition of Peaceful Homeland, Poomtam kept tracking the collaboration. He later participated in other activities launched by the PHN and decided not to take part in the collaboration. Poomtam explained that because the collaboration did not address other causes of the conflict such as the role of the monarchy toward the conflict and court's exercising power on behalf of the King.

Though Petchwat was not interviewed, data and other research subjects explicitly showed that Petchwat's declined to pursue his political agenda. Since Petchwat was the leader of Rak Chiang Mai 51 which was the largest Red Shirts group at that time, whenever and wherever it needed to gather against the opponent, he could mobilize the mass to operate their political missions. Hence, it was unlikely for him to cooperate with the Yellow Shirts. Additionally, Petchwat's financial issues and personal ambition in politics had driven him to serve Thaksin and remained employing aggressive behaviors toward the opponents. The members of the Red Shirts namely Preecha, Pendara, Pongpat, and Pansak shared the same information that "Petchwat was not transparent with budget management in political activities. He also does not have political ideology: I think he did things based on benefits gaining from serving Thaksin" (S. Preecha, personal communication, July 23, 2014).

"He (Petchwat) has faced many challenges on financial management. Since he has desire in seeking power, he has to maintain his status quo as a leader. And because of this, it is impossible for him to join the collaboration" (T. Pendara, personal communication, July 18, 2014).

At that time, nationally the Red Shirts were defeated and did not accomplish their political goal on demanding Democrat party to step down. Since 2006, other prime ministers that were elected by the Red Shirts were overthrown and their demands were unmet. In addition, the Red Shirts' rally in April, 2009 was the first time that the Red Shirts gathered and took action against the opponent. Psychologically, moving from competitive to collaborative approach was impossible because their demands which cling on the national politics could not be achieved through local collaboration. In addition, according to the interview, Thaksin needed to win the political game. Therefore, he relentlessly supported the movement to pursue the political goal.

3.4.3. Lack of Trust

According to the table, lack of trust greatly contributed on why those individuals denied in the collaboration particularly, the members of the Yellow Shirts. On the contrary, the members of the Red Shirts who were interviewed, did not mention the lack of trust as a condition for not being involved with the collaboration. Though two members of the Yellow Shirts were invited to the collaboration, they eventually decided not to join to the collaboration.

K. Udom, one of the Yellow Shirts leaders was invited to the process, but he rejected to do so. He explained that there were several members of the Red Shirts in the process whom he did not trust. "I think it is good idea to do, but I don't trust them" (personal communication, August 3, 2014).

Likewise, V. Sansai shared her thought,

> The main critical reason that I did not join the collaboration is because I do not trust the Red Shirts. I used to be threatened by

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them. Last year, some put a bomb in front of my house and I believed the Red Shirts did this. How can I work with them? (personal communication, June 14, 2014)

3.4.4 Other Conditions

Besides the above conditions, there were other two reasons why some people declined to join the collaboration. To begin with the first one, members of the Red Shirts told that conditions that made them deny was that they were *fearful* of being expelled out of the group and get negative consequences. There were two key members of the Red Shirts who used to attend meetings with the aim to establish the collaboration. Shortly after their presence in the meetings was known to Petchwat, they were verbally threatened by Petchwat and were labeled as traitors. As a result, they had to withdraw from the collaborative process. Arun and Preecha, for instance, told that Mahawan, one of the founders of Rak Chiang Mai 51 and community radio 97.5 Mhz, used to actively engage in the collaboration. Unfortunately, when the news leaked to public, Petchwat announced that the Red Shirts who still collaborated with the Yellow Shirts would be compelled out of Chiang Mai. Consequently, Mahawan withdrew from the collaboration (P. Arun, personal communication, July 22, 2014). Though this condition did not emerge among the members of the Yellow Shirts.

As for the second condition, the members of the Yellow Shirts explained that there was a belief *that this political color-coded conflict requires other approach*. This means they considered that the collaborative process could not handle the conflict effectively. They preferred to employ other approach. For example, some argued that the conflict shall be resolved only when one party becomes dominant. Hence, according to

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their thought, the collaborative process was impractical. Additionally, several believed

that conflict resolution at the local level could not affect the conflict where the causes and

conditions were rooted at the national-scale. Some members of the Red Shirts also

claimed this reason as why they did not take part in the collaboration.

U. Poomtam, a member of the Red Shirts, elaborated,

> The collaboration did not address the cause of the conflict which is
> about the role of the Monarchy. So, it cannot be solved through the
> way they are dealing with, and I rather chose to decline the
> collaboration. (personal communication, July 14, 2014).

Another individual explained,

> The conflict plays a role in my family: my sisters who are the Red
> Shirts, and I always have hot quarrel about the conflict. I feel sad
> and stressful. The violence in Chiang Mai is so brutal, I am so
> angry when hearing the leaders (Red Shirts) stir up people's mood.
> And I want to see harmony returning to our society. As for the
> collaboration, I believe under Democratic party, the conflict would
> be resolved (K. Saifon, personal communication, July 21, 2014)."

The finding revealed that even though these declining individuals shared similar

values about their hometown, they insisted to collaborate. The analysis indicated that at

that time, less than a year after Abhisit just stepped in to power, people who supported

the Democrat Party began to ignore the collaboration because their pro-side was already

in power. For those who did not like Democrat Party, they argued that having

government from the Democrat Party would suspend the pervasiveness of Thaksin's

influence.

Interestingly, later when the PHN had action plans to alleviate the conflict and

working toward Chiang Mai Self-Governing, the five individuals were invited to

participate in the collaboration: some just participated whereas some decided to be

working group members. These people viewed the PHN with skeptical eyes because there were several Red Shirts within the process. In addition, PHN was an exclusive network in which only the invited people could take part in. Therefore, they preferred to involve with only open activities/forums.

Understanding the conditions driving and preventing the cross color-coded collaboration was important, but it was still inadequate to comprehend and utilize the emergence of the collaboration. Hence, it was important to examine PHN members' data at the individual level as well as members of the both conflicting groups who were not involved with the collaboration. These data and analysis have been provided in the Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FOUR

Third-Party Intervention

Many scholars and practitioners in conflict resolution field agree that peacebuilding requires various kinds and roles of third-party intervention. Several peace processes in war-torn countries such as South Africa owed third-party intervention in initiating peace talks. Considering the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, through its extreme escalation in 2009, the collaboration in Chiang Mai could happen. Therefore, the researcher theorized that there must be a third-party who may intervene and encourage the peace talk. After analyzing data, I found that third-party intervention played important roles in the early stage of the collaboration which was proven that the first hypothesis of third party formation strongly exist. This section presents findings and the analysis result on who were the third-party including their features, relationships with the conflicting parties, conflictants' perceptions of them, and their roles in this collaboration.

4.1 Who were the Third-Party?

Throughout the interviews, informants stated that third-party intervention is significant for the collaboration. On November 25th 2009, the Thai Council Chamber of Commerce (TCCC) along with representatives of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts and security services had a public meeting to announce a mutual agreement that they

would not use violence to disturb or threaten the opponent's political activities, but rather

cooperate to solve the conflict (P. Arun, personal communication, June 14, 2014). Both

representatives admitted that if there was no third-party to host this meeting, the talk

between them could have never happened. At that time, the situation was quite critical; if

leaders from neither party initiated cooperation with the another one, they would have

been in serious trouble. This was because they were labeled as traitors to the eyes of their

respective groups (T. Suchit, S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12/29, 2014).

The interview reveals that there were two third party individuals who directly

initiated the collaborative process: Arun, an employee at the U.S. Consulate-General in

Chiang Mai at that time and Jeera, an army official working in Chiang Mai. The

following table is the general backgrounds of them based on the year 2009 when the

collaboration began.

Table 4.1 The Third-Party's Background

Third-Party	Individual/ Organization	Age (Year)	Sex	Hometown/ Settled Town	Occupation
U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai	Non-Thai Government Organization	68 Established in 1950	-	-	-
Arun (Pseudonym)	Individual	55	Male	Lampoon/ Chiang Mai	Senior Officer at the U.S. Consulate - General
Jeera (Pseudonym)	Individual	54	Male	Chiang Mai	Military Officer

Before providing findings about the two key individuals, an overview data on the roles of the U.S. Consulate - General in Chiang Mai is presented.

P. Arun informed that as the U.S. was concerned that a civil war may erupt in Thailand, the U.S. Consulate - General in Chiang Mai aimed to manage the conflict and expected that a project could contribute in preventing violence (negative peace) to reoccur. Hence, the U.S. consulate - General in Chiang Mai initiated the project called "Public Speakers" which allowed conflicting parties and civil society to learn and see new perspectives on the political crisis and roles of the parties as well as citizens to smoothly enhance the transition. The U.S. consulate - General in Chiang Mai anticipated that the public forums would provide constructive approach toward the conflict. Apart from holding the public speaker project, later the U.S. Consulate - General in Chiang Mai also coordinated with other organizations to provide financial supports to the PHN for delivering activities which encouraged collaboration in Chiang Mai (personal communication, June 14, 2014).

4.1.1. Background

Of the three third-party groups, only Arun and Jeera were individuals that could be interviewed for following details;

4.1.1.1 Age and Sex. By the time of initiating the collaboration, Arun and Jeera were male at the age of mid-fifty.

4.1.1.2 Hometown. Jeera was born in Chiang Mai and has been living and working there, so he is Chiang Mai native. On the other hand, Arun considered himself as

Chiang Mai native. Originally, he was Lampoon native and later moved and settled down in Chiang Mai. In Northern Thai people's perception, Lampoon and Chiang Mai are sister cities in affiliation because Lampoon is located next to Chiang Mai. In terms of language, Lampoon's dialect is exactly alike to Chiang Mai's. As a result, the Thai northern people and Chiang Mai native consider Lampoon natives similar to the people in Chiang Mai.

4.1.1.3 Education. Both Arun and Jeera have higher educational background. Arun graduated bachelor and master degree in social science. Jeera at first had diploma and then he pursued his bachelor degree in political science.

4.1.1.4 Occupation and Experiences. At the time of the collaborative process, Arun was a senior political specialist at the U.S. consulate - General in Chiang Mai, Thailand. He had various kinds of working experience such as working with non-profit organizations both local and international organizations and being a Thai official and a Thai state enterprise officer. Later, his position at the U.S. consular made him responsible for meetings and discussing with key officials, NGOs, business personnel, and politicians. Such responsibilities enabled him to have broad relationships and connections with various professionals (personal communication, June 14, 2014).

In case of the second one, third-party Jeera was a non-commissioned military officer based in Chiang Mai upon graduation. He was born in an underprivileged family and faced many difficulties. Therefore, he was eager to learn and demonstrated interest on political issues (A. Jeera, personal communication, July 15, 2014). In the 2000s, the early period of Thai Rak Thai Party, Jeera took part in promoting the party's policies as

well as building political network from grass-root levels in Chiang Mai. He strongly supported Thai Rak Thai because their policies were directly related to majority of people especially to those who did not have access to healthcare service and were underprivileged (S. Chumsai, personal communication, July 15, 2014). In sum, his background on social activities made him well-known among local activists and local politicians in Chiang Mai.

Discussion on the Third-Party's Background

With regards to the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai, their effort is considered as a Track I – Government, or Peacemaking through Diplomacy. Actors of the track I could be diplomats, policymakers, and peace builders working through formal aspects of the governmental processes (Diamond & McDonald cited in Sandole, 2011). The U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai, by their reputation, had given support on human resources, financial, and venue to host the two public forums.

So, Arun's role in organizing the public forums is under the Track I because he performed as a U.S. official. However, Arun claimed that he had strong passion to alleviate the conflict. Consequently, his roles after the two public forums was beyond his obligations and responsibility as an official of the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai. In other word, his involvement is considered as Track IV – Private Citizen through Personal Involvement (Diamond & McDonald cited in Sandole, 2011). Also, Jeera took part in this collaboration because he was greatly concerned and wanted to alleviate the conflict. His intervention, therefore, is considered as Private Citizen Track IV.

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Considering their background, there are similarities between Arun and Jeera as follows:

First, both are male and were at the age of mid-fifty when the process started.

Secondly, Arun and Jeera are Chiang Mai natives. This issue is interesting and may had influence on the individuals who attended the process because the northern dialect called "Kam Mueang" was mainly used throughout the collaboration. While conducting the interview, the researcher observed that the informants' conversations were in northern dialect. And some informants directly pointed out that they felt more connected and comfortable when "Kam Mueang" was used in the collaboration (T. Sangtian, personal communication, June 13, 2014). This can be interpreted that third party who are Chiang Mai natives and reside in the same hometown could make them feel more connected. Moreover, it implied that the collaboration that was initiated by the natives seemed to be more long-lasting and seriously carried out because the parties were greatly concerned about their hometown. The assumption is that if the parties were not Chiang Mai natives, the collaboration may have been unlikely to occur.

Third, according to their educational and occupational background, they did not have specific knowledge nor profession on conflict analysis and resolution. They shared that they had never been trained to intervene a conflict, but they could still perform the roles. And eventually, their efforts were fruitful and brought a creative approach toward the conflict.

Forth, Arun and Jeera had common past experiences of active engagement on the

public issues and that had made the members of both color-coded groups and activists in Chiang Mai aware of their good reputations and so they believed that Arun and Jeera had good will to impose themselves as the third party.

4.2 How did they become the Third-Party?

Basically, these two individuals did not know each other. As they had involved in many public activities, Arun had heard about Jeera and his public activities. Later, he met Jeera in person shortly after the 2006 coup. Arun invited him to talk and assess the general situation in Chiang Mai. As the conflict periodically escalated and spread into Chiang Mai, Arun and Jeera consulted and designed a model for managing the conflict. After interacting with Arun, Jeera explained that he believed Arun was truly concerned about the situation in Chiang Mai and was sincere to handle the conflict. This was why he trusted Arun, and then they became the third-party team. In this case, Arun and Jeera intervened as imposed third party since they initiated the talk that leaded to further constructive process.

4.3 Relationships with the Conflictants

Deduced from the sixteen research informants who were involved with the collaborative process, the relationships between the conflictants and the third party can be roughly categorized into three levels as follows:

Table 4.2 Relationship between the Third-Party and the Conflictants

The Third-Party	Level of Relationship prior PHN			Note
	Friend	Acquaintance	Stranger	
Arun	4	3	9	Four individuals among the Friend were the pioneers of the collaborative process.
Jeera	5	4	7	Four individuals among the Friend were the pioneers of the collaborative process.

First of all, the definition of the level of relationship in this table is provided. Since the research questions are exploring big pictures of relationships among conflictants and the third party, some specific details were not examined. In this research, the category 'Friend' means that the conflictants and the third party knew each other in persons and they considered others as trustworthy.

The Friend relationship also means that they used to coordinate or work together. 'Acquaintance' means that the research informants and the third parties know or may not know in person. But at least one had heard about the other's reputations and interests.

And 'Stranger' means that the research informants and the third parties did not know in person. In addition, one another had never known/heard about each other prior to the collaborative process.

To begin with Arun, as discussed previously, he had passion in taking part in public issues since he was a university student. According to the table, four individuals in the 'Friend' were the pioneers from both the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, their names are Preecha, Suchit, Sangtian, and Suchart. These individuals are social activists who had always involved with the public issues. Therefore, they had known each other for several years prior to the political conflict that had erupted.

Arun as well as the initiators shared the stories they often met, interacted, and coordinated when they attended activities that related to critical public issues. For the pioneers of PHN members, three of them who were interviewed, revealed that they had known Arun prior to the collaborative process. They knew each other from taking part in public activities.

Looking at Jeera, it can be said that the findings related to the level of relationships he shared with others was similar to Arun's. As discussed previously, Jeera was a prominent activist in Chiang Mai. As a result, these individuals especially who were pioneers of the PHN had known him several years before the occurrence of the political conflict. Apart from the four imitators, four of twelve research participants who took part in the PHN, had known Jeera from attending public events and social movements.

Interestingly, both Arun and Jeera had many 'Strangers' before the collaboration, nine and seven respectively. After analyzing the data, the researcher found that all of sixteen 'Strangers' attended the collaborative process because other PHN members who were their friends, invited them. Right after the first talk, three of the four individuals from the Red and Yellow camps tried to engage other members through their own connection. Three of them also were members of non-governmental organizations working on local empowerment. Prominently, they could expand the network participants. These individuals acted as connectors which were useful in expanding the collaborative process. Even though some of the new comers were extremely red or yellow, they decided to be a part of the collaboration to de-escalate the conflict. At that time, the radical leaders of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai had vowed that he would absolutely not negotiate with the opposite group (S.Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014). In addition, even these 'Strangers' did not know the third parties and somehow felt uncomfortable with others, yet they valued the relationship with the connecting individuals and trusted them. As a result, they decided to join the PHN.

4.4 Political Involvement

Apart from Arun's self-identification as not color-coded, data analysis shows that Arun did not affiliate with particular political groups and never got involved with political protests related to the color-coded conflict. The participants also echoed that Arun did not attend any protest related to the political conflict.

On the contrary, Jeera admitted that in 2000s he had affiliated with political parties. His previous role in politics was well-known among Chiang Mai natives. This

also enabled him to connect to the key political leaders from both Thai Rak Thai party and Democrat party. However, Jeera was very clear about his stand - support a party which has concrete policies on improving the lives of poor people. He did not have motive in seeking political power. As a result, when the Thai Rak Thai party had won a general election by a landslide in 2003 and Thaksin became the Prime Minister, Jeera disengaged himself from political activities that related to Thai Rak Thai Party.

4.5 Conflictants' Perceptions on the Third-Party

4.5.1 The Perceptions on the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai

Before presenting the finding, it is clarified that the term "U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai" in this research, including its understanding among the conflictants' refers to the U.S. government, its policies, and its officials. Therefore, while being interviewed, the informants inevitably, had perceptions that U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai, was tied up with the roles of U.S. and its policies.

At the early stage of the collaboration, most of the interviewees accepted that they perceived that U.S. was impartial and did not take side. They also reflected that throughout the past relationship between Thailand and U.S., the two counties had been the strong allies for over a hundred and seventy years (U.S. Embassy, n.d.). Throughout the past relationship, they believed that U.S. was a good friend and sincerely concerned about the political transition in Thailand. Hence, when the U.S Consulate-General in Chiang Mai launched an initiative called public speakers project, they were willing to attend and hoped to see positive change. However, the perceptions on the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai were varied from time to time and complicated. Since the

perceptions were attached to the U.S. position on Thai politic. If those positions were interpreted as having negative impact on some political groups, they changed their perceptions. As several informants shared their stories as follows:

"After joining the PHN for a while, I thought the U.S. has bias. And I just withdrew from the collaboration" (K. Wichai, personal communication, August 1, 2014).

"As for the U.S., in early days of the collaboration, I was not afraid about that. However, when I had watched news I thought that the U.S. took sides and I should be more careful about the collaboration" (C. Chana, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

"At first, I believed that U.S. did not take side then I joined the collaboration. But later I was not sure. Some actions/statement made by the U.S. embassy in Bangkok made me worried and feel distrust towards the U.S. on this" (Y. Jarunee, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

"I thought it was a good opportunity to try and find a new way out. I myself did not worry about the U.S.'s interference" (C. Yingyot , personal communication, June 15,2014).

Surprisingly, the finding illustrates that most of conflictants from the Yellow Shirts and non-color-coded had changed their perceptions about the U.S. positions and their interpretation accordingly. On the contrary, of those from the Red Shirts side, the U.S. position did not affect the perceptions on U.S. impartiality.

4.5.2 The Perceptions on Arun

As for Arun, it can be said that most of the research participants had positive perceptions on him. They perceived that Arun was sincere to intervene the conflict and did not have any hidden agenda behind his action. Though Arun defined himself as non-color coded, the perceptions were varied depending on specific individuals' experiences. He was widely known among members of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai particularly after the first public forum in June 2009. Several people who attended the forum often saw him as part of their respective groups. Many of the Red Shirts viewed that Arun commiserated the Red Shirts. One of the informants shared,

"I have known him since the coup in 2006. I don't know about his political opinion, but what I felt is that he is sincere in taking this action and he is open-mind to listen to the Red Shirts" (S. Preecha, July 23, 2014).

With respect to the Yellow Shirts, while some thought that Arun had common beliefs resonating with them, some saw Arun was a pro-Yellow Shirts. One of the PHN member shared:

"I think Arun has affiliated with the Yellow Shirts. I know when I went to his house and saw what TV channel he is watching" (C. Yingyot, personal communication, June 15, 2014).

From Arun's perspective, he had to gather information from all sides. Therefore, at his residence, he turned on television channels which belonged to both Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. This was why some people thought he was on the yellow's side.

Generally, the members of PHN particularly from the Yellow camp who never

knew Arun in person believed that Arun was a good coordinator and sincere person.

"Even though I do not know what really is in his mind, Arun is nice and impartial" (S. Chana, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

Besides, members of the Yellow Shirts considered that what he had done was a part of the U.S. roles concerning the Thai political stability, which was acceptable for them. Most importantly, they thought that the U.S. was neutral. As a result, they were willing to participate in the collaborative process initiated by the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai.

An interesting point about Arun was that the members who had known him closely saw him as an individual – Chiang Mai native who was sincerely concerned about his home with a strong desire to restore peace in Chiang Mai. As explained previously that the U.S. consular in Chiang Mai initiated the project called "Public Speaker". Arun was assigned to implement the public speaker project. However, he claimed that he had strong passion to alleviate the conflict. Consequently, his roles in the conflict was beyond his obligations and responsibility as a U.S. consular official. Three of the four pioneers knew Arun, particularly the two of the Yellow Shirts, who had been engaging in social issues for a long time with Arun. Hence, they trusted him and neutrality was not an issue. Looking at the members of the Red Shirts, one of them who was involved with the PHN revealed,

"Even though he has a good relationship and barely knew Arun, he was not concerned that Arun would extract any information from him" (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014).

