







NARCO STATE OR FAILED STATE?
NARCOTICS AND POLITICS IN GUINEA-BISSAU

by

Ashley Neese Bybee
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my son, J.D., whose imminent arrival while I was scrambling to write this dissertation was 150% my motivating force for completion. I hope he embraces culture, politics, academics, science, sports, and the arts in a way that allows him to make a meaningful contribution to society, whatever it may be.

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ABSTRACT

NARCO STATE OR FAILED STATE? NARCOTICS AND POLITICS IN GUINEA-BISSAU

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Dissertation Director: Dr. Jack Goldstone

Drug-funded insurgencies in Latin America and more recently in Afghanistan have prompted the use of the term “Narco-State” to describe those countries that have fallen victim to drug cultivation, narco-corruption, trafficking and related activities. In around 2005, West Africa emerged as a major transit hub for Latin American Drug Trafficking Organizations transporting cocaine to Western Europe, prompting many observers to label several countries in the region as the world’s newest “Narco-States.” The absence of a standard definition for a “Narco-State,” however, has compelled many to question the purpose of this designation, asking not only “what is a Narco-State” but “so what?” Moreover, the vulnerability of Transit States – i.e. states through which drugs are transported – to these pressures adds another interesting dimension, begging the question “can Transit States also succumb to the pressures of an illicit drug trade without cultivating drugs within their borders?” and “to what extent?” Lastly, the latest trend of

drug traffickers to exploit weak and failed states, such as Guinea-Bissau and its neighbors in West Africa, adds yet another layer of unanswered questions such as “how do the impacts of drug trafficking differ in states with various degrees of institutional strength and capacity?”

Using Guinea-Bissau as the primary case study and comparing it with the experiences of four other geographically, economically, and institutionally diverse Transit States, this research seeks to clarify the impacts that the drug trade has on weak and failing states, and how – if at all – those states can become destabilized by this phenomenon.

1. INTRODUCTION

Globalization – the integration of regional economies, societies, and cultures – is considered one of the most significant developments of the 20th century. In addition to the multitude of cultural, political, economic, and technological impacts, globalization has brought with it opportunities for the weak, poor, and oppressed to participate in traditionally closed markets.¹ Yet while globalization has been lauded for fostering free trade and economic prosperity, its “Dark Side”² has also created opportunities for criminals and non-state actors to enrich and empower themselves by taking advantage of lucrative illicit markets, or by creating new ones. The contradictions of globalization manifests themselves in many ways – it can be a force for liberation as well as enslavement; it can be a source of education and exposure to new cultures and religions as well as the root of fundamentalism and “Global Jihad.” And it can be measured by the flow of goods, services, capital, and by the flow of drugs, humans, and even human organs.

The forces of globalization, its causes, and effects have been well documented and are largely accepted as having facilitated the expansion of licit as well as illicit

¹ Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham, *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 266.

² The “Dark Side of Globalization” is a term that was coined by Stephen Ellis, referring to the negative impacts of globalization that accompany the advantageous ones.

markets to regions that otherwise would not have enjoyed significant economic activity.³ Sadly, this process has concurrently destabilized regions that otherwise might have remained stable even though undeveloped. One need only examine the causes of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to see how the rising global demand for coltan – the mineral required to produce cell phones, DVD players, video game systems and computers – has been a significant driver of instability in Central Africa.⁴

Similarly, globalization-induced shifts in the cocaine market now pose a formidable threat to the security of fragile West African states. The March 2009 assassinations of the President and the Army Chief of Staff in Guinea-Bissau among other instances of regional instability have drawn unprecedented international attention to West Africa's role as an intermediary in the cocaine trade between Latin America and Europe. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that approximately 50 metric tons of cocaine worth \$2 billion was transiting West Africa up until 2009,⁵ with the Pentagon estimating at least five times that.⁶ In addition to this transatlantic alliance, terrorist groups such as Hezbollah have a history of operating in West Africa both in licit and illicit sectors. These associations indicate not only a transnational threat to the region but a global, trans-continental threat as well. That is

³ Raymond Baker, *Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System* (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2005), 438; Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 239.

⁴ Dena Montague, "Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 1 (2002).

⁵ *Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa*, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008), 54.

⁶ Peter Burgess, "Africom's Counternarcotics Strategies and Operational Realities," (Washington DC: Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 29 May 2009).

why the issue of counternarcotics in West Africa is on the agendas of the UN Security Council, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU).

Many esteemed experts have asserted that West Africa, and Guinea-Bissau in particular, is crumbling under the pressures posed by this drug trade which threatens to turn the region into an “epicenter of lawlessness and instability.”⁷ On the surface, it certainly appears as though narco-corruption runs rampant in Bissau, allowing traffickers to operate with impunity and with the protection of government officials. But when one considers the “state of the state” in Guinea-Bissau before the emergence of the drug trade in the mid-2000s, one must ask: “Has the drug trade really impacted the state of Guinea-Bissau in any meaningful way?” Guinea-Bissau has endured a long history of political instability, military coups, and palpable tensions between the military and civilian authorities. Moreover, it has generally been regarded as a failed state with few, if any functional institutions to begin with. Thus asserting that the drug trade has significantly affected the state in Guinea-Bissau may be erroneously assuming that a legitimate, functioning state was present to begin with. Furthermore, claiming that instability in Guinea-Bissau stems from the drug trade begs the question: “Would such instability have occurred regardless?” Rather, one must consider if Guinea-Bissau has actually become a “shell-state” i.e. sovereign in name but deeply penetrated by criminals in collusion with corrupt government officials, or, if Guinea-Bissau can be classified as a full-fledged “Narco-State,” where drugs or the drug trade has impacted all aspects of the state. As

⁷ *Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa.*

such, this research seeks to clarify the impacts that the drug trade has on weak and failing states, and how – if at all – those states can become destabilized by this phenomenon.

THE EVOLUTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING THROUGH WEST AFRICA

In 2004, the UNODC first recorded a significant increase in cocaine seizures in West Africa, which it documented in its 2005 World Drug Report (WDR). At that time, it was discovered that several Latin American Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) had begun using West Africa as a transit hub when transporting cocaine to Western Europe. By 2006 the issue had reached such an alarming level that the UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa characterized the region as “under attack” by these DTOs.⁸ By 2008, the UNODC reported 35% of cocaine shipped to Europe from Latin America transited West Africa.⁹ As a result, reports, commentaries, and opinions began to emerge which referred to the newest “Narco-states” of West Africa.¹⁰ Guinea-Bissau in particular was identified as the leading culprit, with its President and top military brass purportedly involved with the illicit trade and the beneficiaries of extensive narco-corruption.¹¹ The

⁸ World Drug Report, ed. Available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2006.html> (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006).

⁹ World Drug Report, ed. Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008).

¹⁰ Jónína Einarsdóttir, "Partnership and Post-War Guinea-Bissau," *African Journal of International Affairs* 10, no. 1&2 (2007); Caroline Sourt, "Africa's First Narco-State?," *The Guardian*, 9 March 2009; Ed Vulliamy, "How a Tiny West African Country Became the World's First Narco State," *The Guardian Observer*, March 9, 2008.

¹¹ Assimo Balde and Rukmini Callimachi, "Twin Assassinations Leave Guinea-Bissau in Turmoil," *Associated Press*, 2 March 2009; Brent Latham, "Bissau Assassinations Highlight Obstacles to Drug Trafficking Fight," *VOA News*, 3 March 2009; Tristan McConnell, "President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau Assassinated by Army," *Timesonline*, 3 March 2009; "Murdered Guinea-Bissau

assassinations in March of 2009 of President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira and the Army Chief of Staff General Tagme Na Waie seemed to confirm the assertion that Guinea-Bissau was indeed a "Narco-State", as evidenced by the shocking violence which appeared to be drug-related.

The Data

Given the illicit nature of drug trafficking and the requirement that traffickers evade detection by law enforcement, it is inherently impossible to measure the total volume of the cocaine trade through Africa to any reliable degree. Rather, analysts must use sporadic data points, including significant anecdotal evidence and their own judgment, to estimate the size and scope of the drug trade. From this experts have been able to track and document general trends in the trade through West Africa and to a certain extent, have also been able to deduce the causes behind some of the fluctuations in the trade. Yet gaps in data, inconsistent data and conflicting data all render this exercise vulnerable to criticism.

Nonetheless, one common measure of the drug trade is to track seizure data, or the amount of drugs seized in kilograms by national, state, and territory law enforcement agencies. Figure 1 illustrates the volume of drugs seized in West Africa since 1982.

General Found 200 Kilos of Cocaine," *Agence France Presse*, 5 March 2009; Todd Pitman, "Guinea-Bissau Collapse Deepens after Leader Killed," *ABC News International*, 5 March 2009.




Figure 1. Seizures of Cocaine in West Africa, 1982 – 2007
(Source: UNODC, Individual Seizure Database)

While this data paints a convincing picture, even seizure data is problematic. For example, between 2005 and 2007, 33 metric tons of cocaine were seized from West Africa en route to Europe.¹² However, most of these were in several large seizures, many of which were accidental or partial. This would seem to indicate the possible existence of a much larger quantity of drugs transiting the region – most of which is never seized.

While this graph certainly denotes an alarming trend and confirms the concerns raised by the international community that West Africa is the newest transit hub for cocaine, a further breakdown by country obscures the situation somewhat.

¹² Raggie Johansen, "Guinea-Bissau: A New Hub for Cocaine Trafficking," *UNODC Perspectives*, no. 5 (May 2008).




Figure 2. Seizures of Cocaine by Country, 1982 – 2007
(Source: UNODC, Individual Seizure Database)

At first glance, Figure 2 would seem to imply that the countries experiencing the most drug trafficking are Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. While Nigeria has historically been a well-documented drug trafficking country, according to the UNODC and USG, neither it nor Ghana nor Senegal have been targeted by transnational drug traffickers to the extent that Guinea or Guinea-Bissau has.¹³ One can logically deduce from Figure 2 that those countries seizing large quantities of drugs are also those countries with the best law enforcement capacity to do so. Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana all enjoy relatively functional state institutions, and all enjoy significant assistance from the U.S. and other European partners in law enforcement programs. Because Guinea-Bissau has extremely

¹³ Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa," in *The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs* (Washington DC: 23 June 2009); *Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa*, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2009).

weak law enforcement capacity coupled with weak judicial and penal institutions, it is simply unable to detect and disrupt drug trafficking operations, and when it is able to apprehend culprits (often serendipitously), the high-level corruption between government officials and traffickers ensures that the product is not seized. The absence of a legal infrastructure and trained personnel to prosecute drug traffickers creates almost a “zone of impunity” where traffickers are allowed to operate virtually unimpeded by the rule of law. Even if Guinea-Bissau had the capacity to convict and sentence traffickers, the country lacks a functioning prison in which to incarcerate culprits. Rather, their detention facilities are characterized by open doors and no security measures to detain criminals. These criminals are mainly perpetrators of petty crimes who rely on the center for basic meals and shelter, not drug traffickers.

On the other hand, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal have received training and equipment to carry out seizures, which are then supported by relatively strong law enforcement and judicial institutions. For example, Operation Westbridge is a joint project initiated by the UK’s Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in conjunction with the Ghanaian Narcotics Control Board to apprehend drug smugglers using Accra airport as a gateway to the UK and other European countries. In the first year of its existence (2006-2007), Operation Westbridge successfully seized 356 kilograms of cocaine; 2,275 kilograms of cannabis; and 1.3 kilograms of heroin.¹⁴ The UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) is also actively training African law enforcement in the region. This may explain why seizure data is so much higher in those countries and

¹⁴ "Operation Westbridge Tackles the Ghanaian Connection," *SourceUK.net*, 8 November 2007.

why that data does not reflect the true extent of drug trafficking in each of West Africa's countries. Moreover, one must remember that Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal are the most populous countries in the region, so it stands to reason that they would provide the most couriers transporting drugs to Europe and therefore the greatest opportunities for seizures.

Another method the UNODC employs to measure drug trafficking from West Africa is to identify the source of the drugs reaching Europe. Those countries from which the largest number of apprehended couriers embark can logically be identified as major transit hubs. Figure 3 illustrates the embarkation countries for detected cocaine couriers on flights to Europe.




Figure 3. Detected Cocaine Couriers on Flights to Europe per 100,000 International Passengers by Embarkation Country (January 2006-May 2008)
(Source: Elaborated from INTERPOL (COCAF); UNODC (IDS); and ICAO¹⁵)

¹⁵ ICAO numbers are from 2003, the most recent year for which comparable data are available. While these numbers are likely to have increased in recent years, they likely continue to reflect the relative capacities of the national airports.

This graph clearly depicts Guinea to be the most popular embarkation point for cocaine couriers between January 2006 and May 2008. This would be consistent with the media's portrayal of Guinea as a transit hub since about 2006, following increased international attention on Guinea-Bissau. It is important to note, however, that couriers embarking from a particular country are not necessarily citizens of that country. Nigerian couriers, for example, are known for offering their services to traffickers in other countries. So while Guinea may have been a major embarkation point, it is possible that non-Guineans were actually carrying the drugs.

Anecdotal evidence from 2008 and after has confirmed the continued use of West Africa as a transit hub for cocaine from Latin America on its way to Europe. In May 2008, for example, Venezuelan and Colombian traffickers were caught stockpiling drugs in a warehouse in the suburbs of Conakry (Guinea). The governor, mayor, and several senior officials were suspected of involvement in nighttime drug drops at the local airstrip. Also in Guinea, the country's Central Anti-Drug Office reported 7.5 tons of seized cocaine between August and September 2008. In Sierra Leone, a July 2008 seizure of 600 kilograms of cocaine from a Venezuelan aircraft demonstrates the exploitation of that country, too. Fortunately, the government of Sierra Leone has demonstrated genuine political will to arrest culprits, which would seem to vindicate those government officials of any complicity.¹⁶

¹⁶ Non-attributional interview, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, August 10, 2009).

Decrease in Drug Trafficking Through West Africa Since 2009

2009 saw a sudden decline in drugs transiting West Africa. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has gone so far as to note that whereas 60 percent of cocaine destined for Europe had been transiting West Africa in 2007, this amount dropped to 30 percent in early 2009.¹⁷ Hard evidence of this was captured by the UNODC, who in June 2009 reported a decline in the share of couriers detected in European airports whose flights originated in West Africa (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Share of detected cocaine couriers in Europe
(Source: UNODC, Individual Seizure Database)

Likewise, Interpol has reported that the number of drug seizures at European airports has decreased from 476 in 2007, to 330 in 2008, to 56 in the first quarter of

¹⁷ Workshop on Narcotics-Trafficking and Political Instability in West Africa, (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 27 May 2009).

2009.¹⁸ Others estimate that 20 tons of cocaine worth about \$1 billion still likely transit through West Africa.¹⁹ Other evidence indicating a decline was the sharp increase in price in the region. Several sources reported astronomical increases in cocaine prices from March through May 2009 reflecting a shortage in supply.²⁰

Several structural theories can explain this decrease in drugs transiting West Africa. The UNODC, for example, attributes it to the 18 percent reduction in coca cultivation in Colombia and a stabilizing demand from Europe.²¹ It is also possible that the increased international attention focused on the region has prompted “tactical repositioning” whereby traffickers are moving their operations to less scrutinized areas. Others attribute the decline to enhanced security measures employed at regional airports. For example Guinea-Bissau Justice Minister Mamadu Djalo Pires stated in May 2009 that a permanent brigade of the Criminal Investigation Police at the airport in Bissau had deterred many traffickers, who now realize there is a concerted effort underway to identify drug traffickers. However, he also noted that trafficking on the Bijagos Islands remains active with boats and ships increasingly being used more in lieu of aircraft to avoid airport security.²²

¹⁸ Pierre-Francois Naude, "West Africa: Narcotic Traffickers in Crisis?," *Jeune Afrique* no. 2532 (in French), 19-25 July 2009.

¹⁹ Non-attributional interview, (Vienna: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Studies and Threat Analysis Section, April 29, 2009).

²⁰ Chinedu Eze, "Drug Suspect Excretes 82 Wraps of Cocaine," *This Day Online* 19 May 09; Antonio Mazzitelli, Global Drug Trafficking: Africa's Expanding Role (Washington DC: Remarks made at the Wilson Center 28 May 2009).

²¹ World Drug Report 2009, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009).

²² "Guinea-Bissau Defense Minister Links Prime Minister to Drug Trafficking," *Ditadura do Consenso in Portuguese* 31 May 2010.

Yet the nature of leadership in the region, i.e. the ability of leaders to act independently and to make their own free choices, versus the structural arrangements cited above which influence or limit those choices, also offers a compelling explanation for this decrease. Specifically, the political turmoil in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, brought on by a crisis of leadership in those countries, has affected operations significantly. In Guinea, the late President Lansana Conte and his son Ousmane were known to have facilitated drug trafficking activities. When President Conte died in December 2008, the protection which he offered traffickers departed with him. This became evident when the infamous Greek-French drug trafficker Andreas Tsakiris who had been operating in Guinea and Senegal purportedly fled to Bamako, Mali following the death of Conte.²³ Then Ousmane was arrested by the incoming military junta and confessed to his participation on national TV, alongside the former president's brother-in-law, head of intelligence, and head of the national drug squad. In Guinea-Bissau, the assassinations of President Vieira and Army Chief General Tagme Na Waie (both of whom were purported to facilitate the activities of drug traffickers) in March 2009 similarly removed the protections afforded to traffickers operating in the country, at least temporarily.

Whatever the cause of these fluctuations, one thing seems apparent with regard to the levels of drugs transiting West Africa: that the nature of leadership is as important, if not more so, than the fixed and enduring conditions in the state. Since the removal of certain high-level government officials in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau appears to have had the effect of concomitantly decreasing the volume of drugs transiting the region – one

²³ "Mali Extradites Notorious Drug Trafficker to France," *BBC Monitoring Africa*, 29 May 2009.

might rightly deduce that the propensity of leaders to allow drugs to transit their states ultimately affects the actual amount of drugs that do so. However, even where genuine political will exists to combat the drug trade such as in Ghana, Senegal, and even Sierra Leone, weak state structures may still allow some drugs to continue to pass.

Trafficking Expected to Resume in West Africa

Despite these promising trends, most experts agree that the decrease in drugs transiting West Africa is an entirely temporary phenomenon and will very likely resume in the near future.²⁴ It is likely that many drug traffickers, particularly in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau where their operations were entirely dependent on support from state officials, are laying low while they evaluate their position with the new political elite. Should they still deem it a favorable environment, they will proceed to develop a relationship and reach an understanding with state officials, as they did with previous regimes.

Yet several sporadic instances throughout 2009 and 2010 demonstrate that even following the political turmoil in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the region has not been abandoned entirely and that any permanent decrease is dubious and unlikely at best. For example, in April 2009, the then-interim Chief of the Guinea-Bissauan armed forces Zamora Induta, traveled to Bubaque (the capital of the Bijagos archipelago) and noted that trafficking still continues to thrive on the islands. He stated that at least three islands were being used by suspicious aircraft and that at least one runway on the country's

²⁴ Interviews with numerous SMEs.

mainland was cleared for use by drug traffickers in April 2009.²⁵ These activities resumed, he claimed, when the military contingent once stationed there departed. In early January 2010, six West Africans were arrested in southern Senegal after police seized two kilograms (4.4 pounds) of cocaine on the bus in which they were riding.²⁶

One of the most significant developments in November 2009 was the discovery of a Boeing 727 which purportedly crashed on a makeshift airstrip in Mali after unloading a cargo of drugs from Venezuela. Yet investigators have cast doubt on the crash theory, noting that those involved likely burnt the plane to destroy the evidence of drug trafficking activities after having completed their delivery. In any event, this was the first time officials heard of drug traffickers using a plane of this size to transport drugs through Africa. Although the exact amount of drugs that the plane carried is unknown (the drugs were never found) UNODC West Africa Director Alexandre Schmidt noted that a plane of this size could easily carry ten tons. Given that previous “large” seizures confiscated from light aircraft hovered around 700 kg, one can see how those deliveries pale in comparison to what may be a new trend in drug trafficking through West Africa. Even more recently (as of June 2011) the UNODC has expressed concern that traffickers may be using lightweight submarines – similar to ones seen off the South American and the Caribbean coasts – to transport drugs to West Africa.²⁷

²⁵ "Guinea-Bissau Defense Minister Links Prime Minister to Drug Trafficking."

²⁶ "Senegal: Six Arrested for Cocaine Smuggling," *Agence France Presse*, 4 Jan 2010

²⁷ "UN: West African Drug Trafficking Becoming More Sophisticated," *VOANews.com*, 21 June 2011.

WHY HAS WEST AFRICA BEEN TARGETED?

Several factors have made West Africa an ideal hub for moving narcotics into Europe. First and foremost, it is important to understand the changing nature of the cocaine market. Whereas Latin American DTOs once focused on moving their product (cocaine) into North America, which was a relatively close (necessitating modest transportation costs) and lucrative market, this trend has changed. The drop in demand for narcotics from the U.S. coupled with increasing demand in Europe has forced traffickers to exploit the new market. In addition, the global economy has impacted trafficking patterns, since cocaine now fetches far more revenue in Europe, given the low value of the dollar. Evidence from law enforcement authorities who have confiscated large amounts of Euros from traffickers have illustrated this point exactly, reporting that two pounds of uncut cocaine can fetch \$45,000 in Europe versus \$22,000 in US.²⁸ Interestingly, the EU recently issued a €500 note, roughly equivalent to about \$700. Since the largest U.S. denomination in circulation is the \$100 bill, traffickers prefer the large euro notes because they make it easier to carry larger sums with less weight. For example, \$1 million in \$100 bills weighs 22 pounds, while \$1 million in €500 notes weighs 3.5 pounds.²⁹

Second, improved maritime security practices both on this side of the Atlantic – thanks largely to initiatives pursued by Mexico’s President Calderón – and along

²⁸ Joseph Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa," *World Politics Review* <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2629> (9 September 2008).

²⁹ Arthur Brice, "Latin American Drug Cartels Find Home in West Africa," *CNN.com*, 21 September 2009.

European coastal waters, have deterred traffickers from moving their product directly to U.S. or European markets via sea-going vessels.³⁰ Rather, they have redirected their attention to West Africa, whose proximity between the source and destination makes it an obvious transit hub (see Figure 5).




Figure 5. New Cocaine Trafficking Route Through West Africa

Third, Africa's weak institutions, particularly ineffective law enforcement in many countries, allow criminals to operate with impunity, knowing that their illegal actions will likely have no repercussions. This low-risk environment is also a low-cost one, where the cost of bribing local officials and authorities is relatively cheap due to

³⁰ Colleen Cook, *Mexico's Drug Cartels* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 20.

extreme poverty, unemployment, and perpetual salary arrears, rendering almost everyone vulnerable to corruption.

Finally, the realities that exist in Africa, such as its porous borders, lack of legitimate opportunities for economic advancement, abundant supply of unemployed, impoverished, and willing couriers and their existing diaspora networks in Europe, all facilitate the drug trade through West Africa. Even the direct air flights between many large African cities and the capitals of their former colonial powers facilitate this illicit trade, making West Africa a true traffickers' paradise.

The specific case of Guinea-Bissau, which embodies every one of the attributes described above, also exhibits an array of unique characteristics which create a "permissive environment" wherein drug traffickers can operate.

The Permissive Environment in Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau has what can be termed a "permissive environment," which allows criminals to operate relatively uninhibited by any legal, financial, or other constraints. This is different from an "ungoverned space," which is often used to describe countries in Africa where governance is essentially absent. Rather, a permissive environment may have the semblance of a government (or governance), but it is essentially conducive to illegal activity by failing to impose restrictions or deterrents to such activity. Guinea-Bissau, for example, has an elected government and at least nominally adheres to certain democratic norms. In fact, the parliamentary elections held in November 2008 were touted by the U.S. State Department as "*an encouragement for democracies throughout*

Africa and around the world.” The press release continued to note that “*U.S. and international observers witnessed an election that was transparent, well-organized, and well-executed despite minor technical issues.*”³¹ However, the failure of the central government to perform any of the functions designated to a state, such as the provision of security and public services, and the absence of other democratic institutions, such as a judicial system and the rule of law, essentially negates any assertion that Guinea-Bissau truly is a genuine democracy.

So what else comprises this permissive environment? First and foremost – geography. Guinea-Bissau has 350 km of unpatrolled coastline, and the Bijagós Archipelago has 88 unpoliced islands (see Figure 6).³²

³¹ Sean McCormack, Guinea-Bissau Elections (Washington D.C.: U.S. State Department Press Statement, 19 November 2008).

³² *CIA World Factbook Entry for Guinea-Bissau*, (accessed February 2009); <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pu.html#Geo>.



Figure 6. Location of Guinea-Bissau
(Source: Based on original map from the CIA World Factbook)

Many of these islands host defunct airstrips left-over from the country's war for independence from its former colonial power, Portugal. These airstrips allow traffickers to fly their products to these islands undetected, before continuing the drugs' movement into Europe via couriers or other means. Any risk of detection by maritime officials or airport authorities is, for all intents and purposes, eliminated.

A second crucial component of Guinea-Bissau's permissive environment is the economic incentives that drive participation in trafficking activities. In a country plagued by poverty, unemployment, and perpetual salary arrears for civil servants, the risk one assumes for trafficking narcotics pales in comparison with the opportunity for personal

enrichment. Even at the institutional level the revenue to be derived from trafficking can compensate for the utter destitution of some government entities. For example, the value of one seizure can easily exceed the entire budget of the Guinea-Bissauan Judicial Police (the agency assigned to narcotics interdiction).³³ And for an overly militarized society whose soldiers' salaries the government cannot pay, it is no wonder the military is deeply complicit in the trade.³⁴

Finally, the most important aspect of Guinea-Bissau's permissive environment is its weak institutions. The police, for example, are numerous yet under-resourced. The gendarmerie and police combined gives a ratio of 284 officers per 100,000 citizens – one of the highest in West Africa and only slightly below the European average.³⁵ This many civil servants create a huge burden on the public budget, leaving next to nothing for investigations and operational activities associated with drug interdiction. The Judicial Police, for example, have 60 agents, one vehicle and often no fuel. As a result, when culprits are apprehended they are driven in a taxi to the police station. In the military, one rusty ship patrols the 350-kilometer coastline and 88 islands. The sad picture these anecdotes paint is the unfortunate reality in Guinea-Bissau, where the near absence of law enforcement and a judicial system allows traffickers to operate unimpeded.

³³ Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa."

³⁴ It should be noted that the size of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces have been drastically reduced and that this should continue under a UN SSR mandate

³⁵ *US Department of State Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau*, (Washington DC: February 25, 2009).

THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH

The threats presented by the international drug trade are perhaps best captured by the following extract from the White House's National Drug Control Strategy of 2009, which highlights the dangerous emergence of the drug trade not only in this hemisphere but anywhere that the U.S. has national interests:

*"The illicit drug trade poses a serious threat to our national security due to its ability to destabilize and corrupt governments and to diminish public safety in regions vital to U.S. interests. The ill-gotten profits and nefarious alliances cultivated by the drug trade also facilitate the activities of terrorists and organized criminals worldwide."*³⁶

Copious amounts of research have been performed on drug trafficking in Latin America, the Caribbean, and more recently in Afghanistan and Central Asia.³⁷ In Africa, most research on illicit trade has focused on the exploitation of natural resources and the development of criminal networks and their diaspora.³⁸ Yet there has been a dearth of research on the short- and long-term impacts of drugs transiting through West Africa. This is not surprising, however, since these routes are a relatively new phenomenon.

³⁶ United States National Drug Control Strategy, Washington D.C., 2009), 46.

³⁷ George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* (Transaction Publishers 2009), 275; Letizia Paoli, Victoria Greenfield, and Peter Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Gretchen Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009); Francisco E. Thoumi, *Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 375.

³⁸ Obi Ebbe, "Slicing Nigeria's 'National Cake'," in *Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration around the World*, ed. Roy Godson (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003); Douglas Farah, *Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror* (Washington DC: Broadway Books, 2004); John Ghazvinian, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil* (Harcourt, 2007); William Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2 (2000); Nicholas Shaxson, *Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 288.

Figure 7 illustrates how the entire West African region has been affected to some extent by the scourge of drug trafficking.




Figure 7. Individual seizures of cocaine in Africa, 2005-2009
(Source: UNODC, World Drug Report, 2010)

With so much international attention focused on Guinea-Bissau, it would be easy to believe that it is the only country affected by drug trafficking. Yet as the diagram shows, most every country of West Africa has been exploited by drug traffickers. The UNODC has identified at least two different hubs for cocaine transiting the region. The first involves cocaine trafficked into the Bight of Benin and then routed into Togo, Benin,

Ghana and Nigeria. The second involves Guinea-Bissau and Guinea as entry points, as well as possibly Sierra Leone and Mauritania as additional air destinations. These drugs are believed to be shipped to Senegal, Mali and the Gambia for air couriering on to Europe. Bamako, Mali has also been used as a key hub for air couriers, despite the fact that it is situated some 1,000 kilometers from the coastal countries that were receiving the cocaine. This has presented a perplexing trend that continues to puzzle authorities,³⁹ although the recent revelation that al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) operatives in Mali may be involved in the drug trade could account for this anomaly. The extent to which drug trafficking interests have infiltrated state institutions and have negatively impacted these countries is an interesting question. One might logically speculate that the most fragile states with the weakest law enforcement institutions are the most vulnerable to penetration and corruption by DTOs. The fact that they are failed states to begin with adds another interesting dimension, begging the question: to what extent were these states' institutions functioning before the arrival of drug traffickers?

This latter question is not just an academic issue. Due to the nexus between failed states, ungoverned territories, non-state actors, and terrorism, the ways in which drug traffickers operate in the West African environment and the ways in which they co-opt local government officials to exploit vulnerabilities are important security concerns not only for African governments but also for the USG and its allies. So why exactly should the international community care about drug trafficking in West Africa? International crime is in itself an issue of unambiguous concern which warrants research and analysis.

³⁹ Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa.

Yet to truly appreciate the severity of the situation, one must realize the implications of drug trafficking for all aspects of society. The following points attempt to illustrate the magnitude of this problem and why American, African and multinational partners need to take notice.

a. Destabilizing Impact of Drug Trafficking

International policy-makers have pointed to the drug trade in Africa as a significant driver of instability in these fragile states. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General, has commented that *“I am particularly concerned that drug trafficking could trigger further [regional] destabilization [in Africa],”*⁴⁰ Yet instability in Africa is a U.S. national security threat as well, according to the Department of Defense. The U.S. is concerned about securing its strategic interests in a region which may be threatened by drug-induced instability.⁴¹ This is why the U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) ultimate objective is to *“promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”*⁴² This is also why the push for democratic governance is a major U.S. foreign policy objective in Africa, as stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2006:

“Our strategy is to promote economic development and the expansion of effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges. Through improved governance, reduced corruption, and market

⁴⁰ Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, (New York: U.N. Security Council, 10 Aug 2009).

⁴¹ These strategic interests include energy security and counterterrorism operations, among others.

⁴² U.S. Africa Command Mission Statement, available at <http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/2009%20Command%20Brief.pdf>

*reforms, African nations can lift themselves toward a better future.”*⁴³

States that are ethnically divided or otherwise politically factionalized could well succumb to narco-insurgencies, as this research shows, pitting one group against another. Just as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) or the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) relied on revenues from the exploitation of natural resources (diamonds), cocaine could become yet another commodity that perpetuates conflict, if not provoking it in the first place. What is shocking is that while diamonds, timber, and other natural resources are certainly valuable, they pale in comparison to the revenues to be generated from drug trafficking. Whereas the total value of diamonds smuggled out of Sierra Leone and Liberia throughout the 1990s was approximately \$200 million, the profits to be made from cocaine are several orders of magnitude larger.⁴⁴ Given the dearth of legitimate livelihoods, political equality, and other grievances, the lucrative drug trafficking trade certainly has the ability to finance wars, insurgencies, and other conflicts between divided populations. Given the millions of small arms, light weapons, and unpaid soldiers present in West Africa, this does not seem a stretch for the imagination. Drug trafficking can also destabilize a state by providing the revenues with which to corrupt and bribe government officials, influence elections, and contribute to the empowerment of regimes which may not be popular with the electorate.

⁴³ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington D.C., 2006).

⁴⁴ Douglas Farah, "Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to Global Stability and U.S. National Security from Southwest Asia, Latin America and West Africa," in *Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National security and Foreign Affairs* (Washington DC: 1 October 2009).

Another cause for concern is noted by Kimberley Thachuk who reminds us that DTOs are also renowned for expanding into other illicit markets, the most concerning of which is arms.⁴⁵ Importing more small arms and light weapons into West Africa could ultimately destabilize the region by providing the impoverished and aggrieved with the means to manifest their discontent – violently. Or, other rivalries may come to light as a direct result of drug trafficking.

The world has witnessed instability in two of Africa's so-called "Narco-States." While many believe that the late-2008 coup in Guinea and the assassinations in Guinea-Bissau were related to the drug trade, the mechanisms by which these instances destabilized the countries is not clear. In Guinea, it seems as though drug trafficking activities and the former government's complicity in them provided the justification for the military junta's unconstitutional seizure of power. In Guinea-Bissau it appears as though competition for drug profits was a factor in the assassinations of the President and Army Chief. Yet in both cases there is some debate over the significance of the drug link. Thus it is important for new research to look at these cases and determine the extent to which instability may be attributed to drug trafficking as well as the explanatory power of other variables.

b. Erosion of the Rule of Law

As an illicit market, drug traffickers rely on corruption and coercion to ensure a permissive environment. These activities undeniably undermine the rule of law,

⁴⁵ Kimberley Thachuk, ed., *Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007).

promotion of good governance, legitimate economic growth, and other processes necessary for development and stability. However, one can rightly argue that many African states exploited by DTOs lack these fundamental institutions which are why traffickers are drawn to them in the first place. It highlights an important yet dubious causal relationship, begging the question: are DTOs attracted to failed states which may facilitate their operations or do the corrupt tactics employed by DTOs ultimately cause a state to fail?

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa has emphasized the detrimental effect of drug-trafficking on this goal, stating:

*“We also want to work with African countries so that they can address illicit and illegal activities such as smuggling of drugs, smuggling of people, smuggling of arms, because as long as you have this kind of corruption and illicit activities, it undermines the whole basis for democratic government.”*⁴⁶

So many African states already struggle with efforts to strengthen the rule of law within their borders, and it seems as though the corruption associated with drug-trafficking has only aggravated the situation. Numerous reports of bribes and the disappearance of seized cocaine – purportedly with official connivance – have emerged from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and even Ghana – Africa’s most promising democracy.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Interview with Vicki Huddleston by John Vandiver, Stars and Stripe, September 23, 2009.

⁴⁷ See for example See "Ghana: Snow White," *Africa Confidential* 47, no. 15 (July 21, 2006); "Guinea Drug Agents Are Corrupt," *BBC News*, October 22, 2008; Alistair Thomson, "Drugs Trade Threatens to Corrode Ghana's Image," *Reuters*, December 23, 2008; Leonard Vincent, *Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine and Coups Haunt Gagged Nation* (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2007), 6.; BBC News.; Pascal Fletcher, "Bauxite-Exporter Guinea Faces Drugs Trade Threat-UN," July 12, 2008; "Guinea: Drug Trade 'Potentially More Dangerous Than Guinea-Bissau,'" *Integrated Regional*

c. The Potential for Narco-Terrorism

A particularly disturbing concern raised by drug trafficking through West Africa is the opportunities it may provide to fund terrorist cells that directly threaten U.S. national security interests. In fact, one former DEA senior official stated that “*Of the 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed by the State Department... 19 have clearly established ties to drug trafficking and many more are suspected of having such ties.*”⁴⁸ Given that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda are all known to have operational presences in Africa, concerns of terrorist financing have elevated the issue on the USG’s agenda.

Although many of the Lebanese in West Africa are Christian (Maronite), some portion of the Muslims are believed to be affiliated with, or at least sympathetic to Hezbollah. To date there have not been any substantiated official reports of Hezbollah’s complicity in drug trafficking in West Africa. However, some Lebanese businessmen are known to be involved in the illegal sale of “blood diamonds.”⁴⁹ Furthermore, there have been many reports of the organization’s large footprint and impressive capacity to raise funds through its extensive diaspora network in the region.⁵⁰ In this way, Hezbollah

Information Networks News (IRIN)/U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, October 10, 2008; Saliou Samb, "Guinea Holds Conte Son in Drugs Probe - Police," *Reuters*, February 24, 2009.

⁴⁸ DEA Chief of Operations Michael Braun at a July 18, 2008 speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, accessible at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=411>

⁴⁹ Lansana Gberie, *War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection, The Diamonds and Human Security Project* (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, International Peace Information Service, 2002), 28.

⁵⁰ Michael P. Arena, "Hizballah’s Global Criminal Operations," *Global Crime* (August 1, 2006); Sara A. Carter, "Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into U.S.," *Washington Times*, March 27, 2009; Douglas Farah, Hezbollah’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America International Assessment and Strategy Center, August 4, 2006); Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, "Drug Probe Finds Hezbollah Link," *Los Angeles Times*, October 22, 2008; Matthew Levitt, "

could capitalize on the revenues generated from illicit markets such as that in blood diamonds and potentially in drugs too.

The recent discovery of a drug-laden plane crash on an isolated airstrip in northern Mali reveal that Hezbollah might not be the only terrorist group potentially benefiting from this illicit trade.⁵¹ North Africa, where AQIM has a well-established presence, has emerged as a significant transit route for cocaine that ultimately ends up in Libya or Egypt. From there, law enforcement officials suspect the drugs are hidden in containers on cargo ships, which are less likely to be searched than those from Latin America. Many experts claim that AQIM controls much of the transportation infrastructure in North Africa, including the aforementioned airstrip in Mali. Moreover, a DEA sting operation revealed how three Malians agreed to collaborate with what they believed were members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a Lebanese radical (both undercover) to transport cocaine through West and North Africa to Europe under AQIM protection.⁵² These individuals were arrested in Ghana in December 2009 and are currently awaiting trial in the U.S. Though their culpability has yet to be proven, this operation represents another data point supporting the assertion that AQIM is, at the very least benefiting financially from (if not coordinating) the cocaine trade in West and North Africa.

Hezbollah: Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise," in *Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs* (Washington DC: May 25, 2005); James Phillips, "Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List," in *Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe* (Washington DC: June 20, 2007); Treasury Targets Hizballah Network in Africa, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 27, 2009).

⁵¹ "Three Arrested over Suspected Mali Drugs Plane," *Agence France Presse*, 22 November 2009.

⁵² "Criminal Complaint against Oumar Issa Haroune Toure and Idriss Abelrahman," (15 December 2009).

Stephen Ellis, a well-known Africanist studying the drug trade, has noted that until recently there had not been any hard evidence that al-Qaida was actively involved in the drug trade.⁵³ Moreover, the empirical evidence to suggest a strong linkage between the two remains thin and has not always been compelling. But if the claims of many experts are true and the Mali airstrip was controlled by AQIM and if the three Malians cited above are proven to have supported the terrorist group financially, it will be important to acknowledge that there could be direct contact between terrorists groups and Latin American DTOs. Intelligence agencies continue to investigate these claims.

d. Bolsters Financial Strength of DTOs Operating on U.S. Borders

DTOs operating in West Africa are the same ones that traffic drugs into the U.S., including the powerful Mexican Sinaloa DTO and FARC – a designated terrorist organization. As such, even if U.S. counternarcotics efforts on its southern border were to improve greatly, the fact that these DTOs are benefiting financially from West African operations will only strengthen and embolden Latin American DTOs which pose a direct threat to the U.S. and its allies in the western hemisphere. As one expert noted:

“The money generated by the cocaine trade largely flows back to the DTOs in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, greatly increasing the power of non-state criminal organizations to challenge the state.”⁵⁴

⁵³ Jamie Doward, "Drug Seizures in West Africa Prompt Fears of Terrorist Links," *The Observer*, 29 November 2009

⁵⁴ Farah, "Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to Global Stability and U.S. National Security from Southwest Asia, Latin America and West Africa."

Anecdotal evidence reveals a collaborative and mutually beneficial relationship between West African criminal networks and Latin American DTOs.⁵⁵ As Carmelita Pires, Guinea-Bissau's former Justice Minister has succinctly pointed out: "*There cannot be foreigners without local connections.*"⁵⁶ Not only are these DTOs contributing to the corruption of some West African states, but the vast majority of revenues generated are remitted back to Latin America, thus strengthening the networks that traffic illicit substances into the U.S. and destabilize our borders in doing so. Moreover, many of these DTOs have connections to terrorist entities such as the FARC which poses yet another threat so close to our borders.⁵⁷

e. Growth of a Local Market and African DTOs

The growing use of West Africa as a transshipment hub for drugs has raised fears among experts who observe from previous experience that transit countries eventually become consumer countries.⁵⁸ After Brazil developed into a key transit country for cocaine, it became the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world.⁵⁹ Likewise, key countries through which Afghan opium transits (including 40% through Iran, 30%

⁵⁵ Douglas Farah, "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa," in *The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs* (Washington DC: 23 June 2009).

⁵⁶ Francesc Relea, "Former Guinean Officials Say Guinea-Bissau Becoming Haven for Drug Traffickers," *El Pais.com translated from Spanish*, 22 March 2009.

⁵⁷ Michael Braun, Global Drug Trafficking: Africa's Expanding Role (Washington DC: Remarks made at the Wilson Center 28 May 2009).

⁵⁸ Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook, "Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy," (CRS Report for Congress, 30 September 2009).

⁵⁹ International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Brazil, United States Department of State, 2009).

through Pakistan, and 30% through Central Asia)⁶⁰ have developed local markets and are experiencing rising levels of consumption.⁶¹ Given the impoverished conditions in Africa, it is logical to assume that distributors will deal mainly in crack – the affordable alternative to powder cocaine. This also raises concerns that crack consumption will prompt an increase in crime as users began robbing and stealing to support their habit.⁶²

Another fear is that drugs used as payments to Africans will end up being trafficked to Europe by emerging African DTOs.⁶³ Existing criminal networks are dominated by Nigerians which historically have been involved in heroin trafficking.⁶⁴ The fear expressed by many analysts is that the support, supply, and lessons learned from their Latin American counterparts will create a new generation of African DTO that will seek to operate wherever possible. The Nigerian diaspora could facilitate this development given their global reach in Pakistan, Thailand, and the U.S.

f. Rise in Crime, Prostitution and HIV/AIDS

Many experts fear, based on previous experiences in transit countries, that at least some of the drugs which are used to bribe government officials will stay in Guinea-Bissau, creating a local marketplace. As usually occurs where drugs exist, addiction will

⁶⁰ "Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium," (Vienna: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2009), 152.

⁶¹ Erica Marat, "Impact of Drug Trade and Organized Crime on State Functioning in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (2006).

⁶² J A Inciardi and A E Pottieger, "Kids, Crack, and Crime " *Journal of Drug Issues* 21, no. 1 (Spring 1991).

⁶³ Antonio Mazzitelli, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: The Additional Challenge," *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007).

