






THE POLITICAL LEGITIMIZATION OF EXTREME FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN
EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES: A CASE STUDY ON GREECE'S
GOLDEN DAWN

by

Andrea Mancuso
A Thesis
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of
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of
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Committee:

	Chair of Committee
	
	
	Graduate Program Director
	Dean, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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University of Malta
Valletta, Malta

The Political Legitimization of Extreme Far-Right Parties in European Union Member
States: A Case Study on Greece's Golden Dawn

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
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by

Andrea Mancuso
The Catholic University of America, 2013
Bachelor of Arts

Director: Monika Wohlfeld, Professor
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta

Fall Semester 2014
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
University of Malta
Valletta, Malta



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DEDICATION

To Sergio: We're here.

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I would like to thank my ever loving family and friends, as well as my biggest inspiration, my Grandmother, Pockie. A special thanks to Dr. Monika Wohlfeld and Mr. Michael English for their guidance and encouragement during my time at George Mason University and the University of Malta, as well as the members of my review committee for taking the time to evaluate this dissertation. Finally, endless thanks to my fiancé and best friend, Sergio, who assisted me, supported me, made me laugh and eat throughout this entire journey.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Alleanza Nazionale (Italy)	AN
Alternative for Germany (Germany)	AfD
Austrian Freedom Party (Austria).....	FPÖ
British National Party (United Kingdom).....	BNP
Danish People's Party (Denmark)	DF
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	EFDD
European Conservatives and Reformists	ECR
European Monetary Union.....	EMU
European People's Party	EPP
European Union	EU
Fiamma Tricolore (Italy).....	MS-FT
Finns (Finland).....	PS
Forza Italia (Italy)	FI
Front National (France).....	FN
Golden Dawn (Greece)	XA
Hellenic League for Human Rights	HLHR
International Monetary Fund	IMF
Lega Nord (Italy)	LN
Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungary).....	MSZP
Movimento Cinque Stelle (Italy)	M5S
Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italy).....	MSI
Muslim Association of Greece.....	MAG
National Committee for Human Rights	NCHR
National Democratic Party (Germany)	NPD
National Front (United Kingdom)	NF
National Political Union (Greece)	EPEN
Party for Free Citizens (Czech Republic)	SSO
Party for Freedom (Netherlands)	PVV
People's Orthodox Rally (Greece).....	LAOS
Racist Violence Recording Network	RVRN
Swedish Democrats (Sweden)	SD
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	TFEU
United Kingdom Independence Party (United Kingdom)	UKIP
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (Belgium)	VB

ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL LEGITIMIZATION OF EXTREME FAR-RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES: A CASE STUDY ON GREECE'S GOLDEN DAWN

Andrea Mancuso

George Mason University, 2014

University of Malta, 2014

Dissertation Director: Dr. Monika Wohlfeld

This dissertation describes the political trend by which extreme far-right parties in European Union Member States have found political legitimacy over the past five years. Theoretical requirements for a party to be considered ‘politically legitimate,’ ‘extreme,’ and ‘far-right’ are discussed in order to accurately assess and compare many extreme-right parties that have found unprecedented success—gaining both political and social legitimacy—in their respective country. By closely examining the Golden Dawn party in Greece, this dissertation examines not only one of the most significant current threats to European democracy, but a party that has successfully utilized the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy and has yielded the benefits of it; namely, power. This research is meant to inspire political analysts to follow and evaluate the progress of these parties in an effort to prevent gross abuses of minority rights, as well as further damage to European multicultural democracies during this rise in ultranationalist sentiment.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the early morning of September 18, 2013, Pavlos Fyssas—a 34-year-old Greek rapper—died after suffering fatal stab wounds inflicted by a self-proclaimed political extremist. The attacker, 45-year-old George Roupakias, assaulted the well-known left-leaning celebrity whose lyrics had preached political tolerance and condemned the rise of neo-fascism throughout Greece over the past few years. The political party to which Roupakias claimed allegiance: the radical, far-right Chrysi Avgi, translated into English as Golden Dawn.¹ Although founded 30 years prior in 1983, Golden Dawn had been operating on the periphery of political legitimacy in democratic Greece for nearly ninety-percent of that time. After formally registering as a political party in 1993, the party had only been legitimated as a nationally recognized political force—meaning successfully elected by a national electorate—during the Greek Parliamentary election of May 2012. Generally speaking, the Fyssas case brings up an apparent concern: how could a political party only recently elected by a small margin have created such a quick, threatening message influential enough to prompt an assault against a well-known public figure?

Only ten-days after the stabbing, party leader Nikos Michaloliakos and fourteen other party members, including Golden Dawn Members of Parliament were arrested under charges of establishing and operating within a criminal organization, arson,

¹ Papadimitriou, Despina. “The Golden Dawn and the Extreme Right in Greece.” *E-International Relations*. (2014).

murder, kidnapping, theft, conspiracy to form a paramilitary, arms trading, money laundering, and attempted murder, to name a few of the allegations.² Immediately following the arrests, party members began shying away from affiliation with the alleged criminal organization; many removed tattoos with party symbols and began to openly denounce allegiance to the group.³ However, months after the arrests and public scrutiny, the Greek community replenished support for Golden Dawn's "openly violent and racist"⁴ platform, proving that it had become even more alluring to voters. In June 2014 nearly 10% of the national electorate supported Golden Dawn, awarding the party 3 seats within the European Parliament.⁵ Additionally troubling, though, is the fact that the party is among recently elected, and similarly predominant radical far-right parties hailing from many other European Union member states.

While drastic, the extremist sentiment that Greece's Golden Dawn party demonstrates has not been considered uncommon in European nations over the past five years, though their use of direct violence has arguably made them the most publicized European far-right political movement in this time. Throughout Europe, it has been seen that political violence does not begin and end with celebrity stabbings, destruction of migrant-owned markets, rampant Euroscepticism, and violent protests with racist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic political messaging, as it does in Greece. The majority of

² European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (Vienna). *Thematic Situation Report: Racism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary*. Luxembourg: Publications office of the European Union. (2013).

³ Chatzistefanou, Aris. "Golden Dawn tattoo-wearers 'ask for them to be removed' – Video". *The Guardian (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 20 June 2014. London. (2013).

⁴ Halikiopoulou, Daphne, Sofia Vasilopoulou. "Golden Dawn's success in the European election shows the party now has stable support base among Greek voters". The London School of Economics and Political Science. London. (2014).

⁵ See Halikiopoulou, *supra* note 4.

these parties have made an incredible wave of influence—similarly to Golden Dawn—especially when noting that most had not become legitimate players in their respective national political climate until 2008, and some even more recently. After considering their wide-spread success in the May 2014 European Union Parliament elections, it is clear the potential for political violence from multiple parties throughout the Member States pose a significant threat to those who work to secure and stabilize the democracy in the European Union, as well as allies residing oceans away.

Ultimately, the murder of Fyssas by one self-proclaimed radical is not alone an indication as to whether an ideology's influence has necessarily increased or decreased continent-wide. However, the Fyssas case is vital to understanding the point at which the Greek government and significant percentage of Greek citizens actively retaliated against the violence that the party allegedly supports. The significance of Pavlos Fyssas to this dissertation—therefore—is not in his publicized death, or in the actions of a lone attacker as proof of radical allegiance, or any necessary thesis. The significance lies in the powerful reaction and condemnation that the party received from the rest of the nation after a potentially threatening message inspired the murder of a public figure.

Realistically, the Fyssas case is the beginning—as well as the epicenter—of controversy questioning whether the violent message of Golden Dawn has gone too far, threatening the credibility of their platform and prolonged legitimacy among the Greek electorate.⁶

This dissertation seeks to examine Golden Dawn through a case study discussing their particular path to political legitimacy, political platform and ultimate aims, as well

⁶ See Halikiopoulou, *supra* note 4.

as the potential threat they pose to Greece, the European Union and its allies. However, the more pertinent question in this dissertation is whether the legitimization of Golden Dawn in May 2012 reflected—and perhaps even predicted—a larger socio-political movement that has legitimized far-right political extremism throughout various states in the European Union. Additionally, this paper will question whether other national governments and electorates with potentially radical political parties of a similar mission and vision to Golden Dawn’s may be able to hinder the negative impact of these parties, most pertinently the sort of violence that took the life of Pavlos Fyssas. Ultimately, it is of vital importance that the international community discusses the implications of politically legitimizing extremist political groups—such as Golden Dawn and those to be discussed throughout this dissertation—as well as what the consequences may be when established democracies act either in their favor or against it.

Chapter Two will describe the methodology used to collect information and data throughout the remainder of the paper, specifically that which aids the case study on Golden Dawn and the comparative analysis to follow. Next, Chapter Three will investigate narratives regarding the cornerstone of this dissertation, which is ultimately to define what it means for a political party to be determined “politically legitimate” and where—theoretically—the source of this legitimacy may originate. Following up on this point will be a discussion regarding terminology that is commonly used to describe this far-right phenomenon in the analysis of journalists and academics alike; such terms include “far-right,” “extremists,” “radicals,” “populists,” “neo-fascists,” and “neo-Nazis”. Additionally, understanding the line at which “patriotism” meets “nationalism,” and

“nationalism” meets “ultranationalism” is vital to understanding where pride in one’s culture and country may become outwardly violent, as it has in Greece. Also within Chapter Three will be an in-depth description of the theoretical political platform and aims of the described ideologies.

Chapter Four will complete the case study on Golden Dawn beginning from the group’s historical roots and ending in an analysis of the party’s role in Greek politics over the past five years. This analysis will finish up to the point at which leaders were arrested following allegations by non-radical parties within the Greek Parliament in September 2013. The allegations threaten the party’s integrity and were ultimately made in outrage after the death of Pavlos Fyssas; again, the significance of this event for this dissertation marks the beginning of nation-wide controversy surrounding Golden Dawn’s legitimacy in lieu of radical violence.

Chapter Five will then seek to engage a careful comparative analysis focused between Golden Dawn’s platform and other parties within the European Union with similarly violent sentiment that have gained political legitimacy in their respective country over the past five years. Finally, Chapter Six will address whether a larger socio-political trend can be accurately identified to answer the concern of how and why these parties have risen so quickly throughout European nations. This chapter will provide room for discussion regarding the implications and potential security threats that such a trend may place on the structure of the European Union and the international community as a whole.

CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODS

In the proceeding chapter (Chapter Three), this dissertation will seek to clarify all terminology and necessary foundational information that any reader must be aware of in order to fully grasp information that will be discussed in later chapters, as well as primarily answer the proposed research question. The design of this chapter, therefore, is to outline how this dissertation will move from theoretical and background information and to a formal, analytical case study on Golden Dawn (Chapter Four). Following this case study will be a comparative analysis (Chapter Five) that follows the same research methods as will be used for the case study on Golden Dawn.

Throughout the Literature Review (Chapter Three), a few broad and guideline-like articles will be used to ensure no information is lost among the wide range of theoretical data on the concept of political legitimacy. All specific and key information in these guideline articles that was quoted directly from political theorists was confirmed within primary documents and original writings of said theorist. Instances of this were found in the analysis of key quotations by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, and other classical figures in political theory.

The second part of the Literature Review regards terminology that frequently describes the type of political parties that will be discussed throughout Chapter Four and Chapter Five. For this information, traditional dictionary and peer-reviewed web sources

will be examined for basic information and then elaborated upon further through examination of legal and financial periodicals—including the *German Law Journal*, *The Economist*, *The Financial Times*, The London School of Economics and Political Science, *Forbes*, and *Bloomberg Businessweek*—in order to supplement these broad definitions. To further elaborate upon this information, this dissertation will cite book chapters, peer-reviewed articles, and original writings from leading contemporary political analysts specializing in research on extreme-right and far-right terminology, ideology, and behavior.

Lastly, throughout the discussion of extreme-right platform components, as well as theories of voter appeal to these political platforms, this dissertation will cite similarly well-known articles and theorists. By utilizing contemporary sources—such as the legal and financial periodicals listed above—the background information provided is both theoretical and practical contemporary information that regards the contextual and specific aspects of the current condition in Europe influencing the platforms and stances of its political parties.

Qualitative information used within Chapter Four will be found in legal and financial periodicals, peer-reviewed articles analyzing the party, as well as its competitors. This section will provide some quotations and platform remarks from Golden Dawn officials in already published in academic sources, as well as from their official website. Information pertaining specifically to violence will be found in peer-reviewed sources and legal and financial periodicals only; this research method is meant to ensure that all information provided is factual and not embellished upon by media

sources. The aim of this dissertation is not to feed the readership false information, or information that is manipulated by news corporations, political pundits, or pro-Western propaganda. The reason there is so much thought behind the types of articles used is specifically in order to avoid false information and tabloid-like language in this analysis.

Out of a similar concern, any quantitative data found in news articles or legal and financial periodicals will be confirmed through the utilization of official government databases and national census bureaus, this includes but is not limited to information provided by the Greek Ministry of Interior, European Parliament, European Commission, and United States Central Intelligence Agency. Such information will include statistics illustrating economic prosperity of countries; rates of employment throughout regions, countries, and specific socio-economic and socio-cultural demographics; the monitoring of Euroscepticism; instances of violence as performed by different political parties and organizations; and finally the inclining and declining rates of immigration to Europe from North African and Middle Eastern countries, respectively. Similarly, any information regarding voting records or exit-polling that is discussed in news articles or legal and financial periodicals will be confirmed by official European Union or national databases.

The methodology pertaining to Chapter Five and the comparative analysis aspect of this dissertation does not attempt to completely liken all political parties that will be discussed. In no way is this dissertation attempting to claim that all parties discussed are of the same origin, platform, behavior, or purpose. This is stressed, especially when considering how many of these parties have yet to be socially or politically legitimized to the same degree—or based on the same contextual reasons—as others. Ultimately, this

comparative analysis will attempt to discuss parties only to the extent to which they are comparable on a chronological, influential, and issue-by-issue basis; this will be performed as opposed to a complete party-to-party analysis.

Plausible weaknesses in this dissertation that derive from its research methods are married mostly to individual perspective. Ultimately, it is plausible that minute details of a country's political party may be overlooked due to the complex nature of an issue-by-issue comparative analysis. For example, considering Golden Dawn will be discussed intricately, this dissertation is incapable of covering every thorough detail of each party to be discussed in the comparative analysis against Golden Dawn. There is the utmost effort, however, to understand and discuss context—however brief—in an attempt to provide an accurate profile of each party discussed, as well as how they may further relate or differ from the political nature of Golden Dawn.

Another weakness in the research method of this dissertation is in the language barrier between analysis (English-written) and official party information, propaganda, and public opinion (Greek-written). This is more or less unavoidable in the amount of time allocated to this research project, however if the research component provided a longer window of time for primary source and data collection, it would have been plausible to at least acquire a basic knowledge of the Greek language in an effort to interpret more primary sources. Unfortunately, English is the only language exercised in this research project, thus making primary resource collection near impossible, although some translated documents have been found and utilized.

The majority of materials are secondary sources—if not tertiary—whereby the analyst is not the direct translator of primary information provided throughout the case study and analysis of this dissertation. This is also weakening because it means that there is a lack of interpretation done on public opinion from an uncensored, un-translated, informally expressed communal Greek perspective. The only information available regarding public opinion on different issues will be through public polling, news sources, and web-sourced tools.

Not being written from a Greek citizen perspective separates this dissertation from others written by bi-lingual analysts and writers who can translate primary sources directly, as well as discuss personal experience observing or participating in Golden Dawn's political activities. However, this circumstance may also strengthen this argument for many reasons. Being a complete outsider to the personal experience of a Greek voter allows this dissertation to flourish as an objective view at the situation of Golden Dawn in the Hellenic Parliament and European Parliament. Similarly, not being affected by either positive or negative personal experiences with the party will allow this dissertation to examine Golden Dawn's activities from a more holistic perspective. Holistic perspective, in this case, describes the analysts' ability to objectively notice more ways that these parties affect other facets of society, reaching widely beyond typical analysis and news coverage that often persists when individuals are too close—physically and emotionally—to the source of conflict.

Ultimately, while there is a significant language barrier between this dissertation's research and primary resources, much will be done to safeguard the factual integrity of all

information reviewed. Utilizing peer-reviewed and government-collected information to assist this analysis will be imperative to ensuring this dissertation examines all parties and behaviors with an open-mind in order to maintain a fair, logical and accurate discussion. This method of research will strive to effectively determine whether a socio-political movement or trend may be identified in regards to the political legitimization of extreme-right groups like Golden Dawn throughout Europe over the past five years.

CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

Beginning this dissertation demands explaining key concepts, debates, and theories that have molded the discussion around the proposed research question:

To what extent does the electoral success of Golden Dawn during Greece's 2012 Parliamentary elections reflect a larger socio-political movement that has legitimized far-right political extremism throughout various states in the European Union over the past five years (2008—2013)?

The background knowledge necessary to building the foundation of this discussion will clarify terms and concepts cited throughout the remainder of the argument.

Section I of this literature review will seek to understand what the source of political legitimacy is, how the extent of an authority's legitimacy may be determined, and what obligations may be demanded of politically legitimate entities. This discussion is necessary in order to determine whether Golden Dawn is—or was once—a legitimate political authority in Greece. Following this will be Section II, discussing commonly used terminology for Golden Dawn and similar political groups, as well as which terms will be determined appropriate for use throughout the dissertation. Lastly, Section III will follow up on those points by discussing the theoretical platforms and political perspectives of all the described ideologies, most specifically those by which Golden Dawn is defined.

Section I: Defining Political Legitimacy

Many key theorists discuss the creation and source of political legitimacy, primarily concerned by what the term implies (i.e. obligation to higher morality, or obligation to the will of the public) and where its natural foundation lies (i.e. innately in the foundation of government, or through evaluative and frequent consent of those governed). The process by which political legitimacy is described by each theorist typically questions relationships between authority and legitimacy, as well as whether or not a legitimate political force must necessarily be obligated to morality. This section will seek to discover different ideas on what it requires for a political entity—in this context a political party and its executives—to be legitimate leaders of their constituency. By examining the different theories of what it means to hold political legitimacy, it will be simpler for this dissertation to discuss the term in relation to the contextual situation of Golden Dawn, identifying at what point it became—and to what extent the group remains—politically legitimate.

Political legitimacy begins as a discourse of whether to discuss legitimacy in the sense of descriptive or normative concepts, or perhaps a hybrid of these ideas. As a descriptive concept—typically used in philosophy and morality-centric sciences—political legitimacy is discussed as elements of certain justifications that citizens believe rightfully permit one to have authority over another.⁷ Most famously, theorist Max Weber describes the three main sources of legitimacy as perceived by participants who have “certain beliefs or faiths”—or in his term *Legitimitätsglaube*—regarding what the

⁷ Fabienne Peter, “Political Legitimacy”. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Center for the Study of Language and Information. (ed.) Thomas Pogge. (2014).

government is *supposed* to be.⁸ The three sources include: those who give authority to political officials because they feel traditionally reliant on the social order that was formerly created (otherwise known as *Tradition*); those who transfer authority and deem leaders legitimate if they have faith in the ruler (otherwise known as *Charisma*); or those who trust that there has been no corruption or foul-play among their well-established leaders, thus believing all aspects of the leader's position were gained through legal, forthright processes.⁹ Thus, in terms of Golden Dawn, Weber would most likely deem the party legitimate for their ability to harness legitimate faith from their electorate, transferring their faith into trusted authority through an established electoral process, and therefore confirming their legitimacy as a political entity.

As a normative concept—typically used in social science examinations of the term—legitimacy is discussed as a “benchmark of acceptability” insinuating that so long as a certain political behavior or process has been legitimately established and is practiced in good faith, the outcomes of that process remain legitimate.¹⁰ In this category, legitimacy does not lie in the *perception* of the voter or the citizen—as it does for Weber—instead it concerns the relationships between legitimacy, morality, authority and obligation. Some others understand this concept by noting that political entities may be legitimated, though not necessarily just or moral, the reason being that “because legitimacy relates primarily to political institutions, it is satisfied more easily than

⁸ Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Los Angeles: University of California Press. (1978). 31-8.; See Peter, *supra* note 1.

⁹ See Weber, *supra* note 8. 31-8.

¹⁰ See Peter, *supra* note 7.

justice”.¹¹ By this analysis, the source of legitimacy stems from the established process; this could be thought of as uncorrupted democratic voting processes. However, throughout modern literature there is much debate over what the process itself looks like, therefore affecting the source of legitimacy itself, as well as obligations by which legitimate political entities may or may not have to abide.

Jurgen Habermas and David Beetham explore the hybrid of these two concepts most prominently in history of the debate; this hybrid concept essentially affirms that relationships existing in power are “not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be *justified in terms* of their beliefs”.¹² This idea, in other words, confirms that people do not simply legitimize democratic governments because they are already established; rather they believe they are legitimate because—
theoretically speaking—democratic governments are institutions that yield fair representation and give an equal source of power to each voter. Thus, for those who believe in political and natural equality, the faith that democratic processes uphold their belief is what legitimizes the entity in question.

Section I.I: Classical Debate on the Normative Concept of Political Legitimacy

The distinction between political *legitimacy* and political *authority*, for some theorists, is a key element to the debate that must take place long before one can discuss contemporary political parties or entities in terms of their legitimacy. Some of the most influential accounts to date have been those of Thomas Hobbes, Emmanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke. For these contrasting theories, the source of authority

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Beetham, David. *The Legitimation of Power*. New York: Plagrave Macmillan. (1991). 11.

ultimately determines the function and “benchmark” behavior by which to determine the extent of an entity’s political legitimacy.

Subsection A: Thomas Hobbes on Political Legitimacy

While Hobbes describes the state of nature as a “war of every man against every man,”¹³ he also concludes that political authority is nowhere to be found among this natural war. Hobbes deduces that individuals do not innately carry the power of political authority, but when they bound together collectively in a pursuit to end the war, their created social contract ultimately establishes an assumed authority that is then entrusted to the sovereign—an individual ruler or government.¹⁴ Ultimately, political authority is created out of fear and a desire to stay alive; thus, the measurement by which a political authority is deemed legitimate or illegitimate depends on whether or not the individual is “protected by him against all others”.¹⁵ The benchmark for legitimacy—for Hobbes—therefore, is protection of citizens by the government or sovereign.

Hobbes’ theory is an incredibly eye opening one when placed in the context of modern-day Greece. For example, from the citizen perspective, many believe it is the Greek government who has not properly protected citizens from skyrocketing unemployment rates—reaching nearly 28% nationally in 2013¹⁶—and unmanaged immigration routes to the country, as well as allowed financial dictation from supranational institutions to come before the needs of citizens themselves. From this perspective, the democratic government of Greece is illegitimate, whereas a group such a

¹³ Hobbes, Thomas, (ed.) Edwin Curley. *Leviathan*. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (1994). 76.

¹⁴ See Hobbes, *supra* note 8. 110.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency. *World Factbook: Greece*. Web Source. Accessed 20 July 2014. (2014).

Golden Dawn that delivers food to shelters, offers monetary support to churches, and enables faith in solutions outside of their currently unprotected state would be considered legitimate. Hobbes would argue that regardless of how violent Golden Dawn's proposed solutions may become, the right to self-preservation "can by no covenant be relinquished,"¹⁷ and thus any vote for Golden Dawn that is perceived as a vote to reestablish the protection of Greeks must be considered legitimate, and their political message justifiable.

Subsection B: Emmanuel Kant on Political Legitimacy

Emmanuel Kant similarly hypothesizes that political institutions created from civil society are what establish political authority; once again, authority is not innate in individuals, it is created at the establishment of the institution itself. Kant differs from Hobbes in that he states the reason individuals form civil society is not fear, but because humans have an *imperfect duty* to behave rationally. Some explain that Kant describes the establishment of the civil state as "in itself an end...[and] a necessary first step toward a moral order," otherwise termed as creating an *ethical commonwealth*.¹⁸

In this ethical commonwealth, both citizens and governments are obliged to follow duty and reason, thus political entities are measured effectively by how they accord with civil society's rationally constructed social contract. The way to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate political authority, therefore, is done through the process of consent building, most contemporarily thought of as voting; for Kant, so long as each law

¹⁷ See Hobbes, *supra* note 13. 144.

¹⁸ See Peter, *supra* note 7.

is consented to by rational citizens it must be considered politically legitimate.¹⁹ By this model of legitimacy, rulers are obliged to obey reason above all else. Individuals, however, are not allowed to disobey even irrational rulers; rather, it is the individual's right to keep authority as a servant to public reason by using the "Freedom of the pen, [which] is the only safeguard of the rights of the people".²⁰ Theoretically, rationally established societies that find consistent consent (i.e. voting) will correct illegitimate rulers from their misguided decisions by taking away their authority at the polling booth.

Subsection C: Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Political Legitimacy

In a quite contrasting view to Kant, Jean-Jacques Rousseau states that obligation to one's state only lasts to the extent that the authority is legitimate. Separating legitimate political entities from those who wish only to exercise coercion, Rousseau discusses how political legitimacy consists of attempting to recreate the state of nature within civil society as best as possible. As he famously observes, "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains,"²¹ regarding his theory that human transition from living in the state of nature to a creating a civil society through a social contract restricts the livelihood of individuals who were created to be free. Thus, the legitimate political authority, for Rousseau, is one that will reestablish the state of nature and take away the chains.

In tandem with Kant and Hobbes—as well as in accordance with his thoughts above—Rousseau defends the idea that individuals are innately free, but that this freedom does not necessarily imply that they hold political authority; in fact, for Rousseau,

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ (ed.) H.S. Reiss. *Kant: Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1970). 32.

²¹ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Basic Political Writings*. New York: Classic Books International. (2010). 2.

political authority may only be created artificially through the establishment of civil society institutions. Similar also to Habermas and Beetham's theories, democratic justification of the civil state's law is the means by which political legitimacy is reached.²² Therefore, understanding that only governments attempting to create the highest extent of natural freedom among citizens may be considered legitimate—and that only legitimate governments have earned obedience from their citizenry—citizens are only obligated to obey political entities that support freedom, tolerance toward naturally free individuals, and value the practice of democratic representation.

Subsection D: John Locke on Political Legitimacy

John Locke's similar conception of freedom is what generally likens his theories to those of Rousseau; however, while Rousseau states there is equal freedom among all individuals, Locke discusses this equal freedom as a necessary implication that all citizens possess authority and sovereignty.²³ Thus, a social contract created from fear, duty, or rational thought is not the source of authority, but as the Stanford Encyclopedia explains of Locke, "political authority is embodied in the individuals and pre-exists in the state of nature,"²⁴ and transferring individual's authority through a social contract is the only way in which political authority can be created.

Locke importantly distinguishes authority from legitimacy perhaps in the clearest way possible: while authority exists innately, legitimacy exists within the civil state alone. As Locke discusses political legitimacy, it is determined that legitimacy is

²² See Peter, *supra* note 7.

²³ Locke, John, (ed.) David Wootton. *Political Writings*. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (1993). 273.

²⁴ See Peter, *supra* note 7.

intertwined with the justification of processes that harnesses consent both immediately and continually. The procedural integrity of transferring authority from individuals to institutions through a social contract—otherwise termed by John Rawls as “originating consent”—was the first step in creating legitimate political authority. The second involves the continued evaluation of the authority’s performance and the respect for the authority via frequent elections—what Rawls calls “joining consent” that combines the power of Locke’s theoretical tacit and express consent.²⁵ Ultimately, when authority transferred from individuals to institutions, the natural law—that which ensures equal individual’s right to enjoy life, liberty, and property²⁶—was entrusted to institutions; thus legitimate political authorities are those who respect their duty to uphold natural law on behalf of individuals who gave them the political authority that was originally meant for individual citizens alone.

Section I.II: Modernized Conclusions on Political Legitimacy

Noting the differing views of key political theorists regarding the definition and conditions implied in the title of authorities becoming politically legitimate, this dissertation will now briefly apply these theories to the current context of Greek politics in order to determine the point at which Golden Dawn became politically legitimate. According to different theorists, the group may be or possibly was never necessarily legitimate.

One may conclude that Thomas Hobbes—as explained in Subsection A—would most likely conclude that so long as Golden Dawn is protecting citizens from their

²⁵ See Locke, *supra* note 23. 308-9.

²⁶ See Locke, *supra* note 23. 304.

personal perspective, they must be considered legitimate. Considering the democratic government of Greece was created through a submissive social contract, yet public perception rules that the government has recently failed in protecting citizens from a poor livelihood, leading to poverty, unemployment, and cultural degradation. Thus, Golden Dawn is a legitimate leader in Greece's political sphere so long as it continues to provide protection in the eyes of Greek citizens. The ultimate question—and reason this dissertation will disband Hobbes' definition of political legitimacy—is whose protection counts? Hobbes would claim only the protection of national citizens must necessarily be protected by a legitimate national authority. However, it is the opinion of this analyst that all human lives deserve to be protected under legitimate authority, regardless of their race or nationality. Furthermore, if the attack against Greek-native Fyssas is proved as a product of Golden Dawn's leadership, this murder could plausibly delegitimize the group entirely according to Hobbes. Regardless of the Fyssas case outcome however, this dissertation seeks to affirm the right to life and protection of all humans, thus proclaiming Hobbes' definition unsuitable to continue forward with in this argument.

The analysis of Kant would similarly justify the actions of Golden Dawn in the following way: so long as voters consent with rational thought, as well as out of duty for their nation, the outcome of properly conducted democratic elections must be considered legitimate. This conclusion, however, seems a bit jarring, as rationality and the duty by which some act differs in subjective interpretation. In other words, by whose judge of rational action may another's rationality be measured? Additionally, who must Greek officials primarily stay dutiful to, their citizens or all humans within their lands? By

entrusting much of the democratic process to the power of reason—something easily manipulated and subjective—to naturally rid a legitimate process of illegitimate actors seems a bit unrealistic. There must be an objective to determining the political legitimacy of actors; reason and duty alone are not objective or apparent enough to do so.

Rousseau's opinion of Golden Dawn is seemingly straight forward: considering the general will of a population (as opposed to the private will of an individual) is the main source of political legitimacy, and that there has been a fair amount of the electorate in favor of Golden Dawn's political message—translating to voter consent and thus seats at multiple levels of the Hellenic government—the party is and remains legitimate so long as they are elected through uncorrupted democratic processes. According to Rousseau, “common good must be done by general will,”²⁷ therefore common good is legitimately reached for all citizens through the means of voting processes that accurately reflect the general will of the public.