Adversely, members who did not know Arun before joining the collaboration (which were the majority members) saw him adhering with the image of the U.S. Fortunately, those days Thai people, particularly the Yellow Shirts perceived that the U.S. did not take side. As a result, they were willing to be part of the collaboration and did not get worried that the U.S. would interfere in the internal affairs.

Overall, the PHN members from both color-coded groups had a positive view towards Arun and considered him as credible and trustworthy person.

4.5.3 Perceptions on Jeera

As for the next third party Jeera, he also had gained positive perceptions from the members of the PHN. According to the interview, conflictants from both sides believed that Jeera was sincere and did not have any hidden agenda to take part in the collaboration. Many informants who had known Jeera for several years recognized that Jeera used to be a member of the Thai Rak Thai party, but he did not have any interest in pursuing political power. Jeera was born in not-well-doing family and had learned many political issues causing poverty. He then was eager to take part in political activities to promote well-being of the whole society. In the 2000s, the early period of Thai Rak Thai Party, Jeera had become an advocator of Thai Rak Thai party as well as built political network from grass root levels in Chiang Mai. He strongly supported Thai Rak Thai because its policies were directly related to majority of people, especially to those who could not access the healthcare service and were underprivileged.

As S. Chumsai shared, "I have known him since I was very young. Jeera has a clear political view point and he used to be a front line in political activities to promote

the well-being of poor people. I trust him that he would do with good intention."

(personal communication, July 15, 2014*)*

In addition, "Jeera did not act biased or favorably towards one or another side. In

the public, certainly, Jeera had maintained his impartiality and did not hide his identity as

a military officer. When he needed to meet other especially the members of the

collaboration, he would wear a military uniform. This made him gain trust from

individuals who interacted with him.

During the onset of the PHN, every time I saw him wore a military uniform and

he told me frankly what he is doing – a soldier. I think he was sincere and honest. The

more I have learned about his background, I have a better understanding and trust him."

(P. Tasanai, personal communication, July 18, 2014)

Some members of the PHN added,

> Even though Jeera knows the Democrat Party so well, he does not say that
> he totally agrees with them. And even though Jeera could approach PM
> Somchai (Thaksin's brother-in-law) personally, he never says he supports
> him or the PuaThai Party (former is Thai Rak Thai party). (S. Racha,
> personal communication, June 17, 2014)

Overall, Jeera, though, was a military officer which normally the Red Shirts take

as negative. Yet, he gained the creditability from grassroots, high-ranking authorities,

NGOs, businessmen, and politicians. An explanation is that 1) his actions in the past and

present in terms of sincerely promoting the well-being of people and not seeking political

power were important factors for gaining trust and credibility; and 2) since seniority has

had strong influence to Thai people and Jeera knew several major political figures

personally and received respect from them. As a result, Jeera was considered as a credible

person accordingly. Along with that, he was cautious when giving out his opinion, and did not show support or threat to any side. It made him earn trust and credibility from all sides.

4.6 Neutrality, Impartiality, and Trust

The finding on relationship, political involvement, and perceptions of the members toward the third party assures that neutrality, impartiality, and trust had affected the collaborative process. This resonates with the scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution who have argued that neutrality and impartiality are important characteristics of the third party. However, there are some key points that contradicted to the concept of neutrality.

Referring to the literatures on neutrality, Field (as cited in Regina,2011, p.34) and Benjamin (as cited in Maise, 2005) share common components of neutrality that third party must not have prior relationships with disputants and no interest in an outcome of the conflict. In case of Arun and Jeera, that did not apply. According to the finding, both of them had prior relationships with disputants especially the pioneers: that some of them had been their friends for years. And that fact was widely known among the disputants. But, conversely, because of their prior relationship with their friends, they could trust each other. As one of those who was an acquaintance, took time, and eventually they could build the trust.

In terms of having no interest in the conflict, Arun and Jeera had strong interest to elevate the conflict. They publicly expressed their concerns/interests/ and expectations for taking part in the intervention. This made the conflictants hope and believe that the

third-party were honest and sincerely intervened. If the above definition of Field and Benjamin is considered, Arun and Jeera were disqualified as the third party. However, they successfully acted as the third party and eventually accomplished in establishing the collaboration. It can be concluded that the concept of neutrality explained above is impractical in this context because the prior existing relationships became a source of trust and the development of shared interest, i.e. good faith on the third-party mediators to resolve the conflict.

Echoing Wehr and Lederach, they argue that neutrality also means a lack of bias, favorism, and judgement. The finding collaborates with this definition. As the interview indicates that perception about bias or favor to either conflicting party, could lead to doubt on the third party that could be developed to mistrust. As a result, the stakeholders are likely to decline the collaborative process.

Considering at the definition impartiality provided by Colorado Council of Mediation Organization, Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the National Association, the researcher found the common characteristics that "freedom from favoritism and bias in either word or action and involves a commitment to aid all as opposed to a single party in reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement (2006, p.302)". Within aspect of the research participants' understanding, they argued that it was difficult to know one's thought, so their judgements relied on the third party's behaviors. Throughout the collaborative process, Arun and Jeera could maintain their impartiality which enhanced trust building. Eventually, the collaboration was established successfully.

4.7 Roles of the Third-Party

The third-party's roles and efforts in resolving the political conflict in Chiang Mai is presented according to the following table.

Table 4.3 Roles of the Third-Party

Third-Party	Prior PHN Establishment (June-Sep 2009)	During PHN Establishment (Oct-Dec 2009)	Post PHN Establishment (Jan 2010)
The U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai	- Hosted and provided resources for the public speaker forum	-	- Assisted the PHN in funding application for hosting activities related to the collaboration - Hosted and provided resources for the second public speaker forum
Arun	- Monitored and evaluated the conflict - Set up a third-party team - Researched and designed a constructive process - Arranged the meetings - Provided resources for the meetings	- Arranged the meetings - Provided resources for the meetings - Facilitated the meetings	- Observed the collaborative process - Attended meeting and activities held by the PHN

Third-Party	Prior PHN Establishment (June-Sep 2009)	During PHN Establishment (Oct-Dec 2009)	Post PHN Establishment (Jan 2010)
Jeera	- Made contacts - Researched and designed a constructive process - Sought and evaluated potential conflictants to join the collaboration	- Coordinated conflicting parties - Arranged the meetings	- Observed the collaborative process - Attended meetings and activities held by the PHN

The table shows that each third party had played several roles in order to set up the collaboration.

Prior the PHN Establishment

In this stage, the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai played a leading role as a *convener* to initiate the public forums. It was an important step as it paved the way for further constructive process. During the conflict escalation in early 2009, the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai was concerned on the political conflict and had been trying to reduce the tension in the area. And then it initiated projects entitled "Public Speaker" which invited speakers who had an expertise to lecture on the political issues that Thai people paid a great attention such as the rule of law and double standard of law enforcement, the roles of the opposition party, and election and democracy. In June 2009, Professor Larry Berman from the University of California, Davis was a guest speaker on

"Political Transition and the Roles of Opposition in a Democracy" which was a hot issue that Thai people were concerned at that time.

Arun was responsible of this project and played several roles during this period. According to Christopher Mitchell, his roles showing in the table are *monitor, explorer, convener and facilitator* (1993).

According to the interviewees, from among fifty persons who attended the event, more than half of them were the Red Shirts (P. Arun, personal communication, June 14, 2012). Both the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts who participated at the event stated that not only the issues were interesting, they wanted to hear the opponent's opinions, and also the host, the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai was neutral. In addition, the Red Shirts gave another reason for joining the event. They wanted to tell their stories and unfair law enforcement in Thailand to the international community. Whereas the Yellow Shirts provided a different reason for participating in the event. They said that they needed opportunity and platform to discuss and express their political opinions. The forums went well without offending each other and this made Arun believe that some members of both conflicting groups could talk peacefully.

During the forums and shortly after that, Arun constantly monitored the development of the conflict as well as explored the conflictants' readiness and the possibility for constructive resolution. After that, Arun had discussed with Jeera to design the process and then held meetings between the pioneers from both the groups. Arun provided venue, food, and refreshment for the people who attended the meetings. He also facilitated the meetings by asking constructive questions. Such questions made both

parties to ignore blaming each other and collectively sought ways to overcome the issues. For instance, 'How did you feel about the current situation?', 'How did the conflict at national level connected/related to our life in Chiang Mai?', and 'Do you want to see a peaceful environment in our community?' Three informants provided the same information that after talking and drinking coffee together, they learned each other's ideas, life experiences, political ideas, and dreams about their hometown. They all admitted that they felt more connected and trusted each other, and promised to bring potential members from their groups to the next meeting.

As for Jeera, his roles to establish the collaboration were *coordinator, explorer, and convener* (Mitchell, 1993). As he knew several key members from both color-coded groups, Jeera greatly helped in making contact and inviting the target individuals to join the meetings. Also, for intervening the conflict Jeera worked with Arun as a team to monitor the conflict and designed the collaborative process.

During the PHN Establishment

This period, the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai did not involve in the establishment of the PHN. On the contrary, during this time, Arun still played similar roles as what he had done in the pre- establishment namely facilitator and coordinator. In addition, Arun became an *envisioner* by providing information, thoughts, and ideas that encouraged creative approaches (Mitchell, 1993). While Jeera still took quite the same roles as he did prior to the establishment of the PHN. His former roles such as making contacts and seeking/evaluating potential conflictants were no longer performed because the pioneers promised to bring individuals to the collaborative process.

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Post the PHN Establishment

In this stage, the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai became involved with the collaboration. Its main roles were *enskiller* (Mitchell, 1993) as it gave suggestion in funding application and assisted in coordinating the funders.

In contrary, after the collaboration was officially formed and launched activities publicly, Arun and Jeera took roles as third-party. They just attended the meetings/activities as observers.

4.8 Other Type of Third-Party

To resolve the political conflict in Chiang Mai particularly the establishment of the collaboration and ongoing process toward peace, the Members of PHN also were involved with this peace process.

Immediately after the first talk in July, 2009, the four members of the Red and Yellow camps promised to convince other members from their own connection. Three of them also were members of non-governmental organizations working on local empowerment. Prominently, they could expand the network of participants. Even though some of the new comers were the extreme 'Red' or 'Yellow', they decided to be a part of the collaboration to resolve the conflict. At that time, the radical leaders of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai vowed that they would absolutely have no talks with the opposite group. The result indicated that even though these new participants felt uncomfortable with other, they valued the relationship with the connectors. These connectors also had credibility. Besides, being interested in what those people were doing, the new comers

decided to attend the collaborative process because they wanted to maintain relationship. Several of them revealed;

"I have known Preecha for a long time when he invited me, I think I should participate" (K. Pansak, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

"I participated in PHN because Sangtian invited me. I knew him through social work and believe that he has a good intention. He explained the purposes of the collaboration which I thought they were good. Thus, I decided to join" (Y. Jarunee, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

"I am glad that these people had tried to do something even though I am not sure how it can make any difference. Mainly, I came since Preecha talked and invited me: he and I are friends" (P. Jintana, personal communication, July 16, 2014).

In addition, these new comers trusted the connectors' judgment that the third-party were honest and impartial. Finally, they think it was worthy to try. Though these three individuals were conflicting parties, it can be said that their above-mentioned roles can be classified as Track II – non-state actors who were trying to analyse, prevent, resolve, and manage conflicts.

Upon the formal PHN establishment in March 2010, Arun was no longer playing a role as the facilitator of the meetings. Yingyot had been performing as president of the meetings while Sangtian also had been utilizing his experiences as a facilitator in discussing the root cause of the conflict and brainstorming a working plan.

4.9 Discussion and Conclusion on Third-Party Intervention

Similar to many conflict cases in which parties are deeply divided, the third-party intervention is critical for establishing the collaboration called "Peaceful Homeland Network" among the members of the Red Shirts and the yellow Shirts. Having been polarized since 2006, conflictants' perceptions and attitudes towards each other were deeply negative. In the context where the groups did not have a safe space to express their political opinions, the presence of a third-party's venue in the community creating venues for meeting is relieving. In addition, there were no political activities held by a non-partisan group. The collaboration could be possible because *the third party* took a leading role in conflict intervention. The intervention first begun when the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai played the role as the initiator in the project to introduce new ideas, educate, and provide a safe place to learn from each other. Later, after seeing the opportunity to move forwards, Arun along with Jeera imposed themselves on the disputants. They realized that without a proper conflict intervention, and in the absence of neutral space to engage people, divisions in the society would further deepen. Through casual talks, the third-party could commit disputants to bring additional members from their own groups and later successfully established the collaboration.

This case confirms what theorists and practitioners agree upon, that in building peace, a wide range of actors are needed. For example, the collaboration required various tracks of third-party in contributing towards the process. The case also proves theories of conflict resolution that the third-party intervention in an appropriate time is a crucial

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condition leading to the collaboration. There are two reasons supporting the claim of "*a right time*". The first reason is that the first public forum was held shortly after the Red Shirts had been crushed on protest against the new government from the Democrat party. At that time, Phue Thai party, a party founded by Thaksin and his family, was the opposition. The third- party knew what issues were useful and what disputants were interested in. The second reason is that members from the Yellow Shirts and the informants perceived the U.S. was neutral whereas since 2013 onwards the U.S. was considered as bias because of strongly supporting Yingluck' s government. This indicates that "the Ripeness Moment" is an important factor for the third-party intervention.

As discussed above, immediately beginning collaboration without a positive attitude is very difficult. The first forum not only helped the third-party establishing their credibility, but also allowed conflicting parties to learn about the other and adjust their attitudes towards the opposite.

As Pruitt discusses in his article "*Whether the Ripeness Theory?*", that apart from the third-party, *positivism* significantly encourages conflicting parties' readiness for collaboration. However, listening to others' opinions may or may not significantly alter attitudes and create healthy relationships, so the third-party have to engage both parties to talk in private and in a closed place. According to Axelrod (1996), cooperation requires "*constant interactions*" so that parties understand, share, and learn others' thoughts, experiences, and stories. Through interactions, parties perceive interdependence that encourages cooperation. Hosting constant casual talks, eventually, participants could trust each other and realized the interdependence goal. In addition, the first forum

allowed the third-party not only to assess the conflict situation to guide what he should do further, but also assisted him to identify "*the right individuals*".

Also, the case is a great example of the ripe time. According to the findings, a certain period of conflict requires specific third parties and the third-party's image is also attached to the U.S.'s neutrality. If the process began recently, the Yellow Shirts would decline to collaborate as they perceive the U.S. to be supporting the Red Shirts.

The finding also illustrates that three important factors enabled stakeholders joining the first meeting of four individuals. They were neutrality, impartiality of the third-party and trust emerging from long relationships between the third-party and the disputants. When parties perceived and expanded cooperation in late 2009, members of both the parties considered neutrality of the U.S. as the most important. Several disputants viewed the third party as part of the U.S. However, there were varying perceptions on the third party as an individual.

In terms of trust, to initiate the process when tension is high, the parties need to form good relationships with the third-party as an individual and know the real intention of the third party. *Trust sometimes can substitute neutrality* while the third-party has to maintain its impartiality throughout the process. Conversely, if parties do not recognize the third-party, neutrality could trigger their concern. While the conflict is alleviated and the third-party do not have previous relationships with conflicting parties, the disputants could be the *connector*. Put simply, impartiality is a core characteristic no matter what the circumstance is.

Regarding the question on who the third-party were, the result demonstrates that the third- party from Track I, II, and IV and V had involvement in the pre-stage of the collaboration. Unfortunately, Arun had been a coordinator between these four tracks only before March 2010. Moreover, an interesting point to examine is that after March 2010, as observers, what kind of impact did Arun and Jeera had on the collaboration.

In addition, the third-party must be considered as a credible individual. Credibility could be gained from social status and roles, decent actions, good reputation, honesty and sincerely dedicating themselves for society. Interestingly, three points can be noticed: a) all of them (third-party) are men; b) the interveners, Arun and Jeera, though insisted their roles as personal involvement, they were affiliated with the government agencies; c) Arun and Jeera had prior relationship to those conflictants and they were quite well-known among active citizens in Chiang Mai; and d) all the third party except the U.S. Consulate-General and the professors were Chiang Mai natives who cared after the area as their hometown. Moreover, they spoke in the local tongue throughout the process.

Undoubtedly, amidst the high confrontation between the conflicting parties, the third party is a crucial condition to alleviate the crisis, but there are other conditions provoking the collaborative process. As the data emerging from interviews have shown, circumstances in Chiang Mai which linked to the outside world had also influenced the formation of collaboration.

CHAPTER FIVE

Individual Factors Influencing on Being Involved with the PHN or

Decline to Collaborate

Since an individual is one who makes a decision, to explore individual's perceptions of themselves and others, their relationships, and roles within groups are important to understand why some conflictants engage in the collaboration whereas others decline to do so. This chapter reveals the research finding and discussion on factors at an individual level by examining the research participants' personal backgrounds, political identity, and their roles and relationship within a group. As mentioned in the research methodology, the research participants constituted both who collaborated and declined to do so.

5.1 Group 1: Persons who had engaged in the PHN

The research participants, who have engaged in the collaboration called PHN, can be roughly classified into two groups. The first one is the key persons attending the initial meeting in July, 2009; the members of this type are Preecha, Suchit, Sangtian, and Suchart. The other are those who started engaging with the PHN since July, 2009. The table is an overview of their background and political involvement of the political color-coded conflict. The data is based on the year 2009 when the collaboration emerged.

Table 5.1 The PHN Members' Background and Political Engagement

No.	Pseudonyms	Age	Sex	Original Hometown/ Settled Town	Education	Occupation	Political Identity	Roles in groups
1	Preecha	61	M	Chiang Mai	Diploma	Small Business Owner	Red	Leader
2	Suchit	41	M	Patalung/ Chiang Mai	BA	NGOs	Yellow	Leader
3	Sangtian	50	M	Chiang Mai	BA	NGOs	Yellow	Active Participant
4	Suchart * Not being interviewed	50s	M	Chiang Mai	Unknown	Writer	Red	Active Participant
5	Jadepong	50	M	Lampoon/ Chiang Mai	Ph.D.	Government	Non-color-coded	NA
6	Jintana	58	F	Lampoon/ Chiang Mai	MA	Business	Non-color-coded	NA
7	Sanong	55	M	Chiang Mai	MA	Government	Non-color-coded	NA
8	Tantong	56	M	Samutprakan/ Chiang Mai	BA	Military Officer	Non-color-coded	NA
9	Yingyot	50s	M	Chiang Mai	MA	Academic	Non-color-coded	NA
10	Chana	63	M	Nakornpathom/ Chiang Mai	MA	Academic	Yellow	Leader
11	Chumsai	49	M	Chiang Mai	BA	NGOs	Yellow	Passive Participant
12	Jarunee	63	F	Chiang Mai	BA	Local Politician	Red	Active Participant
13	Pansak	58	M	Bangkok/Chiang Mai	BA	Business	Red	Leader
14	Racha	42	M	Uttaradit/Chiang Mai	BA	SME	Red	Active Participant
15	Tassanai	50s	M	Chiang Mai	Grade 12	Politician	Red	Active Participant
16	Wichai	46	M	Chiang Mai	BA	Business	Yellow	Active Participant

5.1.1 Personal Background

5.1.1.1 Age. The age of the pioneer persons namely Preecha, Sangtian, Suchart, and Suchit are ranged from forty-one to sixty-one years old. Similarly, the other members' ages are from forty-one to sixty-three years old. In a bigger picture, the majority of these collaborative members are over fifty years old and only one-fourth of all members are under fifty.

5.1.1.2 Sex. According to the table, only two members of the collaboration are women whereas the rest of them are men.

5.1.1.3 Hometown. To begin with the pioneer members, only Preecha, Sangtian, and Suchart are Chiang Mai natives who were born and have been residing in Chiang Mai whereas Suchit was born in Pattalung located in the southern region of Thailand. Later he married to a Chiang Mai native woman. After settling down in Chiang Mai, Suchit considers himself as a Chiang Mai native and calls Chiang Mai as his second hometown. In terms of local dialect, these Chiang Mai natives have proficiency in the dialect, except Suchit. He is able to understand Chiang Mai dialect very well, yet cannot speak the language.

As for the other members, more than a half of them are Chiang Mai natives who were born, raised, and have been residing there. Though, the others were not Chiang Mai natives, at the time of being members of the PHN they saw themselves as Chiang Mai natives. Jintana and Jadepong, for instance, originally came from Lampoon Province and later moved and lived in Chiang Mai. Since Lampoon is located next to Chiang Mai, shares similar Lanna culture and traditions with Chiang Mai, Lampoon and Chiang Mai

are called sister cities. Similarly, Racha, who originally came from Uttaradit Province located in the northern region, sees himself as a Chiang Mai native since he moved there during his early childhood.

Chana, Pansak, and Tantong were originally from the central region. After marrying Chiang Mai women, they then moved to Chiang Mai and considered it as their second hometown.

5.1.1.4 Education. Most PHN members have good educational backgrounds; more than a third-fourth hold a bachelor's degree and one-fourth have master's degree. One member has a diploma from overseas whereas another member finished grade 12.

5.1.1.5 Occupation. These members come from diverse occupational backgrounds. Almost half of them are small business owners in Chiang Mai while one-fourth of them are working for non-governmental organizations, and a few are government officers.