⁶⁴ Stephen Ellis, "West Africa's International Drug Trade," *African Affairs* 108, no. 431 (2009). And Mark Shaw, "West African Criminal Networks in South and Southern Africa," *African Affairs* 101 (2002).

soon take hold and one will begin to see its nefarious effects, namely the rise in crime and prostitution among users to pay for their addictions.⁶⁵ This clearly has the ability to increase HIV levels which will undermine efforts of any West African country to achieve several millennium development goals including combating HIV/AIDS and by extension, maternal health and universal education.

Ultimately, this line of research should contribute valuable insights while providing some context for security analysts tracking drug trafficking in emerging transit countries that are also failed states. The case of Guinea-Bissau and its neighbors present a consistent trend which can contribute to the field of research on the impacts of drug trafficking in Transit States. That said, just as every Narco-State is different, every Transit State will undoubtedly have a different experience from the next. However, if studying the case of Guinea-Bissau uncovers a critical new manifestation of a Narco-State that could help scholars understand the relationships between the drug trade and state power in a failed state, it will serve a valuable purpose.

⁶⁵ Lana Harrison, "Drug-Crime Nexus in the USA," *Contemporary Drug Problems* 19 (1992); James Inciardi, "Heroin Use and Street Crime," *Crime and Delinquency* 25, no. 3 (1979).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

THE GLOBALIZATION OF ILLICIT TRADE

The globalization of illicit trade and transnational organized crime are issues that have received increased attention in policy circles in recent years. This elevated visibility is likely due to three factors: the threat posed by the criminal activities of terrorists (the Taliban's use of opium to finance its insurgency); illicit markets as a source of conflict (diamond-financed civil war in Sierra Leone); and the rise of non-state actors that pose a threat to already weak and fragile states (Latin American drug cartels in West Africa). However, scholars in this field of research have been active since the 1990s when authors such as Robert Cox,⁶⁶ Susan Strange,⁶⁷ Peter Reuter⁶⁸ and Louise Shelley⁶⁹ began to explore the relationship between the political economy (licit and illicit) and state power. Since then, criminologists, political scientists and economists have built on these foundations, offering new insights and models to describe transnational organized crime, illicit markets, and the power of states in the face of global markets.

⁶⁶ Robert Cox, *Production Power and World Order* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1987), 500.

⁶⁷ Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*.

⁶⁸ Peter Reuter, *Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 256.

⁶⁹ Louise Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*, ed. H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism," *Transnational Organized Crime* 2, no. 2-3 (1996).

Despite the recent resurgence of interest in illicit trade, most scholars agree that transnational organized crime is *not* a new phenomenon. Trafficking (and its precursor – smuggling) in humans, drugs, arms, natural resources and other commodities has been a fact of life for centuries and will continue to exist for as long as there is a profit to be made. However, scholars broadly believe that the effects of globalization coupled with sophisticated new technologies which have vastly simplified communications and money transfers; liberalization policies which have opened borders to not only licit trade but illicit trade too; and the withdrawal of US and Soviet foreign assistance at the end of the Cold War (forcing many local resistance groups and non-state actors formerly sponsored by the U.S. or USSR to look to alternate sources of revenues), have fundamentally changed the face of the illicit global economy and have prompted a massive increase in illicit cross-border trade.⁷⁰ Stephen Ellis refers to this as the “dark side of globalization” referring to the negative impacts of globalization that accompany the advantageous ones.⁷¹ These market pressures associated with globalization are thought to have caused a direct erosion of state power – a concept coined as “State Retreat” by Susan Strange.⁷²

Another point of agreement is that the scope and monetary amount of this illicit trade will never be definitively quantified due to the inherent difficulty in obtaining

⁷⁰ See for example: Baker, *Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System*; Moises Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 352; Schendel and Abraham, *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization*.

⁷¹ Ellis, "West Africa's International Drug Trade."

⁷² Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*.

reliable, unadulterated data on the illicit political economy.⁷³ It is also important to realize that identifying a direct causal relationship between globalization, technological advances and economic liberalization is hard, if not impossible, to prove. As R.T. Naylor continuously reminds his readers, it may be more appropriate to say that these events merely facilitated the recent increase in transnational illicit trade, which would have transpired in due time regardless.⁷⁴

There are many diverse perspectives on the framework in which the illicit political economy operates. The relationships between criminals and illicit markets vary from country to country, with the most representative models depicting Colombian drug cartels, the Russian Mafia, Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza.⁷⁵ The criminal activity engrained in the modus operandi of these highly-structured organizations has deep roots in their nation's cultural histories. They all also employ many of the same "tools of the trade" such as money laundering, fraud, extortion, bribery, counterfeiting, intimidation and especially violence, in order to achieve their objectives.⁷⁶ Moreover, since they all continue to exist today, they have all been similarly impacted by the processes of globalization, technological advances, economic liberalization and the dissolution of the Former Soviet Union.

⁷³ Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, *The Economics of Organised Crime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 320.

⁷⁴ R.T. Naylor, "Mafias, Myths and Markets: On the Theory and Practice of Enterprise Crime," *Transnational Organized Crime* 3, no. 3 (1997); R.T. Naylor, *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 400.

⁷⁵ Ko-lin Chin, *Chinatown Gangs: Extortion, Enterprise, and Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 233.

⁷⁶ Louise Shelley, *PUBP 710 "Illicit Trade"* (2 November 2009).

Illicit trade and transnational organized crime is a rich field of literature wherein many regional experts have provided valuable insights regarding the form and features organized crime takes in their respective regions. The Russian Mafia perhaps provides one of the best examples of organized crime syndicates forging ties with political regimes. Claire Sterling goes so far as to say that the mafia transitioned from “*merely feeding off the economy to owning it*” during the 1980s.⁷⁷ Stephen Handelman asserts that the mafia made these strides in order to legitimize their profits through stock exchanges, joint ventures, and banks.⁷⁸ On the flip side, the government authority (in the case of Russia an authoritarian elite and bureaucratic oligarchy) used relationships with organized crime to augment its own revenues, particularly when transitioning to democracy, which are useful for maintaining power and avoiding electoral accountability. In a transitioning economy, this is particularly detrimental.

According to many scholars, the main reason why states may chose to ally with organized crime is to soften the blow of external economic shocks. The emergence of Russian organized crime is largely agreed to be the result of the Soviet-controlled economy whose budgetary deficits inspired the black market and whose final demise prompted criminal networks to assume many of the responsibilities of the state where the local government did not have the institutional basis to provide for its citizens.⁷⁹ When the criminals are drug traffickers, this would seem to represent the epitome of a “Narco-

⁷⁷ Claire Sterling, *Thieves' World: The Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 288.

⁷⁸ Stephen Handelman, "The Russian 'Mafiya' " *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994). P.86.

⁷⁹ Joseph Albin et al., "Russian Organized Crime: Its History, Structure and Function," in *Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime* ed. Mark Galeotti (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 2002).

State” similar to Pablo Escobar’s Colombia or other examples of criminals performing the state’s functions such as the Yamaguchi-gumi clan of the Yakuza providing humanitarian relief after the Great Hanshin earthquake of 1995.⁸⁰ However, even when this perverse reversal of roles involves the provision of security, such as by the Russian Mafia or the Taliban in Afghanistan, it severely undermines the states’ ability to address the problem.⁸¹

Much of the literature on the illicit political economy focuses on the relationship between criminals, the state, and global economic forces. The theories of the Courtesan State⁸² and State Retreat,⁸³ for example, explain how the merging of the political system and the criminal elements of civil society coupled with new and illicit business opportunities offered by globalization can create a mutually beneficial relationship which lays the foundation for structural corruption within the state. Ultimately Strange, Mittelman and Johnston deduce that whereas states once governed markets, it is now the markets which govern increasingly corrupt and even criminalized states. While this may be an appropriate contextual framework for developed and even some developing countries, it offers little insight into the nature of economic forces, criminal activity, and government complicity in a failed state such as Guinea-Bissau where there has never been a meaningful state to govern markets let alone “court” foreign investors. Rather,

⁸⁰ Glen S. Fukushima, "The Great Hanshin Earthquake," (JPRI Occasional Paper No. 2 March 1995).

⁸¹ Frederico Varese, "Is Sicily the Future of Russia? Private Protection and the Rise of the Russian Mafia," in *Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime* ed. Mark Galeotti (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002).

⁸² James Mittelman and Robert Johnston, "The Globalization of Organized Crime: The Courtesan State, and the Corruption of Civil Society," *Global Governance* 5, no. 1 (1999).

⁸³ Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*.

understanding the implications of being a failed state offers the most insight to the attraction of a country like Guinea-Bissau to international drug traffickers.

SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The prevailing neo-liberalist notion of security popular up until the collapse of the Soviet Union focused on military force issues.⁸⁴ For example, Hans Morghenthau and Kenneth Waltz frequently referred to states which had strong militaries which reflected their power and authority in the world order.⁸⁵ However, most scholars agree that security theories emanating from the Cold War are inadequate to describe many of today's contemporary, non-military and "soft" threats such as the transnational crime.⁸⁶ As a result, the neorealist notion of security as a military issue has undergone a gradual shift towards a broader view encompassing economic, political, and environmental threats.⁸⁷ Barry Buzan is among the advocates of this theory who argue that security is multifaceted and expands over several national domains.⁸⁸ Some academics have also

⁸⁴ John Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security* 20 (1995); Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, *Security Studies for the 1990s* (New York: Brassey's, 1993); Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (1991).

⁸⁵ John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, vol. 2nd edition Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁸⁶ For an excellent, thorough account of the evolving definition of security, see Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40, no. 2 (1996).

⁸⁷ Beverly Crawford, "The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence," *Millennium* 23 (1994); Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (1989); Theodore Moran, "International Economics and National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990/91); Brad Roberts, "Human Rights and International Security," *Washington Quarterly* 13, no. 65-75 (1990); Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," *International Security* 17 (1992/93).

⁸⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

sought to think of security on a deeper level of analysis- that is to say in terms of human, societal, and regional security.⁸⁹

More recently since 911, it seems as though the academic debate has focused even more narrowly on social threats emanating from regional, intrastate, and transnational threats such as failed states and terrorism.⁹⁰ To that end, the danger posed by states defined as failed, weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, in crisis, or collapsed, has emerged as a major field of study. According to Fukuyama, a failed state becomes such when two dimensions of state power – scope (different functions and goals taken on by governments) and strength (ability of administrations to plan and execute policies) become so impotent that the state cannot fulfill its most basic functions. Among the functions Fukuyama believes the state is responsible to perform are: security, law enforcement, access to high-quality schools and healthcare, sound fiscal and monetary policies, responsive political systems, opportunities for employment and social mobility, retirement benefits, and transparency.⁹¹ A host of other authors including Kimberly Thachuk,⁹² Robert Rotberg,⁹³ Susan Rice,⁹⁴ Stewart Patrick,⁹⁵ all note how these states

⁸⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fears: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); Rebecca Grant, "The Quagmire of Gender and International Security," in *Gendered States*, ed. Spike Peteerrson (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); Roberta Rubenstein, "Cultural Analysis and International Security," *Alternatives* 13 (1988); Ann Tickner, *Gender and International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

⁹⁰ Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism," *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (2004); Kimberly Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 10, no. 1 (2001).

⁹¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The Imperative of State Building," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (April 2004).

⁹² Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?."

⁹³ Robert Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002).

are more vulnerable to an array of transnational security threats including terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and civil conflicts that spill over borders. With regard to organized crime, the post-Cold War environment has seen a surge in the number of transnational organized crime groups thriving in safe havens of weak states including the Balkans, Central Asia, and West Africa.⁹⁶

Chester Crocker asserts that “*state failure directly affects a broad range of U.S. interests including the promotion of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, religious tolerance, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors and exporters.*”⁹⁷ Furthermore, he emphasizes that it is not enough to simply unseat odious rulers in order to promote international security; rather strengthening administrative and governing capabilities, enhancing legal codes and court systems, fostering responsive and well-trained police forces, stronger bank oversight and public financial management, and the like will help these weak states to acquire domestic and international legitimacy. Francis Fukuyama interprets this issue as one of “stateness” noting that a fundamental prerequisite for democracy or economic development is the state itself.⁹⁸ However, he emphasizes that outsiders must be careful *not* to focus too much on state-building, as it

⁹⁴ Susan Rice, "Poverty Breeds Insecurity," in *Too Poor for Peace? Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (Washington DC: Brookings, 2007).

⁹⁵ Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2006).

⁹⁶ Liana Sun Wyler, "Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy," (CRS Report for Congress, 28 August 2008).

⁹⁷ Chester Crocker, "Engaging Failing States," *Foreign Affairs* 32-44 (September/October 2003).

⁹⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "Stateness First," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 1 (January 2005).

often undermines the ability of domestic actors to create their own robust institutions or creates long-term dependence and may ultimately come to seem illegitimate to the indigenous population. Rather, he believes that local ownership, participation, and community-driven development offer the most promising solutions to ameliorate failed states.

Talk of weak and failed states undeniably surged after 911 along with discussion of the intersection between criminal activities and terrorism. Herein lies the difficult problem of differentiating between the two, particularly when the criminals are fall under law enforcement's purview as a matter of policy while terrorists are considered a military threat. This is perhaps best described by Phil Williams who believes this is due to the notion that transnational criminal networks are seen as:

*"economic rather than political organizations; they do not pose the same kind of overt or obvious challenge to states that terrorist groups do; crime is a domestic problem; and law enforcement and national security are based on very different philosophies, organization structures and legal frameworks."*⁹⁹

Makarenko emphasizes a spectrum of criminals and terrorists, where the difference between the two ultimately becomes hard to decipher.¹⁰⁰

Kimberly Thachuk makes a most important observation, noting that historically,

⁹⁹ Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security," in *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).

¹⁰⁰ Tamara Makarenko, "Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* Spring 2002 (2002). For a more general discussion on the crime-terror continuum see also Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism."

*“Organized crime groups rarely cooperated with terrorist groups, or engaged in their activities as their goals were most often at odds... yet many of today’s terrorist groups have not only lost most of their more comprehensible ideals, but are increasingly turning to smuggling and other criminal activities to fund their operations.”*¹⁰¹

At some point it become questionable whether so-called terrorists are still ideologically-motivated or if the profits to be gained through criminal activities become a motivation in and of itself, and the justification for an organization’s existence. In any event, there has been an increasing number of academics focused on studying organized crime as a national security consideration.¹⁰²

THE RESOURCE CURSE

At its heart, the drug trade and the instability that follows it revolves around competition for drug profits. In this way, drugs play the same role as do many natural resources in conflict areas. As such, a review of the literature relating to the “Resource Curse” is a useful reminder of how countries “blessed” with abundant natural resources have found this source of affluence to be a curse. Scholars such as Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Michael Ross, Richard Auty, Richard Snyder and Philippe Le

¹⁰¹ Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?."

¹⁰² See for example: Michael Dziedzic, "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security " *Survival* 31, no. 6 (November 1989); Melvyn Levitsky, "Transnational Criminal Networks and International Security," *Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce* 30, no. 2 (2003); Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, "Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities," *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 2 (1998); Louise Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?," *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2 (1995); Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?."

Billon have contributed greatly to this field of research to explain the causal mechanisms underpinning the unintuitive correlation between an abundance of natural resources, poor economic development, and the existence of conflict.

Richard Auty first coined the term “Resource Curse” in his 1993 book *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Theory*.¹⁰³ In it he explains why a seemingly desirable asset, such as natural resources, can actually pervert an economy to the extent that they become a curse. Terry Lynn Karl subsequently wrote on a similar concept, the “Paradox of Plenty” in her 1997 book *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*¹⁰⁴ in which she focused on the massive oil booms of the 1970s when dependence on oil exports led to disproportionate fiscal reliance on petrodollars and public spending, at the expense of responsible governance. She argued that oil booms created the illusion of prosperity and development while actually destabilizing regimes by reinforcing oil-based interests and further weakening state capacity. In general, these authors argue that countries “blessed” with natural resources often cannot translate this wealth into economic gain and rather suffer from the negative consequences associated with Dutch Disease, being a Rentier State, revenue volatility, excessive borrowing using resource-backed loans, reliance on a single export, and the vast corruption which ensues. And by now it is widely accepted (thanks to research performed by such developmental economists as Paul Collier) that developing states endowed with great natural resources

¹⁰³ Richard Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 284.

¹⁰⁴ Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1997), 380.

are more prone to conflict and more likely to suffer from violent upheaval than states which lack natural resources.¹⁰⁵ Because the revenues derived from illicit goods such as cocaine has the ability to pervert an economy in many of the same ways that the Resource Curse theory describes, it is worth examining some of the impacts here.

First, the ramifications of “Dutch Disease” and the subsequent dependence on a single export have come to characterize countries with vast natural resources. The term “Dutch Disease” is used to describe the economic implications when revenue generated by a boom in a particular sector (such as what occurs after the discovery of a natural resource like oil or natural gas) results in an appreciation of the local currency and consequently, a sharp decline in the competitiveness of other non-booming sectors such as manufacturing. This is exacerbated by economies which come to rely heavily on that single export, since resource dependence renders a country vulnerable to a sudden drop in the price of the commodity (revenue volatility), depletion of the resource and poor economic growth due to abandonment of non-booming sectors. Furthermore, lucrative windfall rents (charged to companies for the commodity’s extraction) deter the development of a diversified economy which could compensate for the dependence on one resource.

Second, a “Rentier State”, like a landlord who depends on income derived from rents, is a state which derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenue from the sale of indigenous resources to external clients. In other words, the Rentier State

¹⁰⁵ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

(typically endowed with great natural resources though it could have another source of strategic advantage such as geographic location) can collect revenues *not* for the provision of a service or manufactured product, but for the mere sale of a natural resource which already exists. And because the resource cannot be extracted without government permission, the state can make demands on extracting companies as high as the market will bear. There are no competitors and whatever the government does with the revenue, the resource will continue to exist. In contrast with citizens who are heavily taxed and therefore expect a certain degree of accountability from their governments, citizens of a Rentier State are typically lightly taxed or not at all (with their government rather relying on the revenue generated from rents). These populations would likely not expect the same level of accountability from their governments, thus allowing political leaders to make poor decisions regarding the expenditure of public funds. To that end, some scholars have asserted that: “*Oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues.*”¹⁰⁶ Ultimately, the availability of easy rents erodes governance due to the absence of accountability or any incentives to combat corruption.

Third, resource wealth offers countless opportunities for corrupt leaders to enrich themselves personally. Politicians may manipulate contracts with extractive companies (oil companies being the worst culprits, by many accounts) or they may cultivate

¹⁰⁶ James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003).

patronage networks to guarantee their positions of power and to secure control over their state's intrinsic wealth. Another means for corruption are the off shore tax havens which enable leaders to hide the proceeds derived from corrupt business practices and avoid legal prosecution. Ultimately, when it is easier to maintain authority through manipulation of natural resources than through good governance and growth-oriented policies, there is simply no incentive for politicians to cease this practice. As a result, corruption persists to the detriment of those less fortunate who do not have access to the state's resource wealth.

A fourth effect of the Resource Curse is the false sense of security which comes from borrowing using resource wealth as collateral. Given the easy availability of resources, borrowing may become excessive, especially when the exchange rate increases (an effect of Dutch Disease) making interest payments on the debt significantly cheaper. However, should the price of the commodity decline (or if the exchange rate falls) a government has less capital with which to pay a now more expensive debt. If debt burdens become so great that penalties are charged, the country may find itself in dire straits as its debt may grow even more.

Lastly, natural resources often induce conflict. This aspect of resource curse theory is perhaps most applicable to the drug trade and its impact on Narco-States. To many people, the assertion that natural resources cause conflict is only logical when it refers to a *scarcity* of natural resources, such as water, land, crops, or food.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Edward B. Barbier, *Economics, Natural Resource Scarcity, Development: Conventional and Alternative Views* (London: Earthscan Publications, 1989), 240.

Conversely, many have argued that scarce resources may work in favor for a country, through necessitating socio-economic innovation, economic diversification, and the development of human capital. Nonetheless, while resource scarcity is certainly one of the most commonly cited sources of conflict, there are other analytical concepts that may be used to frame the resource-conflict relationship. Contributors to this field of research have offered various different hypotheses to explain why countries endowed with great resource wealth are more prone to conflict than those without. Michael Ross, Philippe Le Billon, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler are some of the more prolific academics who have made invaluable contributions to this field of research. In the paragraphs that follow, some of their theoretical underpinnings and causal mechanisms are presented in order to better understand the universe of possible explanations for this phenomenon.

Although determining causality without solid empirical evidence is always a challenge for social scientists, Michael Ross has advanced four persuasive arguments to explain the mechanisms by which resources cause conflict.¹⁰⁸ First and foremost, resource wealth encourages conflict by increasing the value of the state as a target. Since the existence of natural resources typically translates to the presence of a Rentier State, the owner of such wealth automatically becomes a target for those who would also desire control of the state's resources. Under this scenario, rebels are motivated to topple the existing government in an attempt to secure that resource wealth for themselves or their cause. Second, Ross (among others) asserts that rebel forces finance their insurgencies

¹⁰⁸ Michael Ross, "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006).

with wealth derived from natural resources. Without this abundance of wealth, their operations may not be sustainable. This is not to say that the presence of natural resources *causes* their grievances, but that they enable aggrieved rebels to carry out violent attacks. Third, resource wealth often perpetuates conflict because parties stand to gain financially from opportunities for personal enrichment which are only available during times of conflict, such as natural resource predation and associated corruption. In effect, war becomes a lucrative business thus reducing parties' inclination to make peace. Fourth, resource wealth may lead to conflict through trade shocks. Since rentier states are beholden to the global markets, they are particularly vulnerable to the price volatility of mineral wealth. Without a diversified economy, large fluctuations in prices will result in an unreliable source of income with which to provide public services to its population and preclude conflict.

Ross argues that not only can the *incidence* of conflict be explained by resource wealth but that the *duration* of conflict can similarly be rationalized in this manner. It can prolong the duration of a conflict if resource wealth is funding the weaker party, thus creating a more level-playing field and reducing the stronger party's advantage. Conversely, it could shorten the conflict if the wealth is funding the stronger party by increasing its advantage and securing a faster victory.

Philippe Le Billon offers a different framework for analysis of resource-induced conflict, focusing on secession movements.¹⁰⁹ He asserts that resource wealth increases

¹⁰⁹ Philippe LeBillon, "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," *Political Geography* 20, no. 5 (2001).

the value of sovereignty in a mineral-rich region. Under this scenario, secession movements may occur when citizens in a particular region desire the resource wealth to be limited to the region, not the entire state. Le Billon has performed extensive research on this through his work on the geographical distribution of natural resources. He asserts two hypotheses which help to understand the relationship between resources and conflict:

- i. A resource's proximity to the national capital affects the likelihood of its causing conflict because being close to the capital makes it easier for the state to control the resource instead of it falling into the hands of rebel groups;
- ii. "Point-source" or a dense concentration of resources in a given region makes them more easily controlled by a single group, whereas "diffuse" resources are more difficult to capture.

Le Billon's analysis has produced a useful model for thinking of the types of resource and the flavor of conflict it will likely incite. His model suggests the following outcomes when the proximity and density of resources are concerned and offers several examples of each:

Table 1. Relation Between the Geography of a Resource and Type of Conflict

	POINT	DIFFUSE
PROXIMATE	<i>State control/coup d'état</i> Algeria (gas) Angola (oil) Chad (oil) Congo-Brazzaville (oil) Iran-Iraq (oil) Iraq-Kuwait (oil) Liberia (iron ore, rubber) Nicaragua (coffee) Rwanda (coffee)	<i>Rebellion/Rioting</i> El Salvador (coffee) Guatemala (cropland) Israel-Palestine (freshwater) Mexico (cropland) Senegal-Mauritania (cropland)

	Sierra Leone (rutile)	
DISTANT	<i>Secession</i> Angola/Cabinda (oil) Caucasus (oil) DR Congo (copper, cobalt, gold) Indonesia (oil, copper, gold) Morocco/Western Sahara (phosphate) Nigeria/Biafra (oil) Papua New Guinea/Bougainville (copper) Senegal/Casamance (marijuana) Sudan (oil)	<i>Warlordism</i> Afghanistan (opium) Angola (diamonds) Burma (opium, timber) Caucasus (drugs) Cambodia (gems, timber) Colombia (cocaine) DR Congo (diamonds, gold) Kurdistan (heroin) Lebanon (hash) Liberia (timber, diamonds, drugs) Peru (cocaine) Philippines (marijuana, timber) Sierra Leone (diamonds) Somalia (bananas, camels) Tajikistan (drugs) Former Yugoslavia (marijuana, timber)

(Source: Derived from Le Billon (2001))

A similar sub-set of literature relating to the resource-conflict framework is that pertaining to “lootable” wealth. To this end, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler first defined “lootable” wealth in 1998¹¹⁰ as natural resources which can easily be extracted and transported by individuals or other unregulated groups, with Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani (among others) subsequently building on this framework.¹¹¹ Michael Ross has

¹¹⁰ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (1998).

¹¹¹ Richard Snyder, "Does Lutable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 8 (October 1006); Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Disorder," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (August 2005).

also performed research in this field, and in doing so has advanced the following hypotheses:¹¹²

- i. Resources have different effects in separatist and non-separatist conflicts;
- ii. The impact of a particular resource depends largely on whether or not it is “lootable”;
- iii. Lootable resources are more likely to incite nonseparatist conflict (which once begun are harder to resolve) but pose little danger of igniting separatist conflicts;
- iv. Unlootable resources are more likely ignite separatist conflicts but seldom influence nonseparatist conflicts.

While his analysis had many limitations, he was able to show several significant associations. With regards to lootable resources such as diamonds or drugs, Ross demonstrates that although they are often associated with bloody civil war, they also produce more benefits for the local population than unlootable resources. As a result, they do not seem to promote separatist conflicts since they provide revenues for the local population. Unfortunately, lootable resources do appear to promote nonseparatist conflicts since they promote significant corruption and discipline problems within the groups that control the resource.

Using this framework, Ross continued to develop hypotheses regarding the impact of other characteristics of resources on conflict, such as obstructability (the ease with which transportation of a resource can be obstructed by a small number of individuals) and legality (a resource’s ability to be traded freely on international

¹¹² Michael Ross, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (International Peace Academy, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2003).

markets). He surmises that obstructable resources increase the duration and intensity of conflict by allowing rebel groups a reliable flow of extortion opportunities. Finally, he concludes that illicit resources would be more likely to benefit rebels since they are not vulnerable to international sanctions, as a government would be. This field of research has revealed several valuable insights for the policy-maker, not the least of which is that while the “Resource Curse” theory typically applies to the presence of natural resources, illicit resources such as drugs may also qualify.

“STATES” – MODERN ONES AND AFRICAN ONES

African states are frequently criticized for their inability to perform the duties designated to a state, such as the provision of security and public services. Rather, they are often perceived as predators rather than protectors – preying on public resources at the expense of the public. This is because traditional African governance is incompatible with the “State” as conceived in modern political thought. However, Western donors, including the U.S., seem fixated on democratizing the “states” of West Africa along Jeffersonian lines. Thus much of the political rhetoric from Washington and Europe is highly critical of West Africa’s (and especially Guinea-Bissau’s) weak state institutions and its shortcomings in terms of democratic development. Moreover, the mere use of the word “state” in the term “Narco-State” implies some variation of it. For that reason, it warrants a brief description, if only to identify those features deemed most relevant (or absent) in a “Narco-State.” First, however, one must understand the nature of the African

state and the dynamics underlying African governance. Then one can begin to deduce if and the extent to which drug trafficking has impacted the “state” in Guinea-Bissau.

The African State and the Nature of African Governance

The essence of the “African State” and the institutions which govern it have long been a source of debate. The latter presents a problem due to the prevalence of *informal* governance systems in Africa over formal structures. That is to say, often institutions associated with ethnicity, clan, religion, or other primordial trait will resonate over a constitution, administrative regulation, judicial structure, or other western-style institution.¹¹³ The difficulty in describing the African state lays in the use of appropriate concepts and terminology so as to not impose a western bias to an African institution. This is why the western notion of a “Westphalian State,”¹¹⁴ the “Social Contract” or other equally inappropriate models have been eschewed by most Africanists. Under these models, one can see why most, if not all African states have been labeled “weak” given the absence of democratically-elected leaders and other political institutions that ensure compliance among the population and adherence to official rules or laws without resorting to violence. Violent conflict has broken out all too often in Africa, particularly where the state has been unable or ineffective in averting the rise of internal challengers. Michael Bratton has argued that the institutions of governance imposed by colonial rulers

¹¹³ Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa " *African Affairs* 91, no. 362 (1992).

¹¹⁴ The “Westphalian State” may be said to have been derived from the 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia whereby the European powers at that time asserted their nation-state sovereignty based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. Moreover, the interests of nation-states were widely assumed to transcend those of any individual citizen or even any ruler.

in Africa crumbled even before they had a chance to be fully consolidated. He also attributes the eternally weak states in Africa to a “*self-perpetuating cycle of change, in which weak states engender anemic economies whose poor performance in turn further undermines the capacity of the state apparatus.*”¹¹⁵ Bratton argues that the absence of a true middle class has precluded the emergence not only of capitalism but of democracy as well. Goran Hyden has also ascribed Africa’s inability to sustain a state to its economic underdevelopment, noting that historically agrarian economies only employed rudimentary technologies and didn’t accumulate revenues on the scale European nations did which provided the impetus for a capitalist social class.¹¹⁶

In a sense it is this weak African state that has provided the conditions that have given rise to authoritarian behavior stemming from deep political insecurity. The regimes of these dictators or “Big Men” as they have been called in Africa have been characterized by “personalistic politics,”¹¹⁷ and referred to as “lame Leviathans,”¹¹⁸ “omnipresent but hardly omnipotent,”¹¹⁹ “excessively authoritarian to disguise the fact

¹¹⁵ Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics* 41, no. 3 (1989).

¹¹⁶ Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective* (London: Heinemann, 1983), 223.

¹¹⁷ Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa."; Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa " *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (1994).

¹¹⁸ Thomas Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, vol. 515 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

¹¹⁹ Naomi Chazan, "State and Society in Africa: Images and Challenges," in *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

that it is inadequately authoritative,”¹²⁰ or “incorrigibly rough and exploitative.”¹²¹ This emphasis on state sovereignty and national security – derived from a sense of profound insecurity – has been conducive to the establishment of authoritarian one-party governments, military dictatorships and clientelistic regimes that lay on the opposite end of the spectrum from democracy.¹²²

Clientelism describes a system of social relations whereby a patron, boss, or leader furnishes resources (money, jobs etc.) to clients, dependents, or other acquaintance in return for their support in the public sector.¹²³ This patron may also be the conduit which facilitates exchanges between their clients and the higher authority (such as a president or other elected official).¹²⁴ In impoverished societies where access to political, economic, and social resources is limited, this system of clientelism has proven to be quite effective at allocating scarce resources in a seemingly equitable way. Figure 3 illustrates some of the fundamental ways in which Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith believe clientelism differs from a democratic model.

¹²⁰ Ali Mazrui, "Political Engineering in Africa," *International Social Science Journal* 35, no. 2 (1983).

¹²¹ Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa* (New Jersey and London: Zed Books, 1987), 288.

¹²² There is a large field of literature on clientelism in Africa. For more details see René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 4, no. 2 (1972); Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics* 20, no. 2 (January 1968); Steffen Schmidt, *Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 512.

¹²³ Derick Brinkerhoff and Arthur Goldsmith, "Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming," (December 2002).

¹²⁴ Sharon Kettering, "The Historical Development of Political Clientelism," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 3 (1988).

Table 2. Comparison of Clientelistic and Democratic Regimes

Clientelistic	Democratic
Authority is personal, resides with Individuals	Authority is institutional, resides with official roles
Personal enrichment and aggrandizement are core values	Rule of law, fair elections and majority rule are core values
Leaders tend to monopolize power and are unaccountable for their actions	Leaders share power with others and are accountable for actions
Leaders' relationship to supporters is opaque and may be unreliable	Leaders' relationship to supporters is transparent and is predictable
No regular procedures exist regarding leaders' replacement	Regular procedures exist regarding leaders' replacement
Leaders hold onto power by providing personal favors that secure loyalty of key followers	Leaders hold onto power by providing collective benefits that earn support of large segments of society
Policy decisions are taken in secret without public discussion or involvement	Policy decisions are taken in the open after public discussion and review
Political parties are organized around Personalities	Political parties are organized around stated programs
Civil society is fragmented and characterized by vertical links	Civil society is deep and characterized by horizontal links
Decision making standards are tacit and procedures are impossible to follow from outside	Decision making standards are explicit and procedures are transparent
Supporters' interests guide decisions	Public interest guides decisions
Extensive scope exists for patronage appointments	Limited exists scope for patronage appointments

(Source: Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith)

Clientelism can assume a variety of forms in different cultural settings. Many Africanists have termed the model of political behavior that has taken root in Africa as “Neopatrimonialism,” a derivative of classic patrimonialism as first described by Max

Weber.¹²⁵ While patrimonialism describes a political system wherein power rests unequivocally with one single individual, neopatrimonialism, as conceived by Samuel Eisenstadt, incorporates some bureaucratic institutions which allow the leader (or patron) to use the state's resources to secure the allegiance of the population (or his clients).¹²⁶ In this way the leader is able to maintain power through personal patronage networks rather than through fair elections or other legal institutions. As Christopher Clapham notes, "*It is a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres.*"¹²⁷ Robin Theobald goes so far as to say that "states" that exhibit these characteristics are not actually states at all, rather the private tools at the disposal of leaders to enrich themselves.¹²⁸ In a nutshell, Bratton and Van de Walle argue that:

*"The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons."*¹²⁹

Richard Joseph refers to this variant of clientalism as "Prebendalism" invoking the term "prebend" which is the stipend allotted from the revenues of a cathedral or a

¹²⁵ Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1469

¹²⁶ Samuel Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism* (London: Sage, 1973), 96.

¹²⁷ Christopher Clapham, *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 1982), 222.

¹²⁸ Robin Theobald, "Patrimonialism," *World Politics* 34, no. 4 (1982).

¹²⁹ Bratton and Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa ".

collegiate church to a canon or member of the chapter.¹³⁰ In other words, an individual is given a public office in order to gain personal access over state resources. Gabriel Ardant argues that such a system was common in early states due primarily to the absence of a professional civil service and weak extractive capacity of the state.¹³¹ Prebendalism, Van de Walle notes, is fundamentally different from patronage and neopatrimonialism in that it “*invariably entails practices in which important state agents unambiguously subvert the rule of law for personal gain*”¹³² whereas patronage is often legal (though considered by many to be a form of corruption). Van de Walle further argues that prebendalism, *not* patronage, has been the favored form of clientelism in Africa because few African regimes have been able to hold regular elections that are required to maintain electoral support for patronage. Rather, non-electoral regimes have existed in countries with low national integration and few organizational resources and where leaders typically used state resources to appoint different ethnic elites to maintain political stability. Peter Lewis further argues that prebendalism has morphed into outright predation through rapacious dictatorships in resource-rich countries such as Nigeria.¹³³

¹³⁰ Richard Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 237.

¹³¹ Gabriel Ardant, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

¹³² Nicolas van de Walle, "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007).

¹³³ Peter Lewis, "From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 1 (1996).

In addition to the characteristics cited above, there are some additional interesting features of neopatrimonialism in Africa. On the personal level, many have alluded to an “economy of affection”¹³⁴ whereby “*social relations are rooted in the moral expectation that members of extended families will support one another in times of need.*”¹³⁵ In other words, people do not perceive universalistic values embedded in constitutional law as embodying their idea of public morality. Rather, they perceive familial ties, kinship, ethnicity, or tribe as the source of morality and as such, resist attempts by the state to impose such foreign concepts of morality. On the societal level, Bratton notes that neopatrimonial regimes enjoy very few intermediate organizations to facilitate communication and engagement between the population and the state.¹³⁶ Such civil society structures, even if they do exist, are typically so small that they are easily overshadowed by the state. Bratton does not mean to imply that civil society in Africa is weak, just that it has not successfully transitioned people’s allegiances away from traditional institutions such as the clan, tribe, or brotherhood to the state. This highlights a fundamental paradox, that while African states are notoriously weak for reasons cited earlier, they still seem strong in light of weak civic structures. On the national economic level, Samir Amin notes that neopatrimonial regimes have been characterized by the political elite’s complete monopolization of economic activity and their active resistance to those seeking to foster social capital among civil society. According to Amin, this also

¹³⁴ Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*.

¹³⁵ Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa."

¹³⁶ Ibid.

stems from a profound sense of insecurity and the knowledge that empowered civil society may ultimately breed opposition from within.¹³⁷

So what do these features mean for the African State? First and foremost (and most noticeably to any student of African politics) is that political elites have become more adept at consumption than accumulation. In other words, they have completely neglected investment in productive sectors of society which could increase the state's capacity, opting rather for personal enrichment and maintaining swollen bureaucracies to secure their own patronage networks.¹³⁸ Secondly, the system of allocation associated with neopatrimonialism has bred an environment whereby the "winner takes all" which accounts for the high stakes involved in competition for power. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset contend that corruption, violence, and intolerance are all associated with this quest for the ultimate power.¹³⁹ Thirdly, but no less important, is the institutionalization of coups, as Samuel Decalo calls it.¹⁴⁰ Because neopatrimonial regimes are built on the "quicksand" of personal allegiances, leaders will typically surround themselves with sycophantic cronies who are concerned only with ingratiating themselves with the leader to secure their access to the state's resources. They will typically not provide the leader with reliable information reflecting the popular support for the regime and as a result, leaders can easily lose touch with reality. This perpetuates a system where leaders quell

¹³⁷ Samir Amin, "Preface: The State and the Question of Development," in *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*, ed. Peter Anyanwu Nyong'o (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1987).

¹³⁸ Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa."

¹³⁹ Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, vol. 2 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1995), 592.

¹⁴⁰ Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa".

discontent in the only way they know – patronage and/or oppression. Citing the case of Cameroon, Van de Walle notes that when faced with dwindling levels of patronage, leaders will try to secure what resources they *do* have such as export revenues and foreign aid to attract supporters.¹⁴¹ In doing so, Midgall argues they often undermine the very institutions that could legitimize their rule.¹⁴² Though this list is not exhaustive, a final implication of neopatrimonialism, as noted by Bratton, is the apathy it breeds among the population towards the state.¹⁴³ For many African nations upon independence, the notion of a “state” was an alien concept. Some who were familiar with it saw it not as a means for political, economic, and social advancement but rather a coercive instrument employed by colonizers to impose their rule. For others their attitude towards the state is ambivalent, or perhaps better described as a love-hate relationship. They may well be attracted to it as the primary source of spoils and opportunity for personal enrichment, and resent it at the same time for its predatory practices and intrusion into one's personal life.

Given the history of Africa and the unique institutions of governance that evolved there, one can easily see how it clearly has implications for democratization and the development of a modern state. At its core, the existence of “historical and structural handicaps” such as ethnic cleavages, colonial authoritarianism, and poorly prepared

¹⁴¹ Nicolas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with an Illustration from Cameroon," in *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Jennifer Widner (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994).

¹⁴² Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 320.

¹⁴³ Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa."

leadership, according to Diamond, Linz, and Lipset have impeded democratization in Africa.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately Diamond was on target when he wrote in 1989 that,

*“It is unrealistic to think that such countries can suddenly reverse course and institutionalize stable democratic government simply by changing leaders, constitutions and/or public mentalities. If progress is made toward developing democratic government, it is likely to be gradual, messy, fitful and slow, with many imperfections along the way.”*¹⁴⁵

With regards to possible democratic transitions, Bratton and Van de Walle argue that a change in government depends greatly on the preexisting regime and the mechanisms of rule embedded in that regime.¹⁴⁶ By comparing African political transitions with those of Latin America and Southern Europe, they find that the African cases exhibit a distinctly authoritarian flavor which they attribute to the neopatrimonial nature of African regimes.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, they find that:

“based on the degree of political participation and contestation tolerated under the ancient regime, we distinguish several regime variants under the general rubric of neopatrimonialism and show that here, too, regime characteristics can help explain transition processes.”

¹⁴⁴ Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*.

¹⁴⁵ Larry Diamond, *Beyond Autocracy in Africa* (Atlanta: The Carter Center at Emory University, 1989).

¹⁴⁶ Bratton and Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa ".

¹⁴⁷ Bratton and Van de Walle argue that Neopatrimonial regimes differ from Europe and Latin America in the following major respects: Political transitions from neopatrimonial regimes originate in social protest; Neopatrimonial elites fracture over access to patronage; Elite political pacts are unlikely in neopatrimonial regimes; In neopatrimonial regimes, political transitions are struggles to establish legal rules; During transitions from neopatrimonial regimes, middle class elements align with the opposition.

The regime variants that they identify include: personal dictatorship, plebiscitary one-party system, military oligarchy, and competitive one-party systems.¹⁴⁸ A personal dictatorship is one where the leader rules by decree and nominal institutions are powerless to check the power of the chief executive. Most significantly, participation in the political system excludes all but the leader. A plebiscitary one-party system is slightly more inclusive in that participation in the selection of the national leader is allowed, though only one party is present on the ballot. In this way the regime is able to point to elections to validate its rule, though the absence of legitimate state institutions provide the public with little means to affect any real change. A military oligarchy is exclusionary as with the personal dictatorship, but is different because power resides not just with one individual but a cabal of military officers. Decisions are made collectively by this group where there may be a healthy amount of debate when assessing policy options. Under a competitive one-party system, two or more candidates from one party may participate in elections, giving the semblance of more competition. Which of these models is most conducive to the development of a “Narco-State” would be an interesting avenue of research and a valuable contribution to the field.

The Modern Western State and the Social Contract

Simply put, a state is a grouping of institutions that exert legitimate authority and make rules that govern people within a defined territory. A sovereign state enjoys internal and external authority over said territory. According to Weber, a state must also enjoy a

¹⁴⁸ These labels echo existing typologies from Ruth Collier and Samuel Huntington.

"*monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory*" and for this reason such institutions as the armed forces, police, judiciary, and certain elements of civil service are critical components of the state.¹⁴⁹ One reoccurring theme in history and in today's discussion of the modern state is disagreement over the inherent individual rights of a population living under a single authority and the responsibilities designated to the state. One of the most prominent and enduring theories to emerge from this debate is the "Social Contract Theory" for which Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are most famous. Although the Social Contract is not always the most appropriate model to apply to all countries, particularly developing ones, it is a model well worth examining as it may have some potential to explain instability and the prevalence of coups in many parts of the world.

The "Social Contract" is the term given to the implicit arrangement between states and people which is necessary for each to survive and avoid a state of anarchy. It is premised on the notion that the "state of nature" i.e. a society without political authority, is naturally "*solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short*" as described by Thomas Hobbes.¹⁵⁰

While Hobbes invoked Machiavelli's rather pessimistic attitude towards the natural behavior of men, believing them to be apolitical and asocial, John Locke was slightly more optimistic, trusting that "*People will do the right thing as a group*" despite

¹⁴⁹ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *Essays in Sociology*, ed. Han Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

¹⁵⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 576. p. 103.

their fear of one another.¹⁵¹ In either event, both men thought that a social contract must therefore be established between the state and the people whereby the people relinquish some natural, individual rights to a state (or other authority) in return for the delivery or maintenance of social order through the rule of law – a civil right. This agreement formed the foundation for the creation of a legitimate, sovereign state, which was a distinct deviation from the traditional notion that legitimacy was granted unto the monarchy by the power of God.

