


# **Assessing International Statebuilding Initiative Effectiveness at Preventing Armed Conflict Recurrence:**

The Cases of Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nepal

**Elliot Short, Ph.D.**

**Better Evidence Project**

*Center for Peacemaking  
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# Better Evidence Project


## *Mission and Objectives*

The **mission** of the Better Evidence Project (BEP) is to encourage, facilitate, and conduct research aimed at producing evidence that will guide practitioners and donors in reducing large-scale political violence where it exists or threatens to erupt in the near future.

To support this mission, BEP works towards these **objectives**:

- Promoting the idea that decisions about where and how to allocate peacebuilding resources should be based on hard evidence about what is and is not effective.
- Initiating, supporting, and doing research to develop such evidence.
- Disseminating such evidence and urging its use.
- Collecting, maintaining, and facilitating the exchange of relevant ideas and information, determining priority areas for projects, and disseminating useful information and evidence to the peacebuilding community and the public.


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# About the Author

Dr. Elliot Short is a historian and research consultant. His latest book, *Building a Multi-Ethnic Military in Post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina*, will be published by Bloomsbury Academic in the coming year. The research presented in this report was generously funded by Milt Lauenstein.

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
# Abstract

The practice of statebuilding is employed by a broad spectrum of multilateral organisations and national governments as a tool to stabilise fragile states, including those that are recovering from conflict. However, much of the existing literature focuses on weighing up the ethical arguments concerning statebuilding rather than analysing its impact on the societies in which it takes place. This assessment combines data from Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index, financial data harvested from relevant publicly available databases, and an extensive survey of the academic and policy literature to examine whether statebuilding is an effective means of preventing post-conflict states from relapsing into war. By exploring the cases of Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nepal, it demonstrates that although statebuilding can help to achieve this goal, certain conditions and methods are required for it to be effective. When such conditions and methods are absent, donors' resources are employed to build regimes rather than states and leave the recipient country at risk of returning to conflict.

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## Executive Summary

In Burundi, the African Union and the United Nations (UN) spent over \$900 million on peacekeeping operations before the war was finally ended in 2006. Between 2006 and 2019, the international community spent at least \$1 billion on strengthening the Burundian state (\$7 per citizen per annum). Despite such commitments, the Fragile States Index (FSI) indicates that every sector of the Burundian state was less stable in 2019 than it was in 2006.

The failure to build a stable state in Burundi is attributed to:

1. The determination of the late President Nkurunziza and his political party, the CNDD-FDD, to consolidate their control over Burundi. They proved adept at utilising the international community's reliance on Burundian contributions to multilateral peace operations to deflect criticism while resources intended for statebuilding were diverted to strengthening their grip on power.
2. The shortcomings of the Arusha Agreement, the recalcitrance of its signatories to adhere to its principals, and the failure of the international community to recognise and respond to these developments.
3. An unsuccessful internationally led Security Sector Reform (SSR) and military integration process, a failure to separate the military leadership from the party of government, and the use of security services by the government to repress political opposition.

In Chad, the European Union and the UN spent approximately \$2.75 billion on peacekeeping operations between 2008 and 2010. Between 2010 and 2019, the international community spent at least \$1.9 billion on statebuilding initiatives (\$14 per citizen per annum), however this figure does not include contributions from France (likely the largest donor) as such data is not publicly available. These efforts have done little to bring stability to Chad: According to the FSI, in 2019 the Chadian state was as fragile as it was in 2010.

This is the result of:

1. The leadership of President Déby and his regime of 'untouchables.' They have openly appropriated resources intended for development and used them to build a powerful

military, while also enriching themselves. Such actions appear to have been wilfully ignored by the international community due to Chadian contributions to regional security organisations and operations.

2. Owing to a deeply flawed SSR and military integration process, Chad has four armed forces, the largest and most powerful of which is Déby's personal guard. These forces are unprofessional, act with impunity, and are employed to repress political opposition. They have also committed several atrocities while serving with the UN.
3. Pervasive instability across almost all of Chad's borders has created a highly unfavourable environment for building an effective and sustainable state. This has made Chad a critical regional power despite its failure to perform the basic functions of statehood.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the UN spent \$3.75 billion on its peacekeeping mission during the war.

Additional security operations costing over \$2 billion were carried out unilaterally by France.

Between 2011 and 2019, the international community spent at least \$2.8 billion on statebuilding initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire (\$14.5 per citizen per annum). Like Chad, France was likely the largest donor, but these figures do not include its contributions as they are unavailable.

According to the FSI, the Ivoirian state has made modest but sustained progress toward stability.

However, the economy remains unstable and in recent years the security sector has displayed concerning signs of fragility.

The development of the Ivoirian state is due to:

1. President Ouattara, who secured extensive international assistance to support his efforts to bring stability to post-war Côte d'Ivoire. However, his dominance has undermined many aspects of the statebuilding process, such as establishing the rule of law.
2. The international statebuilding effort focused on kick-starting Côte d'Ivoire's formerly prosperous economy. This stimulated an impressive growth rate and created a strong base from which the Ivoirian state can draw revenue. However, uneven economic development threatens to reignite many of the tensions that caused the war.
3. The locally led SSR and military integration process favoured Ouattara's wartime supporters and failed to limit the power of regional military figures. The impunity of such

figures has hindered broader reconciliation efforts. Poor living conditions and unpaid wages has led to several mutinies in recent years.

In Nepal, neither the UN nor any regional organisations deployed a multilateral peacekeeping operation during the war. Between 2006 and 2019, at least \$1.05 billion was spent by the international community on strengthening the Nepalese state (\$3 per citizen per annum), almost a third of which was allocated in 2018 and 2019. According to the FSI, this has contributed to a significant reduction in the fragility of the Nepalese state. Indeed, the Nepalese case represents the most successful transition toward stability in this assessment by a considerable margin.

The success of efforts to strengthen the Nepalese state are the product of:

1. A successful SSR and military integration process, in which Maoist combatants were integrated into the national army and remunerations from extensive commitments to multilateral peacekeeping operations have been invested into the professional development of the military.
2. The consensus shared across the Nepalese political arena that building a functioning constitutional democracy following the abolishment of the monarchy was the way forward, and the shared commitment to ensuring that the statebuilding process was locally led.
3. A functioning democracy in which government alternation is commonplace. This prevented any individual or political party from exerting too much authority over the statebuilding process and ensured that it developed in line with political realities.

International statebuilding initiatives have failed to bring stability to Burundi or Chad. Côte d'Ivoire shows promise, while Nepal demonstrates that such efforts can be successful. The cases reveal that:

1. Local actors should not be underestimated. In Nepal they proved to be more than capable of leading efforts to build and strengthen the state with limited international support, while in Burundi and Chad much greater levels of support were subverted in order to consolidate the power of the ruling administration.
2. Getting SSR and military integration right is vital to any effort to build or strengthen a state. In Burundi and Chad, considerable international resources were employed to build



the armies of authoritarian regimes rather than professional armed forces serving the state. These armies are used to repress opposition and represent a threat to peace during future transitions of power.

3. The international footprint must be light but sustained when the objective is to build a resilient, self-governing, and sustainable state in a country recovering from war. The cases of Burundi, Chad, and to some extent, Côte d'Ivoire, show that statebuilding initiatives are easily subverted when the international community has little in the way of a formal presence in the recipient country. Similarly, they also demonstrate that successfully building a state is not simply a question of resources: Burundi received twice as much assistance as Nepal, while Chad and Côte d'Ivoire received at least four times as much. The Nepalese case proves that a small but sustained presence (manifested in this case by a small UN political mission) can help to achieve much more with far fewer resources.

*Fragile states make violence and violence makes fragile states.*<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Fragile states, those which ‘lack the political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations,’ represent a major threat to global peace and stability.<sup>2</sup> While not every fragile state descends into war, all states are fragile in the aftermath of armed conflict, and approximately half of those that experience it soon relapse into war.<sup>3</sup> The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, which was established in 2011 specifically to address the global challenge posed by fragile states, contends that ‘about 1.5 billion people live in fragile states’ and ‘about 70% of fragile states have seen conflict since 1989.’<sup>4</sup> The majority of wars that have taken place in the post-Cold War period are intrastate conflicts that are, to some extent at least, the result of state fragility and collapse, while every war that is taking place at the time of writing is an intrastate conflict.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, assessing the tools that are employed by the international community to decrease state fragility and reduce relapses into armed conflict after war has never been a more essential endeavour.

The range of tools used by external actors in their efforts to assist post-conflict states transition toward stability is broad. In some cases, such tools are as blunt as military intervention, while in

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<sup>1</sup> Lothar Brock et al offer this adaptation of Charles Tilly’s infamous 1975 declaration in: Lothar Brock, Hans-Henrik Holm, Georg Sørensen & Michael Stohl. *Fragile States*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) p.47. Tilly’s original statement was, of course, that ‘states make war and war makes states.’ The statement appeared in Charles Tilly, ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)

<sup>2</sup> Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*. (OECD: Paris, 2007) p.3

<sup>3</sup> Barbara Walter contends that civil wars that took place between 1945 and 2009 had a recidivism rate of 57 percent. Barbara Walter. “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace.” *World Development Report 2011: Background Paper*. (2011) p.1 Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9069> (Accessed 20/05/2020); A fresher perspective on the subject is available in: George Frederick Willcox. “Why do countries relapse into war? Here are three good predictors.” *Washington Post*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/29/why-do-countries-relapse-into-war-here-are-three-good-predictors/> (Accessed 20/05/2020)

<sup>4</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*. (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Busan, 2011) Available at: <https://www.pbsdialogue.org/en/new-deal/about-new-deal/> (Accessed 02/05/2020) p.1

<sup>5</sup> A recent overview of wars that have taken place since 1991 is available in Chapter One of: Elliot Short & Milt Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991: War, Intervention, and Peacebuilding Organisations*. (New York: Peter Lang, 2020); A report by RAND also offers useful insights into contemporary conflicts, in: Thomas S. Szayna et al. *Conflict Rends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections*. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017)

others they are made up of more subtle approaches such as the formulation of favourable trade and investment agreements, the cancellation of debt, and the provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, in many cases such efforts have not done enough to reduce fragility and, in certain circumstances, have in fact increased instability. Military intervention, for example, is difficult to maintain over a long period, can exacerbate divisions, and comes with considerable question marks regarding legitimacy. Opening the resources of a fragile state to international trade, on the other hand, can sometimes lead to increased prosperity, but in many cases invites instability and conflict due to the “resource curse.”<sup>6</sup> In much the same way, high levels of ODA funnelled through a recipient state can present an incentive for “rent-seeking” individuals to attempt to seize control of that state to enrich themselves and those loyal to them, leading to an increased risk of coup d’états and insurgencies, while also fostering a reliance on (often unpredictable) external support for the maintenance of state institutions.<sup>7</sup>

The international response to the shortcomings of these approaches has been to offer expertise, resources, and training in order to strengthen fragile states and build their capacity to effectively and sustainably govern themselves. Efforts to “build” states in this way received a shot in the arm after 9/11 ‘made devastatingly clear just how dangerous failed states such as Afghanistan could be.’<sup>8</sup> Since then, “statebuilding” has become an increasingly prevalent tool and now constitutes a key pillar of peace support operations conducted by international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), as well as the development policies of many national governments. An unpublished survey of the statebuilding field conducted by the author prior to producing this paper showed that almost every state in the world outside of a relatively small cluster of Western European and North American states (as well as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) has received or continues to receive international statebuilding initiatives. However, despite the

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<sup>6</sup> This is a complex subject and remains the topic of much debate. The idea was introduced in: Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*, No. 5398. (1995); See also: Paul Collier, Lisa Chauvet, and Håvard Hegre. “The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries.” in Bjørn Lomborg, ed. *Global Crises, Global Solutions*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp.74-5

<sup>7</sup> The link between rent-seeking and state fragility is presented in: Asongu Simplice & Oasis Kodila-Tedika. “State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data.” *African Governance and Development Institute Working Paper*, Vol. 13, No.19. (2013)

<sup>8</sup> Nick Grono. “Fragile States and Conflict.” *International Crisis Group*. (2010) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/fragile-states-and-conflict> (Accessed 02/05/2020); This perspective is best encapsulated in: Francis Fukuyama. *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century*. (London: Profile Books, 2004)

widespread use of statebuilding programmes around the world and the considerable resources that are spent on them, there is little empirical evidence proving that such efforts do indeed reduce fragility and minimise the risk of post-conflict states relapsing into war.

Good examples of in-depth data-driven research published on the subject are presented in a series of books and papers by Paul Collier from the 2000s and a 2017 UN report by George Willcoxon.<sup>9</sup> In the report, Willcoxon outlines the benefits of successfully building a state (admittedly a very idealised one), noting that ‘democracies have 82 percent lower risk of war relapse relative to all other regime types,’ elections held within five year limits reduce the risk of relapse by 56 percent, and that the ‘risk of relapse declines approximately 7 percent for every additional soldier per 1,000 people.’<sup>10</sup> He also highlights the importance of civil liberties, the complexities of decentralised government, the impact that the wrong levels of economic growth can have on a post-conflict society, and that while a UN presence usually helps to prevent relapse, the deployment of foreign soldiers under a different banner ‘almost triples the risk of war relapse.’<sup>11</sup> Thus, the case for building democratic and militarily capable sovereign states in order to reduce armed conflict is strong. However, as this assessment will demonstrate, constructing a state such as this is an incredibly complex task fraught with risks and subject to myriad factors that can leave the process corrupted and incomplete, and in some cases even exacerbate the risk of a relapse into conflict.<sup>12</sup>

The research presented here represents an effort to shed much-needed light on this remarkably under-researched field. It goes some small way in providing the better evidence that is required

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<sup>9</sup> Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler. “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War.” *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper*. (2004) Available at: <https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/research-topic/conflicts-and-terrorism> (Accessed 20/05/2020); Paul Collier. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Collier, Chauvet & Hegre. “The Security Challenge in Conflict-Prone Countries.”

<sup>10</sup> George Frederick Willcoxon. *Political Transformation and Conflict: Post-War Risks in the Arab Region*. (Beirut: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2017) p.2 Available at: [https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/page\\_attachments/political\\_transformation\\_and\\_conflict\\_post\\_war\\_risks\\_in\\_the\\_arab\\_region.pdf](https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/page_attachments/political_transformation_and_conflict_post_war_risks_in_the_arab_region.pdf) (Accessed 20/05/2020)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> This is not to even mention the libraries of literature published on both sides of the ethical debate regarding the appropriateness of such principles for use globally. Perhaps the most prolific critic of the ‘modern rendering of the *mission civilisatrice*’ is Roland Paris. See: Roland Paris. “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2. (1997); Roland Paris. “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice.’” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28. (2002); Roland Paris. *At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004)

to frame our understanding of how statebuilding works, whether its objectives are achieved, and what unforeseen impacts it can have on the societies that are intended to benefit from it. This assessment has been produced by quantifying, to the extent that is possible, the amount of statebuilding assistance each case has received. This data has been combined with the metrics used by the Fragile States Index (FSI) and the latest academic literature on the subject cases to assess how effective international statebuilding initiatives have been at reducing the risk of a return to war in four states with a recent history of armed conflict: Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nepal.

### What Is Statebuilding?

For the purposes of this assessment, the “state” is broadly understood in the classic Weberian sense: A ‘compulsory political association with continuous organisation’ whose ‘administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.’<sup>13</sup>

While it is recognised that entire volumes have been published exploring the concept in more depth, Weber’s classic definition strikes right at the heart of the subject of this paper:

Statebuilding.

At its simplest, “statebuilding” should be understood as the process of strengthening the capacity and resilience of Weber’s ‘administrative staff’ in order to allow the ‘continuous compulsory political association’ to more effectively uphold its monopoly on the use of force. Translated into more practical terms, the state should be viewed as a complex web of interdependent institutions and processes which together provide the coercive, financial, and legal framework by which a given territory and the population within it can be administered by a government. Statebuilding, therefore, is simply the procedure in which these institutions and processes are built, developed, and strengthened. Historically, this has often been an endogenous process, but in more recent years (particularly since the end of the Cold War), the international community has taken it upon itself to offer resources and expertise to states that are deemed to be underdeveloped or at risk of conflict, with the hope that such assistance will ultimately lead to the formation of a functioning

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<sup>13</sup> Max Weber. [A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans] *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947) p.154

state that can maintain stability within its own borders, engage with diplomacy and trade with other states, and ultimately contribute to stabilising the wider world.

Much of the existing literature on statebuilding discusses the ethics of attempting to transplant “Western” ideas of the “liberal state” to areas in the Global South and the extent to which “democracy” is appropriate outside of Western European and North American context. However, I have come across little evidence to suggest that the construction of such states is indeed the goal of most international statebuilding initiatives. Rather, the evidence suggests that the goals of such initiatives are to build stable states that can, in turn, support the construction of other stable states. As a result, this assessment makes no attempt to quantify the quality of liberal democratic culture in each state, but rather focuses on assessing the extent to which international statebuilding initiatives have been responsible for producing stability and preventing the return of armed conflict. However, as the cases in this assessment demonstrate, strengthening an autocratic regime does little to create lasting stability.

The term “international community” is inherently problematic, having traditionally been associated with ‘the conglomerate of industrialised democracies and the multilateral agencies over which they have preponderant influence’ rather than a genuine consensus view encompassing all of the states in the world.<sup>14</sup> While “Western” dominance of the international community cannot be ignored, in the context of this assessment, the term includes powerful international organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as significant regional powers such as India, Nigeria, and South Africa.

### Why Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nepal?

The only criterion that was employed to select these states was that they must have had experienced the end of an armed conflict since the FSI began publishing its findings in 2005. This selection process has provided a group of case studies that can be dissected along myriad fault lines and comparatively analysed. For example, while Burundi, Chad, and Côte d’Ivoire have a shared history of colonisation and underwent the process of decolonisation in the context

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<sup>14</sup> Marina Ottaway. “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States.” *Development and Change*, Vol. 33, No. 5. (2002) p.1001

of the Cold War, Nepalese rulers have (for the most part) retained an exceptional degree of formal independence. In terms of development and prosperity in more recent years, Burundi, Chad, and Nepal remain among the most impoverished in the world, while Côte d'Ivoire is notably more prosperous.<sup>15</sup>

While all four states have evidently experienced armed conflict in recent years, the international community only intervened on a multilateral basis in the conflicts that were taking place in Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, only the conflicts in Chad and Côte d'Ivoire had outright victors: The 1993 – 2005 Burundian Civil War was ended by the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the “People’s War” in Nepal was brought to a close by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. In both cases, complex power-sharing arrangements have ushered in governments of a very different nature from their predecessors that stand at the helm of administrative and military apparatuses formed of former belligerents. In Chad and Côte d'Ivoire, by contrast, the victorious leaders remain in power at the time of writing and both have spent over a decade shaping the states that they control in their own image, with varying degrees of success.

Although emerging as a foreign policy actor (largely through troop contributions to multilateral peacekeeping operations) has been an important feature of the post-conflict transition of all four states, the success of such endeavours has varied considerably. Furthermore, sending troops on such operations has had a significant impact on the domestic politics of each state. The Chadian military has become an invaluable component of international operations across the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, while Chadian officials sit in powerful positions in numerous African institutions, and American and French military bases stand on the outskirts of N'Djamena. Nepal, for its part, has become the fifth largest contributor of peacekeepers to UN operations in the world, while Burundian troops form a vital contingent of the multilateral force in Somalia (as well as numerous other peace operations). Indeed, the Burundian case of military integration was viewed as a successful model of post-conflict integration until 2015, when elements of the

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<sup>15</sup> Prior to its descent into armed conflict, Cote d'Ivoire was one of the wealthiest states in Africa, largely thanks to the cocoa trade.

<sup>16</sup> It is important to note that the governments of both Chad and Nepal received extensive bilateral assistance during their respective wars. Chad was the subject of the European Union's first military operation when EUFOR, which was officially limited to providing security to displaced people, was deployed in 2008.

National Defence Force of Burundi attempted to seize power in a failed coup. Similarly, although troops from Côte d'Ivoire have participated in peacekeeping missions since the conflict there was ended in 2011, the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire have been plagued with instability and frequent mutinies, demonstrating a high level of fragility.

The contrasts between these cases provide an interesting picture of post-conflict states in the contemporary period. However, it is the similarities that they share which is the primary interest of this assessment: All four have been subjected to an armed conflict that has ended since 2006, and all have been (and continue to be) the recipient of international statebuilding initiatives. However, despite the considerable resources that are committed to strengthening states around the world in order to increase stability and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, there is little in the way of good evidence that proves this theory. The most salient challenge to developing such evidence is how to identify reliable indicators of the relative failures and successes of programmes and measure the “progress” of a recipient state with regard to concepts such as fragility, good governance, and democratisation. Fortunately, the FSI provides an aggregate scoring of a state based on global media reportage, quantitative analysis of datasets maintained by multilateral organisations, as well as commissioned research by social scientists.<sup>17</sup> When calibrated to focus on the capacity and resilience of the state itself, the Index provides perhaps the best available measure of the effectiveness of international statebuilding initiatives in preventing the return of armed conflict in states recovering from war.

### What Is the Fragile States Index, and How does It Work?

The FSI, compiled and published by the Fund for Peace (FFP) since 2005, traces its origins to the 1990s. In this period, FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool was developed, combining pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis to form a comprehensive social science approach that has been subjected to critical review for decades. Since 2005, this tool has been employed to produce a complete index of all states in the world. The FSI categorises data in four themes that are further broken down into a total of twelve categories: Cohesion (Security Apparatus, Factionalised Elites, and Group Grievance); Economic (Economic Decline, Uneven Economic Development, Human Flight and Brain Drain);


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<sup>17</sup> Fragile States Index. *Methodology*. (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2020) Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/> (Accessed 02/05/2020)



Political (State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and the Rule of Law); and Social and Cross-Cutting (Demographic Pressures, Refugees and Internally Displaced People, and External Intervention).<sup>18</sup> When viewed holistically, these indicators give a peerless perspective on the overall fragility of a state. The development of the cases considered in this assessment is presented below in Table 1. The data for each state begins in the year in which the armed conflict that they were experiencing ended and runs up to 2019, when the latest FSI report was published.

Table 1



The FSI data on overall state fragility in the four cases selected for this assessment reveals some thought-provoking insights that say much about the effectiveness of statebuilding. An ideal post-conflict transition would show a significant decline, such as that witnessed in Chad between 2010 and 2012 or in Nepal between 2017 and 2019. However, when viewed over a slightly

<sup>18</sup> Fragile States Index. *Indicators*. (The Fund for Peace, 2018) Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/> (Accessed 02/05/2020)

longer period (nine years for Côte d'Ivoire, ten for Chad, and fourteen for Côte d'Ivoire and Nepal), it is apparent that a meaningful decline takes time, and may not manifest itself at all: The Burundian case demonstrates that even after fourteen years of a supposed transition from armed conflict supported by international statebuilding initiatives, a state can in fact become even more fragile than it was during war. Although Chad did experience a significant decline in fragility during its initial post-war years, this progress has essentially stagnated since 2012, suggesting that it is possible for statebuilding initiatives to have no discernible impact on fragility. The case of Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, illustrates a sustained downward trend, while that of Nepal shows a similar level of progress, although this has been achieved over a much longer period. Data such as this evidently supports the notion that, in certain contexts, statebuilding can indeed make a meaningful contribution to successful post-conflict transitions and reduce the risk of a return to armed conflict.

The following case studies delve much deeper into the circumstances in which each state emerged from war, before quantifying the extent of statebuilding assistance (as far as is possible) that has been directed to each state. FSI scores for five categories that are considered to best indicate the fragility of Weber's 'public administration' – the institutions and process that compose the state – are then presented, offering a much more detailed image than that depicted in Table 1. Each case study concludes with an analysis, drawn from a range of primary documents and secondary literature, that provides the insights regarding the relative successes and failures of statebuilding that underpin this assessment.

## Methodology

A key element in the assessment of the relative effectiveness of statebuilding is quantifying the amount of resources that have been channelled to each recipient state. However, several obstacles have hindered both the collection and analysis of this data.

Many states and multilateral organisations maintain detailed databases of their development activities. For example, the USA provides information on each individual programme that agencies such as USAID have implemented, including details of the financial cost and the duration of the programme. Wherever possible, these databases have been thoroughly examined to provide the figures given in each case presented in this assessment. Unfortunately, not all

states and organisations have made this information publicly available. France, for example, is a major donor to both Chad and Côte d'Ivoire yet only offers information on its activities between 2006 and 2011, and even this data is not broken down by programme. Instead, 'technical cooperation' between France and the recipient state is presented as a single unit.<sup>19</sup>

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has gathered data on development since 1969. The information that is presented every year by the 30 lead donor states (along with around 80 non-state providers of aid) offers an unparalleled resource for scholars and practitioners to quantitatively assess many important features of development. Unfortunately, such data cannot be employed for the analysis of statebuilding. The primary reason is that military equipment and services are not included in Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures. As security sector reform, military integration, and preparing armed forces for deployment on peacekeeping missions abroad are an integral feature of almost every post-conflict statebuilding endeavour, this unfortunately makes the ODA figures largely irrelevant. The problems that were arising from the omission of such data were recognised in a 2017 document which went to some length to clarify what aspects of military spending should be included in ODA figures. This has only underlined the differences between statebuilding and development in the more traditional sense.<sup>20</sup> The omission of such information from ODA figures has not only made gathering reliable data on statebuilding activities more difficult, but also means that quantifying statebuilding initiatives as a proportion of ODA is impossible.

Overcoming these obstacles in order to build a more complete understanding of the resources that are committed to international statebuilding initiatives requires a much lengthier investigation than what is presented in this assessment. Every effort has been made to ensure that the figures in each case study are as accurate as possible: Every dollar listed in this assessment can be traced on publicly available databases. However, as not all funds that are directed to statebuilding are publicly available, the figures presented in each case study represents an "at least" sum rather than an estimate of the total.

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<sup>19</sup> I have requested data for the years since 2011 but have failed to receive a reply.

<sup>20</sup> Development Assistance Committee. *ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities*. (Paris: OECD, 2017)

## Burundi

In 1993, a civil war erupted in the small, land-locked state of Burundi, located in the Great Lakes region of East-Central Africa. Increasing numbers of armed groups were brought into the peace process between 2000 and 2006, when the conflict was finally ended.