5.1.16.Political and Social Experiences. These collaborative members from the Red Shirts camp mostly have experiences related to political struggle and social injustice. Pansak, for example, used to recruit university students as the insurgent force against the dictatorship regime in 1970s. Likewise, Racha always led political campaigns for promoting democracy when he was a university student. Though being born after the Black October in 1970s, Racha shared his story that his name always was on the blacklist of the Internal Security Operations Command. Preecha, on the other hand, does not have direct experiences with the political protest in 1970s as he was overseas; he usually supported his colleagues for political movements.

5.1.2 Political Identity and Involvement of the PHN's Members from the Red Shirts

Regarding the second hypothesis that members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts who become engaged with the opponent should not be radical, the researcher investigated political identities and the commonalities and differences of these members who worked in the collaborative process. The findings reveal that the members of the collaboration have diverse political identities and involvement which can be clustered into three types: Red Shirts, Yellow Shirts, and non-color-coded. Details of their political identities and involvement are presented as follows:

Six members of the total sixteen PHN members are the Red Shirts and only five persons could be reached and interviewed. As discussed in the literature review, the Red Shirts have diverse shades, so this section presents the exploration of their perceptions, meaning of being a member of the Red Shirts, their political involvement, their understanding about the causes/conditions of the conflict, and their roles within the groups prior and during the collaboration.

(a) The Perception and the meaning of being the Red Shirts. The research examines why these persons have internalized the Red Shirts as a part of their identities and how they define and value the identity of the Red Shirts. According to the interviews, these members identified themselves as members of the Red Shirts and it also can be distinguished that Red Shirts in Chiang Mai are categorized into three sub-groups: Thaksin followers, ordinary Thaksin admirers, and progressive Red. From their perspectives, Thaksin followers or so-called radical Red Shirts are not honest in being

members of the Red Shirts. These people, according to the interviews, are serving

politicians especially Thaksin and his connection because they gain benefits from doing

so. Members of this kind of the Red Shirts may or may not have ideology to fight for

social change, but certainly their goals of being a member of the group include receiving

interest whether they are political status or business affiliation. As a result, these Red

Shirts do not have autonomy in decision making, but rather take actions according to

Thaksin and politicians under Thaksin decisions. The Thaksin followers also include the

Red Shirts who blindly like Thaksin and hate the opponent. These people obey and do

what the Red Shirts leaders command.

The second shade is ordinary Thaksin admirers who were proud to see the Chiang

Mai natives become the Prime Minister and realized that Thaksin's populism policies

benefited them. This type of the Red Shirts may or may not physically participate in the

political protests. They, however, closely follow news related to the Red Shirts via the

community radio, local Red newspaper, Red TV, or websites (interviewed Tassanai,

Pansak, Preecha during June to July 2014 and Lueangaramsri et al, 2012). These Red

Shirts demand the Yellow Shirts, military, and the opposite government to respect their

rights to vote.

Thirdly, the progressive Red Shirts are different from the radical Red Shirts. They

partially admire some of Thaksin's policies which fulfill basic needs such as 30 Baht

universal healthcare and micro finance. Though, the progressive Red Shirts' political movements are quite independent from Thaksin, they still consider Thaksin as an ally.

Shades of the Red Shirts Engaging in the Collaborative Process

Five members of the Red Shirts involved with the collaboration namely Jarunee, Preecha, Pansak, Racha, and Tassanai are progressive Red Shirts. At first, the researcher let them defined themselves and asked questions to check their thoughts. The findings indicate that being the Red Shirts is a new identity constructed recently after the conflict extended to Chiang Mai in 2008. These people value being the Red Shirt with the concept of elective democracy and equality especially juridical equality.

S. Preecha argued that "If being a Red Shirt means you strongly uphold a deliberative democracy, it is meaningful, and then I am proud to be a member of the Red Shirts" (personal communication, August 5, 2014).

Likewise, S. Racha called himself the Red Shirts and expresses that "I am Red because I never ever agree on the coup. Though Thaksin caused several political problems and needed to be testified. Since he came from people's consent, we need democratic means to overthrow him"(personal communication, June 14, 2014).

K. Pansak also asserted that, I used to protest against the authoritative regime during 1970s. For me, being the Red Shirts means I uphold the fundamental principle of democracy. However, what firstly motivated making me the Red Shirts is that the 2006 coup badly affected my business. The more I engaged with the other members of the Red

Shirts, I would say that being the Red Shirts is important because I am calling for equal

juridical treatment and democracy (personal communication, July 20, 2014).

All of them claiming that having *strong position against the coup is a major*

reason of being the Red Shirts and it is a fundamental feature of the Red Shirts identity.

Other reason is their high admiration on Thaksin and his policies. After aligning with the

Red Shirts, they also called for Thaksin to return to his home country. Preecha, Jarunee,

and Tassanai, for instance, do like Thaksin's policies and the way in which Thaksin

governed the country. Jarunee shared her thought as followed,

> I love and respect Thaksin as a person, not only because both he and I are
> Chiang Mai natives. Moreover, his brilliant ideas and the way he
> effectively carries out those policies benefit ordinary people. But I do not
> blindly love him. If the juridical process honestly can prove that Thaksin
> did corruption, I will no longer support him (personal communication,
> July 20, 2014*).*

Likewise, Preecha accepted that prior 2010, he used to employ violent means

against the Yellow Shirts and strongly supported the Red Shirts movement calling

Thaksin back home. S. Preecha argued as followed:

> I advocate for political movement to bring Thaksin home with impunity
> because I believe that he is honest to construct deliberative democracy. His
> several policies reflect the principle of bottom-up approach. Thus, I greatly
> dedicate my time and energy fighting for him (personal communication,
> June 12, 2014).

In the same manner, P. Tassanai explained that "Apart from admiring Thaksin's

policies, I think the juridical process was not fair. There were several defames on the Red

Shirts and Thaksin. I, therefore, also called for bringing Thaksin home" (personal

communication, July 18, 2014).

Interestingly, the interview shows that these persons value the identities of being Chiang Mai natives more than being a member of the Red Shirts. Jarunee, Preecha, Racha, and Tassani assert that their fundamental identities are Chiang Mai natives and Thai citizens except Pansak, who seem to be not attached as a Chiang Mai native. They see that the Red Shirts was constructed to respond to the conflict and it is not as important as the two identities.

Y. Jarunee notes that "Being the Red Shirt is just a part of self-expression on the political preference, but this identity is new and is not meaningful as being a Chiang Mai native and Thai citizen" (personal communication, July 20, 2014).

P. Tassanai also asserted that "It is normal to become a member of a particular group either the Red Shirts or Yellow Shirts is a personal preference, but we should really think that why we, the Chiang Mai natives fight against each other" (personal communication, July 18, 2014).

According to Jarunee, the identities of the Red Shirts and Chiang Mai native are sometimes contradicted. She explained that generally Chiang Mai natives are perceived as polite and gentle persons while the Red Shirts are usually labeled as wild persons who always use violent tactics. Because of this, Jarunee preferred to hide her identity as the Red Shirts when being outside Chiang Mai and tried to reposition that not all the Red Shirts are aggressive and violence-oriented persons. Contrarily, Preecha and Racha did not see any contradiction between being the Red Shirts and Chiang Mai native. They rather argued that the new identity, the Red Shirts, is not really valuable to them compared to a Chiang Mai native.

Briefly, these collaborative members of the Red Shirts were the progressive Red Shirts who uphold the elective democracy and juridical equality while they rejected all coups.

(b) Their Perceptions about the Others. Besides exploring their perceptions about themselves, the researcher also investigated how the collaborative members of the Red Shirts see the Yellow Shirts. The result shows that these people could see the diversity among members of the Yellow Shirts which has several sub-groups and each consisted of different components. Roughly, they identified that the Yellow Shirts included the members of the Democrat Party and members of the PAD who mostly are old establishments and backed up by the military.

Though, their perceptions on the Yellow Shirts are not comprehensive, they *do not stereotype the Yellow Shirts as a threat*. Five research participants recognize that the mass of the Yellow Shirts and the members of Democrat Party had different objectives. According to their perceptions, the mass of the Yellow Shirts aimed to construct clean politics and an effective check and balance mechanism to prevent bad politicians coming into power whereas the Democrat Party wanted to seize political power through non-institutional methods. With these non-rigid perceptions, the five members could tolerate the Yellow Shirts.

(c) Their Understanding about the Conflict. As there is a huge discrepancy on the way in which members of the two political groups perceive the conflict, the research examines similarities and differences between their understanding by focusing on their thoughts about cause and condition of the conflict.

Current literatures discussed in the Chapter Two, point out that there are two sets of explanation about the causes and conditions of the conflict. Both sets have shared a common explanation that one of the root causes of the conflict is social inequality. However, in the second sets of explanation, there is a huge difference on the conflicting parties. The first set argues that the cause of conflict is the clash between old and new elites. The old elite allies with the Yellow Shirts while the new elite Thaksin is aligning with the Red Shirts. In this sense, the mass of both color-coded groups do not act as an agent, but rather are guided by the leaders of each group. Especially, the Red Shirts often denounced as Thaksin followers.

The second set of explanation argues that the mass especially the Red Shirts have been taking part in political movements because they decided to do without being paid or deceived by the Red Shirts' leaders. Scholars explain that these Red Shirts gradually developed their political thoughts through their daily experiences. As a result, they are politicized and acted as agents in the conflict; they knew what they were fighting for. These two sets of explanation acknowledge that socio-economic inequality is one of the root causes of the conflict, but illustrations on the conditions are different.

Looking at the research participants' understanding in the table, the result is likely similar to the existing literatures. The finding presents that according to their understanding there were four causes and conditions of the political conflict as follow:

Table 5.2 The PHN Red Shirts' Understandings on Causes and Conditions of the Conflict

Causes/ Conditions	Preecha	Jarunee	Racha	Tassanai	Pansak
1.Socio-economic Inequality	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause
2. Centralized Government	Cause	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Cause	Cause	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
3. The Clash between the Old and New Elites	Condition	Condition	Condition	Condition	Cause
4. Prolong Political Needs Deprivation	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause

To begin with the first cause, all PHN members from the Red Shirts camp comprehend that socio-economic inequality is one of the root causes of the conflict. They agree that the inequality has existed in Thai society for a long time and it is a fundamental problem paving the way to the conflict.

Next, only three of them viewed that the centralized Thai government is the cause of the political color-coded conflict. These persons argued that the current system of organizing the government administration which is a rigid centralized government has led to improper development and several problems. Under the strong centralized government, the winner takes all. Therefore, if one loses in this conflict, s/he will lose several things such as power, sources of wealth and even being sentenced to prison. In this sense, the five members of the PHN elaborate that strong centralized government is

the root cause of conflict. Additionally, this government structure has led to unequal development and resource distribution because local people cannot access to political power to determine their lives. However, Jarunee and Pansak thought that this condition was unlikely to influence the conflict.

The third one, four of them understood that the conflict occurred and sporadically escalated because the leaders of the two conflicting parties had incompatible goals. They perceived that the Yellow Shirts' leaders including those who were true behind this group are the old elite who felt that the rise of the Red Shirts or the new elite is threatening their status quo. Hence, as long as their goals are not reconciled, these elites still employed the mass and political tactics to overcome the other. Hence, these four persons claimed that the clash between the old and the new elites was a condition driving the conflict throughout the years. In this sense, they explained that even though several Red Shirts took part in the conflict such as attending protests because of being aware and active agents, in fact the mass of the Red Shirts was stirred up by some leaders who exaggerated the conflict and had other agendas.

Pansak strongly believed that the clash between the old and new elites in Thai society is one of the root causes of the conflict as the old elites felt insecure because their status quo was challenged from the rise of the new elites. In addition, the poor who received fruitful impacts from Thaksin's policies became an emerging class. As such, the old elites were concerned on changing socio-political structure which was negative consequences in their eyes. Pansak further elaborated that members of the Red Shirts were enlightened on what the conflict was all about, and then became politicized through

their experiences. These Red Shirts, therefore, aligned with the new elites whose policies were benefited and helped improved their living conditions. Pansak claims that his group, the Red Shirts in Doi Saket district launched political activities without interference from Thaksin (personal communication, July 21, 2014). Those whose understood that the clash between the elites was a cause of the conflict also comprehended that Thaksin was politically bullied by the military and the old elites. This understanding did not see that Thaksin's administration had brought negative impacts to the society. It also denied that Thaksin did commit corruption. Hence, Thaksin was right to rally his supporters in order to come back to Thailand.

The forth cause of the conflict was the prolonged and repeated deprivation of political need. When the prime ministers from elected governments namely, Thaksin, Samak, and Somchai were overthrown, these people felt that their political rights and needs were deprived. Hence, these Red Shirts rallied against the coup and the Yellow Shirts. The more they perceive the deprivation, the Red Shirts felt deeply frustrated and persisted against the opponent. According to the table, all of the PHN members from the Red Shirts agree that it is the root cause of the political conflict.

In short, all of the PHN members from the Red Shirts camp have shared several understandings on the causes and conditions of the conflict. Interestingly, one who believed that the strong centralized government has rooted the political conflict were likely to actively engage in the collaboration. In the same manner, those who understood the clash between the elites as a condition of the conflict, were likely to persist in taking part in the collaboration.

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On the contrary, Jarunee and Pansak who did not consider the centralized

government as a cause of the conflict, eventually became passive PHN members. Pansak,

for instance, had a distinct understanding who stated that the clash of the elites was not a

cause of the conflict. And then he completely disengaged from the collaboration.

(d) Political Conflict Involvement. This section presents the research participants'

political conflict involvement, their roles in the conflict particularly in-group and their

relationship with leaders of both color-coded groups at the national level.

According to the interviews and document, mostly the Red Shirts were advocates

of the political movements such as Jarunee, Racha, Suchart, and Tassanai. Only two

members of the Red Shirts namely Preecha and Pansak were recognized as leaders of the

Red Shirts at the local level.

To begin with the advocates of the Red Shirts, in this research it refers to one

who supports political movements but is not a leader who makes decisions and manages

the movements. These supports include being a coordinator between the Red Shirts

within their community, a public speaker who is educated and arouses protestors'

emotions, and actively participate in political movements and sometimes help recruit

people in joining political activities in Chiang Mai.

Jarunees, for instance, during forming Thai Rak Thai Party in 2002, was a part of

the party's team recruiting members for the party, publicized party's policies, and

becoming election canvasser. At the time of conducting the interview, she was a deputy

mayor at sub-district level. Concerning the color-coded conflict, she started participating

with the Red Shirts' political movement since 2008. She used to speak on the stage

during the Red Shirts assembly in Chiang Mai. She also notified the Red Shirts members in their community about the political activities and usually helped in arranging vehicles for those who wanted to join the activities (personal communication, July 20, 2014).

Similarly, Tassanai had been taking part in local politics for almost twenty years and began assisting the Red Shirts' activities since 2008. He usually delivered speeches during the protest to mobilize the mass. While giving speeches in front of their mass, Tassanai had to reinforce positive images of the Red Shirts and reasserting negative images on the Yellow Shirts. However, he never aroused the mass to use violence on others.

Racha also actively participated in political activities calling for democracy and social change. His roles in the conflict were to support and expand the concept of democracy and social justice. Likewise, Suchart is a writer producing books and media promoting democracy and challenging the roles of the old establishment.

Only Preecha and Pansak are recognized as key persons of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai. Preecha is known as one of the Red Shirts leaders' group called "Rak Chiang Mai 51" whose behaviors are likely aggressive and violent (Interviewed Arun, Racha, Pendara). Not only also providing strategies for movement, Preecha was also an inventor "Teen Top or a feet-shaped hand clapper." as a tool for making noise used among the Red Shirts when attending protests

(S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014). While the Red Shirts used "Teep Top", the Yellow Shirts used "Mue Top or a hand-shaped hand clapper" during protests. Preecha was a member of Rak Chiang Mai 51 during 2008 to 2010. After

learning that there was no transparency in budget management among key leaders in Chiang Mai, he then left Rak Chiang Mai 51 and joined another group. Preecha still engaged with the Red Shirts even after he declared to be a member of PHN.

Likewise, Pansak always came down to Bangkok to join protests during 2009 to 2010. However, in Black April 2010, his group was abandoned by higher leaders of the Red Shirts from Chiang Mai while rallying against Abhisit's government. As a result, Pansak and his colleagues decided to establish the Red Shirts group called "Deang (Red) Doi Saket" and he is one of the group leaders. Pansak is considered as a leader at district level and personally knows prominent Red Shirts leaders at national level. Pansak gains respects from the locals and always is a leader for social and political activities. Pansak claims that his group neither belongs nor is a political tool for the Red politicians. This group allies with UDD, so the members always participate in protests in Bangkok. Pansak said that he is also running training courses named "School of the Red Shirts" which enlighten members of the Red Shirts in understanding power and the socioeconomics of Thai society as well as the roles of the elites (aristocrat) and people-based politics in the past and future. Additionally, the school aims to cultivate and expand the ideologies of the Red Shirts (K. Pansak, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

(e) Relationship with Thaksin/ Thaksin's family/ the Yellow Shirts' leaders. Only Preecha had a close relationship with Thaksin and his family. Thaksin's younger brother who passed away was Preecha's friend. He could visit Thaksin's house in San Kampang District, Chiang Mai any time. Other PHN members knew key politicians under Thaksin's connection. Pansak, for example, became familiar with key Red Shirts'

leaders at the national level as well as well-known politicians. On the contrary, Tassanai and Jarunee did not know those key leaders personally; they rather knew key politicians in Chiang Mai. Regarding the relationship with the Yellow Shirts, four persons do not have any relation to the Yellow Shirts' leaders except Preecha, who used to work with Major General Jamlong, one of the five Yellow Shirts' leaders at national level.

5.1.3 Political Identity and Involvement of the PHN's Members from the Yellow Shirts

Under the PHN, five members of the Yellow Shirts are engaged in the process namely Sangtian, Suchit, Chana, Chumsai, and Wichai.

(a) The Perception and the Meaning of being the Yellow Shirts. After examining the perception and the meaning of being a member of the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai, the researcher found that the shades of being the Yellow Shirts have shaped their views and perceptions on themselves and others. Hence, the discussion on the shades of the Yellow Shirts is provided in the following part, and the meaning is discussed respectively.

The *Shades of the Yellow Shirts*

PHN members from the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai have diverse three shades: the Sonthi-Yellow Shirts, the pro Democrat Party Yellow Shirts, and the progressive Yellow Shirts.

To begin with the Sonthi-Yellow Shirts, this shade is strongly loyal to the King. In their perspectives, the King is highly revered and shall not be criticized. Consequently, they usually stereotyped anyone who criticizes the King including the royal family members, as a traitor. In their eyes, Thaksin was a threat to the monarchy because they interpreted Thaksin's actions as an attempt to demolish the monarchy. By this reason, the Sonthi-Yellow Shirts hate Thaksin and put their efforts to overthrow Thaksin and his connection out of power. Under the leadership of the five leaders of the Yellow Shirts especially Sonthi whom they believe that these leaders were truly loyal to the monarchy, the Sonthi-Yellow Shirts followed on what the leaders demanded. According to the interviews, the Sonthi - Yellow Shirts always doubt on the Democrat Party as they argue that the Democrat politicians are not sincere to deal with Thaksin when they were a government during 2010.

Similarly, the pro- Democrat Party Yellow Shirts share the same core identities with the Sonthi - Yellow Shirts which are loyal to the King and anti-Thaksin. Moreover, these two types of the Yellow Shirts strived for clean politics, and greatly valued the roles of independent entities under the 2007 constitution like the Thai Constitutional Court. They argued that these entities were free from Thaksin's influence, so it is an effective mean to keep Thaksin from abusing power.

Additionally, they were skeptical on the checks and balances of power under parliamentary system because facts point out that Thaksin and his connections often won national elections. Under this environment, they argue that the system is malfunctioned

and could not control Thaksin's exercising power. Hence, the Yellow Shirts denied an election and called for the King, military and particularly juridical intervention. However, the pro- Democrat Party Yellow Shirts do not agree with everything Sonthi requested the mass to do. The pro Democrat party -Yellow Shirts, for instance, still supported and voted for the Democratic Party while the Sonthi -Yellow Shirts campaigned for vote no and harshly criticized the Democrat Party

The third one is the progressive Yellow Shirts. They basically argued that Thaksin's policies on micro finance and other top-down policies like free-trade agreement, special economic zone, and contract farming can cause long-term negative impact on local development, sustainability, and human security. Moreover, the important issues for these people are that Thaksin abused power and violated human rights. Consequently, they actively aligned with the PAD against Thaksin.

However, the progressive Yellow Shirts did not agree with other types of Yellow Shirt who believed that there should be no discussion about the monarchy. The progressive Yellow Shirts agreed that there should be a platform to converse on the roles of the monarchy in the conflict. As such, they agreed to amend the title number 112 of the 2007 Constitution so-called "*lèse-majesté* law". Even though they disagreed with Thaksin, the progressive Shirts denied coup because they realized that it would put democratic development backwards.

Shades of the Yellow Shirts engaging in the PHN and Its Meaning

The five members of the Yellow Shirts engaging in the PHN have diverse shades. One is under the Sonthi Yellow Shirts, one can be classified as the Democrat Yellow Shirts, and two are the progressive Yellow Shirts. There is only one member who is not a member of any group.