An important note on the nature of the state is articulated by Christian Geffray who states:

*“the social existence of the State is not the result of violence, but of the populations’ belief that the exercising of state power is based on some form of the ideal of the public good, upon which along its legitimacy can be founded.”*¹⁵²

He deduces that treasonous behavior or behavior that betrays the ideal of the public good (including corruption) has significant moral effects which translate into social effects, namely, the declining strength and resilience of the rule of law as a social institution.¹⁵³ This leads one to an important feature of the social contract which is its dynamic nature. In other words, the social contract was only a useful arrangement so long as it served the interests of the people. Once violations of the social contract occurred, it

¹⁵¹ John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 148.

¹⁵² Christian Geffray, "State, Wealth, and Criminals," *Lusotopie*, no. 1 (2002).

¹⁵³ This subject is further examined in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections and the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

would be necessary to renegotiate the terms of the contract. In a worst case scenario, John Locke advocated the “*right of rebellion*” or the obligation of people to revolt against a government which did not act in the best interests of its citizens.¹⁵⁴ This, he believed, was the citizenry’s safeguard against tyranny. Yet social contract philosophers also believed in similar repercussions for individuals who violated their contractual obligations, such as engaging in criminal activities which endangered the rest of the citizenry. Thus punishments were established as disincentives to protect the population writ large against the malicious actions of a few societal rejects.

If Guinea-Bissau had such a system in place, it would be easy to see how drug trafficking could cause the demise of the social contract. By making it more attractive for the state to serve the interests of the drug trafficker, it essentially negates what semblance of accountability to the public may have existed. And this theory *may still* offer some applicability in the West African context, given that most West African states in the last 20 years at least nominally adhere to certain democratic norms. With the possible exception of Nigeria, most West African states were united when they exercised their “right of rebellion” over their colonial rulers who they did not see as acting in their best interests. Their quest for independence represented a population that sought to renegotiate the terms of their social contract so that democratically elected leaders could be placed in power with the expectation that they would serve their populations. By exercising one’s right to participate in the establishment of a higher authority, the population could voluntarily give up their natural, individuals rights in exchange for civil rights that

¹⁵⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*.

included security and the guarantee of the rule of law. The long history of coups and revolutions in Africa may be partially attributed to such popular protest against the state's inability or refusal to deliver these products, most commonly the rule of law.

But coups and revolutions may also be indicative of a different set of grievances and dynamics. While Guinea-Bissau's war for independence did indeed represent a genuinely popular movement, many African coups, juntas, and military regimes have served primarily to disenfranchise certain segments of the population and marginalize them from the central government. To understand this tendency, the previous discussion of patrimonialism once again offers the most helpful framework for thinking of African politics.

CORRUPTION

Corruption has been the focus of decades of academic research and debate, thus a thorough review of all the related literature would be impossible.¹⁵⁵ That said, the most important conclusion reached by all scholars is that corruption can take many forms including patronage, nepotism, kick-backs (bribes), extortion, legislative or bureaucratic

¹⁵⁵ The leading works on corruption have included: David Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *The Western Political Science Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (1966); Arnold Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, "Defining Corruption," in *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001); Arnold Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (Transaction Publishers, 1979); Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," *Foreign Affairs* Summer (1997); Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro Vicente, *Legal Corruption* (Washington D.C.: World Bank Institute, October 2005); Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," *American Behavioral Scientist* 8, no. 3 (1964); Joseph Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 2 (1967); Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy* (San Diego: Ap Professional 1978), 270.

conflict of interest, fraud, natural resource exploitation, misappropriation (the use of public resources for personal gain) among countless other definitions. While these are all important concepts, this section will highlight the mechanisms and implications of certain types of corruption that are most relevant to a “Narco-State.”

Corruption in Context

Whereas many authors have theorized about the causes, effects, and different types of corruption, Michael Johnston in particular has pioneered research that differentiates between various “syndromes” of corruption. That is to say, Johnston makes a concerted effort to describe the different groups of related symptoms that when aggregated, characterize a specific type of corruption. Although each of his proposed syndromes clearly describe what has been broadly accepted as “corruption” by authors throughout the years, he breaks down the concept into four groups exhibiting different combinations of political and economic participation and institutions. In these societies, groups of related activities, relationships, and social institutions will ultimately characterize a specific pattern of behavior. He also avoids focusing on specific corrupt activities, rather opting to examine systemic corruption problems which he defines as:

“uses of and connections between wealth and power that significantly weaken open, competitive participation and/or economic and political institutions, or delay or prevent their development.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Michael Johnston, *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 267. P. 12

As such, weak states and public-private relationships are critical components of his analysis. Johnston identifies four significantly different groups of countries: “Influence Markets” (typically mature liberal democracies that enjoy strong, legitimate institutions and steady participation such as the US, Japan, or Germany); “Elite Cartels” (typically reforming democracies with weaker political and economic institutions than Influence Markets such as Italy, South Korea and Chile); “Oligarchs and Clans” (typically transitional regimes which have recently undergone major liberalization such as Russia, Mexico, and the Philippines); and “Official Moguls” (typically emerge in undemocratic countries with new markets undergoing recent liberalization such as China, Indonesia, and many if not most of the sub-Saharan African countries.) In this last category political and economic institutions are weak or non-existent and are mainly used to secure access to wealth. The paradox which exists in these countries is that opportunities for personal enrichment are abundant, but political and economic power typically resides with one individual – the Official Mogul. Once he has secured his position of power, he is able to operate with relative impunity through patronage networks or outright intimidation. For this reason, Official Moguls are rarely popular with the population. Because the evolution of countries in this category is so dependent on the whims and agendas of one personality, the outward appearance and behavior of states may vary tremendously.

It is this latter category to which William Reno would most likely subscribe. As one of the nation’s leading expert on African politics, Reno has conducted extensive field research that has culminated with a comprehensive assessment of corruption in the

African state. He concludes that many African states, or rather the Warlords that control them, *“have used commerce to consolidate their political power within a coalition of interest among themselves, businesspeople, and local fighters.”*¹⁵⁷ The pursuit of commerce and business opportunities by the rulers of weak states, he argues, has been a consistent feature of most African conflicts. Yet even more egregious has been the tendency of African leaders to deliberately shun efficiency and free market enterprise, preferring rather to foster weak institutions that cannot pose a threat to the will of the leader and his “Shadow State.”¹⁵⁸ Reno asserts,

“Rulers who face threatening internal behavior intentionally cripple the arms of the state, which weakens the agencies that outsiders prescribe as the best means to mobilize resources to alleviate pressure from the international economy, such as debts, balance-of-payments imbalances, and instruments to enhance state revenues.”

This behavior is necessary, he believes, to preclude the consolidation of power by rising rivals. Rather than accountable leaders, Reno demonstrates how Shadow States or *“informal commercially orientated networks”* operate in parallel to government bureaucracies and use the state’s revenues for personal enrichment vice for the citizenry as a whole. As such, the Shadow State is by definition incompatible with the provision of public goods and represents a fundamental departure from the notion of a social contract. Rather, Warlords hope that individuals will seek their personal favor to protect

¹⁵⁷ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 260. P. 79

¹⁵⁸ Reno, “Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa.”

themselves from the disorder that the ruler's own methods create (see earlier section on patronage in the African state.)

Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou draw similar conclusions regarding African politics, which they refer to as "criminalized."¹⁵⁹ They refer to several indicators which demonstrate this criminalization, including the privatization of the legitimate means of coercion, hidden power structures at the most senior levels of government which benefit from the use of aforementioned means of coercion (organized gangs), and the complicity of the government elite in international criminal activities

Johnson's description of "Official Moguls," Reno's characterization of "Warlord Politics" and Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou's notion of the criminalization of the African state should resonate with any student of African politics. Alliances with the military, rationalizing the unconstitutional seizure of power and the implementation of a "Shadow State" by blaming previous corrupt regimes, the ruthless exploitation of the state's apparatus and the looting of the nation's natural resources all describe common forms of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. While some countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Senegal, or Ghana arguably do not deserve this designation, the commonly-labeled "Failed States" of Africa such as Guinea-Bissau illustrate Johnson's and Reno's accurate characterization of most African corruption.

¹⁵⁹ Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 144.

Narco-Corruption: State Neutralization and the Lootability of Drugs

In addition to the more “traditional” forms of corruption or patronage that may exist in West Africa, Peter Andreas notes how narco-corruption offers some of its own unique features. It is different from other “petty” corruption in that the pay-offs in question offer an extraordinary – often irresistible – incentive to use one’s official status for private gain.¹⁶⁰ This is particularly relevant where civil servants’ salaries may be especially low or nonexistent. Narco-corruption is also unique in that bribes are often paid “in kind” i.e. with drugs. While the value of the bribe isn’t different, the social implications of this type of bribe are significant – namely leaving a drug trail in regions where it wouldn’t otherwise be, often feeding local addiction and violence associated with competition for local market share.

But a more fundamental and structural feature of narco-corruption raised by Andreas is that neither traffickers nor the state enjoy a monopoly on power.¹⁶¹ For this reason, corruption is a two-way street – it reflects the traffickers’ influence over the state, but also the power the state wields over the traffickers, i.e. penetration of the state and by the state. In order to operate, traffickers must purchase an essential service which only the government can provide – non-enforcement of the law, while the state is in a position to demand bribes because it cannot be ignored or bypassed altogether. In other words, both have leverage over each other or in more benign terms – each has something the other one wants. In this way, the drug trade can be a mutually beneficial activity for traffickers

¹⁶⁰ Peter Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico," *Current History* (1998).

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

and government officials alike, although there will always be “spoilers” in the form of honest government official looking to arrest the illicit trade. Particularly given the high turnover rates in government leadership and the promotion of key officials, this is an inherently tenuous and at times unstable relationship.¹⁶² In some ways this represents a paradox, as Peter Lupsha argues, since the state’s drug enforcement efforts are fundamentally undermined by the corrupting influence of the DTOs, yet the drug trade continues to thrive due to the protection provided by a handful of compromised components of the state.¹⁶³

In another sense, narco-corruption is essentially the equivalent of taxation in the traditional Social Contract model. In return for bribes, the state provides protection to traffickers which allows them to operate. The level of bribery required is typically commensurate with the level of drug enforcement – or as Fiorentini and Peltzman point out – the greater the effectiveness of drug enforcement, the more it pays to invest in corruption.¹⁶⁴ In this way, government officials can at least give the impression that they are upholding their duty to enforce the law – arresting certain drug traffickers who may not be able to compete with the bribes offered by the larger cartels while still collecting from the latter. As Peter Andreas astutely points out:

¹⁶² Peter Lupsha, "Drug Lords and Narco-Corruption: The Players Change but the Game Continues," *Crime, Law, and Social Change* 16 (1991).

¹⁶³ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."; Lupsha, "Drug Lords and Narco-Corruption: The Players Change but the Game Continues."; Peter Lupsha, "Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico," *Transnational Organized Crime* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995).

¹⁶⁴ Fiorentini and Peltzman, *The Economics of Organised Crime*.

*“This dynamic favors large, well-connected smuggling organizations. Those smugglers with the greatest resources and contacts can most afford the corruption tax and pay it to the most appropriate tax collectors, while the smaller smuggling entrepreneurs are treated as tax evaders. Not surprisingly, it is the small-time smugglers who are most often “audited” and penalized.”*¹⁶⁵

There have been numerous scholars who have examined the political-economic implications of narco-corruption. Among the most notable scholars of Latin America are Francisco Thoumi,¹⁶⁶ Peter Andreas,¹⁶⁷ Peter Lupsha,¹⁶⁸ and Laurie Freeman.¹⁶⁹ They all emphasize the corrosive effects that narco-corruption has on state institutions, particularly law enforcement. When law enforcement officers are paid to “look the other way” while illegal activities occur on their watch, this may be referred to as state neutralization.¹⁷⁰ In this way drug traffickers are able to overcome the limits of the law by neutralizing those whose duty it is to enforce it. Once this practice becomes institutionalized, i.e. so well-established and structured that is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture, then its impact on the rule of law and good governance becomes tragically apparent. Similarly, states can be neutralized through the threat of force. In this

¹⁶⁵ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."

¹⁶⁶ Thoumi, *Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia*.

¹⁶⁷ See Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."; Peter Andreas, "U.S.-Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Border," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1996).

¹⁶⁸ See Lupsha, "Drug Lords and Narco-Corruption: The Players Change but the Game Continues."; Lupsha, "Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico."

¹⁶⁹ See Laurie Freeman, "State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs," (A Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) Special Report, June 2006).

¹⁷⁰ Geffray, "State, Wealth, and Criminals."

case, traffickers may threaten a government official's life if he does not see to all the trafficker's demands. As one can see, the powers of benefaction and punishment are two key means for neutralizing the state and its rule of law.

Christian Geffray has articulated what he believes to be unique about this notion of neutralization by clarifying what it is *not*: it is not the traffickers' intent to completely infiltrate the state and its institutions so as to allow its network to operate with impunity. In other words, traffickers are not attempting to purchase outright power over the state (as the theory of State Capture implies). In the case of drug trafficking, traffickers would have nothing to gain from exercising power themselves. And although neutralization will involve soliciting the willing participation of a government official, it does not mean that that individual is forever beholden to that trafficker. Rather what neutralization buys for the trafficker is a government official's willing renouncement of his duty to uphold the rule of law while serving in public office. Given that such a public official will have unarguably renounced his duty to the population who expect him to uphold the rule of law (and indeed pay taxes to ensure he does so) for the purpose of maintaining the legitimacy of the state, one can rightfully call this behavior treasonous. Many have called Mexico a "Narco-State" on these grounds, where government officials have either been bribed or violently coerced into cooperating with DTOs.¹⁷¹

A more recent typology of narco-corruption is that which exists in Afghanistan. Just some of the authors that have examined this "Narco-State" include Louise

¹⁷¹ For more information on the impact of drug-trafficking in Mexico see Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 192; Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."; Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

Shelley,¹⁷² Vanda Felbab-Brown,¹⁷³ and Mark Shaw¹⁷⁴ who differentiate Afghanistan from other “Narco-States” due to its drug-funded terrorist insurgency. Jonathan Goodhand has applied the “resource curse” framework to describe the situation in Afghanistan, where opium is the lootable resource that has contributed to a level of political order of varying degrees around the country and over time. He argues that in regions where rulers and private actors have developed joint institutions of extraction (i.e. both benefit from drug proceeds) political order is more likely than in areas where one or the other has attempted to dominate the trade. In fact, illicit lootable resources such as drugs almost always lend themselves to joint extraction, given the inherent difficulty (and illegality) of either public or private extraction. Furthermore, the extent to which joint extraction promotes stability depends greatly on the “sticks and carrots” or “punishment and benefaction” offered by rulers to private actors. Intimidation can be particularly effective as are monetary incentives. It is when this system dysfunctions that is the most common juncture for conflict to arise, i.e. when shifts in the power structure, fluctuations in the value of the resource, or leadership changes cause factions to fight over the distribution of the spoils.

¹⁷² Louise Shelley, "The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2005).

¹⁷³ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (Autumn 2005).

¹⁷⁴ Mark Shaw, "Drug Trafficking and the Development of Organized Crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan," in *Afghanistan's Drug Industry, Structure, Functions, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy*, ed. Doris Buddenberg and William Byrd (United Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank, 2006).

GUINEA-BISSAU IN CONTEXT

It is important to appreciate the environment and context in which these activities are occurring. In this field, Patrick Chabal, Henrik Vigh, Marina Padrao Temudo, Ramon Sarró, Joshua Forrest, and Lorenzo Bordonaro have emerged as the leading scholars on Guinea-Bissau and the surrounding region. A few of their characterizations of Guinea-Bissau are noted here.

Guinea-Bissau is unique in that it is one of the few countries in Africa to endure a war for its independence.¹⁷⁵ While most African countries negotiated autonomy from their colonial masters (with various degrees of difficulty), Guinea-Bissau waged a long war between 1963 and 1974 and finally became one of the last African nations to attain independence.¹⁷⁶ According to most scholars, the impact of this liberation war on the subsequent development of the state should not be underestimated. It left the military empowered, emboldened, and was perceived as the state's most legitimate institution as it successfully affected political change through the decade-long war. This of course has implications for a democratic state in which the military is subordinate to civilian rule, and this tension is alive and well to this day, most recently manifested by the double assassination of President Vieira and General Na Waie.

A critical force driving the rivalry between the military and its civilian counterparts was its ethnic composition. The Balanta (which reside in Guinea-Bissau,

¹⁷⁵ Tetteh A. Kofi, "Prospects and Problems of the Transition from Agrarianism to Socialism: The Case of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique," *World Development* 9, no. 9/10 (1981).

¹⁷⁶ Joshua Forrest, *Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict, and Renewal in a West African Nation*, vol. 157 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

Senegal, and Gambia) are the largest ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau with approximately one quarter of the population. However, they comprise 80% of the military. This stems from the Balanta's history, throughout which they have been thought of as "backwards" by their neighbors and colonizers. As such they were largely marginalized by the Portuguese and prevented from participating in the state's apparatus. Marina Padrão Temudo has performed extensive field research that examines the ways in which the Balanta compensated for this marginalization, but ultimately she determines that they made ideal recruits for Amílcar Cabral, the leader of Guinea-Bissau's revolution, unlike other tribes which had fostered alliances with the colonial powers.¹⁷⁷ Yet even following the liberation war in which the military was praised for its valiant effort against the Portuguese, the Balanta continued to be ostracized from the political sphere.¹⁷⁸ This set the tone for several military coup attempts, one of which ultimately ended in Civil War in 1998. Since then, Joshua Forrest notes that Bissauan politics have been plagued by perpetual and palpable power struggles between the military and political leaders.¹⁷⁹

Although the military was heralded as the most effective institution of the state, the political environment following independence has been characterized by some as "in

¹⁷⁷ Patrick Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003), 272.

¹⁷⁸ Virginia L. Bollinger, *Development Strategy's Impact on Ethnically-Based Political Violence: A Theoretical Framework with Comparative Applications to Zambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1984).

¹⁷⁹ Joshua Forrest, "Guinea-Bissau since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25 (1987).

need of a state,”¹⁸⁰ “*stable instability*,”¹⁸¹ or being plagued by incessant rebellions over decisive revolutions where there is rarely any profound political change.¹⁸² The infrequency with which African states have launched full-scale revolutions in favor of frequent rebellions was noted in 1963 by Max Gluckman.¹⁸³ He found significant differences in motivations and impacts between the two. Revolutions were fought in order to replace the existing political structure and redistribute the states resources and/or authority while rebellions typically reflected a competition for the power one attains as a state’s leader. Vigh describes this perpetual fighting as “*not ideologically articulated but socially situated*.”¹⁸⁴ This has also been termed “*politricks*” to indicate the politics involved in securing the state’s resources for the advantage of a few rather than the good of the state.¹⁸⁵ This is further echoed by other authors who have studied civil war and conflict in Africa, including Paul Richards,¹⁸⁶ Mark Huband,¹⁸⁷ and Stephen Ellis.¹⁸⁸ And all these descriptions are consistent with Mary Kaldor’s notion of “old wars” versus

180 "Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State," (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), Africa Report No. 142.

181 Michael Taussig, *The Nervous System* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 256.

182 Henrik Vigh, "Conflictual Motion and Political Inertia: On Rebellions and Revolutions in Bissau and Beyond," *African Studies Review* 52, no. 2 (September 2009).

183 Max Gluckman, *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 278.

184 Vigh, "Conflictual Motion and Political Inertia: On Rebellions and Revolutions in Bissau and Beyond."

185 Maya Christensen and Mats Utas, "Mercenaries of Democracy: The 'Politricks' of Remobilized Combatants in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra Leone," *African Affairs* 107, no. 429 (2008).

186 Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996), 182.

187 Mark Huband, *The Liberian Civil War* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 256.

188 Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy Updated Edition: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (New York: NYU Press, 2006), 350.

“new wars” where the former are premised on ideological change, progress, and modernization (often the driving force behind a revolution) while the latter are based almost entirely on identity politics, which invoke historic nationalist sentiments and nostalgia – arguably the impetus for many rebellions.¹⁸⁹

Yet while many describe the tendency of African leaders to exploit the state’s resources for their own personal enrichment,¹⁹⁰ Lorenzo Bordonaro goes even further, asserting that in Guinea-Bissau, political leaders and their patrimonial alliances do not even exist within the state. Rather, even the dysfunctional (criminal, hollow, or vacuous) state is declining, leaving leaders to function in a new political sphere that resides *outside* the state. This irrelevance of the state renders Guinea-Bissau vulnerable to influence by outside forces, including benevolent forces such as the IMF or EU as well as criminals such as drug traffickers, much in the same way as Strange’s notion of State Retreat. Bordonaro, among others, assert that the Weberian, Hobbesian, or Westphalian notion of a state does not apply to Guinea-Bissau. As he writes:

“The state in Guinea- Bissau appears as a legal and sociological fiction devoid of any sovereignty or political and moral authority that can survive beyond its empirical existence, shored up by external economic help and international regulations and agreements.”¹⁹¹

189 Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), 216.

190 Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*; Reno, "Clandestine Economies, Violence, and States in Africa."

191 Lorenzo I. Bordonaro, "Introduction: Guinea-Bissau Today - the Irrelevance of the State and the Permanence of Change," *African Studies Review* 52, no. 2 (September 2009).P. 37

This is similar to Ken Menkhaus's notion of "Governance without Government" which is how he characterizes the situation Somalia where the prolonged absence of a central government has prompted the rise of informal and "organic" systems of governance, such as those provided by clan elders, businessmen, and Sufi sheikhs.¹⁹² His description of the challenges Somalia's face in building a state sounds all too familiar to the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau:

"the lack of an effective government provides [local and international terrorists] with safe haven beyond the reach of law enforcement. To the extent that economic development requires an effective government to provide a dependable legal and security environment for the private sector, obtain international development loans, provide essential public goods, and catalyze economic growth, the absence of a responsible Somali government directly contributes to the country's enduring underdevelopment, which in turn produces social environments conducive to crime, violence, and radicalism."

The primary difference between Somalia and Guinea-Bissau is that the latter does, in fact, have a central government, however inept it may be. The impunity with which terrorists in Somalia and drug traffickers in Guinea-Bissau can operate is a testament to the inability of either to provide security and uphold the rule of law.

The situation in which Guinea-Bissau finds itself today is no wonder, given the engrained rivalry between the military and the political leadership and as Lorenzo

¹⁹² Ken Menkhaus, "Governance without Government in Somalia," *International Security* 31, no. 3 (2006/2007).

Bordonoro describes it, “*the irrelevance of the state and the permanence of change.*”¹⁹³ This is exacerbated by the dire economic situation, poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, and a multitude of other indications of state failure. The extent to which the state has been affected by drug trafficking is the question at hand, and thus this analysis must be based on a firm understanding of the political, economic, security, and social situation in Guinea-Bissau.

¹⁹³ Bordonaro, "Introduction: Guinea-Bissau Today - the Irrelevance of the State and the Permanence of Change."

3. WHAT IS A NARCO-STATE? HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

Drug-funded insurgencies in Latin America, and more recently in Central Asia, have prompted the use of the term “Narco-State” to describe countries that have fallen victim to drug cultivation, trafficking, and related activities. Yet as often as the term is used, consensus on a single definition of “Narco-State” has not emerged. Even General James Jones, then- Supreme Allied Commander, when testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations could not answer Senator Kerry’s question “*At what point does [Afghanistan] become a narco-state?*” He responded “*I don’t know exactly when you become a narco-state by definition, but it’s clear that the influence of narcotics on all organs of emerging Afghan society is there.*”¹⁹⁴

What has emerged is a general sentiment that is largely pejorative and typically insinuates that corrupt government officials either tacitly or actively facilitate the trade. “Narco-States” have also come to be regarded as extremely violent environments, where drug-funded insurgencies exist or where DTOs fight with one another for market share and wield significant influence over local and federal authorities. The term can even connote a public health issue where a significant portion of the population may be

¹⁹⁴ General James Jones, "Transitioning the Command in Afghanistan to the International Security Assistance Force," in *Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations* (Washington DC: 21 September 2006).

addicted to a locally-cultivated drug. As such, designating a state as a “Narco-State” does not tell us much about the nature of the relationship between the drugs and the state, other than there is one. This is why such vastly different operating environments as Mexico, Jamaica, Turkey, and more recently Tajikistan, and now Guinea-Bissau have come to be associated with this term.

EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF A NARCO-STATE

Despite this lack of an official definition, there have been several notable attempts to analyze what it means to be a Narco-State. While most accounts refer to Narco-States merely as countries with entrenched narco-corruption, research by David Jordan and Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter go one step further – describing the process by which a country becomes a Narco-State and the enabling conditions. These academic theories are described in this chapter, followed by the author’s definition of Narco-State to be used for this research. However, as a public and foreign policy issue, it is worth first presenting the U.S. government’s position vis-à-vis drug-producing and Transit States here.

1. Drug Majors and Transit States

The U.S. government has in place a process for identifying major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries. These countries, also known as “Drug Majors,” are designated as such by the President every year as required by section 706(1) of the

Foreign Relations Authorization Act.¹⁹⁵ Section 481(e)(2) and (5) of that act provides the following definitions:

The term “major illicit drug producing country” means a country in which

- a. 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
- b. 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
- c. 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States

Thus the U.S.’s definition of a “Drug Major” is derived primarily from the volume of illicit drugs that any one country cultivates. Although the USG does not use the term Narco-State in any official manner, it is true that the Drug Majors highlighted in Figure 8 present the greatest challenge for U.S. counternarcotics efforts and include those countries that are typically referred to as “Narco-States.”

¹⁹⁵ Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228)




Figure 8. Map of World Drug Majors FY2009
 (Source: Congressional Research Service Report on “International Drug Control Policy”
 9 February 2009).

However, one must be careful not to automatically designate the countries highlighted above as Narco-States. The countries in yellow are not on the Majors List due to any sub-par counternarcotics efforts, rather due to a combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the concerned government's most assiduous enforcement measures. As such, the Majors List does not reflect countries whose drug production or transiting have adversely affected the health of the state's institutions, which would be more in line with the academic definition of a Narco-State. That said, those countries colored in red have failed demonstrably during the previous twelve months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. As a result, these *decertified* drug

Majors will not enjoy the same level of foreign assistance as other Majors. For example, foreign assistance to Venezuela is limited to “*programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic institutions*” and Bolivia’s foreign assistance is limited to “*continued support for bilateral programs in Bolivia*”.¹⁹⁶ One can logically infer that because these states have failed to live up to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements, they may well be allowing, aiding, or even facilitating the cultivation, trafficking, or transit of drugs, thereby designating them in some sense as a Narco-State. However because other states might be pursuing a double-track approach, i.e. outwardly censuring drug-related activities while tacitly sanctioning their operations either through the threat of violence or through narco-corruption, the mere presence on the “Decertified Drug Major List” is insufficient evidence to be classified as a Narco-State.

The U.S. government also defines the term “Transit State” under section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.¹⁹⁷ Section 481(e)(2) and (5) of that act defines a “major drug transit country” as one:

- a. That is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or
- b. Through which are transported such drugs or substances;

According to Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, the single most important determinant of whether a state will be used as a transit zone is geographic proximity to producers and

¹⁹⁶ George W. Bush, Presidential Determination No. 2008-28, “Memorandum to the Secretary of State: Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2009,” September 16, 2008, at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/109777.htm>

¹⁹⁷ Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228)

consumers. Thus new production countries or new markets will require new trafficking routes and therefore typically signal the emergence of new transit countries. This is certainly what transpired in West Africa as the European market grew in size and profitability. Strong commercial and demographic connections, socio-economic and cultural features, and the desire for efficient and relatively secure routes also factor in to the rise of a Transit State. This is why the volume of legal traffic and the degree of law enforcement on a given route will impact a traffickers decision to use that route.¹⁹⁸ Weak states are often seen as low-risk, and the complicity of local officials makes operations particularly easy. On the other hand, governments' policies appear to have little impact on the decision to transit a state. This is opposed to the determinants of production, for which government policy is the most important indicator with socio-economic and cultural and geography factoring less so.¹⁹⁹

2. Narcostatization

While many have studied specific "Narco-States" such as Colombia, Mexico, Jamaica, Afghanistan, and even Tajikistan,²⁰⁰ few have attempted to place the concept in a theoretical framework. Although somewhat dated, David Jordan's 1999 work Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies presents an intriguing analysis of "Narco-States" and how they come to be. Drawing on his experience as Ambassador to Peru in the

¹⁹⁸ Tim Boekhout van Solinge, "Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Europe," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 89, no. 1 (1998).

¹⁹⁹ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

²⁰⁰ For specific case studies, see Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State*; Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut*; Letizia Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State," *Journal of Drug Issues* 37, no. 4 (Fall 2007).

eighties, he examines how many Latin American states as well as Russia have emerged as Narco-States to varying degrees, defined as:

“States where the criminalization of the political system has reached the point that the highest officials of the government protect and depend on narcotics trafficking organizations.”

By describing their different paths to “Narcostatization,” Jordan lays out a framework to explain how autocracies and democracies alike are vulnerable to the corrosive effects of organized crime, transnational capitalism, and the corrupting power of drugs. The framework that Jordan employs is one that defines Narcostatization as:

“The corruption of the political regime as a result of narcotics trafficking; the criminalization of the state. Narcostatization undermines the democratic check on the abuses of power by insulating elected officials from accountability and transforms the authoritarian state into a criminal one.”

He asserts that Narco-States typically pass through a state of anocracy - a term used by many scholars of political regimes²⁰¹ but which Jordan defines as:

²⁰¹ There is no one substantive definition of anocracy. Fearon and Laitin describe it as a “regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features” Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” Others define an anocracy as a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition group behavior but that has incomplete development of the mechanisms to redress grievances James Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 5-19 (1962). Marshall and Gurr differentiate anocracies from democracies and autocracies in terms of institutions and political elites that are generally unable to maintain central authority, control the policy agenda, or manage political dynamics. Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, ed. Center for International Development and Conflict Management (College Park: University of Maryland, 2003). See also Alexander Kohanski, “Martin Buber's Restructuring of Society into a State of Anocracy,” *Jewish Social Studies* 34, no. 1 (1972); Edward Manfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995).

“A system wherein a political or ruling class maintains itself in power despite the apparent existence of contested elections and full public participation.”

Jordan emphasizes that the Narco-State is just one form of anocracy and that not all anocracies are Narco-States. Moreover, anacrotization can occur in a democratic or autocratic state. The defining feature of anocracies is while they have formal democratic institutions such as contested elections and independent judiciaries, these institutions do not produce accountability or a reliable system of checks on the ruling elite. As a result, elites are typically able to maintain power despite the presence of democratic procedures.

Thus on a spectrum where democracy and autocracy lie on either end, anocracies fall in the middle as they exhibit features of each. This notion of anocracy is important for the study of Narco-States because according to Jordan, narcostatization is the most common process facilitating the anocratization of states, be them consolidated democracies, autocracies, or states in transition between the two. It does so by insulating elected officials from accountability and thereby weakens the democratic checks on abuse of power. He also emphasizes the importance of legitimacy for a political system which can all too often be lost by rulers' abuse of power. Without this, the government loses its right to be obeyed by the population, and the unaccountable use of power and ultimately tyranny ensues.

In his analysis, Jordan devises a narcostatization index which helps to measure the extent to which a state has succumbed to the forces of drug interests. Table 3 shows the levels of narcostatization which range from a state exhibiting the first signs of the process

to a state which has succumbed entirely to the interests of drug traffickers. The latter would have a government that relies on the surpluses paid by traffickers to service debts, limit taxes, subsidize, constituencies, buy off power contenders and project state power into other states and societies.²⁰²

Table 3. Index of Narcostatization Indicators

Level	Characteristics
1 – Incipient	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bribery of low-level officials • Widespread drug consumption and inability either through lack of capability or will to reduce demand • Increasing cultural support for drug consumption
2 – Developing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing governmental support for drug consumption • Antidrug activists removed from educational and cultural institutions • Government institutions (e.g. security, judicial, health, education) infiltrated or run by pro-drug officials
3 – Serious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Massive bribery and corruption of public officials • Substantial intimidation, including murder, of resisting officials • Corruption of local and regional police and judicial officials
4 – Critical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption at highest levels of national police and judicial systems, endemic extortion rather than bribery • Top-level police enter drug trade, protect it, and authorize political assassinations • Financing of journalists and magazines by drug lords; narco-journalists become known and remain in place
5 – Advanced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compliance of ministries, in addition to judiciary and police, with organized crime • A president surrounded by compromised officials • Possible complicity of the presidency itself; e.g., the president may be charged as capo di tutti capi and public not be surprised

(Source: David C. Jordan)

²⁰² David Jordan, *Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).

Having established the definition and range of narcostatization, Jordan addresses a more important question, which is: *how* does this process undermine the ability of a democracy to serve its intended purpose? First, narcostatization undermines the civic culture that sustains democracy. Given the assertion proposed by Barry Weingast that civil culture does not create a democracy but rather constrains the behavior of public officials, a decrease in political participation (i.e. elections) brought on by a decaying civil culture will greatly reduce the population's ability to hold its leaders accountable.²⁰³ Secondly, when drug profits are used to fund political campaigns, the accountability which he or she should have towards the public is fundamentally disrupted. Rather, they are beholden to the interests of their financiers until which time that citizens act in concert to remove them from public office. Third, narcostatization undermines a state's system of institutional checks and balances. Once one institutional center, be it the judiciary, executive, or law enforcement, becomes corrupted by drug money, they will become less likely to restrain other institutions engaging in this activity. Fourth, narcostatization ultimately transforms public servants into a ruling class, bypassing accountability measures and creating a tyranny that is equally influenced by drug traffickers as public servants. Lastly, narcostatization creates a situation whereby a state may succumb to the forces of a criminalized world system. When the transnational system of global governance and the economic system are corrupted, and the democratic

²⁰³ Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Role of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 2 (June 1997).

state has no incentive to remedy the situation, its relationship with the transnational system of global governance unarguably deteriorates.

3. Effectiveness of Enforcement

Another way in which some have attempted to think of Narco-States is by the degree of effective illegality of drugs in a country, i.e. the extent to which state authorities enforce the prohibitions against production and trafficking. This framework, as proposed by Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, consists of a spectrum where non-enforcement sits on one end, strict enforcement on the other end and lax enforcement in between.²⁰⁴ Under this model, the following characteristics may be observed:

Table 4. Spectrum of Government Enforcement of Laws Against Trafficking

Non-enforcement (a Narco-State)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local government tolerance or support (albeit tacit) for the drug trade; • Because risks of incarceration or seizures are effectively none, large-scale cultivation and holding large stocks is common. • Cultivation and trafficking activities may ultimately be considered legitimate commerce; • Culprits likely to attain social and/or political legitimacy; • Extent of violence and bribery depends on the strength and involvement of the state's authority. (Violence may be high if supporting state or quasi-state is weak; maybe low if the state or quasi-state is strongly institutionalized and directly involved with the drug trade.) • With strong state support, enterprises may form oligopolies or monopolies • Afghanistan today and Burma most clearly illustrate this category with regard to opiate production.
Lax-enforcement

²⁰⁴ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

- A less hospitable environment for drug producers and traffickers, with some enforcement;
- Due to the increased risk of enforcement, prices may be higher than under non-enforcement;
- Activities may not be as widespread;
- Small- or large-scale operations may arise, depending on the strength of the forces of order;
- Mexico most clearly illustrates this category, where government authorities have laws in place but enforcement is difficult.

Strict Enforcement

- Producers and traffickers must operate without the protection of the state;
- Illegal enterprises operating without the protection of the state are likely to be small, ephemeral, not vertically integrated, dependent on preexisting social relationships (family, ethnic, or familial ties).
- Due to high risk of incarceration and seizures, culprits are likely to avoid producing opiates (which carry the harshest penalties), will have relatively small stockpiles, rarely resort to violence which draws attention to their operations, and not seek to assume any government functions.
- Production and trafficking will remain criminal activities that don't enjoy legitimacy among the population.
- Competitive markets will likely arise for small enterprises and little opportunity for the development of monopolies.
- Afghanistan in 2001 when the Taliban violently forced the cessation of poppy cultivation is an example of strict enforcement.

(Source: Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter)

THE NARCO-STATE FRAMEWORK

It is interesting to note that Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter's notion of a Narco-State, i.e. where non-enforcement negates the illegality of the drug trade, is based primarily on narco-corruption (which undermines law enforcement), and market forces. Social factors such as consumption and even security implications are not addressed. Similarly, Jordan's notion of narcostatization relates primarily to politics and specifically, narco-corruption and the criminalization of the state. Security considerations and some societal factors such as consumption are addressed, but economic factors are not

considered at all. In fact, these frameworks imply that those states which are at an advanced stage of narcostatization or who experience non-enforcement, are so due to political impacts of narco-corruption and state protection, not the culmination of a variety of different factors. Yet “Narco-States” can exhibit characteristics that are either political, economic, security, or social in nature. This opens the door to a new framework – one which recognizes the impacts that the drug trade can have on all components of the state, not merely political factors. Thus the framework to be used for this research encompasses these four broad categories of activities that can be helpful when describing a “Narco-State.” Moreover, these categories are a useful way to think of the integrity of *any* state, so presents a particularly practical framework for thinking of a Narco-State.

That is *not* to say, however, that a Narco-State will necessarily exhibit features of all four categories. This framework is intended to be a spectrum that serves as a useful tool when evaluating the extent to which drugs have affected the integrity of a state. While all Narco-States will experience some corruption (a political feature) others will also contend with a narco-economy, narco-insurgency, and drug addiction. Thus for the purpose of this research, a Narco-State is defined as *a state whose political, economic, security, or social institutions have been impacted to some extent by the drug trade*. The extent to which they have been impacted can be measured using the framework presented here which describes some examples of the types of activities and characteristics that one may observe in a Narco-State. It is from these areas of activity that this dissertation’s hypotheses are derived.



Figure 9. The Narco State

i. Political Characteristics of a Narco-State

With regard to politics, the most common feature of Narco-States is narco-corruption or the “capture” of government officials by persuading them with massive monetary incentives to neutralize the state’s institutions to allow DTOs to operate with impunity. This may also be referred to as the “Criminalization of the state” as has often been evoked in discussion relating to Africa.²⁰⁵

Politically speaking, the term “State,” although an agglomeration of various parts, implies some semblance of governance, or at least government. Merriam-Webster defines a state as: “*a government or politically organized society having a particular character.*”²⁰⁶ In this case drug-trafficking interests would color the character of a state.

²⁰⁵ Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*.

²⁰⁶ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/state>

Yet a critical mechanism that ensures legitimacy and authority for the state is the “Social Contract” which can be interpreted as the willing relinquishment of some personal rights (and taxes) to a government in exchange for social order (and public services.) As soon as DTOs begin to assume the role of the state in the provision of social order and public services, be it through the rule of law or more coercive tactics, one can logically argue that this is the epitome of a “Narco-State.” Although the Social Contract is not the most appropriate model to apply to Africa, the mere use of the word “state” would seem to imply an area where drug-traffickers have assumed some of the critical functions of the state, such as providing security or social services. The most infamous example of this was Pablo Escobar’s who constructed apartments, sports arenas, and zoos for public consumption in Colombia in return for legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the public.²⁰⁷ Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, the Yakuza in Japan, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are additional examples of similar “Shadow States” where non-state actors have assumed some of the critical functions of the state.

ii. Economic Characteristics of a Narco-State

With regard to economic activity, one common depiction of a Narco-State is the presence of a narco-economy. There is no official definition of a narco-economy although the UNODC Executive Director did once refer to Afghanistan as having a narco-economy in the sense that drugs are its “*largest employer, income generator,*

²⁰⁷ Simon Strong, *Whitewash: Pablo Escobar and the Cocaine Wars* (London: Macmillan 1995).

source of capital, export and foreign investment.”²⁰⁸ For the purpose of this research, a narco-economy may be defined simply as an economy which is largely driven by and dependent on drug revenues. Admittedly, identifying the point at which an economy is “dependent” on one revenue source is an inherently difficult task, as it requires subjective determination and acknowledgement of the formal and informal economies (the latter of which are so prevalent in Africa). This research will determine the extent to which a narco-economy exists in Guinea-Bissau and its intersections with politics, security, and social factors.

iii. Security Characteristics of a Narco-State

With regard to security, the term “Narco-State” has long carried with it an image of violence, civil unrest, and in some cases bloody insurgencies. So there must be something more destructive at play than simply narco-corruption or a narco-economy. In many places governments are essentially forced to obey the will of drug traffickers rather than serve the local population. This was clearly the case in Colombia where thousands of police, judges, and government officials were killed in the “Drug Wars” and would also seem to be the case in Mexico where death threats have become common among politicians who reside in particularly strategic trafficking jurisdictions. Or, a drug-funded insurgency such as exists in Afghanistan is a common premise for labeling a country a Narco-State.

iv. Social Characteristics of a Narco-State

²⁰⁸ Antonio M. Costa, UN Anti-Narcotics Chief Calls for Wide-Spectrum Action against Afghan Opium Production (Moscow: Remarks made at a ministerial conference, 28 June 2006).

With regard to social implications, something one might observe in a Narco-State is a local market for the drug in question. For example, there are approximately 200,000 opium addicts in Afghanistan,²⁰⁹ and the same number of cocaine users in Tijuana alone – the largest per-capita rate in Mexico.²¹⁰ Consumption and addiction carry with them a bevy of social implications, including increases in prostitution (to pay for their addictions), increased prevalence of HIV/AIDS (as a result of unprotected prostitution or sharing of needles for drug injection), and ultimately higher mortality rates.

Narco-States in Transit States

On September 15, 2009 the President reported to Congress that the following countries are major illicit drug producing and/or drug-transit countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.²¹¹ While this list might represent the official U.S. government position, it clearly does not acknowledge countries such as Tajikistan, Guinea-Bissau, and even Turkey as significant Transit States even though the vast majority of government, UN, and academic literature states that they are.²¹² Thus for the purpose of this research, the definition of Transit State will simply be a country through which a significant amount of drugs transit between their source of production and ultimate destination.

²⁰⁹ Rukmini Callimachi, "Opium Addiction Ravages Afghan Families," *MSNBC News*, 2009.

²¹⁰ Emilio San Pedro, "In the Shadow of the Cartels," *BBC World Service*, 2008.

²¹¹ "Presidential Determination No. 2009-30," (Washington: The White House, 15 September 2009).

²¹² Christopher Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy," (CRS Report for Congress, 12 August 2009); Wyler and Cook, "Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy."

This identification as a “major drug transit country,” as well as its differentiation from a “major illicit drug producing country” is significant for this research, which will focus specifically on Transit States. Since Transit States, by definition, do not contend with illicit drug cultivation on their territory, this research yields profound new insights regarding the extent to which mere Transit States may also succumb to the pressures and forces of an illicit drug trade unrelated to cultivation within their borders. Indeed one of the premises of this research is that even Transit States can exhibit some features, if not the full spectrum of impacts typically associated with full-fledged Narco-States.

HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Just as Barry Buzan asserts that instability will result from the breakdown of the state – be it the idea of the state, its physical base, or its institutions²¹³ – this research similarly views threats to national stability as activities which threaten the integrity of the state. This framework presents four components of a state – political, economic, security, and social – which when working together correctly ensure the ability of the state to provide those functions designated to it such as the provision of security and good governance. If any one component of the state is compromised or falls victim to the deleterious effects of drug trafficking, I predict that instability may ensue. If corruption becomes so great that the “social contract” is skewed, if an illicit economy begins to outweigh the licit economy, if drug-induced or related violence increases, or if the health of the population deteriorates – each of these have the ability to destabilize the state. Or

²¹³ Buzan, *People, States and Fears: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*.

as Mohammed Ayoob states, a threat to security may arise when any of these sectors are affected to the extent that they:

*“threaten to have political outcomes that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and other regime to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics.”*²¹⁴

Hypotheses

I assert the following hypotheses that relate to the impact of the drug trade on the four components of a Transit State, how instability may develop, and how the drug trade impacts a failed state.

- i. Guinea-Bissau has narco-corruption but political institutions are not fundamentally compromised;
- ii. Guinea-Bissau does not have a narco-economy;
- iii. Guinea-Bissau has not experienced narco-violence over control of the drug trade;
- iv. The Guinea-Bissauan population has not been affected by the drug trade;
- v. Instability resulting from the drug trade will manifest itself in fundamentally different ways depending on the capacity of a state to control its territory and govern its people.

Research Questions

- i. *What have been the political, economic, security, and social impacts of the drug trade in Guinea-Bissau?*
- ii. *How much state capacity is functioning and how much has been "captured" i.e. replaced by DTOs in Guinea-Bissau?*

²¹⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

- iii. *What are the mechanisms by which drug trafficking could destabilize a failed (transit) state?*
- iv. *Where does Guinea-Bissau lie on the spectrum of Narco-States?*
- v. *How do the impacts of drug trafficking differ in a Transit State with varying institutional strengths and capacities, i.e. a failed state versus a functioning state?*

METHODOLOGY

The primary methodology employed for this research is the examination and comparison of a series of case studies. Guinea-Bissau represents the main case with four additional “mini case studies” studied from which to derive useful insights and to place the main case in context. These include Jamaica, Mexico, Turkey, and Tajikistan.

A case study is a research methodology commonly used by social scientists seeking to perform an in-depth investigation of a single individual, group, or event to explore causation in order to find underlying principles.²¹⁵ Per Robert Yin, using such a case study approach is useful when asking questions relating to “why” and “how” and also in cases where the researcher is unable to control events (such as is possible in experiments), when the subject in question is a contemporary case and especially with complex phenomena are involved.

Though some academics frown upon case studies, claiming useful generalizations cannot be drawn from one case and applied to other cases, there are many compelling reasons to employ comparative case study analyses. Using “Comparative Historical

²¹⁵ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Second Edition ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 1994).

Analysis” (CHA) to examine a series of historical revolutions, Jack Goldstone demonstrates how CHA can be a particularly effective method to analyze a small sample of cases rather than attempting to account for all possible differences among a large sample set.²¹⁶ By studying a small number of cases and recognizing that the limited sample set will be far from homogeneous, Goldstone shows how establishing a deep and accurate understanding of the underlying causal relationships actually produces greater insights than a less detailed analysis of a larger sample size. By delving into a few cases in great detail, then comparing patterns and anomalies (both of which are equally embraced as critical parts of the investigation), one can begin to make some generalizations or inferences about the cases being studied. Moreover, after establishing a sound understanding of a number of representative cases, researchers can propose hypotheses about related cases and have a set of qualitative data against which to test those theories. This study of Narco-States lends itself perfectly to such an approach, since there is clearly no one set of necessary and sufficient requirements for the emergence of a Narco-State. Rather, an analysis of several cases to identify the most important causal mechanisms and impacts that the drug trade can have in a given state is required.

²¹⁶ Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Case Selection

Aside from the obvious international attention it has received, there are other compelling reasons to use Guinea-Bissau as the case study for this research. Some may argue that comparing the impacts of drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau with Mexico or Turkey is unfair because the size of Guinea-Bissau's population, geographic area, and economy is miniscule in comparison. However, the availability of such a small country offers an ideal opportunity to examine the specific effects of drug trafficking in a confined area for two reasons. First, the economic effects of drug-trafficking activities should be more apparent in a small economy that is more vulnerable to "shocks" to the system such as a sudden influx in cash. Second, following local events and political developments via online media sources is far more manageable in a small country. To that end, it is not unreasonable to plan to follow every single news source from Guinea-Bissau and many from the surrounding region.

With regard to the four additional mini case studies selected, each was deliberately chosen because they are states that have been identified by international research institutions such as the UN as being significant Transit States and having severe drug trafficking problems. According to the latest International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Turkey continues to be a major transit route for heroin from production and processing centers in Southwest Asia to markets in Western Europe.²¹⁷ Though Mexico is also known to cultivate heroin and marijuana, it is estimated that as much as 90

²¹⁷ International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, 2009).

percent of all cocaine consumed in the United States transits Mexico.²¹⁸ According to the same report the remaining 10% transits the Caribbean, wherein Jamaica stands out as one of the countries most exploited by drug traffickers. Tajikistan was chosen because most sources agree it is the central Asian country that has been most affected by drug cultivation in Afghanistan.²¹⁹

Their designation as Transit States, however, is the extent of their similarities. Since this research seeks to better understand how the drug trade affects Transit States and specifically how it has or could affect Guinea-Bissau, it is important to consider the universe of potential trajectories. Thus it is not enough to examine countries that on the surface appear to exhibit the same characteristics as Guinea-Bissau. Rather, this study embraces differences to better understand what factors may give rise to certain outcomes. These four cases offer plenty of opportunity to compare and identify differences and parallels which may be helpful in analyzing the case of Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, the specific selection of these four cases offer a sample that includes countries from a variety of geographic regions, of different sizes (populations and economies), and varying level of political will to stem the drug trade. These countries also emerged as Transit States at different times over the course of the last century, thus precluding specific global events from skewing each case study analyses. However, the conditions that gave rise to the

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ See, for example "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict," (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 26 November 2001), Asia Report No 25. and Johan Engvall, "The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organized Crime in Tajikistan," *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 6 (September 2006). And Marat, "Impact of Drug Trade and Organized Crime on State Functioning in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan." And Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State."

drug trade in each country are examined not only to provide a temporal baseline but also to address potentially confounding factors such as globalization, existing internal struggles, external threats, and international interference in politics, all of which affect the development and severity of each case.

Most importantly, these countries were selected since they exhibit a range of institutional state capacities. According to the Failed States Index published annually by the Fund for Peace which evaluates 177 countries on 12 metrics of state decay, the selected countries fill this criterion (see Figure 10 below). Jamaica and Mexico are states that are *relatively* stronger than Turkey, and all of which perform better than Tajikistan or Guinea-Bissau. In fact, Tajikistan ranks close to Guinea-Bissau on most metrics of state failure.




Figure 10. Country Rank in Failed State Index, 2010²²⁰

²²⁰ The Failed States Index 2010 (Washington DC: Fund for Peace, 2010).

Using a similar methodology, the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University's Center for Global Policy's State Fragility Index also ranks these countries in that order, (a higher value indicates a stronger state in the Failed State Index while a higher value indicates a more fragile state in the State Fragility Index).




Figure 11. Country Rank in State Fragility Index 2009²²¹

Despite these institutions' best efforts to accurately convey qualitative data in a quantitative framework, these rankings may be objectionable to some. Labeling Jamaica as stronger than Turkey, which has performed so well in the international arena in recent years is potentially misleading. Turkey is part of the G-20 with a diversified economy, a strong military that functions well within NATO, and relatively high levels of education.

²²¹ Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility Center for Systemic Peace and the Center for Global Policy (GMU), 2009).

Similarly, many would argue that Mexico enjoys stronger state institutions than Jamaica, though it also ranks below it in both indices. Though this research is predicated on these rankings, the author acknowledges the difficulty inherent in quantifying qualitative metrics and that these rankings may be slightly misleading in some regards. As such these rankings were *not* considered to be the ultimate determinant of a state's strength; rather they provide the foundation for designating Mexico and Turkey as "Strong" states; Jamaica on the cusp between "Strong" and "Weak"; and Tajikistan and Guinea-Bissau as "Failed". What is important is that they all occupy different positions on the spectrum of failed and functioning states. This is a critical differentiation in order to answer research questions three (what are the mechanisms by which drug trafficking could destabilize a failed state?) and five (how do the impacts of drug trafficking differ in a Transit States with varying institutional strengths and capacities?)

Research Design

i. Establishing a Baseline – Examination of the Mini Case Studies

The first step in this research effort was to establish a "baseline" from which to compare and contrast Guinea-Bissau. A survey of other Transit States offered a benchmark to be used as a basis for comparison, and provided some context for thinking of the West African case. To achieve this, a macro-level examination of Turkey, Tajikistan, Mexico, and Jamaica was performed with an eye toward identifying the most significant political, economic, security, and social impacts of the drug trade in those countries. Other defining characteristics, notable trends and interesting insights were also

captured. Conclusions from these cases then informed the main study, while recognizing the importance of treating each as a unique case.

Given the research that has been performed on these states, a review of existing literature sufficed to establish a baseline. A deep-dive content analysis of the following types of literature was conducted:

- Think Tanks and other research institutions (International Crisis Group, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Institute for Security Studies, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment);
- Commentaries by local and foreign analysts;
- European sources (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction);
- International Organizations (UNODC, World Bank);
- Scholarly papers;
- Written testimonies of SMEs at Congressional Hearings.

Then, recognizing that no one Transit State is the same and that the experiences of each will differ, it was possible to put the main case of Guinea-Bissau in context.

ii. Researching Guinea-Bissau – The Main Case Study

Given the illicit nature of drug-trafficking and the requirement that traffickers evade detection by law enforcement, obtaining reliable and accurate primary data relating to Guinea-Bissau is difficult. In fact, it is inherently impossible to measure the total amount and scope of the trade on any reliable level. This is a known weakness of research relating to illicit markets, particularly for academics who lack access to

classified intelligence or data attained by law enforcement.²²² Instead, this research relies on qualitative and quantitative indicators supported by anecdotal evidence ascertained from interviews. Employing both qualitative and quantitative methods ensures a more comprehensive understanding of the state of Guinea-Bissau and will produce more robust results than could be accomplished using just one approach.²²³ That said, it is critical to control the reliability of sources, avoiding potentially erroneous information that is all too prevalent on the internet. As such, sources were selected with caution to ensure they are reputable sources with a proven track record of delivering useable information. The sources listed above were selected by the author on the grounds of their quality and objectivity, which was confirmed by most interviewees. In addition, the following types of literature pertaining specifically to Guinea-Bissau and West Africa were examined:

- African government organization sources (African Union, Economic Community of West African States);
- Press reports and radio/news broadcasts from Guinea-Bissau and the surrounding region (available in Portuguese, French, and translated into English)

While secondary sources were important in establishing the general themes in Guinea-Bissau, this portion of the research relied mainly on interviews with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Interviewing government officials *in* Guinea-Bissau would be not only dangerous but unlikely to yield any substantial information given the illicit nature of their activities. That said, an opportunity arose for the author to interview more

²²² Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt, *The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics: A Study in Criminal Power* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2006), 263.

²²³ Charlene Yauch and Harold Steudel, "Complementary Use of Qualitative and Quantitative Cultural Assessment Methods," *Organizational Research Methods* 6 (2003).

than 15 high-level counternarcotics officials from eight West African countries, including three from Guinea-Bissau during a November 2009 conference in Dakar, Senegal on “Combating Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa.” In addition to these invaluable interviews, this research relied on discussions with numerous SMEs in the fields of counternarcotics and regional experts on West Africa who offered valuable insights regarding these activities and the impacts on the institutions of West Africa. Many of these individuals spent time on the ground in Bissau and were asked about their experiences, insights, and perspectives regarding the impacts of the drug trade on the state in Guinea-Bissau. Interviewees did not all come from the same organization, institution, or even country, but they all demonstrated expertise in the topic of drug trafficking in West Africa or were regional experts who could attest to the impacts of the drug trade in Guinea-Bissau. This included SMEs from:

- Across the USG (DoD, State Department, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Treasury Department);
- Counter-narcotics officials and regional experts from various West African countries;
- NGOs (Search for Common Ground, ACDI-VOCA, Fund for Peace; Human Rights Watch);
- Scholars from research institutions (International Crisis Group, Institute for Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, International Assessment & Strategy Center, Wilson Center);
- Academia (Mary Washington College, George Mason University, Georgetown, Northwestern, Brown, University of Virginia, College of William and Mary);
- African Regional Organizations (Economic Community for West African States, West African Police Chiefs Committee, Inter-governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa (GIABA));
- International Organizations (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, World Bank);

- Private corporations who contend with illicit smuggling of their commodities (British American Tobacco).

All interviewees were consenting adults. An open-ended interviewing methodology was used with each participant responding on a *non-attribution* basis which helped to ensure candid answers. Each interview lasted approximately one hour during which they were asked specific questions while allowing respondents sufficient time to express their own thoughts and ideas. While the objective of the dissertation is to examine the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, interviewees will be asked about the trends they see in West Africa writ large as well as specifics on Guinea-Bissau.

While interviews were the primary source of data for this case study, they were supported with quantitative data pertaining to Guinea-Bissau. The purpose of quantitative data was to identify trends which could be explained by information collected from interviews and other qualitative data sources. This “trend analysis” utilized an array of statistical data, such as that available in the 2009 “Index of African Governance Results and Rankings” (formerly the “*Ibrahim* Index of African Governance Results and Rankings.”) This index is a compilation of primary datasets collected for each African country. When aggregated, the index produces scores for the following five categories: Safety and Security, Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption, Participation and Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, Human Development. Each of these categories is broken down into sub-categories which are further broken down into sub-sub-categories which provide the raw data derived from a variety of sources. This raw

data can be mined for evidence of increased violence, political corruption, or an uncompetitive economy, for example. Because this index is tailored to provide the most relevant and representative data for Africa, it provides by far the best dataset for any analysis of African political, economic, security, and social institutions.

While the Index on African Governance does provide *some* economic data, it is intended to portray the extent to which sustainable economic opportunity within a state is related to its overall governance. It is not designed to reflect irregularities in economies that are commonly associated with illicit activities such as drug-trafficking. Despite with the general dearth of economic data on Guinea-Bissau, this research analyzed trends and anomalies that could be attributable to drug trafficking activities, such as indications of money laundering. The following sources were used to measure fluctuations in exchange rates, Foreign Direct Investment, remittances, and other variables as deemed appropriate:

- Central Bank of West African States (Annual Reports)
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (FDI in Least Developed Countries at a Glance: 2005/2006)
- International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008)
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (Country Economic Reports)

When official state data was available to the researcher, it was treated with caution. Not only can statistics “lie”²²⁴ but “official” statistics can often be extremely unreliable, particularly in developing countries with little oversight on the collection of such data. As one Crisis Group interviewee noted, they reflect a “*soviet mentality; they*

²²⁴ Darrell Huff, *How to Lie with Statistics* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1954).

*are intended to please the leadership by proving government bodies have achieved their assigned targets.”*²²⁵

iii. Testing the Hypotheses: Operationalizing the Narco-State Framework

This was the most extensive analytical portion of the research wherein the author operationalized the proposed four-dimensional Narco-State framework. Qualitative indicators and quantitative measures were captured, where available, and evaluated for all five cases. By comparing how the drug trade has affected politics, the economy, security, and society in Guinea-Bissau with those sectors in other Transit States, it was possible to authoritatively state whether the proposed hypotheses had any merit or if the case studies demonstrated that they in fact did not.

²²⁵ "Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure," (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 12 February 2009), Asia Report No 162.

4. CASE STUDIES

This chapter explains how each of the four selected case studies emerged as major Transit States and presents the most significant and unique impacts that this trade has had on each case. Appendices A-D offer additional empirical evidence in greater detail which provides the foundation for the analytical judgments made in this chapter. Whereas some states arose as transit routes thanks only to their geographic position, others required the “perfect storm” to set the right conditions for their use as a transit hub. By establishing these parameters for each case, it ensures that flawed generalizations and conclusions are not made with regard to Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, one can better understand the appeal of Guinea-Bissau to cocaine traffickers, the universe of potential implications for the “state” and compare the severity of Guinea-Bissau’s “Narco-Stateness” with other Transit States.

JAMAICA

The rise of Jamaica as a Transit State

Thanks to its physical geography, the absence of law enforcement in many areas, the vulnerability of government institutions to corruption, and its proximity to the large U.S. market, Jamaica has long been the largest marijuana producing and exporting country in the Caribbean, followed closely by Belize. But following the Jamaican government's Anti-drug Master Plan in the 1980s, Jamaica succeeded in achieving a significant reduction in the cultivation and exportation of marijuana.²²⁶ Unfortunately for law enforcement, Colombian cocaine traffickers had already identified Jamaica in the late 1970s as an ideal transit route for their cocaine en route to the U.S. and (to a lesser extent) Europe.

Geography is a major factor in explaining *why* Jamaica has been targeted as a convenient transit hub for Latin American cocaine. Its proximity to both the source and destination countries, its small area of just under 2 million square miles of maritime space punctuated by small islands, 600 miles of under- or unpatrolled coastlines all compounded by weak and ineffective law enforcement institutions and a government easily subject to corruption have made Jamaica an environment particularly conducive to drug trafficking. Second, transportation infrastructure in the region (as a result of historical trading routes through the Yucatan and Windward Passages), including ports, harbors, and more recently frequent passenger airline flights, commercial freighters, and

²²⁶ Carl Williams, Consequences of the War on Drugs for Transit Countries: The Jamaican Experience *Crime and Justice International Magazine* Sam Houston State University.

other conveyances, has been exploited by cocaine traffickers.²²⁷ For example, a common flight route used by many traffickers is between San Andreas, Colombia and Montego Bay, Jamaica. And similarly to Guinea-Bissau, Jamaica hosts many legal and illegal airstrips that are exploited by drug traffickers. In 1994, the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) identified 49 illegal airstrips, many of which were less than 1,500 feet long. This is just barely long enough to be used by the types of planes that commonly transport drugs, such as the Pipers, Cessnas, and KingAir aircraft. Moreover, many traffickers have constructed makeshift landing strips on roads and cane fields, and have used legal landing strips owned by large sugar or bauxite companies.²²⁸ Third, Jamaica hosts a large number of willing couriers, between its own impoverished citizens and a large tourism industry.²²⁹ Lastly, a large Jamaican diaspora resides in major cocaine markets, including the U.S., UK, and Canada. As with the Turks in Western Europe, the Jamaican diaspora helps to coordinate logistics, facilitate relationships, and generally enable Jamaican DTOs to exploit those markets more efficiently.²³⁰

These factors combined have rendered Jamaica vulnerable not only to drug trafficking but to all aspects of organized crime.²³¹ Colombians seized the opportunity in the late 1970s to target Jamaican marijuana traffickers to assist them with their operations

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 295.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, *Report No. 37820* UNODC and the World Bank's Latin America and the Caribbean Office, March 2007).

²³¹ Bruce Bagley, "Globalisation and Latin American and Caribbean Organised " *Global Crime* 6, no. 1 (2004).

while they aggressively sought to establish cocaine marketing and distribution networks in the region. While Colombians remained the suppliers, Jamaican crews were recruited to provide logistical support, transport the drugs, coordinate the arrival of the cocaine-laden go-fast boats from Colombia, accommodate foreign crews, and refuel boats to be dispatched back to Colombia. Jamaican marijuana traffickers happily complied – cocaine is much less bulky and therefore easier to transport, easier to conceal, and is a far more lucrative a commodity than marijuana. Jamaica soon emerged as a major node in the international drug network that linked Latin America to the U.S. and UK.

Figure 12 illustrates the low volume of cocaine seizures until 1990, when law enforcement turned their focus from marijuana to cocaine.




Figure 12. Cannabis and Cocaine Seizures in Jamaica, 1980 – 2006
(Source: UNODC Drug Seizures Database)

Yet Figure 12 also shows that cocaine seizures in Jamaica have fluctuated greatly since 1990. Despite the attraction of Jamaica, it is not the only potential operating environment in the Caribbean. “Displacement,” i.e., DTOs diverting their operations from one vulnerable territory to another, is commonplace the Caribbean, as evidenced by the use of other island nations by cocaine traffickers.²³² The UNODC reports that the relative importance of Jamaica and the Caribbean writ large as a transit hub for cocaine has diminished greatly over the last 15 years and especially since 2001, when successful U.S. interdiction efforts, aided by high-tech radars, caused traffickers to identify new routes. This is how Mexican DTOs entered the cocaine trade, taking control from their Colombian suppliers and directing more of the product through Central America and Mexico.²³³ Figure 13 shows this relative decline in the use of the Caribbean as a transit hub.

²³² Williams, *Consequences of the War on Drugs for Transit Countries: The Jamaican Experience*

²³³ World Drug Report 2010, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010).




Figure 13. Distribution of Cocaine Flows to the U.S. Market, 1998 – 2007
(Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2010)

That said, the volume of cocaine estimated to transit Jamaica is still significant. In 2003, the Tactical Analysis Task Force estimated that approximately 100 metric tons of cocaine passed through Jamaica each year. Assuming each kilo is worth U.S. \$30,000, the value of this trade is approximately U.S.\$3 - \$4.5 billion per year.²³⁴ This is almost five times the revenues generated from Jamaica's leading legitimate foreign exchange earner, tourism. Another 2006 report indicates that Jamaica is the center of a \$3.6 billion crack-cocaine trafficking network, the value of which is estimated to be equivalent to 45 – 50 percent of Jamaica's GDP in 2001.²³⁵

²³⁴ Williams, Consequences of the War on Drugs for Transit Countries: The Jamaican Experience

²³⁵ Colin Clarke, "Politics, Violence and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 25, no. 3 (2006).

The Unique Political Situation in Jamaica

Having identified why Jamaica was targeted by Colombian DTOs as a Transit State, and before delving further into the impacts of the drug trade on the state, it is worth first describing the unique relationship that has evolved between Jamaica's political parties and the urban populations of Kingston. It was among these urban areas in and around Kingston where much of Jamaica's drug activity transpired, but only after a long process in which the drug trade slowly affected the balance of power between political parties and Jamaican "posses," so that the former declined while the latter grew.²³⁶

Following the days of independence and throughout the 1970s, the two main political parties – the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP) – each built separate residential communities in low-income neighborhoods which they stocked with fanatical supporters.²³⁷ These politicized slums, whose purpose was exclusively to mobilize votes, became known as "garrisons," and each was strictly controlled by one of Jamaica's many posses.²³⁸ In return for housing and jobs provided by the PNP or JLP, the parties could expect their posses to secure votes from their respective garrisons by way of coercion, intimidation, or bribery.²³⁹ In creating these clearly delineated party strongholds, violence in urban slums increased as posses ensured

²³⁶ Jamaican posses are based in Jamaica as well as outside the country, particularly in the New York City area and Toronto, Canada. They first became involved in drugs and gun-running in the early 1980s. Jamaican posses are affiliated with Jamaican political parties, such as the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party.

²³⁷ "Slum Rises to Protect Godfather," *New Zealand Herald*, 29 May 2010.

²³⁸ "Slum Standoff in Jamaica over Drug Lord's Extradition to US," *New Zealand Herald*, 24 May 2010.

²³⁹ Carlos King, "How to Successfully Dismantle Political Garrisons," *Jamaicans.com*, 1 August 2008.

that this system of patronage worked as intended.²⁴⁰ It is also known that the criminal activities of the posses, including drug- and gun-running, have been protected (or at least tacitly permitted to occur) by these political parties. However, the changing nature of the drug trade in the 1980s – from marijuana to cocaine – prompted a change in the affiliations of the posses. Whereas their purpose and function initially revolved around politics, they have since focused their activities on reaping the rewards of the cocaine trade – a far more lucrative pastime than rustling up votes.²⁴¹ As a result, political actors began to lose their monopoly on power in the face of growing influence of the drug barons. That said, each gang still remains closely tied to a political party.²⁴² In fact, Christopher "Dudus" Coke, a Jamaican drug lord, probable firearm trafficker, and the leader of the Shower Posse gang who was targeted by Jamaican law enforcement in May 2010 is thought to have delivered votes to the ruling JLP and specifically Prime Minister Bruce Golding, whose parliamentary district includes the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood. According to a Jamaican investigation, Coke was "instrumental" in electing Golding to parliament in 2007.²⁴³

It is important to understand this historical background and the unique type of corruption that has developed in Jamaica as it ultimately contributed to the unique situation that exists in Kingston today, where posses have become so empowered by the

²⁴⁰ Clarke, "Politics, Violence and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica."

²⁴¹ Ibid; Horace Levy, *They Cry 'Respect': Urban Violence and Poverty in Jamaica* (Mona, Kingston: Center for Population, Community and Social Change, Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of the West Indies, 1996); Amanda Sives, "Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clientelism in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica," *Latin American Perspectives* 29, no. 5 (2002).

²⁴² King, "How to Successfully Dismantle Political Garrisons."

²⁴³ "Is Jamaica's Most Wanted Man Like Robin Hood?," *AOLNews*, 24 May 2010.

drug trade that they enjoy extraordinary influence in Jamaican politics and have effectively supplanted legitimate government authorities in some locations.

The Defining Features of Jamaica's Narco-State

As described in detail in Annex A (Empirical Evidence for Jamaica) Jamaica has been impacted by the drug trade in multiple ways.

Politically, narco-corruption has not only undermined the state's capacity to effectively uphold the law, but it has also compelled many ordinary citizens to resort to vigilante tactics in the face of ineffective national institutions. This erosion of confidence in the state's ability to govern seems to have been the impetus for the reversal of the social contract, whereby DTOs perform critical public services normally designated to the state. In many urban communities, this reversal of the social contract has formed a "state within a state" where powerful drug traffickers have filled the vacuum left by an incompetent – or unable – government. This has certainly occurred in areas around Kingston where Jamaican posses have been empowered by the drug trade and cultivated mutually beneficial relationships with members of their communities. In order to maintain influence within their communities, Jamaica's DTOs and posses have engaged in significant "social investment," a term coined by Griffiths in his study of drugs and crime in the Caribbean. DTOs in Jamaica have been known to provide medical and school supplies, health-care, sporting equipment and facilities, humanitarian relief, etc. to members of their communities.²⁴⁴ Moreover, since the drug trade brings business and

²⁴⁴ Griffiths, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

jobs to a region, it is not surprising that the beneficiaries of these services not only welcome these criminal groups but actively disrupt and impede law enforcement efforts at apprehension. The demonstrated loyalty of citizens residing in Christopher Coke's neighborhood of Tivoli Gardens in May 2010 is a testament to the power and legitimacy of these posses in Jamaica.

Jamaica's "Narco-State" has also been characterized by an alarming increase in drug-related homicides and other violent crimes, the latter of which has imposed a significant cost to the government in terms of requirements for domestic security, law enforcement, and even public health. Interestingly, Jamaica is unique from other Transit States, as its elevated homicide levels at least temporarily corresponded with a decrease in drugs transiting the region as a result of heightened counternarcotics efforts. This is an important insight for a small, impoverished country such as Guinea-Bissau, where one could easily imagine local gangs and cabals becoming accustomed to a steady revenue source, only to panic when that revenue source is suddenly cut off, forcing them to find new sources of income to maintain the luxurious lifestyles to which they had become accustomed. Fortunately the will of the Jamaican state to bring its capacities to bear in reducing elevated homicide levels have paid off, as evidenced by falling crime rates in 2010.²⁴⁵ And although the military has never exercised direct control over the Jamaican government, there is some concern among scholars that the use of the military in

²⁴⁵ "Jamaica's Murder Rate Falling," *United Press International*, 8 April 2011; "Major Crimes Down in June," (Kingston: The Jamaican Constabulary Force, Office of the Director of Communications, 9 July 2010); Mark Wignall, "Why Has Jamaica's Crime Rate Fallen?," *Jamaica Observer*, 3 February 2011.

counternarcotics effort could catapult the military into the political sphere.²⁴⁶ While the military is already intimately involved in politics in Guinea-Bissau, this is an important observation for Africa writ large, where militaries are frequently the dominant institutions of the state and where the drug trade could easily justify its gradual, subtle, and unconstitutional seizure of power, disregarding civilian rule and in doing so, creating a military state.

Economically, Jamaica appears to be benefitting from the massive revenues associated with drug trafficking, despite the high cost of the aforementioned crime to the government and private industry. Marijuana cultivation, cocaine trafficking, and associated activities such as money laundering have in fact injected significant levels of illicit cash into the licit Jamaican economy, including through remittances and in foreign exchange holdings. During the 1980s, one estimate of the number of Jamaican farmers involved in marijuana production alone was 6,000.²⁴⁷ When one considers *all* those “employed” either directly or indirectly in the drug trade in Jamaica, estimates jump to the tens of thousands.²⁴⁸

Socially, Jamaica has experienced increased cocaine consumption and addiction as a result of traffickers and couriers being paid in kind, with many arguing that marijuana has acted as a “gateway” drug, encouraging more users to try cocaine who

²⁴⁶ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

²⁴⁷ Scott MacDonald, *Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 177.

²⁴⁸ Carl Stone, "Crime and Violence: Socio-Political Implications," in *Crime and Violence: Causes and Solutions*, ed. J. F. Phillips and Wedderburn.

otherwise might not have.²⁴⁹ Crack cocaine in particular emerged as the drug of choice for many of the country's poorest citizens, being used by people between 15 and 30 (arguably the most productive segment of society).²⁵⁰ Jamaica's democratic civil society has also suffered, with the government citing the drug trade as justification for seizures of conveyances law enforcement reasonably suspects of containing drugs –*without a warrant* – under section 24(1) of the 1987 amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Act. Likewise, the Criminal Justice Administration Amendment Act of 1994, designed to address the deportee problem that arose as a result of the drug trade, has serious repercussions for constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of association and movement.²⁵¹

In these ways, all aspects of the Jamaican state have been impacted, to various extents, by the drug trade. The local narco-economy provides revenues and opportunities for employment that would not otherwise exist; drug gangs provide security and social services for their respective communities where the legitimate government otherwise would not; and consumption and addiction to cocaine has increased. And while violence and criminality have long characterized Jamaican society, there is indisputable evidence that at least some portion of it relates to the drug trade. Fortunately, the state has demonstrated both the political will and the capacity to reduce this violence.

²⁴⁹ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

MEXICO

The Rise of Mexico as a Transit State

Although cocaine is the narcotic typically associated with Mexico in the 21st century, opium and heroin first characterized Mexico as a major grower and manufacturer of drugs. Marijuana has long been a widely-cultivated crop and continues to be very important, but it was opium and later cocaine that contributed to the sharp rise of Mexican organized crime, the array of criminal activities that accompany it, and the unprecedented levels of violence that exists today.

The opium trade in Mexico dates to 1906, when according to one theory, the San Francisco earthquake caused many Chinese immigrants – and their opium – to relocate to Mexico. In fact, a Chinese gentleman named Sam Hing is often cited as Mexico's first drug lord, setting an example for the many locals who followed in his footsteps.²⁵² At that time opium was legal, but pressure quickly mounted from those seeking to cleanse the nation's moral fiber to ban heroin production in 1920 and opium poppy in 1926. Coupled with prohibition in the U.S., during which time Mexican "rum runners" became skilled criminals, these factors were a boon for nascent Mexican organized crime groups.²⁵³ Not surprisingly, they quickly came to dominate the heroin, and later, cocaine markets in the Western Hemisphere.

It has always been the demand for drugs in the U.S. that has driven the drug problem in Mexico. During WWII, the U.S. government nominally pressured Mexico to

²⁵² Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

²⁵³ Ibid.

control its narcotics traffic into the U.S. However, since the U.S. lost access to the primary poppy-growing regions in the Far East (occupied by Japan) and Turkey (allied with the Axis powers), it was in need of an alternative source of opium with which to produce morphine to provide to injured Americans. This prompted the negotiation of a secret deal with Mexico to cultivate poppies in the Western Sierra Maestra. Locals quickly profited from the lucrative crop, and its cultivation became more or less institutionalized, with government officials purchasing the plants for export. Furthermore, the war had increased the U.S.'s demand for hemp fiber in order to manufacture rope, so cultivation of marijuana also found a growing market. When the war ended and the U.S. resumed its imports of Asian and Middle East opium (which was of a much higher quality than Mexican opium), growers in Mexico found that the market in the U.S. was sufficient to justify their continued operations across the border, particularly as many returning soldiers had acquired addictions while overseas. Once these operations were no longer sanctioned by the U.S. government, the licit-though-secret opium trade morphed into an illicit trade fed by demand in the U.S.

Throughout the 50s and 60s, various Mexican DTOs emerged in key regions, such as the Sinaloa cartel in the northwestern part of the country. The Sinaloa region was an extremely effective base of operations for opium smugglers, due mainly to the completion of a pan-American highway, the construction of a regional airport, and the mere existence of a 400-mile coastline that facilitated trafficking activities. Likewise, the Gulf Cartel, based just south of Texas, grew out of an existing network of whisky runners who had smuggled alcohol and cigarettes into the U.S. (primarily California) during

prohibition. These cartels, among others, focused at that time on trafficking heroin into the U.S. However, beginning in the 1980s, greatly improved U.S. interdiction efforts in the Caribbean and South Florida forced Colombian cartels trafficking cocaine through the Caribbean to identify new routes and methods for their shipments. They turned to their Mexican counterparts to carry out their distribution, thus removing much of their risk in transporting cocaine. By the end of the 1990s, most Mexican DTOs were firmly entrenched in the cocaine market, having effectively been outsourced by the Colombians. The initiation of NAFTA in 1994 also facilitated the trafficking of drugs and other illicit substances into the U.S., causing many to label the U.S.-Mexican border as the “soft-underbelly” of drug commerce.²⁵⁴ As explained earlier, seizures are not always the best indicator of drug volume transiting a particular region. Yet Figure 14 clearly shows how cocaine seizures suddenly increased in the late 1980s after years of little to no traffic, reflecting the increased use of Mexico as a Transit State for cocaine.

²⁵⁴ Samuel Logan, "Mexico's Internal War," *Power and Interest News Report*, 14 August 2006.




Figure 14. Cocaine Seizures in Mexico, 1980 – 2006
(Source: UNODC Drug Seizures Database)

Political Corruption in Mexico

Having identified the underlying conditions contributing to the rise of Mexico as a Transit State, and before delving further into the specific effects of the drug trade on the state, it is worth first emphasizing the prevalence of corruption in Mexico, particularly that which arose under the Salinas administration. Political corruption in Mexico dates back to the arrival of the Spanish, who some assert did not benefit from certain Enlightenment ideals such as the rule of law.²⁵⁵ Yet most scholars agree that it was the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) that institutionalized political corruption in Mexico and particularly the Presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari that introduced unprecedented levels of corruption.²⁵⁶ In fact, many argue that Mexico was essentially a

²⁵⁵ Louise Shelley, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 17, no. 33 (August 2001).

²⁵⁶ Alan Doig, *Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 448; Shelley, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition."

one-party state under the PRI, which dominated Mexican politics for as long as it did thanks to the corruption that it institutionalized.²⁵⁷ It is important to highlight and examine the nature of this corruption, lest we attribute today's corruption solely to the rise of the cocaine trade.

When one party or political group dominates a given city or region for a significant amount of time, corruption within that organization tends to increase²⁵⁸ and in doing so, precludes the healthy growth of a competitive party system.²⁵⁹ During its 71-year tenure (from 1929 – 2000), the PRI came to embody these attributes, frequently providing benefits including jobs, business contracts, educational opportunities, and other social services to its members.²⁶⁰ This corruption culminated, most agree, under the Salinas Administration (1988 – 1994), though it became so entrenched that the subsequent Zedillo Administration could not achieve political reform within the corrupted party, despite genuine efforts.²⁶¹ While Salinas was widely lauded by the international community for his ambitious campaign of privatization and opening up the Mexican economy (like many Latin American countries²⁶²), his actions in fact severely

²⁵⁷ Neil Docherty, "Murder, Money, and Mexico," in *PBS's Frontline Reports* (A FRONTLINE coproduction with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Air date: 8 April 1997).

²⁵⁸ Shelley, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition."

²⁵⁹ Michael Johnston, "Public Officials and Private Interests and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet," in *Corruption and the Global Economy*, ed. Kimberly Ann Elliott (Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 1997).

²⁶⁰ Shelley, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition."

²⁶¹ Stanley Pimental, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico," *Trends in Organized Crime* 4, no. 3 (1999).

²⁶² Luigi Manzetti and Charles Blake, "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America: New Means for Old Ways," *Review of International Political Economy* 3, no. 4 (Winter 1996).

undermined the legitimate economy and inadvertently contributed to the rise of organized crime and corruption.²⁶³

Privatization in Mexico was not a fair process by anyone's standards. Although Salinas was elected on a platform to modernize and privatize the Mexican economy by allowing state-owned monopolies to be purchased by foreign investors, he in fact sold these enterprises (such as banks, airlines, telecommunications, oil companies, etc.) exclusively to a small group of his own friends. Moreover, they were sold at highly inflated prices, thereby eluding any criticism from opposition forces that those businesses were being sold "on the cheap" to Salinas's inner circle of friends. In return for the high price tags, however, Salinas offered extremely generous rewards under the table. He assured his buyers that they would be rewarded handsomely with favorable regulatory deals associated with the newly-implemented NAFTA, that their companies would enjoy a long-term monopoly over their respective industries, and that public-private sector cooperation would ensure the profitability of their new investments.

As a result of privatization, Mexico's richest businessmen were made even richer, creating a new cadre of Mexican billionaires which had never before existed. Privatization also allowed those with illicit money from drugs, gambling, and other illicit trades, to launder their revenues into the legitimate economy through newly-acquired and formerly state-owned businesses. Since many of these businessmen had preexisting ties to drug traffickers, they acquired extraordinary influence with the Salinas administration.

²⁶³ Peter Andreas, "When Politics Collide: Market Reform, Market Prohibition, and the Narcostatization of the Mexican Economy," in *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*, ed. Peter Andreas and Richard Friman (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1999).

Perhaps the best-known example of government collusion with drug traffickers was Raul Salinas, the president's brother, as well as a bevy of governors and mayors who were also in the pockets of drug traffickers.²⁶⁴ As such, the privatization process in Mexico served not only to enrich a small clique of Salinas's close friends, but facilitated the laundering of illicit funds into the legitimate economy and contributed to the rise of organized crime in Mexico.²⁶⁵

After 71 years of one-party rule, the PRI eventually lost the presidency to Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000. However, the PRI's legacy of political corruption demonstrates that Mexico has long been affected by unfair political practices unassociated with the drug trade. That said, it has limited the state's capacity to act against crime and corruption and will continue to be a major hurdle in the years to come.

The Defining Features of Mexico's Narco-State

As described in detail in Annex B (Empirical Evidence for Mexico) Mexico has been impacted by the drug trade in multiple ways.

The most prominent feature of the drug trade in Mexico – at least to an outside observer – is the disturbingly high murder rates on the U.S.-Mexican border. Since the beginning of Calderon's tenure in December 2006, more than 28,000 people have died in

²⁶⁴ Docherty, "Murder, Money, and Mexico."

²⁶⁵ Andres Oppenheimer, *Bordering on Chaos: Mexico's Roller-Coaster Journey toward Prosperity* (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1996), 416.

Mexico's drug war.²⁶⁶ In 2008 alone, there were 6,587 drug-related murders in the country.²⁶⁷ Between January 1st and May 2010, drug-related violence in Juarez alone claimed more than 1,000 lives, making it the “murder capital of Mexico.”²⁶⁸ The cause of this violence is three-fold: intimidation by DTOs toward those who threaten to expose their violent tactics; elimination of government officials who threaten their operations; and competition for transit routes, local consumption markets, and other strategic locations. Vis-à-vis intimidation perpetuated by DTOs, this is most evident with regard to the murder of journalists and other members of the media who expose narco-corruption and the other narco-antics of drug traffickers. Violence directed toward government officials (particularly politicians and law enforcement officers) has increased measurably in the last 10 years. While there were no known assassinations of Mexican mayors from 2000 to 2005, more than 20 have been killed since then including six in 2010 alone.²⁶⁹ Similarly, between 2005 and 2008, 6,000 public servants were murdered in Mexico.²⁷⁰ Yet the vast majority of homicides in Mexico may be attributed to competition among DTOs for strategic transit routes, such as those on the U.S. border or coastal ports. It is important to note, however, that DTOs are just as likely to form alliances as rivalries, depending on the perceived risk involved, the value of the drugs trafficked, and personal

²⁶⁶ Randal Archibold, "Mexico Paper, a Drug War Victim, Calls for a Voice," *New York Times*, 20 September 2010.

²⁶⁷ "Mexican authorities seize 33 tons of cocaine in 3.5 years" Media: Xinhua Byline: N/A Date: 01 June 2010

²⁶⁸ "6 Gunned down in Mexican border city" Media: EFE; Byline: N/A; Date: 28 May 2010

²⁶⁹ David Shirk, *Strengthening Mexican State Capacity* (Draft Council Special Report) (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2010).

²⁷⁰ Video, *Steel or silver*.

relationships. These constantly changing alliances and rivalries that exist among Mexico's drug cartels, explain why there are so many fluctuations in murder rates, as organizations exact revenge on others, or join forces for a more lucrative payday.

These murder rates have come to characterize Mexico's "Narco-Stateness." Most agree that the violence in Mexico is due more to the Calderon administration's efforts to quell the drug trade rather than the drug trade itself. Calderon has engaged the Mexican military on unprecedented levels, deploying tens of thousands of troops to establish street patrols, man checkpoints, train local police forces, and generally oversee other domestic law enforcement functions in states with high levels of drug violence.²⁷¹ Jorge Chabat, a prominent Mexican scholar of the drug war, has noted

*"Mexico's drug war has become much more violent in the last year and a half, in some ways because of the government's actions... Before, the government didn't attack cartels, so there was equilibrium. Once they started cracking down and arresting leaders, there was a fight over turf among those who remained."*²⁷²

This is an invaluable insight for any policy maker who will ultimately be forced to choose between quelling the drug trade or quelling drug violence. As Mexico shows us, if they chose the former, that strategy must be accompanied with a corresponding strategy to address the unintended consequences of increased violence.

²⁷¹ Shirk, Strengthening Mexican State Capacity (Draft Council Special Report).

²⁷² Indira Lakshmanan, "Drug-Related Violence Moves into Acapulco: Area's \$1.35b Tourist Industry May Be at Risk," *Boston Globe*, 30 July 2006.