Interestingly, analyst Fabienne Peter elaborates that Rousseau implies “citizens can—and will want to—learn from democratic decisions...those who voted against a particular proposal will recognize that they were wrong and will adjust their beliefs about what the general will is.”²⁸ In other words, decisions are only legitimately decided through outward consent (i.e. voting). Furthermore, Rousseau's relationship between the general will and common good is strengthened by the principle of the Condorcet jury theorem. The theorem states that in every decision there is a legitimate and a correct outcome; voters—as rational beings—are more likely to choose a correct decision than an

²⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract*. (ed.) Jonathan Bennett. (1762). 12.

²⁸ See Peter, *supra* note 7.

incorrect one, thus a majority of voters are more likely to support a correct decision, making the legitimate outcome also the correct one.²⁹ Thus, according to Rousseau, Golden Dawn remains legitimate so long as they are rightfully elected into office; further, they are continually legitimized so long as elections keep proving them victors of the general will. The cause for concern with this interpretation is in the protection of minority voters. However, as a straightforward account of what legitimacy entails, Rousseau's points are well taken and will be greatly considered when discussing the defining aspects of this dissertation's definition of political legitimacy.

Lastly, the theory presented by Locke may conclude that while Golden Dawn was once legitimate, they are held to a strong obligation in their legitimacy—to promote and protect individuals existing under natural law. This theory is similar to that of Kant, considering both demand that political authorities are not only subject to voter's wishes, but also to obligations after election; respectively, these are the natural law and reason. The definition of natural law is clear, as opposed to the theory of reason that Kant suggests. Natural law is the protection of one's life, liberty, and property; thus, so long as a political entity does not disturb citizen's ability to enjoy these—and the authority was rightfully consented to both originally and jointly—then the entity is legitimate. This is mirrored in the "harm principle" explained through the ideology of Utilitarianism. This principle is described by John Stuart Mill (via Peter) to describe the fact that a governments "restriction of liberty is illegitimate unless...the actions suppressed by the

²⁹ Ibid.

restriction harm others...[thus] the harm principle is the basis for legitimacy.”³⁰ The harm principle describes, in other words, the point at which political actors are no longer legitimate in a very concrete way (i.e. by harming citizens, a political entity cannot be considered legitimate), in the same way that Locke describes the entity’s obligation to uphold natural law.

Obviously, the death of Fyssas is a concern—as it was in Hobbes’ contextual analysis—for if Golden Dawn is determined to have dictated an attack against a Greek citizen, they arrive at a status of illegitimacy after having violated natural law. However, an even more underlying concern must be considered; both in terms of living by the harm principle or under the constraint of natural law, is it legitimate for individuals to vote for a political group which advocates against these? How legitimate is it for Golden Dawn to be continuously elected even after the group has been accused of crimes such as murder, arson, and other blatant violence? On the other hand, should such theorists concern themselves with ethical dilemma that predetermines whether political action is legitimate or not, completely disregarding context or public opinion? Or should theorists take a more realist perspective, ignoring “how political agents ought to ideally act, ‘but, rather, [concerning themselves] with the way the social, economic, political, etc. institutions actually operate?’”³¹

After analyzing each classical theorist’s take on the value of normative concepts on political legitimacy, this dissertation can more easily synthesize ideas into one direct

³⁰ Mill, John Stuart, (ed.) Charles W. Elliot. *On Liberty*. New York: Barnes and Noble. (2004). 11.; See Peter, *supra* note 7.

³¹ Gaus, Daniel. “The Dynamics of Legitimation: Why the study of political legitimacy needs more realism”. *ARENA, The Center for European Studies*. University of Oslo. (2011). 1.; Geuss, Raymond. *Philosophy and Real Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (2008). 9.

definition. Without question, one of the most important foundational pieces to each theory's discussion of legitimacy had to do with citizen consent as either the source or on-going justification of legitimate authority. Contemporarily, political theorists defend that Locke's theory "elevated consent to the main source of the legitimacy of political authority".³² Ultimately, Locke outlines how consent is granted in two ways throughout the evaluation of a democracy: through the process of voting—known as "express consent"—or participation and enjoyment in the political environment where decisions are made through legitimate voting processes—known as "tacit consent".³³

Subsection A: Determining Consent Through Proceduralism

An interesting way to proceed, then, is accepting the necessity of consent in democratic legitimacy. In other words, this dissertation concludes that proceduralism—a conception hypothesizing that "legitimate procedures of democratic decision-making are necessary for the justification of political power and the creation of political authority"³⁴—and consent are predominant strains throughout the previously discussed classical theories. Two schools of thought divide the concept of proceduralism; understanding both will allow us to determine one coherent definition of political legitimacy that will henceforth be used throughout the remainder of this dissertation.

Subsection B: Pure Proceduralism

Peter discusses that Rawls—a proponent of pure proceduralism—advocated that democratic legitimacy and public reason coincide because "people regard a properly

³² See Peter, *supra* note 7.

³³ See Locke, *supra* note 23. 322.

³⁴ See Peter, *supra* note 7.

justified process of democratic-decision making as the source of legitimacy, [and] they will accept a democratic decision even if they disagree substantively with it.”³⁵ As expressed above, Rousseau highlights that voter consent is the only determinate of political authority because the general will itself is what is best for society; Rousseau therefore, is a strong proponent of pure proceduralism. This monastic idea—meaning that is routed in one criterion alone (i.e. correct procedure)—contends strongly that, “democratic decisions are legitimate as long as they are the result of an appropriately constrained process of democratic decision-making.”³⁶ There is no need to answer to something higher—such as the natural law or human reason—politically legitimate authorities deserve their title insofar as their electoral success is uncorrupted.

Proceduralism is best justified—according to some theorists—so long as there are preconditions to the time of consent; namely deliberation. Contemporarily, this entails that before political decisions are made, all options and opinions are deliberated publicly; holding open deliberation includes but is not limited to debating policy and candidate platforms, having the freedom to publicly scrutinize, and to receive accurate information on public issues. This precondition makes consent even more viable and legitimate, for all voters who provided consent had enough information to make an entirely informed decision. Thus, legitimacy rests in fair and deliberated elections, not political action. In this way, legitimacy rests on how thoroughly public issues have been criticized, and that criticism promulgated to the electorate.

Subsection C: Rational Proceduralism

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

Advocates of rational proceduralism maintain that legitimacy is not determined by the procedural aspects of a democracy, but in the outcome of the procedural decision. High-quality outcomes imply that rational decisions were consented to by the majority; this qualification for whether or not an electoral outcome is legitimate was discussed due to the creation of what came to be known as Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem.³⁷ The impossibility theorem contends the conclusion of the Condorcet jury theorem—discussed in Section I.II of this chapter—in that to assume majority rule will always be rational is too idealist, and ultimately impossible; further, if majority rule is to eventually decide an irrational or incorrect option, legitimacy of the decision is undermined completely.³⁸ Ultimately for this reason, rational or correct outcomes are the only ones that are legitimate, so long as the procedure was similarly correct or uncorrupted.

Habermas (via Peter) supports this theory, believing that “the legitimacy of democratic decisions...depends on both procedural values and on the substantive quality of the outcomes that these deliberative decision-making procedures generate.” Considering rational proceduralism demands multiple criteria to arrive at political legitimacy (i.e. correct procedure and high-quality outcomes), it must be considered non-monistic. Supplemental theories support the idea that high-quality outcomes are most enabled when citizens deliberate ideas, for deliberation is the way in which rational decisions come to the forefront and can be proven correct in a public forum. By ensuring that the most rational option will be the outcome, it will be rationally justified for all citizens; ultimately, regardless of one's position on a political matter or candidate, they

³⁷ Arrow, Kenneth. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (1951)

³⁸ See Peter, *supra* note 7.

can have good faith that the system enabled the conscientious consensus of voters to make positive decisions for the entire citizenry through a sound, fair democratic process.

Section I.III: The Defining Features of Political Legitimacy for this Dissertation

The contemporary perspectives on the theory of consent reflect the writings and theories of classical authors. Pure proceduralism echoes Rousseau's sentiment that the general will of the citizenry can only be only rightly determined by the majority of the electorate; so long as procedures are uncorrupted, their outcomes will be pure, therefore making electoral outcomes politically legitimate. Rational proceduralism that concerns itself with the procedure as well as the outcome in order to determine legitimacy echoes the sentiment of Locke, Hobbes, and Kant. These thinkers, along with rational proceduralists, claim that political legitimacy must answer to a higher objective—natural law, citizen protection, reason, or high-quality outcomes, respectively. To clarify, while Rousseau values the civil state as a mechanism that should closely maintain natural freedom among all citizens, his theory asserts that the procedure of free elections will yield what the general will desires, which—innately—is freedom.

From the perspective of this dissertation, while each thinker has defended their theory in order to support democratic value construction in civil societies, explaining the benchmark of political legitimization when comparing and analyzing very different groups must be as objective as possible. Thus, the remainder of this argument will subscribe to the normative, pure proceduralist point of view—explained explicitly in Rousseau's theory—in order to create a clear benchmark for differentiation between politically legitimate groups and politically illegitimate ones. Ultimately, so long as a

group has found political success in a deliberative democratic environment, their success deems them a legitimate authority in the position they were elected to serve.

Section II: Commonly Used Terminology

Under the premise that all political groups elected through an uncorrupted, deliberative democratic process are politically legitimate, the next question in examining various ways one may define a group like Golden Dawn is to discuss the party's behavior and ideology. Understanding the foundational reasons that Golden Dawn's platform is inherently different from parties of a more moderate nature will be imperative to this dissertation. One important distinction to make is the difference between patriotic groups and others who act more radically in their pursuit of patriotic action. Therefore, the first part of this section will examine the fine border that exists between strong patriotism—a characteristic that ideally every legitimate political group or party embodies—and zealous nationalism—a characteristic that often supports radical political movements and sometimes even outward violence against non-patriots. This will be accomplished by highlighting key concepts that illustrate where the lines between patriotism, nationalism, and even ultranationalism reside.

Following this point will be a discussion of common terminology associated with Golden Dawn and similar parties throughout Europe. Unfortunately, terms used out of appropriate context often create confusion and allow media, political pundits, and voters alike to confuse the visions of one party with another, wrongly pair or categorize political groups, or even associate the party with negative historical events that may or may not adequately reflect their context or aims. This section therefore seeks to understand these

descriptions from a theoretical and practical standpoint. Once this is accomplished, this dissertation will distinguish the defining terms and characteristics that will be accurately used throughout the remainder of this argument in order to properly and contextually apply to Golden Dawn and other parties of a similar nature and purpose.

Section II.I: Differentiating Between Patriotism and Nationalism

Oftentimes, only a fine line exists between the robust sense of pride and honor one has for their own nation and the projection of this pride onto affairs between international citizens. Exercising one's national identity—a phenomenon that can either be primordially, or civically conceptualized—outwardly toward others is where the line between patriotism and nationalism is most visible; in other words, “national identity develops on the border between groups.”³⁹ What can be extremely detrimental, however, is when this national identity becomes outward within borders. Ultimately, when there is a creation of boundaries that differentiate and consolidate individuals, stereotyping them based on their country of origin, patriotism—or the positive stereotyping of citizens from one's own nation—quickly transforms into nationalism—or the negative stereotyping of citizens of other nations.⁴⁰

Differentiating the exercise of collective patriotism from a large-scale nationalist movement depends on the extent to which created boundaries dictate the language and behavior of state citizens, leadership, media and the like, thus implying that optimal distinction between people has in fact become imbedded as a core value within the nation

³⁹ Korostelina, Karyna. “Structure and Functions of National Narrative.” *Constructing The Narratives of Identity and Power: Self-Imagination in a Young Ukrainian Nation*. Lanham: Lexington Books. (2013). 27-48.

⁴⁰ Korostelina, Karyna. “Formation of National Identity and Conflict Intentions of Minorities.” *Social Identity and Conflict: Structures, Dynamics, and Implications*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. (2007).184.

as a whole. Various concepts relating to political, national, and personal identification may assist in understanding the difference between political groups advocating healthy patriotism and those whose message promotes the mobilization of a potentially violent nationalist sentiment; when this sentiment actually mobilizes from potentially violent to outwardly violent it may be known as ultranationalism. Mostly, these concepts are indistinguishable from one another visually or verbally, yet are able to evoke different outcomes based on the meaning placed upon them by actors of manipulation—media, leadership, politicians, and others discussed above.

Subsection A: The Concept of Prototyping

The prototype of any group is an individual who essentially is viewed as a model or figurehead because they embody ideal attributes and values that the group holds in the crux of its collective identity.⁴¹ In the scope of patriotism, this is an individual who fits positive stereotypes—language spoken, values exercised such as honesty or bravery, noble kin or personal history, physical attributes deemed desirable, and the like—and exercises love for their country in most likely in a non-aggressive, celebratory way. The shift in perception of a prototype to facilitate the scope of nationalism stems from manipulation of prototypical messages; this may also be accomplished by associating a once-patriotic message with potentially aggressive or politicized in-group versus out-group campaign or political platform. In this scenario, one prototypical message is manipulated to satisfy either patriots or nationalists when they see the message fit to manipulate behaviors of a group or electorate. Another way to understand prototypes is to

⁴¹ See Korostelina, *supra* note 39.

acknowledge that there can be many prototypes existing in and around one nation—either positive or negative⁴²—that can be utilized at certain times to personify either patriotic or nationalist messages.

Subsection B: The Concept of Reservoirs

Similar to prototypes, reservoirs are objects or symbols that are used to promote or relay messages to citizens of the in-group. These symbols are created as beacons of national pride; such pride, once again, can be inwardly or competitively exercised among other nations. Nation-state flags and national symbols, personified characters or political cartoons depicting positive or negative stereotypes, and other various symbolic verbal and visual communications can be categorized as reservoirs of a nation.⁴³ In the same way that prototypical messaging can be manipulated, so can those related to reservoirs. For example, the placement of a Greek flag next to a European Union flag may be considered a sentiment of pride in one's nation as a cooperative power within an inclusive European community; however, when that same flag waves next to a Golden Dawn flag, it transforms into a message of nationalism and aggression. This association asserts not only pride in Greek heritage but exclusivity and hostility toward non-Greeks; note that the visual nature and message of Golden Dawn's flag and symbol will be discussed at length in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

Subsection C: The Concept of Myth Making

The concept of prototypes and reservoirs closely align with those of myth making to the extent that myths are essentially propelled and reaffirmed by the celebration of

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ See Korostelina, *supra* note 40.

prototypes and the symbolic recollection of reservoirs. The myth is a story of origin that typically describes the purpose, meaning or perceived deserving of a group to rationalize their solidarity. A myth teaches how those of a nation bond over more than simply territorial entitlement and tradition; myths allude to the concept that the group's purpose transcends immediate circumstances, romanticizing their sense of belonging and shared suffering toward a greater common purpose.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the manipulation of myths can transform stories of pride and opportunity provided in one's country into one of triumph over others, creating a competitive and aggressive ideology regarding what it means for citizens to be of their particular nationality.

Subsection D: The Concept of Chosen Traumas and Glories

In a similar fashion as origin myths, chosen traumas and glories are stories that have the ability to evoke emotional ties between citizens and their nation, creating more salience in national identity. The difference between the two is that while myths solidify foundational values and attributes of the prototypical citizen of the nation, historic traumas and glories are typically romanticized or sometimes over-exaggerated stories of cost-benefit scenarios that the foundational myth has brought them to. Ultimately, chosen traumas and glories describe “evolution of the in-group,”⁴⁵ supporting citizens to reach beyond origin myths, yet justifying whatever values or conceptions the myth previously embedded. These chosen scenes from history illustrate either the exercising of patriotism and collective values that have yielded positive prototypes (as exemplified above), or can be associated with historical clashes with out-groups that have harmed the in-group ego,

⁴⁴ See Korostelina, *supra* note 39.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

often leading to the promotion of negative stereotypes. When describing to a nation's people that they have paid a price for their very existence and foundational beliefs, a manipulative actor has the ability to mobilize retaliation solidified in competitive nationalist ideals, making citizens eager to strike against those who have tainted their collective self-esteem.

Subsection E: The Concept of Security-Freedom Dilemmas

The final concept to be discussed here is one that describes the existential dilemma individuals may feel between their sense of security and their sense of personal agency. To be brief, while there is no black-and-white distinction of where a patriot or nationalist must reside on this spectrum, there is most certainly a contextual manipulation that occurs in order to securitize a free and patriotic society into one easily mobilized toward aggressive behavior during a time of crisis. An example is apparent mostly in the hostility and violent behavior that Golden Dawn and its supporters often have afflicted upon non-Greeks within the nation, as well as the demonizing rhetoric they use to discuss the globalized world. The group uses similar slander against moderate, left-wing, and politically apathetic Greeks. A plethora of examples regarding this sort of behavior and rhetoric will be provided throughout the later chapters of this dissertation.

Subsection F: Golden Dawn as a Promoter of Ultrationalism

Ultimately, the intricacies and implications of exercising the concepts listed above have immense power and influence over even the most open and free citizen populations when manipulated and embedded into society by prominent actors. Therefore, understanding how these concepts may be manipulated allows us to take a deeper look at

the symbolism of political messaging. Political parties utilize these tactics to mobilize the population against perceived threats, and as will be discussed later, socially legitimize their movement through morality-centered rhetoric. This sort of social legitimacy psychologically manipulates citizens into legitimizing behaviors that would otherwise be considered unacceptable (i.e. racially-based violence).

If one subscribes to conflict theorist Louis Kriesberg's theory that "people who share the same identity also believe they share the same fate,"⁴⁶ boundary creation made by nationalist political parties can be understood not only as polarizing by nature, but detrimental to practical in-group and out-group relations. If individuals work innately from a desire to be free—following from Rousseau—but are told to perceive certain threats as inhibiting their natural freedom (i.e. migrant groups, austerity policies, or financial dictation from outside institutions), it makes sense that there will be citizens ready to mobilize in an effort to eradicate the elements that threaten their fate.

Furthermore, if the group creating or manipulating citizen perceptions is a legitimized political party, there are potentially many more resources and justified channels of authority backing the message to eradicate threats. Ultimately, such groups carry a tremendous amount of weight within their country when considering their potential power to mobilize an in-group on the basis of protecting their livelihood from out-group threats. The dominant narrative of Golden Dawn's political rhetoric—to be discussed at length in Chapter Four—promotes Greece by creating "distinction between

⁴⁶ Korostelina, Karyna. "Identity Conflicts: Models of Dynamics and Early Warning." *A Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. (ed.) Dennis Sandole. Abingdon: Routledge. (2008). 101.

superior and inferior nations,”⁴⁷ and painting a picture of a threatened Greek state, allowing the group to enhance mobility of an already-established Greek nationalist sentiment—though this sentiment is not necessarily violent. Ultimately, the ability of this group to manipulate citizens allows them to appeal to voters in the following way:

“Appealing to those who consider themselves patriots, and have been let down by the political mainstream, Golden Dawn presents a story in which the Greek predicament is a result of those foreign exploitative powers who seek to destroy Greece, and their domestic collaborators. The attempt to indict the party members is merely another example of this, an attempt by the ‘old rotten system’ to preserve the status quo by eradicating those who seek to restore true patriotic democracy”.⁴⁸

The supporters that the group currently has, therefore, are not necessarily violent people nor do they necessarily believe the group is violent itself; their perception of the group relies on the narrative above. This is why Golden Dawn has been able to entice patriotic voters from all genders, ages, levels of education, and socio-economic statuses to support their platform.⁴⁹ The power Golden Dawn possesses enables their ability to rally supporters across the line existing between patriotism and nationalism by creating an in-group versus out-group dynamic that promotes violent action against those who threaten the prosperity of Greece and distrust in those who attempt to hold the group accountable

⁴⁷ Halikiopoulou, Daphne, Sofia Vasilopoulou. “The Rise of Golden Dawn and Extremism in Greece can be seen as part of a broader phenomenon of a culture of intolerance, which is maintained and perpetuated through the Greek education system”. *The London School of Economics*. London. (2013).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

for such violent actions. By building off the foundation of nationalist undertones promoted in Greek education systems,⁵⁰ they have the potential to manipulate and mobilize even a larger amount of supporters than they can currently claim.

For the sake of this dissertation—when later discussing the political nature of Golden Dawn and other parties throughout Europe—it will be imperative that groups with a similar nationalist—and potentially ultranationalist—sentiment, rather than those that could arguably be considered merely strongly patriotic, are thoroughly discussed.

Section II.II: Terms Concerning Behavior

There is a plethora of terms used throughout media outlets—by reporters, political pundits, and social media users alike—to discuss the behavior and actions of Golden Dawn, typically characterizing their behavior as extremely violent; most commonly, the group is referred to as “radical” or “extremist”, or sometimes both. Determining the actual definitions of these terms will bring this dissertation one step closer to understanding the appropriate title to proceed with when discussing the behavior and actions of Golden Dawn as a legitimized political party.

Subsection A: Radicalism

According to very basic definitions, radicalism entails the advocacy of “thorough or complete political or social reform,” whereby an actor or small group represent an extreme or progressive strand of an established political party’s supporters.⁵¹ More broadly, the term may refer to an attempt to change the foundation or purpose of something previously established. Thus, radical action does not necessarily imply that it

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ “Radical”. *The Oxford Dictionary*. Web Source. Accessed 2 July 2014. (2014).

is violent or hostile toward any actor, though it does indicate blatant unrest or at least discontent with the current situation as experienced by the radical group or individual. Through this discontent develops the need to reform entire systems rather than solve situations—this may be completed violently or peacefully—by invoking either strong progressive or conservative policies to harness long-lasting change.

Subsection B: Extremism

Similarly, the definition of extremism implies that an extremist believes in supporting ideas that are incorrect, irrational or unreasonable to most others.⁵² In the way that extremism is discussed as a course of action or way to conceptualize, similar terms discuss irrationality a bit further; terms such as ‘fanatic’ have been used by dictionaries and news sources alike to explain the mindset of extremist political thinkers.⁵³ Further, in a declaration that addressed the definition of radicalism, extremism was defined and banned from political platforms in Germany in the year 1972. The German Federal Constitutional Court defined the term at this time as violent “opposition to ‘fundamental values, centrally: the idea of human rights, and procedural rules...rule of law, control of government powers, political pluralism in democratic constitutional states’”.⁵⁴ Different from radicalism—which was discussed as “opposed to” constitutions—extremism involves outward, hostile action against the constitution and those who protect it.⁵⁵

Specifically regarding behavioral patterns, one source asserts that an extremist is one who “resorts to immoderate, uncompromising” methods of handling political strife

⁵² “Extremism”. *Merriam-Webster*. Web Source. Accessed 2 July 2014. (2014).

⁵³ “Extremism”. *The Oxford Dictionary*. Web Source. Accessed 2 July 2014. (2014).

⁵⁴ Neisen, Peter. “Anti-Extremism, Negative Republicanism, Civic Society: Three Paradigms for Banning Political Parties”. *German Law Journal*. (2002).

⁵⁵ Mudde, Cas. *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. (2000). 12.

and debate.⁵⁶ The term that is interesting in this definition is “resorts,” as it typically is used when describing actions one may take when threatened or when it seems there is no orthodox way to handle situations. Using the term “resorts” implies a desperation or helplessness, as if the extremist or extremist group is immediately reacting to a threat, insinuating that the potential for mobilization is heightened.

In an interesting synthesis of the terms, one may be able to hypothesize that political radicalism advocates for systems and states to improve from what they currently are—envisioning a state with an uncorrupted government, a stronger economy, global autonomy, a purely single-cultured state, and so forth—in an effort to create positive change among the citizenry. These ideas may then be harnessed by the momentum of extremist leaders, whereby skewed and often manipulated perceptions of what a positive change would entail are mobilized through unorthodox, inappropriate, and often violent methods of action. Examples of radical sentiment and extremist behavior by Golden Dawn will be discussed in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

Section II.III: Terms Concerning Ideology

The same sources that often confuse terms associated with behavior often confuse what exactly the group stands for insofar as they confuse terms of various political movements and positions. Ideology, as a term, describes “the criteria for choice and decision by virtue of which the major activities of an organized community are governed.”⁵⁷ Some ideologies are associated with ideals rather than solitary political

⁵⁶ “Extremism”. *Dictionary Reference*. Web Source. Accessed 2 July 2014. (2014).

⁵⁷ Fennema, Meindert, “Populist Parties of the Right”. *Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western World*. Nova Publishers. (ed.) Jens Rydgren. (2005). 7.

issues (i.e. “populism”) while others exist completely in the realm of political issues and their solutions (i.e. “far-right”). Other ideologies are associated with negative historical occurrences (i.e. “neo-fascism” gets immediately associated with Mussolini’s Blackshirts, while “neo-Nazism” is paired with Hitler’s Aryan-centric domination of Europe), although the comparison must be made far more carefully than simple resemblances, considering contemporary groups exist in a far different context than predecessors. Once again, determining the true definition of each term that is often associated with Golden Dawn will allow this dissertation to identify the appropriate label to proceed with for the remainder of this argument.

Subsection A: Populism

Populist groups and movements ultimately work in order to stunt corrupt and incompetent existing political regimes. These groups, specifically in Greece, wish to establish a “‘People’s state that protects the ‘biological’ and ‘cultural unity’ of the Greek nation,”⁵⁸ by claiming to find solutions to social justice issues, including mass amounts of poorly controlled migration flow, insufficient public safety infrastructure, food or medical care for the poor, and so forth.⁵⁹ Populist parties operate primarily as an anti-elitist front, rather than an anti-democratic platform, for their rhetoric seeks to celebrate and truly represent the average person in their natural virtue and intellect.⁶⁰ In other

⁵⁸ Dinas, Elias, Vassiliki Georgiadou, Iannis Konstantinidie, Lamprini Rori. “From dusk to dawn: Local party organization and party success of right-wing extremism.” *Party Politics*. (2013).

⁵⁹ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 15.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

words, populists “are usually more focused on political [form or] style and less on anti-democratic features”.⁶¹

Similar to Rousseau’s theory, populism supports the freedom of man to live as naturally as possible, free from obligation to governments that corrupt human freedom. Thus, it is easy for these parties to mobilize individuals who are disenfranchised from—or skeptical of—their current political system for any reason. Populist parties most importantly claim to be “anti-political,” not typically proposing any new political model; populist parties therefore can also be equated to protest parties who disagree with current governance only to the extent of the issue they advocate for.⁶² In other words, populist parties do not necessarily have a specific issue-set they advocate for, they more-so support the value that people are free thinking and inherently good; in order to run a country well, social movements must be vigilant in expelling elites, career politicians, and greedy companies from their positions of power in a free man’s society.

Subsection B: Far-Right

Being of the far-right ideology implies that a political group or individual supporter’s beliefs are “rooted in the acceptance of natural inequality between people, coupled with recognition of violence as a legitimate archetype.”⁶³ ⁶⁴ By this definition, such groups are embedded in hardline nationalist sentiment, meaning their rhetoric is focused on a superior in-group to inferior out-group relationships. While “natural

⁶¹ See Mudde, *supra* note 55. 13.

⁶² See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 16.

⁶³ Banteka, Nadia. “The Resurgence of Right-Wing Extremism in Greece: A Not So Golden Dawn”. *E-International Relations*. (2014).

⁶⁴ Gregor, James A. “Fascism’s Philosophy of Violence and the Concept of Terror”. *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*. New York: Columbia University Press. (ed.) David C. Rapoport, Yonah Alexander. (1989).

inequality” does not necessarily imply unequal races or cultures—it could potentially be discussing ability, intellect, market relationships, etc.—when involved in national, culture-based politics and in the face of large waves of immigration to a country, it is typical that natural inequality—as a staple of the Far-right ideology—will be discussed in terms of racial relations.

In the past, far-right groups were considered extremely anti-democratic; however the contemporary far-right has evolved and—typically—no longer openly denounces the process of true democracy. However, in their nature as “anti-egalitarian, anti-pluralist” parties, they are fundamentally opposed to the pillars which modern democracy rests.⁶⁵ Furthermore, when far-right policies venture into extremist behavior, they typically become reminiscent of the totalitarianism that swept Europe during the first half of the twentieth century.

In order to become more appealing, far-right extremist groups declared their ideologies ‘Socialist Nationalism’⁶⁶—a term coined specifically by Maurice Barres of France⁶⁷—in order to promote a state in which citizens would be subordinate to one unified nation, yet protected and loved by the state they loyally served.⁶⁸ Ultimately, the extreme behavior of far-right parties is what makes the ideology outwardly violent against those considered inferior. Once such violence is used by leaders and simultaneously legitimized by voters, countries and regions end up harboring aggressive nationalist parties unprepared to fulfill extreme, false promises to national electorates.

⁶⁵ See Banketa, *supra* note 63.

⁶⁶ Kitschelt, Herbert. *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (1995).

⁶⁷ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 9.

⁶⁸ See Banketa, *supra* note 63.

Subsection C: Neo-fascism and Neo-Nazism

In a certain time period and when designed with a strict hierarchical structure, extreme-right parties are considered synonymous with fascist ones; thus implying that contemporary political parties with strict hierarchical structure that also embody fascist ideology reminiscent of the those from the past are now to be considered extreme-right.⁶⁹ By donning violence as an essential piece of the movement itself,⁷⁰ fascism becomes characterized as a totalitarian rule in its most aggressive form. Nazism was essentially a brand of fascism that attempted to directly extinguish inferior out-groups, whereas other fascist and extreme-right groups typically aim to oppress these out-groups through tactics involving structural and cultural violence.⁷¹ Fascist parties ultimately legitimized the use of violence as, “an integral element of governance, a kind of violence that quickly converted into a form of massive terrorism both targeted and indiscriminate...was preached as an intrinsic element of fascist and Nazi ‘Weltanschauung’ making it equally self-evident and necessary”.⁷² Thus, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism do not only exist as an ideology—as is for far-right groups—but as behavior greatly legitimizing violence.⁷³

The way that violence was legitimized by fascist groups and the Third Reich was through force, as manifested in “socially sanctioned (‘legitimate’) instrumentalities: the communications media, the schools...the legal system, the armed forces of public security”.⁷⁴ By infiltrating daily life through already-established institutions and social

⁶⁹ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 6.

⁷⁰ See Banketa, *supra* note 63.

⁷¹ Galtung, Johan. “Cultural Violence”. *The Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, Issue 3. (1990).

⁷² See Banketa, *supra* note 63.

⁷³ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 6.

⁷⁴ See Gregor, *supra* note 64. 154.

channels, these groups appeared to be associated with legitimate modes of governance. Through these tactics, these groups found social legitimacy after preaching rhetoric that specifically appealed to those pre-disposed to nationalist sentiment, desperate to revive their culture and find relief from a failing economy. Much of this strategy is echoed in the activities of Golden Dawn as they currently operate, as will be discussed further.