### History and Context

The war in Burundi is often explained as another inevitable example of ethnic conflict, largely due to its mixed population of Hutu, Tutsi, Ganwa, and Twa. However, much like all conflicts that are cast in such light, the reality is far more complex, as Janvier Nkurunziza (a UN official and Burundian national) contends:

All four groups have shared, over several centuries of coexistence - apparently since the 11th century - one single language, Kirundi, one culture, and live mixed in the same geographical areas. Hundreds of years of coexistence under a common value system forge a common identity. Therefore, using differences in ethnicity to explain Burundi's political violence is a tenuous argument, despite its popularity in the literature on Burundi.<sup>21</sup>

Burundi emerged from the Belgian empire in 1962. Since then, it has recorded seven major coup d'états of which five led to regime change, as well as six episodes of civil war and at least two acts of genocide perpetrated by government forces.<sup>22</sup> Throughout this period, the Burundian state became the prize over which countless groups fought, with the victors of such struggles attempting to maintain power by employing clientelism, patronage, and rent seeking to ensure the loyalty of their followers. In other words, 'state institutions were used to accumulate wealth and to protect individual interests' rather than serve Burundian society.<sup>23</sup> Despite the prevalence of such struggles, the majority of them occurred within the framework of the single political party that dominated Burundian politics between 1965 and 1993: The Union for National Progress (*Union pour le Progrès National*, UPRONA).

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<sup>21</sup> Janvier Nkurunziza. "Origin and Persistence of State Fragility in Burundi." *Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development*. (2018) p.5

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p.31

<sup>23</sup> Devon Curtis. "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi." *African Affairs*, Vol. 122, No. 446. (2013) p.79

In 1987, Pierre Buyoya rose to power following a coup d'état. The next year, his armed forces devastated much of northern Burundi, killing thousands of mostly Hutu civilians and forcing many more to flee the country.<sup>24</sup> While such events were, unfortunately, unremarkable in Burundi, they quickly captured the attention of the wider world. Buyoya rejected a request from the European Community to authorise an external investigation, but soon acquiesced to demands to introduce multi-party democracy as a remedy to the violence plaguing Burundian politics.<sup>25</sup> Following the promulgation of a constitution and some other reforms, both parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 1993. In a 'political earthquake,' Buyoya was defeated by Melchior Ndadaye of the Burundi Democratic Front (*Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi*, FRODEBU).<sup>26</sup> Filip Reyntjens, writing in 1993, noted that 'it was clear that a sizeable number of Hutu has voted for [Buyoya]' and 'the support of at least some Tutsi for [FRODEBU]'s candidate... was well known.'<sup>27</sup> Upon his victory, Ndadaye formed a government composed of both Hutu and Tutsi ministers. Developments such as this during the election and its aftermath underline the extent to which politics and ethnicity were not necessarily in step with one another on the eve of war.<sup>28</sup>

Shortly after the elections, high-ranking members of the Burundian Armed Forces (*Forces Armées Burundaises*, FAB), a historically Tutsi institution, assassinated Ndadaye.<sup>29</sup> This event sparked an armed conflict between the FAB and an array of primarily Hutu armed groups, including a militant wing of FRODEBU and another formation that emerged from a split in that party: The National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (*Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie–Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*, CNDD-FDD).<sup>30</sup> While both groups fought for a 'return to constitutional law, the

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<sup>24</sup> Filip Reyntjens. "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating: the June 1993 Elections in Burundi." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993) p.563

<sup>25</sup> Human Rights Watch. *Proxy Targets: Civilians in the War in Burundi*. (New York: HRW, 1988) p.15

<sup>26</sup> Reyntjens. "The Proof of the Pudding is in the Eating." p.573

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p.574

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> The US Ambassador to Burundi at the time, Robert Krueger, contends that the ousted president, Buyoya, was responsible for the attack. His investigation into the events that sparked the war in Burundi feature heavily in: Robert Krueger. *From Bloodshed to Hope in Burundi: Our Embassy Years During Genocide*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007)

<sup>30</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) p.4  
Available at: <https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BDI/> (Accessed 31/03/2020)

institution of democratic majority rule and, most especially, the reform of the Tutsi-dominated army,' the CNDD-FDD developed an uncompromising brand of Hutu nationalism.<sup>31</sup>

As the conflict raged across the country, the toothless Burundian government (which was essentially a bystander in the conflict) struggled to replace Ndadye.<sup>32</sup> Six months after the assassination, Cyprien Ntaryamira was selected as a compromise replacement acceptable to all parties, but just two months after coming to office he was killed along with the president of Rwanda when their plane was shot down near Kigali. In 1996, Buyoya swept the embattled Burundian government aside as he returned to power on the back of yet another coup d'état supported by the FAB. With much of the world's attention focused on conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Chechnya, the UN failed to respond to the conflict.<sup>33</sup> However, following Buyoya's second armed seizure of power, some international economic sanctions were placed on his government.<sup>34</sup>

In 1998, representatives from FRODEBU and Buyoya's government met in Arusha, in neighbouring Tanzania, to begin peace talks. The negotiations culminated two years later with the signing of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, which introduced a 'transitional government based on consociational power-sharing with ethnic quotas for all political institutions.'<sup>35</sup> International observers from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), mostly heralding from South Africa, were immediately deployed to Burundi to monitor the implementation of the agreement. However, as Willy Nindorera points out, the agreement had come 'without a ceasefire – mainly because of internal dissent within the main rebel groups and the virtual exclusion of the real belligerents from the negotiating table.'<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Willy Nindorera. "The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The path from armed to political struggle." *Berghof Transitions Series*, No. 10. (2020) p.9

<sup>32</sup> Six ministers were killed alongside Ndadya. Those that survived sought shelter in the French embassy and eventually formed a government under acting president Sylvie Kinigi.

<sup>33</sup> Nkurunziza. "Origin and Persistence of State Fragility in Burundi." p.17

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Burundi. (2000) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1207> (Accessed 04/05/2020); Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.4

<sup>36</sup> Nindorera. "The CNDD-FDD in Burundi." p.9

In 2003, the CNDD-FDD agreed to lay down their arms under the terms of the Global Ceasefire Agreement and enter negotiations with Buyoya's government in Pretoria, South Africa.<sup>37</sup> Both the Arusha Accords and the agreements negotiated in Pretoria made lengthy stipulations regarding the composition and organisation of the Burundian army, illustrating the significance of state institutions and more specifically, the future of the Burundian military, to the conflict.<sup>38</sup> Although a number of smaller armed groups refused to put an end to the fighting in 2003, this event marked the end of the conflict for most Burundians. Following the ceasefire, the AU deployed a peacekeeping mission (the first such operation carried out by the AU) to Burundi, which prepared the ground for the arrival of a UN mission, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (*l'Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi*, ONUB), the following year.

The presence of UN peacekeepers in Burundi marked the CNDD-FDD's departure from armed conflict as their primary vehicle for gaining power and its transformation into a political party. In August 2004, CNDD-FDD members joined the transitional administration that they had been fighting since it had been established four years earlier, assuming 40 percent of officer positions in the army and 35 percent in the police, as well as a range of ministerial positions. These rapid developments made them the most powerful political force in Burundi after Buyoya and his key tools of power, UPRONA and the FAB.<sup>39</sup>

In March 2005, a new constitution mostly based on the Arusha Agreement was adopted following a referendum. Elections were held later that year under the supervision of UN observers. The CNDD-FDD won a resounding victory, in large part because it 'insisted on its crucial role in reforming the defence and security forces, and on its ability to defend its electoral gains and any possible sabotage attempt like that on the 1993 democratic experiment.'<sup>40</sup> The party's chairman and Minister for Good Governance in the transitional government, Pierre Nkurunziza, became president of the Republic after running unopposed in an 'indirect election'

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<sup>37</sup> The Global Ceasefire Agreement. (2003) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/163> (Accessed 04/05/2020)

<sup>38</sup> Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing in Burundi. (2003) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/node/165> (Accessed 04/05/2020)

<sup>39</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.4

<sup>40</sup> Nindorera. "The CNDD-FDD in Burundi." p.27

while the CNDD-FDD won the parliamentary and local elections.<sup>41</sup> The following year, Nkurunziza's government and the remaining armed groups came to terms, bringing the armed conflict in Burundi to an end after thirteen years. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 people were killed during the war, while countless more were displaced from their homes.<sup>42</sup> Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD remain in power at the time of writing (May 2020) after winning a series of circumspect elections and controversially amending the constitution.

### International Statebuilding Initiatives

The international effort to strengthen the Burundian state following the war began with the Arusha Agreement. It was in the Tanzanian city that the constitutional framework in which the post-conflict Burundian state operates was designed, while the ensuing agreements negotiated in South Africa that marked the incorporation of armed groups such as the CNDD-FDD into the peace process provided the additional details that gradually filled in the sketch originally outlined in 2000. However, it was not until 2004 when these blueprints for the Burundian state began to manifest into something tangible.

The first step was the restoration of security and the creation of an institution that could ensure the state's monopoly on the use of force and thus end the armed conflict. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) had been deployed by the AU the previous year with a mandate that included, among many other tasks, stabilising the security situation in Burundi and ensuring that the desired peace was managed by new national defence and security structures.<sup>43</sup> However, AMIB was equipped with just 2,645 military personnel and was able to achieve little more than making preparations for the arrival of reinforcements.<sup>44</sup> In March 2004, just a few months before UN peacekeepers arrived to relieve AMIB, the Burundian transitional government formed a General Staff composed of senior officers from the FAB, FRODEBU, and CNDD-FDD and tasked it with integrating former combatants into a new National Defence Force (*la Force de Défense Nationale*, FDN) while also overseeing the reintegration of demobilised troops into civilian

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<sup>41</sup> Although the clear winner, the CNDD-FDD parliamentary block was not large enough to amend the constitution to its liking. Human Rights Watch. "Burundi: Missteps at a Crucial Moment." *HRW Report*, No. 2. (2005) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi1105/index.htm> (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>42</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.4

<sup>43</sup> Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.86

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.



life.<sup>45</sup> Thus, with the construction of the first institution of the new Burundian state beginning, the statebuilding process was underway even as the conflict continued in many parts of the country.

AMIB was significantly under-resourced (with a total budget for its 14-month deployment of \$134 million, much of which was donated by “Western” states) and remained largely reliant on enthusiastic South African contributions to near its personnel requirements.<sup>46</sup> The arrival of UN troops doubled the peacekeeping presence in Burundi and was matched by increased financial resources.<sup>47</sup> ONUB’s extensive mandate included a wide range of duties, from supervising disarmament programmes to helping with the electoral process. Although considering a peacekeeping mission as an operation with the explicit goal of statebuilding is problematic, the mandate given to ONUB stretched far beyond monitoring ceasefires and corralling heavy weaponry and encompassed many responsibilities that undeniably served to strengthen the Burundian state. Thus, it is worth noting the scale of resources that were committed to ONUB in this period: \$330 million in 2004, \$300 million in 2005, and \$79 million in 2006.<sup>48</sup> In total, ONUB cost over \$700 million dollars. Furthermore, an additional \$58.5 million was committed to the Burundi Emergency, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program by the World Bank and the International Development Association during this period. Cumulatively, the international community spent almost \$900 million dollars in Burundi between 2003 and 2006 just on creating the minimum-security conditions that were required for peace and stability initiatives such as statebuilding to begin in earnest.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Nina Wilén, David Ambrosetti & Gérard Birantamije. “Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home: Burundi in Somalia.” *Journal of East African Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2. (2015) p.313

<sup>46</sup> Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.86

<sup>47</sup> Jude Cocodia. *Peacekeeping and the African Union: Building Negative Peace*. (New York: Routledge, 2018) p.62; Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. pp.102-3

<sup>48</sup> Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/59/18: Approved budgetary levels for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005*. (New York: United Nations, 2005); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/60/27: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*. (New York: United Nations, 2006); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/60/32: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*. (New York: United Nations, 2007) All available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>49</sup> World Bank. *MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010) p.22 Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/481721468149096857/The-multi-country-demobilization-and-reintegration-program-final-report-overview-of-program-achievements> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

Following the promulgation of the 2005 constitution, Nkurunziza's rise to the presidency, and the negotiation of peace with the remaining armed groups in 2006, the nascent Burundian administration 'decided to play the sovereignty card' and asked the military contingent of ONUB to be withdrawn.<sup>50</sup> The withdrawal of the peacekeepers led to the UN mission being reorganised, and ONUB was replaced with the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (*Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi*, BINUB). BINUB cost just over \$180 million between its establishment at the end of 2006 and 2011, when it was closed.<sup>51</sup> Its replacement, the UN Office in Burundi (*Bureau des Nations unies au Burundi*, BNUB) was given a budget of \$80 million between 2011 and 2014.<sup>52</sup>

Although the departure of peacekeepers from Burundi suggests that progress had been made in stabilising the country, strengthening security remained a priority for both the Burundian government and external donors. In June 2006, Burundi was selected alongside Sierra Leone to participate in the UN's new Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The PBC immediately began a project aimed at enhancing the capacity and cohesion of the FDN, while also developing a new military code of ethics and building accommodation for soldiers, such as the *Camp de la Paix* (Camp of Peace) where the first integrated units of the FDN were housed.<sup>53</sup> Additional programmes were implemented by the Belgian government, which initiated a Military Partnership Programme with Burundi in 2006, and the Dutch government, which focused on harmonising the newly integrated components of the FDN and professionalising the military as a

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<sup>50</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. "Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home." p.310

<sup>51</sup> Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/61/L.36: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2007); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/62/512: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2008); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/63/L.48: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2009); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/65/328: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2010); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/66/7: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2011) All available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>52</sup> Orrin Summerell, ed. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 2011*. (New York: United Nations, 2015) p.120; Orrin Summerell ed. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 2012*. (New York: United Nations, 2016) p.119; Federigo Magherini, ed. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 2013*. (New York: United Nations, 2017) p.128; Orrin Summerell. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 2014*. (New York: United Nations, 2019) p.213

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, pp.314-5

whole in an extensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme costing at least €30 million.<sup>54</sup> In an unusual decision, the Dutch bypassed the Burundian intelligence service ‘because of the sensitivity of the Dutch government of working with an organisation that had engaged in serious human rights abuses,’ leaving it to be organised and employed in whichever way the Burundian administration saw fit.<sup>55</sup>

By 2008, 41,000 ex-FAB soldiers and 15,500 troops from other armed groups had been demobilized, bringing the size of the FAB close to its target strength of 25,000 (a figure stipulated in an agreement between the World Bank and the Burundian government).<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, the following year, a Hutu officer was made chief of the army for the first time, suggesting meaningful progress regarding military integration.<sup>57</sup> However, even before the process of establishing a unified and inclusive military was complete, the first Burundian contributions to a significant and sustained AU presence in Somalia arrived. Their December 2007 deployment as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was limited to a 30-man reconnaissance team, but it set the precedent for a contingent that eventually grew to 5,000 troops.<sup>58</sup> This commitment was facilitated with the assistance of the international community. Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the US provided financial, logistical, and materiel support, while the Ugandan military provided command and support in the field.<sup>59</sup> In 2013, a Burundian officer, Lieutenant General Silas Ntigurirwa, took command of AMISOM, demonstrating the apparent success of the capacity-building programmes that had targeted the FDN.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> I have calculated this figure by trawling through the data on openaidNL and identifying those programmes focusing on SSR. Available at: <https://openaid.nl/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>55</sup> Cyrus Samii. “Military Integration in Burundi, 2000-2006.” In Roy Licklider, ed. *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars*. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014) p.223

<sup>56</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. “Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home.” p.313

<sup>57</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.5

<sup>58</sup> The size and duration of this commitment means that essentially all Burundian soldiers have now served in Somalia. Richard Moncrieff & Thierry Vircoulon. “The Burundian army’s dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping.” *African Arguments*. (2017) Available at: <https://africanarguments.org/2017/09/01/the-burundian-armys-dangerous-over-reliance-on-peacekeeping/> (Accessed 20/03/2020)

<sup>59</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. “Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home.” pp.314-5

<sup>60</sup> AMISOM. “AU Special Representative bids farewell to Lieutenant General Silas Ntigurirwa.” *AMISOM Press Release*. (2014) Available at: <https://amisom-au.org/2014/12/au-special-representative-bids-farewell-to-lieutenant-general-silas-ntigurirwa/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

The US played a particularly significant role in broadening the FDN's capabilities. In 2007, Burundi joined the US African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme, which trained Burundian troops to operate at scale in multinational settings. This preceded their deployment to AMISOM, which itself was made possible by the US, as Nina Wilén notes:

The Burundian government...compiled a 20-page list of requests with material considered essential for the deployment, which included items such as trucks, bulldozers, aircraft and helicopters, as well as office supplies and personal equipment, all of which was provided by the US.<sup>61</sup>

Support such as this grew as the Burundian commitment to AMISOM continued. Between 2011 and 2013, for example, the US Department of Defence (DOD) provided a Train and Equip Program worth \$26 million, a range of 'excess defense articles' such as Cougar light tactical vehicles, as well as other programmes worth at least \$6 million.<sup>62</sup> In addition, the FDN signed a new agreement with the US army in 2014 to receive a 'new, advanced anti-terrorist formation.'<sup>63</sup>

For much of the decade that followed the end of war in Burundi, the construction of the FDN and its deployment to Somalia (and a growing number of other conflict-affected states) was held up as an example of success. Wilén et al highlight a speech given by President Nkurunziza at the opening of the Burundian Higher Military Academy in 2010 to illustrate the progress of 'one of the most crucial political projects for peace in Burundi,' army reform:

The international community today appreciates, and rightly so, our country in general and the Armed Forces in particular. A telling example is the participation of the FDN members in different peacekeeping and observer missions in countries like Somalia, Chad, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Central African Republic, Burundi having been designated by the UN as a country contributing troops to peacekeeping.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Nina Wilén. "Examining the Links between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Troop Contribution in Post-conflict States." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 12, No. 1. (2018) p.74

<sup>62</sup> Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>63</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. "Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home." p.315

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p.311

They also note that the operational success of the FDN in Somalia had earned it ‘a certain respect among external partners’ and was viewed as ‘a better example than the politicians,’ while the report of Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index contends that: ‘The reform of the army was considered highly successful.’<sup>65</sup>

Although the focus of the international community’s efforts to strengthen the Burundian state undoubtedly rested on the security sector, such efforts were accompanied by an extensive range of initiatives in other areas. The Belgian government was a lead donor, and after its initial cooperation programmes it provided over €22 million in technical cooperation between 2010 and 2016.<sup>66</sup> The French government offered a €22.5 million in additional technical cooperation initiatives between 2006 and 2011 alongside its other development activities.<sup>67</sup> The US Agency for International Development (USAID) spent approximately \$14 million on programmes to strengthen the capacity of the Burundian state, including initiatives to improve the development of policy, electoral processes, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, while the US Department of State (DOS) spent over \$1 million providing anti-terrorism training to their Burundian counterparts.<sup>68</sup> The Dutch government spent over €10 million on capacity-building programmes, most of which aimed to assist with the construction of a new national police force.<sup>69</sup> The AU’s African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) ran programmes mostly focusing on economic governance worth almost \$10 million between 2006 and 2016.<sup>70</sup> The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) ran a joint programme with Sweden’s International Development Agency (SIDA) to improve governance worth over £3 million

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p.315; Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.5

<sup>66</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. “Indicative Cooperation Programme 2010 – 2013.” *Burundi*. (2016) Available at: [https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development\\_cooperation/where\\_we\\_work/partner\\_countries/burundi](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/where_we_work/partner_countries/burundi) (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>67</sup> Identifying how these resources were spent or quantifying how much has been provided by France since 2011 has proven to be impossible. Accessing French development data is notoriously difficult: Guardian development network. “French aid transparency among the worst in the world.” *The Guardian*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/04/french-aid-transparency-among-the-worst-in-the-world> (Accessed 07/05/2020); the data that I have collected is available here: <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/cad-2a-destination-de-laide-publique-au-developpement-de-la-france/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>68</sup> Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>69</sup> Available at: <https://openaid.nl/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>70</sup> African Capacity Building Foundation. *Burundi*. (Harare: African Capacity Building Foundation, 2020) Available at: <https://www.acbf-pact.org/our-work/how-we-do-it/grants/projects-regions/eastern-southern-africa/burundi> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

between 2007 and 2012, and also provided £1.5 million to support Burundi's 2010 elections.<sup>71</sup>

The examples listed above represent just the most significantly resourced initiatives; further statebuilding efforts heralded from a range of other states including Germany and Norway.

In a series of programmes implemented separately from the other UN operations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) spent over \$22 million on building the capacity of the Burundian state, with many initiatives aiming to strengthen the rule of law, improving resource management, and enhancing human rights.<sup>72</sup> An additional \$14 million was earmarked specifically for Public Administration Reform in 2013, however the data suggests that only \$6 million was collected for the programme.<sup>73</sup> The UNDP also provided at least \$15 million to support the 2015 elections.<sup>74</sup>

In 2013, the European Union (EU) negotiated a statebuilding contract with the express intention of strengthening the Burundian State. An initial grant of €18 million that year was followed by a 2014 – 2020 programme worth a total of €143 million.<sup>75</sup> The EU suspended this contract in 2016 following the crisis sparked by President Nkurunziza's response to the public protests that followed his bid to secure a third term in office.<sup>76</sup> The most significant investments in building the Burundian state since 2006 have been made by the World Bank. Between 2006 and 2020, it has provided over \$310 million for programmes ranging from 'Strengthening Institutional

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<sup>71</sup> Department for International Development. "DFID/SIDA Joint Governance Programme in Burundi 2007 – 2012." *Development Tracker*. (2014) Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-113431> (Accessed 07/05/2020); Department for International Development. "Support to the 2010 Elections in Burundi." *Development Tracker*. (2011) Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-201371> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>72</sup> This data is available on the UNDP's Transparency Portal. Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00046523> (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>73</sup> UNDP Burundi. *Réforme de l'Administration publique*. (New York: United Nations, 2020) Available at: [https://www.bi.undp.org/content/burundi/fr/home/operations/projects/democratic\\_governance/reforme-de-l-administration-publique.html](https://www.bi.undp.org/content/burundi/fr/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/reforme-de-l-administration-publique.html) (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>74</sup> UNDP Burundi. *Élections 2015*. (New York: United Nations, 2020) Available at: <https://www.bi.undp.org/content/burundi/fr/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/Elections-2015.html> (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>75</sup> Myra Bernardi, Tom Hart & Gideon Rabinowitz. "EU State Building Contracts: Early lessons from the EU's new budget support instruments for fragile states." *Overseas Development Institute Report*. (2015) p.14 Available at: <https://www.odi.org/publications/8614-eu-state-building-contracts-budget-support-fragile-states-mali-south-sudan> (Accessed 07/05/2020); Delegation of the European Union to Burundi. *Programme indicatif national pour la période 2014-2020 – Burundi*. (Brussels: EU, 2014) Available at: <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/burundi/12971/programme-indicatif-national-> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>76</sup> Staff and agencies. "EU suspends aid to Burundi's government." *The Guardian*. (2016) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/15/eu-suspends-aid-to-burundi-government> (Accessed 11/05/2020)



Capacity for Government Effectiveness’ to a series of comprehensive packages aimed at supporting the Burundian government’s economic reform programme.<sup>77</sup>

The data presented thus far only include the programmes and resources that have been possible to trace. France, for example, has almost certainly directed resources to statebuilding in Burundi since 2011 but this data is not yet publicly available. By the same token, efforts to trace military resources that have been received by the FDN in recent years have proven fruitless. Those qualifying statements made, over \$1 billion was spent by the international community in its attempts to help build the post-war Burundian state between 2006 and 2019.<sup>78</sup> This figure translates to approximately \$7 per annum for each Burundian citizen.

### Fragile States Index

Table 2 present’s FSI’s data on four broad sectors of the Burundian state, as well as an additional measure indicating the extent to which an external intervention was present in the country. High numbers indicate high levels of fragility, low numbers signify stability.<sup>79</sup>


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<sup>77</sup> This data is available on the World Bank’s Project list. Available at: [https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode\\_exact=BI](https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode_exact=BI) (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>78</sup> This figure is in addition to the approximately \$900 million spent on peace support operations between 2004 and 2006.

<sup>79</sup> Iceland, for example, had a Security Apparatus score in the 2019 index of 0.7, indicating extremely high stability, whereas Afghanistan and Yemen both had scores of 10.

Table 2



The data collected by the FSI regarding the fragility of post-war Burundi is unequivocal: The considerable international effort to build a functioning and stable state has failed and every state sector is more fragile today than it was when the war ended.

Despite some early signs of progress, Burundi's security apparatus was more fragile in 2019 than it was at the point when the country emerged from war in 2006. In fact, it was from this sector that had received so much focus from the international community that a significant threat to peace and stability in post-war Burundi came, when elements of the FDN along with the former chief of intelligence launched a coup d'état that ultimately failed.<sup>80</sup> Likewise, although some gradual progress in stabilising the Burundian economy was made between 2013 and 2017, it remains more fragile than it was in 2006. In 2019, Burundi remained 159<sup>th</sup> on the Legatum

<sup>80</sup> Agencies in Bujumbura. "Failed Burundi coup plotters arrested as president returns from Tanzania." *The Guardian*. (2015) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/15/burundi-army-dead-radio-station-battle-coup-leaders-arrested> (Accessed 11/05/2020)



Prosperity Index (having been 160<sup>th</sup> in 2009), with a rating far below the Sub-Saharan average.<sup>81</sup> Similarly, it is currently 185<sup>th</sup> out of 189 on the UN's Human Development Index.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, approximately 1.77 million people (over ten percent of the population) needed humanitarian assistance in 2019.<sup>83</sup>

State legitimacy has also become more fragile than in 2006, perhaps best demonstrated by President Nkurunziza's current bid to secure his fourth term in office and the CNDD-FDD's consolidation of power in Burundi. The rule of law and respect for human rights has, unfortunately, also gradually become more fragile since 2006, in large part due to corruption by the ruling party and the utilisation of state resources (such as the Burundian intelligence agency) to intimidate and remove political opposition. It is this sector that has obtained the dubious accolade of experiencing the most significant decline in stability of any sector of the Burundian state between the end of the war and 2019.

The only indicator that has recorded an "improvement" is external intervention. Although the withdrawal of peacekeepers or other external actors may serve as an insightful indicator of decreasing fragility in some circumstances, the Burundian case demonstrates that this measure is subject to distortion by political developments and is not necessarily a reflection of stability. Indeed, it is possible to speculate that the decline in external intervention directly contributed to the rise in fragility, although testing such a hypothesis requires a much lengthier investigation than is possible in this assessment. It is possible, however, to combine the most relevant analysis conducted by observers from both academic and policy backgrounds and present an explanation for the failure of statebuilding in Burundi.