Apart from having no affiliation with the Democrat Party, the Sonthi Yellow Shirts shares the same value about being the Yellow Shirts with the Democrat Yellow Shirts: being proud as protectors of the King and watchdogs on corruption. Chana, for instance, is the Sonthi -Yellow Shirts as he describes that he believed in General Jamlong prior to the occurrence of conflict. He always participated in the political movement both in Chiang Mai and Bangkok and put high effort to ensure that the Yellow Shirts could sustain political activities. S. Chana asserted,

> I am the Yellow Shirts because Yellow represents King Bhumibol and goodness. I consider that being Thai and a member of the Yellow Shirts are my identity: we must protect the crucial institution and public interest. We try to eliminate corrupted politicians especially Thaksin so that we can have clean politics. (personal communication, July 17, 2014)

Similarly, K. Wichai, who sees himself as the Democrat Party Yellow Shirts, explained,

> I could not bear what such aggressive Red Shirts had done in Chiang Mai and the country. I, therefore, decided to go out and stop them. Being the Yellow Shirts does not mean we are fighting with the Red Shirts, but rather normal people who are concerned about their home country and want to restore stability. (personal communication, August 1, 2014)

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On the contrary, Sangtian and Suchit are the progressive Yellow Shirts who did

not appreciate the populist and top-down policies. These people realize that being the

Yellow Shirts is less meaningful when compared to the two shades. They acknowledge

that being the Yellow Shirts is a strategic movement for social change as T. Suchit

argued,

> I am a Yellow Shirts and a leader in the northern region, but I do not agree all with what the five leaders have done. I want to see positive change in this society and Thaksin's polices were undermining my work as well as NGOs on local empowerment. If I want to stop improper policies, it is important to ally with the anti-Thaksin movement. (personal communication, June 29, 2014)

As for T. Sangtian, perceiving negative impacts stemming from Thaksin's

administration, he decided to join the Yellow Shirts movement during the early anti-

Thaksin movement from 2006 to 2008. In his eyes, being the Yellow Shirts is not

important. When the Yellow Shirts became more conservative during the nationalism

movement since late 2008, Sangtian rarely engaged with the Yellow Shirts (personal

communication, June 13, 2014).

Briefly, the common characteristic of the Yellow Shirts emerging from the

interview is that they are anti-Thaksin and seeking for clean politics. In other words, an

individual who comes into power and govern the country in a way Thaksin has done is

inappropriate: abuse of power, integrate policies' corruption, crony capitalism, and

policies undermining locals. The core identity of the Yellow Shirts in this research is

different from general understanding among Thai people including the current literatures

who argue that the core identity of the Yellow Shirts is to protect the King.

(b) Their Perceptions about the Others. The PHN members from the Yellow

Shirts have various perceptions according to their shades. To start with the similarities,

the three shades acknowledged that leaders of the Red Shirts both at national and local

levels and the mass had different purposes in political involvement. The PHN members

from the Yellow Shirts also realized that many of the Red Shirts are from not well-off

backgrounds. In this sense, they admitted that the inequality does exist and the gap

between the rich and the poor is huge. Consequently, they understood why these poor had

to join the Red Shirts' movement.

As for the differences, the Sonthi and pro-Democrat Party Yellow Shirts

have perceived the Red Shirts leaders as Thaksin slaves who have no ideology but only

fighting for Thaksin and have short-term interest. Their perceptions were tied with the

belief that Thaksin was perilous to the country since his actions were undermining the

monarchy and seeking profits to his family and network. They expect that authentic and

decent Thai people must disagree with Thaksin. Consequently, whoever supported

Thaksin was stereotyped as Thaksin slaves. Furthermore, these two shades of the Yellow

Shirts generally viewed that the members of Red Shirts were concerned on short term

advantages. They theorized that because these Red Shirts were poor and innocent, when

they received benefits from Thaksin's policies, they blindly supported him. As a result, in

their eyes, the Red Shirts' engagements in political activities are manipulated by the

corrupted leaders.

On the contrary, the progressive Yellow Shirts acknowledged that members of the

Red Shirts had valid reasons to align with the Red Shirts and Thaksin. They also agree

that somehow policies and its implementation under Thaksin's administration offered

opportunities in improving their living conditions. Therefore, they respect why one joins

the Red Shirts and prefer other approaches to pursue political goals. With this reason,

several Yellow Shirts who constantly attended the collaboration are the progressive

Yellow Shirts whereas others shades became inactive in the collaboration.

 (c) *Their Understanding about the Conflict.* According to the interviews, the

Yellow Shirts' understanding on the causes and conditions of the conflict can be

presented as follows:

Table 5.3 The PHN Yellow Shirts' Understandings on Causes and Conditions of the Conflict

Causes/ Conditions	Sangtian	Suchit	Chana	Chumsai	Wichai
1.Socio-economic Inequality	Cause	Cause	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
2. Centralized Government	Cause	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
3. Prolong Political Needs Deprivation	Cause	Cause	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
4.Thaksin's and his corrupted policies	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause
5.Thaksin's attempt in seizing power	Condition	Condition	Cause	Cause	Cause

The table shows that the understanding on the causes and conditions of the conflict among the members of the Yellow Shirts are varied.

To start with the first one, only Sangtian and Suchit believe that socio-economic inequality is the root cause of the conflict whereas the others understood it differently. Chana, Chumsai, and Wichai, for instance, admitted that the gap between the rich and the poor in Thailand does exist and it is huge, but it is neither a cause nor condition to the political color-coded conflict.

Looking at the second one, only Sangtian claimed that centralized government is one of the root causes of the conflict. He further explained that under the current organizing governmental administrative system which is strongly centralized, inequality has been propagated in many aspects such as through unfair resources distribution, lack of development, and poverty.

Next, reflecting on Sangtian's and Suchit's understanding, prolonged deprivation of basic political needs is the cause of the conflict. However, the others argue that it does not generate the conflict, but the Red Shirts' leaders take advantage of the situation to mobilize the mass. In this sense, some Yellow Shirts believe that to exercise political rights by voting deserves to be suspended because a great number of the Red Shirts are vote –buying.

Lastly, several strongly believed that Thaksin's attempt to seize the power is the cause of the conflict. They claimed that Thaksin was behind several Red Shirts' rallies against the opponents. For them, as long as Thaksin still has influence in Thai politics, the conflict would last and clashes between parties would reoccur. Wichai, for

example, views that "Majority of the Red Shirts are followers who are over politicized by Thaksin. The main cause of conflict is him (Thaksin)" (personal communication, June 16, 2014).

All agreed that Thaksin's policies and his corrupted commits are one of the major causes of conflict. However, there are different understandings on other fours. The main distinctions which encourage one to keep taking part in the PHN or decline it are the understanding number two: Centralized Government and number five: Thaksin's attempt in seizing power. The PHN members like Chana, Wichai, and Chumsai whose understandings were quite rigid and later they became passive PHN members. According to their understandings, they argued that the collaboration has produced positive outcome, but it cannot cope Thaksin. Hence, they prefer to maintain their roles in the group identity and choose other approaches to deal with the conflict.

On the contrary, Sangtian and Suchit were very active PHN members during the first year of the collaboration. However, upon 2010, Sangtian was the only one who still closely engaged with the collaboration whereas Suchit is rather inactive. Suchit articulates that though the collaboration offers and brings fruitful outcome, it cannot effectively change the socio-economic structure.

(d) Political Involvement. The finding reveals that every PHN members from the Yellow Shirts have high level of political involvement during the political conflict. Only Suchit and Chana are recognized as leaders at the provincial level. Suchit, for instance, is a local leader who mobilizes the mass to support the protests in Bangkok and in Chiang Mai. Not being a leader, Sangtian has played a major role as a key analyst on

socioeconomic context and problems resulting from Thaksin and his power structure. He also theorizes on how strong centralized government could cause the conflict. Later, his idea has been gradually developed to be the concept of self-governing which later became a common vision among the PHN members. As for Chumsai, though being a key leader in Muslim community there, he does not take a leading role in the conflict. Similar to Wichai, who did not play a leading role in the group prior 2010, but later he served as a leader of PRDC (the Yellow Shirts who advocated the Democrat Party).

(e) *Relationship with the Democratic Party/the Yellow Shirts' Leaders/ the Red Shirts' Leaders.* To begin with the relationship with the Democrat Party, only Sangtian and Suchit have personal relationships with some members of the party. As for the Yellow Shirts leaders, mostly the PHN members from the Yellow Shirts have engaged with key leaders of the Yellow Shirts both at provincial and national level except Wichai who has relationships only with the Yellow Shirts leaders at provincial level.

Regarding the relationship with the Red Shirts, none of them know the Red Shirts leaders at national level, but they are familiar with some leaders of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai.

5.1.4 Non-Colored-Coded Group

There are five members of the PHN namely Jintana, Jadepong, Sanong, Tantong, and Yingyot, who identify themselves as non-members of any political color-coded group. Since the research focuses on the members of the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts, these five members' identities and political involvements are not examined.

5.2 Group 2: Persons who Declined to Collaborate

This group consists of members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts who decline to participate in the PHN. The following table is a summary of their background and political identity, involvement, and roles within groups. Their details are based on the year 2009 when the collaboration emerged.

Table 5.4 The Non PHN Members' Background and Political Engagement

No.	Pseudonym	Age	Sex	Original Hometown/ Settled Town	Education	Occupation	Political Identity	Roles in groups
1	Petchwat *Not being interviewed	51	M	Lampoon/ Chiang Mai	MA	Business Owner	Red	Leader
2	Pendara	40	M	Chiang Mai	BA	Small Business Owner	Red	Leader
3	Pongpat	42	M	Chiang Mai	BA	Small Business Owner	Red	Active Participant
4	Poomtam	41	M	Chiang Mai	MA	Translator/ Writer	Red	Active Participant
5	Udom	Mid 50	M	Chiang Mai	MA	Academia	Yellow	Leader
6	Narakorn	42	F	Chiang Mai	MA	Small Business Owner	Yellow	Active Participant
7	Saifon	45	F	Chiang Mai	MA	Business Owner	Yellow	Passive Participant
8	Sansai	Mid 50	F	Chiang Mai	BA	Public Figure/Small Business Owner	Yellow	Active Participant

5.2.1. Personal Background

5.2.1.1 Age. The age of these non PHN members ranged from forty to mid fifty. Majority of them are forties and only three are over fifty.

5.2.1.2 Sex. Of eight participants, five are male and three are female.

5.2.1.3 Hometown. Six persons are Chiang Mai natives who were born and have been living there whereas only Petchwat and Poomtam are from other provinces. Originally, Petchwat was born in Lampoon and then moved to Chiang Mai over twenty years ago. Contrastingly, Poomtam is Bangkokian and recently moved to settle down in Chiang Mai.

5.2.1.4 Education. The table shows that everyone has higher educational backgrounds, bachelor's degree. In addition, five persons have master's degree. Poomtam, for instance, has a higher education from western country.

5.2.1.5 Occupation. Non PHN members from the Red Shirts camp mostly are small business owners except Poomtam, who is a writer/translator. Looking at the members of the Yellow Shirts, their occupations vary from academia to business owners.

5.2.1.6 Political and Social Experiences. Majority of non PHN members have intensive political and social experiences. Udom, for example, had played roles in many public involvements regarding culture, health, and environment issues since he was a university student. Likewise, Poomtam has been engaging in political movements on environment, education, human rights, and development issues since he was young. Though some persons like Pendara, revealed that they were highly interested in public

issues and had faced many challenges on social inequality, they never physically joined

any political activities.

As for Petchwat, the data from the research participants and documents shows

that there is no sign of his political and social experiences prior to the political conflict

that erupted in 2005.

5.2.2. Political Identity and Involvement of non-PHN from the Red Shirts

Only Petchwat's data is based on documents and interviews from other research

participants while data analysis of Pendara, Pongpat, and Poomtam, are based on their

interviewed.

(a) The Perception and the meaning of being the Red Shirts. Apart from

Petchwat, the three individuals perceived that being the Red Shirts is meaningful. To start

with Pendara, being the Red Shirts is a symbol of striving for social justice, equality, and

democracy. Due to the double standard in legal practices, the rich have privileges over

the poor, and unfair resource distribution, Pendara does not hesitate to join the Red Shirts

as he agrees with the Red Shirts on social issues (personal communication, July 19,

2014). Likewise, Poomtam considers himself as Red. He reveals that this identity is

important because what the Red Shirts movement has been trying to accomplish are the

same things that he dreams of which are well-being, social welfare, and to reform all

political institutions. Besides, Poomtam wishes to see a mature democracy: election,

check and balance system, all citizens are equal under laws as he shares as follows:

> The Red Shirts respect the monarchy, and do not believe that there is
> Anyone who wants to demolish the monarchy. The Red Shirts particularly who are new
> emerging class (above the poor and peasants) want to get their voices heard and to be
> treated equally whereas the Yellow Shirts claim that the Red Shirts especially Thaksin

want to demolish the monarchy. This is important to me. (personal communication, July 20, 2014)

As for Pongpat, being the Red Shirts also matters because it was an important mass movement calling for what he desired to accomplish which were to achieve re-promulgation of the 1997 constitution, to have a stable and prosperous economy similar to the one during Thaksin's administration, returning Thaksin to Thailand, and having normal election and everyone respecting the voting results. Pongpat shared his thought as follows:

> I am Red because it upholds democracy and calls for equality, justice, and well-being. In addition, I do admire Thaksin because of his leadership and policies as well as good economy under his administration. However, I admit that my group usually employs hate speech and sometimes violent tactics during the movement. (personal communication, July 20, 2014)

Shades of the Red Shirts who Declined to be in the Collaborative Process

According to the analysis, it can be said that non PHN members from the Red Shirts are both progressive Red and Thaksin follower. Three of research participants namely Pendara, Pongpat, and Poomtam are categorized as progressive Red. This shade calls for social justice and democracy. They acknowledged that Thaksin's administration had carried out beneficial policies and contributed positively towards the lives of ordinary people. In this light, they admire Thaksin. More importantly, these people uphold that Thaksin is a legitimate leader coming from the election, so he should only be ousted from the power through democratic methods.

Regarding Petchwat, the data analysis including interviews and sources indicated that he is a Thaksin-follower Red or radical red. Many members of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai doubted his political involvement and the meaning of being Red. Due to his

past experiences and what he had gained after being a leader of the Red Shirts, several research participants from the Red Shirts camp claimed that Petchwat became Red because of personal interest. Dating back over two decades, Petcthwat has been doing business over twenty years. However, his companies did not gain profit and had to dispose his company out of the commercial registrar system and to sell some of his business properties (Isaranews, 2011).

Petchwat claimed that he aimed to see democracy (governments must come from election); desired to see every Thai citizen having equal rights and being treated equally under the same laws, and wants Thaksin to return to power (Intarajak, 2011). However, Red Shirts like Preecha, Pendara, Pongpat, and Pansak shared their experiences that Petchwat has hidden interest of being the Red Shirts' leaders. They believed that Petchwat wanted to obtain political position to recover his accumulated deficit in the business. They told that they used to work together under the Rak Chiang Mai 51, and found out that Petchwat was not transparent about budgeting for political activities and he fights for only Thaksin (personal communication, June - July, 2014). In order to achieve those objectives, Petchwat has to compete with the opponent and employ some harsh strategies. Hence, collaboration with others is impossible for him.

(b) Their Perceptions about the Others. Pendara and Poomtam acknowledged that the mass of Yellow Shirts and its leaders are different: some leaders may have hidden agendas whereas some leaders including the mass of the Yellow Shirts have important issues to protest against Thaksin. In this sense, Pendara and Poomtam did not stereotype the Yellow Shirts as brainwashed mass who are over politicized and then

blindly hating the Red Shirts. However, they admit that the Yellow Shirts have negative

perceptions on them. As T. Pendara shared,

> They somehow hate us and I do understand why they feel that way. I believe what the Yellow Shirts' values such as transparency, loyalty to the Monarch, and good deed are important, but they got it wrong by their leaders. When the leaders continuously created us as an evil, undeniable, the hatred reoccurred. However, these can be fixed. (personal communication, July 18, 2014)

On the other hand, Pongpat's perception on the Yellow Shirts leaders is quite

rigid and rather negative. According to the interview, Pongpat ignores the Yellow Shirts'

issues and their reasons of rallying against Thaksin, but argues that the Yellow Shirts

only desire to be a government without being elected. He argued,

> Because the Yellow Shirts wanted political power, they had to create the discourse of corruption and non-loyalty to the monarchy to defame Thaksin and the Red Shirts. I think they had illogical thinking, brainwashed by the Yellow media to believe that Thaksin was evil and the Red Shirts were fools and poor. (personal communication, July 19, 2014)

(c) Their Understandings about the Conflict. Their understandings on the causes

and conditions of the conflict can be presented as followed:

Table 5.5 The non PHN Red Shirts' Understandings on Causes and Conditions of the Conflict

Causes/ Conditions	Petchwat	Pendara	Pongpat	Poomtam
1.Socio-economic Inequality	NA	Cause	Condition	Cause
2. Centralized Government	NA	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not related to the Conflict
3. Prolonged Political Needs Deprivation	NA	Cause	Cause	Cause
4. The Clash between Elites	NA	Condition	Cause	Condition
5. the Yellow Shirts 'strife for political power	NA	Condition	Cause	Condition

To begin with the first one, Pendara and Poomtam believed that socio-economic inequality is the cause of conflict. They explained that Thai society has been facing such inequality for a very long time and ordinary people had felt insecurity in many dimensions such as limited access to healthcare, education, and jobs. After becoming the prime minister, Thaksin had launched policies that suited to their needs. Therefore, when Thaksin and his brother-in-law and his sister were overthrown, these people had to come out to protect their interests. Contrastingly, Pongpat thought that socio-economic inequality was just a condition.

As for the second one, all of the three research participants did not claim that centralized government could either be a cause or a condition on the political conflict.

Next, three of them agreed that the prolonged deprivation of their political needs was the cause of the conflict. They explained that their three elected governments were ousted of power illegitimately and this had led to the feeling of frustration. They then had to rally against the Yellow Shirts.

Looking at the clash between the old and the new elites, Pendara and Poomtam viewed that it was a condition generating the conflict and making it become intractable. Contrastingly, Pongpat viewed that the clash was the cause of the conflict.

As for the last one, while Pendara and Poomtam considered that the Yellow Shirts' striving for political power was the only condition for conflict, Pongpat saw it differently. He claimed that the root cause of the conflict was Yellow Shirts' strong desire to seize political power. According to Pongpat, as long as the Yellow Shirts are not in power, they will remobilize and employ tactics to obtain their goal. Consequently, the conflict would last until one party wins.

(d) Political Involvement. Of the four persons, at the period of the collaboration only Petchwat and Pendara were leaders of the Red Shirts at the provincial level whereas Poomtam and Pongpat were active Red Shirts. Petchwat had become a Thaksin supporter since 2006 (Manageronline, 2008). According to S. Preecha, in March, 2006, Petchwat and his associates, Mahawan and Preecha, mobilized people who destroyed the Democrat Party's public stage used for political campaign. He began involving with politics and the Red Shirts movement in June, 2008 when he brought people hanging poster against the Yellow Shirts (personal communication, June 12, 2014). Later in August, 2008, Petchwat and his associates set up a local radio station at his hotel named Grand Varoros Palace,

and formed a group called "Rak Chiang Mai 51" and had operated political activities since then. Under Yingluck's administration, Petchwat was appointed as an advisory to Minister of Social Development and Human Security (MSDH website, 2012). Interestingly, Petchwat had not interrupted the collaboration under the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing since 2010. On the contrary, he somehow agreed with the idea and later used that idea to mobilize his group.

Looking at Pendara, a day after the 2006 coup, he started launching flyers against the military junta. Later, Pendara set up a new Red Shirts group in Chiang Mai. Consequently, he was in the name list of the security service, and the military strictly controlled anti-coup movement. Hence Pendara temporary suspended his political activities (T. Pendara, personal communication, August 3, 2014).

As for Pongpat, after the conflict manifested for a while, in 2008 he began as an active member who conducted research and produced papers to support the Red Shirts movement. Poomtam often joined the Red Shirts' movement both in Bangkok and Chiang Mai. Later, Pongpat set up his own Red Shirts group in Chiang Mai which had a small number of members (personal communication, July 19, 2014).

While the others played leading roles in the conflict, U. Poomtam became a strong advocator of the Red Shirts movement by producing many papers, flyers, and essays. He rather attended political activities and did research to support the movement (personal communication, July 14, 2014).

(e) Relationship with Thaksin/ Thaksin's family/ the Yellow Shirts' leaders. Only Petchwat was not interviewed, therefore, this piece of information on his

relationship with Thaksin/Thaksin's family and the Yellow Shirts' leaders is missing. However, the interviews from other participants implied that Petchwat had a relationship with Thaksin and his family since the political conflict outbreak in 2005. As for the relationship with the Yellow Shirts' leaders, there was no clue of any relationship between Petchwat and the Yellow Shirts.

Looking at Pendara, he knew not only several key leaders of the Red Shirts movement both at national and local level, but also had a relationship with some politicians in Chiang Mai who were Thaksin's relatives. Pendara admitted that to accomplish the goal mentioned previously, it was important to align with Thaksin. For this reason, during 2008 to 2010 he had to lift his role as a leader and be recognized by Chiang Mai natives as well as politicians under Thaksin's connection. As for the Yellow Shirts' leaders, Pendara had heard some key leaders' name prior to the debut of conflict, but he never knew them in person.

Contrastingly, Pongpat did not have any relationship either with Thaksin /Thaksin family or the Yellow Shirts'leaders. Similarly, Poomtam did not have relationship with Thaksin and his family. The difference was that Poomtam was acquainted with several key leaders of the Yellow Shirts at both national and local levels.

5.2.3 The Yellow Shirts who are non PHN members

This section provides the result of background, political identity, and political involvement of the members of the Yellow Shirts who decline to the collaboration. Four persons namely Narakorn, Saifon, Sansai, and Udom were interviewed.

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(a) The Perception and the meaning of being the Yellow Shirts. Four research

participants shared the same perception on being the Yellow Shirts: Yellow is the color of

King Bhumibol and symbolizes good deeds.

Sansai, for example, provided the reasons of being the Yellow Shirts,

> "I am the Yellow Shirts because what I and our friends have been doing is
> to return morality back to society, to protect the monarchy, and to build
> the checks and balances system under parliamentary democracy" (personal
> communication, July 18, 2014).