As explained in Section II.I, nationalist parties are already pre-disposed to creating negative stereotyping, and thus an artificially created competition between an in-group and out-group. Mixing this with justified violence creates what may be termed as “extreme-nationalism,” reflecting the doctrine of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups. These groups were historically—and are contemporarily—able to ingrain their message into the population by creating a perception of internal and external threats to their cultural wellbeing and tradition. Ultimately, these groups “claim the existence of an international conspiracy against the nation from both internal and external enemies that interchangeably take the face of everything that is foreign and alien to the nation”.⁷⁵ Through this strategy, political leaders of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups have the ability to demonize any obstacle or threat that stands in their way of power (i.e. being arrested and put on trial for alleged criminal activity), manipulating public opinion to believe that the party is the citizen’s only true champion of survival against an international conspiracy.

A strong part of the allusion of protection comes from false promises that the party is—or will be, when elected—able to reallocate national resources to benefit

⁷⁵ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 10.

vulnerable citizens of a state under attack from threats both internal and external to the state.⁷⁶ In the identification of internal threats, such extremist groups discuss issues that are not discussed as threats in mainstream politics—though they may reflect concerns of the average voter. Internal threats to the state are identified as elitism and corruption in government representation, as well as low birth rates that are propelled in part by abortion, homosexuality, singleness, feminism, and other non-traditional lifestyles that contemporary media and globalization have more or less deemed acceptable.⁷⁷ External threats to the state are typically identified as monetary dictation from international organizations and monetary zones, and even more obviously, immigration. Migration—as a perceived threat—is seen a detriment to public health and security of nationals;⁷⁸ this will be discussed at length in Section III of this chapter.

When citizens are made to believe that these are legitimate threats to their nation, and simultaneously do not trust their existing government representatives to protect them from these threats, extreme far-right populist parties are able to easily gain support.⁷⁹ Groups identify threats (i.e. manipulate situations using the ideology of extreme-nationalist sentiment) and then provide resolutions or protection from these threats (i.e. false promises to remedy artificially created issues) then by existing within already-established political structures and becoming legitimated through successful election, extreme far-right parties are able to exercise legitimate authority within the state.

Section II.IV: Proper Terminology to be Applied Throughout this Dissertation

⁷⁶ See Banketa, *supra* note 63.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

One may conclude that all of the formerly described terms do apply to Golden Dawn in at least some fashion; however, for the purpose of efficiency in this dissertation, the ideological make up of Golden Dawn will be discussed here forth as an “extreme-nationalist” party, existing within the “extreme-right party family”.⁸⁰ This term is meant to imply all of the discussed terms, now that they have been properly examined individually. Also to be clear, the reason the party will not be exclusively termed as “neo-fascist” or “neo-Nazi”—although they are accused to be as such by media outlets—is that these terms “are now used exclusively for parties and groups that explicitly state a desire to restore the Third Reich or quote historical National Socialism as their ideological influence”.⁸¹ While Golden Dawn’s doctrine does discuss similar ideas, their political mission is based specifically in a pursuit of Hellenic and Spartan ideological restoration, not that of the Third Reich or the Italian Social Republic; note that leaders within the group, however, do often express pro-Nazi sentiment. To conclude, Golden Dawn is operating as an extreme-right group, founded in ultranationalism and far-right ideology, while incorporating a populist political style that allows them to claim political and cultural superiority to current entities existing in government; supporting this ideology, they have a tendency to promote behaviors reminiscent of historically violent neo-fascist regimes of the early twentieth century.

Section III: Typical Platforms of Extreme-Right Political Parties

One key point to understanding complex ideologies—and how political platforms are formed based on an ideological perspective—is to realize that the relationship

⁸⁰ See Mudde, *supra* note 55. 14.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

between platform points does not necessarily need to be “*logically* related, as long as they are *psychologically* related”.⁸² This psychological relationship is what forms a political axiom, while logical relationships are what form political doctrine. Fascism and the political far-right, in fact, have developed as “anti-[ideologies]...[Since] Social inequality forms the basis of the political axiom of the extreme-right...Indeed, there *are* inborn differences between human beings and people [naturally] *have* different social positions”.⁸³ Ultimately, the ideology of these parties denies the entire founding principles of political and cultural pluralism, as well as egalitarianism and capitalist markets upon which democracy is based.

Section III.I: Elements of the Extreme-Right Platform

Some theorists arrive at the conclusion that the far-right political axiom breeds a doctrine that contains a few main themes. Most agree that while prescribed themes of the platform root back to the main messages of fascist leaders of the early twentieth century, there are terms that have—or can be—been adapted to modern context, as well as concepts that have been paired together for the sake of efficiency. For Meindert Fennema—whose’ ideas have already been discussed as the basis for much of the terminological analysis—far-right platforms are encapsulated within four concepts, including: ethnic nationalism, anti-materialism, anti-parliamentarianism, and conspiracy creation.⁸⁴ Other established analysts, such as Cas Mudde, would argue that there are five main characteristics to the extreme-right platform—nationalism, xenophobia, racism,

⁸² See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 7.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 8.

anti-democratic sentiment, and an idealistically strong state⁸⁵—that can potentially be placed into three broader categories: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism.⁸⁶

Other analysts list as many as one to ten ideological themes among extreme-right platforms, demanding that all factors are represented by the party in order for them to be considered “extreme-right”.⁸⁷ However, for the sake of efficiency, this dissertation will seek to consolidate ideas from established far-right party analysts Cas Mudde and Meindert Fennema, as well as some more up-to-date information on each issue within the typical extreme-right party’s platform. The purpose of this is to have a compilation of what the extreme-right platform is; this will assist in establishing the definition of what extreme-right parties theoretically advocate and aim for in their political doctrine. Ultimately, this dissertation will use this information discuss which components necessarily suit Golden Dawn’s platform and ambitions, and which perhaps do not; a comparative analysis will later be made between parties with similar platforms existing throughout European Union member states.

Subsection A: Platform Concerning Nation and Race

“Nationalism” and “Ethnic Nationalism” are listed by both major analysts to be the major, if not main, components of extreme-right political platforms. Nationalism, as a term, was coined in the late 18th century, during the time of early democratic theory and the overthrow of longstanding religious monarchies. The term, according to Mudde, is defined as pursuing and idealizing the “congruence of state and nation” often implying

⁸⁵ Mudde, Cas. “Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86)”. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 27. (1995). 206.

⁸⁶ See Mudde, *supra* note 55. 11.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

the desire for “internal homogenization” as well as “external exclusivity”.⁸⁸ These concepts ultimately translate into the statement that those of a certain nationality belong in a certain state, just as those not of that nationality do not belong in that state. This sentiment blends into the concept that Fennema describes as “Ethnic Nationalism” whereby the concept is grounded entirely in primordialism, meaning that membership to a state is only legitimate by *ius sanguis*—in blood—as opposed to *ius soli*—in soil.⁸⁹ By this definition, the purpose of the state is to progress policy as it serves the interests of national culture. Those bound to the nation, according to Fennema, share a common destiny and thus mutually benefit from the success of the culture overall; this concept also explains Kriesberg’s theory—as discussed in Section II.I—that those who are of the same identity believe they share similar fates and fortunes.⁹⁰

Mudde mentions the factor of “Racism” as a specific piece to the extreme-right platform. He explains that “racism is the belief in natural and hereditary differences between races, with the central belief that one race is superior to the others”, thus implying that racial biology dictates the worthiness of some citizens over others. However, he clarifies that this definition serves racism in its most original conception, explaining that there is a new brand of racism more prevalent in contemporary politics. This “New Racism”—having been discussed first in the 1990s during the “Third Wave” of European far-right sentiment—claims that racial differences are not so much a question of superiority and inferiority, but a matter of incompatibility between cultures.⁹¹

⁸⁸ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 209-10.

⁸⁹ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 8.

⁹⁰ See Korostelina, *supra* note 39. 101.; See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 8.

⁹¹ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 211.

Others discuss the purpose of nationalism in platforms as a way to energize voter support over pragmatic issues, such as immigration and economic policies. More concretely, Robert Kaplan—political analyst from *Forbes* financial periodical—writes that the “aging European population with near zero birthrates, coupled with a continuation of immigration from the less developed world will continue to stoke the kind of fear that empowers nationalistic parties united by ethnicity”.⁹² This ultimately implies that so long as immigration and economic factors continue to be perceived as mutually “threatening,” nationalist rhetoric will continue to shine as the main mobilizing tactic of extreme-right platforms.

Subsection B: Platform Concerning Immigration

In practice, platform features regarding “Race” and “Immigration” often blend-together in a whirl of competitive, nationalist rhetoric; however, for the remainder of this dissertation, voter protest against immigration will be looked at from every dimension of tension existing between in-groups and out-groups, rather than simply racism. A large portion of existing conflict between immigrants and natives is a result of the false perception of what immigration entails for the economy, as manipulated by the far-right.

First, however, Fennema makes a very clear point that not all far-right parties are necessarily anti-immigrant. He claims there is an entirely new breed within the extreme-right party family that must be thought of as purely anti-immigrant. Notably, Fennema does not include any elements of anti-immigration or racist sentiment in his defining factors of the extreme-right platform; the closest he gets to such a concept is in his

⁹² Kaplan, Robert D. “Europe’s Deep Right-Wing Logic”. *Forbes*. Washington. (2014).

discussion of “Ethnic Nationalism”, as explained above. He explains anti-immigrant parties as: influenced by extreme-right party ideology, inherently racist with irrational contempt for immigrants claiming inferiority both in race and culture, and populists claiming to speak for those frustrated by perceived results of uncontrolled immigration.⁹³

Mudde explains this in his third listed feature of the extreme-right platform, which is “Xenophobia”. Literally meaning, “fear of strangers” in Greek, the term involves not only emotion (i.e. fear), but also behavior (i.e. hate and/or hostility) toward the feared subject. Mudde defines xenophobia of a collective whole or entire community as what the term ethnocentrism attempts to define.⁹⁴ He discusses in later works how this fear has grown, noting that “policies have shifted even further to the right after 9/11, which has led to the securitization of various other policy fields, not least immigration”.⁹⁵ Kaplan reaffirms this idea, noting that immigration from Muslim countries of North Africa has, from the perspective of the predominantly Christian-European electorate, “seemingly threatened previously cohesive and mono-ethnic societies in Europe”.⁹⁶

According to Mudde, after shock of events such as 9/11 have caused countries—especially those with very small military operating budgets, little border control, and virtually no collective military institution—to become fearful of foreigners, out of an obligation to protect their own citizens. These events have also plausibly caused resentment against national and supranational establishments for making unitary defense mechanisms nearly impossible to mobilize if a similar attack were to occur. Intriguingly,

⁹³ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 4.

⁹⁴ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 212-3.

⁹⁵ Mudde, Cas. “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?”. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 52, Issue 1. (2012). 9.

⁹⁶ See Kaplan, *supra* note 92.

it seems the platform discussion of anti-immigration has grown from underlying fears of extremism—such as that which inspired the attacks against Western society on September 11, 2001—with similar hatred and extremist sentiment. This statement is not attempting to equivocate actions or insinuate the potential of extreme-right groups to commit atrocities of a similar scale; it is merely meant to observe the cause-and-effect that seemingly drives actors to an innate mobilization that fights extremism with extremism in a time of desperation and fear. In this context, these emotions derive from fear after witnessing horrifying atrocities, perceiving a lack of protection from corrupted governments, as well as mistrust in a failing economy and increasing rates of poverty among specific demographics.

Subsection C: Platform Concerning Economics

Fennema provides the most direct and theoretical view of the extreme-right platform regarding economics by discussing his second feature, termed as “Anti-Materialism”. In a system whereby “the individual should subordinate himself to the people, to the nation,”⁹⁷ it would follow that rational-choice and capitalist models that promote private interests are not necessarily compatible with the idea of submission to one’s state and nation. The liberal models of economics that promote corporatism and individualism are deemed “responsible for the lack of national solidarity, which leads to the fragmentation of society,” in the same way that Marxism does when it preaches class warfare.⁹⁸ Ultimately, this conception of extreme-right economics affirms the idea that subordination and loyalty to one’s nation must be synonymous with a united working

⁹⁷ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 8.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 8-9.

class front, protected by their state out of gratitude for their submission to collective interests above personal ones.

Fennema provides one of the only solid descriptions of economic platform specific to extreme-right parties. Otherwise, most analysts agree with *Demos* analyst, Jamie Bartlett, who explains, “the far right is struggling to weave an economic story into their message...they don’t have a coherent story to tell”.⁹⁹ Although Fennema’s description is compelling, there are many arguments made that dismantle his line of thinking; some groups promote a laissez-faire market, so long as it seems the market involves only one type of participant (i.e. all market participants from the same ethnicity and/or culture). By erasing external and internal economic competition, the idea of an economy that naturally takes care of itself is attractive to some—if not most—extreme-right parties. From this line of thought comes the only true consensus found among contemporary extreme-right parties, which is that the European-modeled welfare state allowing non-Europeans to benefit from European tax dollars is inherently backward and exploitative to natives of the continent.

While most party platforms discuss these policies—along with strong contempt for austerity policies and nation-wide bailout packages—in a very vague way, they rarely present a suitable alternative to current economic policies and institutions. One group’s platform stands out, however: specifically, the Hungarian Jobbik party—which will be discussed at length in Chapter Five—has a quite developed economic plan for their country. The party discusses their alternative to current economics as an effort to

⁹⁹ Europe’s Far Right. “Culture Matters More: The far right in Europe is rising in many European countries in spite of its inability to provide a coherent economic message”. *The Economist*. Athens. (2012).

establish an ‘Eco-Social National’ Economic System. More concretely, “Jobbik’s economic policies...are relatively sophisticated. The party advocates for a mixture of state-control and protectionism combined with support for small entrepreneurs and farmers”.¹⁰⁰ Among the ranks of European extreme-right parties, the Jobbik’s economic policy does make it seem more advanced than others.

Aside from typically vague and scapegoat-oriented rhetoric about discontent with “unpopular austerity policies,”¹⁰¹ parties seem to still think in terms of traditional methods of alleviating economic disparity. A wide analysis of various parties has shown that, “Europe’s far-right parties have adopted the welfare aspirations of the center-left and flavored them with protectionism and nationalism,”¹⁰² illustrated throughout the continent, and most notably by Golden Dawn in their food handout schemes. Before serving citizens, they check identification in order to ensure their welfare-like handouts of vegetables and pasta make it only into the homes of Greek nationals. Ultimately, austerity and social-welfare is not the concern (i.e. economics are not the concern of voters); it is the practice of these policies when combined with high rates of immigration and elitist corruption that unsettles taxpayers of Greece and other European nations.

From this line of thought, it is clear that the reason economics are not a main point of extreme-right, anti-immigrant or even much of the theoretical far-right ideology is due to the fact that to solve economic disparity may alleviate tension, but would not necessarily disband nationalist sentiment searching to preserve tradition and culture

¹⁰⁰ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

¹⁰¹ See Kaplan, *supra* note 92.

¹⁰² See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

within the state. As stated in *The Economist*, “Concerns over national culture, identity and a way of life matter more than material worries. The potential for a xenophobic party exists in every European state whether a country has a triple ‘A’ credit rating, as the Netherlands does, or a country is on the brink of bankruptcy, as Greece is”.¹⁰³

Subsection D: Platform Concerning Governance and Elitism

Mudde discusses his fourth feature of the extreme-right platform in terms of parties being “Anti-Democratic”. He explains that parties of the extreme-right reject political pluralism and fundamental equality of all those who are a part of the political body. His analogy consists of one describing a healthy body versus an unhealthy one: for extreme-right parties, certain organs (i.e. institutions and individuals) are more vital to a healthy body politic than others—not every body part is created equally. Further, the only way to maintain a healthy body is to have one central organ (i.e. a charismatic and worthy leader) that keeps the body strong and well-maintained. This ideal form of a body politic exists in stark contrast to a system that would support equal importance to all organs and pieces of the body. Mudde essentially alludes to the idea that extreme-right parties hypothesize that democracy is its own decay on the body politic for it breeds corruption and dismantles order among a nation.¹⁰⁴

A similar perspective comes from Fennema’s point of view about the “Anti-Parliamentarianism” aspects of extreme-right platforms. He states that the nature of democratic theory is to “favor quantity over quality,”¹⁰⁵ in the sense that there may be

¹⁰³ See *The Economist*, *supra* note 99.

¹⁰⁴ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 214-6.

¹⁰⁵ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 9-10.

many representatives, but it is merely for the appearance of representation. The extreme-right at this point attempts to prove corruption by attacking individual politicians and the “parasitical class” that is the elite democratic leadership. What is worse, Fennema prescribes of the extreme-right perspective, is that democratic leadership is not only corrupt but it is filled with “cowards”. He explains that in such a convoluted, quantity-over-quality government, individual politicians are able to “hide behind democratic procedures because they...refuse to take any personal responsibility for their decisions”.¹⁰⁶ One of the last objections that the extreme-right poses against democratic leadership is that partisan politics dismantle unity, therefore having one solid party in a leadership that minimizes discourse and solely understands people’s needs will be the champion of “true democracy” before democratic politics ever will.

Subsection E: Platform Concerning Globalization and State Relations

Mudde’s last aspect of the extreme-right political platform features exclusively the belief that one’s nation is a “Strong State” among weak states, and that citizens have an obligation to ensure this reality. The strong state—according to Mudde—features internal and external political features, namely, “anti-pluralism, law-and-order, and militarism”.¹⁰⁷ Internal features indicate that a single-party state must have offensive police enforcement perpetually on a “quest for order,” attempting to punish crimes such as homosexuality, prostitution, pornography, and the like. External aspects of the extreme-right political platform advocate for strong military presence in order to protect national interests despite supranational entity dictation and typical world-order. In this

¹⁰⁶ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 10.

¹⁰⁷ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 216.

concept, pacifism is considered weak and would potentially undermine national will, as well as the honor and sacrifice of military servants. Finally, if a state is in fact strong and healthy, some parties reach far enough to insinuate that their duty must be to dominate weaker states, enlarging their potential regime and expanding their influence.¹⁰⁸

Ironically, again, the platform seems to counteract something it detests (i.e. supranational institutionalism and globalization) with its own similar brand (i.e. regime influence expansion and ultimate dictation of nationalities outside of their own).

Fennema's last feature of this typical extreme-right platform is based in the group's tendency to advocate "Conspiracy Theories" as rationale for party positions. The origin of this tactic was seen firstly by the Jacobin party—notable for their political influence during the French Revolution—who wildly discussed the "aristocratic plot" of elites and internationalists to establish non-populist, corrupt elitism throughout the country. Conspiracy theories typically discuss the position that "internationalists" (i.e. stateless people lacking patriotism or loyalty to one nation) wish to control otherwise united and mono-ethnic nations; ultimately, control is successful through providing monetary bribes and other pressure-inducing tactics to corrupt politicians at all levels of government.¹⁰⁹ According to extreme-right parties, corruption conspiracies undermine national unity and are the reason that partisan politics yield horrible results for citizens.

While neither article discusses the term directly, other outlets point to paranoia about internal and external threats from the international community as a form of Euroscepticism. As explained by Kaplan, the inability for current institutions to resolve

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 217-8.

¹⁰⁹ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 10-1.

social and economic issues has ultimately undermined their authority—at least socially—and promoted the Eurosceptic vote that most see in extreme-right party platforms.

Interestingly, Kaplan equates the institution of the European Union to fit within the left-right political dichotomy, like so: “The post-national European Union, [is] organized as it has been for decades around the principle of the social welfare state—in turn supported by high taxes and meager defense budgets—is a left-wing or left-of-center historical project” that ultimately has failed European citizens.¹¹⁰ Interestingly, Kaplan explains that the European Union and other supranational institutions were mostly born of a strong-willed, anti-fascist sentiment following the World Wars. Considering the time that has past, Kaplan fears that “there is no longer a taboo against neo-fascism,”¹¹¹ and that this fact is dangerous when mixed with social disapproval of the current liberal left-centric world-order.

According to Kaplan, backlash against institutions perceived to be ineffective—specifically at addressing issues of immigration and economic crises—is running rampant and citizens are growing more resentful of the left’s lack of solutions. A lot of rhetoric explains that the same ways of thinking will not alleviate Europe from its issues; there must be a new world order to resolve citizen’s ability to feel secure and trusting in their home country. As he explains, “for the European masses, the sense of security—political, social and economic—has been weakening on all fronts...[and] the left appears to have fewer answers than the right,” mostly because established democrats are providing

¹¹⁰ See Kaplan, *supra* note 99.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

excuses that blame procedural and technocratic barriers for ineffectiveness.¹¹² With little faith in this platform—seeing as it normally lacks plausible alternatives to the majority of the party’s complaints about the current establishment—it is interesting to eventually accept the idea from both a voter or an analyst’s perspective that, “just as the European left has had no solutions to the current crisis, neither will the nationalistic right”.¹¹³

Section III.II: Voter Attraction to Extreme-Right Platforms

The emotionally based axiom of the extreme-right supports use of potentially violent tactics that address various issues related to their political platform. As stated by researchers at The London School of Economics and Political Science, “the extreme-right provides an avenue of expression for the angry, unemployed, and dispossessed... encouraged and maintained by the country’s educational system”.¹¹⁴ All political parties naturally wish to become politically legitimate; therefore they attempt to best represent the concerns of the people, promising a more positive reality once they enter power.

However, concerned citizens angered by current political and economic status are incredibly unfulfilled when established party democrats “hide behind technocratic arguments of administrative necessity or behind existing commitment to international agreements. Such arguments are not necessarily false, but they tend to be framed in a paternalistic discourse of democratic elitism,”¹¹⁵ only feeding the anger felt by constituents against their establishment. Thus, radical political groups that challenge the elite have the ability to fill spaces that are ungoverned or misgoverned—or at least

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ See Halikiopoulou, *supra* note 47.

¹¹⁵ See Fennema, *supra* note 57. 26.

perceived to be—so long as their platform addresses the concerns of angered and disengaged citizens. As discussed, these concerns typically go unanswered as empty promises. Additionally, specific hypotheses describe voter attraction of extreme-right groups, particularly in terms of an electorate perceiving feelings of anger when solutions are yet to be found.¹¹⁶

Subsection A: The “Social Disintegration Hypothesis”

This hypothesis notes that some voters are intrigued by far-right platforms because of skyrocketing unemployment, depreciated land value, decreasing sense of connectedness to one’s culture, social isolation, and other reasons related to economic wellbeing. The “social disintegration hypothesis” is helpful, as it explains personal and collective motivation deriving from a sense of relative deprivation among citizens who once felt connected to their political structure through a healthy economic system. However, it must be noted that it was not only in isolated areas of the country where Golden Dawn found its first surge of support, but rather the large capital city of Athens. The same holds true for support to Hitler throughout the Weimar Republic.¹¹⁷ While these types of solution-based platforms exist on the far-right, they do not explain the recent rise in vehemently anti-immigrant parties throughout all of Europe, Golden Dawn being one of them.

Subsection B: The “Ethnic Competition Hypothesis”

Sentiments of distrust that used to be justified by economic conditions are now discussed as platform issues unto themselves. Ultimately, the “ethnic competition

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 18.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 19.

hypothesis” states that, “it is immigration—and not social isolation—that is the principle cause of the rise of anti-immigrant parties”.¹¹⁸ While economic interests are still involved in the platform of these parties, immigrants are highlighted as the main reason for economic downfall. They are painted as competitors in their national labor market, attaining jobs that would otherwise belong to the country’s citizens and correct the issue of high-unemployment.

This hypothesis more so illustrates the situation of Golden Dawn’s platform, as statistics show large flows of migration to areas where the party maintains the majority of its supporters. These areas similarly show consistently high-rates of unemployment among certain demographic categories. To be clear, the “ethnic competition hypothesis” does not illustrate the personal motivation or character of those who use this justification to vote for far-right parties—in other words, this hypothesis does not prove racism—rather it divulges the extent to which party leaders have manipulated situations by using immigrants and corrupt elites as the scapegoats for a failing economy. In a region where nationalist sentiment is already taught and highly embedded in society, the actions taken by manipulative groups to scapegoat foreigners simply adds fuel to the fire.

Another way to explain this would be through Mudde’s interpretation of voter appeal to the extreme-right. He regards their electoral success as “enabled by the pre-existence of a fertile breeding ground of popular resentment around immigration, crime and party politics,”¹¹⁹ claiming that manipulation of that ‘breeding ground’ is what becomes dangerous. He also mentions in his piece that right-wing extremism and

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁹ See Mudde, *supra* note 95. 11.

populism does not threaten “the government of the people, by the people and for the people,” but what it does do is define in its own platform-beneficial way what “the people” means.¹²⁰ At a time of economic anger, it may become “people for” and “people against” capitalism; at a time of high-immigration influxes, “people” may be grounded in terms of ethnicity, thus defining who belongs within the nation itself.¹²¹ By this interpretation, extreme-right platforms do not cause issues, they merely manipulate situations to benefit their desire to achieve political legitimacy.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR: GOLDEN DAWN, A CASE STUDY

The central case study of this dissertation seeks to discuss the path that Golden Dawn has taken to national political legitimacy in the country of Greece. After having determined the definition of political legitimacy, the theoretical grounding of common terminology associated with parties of the extreme-right, as well as the typical platform of the extreme-right, it is now imperative to understand how Golden Dawn has transformed into the political authority that it was at the time of Pavlos Fyssas' death.

Section I: Historical Background and Contextual Information

This section will outline the historical background and contextual information regarding the formation of the party from the roots of democracy, as well as military occupation throughout some of the twentieth century. This will set the historical context for the path of how—and perhaps even why—the party has come to be politically legitimized after over twenty-five years of a marginal political presence. The last behavior of Golden Dawn to be discussed in this chapter will be the attack against Pavlos Fyssas in September 2013—again, this event is determined to be the turning point of formal Greek public opinion on the party. This information will allow for a more comprehensive and accurate dialogue later discussing whether the actions of this one group—in context of its entire history and recent political history of Greece—can be

readily compared to other parties with similar platform points in terms of their chronology and type of influence they present to the European Parliament.

Section I.I: Right-Wing Politics in Greece (post-WWII to Present)

As a pinnacle of democratic rule throughout the world—considering its ancient roots in political thought and the development of direct democracy—Greece had always been considered a quite moderate political body. However, following World War II occupation of Greece by Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, the country became quite divided into a polarized political body. While some supported left-wing communism—despite legal restrictions on communist party formation, as well as pressure from fellow NATO members, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan to abandon communist sympathies—others supported the ultranationalism of conservative parties established by previous governments. As an increasingly polar two-party system, the build-up of distrust and political tension eventually culminated in a military coup successfully staged by right-wing military generals. The nationalistic military junta remained in power—though changed its hierarchical structure multiple times between military and monarchy—between the years of 1967 and 1974.

The military dictation ended after a referendum was held by then-Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis; the referendum reinstalled the parliamentary democracy and officially banned any sort of monarchy from Greece. This created a detrimental shift in the power that right-wing political entities had maintained almost entirely since the end of World War II. As leader of the conservative New Democracy party—a steadfast, socially conservative, fiscally liberal group—Karamanlis had always maintained electoral

support from the radical right existing in Greece at the time. The extreme-right party of the time, known as National Alignment, was vehemently anti-communist, pro-nationalist, and pro-traditional monarchical system. Out of protest following the referendum, National Alignment supporters formally withdrew all allegiance to New Democracy and the politically conservative mainstream. In the following 1977 parliament elections, National Alignment secured over 350,000 votes, making the extreme-right politically legitimized by a democracy for the first time, earning 5 seats in the Hellenic Parliament. Despite attempts to rein voters back into the mainstream, splinter groups protesting New Democracy began arising at politically opportune moments.¹²²

Although National Alignment was the first extreme-right party to transform from a role of marginalized-to-legitimized in post-WWII Greece, some splinter parties grew their momentum and eventual disintegration. The Progressive Party, for example, was a similar New Democracy-protest party that ran both nationally and for European Parliament; it sought to place Karamanlis out of his position as President of the Third Hellenic Republic. Despite a lack of success nationally, The Progressive Party won one seat in Greece's first European Parliament class in the elections of 1981—this was the same year of Greek accession into the European Economic Community, now known as the European Union.¹²³

A similar faction of National Alignment was the National Political Union (EPEN). This group became present and influential in European Parliament—more so

¹²² Georgiadou, Vassiliki. "Right-Wing Populism and Extremism: The Rapid Rise of "Golden Dawn" in Crisis-Ridden Greece". *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (2013). 78-80.

¹²³ Ibid., 80.

than in it was in Greece—at the beginning of the “Third Wave” of extreme-right sentiment throughout Europe beginning in the 1980s and ending in the early 2000s.¹²⁴ Idolizing imprisoned military junta leaders, EPEN was an organization and party that gained popular support among youth demographics. Their work among children and at Orthodox churches eventually sowed the seeds for young, zealous right-wing extremists to develop a foothold in Greek politics, ultimately inspiring Golden Dawn.¹²⁵

Another political party that had developed around this time—and that was far more influential in national politics than any of its predecessors—was the People’s Orthodox Rally (LAOS) that is still present, yet now less influential, in the Greek political system. This party was a similar influencer, formed in 2000 toward the end of the Third Wave. The reason for its creation was—again—out of protest against New Democracy, after the party banned parliament member Giorgos Karatzaferis for rejecting the mainstream-right politics and becoming too radical. LAOS became a sternly “national party” in the sense that it championed a Greece with an insular free-market, a strong military, and ethnic homogeneity. Later sentiments confirmed clear Euroscepticism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism, despite attempts by the party to soften their platform during the parliamentary elections of 2007, when LAOS had their first Hellenic Parliament victory.¹²⁶

For a while, New Democracy was able to maintain power among voters nationally, however LAOS received 1 seat in European Parliament (with 4.12% of the

¹²⁴ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 211.

¹²⁵ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 81.

¹²⁶ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 83.

total vote), politically legitimizing the group for the first time in 2004. It was not until the national elections of 2007 that LAOS entered Greek government with 10 seats and 3.8% of the national vote. In 2009 the party did well again—securing 2 seats in European Parliament and 15 seats in Greek Parliament—however failed to carry that momentum any further, unsuccessful in gaining or securing any presence in the Greek or European parliaments after 2012.¹²⁷ Presently, LAOS is seen as a party in compromise; while it does “exhibit a protest mentality...it has functioned as a hub where several ideological currents of the non-establishment right-wing cross paths...[and] created new political opportunities for the entire far-right scene”.¹²⁸ Ultimately, its wavering platform over the past decade has caused ambiguity and paved the way for a solid extreme-right group—namely, Golden Dawn—to find their spotlight in Greek politics with a much more extreme platform.