In addition to these profound security impacts, the effects on Mexico's political sphere are hard to overemphasize. The narco-corruption that has tainted so many of Mexico's political institutions – elections, the criminal justice system, not to mention the complicity of so many state officials – is appalling and reminiscent of Colombia during its “narco heydays.” Narco-corruption is rampant not only among high-profile state officials, but also law enforcement officers, prison guards, and other low-level civil servants. For instance, the provision of vehicles, money, other goods by major drug lords to police officers is commonplace. In return, police may provide the “brains” for traffickers' operations, helping drug barons to find safe havens, providing protection through thousands of smuggled automatic weapons,²⁷³ making introductions to potential business partners, protecting them from higher levels of Mexican law enforcement, equipping them with computers, and even aiding in the purchase of real estate across the border to facilitate trafficking to Latino communities in the U.S.²⁷⁴ Narco-corruption is also a means employed by Mexican DTOs to direct the state's law enforcement efforts and resources toward a particular rival, whether to exact revenge or divert attention away from their own operations.

Paying off public servants in exchange for their agreement to ignore illegal activities – and at times even participate in them – has fundamentally undermined the development of democratic political institutions in Mexico. The inability of the Mexican state to maintain the integrity of elections, the criminal justice sector, its military and

²⁷³ Elaine Shannon, *Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can't Win* (New York: Viking, 1988).

²⁷⁴ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

other security institutions as well as protect its critical infrastructure is a testament to the overwhelming power and influence of DTOs. And while some members of the federal government and local governors are complicit in trafficking activities, the federal government is not a Narco-State in the same sense as local regions are. Examples abound of DTOs gaining such popularity in certain communities that they effectively supplant legitimate local authorities. Each DTO essentially runs its own “mini” Narco-State with the connivance (attained either through corruption or coercion) of government officials. Each has a private army to investigate new markets and routes and to protect old ones from encroachment. Although these “zones of impunity” have decreased as a result of Calderon’s tough stance against traffickers and corruption, (zones down from 2,204 in 2008 to 233 in March 2009,)²⁷⁵ these shadow states are still very powerful where they exist. There are countless examples of DTOs in Mexico that dispense charity and social services (money, jobs, roads, lighting, parks, schools, churches) to those residents living in their communities. This has the effect of undermining, if not negating the programs administered by the government such as Oportunidades (the principal anti-poverty program of the Mexican government which provides cash transfers to households that can demonstrate regular school attendance and health clinic visits) and Procampo (a program of agricultural subsidies for farmers).²⁷⁶ Because assistance from DTOs is typically more generous than government programs drug barons are often venerated for their benevolence, particularly as it is directed toward the community’s poor.

²⁷⁵ Marc Lacey, "29 March 2009," *New York Times*, In Drug War, Mexico Fights Cartel and Itself

²⁷⁶ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

Though Mexico's "Narco-Stateness" is most evident within its political and security spheres, there have been economic and social impacts as well. Economically, reports estimate that the drug industry in Mexico generates \$20 billion per year and employs anywhere between 150,000 – 450,000 people, rivaling the auto industry as an economic force.²⁷⁷ The multiplier effects associated with the narco-economy include demand for the services required by participants in any illicit trade include transportation, security, banking, communications, etc, all of which create jobs for the ordinary population. Moreover, front companies established for the purposes of money laundering may also produce jobs. This is counteracted to some extent by the demise of some regions' tourism industries, much like has occurred in Jamaica. Perhaps the most obvious example is Tijuana, where in June 2008 one news report stated that

*"at least 200 people have been killed in drug violence this year, merchants say tourism is down as much as 90 percent compared with 2005, when an estimated 4 million people visited. Half of the downtown businesses -- more than 2,400 -- are shuttered."*²⁷⁸

One woman interviewed for the report indicated that her craft store which once generated at least \$6,000 a month now brings in only about \$300 in monthly sales.

Socially, cocaine addiction has indeed increased in regions through which cocaine is trafficked, but it is the erosion of a democratic civil society, and the rise of a narco-culture, where even the Catholic Church has ties to drug traffickers, that has made

²⁷⁷ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."

²⁷⁸ Manuel Roig-Franzia, "Tijuana Strip Turns Ghostly in Wake of Drug Violence," *Washington Post*, 16 June 2008.

Mexico unique.²⁷⁹ Children grow up immersed in a whole genre of literature, music, and theater that glamorizes Mexican drug lords in much of the same way as Italian mobsters have been portrayed in movies such as *The Godfather*.

²⁷⁹ There are several known examples of Catholic priests who have fostered close relationships between the drug barons and the church, wherein the church sanctions, either outright or indirectly, the activities of drug traffickers in exchange for significant narco-financing. See Annex B for more detail.

TAJIKISTAN

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan began its ascent as a major Transit State for Afghan opiates crossing Central Asia en route to their final destination – namely Russia, China, and Europe.²⁸⁰ Though opiates may have been transiting the country prior, heroin was seized for the first time in Tajikistan in late 1995, and by 1998 it had flooded the streets of Dushanbe. Evidence of this increase was the plummeting price of heroin each year. Whereas a kilogram bought in Dushanbe cost \$17,000 in 1996, its price dropped to \$3,000 in 1998 and was as low as \$1,000 in 2000.²⁸¹ Although Tajikistan's economy is the world's most reliant on remittances – nearly 50 percent of GDP according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2008, some estimate that in 2007, 30 – 50 percent of the economy was linked to the illicit opiate industry.²⁸² With several cases of senior government officials being implicated in the drug trade, along with skyrocketing consumption and a drug-funded civil war, one cannot deny that the drug trade has affected all aspects of the Tajik state.

²⁸⁰ 3% ultimately end up in the U.S. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, vol. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119141.htm> (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 25 February 2009).

²⁸¹ Assessment of the Drug Trafficking Situation in Central Asia, *Rapid Assessment of Drug Abuse in Central Asia* (Dushanbe: Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan, 2002).

²⁸² Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State."; "Tajikistan: Poverty Pushes People to Drug Trafficking," *Eurasianet*, 21 December 2000. Svante Cornell also came to this conclusion using Tajikistan's GDP for 2003 which was \$1.2 billion. Meanwhile the production of opiates in neighboring northeastern Afghanistan, which are mainly smuggled through Tajikistan, stood at 5,400 MT of opium – roughly equivalent to 60 tons of heroin. High-quality heroin was priced at \$7,000 a kilogram in Dushanbe, hence a total value of \$378 million. He admits that this was not all income generated in Tajikistan, but shows the value of the drug trade as compared to the economic production in the country.

Tajikistan's drug trade is fundamentally connected to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Figure 15 illustrates this relationship between heroin and opium seizures in Tajikistan compared with the number of hectares cultivated in Afghanistan, showing various trends over time.




Figure 15. Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan and Opiate Seizures in Tajikistan
(Source: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009 and Drug Seizures Database)

As Figure 15 illustrates, seizures of both heroin and opium in Tajikistan have increased since 1994. More importantly, Figure 15 shows that based on seizure data, opium trafficking thrived during the civil war. While the data indicate a drastic decrease in opium seizures in 1998 and again in 2001, this happened concurrently with a rapid increase in seizures of heroin. According to the UNODC, this was evidence that opium was being refined into heroin before transiting Tajikistan's borders or while within them. In 2001, production practically stopped in Afghanistan following the Taliban's religious

edict to cease all cultivation (due in part to international pressure). However, the fact that heroin continued to be seized is a clear indication that the Taliban was stockpiling heroin in order to drive up the price and generate even greater revenues in the face of dwindling supply. This has been well documented in a number of publications.²⁸³ While opium seizures continued to decline, heroin seizures reached a peak in 2004, which corresponded with a record high cultivation year in Afghanistan (up to that time). Given the general decline in opium seizures since 2001 alongside an increase in heroin seizures and coupled with other intelligence from the field, experts deduced that this trend can be explained by the existence of more heroin processing labs in Afghanistan which convert opium into heroin before leaving Afghanistan. This makes for a much less bulky commodity to transport. The decline in opium and heroin seizures since 2005 is a result of the transfer of responsibility for Tajikistan's 1,200-kilometer long border with Afghanistan from the Russian Border Forces (RBF) to Tajik troops. Whereas the RBF were responsible for 2/3 of the seizures on this border, their withdrawal and replacement with the less competent Tajik forces in 2005 had a negative impact on drug interdiction efforts.²⁸⁴ This was a significant development for Tajikistan's law enforcement efforts and is discussed in more detail below.

The greatest insight to be taken from Figure 15 is to recognize the vulnerability, resilience, and power of this illicit market. While the market in opiates is clearly vulnerable to fluctuations in cultivation, changes in the political climate, the practice of

²⁸³ Peters, *Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda*

²⁸⁴ International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, 2005).

stockpiling and changes in law enforcement tactics, fluctuations also signal the potential universe of corruption, violence, and generally corrosive impacts that the illicit trade may have on a Transit State. For example, Tajikistan reported seizing 5,600 kilograms of heroin in 2003. The UNODC estimates that assuming seizures are 10 percent of the actual total, (giving a real figure of approximately 50,000 kilograms and a street value of US \$9,000 per kilogram in Tajikistan, its street value in Dushanbe would be about \$450 million. Furthermore, that figure could rise to between \$1.5 and 1.8 billion in Moscow, and exceed \$3 billion in some EU countries.²⁸⁵

Like Guinea-Bissau, the rise of Tajikistan as a Transit State is a relatively new phenomenon. Unlike the other cases examined which have been involved in some aspect of the global drug trade for years, it was the confluence of a number of factors that ultimately created the “perfect storm” in Tajikistan that has set the right conditions for its emergence as a major Transit State. Its devolution to this status is more complex than the other cases, and the causes for its demise are described in some depth here.

The Rise of Tajikistan as a Transit State

First and foremost, geographic shifts in the opium trade have contributed to the rise of Tajikistan as a Transit State, specifically Afghanistan’s replacement of Burma as the major global producer. Since the drug trade in Tajikistan is inextricably tied to the drug trade in Afghanistan, Tajikistan’s geographic proximity made it an attractive trafficking route in the early 1990s when Afghanistan (under the Taliban) superseded

²⁸⁵ "Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan's New War: Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide," August 2004.

Burma as the world's main supplier of opium. Until that time, there had been some cultivation by the Mujahedeen to finance its operations against the Soviets in the 1980s, but in general Afghanistan was not a significant opium grower. Once the Taliban began to allow and even encourage cultivation, Tajikistan's geography immediately rendered it vulnerable to trafficking. Moreover, certain disputed civil war enclaves where authority was contested (for example, between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) were extremely attractive to traffickers since neither side actually wielded any power or had a notable law enforcement presence.²⁸⁶

It is important to note that some poppy cultivation did occur in Tajikistan following independence from the USSR. However, the amount was minimal and never amounted to a significant crop in the broader Tajik economy. By 1995, local opium and its derivatives were largely supplanted by cheaper and better quality opiates imported from Afghanistan. Thus it was the rise of Afghanistan as a producer country that ultimately put Tajik opium farmers out of the cultivation business and into the trafficking business.

Second, a massive consumer market has arisen in Russia, sandwiching Tajikistan in between the source and the market for the drug. Russia had been a relatively minor heroin consumer before 1995 but has quickly risen in the ranks of consumption. Today, it follows Western Europe as the second largest heroin market in the world (see Figure 16).

²⁸⁶ Maral Madi, "Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan: Structure, Implications and Countermeasures " *Central Asian Survey* 23, no. 3-4 (December 2004).




Figure 16. Global Heroin Consumption, 2008
(Source: UNODC World Drug Report, 2010)

Third, heightened interdiction efforts in Iran – the historic Transit State of choice for Afghan opiates – have squeezed many traffickers’ operations into Tajikistan. In the mid 90s, the Iranian government cracked down on drugs transiting its borders, forcing many traffickers to find alternate routes. Many began to use the “Silk Road” – one of the most historically important trade routes connecting China and Central Asia with the West. This route took traffickers north through central Asia where most of their drugs seized were in Tajikistan.²⁸⁷

Fourth, ethnic ties on either side of the Tajik/Afghan border have facilitated well-connected networks of trust, which are critical for any illicit trade. Nowhere is this as

²⁸⁷ Drug Trade in Eurasia Database (Uppsala Silk Road Studies Program)

evident as in the region of Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan and southeastern Tajikistan (see Figure 17).



Figure 17. Region of Badakhshan

(Source: <http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/centrasia/xbadakhshan.html>)

Although now technically an Afghan province, much of historic Badakhshan lies within Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), where Tajiks – many of whom are Ismaili Muslims, a religious minority that has historically been marginalized – comprise the majority of the population along with some Kyrgyz and Russian minorities.²⁸⁸ Moreover, there is a complex network of transit routes linking the largest trade hubs in this region. The existence of such a network of tight-knit communities and existing transit routes on both sides of the border is extremely conducive to the transportation of any commodity, but coupled with porous borders and poor border control, it is especially easy for illicit commodities to be smuggled.

²⁸⁸ *Find out All About Badakhshan*, (accessed 1 October 2010).

Furthermore, the strong ethnic and religious ties between Afghanistan and Tajikistan have not been limited to the Badakhshan region. There are actually more Tajiks in Afghanistan (7,666,843 comprising 27 percent of the total population) than within Tajikistan's own borders (5,879,316 comprising 80 percent of the total population).²⁸⁹

Fifth, the impact of its civil war and its aftermath should not be underestimated when examining drug trafficking through Tajikistan. Though inextricably linked to cultivation in Afghanistan, the Tajik Civil War (1992–1997) provided the impetus – arguably a requirement – for states, non-state actors, and individuals alike to engage in drug trafficking. One must not confuse this concept with the impacts that drug trafficking had on the civil war – those will be addressed in a following section. Rather, it is critical to understand that the civil war created the environment and conditions that were conducive to drug trafficking, thus facilitating the rise of Tajikistan as a Transit State.

For President Emomali Rahmonov's government as well as the anti-government United Tajik Opposition (UTO) (an alliance of democratic, liberal, and Islamist forces), drugs were arguably enablers of their operations. Both sides needed funds with which to operate, and the nascent opium trade provided an easy and lucrative means to raise revenues. In this way, the civil war provided the motivation for each side to engage in the drug trade. For the Tajik population, the civil war created the dire economic conditions that compelled many individuals to resort to trafficking in the absence of other opportunities. The socio-political-economic situation in Tajikistan following the civil war

²⁸⁹ Calculated from the CIA World Factbook's demographic statistics for 2009.

are worth briefly describing to fully comprehend *why* so many individuals turned to drug trafficking as a livelihood.

Most sources estimate that the Tajik Civil War cost \$7 billion, killed between 50,000 - 100,000 men and created between 800,000 to one million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁹⁰ What little legitimate economy existed (primarily cotton and aluminum) was devastated, and unemployment hovered around 30 percent nationally but reached 80 percent in many rural areas.²⁹¹ Young men – the demographic arguably most vulnerable to drug trafficking – were most affected by unemployment. Approximately 80 percent lived below the poverty line, and Tajikistan's GDP was 57 percent lower in 1998 than in 1990. To this day poverty is pervasive – a family of five or six may subsist on \$10 per month.²⁹² Civil servants' salaries are low, particularly those in law enforcement and customs officials, at \$50 per month. Given these dire economic straits, it is not surprising that Tajikistan has been largely dependent on Russia for 40 percent of its budget subsidies before and after the civil war.²⁹³ It is also not surprising that trafficking drugs has been an attractive option for many Tajiks who have no other way to provide for their families. The aftermath of the civil war essentially provided a strong incentive for individuals to get involved in the illicit opiate industry.

²⁹⁰ "Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace," (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 December 2001), Asia Report No 30.

²⁹¹ "Tajikistan: Poverty Pushes People to Drug Trafficking."

²⁹² "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

²⁹³ Olivier Roy, "Is the Conflict in Tajikistan a Model for Conflicts Throughout Central Asia?," in *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence* ed. Frederic Grare, Shirin Akiner, and Reza Djalili (New York: St. Martin's Press 1997); "Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace."

Moreover, the economic situation was compounded with an array of domestic factors that proved to be advantageous for the drug trade. During the civil war, 60,000 to 80,000 IDPs fled Tajikistan to neighboring Afghanistan as well as a significant number to Russia.²⁹⁴ This facilitated the use of Tajikistan as a Transit State because immigrants and transitory workers have been able to provide cover for the movement of drugs across borders. Countries that have strong commercial or migratory ties with key producing or consuming countries often are used as Transit States. In Tajikistan, emigration certainly facilitated the establishment of new transportation networks.²⁹⁵

Closer to home, the tradition for men to marry early, even if they cannot support a family, resulted in many being drawn to the drug trade as a way to provide for their families.²⁹⁶ Even the agriculture sector failed to provide opportunities for Tajiks. A four-year drought culminated in 2000 with a fire that destroyed 126,000 hectares of wheat, resulting in a harvest of 180,000 tons of grain as opposed to 500,000 tons in 1999. Due to these poor harvests and little cultivation throughout much of the country (such as the incredibly impoverished Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast), most food had to be imported, imposing even higher taxes on those least able to afford it.²⁹⁷

Compounded further with endemic corruption, widespread cronyism, weak institutions, the absence of a strong licit economy, and Russia's economic crisis in 1998

²⁹⁴ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

²⁹⁵ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

²⁹⁶ Drug Policy and Health in Tajikistan, Drug Law and Health Policy Resource Network, 18 April 2002).

²⁹⁷ "Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace."

that caused the value of the Tajik ruble to fall by 48 percent,²⁹⁸ it is not hard to see how the civil war and its aftermath created a “perfect storm” that attracted criminal activity and contributed to the rise of Tajikistan as a Transit State.

Sixth, the culture of corruption that exists in Tajikistan has made it a permissive environment in which criminals can operate. While one can debate *ad nauseam* what came first, illicit trade or corruption, one thing is for certain – they are mutually reinforcing. According to the International Crisis Group who have conducted interviews in Dushanbe with government officials, extortion, specious import-export operations in the gold, cotton, and aluminum sectors, and a range of dishonest licensing schemes are the most common types of corruption in Tajikistan.²⁹⁹ The prevalence of said corruption has created a culture of impunity wherein government officials can be complicit in illegal deals without fear of punishment. So while corruption may be listed as a direct result of the drug trade in Tajikistan, one should not overlook the fact that latent corruption has existed in Tajikistan for years (and indeed the whole region). It is important to note this caveat lest we attribute it entirely to the drug trade.

Seventh, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a major impact on global illicit trade, as described in the literature review chapter. The implications for Tajikistan, as well as the other CIS countries, were even more apparent given their dependence on the Soviet Union for economic support, political guidance, and most important for the purposes of this study – secure borders. In 1991, Russia placed its

²⁹⁸ "As the Century Turns: The Social Challenge in Asia," in *Asian Development Outlook 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Asian Development Bank, 2000).

²⁹⁹ "Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace."

201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) – its second-largest military presence abroad (with 11,700 men) after the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine³⁰⁰ – along the Tajik-Afghan frontier, prior to an official agreement with the Tajik government in 1993. Russia feared that if Tajikistan – the soft underbelly of the Russian Empire – was left unguarded, it posed a potential risk for Russia's own security. Ironically, local Tajiks comprised the vast majority of the Russian force – 99 percent of the conscripted soldiers, 71 percent of the contracted soldiers, yet only 7 percent of its Officer Corps.³⁰¹ However, these border guards under Russian command received a salary ten times greater than what would have been received under Tajik command. Even so, the 201st MRD is known to have played a significant role in facilitating the movement of Afghan heroin across the border into Tajikistan.³⁰² Robert Baer, the former CIA station chief in Dushanbe from 1992 – 1995, has asserted that Russian officers were willing collaborators with corrupt Tajik officials in the drug trade.³⁰³ Other local sources claim that Russian soldiers were repeatedly found to be involved in smuggling heroin into Russia³⁰⁴ and that Russian military planes

³⁰⁰ Jim Nichol, *Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 29 July 2009).

³⁰¹ Maral Madi, *Drug Trafficking in Weak States: The Case of Central Asia* (Department of Peace and Conflict Studies: Uppsala University, 2003); "Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?," (Dushanbe/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 19 May 2004), Asia Briefing.

³⁰² Roger McDermott, "Border Security in Tajikistan: Countering the Narcotics Trade," *Conflict Studies Research Center* (October 2002).

³⁰³ Robert Baer, *See No Evil* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002), 320.

³⁰⁴ Kathleen Knox, "Tajikistan: Heroin Busts Tie Russian Military to Drug Trade," *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, 7 May 2004.

were even occasionally used for these purposes.³⁰⁵ Thus the 201st MRD clearly served as an important distribution channel for heroin into the growing Russian market.

Thanks to their relatively generous salaries, soldiers in this Russian force provided for as many as 50,000 people in border regions (particularly in the large eastern province of Badakhshan.)³⁰⁶ This stoked many concerns among international observers that once this force was replaced with conscripts from Tajikistan's own national army (which occurred in 2004), newly unemployed soldiers would revert to drug trafficking, full-time, to replace these lost revenues.³⁰⁷ Moreover, some feared that in the absence of a logical successor to the MRD, a struggle could potentially ensue for control over the lucrative region (much like we see in Mexico where cartels battle for control of certain strategic thoroughfares into the U.S.).³⁰⁸ To that end, one diplomat familiar with the situation in 2004 stated *"Afghan drug-lords are worried: they don't know who they're going to have to deal with."*³⁰⁹ Unfortunately, these fears were realized, and the departure of the Russian MRD has allowed continued and even heightened trafficking to occur across the Tajik-Afghan border. Despite the seizure of four tons of opium in 2005 by the Tajik Drug Control Agency and Tajik border guards, Russian authorities still reported an

³⁰⁵ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."; Martha Brill Olcott and Natalia Udalova Zwart, *Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2000), Working Paper 11.

³⁰⁶ "Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?."

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

increased flow of drugs into Russia via Tajikistan.³¹⁰ One UNODC expert believes that this transfer of power has resulted in increased corruption, with numerous Afghan warlords/opium traffickers in northern Afghanistan having “good relations” with Tajik border guards.³¹¹

All of these factors, coupled with the absence of a strong government, or even a weak one that provides some semblance of governance, security, the rule of law, and provides for its citizens, has created a vacuum in Tajikistan that has been exploited by drug traffickers. This begs the question, does drug trafficking really affect a state if there is no state to begin with? In this way, the example of Tajikistan will be particularly insightful when examining the case of Guinea-Bissau, where the state is equally as absent.

The Defining Features of Tajikistan’s Narco-State

As described in detail in Annex C (Empirical Evidence for Tajikistan) Tajikistan has been impacted by the drug trade in multiple ways.

It is hard to disagree with the notion that the drug trade has affected Tajikistan to such a great degree that the secretary of the country’s Security Council in 2001 wrote a report concluding that the drug business had reached a level that “*poses a direct threat to*

³¹⁰ Vladimir Fenopetov, “The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the ‘Silk Road,’” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (2006).

³¹¹ “Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan’s New War: Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide.”

national security."³¹² However, the various components of the Tajik “state” have suffered to different degrees.

Politically, narco-corruption has facilitated the criminalization of state officials, though one must be wary of overestimating this connection since non drug-related corruption is and always has been rampant and endemic in Tajikistan. As explained in the previous section, drug trafficking was born out of Tajikistan’s five-year civil war, during which time drug trafficking came to be an important source of revenue for opposition forces as well as the government. This appears to have had an incredibly significant impact on the subsequent regime, having laid the foundation for a corrupt political system in which warlords – many of whom were active traffickers – were integrated into the new government.³¹³ Moreover, when these warlords became legitimate government officials, they did not cease their roles in the drug trade, rather continued them from their positions of power, effectively shrouding themselves in immunity.

The complicity of senior-level government officials in the drug trade has allowed organized crime to penetrate the institutions of the Tajik state with very little resistance. While the implications this has for the integrity and reputation of the state is obvious, the actual impact that the criminalization of the Tajik state will have on its ability to carry out the functions designated to it is less convincing. The already weak Tajik state has in effect acted as a buffer against the deleterious effects of corruption and organized crime. By failing to live up to the principles that are supposed to govern the behavior of a state,

³¹² Drug Trade Engulfs Tajikistan, Spills into Russia, Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 31 January 2001).

³¹³ International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, 1999).

such as the provision of the rule of law and protection from nefarious forces like organized crime, the Tajik state presents no real bulwark against the forces of the drug trade. In fact, there is some evidence that local drug traffickers offer more protection and services to their local communities than offered by the legitimate Tajik government.³¹⁴ Though labeling this a reversal of the social contract similar to Mexico or Jamaica erroneously implies the existence of a state to begin with, it is interesting to note that this is a consistent trend which appears in all Transit States, where drug traffickers assume some duties normally carried out by the government. Perhaps the best way to characterize the impact of the drug trade on the state of Tajikistan is to echo Joel Migdal's notion that it severely *undermines* attempts by the state to become the dominant organizational force and identifying feature in society.³¹⁵ The difficulty Tajik authorities have had in establishing honest institutions – specifically a national Drug Control Agency – is a testament to this.³¹⁶ This is an important insight for Guinea-Bissau, where the capacity of the state is, according to most measures, even less able than Tajikistan. Granted, one may argue that the most deleterious effects of the trade are the mid- and long-term effects that it has on the country's political institutions, specifically for the citizens who will suffer under a corrupt regime with no accountability to its people. Once organized crime has infiltrated a state and exerted its power over the already weak political structures, it is hard to overcome such a powerful force whose primary goal is to

³¹⁴ 2008 World Report: Tajikistan, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008); "Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure."

³¹⁵ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*.

³¹⁶ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

ensure the continuation of an activity that at its core relies on corruption and the absent enforcement of the rule of law.

Tajikistan has experienced a few economic anomalies in recent years, and many analysts assert that the drug trade is to blame for these. However, attributing these directly to the drug trade is not only impossible to do with any certainty but may imply a greater economic impact on the Tajik state than actually exists. For instance, the “shadow economy” that has emerged with significant amounts of undocumented wealth is purportedly connected to an increase in money laundering activities. Similarly, the sudden and unexplainable displays of wealth, particularly among government officials on the streets of Dushanbe (such as “Drug Mobiles” as luxury cars are referred to locally) is striking evidence of a discrepancy between the luxurious lifestyles of these civil servants and the relatively modest salaries which they are paid.³¹⁷ Some analysts believe this influx of cash is the result of heroin trafficking, though it could be attributable to any number of illicit markets.³¹⁸ It is worth noting that some experts believe that heroin trafficking may be the most lucrative form of employment in Tajikistan, particularly when one considers the second- and third-order jobs that are generated by this trade, including jobs in legitimate companies funded with drug money and jobs supplying goods and services to wholesale drug traffickers and their families.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

³¹⁸ Zafar Abdullayev, "Tajikistan's Capital Amnesty Barely Dents Shadow Economy," *Eurasianet*, 23 June 2003.

³¹⁹ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

Tajikistan differs from the other case studies in so far as Tajik citizens appear to have been directly affected by the drug trade to a greater degree than in Mexico, Jamaica, or Turkey. That is not to discount the victimization of these countries' citizens who have died as a result of increased violence, or suffered in other ways. But the specific social impacts of the drug trade on Tajik citizens – particularly the alarming levels of drug abuse, addiction, and the spread of HIV/AIDS – are much higher than in other countries. Moreover, in the absence of other opportunities for employment, the availability of drug-related jobs has benefited Tajiks to a greater extent than in other Transit States.

Perhaps the most significant feature of Tajikistan's Narco-State is the security threat posed by a narco-insurgency. Appendix C describes in great detail the provenance of this insurgency and the role heroin played in financing both government and rebel forces. The most significant insight to take away from this example is that the conflict in Tajikistan lasted as long as it did due to the presence of drugs and the revenues that they generated for the rebel forces, allowing a crime-terror nexus to thrive, thus prolonging the conflict. It shows how a once ideologically-driven conflict can quickly morph into a criminally-driven conflict when the wealth to be attained proves too much to resist. Admittedly, it is not the drug trafficking *per se* that threatens the state, but the militant groups that are financed with drug proceeds. In this way, Tajikistan offers an important lesson for Guinea-Bissau – that the conditions that allowed an insurgency to survive – unpopular governments, poverty, permissive environments, and the drug trade – are prevalent in Guinea-Bissau and could potentially lay the groundwork for a similar drug-funded insurgency based on local grievances.

TURKEY

The Rise of Turkey as a Transit State

Turkey is a well-documented Transit State for Afghan heroin en route to Europe to feed its 1.5 million addicts. In fact, approximately 75 percent of the heroin seized in Europe has a Turkish connection, whether it was processed there, transited the country, or was associated with a Turkish organized crime group.³²⁰ More recently, Turkey has been used by traffickers to move precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs in the opposite direction, i.e. through Turkey to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, where precursor chemicals are used to process opium³²¹ and to the Persian Gulf region where synthetic drugs are growing in popularity.³²² The volume of illicit drugs transiting the country, particularly heroin, is massive, estimated by the UNODC to be around 95 MT in 2008. Yet actual seizures are much less, underscoring the disparity between the total volume of drugs transiting the region and the amount seized. Nonetheless, seizures have increased steadily since 1980 and significantly since the early 2000s.

³²⁰ Fuat Salih Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party," in *Case Studies in Terrorism-Drug Connection: The Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Shining Path* (Denton: University of North Texas).

³²¹ World Drug Report 2009.

³²² Mark Galeotti, *Narcotics Trafficking Networks in Europe: Turkish and Other Gateways into Europe, The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners* (Arlington: Remarks made at George Mason University, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, 3 May 2009); World Drug Report, ed. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2009/WDR2009_eng_web.pdf (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007); World Drug Report 2009. World Drug Report 2009.




Figure 18. Heroin Seizures in Turkey, 1980 – 2006
(Source: UNODC Drug Seizures Database)

Based on these seizure data, one can see that heroin transiting Turkey is a growing problem, dating *at least* as far back as the early 1980s. This corresponds with the rise of the militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (known by its Turkish acronym PKK), and while that may lead one to deduce that the PKK had a significant role in trafficking heroin, it could equally reflect the Turkish government's concerted efforts in the early 1980s to cut off the revenues sustaining the insurgency that threatened its very existence. Similarly, enforcement has become particularly effective since 2000, possibly attributable to the country's desire to join the EU or simply the government's desire to protect the state against the growing threat of organized crime. Either way, the significant increase in seizures since the 1980s, coupled with increasing user rates in Europe, and market data to indicate increasing supply in Europe, are not welcome trends for the Turkish state. Those

trends show that Turkey is being exploited now more than ever, though fortunately Turkish law enforcement is well aware of the problem and dedicated to stemming the flow of drugs across its borders. Despite the massive scale of drugs transiting, the impacts of the drug trade in Turkey do not seem to have been as devastating as in other Transit States such as Mexico or Jamaica.

Turkey's Licit Poppy Cultivation

Turkey's case is unique from the other case studies because of its long history of licit poppy cultivation within its borders, dating back thousands of years, and which continues to this day. Medical products such as morphine and codeine as well as poppy seed oil and other foodstuffs were produced from poppy crops.³²³ It is logical to assume, though difficult to prove, that this licit poppy cultivation contributed to the rise of illicit heroin production in Turkey. By the late 1960s, Turkey was one of the world's main opium-producing countries, feeding much of the U.S.'s increasing demand from addicted soldiers returning from Southeast Asia. As with heroin production in Mexico, it became a major, and somewhat contentious issue between the two countries.³²⁴

The U.S.'s approach was to request complete poppy eradication, to which the Turkish government eventually complied in August 1971. However, this agreement was short-lived. Poppy products, including medicines, were a critical component of Turkey's agricultural economy. Moreover, poppy farmers in Turkey were high enough in numbers

³²³ Jorrit Kamminga, *The Political History of Turkey's Opium Licensing System for the Production of Medicines: Lessons for Afghanistan* (London: International Council on Security and Development May 2006).

³²⁴ Ibid.

(approximately 70,000) that the Turkish government could not ignore this influential lobby. It believed that preserving the livelihoods of poppy farmers was critical to the stability of the country. Politicians feared the political fallout and eventually their own political demise if they allowed the poppy ban to continue, especially given the absence of other opportunities and the failure of alternative livelihood programs to take a hold. Even the U.S. relented, admitting that the poppy ban had resulted in a severe global morphine shortage. As a result, in 1974 Turkish authorities agreed to a strictly-regulated poppy cultivation system for the production of medicines, with the support of the UN and with a preferential trade agreement with the U.S.³²⁵ By most accounts, Turkey has since been free of illicit opium cultivation while licit poppy cultivation continues to this day with the support of the USG, to serve medical needs.³²⁶

Licit poppy cultivation is still an important component of the Turkish agricultural sector. As of 2006, approximately 100,000 Turkish farmers were licensed each year to cultivate an average of 0.4 hectares each. An estimated 600,000 people earn their living from poppy cultivation in Turkey. The Turkish government spends about \$6 million each year to control poppy cultivation and employs over 350 Ministry of Agriculture officials (excluding local administrators) who are involved with controlling poppy cultivation. Approximately 95 percent of Turkey's opium is exported each year, which is estimated to earn \$60 million annually. This includes revenues from poppy seeds as well as opium-

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ A Viable Alternative: Curbing Illicit Drugs through Development, ed. Available at: <http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=1900> (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).

based medicines (75 tons of morphine are manufactured each year).³²⁷ While Turkey's licit poppy trade is not the subject of this case study, it serves to highlight the significant role drug cultivation, production, and sales, can play in a given economy.

Turkey's Use as a Transit State

The rise of the drug trade in Turkey was the result of a number of factors, most of which are similar to those in other Transit States. Among them, convenient geography once again has the greatest explanatory power. Turkey's use as a transit route is an ancient phenomenon, as evidenced by its use as a bridge between Asia and Europe, facilitating international trade and commerce on the Silk and Spice roads as far back as the first century.³²⁸ Throughout the next millennia, Turkey continued to be a major economic hub, importing raw materials and exporting foods and industrial goods. Thanks to the numerous opportunities licit activity provides as a cover to facilitate illicit trafficking, Turkey's physical location between Afghanistan and Europe has made it vulnerable both to the beneficial and detrimental effects of these economic activities. Moreover, the mountainous landscape in the eastern part of the country is particularly conducive to trafficking since it is difficult for security forces to police that rugged terrain.

³²⁷ Kamminga, The Political History of Turkey's Opium Licensing System for the Production of Medicines: Lessons for Afghanistan.

³²⁸ Nurdan Keser and Ali Özel, "Geo-Political Position and Importance of Turkey in the Crime Trafficking between the Continents Asia, Europe and Africa," *International Journal of Environmental & Science Education* 3, no. 1 (2008).

Second, just as porous borders facilitate illicit trade in many regions, legal border crossings coupled with inadequate surveillance systems and detection mechanisms similarly offer opportunities for traffickers to move heroin into Europe.³²⁹ As a major historical international transit hub, Turkey sees considerable licit trade. However, traffickers have taken advantage of the large volume of licit trade to hide their contraband, knowing that border control agents do not have the time and resources to inspect each vehicle and container.

Third, just as geography has facilitated much trade and commerce across Turkey, so have the cultural, ethnic, and linguistic ties that are shared by many groups across the region. Upon the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, these groups did not similarly disband and identify solely with Turkey or the Empire's other successor states. Rather, they have maintained strong cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and even blood ties with individuals residing in other regions including the Caucuses, the Middle East, and the Balkans.³³⁰ For example, many Turks living on the country's eastern border have cultural and familial ties with Kurdish people in Iraq and Iran. Likewise, Iranians living on the Turkish border speak either Kurdish or Azeri Turkish.³³¹ The trust issues that are overcome by a common language facilitate illicit trade of all kinds. One researcher, interviewing a Turkish policeman, was told that:

³²⁹ Mehmet Unal, *Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Cross-Border Heroin Trafficking in Turkey* (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, 2009).

³³⁰ Keser and Özel, "Geo-Political Position and Importance of Turkey in the Crime Trafficking between the Continents Asia, Europe and Africa."

³³¹ *CIA World Factbook Entry for Iran*, (accessed May 2010); <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pu.html#Geo>.

*“One of the most important risks in trafficking is the mistrust between two traffickers. In border regions, the traffickers reduce this risk by using their relatives or tribal connections when they are providing heroin in Iran. They use Kurdish as their primary language and use this as an advantage since most of the law enforcement officers do not speak Kurdish.”*³³²

As alluded to in this quote, a secondary effect of these cultural connections in rural, border areas is the limited interaction between law enforcement officials and local populations. The researcher observed how the strong feelings of loyalty to one’s tribe made locals less willing to cooperate with law enforcement officials, which would be perceived as treason by their tribes and families.

Fourth, while factors such as those cited above have contributed to the use of Turkey as a Transit State, the Turkish diaspora in Western Europe has been a major facilitator of the drug trade through Turkey in the last 50 years. Following the October 1961 Labor Export Agreement with Germany, almost one million Turkish citizens began to migrate not only to that country but elsewhere around Europe seeking work.³³³ These Gastarbeiter or “Guest Workers” and their descendants now number over five million, with Germany hosting the highest number (2,700,000), followed by France (500,000), Denmark (70,000), the Netherlands (400,000), the U.K. (500,000), Belgium (200,000), and Sweden (200,000).³³⁴ Additionally, the PKK has facilitated the illegal movement of Kurdish refugees to Western Europe in recent years. In return for the PKK’s assistance in

³³² Unal, Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Cross-Border Heroin Trafficking in Turkey.

³³³ Nermin Abadan-Unat, *Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975: A Socio-Economic Reappraisal* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1976), 425.

³³⁴ Turkish people, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_people#cite_note-7

this process, these newly-emigrated refugees are expected to “donate” a significant part of their income to the PKK. This can be voluntary or extracted through coercive means. In some cases, the PKK has forced these individuals – even children – to sell their drugs.³³⁵ As a result, Turks have emerged as the dominant suppliers and street-level dealers of heroin in these countries, having obtained the drugs from Turkish organized crime groups and PKK traffickers. Turkish organized crime groups, specifically in Europe, have risen to such prominence in recent years that more than 90 percent of global indictments of Turks occurred in Europe.³³⁶ According to Interpol and SOCA, Turkish traffickers, led mainly by the PKK, have consistently controlled 80 percent of the opium market in Europe.³³⁷ This included control over processing, transportation (including security), distribution, and marketing.

Unfortunately, the Turkish diaspora has been the source of considerable violence in Europe through competition between the PKK and Turkish organized crime groups for control of distribution networks. For example, the UK has witnessed several armed conflicts between rival organized crime groups and the PKK, particularly since 2000. In one particularly violent instance in London, two died and 20 were injured in a feud between the PKK and members of a Turkish organized crime group known as the

³³⁵ "Drug Smuggling as the Main Financial Source for the PKK Terrorism," *Turkish Weekly*, 19 November 2009; Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party."

³³⁶ Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party."

³³⁷ "Drug Smuggling as the Main Financial Source for the PKK Terrorism."; The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organized Crime, (London: Serious Organized Crime Agency, October 2009/2010), p. 26.

“Bombacilar Gang,”³³⁸ The Bombacilar Gang has also been reported to have had violent, drug-related clashes with the Tottenham Boys – another Turkish organized crime group.³³⁹ It should be emphasized, however, that it is only elements within the Turkish diaspora that are members of the PKK, organized crime groups, or otherwise involved in drug trafficking. The vast majority of Turkish citizens living abroad are honest, law-abiding citizens.

The Defining Features of Turkey’s Narco-State

As described in detail in Annex D (Empirical Evidence for Turkey) Turkey has been impacted by the drug trade in multiple ways.

Like Tajikistan, one of the most significant impacts of the drug trade in Turkey has been its impact on local security. The current insurgency waged by the PKK has killed more than 40,000 Turkish citizens to date.³⁴⁰ All sources agree that drug revenues have perpetuated this conflict by financing the PKK, which relies on drug proceeds as its primary source of financing for its operations. In fact, some estimate that revenues raised from trafficking and “taxing” other traffickers have likely sustained the PKK’s operations

³³⁸ Ahmet Pek and Behsat Ekici, "Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-Kongra Gel from Illicit Drug Business," in *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective* ed. O. Kikbay (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007).

³³⁹ Mark Townsend, "The Gang Shootings That Put Police with Machine Guns on London's Streets: Spate of Tit-for-Tat Murders between Turkish Drugs Gangs Is Behind Met's Decision to Deploy Armed Patrols," *The Guardian Online*, 25 October 2009

³⁴⁰ Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe* (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2002).

for three decades.³⁴¹ Similarly, the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff estimates that the PKK's budget is made up of 50 to 60 percent drug revenues.³⁴² By financing the PKK, the drug trade has not only perpetuated narco-terrorism but arguably prolonged the armed conflict between militant Kurdish separatists and the Turkish state. Whether the PKK has genuine political goals and aspirations or if it has simply morphed into a DTO, the drug trade has allowed this organization to operate by sustaining its operations against the Turkish state. In this way, Turkey exemplifies those theories asserting that natural resources (typically licit resources but in this case illicit ones) not only incite conflict but can prolong the duration of a conflict if resource wealth is funding the weaker party, thus creating a more level-playing field and reducing the stronger party's advantage. Given the number of political, institutional, generational, and ethnic cleavages in Guinea-Bissau, the potential for drugs to fund any one faction – or more – should never be underestimated.

The other defining feature of Turkey's Narco-State is the role of its diaspora. Although the other case studies examined certainly highlight the role of diaspora communities in facilitating the movement of drugs, Turkish organized crime groups seem to be more globalized, more sophisticated, and more capable than other national organized crime groups. Numerous studies have drawn the conclusion that the massive numbers of Turks residing in Western Europe have contributed significantly to the

³⁴¹ "The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners," (Arlington: Remarks at the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, George Mason University, 3 May 2010).

³⁴² "Drug Smuggling as the Main Financial Source for the PKK Terrorism."

globalization of Turkish organized crime.³⁴³ This is an important insight for Guinea-Bissau, since it has significant diaspora communities both in Lisbon and Paris – already both major entry points for Latin American cocaine.

Politically, narco-corruption in Turkey has undeniably weakened the state's governance institutions by facilitating a mutually beneficial working relationship between some politicians, government officials, and Turkish organized crime networks – in other words, a “state-mafia nexus.” For example, the Susurluk scandal of 1996 revealed a close relationship between the country's politicians, police, and mafia.³⁴⁴ However, it is important to recognize that Turkey suffers from a wide range of latent corruption, i.e. corruption not associated with narcotics, rather petty corruption, nepotism, and corruption within the bureaucracies governing the areas of public procurement, customs, taxes, law enforcement, and banking. Thus to attribute political corruption in Turkey to the drug trade is misleading as it neglects other influences.

In fact, Turkey has demonstrated significant political will and state capacity to combat the drug trade. While most governments in Transit States recognize the drug problem they face and may even demonstrate genuine political will to address it, few have the actual capacity to implement effective measures to combat it. Turkey, on the other hand, appears to have been most introspective and effective in this regard, recognizing the severity of the problem within its borders and the threat it represents to

³⁴³ Mahmut Cengiz, *The Globalization of the Turkish Organized Crime and the Policy Response* (Arlington: Dissertation Defense, George Mason University, School of Public Policy, 22 September 2010).

³⁴⁴ See Annex D for more detail on the Susurluk scandal.

the stability of the state. Even the UN and the U.S. Department of State agree that Turkish law enforcement agencies are far more professional and effective than those in other Transit States and applaud their initiative in leading the regional fight against the drug trade.³⁴⁵ This capacity is certainly sufficient cause to place Turkey in the category of strong, versus weak or failed, states.