## **What happened and why?**

### *Arusha*

Sidney Leclercq argues that the belligerent parties to the armed conflict in Burundi came to realise that 'the war could not be won militarily' and feared being treated 'as a negative force' by

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<sup>81</sup> Legatum Prosperity Index. *Burundi Country Profile*. (London: Legatum Institute Foundation, 2019) Available at: <https://www.prosperity.com/all-countries> (Accessed 16/05/2020)

<sup>82</sup> The World Bank. *Overview*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi/overview> (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>83</sup> The World Bank. *Overview*.

the international community and the Burundian population.<sup>84</sup> He cites the Burundian case as an example of “ripeness theory” in action, contending that ‘the attractiveness of military victory was gradually supplanted by... the increased appeal of switching to the political battlefield,’ and notes that as a result ‘the adhesion to the peace process was thus more the result of an exercise of a cost-benefit analysis than a genuine will for peace.’<sup>85</sup> In other words, Arusha and the ensuing agreements shifted the conflict from the battlefield to politics, but failed to establish a consensus regarding the future of Burundi. The exiled former Second Vice-President under Nkurunziza, Gervais Rufyikiri, offers an insight regarding the motivations for the belligerent parties to enter such an agreement:

The strategy was to adhere to the Arusha Agreement for the record and in the hope of changing it progressively once in power so as to achieve the objectives of the struggle it had not been able to attain by force of arms.<sup>86</sup>

Furthermore, Devon Curtis highlights the illegitimacy with which many Burundians viewed Arusha, particularly in reference to the signatories of the agreement:

The negotiations conferred legitimacy on individuals and parties who otherwise had no popular support, leading to the charge that the Arusha process had international and regional, but not popular legitimacy.<sup>87</sup>

The question of the legitimacy of the Arusha-mandated transitional government, which essentially divided power in government based on military power at the time of negotiation, was somewhat resolved by the 2005 elections. With a popular electoral mandate, the CNDD-FDD government enjoyed much greater legitimacy and was able to use the power this offered to shape the political environment in Burundi to its liking, such as when international peacekeepers were asked to depart the country. However, as Thierry Vircoulon observes, the CNDD-FDD ‘never

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<sup>84</sup> Sidney Leclercq. “Between the Letter and the Spirit: International Statebuilding Subversion Tactics in Burundi.” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2018) p.169; for more on ripeness theory see: William Zartman. “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond.” In Paul C. Stern & Daniel Druckman. *National Research Council: International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000)

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Gervais Rufyikiri. “The Post-wartime Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi: A Facade Transformation of Rebel Movement to Political Party.” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 19, No. 2. (2017) p.232

<sup>87</sup> Curtis. “The International Peacebuilding Paradox.” p.83

genuinely adhered to [Arusha's] principles and had not been part of the negotiations to begin with' and as a result 'the implementation of the agreement was both unfinished and undesired by the government.'<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index suggests that the transformation envisioned for Burundi in the Arusha Agreement has essentially been abandoned:

The elaborate system of power-sharing institutionalized by the Arusha Agreement - designed to initiate the process of reconciliation, democratization and peaceful development - seems to have completely collapsed through the intransigence of the dominant politicians and the incapacity, opportunism and fragmentation of the oppositional forces. Its central provisions were recently questioned by the president.<sup>89</sup>

Although the success of the peace process in ending the war should not be understated, the negotiations that began in Arusha were flawed from the start. Key actors in the conflict were ignored, while the talks themselves were held between a government that had risen to power in a coup d'état and a range of armed groups, rather than political leaders representing select constituencies. Furthermore, once the CNDD-FDD had achieved its goal rising to power in Burundi, the protocols and stipulations of the peace process were increasingly ignored. The international community, for its part, was largely disengaged once peace had been established and must bear considerable responsibility for the failure to uphold Arusha, as Vircoulon succinctly summarises:

The countries and organizations that guarantee the Arusha agreement paid little attention to these developments. They were complacent with the post-conflict regime despite its rising corruption, poor human rights record, and authoritarian behavior. They turned a blind eye to these dangerous patterns and continued to promote the narrative of success that was convenient for all stakeholders; it pleased the Burundian government and justified the political disengagement of others.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Thierry Vircoulon. "Burundi: How to Deconstruct Peace." *IPI Global Observatory*. (2015) Available at: <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/11/burundi-nkurunziza-peacebuilding-united-nations-rwanda-genocide/> (Accessed 20/03/2020)

<sup>89</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.9

<sup>90</sup> Vircoulon. "Burundi: How to Deconstruct Peace."

### *Military Integration and AMISOM*

Until 2015, the construction of Burundi's post-war security apparatus was viewed as a success, and even an example to be followed. Indeed, the process of integrating formerly warring armies was considered complete enough for Burundian troops to be deployed to Somalia just a few years after the FDN was established. However, considering the upward trend in fragility that this sector has witnessed since 2006, it is necessary to challenge the conventional wisdom that military integration was successful and that operating in Somalia not only offered the FDN access to financial opportunities and modern equipment, but also helped to erode wartime divisions and forge an inclusive institutional identity.

Wilén et al contend that the integration process was undermined from as early as 2007, when the proportion of troops in the FDN had to be recalibrated to accommodate soldiers from the armed groups that were joining the peace process. With the CNDD-FDD now firmly controlling the reins of political power, the troops who had to make way were almost all former FAB.<sup>91</sup> Similar processes took place with the intelligence service, which had been omitted from SSR programmes. Between 2005 and 2010, the agency became another tool in the hands of the CNDD-FDD and was employed for political purposes, such as the intimidation of the political opposition during the 2010 elections.<sup>92</sup> The CNDD-FDD's tightening grip on state security institutions progressed alongside the creation of a considerable reserve of troops loyal to the CNDD-FDD as the party's youth wing, *Imbonerakure*, became a militarised organisation in contravention of the 2003 Law on Political Parties.<sup>93</sup>

Throughout the post-war period, very little progress was made in another key area of SSR: The separation of military power from politics. This objective was particularly pertinent in the Burundian case due to the militant origins of the party of government, the CNDD-FDD. With a significant portion of the Burundian military owing their positions to the quota allotted to the CNDD-FDD in the peace process, the emergence of a CNDD-FDD government led to a situation in which a single party traversed both the military and political leadership of Burundi. Vircoulon, writing with Richard Moncrieff, provides this assessment of the situation: 'The senior ranks are

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<sup>91</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. "Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home." p.313

<sup>92</sup> Samii. "Military Integration in Burundi, 2000-2006." p.223

<sup>93</sup> Rufyikiri. "The Post-wartime Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi." p.235

still part of a violent and corrupt regime operating with zero-sum political mentality. Parallel chains of command reach up to the presidency, wielding great power, undermining formal structures and sowing distrust.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, many FDN generals remained members of the high-level decision-making body of the CNDD-FDD, the Council of Elders, in another contravention of the 2003 Law on Political Parties.<sup>95</sup> Increasing CNDD-FDD dominance of the military not only undermined the state that was being built, but also manifested myriad other challenges. Rufyikiri offers this assessment of the political atmosphere that emerged in Burundi during this period:

The militant background of warlords... negatively influenced the CNDD-FDD leadership in post-wartime and hindered efforts to implement legal and institutional reforms in Burundi. In spite of external driven peacebuilding and state-building initiatives, big-man rules, military supremacy over civilians, predation, intolerance, clientelism, exercise of power by force, human rights violations, non-respect of the rule of law and of fundamental democratic principles and informal structures in the continuation of old politico-military command bodies were features of the post-war CNDD-FDD.<sup>96</sup>

It is in the context of this very one-sided “integration” process that the deployment of Burundian troops to Somalia must be understood. Serving in AMISOM undoubtedly presented a beneficial opportunity for the FDN as an institution, the advantages of which have been well-documented. Furthermore, the Burundian contingent in Somalia was ‘considered effective’ and ‘was seen, at least in the short term, as irreplaceable.’<sup>97</sup> However, the impact that this significant undertaking had on Burundian politics and society, as well as the stability of the state, must be considered.

According to Wilén et al, the Burundian state earns about \$45 million per annum from the international peacekeeping operations of the FDN. In addition to this figure, the Burundian personnel who serve abroad earn as much as twenty times their usual salary, even after some of their allowance is retained by the Burundian government.<sup>98</sup> Thus, the presence of Burundian troops on multinational operations provides a much-needed opportunity and source of wealth for

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<sup>94</sup> Moncrieff & Vircoulon. “The Burundian army’s dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping.”

<sup>95</sup> Rufyikiri. “The Post-wartime Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi.” p.233

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, pp.239-40

<sup>97</sup> Moncrieff & Vircoulon. “The Burundian army’s dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping.”

<sup>98</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. “Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home.” p.316

many Burundians. However, this dynamic has presented several serious problems. Rather than being invested back into the FDN or directed toward poverty reduction, the income gained by the state from peacekeeping has purportedly been spent on frivolous items such as a presidential jet for Nkurunziza.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, sustained deployment abroad at the expense of external actors such as the UN has created a situation in which the income and benefits of serving on such operations has become institutionalised. If Burundian participation in such missions were to end, not only would the government lose a lucrative source of income, but thousands of Burundian soldiers would be forced to return home with their financial prospects in tatters. Given that the size of the FDN is inflated due to its international commitments, many returning soldiers would likely also face demobilisation.

The most significant problem that has emerged from Burundian peacekeeping commitments concerns its position internationally. While much of the Burundian security apparatus has become dependent on external resources to sustain itself, it is important to note the extent to which the international community came to be reliant on Burundi; and the extent to which Nkurunziza's administration learned to utilise this reliance to deflect international criticism. Moncrieff and Vircoulon point out that:

This episode tells us that the leverage that troop-contributing countries have over donors is very real... International interests in the mission in Somalia far outweigh any desire to exercise leverage over Burundian authorities. At the back of the mind of many European officials was also the question: if we stop payments to Burundian troops and they go home, could it have a de-stabilising effect on the country?<sup>100</sup>

Wilén et al expand on this observation, noting that the deployment of Burundian peacekeepers abroad allowed the Burundian government to 'claim a certain progress' and 'ask international partners to temper their criticisms concerning the use of intimidation and political violence' while also requesting a 'decreased presence on external actors on its territory.'<sup>101</sup> Thus, military integration and SSR in Burundi, although successful in some regards, has provided the government with the means to maintain an inflated security sector that it employs to repress

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Moncrieff & Vircoulon. "The Burundian army's dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping."

<sup>101</sup> Wilén, Ambrosetti & Birantamije. "Sending peacekeepers abroad, sharing power at home." p.317

political opposition domestically and deflect criticism internationally. The failed coup in 2016 further demonstrates that far from being a stabilising force, the security institutions built with the assistance of the international community pose a real and present threat to peace in Burundi.

### *The CNDD-FDD and President Nkurunziza*

It is evident that international statebuilding initiatives in Burundi have failed to achieve many of their objectives. However, although some misjudgements and poor policies on the part of external actors go some way in explaining the persistence of fragility, the role played by the Burundian actors, specifically President Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD, must be considered.

Rufyikiri provides a noteworthy historical account of the post-war evolution of the CNDD-FDD.<sup>102</sup> He identifies a trend in which the motivations of the original CNDD-FDD leadership (which he summarises as ‘saving Ndadye’s democratic legacy’) were gradually replaced as new cadres of leaders emerged during the war who fought for a rather different goal: ‘To achieve total control of the state.’<sup>103</sup> The most significant moment, he contends, came in 2001 when the leader of the CNDD-FDD at the time, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, was deposed by Nkurunziza. Rufyikiri contends that from this juncture onwards, a relatively small clique consolidated control of the political and military leadership of the CNDD-FDD, and since their victory in the 2005 elections, this group has progressively transformed the CNDD-FDD into ‘a dominant authoritarian party.’<sup>104</sup>

Janvier Nkurunziza (the scholar, not the president) observes that other institutions such as the civil service have gradually been consolidated into the hands of the CNDD-FDD, with ‘many experienced and competent civil servants’ having ‘to cede their positions to people with limited or no capacity to carry out the functions associated with their positions’ in order to ‘reward CNDD-FDD members for their loyalty’ and ‘ensure that the administration is in the “right hands.”’<sup>105</sup> The result, according to Nkurunziza, has been a ‘generalised weakening of state institutions and widespread corruption.’<sup>106</sup> Likewise, the Bertelsmann report also observes that

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<sup>102</sup> It is worth noting again that Rufyikiri was a senior member of the CNDD-FDD until 2015, when he fled to Belgium after criticising Nkurunziza’s bid for a third presidential term as unconstitutional.

<sup>103</sup> Rufyikiri. “The Post-war-time Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi.” p.226

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p.227

<sup>105</sup> Nkurunziza. “Origin and Persistence of State Fragility in Burundi.” p.20

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

‘judicial appointments are made by the government (by the minister of justice, in consultation with the president), and political pressure is increasingly exerted on the judicial system.’<sup>107</sup> Rufyikiri argues that the instability that has marked the post-war Burundian state proves the ‘development of CNDD-FDD as the main cause of the failure of peacebuilding programmes.’<sup>108</sup> According to the Bertelsmann report, ‘since the elections of 2015, a radicalized hard core of the ruling CNDD-FDD around president Nkurunziza has obtained full control over the entire state apparatus.’<sup>109</sup> In 2018, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance published its data, which showed the ‘increasing deterioration’ of overall governance in Burundi since 2008, much of which was driven by a particularly sharp decline in the standard of governance exercised over the indicators grouped in the “Safety and Rule of Law” category of the Index.<sup>110</sup>

Leclercq cites numerous examples in which CNDD-FDD actors have demonstrated an ability to manipulate and subvert the initiatives of external actors to their own benefit, including consolidating their control of the state. He notes that domestic actors use the ‘vocabulary’ of statebuilding ‘such as governance, rule of law and constitutionalism’ and make use of its processes ‘with regard to elections, legislation and the judiciary.’<sup>111</sup> However, he argues, they have also learned to ‘exploit the constraints, diverging priorities and functioning of international actors.’<sup>112</sup> This has resulted in a situation in which, as Curtis observes, ‘Burundian leaders have appropriated and re-inscribed peacebuilding ideas and strategies to further their own authority and control.’<sup>113</sup> In other words, the CNDD-FDD has learned the language of statebuilding to ensure it continues receiving resources and training for the institutions it controls, while simultaneously using those institutions to strengthen its grip on the Burundian state. Furthermore, Nkurunziza and his government have proven adept at employing the ‘language of sovereignty,’ concepts such as ‘national ownership,’ and Burundian contributions to peacekeeping missions to dampen international criticism.<sup>114</sup> Unfortunately, as Moncrieff and

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<sup>107</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.13

<sup>108</sup> Rufyikiri. “The Post-wartime Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi.” p.221

<sup>109</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.40

<sup>110</sup> This data can be accessed through the Ibrahim Index of African Governance’s online portal here: <http://iiag.online/> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>111</sup> Leclercq. “Between the Letter and the Spirit.” p.167

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p.178

<sup>113</sup> Curtis. “The International Peacebuilding Paradox.” p.78

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p.89



Vircoulon bluntly state: ‘International statebuilding provided a mechanism to establish authoritarian government in Burundi.’<sup>115</sup>

### A Way Forward?

The Bertelsmann 2018 report offers this damning assessment of the effectiveness of efforts to build and strengthen the post-war Burundian state: ‘The only restraining element against a definitive breakdown of the state is the fear most Burundians have of entering into a new and bloody civil war.’<sup>116</sup> This case study has demonstrated the ways in which the shortcomings of the Arusha agreement, the compromises and failings of SSR, and the ability of the CNDD-FDD to outmanoeuvre the international community to achieve its goals have compromised efforts to reduce fragility in post-conflict Burundi. However, one central theme runs through not just these three aspects of the failed statebuilding process, but through many of the problems in post-war Burundi: The misdiagnosis of the armed conflict being result of inter-ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi. This has not only ensured that the institutions and processes that have been built are overly complex (organised by ethnic quotas and previous political affiliations rather than ability or accountability), but has also served to reinforce the narrative that without the “strong leadership” of an uncompromisingly pro-Hutu party, the country could be threatened by vengeful Tutsis and a return to war. The candidacy of Dieudonné Nahimana in the 2020 elections (just over a week after I write this) on a platform of unity proves that this narrative can be challenged and, perhaps, the cycle of state capture and repression that has prevailed since 1965 can be broken.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Leclercq. “Between the Letter and the Spirit.” pp.160-1

<sup>116</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Burundi*. p.41

<sup>117</sup> Jo Griffin. ““Not just where people kill each other”: the man hoping to transform Burundi.” *The Guardian*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/mar/10/on-a-mission-to-heal-the-man-with-a-plan-to-transform-burundi> (Accessed 11/05/2020)

## Chad

In 2005, armed conflict erupted in Chad, a large country that straddles the Sahel at the northern tip of Central Africa. After government forces secured a series of military victories, negotiations with the remaining rebel groups brought an end to the war early in 2010.

### History and Context

Chad emerged from the French Empire in 1960. Political power was soon consolidated around the country's first president, François Tombalbaye, who established a one-party state in 1962. Three years later, a rebellion broke out among the majority-Muslim population of the north who resented the 'insensitive policies' of the southern-dominated government.<sup>118</sup> These developments set in motion a chain of events that left Chad beset by armed conflict for decades, as Patrick Berg observes: 'Chad has been marked by permanent conflict since its independence from French colonial power in 1960. A whole host of authoritarian regimes have followed one another, with power changes usually coming about through military coups.'<sup>119</sup> In 1979, the northern rebels captured the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, ousting the government. However, the former rebels began fighting among themselves rather than forming a government, sparking a civil war that lasted until 1982, when one rebel commander, Hissène Habré, emerged victorious. Berg notes that: 'The civil war hence marked the solidification of north-south antagonisms, which had at least until then been considered reversible.'<sup>120</sup>

Once in power, Habré embarked on a costly conflict with neighbouring Libya but was able to negotiate much-needed support from France and the USA. His rule was marked by widespread human rights abuses, to the extent that he was later convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture.<sup>121</sup> In 1989, Habré accused his top military adviser, Idriss Déby, of plotting to overthrow him, forcing Déby to flee to Darfur in neighbouring Sudan. While in exile, Déby formed the Patriotic Movement of Salvation (*Mouvement patriotique du Salut*, MPS) with other

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<sup>118</sup> Jérôme Tubiana & Marielle Debos. "Deby's Chad: Political Manipulation at Home, Military Intervention Abroad, Challenging Times Ahead." *Peaceworks*, No. 136. (2016) p.6

<sup>119</sup> Patrick Berg. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Tri-Border Region of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Country Conflict-Analysis Studies*. (2008) p.10 Available at: [http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib\\_en.pl](http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib_en.pl) (Accessed 27/03/2020)

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p.12

<sup>121</sup> A detailed account of Habré's trial is available in: Reed Brody. *Victims bring a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène Habré*. (Berlin: Bread for the World, 2017) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/tag/hissene-habre> (Accessed 20/05/2020)

opponents of Habré and managed to acquire the support of France and Libya, as well as Sudan.<sup>122</sup> In 1990, the MPS began operations in Chad, and in the final months of the year Déby led a column of 300 “battlewagons” (non-standard tactical vehicles, usually Toyota Hilux pick-up trucks with weapons mounted on the back) to N’Djamena, where he seized the presidency as Habré fled to Senegal.<sup>123</sup>

Although Déby pledged to institute freedom and democracy in Chad upon his assumption of power, the MPS remained the only legal political party. Berg argues that ‘Déby’s pro-democracy rhetoric was buying time to arm for the political struggle... most of the important posts in the government, party and state-run enterprises were awarded to Déby’s ethnic group, the Zaghawa.’<sup>124</sup> Given that Déby had to outmanoeuvre three separate coup attempts between October 1991 and June 1992, the prioritisation of security is perhaps unsurprising.<sup>125</sup> The people of Chad had to wait until 1996 before a constitution was promulgated, and when it came, they discovered that the president retained the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the judiciary. The 1996 - 1997 parliamentary elections were ‘clearly rigged,’ as were those held in 2001 - 2002.<sup>126</sup> In 2004, Déby announced an amendment to the constitution that would make it possible for him to run for a third presidential term and the next year, following a controversial referendum boycotted by much of the population, the amendment was approved.<sup>127</sup> Déby’s attempts to consolidate power and secure his position left him in a precarious position, as a wide array of rebel groups opposed to his rule soon manifested both in Chad and in neighbouring Darfur, where generations of Chadian exiles had plotted and gathered support against the government in N’Djamena.<sup>128</sup>

The groups arrayed against Déby and his MSP administration varied in terms of their composition, strength, and outlook. The largest hailed from the north of the country, where

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<sup>122</sup> Gérard Prunier. “Chad’s Tragedy.” *Open Democracy*. (2007) Available at: [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/chads\\_tragedy/](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/chads_tragedy/) (Accessed 27/03/2020)

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Berg. “The Dynamics of Conflict in the Tri-Border Region of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic.” p.14

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Likewise, over the years many Sudanese rebel groups have made their base of operations in Chadian territory. This complex dynamic underpinned much of the 2005 – 2010 civil war in Chad.

countless rebellions had begun in previous years, while one group coalesced around two brothers who were the nephews of Déby. Many of the rebels were former officers and ministers of Déby's administration and were therefore not only experienced at fighting in Chad but were also intimately aware of what was required to rise to power through military means and capture the Chadian state. Gérard Prunier observes that additional groups 'kept popping up, mushroom-like, in various parts of the country as it looked likely (as on several previous occasions) Idriss Déby could fall' and contends that altogether the various groups could muster approximately 10,000 fighters.<sup>129</sup>

The initial wave of fighting was largely restricted to the border region between Chad and Sudan, where Chadian government forces, Chadian rebels, the Sudanese military, Darfurian rebels, and Sudanese government-backed Janjaweed militias operated in a complex and multifaceted environment. From this lawless region, an armed force formed of several rebel groups (and supposedly backed by Khartoum) emerged to pose the first significant threat to Déby: the Single Front for Democratic Change in Chad (*Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique au Tchad*, FUCD).<sup>130</sup> After unsuccessfully attacking the Chadian government garrison town of Adré at the end of 2005, which led to the declaration of a "state of belligerence" between Chad and Sudan, FUCD turned its attention to N'Djamena.<sup>131</sup> In April 2006, a sizeable rebel force mounted on battlewagons drove across the desert from operating bases in Darfur and the Central African Republic to the capital and attempted to seize government buildings. The rebels were defeated with considerable assistance from French troops deployed in the area. Although he survived the rebellion, Déby's grip on power appeared to be weakening.

In 2007, several peace agreements were negotiated between the government of Chad and some of the rebel groups, such as those which had launched the assault on N'Djamena the previous year. Berg argues that the strategy of avoiding a single expansive peace process demonstrates that 'the regime's aim was not lasting peace' and contends that the peace agreements 'exclusively deal with the issues of an amnesty for the rebels and their integration into the

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<sup>129</sup> Gérard Prunier. "Chad: between Sudan's blitzkrieg and Darfur's war." *Open Democracy*. (2008) Available at: [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/chad\\_sudan\\_darfur/](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/chad_sudan_darfur/) (Accessed 27/03/2020)

<sup>130</sup> Human Rights Watch. *The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad: Background*. (New York: HRW, 2006)

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

government and army' rather than attempting 'to solve the country's structural problems.'<sup>132</sup> For example, the leader of the attack on N'Djamena, Mahamat Nour, was awarded the position of Minister of Defence after coming to terms with Déby, gaining access to both power and wealth, yet the negotiations that led to this outcome made no mention of bringing positive change to Chad.<sup>133</sup>

In response to the growing threat of the armed conflict in Chad spiralling out of control, the French government sought to strengthen Déby's position. Their preferred means of achieving this was a multilateral international operation, however an initiative in the final months of 2006 to establish a UN operation in Chad comprising almost 11,000 personnel was rejected by Déby.<sup>134</sup> This led French politicians to lobby the capitals of Europe for support, leading to the launch of the EU's first military operation, EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, in October 2007.<sup>135</sup> From the outset, EUFOR faced some significant challenges, not least due to the recalcitrance of some of Europe's more powerful states. Nonetheless, a total of fourteen national contingents formed up under the leadership of an Irish commander, equipped with leased Ukrainian equipment and provided with logistical support by Russia.<sup>136</sup> Of a total of 3,300 troops, 1,700 were French, while France also provided the operational headquarters and most of the financing.<sup>137</sup>

Although the mandate of EUFOR was limited to providing a safe and secure environment for refugees and was only intended to operate for one year, the implications of additional French troops deploying to Chad were clear.<sup>138</sup> As a result, before EUFOR arrived in Chad the rebels launched a last-ditch offensive with the goal of seizing power. In a familiar sequence of events, approximately 250 battlewagons drove across the desert and attacked government buildings

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<sup>132</sup> Berg. "The Dynamics of Conflict in the Tri-Border Region of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic." p.16

<sup>133</sup> BBC. "Chad ex-rebel leader gets top job." *BBC News*. (2007) Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6418743.stm> (Accessed 14/05/2020)

<sup>134</sup> Hylke Dijkstra. "The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad Politics." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 3. (2010) p.397

<sup>135</sup> Giovanna Bono. "The EU's Military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 5, No. 1. (2011) p.27

<sup>136</sup> Prunier. "Chad: between Sudan's blitzkrieg and Darfur's war."; Bono. "The EU's Military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic." P.35

<sup>137</sup> Dijkstra. "The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic." p.398

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, p.401

across the city, including the presidential palace in which Déby was trapped.<sup>139</sup> French special forces helped to rescue the president, while other French troops engaged the rebels, ensuring the offensive failed. It took until March 2008 for EUFOR to reach its initial operational capacity after various delays sourcing personnel and equipment. Once on the ground, it began working on major projects to improve infrastructure and ensure the supply of humanitarian aid. This prepared the ground for the arrival of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (*Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine et au Tchad*, MINURCAT), which replaced EUFOR and brought with it additional reinforcements and a broader mandate.<sup>140</sup> In November 2008, the African Union deployed its own fact-finding mission (led by former Burundian president Pierre Buyoya) to Chad and Sudan in a bid to defuse escalating tensions between the two states.<sup>141</sup> MINURCAT completed its mandate on 31 December 2010, by which time Déby had defeated the remaining rebel groups and, with international pressure mounting, negotiated an agreement with Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir that committed both leaders to respecting the Chad-Sudan border.<sup>142</sup>

### International Statebuilding Initiatives

The international effort to strengthen the Chadian state began following independence in 1960 and continued through periods of war and peace until the 2005 – 2010 war. Indeed, the French retained a presence in Chad throughout this period that extended far beyond military assistance, and regularly included aspects of statebuilding.<sup>143</sup> In the five years of the war alone, Chad

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<sup>139</sup> Bono. “The EU’s Military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic.” pp.36-7

<sup>140</sup> Although its tasks now included creating a secure environment and favourable conditions for social and economic development, statebuilding was not yet an explicit objective for MINURCAT. United Nations Peacekeeping. “MINURCAT Mandate.” *Minurcat: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad*. (2020) Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/minurcat/mandate.shtml> (Accessed 20/05/2020)

<sup>141</sup> UNAMID. “DJSR Anyidoho welcomes African Union fact-finding team to Darfur.” *News*. (2008) Available at: <https://unamid.unmissions.org/djsr-anyidoho-welcomes-african-union-fact-finding-team-darfur> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>142</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping. *Closure of MINURCAT*. (United Nations Peacekeeping: New York, 2020) Available at: <https://minurcat.unmissions.org/> (Accessed 27/03/2020); Marielle Debos. “Behind the cliché of the Chadian ‘desert warriors’, militarized politics and Idriss Déby’s global political capital.” *African Politics, African Peace*, No. 22. (2016) p.1

<sup>143</sup> For more on France’s long-term presence in Chad and the efforts of various parties to build the state see: Nathaniel Powell. “Experts in Decolonization? French Statebuilding and Counterinsurgency in Chad, 1969-1972.” *The International History Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2. (2020); William Foltz. “Reconstructing the State of Chad.” in I. William Zartman, ed. *Collapse States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Nikolas Emmanuel & Brendan Schwartz. “Managing Fragility? Chad’s (Il)liberal Interventions and

received ‘technical cooperation’ projects from France worth over €50 million.<sup>144</sup> However, although French efforts have certainly been the most sustained, the most significant have been implemented by the World Bank. The discovery of oil in Chad has long offered a route out of poverty and the cycles of political violence experienced by the Chadian population, and in 2000 the World Bank (along with French and American investors) came to an agreement with Déby to fund the construction of a pipeline through Cameroon that would allow the export of oil on a scale that could enrich Chad.<sup>145</sup> The agreement provided for the construction of the pipeline and scheduled repayments, but also stipulated that 80 percent of the revenue received by the Chadian government from the project must be spent on poverty alleviation and infrastructure.<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, Chad received extensive assistance from the US in the aftermath of 9/11 after being included in the Pan-Sahel Initiative and its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.<sup>147</sup> Both programmes brought training and resources to the Chadian security forces. Thus, it is important to note that external initiatives aimed at strengthening the state had been a feature of Chadian society for decades at the time of the 2005 – 2010 war.