Udom, explicitly called himself as yellow as he elaborated that "The Yellow

Shirts are free people who are calling for real democracy, clean politics, stability of the

monarchy, and empowered people and well-being" (personal communication, August 5,

2014).

Shades of the Yellow Shirts who declined to be in the Collaborative Process

Referring to the shade of Yellow Shirts discussed previously, the analysis

revealed that Narakorn and Saifon are pro Democrat – Yellow Shirts whereas Sansai and

Udom are Sonthi – Yellow Shirt.

(b) Their Perceptions about the Others. The result showed that their perceptions

on the Red Shirts were similar to those PHN members who were Sonthi and pro-

Democrat Party Yellow Shirts discussed in the previous section. They considered that the

leaders of the Red Shirts were Thaksin's slaves and perceived the mass of the Red Shirts

as naïve ordinary people who were manipulated by Thaksin and corrupted leaders. K.

Saifon, for instance, argued that "Majority of the Red Shirts are poor, underprivileged,

and innocent people who have been being deceived and exploited by Thaksin and the

leaders" (personal communication, July 21, 2014).

(c)Their Understanding about the Conflict. Their understanding about the

conflict can be explained as follows:

Table 5.6 The non PHN Yellow Shirts' Understandings on Causes and Conditions of the Conflict

Causes/ Conditions	Narakorn	Saifon	Sansai	Udom
1.Socio-economic Inequality	Condition	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
2. Centralized Government	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
3. Prolong Political Needs Deprivation	Condition	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict	Not Likely to fuel the conflict
4.Thaksin's and his corrupted policies	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause
5.Thaksin's attempt in seizing power	Cause	Cause	Cause	Cause

As presented in the table, the non PHN from the Yellow Shirts have shared the

same understanding on the cause and condition of the conflict. Their belief was that

Thaksin and his corrupted policies, and his attempts of seizing the political power were

the root causes of the conflict. They pointed out that because of the endurance towards

Thaksin's wish to come back to power, the conflict deescalated constantly. Regarding

number one and two, though admitting that there is a huge gap between the Rich and the

poor and still many forms of inequality are existing in Thai society, they argued that this did not provoke the conflict. They also ignored the deprivation on the Red Shirts' political right as they claimed that ousted governments deserved to be dismissed from the political power. As for the centralized government, they viewed that it caused difficulties and unintended consequences, yet they did not see any correlation to the conflict.

(d) Political Involvement. Udom a key leader of the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai, began criticizing Thaksin' top down development projects since 2004. After the five leaders of the Yellow Shirts started anti-Thaksin movement in 2006, Udom had always attended the movements in Bangkok. Shortly, he and his friends initiated the movement in Chiang Mai and had continued the political activities since then.

Others are active advocators to the Yellow Shirts. Sansai, for example, often took part in protests against Thaksin by being on stage to sing songs and calling for public supports. Likewise, Narakorn used to attend movements both in Chiang Mai and Bangkok. On the contrary, though strongly disagreeing with Thaksin, Saifon did not reveal her political thoughts because she was afraid of the negative consequences on her business. As a result, she had rather choosen to support the Yellow Shirts by donating money and receiving news from the Yellow Shirts' media since the onset of the conflict in 2005.

(e) Relationship with Thaksin/ Thaksin's family/ the Yellow Shirts' leaders. None of the research participants had relationship with Thaksin/Thaksin's family. Contrastingly, Udom and Sansai had long lasting relationships with some leaders of the

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Yellow Shirts both at national and local levels whereas Narakorn knew some leaders of the Yellow Shirts only in Chiang Mai.

5.3 Comparison between the Two Groups

The analysis below presents the comparison of various component between the PHN and non PHN members.

5.3.1 Personal Background

It is revealed that the personal background such as age, sex, and education was not an influential condition since there was no major difference between PHN and non PHN members. However, what mattered were their perceptions on themselves and others, the causes and conditions of the conflict, and their roles within the group.

(a) Age and Sex. The result can imply that age was not the factor causing one to collaborate or decline. Most members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts who attended the collaboration were at the age of fifty to sixty. Only Racha and Tassanai were mid-forties when they began participating in the collaborative process. Likewise, the age of non PHN members from the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts were late forties to mid-fifties. Only some individuals namely Pendara, Pongpat, Poomtam, and Narakorm were in their early forties.

In terms of gender, there was only one woman from the Red Shirts who took part in the PHN. It could not be concluded that the issue of gender had an influence on decision making to join the PHN, it should be further investigated on how it affected the collaborative process.

(b) Hometown and Settlement. According to the result, it can be roughly concluded that there is no strong correlation between the residence and one's decision to take part in or decline the collaborative process because both PHN and non PHN members were comprised of Chiang Mai natives.

Noticeably, hometown and settlement considerably mattered on the level of commitment in the PHN. For instance, Preecha, Chiang Mai native, was recognized by the other members as strongly engaged with the collaboration and later became a working member to promote the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governance. Differently, Pansak, originally a Bangkokian, attended the collaboration for a while and then withdrew from the process.

This is similar to the Yellow Shirts side, Sangtian, a Chiang Mai native, constantly joined the PHN and always was an active member. On the contrary, Chana, who was born in Nakhon Pathom and had been residing in Chiang Mai, attended the PHN and later he rarely got involved with the PHN.

(c) Education. Both members and non-members of the PHN had similar educational backgrounds. Most of them obtained bachelor's degree or higher. There were only three members of the PHN who did not obtain a degree: two finished a high school and another one had a diploma from overseas.

(d) Occupation. All the Red Shirts, both the members and non-members of the PHN had stable jobs. Most of them owned a small business; some were wealthy and successful business people. Only two members of the PHN were local politicians.

(e) Experiences. The PHN members had diverse and prolonged experiences in public issues: they belonged to several civil organizations and were always involved with social activities. Preecha, for example, was the president of Federal of Northern Grassroot, president of OTOP in Doi Saket District, and used to initiate campaigns on promoting democracy. Jarunee, a widely known person in her district, is a good example that she had been involved with community work for over thirty years.

In contrast, some Red Shirts who were non PHN members did not have noticeable experiences in community services or public issues. Petchwat, for instance, was recently involved with a non-profit organization called International Rotary from early 2000s and was appointed as a supportive judge. Similarly, Pendara and Pongpat had no experience in public issues prior to being active members of the Red Shirts while Poomtam had extensive experiences in local empowerment and human rights works since he was a university student.

This can conclude that experiences in social issues and being members of civil society organizations were quite considerable factors among members of the Red Shirts in contributing towards becoming a member of the collaboration or declining it. However, it could not be explained in the cases of some members of the Yellow Shirts such as Udom, Sansai, and Narakorn. Those persons were activists but declined to be involved with the PHN.

Personal background of the research participants was not the strong influencing factor on one's decision making to collaborate or decline being member of the PHN. However, interestingly, the results on the Red Shirts in this research were contradictory

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to the master narrative among the Yellow Shirts that most of the Red Shirts were poor,

peasants and laborers who had unstable and not-well-paying jobs, and uneducated.

According to the National Economic and Social Advisory Board (2011), the poverty line

is persons who earn less than 5,000 baht per month. These Red Shirts had commonalities

in personal background. They had higher income than people who were classified as

poor. None of them were peasants or laborer; they had small businesses and had stable

jobs. Though the researcher did not ask for their specific income, from their jobs and

positions they can earn more than 15,000 Baht per month. Besides, through observation,

the researcher could tell that their personal belongings clearly indicated that they were

much above the poverty line. Concerning their education, the research participants had

received good education. Several of them had a master's degree. The results emphasize

the existing research of Pinkeaw 2012, Apichart et al 2012; Siamwara 2010; Keyes 2010

that the Red Shirts are diverse people and mixed-class mass political movement.

5.3.2 Political Identities and Involvement Matter

The research reveals that political identities and involvement are important

conditions leading to collaboration or dissociation. It can be concluded that the *shade of

being the Red Shirts or the Yellow Shirts and perceptions on oneself and others* are

determining factors. This is concurrent with the third hypothesis that moderate shades

like progressive Red/Yellow were likely to engaging with the collaboration. On the

contrary, the radical or extreme shades namely Thaksin followers, Sonthi-Yellow, and

pro-Democrat party rather declined to collaborate. The PHN members from the two

color-coded groups were progressive ones. Those persons were likely to get involved

with the PHN whereas several who were not progressive became inactive PHN members. Udom and Saifon were good examples of considering themselves in this group as Sonthi Yellow Shirts and pro-Democrat Party Yellow Shirt perceive the Red Shirts as Thaksin slaves. In this sense, the Red Shirts did not deserve to collaborate with the Yellow Shirts. These made them rather decline the PHN. Apart from the second hypothesis, the analysis reveals that two strong conditions leading to be take part in the PHN or not are 1) their understanding on the causes and conditions of the conflict and 2) the roles within identity groups.

The analysis also points out that *their understanding on the causes and conditions of the conflict* was critical for determining their decision making on the collaboration. Those whose understandings were based on structural problems were likely to get involved with the collaboration. In contrast, one who comprehended that the cause of the conflict was more about individuals' desire for power was less likely to take part in the PHN. Udom and Sansai, for instance, understood that the cause of the conflict was Thaksin's attempt to seize power; they denied joining the PHN. As for the Red Shirts, Pongpat decided not to join the PHN because his comprehension was that the Yellow Shirts went out for political uprising because of their desire to seize power.

Moreover, *the understandings on causes and conditions of the conflict have played vital roles in their long-term commitment to the PHN*. Pansak, for instance, was a progressive Red and took part in the collaboration during the early stages. Eventually he withdrew from the PHN since he considered that the PHN was incompetent to handle the conflict. He believed that the causes of the conflict were socio-economic inequality along

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with the clash between the two elites and prolonged political need deprivation that required a drastic change in Thai society. Hence, the small collaboration like PHN was not the answer. This was similar to what Chana and Wichai who are Sonthi and pro-Democrat Party Yellow Shirts respectively said. They argued that as long as Thaksin whom they viewed as the cause of the political conflict, had influence, the conflict would last. Hence, they rarely attended the collaboration.

Another important condition to collaborate or decline in the PHN was *the roles within identity groups.* Findings indicate that one who was a leader or became an emerging leader was less likely to take part in the collaboration. Suchit was a good sample that being involved with the PHN had brought him difficulties. As for Pendara, he stated that his reason for not being a PHN member was because he was an emerging leader of the Red Shirts at that time. Taking part in the PHN would prevent him from being a leader of the Red Shirts.

CHAPTER SIX

The Way Forward: A Shared Vision among the PHN Members
and the PHN' s Outcome

Upon the deep polarization of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts coupled with constantly violent incidents, the PHN could secure a space where conflicting parties discussed and worked together**.** Later, PHN was able to develop a common vision which was **"**Chiang Mai Self**-**Governing**".** The concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing had the potential to become a model for the other forty-five provinces nationwide to follow (T. Sangtian, personal communication, June 13, 2014; Chanrueang, 2016). Thus, this chapter aims to reveal the PHN's shared vision, how they developed it, and its relation to the conflict. Additionally, since the PHN has carried out the vision, the discussion on the PHN's evolution, structure and collaborative process framework, outcome of this collaboration, and the factors that sustains or derails the collaboration are discussed in this chapter

6.1 What is the shared vision of the PHN members?

Before going to the field research, the researcher thought that Chiang Mai Self-Governing was a shared vision between colored‑coded conflictants. That understanding proved to be quite accurate as to what had happened that eventually lead the PHN into

developing Chiang Mai Self – Governing as their common vision. However, prior to

reaching this common vision, the PHN members had been struggling on how to make

progress on their collaboration. By late December 2010, they eventually could develop a

shared vision–Chiang Mai Self - Governing. Hence, this part provides an examination of

the elements of the conflict of the PHN members prior to the emergence of Chiang Mai

Self-Governing and its development. The following table provides the PHN members'

issues, positions, and dreams.

Table 6.1 The PHN members' Issues, Positions, and Dreams

Parties	Issues	Positions	Dreams
The PHN members from the Red Shirts	1.Illegitimacy of Abhisit's government 2.Unfair overthrown of their elected prime ministers by the 2006 coup and the opponent's network 3.Prolonged and repeated rejection of their votes and political rights 4.Being unfairly and unequally treated by the government	1.Demanding that Abhisit shall not visit Chiang Mai for the CTCC annual meeting .If he insisted to come, the Red Shirts would rally against him. 2.Demanding Abhisit to resign and call new elections.	Short term 1.To alleviate tensions among conflicting parties 2.To prevent further violence in their hometown 3.To boost local tourism economy Long Term 1.Security in property and life 2. Political Stability 3. Social Justice 4. Good Standard of Living
The PHN members from the	1.Corruption and Transparency :The Yellow Shirts	1.Thaksin must be on trial and no longer in political	Short term 1. To prevent further violence in

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Parties	Issues	Positions	Dreams
Yellow Shirts	claimed that Thaksin and his network have corrupt policies and mega-projects and policies that only benefited them. 2. Inefficiency of Checks and Balance System：Under Thaksin, the parliament and independent entities could not investigate the government. 3.Unfair Election： Thaksin won because of vote-buying 4. Majority of the Red Shirts were "uneducated, poor, and fools" and were manipulated by Thaksin	power. 2. Whoever criticizes the Monarchy is a threat and should be persecuted. 3. Abhisit, PM can visit anywhere in Thailand including Chiang Mai.	Chiang Mai 2. To boost local tourism economy 3. To have safe space for launching political activities 4. To prevent Thaksin back in to power Long Term 1. Peaceful Society where everyone has good well-being 2.The Monarchy should be highly revered and no one shall criticize especially King Bhumibol. 3. Mature Democracy 4. Clean Politics free from any kind of corruption

According to the table, the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai had a huge cleavage in issues and positions. To begin with the issues and position on Abhisit's visit to Chiang Mai, in the Red Shirts' eyes, Abhisit came into power because of the coup and anti-Thaksin's network paving the path for him. As a result, Abhisit could be a Prime

Minister even though his party did not win a majority vote in the 2007 general election.

Hence, the Red Shirts perceived that Abhisit was illegitimate and was not their leader.

This was why the Red Shirts upheld the position that Abhisit shall not visit Chiang Mai

for the TCCC's annual meeting in October, 2009. On the contrary, the Yellow Shirts

considered that Abhisit was Thaksin's opponent, so having Abhisit as a prime minister

was a better choice than either Samak or Somchai whom had close relations with

Thaksin. Therefore, the Yellow Shirts could accept Abhisit's premiership and argued that

he had the right to go anywhere in Thailand including Chiang Mai without restriction.

Similar to other issues and positions, like the 2006 coup, the Red Shirts argued

that the junta ousting Thaksin out of power was an unjustifiable action. And this deprived

their political rights. Another controversial issue was about the roles of independent

entities in the conflict. There were competing narratives among the parties regarding their

roles. The constitutional court, for example, had been accused by the Red Shirts that the

court was a biased entity giving unfair convictions to Somchai and Samak. On the

contrary, the Yellow Shirts were highly appreciative of the roles of the coup and the court

in undermining Thaksin's influence on Thai politics.

Another important issue and position was about the national election. The Red

Shirts demanded Abhisit to resign from the parliament and hold an election because they

viewed that Abhisit's premiership was illegitimate. Therefore, their position was to hold

an election. In contrast, the Yellow Shirts constantly argued that Thaksin remained having

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majority vote because of vote-buying. Consequently, the Yellow Shirts denied an election and preferred having extra-constitutional mechanisms to cope with the conflict and resetting more transparent politics.

Though these issues and positions were incompatible, the parties had some shared dreams. In order to point out to the conflicting parties to realize their common dreams, third party intervention was required. Arun, the key third-party who initiated the first talk crossing color-coded members, observed some common things among them. While talking to the four pioneers, Arun (personal communication, June 14, 2014) touched the fundamental level of what their dreams and found some shared dreams as follows:

(1) To build a just society which they realized that a critical mass movement was needed to ensure

(2) To live peacefully without violence

(3) To have space to creatively and safety express political opinions and activities without fear.

During the talk with the four persons, Arun saw an opportunity for initiating collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai. Then, he encouraged and made the four persons who were committed to bring others to join the talk. Referring to the literatures on collaboration, this case has confirmed that conflictants' perceptions on their interdependent and mutual dreams/goals is critical. They admitted that to reach their long-term goals or even a short-term goal, suppressing the violent incidents needed the mutual collaboration from the Red Shirts and the Yellow

Shirts. Moreover, they realized that some of their goals were interdependent both negatively and positively. Hence, the collaboration was essential.

After several meetings between members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, they could perceive their shared dreams and were willing to work together. And then they established a collaborative group called "Coalition of Peaceful Homeland (CPH)" in late October, 2009 with stating four objectives as follows:

(1) To return stability in Chiang Mai

(2) To resume local tourism economy planning to launch annual floating lantern festival in November 2009

(3) To welcome the Prime Minister Abhisit and members of TCCC to come to Chiang Mai for TCCC annual meeting

(4) To restore a safe place where anyone could come to discuss, share ideas/information, and provide alternative solutions regarding the political conflict in their hometown (P. Arun, T. Sangtian, C. Yingyot, and S. Preecha, personal communication, June – July 2014).

On November 25th, 2009, a few days prior to the scheduled date which was TCCC's annual meeting day, there was a public conference in Chiang Mai announcing that CPH was established from a mutual agreement among several stakeholders in Chiang Mai including members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. This conference could draw huge public attention and support (P. Arun and A. Jeera, personal communication, July 15-22, 2014).

However, some Red Shirts still insisted that Abhisit should not come to Chiang Mai. This eventually resulted in the cancellation of the TCCC annual meeting to prevent unintended consequences. After that, CPH (Later changed to PHN) had continued their activities and more people were willing to take part in it. Several activities were carried out such as campaigns for hosting cultural activities, public seminars on political issues, and big cleaning days around the city. These activities became a platform for members of different groups coming to share, learn, and exchange ideas.

Overall, the PHN had accomplished some objectives stated previously. The PHN could prevent further confrontation between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. Since being able to create a safe place, PHN members from both color-coded groups constantly communicated, shared information, and assessed the situation. As such, PHN members came back to their political identity group to persuade and propose alternative political activities to avoid confrontation. By doing this, leaders of both the groups adapted their strategies accordingly (T. Suchit, personal communication, July 31, 2014). This led to decrease in the clash between both groups in Chiang Mai. Moreover, the PHN along with stakeholders in Chiang Mai could successfully resume their traditional floating lantern in November 2009 which helped boost their local tourism economy. More importantly, several PHN members claimed that the PHN significantly influenced a number of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in joining rallies against each other.

Unfortunately, the crackdown of the Red Shirts in Bangkok in April and May 2010 had left huge scar on the Red Shirts because several Red Shirts were injured and died in the uprising (TRC, 2012). This inevitably affected the PHN's progress as during

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the PHN meeting the Red Shirts were upset as the Yellow Shirts were hardly criticized. This poisoned the atmosphere and made several felt uncomfortable (T. Suchit and S. Chana, personal communication, July 15-31, 2014). At the same time, some PHN members had tried to point out the bright side and took this opportunity to move on. With their endurance, they finally persuaded that one of the major causes of the political conflict is *centralized government* of Thai state.

According to their explanation, this government was formed with the scenario of winner takes all that had led to relentless attempt in seizing political power. As such, Thai politicians would try to remain in power at all cost. Under this political circumstance, they somehow manipulated and/or aligned with the mass in order to have power to be dominant in the political arena. Additionally, the PHN members further explained that a centralized government was the fundamental factor leading to unfair resource distribution, underdeveloped living conditions and infrastructures in many areas, and so on. Eventually, in December, 2010, the PHN members successfully agreed to work on promoting the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing as a shared vision (T. Sangtian, and S. Racha, personal communication, June-July, 2014).

6.2. What is Chiang Mai Self-Governing?

"Chiang Mai Self-Governing (CMSG)" became a shared vision of the collaboration, and members of PHN have been working together to achieve the goal which they firmly believe would bring a sustainable peaceful society. After analyzing the interviews and related research, the researcher found that under the CMSG, local people had full right to determine their lives and future especially the right to elect their

governor. Currently, the administrative system allowed the Ministry of Interior to fill governor positions by appointing officials. Often these officials were outsiders to the province even in the northern region.

From lessons learned from many countries, the PHN members considered that the CMSG was a better administrative form (Sangtian, T., personal communication, June 13, 2014). They strongly believed that once the CMSG effectively functions, it would help distribute equal developments, enhancing local people to exercise their power, and decreasing high stake in the political race at a national level. To sum up, the CMSG is a shared vision and also a tool for resolving the causes and conditions of the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. This section, therefore, presented the evolution of the concept, the collaborative members' perception to the concept, and its relation to the conflict.

6.2.1 Historical Overview of Chiang Mai

Since the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing is closely linked with the history of Chiang Mai, it is essential to lay out a brief history of the province.

Located in the northern region, Chiang Mai, a second largest economy province in Thailand, is an important city for over the past 700 years (Lekuthai, 2008). In 1296, Chiang Mai (a short name of "Nopburi Si Nakorn Ping Chiang Mai"), a capital of Lanna Kingdom, was established by King Mengrai. Geopolitically, the kingdom is located between other powerful kingdoms; Burma, India, China, and Siam (Thailand). It was a great concern for King Mengrai to build the city surrounded with natural defensive walls.

During King Mengrai's legacy, the kingdom which had Buddhism as a main religion, had

developed, accumulated, and cultivated its own Lanna culture and has its language, both

spoken and written; unique architecture; and Lanna law entitled "Mengraisart"

(Ongsakul, 2001).