Subsection A: Historical Characterization of the Greek Right-Wing

Georgiadou characterizes the post-WWII political right-wing into a multi-dimensional template of “old” versus “new” as well as “radical” versus “extremist”. According to Georgiadou, National Alignment is considered an “old radical” while LAOS is considered a “new radical” party. More similarly to the behavior of Golden Dawn is the EPEN, characterized as an “old extremist” party, while Golden Dawn solidifies the title as the “new extremist” far-right party in the Greek political sphere.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Ministry of Interior (Hellenic Republic). *Elections*. Web Source. Accessed 20 July 2014. (2014).

¹²⁸ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 84.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 84.

The characteristic differentiating “old” from “new” not only refers to physical time and space, but also to the way mainstream New Democracy handled its splinter groups. Originally, the party attempted to compromise and reconcile differences with “old” extreme-right groups—otherwise thought of as “absorbing” ultranationalists—in an effort to reestablish a solid parliamentary system that had been broken during the military junta. Their tactics were successful over time, as evidenced by the lack of longevity of each “old” protest party.¹³⁰ However, the development of groups like LAOS, who included Euroscepticism in their key platform points—blatantly separating “old” from “new” even considering basic chronology—caused New Democracy to completely separate its politics from the “new” far-right.¹³¹ Ultimately, it is imperative that predominant mainstream parties stay adamantly pro-European integration, for they are the ones who built the European Union; while “old” parties may have had sceptic attitudes and tendencies, this was a far less prominent platform point than it is for “new” extreme-right parties. The distinct features between “old” and “new” have created just as much room for the extreme-right to rise on a long-term basis—evident from the multi-term success of LAOS—as the independent political variables that these parties attempt to manipulate (i.e. immigration, unemployment, etc.).

¹³⁰ See Table 1; See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 79.

¹³¹ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 84.

Table 1: Radical Right-Wing Party Success As Protest to New Democracy.: “P” indicates Hellenic Parliament elections, “E” indicates European Parliament Elections

Radical right-wing and extreme right-wing parties with parliamentary representation **Table 1**

Name of party	Party strength in parliamentary elections (P) and European elections (E) 1974 to 2009						
	1977 P	1981 E	1984 E	2004 E	2007 P	2009 P	2009 E
National Alignment	6.82 % (5)						
Progressive Party		1.96 % (1)					
EPEN			2.29 % (1)				
LAOS				4.1 % (1)	3.8 % (10)	5.36 % (15)	7.15% (2)

Source: Ministry of the Interior, <http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/>.
The number of MPs in each category is given in parentheses

Section I.II: The Development of Golden Dawn

Developing from and within this context was the brewing prominence of the extreme-right political organization known in Greek as Chrysi Avgi, or in English as The Peoples Association—Golden Dawn. Despite slight presence of EPEN and LAOS in European Parliament, Greece’s Golden Dawn is not typically discussed in most analysts’ descriptions of the Third Wave. As Georgiadou explains, “in the 1980s and 1990s, when Europe’s right-wing radicals and populists started to make electoral gains...like-minded Greeks remained on the periphery of the party system,”¹³² thus there was not much of an electoral presence of Third Wave influence in Greece until the success of LAOS in 2004. While New Democracy was quickly recollecting voters who strayed from the right-of-center political margin—making these parties typically one-time electoral successes—

¹³² Ibid., 76.

there are other reasons that discussion of the Third Wave wildly ignored the presence and potential that Golden Dawn was slowly cultivating.

From an election-centric perspective, there was nothing to necessarily report on Golden Dawn in its first twenty-five years of existence. Thus, it now seems as though this party erupted over-night; and while this is true in terms of its electoral success, it must be noted that the party's maturity derived greatly during the Third Wave, although its electoral opportunities were only present nearly ten years later. What may be questioned, then, is why their beginning stages were so wildly ignored considering they are an ideological product of "the most successful post-war period...for right-wing extremist parties almost everywhere"?¹³³ Mudde suggests that many groups were left out of Third Wave analysis due to language barriers, whereby "the scholarly (English-language) community [could] get more information on the British right-wing extremist parties (BNP and NF), which [were] electorally irrelevant".¹³⁴ In other words, all electorally successful groups at the time were discussed in Third Wave literature, but the only non-electorally successful groups documented were those speaking English; thus, Golden Dawn as a Greek-speaking, non-electoral success until nearly twenty-five years-later fell outside the radar of international political analysts until very recently.

Other analysts suggest that very little is known about the internal makeup of the party because such information is simply never divulged, neither to Greek nor English audiences. As Dinas (et. al.) explains, "Golden Dawn refuses to provide specific

¹³³ Mudde, Cas. "The war of words defining the extreme right party family". *West European Politics*, Vol. 19, Issue 2. (1996). 2.

¹³⁴ See Mudde, *supra* note 133. 9.

information concerning its organization and membership,”¹³⁵ just as many other far-right parties do. They affirm that what is known about the party has only been discovered because of investigative reports and public intrigue following its electoral success.¹³⁶

The little that is known among the scholarly community about the beginning stages of the party will be discussed here, in an attempt to fill in any gaps that may explain the rapid growth—as well as ideological and organizational components—of Golden Dawn. Furthermore, what is quite impressive is the resilience of this group despite its lack of electoral success for over twenty years, and even more so at a time when “moderation and convergence” politics dominated the Greek political spectrum.¹³⁷ During the time of their development, centrist parties—New Democracy and PASOK—alternated power, striving to maintain a non-polar political environment while the rest of the European mainstream struggled with Third Wave politics. As discussed, New Democracy’s tight control on “old” splinter groups kept the bulk of ultranationalist voters in the mainstream, at least while at the voting booth.

Subsection A: Organization and Party Foundations

Golden Dawn has existed—at least to some degree of political presence—since 1980, right before Greece entered the EEC. The name was first seen used as the title of a news journal founded in neo-fascist sentiment by supporters of fascist Italy’s World War II occupation of Greece. In 1983, the same founders of *Chrysi Avgi* created *The People’s*

¹³⁵ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

¹³⁶ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

¹³⁷ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 75.

Association as a political organization; by 1985, they blended the names to create *The People's Association—Golden Dawn* as an official political organization.

Golden Dawn followed the influence of like-minded Third Wave parties in other European countries; its founders and officials were notably “cognizant of contemporary developments within Europe’s ‘New Right’”.¹³⁸ The People’s Association—Golden Dawn and other organizations attempted to create a politically prominent group to defend Europe against Marxist, individualistic, egalitarian, and Protestant values. The group, between the years of 1980 and 1994, was much more of a blanketed far-right sentiment group—coordinating efforts with neo-Nazis, as well as populists—than an outward “extremist political force”.¹³⁹

Subsection B: Symbolism and Community Involvement

Regarding the flag and symbol of Golden Dawn—though most descriptions are based in assumption alone—most political analysts liken the party’s symbol to that of the Nazi German swastika.¹⁴⁰ The flag, bearing this symbol as well as a wreath—typically a sign of honor and accomplishment throughout Ancient Greek mythology and art—has been shown in different colors. The official symbol of the political party is a white symbol surrounded by a gold wreath on a navy background. Other popular uses of the symbol have are seen as white on black t-shirts—more or less the uniform of Golden Dawn members—while others symbols are presented in black, outlined in white against a red flag (this color combination is the same as those used to adorn the Nazi German

¹³⁸ Ibid., 85.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 85-6.

¹⁴⁰ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

swastika).¹⁴¹ In response to these assumptions, however, Golden Dawn members defend the symbol, saying that it is an Ancient Greek symbol known as the Meandros, visible on traditional pieces of Hellenic art, specifically from the Geometric Period.¹⁴²



Figure 1: Different Uses and Golden Dawn Symbol. Left to Right: Logo, T-Shirt, Flag




Figure 2: Hellenic Pottery from the Geometric Era Illustrating Meandros Symbol

The symbols and flags of the party are proudly donned at all occasions, as an invitation and in an attempt to create a safe haven for Greeks; yet also a warning to those who are not. Throughout the years, Golden Dawn has been distributing medicine and

¹⁴¹ See Figure 1; Basics News. Web Source. Accessed 15 June 2014. (2012); Golden Dawn (London). Web Source. Accessed 15 June 2014. (2014); Wikimedia Commons. Web Source. Accessed 15 June 2014. (2012); *Note: Photos have been resized from their original format by Andrea Mancuso, the author of this dissertation.*

¹⁴² See Figure 2; Its All Greek (UK). Web Source. Accessed 15 July 2014. (2014); *Note: Photos have been resized from their original format by Andrea Mancuso, the author of this dissertation.*

food to impoverished Greek families—many of which include or are exclusively comprised of elderly individuals—however, the handouts come with both explicit and implicit conditions. Explicit requirements to gain Golden Dawn-sponsored handouts include that one is able to prove they are a Greek citizen by birth;¹⁴³ this typically means showing of government-issued identification or birth certificates.¹⁴⁴ Implicitly, those who are hungry and feel insecure in their own state gain support from a legitimated political party that supports their families; this is a key way in which the party conditions trust within Greek communities. The ability of the party to sponsor such events has been made easier since their political legitimization in 2010. In other words, following their election into the Athenian government, Golden Dawn has had much more mobility and access to monetary support for these programs and charity funds, making them appear more effective at addressing communal issues.

Other tactics of community involvement include recruitment at primary and secondary schools—beginning as early as 2006—and Greek Orthodox sermons, where Golden Dawn leaders would hand out pamphlets with “racist content intimidating migrant school children and teachers who opposed these visits”.¹⁴⁵ Unofficial accounts of their involvement at these venues include recruitment into the organization, as well as scouting for paramilitary and political talent. Similarly, the party holds what are known as “national awakening” sessions. These sessions attempt to teach young children—typically aged 6 to 10 years old—about Greek heritage, the Orthodox Christian faith, and

¹⁴³ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

¹⁴⁴ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2, 23.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

stories of glory and honor from Greek history. Many draw comparisons between these tactics and those used by the military junta, and even Nazi propaganda of the 1930s.¹⁴⁶

Subsection C: Hierarchical Structure and Party Affiliations

According to Dinas and his colleagues, typical extreme-right parties wish to be regarded as, “rigorously structured, strictly hierarchical, introvert [organizations] with very strong leadership,”¹⁴⁷ and the same rings true for Golden Dawn. Ever since its roots as a small publication, one source of control has remained in the spotlight since Golden Dawn’s conception in 1980. Nikos Michaloliakos, a prominent member of other extreme-right and neo-fascist parties—namely, the August 4th Party (dissolved in 1977) and the EPEN—has been the organizer, gatekeeper of information, as well as front-running politician for Golden Dawn; additionally, Michaloliakos has “never been challenged seriously by internal party rivals”.¹⁴⁸

Throughout his time as the party’s figurehead, Michaloliakos has been well known for writing and speaking to promote a revival of neo-Nazi sentiment; many of his published political essays have included “Heil Hitler” salutes after describing the ideological principles of Golden Dawn. In a similar neo-Nazi vein, the Golden Dawn leader has openly denied the massacre of millions during the reign of Nazi Germany, namely the Holocaust; he has also been photographed several times greeting his constituents and supporters with the Nazi salute. Similarly to his response regarding

¹⁴⁶ K.H. “Charlemagne Politics: Golden Dawn’s “national awakening” sessions. *The Economist*. Athens. (2013).

¹⁴⁷ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

assumptions made about the Golden Dawn symbol, however Michaloliakos defends the gesture, noting that it is a gesture from Greek tradition, not that of the Nazi tradition.

According to the United Nations, the party “retains close contacts with the German neo-Nazi organization, Free South Network,” and was invited by Golden Dawn politicians to visit the Hellenic Parliament in February 2013.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, Michaloliakos held sympathies for other ultranationalist movements of the time; he showed strong “solidarity with the regime of Slobodan Milosevic,” and there has been confirmed involvement of Golden Dawn volunteers during the massacre against the Bosniaks at Srebrenica in 1995.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, Milosevic and Michaloliakos shared similar anger toward the Republic of Macedonia, both publicly refusing its recognition as a sovereign nation and harboring feelings of irredentism.¹⁵¹

In coordination with its involvement in Yugoslav foreign affairs, Golden Dawn had transformed from a research and defense organization to an official extreme-right political party; it had registered and began its political debut in 1994.¹⁵² When state resources became within the party’s potential reach at each election cycle, Golden Dawn began “[shifting] the focus of its militant activity from foreign to domestic issues”.¹⁵³ The shift ultimately implied that claims to Macedonian lands were replaced by rhetoric about reclaiming Greek lands from foreign immigrants. Although they still lacked a solid political platform and no electoral success in the European Parliament election of 1994 or the Greek Parliament election of 1996, Golden Dawn leadership was found fighting and

¹⁴⁹ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁵⁰ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 87.

¹⁵¹ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁵² See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 85.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 87.

attacking—verbally and physically—left-wing and anti-fascist activists regarding the issue of immigration on the diverse streets of Athens throughout the 1990s.¹⁵⁴

Section II: Violent Behavior of Golden Dawn

In particular, Golden Dawn’s anti-immigrant stances have yielded the most counts of violence against the party in its history. Growing numbers of violence involving or caused by Golden Dawn have continued to be reported to the United Nations’ Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN)—an initiative created by the Greek National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Greece (UNHCR). A few instances of outright violence have been reported prior to the downturn of the Greek economy—which will be discussed—however, it seems that the bulk of reported violence has occurred since 2009, primarily against migrants living in densely populated cities, most often Athens.

Section II.I: Incidents of Violence

The phenomenon of racist violence throughout Greece is not by the fault of Golden Dawn alone. In 2011, the RVRN began recording counts of racial crimes, recording 154 incidents in 2012.¹⁵⁵ According to unofficial sources, Golden Dawn was directly responsible for over half of those incidents. In the year 2013, the RVRN recorded “166 incidents of racist violence with at least 320 victims,”¹⁵⁶ again a significant portion of the offenses derive from Golden Dawn leaders and members directly. While not all incidents may be traced back to Golden Dawn, the United Nations and RVRN imply that

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 87-8.

¹⁵⁵ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 19.

¹⁵⁶ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Greece), National Commission for Human Rights (Greece). *2013 Annual Report*. Athens: Racist Violence Recording Network. (2013). 5.

the party is a main source of violence throughout the country.¹⁵⁷ Some of the following incidents of violence have been recorded by the RVRN; others are incidents that took place prior to the creation of the network.

Subsection A: Violence Against Migrants

Many recent incidents—meaning those occurring after 2009—have been collected by the RVRN and categorized as specific attempts to harm immigrant merchants working at open-air markets. These reports have indicated the direct involvement of Golden Dawn Members of Parliament in attacks against migrants, “destroying their open market stalls and verbally or physically abusing members of the public who objected”.¹⁵⁸ According to the RVRN, the Hellenic Police typically turn their backs during and after the incidents, despite the fact that large-scale attacks were frequently shown and discussed on Greek news stations. The attackers most commonly wear black Golden Dawn t-shirts with military fatigues. A specific attack happened in September 2012, when three Members of Parliament led a group of Golden Dawn members to a group of immigrant merchants. “After ‘verifying’ they had no permits to sell their goods, the black-shirted GD supporters used their Greek-flag poles to destroy the merchants’ stalls;” politicians claimed to have informed the police of illegal merchant activity, but eventually took matters into their own hands and, “did what the Golden Dawn had to do”.¹⁵⁹

To the extent of individual attacks, victims typically described their attackers as groups of “self-proclaimed vigilantes,” waiting to attack migrants and refugees “in the

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵⁸ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁵⁹ Ellinas, Antonis. “The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece”. *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 18, Issue 4. (ed.) Susannah Verney, Anna Bosco. (2013). 7-8.

streets, squares or public transportation stops”.¹⁶⁰ According to the RVRN, 75 cases in 2013 note that “the victims of the attacks believe that the perpetrators are linked to extremist groups...[reportedly] dressed in black and at times with military trousers, wearing helmets or having their faces covered,” if not directly recognizing the attacker as a politician or known member of Golden Dawn.¹⁶¹ These direct associations were made in 15 cases recorded in 2013.

Unofficial sources have associated the party with mass-disappearances of over one hundred migrant workers; there is speculation that Golden Dawn is behind these abductions, and this question remains under special investigation. Overall, however, the RVRN notes that out of 166 racial incidents in 2013, 143 of those incidents were targeted against immigrants and refugees, mostly in the form of direct violence.¹⁶² Other accounts tell of more structural and cultural violence, however, referring to situations like refusal of basic human services, medical attention, and security.

Subsection B: Violence Against Homosexuals

While there have been alleged pamphlets and “national awakening” sessions that highlight homophobic sentiment, among the 166 attacks in 2013, 22 were against homosexual individuals and couples. 12 of these cases actually took place in detention centers of Thessaloniki, against transgendered women who were being repeatedly jailed. According to the RVRN, these attacks were physical, “accompanied by threats, verbal

¹⁶⁰ See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, *supra* note 166. 7.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁶² Ibid., 5.

abuse, derogatory characterizations regarding gender identity, denial of access to a legal counsel, and...even denial to provide medication”.¹⁶³

In one particular case—of which there is little detail—a student describes attempting to flee from her classmates, who attempted to beat her up because of her gender identity. The student sought refuge in a teacher’s room where a security guard apathetically locked her in the room, then “when the director of the school arrived, he allegedly told her, ‘I will call Golden Dawn just for you’”.¹⁶⁴ Just as there is fear from threatening messages and actions against among immigrant communities, there is fear among the homosexual community as well.

Subsection C: Violence Against Muslims

Aside from accounts of immigrant-targeted violence that typically involves the identification of foreigners from their appearance as well as religious affiliation, there have been direct threats against the Muslim population in Greece that is in fact comprised of Greek nationals. May 2013, the RVRN published a document written on a large Golden Dawn symbol addressed to The Muslim Association of Greece (MAG). The letter stated that if Muslim communities did not “shut down their brothels and go to hell...[that] from July 1 onwards those who are still here will be slaughtered like chickens on the road.”¹⁶⁵ The threat was unprovoked, and MAG contacted authorities, stating that the

¹⁶³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ 1AgainstRacism. “Muslim Association of Greece receives letter containing sick threats”. *UNHCR (Greece)*. Athens. (2013).

Greek police must do everything to “ensure that all citizens can enjoy equality in the eyes of the law and that we are not prey to every asymmetric threat”.¹⁶⁶

In regard to their power as elected to officials, there have been multiple policies proposed to purposefully hinder the Greek Muslim minority’s access to Greek public services. One policy in particular sought to fully abolish all policies related to the assisted entry and financial aid packages offered to Greek Muslim university students. This instance—while not an account of direct violence—demonstrates the party’s aim, and ultimately their ability, to harm communities at a structural and cultural level since their political legitimization first occurred at the national level in 2012.¹⁶⁷

Subsection D: Violence Against Other Greeks

One of the first major events related to Golden Dawn’s violence record happened in 1998, when Deputy Chairman Antonios Androutsopoulos attacked left-wing student Dimitris Kousouris; the victim was a known advocate of minority and immigrant rights in Greece. Although some claimed the attack was attempted murder, Androutsopoulos was charged with criminal assault. However, Androutsopoulos—who also went by the alias “Periandros”—avoided arrest for over eight years after going into hiding; once found he was charged with 21 years in prison, but only served 12 after a successful court appeal.¹⁶⁸ According to some sources, this attack was only one of three assassination attempts that Periandros was accused of in 1998.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁶⁸ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 87-8.

¹⁶⁹ See Papadimitriou, *supra* note 1.

Another high-profile instance of anti-leftist violence was seen live on television by the entire Greek nation when parliament member Elias Kasidiaris assaulted two female politicians during a live debate. The incident occurred on July 7, 2012 just after the electorate had secured the party's first seats in national parliament only one month earlier. Out of rage, he first threw a glass of water at SYRIZA—the dominant radical left-wing party, otherwise known as the “Coalition of the Radical Left”—representative Rena Dourou. Kasidiaris then turned to KKE—Communist Party of Greece—representative, a fellow member of parliament by the name of Liana Kanelli, and slapped her multiple times while she threw up her arms in defense.¹⁷⁰ As Michaloliakos stated to the Associated Press regarding the party platform for the upcoming 2012 national election, “no one should fear [us] if they are a good Greek citizen. If they are traitors—I don't know”.¹⁷¹

Most notably, as used as an introductory point in the beginning of this dissertation, the stabbing of popular—anti-fascist and anti-racist—musician Pavlos Fyssas on September 18, 2013 by a self-proclaimed member of Golden Dawn was possibly the most significant incident of violence the group had ever been accused of. Harm to left-wing counterparts was surprising, but not unprecedented as many SYRIZA and KKE supporters had been accused of similar violence against right-wing party members. However, the murderous action that occurred in that instance due to political messaging shook the nation. At this point, “the Greek coalition government [had] adopted

¹⁷⁰ See Ellinas, *supra* note 159. 7.

¹⁷¹ Qena, Nebi. “Extreme right leader lashes Greece's ‘traitors’”. *US News and World Report*. Washington: Associated Press. Web Source. Accessed 15 July 2014. (2012).

a firm stance towards [Golden Dawn],”¹⁷² finally understanding the point at which political violence and extremist behavior went too far. At this point, Greek politicians and citizens effectively drew the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior, as far as the rest of the government was concerned.

Section II.II: Consequences of Violent Behavior

Only ten days following the murder, Michaloliakos and 17 other Golden Dawn members of parliament—along with dozens of supporters—were arrested under 32 counts of alleged criminal activity.¹⁷³ The group was officially charged with operation as a criminal organization, arson, murder, theft, kidnappings, conspiracy to create a paramilitary, attempted murder, first-degree murder, money laundering, and benefiting from an illegal arms trade.¹⁷⁴ Soon after, “three of the arrested MPs were released under restraining orders due to the fact that the evidence was considered inadequate for their detention,”¹⁷⁵ while 6 others, including Michaloliakos remained in jail. Some weeks later, the Hellenic Parliament voted to suspend state funding for any political party undergoing a criminal investigation;¹⁷⁶ however, the group was able to still run for public office, and successfully did so the following May during the 2014 European Parliamentary elections.

While these are only a handful of violent instances that were either confirmedly or allegedly performed by Golden Dawn members, it is far more than most far-right, or even extreme-right groups have to their name. As scholar Antonis Ellinas has stated publicly,

¹⁷² See Papadimitriou, *supra* note 1.

¹⁷³ Hope, Kerin. “Greek police ‘infiltrated’ by Golden Dawn”. *The Financial Times*. Athens. (2013).

¹⁷⁴ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁷⁵ See Papadimitriou, *supra* note 1.

¹⁷⁶ Hope, Kerin. “Athens votes overwhelmingly to cut state funding to Golden Dawn”. *The Financial Times*. Athens. (2013).

Golden Dawn is “at the extreme end of the far-right spectrum, but what makes them exceptional is their use of violence”.¹⁷⁷ It is not necessarily their platform, but the way they go about achieving that platform—through manipulation of situations, attempts to frame and scapegoat individuals and groups, as well as blatant structural, cultural and direct violence—that sets this group apart from others. Ellinas and Mudde would agree that Michaloliakos and his party’s outright admiration for the leadership and ideology of Adolf Hitler combined with pre-meditated instances of violent behavior, as well as the use of manipulative propaganda earn the party a title of “neo-Nazi” or more broadly, the farthest extreme that extreme-right political organizations get.

Subsection A: How (Un)acceptable Violence Went Too Far

An appropriate question stemming from this discussion is ultimately: how did Golden Dawn get away with so much violent behavior prior to their arrests in September 2013? Clearly, the death of Fyssas was a marker for the point at which their behavior had become unacceptable—hence why it was so quickly punished by lawmakers and the judicial system alike—however, should the national heritage of an individual deem the taking of his or her life acceptable or unacceptable in the eyes of a truly democratic law? While officials only recently acted against Golden Dawn, the Commissioner for Human Rights for the Council of Europe stated blankly about counteracting this threat in Greece:

“A profound overhaul of policies to counter hate and (especially racist) crime is necessary, starting with systematic, conscientious training of judges, prosecutors and the police, and addressing the serious dysfunctions

¹⁷⁷ See K.H., *supra* note 146.

in this domain that have, for a long time, been the object of international criticism.”¹⁷⁸

In other words, critiques of past systems will not bring about progress; the only way to ensure the safety of all is to move forward with a renewed sense of service to citizens with completely new policies that protect all citizens, regardless of race or origin.

In an effort to clean up corruption between Golden Dawn and the Hellenic Police force, an internal investigation tracked “319 police officers, two coast guard officers, 12 citizens and 104 police precincts, as well as one Golden Dawn office”.¹⁷⁹ Ultimately, the investigation resulted in the arrest 15 police officers for “extreme police behavior” and at least 10 for “beyond colluding with local neo-Nazis to set up political cells within their units”.¹⁸⁰ According to top Greek security officials, “Greece’s neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party has penetrated the country’s police force, set up caches of heavy weapons in remote locations and trained its recruits to carry out brutal attacks against immigrants and political opponents”.¹⁸¹

Aside from police corruption, there are reasons contributing to why Greece had not addressed Golden Dawn formally until the death of Fyssas. Most notably, there have been assaults against Golden Dawn members and bombings at their offices multiple times; the most recent took place on November 1, 2013 when a shooting outside Golden Dawn’s Athens office took the lives of two young Golden Dawn supporters.¹⁸² While

¹⁷⁸ Human Rights Europe. “Nils Muižnieks: Greece ‘in its right’ to ban Golden Dawn”. *The Council of Europe*. Strasbourg. (2013).

¹⁷⁹ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 24.

¹⁸⁰ See Kerin, *supra* note 173.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 24.

Golden Dawn's violence was quite excessive and racially-based, it was not necessarily unwarranted from the opinion of the far-right. However, the violence committed over ten years truly has gone too far; it is regrettable that it had not been addressed earlier to possibly save the lives of Greeks and non-Greeks from all political affiliations.

Section III: The Political Legitimization of Golden Dawn's Violent Platform

After analyzing the development of Golden Dawn, as well as understanding the type of violence that Golden Dawn exercises and promotes, this dissertation now seeks to fully grasp the significance of each issue mentioned in Golden Dawn's political platform. In completing this platform evaluation, this argument will be one step closer to understanding the full extent to which Golden Dawn aligns with other parties on various issues. This section will complete the foundational work necessary to begin a comparative case study analysis of extreme-right political parties throughout Europe based on political platform issues alone. Comparative methods used in Chapter Five will allow this argument to discover any plausible trends regarding the timing of political legitimization, in accordance with a party's platform and level of behavioral intensity. In identifying any such trend, this dissertation will outline any plausible implications or consequences that any such trend may have on the European Union and its allies.

Section III.I: Golden Dawn's Political Platform

The party's manifesto explains Golden Dawn's role as a "social and nationalist movement," which now may be recognized in this dissertation as reminiscent, if not identical, to the National Socialism supported by the Nazi party.¹⁸³ With sentiment and

¹⁸³ Ibid., 23.

platform points that typically coincide around the points of being an “anti-immigrant, anti-communist and anti-leftist” party, Golden Dawn announces in its 12-point manifesto that “We are Struggling for a Greece which Belongs to the Greeks”.¹⁸⁴ The following platform points are interpreted from the party manifesto and academic sources.

One resource heavily relied upon is the analysis of Dinas (et. al.), describing the platform that made the party seem worthy to voters in the Athenian 2010 municipal elections, as well as the national parliament elections of 2012. Golden Dawn—in a nutshell—from their analysis—is an:

“ultra-nationalist, xenophobic, pro-Nazi political organization that is opposed to all immigrants, regardless of their legal status. It supports racist ideas with cultural and biological connotations. The [Golden Dawn] supports anti-parliamentarianism, anti-political and anti-communist stances and defines globalization, EU and multi-culturalism among its major enemies”.¹⁸⁵

This brief summary recalls major themes from the earlier analysis of extreme-right platforms listed at the end of Chapter Three; namely xenophobia, ultra-nationalism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-communist sentiment, and biological racism. Thus, the only differing factors between Golden Dawn and its theoretical nature is the party’s use of incessant violence, as well as its pro-Nazi politics. However, in the same fashion as the

¹⁸⁴ Golden Dawn (Official Website). “Political Identity”. *The Official Website of Golden Dawn*. Web Source. Accessed 15 July 2014. Athens. (2014).

¹⁸⁵ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

ideological extreme-right, Golden Dawn's platform will be broken down into corresponding categorical points.

Subsection A: Platform Concerning Nation and Race

Mentioned in the party manifesto, nations are measured and defined by the “biological and spiritual heritage” of those living within its territory.¹⁸⁶ As Dinas elaborates, Golden Dawn strives to defend “the idea of an organic interclassist state,” that defends mono-cultural relationships.¹⁸⁷ Golden Dawn members are meant to be those who worship the principles of nationalism, heeding the punishment that comes to nations who encourage rampant multiculturalism. According to Golden Dawn, the racial integrity of Greece is threatened, and the only way to respond to this threat is through “nationalism [because it] is the only absolute and true revolution,” because all other politics are a product of Western-domination and “cosmopolitan internationalism”.¹⁸⁸

Golden Dawn's aversion to any truth other than that which exists in-and-of the Greek heritage and Greek people characterizes its need to support one united and pure Hellenic nation, seeking internal homogeneity and external exclusivity to eventually dominate weakened and corrupted states subscribing to multiculturalist practices in the international community.

Subsection B: Platform Concerning Immigration

Interestingly enough, while the party's anti-immigrant stance has been made quite clear throughout this dissertation, most analysts note that Golden Dawn is far more

¹⁸⁶ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁸⁷ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

¹⁸⁸ See Golden Dawn (Official Website), *supra* note 184.

complex than most primarily anti-immigrant parties of Europe. Golden Dawn's tactics to target and intimidate migrant school children, young adults, and merchants is very much present in media headlines. However, some analysts conclude that, "the party exploited the issue between 2008 and 2010, when Athens experienced a massive wave of non-registered immigrants that generated social conflict and stoked popular fears. But just two years later, when the political agenda...changed, immigration had only a second place,"¹⁸⁹ in Golden Dawn's rhetoric.

Ultimately, the party did not come up with the issue of immigration as its platform stance, rather Golden Dawn primarily rode the momentum of voter excitement toward certain issues in order to drum-up support for its nationalistic cause, and out of a twenty-five-year effort to become politically legitimized. Interestingly enough, while the party's position on immigration is very much implied in Golden Dawn's actions and nationalist sentiment, "immigration"—or any variant of the word—is the only platform point not written explicitly in the party's 12-point manifesto.