The World Bank suspended its cooperation with Chad in 2008, following Déby’s insistence on utilising oil revenue to strengthen his armed forces.<sup>148</sup> However, this coincided with renewed international interest in employing statebuilding in Chad as a means to improve stability, end the conflict, and prevent a return to war. In January 2008, a small UN police mission was deployed alongside EUFOR and began training personnel for the Integrated Security Detachment (*Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*, DIS), a newly-established Chadian police unit that was intended to assist EUFOR personnel in providing security for refugees, before taking over such responsibilities entirely when the European operation ended. By February 2009, hundreds of DIS

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the Making of a Regional Hegemon.” in John Lahai et al, eds. *Governance and Political Adaptation in Fragile States*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019)

<sup>144</sup> Available at: <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/cad-2a-destination-de-laide-publique-au-developpement-de-la-france/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>145</sup> World Bank. *Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: overview*. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2006) Available at: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/821131468224690538/chad-cameroon-petroleum-development-and-pipeline-project-overview> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>146</sup> René Lemarchand. “Où va le Tchad?” *Afrique Contemporaine*, Vol. 3, No. 215. (2005) pp.118-9

<sup>147</sup> Debos. “Behind the cliché of the Chadian ‘desert warriors’, militarized politics and Idriss Déby’s global political capital.” p.5

<sup>148</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Chad*. p.38



officers had been trained by UN personnel.<sup>149</sup> This initiative was reliant on the sizeable EUFOR presence to provide security and facilitate the training, and as a result it is worth noting the scale of the resources that were necessary to make the first joint-European military endeavour possible: In his contribution to a history of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation, Roland Marchel concedes that the overall cost is ‘subject to discussion’ but suggests that somewhere between €900 million – €1 billion is the figure agreed by most observers.<sup>150</sup>

Although statebuilding was not an official objective of EUFOR, the Chadian state was doubtlessly strengthened by the operation, and not just in terms of the improved security environment.<sup>151</sup> For example, the infrastructure built by European troops (and at European expense, to the tune of €70 million), such as six new military bases on the eastern frontier and two noteworthy enlargements of the airports of Abéché and N’Djamena, was handed over to the Chadian government when EUFOR’s mandate expired.<sup>152</sup> These facilities then became a key source of revenue for Déby’s administration when it was decided that they should be leased to the ‘very bitter’ officials of MINURCAT, who had just a fraction of EUFOR’s budget at their disposal as well as a much more ambitious mandate.<sup>153</sup> MINURCAT’s operating costs ran up to \$440 million in 2008, \$690 million in 2010, and \$215 million in 2010.<sup>154</sup> In total, the initial UN deployment in Chad cost \$1.35 billion, bringing the total cost (EU and UN combined) of multilateral peacekeeping operations in Chad between 2008 and 2010 to \$2.75 billion.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping. *MINURCAT Milestones and Achievements*. (United Nations Peacekeeping: New York, 2020) Available at: <https://minurcat.unmissions.org/milestones-and-achievements> (Accessed 27/03/2020)

<sup>150</sup> Roland Marchal. “An Assessment of EUFOR Chad/CAR.” in Walter Feichtinger & Gerald Hainzl. *EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited*. (Austrian Armed Forces: Vienna, 2009) p.27

<sup>151</sup> The mandate was in fact exceptionally limited when compared with most multilateral operations that took place at the time, perhaps reflecting a very realistic and achievable set of goals. It is also possible to speculate that the significant yet immeasurable boost in security that the operation offered Déby was the product of a very deliberate but understated design that was omitted from its official mandate.

<sup>152</sup> Marchal. “An Assessment of EUFOR Chad/CAR.” p.28

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/63/23: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009*. (New York: United Nations, 2009); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/63/26: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010*. (New York: United Nations, 2009); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/64/19: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010*. (New York: United Nations, 2010) All available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>155</sup> Conversion based on the average Euro to US Dollar exchange rate for 2008.



The cessation of armed conflict across Chad in 2010 marked the end of the UN's peacekeeping mission and the beginning of a wide range of international initiatives that aimed to strengthen the Chadian state. A key focus was the fractured security sector that had consistently been a major cause of instability. While many of the problems within the armed forces resulted from the integration of former belligerents into security institutions, some were the result of historical circumstances and Déby's desire to protect his position. For example, during the war the armed forces in Chad were divided into the Chadian National Army (*Armée Nationale Tchadienne*, ANT) and the General Directorate of Security Services for National Institutions (*Direction générale des services de sécurité des institutions de l'État*, DGSSIE), the latter of which was ostensibly a presidential guard. The DGSSIE's chain of command ran directly to the president rather than through the ANT's General Chief of Staff and, unlike most presidential guards, it had as many troops (approximately 15,000) as the regular ANT along with much better equipment. This unusual balance illustrates the extent to which Déby required a considerable body of reliable troops in case a military commander attempted a coup d'état, as he and so many others had done previously.<sup>156</sup> Additional complexity in the security sector was added by the presence of two more armed forces: The 5,000-strong armed police of the gendarmerie (who were commanded by the Defence Minister) and the National Nomadic Guard (*Garde nationale et nomade du Tchad*, GNNT), which was composed of 4,000 capable troops who answered to the Ministry for Territorial Administration rather than the Ministry of Defence.<sup>157</sup>

As the 2005 – 2010 war progressed, the Chadian armed forces became 'one of the best equipped on the continent' as hundreds of armoured vehicles were purchased along with a dozen Su-25 and MiG 29 fighter aircraft and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters.<sup>158</sup> Such purchases, paid for with revenue from oil exports, made Chad the third largest arms importer in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>159</sup> Despite the capabilities of the armed forces, a considerable number of international initiatives that took place in Chad after the war aimed to build the capacity of the military even further. The US Department of Defense, for example, spent over \$50 million on strengthening

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<sup>156</sup> Debos. "Behind the cliché of the Chadian 'desert warriors', militarized politics and Idriss Déby's global political capital." p.3

<sup>157</sup> Tubiana & Debos. "Deby's Chad." p.13

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Debos. "Behind the cliché of the Chadian 'desert warriors', militarized politics and Idriss Déby's global political capital." p.4

armed forces in Chad between 2010 and 2019 through extensive training programmes and the creation of specialist counterterrorism, border protection, and logistics units.<sup>160</sup> The US Department of State spent an additional \$7.5 million on further developing the anti-terrorism capabilities of Chadian security institutions.<sup>161</sup>

Additional support for the Chadian military was provided by the ubiquitous French presence in the country. Operation Épervier, a deployment of French troops that had begun in 1986, continued throughout the 2005 – 2010 war (offering some vital support to Déby) and lasted until 2014, when it was replaced by a significantly larger mission: Operation Barkhane. With up to 5,000 French troops stationed outside N'Djamena and costing approximately €600 million a year, Barkhane represents a considerable effort to combat transnational insurgent groups across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.<sup>162</sup> Although detailed information regarding the activity of French troops is unavailable, it is known that they provide training to local security forces and patrol alongside them.<sup>163</sup>

The construction of a large, well-equipped, and highly capable military in post-conflict Chad had implications far beyond its borders just a few years after the war ended. In January 2013, just over two years after the war ended, Chad provided troops for a French-led campaign against Islamic extremists in Mali. Their efforts (assisted by a separate ECOWAS operation) cleared the ground for the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (*Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au Mali*, MINUSMA) in April. MINUSMA was composed of troops from various states, such as Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Egypt, however Chad provided the lead contingent of more than 1,200 men.<sup>164</sup> The UN troops were specifically mandated to re-establish the authority

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<sup>160</sup> Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> European Council on Foreign Relations. *Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel*. (London: ECFR, 2019) Available at: [https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/sahel\\_mapping/operation\\_barkhane](https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/sahel_mapping/operation_barkhane) (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Debos. “Behind the cliché of the Chadian ‘desert warriors’, militarized politics and Idriss Déby’s global political capital.” p.2; Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.120

of the Malian state over its territory, while the operationally independent French forces were authorised to use all means necessary to help achieve this goal.<sup>165</sup>

In December 2013, Chadian troops joined the UN mission in the Central African Republic only to leave a few months later after reportedly killing 24 civilians.<sup>166</sup> This event did little to temper the international community's appetite for Chadian troops on operations abroad, and in February 2015, Chad committed a considerable number of troops (including 2,500 that were deployed in Cameroon) to the AU-backed Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which is headquartered in N'Djamena.<sup>167</sup> Many Chadian officials rose to influential positions in international organisations in this period, with a former foreign minister becoming head of AMISOM in 2012, Chad obtaining a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2014 and 2015, while in 2016 Déby took over the presidency of the AU and other Chadian officials took up senior posts with the AU Commission, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Bank of Central African States, and the Development Bank of Central African States.<sup>168</sup> The integration of the Chadian military into multilateral forces and the ascension of Chadian diplomats into major roles in regional organisations reflects the level of success that Chad is perceived to have attained in its post-conflict transition. This perception is perhaps best measured by the \$10 billion five-year development plan that donors agreed to sponsor during a 2017 conference in Paris, which was described 'as a reward for Chad's military interventions abroad.'<sup>169</sup>

International statebuilding initiatives in post-conflict Chad have not been limited to the security sector. The African Capacity Building Foundation, for example, provided an extensive civil service training programme between 2012 and 2016 worth \$1.7 million.<sup>170</sup> France continued its 'technical cooperation' programme, spending almost €7 million on projects in 2011, but data for

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<sup>165</sup> Oxford Research Group. *The Military Intervention in Mali and Beyond: An Interview with Bruno Charbonneau*. (ORG: London, 2019) Available at: <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-french-intervention-in-mali-an-interview-with-bruno-charbonneau> (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>166</sup> BBC. "CAR conflict: Chadian troops kill at least 24 in Bangui." *BBC News*. (2014) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26810796> (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>167</sup> Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Chad*. p.40

<sup>168</sup> Tubiana & Debos. "Deby's Chad." pp.16-19

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, p.32

<sup>170</sup> African Capacity Building Foundation. "Training Support Project for Public Administration civil servants in Chad (PROFAP)." *Chad*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.acbf-pact.org/what-we-do/how-we-do-it/grants/projects-regions/west-central-africa/chad/training-support-project> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

later years is currently unavailable.<sup>171</sup> Beginning in 2013, the German Corporation for Development (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit*, GIZ) ran a sizeable programme to support police reform in Chad, however the resources committed to this enterprise are unavailable.<sup>172</sup>

Bilateral French and German efforts were supplemented by broader European efforts channelled through the EU. Between 2008 and 2013, European funds amounting to €117 million became available to support ongoing technical cooperation and good governance initiatives, and an expansive €542 million programme running from 2014 until 2020 highlights the consolidation of the rule of law as a priority – although the vast majority of these resources were reserved for projects to ensure food security for the Chadian population.<sup>173</sup> Between 2010 and 2019, the UNDP spent over \$30 million on statebuilding initiatives in Chad, ranging from supporting judicial reform and the development of local government, to strengthening ‘democratic governance’ and providing assistance with elections.<sup>174</sup>

USAID ran programmes amounting to \$13.6 million that focussed on similar themes, with most resources either coming via the Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) route or focusing directly on supporting elections.<sup>175</sup> According to the available data, US Agencies spent almost five times as much on strengthening the Chadian security sector as they did on building the capacity of other sectors of the state. This of course excludes payments made via international organisations such as the World Bank, which has provided the Chadian state with programmes that have aimed to strengthen public financial management, improve resource mobilisation and management, and build policymaking capacity. In total, the World Bank

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<sup>171</sup> Available at: <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/cad-2a-destination-de-laide-publique-au-developpement-de-la-france/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>172</sup> GIZ. “Police Programme Africa – Chad.” *Worldwide*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/20016.html> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>173</sup> European External Action Service. *Tchad - Programme Indicatif National pour la période 2008-2013 - 10ème FED*. (EEAS: Brussels, 2012) Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/12854/tchad-programme-indicatif-national-pour-la-p%C3%A9riode-2008-2013-10%C3%A8me-fed\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/12854/tchad-programme-indicatif-national-pour-la-p%C3%A9riode-2008-2013-10%C3%A8me-fed_en) (Accessed 17/05/2020); European Commission. “Chad.” *Where we work*. (2020) Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/chad\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/chad_en) (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>174</sup> Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects> (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>175</sup> Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)


programmes have amounted to over \$300 million since 2010, with additional resources scheduled for dispersal in the coming years.<sup>176</sup>

Over \$1.9 billion was spent on international statebuilding initiatives in post-conflict Chad between 2010 and 2019.<sup>177</sup> This translates to roughly \$14 per annum for each Chadian citizen. However, both figures given here are likely to be much higher as France is such a significant actor in Chad but has not released data on its programmes since 2011.

### Fragile States Index

Table 3 presents FSI's data on four broad sectors of the Chadian state, as well as an additional measure indicating the extent to which an external intervention was present in the country.

Table 3



<sup>176</sup> Available at: [https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode\\_exact=TD](https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode_exact=TD) (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>177</sup> This figure is in addition to the \$2.7 billion that was spent on EUFOR and MINURCAT between 2008 and 2010.

Once again, the data from the FSI is unequivocal: International efforts to strengthen the Chadian state in order to build stability and prevent a return to war has failed, leaving the economy in a more fragile condition that it was in 2010 and the other sectors of the state only fractionally more stable after a decade of international initiatives costing billions of dollars.

The statebuilding process in Chad did display some signs of progress, with the security apparatus showing particularly good progress in the years immediately following the conflict. Indeed, had this progress in the security sector been sustained, Chad's ranking on the FSI would now appear alongside notably stable African states such as Senegal and Tanzania rather than Somalia, Libya, and South Sudan, all of which are currently experiencing armed conflict.<sup>178</sup> Likewise, the Chadian economy became marginally more stable between 2010 and 2014, but has since become increasingly fragile. In 2019, Chad remained 164<sup>th</sup> on the Legatum Prosperity Index (having risen just three places since 2009) and 187<sup>th</sup> (of 189) on the UN's Human Development Index, despite sizeable oil revenues and international development assistance.<sup>179</sup> Chad also remained near the bottom of the World Bank's Human Capital Index in 2019.<sup>180</sup>

The legitimacy of the Chadian state experienced a gradual progression away from fragility between 2010 and 2018, although the limited improvements made in this sector were undone between 2018 and 2019. In these two years, Chad's score for legitimacy rose to almost match the level that it had been in 2010. This is likely the result of the Chadian parliament (controlled by the MSP) amending the constitution in 2018 to increase the power of the president, which was followed a few months later by the first significant rebel incursion into Chadian territory since 2010.<sup>181</sup> Respect for human rights and the rule of law witnessed a sharp increase in fragility following the war, to the extent that in 2013 this sector was considered more fragile than it had

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<sup>178</sup> Comparisons between states on the FSI can be calibrated on its Global Data page, available here: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/data/> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>179</sup> Legatum Prosperity Index. *Chad Country Profile*. (London: Legatum Institute Foundation, 2019) Available at: <https://www.prosperity.com/all-countries> (Accessed 16/05/2020); UNDP. "Chad" *Human Development Reports*. (New York: United Nations, 2020) Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TCD> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>180</sup> World Bank. *Overview*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019) Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>181</sup> Freedom House. "Chad." *Freedom in the World 2019*. (2020) Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chad/freedom-world/2019> (Accessed 18/05/2020); International Crisis Group. "Rebel Incursion Exposes Chad's Weaknesses." *Q&A Africa*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

been during the conflict. Since this peak, the sector's score has made slow but measured progress towards stability. The rapid increase in the fragility of state legitimacy in Chad demonstrates that the minor gains witnessed in sectors such as the rule of law could easily be reversed.

Much like Burundi, the only FSI metric that has recorded a sustained improvement is external intervention. In a very similar story, this apparent improvement is simply the result of peacekeepers being asked to leave the country once a victor had emerged from the fighting and is therefore not a reflection of increased stability. In fact, it was only after the marked decline in the level of external intervention in Chad between 2010 and 2012 that the trend toward stability reversed, suggesting that the departure of international troops, observers, and trainers directly contributed to the rise in fragility. This evidently resonates with the data from the Burundian case, which indicated a similar correlation. However, it is important to stress that much more research is required to confirm this hypothesis than can be presented in this assessment.<sup>182</sup>

### What Happened and Why?

#### *Déby and the 'Untouchables'*

At the time of writing, President Déby has been in power for almost thirty years, making him one of the longest serving presidents in the world. After raising an army and conquering the country, he ruled Chad for fifteen years prior to the 2005 – 2010 war, then retained his position during the conflict, emerged victorious, and has enjoyed complete control of the Chadian state ever since. Ahmat Hassan offers this succinct observation of Déby's position: 'The president controls everything...The Constitution, the laws and institutions seem to be decorations to legitimize and maintain a power conquered by arms.'<sup>183</sup> Jérôme Tubiana and Marielle Debos provide a similar assessment, contending that 'Déby has held on to power by controlling the armed forces, fighting

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<sup>182</sup> The Department of Politics & Relations at Oxford University is currently undertaking a project funded by the UK's Economic & Social Research Council titled "After Exit: Assessing the Consequences of United Nations Peacekeeping Withdrawal." The project, led by Professor Richard Caplan, is due to conclude in September 2021 and will hopefully offer some answers in this regard. More information on the project is available at:

<https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/after-exit-assessing-the-consequences-of-united-nations-peacekeeping-withdrawal.html> (Accessed 18/05/2020); The increase in fragility in both countries also correlates with the deployment of troops on multilateral operations abroad, the holding of presidential elections, as well as myriad other factors that, without additional research, could provide reasonable explanations for the trend.

<sup>183</sup> Ahmat Mahamat Hassan. "Security Challenges and Issues in the Sahelo-Saharan Region: The Chad Perspective." *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Dialogues Dans L'Espace Sahelo-Saharien*. (2017) p.9 Available at: [http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib.pl?f\\_RSW=afrika&f\\_ABC=iez-af&logik=not&t\\_listen=x&sortierung=jab](http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/digbib.pl?f_RSW=afrika&f_ABC=iez-af&logik=not&t_listen=x&sortierung=jab) (Accessed 27/03/2020)

rebels backed by neighbors, supporting rebels from neighboring states, revising the constitution, rigging elections, and co-opting, intimidating, or repressing his unarmed opponents.’<sup>184</sup> As a result, the role of Déby and his MSP administration in the failure to reduce fragility in post-conflict Chad is paramount.

The World Bank viewed the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline as a way not just to reduce the high level of poverty in Chad, but to also to bring stability to the country: While much of the revenue was earmarked for poverty alleviation programmes, 10 percent was intended to be reserved in a “stability fund” for future use.<sup>185</sup> The entire programme was built on the premise that the “oil-curse” could be avoided if the appropriate controls were put in place to ensure that oil income represented a reliable revenue stream for the Chadian state rather than a means of enrichment for Déby and his followers.<sup>186</sup> Furthermore, a key condition of the World Bank’s involvement in the project was that Chad would receive external technical assistance to help build up the capacity that was required to manage both the pipeline and the revenues it generated.<sup>187</sup> In other words, under the terms stipulated by the World Bank, the pipeline could have served as a vehicle to decrease poverty and strengthen the state in Chad.

In 2006, just three years after the pipeline opened, Déby dismantled the control mechanism for oil exports and diverted the revenue to purchasing arms and employing a considerable military. Two years later, the World Bank cancelled its involvement in the project, citing Déby’s failure to properly allocate resources.<sup>188</sup> According to Tubiana and Debos, Chad earned £13 billion in oil revenues between 2004 and 2015, suggesting that if funds had been directed as planned, at least \$10.4 billion would have been spent on improving lives and strengthening the Chadian state.<sup>189</sup> Déby’s misallocation of oil revenue extends, unfortunately, beyond lost opportunities. René Lemarchand highlights the damage done to the already-fragile economic and social fabric of Chad: ‘The disruption of traditional economic cycles leads to social upheavals that threaten civil

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<sup>184</sup> Tubiana & Debos. “Deby’s Chad.” p.6

<sup>185</sup> World Bank. *Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project*. p.vi

<sup>186</sup> Ibid, p.31

<sup>187</sup> Aude Delescluse. “Chad-Cameroon: A Model Pipeline?” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 1. (2004) p.46

<sup>188</sup> Xan Rice. “World Bank cancels pipeline deal with Chad after revenues misspent.” *The Guardian*. (2008) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/12/worldbank.oil> (Accessed 21/06/2020)

<sup>189</sup> Tubiana & Debos. “Deby’s Chad.” p.31



peace as it deepens the gap between the mass of peasants and the beneficiaries of the oil rent.’<sup>190</sup> He contends that not only has growing economic inequality caused unrest, but cites Chad as an example of “Dutch disease,” a situation in which the growth of one economic sector causes the decline of others.<sup>191</sup>

President Déby has also proven adept at manipulating external donors to his own benefit, taking assistance where available and employing it however he sees fit. The removal of international control mechanisms on Chad’s oil revenue and the leasing of facilities constructed by EUFOR to MINURCAT have already been mentioned, but an even more revealing example is the fate of the DIS. Built and trained by the UN, the DIS were intended to first provide security to refugees, and ultimately form part of a larger professional police force. Instead, following the departure of MINURCAT peacekeepers, Déby hired the detachments out as security to international actors working in Chad such as the UNDP, which paid the Chadian government approximately \$9.5 million between 2012 and 2017 for such services.<sup>192</sup> In the likely scenario that this kind of revenue shared a similar fate to much of the Chadian state’s income, it was either lost to corruption or spent on arms.

Pervasive political instability and the ongoing threat of rebel incursions has created an environment in which personal loyalty to Déby is prioritised above all else. The award for such loyalty is political power and positions in the state administration (including in various state-owned enterprises), which in turn present ample opportunities for personal enrichment and turn the individual into an ‘untouchable’ who enjoys a life of impunity.<sup>193</sup> This method of patronage and clientelism is the result of decades of complex multi-dimensional conflicts on numerous fronts (and is also informed by the Chadian colonial experience) and has evidently been successful in maintaining Déby’s position. However, it has two clear drawbacks that pose serious threats to stability in Chad. First, it creates an incentive for marginalised groups to attempt to conquer the state and gain the associated riches for themselves, something that has been

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<sup>190</sup> Lemarchand. “Où va le Tchad?” p.118

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> UNDP. “Appui au Détachement Intégré de Sécurité.” *Projects*. (2015) Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00061084> (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>193</sup> Chad is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt states in the world. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index shows that the scale of corruption in Chad has remained largely unchanged since at least 2012. Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/tcd> (Accessed 19/05/2020); Debos. *Living by the Gun in Chad*. p.147

demonstrated through decades of Chadian history. Second, appointing leaders and managers in this manner ensures that many talented and capable civil servants are overlooked for senior positions, or may indeed lose their positions to a political actor in need of reward.

The impact that this system has had on governance in Chad is made plain by data collated by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Although its 2018 report listed the overall governance trend in Chad as having shown ‘slowing improvement’ since 2008, it is important to note that this trend is the result of monumental strides that have been made (with external assistance) in the administration of health provision in Chad, and categories such as “Participation and Human Rights” and “Sustainable Economic Opportunity” have shown negligible improvements, if any at all.<sup>194</sup>

The elaborate system that maintains Déby’s position has failed to reduce fragility in Chad, and after almost three decades in power there has been little improvement in the prospects of most Chadian people. Rather than working with international partners to build a functioning state apparatus, Déby has consistently used what resources are offered to build a formidable army and offer wealth to those who are loyal to him. Although this system has survived for thirty years, it is extremely vulnerable to collapse in the event of Déby’s death.

### *Building Armies Instead of Building a State*

The extent of military assistance received by Chad has been documented, along with the scale of its arms purchases. By these means, Déby was able to build and maintain the ‘largest army in Francophone Africa’ and deploy Chadian troops on major international peacekeeping operations just a few years after the war in Chad ended.<sup>195</sup> However, despite the considerable resources that were directed to building the capacity of the Chadian armed forces by external actors, there is no evidence to suggest that any programmes were implemented with the objective of improving accountability, budget-keeping, civilian oversight, or the separation of the military from politics.