Economically, Turkey has experienced some anomalies typical of other Transit States examined. Specifically, money laundering through Turkish banks, nonbank financial institutions (hawalas), gold couriers, and the underground economy writ large have become important vehicles not only for laundered narcotics revenues, but also illegally-derived gains from fraud, tax evasion, counterfeit goods, forgery, robbery, and kidnapping. That said, informal economies are common in Turkey, thus it is difficult to attribute these activities entirely to the drug trade, though one must admit that drugs have certainly perpetuated money laundering and deceptive economic activities in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey has demonstrated significant state capacity to counter the deleterious economic impacts of the drug trade (and other illicit markets). Coupled with a large licit economy, economic anomalies have not come to characterize Turkey's Narco-Stateness.

With regard to consumption, most research institutions agree that drug use and addiction rates in Turkey have historically been quite low (though hard data are hard to

³⁴⁵ International Narcotics Control Board Report, (Vienna: United Nations, 2007); International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, 2006).

find).³⁴⁶ That said, other government sources assert that since 1996, drug use is becoming an increasingly serious problem, especially in areas around the major cities such as Istanbul.³⁴⁷ In any event, Turkey represents a notable difference from the other cases examined, where the drug trade has posed a major public health issue due to its tendency to increase addicts. While Turkey still suffers from low levels of drug addiction, the capacity of the state not only to remove more drugs off the streets but also to invest in public health appears to mitigate this impact when compared to a country such as Tajikistan. A more detailed explanation for Turkey's relative success in stemming heroin addiction would certainly be a valuable contribution to this area of research. Yet for the time being, the most relevant insight for Guinea-Bissau is that the government must assume that drug use and addiction will eventually become a major public health issue, given the government's extremely limited capacity to address it.

Other significant features of Turkey's Narco-Stateness include its expansion into other drug markets (particularly synthetic drugs³⁴⁸) and its emergence as a significant producer of heroin. Seizures of morphine base and raw opium, coupled with the discovery of numerous heroin refineries and other production facilities in Turkey throughout the 1990s indicate that these substances were transported into Turkey where

³⁴⁶ Sevil Atasoy, *The Opiate Trade in Turkey*, vol. Mimeo (Istanbul: Report submitted for the project *Modeling the World Heroin Market: Assessing the Consequences of Changes in Afghanistan Production*, 2004); "Drug Use by Young People on the Rise," *Turkish Daily News*, April 21 2005; Fenopetov, "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the 'Silk Road'."

³⁴⁷ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey," (2010); Aydin Özgül, *Country Factsheet on Eurasian Narcotics: Turkey* (Uppsala: Central Asia - Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, 2004).

³⁴⁸ World Drug Report 2010.

they underwent production into heroin before being sold on the European market.³⁴⁹ Once again, a concerted effort by Turkish law enforcement to crack down on production facilities is a testament to the strength of Turkey's counternarcotics institutions. This is an important insight for Guinea-Bissau, where policy-makers and partners must be aware of the potential for local production to occur, particularly if the environment is more permissive and especially if it is cost effective for traffickers, i.e. if it reduces transportation costs onward to Europe.

³⁴⁹ Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opiate Smuggling Routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia, vol. Available at: <http://www.geopium.org/JIR3.htm> Janes Intelligence Review, 1 March 2003); Tim Boekhout Van Solinge, "Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Europe," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 1 (1998).

5. GUINEA-BISSAU

HYPOTHESIS 1: Guinea-Bissau has narco-corruption, but political institutions are not fundamentally compromised.

Supporting Evidence

i. Guinea-Bissau's military has always been politicized

The power of the Guinea-Bissauan military and the role it plays in national politics has undoubtedly been highlighted in recent years along with its role in the drug trade. The next section will even describe ways in which the military has become empowered by the drug trade and increased its involvement in national politics. However, attributing its inordinate influence entirely or even mostly to the drug trade would be a major error in an analysis of Guinea-Bissau. On the contrary, *all* those interviewed and *all* the literature reviewed revealed the historic power and prestige of the Guinea-Bissauan military dating back to the country's Liberation War from Portugal. As such, one would be remiss to neglect this most critical feature of Bissauan politics, particularly as it supports the hypothesis that Guinea-Bissau's political institutions have not been fundamentally compromised as a result of the drug trade. In fact, many argue that the militarization of Bissauan politics today is simply "business as usual" and has roots in history, not the drug trade. Presented here is some background to explain the source of this power and national prestige in an effort to emphasize that the military's

recent interference in national politics is not necessarily the result of drugs, rather typical for this country.

There are numerous accounts of the evolution of the Bissauan military.³⁵⁰ In short, the military's power dates back to Guinea-Bissau's war of independence from Portugal. It is important to note that Guinea-Bissau was one of the only African countries to have fought and won a war for its independence. Suffering approximately 10,000 losses, the military emerged as the most prestigious, legitimate institution of the state having freed itself of Portuguese domination. Guinea-Bissau's military is also different from other African armies in that its members hailed primarily from rural villages – unlike the armies of many other African countries whose soldiers are often educated in the large urban centers and therefore don't have a strong connection to the countryside. Since many members of Guinea-Bissau's military were from the country, they were extremely popular among the population and acted as what one interviewee described as the "social glue" holding together Bissauan society.³⁵¹

Members of the military immediately capitalized on this newfound adulation and respect and assumed a major role in Bissauan society and politics. They adopted an entitlement mentality, reminding citizens that they sacrificed life and limb for the country's independence and were therefore entitled to their fair share of resources and

³⁵⁰ Among the most prominent works relating to the Bissauan military, see: Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*; Forrest, "Guinea-Bissau since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles."; Forrest, *Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict, and Renewal in a West African Nation*; Marine Padrao Temudo, "From the Margins of the State to the Presidential Palace: The Balanta Case in Guinea-Bissau," *African Studies Review* 52, no. 2 (September 2009).

³⁵¹ Non-attribution interview.

influence over national politics. One interviewee even recalled the phrase they coined, relentlessly claiming “En esc e lute” meaning “*It was us who fought*”.³⁵² Another facet of the military’s historical hold on power has been its relationship with the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC),³⁵³ which it effectively served as the party’s armed wing in the nation’s quest for independence from Portugal. At that time, it was common for military leaders to serve concurrently as politicians within the PAIGC so long as the party remained in power. As a result, the military enjoyed significant influence over Bissauan politics. Although the Partido para a Renovação Social (PRS)³⁵⁴ and other political parties have entered the scene more recently, this tradition of non-separation between the military and politics has prevailed.³⁵⁵ As long as Amílcar Cabral – the charismatic, effective, and visionary leader – was alive, he kept the military in check and emphasized the primacy of politics over the military. However, Cabral was a unique, one-man show; following his assassination in 1973, the power vacuum immediately allowed the military to embark on its insidious foray into Bissauan politics.

A particularly disturbing example of the military’s influence in national politics has been its predilection for vetting and appointing civilian government ministers. This has happened on multiple occasions, such as following the coup launched by Armed

³⁵² Non-attribution interview.

³⁵³ PAIGC is the Portuguese acronym for the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

³⁵⁴ PRS is the Portuguese acronym for the Social Renovation Party.

³⁵⁵ "Article Analyzes 'Difficulties' in Military-Civilian Relations," *Ultima Hora in Portuguese*, 14 September 2010.

Forces Chief of Staff Correia Seabra that ousted Kumba Yalá from power on September 14, 2003. In addition to its unconstitutional nature, Seabra's first act was to convene a meeting of political, religious, and civil society leaders to choose the interim civilian government that would be responsible for organizing elections. On October 6, 2004, Seabra was himself killed in a mutiny by soldiers over unpaid salaries. The group of soldiers who killed him proceeded to impose on the government a new hierarchy of military Chiefs. These appointments effectively made the military the "Kingmaker"³⁵⁶ with the de facto authority to approve government ministers – an inherently civilian function. Other examples of the military's dominance over civilian authorities abound. For example, following his exile during the country's Civil War in 1999, Vieira was eventually permitted to return to Guinea-Bissau in 2005 – according to most experts and interviewees due to a negotiation he forged with the then-Chief of Staff Na Waie who wanted full control over the military (and possibly the opportunity to profit from the drug trade³⁵⁷). The civilian government (led by Prime Minister Carlos Domingos Gomes Júnior) nonetheless objected to Vieira's return and forbade his helicopter to land at the Bissau airport. But because Vieira had the protection of the military, his helicopter landed illegally in the city's main football stadium where he was greeted by thousands of supporters. The fact that the military was able to violate the airspace of Guinea-Bissau – with impunity – is yet another disconcerting example of the military's excessive influence over the civilian government.

³⁵⁶ Non-attribution interview.

³⁵⁷ Non-attribution interview.

Another example to illustrate the superior status of the military in Guinea-Bissau's government is the salary payments of civil servants. Since there is no tax system in Guinea-Bissau (because the state doesn't have the capacity to collect them and people are too poor to pay them) it cannot cover the salaries of civil servants itself and is entirely dependent on foreign assistance. Yet when assistance arrives (typically from the EU and UN), the military is *always* the first to be paid, despite the vast array of alternative (and arguably more deserving) uses for foreign assistance dollars. Admittedly this practice may be necessary to prevent internal struggles from festering and possibly quickly turn violent, but it undoubtedly reinforces the senses of entitlement that has empowered the military for decades.³⁵⁸

Examination of the source of the military's power and prestige in Guinea-Bissau reveals, not surprisingly, that it continues to be a troublesome institution in Bissauan politics today. It is clearly the national institution with the most capacity to effect change – which it has demonstrated on multiple occasions as it ousts sitting Presidents. For this reason, it doesn't even seem appropriate to label it a “shadow power” as some experts have labeled it, since its influence over politics is so brazen and unapologetic. Interestingly, one expert observed that military commanders are not interested in running the government under a military regime. On the contrary, as much as the military has shown a proclivity to intervene, it has also demonstrated its willingness to step back and allow elections to occur. This is why it has been very rare to have military rule in Guinea-

³⁵⁸ Non-attribution interview.

Bissau for any length of time.³⁵⁹ Whatever its tactics, the military in Guinea-Bissau clearly has one objective – to remain the most powerful institution in the country and exert its influence over the civilian government. While drugs may have raised the stakes as it seeks to accomplish these goals, it is clear that the military as an institution has always been politicized.

ii. The inept judicial system has been exploited by drug traffickers

Perhaps the best example of narco-corruption in Guinea-Bissau has been the blatant manipulation of the judicial system on more than one occasion. In two of the country's highest profile seizures (each entailing more than several hundred kilogram shipments) culprits who were apprehended were quickly released from custody and seized drugs disappeared. For example, following the arrest of two Colombians in September 2006 and the seizure of 674 kilograms worth about \$39 million (as well as laptops, firearms, and radios) found in their home, military officers quickly demanded that the drugs be transferred to their care from the judicial police who had made the seizure.³⁶⁰ The officers proceeded to transfer the cocaine to the Public Treasury building where it mysteriously went missing several days later, while the Attorney General ordered a local judge to release the accused Colombians without legal explanation.³⁶¹

³⁵⁹ Non-attribution interview.

³⁶⁰ "Guinea-Bissau: Fears of an Emerging Narcostate," *IRIN*, 2 February 2007.

³⁶¹ Alberto Dabo, "Guinea-Bissau Probes State Complicity in Drug Trade," *Reuters*, 1 June 2007; James Straub, "Africa's Drug Problem," *New York Times*, 5 April 2010; Vulliamy, "How a Tiny West African Country Became the World's First Narco State."; Vivienne Walt, "Cocaine Country," *Time Magazine*, 27 June 2007.

Another infamous example cited by interviewees and widely reported in the media occurred in July 2008 when two Venezuelan planes landed without official authorization at Bissau's international airport. The planes were immediately cordoned off by military personnel who loaded its cargo onto vehicles that were driven to an unknown destination. The military quickly blocked a judicial investigation with apparent ease. According to those familiar with the incident, no one dared to openly question the military's role in the drugs' disappearance or the military's blatant disregard for the due process.

The fact that there have not been official investigations of these cases may demonstrate one of two things: that there is (and always has been) extremely limited capacity and will of Guinea-Bissau's judicial institutions to prosecute criminal cases or that narco-corruption is at play. This research points to the latter – that the military is clearly benefiting from its extraordinary powers to bypass the state's judicial institutions and act with utter impunity.

Furthermore, the fact that the UNODC built two new prisons in Mansoa and Bafata (inaugurated in September) and plans to build another two in Bissau and Cachungo demonstrates the increased international attention that has been paid to Guinea-Bissau's justice system in recent years.³⁶² This is a clear signal from the international community that it believes the judicial system in Guinea-Bissau has failed to

³⁶² "Guinea-Bissau: Prisons in Mansoa, Bafata May Only Open in 2011," *Lusa* (translated from Portuguese), 9 November 2010.

be effective. Whether or not it attributes this directly to narco-corruption or simply a typical Bissauan institution is unclear, but the timing would certainly point to the former.

iii. Drug revenues may have influenced elections

According to the 2009 Index of African Governance, Guinea-Bissau has consistently experienced “partially free and fair” executive elections since 2000.³⁶³ Several interviewees who served as members of official observer missions for the June 28, 2009, elections (from the EU, AU, and ECOWAS) also noted that they were transparent, free, fair, and even well organized. Civil society seemed to be very active during this period with copious media reports of citizens undertaking activities aimed at promoting a peaceful election, such as pressing politicians to sign a code of conduct, holding radio debates, and improving voter education through radio programming.³⁶⁴ The official results of this election following the assassination of President Vieira and several Presidential candidates even necessitated a second round of voting, between Malam Bacai Sanha (PAIGC) who received 133,786 votes and Kumba Yala (PRS) who received

³⁶³ Robert Rotberg and Rachel Gisselquist, *Strengthening African Governance: Index of African Governance, Results and Rankings 2009* (Cambridge: Harvard University and the World Peace Foundation, 2009). Scoring was determined based on the following key sources: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)’s Election Guide; the African Elections Database; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) country reports and profiles; country reports from the “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2008”; and BBC News country profiles. If these reports left any doubt as to the appropriate coding, further information was reviewed from the IRIN news archives (produced by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and allAfrica.com. The following sources were also consulted in selected cases: U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Country Specific Information reports; Freedom House’s Country at the Crossroads and Freedom in the World country profiles; and articles on elections and electoral systems in selected countries from journals such as *Journal of Democracy*, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, *Electoral Studies*, and *Comparative Political Studies*.

³⁶⁴ “The Bissau Monitor,” June 2009.

99,428 votes of the total 356,430 votes. The independent candidate Henrique Pereira Rosa obtained 81,751 votes with an abstention rate of up to 40 percent.³⁶⁵ The activities of civil society groups leading up to the elections, the absence of violence or protests, the relatively good voter turnout, and the peaceful process that ensued appeared to indicate a democratic electoral system.

However, frank discussions with individuals who have lived in Guinea-Bissau and experts with decent insight into the electoral process there have revealed significant suspicion of the fairness of these elections. In particular, the late Interior Minister Baciro Dabó – who resigned as Interior Minister in May 2009 to be an independent candidate in the election following the murder of President Vieira – is rumored by many to have been guilty of influencing voters with money he earned from the drug trade. By way of background, Dabó had been a close ally of President Vieira, a senior member of the governing PAIGC, and was known for his flamboyant lifestyle, which most citizens attributed to his involvement in the drug trade.³⁶⁶ As Interior Minister, he enjoyed one of the most powerful positions in the government, with unrestricted access to much of the country's security apparatus as well as running elections. Coupled with his military intelligence background, Dabó was an extremely powerful, but feared and physically intimidating individual in Guinea-Bissau's political circles with a reputation for being violent. Moreover, he was despised by General Na Waie, which many believe was the cause of Dabó's assassination (fear by soldiers loyal to General Na Waie that Dabó could

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ "Guinea-Bissau Candidates Keep It Low-Key after Killings," *AFP Global Edition*, 10 June 2009.

have prosecuted them for killing the President if he won the election.)³⁶⁷ Those interviewees who knew Dabó claim without doubt not only that he was one of the top three players in the drug trade (along with President Vieira and General Na Waie) but also that he unquestionably paid journalists to keep his activities quiet and bought votes with his drug money.³⁶⁸ As early as 2007, Dabó reportedly spent time “handing out motorcycles in the east and wads of cash at concerts in Bissau.”³⁶⁹ In hindsight, it is quite probable that he was positioning himself for the next year’s elections.

Though there are rumors that drugs have funded other politicians’ campaigns, the case of Dabó stands out as the most convincing evidence that drugs have indeed influenced elections in Guinea-Bissau. Interestingly, several interviews noted that there are other factors influencing Guinea-Bissau’s elections, particularly Arab (Libyan, Kuwaiti, and Saudi) financial support for Muslim candidates.³⁷⁰ If this is true, it is yet another testament to the susceptibility of the Bissauan electoral process to external influences. Another aspect of the electoral system that appears to have been affected by the drug trade is voter turnout. The abstention rate during the June 28, 2009, elections reached 40 percent.³⁷¹ In more than one media commentary and in more than one interview, experts attribute this relatively low voter-turnout and the political apathy that it represents to the impunity that has protected politicians who aid and abet drug traffickers.

³⁶⁷ “Bissau Military Kills Politicians,” *BBC News*, 6 June 2009.

³⁶⁸ Non-attribution interview.

³⁶⁹ “Cocaine Central,” *Africa Confidential* 48, no. 18 (7 September 2007).

³⁷⁰ Non-attribution interview.

³⁷¹ “The Bissau Monitor.”

Refuting Evidence

i. Drug revenues place a higher premium on power and further empower the military

As much of the evidence presented here indicates, Guinea-Bissau has long been plagued by incessant rebellions, personal power struggles, and an overly strong military, which has resulted in numerous coup attempts as well as several assassinations of military leaders.³⁷² This underlying “stable instability” in Guinea-Bissau should not be underestimated. However, the last five years have seen an inordinate level of political instability – even for Guinea-Bissau – that many have argued is a result of competition between individuals (and their factions) for control of drug revenues. Based on the preponderance of inputs from regional experts with particular credence given to Guinea-Bissauans, this research deduces that drugs have indeed placed a higher premium on power in Bissauan national politics.

The political instability that has historically characterized Guinea-Bissau has been the result of power struggles between various institutional and ethnic factions looking to secure their control over the resources of the state. The more recent coups attempts since the arrival of cocaine are no different – individuals representing various factions are still vying for political power. However, natives and other experts argue that the presence of drugs has raised the stakes tremendously, since those in power are guaranteed some portion of the market. And given the military’s unmatched influence over national

³⁷² Taussig, *The Nervous System* ; Vigh, "Conflictual Motion and Political Inertia: On Rebellions and Revolutions in Bissau and Beyond."

politics, the drug trade has *further* empowered it as a political actor, despite nominal attempts at Security Sector Reform (SSR) by the external community.

The most obvious manifestation of this has been the numerous coup attempts and power grabs by the military. For instance, Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto purportedly attempted to organize a coup in August 2008 but was pre-empted by soldiers loyal to the President and was subsequently forced to flee to the Gambia. According to most accounts, Bubo was one of the first Bissauans to get involved with the drug trade, due in large part to his position as Navy Chief and the control he exerted over the shores and waters off of Guinea-Bissau's coastline. Many argue that this coup attempt was an effort of Na Tchuto to take back his control of the drug trade, which had been lost to President Vieira and his Army COS General Tagme Na Waie.

The more recent April 1, 2010, coup attempt (though perhaps better described as the unconstitutional seizure of military power, vice the entire state's apparatus) by the then-Deputy Head of the military General Antonio Indjai was justified on the grounds that Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior and Chief of Staff General Jose Zamora Induta abused their power and used large sums of money for military rations and for their own benefit.³⁷³ Indjai immediately announced himself as Induta's replacement while Na Tchuto assumed the role of his deputy. This incident was also perceived by many to have been related to the drug trade. Many assert that Induta was a genuine proponent not only for SSR but also for reducing the military's involvement in the drug trade and that Indjai

³⁷³ "Former Military Chief Admiral Jose Zamora Induta Released," *Agence France-Presse (World Service)*, 23 December 2010.

– assisted by Na Tchuto who had secretly returned to Guinea-Bissau several months earlier – seized power in an attempt to ensure the survival of this revenue source for the Bissauan military.

While Gomes was promptly released, Induta was held without a warrant or due process until December 23, 2010 (eight months during which time his health suffered greatly).³⁷⁴ The unconstitutionality of Induta's detention and the impunity that characterized Indjai's behavior is further evidence of the military's disproportionate power that trumps the rule of law. It was, in the words of Carlos Vamain (former Minister of Justice and Labor), "*in breach of all limits provided for under the terms of the Constitution of the Republic.*"³⁷⁵ This is not an isolated example either. The former Military Secret Service Chief Samba Djalo was taken into custody along with Induta and Gomes in April 2010. The former Prime Minister Francisco Fadul was purportedly detained at the armed forces headquarters in 2009. Another former Prime Minister Faustino Imbali was arrested on June 5, 2009, and held without charge for two months after calling on the government to hold accountable security force members responsible for the military assassinations several months earlier and for characterizing the assassinations as a de facto coup.³⁷⁶ All of these men have since been released but only after very long, unconstitutional detentions. It seems that the international attention

³⁷⁴ "Guinea-Bissau: Civil Society Says Former Army Chief Weak, Lacks Medical Care," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 11 November 2010.

³⁷⁵ "Guinea-Bissau Jurist: Former Army Chief's Continued Detention Breaks Law," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 24 September 2010.

³⁷⁶ 2009 Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, 11 March 2010).

surrounding the detainment of Induta, the threat of sanctions, and the cessation of foreign assistance are what ultimately provided the impetus for these men's release. For example, Induta's release came shortly after the EU threatened to suspend some 120 million euros (\$157 million) in development aid until 2013 as it called for "the end of illegal detentions and impunity."³⁷⁷

Bissauan President Malam Bacai Sanha has not denounced these unconstitutional power seizures or arrests, rather attributing them to "*confusion between soldiers that reached the government.*"³⁷⁸ A similar lackluster response came from the Prime Minister Carlos Gomes, who had been detained by the cabal but two days later stated: "*The situation is now stable. I can assure you that institutions will return to their normal functions.*"³⁷⁹ This apathy on the part of the civilian government to denounce and punish the culprits for these illegal actions is another testament to the military's power over politics in Guinea-Bissau. From one Bissau's perspective (in response to why Sanha didn't object to the military's illegal apprehension of Induta): "*Sanha stayed quiet because he backs Indjai, either because he has no real power or because he did not want Induta around or because the eyes of the world were on Guinea-Bissau... Either way, in my opinion, Sanha has no real power. He has no political clout.*"³⁸⁰ To add insult to injury, Sanha officially dismissed Induta in October by presidential decree, appointing

³⁷⁷ "Former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Released after Nine Months," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 22 December 2010; "Former Military Chief Admiral Jose Zamora Induta Released."

³⁷⁸ "Guinea-Bissau's PM Says He Will Not Resign after Mutiny," *Al-Manar TV*, 3 April 2010.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Angola: Journalist Discusses Tensions Within Guinea-Bissau Politics, Military; AFP20100915530001 Luanda O Pais in Portuguese 10 Sep 10 p 24-26; [Interview with Milocas Pereira by Jose Kalinengue: Zamora Induta was the Product of Portuguese Cooperation]

Major General Indjai to the position of Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and promoting him to the rank of Lieutenant General. Bubo Na Tchuto was also appointed by the President to his former post as Head of the Navy. Both of these appointments came amid vociferous objections from the international community, which focused on the illegal nature of these power transitions and the fact that Na Tchuto had been designated by the U.S. as a “Drug Kingpin” on April 8, 2010.³⁸¹ Although President Sanha has repeatedly emphasized that these appointments were a sovereign decision and were not made under coercion, the general consensus among those interviewed was that Sanha’s political survival depended on those appointments. It seems to be the only plausible reason that he would jeopardize Guinea-Bissau’s much-needed foreign assistance when so many bilateral and multinational donors objected. Though some may argue this type of behavior is typical of the military, it shows the unparalleled power of the military and its unrelenting quest for control of the states resources (drugs).

One need only observe Na Tchuto’s subsequent actions and behavior for further evidence of the military’s stronghold on the affairs of the state. During a September 2010 visit of an Angolan military delegation sent to Guinea-Bissau to carry out an assessment of the country’s armed forces under the auspices of a bilateral technical and military cooperation agreement, Bubo purportedly “invited” the delegation to leave the country³⁸²

³⁸¹ Treasury Designates Two Narcotics Traffickers in Guinea-Bissau, vol. <http://205.168.45.51/press/releases/tg633.htm> U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs, TG-633.

³⁸² Rodrigo Nunes, "Guinea-Bissau: Angolan Military Team Reportedly 'Invited' to Leave," *Angop (in Portuguese)*, 29 September 2010.

(which he ardently denies.)³⁸³ The fact that Bubo singlehandedly had the authority to dismiss the delegation would suggest that real power resides not only with the military but specifically with individuals who do not respect the democratic concept of military subordination to civilian rule. Furthermore, it is quite possible, if not probable, that Bubo dismissed this team because he felt they could threaten his hold on power, including potentially criminal activities.

ii. Drug revenues promotes political factionalism and exacerbate existing cleavages

The political factionalism and exacerbation of existing cleavages in Guinea-Bissau have occurred along two main fault lines: ethnicity and generations. While other cleavages such as religion, institutional differences, and party affiliation exist in Guinea-Bissau, it is ethnicity and the generational divide that have been most affected by the drug trade. While it is difficult to attribute these rivalries directly to the drug trade (since they have existed in some way prior), a common theme throughout this research has been how the drug trade has exacerbated existing cleavages that may not otherwise have been cause for concern.

Ethnicity

Despite the pervasiveness of ethnic strife across most of the African continent, ethnicity in Guinea-Bissau does not exhibit the same divisiveness as it does in other

³⁸³ "Guinea-Bissau: Rear Admiral Denies Asking Angolan Military to Leave Country," *Bissau Digital in Portuguese*, 7 October 2010.

African countries. In fact, most interviewees stressed that Guinea-Bissau is an excellent counter example of a heterogeneous society with relatively little conflict along ethnic lines. As Figure 19 shows, there are more than ten significant ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau, though no one enjoys a majority of the population. Although people do organize around ethnic lines (primarily over land disputes), this is not a fault line and hasn't been the basis for political organization.³⁸⁴ The extent of ethnic factionalism in Guinea-Bissau is perhaps most succinctly described by one interviewee who noted “though not irrelevant, ethnicity is not the primary cause of splits today.”³⁸⁵




Figure 19. Ethnic Groups in Guinea-Bissau
(Source: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 3 November 2010)

³⁸⁴ Non-attribution interview.

³⁸⁵ Non-attribution interview.

That said, there is one place in Bissauan society where ethnic identity *is* significant – the military. With only 26 percent of the population, the Balanta –the largest ethnic group – have traditionally dominated the military, with some estimates as high as 80 percent of its total composition.³⁸⁶ As a result, the empowerment of the military by its involvement in the drug trade has also been an empowerment of the Balanta people, which represents a distinct shift from the Balantas’ traditionally marginalized role in Bissauan society. In order to fully appreciate the significance of the Balantas’ quest for power, it is worth briefly describing their experience from their marginalization to their role in the independence movement to their place in presidential politics.

According to anthropologists and historians who have spent time among the Balanta or have studied their role in Guinea-Bissau’s evolution, the Balanta have historically been perceived in a negative light among Guinea-Bissau’s other ethnic groups.³⁸⁷ First, as rice farmers, they were generally perceived to be poor, uneducated, and generally “backwards.” They essentially served as a slave repository to be exploited by the other ethnic groups as well as Portuguese colonizers. Second, the Balanta ardently resisted Islamization *and* Christianization, opting rather to remain isolated from other organized segments of society. Whereas the Fula and Mandinka ethnic groups had a more hierarchical social organization, the Balanta were more decentralized and “stateless” although there was some organization within the Balanta along generational lines with a council of elders generally providing authority over the younger generation. Others were

³⁸⁶ "Jane's Sentinel: Guinea-Bissau," (2008).

³⁸⁷ Temudo, "From the Margins of the State Ot the Presidential Palace: The Balanta Case in Guinea-Bissau."

suspicious of the Balanta due to their seemingly anti-social customs and beliefs, such as their bellicose reputation, choosing not to attend school, not speaking Kriol, and their beliefs in witchcraft.

The division between the Balantas and other ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau played out in the country's war for independence, in which the Balantas were heavily recruited by Amilcar Cabral for their inherent distaste of the centralized state that the Portuguese colonizers represented. In particular, Balanta youth were attracted to the anticolonial struggle because it represented a route to freedom not only from the Portuguese, but also from their own Balanta elders. Thus the predominance of the Balanta in the military and these generational factions within the military are deeply seated in Bissauan history and have been significant contributors to the empowerment of young Balanta men following independence.

Yet the attitude of the Balanta continued to be hostile toward the state following the war when, despite their commendable role in the anticolonial struggle, they continued to be marginalized by the PAIGC from politics (though they continued to maintain a majority in the army). By 1985, President Vieira (while on his first tour as President) essentially began a campaign of ethnic cleansing within his party (the PAIGC) and the military. He imprisoned 150 Balanta men (mostly in the military but also several serving in the government) who he feared were plotting a coup against his government. This prompted the rise of the Balanta-dominated Party for Social Renovation (PRS), which Kumba Yala led in 1994. The Civil War that followed in 1998 heralded the demise of Vieira's regime, and Yala – a Balanta who historically lauded isolationist policies – was

elected President in 1999. For the first time in Bissauan history, the Balanta emerged as a major political force, and the process coined as “Balantization of the state apparatus”³⁸⁸ ensued.

Yet PRS rule, which turned out to be characterized by extreme corruption and economic mismanagement, was eventually terminated following the assassination of two military Chiefs of Staff and a coup against Yala’s government. Ironically, this disastrous stint of Balanta control served to improve relations between Balanta citizens and other ethnic groups. Both were appalled by the PRS’s failure to rule and longed for more effective government. While the PAIGC returned to power, it did so only with the support of the Balanta – including Yala. The Balanta became a major political force, which now had at least some experience in the affairs of the state. One might surmise that this experience at least partly explains the military’s predilection for interfering in politics (i.e., launching coups).

The Balanta have finally, but only recently, become a formidable force in Bissauan politics. Given the military’s (and therefore the Balantas’) relatively new involvement in the drug trade and access to the revenues that that represents, it stands to reason that the Balanta will continue to have a significant influence on the future trajectory of politics in Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, it is logical to assume that existing rivalries that are ethnically motivated have been exacerbated by drug revenues. Many assert that ethnicity played a role in the 2009 assassinations of President Vieira – a Papel

³⁸⁸ Alvaro Nobrega, *The Power Struggle in Guinea Bissau* (Lisbon: Institute of Social and Political Sciences 2003).

from the coastal community – and General Na Waie – a Balanta. Although it may not have been the primary point of contention, the personal rivalry could well have been a product of these underlying ethnic divisions.

Generational Divide

Guinea-Bissau has often been referred to as a “gerontocracy” where the younger generations in particular have formed institutionalized groups and where it is commonplace for youths to rebel against their elders and the traditions they represent.³⁸⁹ Throughout the course of the interview process, many experts echoed this sentiment, noting how the drug trade is exacerbating some of these tensions. While cultural “ageism” is typically associated with communities residing in the Bijagos islands and even Balanta communities, many interviewees noted that it is the intergenerational tensions among the military that have been most affected by the drug trade.

The generational divide within the military may have cultural roots, but it has been exemplified by the clear split between the military’s top-heavy officer corps comprising veterans of the Liberation War, and the rank and file consisting of newly enlisted soldiers entering since the Civil War. As described in a previous section, the prestige of the military grew tremendously following the Liberation War, when soldiers were considered to be the country’s liberators and entitled to the utmost respect.

³⁸⁹ Inger Callewaert, "The Birth of Religion among the Balanta of Guinea-Bissau " in *Lund studies in African and Asian religions* (Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2000); Eric Gable, "The Culture Development Club: Youth, Neo-Tradition, and the Construction of Society in Guinea-Bissau," *Anthropological Quarterly* 73, no. 4 (2000); Silva Marques and José Eduardo, "A Gerontocracia Na Organização Social Dos Bijagós," *Boletim Cultural da Guiné Portuguesa* 10, no. 38 (1955). Also Non-attribution interviews.

However, this “Old Guard,” i.e., the warrior class that fought for the country’s independence, is now faced with a new, younger cadre of soldiers who are trying to fulfill a similar legacy for their generation. Moreover, according to one interviewee who has spent time with the country’s younger generation of soldiers, much resentment stems from the issue of resource distribution, since the older soldiers have historically controlled access to the state’s resources and patronage networks.³⁹⁰ This, of course, includes access to drug revenues, which according to some was the cause of the latest coup attempt by General Antonio Indjai against the young Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Admiral Jose Zamora Induta, in April 2010. As one Bissauan journalist with an insightful native perspective observed

“Induta never was a problem... He was a youthful figure. We all know that here in Africa, age counts. Induta was seen as an intrepid young man who dared to trespass into his elders’ territory. From there, as is the custom amongst African people groups, he was disciplined and I do not believe that decision will be reversed for quite some time. By confronting his elders, he is seen as a traitor both by the Balanta and the Biafada.”³⁹¹

Thus a cultural predisposition toward rebelling against elders coupled with the prospect of very lucrative drug revenues for those in power suggests that these latest power grabs can at least partially be attributed to competition for drug profits. Moreover, this internal division within the military is therefore also a potential source of political

³⁹⁰ Non-attribution interview.

³⁹¹ "Angola: Journalist Discusses Tensions within Guinea-Bissau Politics, Military," *Luanda O Pais* (translated from Portuguese), 10 September 2010.

instability, thus refuting the hypothesis that the drug trade has not fundamentally compromised Guinea-Bissau's political institutions.

Institutional Rivalries

The only other significant cleavage in Guinea-Bissau that has been exacerbated by the drug trade is not among the population but within the government apparatus. Institutional factionalism has characterized Guinea-Bissau's government operations since the war for independence, when Presidents – Vieira most notably – appointed fellow soldiers (known as “Big Men”) to lead the various ministries. However, these appointments were not granted as a reward or to cultivate new alliances; rather they were made to appease men who Vieira believed may have posed a threat to his authority. As such, institutional rivalries developed because these Big Men did not consider themselves subordinate to Vieira but wished to exert their influence over the respective institutions.³⁹²

Several native Bissauans interviewed also alluded to a Soviet/communistic style of government following the Liberation War. This stems from Guinea-Bissau's historically close relationship with the former USSR, which was characterized with extensive military assistance, training, and provision of weapons. For example, in 1965 75 PAIGC leaders traveled to the Crimean village of Perevalne where they were taught how to make and use explosives, seize arms depots, carry out acts of sabotage on power

³⁹² Non-attribution interview.

plants and military installations and other guerrilla skills.³⁹³ By 1975, the USSR was supplying the PAIGC with ground-to-air missiles to aid in Guinea-Bissau's liberation fight against Portugal.³⁹⁴ At that time, numerous economic, technical, cultural, and scientific agreements of cooperation were signed, which cemented this close alliance. According to some interviewed, it was the Soviet influence that compelled Guinea-Bissau's leaders to create a secret police force whose job it was to counterbalance the influence of the army. This theory is not grounded in any recent research, but it could explain the source of some tension between the military and the Interior Ministry (which would have served as the secret police). Many interviewees who have had interactions with government ministers and other officials noted the rivalries detected in some of their comments. Some have even speculated that it was the former Interior Minister, Major Baciro Dabó, who was the first to become involved in drug trafficking until the military sought to gain control of this lucrative trade.³⁹⁵ As a close ally of Vieira's and the most powerful individual in the non-security sector, Dabó clearly posed a threat to the military's monopoly on the drugs transiting the country. He was murdered shortly after Vieira's assassination, some interviewees say to hedge against the Interior Ministry's renewed involvement in the drug trade.

³⁹³ "Russia and Guinea-Bissau Relations," (Retrieved 18 July 2011: http://www.africana.ru/lands/Guinea_Biss/russia.htm, Translated from Russian).

³⁹⁴ William Thom, "Trends in Soviet Support for African Liberation," *Air University Review* July-August (1974).

³⁹⁵ Lisbon's Africa Monitor, a biweekly publication that covers Lusophone Africa, alleged that Internal Administration Minister Baciro Dabó, whose office heads police and state security, has been involved in cocaine trafficking. The same report also linked Navy Chief Bubo Na Tchuto, a close ally of President Vieira, to drug profiteering Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa."

Although this rivalry between the military and the Interior Ministry is the most commonly cited, another major rivalry that should not be overlooked (or underestimated) is that between the President and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Several interviewees noted the power triangle that exists between these two individuals and the Interior Minister, all of whom were killed within four months of each other in 2009.

iii. The drug trade has undermined the legitimacy of the state

A review of historic literature has made it clear that the state and political leadership in Guinea-Bissau has *never* enjoyed much legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In other words, the population has never had much confidence that the Bissauan government would uphold the duties typically expected of a modern state. This is true for a large number of African nations, particularly failed states. For this reason, it would be wrong to assert that the drug trade has directly eroded the legitimacy of the state.

However, media reports and discussions with experts indicate that the drug trade has undermined the legitimacy of the state by further distancing the state from the people it is intended to serve. Respondents describe their perception of the political elite as having an agenda that has become even more disconnected from the interests of the community than it otherwise would have been. They feel that the political elite, including the President and politicians, are motivated by the lucrative bribes paid by DTOs rather than the will of Bissauan people. Many cited President Vieira as having an

agenda overwhelmingly skewed toward the benefit of drug traffickers, effectively serving as their “puppet” rather than the elected representative of the Bissauan People.

Interestingly, all respondents indicated that drug trafficking is *not* the issue that will sap the public’s confidence in the government. They are most likely to object to poor economic conditions such as unemployment or unpaid salaries; so drug trafficking ranks well below these economic circumstances on their list of grievances. However, the drug trade *has* raised concerns among Bissauans who lament that their country’s integrity has been called into question by the international community, which puts them at a disadvantage in terms of receiving international aid. Thus they are concerned about the drug trade’s stigmatizing effects in terms of international perception, but not its direct security, economic, political, or social implications.³⁹⁶

Along the same vein, the drug trade has also undermined – though not directly eroded – the judicial system in Guinea-Bissau. The assassinations of President Vieira and General Na Waie were followed by numerous calls from the local media and civil society groups (as well as international outlets) for the government to investigate the murders and prosecute the culprits. As 2009 passed and an investigation was not complete, news reporting from the region began to become more vociferous and critical of the government for failing to prosecute those responsible. A general air of disapproval of the government’s handling the situation has since become evident in media reports from the region, reflecting a further loss of public confidence in the state to uphold the rule of law.

³⁹⁶ Non-attribution interview.

Another indication that the state of Guinea-Bissau is losing what little legitimacy it has in the eyes of its citizens is the number of criticisms by civil society groups who disapprove of blatant government impunity. As one particularly vocal civil society group leader stated, *"The apparent freedom that drug dealers find in the country raises suspicions of a possible high level of complicity with high circles of power."*³⁹⁷

Ultimately, there is no evidence to support the notion that the drug trade alone has caused the demise of legitimacy of the Bissauan state. However, it is clear that the lack of political will to prosecute drug cases (notwithstanding the lack of capacity) and widespread government impunity for drug traffickers has *undermined* the legitimacy of the Bissauan state by reinforcing the perception among the population that the government has been “captured” by the will of drug traffickers. As a result, many lamented that attempts to rehabilitate the state and cultivate some sense of government accountability will be lost as long as the political elite is concerned only with serving the interests of drug traffickers.

iv. The drug trade has undermined Guinea-Bissau’s sovereignty

A major implication of the drug trade in Guinea-Bissau has been to question the country’s sovereignty, both at the institutional and physical levels. In other words, the capacity of Guinea-Bissau to exist without interference from external actors has clearly been threatened – whether from the persuasive power of DTOs, or pressure from the UN,

³⁹⁷ "Analyst Says Leaders May Have Been Killed Due to Drug Trade," *Luanda Novo Journal in Portuguese*, 24 July 2009.

EU, and other inter- and multi-national partners to whom Guinea-Bissau has conferred power in some regard.

Physically, one need only consider the Bijagós archipelago, whose 88 islands have become the permanent residence for a number of drug traffickers. According to Antonio Mazzitelli, former UNODC director for West Africa, the Bissauan government officials effectively sold access to these islands to drug traffickers.³⁹⁸ This is a major infraction on the physical sovereignty of Guinea-Bissau. Politically, external actors including drug traffickers and international institutions have also compromised Guinea-Bissau's sovereignty. While they are not necessarily seeking to wield control over the institutions of state power directly, they are seeking to influence them in a way that is conducive to their own pursuits.

The prospect of a stabilization force in Guinea-Bissau (planned to arrive in February 2011 with contingents from the AU, ECOWAS, and Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries or CPLP)³⁹⁹ also brings into question its strength as a sovereign power. Interestingly, various actors in the Bissauan government appear to be conflicted in their attitude toward this force, at times hailing it as a godsend and at other times denouncing it as an imposition on its sovereignty.⁴⁰⁰ There also seem to be camps emerging who support or oppose the force, such as President Sanha who generally favors

³⁹⁸ Mazzitelli, *Global Drug Trafficking: Africa's Expanding Role*; Straub, "Africa's Drug Problem."

³⁹⁹ "AU Announces Stabilization Force to Arrive in February," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 6 January 2011.

⁴⁰⁰ "Guinea-Bissau President, PM Reportedly Disagree over Stabilization Force," *Ultima Hora in Portuguese*, 23 September 2010.

the idea⁴⁰¹ while military leaders generally disapprove (not surprisingly, since a stabilization force would negate the need for a strong national military).⁴⁰² The Defense Minister has even referred to the stabilization mission as “expendable” if security and defense cooperation with Angola proceed.⁴⁰³ More significantly, camps seem to have emerged among the population regarding the prospect of a stabilization force. While some have indeed labeled it an imposition on their sovereignty, others indicate they would welcome it. A similar proposal for the deployment of an Angolan military mission to maintain peace in Guinea-Bissau was described by one Bissauan journalist as a necessary and welcome development because “*civil society no longer believes in an internal solution to the military problem, so there needs to be a foreign presence. It may not need to be Angola, but Angola’s experience would be very valuable to us.*”⁴⁰⁴

The issue of sovereignty is a sensitive one for Guinea-Bissau, given its history of having fought one of the only wars for independence from its former colonial power and the prestige that accompanied that feat. Unfortunately, the general sense among those interviewed is that the drug trade has had the effect of eroding political and physical sovereignty.

⁴⁰¹ See for example “Guinea-Bissau President Warns Stabilization, Not Occupation Force to Come,” *Lusa in Portuguese*, 8 September 2010.

⁴⁰² “Guinea-Bissau President, PM Reportedly Disagree over Stabilization Force.”; “Guinea-Bissau Prime Minister Says No Stabilization Force to Come,” *Lusa in Portuguese*, 7 January 2011.