Subsection C: Platform Concerning Economics

As discussed in Chapter Three, most far-right parties do not have much of an alternative for condemned and current economic systems to adopt; Golden Dawn is not necessarily an exception to this ambiguity. While the party has clear positions on austerity programs and policies, the majority of anger derives from high rates of unemployment; as mentioned in Chapter Three, their true disdain to paying taxes derives from resentment of a multicultural society that they perceive benefits from Greek

¹⁸⁹ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 88.

taxpayer dollars. However, not only Greeks but also the *Troika*—consisting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission, and European Central Bank—eventually agreed that not only the design of austerity policies implemented in Greece (designed by the country’s mainstream political party leaders), but the consequences of them were massively detrimental to the Greek economy and all others affected by it. Greece’s economic downfall illustrated how, “the loss of monetary policy sovereignty magnified the asymmetries between stronger and weaker economies inside the European Monetary Union (EMU),”¹⁹⁰ ultimately causing weaker countries to grow resentful of any economic intervention where citizens perceive their monetary funds to be dictated by stronger countries and the supranational institutions they control.

Golden Dawn idealizes, however, a very unrealistic type of economic system—one they theorize is only plausible in a completely homogeneous society—that allows for “organically collaborating groups of people with different abilities and production skills based on merit” to thrive in an interclassist meritocracy.¹⁹¹ As the manifesto ends, it leaves the reader with the statement that “ARISTOCRACY IS BORN OF MERITOCRACY, THIS IS WHY I FIGHT AGAINST ALL FORMS OF OLIGARCHY”.¹⁹² Thus, a subliminal case is made for an insular capitalist market to be formed that contains only Greek citizens. This is idealized out of an effort to ensure that society may eventually flourish as an Aristocracy (or as Aristotle defines it, the rule of

¹⁹⁰ Kompsopoulos Jannis, Jannis Chasoglou. “The Collapse and Transformation of the Greek Party System”. *Socialism and Democracy*, Vol. 28, Issue 1. (2014). 90.

¹⁹¹ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁹² See Golden Dawn (Official Website), *supra* note 184.

the intelligent) as opposed to an oligarchical rule (or rule of the rich) that seems to illustrate the current situation of corrupt capitalists and democrats in Greece.

Subsection D: Platform Concerning Governance and Elitism

The platform that Golden Dawn puts forth—as a populist-leaning extremist group—is quite textbook, and even reminiscent of Rousseau, in that the manifesto states “the will of the people is the supreme law, and obedience to it results in true justice from the whole to every unit”.¹⁹³ As for elites, Golden Dawn resents the individualistic ways of some, noting that, “money is a mean of necessity, not a governing principle of life or the purpose of it. The ultimate goal of the social state is the elimination of tiered false-value of money and the controlled use of it”.¹⁹⁴ Ultimately, the goal of governance is to serve and protect the will of the people, not the economy, not personal wealth nor individual elitist goals. The sole purpose of government is to maintain a homogeneous state so that economics may maintain itself as an organic market supporting the all, not the few.

Subsection E: Platform Concerning Globalization and State Relations

A similarly obvious stance of Golden Dawn is that which describes the downfall of society as the development of market and societal globalization. With a platform supporting irredentism and expansionism of the Greek state into lands that were historically ruled by Ancient Hellenic empires—specifically the Republic of Macedonia—Golden Dawn supports international ambitions of its own making, though resents the same tactics being placed on the Greek state by others. Specifically, the Golden Dawn platform seeks to expand party—as well as Greek—influence throughout

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

the countries of Cyprus, Albania, Kosovo, and even to Diaspora communities living in America, Australia, and Canada. Similarly, the country still holds an outward rejection of the Republic of Macedonia for claiming the title “Macedonian”—a historically Greek title and region. Regarding this issue, Golden Dawn Members of Parliament have, on multiple occasions, proposed legislation subjecting any Greek politician who openly recognizes The Republic of Macedonia as a formal country to be tried for treason.¹⁹⁵

While it seems a bit hypocritical, the perspective of Golden Dawn regarding globalization and state affairs ultimately “opposes communist internationalism and universalist-liberalism,”¹⁹⁶ and although the party does not openly admit to being anti-European Union, it does blame Greece’s failing economy and increases in irregular migration on the country’s accession into the EU and Eurozone.¹⁹⁷ Golden Dawn therefore may be thought of as Eurosceptic, but not necessarily anti-establishment in terms of the European Union structure. Furthermore, “Golden Dawn is explicitly anti-Semitic, accusing the Jews or Zionists of seeking to eliminate the Greek nation through US-induced globalization and cosmopolitanism”.¹⁹⁸ Ultimately, while issues of anti-Semitism and anti-EU establishment are not currently at the center of Golden Dawn’s political rhetoric, they have built such a constituency of resentment toward these issues; if the political opportunity were to present itself, there is no doubt that Golden Dawn could leverage this momentum into a potentially dangerous anti-Semitic or anti-EU platform.

¹⁹⁵ See Ellinas, *supra* note 159. 9.

¹⁹⁶ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

¹⁹⁷ See Ellinas, *supra* note 159. 9.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

Section III.II: Electoral Analysis

Despite public violence—and an official platform that harbors violent action—the group has continued to be politically legitimized and successfully re-elected, by the Greek electorate on municipal, regional, and national levels over the past five years.¹⁹⁹ Mudde describes a political opportunity structure that often presents itself to right-wing populist parties so that they may gain electoral success; the opportunity includes having a legitimately a strong grassroots following, as well as local strongholds or organizations that already push for politically marginal far-right sentiment.²⁰⁰ Harnessing the power of a party's already built grassroots community into locally experienced NGOs allows established groups like Golden Dawn to appear as white-knight figure for ultranationalists lacking a strong party to rally around. These two preconditions describe the politically opportune moment that often facilitates the success of right-wing parties, as it did for Golden Dawn in the 2010 Athenian Municipal Election.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ See Table 2; See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 91.

²⁰⁰ Mudde, Cas. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2007). 269.

²⁰¹ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

Table 2: Golden Dawn Electoral Record Ending With May/June 2012: “K” indicates Municipal Elections, “P” indicates Hellenic Parliament elections, “E” indicates European Parliament Elections

The electoral fortunes of *Golden Dawn* since 1994 Table 2

Election year (Type of election •)	Election results		Seats won
	% of the vote	of votes	
1994 (E)	0.1	7,242	-
1996 (P)	0.07	4,487	-
1999 (E) ¹	0.75	48,532	-
2002 (K) ²	0.30	1,059	-
2004 (E) ³	0.17	10,618	-
2006 (K) ⁴	1.4	3,705	-
2009 (E)	0.46	23,609	-
2009 (P)	0.29	19,624	-
2010 (K) ⁵	5.29	10,222	1
2012/May (P)	6.97	441,018	21
2012/June (P)	6.92	425,990	18

Notes:

- The type of election is indicated in parentheses: European elections (E), parliamentary elections (P), or municipal elections (M).
- 1 Together with First Line (Πρώτη Γραμμή, or Proti Grammi), the party led by Konstantinos Plevris
- 2 Election results in the city of Athens. *Golden Dawn* supported the mayoral candidate Odysseas Tiligadas, chairman of the electoral combination, “Greek Orthodox Community – Greeks First.” In the prefecture of Athens-Piraeus, *Golden Dawn* supported the candidacy of Giorgos Karatzaferis (LAOS) who, with the election merger “Clean Heart,” received 13.6 % of all votes cast.
- 3 Together with Patriotic Alliance (Πατριωτική Συμμαχία – ΠΑΤΡΙΣ, or Patriotiki Symmachia – PATRI.S). PATRI.S, which means “fatherland” in Greek, was founded by functionaries of *Golden Dawn* with the leadership’s approval and was its subsidiary organization until 2007.
- 4 Together with the Patriotic Alliance
- 5 Election results in the city of Athens. The mayoral candidate was N. Michaloliakos, and his electoral combination was called “Greek Dawn for Athens.” Michaloliakos was elected to Athens’ municipal council.

Source: Ministry of the Interior, <http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/>.

As a party yet to be legitimized by the national electorate—note, it did run unsuccessful national campaigns in 1996 and 2009, foregoing the 2000, 2004, and 2007 elections—*Golden Dawn* took the political opportunity that 2010 presented in the nation’s capital city. The party focused all efforts into constituencies in Athens with densely populated areas, mass amounts of immigration, and considerably high rates of crime.²⁰² Following this victory, the party was able to create momentum, carrying their success into the 2012 Greek Parliament elections and the 2014 European Parliament elections. In analyzing the political opportunity that *Golden Dawn* seized in 2010—and

²⁰² See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 89.

the electoral momentum it gained for future elections—this dissertation will first analyze the national election of 2009 where the party gained only 0.46% of the vote. This first analysis is quite reflective of all elections Golden Dawn participated in up until the Athenian Municipal elections of 2010.

Subsection A: The Greek Parliamentary Elections of 2009

In its first national election in 1996, Golden Dawn secured only 0.07% of the national vote; the following national election that the party participated in was over a decade later in 2009. Golden Dawn's numbers had not progressed—they secured only 0.46% of the national vote in 2009—although its profile as an extreme, violent political party had. With Periandros behind bars and in the minds of voters, as well as newly occurring immigrant market raids and “national awakening” sessions threatening those who did not align or agree with the message of Golden Dawn, the party's extreme-right platform proved too heavy for most Greeks voters.²⁰³

Much of the electorate that Golden Dawn eventually captured had voted for LAOS during this election.²⁰⁴ As mentioned previously, LAOS was a Third Wave extreme-right political party established in 2000. The group's title as a “new radical” right-wing party identified them as presenting a radical-right platform, but without the type of extremist behavior that most had associated with Golden Dawn. LAOS was Greece's non-violent alternative to Golden Dawn's position during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

²⁰³ See Dinas, *supra* note 58, 3.

²⁰⁴ Papadimitriou, Despina. “Greece.” *Political Parties of the World, seventh edition*. London: Harper Publishing. (2009). 246.

In 2004, LAOS made their national debut in the Hellenic Parliament elections, securing 2.19% of the popular vote. While this did not equate to any seats, the percentage LAOS gained in its first national election is commendable, especially when compared to Golden Dawn's 1996 national debut where only 0.07% was gained from the far-right voting demographic. Ultimately, as the behaviorally acceptable representative of populism, the extreme-right, and nationalist sentiment, LAOS secured 10 seats in the Hellenic Parliament (3.8% of the vote) in 2007. The following national election of 2009, where Golden Dawn ran nationally for the second time, amounted to LAOS securing 15 seats (5.63% of the vote).²⁰⁵

Golden Dawn's largest support groups in 2009 were primarily from the large cities and immigrant-popular districts of Athens (where Golden Dawn secured 0.87% of the popular vote), Thessalonikis (0.64%), Attikis (0.42%), and up to 1.1% in Peiraios. These four areas were the only ones to break 1,000 votes for Golden Dawn this election. All other districts—aside from two—did not amount to even 400 votes for Golden Dawn, respectively.²⁰⁶

Subsection B: The Athenian Municipal Elections of 2010

The victory of Golden Dawn, however, came very strikingly the next year during the Athenian municipal elections of 2010. Winning 5.29% of the total vote, Michaloliakos secured a seat in the capital city's municipal government.²⁰⁷ This was officially the first time the party had been politically legitimized by the Athenian

²⁰⁵ See Ministry of Interior (Greece), *supra* note 127.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 3.

electorate, but had yet to be legitimized on the national level. Although the Athenian population contributed the majority of Golden Dawn's support in 2009 (nearly 5,300 votes), based on percentages the party still had only received 0.87% of the city's support. So, why only one year later did 5.29% of this electorate decide to give Golden Dawn their unprecedented support in a municipal election?

The most significant factor in the political legitimization of Golden Dawn, according to Dinas and his colleagues, was the absence of LAOS from the 2010 Athenian municipal election. Their analysis explains that this election was a phenomenon, considering the 'radical flank' theory typically predicts that far-right parties are deemed more 'level headed' when extremist parties enter the political sphere, thus making the far-right platform of a non-extremist party more appealing to right-leaning voters.²⁰⁸ In other words, for LAOS to have left the electoral ticket, theories on far-right voting patterns typically suggest that far-right Athenian voters would be more likely to support the more neutral ticket of New Democracy than a party more extreme than LAOS.

The success of Golden Dawn confirms the anti-thesis of this theory, illustrating how "the absence of a populist radical right candidate released far-right voters to move further to the (extreme) right,"²⁰⁹ however the absence of LAOS alone does not numerically explain where the 5.29% of voter support for Golden Dawn derived from in 2010. More districts than LAOS strongholds alone were responsible for Golden Dawn's success, as seen clearly when comparing distributive maps of Athenian poll results.

²⁰⁸ Rydgren, J. "How party organization matters: Understanding the ups and downs of radical right-wing populism in Sweden". *Department of Sociology: Working Paper Series No. 17*. Stockholm University. (2009).

²⁰⁹ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 3.

Dinas (et. al.) explain that a “combination of rapid increase of the immigrant population, high crime rates and urban degradation boosted the demand for anti-immigrant rhetoric”.²¹⁰ The Athenian population witnessed the immigrant population rise from 19% to 26.5% between May and September of 2008; the most highly concentrated district was located in Agios Pantelimonas, also known as the 6th city district. Out of pure strategy to “mobilize support, by equating immigrants with criminals”²¹¹ and taking tactical measures to operate the party’s offices out of the 6th district—and neighborhoods of similar demography—Golden Dawn was able to secure their vote in areas with large and concentrated populations of irregular migrants. By conducting neighborhood-oriented campaigning that exploited fears rather than hopes, joining with local right-wing NGOs and strongholds, as well as losing their largest electoral contender, Golden Dawn seamlessly found its opportunity to finally reach political legitimization in 2010.

Subsection C: The Greek Parliamentary Elections of 2012

While the 2010 elections were a turning point in terms of Golden Dawn’s success, 2012 was the party’s first debut as a *nationally* legitimate political force. The party’s opportunity to prove its message in Athens—acquiring funding, political influence and legitimacy—acted as a “springboard for the twenty-fold electoral growth of the [Golden Dawn] in the 2012 elections”.²¹² Prior to this election, the Greek national electorate typically supported the dominance of two parties, with some independent or protest groups speckled into the parliament, but normally not in power for a period longer than


²¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

²¹¹ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 5.

²¹² See Ellinas, *supra* note 159. 6.

two terms.²¹³ However, the elections of May/June 2012 saw a radical decline in support for traditional centrist parties forcing politics to become more polarized, exclusively due to reasons of financial mismanagement and corruption.²¹⁴ In this election, nearly ten parties were voted to represent the Greek nation—seven of them with successful bids—as opposed to constituents primarily voting for two traditional parties to dominate the Hellenic Parliament.²¹⁵

FIGURE 1
FROM A CENTRIPETAL (SOLID CURVE) TO A CENTRIFUGAL (DASHED CURVE)
DEMOCRACY



Source: Adapted by Downs (1957).

Figure 3: Theoretical Graph Illustrating How Support Shifts from Centrist Parties to Polarized Parties: Traditional/Pre-2012 Elections (Solid Line), 2012 Hellenic Parliament Election (Dashed Line)

²¹³ Dinas, Elias, Lamprini Rori. "The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear and Loathing in the Polls". *West European Politics*, Vol. 36, Issue 1. (2013). 270.

²¹⁴ See Figure 3; Ibid., 271.

²¹⁵ See Table 3; Ibid, 280.

Table 3: Confirming the Entry of Eight New Political Parties (2009—2012)

TABLE 1 GREEK ELECTION RESULTS, 2009 AND 2012								
	7 October 2009		6 May 2012			17 June 2012		
	% votes	N of seats	N of votes	% votes	N of seats	N of votes	% votes	N of seats
ND	33.47	91	1,192,051	18.85	108	1,825,609	29.66	129
SYRIZA	4.60	13	1,061,282	16.78	52	1,655,053	26.89	71
PASOK	43.92	160	833,527	13.18	41	755,832	12.28	33
ANEL			670,957	10.61	33	462,456	7.51	20
Chrissi Avgi			441,018	6.97	21	425,980	6.92	18
DIMAR			386,263	6.11	19	385,079	6.26	17
KKE	7.54	21	536,072	8.48	26	277,179	4.5	12
DIXAN			135,965	2.15		98,063	1.59	
Drassi			114,058	1.8				
LAOS	5.63	15	183,467	2.9		97,099	1.58	
Greens	2.53		185,410	2.93		54,421	0.88	
Others	2.31		422,431	6.68		118,756	1.93	
Turnout	70.95	300	6,467,110	65.10	300	6,217,370	62.47	300

Note: Turnout is underrepresented due to out-of-date electoral registration records.

In the two years preceding the 2012 election, both sides of the political spectrum were angered by the worsening debt crisis in Greece that began with the onset of the Eurocrisis in 2007. When it was discovered that the government was secretly operating at a 15.4% deficit, international bailouts were proposed and accepted in May 2010 and October/November 2011, respectively. Additionally, a huge amount of long-term resentment resulted from the Troika imposed *Memorandum*, otherwise known as the first bailout package that came with the conditions of implementing new economic reforms and imposing austerity measures.²¹⁶ Angered at traditional and mainstream politics, “[fringe] parties, the media and public opinion alike converged to the conclusion that the government was trying to execute a potentially disastrous economic plan without any

²¹⁶ Ibid., 272-3.

mandate for it”.²¹⁷ Thus, when the offer for the second bailout was proposed in October 2011, Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou accepted under the condition that the Greek population agreed to the measure through a national referendum. While Papandreou was looking to appeal to dominating populist rhetoric, what occurred was far more damaging; the adequate leadership of the Prime Minister was harshly questioned, and following weeks of severe pressure, Papandreou resigned and the referendum was cancelled.²¹⁸

The election cycle of the following year proved incredibly detrimental to Papandreou’s PASOK party and New Democracy, who appeared to have an ambiguous, at times left-leaning position regarding economics throughout the bailout debates. Splinter groups on both sides of the left-right spectrum emerged out of protest, but the longstanding parties of the extreme left and right (SYRIZA and Golden Dawn) were able to take a significant amount of votes from PASOK and New Democracy, respectively. Debates surrounding the issue of corruption, financial mismanagement, and immigration filed voters into two new camps, existing more exclusively on a polar side of the left-right spectrum than most voters had in the past. Ultimately, through the perceived corruption of New Democracy—and the inability of LAOS to rebound from its absence in the 2010 Athenian municipal election, or maintain a solid stance on current economic issues—Golden Dawn was able to secure 18 out of 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament, collecting 6.92% of the national vote.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Ibid., 273.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 273-4.

²¹⁹ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 23.

Subsection D: The European Parliamentary Elections of 2014

Advocating within an already broken two-party system, electoral candidates from splinter groups began campaigning to secure seats in the 2014 European Parliament. One group that surprisingly joined them was Golden Dawn; surprising due to the fact that their leadership and a significant amount of party members were arrested only months earlier. After the fatal stabbing of Fyssas in September 2013, Golden Dawn's approval ratings fell to 7.8% in October, slowly rising to 8.4% in November, and eventually reaching 10% approval in January 2014.²²⁰ Approval ratings of undecided voters fell sharply after the shooting in September 2013, though were at 17.9% only four months later.²²¹

In order to safeguard its position in Greek politics—in case of a legal ban on the party's eligibility to run—Golden Dawn set up a proxy-group named National Dawn. Only three months before the election, Kasidiaris explained to a reporter at the *Financial Times* that, if “the government [outlaws] Golden Dawn, [it will] amount to a coup and be destructive of the political system. National Dawn has been set up to represent the millions of Greek patriots in this country and contest the elections if we are banned”.²²² However, the party was granted permission to run and did so successfully, earning the third highest vote in the nation, only behind SYRIZA and New Democracy.

In May 2014, only nine months after party leaders were arrested for alleged criminal activity, Golden Dawn secured 9.4% of the national vote, earning 3 of Greece's

²²⁰ Hope, Kerin. “Greece: Golden Dawn plans for election race as leaders face jail”. *The Financial Times*. Athens. (2014).

²²¹ See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *supra* note 2. 24.

²²² See Kerin, *supra* note 220.

allocated seats in the European Parliament.²²³ Golden Dawn entered the institution for the first time as an unaffiliated or “non-attached” member of the European Parliament, despite alleged attempts of the group to coordinate with extreme and far-right parties of similar platforms. Ultimately, since the party’s opportunity to seize power in 2010 was captured, voter support and approval ratings for Golden Dawn have steadily risen with each new election.

Section III.III: Possible Implications of Legitimizing Golden Dawn

If this dissertation is to follow its argument closely, the political legitimization of Golden Dawn begins and ends with successful elections; as established in Chapter Three, legitimacy is not based in morality nor is it required that a party necessarily abide by certain natural laws in order to maintain this status. Legitimacy, for this dissertation and thus for Golden Dawn, solely relies in the democratic electoral process, most significantly the process that determines leaders on the national level. Out of logic, as well, one may assume that there is little to no corruption in the Greek electoral process necessarily, simply due to the outcome of the election—for those in power lost power, as opposed to those in power maintaining power by using the control mechanisms and resources at their disposal.

For both the New Democracy and PASOK parties to lose so much support within a three-year time period is reflective not of Golden Dawn’s platform or appeal, but of the Greek citizen’s dissatisfaction with the norm that had been justified by corrupt officials and international entities for far too long. The resentment and skepticism that resulted

²²³ European Parliament. *Results of the 2014 European Elections*. Web Source. Accessed 30 May 2014. Brussels. (2014).

from poor financial and immigration policy management eventually boiled to a place where even allegations of murder were overlooked in order to support parties who proposed alternatives to the past five years of, “not absolute deprivation, but [an] expectation of deprivation”²²⁴ from former government regimes.

This perceived deprivation is important in the decision-making process of voters, for it effectively acts as a tool to socially legitimize and justify actions taken on the behalf of securitizing one’s own—and the nation’s collective—livelihood. As Georgiadou summarized the situation:

“Concealed behind the ‘Greek norm’ was a country with high government spending and low productivity, an inefficient and nontransparent public sector, and rampant nepotism. The crisis brought latent right-wing extremist potential to the surface. Hidden under the cloak of anti-capitalist, anti-globalization rhetoric, euro-skepticism, and opposition to multiculturalism, far-right attitudes proved to have appeal across a large swath of the political spectrum. Confidence in the country’s political institutions has declined so much that extreme right-wing ideology has even started to attract voters from the established parties.”²²⁵

It was these feelings, as well as governmental mismanagement that led Greek citizens to question their prominence in their representative’s decision making; however, with their ability to “blend nationalism with populism”²²⁶ Golden Dawn’s appeal not only seemed

²²⁴ See Halikiopoulou, *supra* note 4.

²²⁵ See Georgiadou, *supra* note 122. 76.

²²⁶ See Halikiopoulou, *supra* note 4.

logical to voters, but it seemed to provide an alternative to the currently established—and rapidly worsening—Greek norm.

In a string of logic that is reminiscent of Hobbes’ theory on political legitimacy, it is plausible to theorize that people will vote for parties and individuals who protect them. While Hobbes’ theory leaves room only for absolute protection—not to be changed on the whims of democratic processes—the same rings true in Rousseau’s analysis of how joining consent reaffirms the general will. As stated in Chapter Three, so long as democratic processes remain uncorrupted, the decisions that come of them are politically legitimate, for they reflect the general will of the people, the people being the only ones fit to transfer legitimate authority to any political entity.

The psychological aspects of the general wills’ collective decision to grant one political entity legitimate authority over another, according to Effron and Miller, resides in the human ability to moralize certain behaviors or platforms over others. In other words, “moralization [of political issues] grants people the social legitimacy to act on attitudes or motives that would otherwise be illegitimate for them to act on”.²²⁷

Ultimately, the process by which voters justify the otherwise unacceptable violence of Golden Dawn is through the moralization of issues, including respect of livelihood and physical protection. By perceiving a certain behavior or political party as socially legitimate, it provokes others to come to a “psychological standing” that causes an otherwise inappropriate action to appear “appropriate for an individual to engage in”.²²⁸

²²⁷ Effron, Daniel A., Dale T. Miller. “How the Moralization of Issues Grants Social Legitimacy to Act on One’s Attitudes”. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* at SAGE Publications. (2012). 690.

²²⁸ Ibid.

Regardless of whether an individual feels moralized in their bid to vote for a violent political platform, or if they are engaged in violence themselves, they have come to a similar psychological standing that moralizes the platform and behavior of Golden Dawn.

The question that is ultimately asked then, is what are the implications of moralizing, and thus politically legitimizing this group, for if they continue to be voted into office (as they were in the 2014 European Parliament election) does that not reward the behavior and violence that preceded the party's confirmed legitimization? Should the party responsible for legitimizing—or not intervening in the behavior of—violent actors be held accountable for the violence they condone, at least to some extent?

CHAPTER FIVE: EXTREME-RIGHT PARTIES THROUGHOUT EUROPE, A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Ultimately, the electoral success—and thus political legitimization—of radical and extreme parties has become a trend in Greece since citizens became angered and confused by the corruption and abuse of power they perceived within their traditionally two-party, centrist government. Beginning in 2008, the Greek electorate began lashing out at center-left PASOK and center-right New Democracy by showing unprecedented support for two fringe political players in the national parliament elections of 2009: extreme-left party SYRIZA, and radical-right LAOS. Support for LAOS—as it has been discussed—circumstantially transferred to Golden Dawn in 2010 when the party’s absence presented Golden Dawn with their opportunity to enter Athenian politics; ultimately this opportunity enabled Golden Dawn’s ability to harness necessary support to secure legitimacy among the national electorate in 2012. Conclusively, over the past five years, a significantly shifted voting pattern in Greece has abruptly dismantled the traditional two-party system that the country once rested its democratic government upon.

The main reason for this political shift is in promulgating that not all enemies lie outside Greek borders (i.e. immigrants, the Troika and European Union, and foreign influencers); in other words, the country’s current situation “entails a willingness from the Greek elites’ side to subordinate themselves to the strategic interests and investment

of [other] elites”²²⁹ in Europe and America. Thus—regarding voter support and motivation—the desire to securitize one’s nation, as well as skepticism toward internal and external actors that may have any link to that which threatens their perceived security, is ultimately the guiding force at the voting booth that determines the wave of extreme-right political legitimization throughout Greece. What naturally is questioned next, though, is whether this same trend is occurring throughout Europe; if not, could it potentially? With the rise of parties with similar extremist platforms—some even as publicly violent as Golden Dawn—it will now be discussed whether the political legitimization of the Golden Dawn party has created a sort of moralization or social-legitimacy-springboard that justifies violent and extremist behavior to otherwise non-violent voters residing both within and outside of Greece.

This chapter will seek to carefully engage in a comparative analysis focused on similar platform points that exist between Golden Dawn and other parties of the European radical and/or extreme-right that have either been known for their violence, or have obtained—and maintain—significant voting power either in their respective nation or European Parliament over the past five years. Through the analysis, this dissertation will determine whether, “recent electoral successes and the consequent increased visibility have validated a series of characteristics, which are common to right-wing extremist organizations”.²³⁰ Again, this dissertation is in no way attempting to equivocate or completely liken the groups analyzed, it is merely searching for the implications of each group’s respective influence on other European electorates. Similarly, in no way is

²²⁹ See Komsopoulou, *supra* note 190. 95.

²³⁰ See Dinas, *supra* note 58. 2.

this analysis attempting to proclaim that Golden Dawn has been the leader of these movements, considering many parties to be discussed have had a more long-standing and significant presence in their national electorate than Golden Dawn has had in Greece. The aim is more concretely to examine that whether Golden Dawn's success despite violence has or may legitimize extremist behavior elsewhere in the European Union.

Section I: A Wave of Circumstantial Growth

To note the pattern by which extreme and far-right parties have become incredibly present in European politics demands full consideration of the previously mentioned Third Wave of far-right sentiment that lasted throughout the 1980s to early 2000s. This dissertation will consider four types of political parties that seem to encompass the main far-right parties relevant in present-day European politics.²³¹ The four types of preliminary categories to be discussed concern the time periods in which each party was respectively founded and significantly legitimized by their national electorate—“significantly” being a term that will be discussed in-context with each country's political climate at the time. This typology represents the context-centric and careful analysis that will be accomplished in this chapter by noting significant political shifts that occurred due to each party's political legitimization, or events that inspired the rise and legitimization of the party in the first place.

²³¹ See Table 4; European Parliament. Results of the 2014 European Elections. Web Source. Accessed 30 May 2014. (2014); *Note: Table created by Andrea Mancuso, the author of this dissertation.*

Table 4: Current Extreme-Right and Eurosceptic Groups in the European Union

Current Extreme-Right and Eurosceptic Groups in the European Union						
Country	Party Name (abbrev.)	Significant Dates		Electoral Results [seats (%)]		EU Coalition
		Founded	Legitimized	2009	2014	
Austria	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)	1956	1956 (doubled success 1986)	2 (12.71)	4 (19.72)	None
Belgium	Vlaams Belang/Blok (VB)	1979	1987	2 (9.85)	1 (4.14)	None
Czech Republic	Party for Free Citizens (SSO)	2009	2014	--	1 (5.24)	EFDD
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	1995	1998	2 (14.80)	4 (26.60)	ECR
Finland	Finns (PS)	1995	1999	1 (14.00)	2 (12.90)	ECR
France	Front National (FN)	1972	1984	3 (6.30)	23 (24.86)	None
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	2013	2014	--	7 (7.10)	ECR
	National Democratic Party (NPD)	1964	2014	--	1 (1.00)	None
Greece	Golden Dawn (XA)	1985	2012	--	3 (9.38)	None
Hungary	Jobbik	2003	2009	3 (14.77)	3 (14.67)	None
Italy	Lega Nord (LN)	1991	2001*	9 (10.20)	5 (6.16)	None
	Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S)	2009	2013	--	17 (21.60)	EFDD
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	2006	2009	4 (19.97)	4 (13.32)	None
Sweden	Swedish Democrats (SD)	1988	2010	0 (3.27)	2 (9.70)	EFDD
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	1993	1999	13 (16.09)	24 (26.77)	EFDD
	British National Party (BNP)	1982	2009	2 (6.04)	0 (1.11)	None

*See Chapter 5, Section I.I, Subsection B for clarification.

Two broader secondary categories of extreme-right parties will concern the type of influence that each presents. Some contemporary far-right parties are influential due to their newly gained voting power; in other words, they have achieved unprecedented prominence among their national electorate, greatly altering the balance of their national political norm. The contrasting type of influential party is based on the group's intensity, promotion of messages and actions, most likely in a violent manner. While this second type of politically influential party has typically not found the same amount electoral success as the first type, it is important to consider how these groups became politically legitimized on national levels despite their violent and intense actions and whether this behavior may influence or inspire others to behave similarly.

Section I.I: Typology Based on Chronology

Many of the political parties that are now undeniably present in national and supranational European governments grew from the momentum of the Third Wave; some

established before it, others during it, and very few after it. Of these groups, this dissertation will identify which parties were nationally legitimized before, during or after the Third Wave of far-right political influence throughout Europe. Again, the significance of this section is to add historic context to the period in which respective national electorates legitimized each now-prominent extreme-right political party.