Debos describes the Chadian military as a ‘militianised army’ in which children are recruited, power is factionalised between rival commanders, and soldiers serve on such an informal basis

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<sup>194</sup> Available at: <http://iiag.online/> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>195</sup> Jonathan Fisher & David Anderson. “Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa.” *International Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 1. (2015) p.137

that there is no accurate way of even measuring how many troops are serving. Citing the complaints of soldiers in the ANT, she describes a ‘moral decay of the army’ in which the values of professionalism, discipline and respect for hierarchy have been perverted.<sup>196</sup> Yommon Tchinsala offers this insight into the sector following the war:

Efforts to reform this largely untrained shoot-and-kill army failed and the bulk of them were diverted into the country’s different security institutions such as the police force, the gendarmerie, the nomad guards, and even customs, often with no further training on how to interact with the civilian population. The result was catastrophic. Across the country, the army quickly resorted to killing, looting, and terrorizing of the civilian population.<sup>197</sup>

Reports of Chadian troops committing atrocities while on peacekeeping missions only serves to illustrate the extent to which the military remained unprofessional.<sup>198</sup> Although adept at overcoming rebellions and protecting Déby, such forces simply lack the discipline and appropriate training to serve on dynamic peace support operations. As a result, Chad is left with a collection of armed forces that represent a threat not just to the stability of Chad, but of the entire region: Without a unified chain of command and accountable civilian leaders, the various armed forces that compose the Chadian military could fracture and compete for power, particularly in the event of Déby’s death. Discussing the position of the presidential guard in the Chadian state, Debos notes that ‘we may worry even more about the political role they may play on the day when the question of Déby’s successor arises.’<sup>199</sup>

### *Regional Instability*

The presence of major challenges to peace and stability in the region (such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, other Islamist groups in Mali, the war in Libya, and the crisis in Darfur) evidently explains why building a strong allied military in the area was a priority for the international community.

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<sup>196</sup> Debos. *Living by the Gun in Chad*. p.125

<sup>197</sup> Yommon Tchinsala. “Rethinking Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Chad as a Case Study.” *Centre for Security Governance Commentary*. (2013) Available at: <https://secgovcentre.org/2013/12/rethinking-security-in-sub-saharan-africa-chad-as-a-case-study/> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

<sup>198</sup> Somini Sengupta & Alan Cowell. “Chad, Amid Criticism, Will Pull Troops From Force in Central Africa.” *The New York Times*. (2014) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/world/africa/as-leaders-meet-report-describes-chaos-in-central-african-republic.html> (Accessed 21/06/2020)

<sup>199</sup> Debos. *Living by the Gun in Chad*. p.146

However, Déby has proven adept at maximising this situation to his personal benefit, as Jonathan Fisher and David Anderson observe:

In its public and private discourse on the Islamist terror threat posed by a variety of groups in the Sahel, for example, Ndjamena has consistently stressed that ‘Chad is on the front line’, Déby reminding European allies that ‘it’s very easy to cross the Mediterranean Sea with arms and ammunition’ and that terrorism may spread quickly to ‘Europe and the Mediterranean’.<sup>200</sup>

Ngambouk Pemunta and Tabi Tabenyang argue that ‘the overemphasis on state and regional security... is a mechanism for diverting the attention of the international community away from the country’s low showing in the international development and human rights indices.’<sup>201</sup> Hassan elaborates, noting the benefits Déby gains in terms of domestic politics:

Beyond the financial and military resources on which the regime relies to consolidate its power, the regime benefits from the support of the international community on the pretext of the fight against terrorism. Thus, the international community aggravates the fragility of the opposition and breaks all possibility of [government] alternation.<sup>202</sup>

Chad’s contributions to multilateral military operations are doubtlessly valuable and may indeed contribute to building stability in the region. However, Debos contends that these contributions have made Déby ‘the man with whom the West cannot manage’ and represent ‘diplomatic rents’ which serve to consolidate his domestic position.<sup>203</sup> These factors have undermined efforts to build a functioning and stable state in Chad. Assessing whether this strategy has led to a net gain in regional stability would be a significant undertaking, but the question does raise an interesting point, as Nikolas Emmanuel and Brendan Schwartz explain:

Chad is perhaps giving new definition to the concept of a fragile state; it is at the same time a critical regional military and diplomatic player while struggling to perform the

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<sup>200</sup> Fisher & Anderson. “Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in Africa.” p.148

<sup>201</sup> Ngambouk Vitalis Pemunta & Tabi Chama James Tabenyang. “The paradox of petrodollar development: Chad’s military diplomacy in regional and global security.” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 3. (2016) p.2

<sup>202</sup> Hassan. “Security Challenges and Issues in the Sahelo-Saharan Region.” p.10

<sup>203</sup> Debos. *Living by the Gun in Chad*. p.177

basic functions of twenty-first-century statehood which in turn renders it vulnerable to disintegration via social unrest and violent conflict.<sup>204</sup>

### A way forward?

Post-conflict statebuilding efforts in Chad resulted in the construction of several well-equipped armed forces that, along with senior Chadian officials, have proven valuable to international efforts to improve regional stability. However, there is nothing to maintain the cohesion of these structures other than Déby himself; a situation that he has manufactured over three decades. Furthermore, most of the Chadian population remain in poverty and the state remains as fragile as it was when the war ended in 2010, making a return to conflict likely. This case study has shown that Déby's political acumen and pursuit of his own agenda, a deeply flawed defence reform process, and pervasive instability in the wider region have caused international statebuilding efforts to fail in Chad.

Déby's position in the puzzle is somewhat paradoxical: He is the main obstacle to meaningful reform that could achieve stability, while also being the only buttress that is stopping the current fragile situation from descending into armed conflict. He also has control of the oil revenue that could fund the necessary transition, as well as the diplomatic relationships to access whatever technical assistance is required. As a result, he is the key to increasing stability and building a resilient state in Chad. Unfortunately, as it currently stands there appears to be little likelihood of him changing his approach. Indeed, Debos contends that 'insecurity serves the MPS.'<sup>205</sup> She observes that 'if the level of control of the state over men in arms is open to question' then political opponents, human rights activists, and ordinary citizens can be targeted without fear of repercussions as the blame could always plausibly be placed on 'bandits.'<sup>206</sup> In the foreword to her excellent study of conflict in Chad, Debos eloquently summarises the situation in post-war Chad:

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<sup>204</sup> Emmanuel & Schwartz. "Managing Fragility?" p.198

<sup>205</sup> Debos. *Living by the Gun in Chad*. p.169

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

The country is still marked by the practices of a state built on violence, an economy that leaves a large part of the population in poverty, and a society dominated by 'untouchables' who are all connected to this history of war.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid, p.xiii

## Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire, a French-speaking republic on the southern coast of West Africa, descended into civil war in 2002. The conflict finally ended in 2011, however an ongoing peace process (and the exploits of the national football team) facilitated several breaks in the fighting, particularly between 2007 and 2010.

### History and Context

Like Chad, Côte d'Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a former union leader and campaigner, ran unopposed in the country's first elections and assumed the presidency. Before taking office, Houphouët-Boigny had been elected to the National Assembly of France, and in 1956 he had even taken up a ministerial portfolio in the French government, the first African to have held such a position.<sup>208</sup> Furthermore, for all intents and purposes he had already ruled Côte d'Ivoire since 1957 and was therefore well prepared for the transition to independence. Thus, when the time came, he maintained the administrative and bureaucratic structures of the colonial state, negotiated a defence agreement with France, and kept diplomatic ties with Paris 'markedly strong.'<sup>209</sup> The stability fostered by this continuity (not to mention access to the French market) helped the coffee and cocoa industries to flourish and the country as a whole to prosper. While much of West Africa remained poor, the economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire, sometimes dubbed the "Ivorian Miracle," sustained itself throughout the Cold War period. Furthermore, Houphouët-Boigny carefully managed the composition of the Ivorian armed forces, ensuring that representatives from each of the country's main ethnic groups were represented within the senior officer corps.<sup>210</sup> Along with limiting the overall size of the armed forces and developing the gendarmerie as a paramilitary counterweight to the military,

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<sup>208</sup> The 1946 constitution of the French Fourth Republic ensured that 21 (30 from 1958) deputies from French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and the French West Indies were elected to the National Assembly in Paris. Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert, & Christophe Prochasson. *The French Republic: History, Values, Debates*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011) p.257

<sup>209</sup> Boubacar N'Diaye, Sonja Theron & Nayanka Perdigao. "Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Cote d'Ivoire." *International Development Research Centre*. (2016) p.5 Available at: <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/handle/10625/55886> (Accessed 07/04/2020)

<sup>210</sup> Philip Martin. "Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d'Ivoire." *African Affairs*, Vol. 117, No. 468. (2018) p.523

maintaining this balance contributed to making Côte d'Ivoire one of the few countries in Africa to have avoided a military coup d'état in the decades following independence.<sup>211</sup>

Houphouët-Boigny served as president until 1993, when he died. Boubacar N'Diaye et al observe that: 'Cote d'Ivoire's contemporary political evolution is a direct result of Houphouet-Boigny's 33-year presidency. His vision and leadership also heavily influenced the state building conversations that emerged and shaped Cote d'Ivoire as we know it.'<sup>212</sup> The years following Houphouët-Boigny's death became a turbulent period for Côte d'Ivoire. In 1994, the French government devalued the Financial Community of Africa Franc (the currency used in former French colonies in West Africa that was pegged to the French Franc) by 50 percent, severely disrupting the economy.<sup>213</sup> This was followed by fluctuating market prices of exports, increasing debt, as well as reductions in foreign aid in 1998 and 1999.<sup>214</sup> It was in this context that Houphouët-Boigny's successor, Henri Konan Bédié, oversaw the final years of the 1990 – 1995 presidential term before elections were held.

Just before the country went to the polls, Bédié amended the electoral law to require presidential candidates to have been born to two Ivorian parents and have resided in the country for five years. According to the 1998 census, this excluded at least 26 percent the population, many of whom were descended from migrants (or were migrants themselves) who had come to Côte d'Ivoire from its poorer neighbours such as Burkina Faso to work in the Ivorian agricultural sector.<sup>215</sup> These criteria also ensured that Bédié's main rival, Alassane Ouattara, was barred from running. An American-educated economist and former prime-minister under Houphouët-Boigny, Ouattara was serving as Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at the time and thus lived in the USA.<sup>216</sup> His father was also reportedly Burkinabé. Mike McGovern highlights the 'intellectual apparatus' that was concocted at the expense of Côte d'Ivoire's

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<sup>211</sup> Arthur Boutellis. *The Security Sector in Côte d'Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace*. (New York: International Peace Research Institute, 2011) p.2

<sup>212</sup> N'Diaye, Theron & Perdigao. "Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Cote d'Ivoire." p.5

<sup>213</sup> Kenneth Noble. "French Devaluation of African Currency Brings Widespread Unrest." *New York Times*. (1994) Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/23/world/french-devaluation-of-african-currency-brings-wide-unrest.html> (Accessed 21/05/2020)

<sup>214</sup> N'Diaye, Theron & Perdigao. "Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Cote d'Ivoire." p.5

<sup>215</sup> Mike McGovern. *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*. (London: Hurst, 2011) p.14

<sup>216</sup> Giulia Piccolino. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d'Ivoire: A Victors Peace?" *African Affairs*, Vol. 117, No. 468. (2018) p.503



migrant communities to facilitate this manoeuvre: ‘Called ‘*Ivorité*’, it gave a metaphysical and pseudo-intellectual justification to an instrumentalised xenophobia whose main object was keeping Ouattara... out of politics.’<sup>217</sup> This objective was ultimately successful, as Bédié ran unopposed following an opposition boycott of the contest.

Bédié’s leadership alienated an increasing portion of the armed forces, as many ‘military officers, especially those of western and northern origins, felt threatened by the perceived pro-Baoulé ethnic favouritism of Houphouët-Boigny’s successor.’<sup>218</sup> This disconnection between the presidency and the military grew until the end of 1999, when Bédié was removed from office in a coup d’état and replaced by an army general. Although the elections scheduled for the next year did go ahead, both Bédié and Ouattara were barred from running.<sup>219</sup> However, in a surprising turn of events, the only major candidate that did run against the military government, Laurent Gbagbo, won the election.<sup>220</sup>

Gbagbo’s presidency was rocked by an attempted coup d’état in January 2001, followed by another unsuccessful coup and a series of concerted attacks across the north of the country by exiled military personnel in September 2002.<sup>221</sup> The aggressive security operation that was launched in response (which displaced 12,000 people) triggered a wider conflict that rapidly escalated into civil war.<sup>222</sup> Gbagbo’s administration found itself facing an array of armed groups gathered under the banner of the New Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (*Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire*, FNCI), which rapidly consolidated its control of the north of the country. French troops permanently stationed in Côte d’Ivoire’s largest city and main port, Abidjan, helped Gbagbo’s Defence and Security Forces (*Forces de défense et de sécurité*, FDS) repel a rebel assault, leaving the country divided between a FNCI administration in the north and Gbagbo’s beleaguered government in the south.<sup>223</sup> A ceasefire was signed in October that recognised the *de facto* border: ‘Dividing the country in two, the zone of confidence provided a concrete symbol for the discrepancy between northern and southern narratives of Ivoirian society.’<sup>224</sup> The

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<sup>217</sup> McGovern. *Making War in Côte d’Ivoire*. p.17

<sup>218</sup> Martin. “Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d’Ivoire.” p.525

<sup>219</sup> McGovern. *Making War in Côte d’Ivoire*. p.18

<sup>220</sup> N'Diaye, Theron & Perdigao. “Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Cote d’Ivoire.” p.6

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.36

<sup>224</sup> N'Diaye, Theron & Perdigao. “Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Cote d’Ivoire.” p.15

following month, additional rebel groups emerged in the west and claimed territory for themselves, while clashes along the “zone of confidence” remained frequent.

The international response to the conflict, spurred by the interest of France and ECOWAS (the member-states of which surrounded Côte d’Ivoire), was uncharacteristically quick. French troops already stationed in Côte d’Ivoire were reinforced in September 2002 and moved to place themselves between the warring armed forces while also providing logistical support to soldiers arriving as part of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), which was established in December of the same year.<sup>225</sup> Having already been operating for many months, French and ECOMICI troops received a mandate to be in Côte d’Ivoire from the UN Security Council in February 2003. In May, a UN mission with a small component of military observers joined the intervention.<sup>226</sup> By the end of the year, 3000 French troops, 3,200 ECOMICI troops (from Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Togo, and Benin), and 26 UN military observers were attempting to monitor the situation and prevent the conflict from escalating.<sup>227</sup> In 2004, ECOMICI and the UN operation were merged into a new UN mission, the United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which had an initial deployment of 6,240 troops and was tasked with (among other things) monitoring the peace, carrying out a DDR programme, supporting the electoral process, and restoring the police, judiciary, and rule of law.<sup>228</sup>

Throughout 2003 and 2004, negotiations took place between Gbagbo’s administration and the leaders of the FNCI. Giulia Piccolino offers this explanation for why Gbagbo entered negotiations with the rebels so soon:

The President was conscious of the weakness of the loyalist army and of the difficulties of achieving a military victory. In this context, the tactic of the pro-Gbagbo elite shifted to extending the condition - profitable in political and economic terms - of stalemate and state of emergency, and postponing the elections to a moment when victory would have looked achievable. An international peacekeeping presence was not totally incompatible

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<sup>225</sup> Gilles Yabi. “Keeping the Peace in Electoral Conflicts: The Role of ECOWAS, UNOCI and the International Community in Côte d’Ivoire” *ZIF Policy Briefing*. (2012) p.2

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Short & Lauenstein. *Peace and Conflict Since 1991*. p.92

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, pp.116-7

with this goal, as it could represent a security barrier against the rebels of the Forces Nouvelles.<sup>229</sup>

The 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, facilitated with French assistance, acknowledged many of the rebels' grievances and established the framework for a transitional government featuring a strong power-sharing component in which the FNCI would hold both the Defence and Interior ministries.<sup>230</sup> Additional talks hosted by ECOWAS in Ghana, known as the Accra Accords, called for the establishment of a National Security Committee to implement the terms agreed in Linas and Marcoussis.<sup>231</sup> However, the ongoing peace process had little impact on the ground, with DDR programmes repeatedly stalling and clashes remaining frequent.<sup>232</sup> In November 2004, an air raid ordered by Gbagbo hit a French base in the north of the country, killing nine French soldiers and an American aid worker. Although Gbagbo claimed the incident was an accident, French ground forces immediately occupied Abidjan airport and destroyed the entire Ivorian air force.<sup>233</sup>

Even though it remained divided and governed by two separate administrations, Côte d'Ivoire remained largely at peace between 2005 and 2007. Dialogue between the belligerents continued in this period, with talks in South Africa culminating with an agreement in 2005 that all Ivorian citizens (including Ouattara) could run for office.<sup>234</sup> These efforts were helped along by the Ivorian football team and its captain, Didier Drogba. After leading his team to the 2006 World Cup finals for the first time in Côte d'Ivoire's history, Drogba demanded a ceasefire was put in place and asked both sides to 'lay down your weapons and hold elections.'<sup>235</sup> The following year, Gbagbo and the leader of the FNCI, Guillaume Soro, met in Burkina Faso to sign the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, seemingly bringing an end to the war. The Agreement

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<sup>229</sup> Giulia Piccolino. "David Against Goliath in Cote D'Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo's War Against Global Governance." *African Affairs*, Vol. 111, No. 442. (2011) p.5

<sup>230</sup> Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. (2003) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/cotedivoire-linasmarcousis2003> (Accessed 21/05/2020)

<sup>231</sup> Accord Accra II sur la Crise en Côte d'Ivoire. (2003) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/cotedivoire-accraII2003> (Accessed 21/05/2020)

<sup>232</sup> N'Diaye, Theron & Perdigao. "Trajectories of State Building and Peace Building in Cote d'Ivoire." p.18

<sup>233</sup> Rory Carroll & Jon Henley. "French attack sparks riots in Ivory Coast." *The Guardian*. (2004) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/08/france.westafrica> (Accessed 21/05/2020)

<sup>234</sup> McGovern. *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*. p.22

<sup>235</sup> Olivier Guiberteau. "Didier Drogba: How Ivory Coast striker helped to halt civil war in his home nation." *BBC Sport*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/52072592> (Accessed 21/05/2020)

echoed the sentiment expressed in earlier accords and established a transitional government based on power sharing, but also detailed a constitutional and legal framework within which the post-conflict Ivorian state would hypothetically be built.<sup>236</sup> A key point of contention, however, was when the delayed 2005 elections would go ahead.

Côte d'Ivoire eventually went to the polls in November 2010 after a decade of political uncertainty and violence. Unfortunately, hopes that the election would signal the end of the conflict were dashed when the result was disputed. The Ivorian electoral commission declared Ouattara the winner with 54 percent of votes cast after the second round of voting. However, the Constitutional Council of Côte d'Ivoire (which had been appointed by Gbagbo) invalidated approximately 600,000 ballots from the FNCI-controlled north and certified Gbagbo as the winner.<sup>237</sup> Both the UN and ECOWAS recognised Ouattara and demanded that Gbagbo step down. In response, Gbagbo mobilised the FDS along with militias loyal to him, decried the imperialism of the international community, and called for a "Second War of Independence."<sup>238</sup> With the overt support of UNOCI troops and operationally independent French forces, the FNCI managed to capture the capital, Yamoussoukro, in February 2011 and by late March Abidjan was surrounded.<sup>239</sup> In April 2011, Gbagbo was arrested, bringing the conflict to an end.<sup>240</sup> In the few months between the election and Gbagbo's arrest, approximately 3,000 Ivorians were killed and up to a million were displaced from their homes.<sup>241</sup> For his part in instigating violence in 2011, Gbagbo faced trial at the International Criminal Court. He was acquitted of charges of crimes against humanity in 2019.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> Ouagadougou Political Agreement. (2007) Available at: <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/ouagadougou-political-agreement-opa> (Accessed 21/05/2020)

<sup>237</sup> Piccolino. "David Against Goliath in Cote D'Ivoire?" p.21

<sup>238</sup> Ibid, p.2

<sup>239</sup> Marco Wyss. "The Gendarme Stays in Africa: France's Military Role in Côte d'Ivoire." *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2013) p.98

<sup>240</sup> A series of low-intensity attacks carried out by Gbagbo loyalists took place between 2011 and 2014. Piccolino. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d'Ivoire." p.498

<sup>241</sup> Alexandra Novosseloff. *The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The Un operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. (New York: International Peace Institute, 2018) p.18

<sup>242</sup> Agence France Presse. "Laurent Gbagbo: former Ivory Coast president freed by war crimes court." *The Guardian*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/feb/02/laurent-gbagbo-former-ivory-coast-president-freed-by-war-crimes-court> (Accessed 24/05/2020)

## International Statebuilding Initiatives

International efforts to strengthen the Ivorian state date back to independence, with France taking a particular interest throughout the post-colonial period. However, as Côte d'Ivoire was a stable and relatively prosperous country, such efforts were limited compared with many other former colonies such as Chad. Thus, the arrival of UNOCI in 2004 (with its mandate to implement a DDR programme, support the peace process, and restore law and order) represents the first major international intervention in the affairs of the Ivorian state since independence. UNOCI remained in Côte d'Ivoire until 2017, and as a result it not only played a key role in bringing an end to the conflict through peacekeeping, but also helped the transition to peace. During the war, over \$3.75 billion was spent on the UNOCI operation.<sup>243</sup> In addition, ECOMICI cost approximately \$13 million to establish in 2002 before it was folded into UNOCI.<sup>244</sup> These figures do not include the French operation, which is estimated to have cost approximately \$250 million per annum during the war (or over \$2 billion in total).<sup>245</sup> The French also spent an additional €172 million on 'technical cooperation' projects with the Ivorian state between 2006 and 2011.<sup>246</sup>

In 2011, UNOCI's mandate was extended to include an ambitious series of statebuilding programmes targeting security sector and rule of law institutions, in addition to a host of other tasks such as safeguarding a secure environment for the return of refugees.<sup>247</sup> Its main duty,

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<sup>243</sup> Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/59/18/Rev.1: Approved budgetary levels for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005*. (New York: United Nations, 2005); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/60/27: Approved budgetary levels for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*. (New York: United Nations, 2006); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/60/32: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*. (New York: United Nations, 2006); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/61/24: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008*. (New York: United Nations, 2007); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/63/23: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009*. (New York: United Nations, 2009); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/63/26: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010*. (New York: United Nations, 2009); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/64/19: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011*. (New York: United Nations, 2010); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/66/14: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012*. (New York: United Nations, 2012) All available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>244</sup> Maya Collett. "Foreign Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire." in Tony Coady & Michael O'Keefe, eds. *Righteous Violence: The Ethics and Politics of Military Intervention*. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005)

<sup>245</sup> Terry M. Mays. *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*. (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2011) p.192

<sup>246</sup> Available at: <https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/cad-2a-destination-de-laide-publique-au-developpement-de-la-france/> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>247</sup> United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 2000*. (New York: United Nations, 2011) Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2000> (Accessed 22/05/2020)

however, was to certify ‘all five stages’ of the electoral process, from creating a secure environment for them to be held to ensuring the counting of ballots was transparent.<sup>248</sup> This broadened mandate was supported by resources that matched UNOCI’s wartime budget for several years. From the end of the war until June 2017, when the mission was deemed to have completed its mandate and was drawn down, a total of \$2.2 billion was committed to supporting UNOCI, bringing the total cost of the mission from start to finish to almost \$6 billion.<sup>249</sup>

The UNDP ran an extensive statebuilding programme alongside UNOCI in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. Its efforts ranged from ongoing election support through the *Programme d’Appui au Processus Electoral* to a broad spectrum of initiatives that aimed to build the capacity of various state institutions. The Ivorian police, for example, received programmes such as the *Appui Renforcement des Capacites de la Police Nationale* worth at least \$14.7 million which were in addition to UNOCI’s efforts in this area.<sup>250</sup> In total, the UNDP spent over \$55 million on strengthening the Ivorian state between 2011 and 2019.<sup>251</sup> Other multilateral statebuilding initiatives were channelled to Côte d’Ivoire via the EU, which launched a €273 million assistance package in 2014 that largely focused on the Ivorian energy sector but reserved €60 million specifically for statebuilding programmes.<sup>252</sup> ECOWAS also retained an interest in Côte d’Ivoire, providing technical assistance and observation teams for the 2015 Ivorian elections

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<sup>248</sup> Novosseloff. *The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission*. p.27

<sup>249</sup> Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/67/16: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013*. (New York: United Nations, 2013); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/67/19: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014*. (New York: United Nations, 2013); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/68/26: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015*. (New York: United Nations, 2014); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/69/24: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016*. (New York: United Nations, 2015); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/C.5/70/24: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017*. (New York: United Nations, 2016)

<sup>250</sup> Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects> (Accessed 17/05/2020)

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> Delegation of the European Union to Côte d’Ivoire. *Programme indicatif national 2014-2020*. (Brussels: European Union, 2014) Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/c%C3%B4te-divoire/13574/node/13574\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/c%C3%B4te-divoire/13574/node/13574_en) (Accessed 23/05/2020)

through the mechanism that the organisation maintains through the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.<sup>253</sup>

Ensuring the Ivorian economy bounced back to its former strength was a priority for both the international community and Ouattara's administration. Piccolino argues that the president's 'close relationship' with international financial institutions, such as his former employers at the IMF, helped to facilitate some generous assistance.<sup>254</sup> In 2012, for example, the IMF cancelled 24 percent of Côte d'Ivoire's national debt in a move that was soon followed by other creditors.<sup>255</sup> Immediately upon assuming power, Ouattara was able to secure a grant of \$150 million from the World Bank in the form of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Grant, more than half of which was earmarked for statebuilding initiatives that aimed to support 'essential reforms to improve governance, transparency and efficiency in public expenditure management and in the key sectors of cocoa, energy and finance.'<sup>256</sup> In total, the World Bank provided \$392.5 million to support reforms in the Ivorian public sector between 2011 and 2019, with an ongoing emphasis being placed on the fields of economic governance and public financial management.<sup>257</sup> Additional statebuilding initiatives implemented by the African Capacity Building Foundation worth \$14.5 million focused on economic policy management, while the US Treasury ran projects that aimed to enhance revenue collection worth almost \$1 million.<sup>258</sup>

The vast majority of American statebuilding assistance for post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire was channelled through USAID, which provided over \$71 million for initiatives that aimed to strengthen the judiciary, the legislature, and the electoral process.<sup>259</sup> The US Department of State, meanwhile, supported initiatives strengthening border security, the police, and criminal

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<sup>253</sup> ECOWAS. "ECOWAS deploys observers for the 2015 presidential election in Côte d'Ivoire." *ECOWAS Info*. (2015) Available at: <https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-deploys-observers-for-the-2015-presidential-election-in-cote-divoire/> (Accessed 23/05/2020)

<sup>254</sup> Piccolino. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d'Ivoire." p.504

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> World Bank. "CI: Post-conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Grant (PCRRG)." *Projects by Country*. (2020) Available at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P122800?lang=ar> (Accessed 23/05/2020)

<sup>257</sup> Available at: [https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode\\_exact=CI](https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode_exact=CI) (Accessed 23/05/2020)

<sup>258</sup> Available at: <https://www.acbf-pact.org/our-work/how-we-do-it/grants/projects-regions/west-central-africa/cote-divoire> (Accessed 23/05/2020); Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>259</sup> Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)



justice worth \$5 million, while the US Department of Defense provided military education and training to the newly-established Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (*Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire*, FRCI) also worth \$5 million.<sup>260</sup>

Ouattara had established the FRCI in March 2011, just three months after coming to office, and the integration process between former FNCI and DSF forces was already underway when Gbagbo was arrested with UN support in April 2011.<sup>261</sup> The shape of the post-war Ivorian military had been a major sticking point during the peace process, however unlike in many other post-conflict states, the complex task of building a unified military was not prioritised by the international community. Although UNOCI provided some harmonisation and professionalisation programmes and France and the USA provided bilateral assistance to the FNCI, the majority of post-war DDR and SSR initiatives were led by Ouattara and the Ivorian government.