⁴⁰³ “Guinea-Bissau: President Attends ECOWAS Summit to Discuss Military Reforms,” *Lusa in Portuguese*, 15 September 2010.

⁴⁰⁴ “Angola: Journalist Discusses Tensions within Guinea-Bissau Politics, Military.”

HYPOTHESIS 2: Guinea-Bissau does not have a narco-economy.

Supporting Evidence

As previously stated, a narco-economy may be defined simply as an economy that is largely driven by and dependent on drug revenues. Gathering evidence to support the hypothesis that Guinea-Bissau does not have a narco-economy is difficult, since the absence of a narco-economy is essentially the presence of an otherwise “normal” economy. The best one can hope to accomplish is to examine significant developments in Guinea-Bissau’s economy that would seem to indicate “business as usual” (even for an extremely underdeveloped economy) and determine whether these developments are outweighed by any evidence of anomalous trends potentially indicating the presence of a narco-economy.

To that end, the best example of “business as usual” in an African economy in recent years is the level of investment, particularly Chinese investment, in a country. In Guinea-Bissau, Chinese interest and investment appear to be proceeding quickly and meaningfully, as has been the general trend throughout the rest of the African continent. Neither the presence of drug traffickers nor the threat of instability as a result of the drug trade appear to be deterring Chinese investors who, according to one report, have doubled investment in the last two years. In fact, China recently completed the Bissauan government’s new \$25 million (USD) government administration building. China has already played a hand in other projects in Bissau including the National Assembly, built in 2000 for \$6 million, a military hospital with 200 beds that cost \$12 million, as well as

a 25,000-seat stadium. Beijing has also financed renovation work on barracks, three primary schools, and hospitals; has invested in the country's agriculture sector; and is interested in offshore oil exploration and the vast forest and fishing wealth of Guinea-Bissau.⁴⁰⁵ All the while Chinese officials have continued to pursue bilateral economic agreements in Guinea-Bissau⁴⁰⁶ and even hosted Prime Minister Gomes in China in September 2010 to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries.⁴⁰⁷ In addition to Chinese investment, there has been some discussion of the South African company Ophir seeking partners to help shoulder the cost of drilling for oil in between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.⁴⁰⁸ Since this is a known operating area for drug traffickers, the mere discussion of such a project would seem to indicate these investors are not deterred by their presence.

Refuting Evidence

The presence of a narco-economy is inherently difficult to prove, since so many transactions that are likely connected to drug trafficking are somehow disguised to evade law enforcement authorities. Moreover, there may be certain economic developments that cannot be explained by the legitimate economy but that don't meet the definition of a narco-economy. In Guinea-Bissau, the main evidence pointing to the existence of a

⁴⁰⁵ "Guinea-Bissau Opens Chinese-Funded Government Headquarters," *Agence France-Presse in English*, 10 November 2010.

⁴⁰⁶ "Guinea-Bissau, China Undertake to 'Strengthen Bilateral Ties'," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 21 September 2010.

⁴⁰⁷ "Guinea-Bissau: Prime Minister Starts Official Visit to China to up Cooperation," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 21 September 2010.

⁴⁰⁸ "Ophir Seeks Partners to Help Finance Drilling between Senegal, Guinea-Bissau," *Africa Energy Intelligence in English* 10 November 2010.

narco-economy is better described as anomalies. These economic anomalies – unexpected in a legitimate economy but often common where massive drug revenues are at play – do not always prove the existence of a narco-economy but certainly raise doubts of the legitimacy of many transactions. The following data points fall into this category; they do not necessarily reflect the existence of an economy that is largely driven by and dependent on drug revenues, but these anomalies are suspicious enough to raise the question among economists familiar with African economies.

i. The drug trade may account for a sudden increase in FDI

Many of the economists and even regional experts interviewed commented on the sudden increase in FDI into Guinea-Bissau in recent years. They attribute this to money laundering transactions associated with the drug trade, such as through legitimate businesses or real estate. In order to verify the investment itself, hard economic data was examined and is presented here. The claim that increased FDI is due to money laundering activities is harder to prove, but anecdotal evidence supporting it is presented in the next section.

Economic data confirms that FDI inward to West Africa has generally increased since 1990 (see Figure 20). The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) attributes this to a then-booming global commodities market, rising corporate profitability of investment, and an increasingly FDI-friendly environment.⁴⁰⁹ It also cites the numerous expansion projects in Nigeria's oil industry, project upgrades by

⁴⁰⁹ World Investment Report, (New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2008).

transnational corporations already operating in the region, and recent Chinese interest in Africa as accounting for much of this FDI.




Figure 20. FDI Flow Inward to West Africa (Excluding Nigeria) ⁴¹⁰
(Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database)

A closer look reveals that FDI into Guinea-Bissau is consistent with these claims, but not when one considers the small size of the Bissauan economy relative to Nigeria and other economic giants in the region. In fact, it would seem to demonstrate the danger of looking at FDI from a regional perspective since the presence of large economies can overshadow seemingly insignificant increases in FDI in smaller countries that may not be explained by the same rationale as FDI into Nigeria. In fact, these seemingly insignificant

⁴¹⁰ Nigeria's FDI levels are not shown here because they are massively higher than the rest of the regional economies and distort the graph. The large fluctuations in Liberia's FDI levels are due to internal conflict followed by foreign reconstruction efforts.

increases in FDI may actually be explained by illicit activities, as the interviewees speculated. Figure 21 illustrates the FDI into Guinea-Bissau which has grown significantly since 2005.




Figure 21. FDI Flow Inward to Guinea-Bissau
(Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database)

While some of this investment into Guinea-Bissau can be explained by legitimate Chinese investment into Guinea-Bissau's agricultural sector and other projects cited above⁴¹¹ and/or the growing number of ex-patriots in the country as a result of the increased international attention on Guinea-Bissau, there are insufficient data to rule out other sources of FDI. Regional experts suspect there may be more nefarious activities at

⁴¹¹ Guinea-Bissau: Review of Performance under the Program Supported by Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance and Request for Second Purchase under Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance, vol. Country Report No. 08/266 (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund August 2008).

play and believe that traffickers are investing in the region as a way to disguise their illicit revenues while creating the vehicles through which to launder their money. This has been manifested, according to most observers, through investment in local real estate.

ii. The real estate sector in Guinea-Bissau has likely been used for money laundering purposes

Money laundering has historically been associated with businesses that have a high cash turnover rate, ample opportunities to move bulk cash, or the ability to engage in trade-based money laundering. However, in West Africa (as well as some other regions) money laundering through the real estate sector has become a particularly popular way of hiding the source of illicit revenues. According to the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (known by its French acronym GIABA), which is the preeminent authority in this subject, there are several aspects of the real estate sector in Africa that is conducive to money laundering. First, lax laws and poor supervision of the real estate sector (translating into low risk for the money launderer) makes it easy to hide illicit funds. Secondly, there is no average market price for real estate property in the region, so manipulating the price of property raises little suspicion. Thirdly, like most African economies, even the real estate sector is cash-dominated, so money can easily be disguised as genuine commercial transactions. The numerous predicate offenses that generate illicit funds in the first place are abundant in West Africa (counterfeiting, corruption, advance fee fraud, illicit trade in gold and other minerals, oil bunkers, and drug trafficking). Documented techniques to launder these funds through

the real estate sector include the use of unregistered real estate agents and other front men, mortgage schemes (under- or over-valuing real estate), use of fictitious names to purchase property, use of shell/front companies, and alternative money transfer systems.⁴¹²

Anecdotal evidence provided by interviewees supports the assertion that the real estate sector in Guinea-Bissau has likely been used for money laundering purposes, though not on the level as observed in other larger West African cities such as Dakar or Accra. Numerous opulent mansions have been constructed in Guinea-Bissau since 2003, according to reports from the field.⁴¹³ According to one interviewee, entire communities of newly constructed yet completely *unoccupied* buildings have raised concerns among international observers because this growth of the real estate sector does not correlate with a rise in banking mortgages.⁴¹⁴ Interviewees reasoned that if legitimate banks were involved in financing these projects, banks would have expressed concern at the lack of occupancy and thus the absence of rents. Presumably, banks would have even repossessed property if their loans weren't being repaid. Rather, they speculate that real estate is probably being purchased or constructed with bulk cash – an indication that criminals are using the transaction as a way to launder illicitly gained proceeds. Since real estate projects appear to be the only visible signs of FDI, experts believe that the

⁴¹² For an excellent summary of money laundering through the real estate sector in West Africa, see *Typologies of Money Laundering through the Real Estate Sector in West Africa*, (Dakar: Groupe Intergouvernemental d'Action contre le Blanchiment d'Argent en Afrique de l'Ouest (GIABA), 31 December 2008).

⁴¹³ Non-attribution interview.

⁴¹⁴ *Typologies of Money Laundering through the Real Estate Sector in West Africa*.

sudden influx of foreign investment is likely a front operation for the laundering of drug proceeds. For this reason, some have referred to the growth of the real estate sector as “narcotecture,” indicating the source of these funds.⁴¹⁵ The Economic Intelligence Unit has connected the striking increase in foreign exchange reserves in Guinea-Bissau from \$33 million in 2003 to \$174 million in 2008 to the observed increases in FDI, which one can further deduce were associated with drug-related activities such as money laundering.⁴¹⁶

The Bissau Palace Hotel (Figure 22) outside Bissau is a prime example of a suspicious new construction project that has not enjoyed many visitors since its establishment. According to one journalist, it remains entirely vacant year-round, which begs the question: why did its Lebanese owner build it when there was clearly no tourism industry in Bissau? This particular example highlights a major concern regarding drug-trafficking in West Africa, which is the opportunities that exist for Latin American collaboration with the large Lebanese Diaspora, some of whom are thought to be affiliated with Hezbollah.⁴¹⁷ One may logically deduce that elements of the Lebanese population in West Africa (numbering several hundred thousand)⁴¹⁸ may in some way collaborate with Latin American DTOs to generate profits which are remitted to Lebanon and ultimately threaten U.S. security interests.

⁴¹⁵ Antonio Maria Costa, "Cocaine Finds Africa," *Washington Post*, 29 July 2008.

⁴¹⁶ "Drug Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa: Guinea-Bissau: Africa's First Narco-State," *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 16 June 2009.

⁴¹⁷ Mario Vernaschi, Guinea-Bissau: Narco-State, ed. Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, *Untold Stories* Available at: http://pulitzercenter.typepad.com/untold_stories/guinea-bissau/, June 2009).

⁴¹⁸ Farah, "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa."



Figure 22. Bissau Palace, Guinea-Bissau
(Source: www.bissaupalacehotel.com)

Besides the Bissau Palace Hotel, there are rumors of at least one five-star resort hotel that has been built in Bubaque on the Bijagos Islands (also by Lebanese businessmen).⁴¹⁹ Supposedly this hotel remains largely unoccupied, which is not surprising given the absence of a tourism industry in the area. In fact, there are not even Bissauan tourist agencies that will organize trips to the islands. Getting there is very difficult and is usually arranged by companies in Senegal.⁴²⁰ As a result, there is broad speculation that the resort hotel is merely a money-laundering facility (and is actually deterring legitimate investment as described in a subsequent section).

⁴¹⁹ Non-attribution interview.

⁴²⁰ Non-attribution interview.

Aside from these few, high-profile hotels and the construction of numerous “narco-mansions” for powerful politicians and high-ranking members of the military,⁴²¹ most experts agreed that Guinea-Bissau has actually *not* experienced a massive construction boom as in Dakar or Accra. According to some, this is because Bissau is not a financial “hub” in the region, as Dakar is. Dakar and Accra are extremely important cities in the region not only because of their relatively sophisticated financial infrastructure but also because so many diaspora populations reside there and keep their money in reputable West African banks such as ECOBANK and the Central Bank of West Africa States (known by its French acronym, BCEAO), which have better anti-money laundering practices (although BCEAO was suspected of doing so in early 2008).⁴²² That said, the opening of several new Nigerian banks in Bissau,⁴²³ and 15 in the Gambia⁴²⁴ (which is absurd for their small populations of 1.5 and one million, respectively) raises major concerns given that these tiny countries don’t *need* such financial infrastructure and are likely using these institutions to launder proceeds generated from drug trafficking.⁴²⁵

The veracity of these claims is hard to verify, though it is easy to understand how they have come to be. The experience of Senegal, which is also thought to be fraught with narco-dollars (and whose counternarcotics institutions are arguably more competent

⁴²¹ Non-attribution interview.

⁴²² Non-attribution interview.

⁴²³ Non-attribution interview.

⁴²⁴ Non-attribution interview.

⁴²⁵ Non-attribution interview.

than their neighbors’) lends credence to the assertion that new construction is indicative of the presence of drug money. Figure 23 and Figure 24 show examples of new residential construction also known as “narcotecture” by some in Dakar.



Figure 23. New Residential Construction in Dakar
(Source: Ashley Bybee)



Figure 24. New Residential Construction in Dakar
(Source: Ashley Bybee)

Figure 25 is of the recently built Radisson Hotel where rates average \$375 per night. There is not a large tourism industry in Senegal, nor are most visitors able to afford such high rates. Some interviewees believe that the hotel was built with drug money and is being used to launder proceeds, though there are no substantiated reports of this.



Figure 25. Interior of the Radisson Hotel, Dakar
(Source: Ashley Bybee)

iii. The drug trade may account for the growth of luxury items in Bissau

Every interview with a subject who had spent any time in Bissau in recent years yielded some comment regarding the luxurious lifestyles of individuals they had observed. New cars (Hummers, SUVs, and Jaguars were cited the most) have been the most obvious luxury item, but jewelry, designer clothes, and expensive liquor are other items that have apparently grown in popularity. These luxury items are so prominent that one respondent said all you had to do is “*walk around Bissau to get a sense of the volume*

*of drugs transiting the country by the cars and other luxury items.”*⁴²⁶ More importantly it is well-known among the general population that the individuals flaunting this new-found wealth are involved in the drug trade. One respondent remarked how the teenagers in his neighborhood could easily identify specific drug traffickers by the cars they drive.⁴²⁷ Similarly, one journalist who works in what is considered to be the most drug-ridden neighborhood in Bissau, said “*everyone can point out a person suspected of having ties to drug trafficking,*” although “*no one is able to provide proof...We see things that surprise us. People who had nothing, and now have many things.*”⁴²⁸ It is important to note that it is not just Latin Americans driving these luxury cars; government officials and high-ranking members of the military are increasingly the ones driving these cars – a clear indicator that corruption is rampant and on a scale to sustain these luxury lifestyles.

iv. The drug trade appears to deter legitimate foreign investment

There exists in Guinea-Bissau an apparent paradox vis-à-vis foreign investment. While there has been a significant increase in FDI in the real estate sector most likely for money-laundering purposes, there have not been market-driven, long-term investment projects by foreign entities looking to grow Guinea-Bissau’s economy and profit from its abundant natural resources. The one exception is China, whose significant investment levels are more politically motivated than genuine attempts to capitalize on Guinea-

⁴²⁶ Non-attribution interview.

⁴²⁷ Non-attribution interview.

⁴²⁸ "Analyst Says Leaders May Have Been Killed Due to Drug Trade."

Bissau's resources.⁴²⁹ Iran has alluded to massive increases in their country's investment in Guinea-Bissau, which have largely failed to materialize, amounting to nothing more than empty promises.⁴³⁰ Even Angola has paid lip service to investing in Guinea-Bissau; although it has become involved in a mining project and the construction of Buba Harbor in the country's Southern region, much of this investment has yet to come to fruition.⁴³¹

Experts have noted that foreign investment in the country's most productive sectors (such as the cashew sector or the tourism industry) has actually been deterred by political instability in Guinea-Bissau.⁴³² This includes not only the general political instability that has plagued Guinea-Bissau since the country's civil war, but also the perceived danger of operating in Bissau, the capital, since the arrival of the Latin American DTOs. According to some, foreign investors are simply not eager to invest in Bissau where intimidation tactics by Latin Americans might occur. Likewise, the scenic Bijagos archipelago has been touted as a potentially lucrative eco-tourism destination. Yet to date, the only apparent development on the archipelago has been allegedly

⁴²⁹ Kwesi Aning and Delphine Lecoutre, "China's Ventures in Africa," *African Security Review* 17, no. 1 (March 2008); Benedicte Vibe Christensen, *China in Africa: A Macroeconomic Perspective* (Washington DC: Center for Global Development, November 2010); Domingos Jardo Muekalia, "Africa and China's Strategic Partnership," *African Security Review* 13, no. 1 (2004). One of China's purported motivations for investment in Africa is to secure political support on the issue Taiwan's sovereignty in the UN. Interestingly, Guinea-Bissau is actually ahead of Senegal in terms of relationship with the Chinese. Senegal had been working with the Taiwanese until 2005 when they reversed course, realizing they were missing out on the gravy train.

⁴³⁰ Hamid Reza Moqaddamfar, "Iran, Guinea-Bissau Officials Discuss Expansion of Mutual Cooperation," *Fars News Agency in English* 23 May 10.

⁴³¹ Salas Neto, "Angola Journalist Questions Continuing Aid to Guinea-Bissau," *Luanda Semanario Angolense in Portuguese*, 18 September 2010.

⁴³² Non-attribution interview. Interview, (Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), Democracy and Governance (DG), USAID, July 28, 2009); "Jane's Sentinel: Guinea-Bissau."

performed by drug traffickers as a way to launder their illicit proceeds. The consensus among those interviewed is that they would not tolerate competition from a legitimate tourism industry or any activities that might disrupt their illegal activities.

Another example of the reluctance of foreigners to invest in the region is India's interest in Guinea-Bissau's cashew sector but failure to invest in the region. Although Guinea-Bissau enjoyed a 14.5 percent increase in cashew-nut exportation in 2008, 97 percent of this harvest was exported to India where it is processed locally then exported to the more lucrative Western European and North American markets. These processed cashews fetch up to four times the prices of unprocessed cashews, but due to the absence of a domestic cashew-processing factory, Guinea-Bissau is unable to capitalize on this potential revenue source. Even though processing operations are labor intensive and low-tech, which would provide high levels of employment for Bissauans at a relatively low cost, Guinea-Bissau has yet to receive foreign investment to build such a facility.

For a country in such dire need of foreign capital for economic development, this deterrence of legitimate FDI is a major setback. As one respondent noted, foreign aid from the EU, World Bank, IMF, and U.S. is intended to develop the country's economy, but many of these initiatives have failed and/or have largely been abandoned due to their high costs.⁴³³ Without additional long-term foreign investment, projects funded with foreign assistance are unlikely to reach their full potential.

⁴³³ Non-attribution interview.

v. Drug revenues may account for a sudden increase in remittances

Several experts interviewed noted a sharp increase in remittances to Guinea-Bissau from Europe over the last few years, and data from the World Bank confirms this (Figure 26). Because there is not a growing Bissauan Diaspora abroad (see Figure 27), many speculate that the remittances channel is being used by African couriers in Europe to deposit drug proceeds into local banks. Since there is no way to determine the legitimacy of such remittances, it is an ideal way to launder drug proceeds into personal bank accounts. It should be emphasized, however, that as with the sudden influx of FDI, this theory is based entirely on speculation since there is no positive evidence of a link between remittances and the drug trade. Nonetheless, it would certainly be worth tracking these trends as part of a broader effort to track economic indicators that could potentially offer valuable insights regarding anomalous economic activity in the region.




Figure 26. Inward Remittance Flows to Guinea-Bissau
(Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group)




Figure 27. Migration Flows from Guinea-Bissau
(Source: World Factbook, 2003-2009)

vi. The drug trade jeopardizes foreign assistance

Guinea-Bissau has experienced a long history of foreign donors suspending aid due to military involvement in politics. For example, following the army mutiny of 2004 reconstruction aid was terminated and donors agreed to provide funding through the UN only to ensure payment of salaries and reintegration of demobilized soldiers.⁴³⁴ Similarly, the recent cessation of much foreign aid to Guinea-Bissau is not due to the drug trade per se, but rather to the various power grabs and unconstitutional apprehensions by the hands of the military. But if the assumption is that these latter actions were themselves a result of the drug trade (or a manifestation of the power struggle caused by competition over the drug trade), then it is logical to deduce that the cessation of foreign aid is an indirect impact of the drug trade.

The international donor community suspended its foreign aid to Guinea-Bissau after the politically motivated attack on President Vieira's official residence and the ensuing political turmoil. More recently, the suspension of U.S. aid to Guinea-Bissau was intended to pressure authorities to restore the constitutional “normalcy” that existed prior to the April 2010 uprising. The subsequent appointment of Indjai – the primary instigator of the uprising – as Army Chief and then the more recent appointment of Na Tchuto – a U.S.-designated Drug Kingpin – as Navy Chief have been perceived by all donors as unacceptable. Similarly, the EU’s threats to block tens of millions of euros in aid and

⁴³⁴ Donor aid to Africa is led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, although Portugal is Guinea-Bissau’s key bilateral development partner. In recent years, Angola and China have greatly increased their investment and development assistance. Senegal has also been historically an important partner as President Wade was a close ally of President Vieira, who had offered substantial support to Senegal in the Casamance region.

withdraw support for SSR were in direct response to Indjai's unconstitutional apprehension of Induta.⁴³⁵ Given its heavy reliance on foreign aid (accounting for 37.3 percent of Guinea-Bissau's GDP in 2002)⁴³⁶ and its poorly performing agricultural sector, this action will exact a significant toll on the economy.

If the assassinations in Guinea-Bissau were indeed motivated by narco-corruption, then one significant indirect effect of these illicit activities is the suspension of foreign aid. Because a growing portion of aid to West African countries is targeted to develop capacity in counternarcotics efforts, some U.S. aid experts believe that the cessation of this aid could result in a downward spiral by which countries are unable to overcome the forces of this illicit market. For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State requested \$7.96 million in narcotics and law enforcement assistance for West Africa. Its primary targets are to develop capacity in the law enforcement and judicial sectors in Guinea-Bissau (\$3 million), Cape Verde (\$2 million), Nigeria (\$2 million), Ghana (\$500,000), Sierra Leone (\$250,000), Guinea (\$110,000), and Burkina Faso (\$100,000). In addition, \$42.4 million in other Department resources has been proposed to bolster democracy, governance, and rule of law programs in these countries.⁴³⁷ Should this critical foreign assistance be suspended to punish military intervention in politics, then countries such as Guinea-Bissau could well be at a further disadvantage during a time when assistance is most critical to overcome the challenges associated with drug trafficking. Moreover, the

⁴³⁵ "EU Begins Moves to Block Tens of Millions of Euros in Aid for Guinea-Bissau," *Agence France-Presse (North European Service)*, 20 December 2010.

⁴³⁶ World Development Indicators, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2009).

⁴³⁷ Johnnie Carson, "Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa."

suspension of foreign aid could undermine the government's capacity to make debt repayments and, most importantly, pay public-sector salaries.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Guinea-Bissau has not experienced narco-violence over control of the drug trade.

Supporting Evidence

i. There is an absence of widespread violence

In order to provide evidence to support this hypothesis, one must essentially prove a negative, i.e., demonstrate that there has *not* been any drug-related violence or insecurity in Guinea-Bissau. To this end, the absence of widespread violence and criminality is a major finding in itself. This is true on two levels – the national and local levels.

On the national level, there is no indication, either through press reports, political commentaries, or interviews, that insurgents within Guinea-Bissau's borders are involved in the cocaine trade. Even in Casamance – where cannabis smuggling has long fueled a low-level Senegalese civil war in which the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) has allegedly received covert support from the Guinea-Bissauan Army – there is no evidence that cocaine revenues have fueled that conflict, yet. All interviewees, including the UNODC, believe this to be true, though many fear that the conflict could well be intensified and prolonged by cocaine revenues.⁴³⁸

⁴³⁸ World Drug Report 2010. Non-attribution interviews.

Most experts attribute the absence of national conflict in Guinea-Bissau to its unique history in overcoming Portuguese domination. Bissauan national unity has generally been strong since this struggle for independence and vulnerable only by external threats to the country as a whole (such as a separatist movement in 1998 that incited a year-long civil war.) While institutional and personal rivalries abound, Guinea-Bissau is one of the few African countries that have had the experience of uniting under a national banner against the Portuguese.⁴³⁹ As a result, it has generally enjoyed peace at the national level and has not had to contend with historic conflict that has characterized so many other African nations.

Similarly, respondents all agreed that they had *not* observed an increase in violence on a local level in recent years. In fact, all emphasized the safe, relatively peaceful environment that characterizes Bissau. Unlike other capital cities affected by the drug trade that have experienced violence such as Kingston, Bissau is a peaceful, though impoverished city. One American respondent remarked that he frequently walks around Bissau late at night and feels entirely safe.⁴⁴⁰ This comfort level is surprising and not due to the state providing security. Rather, it is the natural environment that characterizes Bissau.

Quantitative evidence confirms this absence of violence in Guinea-Bissau. The 2009 Index of African Governance Results and Rankings (formerly the Mo Ibrahim

⁴³⁹ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁴⁰ Non-attribution interview.

Index of African Governance) has created an integrated statistic for violent crime.⁴⁴¹ As Figure 28 illustrates, Guinea-Bissau has received the same score since 2000 and when compared to its neighbors, actually ranks above average, suggesting relative peace and stability in the country. A consolidated variable that incorporates other aspects of safety and security (such as government involvement in armed conflict, access to arms, etc) also places Guinea-Bissau in the top half of “safe and secure” countries in West Africa, with only Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal, and the Gambia scoring higher.




Figure 28. Safety and Security Category Score
(Source: The 2009 Index of African Governance Results and Rankings)

⁴⁴¹ This statistic is based on the homicide rate in each country but is coded to take into account both reported rates (when available) and other information on each country. It is supplemented by the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice Systems to create an all-encompassing measure that is scored on a four-point scale. Scores are assigned based on the rate of intentional homicides per 100,000 people, using the following scale: 1 = 0 – 1.9; 2 = 2 – 5.9; 3 = 6 – 9.9; 4 = 10 – 19.9; 5 = >20.

Narcotics and law enforcement experts attribute this absence of violence in a city so affected by the drug trade to effective corruption. The power and influence enjoyed by traffickers (and the bribes paid to government officials) have allowed traffickers to operate virtually unimpeded. As a result, there is no need for them to resort to violence.

ii. Assassinations are not entirely attributable to the drug trade

Despite a relatively low homicide rate in Guinea-Bissau (2 to 5.9 intentional homicides per 100,000 people), 2009 witnessed a slew of political and military assassinations. For the purpose of this research, the dilemma has been to assess the extent to which these assassinations were prompted by competition for control of the drug trade (and therefore access to drug revenues), or the extent to which these assassinations were the results of deeply engrained personal rivalries that would have occurred regardless of the drug trade. Although it has been impossible to answer this question with certainty, the majority of those interviewed who are familiar with Bissauan history and politics tend to side with the latter argument – that these assassinations were inevitable, particularly since both men had survived assassination attempts in the four months leading up to their deaths. That said, many admitted that drug revenues may have played some role in amplifying these rivalries and ultimately “been the straw that broke the camel’s back” (a phrase used by more than one interviewee in describing this situation). Thus these assassinations ultimately support the hypothesis that Guinea-Bissau has not experienced narco-violence over control of the drug trade, since these incidents most likely would have occurred regardless. To understand this complicated reasoning, it

is worth examining the events and sharing the various theories that have emerged to explain them.

On March 1, 2009, an explosion in the headquarters of the Guinea-Bissauan military killed Army Chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie. While reports of the event vary widely, credible sources state that General Na Waie was killed by a bomb that was detonated under a staircase as he was heading to his office.⁴⁴² Early the next day, a group of soldiers killed President Vieira as he fled from his private residence. Based on media reports from the region, political commentaries from international organizations, and personal opinions expressed during interviews, most people believe that troops loyal to General Na Waie committed the assassination of President Vieira in retaliation for his assumed murder of General Na Waie. According to some reports, these troops initially blamed Vieira for the bomb that killed General Na Waie but subsequently withdrew this accusation, presumably to deflect any claim that would have implicated the military in the assassination. They also denied allegations that Vieira's death had been in retaliation for taking the life of General Na Waie.⁴⁴³ Sources from the International Crisis Group reported that, in a meeting at the Presidential Palace immediately following the assassination of General Na Waie, President Vieira considered resigning for fear of being blamed for his death.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴² Lydia Polgreen and Alan Cowell, "Soldiers Kill Guinea-Bissau's President after Death of Army Chief, Diplomats Say," *The New York Times*, 2 March 2009.

⁴⁴³ David Pallister, "Guinea-Bissau President 'Killed in Clash between Rival Soldiers,'" *The Guardian*, 2 March 2009.

⁴⁴⁴ "Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun," (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 25 June 2009), Briefing No 61.

Three months later, on June 5th 2009 two prominent politicians and their bodyguard and driver were killed. Baciro Dabó, a former Interior Minister under Nino Vieira and independent candidate in the then-approaching 28 June presidential election, and Helder Proença, a Member of Parliament and former Minister of Defense in Vieira's previous administration.⁴⁴⁵ Both men were allies of the late President Vieira and rumored to be involved in the drug trade.⁴⁴⁶ The assassinations of these men were committed by the Military Police under the pretext of preventing a coup attempt.⁴⁴⁷ Despite two government communiqués defending the deaths, claiming they were the result of the victims' refusal to accept arrest and consequently avert a coup attempt, the majority of the population purportedly did not buy this argument.⁴⁴⁸ Several interviewees commented that Dabó especially wielded significant power in the Bissauan government and was feared by his peers. The notion that his refusal to accept arrest warranted killing can more likely be interpreted as an intentional murder plot to remove his influence from the political equation.

This spate of assassinations of prominent figures is out of the ordinary, even in a country as politically unstable as Guinea-Bissau. Naturally, rumors and theories soon followed both in the media and among regional analysts. While it is difficult to determine

⁴⁴⁵ Adam Nossiter, "Two Politicians Are Killed in Guinea-Bissau," *New York Times*, June 5, 2009.

⁴⁴⁶ Lisbon's Africa Monitor, a biweekly publication that covers Lusophone Africa, alleged that Internal Administration Minister Baciro Dabó, whose office heads police and state security, has been involved in cocaine trafficking. The same report also linked Navy Chief Bubo Na Tchute, a close ally of President Vieira, to drug profiteering. Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa."

⁴⁴⁷ 2009 Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau.

⁴⁴⁸ "The Bissau Monitor."

the causes of those assassinations with any certainty, it is worth describing these rumors in hopes that they expose other aspects of Guinea-Bissauan politics. Better understanding the rivalries among the actors helps to determine to what extent drug trafficking may have precipitated the events. Some of the most plausible explanations (according to experts interviewed and credible reports) are presented here.

i. *Competition for Drug Profits*

The most commonly cited explanation for the assassinations of President Vieira and General Na Waie was that they were competing with each other for the drug profits generated by Latin American traffickers. Calvario Ahukharie, National Director of Interpol, said that the escalation of violence reflects a war to gain more personal benefits and power over drug trafficking. Ahukharie stated that “*the Army, the Navy, and the President are all involved – Nino was number one and Tagme number two and they were competing... someone had to fall.*”⁴⁴⁹

According to this theory, the spiral of violence began in 2008 when several flights originating from Venezuela and carrying cocaine landed in Bissau; several witnesses have reported that they saw men in military uniforms unloading cocaine from the private jets. Despite attempts by the Judicial Police to inspect the planes and arrest the culprits, the crews in both cases were released and the drugs disappeared. About one month later, President Vieira survived an attack in his home by mutinous soldiers in what appeared to be a failed coup. In response, the president recruited a 400-strong militia as his personal bodyguard. This militia, later accused of trying to kill General Na Waie, was disbanded.

⁴⁴⁹ Vernaschi, Guinea-Bissau: Narco-State.

Although experts interviewed could not confirm this level of detail, they agree that President Vieira began to feel politically isolated as it became clear that his generals were gaining influence by increasing their involvement in the drug trade. Advocates of this theory believe that ultimately President Vieira sought to eliminate all those who endangered his business. They say the goal was to strengthen his position at home and reassert his dominance over the drug trade. He needed to show the Latin Americans that he was still the primary facilitator of drug trafficking activities and that Guinea-Bissau would remain a convenient place for their business.⁴⁵⁰

Others contend that Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto, former Chief of the Navy, had been the primary figure facilitating the Bissauan military's involvement with drug traffickers. He was arrested in November 2008 after being accused of attempting a coup and subsequently fled to the Gambia, apparently afraid for his life. Because his hostility toward General Na Waie was widely known, some have pointed to him as the culprit who acquired and planted the bomb that killed the General. One can logically reason that with General Na Waie eliminated, Admiral Na Tchuto may have believed he could resume his trafficking activities after having made a deal with the President.

There are countless sub-theories that implicate various military and political leaders, factions, and spontaneous alliances that were in competition for control of this trade. Who "controlled" the drug trade, however, is irrelevant for the purpose of this research. The more insightful observation is that the assassinations could well have been

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

the result of high-stakes competition at the highest government levels over access to these drug revenues.

ii. *Result of an Old Rivalry*

Another common theory for the assassinations, particularly among those academics and other interviewees who have studied Guinea-Bissau's history and/or spent extended amounts of time in the country, is that the assassinations were the culmination of a long rivalry between President Vieira and General Na Waie. This rivalry was rooted in several tensions, one of the most basic of which was ethnicity. A brief explanation of this personal rivalry is summarized here.

President Vieira hailed from the minority Papel ethnic group (representing 7 percent of the population), which had historically been at odds with General Na Waie's Balanta faction (representing 30 percent of the population). This cleavage was exacerbated when the Balanta-dominated military attempted a coup against President Vieira in his first presidency in 1985. Following this coup, some claim that Vieira tortured – some even say castrated – Na Waie. During the next two years, President Vieira ordered the deaths of 11 coup plotters, and more than 40 others were sentenced to long prison terms. This incident aggravated existing ethnic tensions as resentment against President Vieira grew among the Balanta. Advocates of this theory argue that it was this deep-seated and historical ethnic tension that characterized the rivalry between the two men, and they discount the notion that drug-trafficking activities exacerbated this cleavage. Some academics have speculated that Latin American drug traffickers may have employed the “divide and rule” tactic reminiscent of Africa's colonial rulers to pit

factions against each other in search of the most beneficial arrangement. Yet experts with direct access and insights to the situation argue that this rivalry is purely a competition for market share motivated by personal greed rather than pursuing the agenda of a particular ethnic group. That said, it is interesting to note that President Wade of Senegal warned that the instability in Guinea-Bissau could evolve into an ethnic war.⁴⁵¹

The more significant factor driving the rivalry had to do with the inherent institutional distrust between the Presidency and the military and Vieira's and Na Waie's personal quests for power. Both men were celebrated veterans of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (better known by its French acronym PAIGC) guerrilla army that defeated the Portuguese and enjoyed the respect of the Bissauan population. When a mutinous army of unpaid soldiers killed his predecessor in 2004, Tagme Na Waie emerged as the preferred choice of the troops to lead and unify the divided institution of the Armed Forces. As a result, one of his first acts as Army Chief in 2004 was the reintegration of a significant contingent of minority officers that would provide more ethnic and political balance to the upper echelons of the armed forces, which had previously been dominated by the Balanta.⁴⁵² Among those welcomed back were several close associates of Vieira. Assuming that General Na Waie wanted to keep drug trafficking activities within his own patronage network, this action would seem to be inconsistent with a strategy of keeping ones allies close. It may, however, lend credence to some reports from the field that Vieira's return to power was based on an arrangement

⁴⁵¹ Chen Shun, "Roundup: Guinea-Bissau Interior Ministry Says Coup Attempt Foiled," *Xinhua General News Service*, 5 June 2009.

⁴⁵² "Jane's Sentinel: Guinea-Bissau."

between him and General Na Waie whereby the latter would protect the former in exchange for a free hand over the military.⁴⁵³ In the lead-up to the elections of 2005, in which Vieira was running, General Na Waie was purportedly the “real power” behind the civilian transitional government led by Rosa Henrique.⁴⁵⁴ This was shortly after Latin American drug traffickers began to transit Guinea-Bissau, so one might deduce that was when General Na Waie became involved in their operations. While the extent of his involvement is unclear, some believe that he solidified his role in the trade at an early juncture and might have even dominated it before the entrance of other politicians such as Vieira.⁴⁵⁵

Further evidence supporting this theory was provided by a number of interviewees who commented that the assassinations in Bissau came as no surprise to anyone, particularly since Tagme often noted that “*if I die in the morning, Nino will die in the evening; if I die in the evening, Nino will die in the morning.*”⁴⁵⁶ One Portuguese scholar, in Guinea-Bissau at the time of the assassinations, observed that the locals with whom he was staying, among others in the community, were not at all surprised at the news of the deaths.⁴⁵⁷

Under either scenario, most agree that the high profile assassinations in Guinea-Bissau were personal reprisals that served political agendas. The drug trade may well

⁴⁵³ "Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun."

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁵⁶ Temudo, "From the Margins of the State Ot the Presidential Palace: The Balanta Case in Guinea-Bissau."

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

have served as a catalyst – raising the stakes by bringing more resources and introducing new players (traffickers) who seek alliances with those in power.⁴⁵⁸ This echoes the UNODC's former West Africa Director Antonio Mazittelli's view that the death of these leaders was basically rooted "in personal disputes," not in their supposed involvement with drug trafficking.⁴⁵⁹

Refuting Evidence

i. There have been death threats against officials investigating the drug trade

Though not narco-violence per se, there is evidence that drugs have threatened the lives and personal security of several high-ranking government officials. Among the most highly publicized of these death threats was to the former Minister of Justice, Carmelita Pires who began receiving threats in 2008, after her persistent inquiries into the seizure of 500 kilos of cocaine by the judicial police and the arrest of six Venezuelans traveling on two Venezuelan aircraft that landed at the Bissau airport in July of that year. This seizure was followed by an inexplicable release of at least one of the culprits by a Bissauan judge, who promptly allowed the Venezuelan pilot to leave the country almost immediately following his arrest by the judicial police.⁴⁶⁰ This led many, including Pires, to believe that members of the armed forces tampered with evidence and interfered with

⁴⁵⁸ "Analyst Says Leaders May Have Been Killed Due to Drug Trade," *Novo Jornal in Portuguese*, 24 July 2009.

⁴⁵⁹ Mazittelli, *Global Drug Trafficking: Africa's Expanding Role*.

⁴⁶⁰ "Guinea-Bissau: A Cocaine Coup Fails," *Africa Confidential* 49, no. 18 (5 September 2008).

the investigation.⁴⁶¹ She was quoted saying: “*It is important to know that we are talking about huge sums of money and these people have every means to corrupt our institutions.*”⁴⁶² Similarly the Attorney General Manuel Cabral received death threats for launching an investigation into the military’s protection of the crew and seizure of the cargo. Furthermore, according to media reports and confirmed by one interviewee who is personal friends with him, Cabral – who was placed in charge of investigating the murders of President Vieira and General Na Waie in 2009 – was forced to seek refuge in the Angolan embassy after receiving threatening telephone calls related to his investigation.⁴⁶³

Journalists who dare to report on the drug trade have also received death threats or been otherwise impeded by government officials from pursuing their leads. However, this is more appropriately labeled a social phenomenon as restrictions on press freedom fundamentally undermine the role of civil society and is therefore covered in the next section.

⁴⁶¹ 2009 Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau.

⁴⁶² "Africa's Cocaine Coast," *Al Jazeera, McClatchy-Tribune Business News*, 12 February 2009.

⁴⁶³ 2009 Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau; "Guinea-Bissau State Prosecutor Says Receiving Death Threats," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 19 August 2009.

HYPOTHESIS 4: The Guinea-Bissauan population has not been affected by the drug trade.

Supporting Evidence

i. The Bissauan public has been minimally affected by the drug trade

Once again, providing specific evidence in support of this hypothesis is inherently difficult, as one must prove a negative, i.e., that there have *not* been any notable impacts of the drug trade that have affected the general population. The best way to do this is to learn about the perceptions and experiences of local citizens in order to determine if and how they have been affected by the drug trade.

To that end, this issue was raised with interviewees who are either Guinea-Bissauan or who have spent extended periods of time in Guinea-Bissau (particularly anthropologists, historians, and also NGO workers). The vast majority of them agreed that the general population has been only minimally affected by drug trade, if at all. As evidence of this, all interviewees highlighted the relatively calm and peaceful environment in Bissau, unlike other capital cities that have experienced heightened violence as a result of competition over a thriving or even dwindling drug trade, such as Kingston. When one visits Bissau, they emphasized, one is not immediately struck by the presence of the drug trade either through violence, criminality, or a large user population (though a few anomalous luxury items have increased).

Further evidence that the public has been relatively unaffected by drugs is that outside of Bissau and Bubaque (the largest city of the Bijagos islands), most Bissauans do not know what cocaine is and are unaware of the country's use as a Transit State.

While some in the countryside may have radios, they are very isolated from the larger urban areas where the trafficking is occurring. This has been a defining feature of the urban-rural divide for decades.⁴⁶⁴ The Bissauan government has always struggled (and typically failed) to “capture” rural nodes of power, which would allow it to expand the reach of state power outside of Bissau.⁴⁶⁵ Because of this isolation, rural communities are largely unaware of the activities occurring in the large cities, including the drug trade. That is not to say, however, that there is complete unawareness of the issue. According to interviewees, many have heard rumors of the newfound presence of an unknown substance worth a lot of money, but, to date, they have not been directly affected by drugs.

The situation is slightly different in Bissau, where interviewees have observed a higher level of awareness among the population, though personal experiences and interaction with the trade are still at a very low level. One example described by a U.S. Government official residing in Dakar but who made frequent trips to Bissau was particularly revealing. The interviewee described how during carnival in Bissau in February 2009, in addition to the standard costumes that are typically worn, they observed several individuals wearing masks in the shape of airplanes. This was a symbol of the drug-laden flights that had been arriving in Guinea-Bissau, and proves that the

⁴⁶⁴ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁶⁵ Non-attribution interview.

public *is* aware of this new phenomenon, though they haven't been greatly affected by it thus far.⁴⁶⁶

Moreover, the majority of the population is isolated not only geographically, but also figuratively from the official apparatus of the state. Even in Bissau the public is so disconnected from the government, public servants, and the military that the opportunities for them even to come into contact with drugs are few and far between. In Guinea-Bissau, the affairs of the state and the military occur at an entirely different level than the public is privy to. While drug business is clearly rampant at these political/military levels, ordinary Bissauans are so far removed from the affairs of the state that the drug trade never typically enters their awareness.⁴⁶⁷ Although this separation between public officials and the population they are supposed to serve has negative implications for governance and the health of a vibrant democracy, it does serve to shelter ordinary citizens from access to and involvement in illicit activities. Along the same vein, the fact that the rural population is disconnected from activities in the capital may well be a good thing in this regard, as it protects them from larger macro and geo-political implications of the drug trade.

⁴⁶⁶ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁶⁷ Non-attribution interview.