Subsection A: Established Before, Empowered During

Some parties to be examined are products of earlier movements, some having been legitimized before the 1980s and others during it. France's Front National (FN) and Belgium's Vlaams Belang (VB, formerly known as the Vlaams Blok) were established prior to the Third Wave, though were only legitimized by their respective national electorate some time into the 1980s and 1990s. One of the only examples of a party that was created and legitimized before the Third Wave, yet greatly empowered by it—and still present in European politics—is the case of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).

The FPÖ is one of the strongest examples of this chronological type of far-right revivalism, considering the group maintained a solid political presence in their respective national politics since the party's conception in 1956. However, under the leadership of Jörg Haider—beginning in 1986—the party began to see its electoral success rates double nationally.²³² Under Haider, the FPÖ platform changed from being focused on liberal markets, to advocating for more conservative and populist political reforms. Additionally, they further created strong advocacy for the “Pan-Germanic political position”—an

²³² Meret, Susi. “The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League, and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support”. *SPIRIT PhD Series, Thesis no. 25, ISSN: 1903-7783*. Institute of History and International Social Studies, Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark at Aalborg University. (2009). 187.

attempt to unite international communities of German decent as a tool to harness sympathy for former Nazi soldiers and officers, as well as combat anti-German sentiment following World War II.²³³

Their more basic platform was legitimized by relatively small national margins since 1956, when the party registered. Most significantly, after their rise of support in the late 1980s, the party earned 33 seats—or 16.6% of the national vote—in Austria’s 1990 national elections, and then earned 52 seats with 26.9% of the national vote in 1999. Austria’s accession to the European Union in 1996 illustrated a significant support for the extreme-right populist group; they gained over a quarter of the national vote (27.5%) yielding them 6 seats in the European Parliament.²³⁴ Over the next few elections they lost their significant majority, however in the past year the FPÖ has done surprisingly well again in gaining prominence among its traditional center-left and center-right rivals. In the general election of 2013, the party earned 40 seats (20.5% of the national vote); subsequently in the European Parliament election of 2014, the party earned 4 out of 18 seats to represent the country of Austria.²³⁵

One of the most academically studied extreme-right parties—arguably considered neo-Nazi, as it is termed by unofficial sources—is France’s long-established Front National. FN was established in 1972, yet only nationally legitimized in the European Parliament elections of 1984. This race saw 11% of the French electorate vote for the radical group, awarding them with 10 out of 81 seats representing the group in the

²³³ Ibid., 186.

²³⁴ “Election Resources on the Internet: Federal Elections in Austria”. Web Source. Accessed 2 August 2014.

²³⁵ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

institutional parliament.²³⁶ The following election for the French National Assembly in 1986 found the group winning 9.8% of the vote, equivocating to 35 seats in national government.²³⁷

In the following decade, the group won in national settings with consistent polling numbers ranging between 11 and 15%, however changes to the electoral process ensured the group maintained only marginal support. The party continued more successfully in municipal elections during the first decade of the twenty-first century,²³⁸ maintaining support primarily from working-class and politically disenchanted voters.²³⁹ Ultimately only since the 2014 European Parliament election has FN has seen an outstanding and unprecedented revival of its political support from French voters since their electoral relevance that lasted throughout the Third Wave. FN secured 24.86% (23 seats) in the 2014 nation-wide election,²⁴⁰ making them the current leading political force in France with the potential to catalyze a major—and unprecedented—anti-establishment voting bloc in the European Parliament.

FN and its leaders’—formerly Jean-Marie Le Pen, currently his daughter Marine Le Pen—mission to “change the established power relations and governing rules in contemporary society”²⁴¹ categorizes the group as extremist when reflecting back on the definition from the German Federal Constitutional Court. Aligned with this mission is

²³⁶ Ivaldi, Gilles, Marc Swyngedouw. “The Extreme Right Utopia in Belgium and France: The Ideology of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the French Front National”. *West European Politics*, Vol. 24, Issue 3. London: Routledge. (2001).

²³⁷ Shields, James. *The Extreme Right in France: From Petain to Le Pen*. Routledge. (2007). 319.

²³⁸ See Ivaldi, *supra* note 236.

²³⁹ Ford, Robert, Matthew J. Goodwin. “Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party”. *Political Studies*, Vol. 58. University of Manchester Press. (2010).

²⁴⁰ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁴¹ See Ivaldi, *supra* note 236.

Belgium's notable extreme-right party, known since 2004 as the Vlaams Belang (VB)—formerly known as Vlaams Blok; VB's path to political legitimacy also reflects that of FN. The VB was formed in the late 1970s—though its ideological history and inspiration dates back to the 1930s in alliance with the “solidaristic corporatism” and authoritarianism preached by fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini;²⁴²—yet was only politically legitimized on a national scale in both the Belgian Senate and Representative chambers in 1987. The party found greater success throughout the later stages of the Third Wave, into the 1990s, winning most predominantly in municipal and regional elections, appealing primarily to Flemish voters. The party's highest amount of support reached 24.2% in 2004, yielding the party 32 seats in the Flemish Parliament.²⁴³ This year was also the point at which VB first elected representatives to European Parliament.

Since 2004 however, the party's electoral force has been on a steady decline, winning nearly 10% of the national vote in the 2009 European Parliament election—amounting to two seats—and only 4.14% of the vote in 2014, maintaining only one seat in the European Parliament.²⁴⁴ The point at which political support for VB peaked was the same year in which they were placed under trial and eventually convicted for being a racist political organization—not dissimilar to the situation of Golden Dawn, as discussed in Chapter Four. Although the group was elected most prominently at the height of their hostility toward immigrants and racist rhetoric, in 2004 the party was found guilty of

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Erk, Jan. “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself”. *West European Politics*, Vol. 28, Issue 3. London: Routledge. (2005). 497.

²⁴⁴ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

violating various laws against promulgating racist and xenophobic messages by a national court.²⁴⁵

The decision was made on November 9, 2004, and “effectively forced Vlaams Blok to disband and re-establish itself along a legally acceptable agenda in order to keep receiving state subsidies as a political party. [VB] was expecting the court’s decision, so the party leaders made the most of the media attention”.²⁴⁶ By anticipating this result, Vlaams Blok changed its name to the Vlaams Belang, translated as “Flemish Interest”—as well as its mission and constitution—only five days after the court’s ruling; note that this is not unlike Golden Dawn’s National Dawn proxy-party, as discussed in Chapter Four. Under its new identity, VB identifies itself as a platform of nationalism, separatism—seeking independence of Flanders and Brussels (its proclaimed capital city) for the “return of lands ‘stolen’ from Flanders”—as well as amnesty for former Nazi affiliates, and abolition of linguistic services for French-speakers living in Flemish speaking regions of Belgium. Regarding its predecessor’s outlawed stance on immigration, VB remains anti-immigrant—specifically anti-Muslim—but has “softened” xenophobic rhetoric to accord with Belgian law.²⁴⁷

Subsection B: Established During, Empowered During

The second chronological type of extreme-right party concerns those founded and legitimated during the Third Wave. This definition includes prominent political actors such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Denmark’s Danish People’s

²⁴⁵ See Erk, *supra* note 253. 494.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 493.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 494-5.

Party (DF), Lega Nord of Italy (LN), as well as Finland's Finns Party (PS). Having all been products of the European electorate's desire to legitimate far-right groups—be they radical or extreme in their ideology or behavior—these parties were all formed and legitimated within the time period of 1980 and 2004.

UKIP is often referred to as a very far-right—sometimes even radical-right wing—party compared to its extremist counterpart, the British National Party (BNP, to be discussed later in this chapter). The party is known for being primarily used as a second-order election option for Eurosceptics; however, some analysts look deeper, noting that UKIP's radical platform does not only attract Eurosceptics, anti-mainstream and anti-elitist citizens from all socio-economic and political demographics, but also “polite xenophobes”. This term comes from Robert Ford (et. al) who discusses how supporters of this Third Wave party are less likely to support outward extremism—as promulgated by Nick Griffin, leader of the BNP—but vote for leaders who ultimately make legislation that promotes the same goals as extremist anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim parties.²⁴⁸

Ultimately, Ford concludes that “the populist Eurosceptic UKIP and extreme right BNP are not simply mobilising a diverse array of voters disconnected from mainstream politics, but are recruiting electorates that share several key attitudinal features—in particular populism and anti-immigrant hostility).”²⁴⁹ Although both groups are pulling from similar demographical pools of UK citizens, UKIP is ultimately seen as a more acceptable and socially legitimate alternative to the BNP, a group that is often compared

²⁴⁸ Ford, Robert, Matthew J. Goodwin, David Cutts. “Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections”. *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 51, Issue 2. (2012).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

to and discussed using the same terminology as Golden Dawn. This less-hostile, less-extreme version of a similar platform has proven lucrative for UKIP and its leaders, as it has served them well in their ability to maintain political legitimacy and even break polling records throughout the UK.

UKIP was established in 1993 and its platform became legitimized slowly throughout the decade. By 1999 the party had been politically legitimized by the national electorate, winning 7% of the national vote, yielding 3 seats in the European Parliament. In the 2004 election, UKIP won 16.2% of the vote, yielding 12 seats; maintaining that support and just a bit more in 2009, where the group was awarded 13 seats in European Parliament and surpassed the century-long political stronghold Labour Party in the polls.²⁵⁰ Throughout this time, UKIP struggled to make any sort of significant presence among regional and municipal elections; however—*afore mentioned*—UKIP’s appeal to Eurosceptics has made it the party a prime choice for politically mainstream voters when deciding how to vote in second-order elections (i.e. concerning European Union politics, as opposed to national politics).

Throughout its time influencing and empowering other Eurosceptic parties around Europe, UKIP has played an integral role in designing parliamentary coalition groups between Eurosceptic and nationalist parties with similarly “polite” anti-immigrant platforms since their entry into the body in 1999. The latest group they maintain in parliament is the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD) currently including members from the UK, Italy, Latvia (political-center), France (independent),

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

Sweden, Czech Republic, Lithuania (political-left); as of the 2014 election, 48 Members of Parliament are part of the EFDD.²⁵¹ More tellingly of their influence, however, is the fact that UKIP surpassed both the Conservative and Labour parties in 2014, making them the first non-mainstream majority vote in over a century; UKIP secured 26.77% of the vote, equivocating to 24 out of the country's 73 seats in European Parliament.²⁵²

The Danish People's Party (DF) had a similar success in the 2014 election, by securing the majority of votes—26.6% or 4 seats—for the European Parliament.²⁵³ This was a significant rise in support for the party, as they had only secured the fourth position among Denmark's political parties in the 2009 European Union election. Established in 1995, the DF was first politically legitimized on the national stage in Denmark's 1998 parliament election; at this time, DF won 13 seats and earned 7.4% of the national vote.²⁵⁴ The party steadily rose throughout the next decade, securing their position as Denmark's strongest Eurosceptic party with support comparable to that of mainstream competitors.²⁵⁵ Their ability to influence the mainstream is further illustrated in the party's membership in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) coalition within European Parliament.²⁵⁶ Other members of the ECR are typically center-right parties—most notably the UK's Conservative Party—that do not uphold particularly radical ideas or extremist behaviors; comparatively, however, the DF is known for being

²⁵¹ EFDD (Official Website). "Our MEPs". *The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group in the European Parliament*. Brussels. Web Source. Accessed 2 August 2014. (2014).

²⁵² See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 98-9.

²⁵⁵ Leonard, Mark, Jose Ignacio Torreblanca. "The Eurosceptic Surge and How to Respond to it". *European Council on Foreign Relations: Policy Brief*. (2014). 8.

²⁵⁶ ECR (Official Website). "Your MEPs". *European Conservatives and Reformists Group: Time To Take New Direction*. Brussels. Web Source. Accessed 2 August 2014. (2012).

wildly authoritarian, Eurosceptic, and strongly anti-immigrant.²⁵⁷ The DF's presence within a more mainstream voting block puts the party at an advantage to sway voting patterns toward more radical and extreme policy making on behalf of Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant parties, should it wish to.

Another extreme-right party that is also currently part of the ECR is the Finns (PS). Founded in 1995, Finland's adapted extreme-right group was nationally legitimized in 1999 after gaining 1 seat in national parliament. The Finns slowly gained political prominence by gaining 2 seats in both the 2003 and 2007 Finnish general elections, respectively. In 2009, the party made their debut into the European Parliament with 14% of the national vote, earning 2 seats, though in different coalitions (ECR and EPP). However, the Finns surprised political rivals in 2011 when they earned 9.0% of the national vote, yielding the party 39 seats in the Finnish Parliament.²⁵⁸ Maintaining support in both regional and municipal elections within Finland, the party secured 2 seats in the European Parliament election of 2014 (having won 12.9% of the national vote) for the ECR group of parliament members.²⁵⁹

The last extreme-right party of this category is Italy's Lega Nord (LN, translated as the Northern League). Founded in 1991, the LN is a composite of many smaller extreme-right parties that held political prominence throughout the 1980s. Existing primarily throughout the Northern and Central regions of the country, the LN essentially became a centralized party, uniting fringe far-right groups existing throughout the regions

²⁵⁷ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 115-40.

²⁵⁸ Finns (Official Website). "Finns party – In English: Introduction". *PeruS*. Web Source. Accessed 2 August 2014.

²⁵⁹ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

of Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Liguria, and Piemonte.²⁶⁰ They were known from conception as a large coalition group of populists, xenophobes, racists, and authoritarian supporters existing to the north of Rome.²⁶¹

At times, LN was closely aligned with Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia (FI), while at others it was a fierce competitor for the far-right vote. Although FI remained comparably more center-right than LN, FI's strong affiliation with openly neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)—a group that later split into the Alleanza Nazionale (AN, translated as National Alliance), and the Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT, translated as the Tricolor Flame)—lost FI significant support, assisting the non-fascist profile of LN. While the LN leader claimed in 1994 that “[We] will never make a political agreement with the MSI, with the fascists, or whatever they now call themselves,”²⁶² the party was forced to cooperate with “the fascists” in order to maintain its political power. However, the LN, FI and AN continue to be portrayed to Italian voters as the “[fascists] of the new millennium”²⁶³ by leftist propaganda, watch-dog media, and political rivals alike.

Having lost power in the mid-1990s, the group was only legitimated by the national electorate once again in 2001,²⁶⁴ providing a new foundation of support for the party's electoral success in the 2009 European Parliament election where it gained 10.2% of the vote (9 seats); FI did not run in the election. However, in the 2014 election—with

²⁶⁰ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 149-50.

²⁶¹ (ed.) Ralf Melzer, Sabastain Serafin. *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Strategies*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (2013). 103.

²⁶² See Meret, *supra* note 232. 153.

²⁶³ See Melzer, *supra* note 261. 103.

²⁶⁴ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 152.

the return of FI in and the addition of another extreme-right party—LN was only able to secure 5 of its seats in the European Parliament and 6.16% of the national vote.²⁶⁵

Subsection C: Established During, Empowered After

The next type of relevant extreme-right group—in terms of chronology—are those which were founded during the Third Wave, but have only harbored marginal political support until recently; these groups sometimes succeeded on the municipal level, yet were only politically legitimated on a national scale within the past five years (2008-2013), or even just in the 2014 European Parliament election. As discussed in the previous chapter, Golden Dawn would fall into this category considering it was founded during the momentum of the Third Wave, though was unsuccessful on the national level until the 2012 Hellenic Parliament elections. Others that follow a similar timeline regarding establishment and legitimacy as a political party are the British National Party (BNP), the Swedish Democrats (SD), and Hungary’s Jobbik party.

The BNP—as mentioned above in discussion of their less-extreme Eurosceptic counterpart UKIP—was founded in 1982 as a “whites only political party [advocating for] anti-Semitic and subsequently anti-coloured immigration policies,”²⁶⁶ and is now considered one of the most successful extreme-right parties in the UK’s history.²⁶⁷ While their success remained on low-scale and on municipal levels throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the party eventually was legitimized nationally in 2009 after winning significant

²⁶⁵ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁶⁶ Easat-Daas, A., S. Ounissi. “European Muslim Youth and the Rise of the Far-Right Anti-Muslim Narrative”. *Forum of the European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations*. (2013). 27.

²⁶⁷ See Ford, *supra* note 239.

municipal positions across England over the eight years prior.²⁶⁸ From 2001 forward, “the BNP vote increased” with each passing election, although it failed to gain national legitimacy until its breakthrough in 2009 when the party secured 6.04% of the national vote for European Parliament.²⁶⁹ After winning 2 seats, political rivals from the Labour Party noted the BNP’s sudden electoral success as “a result of local political failure”.²⁷⁰ The majority of the party’s support derives from the elderly living in metropolitan suburbs, as well as constituencies in the Northern and Midland regions that are currently enduring significant deindustrialization and overall decline in employment.

After the party’s unprecedented success on the national level in the 2009 election, they were hailed as “the fastest growing political party in Britain”²⁷¹; however, the 2014 election did not prove as successful for the group, seeing as they gained only 1.11% of the national vote, losing their presence in the European Parliament.²⁷² The group lost significant prominence in its former stronghold areas of Northwest regions of England. However, unofficial sources quote BNP leader Nick Griffin’s social media accounts as having stating that food banks for “our people” will continue to be a campaigning tool in regions where the BNP lost its bulk of electoral support.²⁷³ The purpose and conduction of this political tactic mirrors that of Golden Dawn’s food banks in Greece.

²⁶⁸ Renton, David. “‘A day to make history’? The 2004 elections and the British National Party”. *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 31, No. 9. London: Routledge. (2005).

²⁶⁹ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁷⁰ See Ford, *supra* note 239.

²⁷¹ See Ford, *supra* note 239.

²⁷² See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁷³ Pidd, Helen. “Nick Griffin concedes European parliament seat as BNP votes fall away”. *The Guardian (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 2 August 2014. London. (2014).

Another major extreme-right player that is a regional counterpart to the Finns and Danish People's Party is the Swedish Democrats. Of the three, the SD is considered one of the lesser threats because its electoral standing has not been as significant as other Scandinavian extreme-right groups. However, some suggest the existence of SD to be a considerable case of "neo-Nazi violence" from a political party that specifically targets attacks against individuals and structures that threaten the purity of Swedish culture, as well as those who criticize and oppose their mission or behavior.²⁷⁴ In Sweden however, traditional and mainstream parties have condemned the actions and platform of the SD, although they do promote rhetoric similar that supports the wellbeing of "authentic" or "genuine" Swedish citizens; this is opposed to the case of the Finns and DF that are considered legitimate parties even by centrist rivals.²⁷⁵

The SD's rise to legitimacy has been slow; the party was created in 1988, and ran for elections regularly on the national and EU-level throughout the next two decades. However, the party was only politically legitimized at the national level in 2010 when the party gained 6% of the national vote for Swedish Parliament, equivocating to 20 out of 349 seats.²⁷⁶ After breaking an over twenty-year marginal presence in Swedish politics, the party was awarded 2 seats in this past European Parliament election of 2014—earning 9.7% of the national vote—and has become a coalition member of the EFFD.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ Mulinari, Diana, Anders Neergaard. "Violence, Racism, and the Political Arena: A Scandinavian Dilemma". *NORA—Nordic Journal of Feminist Gender Research*. Centre for Gender Studies, University of Lund. (2012). 14.

²⁷⁵ Alund, Aleksandra, Carl-Ulrik Schierup. "The end of Swedish exceptionalism? Citizenship, neoliberalism, and the politics of exclusion". *Institute of Race Relations, Vol. 53*. Sage Publications. (2011). 58.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

²⁷⁷ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

The last group of this category, the wildly infamous Jobbik party in Hungary, has been known for violent behavior and rhetoric; interestingly, all others in this category (BNP, SD, Golden Dawn) are also considered some of the most outwardly racist and violent groups among those discussed in this chapter. The Jobbik, however, has been discussed by many scholars to be a party that performs actions and promotes messages even “more radical than the radicals”.²⁷⁸ While only founded at the very end of the Third Wave in 2002 as a youth organization—becoming a political party in 2003—the Jobbik were polling at less than 2% in elections at all levels of the government. However, two years after the party founded a strong, assertive, norm-shattering paramilitary wing to complement its extreme-right political platform, the party began reaching unprecedented electoral success of up to 14.77% of national support in the 2009 European Parliament race. Stunning the entire country, support for the Jobbik grew over the next year, earning them 16.67% of the national vote, making them “the third largest party in the *Hungarian National Assembly*”.²⁷⁹ While the center-right party—known as Fidesz—won the clear majority of the electoral results with over 56% of national support, the Jobbik only trailed 2.6% behind the traditional center-left Magyar Szocialista Party (MSZP).²⁸⁰

From their point of political legitimacy in the 2009 election, the Jobbik was more frequently involved in scandals that have led to slight public disapproval and resignations from Jobbik politicians who felt the party became too radical. Despite setbacks, the Jobbik secured nearly the same percentage (14.67%) amounting to the same number of

²⁷⁸ See Melzer, *supra* note 261. 229.

²⁷⁹ See Melzer, *supra* note 231. 229.

²⁸⁰ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

seats (3), in the 2014 European Parliament election; this time, Jobbik surpassed the MSZP by 3.77% in the race, making it the second-largest party representative of Hungary to the European Union and defying Hungary's traditional two-party system.²⁸¹ While the party's presence in national government has not remained as consistent over these five years, the party has maintained significant support as a strong Hungarian voice to the European Parliament.

Subsection D: Established After, Empowered After

The following parties in this chronological category of modern extreme-right parties concerns those that have been established, as well as legitimated after the Third Wave, specifically within the past five years (2008-2013), or some even in the 2014 European Parliament election. Considering their newly founded relevance, there is very little written on most of these parties from an academic standpoint. However, the strong political alliances, messaging, and quick legitimization of these parties warrant them to be understood and examined as potentially powerful influencers of extreme-right parties that have already been discussed. Some of these parties are very one-issue-centric—focused on Euroscepticism, anti-immigration, populism, or so forth—while others feature all-around extreme-right politicians with the political position to either assist or inhibit the existence of already established extreme-right parties. The parties to which this typology applies are Alternative for Germany (AfD), The Netherlands' Party for Freedom (PVV), Italy's Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S), as well as the Czech Republic's Party of Free Citizens (SSO).

²⁸¹ Ibid.

As of 2012, the extreme-right in Germany had not met much political legitimization. With legal restrictions placed on practices of hate-speech, and abolition of racial discrimination and extremism in politics Germany's only significant far-right party for the past fifty years has been the National Democratic Party (NPD, to be discussed later in this chapter). While the two fit into very different chronological groupings, the dynamic that exists between the AfD and NPD is not unlike the relationship that exists between UKIP and the BNP. While the NPD and BNP are considered radical and racially motivated political groups, the AfD and UKIP appeal to voters as being less extreme in their tactics and "politely" racist in their politics, focusing on their primary platform point—Euroscepticism—to rouse fear and voter support.

The AfD—established only in 2013—earned 7 out of Germany's 96 representative seats in the European Parliament with 7.10% of the national vote in the 2014 election.²⁸² Sporting an even less-far-right platform than UKIP, AfD is a member of the ECR and advocates for German interest specifically concerning economic solutions, including: the reinstatement of Deutschmark and abandonment of the Euro, and blatant disapproval of the Troika and Chancellor Angela Merkel's handling of bailouts and economic assistance across Europe. In an attempt to not fall to the margins after such a quick support was formed for the one-issue party—a common trend in traditional German voting patterns—the AfD is attempting to build credibility among businessmen, doctors, and professors alike.²⁸³ Ultimately, should German far-right supporters decide their vote

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Sting, Anna. "Founding of Anti-Euro party: 'An Alternative for Germany'?" *Artudis Academic Repository*. Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. (2013).

is cast in a pursuit of economic reform—rather than out of racial prejudice supported by the NPD—and if the AfD broadens its platform to address other issues, continuing to intrigue its young voter demographic, the party may have the potential to derail support the radical NPD entirely.

The neighboring Netherlands has its own brand of extreme-right that closely aligns itself with Marine LePen’s electorally revived Front National. Party leader Geert Wilders founded the PVV in 2006 in order to create an ultranationalist splinter party to their far-right predecessor the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy.²⁸⁴ Legitimized first in the country’s 2006 general election, the PVV gained 16.97% of the national vote (4 seats) in the 2009 European Parliament election, holding that same number of seats with a slightly lower voter support (13.32%) in the 2014 race.²⁸⁵ Through strong anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant propaganda, the PVV has captured a significant portion of the country’s support—being the second most powerful party in the 2009 election and third most in the 2014 election—in a very short period of existence.

Next, a very recent addition to the plethora of far-right Italian political parties is the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S, translated as the Five Star Movement). Similar to the AfD, M5S is not necessarily far-right in its political nature, but strictly holds to platform points such as populism, anti-corruption and anti-elitism, and most strongly Euroscepticism. Celebrity comedian and activist Beppe Grillo founded the M5S in 2009. The party gained its legitimacy at their electoral debut in 2013, gaining a significant

²⁸⁴ Pas, N. “The state of the right: the Netherlands”. *Universiteit Van Amsterdam, Academic Repository*. Paris: Fondapol, Fondation pour l’innovation politique. (2011).

²⁸⁵ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

amount of support in national elections of 2013. M5S won 163 out of 945 total seats in their electoral debut with 26.6% of the vote, nationally,²⁸⁶ and was able to translate their success into becoming the second most powerful party in Italy following the 2014 European Parliament election. The party won 21.16% at their in their first European election, earning 17 of the allocated 73 seats to represent Italy in parliament, and entered the EFDD coalition at this time.²⁸⁷

While the politics are not necessarily threatening, the radical anti-establishment sentiment that M5S has garnered in such a short amount of time also threatens the political norm in Italy and could plausibly create a gap for more radical political movements to rise. Grillo has been known for hosting large-scale rallies all over the country, proclaiming his followers “conservative revolutionaries” who do not exist on a left-right political spectrum, but “above it!”²⁸⁸ This same source cites that the majority of voters for the M5S are disenchanted extreme-right voters who formerly supported groups like the LN and FI, and that Grillo has every intention to expand his support to all Italians angered by corruption that affects all of Italy’s politicians, regardless of their position on the left-right spectrum.²⁸⁹

Last of this chronological grouping is the Czech Republic’s SSO. Also a member of the EFDD that has been created and legitimated within the past five years, the party has risen with marginal support, but with quite a radical stance. Founded in 2009, the

²⁸⁶ Cataldi, Matteo, Vincenzo Emanuele. “An electoral tsunami hits Italy: 20 provinces washed away from PD and PdL”. *Il Sole*. Rome: CISE. (2013). 49.

²⁸⁷ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁸⁸ Hooper, John. “Beppe Grillo: populist who could throw Italy into turmoil at general election: Election in two weeks’ time could see Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement in position to stop the left or right from wielding majority”. *The Guardian (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 5 August 2014. (2013).

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

party was first legitimized at the national level in the 2014 European Parliament election, winning 5.24% of the national vote, or 1 seat.²⁹⁰ Along with other parties at the time, the SSO was considered a party that rose directly out of populism, right-wing sentiment, and most significantly opposition to the 2007 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)—otherwise known as the Treaty of Lisbon—that centralized European Union relations, seeking to make the institution more efficient. However, the legislation confirmed the worst fears of Eurosceptics, that the European Union has the power to further strip countries and national governments of their sovereignty; thus, a powerful rise in Euroscepticism—as well as Eurosceptic political movements and parties—was created after 2007, though more significant after the treaty’s implementation in 2009, as reflected earlier in this chapter.²⁹¹

Subsection E: Chronological Outliers

The last extreme-right party to be discussed in this dissertation is slowly working its way within European politics after having been formed in the 1964 and only being legitimized fifty years later in 2014; it is an outlier to all preceding chronological categories. Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD) was formed well before the Third Wave, yet remained on the political margins until recently when the NPD was awarded 1 seat in the European Parliament after winning 1% of the national vote. Some scholars suggest the party is Europe’s “most significant neo-Nazi party to emerge after

²⁹⁰ See European Parliament, *supra* note 223.

²⁹¹ Hanley, S. “Dynamics of new party formation in the Czech Republic 1996-2010: Looking for the origins of a ‘political earthquake’”. *East European Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2. (2012). 27.

1945,”²⁹² while the party describes itself as “one of the few patriotic organizations not yet banned by the government”.²⁹³ Clearly drawing from the discussion of patriotism versus nationalism—as discussed in Chapter Three—the NPD paints itself as a patriotic front threatened by the governmental mainstream, declaring that it is the last mechanism standing to represent German patriots in a Euro-centric Germany. While the political center—and voters—kept the NPD on the fringe throughout the Third Wave, even this small electoral success may potentially signify that the group finally has found their opportunity to reinstall a radical, extreme-right front in Germany since the abandonment of the Nazi party in 1945.

Section I.II: Typology Based on Influence

The second category necessary to discuss in this argument is the type of influence that each party has on their extreme-right and Eurosceptic counterparts. It is undoubted that “the threat of violent far-right extremism has ‘reached new levels in Europe and should not be underestimated’, ”²⁹⁴ but what must be considered is the type of violence being posed—i.e. structural, cultural, or direct violence—because different parties are bound to impact our lives in different ways. Parties like UKIP, Front National, and M5S pose a significant threat to the European Union as a whole, rather than simply to their constituents and non-constituents living within their country’s borders; this is primarily due to their newly acquired prominence in European Parliament. For the purpose of this

²⁹² Davies, Peter, Derek Lynch. *The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right*. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis Group. (2005). 315.

²⁹³ National Democratic Party (Official Website). “Welcome to the English Homepage of the National Democratic Party of Germany - Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD): History of the National Democratic Party”. Kiel. Web Source. Accessed 5 August 2014. (2014).

²⁹⁴ Ramalingam, Vidhya. “Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention”. *The Institute of Strategic Dialogue: Counter Extremism Division, Project on Far-Right Extremism*. (2012). 5.

dissertation, these parties and others that fall into this typology will be known as “Vote Influencers”.

Other parties—including Golden Dawn, the Jobbik, BNP, VB, LN, and SD—pose a threat to Europe that is equally detrimental, not due to their voting power but rather their legitimized, violent behavior. This second type of influencer—known in this dissertation as “Behavior Influencers”—threaten the physical safety of minority groups, political rivals, and those who do not align with their political message or ideal political state; each discussed has already been tied to cases of direct violence inflicted on political opponents or minority communities and individuals. The more jarring aspect, however, is the potential these parties have to inspire similar action from marginal—most likely politically illegitimate—groups looking to impact society, as they may start to mimic the violent behavior they witness from parties that are already legitimized by their nation.