Perhaps the most pressing issue following the war was the plight of the 74,000 former combatants that found themselves without positions in peacetime security institutions.<sup>262</sup> Seeking to address their needs, in 2012 Ouattara established the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (*l'Autorité pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réintégration*), which answered directly to him. By 2015, 95 percent of the targeted population had been reintegrated, and 68 percent of the financial resources required for the programme had come from the Ivorian state rather than external donors.<sup>263</sup> Indeed, aside from UNOCI's relatively modest SSR programmes and the \$10 million spent by the USA, the only external actor to have made a noteworthy contribution to shaping the security sector in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire was France. Unfortunately, the data that would illustrate the scale of assistance that has been directed from Paris since 2011 is unavailable.

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<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Boutellis. *The Security Sector in Côte d'Ivoire*. p.13

<sup>262</sup> Franziska Ehlert. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Côte d'Ivoire: Lessons Identified for Security Sector Reform." *Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance: International Security Sector Advisory Team Blog*. (2017) Available at: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Share/Blogs/ISSAT-Blog/Disarmament-Demobilization-and-Reintegration-in-Cote-d-Ivoire-Lessons-Identified-for-Security-Sector-Reform> (Accessed 23/05/2020)

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.




Between 2011 and 2019, the international community dispersed at least \$2.8 billion on statebuilding initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>264</sup> This translates to approximately \$14.5 per annum for each Ivorian citizen. As the scale of resources committed to such initiatives by France since 2011 is unavailable, the actual figure is likely to be much higher. Indeed, post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire was one of just a few states to receive general budget support from France (in 2013, for example, the Ivorian budget was boosted by €300 million from Paris), illustrating the scale of French interest.<sup>265</sup>

### Fragile States Index

Table 4 presents FSI's data on four broad sectors of the Ivorian state, as well as an additional measure indicating the extent to which an external intervention was present in the country.

Table 4



<sup>264</sup> This figure includes those initiatives discussed, as well as a handful of minor ones carried out by the British and Dutch governments.

<sup>265</sup> The other states were Guinea, Senegal, Niger, and Mauritania. Côte d'Ivoire received the most. Paul Melly & Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. (2013) p.14

Unlike the cases of Burundi and Chad, Côte d'Ivoire has witnessed an overall decline in fragility since the war ended in 2011. After an uncertain few years in which, according to the FSI, the fragility of the security apparatus, rule of law, and the economy increased slightly, every sector of the Ivorian state has demonstrated a modest but sustained move toward stability.

The most significant progress has been made with state legitimacy, which has become significantly more stable since 2012. Given the problematic nature of previous elections in Côte d'Ivoire, the 2015 presidential contest presented a risk that could have stalled or reversed such progress. Instead, the downward trend toward stability was sustained. The success of the elections also heralded a significant improvement in respect for human rights and the rule of law and marked the point at which international actors such as UNOCI began to leave the country.

The main point of concern regarding Côte d'Ivoire's transition to stability is the uneven impact of the economic recovery. Since 2011, the Ivorian economy has grown at an average of 8 percent per year and the country as a whole has risen from 146<sup>th</sup> place on the Legatum Prosperity Index in 2011 to 130<sup>th</sup> in 2019, after rising above the Sub-Saharan average in 2014.<sup>266</sup> Such figures disguise many issues, as highlighted by the World Bank: 'The excellent economic performance of Côte d'Ivoire has not produced the results expected in terms of social inclusion and a reduction in the poverty rate, which remains high.'<sup>267</sup> Indeed, poverty remains at 46.3 percent, having fallen less than 5 percent despite almost a decade of sustained growth.<sup>268</sup> Furthermore, despite such economic performance, Côte d'Ivoire is ranked 165<sup>th</sup> out of 189 countries on the UNDP's 2019 Human Development Index, far behind many less prosperous African economies.<sup>269</sup> Thus, despite a concerted international effort and sustained economic growth, the Ivorian economy remains only slightly less fragile than it was in 2011.

Another noteworthy trend is the stagnation in the security apparatus in recent years, with progress towards stability being hampered by a series of mutinies that broke out among units of

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<sup>266</sup> Legatum Prosperity Index. *Burundi Country Profile*. (London: Legatum Institute Foundation, 2019) Available at: <https://www.prosperity.com/all-countries> (Accessed 16/05/2020); World Bank. *Overview*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cotedivoire/overview> (Accessed 11/05/2020)

<sup>267</sup> The World Bank. *Overview*.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> UNDP. "Côte d'Ivoire." *Human Development Reports*. (New York: United Nations, 2020) Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CIV> (Accessed 27/05/2020)

the FRCI in 2017.<sup>270</sup> Given that a discontented military led to a series of crises in the 1990s and sparked the civil war in 2002, such events highlight the limited progress that has been made in strengthening the Ivorian security sector.

## What Happened and Why?

### *Ouattara*

After triumphing at the polls in 2010 and on the battlefield in 2011, Ouattara enjoyed a very strong position in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, given the extent of international support he received and the extradition of his main political rival to the ICC, he wielded as much power as any Ivorian had since Houphouët-Boigny. Although the support of the international community (particularly France) was evidently welcome, Ouattara was unwilling to delegate much in the way of authority over Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict transition, as Novoseloff observes: 'UNOCI had to shift its priorities to support a new president who wanted to take full ownership of the post-crisis process.'<sup>271</sup>

The extent to which Ouattara has been able to dominate Ivorian politics has had a mixed impact on efforts to stabilise Côte d'Ivoire and prevent a relapse into war. While the extent to which his personal relationship with international financial institutions expedited the provision of aid and investment is difficult to quantify, he was able to secure enough resources to stimulate a decade of impressive economic growth. Furthermore, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance lists Côte d'Ivoire in 22<sup>nd</sup> place out of 54 for good governance, highlighting the 'increasing improvement' in levels of governance that have been witnessed in the past decade. According to the index, this progress has been driven by noteworthy improvements in its "Safety and Rule of Law" and "Participation and Human Rights" categories, although much more modest gains regarding "Sustainable Opportunity" (which measures Public Management, Business Environment, Infrastructure, and the Rural Sector) have limited further progress.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> BBC. "Ivory Coast: Soldiers revolt over pay dispute." *BBC News*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39895581> (Accessed 27/05/200); An in-depth study of these events is also available: Rebecca Schiel, Christopher Faulkner & Jonathan Powell. "Mutiny in Côte d'Ivoire." *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 52, No. 2. (2017)

<sup>271</sup> Novoseloff. *The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission*. p.19

<sup>272</sup> This data can be accessed through the Ibrahim Index of African Governance's online portal here: <http://iiag.online/> (Accessed 18/05/2020)

The relative success of Côte d'Ivoire's recovery from conflict helped to provide Ouattara with noteworthy diplomatic influence, particularly among neighbouring states. Between 2012 and 2014, the new Ivorian president also served as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) after being unanimously elected by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government.<sup>273</sup> Maxime Ricard observes that:

Ouattara was quick to present Côte d'Ivoire as a country of stability, as West Africa was facing conflict in Mali since 2012, which raised issues of terrorism in the Sahel-Sahara region, in addition to the increase of tensions in Nigeria with Boko Haram.<sup>274</sup>

The perception of Ouattara as a capable leader and valuable ally in the fight against such threats has given the president a degree of latitude to exert his power in undemocratic ways without fear of reproach from the international community. For example, Maja Bovcon highlights how transitional justice in post-war Côte d'Ivoire has focussed exclusively on individuals who supported Gbagbo during the war. She notes that by 2014, 72 former members of the FDS had been investigated by military tribunals, but, in a sign of the 'acute partiality of the Ivorian judiciary,' not a single person from the FNCI had.<sup>275</sup> She also highlights the 'overwhelming influence of the executive over the judiciary' with specific regard to Côte d'Ivoire's Constitutional Council.<sup>276</sup> Furthermore, in 2016 the constitution was amended to allow Ouattara to run for a third term, while in December 2019 a 'dubious' arrest warrant was issued for Ouattara's main rival and former ally, Guillaume Soro (leader of the FNCI during the war), while numerous other opposition figures have also been imprisoned.<sup>277</sup>

The central position that Ouattara has placed himself in means that his departure from politics, either through death or retirement, will be destabilising. Piccolino observes that 'his retirement will probably lead to the collapse of the war-time alliance' and contends that 'the problem of

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<sup>273</sup> Reuters. "Ivory Coast president chosen as new ECOWAS chairman." *Reuters World News*. (2012) Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-ecowas-idAFJOE81G09H20120217> (Accessed 30/05/2020)

<sup>274</sup> Maxime Ricard. "Historicity of extraversion in Côte d'Ivoire and the 'postconflict.'" *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2017) p.517

<sup>275</sup> Maja Bovcon. "The progress in establishing the rule of law in Côte d'Ivoire under Ouattara's presidency." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2. (2014) p.192

<sup>276</sup> Ibid, p.194

<sup>277</sup> Jessica Moody. "The Rise and Fall of Another African Donor Darling." *Foreign Policy*. (2020) Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/22/ivory-coast-ouattara-economic-success-clamp-down-opposition-democracy/> (Accessed 28/05/2020)

Ouattara's succession constitutes the most important threat to the stability of the country.'<sup>278</sup>

Thus, while Ouattara's contribution to the relative success of Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict transition should not be understated, his leadership has left legacies which undermine the statebuilding effort in sectors such as the rule of law and could pose a threat to the stability of the country in future. Jessica Moody warns of such dangers: 'The president's increasing tendency toward policies that contravene human rights, due process, and freedom of speech has gotten far less attention than his country's growth and progress. Yet these very policies might spark further violence in 2020.'<sup>279</sup>

### *"It's the Economy, Stupid"*

The cases of Burundi and Chad both illustrated examples in which security was prioritised at the expense of other sectors of the state. The Ivorian case demonstrates a very different approach, in which stabilising the economy has been prioritised by both domestic and external actors. In terms of international statebuilding initiatives, this encompassed widespread reforms in the way the Ivorian government produced and implemented economic policy, the strengthening of public financial management capacity, as well as improving processes such as revenue collection. While the shortcomings of the economic success story regarding poverty have been noted, becoming the fastest growing economy in Africa (in 2016) had a profound impact on several sectors of the Ivorian state.<sup>280</sup>

After a 2011 high of 93 percent of GDP, Côte d'Ivoire's national debt dropped to 44 percent of GDP in 2012 and was down to just 36 percent in 2014.<sup>281</sup> In the same timeframe, ODA to Côte d'Ivoire dropped to below 3 percent of GDP.<sup>282</sup> As a result, within just a few years of the conflict's end, Côte d'Ivoire was not reliant on public borrowing or agreements made with donors to fund its transition to peace and the construction of a new state. With a decent revenue base established, Ouattara's administration has been able to develop institutions and processes that are funded by Ivorians rather than external donors. Furthermore, a vibrant economy provides a broad range of opportunities for people to earn a living and accumulate wealth, arguably

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<sup>278</sup> Piccolino. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d'Ivoire." p.507, p.497

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

<sup>280</sup> The World Bank. *Overview*.

<sup>281</sup> Ricard. "Historicity of extraversion in Côte d'Ivoire and the 'postconflict.'" p.516

<sup>282</sup> Piccolino. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d'Ivoire." p.504

lowering the value of state capture, clientelism, and rents to sovereignty.<sup>283</sup> Thus, a reasonable explanation for the relative success of Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict transition is that a favourable economic climate (created with the assistance of the international community) made ownership of the state less financially valuable, allowing international statebuilding initiatives to be implemented in a more favourable political environment than in less prosperous post-conflict states such as Chad, where controlling oil exports was one of the only means of enrichment in the country. This not only ensured additional economic growth due to good economic governance on the part of strengthened state institutions, but also led to greater capacity in all state sectors and increased tax revenue. Applying a hypothesis such as this in the Ivorian context evidently requires testing before any assumptions can be made, however research highlighting the link between economic growth and escaping the fragility trap suggests it has merit.<sup>284</sup>

### *The Shortcomings of the SSR Process*

In recent years, the Ivorian security sector has once again become a source of social unrest and the centre of political controversy. In 2014, approximately 9,000 former FNCI soldiers staged a mutiny to demand back-pay and other benefits, while three years later another mutiny spread across 'at least seven cities across the country' with soldiers again demanding 'pay raises, bonuses, and better living conditions.'<sup>285</sup> Furthermore, the Minister of Defence was briefly held captive and some troops reportedly refused to follow orders to confront the mutineers when ordered to do so by Ouattara.<sup>286</sup> A deal struck between the mutineers and Ouattara stipulated that each soldier would receive bonuses worth 5 million CFA Francs (\$8,400, with more payments to follow), calming the crisis. However, these events serve to highlight the shortcomings of the SSR process in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> The arguments exploring the link between economic recession and coup d'états are assessed in: Nam Kyu Kim. "Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 60, No.1 (2016)

<sup>284</sup> For example: Collier. *The Bottom Billion*. pp.8-12

<sup>285</sup> Sean Lyngass. "The Real Cost of Ivory Coast's Military Mutiny." *Foreign Policy*. (2017) Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/12/the-real-cost-of-ivory-coasts-military-mutiny-africa-fastest-growing-economy/> (Accessed 28/05/2020)

<sup>286</sup> Piccolino. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d'Ivoire." p.500

<sup>287</sup> Jeremy Allouche & Oswald Padonou. "Côte d'Ivoire: The mutiny may be over, but the army's problems are not." *African Arguments*. (2017) Available at: <https://africanarguments.org/2017/05/17/cote-divoire-the-mutiny-may-be-over-but-the-armys-problems-are-not/> (Accessed 28/05/2020)

Given the nature of his victory, conventional wisdom might suggest that Ouattara was able to mould the FRCI and the wider Ivorian security sector to his liking in the aftermath of the war. However, while he did serve as the political figurehead of the FNCI and the final clashes of the war were fought to install him as president, he was not a military commander. Indeed, while there was an overall leader of the FNCI, Guillaume Soro, it remained more of a coalition of armed groups rather than a unified army throughout the war. Writing in 2011, Boutellis identified how the need for international support to capture Gbagbo led to ruptures in this coalition emerging even before the war was over:

The inability of the FRCI to complete the offensive opened speculations about internal divisions within their ranks – among leaders of the ex-rebel Forces Nouvelles. The potential for such divisions will be one of the great challenges President Ouattara will face in recreating a truly “republican army” in the aftermath of this crisis, particularly as he had to rely on these former FN commander’s military forces to seize power.<sup>288</sup>

Once in office, Ouattara was faced with the dilemma of whether to reward those who had brought him to power (hopefully ensuring they would not launch a coup d’état) or to prioritise the construction of a unified professional Ivorian military. His decision became apparent almost immediately: Soro was awarded with the presidency of the National Assembly, overall command of the military was given to a former FNCI officer, while other former rebels were given command of elite units such as the Republican Guard and the Special Forces.<sup>289</sup> Furthermore, Philip Martin describes a culture in which former FDS troops were side-lined in the post-war FRCI:

In order to facilitate integration across rival factions of the FRCI, former [FNCI] and FDS officers were integrated together in ‘co-command’ of FRCI units beginning in 2012. In reality, however, decision-making authority and political clout have remained largely in the hands of former [FNCI] elements, and soldiers are reticent to take orders from members of the opposing camp. As one military officer explained: ‘there is a sense

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<sup>288</sup> Boutellis. *The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire*. p.13

<sup>289</sup> Martin. “Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d’Ivoire.” p.526

among them... that hey, we won the war, Gbagbo is gone, we don't have to listen to you.'<sup>290</sup>

Bovcon contends that this created an 'extremely delicate and overly intimate relationship between the president and the security forces' that has hindered the development of other sectors of the Ivorian state, such as the judiciary.<sup>291</sup>

The legacy of conflict between former belligerents complicates the military integration process in any post-conflict state. However, in the Ivorian case the resulting divisions were compounded by other rivalries and sources of mistrust. The unusual cadence of the war in Côte d'Ivoire (broken up as it was by many years of relative peace) and its protracted nature created a situation in which military commanders held absolute power over their respective jurisdictions for almost a decade, on many occasions during lengthy breaks in the fighting. This resulted in the development of extensive parallel structures of governance, justice, and trade, as Martin notes:

These wartime structures included a broad array of informal tax and revenue-generating networks, as well as local dispute resolution and service provision roles. These institutions have kept ex-rebel commanders embedded in the economic and social fabric of many northern communities, which further enables [FNCI] officers to resist unwanted military reforms by threatening to turn that power against the government.'<sup>292</sup>

The status of military commanders in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire has provided them with significant political power, to the extent that they have been able to hinder the reform process and retain many of their wartime privileges. One such privilege, impunity, was described in a recent Human Rights Watch report:

The lack of accountability for human rights abuses is indicative of a wider failure to address a longstanding culture of impunity within the army. Mutinies in January and May, in which soldiers seized control of the country's second largest city and

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<sup>290</sup> FAFN is another abbreviation of FNCI. Ibid, p.528

<sup>291</sup> Bovcon. "The progress in establishing the rule of law in Côte d'Ivoire under Ouattara's presidency." p.195

<sup>292</sup> Martin. "Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d'Ivoire." p.532



neighborhoods in several other towns, reflect a wider perception that the army is “above the law.”<sup>293</sup>

Richard Ehui argues that the unprofessional nature of the FRCI, coupled with ‘long-standing lack of leadership and institutional civilian control over the military’ has created the conditions for Côte d’Ivoire to have become a “mutineers’ paradise.”<sup>294</sup> Citing the ‘deplorable insubordination’ of the mutineers, he argues that the Ivorian armed forces have developed a ‘sense of entitlement’ due to their exploits in the war that they have carried with them into peacetime.<sup>295</sup> Whether or not the motivation for the mutinies came from a sense of entitlement among the rank and file, Ehui does raise an important point regarding the failings of post-conflict DDR and SSR programmes in Côte d’Ivoire: ‘The country is left with a divided army with rival chains of command and a total lack of civilian oversight.’<sup>296</sup>

The failure to reform the military has impacted Ivorian society in ways that stretch beyond statebuilding. For example, the lack of accountability not only means that FRCI officers are free to disobey orders, such as refusing to leave their wartime zones of influence when ordered to relocate, but also to avoid investigation for their conduct during the war.<sup>297</sup> Piccolino argues that as a result: ‘The major undertaking of the Ivorian government, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (*Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation*), is seen by most Ivorian people as an utter failure.’<sup>298</sup> Viewed in this context, the failings of both Ivorian and international SSR initiatives not only present a threat to peace in Côte d’Ivoire, thus undermining progress in other sectors, but have also negatively influenced much broader efforts to reconcile Ivorian society .

### A Way Forward?

Jeremy Allouche and Oswald Padonou argue that deployment elements of the FRCI abroad could serve as a remedy to many of the problems plaguing the Ivorian security sector. They note

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<sup>293</sup> Human Rights Watch. “Côte d’Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping Mission Ends.” *News*. (2017) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/30/cote-divoire-un-peacekeeping-mission-ends> (Accessed 25/05/2020)

<sup>294</sup> Richard Ehui. “Côte d’Ivoire: mutineers’ paradise?” *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 1. (2019) p.116

<sup>295</sup> Ibid, pp.117-8

<sup>296</sup> Ibid, p.123

<sup>297</sup> Martin. “Security Sector Reform and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar Côte d’Ivoire.” p.528

<sup>298</sup> Piccolino. “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Post-2011 Cote d’Ivoire.” p.500

that the presence of a 150-strong Ivorian contingent in MINUMSA (the UN operation in Mali) could be:

Part of a strategy to professionalise the army through a learn-by-doing approach under the guidelines and guidance of the UN. These forces could learn and share good practices – around issues such as ethics, human rights, responsibility and hierarchy – that could create the conditions for reform on their return home.<sup>299</sup>

Furthermore, given that much of the unrest within the FRCI appears to stem from disputes about pay and material wellbeing, deploying troops on multilateral peace operations would provide a considerable financial opportunity for Ivorian soldiers, in much the same way that service with AMISOM is a reliable means for Burundian soldiers to earn money. However, the cases of both Burundi and Chad prove that this course may be problematic.

A more favourable path could be found with a reconsideration of the apparent success of Côte d'Ivoire's post-war economic development. The FSI data indicates that despite high levels of growth, the Ivorian economy remains fragile, while the World Bank highlighted the high levels of poverty that remain in the country. In addition, it was low levels of economic opportunity that lowered Côte d'Ivoire's score on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Assessments such as these suggest that the Ivorian economy is developing very unevenly, leaving much of the population impoverished while a relatively small elite enjoy the benefits of a decade of economic growth. When viewed through this lens, the demands of the mutinying soldiers appear to genuinely represent a pay dispute that, if sense prevails, should not force a prosperous country to relapse into war. This argument becomes even more salient if one considers the fact that the mutinies occurred in the context of widespread disputes between the government and other state workers, such as civil servants, police officers, and teachers, many of whom were on strike at the time for essentially the same reasons as the soldiers.<sup>300</sup>

If the fruits of economic growth can be shared more equally across Ivorian society, many of the factors that are impeding the transition from fragility will be weakened. Reports of Ivorian

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<sup>299</sup> Allouche & Padonou. "Côte d'Ivoire."

<sup>300</sup> Reuters. "Ivory Coast civil servants suspend strike after three weeks." *Reuters World News*. (2017) Available at: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-strike/ivory-coast-civil-servants-suspend-strike-after-three-weeks-idUKKBN15B1RX> (Accessed 28/05/2020)

citizens organising strikes and peaceful protests to hold their government to account and demand better living and working conditions suggests that this may indeed be happening. Even if their goals are not met, the presence of an organised, peaceful, and active civil society highlights the extent to which in Côte d'Ivoire has transitioned from armed conflict.

## Nepal

A civil war broke out in Nepal in 1996, leaving the small Himalayan kingdom divided for a decade. The conflict culminated in 2006 with the end of monarchic rule and the establishment of a power-sharing government formed of representatives from across the Nepalese political spectrum.

### History and Context

Unlike the other states considered in this assessment, Nepal was not colonised by a European power. Indeed, despite the presence of the British and other European powers in neighbouring India for centuries, Nepalese rulers managed to limit the influence of external forces in the country and maintain endogenous state structures. Between 1846 and 1951, a single family held the office of Prime Minister and governed Nepal in the name of a largely symbolic monarchy. However, like so many new states that were emerging from various empires at the time, Nepal fell into armed conflict during the Cold War. The first, in 1950, led to the monarchy assuming executive powers. Additional conflicts between the government and a range of armed groups took place in 1952-3, 1959-60, 1962, 1971, and 1972-3.<sup>301</sup> By the 1980s, a growing but fragmented democratic movement, ‘largely originating from the small middle-class intellectual elite based in Kathmandu,’ began to spread to other parts of Nepalese society. This movement shot to the fore of Nepalese politics in 1989 when a trade dispute with India led to mass unemployment and high inflation.<sup>302</sup>

In response to the crisis, Nepalese opposition parties joined together to present a united front against the authoritarian rule of the monarch, King Birendra. *Jana Andolan*, as this broad coalition was called, contained conservative parties such as the Nepali Congress as well as more radical groups such as the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre).<sup>303</sup> Protests and acts of civil disobedience organised by *Jana Andolan* were met with the declaration of a state of emergency, but eventually Birendra was forced to schedule multi-party elections for 1991, draft a new constitution, and promise

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<sup>301</sup> Krishna Hachhethu. “Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy.” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 20. (2007) p.1832

<sup>302</sup> Stuart Gordon. “Evaluating Nepal’s Integrated “Security” and “Development” Policy: Development, Democracy, and Counterinsurgency.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 4. (2005) pp.582-3

<sup>303</sup> *Jana Andolan* means “People’s Movement.”

comprehensive reforms.<sup>304</sup> The new constitution provided for the rule of law, separation of powers, freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, and also recognized the ethnic and confessional diversity of the population.<sup>305</sup> In this new system, the monarch retained command of the Nepalese Army as well as a 'primary role' in foreign affairs, while civic administration and the legislative process was managed by an elected parliament.<sup>306</sup>

The 1991 elections resulted in Nepali Congress winning 110 seats of a total of 205, with the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) winning 69 and the United Peoples Front of Nepal, a front for the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre), winning 9 seats. Most of the remaining seats were split among several smaller communist parties, although a pro-monarchy party did win three seats. A government was formed by the Nepali Congress, but the new administration failed to win many plaudits. John Mage contends that 'the "parliamentary" governments of the post-1991 period quickly discredited themselves by crude lust for the profits of office,' while Anand Swaroop Verma and Gautam Navlakha describe the parliamentary politics of the time as 'utterly degenerate.'<sup>307</sup> In 1994, the government collapsed due to splits within the Nepali Congress, leading to fresh elections. The Communist Part of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) emerged as the largest party in a hung parliament and attempted to govern with a minority administration. This lasted less than a year, and in 1995 a coalition government was formed between the Marxist-Leninists and the Nepali Congress.<sup>308</sup>

The Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) split in 1994 after a dispute within its leadership over whether to continue participating in parliamentary politics. One splinter, led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (more commonly known as Prachanda), was renamed the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and renounced parliamentary politics in favour of armed struggle.<sup>309</sup> For much of

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<sup>304</sup> Gordon. "Evaluating Nepal's Integrated "Security" and "Development" Policy." p.583

<sup>305</sup> Ganga B. Thapa & Jan Sharma. "From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy-Building in Nepal." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2. (2009) p.208

<sup>306</sup> John Mage. "The Nepali Revolution and International Relations." *Economic and Political Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 20. (2007) p.1835

<sup>307</sup> Mage. "The Nepali Revolution and International Relations." p.1835; Anand Swaroop Verma & Gautam Navlakha. "People's War in Nepal: Genesis and Development." *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 42, No. 20. (2007) p.1839

<sup>308</sup> Michael Hutt. "Introduction: Monarchy, Democracy, and Maoism in Nepal." in Michael Hutt, ed. *Himalayan 'Peoples War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*. (London: Hurst & Company, 2005) p.4

<sup>309</sup> Deepak Thapa. "Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists." in Michael Hutt, ed. *Himalayan 'Peoples War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*. (London: Hurst & Company, 2005) p.37

1995, the Maoists' activities were limited to the Rolpa district, one of the poorest in Nepal, where they prepared to launch a rebellion. In November that year, their plans were interrupted by a police operation that was ostensibly tasked with controlling a rise in criminal activity in the area.<sup>310</sup> Operation Romeo, as it was codenamed, proved to be a targeted attack on the Maoists and the settlements they were living in. Human Rights Watch recorded 'gross violations of human rights, including the arbitrary arrest and detention of left-of-center parties, rapes, executions and "disappearances."' <sup>311</sup> Mage observes that 'atrocities committed by police in "Operation Romeo" brought the villages of Rolpa to a fever pitch,' while the Human Rights Watch report noted that the operation 'drove the already disaffected and impoverished rural population toward the Maoist fold.'<sup>312</sup>

On 4 February 1996, Prachanda submitted a 40-point charter of demands to the government along with a two-week ultimatum to begin implementing reforms.<sup>313</sup> Ganga Thapa and Jan Sharma offer this concise summary of the charter and what it represented:

The 40-point agenda submitted to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba had three key demands - people-centered governance, a self-reliant economy, and nationhood - which constitute the central axes of political debate today. Politically, it called for an end to the special privileges of the king and the royal family. It also sought an end to social and political inequalities, ethnic/caste disparities, and discrimination against minorities and disadvantaged groups. Economically, insurgent demands included a nationalization of private property and a redistribution of land through revolutionary land reforms. In foreign relations, it wanted to redefine Nepal's relations with India by abrogating all "unequal treaties" with India and calling a halt to the recruitment of Nepali hill people to the Indian and British armies.'<sup>314</sup>

Just nine days later, on 13 February, the Maoists launched a series of attacks on police stations across the country, signalling the start of what they declared to be a People's War. However, it

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<sup>310</sup> Human Rights Watch. "Nepal: Between a Rock and Hard Place." *HRW Report*. (2004) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal1004/index.htm> (Accessed 02/06/2020)

<sup>311</sup> Ibid.