Since 1158, the Lanna Kingdom was occupied by nearby Kingdoms. The fall of

Siam (Thailand) allowed Burma to rule Lanna for 200 years, and then Siam rose and

defeated Burma in 1750s; Lanna became a colony of Siam (Kirigaya, 2014). During the

British Empire, Siam was forced to reform state and governmental structure. And because

of the modernized state policy, Chiang Mai was integrated as a part of the Siam modern

state since 1884 (Ongsakul, 2001). However, the Chiang Mai dynasty still had power and

autonomy to govern the city and the central government of Siam did not interfere with

Chiang Mai's domestic affair. Since its location is between those Kingdoms in

mountainous area, when either Lanna was defeated or the conquered, people were

brought/migrated/hostaged from one to another kingdom. Hence, Chiang Mai has been a

residing place of diversity in terms of tribes, ethnic, and culture (Kirigaya, 2014;

Ongsakul, 2001).

Until 1884, King Rama V of Siam gradually transferred power of the Chiang Mai

dynasty to the central state by appointing governors from Bangkok to govern Chiang Mai

and marry with the princess of Chiang Mai (Ongsakul, 2001). Under a new form of

government, Chiang Mai became a city under the modern municipality (*sukhaphiban*)

which was created in 1915. In 1933, shortly after the 1932 Siamese revolution, the new

government canceled the municipality system which resulted in Chiang Mai just

becoming a province under Thai modern state (Kraipakorn, nd.). All policies and

developments are from the central government which gradually made Chiang Mai slowly

grow into a modern culture including trading and economics (Netipo, 2008). At present,

Chiang Mai not only is the center of Lanna culture and a famous tourist attraction, but

also a hub for international organizations and a strategic place which is a connecting

point to Myanmar, China, and Laos. On the other hand, the centralized government and

its top-down policies have been generating negative impact on Chiang Mai natives. (T.

Sangtian, and S. Chana, personal communication, June-July, 2014)

6.2.2. An Evolution of Chiang Mai Self-Governing: A Shared and Competing Vision

Since Chiang Mai became a province of the Thai modern state, most policies and

developmental projects have been forming from the central government and implemented

by officials who are appointed from Bangkok. These top-down policies have been

leading to negative consequences on Chiang Mai natives. Over three decades, then Mr.

Graisorn Tantipong, former Chiang Mai representative, came out and argued that the

decentralize government should be evolved. Later, he had launched campaigns for

decentralized government/Chiang Mai Self-Governing. However, Mr. Graisorn's

proposal was not fulfilled (C. Yingyot, personal communication, June 15, 2014). Though

the concept was ignored, several activists still have been working on it and monitoring

how the current governmental form would be provided for Chiang Mai natives including

its consequences.

Upon accomplishing some declared objectives, the PHN tried to move an advance

step to sustain the network as well as to propose concrete solutions. Throughout several

discussions and seminars, eventually they were convinced that the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing was an effective key to cope with the causes and conditions of the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. Later, several activities and strategic movements were required to call for CMSG. In the late 2010, the PHN had mark the 120 days' campaign to educate the public on CMSG and how CMSG would offer a better life and resolve the conflict (ThaiPBS, 2012). The PHN has used "orange" color as a symbol of the PHN: widely known that it is a mix color between red and yellow (S. Racha, personal communication, June 17, 2014). Hence, it represented a new identity (actually the subtle identity of being Chiang Mai natives which were faded by the political conflict) and collaboration between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. Though, the researcher did not examine which identity the research participants valued as more meaningful, the interviews imply that being Chiang Mai natives was the core of their identities.

Overall, the CMSG had raised awareness on local issues and identity of Chiang Mai natives. It captured the need of the local people to make one to ponder on their own issues in their hometown. Most of the PHN members agreed that CMSG was a sustainable approach and shared vision to resolve the root cause of the political conflict. And in the next section, how the PHN has carried out the shared vision is presented. The finding also provides an assessment of the collaboration's effectiveness as well as its outcome.

6.3 The PHN's Outcome: Factors that Sustain or

Deconstruct the Collaboration

The collaboration of the Coalition of Peaceful Homeland (CPH: and later Peaceful Homeland Network: PHN) to resolve the political conflict occurred amidst the conflict escalation. Interestingly, the PHN has been quite resilient despite the unstable political situation in Chiang Mai. Thus, the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing has the potential to become a model for the other forty-five provinces nationwide to follow. The purpose of this part is to analyze the PHN to understand its origins, evolution, structure and collaborative process framework, outcome of this collaboration, and finally some of the limitations that confronts this group, in order to understand the factors that sustains or derails the collaboration.

6.3.1 Structure of the Peaceful Homeland Network

Admittedly, the structure of an organization is a key to the way in which members of an organization communicate, develop mutual goals, and work on achieving those goals. In conflict resolution, structure covers the process of engaging the right people in the collaboration process. In this section, the participants of the collaborative process and organization structure are presented and discussed.

(a) Stakeholder Identification and the Participants of the Collaborative Process

As indicated in previous research findings and discussions during the early day of the collaborative process between July to September, 2009, the third-party members and the four key persons had a consultation on who should be the part of the process. They

theorized that potential working group members should be moderate members of the Red and the Yellow shirts, and should have various backgrounds and experiences. However, the radical Red Shirts explicitly opposed the initiative and for this reason, some parties were excluded intentionally from this process.

Later, the pioneers of this process invited several people mostly through their own networks to join this collaboration (P. Arun, personal communication, June 14, 2014). Finally, lawyers, retired military officer, small business entrepreneurs, farmers, independent scholars, university professors, local politicians (Mayor and deputy Mayor), and local NGOs who were recruited through these networks, became a part of the PHN. In terms of their affiliations to the political color code, these individuals varied from extreme Red/Yellow to non-color coded (political color code, that is the yellow and red) (In-depth detail of their background and political thoughts are in the chapter IV). A fact that was also noted was that the participants of PHN had been affected by the conflict dynamics, that is the more intense the conflict was, the larger the group from the various parties attended meetings which also correlated with the frequency that they meet. Eventually, after the critical situation in November 2009 the total number of the PHN's members was sixteen. Demographically, these members mostly resided in the Chiang Mai city while a few lived in the surrounding districts.

(b) Organizational structure. To achieve mutual goals, having an appropriate organizational structure is essential. Hence, the pioneers conflicting parties established the PHN whose structure and its members have changed periodically according to the political environment and internal conditions of the PHN. The structure in this research

portrays the relationship among members and the third-party and the communication

process within the organization. Understanding how the collaboration works is essential

for improving a better collaboration. As the PHN had to adjust its initial structure to

capture its new dynamics therefore, this research results, presents the organizational

structure according to the timeline which is divided into four periods; 1) July 2009,

2) August 2009 to February 2010; 3) March to December 2010; and 4) January 2011

onward.

July 2009

The initial structure of the meeting in July 2009, started with only four people.

Even though the period was very short and later the organization had drastically changed,

it was important to examine what the initial structure looked like.

Figure 6.1: Initial Structure of the first Meeting in July 2009

The figure 6.1 shows that the initial process was a closed structure in which only invited persons could take part in the meeting. Since the collaborative process emerged amidst the intensified conflict in Chiang Mai where people were clearly polarized, the initial meeting had to be conducted in secret (A. Jeera, personal communication, July 15, 2014). From the lines and arrows, the third parties had direct communication with the four persons. Only Arun and Jeera made contacts with the conflictants while the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts did not communicate across their own groups. Therefore, the lines stemming from the third parties are solid with two-way arrows. As for Arun, the key third party, he and the two members of the Yellow Shirts had quite a long relationship because he had associated with them regarding social issues. Prior to working with the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai, Thailand, Arun had some work experience in promoting social justice and democracy with German civil society organization, and also had personal interests about social issues. On the other hand, Arun knew the two members of the Red Shirts shortly after the coup in 2006. Therefore, their relationships at that time was based on Arun's responsibilities as a senior political analyst, and not because he had informal association with the Red Shirts. Likewise, Jeera, a co-third party who supported Arun, was familiar with the Red Shirts, so he was able to suggest to Arun on inviting the right members of the Red Shirts.

The members of the two-color groups did not have any connection though they recognized each other from the media and public activities, but did not know each other in person prior to the initial meeting (S. Preech, personal communication, July 23, 2014).

This is why there is no line linking across the groups. Looking at the relationship within the groups also, the two individuals from the Red Shirts camp had known each other for a while since the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai began the movement, whereas they did not have personal relationship. As a result, the lines within the Red group are dashed lines. On the other hand, the two members of the Yellow Shirts had a long relationship through social activists prior to the emergence of the political color-coded conflict. Regarding the third-party as described previously that they played crucial roles as initiators, the two-way solid lines show that they were the central of initiators of all communication. Acting as initiators and connectors of the collaborative process, the third-party was able to ensure that there was a safe space for discussions by the two groups and a hope to pursue peaceful in Chiang Mai.

Consequently, the members of two-color camps felt relaxed and committed to the further step (T. Suchit, personal communication, June 29, 2014). Then, upon realizing that the initiative required more people, they came back to their groups and provided details on the emerging collaboration to others. Because of this, the four pioneers became referees and connectors to other members of the two color-coded groups. With good faith and determined to do good thing for their hometown, the pioneers could invite several to join the talk and later could form the PHN.

August 2009 to February 2010

The next period in the collaborative structure was from August 2009 to February 2010. After the four initial individuals were committed to the plan to recruit people, they invited members from their networks to join the collaborative process (P. Arun, personal

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communication, June 14, 2014). During this period, participants of the process agreed to establish the Coalition of Peaceful Homeland in which its members had diverse professional backgrounds, slight age difference, and recognition in their own groups. Those days, the first priorities of the PHN were to restore peaceful atmosphere and to recover the long periods of stagnant tourism business in Chiang Mai. However, in October 2009, Prime Minister Abhisit had a plan for visit to Chiang Mai. As a result, the urgent task was to host the TCCC annual meeting that required an immediate response (C. Yingyot, personal communication, June 15, 2014). Therefore, there was no clear structure, but rather, a loosely based collective action, which was set up to respond to emergency. The structure of the Coalition of Peaceful Homeland can be described as follows.

Figure 6.2

Figure 6.2 The Structure of the Collaboration from August 2009 to February 2010

According to the figure, the structure was a semi-opened one, as the four persons were connectors to other members in their networks. After the meeting, the four initial persons promised to invite more potential individuals who had capabilities and strong interests in public issue to attend the process. The third-party, after consulting with the four persons, could see whom they should invite to join the collaboration, so that members of two camps would feel comfortable. While the third-party invited individuals and organizations from their contact list, the initiative was also known in high-ranking government offices and well-known business organizations. Later, business organization

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contacted the third parties to express their interest to take part in this collaborative

process. Hence, during this period, the third-party still played an important role in

inviting people to join the process and remained the fulcrum of this collaborative process.

Those days, Arun played the role of a coordinator who made appointments, and a

facilitator who prepared the meeting place and led the meeting by encouraging

participants to put aside their political identities, focusing on a friendly talk on how to

return peace to Chiang Mai.

As the figure 6.2 shows about the structure and relationship, the four persons were

able to bring individuals who they had direct connection to participate in the process, so

the solid line and arrow shows the relationships and how they communicated. Though the

four persons became connectors between their networks, the third parties were still the

center of coordination and communication. Since the collaboration debuted in public,

both color groups tried to pressure their members to withdraw from the process during

this period. As a result, some had to withdraw from the process.

March to December 2010

The third period of the collaboration was from March to December 2010. In

March 2010, there were three changes. The first change was in the name from "Coalition

of Peaceful Homeland" to "Peaceful Homeland Network" (C. Yingyot, personal

communication, June 15, 2014). The members reasoned that the public was unfamiliar

with the word 'coalition' while 'network' was widely used among civil societies,

business sector, and public sectors. Secondly, there was the PHN's objective refinement

in accordance to a long-term goal, political situation, and the professional skills of its

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members. Lastly, some members of the PHN who came from business sector withdrew from the process. They considered that the PHN somehow was involved with the political conflict, so closely associating with this collaboration would cause a negative impact in terms of gaining business contract with governments. Those days, people perceived the PHN differently as some people viewed the PHN as pro- Red Shirts whereas some thought it tried to undermine the Red Shirts movement. As a result, they preferred to protect their business and image from being affiliated with the political aspect of the conflict.

These changes made the rest of the members realize that there was a need to refine the PHN's structure, objectives, and to create plans in accordance with long-term goals, political situation, and professional skills of its members. The origin of the PHN emerged from persons who have diverse professional backgrounds, different age groups, and credibility in their own groups. Therefore, they preferred flat and flexible organization. Since, several of them came to the table with political baggage, having equal participation, roles, and responsibilities were essential. Moreover, several key members of the PHN are NGOs were familiar with flexible and non-hierarchical structures, so they proposed this type of network as a prototype for the new PHN's structure. Hence, all agreed to adopt the 'loose' network which was non-hierarchical, decentralized, and flexible, and followed consensus process.

Although every member was equal and could give opinions to the public on behalf of the PHN, in practice, they realized that it was important to name someone to be the president of the PHN. As a result, they agreed to have Yingyot as the president (S.

Chumsai, personal communication, July 15, 2014). At that time, no one volunteered to be

a president, so Yingyot proposed himself and other members thought he could do it and

did not perceive him taking any side. Additionally, his status as a university lecturer

made him credible to public. Yingyot performed his role as a president in the meetings

and signed letters issued in the name of the PHN. The structure of the PHN can be

presented in the following figure.

Figure 6.3

Figure 6.3 The Structure of the Collaboration from March to December 2010

According to figure 6.3, the PHN has a closed structure in which only its working

members are involved with the collaboration. It became a closed structure because the

PHN needed a formal organization which had to have more of a systemic management.

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Additionally, the PHN agreed to launch a public project to increase awareness and seek

alternative solutions for the conflict, these kinds of activities needed specific persons to

be responsible for the task, to make decision, and to implement the plans. Thus, the PHN

had to be a closed structure. Occasionally though, the PHN invited some other local

NGOs to join the meeting as guest speakers. During this period, the structure operated as

a network pattern in which all members were independent and loosely held. However, the

PHN was under the umbrella of the color-coded conflict, and some working members

were still influenced and associated with their own groups. As a result, these members

represented by dashed lines became passive members and later likely declined to be the

part of the collaboration. Being a passive member does not mean that they were ignorant

to the problem (conflict), but for this research, passive meant that they were only inactive

participants in the PHN.

December 2010 Onward

The fourth period was from December 2010 onward. During this time, the internal

structure of PHN did not change, but the PHN became a part of the larger new network

organization so-called "the Coalition of Chiang Mai Self-Governing (CCMSG)." The

structure and relationship between the PHN and the new organization is illustrated in

figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4

Figure 6.4: The Structure of the Collaboration since December 2010 Onward

According to the figure, the PHN is one of several organizations under the

CCMSG because the primary objective of the new network concentrates on the new

power structure of the local Thai administration. The concept of self-governing is not

considered as having direct involvement with the current political conflict. Therefore,

both conflicting parties were not strongly against the collaboration. Conversely, some

middle-rank leaders of the Red Shirts in Chiang Mai gradually became participants of the

CCMSG's public activities (A. Jeera, personal communication, July 15, 2014). As for the

Yellow Shirts, though, several of their key members agreed with the concept of decentralization, as they distrusted the roles of the Red Shirts in the collaboration (K. Wichai, personal communication, August 1, 2014). However, the research did not pay attention to the CCMSG since the political situation as a whole had changed and several variables affected the collaboration

6.3.2 The Collaborative Implementation Process

The collaborative process is an essential component not only as a means of moving toward the shared vision, but also a constructive process to maintain members' cohesion (However, in this case, some PHN members doubted on CCMSG as unrelated vision/mean to resolve the color-coded conflict). Generally, the process refers to working procedures, communication patterns, and receiving funding to keep pushing the mutual goal.

(a) Working Procedure. No matter how the structure of the collaboration had changed, the operational and decision-making process remained the same. Since the onset of the collaboration in July 2009, all members of the collaborative process were treated equally and had the right to express their ideas and concerns. Interestingly, though there was no formal ground rule of what issues should not be discussed and unacceptable behaviors that should be avoided. All members intuitively knew which issues should not be discussed during the meetings. Wichai shared, "We did not have specific rules of what we should talk or not; we all knew that discussing on political issues like blaming one side was improper manner while we were seeking solutions for the urgent situation" *(K. Wichai, personal communication, August 1, 2014).

P. Arun also stated, "We did not have a specific guideline for talking, we (including members) knew what issues should be talked to keep the healthy atmosphere and encourage the positive attitudes" (personal communication, August 3, 2014).

In the same way, C. Yingyot asserted, "We normally discussed on those issues that the members brought into the meeting" (personal communication, July 15, 2014).

In terms of decision-making, all proposed plans, issues, and agreements on working procedures had been done through deliberative consulting. For example, naming the organization, designing the structure of the collaboration, working procedures and pattern of communication were all as the result of the inputs of members' consultation. In reality, members of the PHN realized that it was necessary to have a formal president of the collaboration due to external interactions between other organizations and the professional image of the PHN. Therefore, they agreed to name Yingyot to serve that purpose and Racha volunteered to serve as the secretary.

Regarding job allocation, instead of assigning jobs and responsibilities to particular members, each member agreed that taking responsibility should be voluntary. Members decided to be responsible for the issues and responsibilities that matched their interests, ability, and time schedule. The work of the PHN has been driven by monitoring assigned tasks and providing feedback through the meeting mechanism, but the PHN's secretary rarely documented the meeting minutes. Consequently, several members criticized that the PHN was an unprofessional network that could not extract members' capacities as well as foster engagement effectively. Some elucidated that the PHN did not have systemic filing document, following up assigned tasks, and tracing members. When

some members missed the meetings, later ideally, they would have to inquire after their situations and well-being. (S. Choomsai, personal communication, July 15, 2014).

Similarly, a person from non-color coded stated that "the PHN had non-systemic organizational structure and management. Therefore, it lacked clear strategies and a roadmap to achieve the peaceful community" (N. Jadepong, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

(b) Communication Pattern. Prior to March 2010, the third-party was the center of external communication and this was done through both cell phones and landlines. At the same time, after interacting with the third parties, the four key persons were also responsible for communicating between their lines of connection. With the two lines and layers of communications, members of the PHN could equally receive and send message within their groups. Conversely, after changing the structure in March, 2010, Racha became a center of coordination and communication. Only Racha was responsible for spreading news to other members. Consequently, communication within members of the same color camps was replaced by this pattern. Besides this, the primary communication channel of this period was electronic mails and communicating via phone rarely happened. The change in communication pattern seemed to have some limitations as some members claimed that they did not receive emails regularly. As S. Chana said "I never received a meeting minute, may be because I was no longer using the previous email account that I gave them. However, they should contact via phone" (personal communication, July 20, 2014).

Likewise, S. Chumsai informed, "I hardly heard news from them. Sometimes, I was busy and missed the meetings, but after that I was not being reached out from them to update. They should improve the way of keeping in touch with the members" (personal communication, July 15, 2014).

Not only members from the Yellow camp faced this communication problem, but some non-color-coded members indicated, "Later, I did not attend the meeting for years. I was not sure that when they met, but since 2011, I have not heard about the PHN's meeting" (N. Jadepong, personal communication, July 17, 2014).

The lack of a constant and reliable communication system somehow contributed towards them gradually becoming the passive members.

(c) Sources of Funding. A working budget is inevitably a critical factor for driving the collaboration. In the early days of the collaboration particularly from July 2009 to February 2010, a working budget was not an issue because Arun was a key contributor and there was no project that required a budget. Arun always brought food and refreshment for every one attending the meetings. Arun did this because 1) he cared about the process, 2) his status could support these things without difficulties, and 3) there was no long-term project that required a great amount of money. Jeera and Sangtian also prepared relevant documents for the meetings and they did this from their own pockets.

Once the PHN had projects and had to apply for grants from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and The (Thai) National Health Assembly (NHA), Arun suggested to members of PHN to write a proposal to NDI which is

an institute funded by the Democrat Party, in the United States of America. At the same time, Sangtian also recommended NHA, a well-known NGO as a source of funding. Eventually, both institutions provided funding to the project. Although some members were quite doubtful of any hidden agenda from the NDI, this did not destabilize trust on the process.

After operating the project for a while, core members of the PHN realized that there was the need for more staff and a working budget. As a result, they had to find more cross-section working members and money. Coincidentally, NGOs working on alternative education and community-based development also have been pushing forward the concept of "Chiang Mai Self-Governing". In January 2011, core members of PHN collaborated with other networks and organizations including Chiang Mai Provincial Administration Organization (PAO). The Chiang Mai PAO became a major sponsor and partner of the project campaign and several members of the PHN were pleased that the Chiang Mai PAO was willing to support the project.

6.3.3 The Outcome of the Process

Referring to the objectives of the PHN during the period of August 2009 to February 2010, it primarily aimed to prevent violence from reoccurring in Chiang Mai and to regain a peaceful and stable image of their hometown. According to the interviews, the participants considered the outcome as both effective and ineffective.

(a) Justifiable Outcome. The members of PHN realized that the collaboration process could operate with passive and proactive roles. As for the passive role, the PHN could stop the violence associated with two major events: 1) the clashes between the Red

Shirts and the Prime Minister in November 2009, and 2) the Yellow Shirts' concert in

December 2009. These moves were passive because the PHN could not negotiate with

the Red Shirts which had the upper hand using threats against the Yellow Shirts and

politicians who were opponent to Thaksin. The only thing that PHN could do was to avert

the critical situation. As discussed in the chapter III, the four key members of the PHN

were expected to create a communication channel, and the PHN did partially serve this

purpose. The members of PHN who were Red Shirts, knew details of the plans of the

extreme Red Shirts and then brought it in the meetings. Hence, the Yellow Shirts could

precisely assess the situation so that they could avoid confrontation with the Red Shirts.