Subsection A: Impact through Numbers—Vote Influencers

Vote Influencers have been granted an incredible amount of responsibility and chance to truly impact national and supranational policy throughout Europe. These parties have gained unprecedented electoral support over the past five years, equivocating to significant voting power in various institutions. Even more importantly, many of these parties have disrupted their country’s governmental norms (i.e. traditional two-party systems, mainstream and centrist-dominant systems, and the like), completely shifting political dynamics and dismantling conventional voting patterns. While the majority of these groups have not necessarily been accused or convicted of direct violence fueled by their far-right or Eurosceptic ideology, their newly founded voting power and potential to

form political alliances make them an incredible threat. Most directly, they now have a considerable ability to construct and implement policies that may be structurally or culturally violent against their political rivals or whomever they chose to attack silently.

Typically, the parties that have been recently created or revived, and legitimized in large numbers by national electorates are those that have staunchly Eurosceptic attitudes and promote anti-European Union policies. They do this, from their perspective, to save their nation from a culturally and economic oppressive relationship, greatly oversimplifying the costs and benefits of European Union membership. They primarily exist in opposition to elitism and the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as harbor an overall sceptic and resentful attitude toward Winston Churchill's famous—and Americanized—idea to create a “United States of Europe” following the devastation of aggressive, ultranationalist violence that took place during World War II.²⁹⁵ Based on the 2014 European Parliament elections, groups that fit most appropriately into this category are: UKIP (earning 24 seats with nearly 27% of the national vote, up from only 6.3% four years prior); M5S (earning 17 over 21% of the national vote, this being its debut into political power); and AfD (earning 7 seats and over 7% of the national vote, only having been founded one year earlier). Ultimately, these groups signify large support for Eurosceptic attitudes and policy making that revives cultural and governmental sovereignty, stripping the European Union and outside influences of their immense power over their country.

However, there are others in this category that are not primarily Eurosceptics, but advocate fully for an extreme-right platform—consisting of populist, ultranationalist,

²⁹⁵ European Commission. “Winston Churchill: calling for a United States of Europe”. *The Founding Fathers of the European Union*.

anti-immigrant, anti-globalization, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim rhetoric—that have been legitimized by a significant portion of their national electorate in the latest European Parliament election. While some of these parties do not necessarily have a tremendous amount of seats in the European Parliament (due to the size and population of the country), their significance to this category is measured as having received over 10% of the national vote, and position among the top-three voted parties in the 2014 European Parliament election. These groups advocate traditional extreme-right platforms and continue to maintain significant support from their respective national electorate. Parties that these criteria pertain to are: Front National (earning 23 seats and nearly a quarter of votes from the national electorate); Austria’s FPÖ (earning 4 seats with nearly 20% of the vote); Denmark’s DF (earning 4 seats and nearly 27% of the vote); the Netherlands’ PVV (earning 4 seats and over 13% of the vote); Finland’s PS (earning 2 seats with nearly 13% of the national vote); and Hungary’s Jobbik (earning 3 seats and 14.67% of the national vote).

Interestingly, many of the parties listed do not prefer to be categorized as extreme-right or even far-right. Unofficial sources state that, “most of them are trying to shake off the far-right tag and appeal to the more mainstream voters. But [that] there have been slip-ups,” such as when an FPÖ candidate stated that the European Parliament was a “conglomerate of Negroes,” or when PVV leader Wilders asked constituents if “they would like ‘fewer Moroccans’ in The Netherlands”.²⁹⁶ Not to say these instances alone prove an entire political platform to be extremist—racist comments do not yield extremist

²⁹⁶ Lichfield, John, Charlotte McDonald-Gibson. “European election results 2014: Far-right parties flourish across Europe”. *The Independent (UK)*. Brussels. (2014).

actions—but it is considerable to at least note parties that are attempting to shed old associations in an effort to appear mainstream and less radical in the eyes of voter, yet are failing quite publicly.

Thus, one of the only blanket characteristics that every Vote Influencer has is not in their ideology or rhetoric, but in their sheer support and ability to disturb traditional politics as they existed before their arrival to political legitimacy and recently overwhelming success in the polls. Whether they advocate for extreme anti-Europeanism or extreme-right platforms, each brings at least some degree of “extreme” or “radical” to their platform, making them and their potential alliances a serious and potential threat to either the European Union as an institution or the individuals living within it. The method by which Vote Influencers are most likely to reach their political goals is not found in direct violence, but policy making that may create structural or cultural violence against those they wish their nation was without, elites and immigrants alike.

Subsection B: Impact through Tactics—Behavior Influencers

The second type of influencer is known for their tactics; these parties have violent tendencies, using coercion and scare tactics typically against non-citizens or individuals of foreign races and ethnicities. While the majority of these groups have been legitimized, they remain a small voting presence compared to their previously discussed counterparts. However, these groups have all been known to use tactics that influence youth in order to condition society into acting as aggressive and “patriotic” ultranationalists. Further, they commend past fascist regimes and leaders known for violent behavior and policymaking, as well as—either conclusively or allegedly—have

inflicted outward violence toward their political and cultural rivals (be they perceived as internal or external threats to their nation).

Outward and direct violence, along with conditioning of society to continue socially and politically legitimizing this behavior—and even promoting individuals to carry out the violence themselves—is what this dissertation considers to constitute direct violence against one’s community. By this definition and criteria parties that fit this description are: Golden Dawn—and Jobbik—(both associated with crimes against migrants, homosexuals, Semites, Muslims, Roma, as well as political opponents and leftists); the BNP (associated with exclusive food banks that deny minorities of sustenance, racially motivated political violence early on in its conception,²⁹⁷ the ‘London nail-bombings,’ as well as supporting political leaders arrested for carrying large military arsenals in their home out of protection from “the evils of uncontrolled immigration”²⁹⁸); the SD (condemned by the far-right and far-left of Sweden alike,²⁹⁹ and dubbed an “increasingly influential ethnocentric, xenophobic and nationalist” populist party with legitimate roots in violent neo-Nazi movements of the 1980s³⁰⁰); the LN (promulgating political attacks “that are not only crude and vulgar, but often violent”³⁰¹ and have legitimized this among supporters³⁰²); the VB—and FN—(associated with attacks against immigrants, primarily Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and

²⁹⁷ See Renton, *supra* note 268. 30.

²⁹⁸ See Ramalingam, *supra* note 294. 2-3, 5.

²⁹⁹ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

³⁰⁰ See Alund, *supra* note 275. 57-8.

³⁰¹ Zaslove, Andrej. *The Re-invention of the European Radical Right: Populism, Regionalism, and the Italian Lega Nord*. Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press. (2011). 86.

³⁰² Bartlett, Jamie. “Populism in Europe: Lega Nord”. *Demos*. London. (2012). 40.

North Africa³⁰³); and the NPD (established as a neo-Nazi alliance that has more recently been associated with far-right terrorist violence executed by the National Socialist Underground [NSU],³⁰⁴ and anti-Muslim attacks by their proxy anti-Muslim group³⁰⁵). Each of the parties' listed offenses are concrete, however each party has a plethora of unofficial sources linking them to more violent actions that will not be listed in this dissertation due to plausible speculation or media bias behind the allegations.

Groups such as the BNP have also attempted to “shake off [their] reputation for criminal behavior by choosing candidates without criminal records who dress smartly...and declare that they are not racists” though admit they still need to “limit their attacks” on minority groups in order to not scare audiences and certain demographics away from their platform.³⁰⁶ Similarly, the SD has attempted to shed association with violent tactics of its founding fathers.³⁰⁷ While many of the Behavior Influencers attempt to change their profile in order to become more appealing to mainstream voters—effectively to gain and maintain political legitimacy, become Vote Influencers, and solidify social legitimacy for their platform and actions—most are merely attempting to conceal sentiment that otherwise promotes behavioral violence.

³⁰³ National Focal Point of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). “National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime: RAXEN Focal Point for Belgium”. *Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism*. (1994).

³⁰⁴ See Ramalingam, *supra* note 294. 2.

³⁰⁵ See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 35.

³⁰⁶ Copsey, Nigel, Graham Macklin. *British National Party: Contemporary Perspectives*. London: Routledge. (2011). 218.

³⁰⁷ See Alund, *supra* note 275. 58.

Subsection C: Influential Outliers

While the Czech Republic's SSO would be characteristic of a party not as focused on far-right extremism as it is Euroscepticism, its current polling numbers do not reflect the party as a terribly strong or wildly influential voting power. According to academic sources, the SSO is not involved with any concrete instances of violence or political associations with violent actors, as of 2014. For these reasons, the SSO must be considered neither a Vote nor Behavior Influencer among its extreme-right counterparts—currently—but rather a product of radical opposition to European centrism under the principles of far-right populism.

Section II: Comparing Political Platforms of the Extreme-Right

The last element to be compared between this broad range of extreme-right parties currently prominent in European politics is that of what they advocate for. Seeking to understand the similarities between Golden Dawn and its fellow far-right counterparts, this section will attempt to compare Golden Dawn's platform to others regarding specific and central far-right issues. Only platform points that are radically different from and have the potential to influence Golden Dawn policy makers will also be noted.

Section II.I: Platforms Concerning Nation and Race

As the most basic defining characteristic of far-right parties, the point at which a party's patriotic attitude transforms from nationalist to ultranationalist is crucial to determine, and typically decides when "extreme" or "radical" labels enter their party's official title; all of the parties discussed have acquired one or both of these labels at least to some degree. Again, patriotic love for one's country transforms into nationalism or

ultranationalism when citizens mobilize the frustration and resentment they feel toward outsiders in an aggressive or violent way—be they institutions or elites, foreign communities or individuals. Recent political dialogue has seen ultranationalism translated into platforms of Euroscepticism (against the institution) and platforms of racism (against the foreigner). Ultimately, the Eurosceptic party harnesses ultranationalism to build legitimacy for policies that will weaken or dismantle the power of supranational institutions in order to strengthen the cultural integrity of sovereign nations. Conversely, racist policy makers will harness ultranationalism to “prove” that certain cultures and religions are simply not compatible with one another—either for biological or social reasons—justifying their exclusion from the nation.

Typically, racism is thought of as a static concept, however as explained earlier in this dissertation, there is a notable difference between political rhetoric that supports “Old Racism” versus that which discusses “New Racism”.³⁰⁸ “Old Racism”—where one’s race is claimed to be biologically and spiritually superior to others—is not typically seen in current politically legitimized platforms (though arguably, Golden Dawn has elements of this sentiment in its manifesto). However, New Racism is indulged in by nearly all of the current extreme-right parties, on the predication that certain races (and religions) are not meant to coexist with one another. New Racism, some argue, is not as severe or detrimental to society as Old Racism, and they downplay the affect it has on societies and policymaking. However, both Behavior and Vote Influencers alike have allegedly used

³⁰⁸ See Mudde, *supra* note 85. 211.

such rhetoric in order to strengthen their political platform—be it racist or Eurosceptic, or both—despite many of these party’s attempts to avoid negative labels.

Section II.II: Platforms Concerning Immigration

Just as Golden Dawn’s position on immigration was described, FN and PVV have been known for similarly “exploiting latent feelings of resentment against immigrants,”³⁰⁹ and in a similar way, the Jobbik is able to use this same tactic against Roma populations living in Hungary in an attempt to justify violence committed against them.³¹⁰ In terms of anti-immigrant platforms aimed at certain groups, an example lies in the PVV’s much-publicized fight against Muslim immigrants. Early in its conception, the party called for a national ban on the “backwards” religion’s texts and clothing. Recently, however, they have attempted to clear their name of racist remarks and policies, though—as previously mentioned—there have been significant backslides in the party’s effort to erase a violent, anti-immigrant sentiment from their politics.³¹¹ Leaders of the FN have similarly demonized Muslims in France to the point that many believe the “core of their political ideology at the moment is Islamophobia”.³¹² Specific examples of this include LePen’s comparison of public Islamic prayer to “the Nazi occupation of France, thus creating the image of a Muslim invasion of France,” and the party’s prominent influence during the 2004 ban on Islamic headscarves in schools, as well as burqas and

³⁰⁹ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

³¹⁰ See Melzer, *supra* note 261. 232.

³¹¹ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

³¹² See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 23.

niqabs across the nation in 2011.³¹³ The European Court of Human Rights reaffirmed these rulings in July 2014.³¹⁴

Subsequently, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim campaigns have been seen in varied degrees—primarily throughout the time of the Third Wave—in countries with a strong extreme-right presence. For example, in 1991 the FN launched the “Implantation of Islam in France” campaign; inspired by this was the BNP that in 2002 launched the “Islam out of Britain” campaign to ultimately prove incompatibility of the religion with traditionally Christian communities.³¹⁵ This common strategy to promote New Racism is also illustrated concretely in the DF’s campaign against the government’s past attempts to support a multiethnic society in Denmark in their platform—known in its 2001 published form as *Denmark’s Future: Your Land, Your Vote*.³¹⁶ The strategy is also illustrated by the NPD and VB, where specifically in their most recent platform regarding Muslim immigration, the NPD states how threatening the “unstoppable Islamisation of Germany [is] due to a perceived Muslim inability to integrate,”³¹⁷ while VB claims that the religion is a “Trojan Horse” leading to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in the nation.³¹⁸

Similarly, Nordic groups—including the SD, Finns, and DF—all “share a loathing for Islam” despite attempts to clear their names as racist ultranationalists.³¹⁹ The majority of non-mainstream parties in the region tend to favor forced assimilation over

³¹³ Ibid., 21.

³¹⁴ Landauro, Inti, Gabriele Steinhauser. “European Human Rights Court Upholds France’s Burqa Ban”. *The Wall Street Journal (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 15 August 2014. New York. (2014).

³¹⁵ See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 24, 27.

³¹⁶ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 90.

³¹⁷ See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 35.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 32.

³¹⁹ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

multiculturalism. More radically, however, the DF warns that naturalization processes allowing foreigners to become citizens are an, “attack against the Danish people and outrageous rape against the spirit and words of the Constitution”.³²⁰ In similar sentiment, the typical anti-immigrant slogan that Golden Dawn has been known to use (“Greece for the Greeks”) has been used by nearly every other party discussed in this dissertation (i.e. “[Country] for the [Nation]”). One of the more assertive examples—cited from an unofficial source—comes from a young Lega Nord member who shouted at a political rally: “Italy for the Italians: Africans and Jews out!”³²¹

Even more violent, unofficial sources report that LN leader Umberto Bossi stated during a rally that, “boats carrying illegal immigrants to Italy’s shores should be shot out of the water”.³²² Other threatening remarks have been made in political rhetoric by the Jobbik—and now many Hungarian citizens—who brand immigrants as “Multis” (used derogatorily against those of different nationalities).³²³ This term has been accompanied by controversial blood tests taken by multiple Jobbik politicians to affirm their “racial purity” ensuring they are “free of Jewish and Roman genes”.³²⁴ Ultimately, rhetoric from the extreme-right has “led to the problematisation of immigrant communities,” prompting the securitization of citizens against foreigners, be they Roma, Muslim, Semitic, African, Middle Eastern, or any other minority demographic. This is widely done by falsifying

³²⁰ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 120.

³²¹ Mane, Saviona, Annie Sacerdoti. “Winds of right-wing wars”. *Haaretz (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 6 August 2014. Milan. (2012).

³²² BBC News: Europe. “Profile: Italy’s Umberto Bossi”. *BBC News (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 5 August 2014. London. (2012).

³²³ See The Economist, *supra* note 99.

³²⁴ Abbott, Alison. “Genome test slammed for assessing ‘racial purity’: Hungarian far-right politician certified as ‘free of Jewish and Roma genes’”. *Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science*. (2012).

information that implies increased crime rates and metropolitan degradation directly correlate to the immigration of minority communities.³²⁵

Section II.III: Platforms Concerning Economics

The case of Greece—from an economic perspective—was different than other Southern European countries that experienced recessions in 2008 and bailouts in 2011. While others had been on a slow economic decline since the decade prior, Greece’s unemployment rates nearly doubled in the space of three years (2008-2011); overall, “the Greek economy had been booming in the years immediately before the 2008 financial crisis...[with] the fastest growth rates in the Eurozone”.³²⁶ Countries in gradual economic decline at the time—including Portugal and Spain—on the other hand have seen far less extreme-right political legitimization, most likely for the reason that their recession was less shocking than Greece’s. Combined with dictation from the Troika, resentment toward outsiders in Greece has boiled to a point of scapegoating in order to make sense of their quick downturn; thus, Golden Dawn’s idealization of a mono-cultural, organic economy that is insular, interclassist, and meritocratic is justified in the eyes of voters.

However, many other parties—such as the PVV—criticize the global market, although they provide no practical economic alternative to the existing system (this is with exception to the Jobbik, as discussed in Chapter Three). Other party’s suggestions that align with Golden Dawn’s economic platform include: lowering taxes and alleviating austerity measures (primarily supported by LN³²⁷, and non-extremist parties in Ireland),

³²⁵ See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 35.

³²⁶ Bosco, Anna, Susannah Verney. “Electoral Epidemic: The Political Cost of Economic Crisis in Southern Europe, 2010-11”. *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 17, Issue 2. (2012). 136.

³²⁷ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 162.

and economic nationalism and protectionism (primarily supported by FN, and the BNP). Protectionism as an ideological component of economic platforms mostly arises from rhetorical attempts to scapegoat immigrants and non-citizens, specifically to “frame Muslims [and others] as constituting an economic burden on society”.³²⁸ Other extreme platforms regarding economics—though not yet included in Golden Dawn’s official platform—include AfD’s call to abolish the Euro and reinstall traditional currencies. Ultimately, however, the ambiguity of most far-right parties in terms of their economic platform exists among the parties discussed; some favor a welfare state, others a free-market, and even fewer propose legitimate alternatives to the policies they criticize.

Section II.IV: Platforms Concerning Governance and Elitism

Golden Dawn’s firm placement in populism claims that justice is served when citizens are obeyed by their government; ultimately rejecting the monetary greed seen throughout the years prior to the Eurocrisis—and subsequent bailouts and austerity policies—Golden Dawn began preaching the organic state that functions best when it is natural (or in other words, homogenous). This sort of New Racism has implications of how to govern the country; most ideally the government should act as a doctor, maintaining a healthy body and expelling that which will hurt it. The threats that Golden Dawn identifies against the state (listed extensively in Chapter Four) are not unlike those listed by other parties: homosexuality, migration, feminism, non-Christians, Roma populations, capitalists, elites, and so forth.

³²⁸ See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 35.

In a response to these challenges, many parties have become openly pro-authoritarian or anti-democratic in order to promote more radical change quickly; hypothesizing that democracy is a sure way to breed corruption. Germany's NPD for instance does, "show clear borderline anti-democratic and anti-systemic" features to its political platform, supporting authoritarianism and a radical overhaul of the German government.³²⁹ These characteristics ultimately make a party known as anti-establishment, competing with norms in order to place their own prototypical leader into power. For Denmark's DF, anti-establishment is the core of its platform, "accusing the political and intellectual elite of being disconnected from the common people" as well as poorly managing and implementing immigration policies.³³⁰ Similarly, the Austrian FPÖ has painted itself as the true savior to the country's failing two-party system, harnessing gross dissatisfaction with mainstream politics to suggest an authoritarian alternative.³³¹

One way to gauge how citizens feel regarding their current governance—nationally and supranational—is by the European Commission's *Eurobarometer*. The most recent data from polling in Fall 2013, measured that quite a few nations with prominent far-right actors are quite dissatisfied with the European Union. Most tellingly, as of Fall 2013 the Greeks' trust in the EU is at an all-time low; when polled, 71% of the Greek nation and believe that in terms of the economic crisis "the worst is still to come"³³² and 98% voted that the state of their national economy is "[Totally] Bad".³³³

³²⁹ See Meret, *supra* note 242. 82.

³³⁰ Ibid., 114.

³³¹ Ibid., 193.

³³² European Commission. "Europeans, the European Union and the Crisis". *Standard Barometer 80 Autumn 2013*. Web Source. Accessed 28 March 2014. (2013).

France similarly had 66% vote against trusting the EU to legitimately alleviate the Eurocrisis. However, in the same year 62% of Greeks polled reported being “[Totally] ‘Not Satisfied’” with their lives, while only 17% of the French said the same.³³⁴

What may be deduced, therefore, is that while the French have very little trust in the European Union as an institution, they are quite happy with their situation as a sovereign nation; whereas in Greece, the economic downturn has become so devastating that it is the second-most dissatisfied country in the European Union—behind Bulgaria by only 2%. Therefore, in order to become legitimated parties must grow keen to knowing what their constituents feel dissatisfied about; for the FN, promises must be focused on reforming the EU, whereas for Golden Dawn, promises must focus on a complete overhaul of Greek politics and dismissal of outside actors from dictating monetary funds, as to start serving the people instead of the politicians.

Section II.V: Platforms Concerning Globalization and State Relations

Golden Dawn’s outward view of the world is one that promotes resentment toward European and international monetary institutions that dictate them, as well as feelings of oppression by the Zionist-American global economy that has idolized wealth and cosmopolitanism, failing the Greek nation. Additionally, foreign policy for the party has elements of expansionism and irredentism of former lands belonging to the Hellenic Empire, namely, the Republic of Macedonia. Interestingly, only one other party illustrates a strong call for expansionism, promoting “irredentist claims on areas detached

³³³ European Commission. “Public Opinion in the European Union”. *Standard Barometer 80 Autumn 2013*. Web Source. Accessed 28 March 2014. (2013).

³³⁴ See European Commission, *supra* note 332.

from Hungary after World War I,³³⁵ that being the Jobbik party. Golden Dawn, however, is not particularly a Eurosceptic group in the sense that they wish to weaken the presence of the institution; what they resolve to do, however, is change the inner-workings of the Greek political system, in order to purge itself of greedy elites who have allowed the country to be governed by outside imperialists.

However, to the extent of party platforms that relate to Globalization and State Relationships, the main platform point presented by most parties is Euroscepticism. The primary purpose of many of the parties discussed is to challenge the European Union as a governing institution—specifically the AfD, M5S, and SSO—rejecting Euro-centrism and leftist programs that promote the welfare state for multicultural residents. While some groups create their own brand of Euroscepticism, overall anger has created the perception that the EU welfare state—combined with poorly managed fiscal and migration policies—have caused inflation and a decreasing value of livelihood in most countries. Many suggest that, “the new Eurosceptics have been strengthened by the euro crisis and austerity,”³³⁶ and in reality, there have been many parties created specifically from a nationalist, anti-European sentiment—AfD, M5S, SSO, and the PVV. There are others, however, that began as radical-right parties of the Third Wave and have now shifted to platforms focused on ultranationalism that fuels Euroscepticism;³³⁷ the most prominent examples of this political platform is seen in rhetoric from the DF, VB, FPÖ, LN, FN, Jobbik, and UKIP.

³³⁵ See Melzer, *supra* note 261. 231.

³³⁶ See Leonard, *supra* note 255. 9.

³³⁷ See Meret, *supra* note 232. 137.

CHAPTER SIX: THE POLITICAL TREND AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTREME-RIGHT LEGITIMIZATION

This dissertation has sought to create an outline of aspects that facilitate understanding a contemporary political trend; defining the terms by which to describe and decipher key concepts and terminology relating to relevant trends and political labeling, examining one case study to understand the closeness and prominence of the issue, and closing with an examination of similarly relevant platform points that illustrate comparable characteristics between them all. Rather than merely looking at a zoomed-out version of the current rise of the European extreme-right, the mission of this dissertation was to zoom-in on one political party to potentially place it contextually within a larger socio-political trend. In order to justify discussing such a trend, it became clear that a broad range of parties had to be discussed with similar terminology and concepts in order to devise an accurate comparative analysis. Within context—this included the party’s foundation, point of legitimacy, influence on society, and platform positioning—as discussed at length in Chapter Five.

Therefore, the point at which Chapter Six begins is at an evaluation of already-established information. In performing this evaluation, this dissertation will build an accurate foundation to discuss whether a political trend regarding the rise in extreme-right political legitimization throughout Europe over the past five years (2008-2013) is present or not, and to what extent this trend—or the parties it concerns—may be

influential in the near future. Following this point will be a discussion of the trend's implications toward different levels of society, including but not limited to: individuals (citizens and non-citizens), communities, nations, the continent of Europe, and the international community.

Section I: Identifying Political Trends

This section will seek to analyze and evaluate the information discussed in Chapters Four and Five to identify any chronological trends, or shifts in behavior or strategy that have enabled the political legitimization of the extreme-right. Ultimately, this section will act as an analytical conclusion to all presented information; it will culminate in identification of either a conclusive or potential political trend that may be able to explain why, how, and whether the extreme-right will continue to flourish in Europe. Elaboration regarding the implications and potential consequences of this trend will follow at the end of this chapter.

Section I.I: Typologies Examined

Considering the sections regarding chronology and influence dynamic were developed separately, this dissertation will similarly examine the trends found within each category as previously discussed and in their own merit. Following this will be a combined look at each typology's influence and political stance in order to determine whether one or more strategies have been utilized by the extreme-right in order to inspire voters, catalyzing an upward trend in their political legitimization over the past five years.

Subsection A: Chronology Examined

Concerning the timeline by which the parties discussed had been established and experienced electoral lulls and successes, there are significant patterns to be seen upon examination of the extreme-right and their prominence over the past five years across Europe. While some of these parties existed on the periphery of political legitimacy within their respective country for thirty years or more, others were newly constructed out of citizen protest against various issues that have increasingly damaged citizen's trust in the European Union, and even members of its parliament.

Ultimately, 9 out of the 16 parties discussed were legitimized between the years 2009 and 2014; 5 out of these 9 were established before or during the Third Wave and only legitimized decades later (NPD, BNP, Golden Dawn, SD, Jobbik), while another 4 were established and legitimized after it (PVV, M5S, SSO, AfD). Parties that were legitimized before these, though, have recently experienced unprecedented electoral support or a revival of support similar—if not on par—with the numbers they received during the Third Wave. Parties that experienced significant support in the 1980s and 1990s, but have gained unprecedented amounts of support since that time are the FN, DF, UKIP, and PS—accounting for one-fourth of the originally examined group of relevant parties. Parties that peaked during the Third Wave, but have begun to see a revival of their support in numbers are the FPÖ and LN—both having peaked in their respective electorate during the mid-1990s, and now finding similar success again since the end of the Third Wave. The only outlier to this trend that chronologically illustrates the legitimization, unprecedented support, and revival of extreme-right parties in the past five

years, is the case of Belgium's VB. However, as discussed in Chapter Five, VB's profile and platform transition after being officially condemned as a racist political organization in 2004 has ultimately made the party's electoral comeback lack-luster.

Historically speaking, this trend is marked by the years 2007 and 2008, setting the stage for voter motivation to legitimize the extreme-right. Firstly, the conception and creation of the Treaty of Lisbon marked a reorganization that—from the perspective of nationalists—would centralize Europe to the extent of further sacrificing what national sovereignty was left in an already-overbearing European Union. Secondly, coinciding with this rise in scepticism and resentment toward a centralized power and monetary system was prolonged—and for some countries unexpected—recessions, resulting in the Eurocrisis; ultimately, 2008 became a marker of significant unrest and anger toward the established European status-quo. Furthermore, 2007 and 2008 saw a large surge in irregular migration to the whole of Europe. While the entire continent received nearly 325,000 irregular migrants over the two-year period, Italy received over 35,000 irregular migrants in the summer of 2008 alone,³³⁸ and Greece experienced a near 8% increase in migration from the summer prior, as noted in Chapter Four.

The next two years continued with a deepening and spreading financial crisis, leading to the national bailouts of Greece and Portugal, both finalized in 2011; Cyprus followed with a national bailout in Spring 2013. Alongside economic debates, however, were second and third influxes in irregular migration. The second was felt mostly at the Greece-Turkey land border, noticing a dynamic shift between 2008—when nearly 40,000

³³⁸ Morehouse, Christal, Michael Bloomfield. "Irregular Migration in Europe". *Migration Policy Institute*. (2011). 8-10.

illegal entries to Greece happened by sea and less than 15,000 by land—and 2010 when that number greatly shifted to being well over 82,000 illegal entries by land and not even 5,000 entries by sea.³³⁹ In 2010, Greece received over 90% of the European Union’s irregular migrants.³⁴⁰ Following this, the third increase during these five years was, in the first quarter of 2011 and “almost exclusively due to higher rates of irregular migration from North Africa during the ‘Arab Spring’.”³⁴¹ The *Migration Policy Institute* has cited that while Italy received the vast majority of Arab Spring migrants in 2011, “Greece has remained a targeted entry point for irregular migration,” and that migration causing pressure on weakened democracies, “may have a collateral effect on the calm but vast Eastern [EU] border” between Greece and Turkey.³⁴²

When corresponding historical context to the timeline already presented regarding the foundation and legitimization of extreme-right parties, it is interesting to note which countries legitimized them in the same year—or immediate years after—migratory influxes, as well as the dates when the Eurocrisis began taking its toll on individual nations. The example of Italy illustrates how the founding of M5S and quick rise in support for the LN both occurred in 2009, following the country’s sharp irregular migrant increase in 2008. Similarly, in the year that Greece experienced its highest influx of migrants (2010), Golden Dawn was first legitimized in the Athenian municipal elections; the following national election of 2012 was when the party gained an unprecedented amount of support, securing 18 seats in the Hellenic Parliament.

³³⁹ Ibid., 10.

³⁴⁰ Kasimis, Charalambos. “Illegal Immigration in the Midst of Crisis”. *Migration Policy Institute*. (2012).

³⁴¹ See Morehouse, *supra* note 338. 1.

³⁴² Ibid., 11-4.

Between 2009 and 2010, citizen concerns regarding immigration raised an entire 12% according to Eurobarometer reports, although economic issues continued to dominate the polls.³⁴³ The following year showed that numbers reflecting citizen's perception of the European Union's main challenges continued fluctuating. Ultimately, Eurobarometer results from Spring 2001, 2012, 2013 and 2014 find that among countries with unprecedented electoral support for new or revived extreme-right parties:

- Countries that had relatively little concern with their economic situation in 2011 had a sharp increase in concern in 2012 that slowly declined in 2013 and 2014. This included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.³⁴⁴
- Countries that had high concern for their economic situation in 2011 had a slowly declining concern throughout 2012, 2013, and 2014. This included: Finland, Greece, and Hungary.³⁴⁵
 - The only outlier of the above points was the Czech Republic, a country that arguably contains the least threatening party of all those discussed.
- Those situated in Southern and Central European nations had a higher concern over unemployment than immigration in 2011. This included: Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden.
- In this time span, concern over immigration reached its peak in 2011 and 2014, correlating primarily to the Arab Spring influx of immigration (2011), and to the

³⁴³ European Commission. "Public Opinion in the European Union". *Eurobarometer 74, Autumn 2010*. Web Source. Accessed 20 June 2014. 19. (2010).