<sup>312</sup> Mage. "The Nepali Revolution and International Relations." p.1835; Human Rights Watch. "Nepal."

<sup>313</sup> Verma & Navlakha. "People's War in Nepal." p.1841

<sup>314</sup> Thapa & Sharma. "From Insurgency to Democracy." p.209

took many years for the conflict to erupt into widescale violence: In the two years following the first attacks, a total of 129 people were killed in the war, the majority by the police.<sup>315</sup> During this period, the Maoists focused on developing *Jan Sarkar* (People's Governments) that were intended to replace central government bodies in the rural areas they controlled. These governments were elected from the local population, gathered taxes, and developed their own judicial system.<sup>316</sup> Such activities allowed the Maoists to spread their influence across much of the Nepalese countryside, encompassing the districts of Rukum, Salyan, Kalikot, Jajarkot, Gorkha, and Pyuthan (in addition to Rolpa).<sup>317</sup> Thapa and Sharma note that 'beyond the Kathmandu Valley, the presence of the state had shrunk to district headquarters and commercial towns, leaving Maoists as the only political group in rural areas.'<sup>318</sup>

In May 1998, the Nepalese government launched several major police operations with the goal of retaking the areas governed by the parallel Maoist administrations. Tens of thousands of armed police were deployed in 20 of Nepal's 75 districts, sparking clashes that led to hundreds of deaths and a major escalation of the conflict.<sup>319</sup> The police were only able to reintroduce government control briefly before once again withdrawing. Their failure led to renewed calls for the Nepalese army to be deployed against the Maoists, however Birendra continued to prevaricate, citing various logistical and legal issues that prevented him from ordering his soldiers into the fray.<sup>320</sup> Ongoing Maoist victories increased pressure on the palace and in early 2001 the army was deployed on small operations in Maoist-controlled areas, although 'the army mobilisation... was confined to social and economic activities, and did not involve combating the guerrillas.'<sup>321</sup>

The reasons for Birendra's recalcitrance regarding the deployment of his army is the subject of much speculation. Writing in November 2001, Krishna Hachethu contended that the army 'has deliberately and consciously maintained its distance from the elected government... as if its

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<sup>315</sup> Krishna Hachethu. "The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996 – 2001." in Michael Hutt, ed. *Himalayan 'Peoples War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*. (London: Hurst & Company, 2005) p.61

<sup>316</sup> Sudheer Sharma. "The Maoist Movement." in Michael Hutt, ed. *Himalayan 'Peoples War': Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*. (London: Hurst & Company, 2005) p.47

<sup>317</sup> Hachethu. "The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996 – 2001." p.69

<sup>318</sup> Thapa & Sharma. "From Insurgency to Democracy." p.209

<sup>319</sup> Li Onesto. *Dispatches from the People's War in Nepal*. (New Delhi: Heritage, 2006) p.xiii

<sup>320</sup> Hachethu. "The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996 – 2001." p.69

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, p.71

primary duty is only to protect the palace.’<sup>322</sup> Given Birendra’s reluctance to cede power to parliament, his refusal to send his army to rescue the embattled government appears plausible. It may be the case the king had bypassed parliament altogether and was quietly preparing to negotiate with the Maoists via interlocuters in China.<sup>323</sup>

In June 2001, just months after visiting China, Birendra was killed along with most of the royal family in a shooting that remains shrouded in mystery to this day. The official story, released after a week-long investigation by a government commission, was that the inebriated crown prince killed his family before committing suicide because of a dispute over his future wife. This account has been challenged many times since the massacre.<sup>324</sup> The Maoists initially blamed the king’s brother, Prince Gyanendra (who assumed the throne in the wake of the massacre), and in later years claimed that the Indian government was involved.<sup>325</sup>

Upon his assumption of the throne in June 2001, King Gyanendra continued with his brother’s policy of keeping the army out of the conflict as much as possible, to the extent that the Nepali Congress government collapsed after soldiers refused to follow the orders of the prime minister.<sup>326</sup> In an apparent change of direction, the new government reached a ceasefire with the Maoists and entered into negotiations, although initially the talks were limited to ‘an exchange of views.’<sup>327</sup> On the same day that the new government was formed in Kathmandu, a *Jan Sarkar* administration was established in Dolakha District, far to the east of the Maoist’s traditional base in the west.<sup>328</sup> This not only served to illustrate the growing influence of the Maoists, but also raised the possibility of Kathmandu becoming surrounded by Maoist territory.

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<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

<sup>323</sup> Mage. “The Nepali Revolution and International Relations.” p.1835; Rory McCarthy. “Nepal’s royal upheaval gives cue to Maoists.” *The Guardian*. (2001) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jun/11/nepal> (Accessed 02/06/2020)

<sup>324</sup> An excellent overview of the massacre and the debates concerning it can be found in: Michael Hutt. “The Royal Palace Massacre, Conspiracy Theories and Nepali Street Literature.” in Michael Hutt & Pratyough Raj Onta. *Political Change and Public Culture in Post-1990 Nepal*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017)

<sup>325</sup> IANS. “Maoists now see Indian hand in palace massacre.” *Hindustan Times*. (2010) Available at: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/maoists-now-see-indian-hand-in-palace-massacre/story-uy9BReAJxMuzwMQXY2rDZK.html> (Accessed 02/06/2020)

<sup>326</sup> Hacchethu. “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996 – 2001.” p.72

<sup>327</sup> Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Sara Shneiderman & Mark Turin. “The Path to *Jan Sarkar* in Dolakha District: Towards an Ethnography of the Maoist Movement.” in Michael Hutt, ed. *Himalayan ‘Peoples War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion*. (London: Hurst & Company, 2005) p.79



The 9/11 attacks on the USA and the ensuing “War on Terror” had a profound effect on the conflict in Nepal. In the aftermath of the attacks, the Indian government announced that it was going to help Nepal confront Maoist terrorism and moved troops to the border. Hachhethu contends that these external factors, combined with political developments in Nepal (including the potential for the Nepalese army to enter the conflict), served to strengthen the government’s position regarding the Maoists.<sup>329</sup> The talks broke down in November 2001 after the government refused to form a constituent assembly which would be tasked with writing a new constitution. In response, the Maoists launched 75 coordinated attacks across the country, including some against the army, causing the government to announce a three-month State of Emergency (including the suspension of constitutional freedoms) and mobilise the entire army.<sup>330</sup>

In January 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Kathmandu for talks with the government. He was soon followed by a grant of \$20 million from the US government for the Nepalese security forces, a team of US military advisers, and offers of training at American military academies for Nepalese officers.<sup>331</sup> Mage contends that these events ‘marked the emergence of a qualitatively higher stage (“strategic equilibrium” in the Maoist lexicon) of the revolutionary conflict, in which two armies and two regimes faced each other in a nationwide civil war.’<sup>332</sup> Initially, the war developed in favour of the Maoists. The 35,000-strong Royal Nepalese Army had ‘for more than a century... been limited to providing the pomp and pageantry in honour of royalty’ or serving on multilateral peace support operations, and was therefore unprepared for fighting the battle-hardened Maoists, most of whom were equipped with arms captured from military and police arsenals.<sup>333</sup>

Despite increasing external support for government forces, the fighting continued sporadically across the country with no sign of a victor emerging. The government was repeatedly forced to extend the State of Emergency and eventually had to delay elections scheduled for October 2002.

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<sup>329</sup> Hachhethu. “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996 – 2001.” p.78

<sup>330</sup> Gordon. “Evaluating Nepal’s Integrated “Security” and “Development” Policy.” pp.585-6

<sup>331</sup> BBC. “US pledges support to Nepal.” *BBC News*. (2002) Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1767826.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1767826.stm) (Accessed 22/06/2020); BBC. “US tells Nepal rebels to disarm.” *BBC News*. (2002) Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/2576043.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2576043.stm) (Accessed 22/06/2020)

<sup>332</sup> Mage. “The Nepali Revolution and International Relations.” p.1836

<sup>333</sup> Deepak Thapa & Bandita Sijapati. *Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 – 2004*. (London: Zed Books, 2004) p.136

The failure to make any military progress against the Maoists led Gyanendra to assume executive power for himself and postpone the elections indefinitely, before entering into negotiations with the Maoists in January 2003.<sup>334</sup> Mage contends that while talks were taking place between Gyanendra and the Maoists, the US government stepped up its military assistance to the Nepalese military, delivering 8,000 assault rifles and overseeing the expansion of the army to more than twice the size it was in 2001.<sup>335</sup> In August 2003, the peace talks collapsed, reportedly due to Gyanendra's reluctance to include an option for abolishing the monarchy in the constitutional reforms demanded by the Maoists.<sup>336</sup> Two months later, the Maoists were deemed to pose a threat to US national security and were designated as a terrorist organisation.<sup>337</sup>

After the second round of peace talks collapsed, the war in Nepal escalated. The USA, UK, and Indian governments provided extensive arsenals to the Nepalese government, including attack helicopters and armoured vehicles. Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati note that in this phase of the conflict, the US provided an additional \$14 million in military assistance on top of its previous commitments, the UK procured £6.7 million worth of equipment for the Nepalese military, while the Indian government (fearful of Maoists in India) offered assistance to the tune of almost \$70 million.<sup>338</sup> The failure of the peace talks and the influx of military equipment led to an intensification of the fighting, although neither side was able to make significant ground against their adversary. The stalemate continued until February 2005, when Gyanendra sacked his government and arrested senior politicians in an army-backed coup d'état that provided him with the absolute powers that many of his predecessors had held.<sup>339</sup> Writing at the time, Stuart Gordon commented that:

Gyanendra's strategy is high-risk, with the temporarily expedient course deepening the crisis of political legitimacy. It may also have served to convince many Nepalese of the

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<sup>334</sup> Gordon. "Evaluating Nepal's Integrated "Security" and "Development" Policy." p.587

<sup>335</sup> Mage. "The Nepali Revolution and International Relations." p.1836

<sup>336</sup> BBC. "Nepal ceasefire collapses." *BBC News*. (2003) Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/3184293.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3184293.stm) (Accessed 05/06/2020)

<sup>337</sup> Thapa & Sijapati. *Kingdom Under Siege*. p.191

<sup>338</sup> Ibid, p.190

<sup>339</sup> Randeep Ramesh. "King of Nepal seizes power." *The Guardian*. (2005) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/02/nepal> (Accessed 05/06/2020)

inability to effect reform through peaceful constitutional processes, thereby increasing the attraction of non-constitutional alternatives or more major constitutional changes.<sup>340</sup>

His assessment proved accurate, and when the king's assumption of absolute power proved to be as ineffective at defeating the Maoists as previous systems, political groups of all persuasions began cooperating in opposition to the monarchy. Before the end of the year, a coalition of parties known as the Seven Party Alliance entered into a partnership with the Maoists with the shared goal of removing Gyanendra from power.<sup>341</sup> This major shift in domestic politics was echoed by the international community, with the EU leading calls for the restoration of democracy and India and the UK suspending arms shipments to the government.<sup>342</sup> In April 2006, opposition groups including the Maoists launched a mass uprising involving three to four million people (of a population of 23 million) that has become known as *Jana Andolan II*. Mage reports that Nepalese security commanders were 'forced to tell the king that their troops were no longer willing to fire on the citizenry,' marking the conclusion of the conflict and end the road for Gyanendra.<sup>343</sup>

Negotiations between the government and the Maoists culminated with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006.<sup>344</sup> Ian Martin, who led the UN mission that was deployed to Nepal following the war, observes that: 'Nepal's peace process has been exceptional in the extent to which it was a truly national achievement and not one mediated by any international actor.'<sup>345</sup> A month later, the former belligerents signed the Agreement on the Monitoring of Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA), which provided the framework for the deployment of a UN mission to supervise the de-escalation process.<sup>346</sup> This was followed by the promulgation of an interim constitution that was drafted by a provisional parliament a few

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<sup>340</sup> Gordon. "Evaluating Nepal's Integrated "Security" and "Development" Policy." p.591

<sup>341</sup> Hachhethu. "Legitimacy Crisis of Nepali Monarchy." p.1832

<sup>342</sup> Ibid, p.1831

<sup>343</sup> Mage. "The Nepali Revolution and International Relations." p.1838

<sup>344</sup> Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). (2006) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-comprehensiveagreement2006> (Accessed 05/06/2020)

<sup>345</sup> Ian Martin. "The United Nations and Support to Nepal's Peace Process: The Role of the UN Mission in Nepal." in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, & Suman Pradhan, eds. *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.201

<sup>346</sup> Agreement on the Monitoring of Arms and Armies. (2006) Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/nepal-monitoringarmies2006> (Accessed 07/06/2020)

months later, and in April 2007, the Maoists entered a power-sharing government.<sup>347</sup> In April 2008, elections for the Constituent Assembly were successfully held, although it was not until 2015 that the Constitution of Nepal was finally promulgated. Over 13,000 people were killed during the war in Nepal, the vast majority of whom (approximately 8,000) lost their lives after the declaration of emergency in November 2001.<sup>348</sup>

### International Statebuilding Initiatives

Nepal had very limited experience of external statebuilding initiatives prior to 2006. In 1951, the US government signed a technical cooperation agreement with the Nepalese government, heralding the beginning of a long but limited relationship during the Cold War that focused on building roads and providing grants to develop the mineral extraction sector.<sup>349</sup> Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, India became the largest external donor to Nepal, before Japan rose to this position in the 1980s.<sup>350</sup> Throughout this period, the Nepalese state was largely excluded from external aid, with most projects remaining centred on infrastructure.<sup>351</sup>

A second wave of development assistance began following the introduction of democracy in 1990, bringing much greater financial resources to Nepal. However, projects implemented in this period once again focused on developing infrastructure and sectors of the economy rather than strengthening the state.<sup>352</sup> A 1999 report by the World Bank deemed its performance in Nepal throughout the 1990s as ‘unsatisfactory’ and highlighted the failure to ‘address fundamental institutional and policy constraints’ that were impeding more effective public investment and increased private sector activity.<sup>353</sup> The earliest international statebuilding initiative to be implemented in Nepal was the British Department for International Development’s Enabling State Programme, which was launched in 1997 with the goal strengthening state institutions ‘to

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<sup>347</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Nepal*. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) p.3

<sup>348</sup> Thapa & Sijapati. *Kingdom Under Siege*. p.197

<sup>349</sup> Narayan Khadka. “U.S. Aid to Nepal in the Cold War Period: Lessons for the Future.” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2000) p.83

<sup>350</sup> Monalisa Adhikari. “Politics and Perceptions of Indian Aid to Nepal.” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 38, No. 3. (2014) pp.327-8

<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

<sup>352</sup> Narayan Khadka. “Foreign Aid to Nepal: Donor Motivations in the Post-Cold War Period.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 11. (1997) p.1054

<sup>353</sup> Office of the Director-General. *Nepal – Country Assistance Evaluation*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999) p.1

promote inclusive policies and programmes.’<sup>354</sup> Such efforts were followed in 2002, when India, the UK, and the USA began building the capacity of security institutions.

This history of limited external engagement with the functioning of the Nepalese state ended abruptly following the signing of the CPA. Indeed, Chandra Dev Bhatta argues that the coming of peace ‘opened the floodgates’ for the international community to bring ‘their own packages of state-building’ to Nepal.<sup>355</sup> The British government remained a key player in the post-conflict statebuilding process, spending over £56 million on initiatives ranging from SSR and police modernisation to improving local governance and public financial management.<sup>356</sup> Including the Enabling State Programme, part of which was implemented during the war, the British government spent over £87 million on strengthening the Nepalese state.

USAID spent over \$108 million on statebuilding initiatives following the war, with a wide array of initiatives focussing on improving governance, the electoral process, and public financial management, as well as the drafting of the new constitution.<sup>357</sup> The US Department of Defense continued its assistance to the Nepalese armed forces in the wake of the conflict, spending over \$54 million on training Nepalese soldiers and providing military equipment such as light transport aircraft.<sup>358</sup> The US Department of State spent an additional \$33.5 million on statebuilding initiatives, including efforts to strengthen the police and border control.<sup>359</sup> In total, the US government spent at least \$195 million on statebuilding initiatives in Nepal between 2006 and 2019.

Martin contends that the greatest challenge to consolidating peace in post-war Nepal was ‘the failure to negotiate more fully the future of armies and of the Maoist militia.’<sup>360</sup> He notes that rather than designing a procedure in which the armies would be integrated, the CPA ‘merely set out processes toward vaguely formulated objectives: the “integration and rehabilitation” of

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<sup>354</sup> Between 1997 and 2014, over £31 million was spent on this initiative. Department of International Development. “Enabling State Programme.” *Devtracker*. (2016) Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-108572> (Accessed 08/06/2020)

<sup>355</sup> Chandra Dev Bhatta. “External Influence and Challenges of State-building in Nepal.” *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 2. (2013) p.170

<sup>356</sup> Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/NP/projects> (Accessed 08/06/2020)

<sup>357</sup> Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/query> (Accessed 07/05/2020)

<sup>358</sup> Ibid.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> Martin. “The United Nations and Support to Nepal’s Peace Process.” p.229

Maoist combatants and the “democratization” of the Nepalese Army.’<sup>361</sup> Six years after the Agreement was signed, the two armies that had fought each other for a decade remained in place as separate forces, with approximately 9,000 Maoist troops being confined to UN-monitored camps while they awaited a political settlement regarding their future. Furthermore, the complexity of the SSR process in Nepal was compounded by the traditional position of the armed forces as the military of the monarchy rather than the state. As such, not only did former belligerents need integrating if the spirit for the peace process was to be honoured, but the structures of civilian oversight and administration that govern the military in a democratic state also had to be established from scratch.

Although the international community did not intervene in the conflict, a UN mission was deployed to Nepal once peace had been negotiated. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) included 153 unarmed military observers, along with an electoral component, a police advisory team, and a civil affairs department.<sup>362</sup> UNMIN was tasked with supporting certain aspects of the peace process, such as providing technical support to the Constituent Assembly elections.<sup>363</sup> It was also given a minor (yet noteworthy) role in the SSR process, with its duties in this area being limited to supervising the caches of arms that were deposited by the Maoists following the cessation of hostilities and hosting meetings between former belligerents.<sup>364</sup> These meetings took place through the mechanism of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC), as stipulated by the AMMAA. Bishnu Raj Upreti and Peter Vanhoutte contend that while various governmental bodies (such as the Army Integration Special Committee) fell prey to paralysis due to political disputes, the JMCC provided a key vehicle to further the SSR process in Nepal: ‘The JMCC is one of the very few bodies where representatives from the Nepalese Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) ex-combatants still [in 2009] regularly meet to discuss issues.’<sup>365</sup> In April 2012, the first contingents of Maoist soldiers were integrated into the Nepalese Army in a compromise that was welcomed by their commander:

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<sup>361</sup> Ibid.

<sup>362</sup> Martin. “The United Nations and Support to Nepal’s Peace Process.” p.207

<sup>363</sup> United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1740*. (New York: United Nations, 2007)

<sup>364</sup> A detailed description of these duties is available in: Bishnu Raj Upreti & Peter Vanhoutte. “Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities.” in Hans Born & Albrecht Schnabel, eds. *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*. (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2009) p.173

<sup>365</sup> Ibid, pp.178-9

‘It’s final now. The peace process is over. The armies have merged.’<sup>366</sup> Between its initial deployment in January 2007 and the withdrawal of the last UNMIN officials in January 2011, over \$241 million was spent on the operation.<sup>367</sup>

The UNDP operated alongside UNMIN, and spent \$43 million on building ‘democratic governance’ in Nepal between 2006 and 2010, in addition to the significant resources committed to programmes focussing on poverty reduction and crisis prevention.<sup>368</sup> Between 2012 and 2019, over \$26.5 million was spent by the UNDP on building the capacity of Nepal’s Electoral Commission, while an additional \$5 million was spent supporting the creation of the new constitution.<sup>369</sup> Additional programmes focused on increasing the capacity of local government and public administration, strengthening the Human Rights Commission, and reforming the justice sector. In total, the UNDP spent at least \$125 million on statebuilding initiatives in Nepal between 2006 and 2019.<sup>370</sup>

The most significant external contributor to statebuilding initiatives in post-conflict Nepal was the World Bank. A small number of initiatives were started while the fighting continued, such as a \$30 million project to build the capacity of the central bank and improve financial governance that ran from 2002 to 2011.<sup>371</sup> The majority of the World Bank’s efforts came after the war, with projects targeting good governance, strengthening public financial management, and building the capacity of the Office of the Auditor General.<sup>372</sup> In the immediate post-war period, over \$50

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<sup>366</sup> BBC. “Nepal army ‘completes’ peace process with Maoists.” *BBC News*. (2012) Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17676538> (Accessed 07/06/2020)

<sup>367</sup> Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/62/512: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2007); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/64/349: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2009); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/65/328: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2010); Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. *A/66/354: Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council*. (New York: United Nations, 2011)

<sup>368</sup> UNDP. *Assessment of Development Results: Nepal*. (New York: United Nations, 2012) p.21

<sup>369</sup> Available at: <https://open.undp.org/projects> (Accessed 08/06/2020)

<sup>370</sup> I have been unable to trace the extent of UNDP statebuilding activities in Nepal between 2010 and 2012.

<sup>371</sup> World Bank. *Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P071291> (Accessed 08/06/2020)

<sup>372</sup> World Bank. *NP: Strengthening the Office of the Auditor General*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P127040> (Accessed 08/06/2020)



million was spent by the World Bank on statebuilding initiatives in Nepal.<sup>373</sup> In more recent years, the World Bank has invested heavily in its ongoing efforts to improve financial management in Nepal, with a \$200 million project being approved in 2018 and another \$100 million being committed in 2019.<sup>374</sup>

Between the end of 2006 and 2019, the international community spent at least \$1.05 billion on statebuilding initiatives in post-conflict Nepal, although it is important to note that \$300 million of that figure has been allocated by the World Bank since 2018. The cumulative value of international statebuilding initiatives in Nepal translates to approximately \$3 per annum for each Nepalese citizen, far less than the other cases in this assessment. It is possible that these figures would be higher if Indian assistance was included, however detailed such data is unavailable. Of the Indian initiatives that have been traced, there are no examples of statebuilding programmes.<sup>375</sup>

### Fragile States Index

Table 5 presents FSI's data on four broad sectors of the Nepalese state, as well as an additional measure indicating the extent to which an external intervention was present in the country.

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
<sup>373</sup> Available at: [https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode\\_exact=NP](https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-list?countrycode_exact=NP) (Accessed 08/06/2020)

<sup>374</sup> World Bank. *Nepal Fiscal Reforms DPC*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P160792> (Accessed 08/06/2020); World Bank. *Programmatic Fiscal and Public Financial Management Development Policy Credit ( II )*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P168869> (Accessed 08/06/2020)

<sup>375</sup> Given the presence of the Maoists in many recent Nepalese governments, it is plausible that efforts by the Indian government to influence the statebuilding process have been stymied. Likewise, given ongoing Maoist activity in India, it is plausible that the Indian government has not engaged with building a state that is often governed by Maoists.



Table 5



Since the conflict in Nepal ended in 2006, every sector of the Nepalese state has witnessed a sustained increase in stability, with the Security Apparatus having made the most progress in this regard. Indeed, the development of the security sector in post-conflict Nepal represents the largest shift away from fragility of any state sector examined in this assessment. While noteworthy improvements were made in the years immediately after the conflict, progress was redoubled following the integration of Maoist troops into the Nepalese military in 2012.

The Nepalese economy has also become increasingly stable since 2006, demonstrating the success of efforts by actors such as the World Bank and USAID to strengthen public financial management. Nepal has gradually risen on the Legatum Prosperity Index, from a low of 129<sup>th</sup> in 2010 to 115<sup>th</sup> in 2019.<sup>376</sup> In this period, poverty has also decreased from 15 percent to 8 percent

<sup>376</sup> Legatum Prosperity Index. *Nepal Country Profile*. (London: Legatum Institute Foundation, 2019) Available at: <https://www.prosperity.com/all-countries> (Accessed 16/05/2020)

and the trade deficit has contracted.<sup>377</sup> In 2015, the Nepalese economy was dealt a significant shock by two devastating earthquakes which left approximately 70 percent of the population in temporary accommodation for years.<sup>378</sup> In this period, the legitimacy of the state and respect for the rule of law also became slightly more fragile. Since 2017, however, all sectors of the Nepalese state have continued to become more stable.