Regarding the situation in November 2009, some members, particularly

representatives from the business sector, highly expected to see that the TCCC annual

meeting could be held smoothly. When their interest was met, they were willing to be a

part of the collaboration. At the same time, the output of non-emergence of a violent

incident made some Yellow shirts feel more positive towards the members of the Red

Shirts. They informed the researcher that "These people were progressive Red who had

good intention to society" (K. Wichai, personal communication, June 16, 2014).

Likewise, T. Suchit had more trust on Preecha as he shared that "I felt that

Preecha is progressive Red and honest, so I continued supporting the collaboration"

(personal communication, June 29, 2014).

At the same time, S. Preecha stated,

> I could see that actually the Yellow Shirts have good intention, but only
> the difference is that employing mean toward political goal. The two
> incidents made me realize that this person (Suchit) is very rational, not a

Yellow follower. I do hope working with him and the PHN could fulfill my dream. (personal communication, June 12, 2014)

Hence, not only the members of the PHN, but also people especially officials and business sector appreciated its role.

As for the proactive role, the PHN stimulated the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing which served the underlying interests of the members of the PHN which were the needs for safety and security in their community, local self-determination, sustainable development, and alleviation of the conflict. Several members of the PHN have been working on social issues; they realized that the major problem in Thailand as well as the root cause of the conflict was structural: too rigid centralized government. Hence, they firmly believed that the concept of Chiang Mai Self-Governing was a sustainable solution for the current conflict. Some members of the PHN were social activists who have been witnessing negative outcomes of improper socio-economic development being enforced by strong centralized government for several decades. T. Sangtian, for instance, a social activist, claimed,

> Because without Self-Governing, local development policies which have been made from Bangkok, are not only undermining soul of Chiang Mai natives, but also do not provide adequate development projects that resonate to the needs for the local people and potential of area. Thus, we need to really advocate for this idea and make it happen. (personal communication, June 13, 2014)

Likewise, active members agreed that the national politics of winner-take-all plays a crucial role in mobilizing people into the two-color camps. The more these people engage in conversations, discuss the problems, and learn from each other, the stronger they would believe that self-governance is a new dimension that could transform the

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conflict. This makes them constant active members of the PHN in promoting the Chiang Mai Self-Governing.

As for some members, apart from fulfilling their dreams to alleviate the conflict, they felt more sense of ownership and recognition. C.Yingyot, for instance, responded that "Not only quite glad of what we did to our community. For me, having sense of ownership and being recognized from other members and in public made me proud" (personal communication, June 15, 2014).

While being the part of the PHN, some active members did receive tangible fruitful results from the PHN's activities. Racha, for example, informed that he has a strong hope to find resolution for this conflict, and he and his network has gained benefits from the collaboration. Racha revealed that knowing new people and another network from working with the PHN has enhanced his small organic herbal and agricultural-product business. S. Racha said

> Before working with the PHN, my organic agricultural network had not had our market and varied customer and had problem with a group formation. After working with them I learned new things from them, the new experience, people, networks that support my network quite a lot. (personal communication, July 17, 2014)

Undoubtedly, when people perceived that their interests were addressed and were taken care of, they were likely to continue the collaboration. Particularly, if they anticipated that the process benefited their core interest, they became relentless active members.

(b) Unjustified Outcome. Although every member was pleased with the passive role in preventing the urgent situations from turning to violence, almost a half of the PHN's members became inactive members. These members argued that though their shared vision aligned with the collaboration's ultimate goal, they withdrew because the outcome did not meet their expectations. As some members described, "We had discussed several times after the hectic incidents, but I did not see any progress. And actually, the core agents who caused the conflict, especially the politicians, need to be handled" (Y. Jarunee, personal communication, July 20, 2014).

Likewise, one member narrated, "It is good to promote the concept of decentralized government. However, the causes of the conflict such as injustice, double-standard treatments, and using fake stories to mobilize people via mass media, were not going to be addressed through the collaboration" (P. Jintana, personal communication, July 16, 2014).

Another member shared, "I think decentralization is a good idea and it should cover all dimensions of life. In fact, I did not see religious in their proposed plan. And I quite do not understand the substance of the Chiang Mai Self-Governing" (S. Chumsai, personal communication, July 15, 2014).

Briefly accomplishing short-term goals greatly contributed to members' engagement with the collaborative process regardless of members' background and political preferences. Later, they still continued to be a part of the PHN as a long-term perspective also tied them up with the collaboration. However, the interviews indicated

that the inability to make progress in the performance had been an obstacle to the collaboration.

6.4 Discussion

To achieve the ultimate goal of any organization, literature on collaboration theory in conflict setting (Leach, 2011) argues that if participants consider collaboration as meaningful, legitimate, and efficient process, they tend to constantly engage and contribute to the collaboration process. Likewise, in a general setting, collaboration must have these following components: the right people and size of working group, clear shared visions, efficient process and outcome, adequate resources, and trust (Bratton & Tumin, 2011). A functioning organization covers having the right people who are determined to work toward goal and to complement one another's work. A size of a working group has to be suitable to make a goal do-able. This means having an organization and structure matching a goal is important. In terms of organization, having an organization which is directly responsible for driving a shared vision is crucial.

Details provided in previous chapters show that the collaboration process was set up to resolve the conflict by promoting CMSG and this was a non-static process. The collaboration started from only the four persons and later became the PHN. In December 2010, the members of the PHN established the CCMSG with the goal of promoting Chiang Mai Self-Governing. This part examines that since the initial process in July 2009 to December, 2010 what factors had sustained and deconstructed the collaborative process.

6.4.1 The Meaningful Participation

Perceiving meaningful participation is an essential factor that underpins the PHN. Theorists in various disciplines argue that meaningful participation in the process means the ability to learn, understand the problem and others in the group, and to invent new policy/ideas/common visions that serve participants' fundamental interests. In order to achieve any meaningful collaboration, the process should be inclusive and representative (Leach, 2011). This part will discuss what happened in this collaboration and how it impacts the process.

6.4.1.1 Stakeholder Identification and Participants of the Collaboration.

Regarding the first step of conflict resolution, identifying stakeholder is a critical stage for bringing stakeholders to the collaborative process (Grey 1989; Leach 2011). Stakeholder identification is based on the concept of a holistic perspective: representativeness and inclusiveness.

(1) Representativeness. Representativeness means a participant in the collaborative process must receive authority from their respective groups to attend the process as their group's representative. In this conflict, principally it can be argued that the participants were not real representatives because they attended the PHN without being authorized from their groups. However, at some point the collaboration could play an important role and provide satisfied results to preventing violent incidents in Chiang Mai and planting the concept of Self-Governing. What made the PHN perform their role despite not having support from their respective groups to the representatives?

The primary purpose of PHN was to create a safe space where parties and other members of civil society could talk freely. Petchwat, a prominent leader of the Red Shirts group entitled Rak Chiang Mai 51, always employed threatening tactics be it verbally, physically, and symbolically. For instance, Mahawan, a key active Red Shirt who used to attend the talks, was surrounded by the members of the Red Shirts led by Petchwat. They shouted at him and called him as a traitor (S. Preecha, personal communication, June 12, 2014; P. Arun, personal communication, June 14, 2014). Consequently, the persons who were willing to talk felt bad towards those followers and did not associate with Petchwat and other leaders of the Red Shirts. The initiating members believed that having spoilers like Petchwat in the process was an obstacle in creating a safe and friendly environment.

Secondly, as the PHN's major goal was to build a collaboration platform among potential and willing parties to work together, not to reach an agreement with the hard-core leaders, so the establishment of the PHN was a satisfying step. The CTCC in 2009 also reflected that even though the initiative did not have a representative from Petchwat and other hard-core leaders, a small group of these people could draw public's attention and eventually prevented violent incident in November 2009 and so on. Thus, the CTCC canceled the plan and other parties promised to respect others' right to hold peaceful political activities and not to interrupt others' activities. Contradictory, Petchwat vowed that the agreement was not binding to the Red Shirts groups because the persons who claimed representatives of the Red Shirts were not real representatives. This aggressive position made the third parties firmly believed that Petchwat, a Thaksin follower should not take part in this initiative.

Lastly, during the critical situation and later on throughout the collaborative process, members of PHN started to question how the conflict, which clearly was the struggle over power among politicians at national level, was related to their lives in Chiang Mai. They began to discuss on what the root causes and condition those were driving the conflict. And they mostly agreed that one of them was the strong centralized government. This also made them perceive Petchwat as a proxy disputant who tied himself with leaders in Bangkok and served the politicians for his own interests. In reality, members of the PHN could see that Petchwat had a hidden agenda of being a prominent leader. In the past, Petchwat as mentioned previously did not have background on public issues. Additionally, upon taking a leading role as the leader of the Red Shirts, he was appointed to be an advisor of the Minister of Human Security and Development. As such, these persons consider Petchwat as Thaksin follower who was not sincere to be a leader of the Red Shirts. Therefore, they did not question why some really far extreme groups were excluded from the collaboration. To sum up, adopting the concept of representativeness in this collaboration might cause drawbacks to the process. Hence, representativeness was not perfectly applicable under this circumstance.

(2) Inclusiveness. Inclusiveness represents the notion that the participants of the collaborative process should comprise all potential and relevant stakeholders. As Leach argues, inclusiveness is an essential component for the collaboration: restricting participation raises questions of why some groups are excluded (Leach, p.151). In this case, the third parties and initial members did acknowledge that participants of the process should include actors having wide range of experiences, groups, and occupations.

Apparently, the members' backgrounds reflected almost cross-sectors in terms of

occupations and political thoughts. In terms of class perspective, grass-root organizations,

informal labors, minority groups, and Chiang Mai high-established families should take

part in the collaboration.

The researcher noticed that some extreme political groups were deliberately

excluded which seemed reasonable as discussed in the representativeness issue. In the

real practice, the PHN acknowledged that they did leave out some important groups.

Admittedly, the members of PHN were not inclusive, but lacking inclusiveness did not

explicitly affect the process during the early stages of the collaboration. At that time, the

situation was critical and needed immediate response. The process of seeking the

representativeness and inclusiveness of stakeholders would have taken a greater amount

of time and that was not applicable at that moment. In addition, lacking inclusiveness did

not undermine the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the members, but rather it

affected the implementation the plan. As it could be seen, eventually the PHN had to

build a network with other organizations, and the lack of inclusiveness provided

disadvantages when almost half of the PHN's members were non-active especially in the

late 2010 onwards. As a result, core active members realized that it was needed to have

more inclusive members and networks; they then formed "the Coalition for Chiang Mai

Self-governing (CCMSG)" in January 2011. The PHN still existed and contributed to the

CCMSG as one of the several networks working toward better governance. At the same

time, core members of PHN were also key persons in the CCMSG. As Bratton & Tumin

(2012) discuss, a successful collaboration requires the right size of people, to assess the

real organization's capacity compared to a perspective vision needs to consider a balance of an organization and its members. In case of the PHN, they had eighteen members from the middle class and less than half were active members and this brought imbalance to keep pushing for change and to pursue their goals.

6.4.2 Meaningful Collaborative Process

Despite the fact the PHN did not have true representation and inclusive participation, it can be claimed that the collaborative process generated a meaningful learning and understanding among group members. Largely, informants concurred that attending this process was somehow meaningful for them. They reflected that conversations among members throughout the process enhanced the understanding at least on 1) themselves and others within the PHN; 2) the structural cause of conflict, and 3) their collective roles to address the conflict constructively.

Firstly, the members of PHN were both extreme and moderate Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts who almost never knew the opposite side. The process allowed them to talk about their life, dreams, and expectations. At first, they did not talk directly about the conflict and opinions on specific persons like Thaksin, Sonthi, and prominent leaders of both parties. Several extreme Yellow Shirts had better attitudes toward the Red Shirts like Wichai, Suchit, and Chana: they could understand that members of the Red Shirts were more sophisticated. Similarly, Preecha could understand and integrated some of the Yellow Shirts' concepts, and then influenced people surrounding him. Eventually, understanding true intentions for a better change created trust among them.

Secondly, the honest and friendly conversations throughout the process opened

new perspectives to the members of PHN and made them question the structural politics

and the socioeconomic conditions driving the conflict. In fact, there were various

understandings on the causes and conditions of the conflict among the members with

some resonance with others' understanding, while some were contradicting to others. For

instance, some extreme Yellow Shirts firmly believed that the elite (conservative upper

class) did not persecute the Red Shirts. Contrarily, the Red Shirts viewed that the elite

had more privileges over the Red Shirts under the justice system. By constantly engaging,

even though they still had different perspectives, almost everyone agreed that the strong

centralized government played a role in the political conflict. They thus had a consensus

on working to promote a comprehensive understanding on democracy and developing

democracy network and decentralization.

Lastly, the members assessed their ability to handle the conflict. The members of

PHN agreed that they would keep creating a safe public space for democratic

development. Finally, they received a grant to pursue their project entitled "Sustainable

Democracy Network Development". Under this project, there were thirty public fora held

from October 2010 to July 2012 which accumulated to twenty-five in total. Constantly

discussing and sharing insights, the PHN strongly agreed with the concept of self-

governance proposed by local NGOs in Chiang Mai. Since then, the PHN and other civil

society organizations joined together to form the Coalition for Chiang Mai Self-

Governance in hosting twenty-five districts to explain the concept of self-governance,

listen to advice from the locals, and brainstorm on what the Chiang Mai Self-governance

should look like. Three public fora were organized at provincial level that gathered two representatives of each district to discuss and provide recommendations for CMCS working group to draft a bill.

6.4.3 Procedural Fairness of the Collaboration

If participants perceived that the collaboration had procedural fairness, they were likely to engage and contribute to the process. Procedural process means having the perception of being treated equally and civilly with respect, and complying to the consensus of decision-making.

(1) Being Treated Equally and Civilly. Amidst the high conflict escalation point, the conflicting parties and people in general had pre-perceptions toward each other. These perceptions varied from uncomfortable, dislike to hatred. Therefore, throughout the process of PHN formation, it was critical to make the participants feel safe, be respected, and be treated civilly and equally. During the PHN meetings, all members totally agreed that there was no aggressive and antagonistic behavior and conversation among themselves. Everyone had an equal right to express their individual creative opinions.

(2) Deliberative and Complying Consensus Decision Making. As the PHN is a loosely based network with non-hierarchical structure, the driving process heavily depended on deliberative discussion and a consensus decision making process. Every member had an equal chance to express their opinions, while the rest listened with respect. For instance, naming the network was one thing that reflected the deliberate and consensus decision making. Several members proposed various names that was good

meaning. The meeting agreed to let each member to present their names and vote upon it. Some paired up and brainstormed together. Finally, they did not vote, but discussed which one precisely and meaningfully represented their values and expectations on their home.

All of them made a decision on meeting agendas, date and time of the next meetings, and working plan. Regarding assigning tasks, the members were determined to take responsibilities on volunteer basis, based on their skills, capacity, and time. In addition, everyone could give their opinions on behalf of the PHN.

(3) Working Procedure and Communication Pattern. Though the members were received civilly and fair treatment was meted out, an obstacle to the PHN was that it was lacking a systematic work management and clear communication. As several members pointed out, there were no minutes, meeting agendas, and strategic plan, and those members who missed the meetings were behind and could not catch up. This also reflected that the PHN had a poor communication process between members. Lacking updated information as such caused some members to feel uncomfortable and later they became passive members. Normally during the time of escalating conflict, communication is a key to make members understand each other, hence when communication channel was limited, their doubts toward other members easily reoccurred.

6.4.4 Efficiency of the Collaboration

Efficiency of the collaboration, according to Leach (2011), means participants perceive that their time is spent wisely and their interests are fulfilled. In addition, several

studies conclude that incentives are likely to sustain the collaboration (Wonderlack & Yaffee, 1997). At the early phase of the PHN, the members realized that the collaboration could operate both having a passive and proactive role. As for the passive role, the PHN could prevent violence such as the clash between the Red Shirts and the Prime Minister in November 2009, and the Yellow Shirts' concert in December 2009. These are passive roles as the PHN could not negotiate with the Red Shirts which had the upper hand using threat to other. The only thing that PHN could do was to avert the critical situation. Obviously, the collaboration somehow could respond to member's incentives in suspending the rioting and returning to a stable environment to welcome the incoming tourism season. As mentioned earlier, not only the members of the PHN, but also people in general appreciated its role. The members of PHN who sought public recognition and had a strong will for change, were satisfied with their roles.

As for a proactive role, the PHN spread the concept of Chiang Mai Self-governance, which served almost all members of the PHN. Those members like Sangtian and Preecha who had been promoting the concept for a long time perceived the upbeat moment of the collaboration.

However, some members contradicted that the process consumed a great amount of time, but made little progress. These participants had a background in business and less experience in social movements, so they viewed the NGOs working style as not effective as they expected. In addition, several members who were still attached with their own political groups argued that the collaboration could not really solve the conflict.

From their perspectives, the collaboration for self-governance was a good idea, but it did not directly address the causes of the conflict.

Echoing popular sentiment, a member mentioned, "I am not sure how the CMSG can deal with the corruption. I totally agreed that we should collaborate, but the outcome of the PHN seemed not serving my interests" (K. Wichai, personal communication, June 15, 2014).

These members, therefore, were likely to become the outsider group members and remain affiliated with their preferred political groups. Eventually, more than a half of the PHN's members were passive members.

These challenges including limited human resources, time constraint, and non-inclusiveness resulted in the core of PHN members forming a new network called Coalition for Chiang Mai Self-Governing (CCMSG) in December 2010. The new organization comprised a larger civil society network in Chiang Mai and could make some progress in promoting CMSG. Since then, the PHN has rarely held meetings, but several core members relentlessly have still been working actively on promoting the CMSG and occasionally gave public opinions on political situation on behalf of the PHN.

6.4.5 Trust Building throughout the Collaboration

Trust is a crucial component for conflict resolution as without trust, collaboration among conflicting parties is impossible. As Rousseau defines "trust is confident expectation and a willingness to be vulnerable, so trust can build from state of being risk and interdependence. Likewise, building trust based on interdependence, according to Hardin (cited in Warren, 1999) means a person will trust another person because s/he

expects that it is reasonable for that person to act to gain interdependence interests. Similarly, trust also means expectation of a person to not take advantage of one's vulnerability.

This collaboration of trust was gradually built between the third-party and members, as the members saw the third parties as reliable due to their non-deviant behaviors from their expectations, and shared common values. According to the interviews, members saw the third-party especially Arun initially as an official from the U.S. Consular, but later when trust emerged, they saw Arun as a Chiang Mai native who was nice and honest to initiate the collaboration. Regarding trust among the members who were from different political camps, trust emerged between the conflicting parties because they shared common interests and goals which were to restore a peaceful community and to have stable social conditions to maintain daily socioeconomic activities namely tourism, investment, and safe place. At that time, members of both conflicting parties did accordingly to what they said to each other. This secured trust between them.

Unfortunately, mistrust crept out when the PHN sought budget assistance. Originally, granting financial support from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the (Thai) National Health Assembly (NHA) did not destabilize trust on the process because some argued that there was no link between these funders and Thai politicians including one particular identity group.

Later though, funding from local political institutions, caused mistrust among members of the PHN. After receiving funding and assistance from the Chiang Mai

Provincial Administration Organization (PAO), several members of the PHN were pleased that the Chiang Mai PAO was willing to support the project and it was a good sign for further pushing the concept of CMSG forward. From the Yellow Shirts' perspectives, most of them strongly believed that PAO had close relationship with political parties at the national level. Normally, citizens who have the right to vote a chief executive of PAO, were the same group who voted a member of the House of Representatives. As a result, in Thai politics almost all chief executives of PAO have to cooperate with parties to win an election. Consequently, members of PHN from the Yellow shirts, were suspicious and distrusted those politicians; especially politicians from Thaksin's camp. They anticipated that these people would exploit and manipulate the process. Their association with the local politician diminished trust among members who had extreme political identities and made them gradually distance from the collaboration.

Interestingly, the members who agreed with a new cooperation from Chiang Mai PAO were not aware that the action violated the trust of some members. As P. Arun revealed "I used to ask them about being the Chiang Mai PAO's grantee, and no PHN members objected on this" (personal communication, July 21, 2014).

Because of lacking awareness on this issue, they did not develop distrust management. Consequently, later for those who had distrust, rarely attended the CCMSG's activities. There were three main sources of distrust in this case: 1) poor communication within the PHN; 2) lacking concern for other members; and 3) unexpected and inconsistency of behaviors. The source for number 1 and 2 were organizational structure whereas number 3 was more agent-based and procedural

problem. Tracing back on the early day of the collaboration, the interviews indicated that the members did not establish formal and clear agreement of how to work, document minutes and communicate among members. Consequently, some members did not feel any ties with the group and somehow perceived they were left out when the active members decided to request and collaborate with the Chiang Mai PAO without comprehensively consulting with some outsider members.

Briefly, throughout the collaborative process, there was high pressure from the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts to breakout their members from the PHN. Some had to withdraw, especially members from the Red camp, whereas some members were enduring with the collaboration despite being threatened. Beyond personal determination to solve the conflict, the organizational factors had played important roles in tackling with the conflict. Inclusiveness of stakeholders was not a problem in terms of legitimacy of the collaboration, but it affected working processes which was aimed to achieve the long-term prospective. This is the reason that PHN had to expand the network and shifted its role as a network under the CCMSG.