³⁴⁴ See Figure 4; European Commission. *Standard Eurobarometer*. Web Source. Accessed 20 June 2014; Note: Figure created by Andrea Mancuso, the author of this dissertation.

³⁴⁵ See Figure 4. Ibid.

date in which most of the extreme-right parties studied were either first legitimated or disrupted traditional two-party systems (2014). This pattern is accounted for in every country studied.³⁴⁶




Figure 4: Percentage of Citizens who Named “Immigration” an Important Concern in Europe, As Found in Eurobarometer Public Opinion Polling (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)

³⁴⁶ See Figure 5. Ibid.; Note: Figure created by Andrea Mancuso, the author of this dissertation.




Figure 5: Percentage of Citizens who Named “Economic Situation” an Important Concern in Europe, As Found in Eurobarometer Public Opinion Polling (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)

Ultimately, while public opinion on the two issues fluctuated, respectively—with the economy still the dominating concern—the years where they were of relatively equal importance are the years that extreme-right groups found unprecedented support from national electorates. Typically—and as discussed throughout Chapter Four and Chapter Five—the tactics by these groups included campaigning against immigrants by associating a failing economy, as well as heightened rates of crime and unemployment, with minority populations. One of the most telling examples is from the UK; in the year that citizens found both the economy and immigration of relatively equal concern, UKIP found the momentum to not only be elected with unprecedented support, but surpass both

the Conservative and Labour parties—a situation not had in the country for over a century.

Thus, concerning public opinion in light of historical occurrences, the chronological trend that can be seen in recent far-right legitimization throughout Europe is that which corresponds to years of heightened dissatisfaction with economic issues and increased rates of irregular migration; a trend that was seen during the Third Wave, and is again prevalent in European society. However, these factors merely fuel the fire for nationalistic parties to disrupt the political norm; they do not represent a direct cause-and-effect on the voting patterns of European citizens. Rather, populist parties of the extreme-right exacerbate these challenges, linking them together, manipulating perception, and securitizing the issues that Europeans otherwise feel, see, and confront every day.

- **Minor Trend #1:** Citizen concern over increases in irregular migration and economic downfall are most likely present in the year—before or when—extreme-right parties are legitimized; however, they do not determine party success, rather they present an opportunity for marginalized parties to capitalize on the dissatisfaction and scepticism of citizens toward their political norm.

Subsection B: Influencers Examined

As established in Chapter Five, Behavior Influencers are parties associated with violence, yet continue to be elected despite their behavior—including the NPD, VB, BNP, Golden Dawn, SD, and LN, exclusively; interestingly, 4 of these 6 parties were only legitimated within the past five years. Vote Influencers, be they extreme-right or Eurosceptic parties that have disrupted the political norm in their respective country,

include the FPÖ, FN, UKIP, DF, PS, Jobbik, PVV, M5S, and AfD. However, many of these parties arguably overlap into both categories; for example, the infamously violent, “more radical than the radical” Jobbik party has become the second-most powerful political group in Hungary, gaining over 14% of support from the national electorate in 2009 and 2014. Similarly, the popular FN, DF, and PVV parties have been confirmedly associated with violent behavior and aggressive policy platforms targeting Muslim and immigrant communities.

What is interesting, however, is how closely aligned much of this influence typing corresponds to chronological groupings. For instance, 3 out of 4 parties that were established and legitimized within the past five years are among the Vote Influencers and are challenging their national political norm; this includes the PVV, M5S and AfD. Conversely, 4 out of 5 parties that were established before or during the Third Wave, yet not nationally legitimized until the past five years, are exclusively Behavior Influencers; including the NPD, BNP, Golden Dawn, and SD (the Jobbik is not included in this count because it is not exclusively a Behavior Influencer). The Behavior Influencers that have been electorally revived or unprecedentedly supported within the past five years—thus falling into both categories, as the Jobbik does—are the FN, LN, PS, and DF. Although some parties are displaced from their typical influencer category (UKIP, FPÖ, VB) the majority are encompassed within them, ultimately illustrating that parties founded during the Third Wave, yet only legitimized within the past five years are more likely to be violent Behavior Influencers than Vote Influencers. This conclusive statement is accompanied by a second: parties that have been established and legitimated within the

past five years have been significant enough to disrupt their respective country's political norm, yet remain primarily non-violent.

- **Minor Trend #2:** Older parties that had not politically legitimized until—or have been significantly revived within—the past five years are more likely to be associated with violent behavior. Newer parties that greatly excel in recent elections are powerful enough to be altering their country's political norms, and less likely to be associated with violence.

Subsection C: Platforms Examined

Even more important toward determining the overall political trend that has legitimized the European extreme-right over the past five years involve elements of Old and New Racism, as discussed in Chapters Three and Five. As a specific component to extreme-right political platforms, racism—of either version—does seep into the rhetoric and policymaking of far-right political groups and their extreme tactics. What is questioned regarding the second minor trend, however, is how violent behavior may chronologically align with the ideological break between Old and New Racism.

The Third Wave was a historic breaking point between far-right schools of thought. While many parties established before and during the Third Wave advocated Old Racist ideas (i.e. homogeny achieved through dominance and violence), others have been more associated with language and policies reminiscent of New Racist ideas (i.e. homogeny achieved through exclusivism). The legitimization of parties associated with Old Racism, however, directly correlates to the minor chronological and influencer trends mentioned above: parties conceived when Old Racism was prominent that are exclusively

Behavior Influencers—i.e. are more likely to be associated with violence—have only been legitimized over the past five years. This conclusion, of course, requires this argument to ask why Vote Influencers similarly conceived during the time that Old Racism was still quite prominent in far-right politics were legitimated much sooner than their chronological counterparts.

Behavior Influencers originating before or during the Third Wave that have only recently found political legitimacy (NPD, BNP, Golden Dawn, SD, Jobbik) have operated since their conception with a platform embedded in Old Racism. This ideology, that they are still typically associated with, ties them to sentiment supporting direct violence, though their official platforms now tend to promulgate more structural and cultural violence. Carrying this stigma, the Behavior Influencers have only now begun to “[ditch] boots for suits”³⁴⁷ in an effort to become politically legitimated by their national electorate. While most have decided to polish their political image in an attempt to shed preconceptions, they have not necessarily compromised Old Racist sentiment. While these parties have also begun to capitalize on growing Euroscepticism among their electorate, their rhetoric relies on the ideas that their nation is being weakened by elites who attempt to suppress their national uniqueness into a broader, globalized and European identity. These platforms also vehemently promulgate that multiculturalism assists this elitist mission, and therefore anti-immigrant policies are best for the nation.

Vote Influencers originating before and during the Third Wave, but legitimized by their national electorate earlier in their political career (FPÖ, FN, UKIP, LN, PS, DF) are

³⁴⁷ Smith, Helena. “Golden Dawn ditches boots for suits in European election makeover”. *The Guardian (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 15 August 2014. (2014).

now typically associated with New Racist ideas. Despite the fact that they were conceived and began their political careers during the prominence of Old Racism, these parties adapted earlier to the rhetoric of New Racism, and comparatively better—or at least more consistently—than their chronological counterparts. Now, rather than discussing topics reminiscent of their violent political roots, they promote renewed and more socially acceptable ideas of exclusivism and incompatibility between races, either through Eurosceptic or exclusionary platforms. Whether they were created recently or in the 1970s, these parties have been able to adapt and capitalize on citizen's perceptions more aligned with popular thought; the success of this strategy is illustrated by these party's electoral records. These parties, again, have not necessarily been as conclusively tied to direct violence as their counterparts have been; however, their policies and voter influence make them a clear threat to the structural and cultural integrity of the European Union and its dedication to multiculturalism and Euro-centrism.

- **Minor Trend #3:** Political platforms of Behavior Influencers are more likely to be associated with Old Racism, while political platforms of Vote Influencers are more likely to be associated with New Racism. Parties that have transitioned between these types of platforms, adopting New Racist language—whether their platform matches it or not—are more likely to become Vote Influencers. Only until Behavior Influencers are able to transfer their platforms from being grounded in Old Racism to consistently promote New Racism will they acquire the potential to become Vote Influencers.

Section I.II: Strategy of the European Extreme-Right

Ultimately, it is evident that a clear political trend has legitimized extreme-right actors throughout Europe over the past five years. This trend, however, is not one dictated by voter motivations or statistics; rather, this trend is a product of many far-right and Eurosceptic parties utilizing a certain political strategy that has become wildly successful among many dissatisfied European electorates. This strategy has been used among the cases discussed in this dissertation—at least to some degree—as explained in the analyses above, and combines the aspects of Minor Trends 1-3 into a larger political trend that legitimizes the party and its behavior.

Ultimately, the parties conceived out of Old Racist ideals that successfully were able to transform their platform to one that promotes New Racism during the Third Wave were most likely to become Vote Influencers as of 2014. Parties that remain exclusively Behavior Influencers, however, failed to successfully implement this transition—among its leadership as well as its members—during this period of time and therefore remained on the margins of political legitimacy until only the past five years. The legitimization of Behavior Influencers over the past five years remains contextual to each party's respective path to legitimization—contingent upon leadership changes, socio-political opportunities, and even belated attempts to transition their platform to one of New Racist language—as was discussed throughout Chapter Five.

The strategy undertaken by extreme-right actors—in other words, the strategy by which far-right parties of the Third Wave transitioned their association from Old to New Racism—will be herein referred to as the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy. This

strategy involves the party's ability to identify the needs of the people—not only the radicals, but the individuals who may sit on the border of the political mainstream and complete dissatisfaction with their current situation—as well as understand what type of language society currently deems appropriate, or in the case of UKIP supporters, “polite”.

The Racist Platform Transformation Strategy was implemented in many ways—as is seen in the path to legitimization that each party made, described in Chapters Four and Five—however, the key characteristic to the eventual success of extreme-right parties was that each effectively shed associations with violence, beginning to consistently advocate in terms of racial incompatibility rather than racial inferiority. Once parties have successfully made this vital transition, the strategy guides them to capitalize on times where citizen concern for economic and immigration issues is high, and relatively equivalent. Ultimately, this is a time where New Racist language regarding the incompatibility of communities will be most resonant with individuals predisposed to nationalist thinking, regardless of where they typically vote on the left-right political spectrum. These concerns rise to similarly equal prominence when parties securitize—or create a Freedom-Security dilemma around—the two issues, done primarily through propaganda that links the issues together, as well as to an elaborate elitist conspiracy to suppress the nation and deprive citizens of their right to thrive.

What this strategy ultimately does for voters is that it makes the racist aspect innate in the far-right platform seem acceptable, justifying structural and cultural violence in political platforms and policymaking, so long as direct violence is not necessarily seen by the public. Ultimately, a party's ability to shed its predisposition and association with

outward violence has seemed to assist greatly in the social and political legitimization of their actions and New Racist platform.

Subsection A: Golden Dawn's Use of this Strategy

For Golden Dawn, utilizing this strategy during a time of great political opportunity—the 2010 Athenian Mayoral Race—specifically amounted to political legitimacy on a national level in the most significant 2012 Hellenic Parliament election. Their electoral success, as well as their ability to erode much of their negative profile among Greek voters, has now left “many of its supporters not [believing] that it is a neo-Nazi or neo-fascist party. This is why...Golden Dawn has managed to attract voters from across the party system”.³⁴⁸ In this account, Golden Dawn is discussed as a neo-fascist party that has been legitimated by the electoral system primarily due to its ability to mask its violent platform; in other words, Golden Dawn is a prime example of a party that has successfully completed the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy. Golden Dawn is not considered a Vote Influencer because it did not gain 10% of the national vote in the 2014 European Parliament election. However, when the party gained 9.38% of the national vote and secured its position as the third-most powerful party in Greece, Golden Dawn illustrated how if this strategy is implemented well—and public discontent for the status quo is high—even parties with confirmed records of direct violence can become politically legitimated.

³⁴⁸ See Halikiopoulou, *supra* note 4.

Subsection B: The European Extreme-Right's Use of this Strategy

Similarly, one of the strongest examples of a party that was originally constructed upon and operated under the ideological model of Old Racism is France's Front National, considering the party made clear and deliberate attempts to change their political strategy in order to become politically legitimated by their national electorate. Their implementation of the strategy combined a change in leadership with the change in platform, in order to align the party's aims with the language of New Racism, as deemed appropriate by the electorate.

As one analyst describes, "Whilst Jean-Marie LePen was known for his tough stance, Marine LePen tries to be more conciliatory...[as] she wants the Front National to be part of the French political power at the local and national level...[enabling] the FN to position itself as a legitimate political player".³⁴⁹ The transition of leadership within the LePen family secured the fact that while their ideological roots have not changed, considering their policies still "evoke feelings of fear, concern and revulsion"³⁵⁰ among those their rhetoric targets. However, Front National's language and presentation have been deliberately altered in order to secure the party's position as one of the strongest Vote Influencers in Europe, as well as the most powerful political party in France; thus, FN's utilization of the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy was similarly a success.

Parties originating in the Third Wave and with predisposition to being rooted in Old Racism have used this strategy as a way to find political legitimacy in a society that has socially legitimized New Racist language and condemned its predecessor. Another

³⁴⁹ See Easat-Daas, *supra* note 266. 22.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

example notes how the trials against the Vlaams Blok in 2004—and the party’s conviction of having violated laws against racism in Belgium—showed a transition in its platform and even its name in order to shed its Old Racist profile, with 9.85% of the national electorate re-legitimizing the party in the 2009 European Parliament election. Other examples were seen in NPD and other party’s revised platform and campaigning regarding Muslim migrants as “incompatible” rather than “inferior”.

Section II: Implications of Legitimizing the European Extreme-Right

The implications of this political trend—legitimizing actors that have seemingly transformed their platform from Old Racism, to a more acceptable type of racist violence found in New Racism—are going to be indicated by whether the outcomes of the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy (i.e. political legitimacy and strong voter support) are long-lasting or merely sensational. As this dissertation has outlined, this strategy has worked most effectively when parties are able to consistently capitalize on instances where voter concern for the economy and immigration are high, respectively, manipulating these concerns to seem as though they are directly associated with one another. This political trend may continue insofar as political parties remain manipulative and evaluative of voter perceptions, leading to continued political legitimization of the party. Most troubling, ultimately, is the fact that these parties remain legitimate insofar as they are elected to champion the general will of their electorate; however, if they are in exclusive control of that will—through manipulation of voter perceptions—their political authority is more dangerous and threatening than that of other parties.

Many of these parties are out to create platforms that will achieve a perception of maximal happiness for their citizens, resulting in power for their leadership. These party platforms typically stay true to voter perceptions regarding the issues in their respective country; but ultimately, the party is able to manipulate these perceptions concerning where citizens believe their problems originate from, and thus what the solution may be. Overall, perceptions dictate populist-right platforms: parties perceive what their constituents want in order to reach their goal of power and legitimization, no matter how false their promises may be. Therefore, parties of the extreme-right that were conceived during or before the Third Wave—and remain populist—have benefited from utilizing the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy and now possess a great opportunity to legitimize violent platforms by manipulating and monitoring public perception. The main component of their legitimacy, therefore, rests in whether the party has figured out which false promises are most desirable—and socially acceptable—to their electorate.

Considering the implications of this trend are mostly relevant insofar as these parties are legitimized, the power rests with the public to decide whether they will continue to vote for them. However, it must be considered how much damage has already been done since this wave of legitimization began. Many suggest that platforms alone catalyze action, specifically in terms of structurally and culturally violent hate-speech, that may compel individuals to behave violently. Analysts that study anti-Muslim violence suggest that that, “there is a direct link between hate-speech ideas...and the rise of Islamophobic acts;”³⁵¹ analysts of other issues discuss the same cause-effect model for

³⁵¹ Ibid.

other contentious issues in politics. To elaborate, this cause-effect model would conclude that to politically legitimize violent actors is to politically legitimize the tactics and behaviors that got them to their point of legitimacy, therefore voters of violent and extreme-right parties legitimize violence. Further, despite whether violence is inspired in others or not, the amount of influence politically legitimized violent actors now have is dangerous to the livelihood of minority communities targeted by New Racist platforms and policymaking all over Europe.

Potentially, the most dangerous type of extreme-right legitimization is found in legitimizing parties that are considered both Behavior Influencers and Vote Influencers. As alluded to in Chapter Five of this dissertation, should Behavior Influencers harness the amount of support that the Vote Influencers have, consequences could be dire for European residents, especially non-citizens. Subsequently, if the Vote Influencers—already maintaining a strong political influence in national and supranational governments—become inspired by the actions of Behavior Influencers, the result could be equally catastrophic for institutions and individuals alike. Thus, parties that prove to be both Vote and Behavior Influencers—with strong New Racist platforms and Old Racist roots—are arguably the most significant current threat to European democracy.

Section II.I: Implications for Individuals and Communities

Ultimately, while most of these parties are not necessarily anti-democracy, considering they are very much pro-direct democracy—they are anti-pluralists, anti-multiculturalists, and against equal rights between citizens of their nation and minorities

living within their borders.³⁵² To a certain extent, this sort of hate for minority rights—and political attempts to strip them—is the single-most threatening aspect of these parties on individuals and communities. Should parties with significant voting power be influenced by those with radical and often extremist behavior and stances—more than likely out of a perceived duty to populist roots and aim to promise satisfaction to the masses no matter how extreme the request—results could be detrimental to non-citizens of Europe.

Again, the populist-right is based in perception that is both molded by and “solved” through false promises by these political parties. Thus, citizens of the nation are also at a high risk of being further manipulated by these parties, fed idealistic promises of a renewed state, only to be let down. More conclusively, however, these tactics manipulate European citizens to give up their freedom (i.e. voting for pro-authoritarian, anti-pluralist platforms) in exchange for a false security. This manipulation will cause grave implications on the state of democracy in Europe if these parties remain successful.

Section II.II: Implications for Nations and the European Union

In a similar vein, the disruption of democracy throughout the European Union may cause devastating domino effects among fellow member states. If parties with Vote Influencers become more extreme, to the point of proactively weakening or dismantling the European Union, could this not bare implications on smaller countries with barely any presence of a disruptive extreme-right? Countries that fully rely on the European Union and Eurozone in order to exist in a competitive global market could fall further into

³⁵² Mudde, Cas. “Who’s Afraid of the European Radical Right?”. *Dissent*, Vol. 58, No. 4. (2011). 7.

financial turmoil if the European Central Bank or any regional and institutional affiliates are weakened or erased. The amount un-done in such a short amount of time in terms of the regional and continental unity, as well as relative financial stabilization that was created and maintained by the European Union is very much threatened by these actors, and will be further jeopardized if extreme-right legitimization continues and strengthens.

While there remains a significant majority of mainstream actors in the European Parliament, the amount of Eurosceptic and extreme-right parties entering the institute from traditionally dominant member states such as France, the UK, Italy, and Germany implies that politicians from smaller member states, “will be battling a stronger dissenting bloc than even before...specifically aimed at curbing the [EU’s] powers”.³⁵³ Parties that have traditionally led the way in European Parliament have lost a significant amount of power, and if this trend of legitimization continues—especially within traditionally dominant countries—the repercussions of policymaking based on party’s exclusionary platforms and false promises could be detrimental to the institution as well as individual countries.

Section II.III: Implications for the International Community

If the trend of extreme-right legitimization continues throughout Europe—strengthening already-elected groups, as well as empowering others to follow their lead—could have many different effects on international relations, however one of the most contentious and threatening debates regards whether countries that either leave or blatantly disobey structure of the European Union will have the capacity to remilitarize,

³⁵³ See Lichfield, *supra* note 296.

at least to some degree. The idea sounds quite far-fetched. However, taking into consideration the amount of paramilitary groups and citizen action organizations that have been bred alongside these extreme-right fronts, as well as manipulation of state police resources, there is a substantive question as to whether smaller vigilante-type paramilitary groups will begin to grow in states governed largely by extreme-right parties, either in opposition to or alongside national police forces.

This very considerable threat of paramilitary organization—and overall radicalization of Europe’s justice and security systems—must also recall the very direct threat that has been made by Golden Dawn, that should their party be banned from political activity, they would stage a military coup d’etat. Whether the party actually has the capability to perform such an act is a separate debate. Kaplan, for instance, states that while “ethnic nationalism in Europe in the 1930s led to interstate war...in the early 21st century [it] will almost certainly not,” rather, disintegration of the European Union due to ultranationalism would create “a paralysis within the states themselves”.³⁵⁴ Considering the extent of capabilities these parties have over military resources remains unknown to outsiders, the question remains: what implications are there for residents, institutions, and the world if European electorates continue strengthen the extreme-right?

The international community may also feel great implications from these groups in the form of prolonged economic recession, should their economic platforms be seriously implemented in their states and throughout the European Union. Whether they aim to abolish the Euro, create an insular and homogenous economy through protectionist

³⁵⁴ See Kaplan, *supra* note 92.

economic ideals, or strive to “[quit] the current virtual economy,”³⁵⁵ the success of extreme-right parties could have devastating effects on the recovery of international markets. These proposals for economic reform are likely to further prolong economic recession, and fail to keep false promises of economic prosperity ultimately giving these parties more fuel to their resentful fire, blaming outsiders—be they immigrants or international influencers—for their lack of recovery and prosperity.

Finally, the relationship that exists between the United States of America and the European Union, as a whole, is very much criticized by the majority of extremist parties. The extreme-right has been incredibly vocal about “fighting the American Zionist hegemony,”³⁵⁶ and for many parties this entails spreading their influence to all corners of the globe.³⁵⁷ Other parties—as discussed—justify their resentment of American-European relations for harboring elitism and a disconnection between governments and their people. While the United States has watched extreme-right and fundamentalist groups march and disrupt democracies around the world—most recently Thailand, Syria, and Iraq—policymakers must begin taking the threat seriously: what will the US strategy be if similar events begin occurring within and among its largest conglomerate of allies?

Section III: Implications of Legitimizing Golden Dawn, Revisited

Now having examined the full extent of the political trend that Golden Dawn has been a primary player within—being a Behavior Influencer very near to Vote Influencer status—the importance of the party’s court case and its outcome must start to be taken

³⁵⁵ Jobbik (Official Website). “Anti-Zionism is not anti-Semitism: The lie of democracy”. *Jobbik: The Movement for a Better Hungary*. (2014).

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Smith, Helena. “Greece’s neo-Nazi Golden Dawn goes global with political ambitions”. *The Guardian (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 20 August 2014. (2013).

seriously by European mainstream politicians and the international community. The outcome of this trial is imperative to gauging whether the most radical, most extremist groups that have utilized the Radical Platform Transition Strategy will find lasting success in their political legitimacy. Golden Dawn's trial is entirely contextual to Greece and the actions specifically taken by the party, and therefore cannot reflect nor predict the actions taken by any other countries or parties if they were in a similar situation.

However, the Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR) and Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) state clearly in a joint-press release—as a response to the stabbing of Pavlos Fysas in September 2013—that lacking impunity to vigilante crime targeting people of different races, religions, and political stances is what causes the perpetuation and escalation of similar violence.³⁵⁸ Thus, to legitimize Golden Dawn is to promote the continued violent behavior they advocate for. Independent Member of Parliament, Petros Tatsopoulos, voiced similar regrets regarding the lack of impunity on Golden Dawn, stating:

“It was a huge, historic mistake on the part of our parliament not to de-legitimise Golden Dawn...it should have been banned, not for its Nazi ideology but because it is a paramilitary force...who, if it could, would press ahead with a coup d’etat...[it is] fascist poison...poisoning every aspect of social life, the way people think, the way they behave.”³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ Hellenic League for Human Rights. “Press Release—Athens, September 25, 2013”. *Hellenic League for Human Rights*. Web Source. Accessed 20 August 2014. Athens. (2013).

³⁵⁹ Smith, Helena. “SS songs and anti-Semitism: the week Golden Dawn turned openly Nazi”. *The Guardian (Online)*. Web Source. Accessed 20 August 2014. Athens. (2014).

The Greek judicial system will ultimately determine the fate of Golden Dawn as a political party in Greece, however their decision will influence many more people than simply their supporters. Should the courts find Golden Dawn guilty of being a criminal organization and all other counts of criminal activity currently held against them, they could ideally begin healing Greece's two-party system, over a long period to rebuild trust between the people and their government. The more practical outcome to be seen in a "guilty" court determination, however, would more than likely find backlash by Golden Dawn supporters, and potentially the fulfillment of the party's threat to perform a coup d'état if the Greek government decides to ban them indefinitely. While there is a high risk of violence following a "guilty" sentencing, there is also the argument that Golden Dawn's case could reflect the political legitimization pattern of VB following its conviction in 2004. The VB, while at the height of its political power the same year it was held on trial for breaking laws regarding racist hate-speech in Belgium, eventually saw its electoral support wane after the hype around the case began to fade and the mainstream's condemnation of the group was proven lawful and just.

If the Greek courts decide to rule Golden Dawn and its leadership as "not guilty" of acting as a criminal organization, however, the outcome could be very different. Signaling to the international community that the direct violence Golden Dawn allegedly performed is legitimate and acceptable within the Hellenic law and parliament, this outcome could further fuel the fire against the political mainstream, as well as inspire anger toward parties and leaders who have condemned the group during their trial. Those targeted by this anger may be accused of being traitors to democracy, failing to legitimize

a group that was simply looking out of the interests of their supporters, and has now been proven to be doing just that; this type of reaction would make the two-party system ultimately irreparable. Either way that the conviction goes, however, it will set a precedent for the international community and other extreme-right parties in Europe regarding how far neo-fascism and extremist behavior will be permitted to damage democratic systems.

CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The trend identified in this dissertation—by which Old Racist parties of the Third Wave have become legitimized and unprecedentedly supported by national electorates after successfully utilizing the Racist Platform Transformation Strategy—has determined without doubt that there has been a rise in the legitimization of extreme-right groups, both old and new, over the past five years throughout Europe. The implications of this, as explained, are vast and should not be taken lightly by national and supranational actors. To protect those whom these parties intend to harm and/or expel from their nations through policy, hate-speech, and even direct violence is of utmost importance moving forward in addressing this issue.

The most important recommendation to provide is that non-extremist authorities must safeguard minority rights in all nations, and most specifically monitor the abuse of these rights in nations where an extreme-right presence is rising. While there are many groups who already do this work, it is vital to the security of individuals (both citizens and non-citizens) that our governments, judicial branches, and community leaders and organizations are empowered to stand against hate crimes, fascist policymaking, and ultranationalist speech. What will be best is for these actors to work together, build one another's organizational capacity and access to information that will assist them in combatting extreme-right policies and behavior in their communities. The ultimate

motivation must remain the protection of minority rights, as well as multiculturalism and pluralism in European democracies.

In terms of preventative measures, the most effective way for national and supranational entities to combat the growing threat of extreme-right political power is to create a specific framework and definition to outline the boundaries where nationalism meets ultranationalism and the extreme-right meets fascism. NGOs, governments, and supranational institutions must begin engaging in conversation to fully understand the causes, triggers, and symptoms of this rise in ultranationalism that continues to legitimize violent political actors. Citizens must begin asking themselves that if political legitimacy, and ultimately power and resources, are allocated to parties based on whether or not they are voted into office, should there not be a greater standard by which to judge parties before entering the polling booth? Is it enough to publicly deliberate or should there be necessary voter education to promote understanding the implications of all political platforms? The best way to accomplish this is through supporting anti-extremist watchdog groups, as well as creating grassroots awareness about the manipulative measures of extremist political parties. Through education systems and community organizations, society can begin reviving the spirit of democracy, and supporting minority groups in their efforts to hold leaders accountable for the protection of their human rights.

Ultimately, legitimizing extreme-right parties has led to a shift in traditional governments throughout Europe. These are the parties with potential—and now the legitimate power—to impose structural violence against non-‘authentic’-citizens of their respective country. These parties are being voted into an institution that they genuinely

intend to disassemble in an effort to restore cultural solidarity within their nation, as to secure their future wellbeing, from their perspective. Thus, recommended next-steps involving research on—and prevention against—this looming threat is to monitor voting patterns at all levels where violent actors have the potential to garner strong political power. Such research should strive to include voter motivations applying to each respective country and demographic. Lastly, research should strive to follow the pattern of political legitimacy experienced by these parties at all times. By monitoring whether Behavior Influencers are amounting to the political prominence of Vote Influencers, or if Vote Influencers' behavior is becoming more outwardly violent, the international community will be able to have time to prepare counteractive measures to threats that these groups may pose in the future.

The purpose of this dissertation was not to provide a complete comparative analysis; it was meant to perform a comprehensive case study that then considers plausible trends it may affect or be affected by. Therefore, looking at a broad range of cases in this dissertation was vital to understanding European-wide trends for a very specific type of political platform, instead of simply completing a comparative case study that would have plausibly looked at two or three parties in more depth. However, the aim of this dissertation was to focus on Golden Dawn, understand how it has reached its level of political legitimacy and what type of influence or implications its success may have had—or will have—on the rest of the international community, most specifically in terms of European nations.

To examine only a few parties would not have allowed this dissertation to identify accurate political trends or party strategies. In identifying the chronology of many parties in terms of their structure, legitimization, and tactics they utilize because of it, parties exercising similar platforms can be discussed in a comparative manor. This dissertation therefore has made a genuine effort to paint a broad picture of a current political trend that threatens democracy at its core; while manipulative political parties create this threat, citizens are unfortunately the ones who have socially and politically legitimized their violent efforts to gain power and intimidate those who stand in their way.

Nazi occupation of Germany did not happen overnight, just as the massacre of Tutsis and Hutus was not unplanned; each event in history that the international community regrets and remembers as tragedy had very specific strategies fueling them. The actions outlined in this dissertation do not imply an impending genocide, however effective conflict prevention demands that holistic, serious consideration of all threats to democracy, individuals and communities alike are taken seriously. This dissertation ultimately calls on the international community of political analysts, policymakers, and responsible citizens to monitor the aggression and progression of the extreme-right in Europe, most certainly not taking their positions or threats against minority populations lightly.

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BIOGRAPHY

Andrea Mancuso graduated as a National Honor Society member from Parsippany Hills High School—located in Parsippany, New Jersey—in 2009. She received her Bachelor of Arts in Political Theory and Comparative Politics with minor studies in the Anthropology of Migrants and Refugees as a Cum Laude honors graduate from The Catholic University of America in 2013. While a student, she was employed at multiple NGOs, as well as political lobby and research firms in America, Peru, Belgium, and Malta. She continued her education, receiving a graduate-level certification in Development Project Management from The Monterey Institute of International Studies in 2013. Finally, she completes this dissertation as a final requirement to earn her Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution and Mediterranean Security from the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta, as well as a Master of Science in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.