In contrast to the other cases, in which the international presence decreased following the cessation of hostilities, external intervention increased following the war in Nepal. Indeed, the extent of international intervention in Nepal gradually increased for an entire decade in the aftermath of the conflict and only began to decline in 2015. The lack of an international peacekeeping presence during the war evidently explains why there was not a considerable drawdown of external intervention in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, as there was in Burundi and Chad (and to some extent, Côte d'Ivoire). However, the sustained increase indicates a growing international interest between 2006 and 2015 to ensure Nepal did not relapse into conflict.

## **What happened and why?**

### *Successful SSR*

Building an accountable and professional security sector that incorporated elements of both government and Maoist armed forces was one of the key stipulations of the peace process. As a result, getting the SSR process right in post-conflict Nepal constituted a major challenge to all those hoping to prevent a return to war. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, thousands of Maoist troops remained confined to camps while the constitutional status of the Nepalese Army remained ambiguous following the abolishment of the monarchy. Furthermore, the Special Committees established by the Nepalese government to address SSR issues met just once between the end of the war and July 2009.<sup>379</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> World Bank. *Overview*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020) Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nepal/overview> (Accessed 10/06/2020)

<sup>378</sup> Stephen Khan. "Two years after the earthquake, why has Nepal failed to recover?" *The Conversation*. (2017) Available at: <https://theconversation.com/two-years-after-the-earthquake-why-has-nepal-failed-to-recover-77552> (Accessed 10/06/2020)

<sup>379</sup> Rhoderick Chalmers. "State Power and the Security Sector." in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone, & Suman Pradhan, eds. *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p.78

The stagnation of the SSR process remained largely unaddressed until, in 2009, it became the focus of a political crisis. Nepal's first Maoist prime minister attempted to dismiss the head of the army for refusing to accept the supremacy of civilian authorities. The commander refused to leave his post and was then formally reinstated by the president. In an effort to deescalate the crisis, the prime minister resigned, but not before the governing coalition collapsed and widespread protests took place.<sup>380</sup> In November 2011, it was agreed that a maximum of 6,500 Maoist troops would be integrated into the Nepalese Army. However, divisions within the Maoist movement regarding the integration process (compounded by socio-economic pressures to opt for substantial cash lump-sums) led many former combatants to choose retirement rather than integration. Ultimately, just 1,500 Maoist troops joined the newly established Nepalese Armed Forces (NAF) in 2012.<sup>381</sup> While Maoists were excluded from the most senior positions, 70 were commissioned as officers.<sup>382</sup>

Another key stipulation of the peace process advanced by the Maoists was for the military to adjust its composition to more accurately reflect Nepalese society. The Interim Constitution that was promulgated following the signing of the CPA decreed that 45 percent of the NAF should be recruited from previously marginalised groups such as women, ethnic minorities (such as the Madheshi from Tarai), and groups at the bottom of the caste system. While some progress has been made towards meeting this target, it is extremely limited: A few thousand Madheshi serve in largely technical roles, while in 2015 there were 1,776 female personnel of all ranks in the NAF.<sup>383</sup> Together, these groups now make up just a few percent of the total strength of the military.

Although progress was initially slow, the construction of the NAF has been an exceptionally smooth process. Indeed, given the opposition among hardliners to the compromises made by the Maoist leadership regarding the integration process and the reservations of the Nepal's traditional military leadership, the complete absence of coup d'états and mutinies in post-war Nepal is almost surprising. The 2018 Bertelsmann Stiftung country report notes that 'despite

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<sup>380</sup> Maseeh Rahman & Owen Bowcott. "Nepalese prime minister resigns from cabinet." *The Guardian*. (2009) Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/04/nepal-dahal-maoist> (11/06/2020)

<sup>381</sup> Subindra Bogati. "Assessing Inclusivity in the Post-War Army Integration Process in Nepal." *Berghof Foundation Inclusive Political Settlements Paper*, No. 11. (2015) p.7

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid, pp.11-12

some worries about a possible coup d'état in 2012/13, the Nepalese Army has refrained from overt political engagement in recent years.<sup>384</sup> Furthermore, the report celebrates SSR in post-conflict Nepal as 'one of the few successful instances worldwide of post-conflict army integration.'<sup>385</sup>

The successful construction of the NAF not only brought an end to the situation in which two separate and formerly warring armies existed within one state, but also presented an opportunity for Nepalese troops to return their focus to serving on multilateral peace support operations.<sup>386</sup> During the war, the Nepalese government was able to contribute an average of 800 soldiers per year to UN operations.<sup>387</sup> Following the signing of the CPA, this figure quickly rose to 3,000 and, by 2010, had grown to 5,000, with full battalions of Nepalese troops serving in Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, and Darfur.<sup>388</sup> Since military unification in 2012, Nepal has contributed troops to six new UN operations, while also increasing its contributions to existing operations such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.<sup>389</sup> At the time of writing, 5091 Nepalese troops and police are serving with the UN, making this relatively small country the fifth largest personnel contributor in the world (or second, after Uruguay, if measured per capita).<sup>390</sup>

Arturo Sotomayor highlights the importance of these contributions to UN operations to the overall SSR process in Nepal, observing that when the military found itself starved of funds following the war, 'peacekeeping provided an important source of income, while making it possible for force levels to be maintained.'<sup>391</sup> At its peak, UN payments to the NAF represented approximately 25 percent of the entire defence budget, and thus represented a key source of reliable funding for a military in the midst of considerable upheaval.<sup>392</sup> Thus, while it is

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<sup>384</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung. *BTI 2018 Country Report — Nepal*. p.9

<sup>385</sup> Ibid.

<sup>386</sup> 135,000 Nepalese troops have served on over 40 peace support operations since 1958. During the 1990s, major contributions were made to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia.

<sup>387</sup> Arturo Sotomayor. "The Nepalese Army: From counterinsurgency to peacekeeping?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 25, No. 5. (2014) p.998

<sup>388</sup> Ibid, p.999

<sup>389</sup> Nepali Army. "The Nepali Army in UN Peace Support Operations." *About Us*. (2020) Available at: [https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/page/na\\_in\\_un](https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/page/na_in_un) (Accessed 10/06/2020)

<sup>390</sup> Ibid.

<sup>391</sup> Sotomayor. "The Nepalese Army." p.1000

<sup>392</sup> Ibid.

important to note that assumptions regarding some of the benefits of serving on multilateral missions are highly debatable, it is also evident that the financial opportunities that such operations present not only incentivised adherence to the peace process, but also provided much-needed resources. This allowed military leaders to ‘manoeuvre the transition from insurgency to peace without provoking large operational cuts’ which could have destabilised the peace process by either introducing large numbers of disgruntled soldiers into society or provoking mutinies in the ranks like those that took place in Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>393</sup>

### *Local Consensus and Local Ownership*

The conflict in Nepal was not ended by an international intervention or by a peace process sponsored by major regional or global powers, but by an endogenous political settlement that resulted from a military stalemate and widespread demand for comprehensive changes in Nepalese society. Furthermore, parties from across the political spectrum supported *Jana Andolan II* and the abolishment of the monarchy, providing a broad base of legitimacy for the post-war constitutional settlement represented by the Interim Constitution and the Constitutional Assembly. Even the Maoists, who had in 1996 proclaimed armed struggle as the best vehicle to achieve their goals, participated in the newly established consociational structures of governance and the electoral process. Indeed, while some hard-line elements within the movement remained sceptical, the Maoist leadership appears to have been committed to using parliamentary democracy to achieve their goals even prior to the signing of the CPA. In an interview conducted in May 2006, Prachanda stated: ‘Within the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist constitutional framework, only through multiparty competition... can counter-revolution be prevented.’<sup>394</sup>

This broad consensus allowed major debates regarding the future of the Nepalese state to be contested in the political arena rather than by violence or threats of renewed conflict. As has been noted, the SSR process was highly contentious and represented a significant challenge to establishing a lasting peace. However, thousands of Maoist troops waited for years after the war while the political leadership participated in drawn-out negotiations to decide their future. While Prachanda warned in 2007 that a failure to end the monarchy could force the Maoists to take up arms again, Maoist troops did not break the terms of the peace process at any point between the

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<sup>393</sup> Ibid.

<sup>394</sup> Verma & Navlakha. “People’s War in Nepal.” p.1843

signing of the CPA and military unification in 2012, demonstrating a meaningful commitment to peace.<sup>395</sup> While the value of consensus for ending the conflict is rather obvious, the value of former belligerents sharing a belief in the parliamentary process to achieve their goals cannot be understated.<sup>396</sup>

The provisions of the CPA and the AMMAA not only provided the framework in which Nepal's post-conflict transition took place, but also provided many of the blueprints for how the post-war state would be built. The articles concerning the security sector, for example, invited a UN mission to facilitate the military integration process through its position as Chair of the JMCC. Its responsibilities beyond this role were extremely limited. Indeed, Jasmine-Kim Westendorf observes the exceptional nature of UN presence in post-war Nepal:

UNMIN's early engagement in Nepal was based on a deep understanding of the local context and conflict, existing relationships with key actors, and a willingness to proactively seek ways to assist in resolving conflicts between the parties as they emerged.<sup>397</sup>

Through the JMCC, representatives of the Maoists and the Nepalese Army were able to discuss and plan the integration process while the details were discussed and debated in parliament. Ultimately, the decision to integrate the armies in 2012 was that of the Nepalese government, rather than a directive of the international community. Westendorf notes that UNMIN officials prioritised 'political engagement and ongoing mediation' in their work, an approach which 'satisfied Nepali demands for local ownership.'<sup>398</sup> As a result, the entire process was led locally, conferring legitimacy and ensuring that the process reflected political realities at the time. Elly Harrowell and Varsha Gyawali argue that one of the most important lessons to emerge from the

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<sup>395</sup> Reuters. "Nepal Maoists threaten to return to armed revolt." *Reuters Nepal*. (2007) Available at: <https://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-30676220071125> (Accessed 11/06/2020)

<sup>396</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina represents an interesting case in which the former belligerents seemingly share a belief in the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war (although interpretations differ considerably) but find little to no common ground in the national parliament. This author explores this complex dynamic in Elliot Short. "The Orao Affair: The Key to Military Integration in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1. (2018)

<sup>397</sup> Jasmine-Kim Westendorf. "Challenges of Local Ownership: Understanding the Outcomes of the International Community's 'Light Footprint' Approach to the Nepal Peace Process." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, Vol. 12, No. 2. (2018) p.230

<sup>398</sup> Ibid, p.237

Nepali peace process is the importance of ‘local ownership of the peace process,’ elaborating that:

While international actors did play a role, the fact that local ownership was retained over Nepal’s peace process is significant and goes some way to explaining why this process has not experienced the same kind of crisis in legitimacy witnessed in other cases.<sup>399</sup>

### *Government Alternation*

Nepal is unique among the cases in this assessment for many reasons, perhaps the most striking of which is that it is the only state to have experienced a change in government since the war ended. Indeed, a patchwork of coalition governments have governed Nepal since the end of the war, with shifting alliances between elections driving the collapse and formation of a dozen administrations since 2006. Since the proclamation of a Federal Democratic Republic in 2008, Nepal has had eleven prime ministers: Three representing the Nepali Congress; three Maoists; three Marxist-Leninists; one independent; and one (the incumbent) who represents the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), which was formed in 2018 when the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist parties merged.<sup>400</sup> The Nepali Congress held the presidency between 2010 and 2015, when Bidhya Devi Bhandari, a former a Marxist-Leninist but now a member of the NCP, took office.

While the extent of government alternation in Nepal is unusually high and has undoubtedly resulted in political instability, several key benefits can be identified. Freedom House highlights several areas in which Nepal has made noteworthy progress, particularly regarding elections. For example, it notes that ‘the legal framework for elections is largely sound and facilitates the conduct of credible polls’ and lists the electoral process as being free and fair for the most part, while also observing that a plurality of parties have a realistic chance of gaining power.<sup>401</sup> The assessment is not wholly positive, with major concerns being raised about instances of election-related violence and corruption among public officials. On balance, however, Nepal has made

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<sup>399</sup> Elly Harrowell & Varsha Gyawali. “Nepal.” in Alpaslan Özerdem & Roger Mac Ginty, eds. *Comparing Peace Processes*. (Oxford: Routledge, 2019) p.208

<sup>400</sup> Kamal Dev Bhattarai. “The (Re)Birth of the Nepal Communist Party.” *The Diplomat*. (2018) Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-rebirth-of-the-nepal-communist-party/> (Accessed 12/06/2020)

<sup>401</sup> Freedom House. *Nepal Overview*. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020) Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nepal/freedom-world/2020> (Accessed 12/06/2020)

remarkable progress towards establishing a functioning and vibrant democracy and stands alone among the cases in this assessment in this regard.

While the impact of government alternation on the statebuilding process is hard to quantify, several important observations can be made. The other cases in this assessment all fell prey to the ambitions of a single individual who strove to maintain their grip on the state in the aftermath of conflict. This created situations in which loyalty was valued above ability in state institutions, which in turn fostered clientelism and ultimately subverted the statebuilding process. In Nepal, almost every political party that is represented in parliament was united under the banner of *Jana Andolan II* and, as a result, they are well versed in opposing dictatorship. This has contributed to preventing a single individual from accumulating too much power, which in turn has ensured that statebuilding initiatives have been subjected to debate and scrutiny. Furthermore, although frequent government alternation has slowed the implementation of certain aspects of the peace process (such as military integration), it has also ensured that the terms of the accords have not been forgotten, subverted, or implemented in a one-sided way. Together, these factors have allowed international statebuilding initiatives and the broader post-conflict transition in Nepal to be relatively successful.

### A Way Forward?

At the time of writing, the most salient threat to peace in Nepal is not a relapse into civil war, but the rapidly escalating border dispute with India.<sup>402</sup> While certainly not a development worthy of celebration, the crisis does illustrate the extent to which Nepalese society has moved on from wartime divisions. Indeed, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli has received support from across the political spectrum for his aggressive stance against Nepal's southern neighbour, suggesting that historic divisions may have been smoothed over by 'a cross-partisan, nationalist opposition to India.'<sup>403</sup> How long this sense of unity will last is unclear, and although a relapse into conflict appears unlikely, key questions regarding the strength and capacity of the state remain.

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<sup>402</sup> Amy Kazmin. "Nepal angers India with map claiming disputed territory." *Financial Times*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/08621230-550a-4a92-a29e-cd7379783a4e> (Accessed 12/06/2020)

<sup>403</sup> Constantino Xavier. "Interpreting the India-Nepal border dispute." *Brookings*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/11/interpreting-the-india-nepal-border-dispute/> (Accessed 12/06/2020)



The data from both the FSI and Freedom House highlight respect for human rights as an area of concern. The progress made since the signing of the CPA has been positive and should not be ignored, however the multi-party democracy that has been established risks being undermined by the failure to firmly entrench civil liberties as part of the Nepalese political environment. Human Rights Watch highlights the following areas of concern: The lack of inclusion for minority groups, inaction over ‘caste-based killings,’ and the failure of successive governments to hold those responsible for abuses during the war to account.<sup>404</sup> Indeed, the two transitional justice commissions that have been established to investigate such wartime abuses are described as being ‘plagued by a lack of transparency and compliance with international law.’<sup>405</sup> Thus, many of the issues that were held up as motivations for the Maoist rebellion remain. While the current Maoist/NCP leadership appears satisfied with its position in parliamentary politics, their model for political success (using violence as a vehicle to achieve power and influence) could easily be adopted by a wide spectrum of disgruntled groups.

Despite the progress that has been made in stabilising Nepal’s economy since the war, it represents another key area that is beset with problems that have the potential to threaten peace. The World Bank contends that approximately 31 percent of the population faces ‘significant risks of falling into extreme poverty, primarily because of reduced remittances, foregone earnings of potential migrants, job losses in the informal sector, and rising prices for essential commodities.’<sup>406</sup> Such concerns serve to illustrate the extent to which the economy remains fragile. High levels of poverty and the uneven distribution of wealth across the country were, along with human rights grievances, a motivation for the Maoist rebellion. Therefore, both Nepalese policymakers and external actors must ensure that international statebuilding efforts targeting the economic institutions of the state continue to bring the poorest parts of the population out of poverty.

Westendorf summarises the shortcomings of the peace process eloquently:

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<sup>404</sup> Human Rights Watch. “Nepal.” *World Report 2020*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/asia/nepal> (Accessed 12/06/2020); Human Rights Watch. “Nepal: Ensure Justice for Caste-Based Killings.” *HRW News*. (2020) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/01/nepal-ensure-justice-caste-based-killings> (Accessed 12/06/2020); Human Rights Watch. “Nepal: Justice Stalled for Conflict-Era Crimes.” *HRW News*. (2019) Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/29/nepal-justice-stalled-conflict-era-crimes> (Accessed 12/06/2020)

<sup>405</sup> Human Rights Watch. *Nepal*.

<sup>406</sup> World Bank. *Overview*.

In many ways, the peace process has been a transition back to the ‘normal’ that defined Nepali politics pre-war, with the Kathmandu elite maintaining control of the political and economic systems while the rest of the country struggles with the daily task of subsisting. The Maoist elites have joined the Kathmandu elites and benefited more from their participation in the political system than resuming the People’s War; a peace dividend thus exists, but is not stable.<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>407</sup> Westendorf. “Challenges of Local Ownership.” p.247

## Conclusion

This assessment has demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, international statebuilding initiatives can help a country that is recovering from conflict to become more stable. It is also evident that, in some cases, such initiatives do little to strengthen the state and leave it as fragile as it was in the immediate aftermath of war, despite the allocation of considerable resources. By better understanding the factors that allow statebuilding to be successful and incorporating the lessons learned from past efforts into future programming, it may be possible to increase the effectiveness of statebuilding initiatives and ultimately build more stable states. If the opening statement of this assessment (that fragile states make violence and violence makes fragile states) holds true, this will reduce armed conflict.

In this concluding section of the assessment, the findings and insights that have been garnered from comparatively analysing the post-conflict statebuilding experiences of Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nepal are presented. These “lessons learned” may offer a way to improve future statebuilding initiatives. However, further research on additional case studies is required to add both depth and nuance, while a more detailed examination of the methods and tools that are employed by statebuilding practitioners in the field will likely provide a broader spectrum of insights.

### *Local Actors Should Not Be Underestimated*

The governing administrations of states receiving international statebuilding initiatives have demonstrated their ability to use the resources intended for statebuilding, as well as the associated diplomatic rents to sovereignty, to consolidate their positions of power. In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD paid lip-service to international donors to ensure resources continued to flow into the country while consolidating their grip on state institutions such as the military and the civil service. In Chad, Déby managed to secure World Bank support to develop the oil industry before dismantling the mechanisms that were put in place to ensure the revenue was spent on development and re-directing resources to strengthen his grip on power. In addition, he has proven adept at co-opting resources that were intended for other statebuilding initiatives in a similar way, while also maintaining a level of instability within Chad that allows him to repress opposition. Even in the relatively successful case of Côte d'Ivoire, Ouattara was able to harness considerable resources from the international community to kick-start the Ivoirian economy

while also subverting efforts to strengthen sectors of the state that could present a threat to his rule, such as the judiciary.

The post-conflict recovery in Nepal was locally led, from the negotiation of the CPA to the creation of a constitution and the construction of new state institutions. While international assistance augmented the work of local actors and provided resources where necessary, statebuilding efforts in post-war Nepal were designed and implemented by Nepalese officials. In other words, the most successful example of post-conflict statebuilding surveyed in this assessment was one in which international efforts were present but were very much subsidiary to local ones.

Local actors are far from passive recipients of international statebuilding initiatives. Instead, they are capable and dynamic leaders with their own aims and objectives. This assessment demonstrates how such actors can construct a façade of cooperation and appropriate resources intended for statebuilding, while actively working to subvert the objectives of the international community behind the scenes. Local actors have also proven their ability to build a stronger and more resilient state than those designed by outsiders when it is in their interest to do so. For statebuilding initiatives to work, donors and practitioners need to demonstrate far more political acumen and gain much better intelligence on how the resources that they provide are spent. When an administration that is receiving statebuilding assistance employs those resources for repressing political opposition or personal enrichment, the international community must recognise that it is building a regime rather than a state.

As this assessment has demonstrated, a strong regime does not necessarily mean a strong state, nor a peaceful society. Therefore, statebuilding initiatives that fashion regimes with powerful armies and diplomatic prestige must be controlled by mechanisms that reward the construction of functioning, resilient, and stable states and penalise corruption, political repression, and one-party rule. Such mechanisms would not necessarily have to encompass the application of conditionality to development assistance. Instead, lucrative opportunities on multilateral peacekeeping operations could be withheld until the armed forces that would serve in such a capacity observe a single chain of command, can be held to account by the judiciary, and are overseen by the appropriate civilian ministries. Alternatively, politically valuable diplomatic

positions in international organisations could be withheld until a state is assessed to have held free and fair elections, or at least until the political opposition is not violently repressed.

### *Getting SSR Right Is Vital*

In all four cases presented in this assessment, the security sector was the central component of the peace process. Indeed, the negotiations that brought each conflict to an end can essentially be boiled down to a bartering process between rival military leaders over how many of their troops would join the post-war national military and how many ministries they would control in the post-war national government. As a result, the process of military integration and the construction of an integrated army was arguably the most significant process in bringing stability to each state.

In Burundi, an internationally led SSR process was successful in building a large Burundian military capable of operating as part of a multilateral force in extremely hostile environments. However, these efforts failed to build the kind of military stipulated in the Arusha Agreement: Troops from the CNDD-FDD came to dominate the military at the expense of other parties to Arusha, undermining the peace process; furthermore, many Burundian military leaders remained connected to the party, undermining efforts to build an accountable and professional armed force. The omission of the Burundian intelligence service from the SSR process allowed the CNDD-FDD to employ it against domestic political opposition and consolidate its grip on the Burundian state. As a result, the SSR process in Burundi built a highly capable security sector for the CNDD-FDD administration rather than the Burundian state.

The SSR process in Chad resulted in the construction of a well-equipped praetorian guard for Déby but left the rest of the Chadian security sector fractured, unprofessional, and unaccountable. Furthermore, positions in Chadian security institutions represent a form of political currency that are exchanged for loyalty, rather than a manifestation of skill and merit. Like in Burundi, the SSR process has built an army for the incumbent administration rather than the state. Even in the relatively successful case of Côte d'Ivoire, the military integration process has been skewed in favour of Ouattara's wartime backers in contravention of the terms of the peace process. Furthermore, efforts to professionalise the Ivorian military have failed, to the

extent that soldiers have mutinied to express their discontent over poor conditions and a lack of pay, threatening a repeat of the same cycle that led to war in the first place.

A central objective of the SSR process of each case in this assessment is the deployment of troops on multilateral support operations. Although this has been achieved by all four states, the impact that this has had varies considerably, both domestically and on the countries in which the troops have been deployed. The Burundian contribution to AMISOM was heralded as valuable and effective, but the revenue received by the Burundian state for such efforts have been appropriated by the CNDD-FDD leadership rather than being invested back into the military or spent on development. Chadian troops have also been described as highly effective combatants when pitched against Islamic extremists across the Sahel, however much of the revenue that Chad receives for such services goes to Déby and his ‘untouchables.’ Furthermore, while Chadian troops have proven themselves on the battlefield, they have repeatedly demonstrated that they are not fit for service on multilateral peace support operations by massacring unarmed civilians. Such actions serve to undermine the entire peacekeeping operation and the credibility of the UN across the world.

Nepal is the only case in which the SSR process has not contravened the terms of the peace process: Although less Maoists were eventually integrated than first intended, this was the result of political compromise and the decision of Maoist troops to opt for retirement. Furthermore, the newly integrated NAF was professionalised, with troops from both sides receiving formal training as officers and Nepalese peacekeepers being more effectively trained for multilateral peace support operations than their counterparts from the other cases in this assessment.<sup>408</sup> Since the NAF embarked on widespread peace support operations in the aftermath of the war, its major contributions have taken place largely free from controversy. Furthermore, the revenue for such services subsidises the professional development of the NAF rather than consolidating the power of the government. The success of the post-war SSR process in Nepal has created the conditions in which other sectors of the state have been strengthened and politics has taken place in a peaceful environment, highlighting the extent to which getting SSR right can catalyse the stabilisation of a state recovering from conflict.

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<sup>408</sup> Nepal’s historic contributions to such endeavours undoubtedly aided this process.

*The International Footprint Must Be Light but Sustained*

The size and duration of the international presence in a state recovering from conflict has a direct bearing on the success of statebuilding efforts. In both Burundi and Chad, a large international military intervention was deployed during the conflict but departed (at the behest of Nkurunziza and Déby, respectively) almost immediately after the peace agreements that ended each war were signed. The departure of the peacekeepers marked the end of the international presence in each country, although international actors continued to play a major role in efforts to bring stability. In Burundi, the international community spent at least \$7 per capita per annum on statebuilding initiatives and led the SSR process, while in Chad at least \$14 was spent per capita per annum on efforts to strengthen the state.

In contrast, the international presence in Côte d'Ivoire and Nepal remained in place for many years after their respective conflicts ended: Six in the former, five in the latter. Furthermore, although the international intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was large during the conflict, the number of personnel was quickly drawn down afterwards, while in Nepal the intervention remained small and targeted for its entire deployment. In both cases, external actors fulfilled the role of facilitator, monitor, and advisor rather than the architects of the statebuilding project.

Furthermore, the international community spent just \$3 per capita per annum on statebuilding projects in Nepal, the most successful case in this assessment. The light footprint of UNMIN in Nepal ensured that processes such as SSR continued to make progress through mechanisms such as the JMCC without detracting from the legitimacy of the process. In Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI provided Ouattara with much leeway to lead the statebuilding process himself and, like UNMIN, focussed on ensuring processes such as police reform were moving forward as intended.

Although Côte d'Ivoire received at least \$14.5 per capita per annum (a very similar figure to Chad) for statebuilding initiatives, these funds were dispersed in an environment in which the international community remained present. Furthermore, in both cases the international presence was sustained through several elections, presenting an opportunity to assess how each state was developing during potentially disruptive contests and transitions of power.

The success of the Nepalese case demonstrates that simply committing greater resources to statebuilding efforts does not increase their effectiveness. Indeed, the findings of this assessment suggests that a small but sustained international presence can help ensure that relatively modest

resources can have a much greater impact. Such a presence can advise, facilitate, and monitor, thereby reducing the likelihood that statebuilding initiatives are not subverted or abused. This helps to ensure that a state is built rather than a regime, while also respecting the sovereignty of local actors and minimising wastage. In practical terms, this means that international statebuilding initiatives can be effective in preventing post-conflict states from relapsing into war if an appropriately sized multilateral mission is present with the power to advise, facilitate, and monitor. Local actors are more than capable of doing the rest.



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