In addition, the communication process was a major challenge of the PHN as the result indicated that poor communication had led to the misunderstanding and created gap rather than strengthen group cohesion. At the same time, non-sensitivity towards vulnerable issues and lacking management mechanism allowed distrust to emerge among the members. The members from the Yellow Shirts decided to keep their distance not only because of the influence from their connection and their firm negative attitudes toward local politicians, but also internal organizational management.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion and Implications for a Better Collaboration

and Further Studies

The central aim of this chapter is to provide the conclusion of what conditions encouraged the two conflicting parties to establish the collaboration entitled "Peaceful Homeland Network: PHN". Implications emerging from the research for more effective policies on conflict resolution are also included; particulalry a better collaboration for the members of Peaceful Homeland Network including Coliation for Chiang Mai Self-Governing. Additionally, particular aspects of the conflicts and theories of conflict resolution are reccommmened for future investigations.

7.1 Overview of the Research Findings and Analysis

Upon analyzing the research findings and discussion, it can be concluded that six interrelated conditions had led to the collaboration entitled "PHN" between the members of the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in Chiang Mai. Firstly, the third-party intervention was a critical step for the collaboration. Beyond the impartiality and social status, in this case, the third party were insiders who used to become involved with the political conflict and had borne the consequences of the conflict that erupted in their hometown. Besides, these third-party were familiar to Chiang Mai natives and had long relations with disputants. This is important because it helped to develop trust during the

initial stage of the PHN and so on. In this sense, to have insider third-party to initiate the collaborative process seems more possible and practical than to have outsider third parties who are not connected to the conflict (Wehr & Laderach, 1991). Secondly, the collaboration emerged under a democratic atmosphere where individuals did not have a great concern on their security and had freedom of political expression. That was the ripe moment for the collaboration. In the aftermath of the conflict spreading to Chiang Mai, the natives had been struggling with the conflict for years and it seemed there was no way out. In addition, their interests both tangible and intangible were undermined because of the conflict. This forced them to look for alternative approaches to deal with the conflict and they realized that their goals were interdependent. The fourth condition is the individuals' political involvement particularly their shadow of being a particular member of conflicting parties. It was a considerable influence on one's decision making to collaborate or decline. Next, these individuals engaged with the collaboration because of their willing participation. Lastly, the ability to alleviate the violent incidents and to create a shared vision was important to tie up the conflictants in order to keep working on behalf of the PHN.

Later, the PHN became a part of CMSG work to promote the concept of the shared vision "Chiang Mai Self-Governing". It can be confirmed that PHN was a rhizome for the cross-groups collaboration as it provided a new creative puzzle not only for the collaboration across groups, but also people residing in other provinces. At the present, PHN and CMSG have been suspending their political activities since the coup in 2014.

7.2 A Model for Conflict Resolution

Despite different resolution efforts, the color-coded conflict still exists in Thailand. Therefore, the collaboration entitled PHN is worth to be considered and developed as a practical model to constructively deal with the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts.

As discussed in previous chapters, the conflict is much more complex and involves several stakeholders. Coupled with the Thai culture, it is challenging to propose a third-party who has credibility and is acceptable to all the related parties. In the past, King Bhumibol used to intervene in the political conflict during 1980s. In contrast, the monarchy has become highly imbedded in the color-coded conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. Therefore, the monarchy's intervention would generate rather negative outcome. In other words, at the national level, there is no suitable third-party who has a higher social status and would be accepted by all the related parties to resolve the color-coded conflict.

By referring to the PHN case, it can be inferred that having an area-based model is more practical. The PHN could be considered as the provincial-based entity which emerged through the facilitation from the third-parties who resided in that area and were well-known among conflicting parties, and that is why they could successfully initiate collaboration among the conflictants. Similar approaches can be explored in other provinces/areas, where a revered individual or individuals intervene to diminish the conflict, thereby reducing the probability of violence. And then that is likely to bring collaborative approach into that area. In addition, this model can serve as a good practice

that overcomes the limitation of finding a highly-revered third-party from outside. However, the researcher acknowledges that to widely establish the similar model in every province would be challenging as there is inadequate knowledge/skills of conflict resolution in Thai society. Consequently, recommendations to deal with this conundrum have been proposed by employing the multi-tracks framework in the following section.

7.3 Policy Recommendation Emerging from the Research

Though, PHN, a "Third Side" platform where conflictants could come, talk, gather, and work for a better circumstance, did not greatly influence or resolve the political conflict, the worthiness of this collaboration has offered useful perspectives. Referring to Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Tracks Framework (cited in Sandole, 2011, p.52-54), which has nine tracks, the policies recommendation for each track, the who and how to handle with conflict are as follows;

7.3.1 For Track I Government/Peacemaking through Diplomacy

Lessons learned from deadly conflicts across the globe, Track I – government is a key factor who either can resolve or worsen the conflict. Several cases from South Africa to East Timor in South East Asia, illustrate that governments play significant role in establishing peace agreements. In the case of the Thai political color-coded conflict, its path towards peaceful society was heavily clinging on the government. Recurrences of the violence since November 2013 had proven that the previous policies regarding the conflict were ineffective. Thus, this section aims to propose recommendations rising from the research so that the Thai government is able to perform more constructive roles in tackling with the conflict.

7.3.1.1 Democratic Atmosphere. As discussed previously, having a democratic

atmosphere is an important condition enhancing the collaboration. I strongly believe that

under democratic governments more diverse constructive activities will be carried out

more effectively and creatively. Prior to the coup in 2014, not only the PHN, but several

groups/networks/organizations were able to launch various activities, but later PHN

members including activists were afraid to take action. The PHN and CCMSG had

suspended their campaign since then.

In this light, to regain social vibes on public activities, it is critical to bring back a

democratic atmosphere. Hence, the military government led by General Prayuth, the 2014

coup leader, must hold a fair and transparent general election and withdraw from Thai

politics. Though the general election was held in March 24, 2019, it has generated public

doubt and several controversial debates on several issues. As the Asian Network for Free

Elections (ANFREL) had conducted the observation on the Thai general election 2019,

its report reveals that there were several inaccurate counts on the ballots. It also shows

that the formula of allocating party-seats was unclear and unfair. Briefly, the election has

encountered the issues of fairness and transparency (2019).

In fact, the election in March, 2019 has proved that the main opponent party

(former Thai Rak Thai party) is highly popular in several provinces. However, with

difficult attempts, eventually, on July 15, 2019, Palang Pracharat party successfully

formed a coalition government led by General Prayuth. While competing to form a

government, Thailand has witnessed serious political bullying and some physical

violence. Additionally, though the military junta entitled the National Council for Peace

and Order (NCPO) was recently retrenched, its power to summon political activists to testify still exists by devoting the power to the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). These are inevitably major obstacles to create constructive approaches to the conflict but rather generate more concern among several political activists

7.3.1.2 Governments' Constructive Roles to Resolve the Political Conflict. Prior proposing the recommendation, an explanation on what the Thai government has done including its analysis on the obstacle in dealing with the conflict is presented. The researcher has found four main reasons for the obstacle. They are;

(1) perception of the conflict as problematic and undesired,

(2) lacking a central organization which had direct responsibility in dealing with the conflict,

 (3) lacking coordination among interveners while managing the conflict;

(4) lacking innovative knowledge and skills to constructively handle a conflict.

These four difficulties are closely interrelated and influence each other particularly in Thai culture. To begin with the most important reason, having negative perception on the conflict had led to improper policies and practices in conflict resolution. For example, the military government under Prayuth's administration has framed the conflict as a threat and something that had to be eradicated. As a result, to undermine Thaksin and illuminate corruptions have been overarching concept behind policies on dealing with the political conflict under Prayuth's administration. Having limited comprehension of the conflict has prevented creative discussions/alternative

approaches to resolve the conflict. Hence, it is essential that these officials have to be educated about the conflict. Once they understand what the conflict is all about, they would change attitudes, policies, and action plans responding to the conflict.

Also, as for the nature of working style especially in professional bureaucratic organizations, it is important to have a clear organizational structure: line of command, reporting process, and clear job description. As Paris (Paris & Sisk, 2009) critiques that several UN's interventions failed because conflict is very complex which require coordination of the third party at all levels. More effective intervention also needs more hierarchical arrangement (p. 53-61). This means there should be a stable central agency of integral intervening sector directly responsible for a conflict: this point is discussed further in the new mechanism part. An absence of a major agency to tackle with a conflict can lead to lacking of coordination because each group/organization/sector does their own work without sharing information, visions, and collaboration. Consequently, we have faced not only ineffective intervention, but we have not learned from the failure collectively. Even worse, we tend to repeatedly do the same thing. Here is a concrete proposal called "Protest Management to prevent violence: "Cross-Security Agencies Partnership"

Before starting to design an intervention, it is necessary to revisit the Pillar I, Pillar II, and the "3 levels of Conflict Reality". These frameworks assisted the researcher in deciding what intervention would be appropriate. Since the conflict has escalated, every protest particularly after 2007 regardless of the Red Shirts' or the Yellow Shirts', violence has always occurred. A statistic on protest shows that the number of injuries and

death has been increasing (Satar-arnant, 2011). When violence exploded, there were

always accusations that protesters or the government officer started using violent actions

first, so the opposition needed to respond violently to protect themselves. Often, the fact

could not be identified. The first missing piece is similar to what was mentioned earlier

that there is no central agency of integral security services. In addition, the outcome of

the conflict obviously shows that security officers whether Army, Police, and Ministry of

Interior lack 4C (Nan, 2003) communication within government officers and between the

government officers and protesters, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration to

operate their duties to mitigate damages.

The first thing is to educate officials on the constructive comprehension on the

conflict as well as non-violence approach and building officers' capacity in managing

crisis with protesters. When officials can acknowledge the bright side of the conflict, they

would treat the conflict differently especially during protest management. Though, the

use of force to dissolve protesters less likely happened during 1990s, but with intense

conflict recently in 2009-2012 violent means were handled by deploying capacity

building tactics including adjusting the officers' attitudes toward protestors,

acknowledging human security concepts, and enhancing communication skills. Normally,

they see protestors as troublesome, irrational, and aggressive people. These negative

attitudes are a result of lacking communication and block themselves with some grand

narratives. Consequently, these officers fear and misinterpret signals from protestors, and

then they react aggressively towards protestors. Similarly, protesters perceive officers

negatively, so they tend to respond viciously.

The second is to institutionalize protest policies by reforming the current structure and strategies of protest management. Referring to the concept of "Security Sector Reform (SSR)" (UNSG cited in Beswick & Jackson, 2011), coordination (Nan, 2003), and hierarchical model (Paris & Sisk, 2009), three agencies: Army, Police, and Ministry of Interior (APM) must have a mutual plan in managing protests at a national level. APM should establish cross-security agency partnerships which should have a clear structure, line of command, responsibility, new strategies, and budget. Beyond the structure of the new reformed security services, it is critical to integrate principles underpinning SSR into the process of designing the new form, its principles and practice, and APM officers' belief. According to Beswick & Johnson (2011), the key principles are democracy, civilian oversight and control, accountability and transparency, local ownership, professionalism, and holistic approaches.

The third is to allow a civil society to monitor and to assess the governmental management. The researcher expects that if this mechanism is integrated with the security services, conflict management will be more transparent and APM will take feedback into account. In the recent uprising during 200-2011, a civil society organization called non-violence action network used to educate protestors during uprising and witnessed some violent actions, but their work is not widely recognized.

7.3.1.3 Willingness and Voluntary Participation. According to the research findings, the collaborative process began from the pioneers' willingness to attend the talk. The attempt of the PHN's members to lessen violence and restore a peaceful community, arouse from the strong will of Chiang Mai natives desiring to see a better situation.

Besides enhancing the initiation process, willingness to participate is a factor sustaining commitments and dedication of those people. In another words, the local people initiated the collaboration and had the willingness to take part in the collaboration, because of following five reasons:

(1) Perceiving stalemate situation and being eager to find alternatives,

(2) Considering the third parties were honest, impartial, and credible persons,

(3) Conceiving place and process of the meetings were safe with a friendly environment,

(4) Anticipating the collaboration could yield fruitful results, and

(5) Having positive attitudes towards the opponents.

Prior to proposing the recommendation, what the Thai government has done regarding the conflict resolution should be revisited. Since the conflict emerged in 2005, several top-down policies related to the conflict resolution not only have ignored the causes of conflict, but also suppressed people who are trying to address the conflict. As a result, the conflict has escalated sporadically. Policies from the Ministry of Interior under Abhisit administration during 2009 to 2010, for instance, demanded officials to control and suspend people to launch political activities and participate in protests in Bangkok. Likewise, the Thai military has a policy to shift the Red Shirts' attitudes to be non-Thaksin supporters. These policy makers view the conflict as undesirable situation that need to be demolished. Considering the outcome, these policies are rather ineffective.

Repeatedly, General Prayuth announced after taking power that the first urgent mission of the Thailand National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) is to unite the Thai people. Under this scheme, officials have implemented policies by detaining political figures and forcing them (leaders of the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts) to make agreements (Pavin, 2014). Though these political figures kneeled to the current government, they as well as the public who disagree with the coup and current polices have accumulated frustration (T. Pendara, and C. Pongpat, personal communication, July 18ˉ20, 2014). These government actions contradicted not only the concept of willingness to participate, but also the concept of safety and freedom of expression. Constantly pushing this policy forward means continuing repressing people particularly the Red Shirts. This approach keeps the conflict more intractable.

In order to construct conditions that encourage willingness to participate, government should apply the following instructions.

(1) Governments whether coming from democratic or nondemocratic means must allow stakeholders to express their opinions, concerns, and act as long as their actions do not violate laws and others' rights. Rather forcing conflicting parties to work together, governments should let parties initiate collaboration. Each community has the capacity and their wisdom to manage conflicts, so naturally emergence of collaborative process is far better than government mechanism.

(2) Governments should offer institutional incentives for collaboration. At the same time, it should create and socialize "the norm of collaboration" among members of Thai society; whoever does not collaborate should receive some social penalties.

(3) Government particular military government should not act as mediators, but rather being an enforcer.

7.3.1.4 International Community/Governments. The finding has confirmed that the U.S. Consulate-General in Chiang Mai played significant roles in providing resources to educate public on issues related to the political conflict. It also constantly supported Thai civil society to initiate the collaboration. Hence, international community and foreign countries that have knowledge/skills/and resources on conflict analysis and resolution should volunteer to take leading roles to continue their support to Thailand including other counties which are facing conflicts.

7.3.2 For Track V Peacemaking through Learning

Past experiences give lessons that conflict resolution process cannot solely rely on governments because not all of them have strong will to deal with conflict. In addition, conflicts are complex and involve various actors: only governments in charge could generate unsatisfied outcome. In this case, apart from Track I, there are several Tracks taking important roles in the PHN namely non-governmental organizations and personal involvement, and these Tracks were rooted and cultivated from social institutions at all times. Coupled with the concept of credibility in Thai culture, the researcher has seen that academia is the most revered institution and has strong fundamental influences. Hence, the researcher proposes for peacemaking through learning/ academic institutions as a core Track contributing for conflict analysis and resolution in the cases of Thai society.

The color-coded conflict has not just been polarizing society and undermining

compassion to each other especially one who has different political views, it has also left

scars among people and accumulated hatred in the society. Constant response and social

mechanism is required to rebuild love and compassion which have been diminished by

the conflict. Besides, extracting from the research, the researcher has found that lacking

knowledge and skills in conflict analysis and resolution is a major obstacle for

constructive solution. Hence, Thai academia should take roles, responses, and duties as

follows:

(1) Produce knowledge on Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR). At

the present, there is no solid, systemic, and various curriculum/programs/courses related

to the field available in Thailand. Only some introduction subjects are taught in some

universities and a few training courses for professionals offered by an academic Center

for Peace and Conflict, King Prajadhipok's Institute. Therefore, it has to promote and

prepare its staff (Lecturers) to obtain a degree in this field. And then, curriculum and

courses on Conflict Analysis and Resolution should be developed and restructured

accordingly so that several researches in this field can be examined. As the field of CAR

is new in Thailand, skills in CAR such as problem-solving workshops, conflict

assessment, and mediation are inadequate to deal with conflict effectively. In addition,

some skills are not familiar to many Thai academia. As such, academic institutions

should seek support from other countries to prepare its staff knowledge and skills.

(2) Provide training courses/programs on CAR for practitioners and offer public

services on CAR. This would help enhance learning and growing in the field. It also has

to provide support in collaborative processes for third party intervention.

(3) Educate the public to have a better understanding about conflict so that Thai people have tools to initially analyze conflict. When public has appropriate comprehension about it, there is more room for flawed approaches.

(4) Socialize members of Thai society to be open-minded, salient, and tolerate each other as well as cultivate social norms which are fruitful for mutual collaboration.

<u>**7.4 Implication for a Better Collaboration**</u>

Considering the difficulties of the PHN discussed in the Chapter Six, the researcher proposes recommendations to improve the collaboration as follows:

7.4.1 More professional and systemic management are required to improve the collaborative process and to implement its plans.

To be concrete, it needs to reform the organizational structure which should be a well-designed structure that reflects on reporting relationships, flow of information, unity of command and direction, simplicity, flexibility, and continuity. It also has to establish ground rules, clear instruction, and follow-up mechanism and communication patterns where everyone equally receives information and notification regarding the PHN in a timely manner. This is critical as it determines how the PHN would perform and fulfill its goals effectively and meaningfully.

7.4.2 To establish trust management is critical to strengthen unity of the PHN as well as to keep the PHN's members' commitment to the process.

The interviews reveal that the PHN was lacking knowledge and skills on trust/distrust management. Several PHN members did not realize the sensitivity of trust and were not aware that some behaviors may cause issues on trust. When trust became an

emerging issue several PHN members did not recognize and did not develop mechanisms to deal with the distrust and prevent it. Hence, several gradually withdrew from the PHN.

7.4.3 To have communication patterns/channels where everyone equally receives information and notification regarding the PHN's activities in a timely manner is essential for a better collaboration. Since some claimed that sometimes, they were not notified on PHN's meetings/ activities, so they felt ignored and then rarely took part in the collaboration.

7.4.4 Although there is no evidence suggesting that having no third party intervention could generate less productivity in the case of PHN, the researcher would like to believe that to have third party playing roles throughout the collaborative process should significantly create more fruitful outcome.

7.4.5 The PHN eventually became a third side where members of conflicting parties as well as other non-conflictants came and worked together. Therefore, the PHN should create a more solid identity. Though, the PHN had a good start by pointing a shared identity of Chiang Mai natives, it still needs strategic story-telling to reposition their identities. As such, the PHN including CMSG has to consider crafting messages of the new identity and to develop sets of explanation on how their shared vision is able to bring better living conditions, and then to convey this to its members and the public. Additionally, concrete plans in pursing their goals are required to propose so that everyone can see progress and have morale to move forward towards the goals.

<center>**7.5 Implications for Future Studies**</center>

Apart from proposing the gap of the extant literatures on the political conflict between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts in the Chapter One, this part presents implications for future investigation by concentrating only on conflict analysis and resolution emerging from the case in Chiang Mai.

7.5.1 Conflict Analysis

There should be more studies on the following points:

(1) Who the conflicting parties in Chiang Mai are and what are their issues/ needs/concerns

(2) Process of becoming members of the particular groups both the Red shirts and the Yellow Shirts including interactions across the groups,

(3) The impact of polarization/conflict on community's cohesion and relationship between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts both at individual and group levels, and

(4) The importance of the new identities and comparison on which identities is more influential in their lives, and

(5) The reasons why several members of the Yellow Shirts who used to rally against dictatorship and call for democracy during 1980s, have later supported the coup.

7.5.2 Conflict Resolution

This research has concentrated on the general conditions which enabled the collaboration, but several in-depth analyses such as dynamics within the PHN, impacts of

third parties throughout the collaborative process, and impacts of the PHN on perceptions among Chiang Mai natives/how it has changed and on the numbers of protesters have not been examined.

Based on cultural perspectives, the researcher believes that succinct studies on expectations of third parties' features/status/roles in the context of Thai culture are required for a better CAR in Thailand. Additionally, Thai society is hierarchical and male-dominant, studies on how individuals can be credible and respected third parties including the possibility on female third parties in CAR are needed. Also, the studies should cover Thais' preference especially for Chiang Mai natives on handling conflict because that would be useful to design the conflict resolution process and to approach conflict more effectively.

Equally important, scholars should conduct evaluations on the Thai governments' paradigm, policies, and plans on CAR and then echo to the public.

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BIOGRAPHY

Naphaphanni Singsuwan received a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Chulalongkorn University in 2006. After graduation, she had worked as an academic officer under the secretary of Committee on Science, Technology, National Resources and Environment of the National Economic and Social Advisory Council in Thailand. While working there, she had learned various controversial issues regarding community rights in natural resources management and environmental issues. With the nature of the organization, she had an opportunity to draft important policy recommendations for the Thai government namely a proposal to amend the promotion and preservation of the environmental quality act B.E.1998, and community forest act, a proposal to legislate a management water act, and guidance for implementing policies on health promotion and natural resources management. Currently, some policies have just been launched after redefining while others have not been implemented.

Since 2009, she has been serving as an assistant to chief district officers, Department of Provincial Administration. Her office was based in a district. With the new responsibilities, Naphaphanni had witnessed broader and deeper aspects of how top-down policies have been impacting local people as well as several controversial issues such as individuals' struggling on a daily life basis. At the same time, she was given the opportunity to initiate some projects that benefited and concurred with the area's needs and potentials. Later, in 2012 she was granted a scholarship to pursue a master's degree in Conflict Resolution at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, U.S.A.

Upon her returning to Thailand up till this present day, Naphaphanni has been serving as the secretary to the Director-General of the Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior. At this position, she is able to initiate projects which are meaningful for those in need and who are vulnerable. Even though this job requires relentless contribution and a strong heart, she is determined to stand firmly with her beliefs to build her home country a better and more peaceful place.