Refuting Evidence

i. There is some evidence of rising cocaine consumption and the development of a local market

There appears to be two camps on the cocaine consumption issue in Guinea-Bissau. On the one hand, media reports and the standard position of most government officials (African, U.S., and otherwise) is that cocaine consumption in Guinea-Bissau, and West Africa writ large, is absolutely on the rise. However, the anthropologists, political scientists, and other subject matter experts who have spent extended periods of time in Bissau generally feel that this claim has been vastly overstated. Here are some of the observations and insights gathered through the interview process in support of both camps.

At a 2009 counternarcotics conference in Senegal, several West African government officials noted that cocaine consumption, particularly in its most affordable form (crack) was on the rise in their countries. They further lamented the associated resurgence of delinquency and crime within their societies.⁴⁶⁸ An additional aggravating factor is the lack of awareness among the population regarding the long-term effects of cocaine addiction. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, presenters claimed that crack was virtually unheard of until cocaine entered the country in the mid-2000s. Now, they claim to have observed an alarming increase in the local demand and market for cocaine.

⁴⁶⁸ Combating Narcotics Trafficking in West Africa, (Dakar: Remarks made at a conference sponsored by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9 November 2009).

Likewise, the U.S. State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Affairs has asserted that cocaine use is on the rise throughout West Africa and has been for the last several years.⁴⁶⁹ They attribute this to the cartels' 'payment in kind' strategy, which the DEA estimates amounts to 10 percent of trafficked cocaine remaining in the region as payment for safe passage. While the DEA admits that some of this may also be trafficked to Europe via emerging African DTOs, the reality is that these nascent organizations do not yet have the logistical capabilities to transport efficiently all this load to Europe. Rather they are selling crack locally.⁴⁷⁰ AFRICOM counternarcotics staff further notes that after coupling drugs with a local "youth bulge" and high levels of unemployment, it is not difficult to see how rising drug consumption and the development of a local market could quickly destabilize Bissauan society.⁴⁷¹

In addition to the observations gathered through interviews, media sources have also portrayed a rising drug problem in Guinea-Bissau – at times bordering on alarmist reporting. One article and associated YouTube video⁴⁷² highlighted the work of Guinea-Bissau's first ever rehabilitation center called "Desavio Jovem," in which six staff members, none of whom are doctors or psychologists, "treat" 55 recovering drug addicts and alcoholics offering little more than guidance, a mattress, and meals.⁴⁷³ Its founder

⁴⁶⁹ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷⁰ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷¹ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷² <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyi1K918QCI&feature=related>

⁴⁷³ "Cocaine to Europe Produces Addicts Locally," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)*, 3 March 2008; "Images of a Crack Cocaine Rehabilitation Centre," *Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)*, 5 March 2008.

claims that the “flood” of cocaine transiting the country is “destroying his country’s youth.”



Figure 29. Addicts in Desafio Jovem Rehabilitation Center
(Source: Manoocher Deghati/IRIN)

While most of the social scientists interviewed felt that cocaine consumption in Guinea-Bissau had not yet reached such an alarming level, those who had observed increased drug use emphasized locals’ preference for crack. Even in its cheapest form, it is surprising that locals can afford this drug. For that reason,, some speculate that the increasing numbers of crack addicts are actually receiving drugs in exchange for their services, such as couriering drugs across borders. However they receive it, it is through their existing patronage circles – the typical method through which every Bissauan receives their daily requirements. There are also different perceptions of who specifically

is using crack. While some have observed or heard rumors of drug use among people who come into direct contact with it (politicians, military and the government “elite”), others have personally observed young, bright, entrepreneurs who were once poor but who are now selling cocaine.⁴⁷⁴ Regardless of who is using crack, all interviewees believe that numbers are low and that there is certainly not a sufficient user base to sustain a local market.⁴⁷⁵

Despite these claims of rising consumption, the vast majority of interviewees who have direct insight into Bissauan society through their own extended field research indicated that drug use in Guinea-Bissau is grossly exaggerated. Most Bissauans, they assert, do not even know what cocaine is. Even cigarette-smoking is relatively rare since most people cannot afford the habit. As of June 2010, one anthropologist who had performed extensive field work in the region definitively noted that throughout the rural areas of northwest Guinea-Bissau, the population had not been affected by drugs. While some may have heard about drugs on their radios, it is not a point of interest and there were certainly no personal experiences with cocaine.⁴⁷⁶ Others residing in Bissau noted that they had also not observed increased drug use in the larger cities (which, based on the experiences of other Transit States researched, is where consumption tends to be concentrated).⁴⁷⁷ One respondent who lived with a Bissauan family and asked about

⁴⁷⁴ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷⁵ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷⁶ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷⁷ Non-attribution interview.

cocaine consumption was told that drug use was uncommon.⁴⁷⁸ Others emphasized that the more affordable marijuana and alcohol use was more common.⁴⁷⁹

Incidentally, many among those who claimed that Guinea-Bissau was not experiencing increased drug use noted that one place that *was* experiencing increased drug use was the Gambia. According to several respondents, the Gambia has become a popular tourist destination for “drunk, sun-burnt, lower middle-class Brits” particularly older women looking to meet young Gambian men. It is purported that significant cocaine consumption is taking place in these luxury resorts.⁴⁸⁰

While the “party line” at the previously mentioned counternarcotics conference in Dakar was to emphasize increasing cocaine consumption in West Africa, one-on-one discussions with locals and Bissauan counternarcotics officials confirmed that the level of consumption and addiction is the subject of some debate. Some admitted in confidence that cocaine consumption within their countries is exaggerated, and that only the very affluent and the elite can afford cocaine, even in its most inexpensive form, crack. They are more concerned over the use of cannabis, though admittedly the health ramifications of this drug are significantly less severe.

These conflicting viewpoints may be a sign that government officials are exaggerating the rates of consumption to promote the work of their agencies and solicit foreign assistance, or it might simply reflect the different perspectives of individuals based on their own circumstances. According to official sources, fears of rising local

⁴⁷⁸ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁷⁹ Non-attribution interview.

⁴⁸⁰ Non-attribution interview.

cocaine consumption in West Africa have been realized, though there is currently insufficient data to determine the true scope of the problem. Even if consumption is not at the alarming levels indicated by some, it does appear to be greater now than it was just a few years ago, which suggests that a local market could be developing.

ii. The drug trade has repressed some press freedoms

Perhaps the most disturbing impact of the drug trade for a country supposedly striving to achieve certain democratic ideals and milestones has been the corruption of a central segment of civil society – the press. Several of the regional experts and African political scientists interviewed indicated that they had heard numerous reports that journalists who have dared to report on the drug trade received death threats or have been summoned to government premises to explain their activities or statements. Other reports reveal that journalists have reported prolonged court proceedings that impeded their work.⁴⁸¹

The NGO “Reporters Without Borders” (or Reporters Sans Frontieres) has done an excellent job documenting this repression of the Bissauan press. In a 2007 report, the group exposed several cases of Bissauan journalists being coerced by authorities complicit in drug trafficking. For example, Allen Yéro Emballo, the local correspondent for Agence France-Presse and Radio France Internationale, was forced into exile. Emballo had purportedly been threatened by the Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who told Emballo to “*shut up or die, it’s up to the journalist*

⁴⁸¹ Léonard Vincent, *Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine and Coups Haunt Gagged Nation* (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, November 2007), 6.

to choose” when Emballo revealed that he knew that Na Tchuto’s men were giving the Colombians protection.⁴⁸² According to the report, his home was stormed by members of the military who took his computer, notes, and photographs. Despite a complaint lodged to the Bissaun police, no action was taken by authorities. One interviewee familiar with the case believes that Emballo is now living with his family in Senegal, reluctant to return to Guinea-Bissau for fear of retribution. The impact such an incident has on the free press in Guinea-Bissau cannot be overstated. One foreign reporter who has been to Guinea-Bissau many times in recent years even opined: “*Allen’s departure is a great loss as he was the country’s best journalist.*” Interestingly, one interviewee more familiar with Kenya noted that when he spoke to a leading investigator from a major newspaper in that region, he was told that DTOs often pay journalists to “deal with” opponents and to deflect attention away from the blatant activities of organized crime groups. They also pay civil society groups to ignore those contentious issues that could jeopardize their (criminals) ability to operate.⁴⁸³ It is not unreasonable to assume that some Bissauan journalists may also be in the pockets of powerful drug traffickers.

In addition to such anecdotal evidence, there have also been systematic attempts to quantify and measure the freedom of the press in Africa. Figure 30 shows the scores that West Africa received from the Index of African Governance in the sub-category of Press Freedom. This data, collected by the organization Reporters Without Borders, is based on a survey of partner organizations, journalists, and others. The questionnaire

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Non-attribution interview.

includes 50 questions, including questions about the number of journalists who have been victims of various forms of intimidation, yes/no questions about whether journalists have been threatened and attacked, and questions about the presence of surveillance, censorship, concentration of media ownership, and other limits to press freedom. Lower scores on the index indicate a freer press; higher scores, a less free press.




Figure 30. Press Freedom (2000 – 2007)
(Source: Index of African Governance, 2009)

This data clearly shows an erratic trend in press freedom in Guinea-Bissau. The fact that press freedom actually improved in Guinea-Bissau between 2000 and 2006 is surprising and may reflect a situation where the press was not actually silenced to the extent implied by international reporting. Yet the steep decline in press freedom in 2007

(around the same time as several high-profile drug seizures and subsequent release of suspected culprits) confirms what the anecdotal evidence indicates – that journalists in Guinea-Bissau appear to have been influenced and corrupted by drug lords and organized crime groups operating in Guinea-Bissau.

HYPOTHESIS 5: Instability resulting from the drug trade will manifest itself in fundamentally different ways depending on the capacity of a state to control its territory and govern its people.

Whereas the previous four hypotheses highlighted the specific ways in which Guinea-Bissau has been affected by the drug trade, the purpose of this line of inquiry is to put these effects into context. By comparing the nature and extent of instability in Guinea-Bissau with a range of other Transit States, one can begin to make some broad assessments regarding the ability of a state to address, deflect, or cope with the drug trade based on the strengths of its own institutions. As described in Chapter three (methodology), Jamaica, Mexico, Tajikistan, and Turkey were strategically selected to provide a sample of states with capacities ranging from quite strong (Mexico or Turkey) to very weak (Tajikistan).

It is first important to provide a definition for instability so that it can be evaluated fairly across the board. There are some impacts of the drug trade that, while abhorrent, do not directly destabilize the state. These include drug-funded elections, the erosion of the criminal justice system, or the loss of control over critical transportation infrastructure. Though they may ultimately contribute to an environment considered to be unacceptable to the population, eventually inciting rebellion, insurgency, or other form of violence,

they are not by themselves a destabilizing force. To that end and for the purpose of this research, instability is defined as a state lacking physical security or at risk of falling into violent conflict.

Narco-corruption as Instability

Narco-corruption contributes to political instability in all cases, while there is significant variation in the scope and impact of other sources of instability. As such, it is worth first describing how narco-corruption has destabilized each case before examining other sources of instability. Even within the category of narco-corruption, the states selected have been affected by it in very different ways, based not only on the strength of their institutions but also the unique features that characterize their region and history. Figure 19 summarizes some of the defining features of narco-corruption in each Transit State.

Table 5. Features of Narco-Corruption in Transit States

Country	Effect of Narco-Corruption
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distorts the social contract
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violent backlash from strong government position; • Desertions among the military
Tajikistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perpetuates conflicts that posed a threat to the legitimate governments • Undermines attempts to improve governance • Mid- and long-term effects that it has on the country's political institutions
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perpetuates conflicts that posed a threat to the legitimate governments
Guinea-Bissau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undermines attempts to improve governance • Mid- and long-term effects that it has on the country's political institutions

In all cases, the argument can be made that narco-corruption has contributed to a politically unstable and even volatile environment. Although endemic narco-corruption may not always pose an imminent threat to individuals' personal security, and in fact often has a stabilizing effect as it negates the actions of honest officials who would otherwise blow the whistle on illicit activities, its implications for populations' long-term security should not be overlooked. In all cases examined, narco-corruption contributed to the erosion of each state's political stability by fundamentally undermining the legitimacy and authority of the state and its ability to provide good governance. In most cases, this manifested itself by distorting the social contract and contributing to the rise of alternate sources of authority and/or privately provided security mechanisms to supplant that of the legitimate governments. Not only has this highlighted the government's inability to perform those critical functions designated to it, but it fundamentally threatens the government's monopoly on force, when such organizations are allowed to become too powerful.

In Jamaica, the destabilizing impacts of narco-corruption have been observed through a long process in which the lucrative drug trade slowly affected the balance of power between political parties and Jamaican posses, so that the former declined while the latter grew. The May 2010 example whereby Christopher Coke's loyal followers successfully waged a localized insurgency against government forces demonstrates the power and influence that these posses wield in Jamaica as a result of narco-corruption.

Mexico has similarly been destabilized by narco-corruption; efforts by upstanding and honorable politicians, most notably Calderon, to combat the drug trade and the narco-

corruption associated with it have created violent backlash against those individuals. Mexico exemplifies how if there were no political will to crack down on the drug trade, then the violence directed against law enforcement officials and politicians would not be necessary. It is only because of the courageous efforts of some to reject narco-corruption and uphold the rule of law that DTOs have resorted to their violent tactics. Mexico also typifies a situation whereby narco-corruption has caused the government to lose its monopoly on force. Desertions among the armed forces, and the concomitant increase in paramilitary organizations working for DTOs (Zetas, for example) and the violence that has ensued describes a situation whereby the military has become a valuable resource pool of well-trained recruits for DTOs.

Because the drug trade has fueled a civil war in Tajikistan and a terrorist insurgency in Turkey, both of which were at least premised on political grievances and long-standing feelings of political marginalization, it is fair to say that the drug trade has threatened the political stability of both countries since it has perpetuated conflicts that posed a threat to the legitimate governments. In Tajikistan, drugs became an important revenue source for both government and opposition forces, thus perpetuating a conflict where opposition forces sought to overthrow the legitimate government. In Turkey, the PKK's objectives were at one time secession and the unlawful overthrow of the legitimate Turkish government. By its very nature, a secessionist group challenges the authority and legitimacy of the state by seeking to establish its own sovereign nation, in this case an independent Kurdish state in the region that includes southeastern Turkey. Now it is vying for cultural and political rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in

Turkey, which is still a politically destabilizing force since the PKK has met some resistance from the Turkish government.

Each example demonstrates how narco-corruption's corrosive impacts on the state have fundamentally destabilized regimes to the extent that instability often ensues, regardless of the state's capacity to control its own territory. However, as the following specific examples highlight, the most common sources of instability in Transit States are associated with competition for drug profits, criminality, narco-insurgencies, and even the *ineffectiveness* of narco-corruption in some cases.

Other Sources of Instability

In addition to narco-corruption, there are other sources of instability that have emerged in each case study as a result of the drug trade. However, the nature, extent, and severity of instability vary in each case, depending on the capacity of the state and the strengths of its own institutions to address the drug trade. Table 6 summarizes the nature of drug-related instability in each state.

Table 6. Drug-Related Instability in Selected States

Country	Nature of Drug-Related Instability
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vigilantism as a result of perceived ineffective and corrupt national institutions • Violent crime partly as a result of enhanced government interdiction efforts
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intimidation by DTOs towards civilians who threaten to expose their violent tactics; • Elimination of government officials who threaten their operations; • Competition for transit routes, local consumption markets and other strategic locations.

Tajikistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Narco-insurgency premised on political grievances
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Narco-insurgency premised on political grievances • Some increase in violence and criminality by Turkish Organized Crime
Guinea-Bissau	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None.

i. *Instability in Jamaica*

Jamaica's high ranking on the Failed State and State Fragility Indices – although misleading in some aspects – reflects a state with significant capacity to control its territory and govern its people. The case of Jamaica is an example of a Transit State in which instability has taken two main forms: vigilantism as a result of perceived ineffective and corrupt national institutions and violent crime as a result of enhanced government interdiction efforts.

Vigilantism emerged in the face of national institutions that were perceived to be corrupted by individuals with obvious connections with criminal elements.⁴⁸⁴ As a result, these law enforcement institutions were not regarded as legitimate security providers or even as working for the public. Some segments of the population blamed the government for its failure to maintain accountable security and law enforcement institutions that protect the population and resorted to vigilantism for social justice. Ironically, most of these vigilante groups are also criminals who use the resources they derive from drug trafficking for social investment, fundamentally altering the “social contract” so that they

⁴⁸⁴ Report of the National Task Force on Crime, (Kingston: National Task Force on Crime, 1993).

represent an alternative authority to the legitimate government. This is instability that clearly results from a government perceived as weak and ineffective.

On the other hand, much of the violent crime in Jamaica is, paradoxically, a direct result of enhanced counternarcotics programs that have successfully stemmed the flow of drugs transiting the region. As the case study shows, the sudden dearth of business and revenues compelled Jamaican criminal groups to resort to other illegal means to supplement their declining revenues, including extortion, robbery, and kidnapping.⁴⁸⁵ This provoked significant street-level competition for what little business was left, causing a further rise in homicide rates.⁴⁸⁶ As of 2010, however, the JCF has been successful in reducing this scourge of violence by concentrating police and military units in the most crime-infested areas. This was likely prompted by the Christopher Coke crisis and the negative attention Jamaica attracted in terms of international perception. Nonetheless, it is a testament to the effectiveness of the JCF if sufficient and genuine political will is present to combat these violent forces.

Admittedly the arrival of cocaine into Jamaica caused an initial increase in violence, but instability in the market itself, including a sharp *decline* in the market caused a more significant increase in violence. Because it is reflective of enhanced government capacity to combat the drug trade, one can see how this type of outcome may be unique to states with significant government capacity to combat the drug trade. This phenomenon has been a defining feature of the Jamaican case, which makes it a unique

⁴⁸⁵ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁴⁸⁶ World Drug Report 2010.

and compelling case study, though we have also observed the same trend in Mexico in recent years.

ii. *Instability in Mexico*

Mexico is an example of a state with significant government capacity. As described in the case study, instability in Mexico is ascribed to three different fronts: intimidation by DTOs toward those who threaten to expose their violent tactics; elimination of government officials who threaten their operations; and competition for transit routes, local consumption markets, and other strategic locations. Whereas the first of these is typical in any narco-state, the latter two are a direct result of the Mexican government's demonstrated political will and capacity to crack down on the drug trade. Elimination of public officials is necessary only when those officials stand firm against narco-corruption. In this way, Mexico is similar to the Jamaican case wherein violence directed at public officials is due more to the Calderon administration's commendable efforts to quell the drug trade than to the drug trade itself. The last front – intensified competition among the DTOs – is a testament to the government's successful interdiction and law enforcement programs in certain strategic locations.

iii. *Instability in Tajikistan*

Tajikistan is a low performer according to all measures of state capacity though it is slightly higher (i.e., less failed) than Guinea-Bissau. Tajikistan is an example of a Transit State where the drug trade is not the primary source of instability. Rather the drug trade has enabled and emboldened an otherwise preexisting insurgency and a Civil War. Whether or not either would have persisted at a lower intensity level without drug

revenues is open to debate, but one thing is certain – that drug revenues have prolonged the conflict. Although one can argue that non-state actors (such as organized crime elements) to challenge the state's sovereignty, legitimacy, and even its ability to control its own territory, it is disingenuous to assert that the drug trade in Tajikistan has directly caused instability by compromising some aspect of the state. Rather, some aspect of the state was already compromised (hence the Civil War) and drugs perpetuated the conflict. This is as opposed to Mexico where the drug trade itself has prompted an insurgency, or in Jamaica where violence is a direct result of the drug trade.

iv. Instability in Turkey

Turkey is a strong state with significant capacity to govern. It too has demonstrated impressive political will and developed some internal capacity to combat the drug trade. Despite these measures, Turkey has not experienced instability on the level of Jamaica or Mexico. The nature of instability in Turkey is more similar to Tajikistan, where drug revenues have funded and arguably prolonged a preexisting insurgency premised on political grievances. Instability in Turkey has been first and foremost the result of a marginalized Kurdish population whose paramilitary wing, the PKK, sought to create an independent Kurdish state. This conflict existed before the explosion of drug trafficking through Turkey. As described in the case study, the PKK initially received financial support from Syria, then Iraq and other neighbors who wanted to weaken Turkey. When these funding sources abated, the PKK turned to other revenue

sources such as those associated with the drug trade.⁴⁸⁷ Proceeds raised from trafficking and “taxing” other traffickers have likely sustained the PKK’s operations for three decades.⁴⁸⁸ Financing any non-state actor certainly represents a destabilizing force in the region as these terrorist organizations challenge the rule of law and legitimate government.

Interestingly, stability has actually improved in recent years despite the fact that heroin trafficking has picked up. As described in Appendix D, the PKK is now much weaker than it was in the early 1990s and no longer poses a military threat to the Turkish state. Rather, a once politically and ideologically motivated terrorist organization has in recent years declined militarily and transformed into a major DTO, generating sufficient supplies and personnel to maintain a low-level insurgency. Perhaps this is due to Turkey’s demonstrated political will and increased capacity to combat the drug trade. If so, it is interesting to note that this has not had the same effect as in Jamaica or Mexico, where efforts to the same end have resulted in even more violence.

v. *Instability in Guinea-Bissau*

Guinea-Bissau is the most failed state of those sampled. As hypotheses 1 through 4 demonstrate, Guinea-Bissau has experienced extremely limited drug-related instability. Despite the fact that the drug trade has empowered the military, exacerbated existing cleavages, prompted death threats, and undermined the legitimacy of the state, Guinea-

⁴⁸⁷ Jana Arsovska, Fueling Nationalism through Organized Crime, *The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners* (Arlington: Remarks made at George Mason University, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, 3 May 2009).

⁴⁸⁸ "The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners."

Bissau has not fallen into violent conflict or even sacrificed physical security as a direct result of the drug trade. In fact, the absence of widespread narco-violence and criminality is a major finding of this research, which concludes that political instability, including assassinations, has always existed in Guinea-Bissau and ought not to be attributed directly to the drug trade. The absence of drug-related instability in Guinea-Bissau suggests that traffickers have met little resistance from the Bissauan state, and that narco-corruption has been sufficient to secure government protection of their operations. The general lack of political will to combat the drug trade has enabled drug traffickers to operate in these “uncontrolled spaces” without any effect on the Bissauan state.

6. SYNTHESIS

RQ1: What have been the impacts of the drug trade in Guinea-Bissau?

For all components of this analytical framework, i.e., political, economic, security, and social, it is critical to understand that there have been recent trends and developments in Guinea-Bissau that the media and other analytical voices have attributed erroneously to the drug trade. This research has sought to clarify which of these trends are in fact attributable to the drug trade and in doing so differentiate them from those developments that likely would have occurred otherwise.

Political Impacts

Above all, the drug trade in Guinea-Bissau has fundamentally undermined and negated attempts to promote the rule of law in the country by promoting narco-corruption and providing the motive for impunity. Here are some of the mechanisms specific to Guinea-Bissau that have been observed:

i. Narco-corruption

Guinea-Bissau has long suffered from endemic corruption and one can debate ad nauseam what came first – illicit trade or corruption. However, two things are for certain: they are mutually reinforcing, and the arrival of drug revenues has undeniably

presented new opportunities for narco-corruption including manipulation of the judicial system (releasing suspected drug traffickers) and vote-buying.

ii. Drug revenues place a higher premium on power and further empower the military

Cocaine has raised the value placed on positions of power in Guinea-Bissau, since those in power almost automatically have direct access to drug revenues. This phenomenon is not unique to Guinea-Bissau; rather is an extension of the model of political behavior that has taken root in Africa known as “Neopatrimonialism,” (described in chapter 2). Whereas patrimonialism describes a political system in which power rests unequivocally with one single individual, neopatrimonialism incorporates some bureaucratic institutions that allow the leader (or patron) to use the state’s resources to secure the allegiance of the population (or his clients). In this way, the leader is able to maintain power through personal patronage networks rather than through fair elections or other legal institutions. In other words: *“It is a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres.”*⁴⁸⁹ In Guinea-Bissau, drugs have emboldened high-ranking members of the military who are now vying more than ever for these positions of power. These power struggles have been manifested in the unconstitutional seizures of power and illegal detentions.

⁴⁸⁹ Clapham, *Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State*.

iii. Exacerbates existing cleavages

It is difficult to attribute rising ethnic strife to the drug trade since these divisions have long been present in some way, shape, or form. However, as described earlier, patrimonialism drives most every aspect of political, economic, and social interactions in Africa. In Guinea-Bissau, drugs are clearly a major force in this system, where a few people have access to drug revenues, but they are responsible for sustaining patronage circles. A natural result of this is to exacerbate existing cleavages, rivalries, and generally promote factionalism. Because factions are structured around patrimonial relationships and allegiances rather than states or ideologies, the sudden influx of drugs (and accompanying resources) exemplifies this behavior as spoils are shared with loyal supporters and members of leaders' factions.

iv. Undermines legitimacy of the state

Drugs have undermined the legitimacy of the Bissauan government by further distancing it from the people it is intended to serve. Admittedly, civil servants lack the professional qualifications and resources to investigate drug cases and prosecute culprits,⁴⁹⁰ but the obvious lack of political will to even attempt to do so casts doubt over the country's integrity, which has a stigmatizing effect in terms of international perception. This has *undermined* what little legitimacy Guinea-Bissau has by reinforcing

⁴⁹⁰ "Police Chief Says Resources Necessary to Fight Organized Crime," *Lusa* (translated from Portuguese), 2 February 2011.

the perception among the population that the government has been “captured” by the will of drug traffickers.

v. Loss of sovereignty

The drug trade has undermined Guinea-Bissau’s ability to act without interference from external actors. The persuasive power of DTOs and pressure from the UN, EU, U.S., and other inter- and multi-national partners to whom Guinea-Bissau has conferred power in exchange for assurances of foreign assistance are all examples.

Economic Impacts

Guinea-Bissau has experienced a number of economic anomalies over the last decade. Although they are not proven to be associated with the drug trade, they are suspicious enough to have raised doubts regarding the legitimacy of many transactions. These include:

i. Sudden increase in FDI

Guinea-Bissau’s sudden increase in FDI in recent years is possibly attributable to money laundering transactions associated with the drug trade. There is simply not enough evidence of legitimate economic investment in Guinea-Bissau to explain this significant influx of financing.

ii. Money laundering through real estate

Real estate appears to be the main conduit through which much money laundering is occurring. Luxury hotels, apartment complexes, and other forms of “Narcotecture” have been observed, as well as the construction of several new Nigerian banks in Bissau.⁴⁹¹

iii. Growth of luxury items in Bissau

As a result of new sources of wealth now available to a small portion of the population, these individuals (residing mainly in Bissau) have adopted lavish lifestyles that include owning various luxury items such as cars, jewelry, designer clothes, and expensive liquor. Foreign drug traffickers also flaunt these items, which are visible to citizens residing in Bissau.

iv. Deters legitimate foreign investment

With the exception of FDI for money laundering purposes and China’s politically-motivated investment into Guinea-Bissau,⁴⁹² the country has not benefited from long-term, market-driven investment projects in the productive sectors of its economy. The reason for this is that potential investors have been deterred by instability in Guinea-Bissau. This includes not only the usual political instability but also the perceived risks

⁴⁹¹ Several non-attribution interviews.

⁴⁹² China’s investment strategy in Guinea-Bissau is part of a broader trend for investment across the entire African continent. While most agree that this investment is primarily to secure natural resources and markets for China’s growing economy, some speculate that it is also politically-motivated, with China seeking allies in the UN who will support it on the debate over Taiwanese sovereignty.

involved in operating in a country where the drug trade may impose security concerns that disrupt daily operations, drive away consumers, or distort the market.

v. Sudden increase in remittances

Since 2000, remittances into Guinea-Bissau have increased significantly, despite the absence of a growing Bissauan Diaspora abroad.⁴⁹³ Though this could be beneficial for the Bissauan economy, it may be a result of laundered drug proceeds into personal bank accounts.

vi. Threats to cease foreign aid

Though not directly attributed to the drug trade, many donors have ceased foreign aid to Guinea-Bissau as a result of the military's unconstitutional apprehensions and illegal detentions of a number of public officials. The subsequent appointments of those directly involved with these unconstitutional activities to high-ranking positions in the military have been perceived to be equally as egregious and deserving of a strong response. Given Guinea-Bissau's heavy reliance on foreign aid and its poorly performing agricultural sector, this action threatens to be a significant setback for the country.

Security Impacts

Despite claims by the international media and distinguished analysts that the drug trade has created a physical insecurity problem in Guinea-Bissau wherein public officials

⁴⁹³ For inward remittance flows to Guinea-Bissau see the World Bank, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group; for migration flows from Guinea-Bissau see the World Factbook, 2003-2009.

have been assassinated, the truth is that these acts of violence would likely have occurred regardless of the drug trade. In fact, Guinea-Bissau has remained surprisingly peaceful over the last decade unlike other Transit States, which have fallen victim to violent crime and drug-funded insurgencies. That said, through some political mechanisms (empowering the military, impeding security sector reform, and exacerbating existing cleavages), the drug trade appears to be laying the groundwork for future insecurity associated with an overly powerful military and potential funding conflict among political, ethnic, generational, and other factions.

Social Impacts

On the whole, the Guinea-Bissauan population has been largely unaffected by the drug trade. Although there is rising awareness of the drug trade and some resentment directed at those who have benefited from ill-gotten gains, it is as of yet not on a level that affects most citizens, since those involved are mainly a few high-level public officials. However, there does appear to be rising cocaine consumption and potentially the development of a local market as a result of payments “in kind” to locals involved with facilitating these activities. It must be emphasized that there is currently insufficient data to determine the true scope of the consumption problem. Repression of the press, specifically threats aimed at journalists who have dared to expose the involvement of public officials in the drug trade, is another observation from Guinea-Bissau.

RQ 2: How much state capacity is functioning and how much has been “captured”?

This research question boils down to one fundamental assumption – that the Guinea-Bissauan state ever had capacity to be captured by DTOs. Admittedly, this research was never premised on the notion that Guinea-Bissau was a functioning state; indeed, it was selected as an example of a failed state. Nonetheless, as more than one interviewee pointed out, Guinea-Bissau is not a failed state on the same level as Somalia, for example, where complete anarchy exists. Rather, nominally democratic elections and the existence of national institutions give some semblance of a state in Guinea-Bissau. Yet throughout the course of this research, it has become painfully clear that the state and its institutions exist in name only and are, for the most part, “irrelevant”.⁴⁹⁴ Thus an important differentiation arises between the *state* versus *state capacity*. One can certainly argue that certain institutions of the state have been captured, though characterizing state capacity as having been captured can be very misleading due to its extremely limited capacity to begin with.

The most obvious example of the state having been captured by DTOs is within the military. Whereas the function of a professional military in a democratic society is to serve as a tool for civilian authorities to defend a nation’s borders and sovereignty, the Armed Forces of Guinea-Bissau have clearly expanded their mandate to include illegal detentions, seizures of power, and general interference in politics. As described throughout this thesis, this has been a typical trait of the Bissauan military, but their

⁴⁹⁴ For further discussion of this concept and the nature of the African state, see Chapter 2 (literature review).

complicity in the drug trade has further detracted from their constitutional responsibilities. Many high-level military officials, not the least of whom included the late General Tagme Na Waie, Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto, and Air Force Chief of Staff Ibraima Papa Camara, are known to be heavily complicit in the drug trade. They have used their positions of power and the resources available to them (mainly human resources) to facilitate the transportation of cocaine across Guinea-Bissau's borders. For example, President Vieira was able to mobilize his personal militia (known as the *Aguentas*) to smuggle drugs received from DTOs.⁴⁹⁵ Moreover, soldiers are now often paid with narco-dollars to remain loyal to their Commanders and to ensure their continued participation in the drug trade. Ultimately, the military of Guinea-Bissau has opted to protect the interests of drug traffickers over the interests of the Bissauan population, which it is intended to serve. In this way, one can rightly say the military has been captured by DTOs.

The same can be said for Guinea-Bissau's criminal justice sector. Many of the offices that fall under the Department of the Interior have undeniably aided and abetted drug traffickers, as evidenced by their release of known culprits and the disappearance of seized cocaine. However, to imply that these institutions have been fundamentally altered or compromised by traffickers is misleading. The entire criminal justice sector in Guinea-Bissau has been in dire need of reform for years. There is no system in place for plea-bargaining, or for culprits to produce evidence that exposes higher-level culprits while

⁴⁹⁵ For more information on the *Aguentas* see: Vigh, "Conflictual Motion and Political Inertia: On Rebellions and Revolutions in Bissau and Beyond."

reducing their own sentences, both of which would assist tremendously in the prosecution of drug cases. The criminal justice sector in Guinea-Bissau simply lacks the capacity to track transnational criminal networks and prosecute cases, though it can serve to protect drug traffickers.

The military and criminal justice sectors have been the primary organs of the state to have been captured by DTOs. However, these institutions have never fulfilled the functions of the “state” as envisioned by political theorists; therefore their capacity has not been fundamentally altered. Furthermore, the extremely limited capacity, if not total incapacity, of the state to deliver any public services further exemplifies the absence of the state in the day-to-day lives of ordinary Bissauans. As all interviewees indicated, the “state” in Guinea-Bissau exists only as an avenue for personal enrichment for those with access to it. This is why many African states have been referred to as predatory in nature, in that public servants steal the resources of the state, including drug revenues in the case of Narco-States, for personal exploits. Yet Guinea-Bissau has no capacity to pay its military or civil servants, provide security, governance, justice, or the rule of law for its population, let alone healthcare, education, or other social services. This becomes even more evident as one travels outside the capital to the more rural regions of the country, where not even the nominal organs of the state are visible. Whereas in urban areas, there is at least some impression that the state exists, Guinea-Bissau’s rural areas are practically untouched by the state, relying on alternative indigenous forms of governance and foreign aid. As such, Bissauans have extremely low expectations of the state, and recognize that democratic rhetoric and public speeches are simply ways to maintain

legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. This is why one Bissauan journalist noted: *“To call Guinea-Bissau’s “institutions” today is to make a mockery of the term, since what we actually have is people working for lobbies.”*⁴⁹⁶ Similarly, many interviewees have referred to Guinea-Bissau’s institutions as a “joke” as they exist in name only.

DTOs may have captured the military, the criminal justice sector, and the nominal institutions of the state. However, this only matters inasmuch as the state plays a meaningful role in the country. In Guinea-Bissau, the state is irrelevant in the eyes of most Bissauans, and its capacity to deliver security, the rule of law, justice, good governance, and social services has *never* existed. As such, DTOs have found amenable and uncomplicated partners in Guinea-Bissau, whom they have been able to corrupt or “capture” while having a minimal direct impact on the state’s capacity to fulfill its duties.⁴⁹⁷

RQ 3: What are the mechanisms by which drug trafficking could destabilize a failed state?

This research question compels one to ask what the experiences of other Transit States reveal regarding the potential trajectory of the drug trade in West Africa. Based on the experiences of Jamaica, Mexico, Tajikistan, and Turkey, and taking into account the

⁴⁹⁶ "Angola: Journalist Discusses Tensions within Guinea-Bissau Politics, Military."

⁴⁹⁷ This is not to downplay the corrosive effect that narco-corruption has on attempts to cultivate the rule of law in Guinea-Bissau as it undeniably distances the state from the people it is intended to serve.

unique circumstances that exist in Guinea-Bissau, the country could likely be destabilized by one of the following mechanisms:

i. Fueling insurgency

As in Tajikistan and Turkey, the potential for drug revenues to fuel an existing insurgency in West Africa seems very likely. Given the number of ongoing conflicts in the region, as well as the tendency for ethnic factionalism to turn violent, and the massive revenues to be gained in the face of relative despair and poverty, West Africa would seem to be vulnerable in every regard to the threat of a drug-fueled insurgency. There is already mounting evidence that AQIM has been benefiting financially for some time from providing protection to Latin American and Arab drug traffickers transiting the Sahara.⁴⁹⁸ More recent revelations that the Polisario Front (Separatists from the Western Sahara) are now colluding with traffickers, and AQIM provides further cause for concern that armed rebel groups may be financed with drug revenues.⁴⁹⁹ Additional regional insurgencies in Northern Mali, Niger, not to mention in the Casamance where Guinea-Bissau is deeply involved, are all potential red zones whose conflicts could well be prolonged by drug revenues. Recent research has already demonstrated that the “flavor” or type of insurgency that might be perpetuated by these drug revenues will depend on

⁴⁹⁸ Scott Baldauf, "Air Al Qaeda: Are Latin America's Drug Cartels Giving Al Qaeda a Lift?," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 January 2010; Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, "Al Qaeda Linked to Rogue Aviation Network," *Reuters*, 13 January 2009.

⁴⁹⁹ Jim Dunnigan, "Algeria: Western Sahara Separatists Group Polisario Linked to AQIM," *Morocco Board News*, 8 September 2010; "Links between Western Sahara Separatists Polisario and AQIM," *Morocco Board News*, 25 May 2010; Hassan Masiky, "Ramification of Links between Western Sahara Separatists and Al Qaeda Hard to Ignore," *Morocco Board News* 21 December 2010.

the initial conditions and players in those regions. For example, Jeremy Weinstein has shown that the level of violence employed by insurgent leaders depends on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion and the level of resources available to the insurgent group. With great resources available to insurgent leaders (such as drug revenues), these insurgencies, Weinstein argues, do not need the support of local populations and are therefore much more likely to commit violence against civilians.⁵⁰⁰ Moreover, these conflicts could well perpetuate the drug trade in West Africa as Tajikistan's civil war and the Kurdish insurgency did for heroin trafficking in Central Asia and Europe, respectively.

ii. Increase in criminality and violence

In each Transit State examined, the drug trade has been accompanied by a concomitant increase in local criminality and violence. So far this has not played out in Guinea-Bissau, though this is to be expected since most drug trafficking opportunities are limited to the country's elite. However, it is not unreasonable to expect opportunities to participate in the drug trade to eventually become available to larger segments of the population including unemployed youths, and other vulnerable populations. If that occurs, one can logically expect the criminality and violence associated with drug-dealing to follow.

⁵⁰⁰ Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 430.

iii. Influx of small arms and sophisticated weapons

As evidenced by the Jamaican and Mexican case studies, it is quite common for small arms and light weapons to accompany drugs en route to or from their final destinations. The violence on the U.S.-Mexican border is exacerbated by this abundant supply of arms while violence in Jamaica is perpetuated in large part by arms traffickers who have collaborated with or double as drug traffickers. The unfortunate reality is that drugs and guns tend to be trafficked in tandem and in a region so prone to conflict as West Africa, this could have dire consequences for human and national security.

In addition to this pairing, there are some concerns that more sophisticated weapons might be making their way into West Africa as a result of new associations between criminals and state actors. Though not verified, most reporting and opinions from experts interviewed conclude that the bomb used to kill General Na Waie was not a device that could have been purchased in Guinea-Bissau, or even in Africa. It was a sophisticated, remote-controlled explosive device that only an affluent organization could afford, which raises suspicions of non-state assistance in the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry. Furthermore, reports that a Ukrainian cargo plane intercepted in Kano, Nigeria, was carrying a large weapons cache and was headed toward Bissau would offer further evidence of collaboration with arms traffickers from foreign countries.⁵⁰¹ While drugs may not have been traded directly for weapons, the wealth generated by the trade

⁵⁰¹ Auwalu Umar, Benjamin Auta, and Aisha Umar, "Nigeria: Crew Name Arms' Owners," *Daily Trust*, 19 June 2009.

could have raised sufficient revenues for political rivals in Guinea-Bissau to purchase weapons in an attempt to launch a coup.⁵⁰²

iv. Providing the justification for the unconstitutional seizure of power

Although none of the four case studies illustrate how the drug trade could justify the unconstitutional seizure of power by an opponent of the regime, one would be remiss to ignore the experience of Guinea-Bissau's neighbor, Guinea-Conakry, where the former government's complicity in drug trafficking provided the justification for the military's unconstitutional seizure of power in December 2008. This coup was predicated on the notion that Guinea's existing government, bureaucracy, and state institutions under President Lansana Conté were incapable of addressing the slew of crises facing the nation, including the rise in drug-trafficking in which the Conte regime had been implicated. In a speech announcing the coup and in several speeches thereafter, the rebel leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara constantly referred to the incompetency of the former regime, which had allowed criminal activities to proliferate unabated.⁵⁰³ He continued to denounce the Conte regime for failing to capitalize on the country's vast natural resources, opting instead to exploit the fresh upsurge of drugs trafficked throughout the country. Moreover, he claimed the coup was necessary to break the pattern of narco-corruption that had been induced by drug trafficking activities in Conakry. Captain Camara's immediate actions upon seizure of power included

⁵⁰² "Country Analysis for Guinea-Bissau," (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009).

⁵⁰³ Army Captain Camara Announces Dissolution of Government, (Conakry Radio Guinee Internationale in French 23 Dec 08).

suspending the constitution, dissolving the legislature, and banning political and trade union activity (the latter of which was ultimately lifted).⁵⁰⁴

Despite different colonial histories that account for some variation in governance styles, the similarities between Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry are striking, particularly relating to the dominant role of the military. As such, one must consider the potential for Guinea-Bissau's military not only to engage in internal military power struggles but also possibly to vie for national power. Guinea's military coup demonstrates just one way in which drug trafficking activities can destabilize a country by justifying an opponent's unconstitutional seizure of power amid high expectations that it will curb drug trafficking activities, only to take advantage of these sentiments to sanction further repression of constitutional rights.

v. Destabilizing impacts of the military when used as a law enforcement tool

As the case of Mexico has demonstrated, the use of the military as a law enforcement tool is a slippery slope. Even the UNODC has noted: *“particularly in countries where the military has played an important role in past authoritarian regimes, putting soldiers on the streets can be the first phase in a long-term roll-back of democratic values.”*⁵⁰⁵ Trained soldiers are generally more inclined to use lethal force, which has obvious implication for human rights. The aforementioned example of Guinea-Conakry is another case in point, where following the coup, the military assumed the role

⁵⁰⁴ Trade unions have historically been major political actors in Guinea.

⁵⁰⁵ World Drug Report 2010. P. 233

of the police, gendarmerie, and judiciary supposedly to uphold the rule of law. It was under the banner of counternarcotics and prosecuting culprits that empowered the military to assume these traditionally civilian-executed duties. Although Captain Camara touted his actions as noble and necessary to rid the country of drug traffickers, his coercive tactics, which resulted in the massacre of more than 150 civilians in September 2009, clearly illustrate the destabilizing effects of a military that expands its reach beyond its traditional duties and is used as a law enforcement tool.⁵⁰⁶

vi. Local drug manufacturing and possible cultivation

Though not the case in the four case studies examined, interviews with regional experts revealed the significant concern that West Africa may become a new base from which to manufacture drugs. UNODC- and Interpol-led inspections of suspicious labs in Guinea-Conakry in August 2009 revealed the presence of substances and chemicals used to produce synthetic drugs and solvents commonly used in the processing of cocaine and heroin. Inspectors found high-pressure reaction vessels and sassafras oil used in the manufacture of MDMA (ecstasy). Inspectors also found tools for making counterfeit antibiotics in at least two locations.⁵⁰⁷ The discovery of these labs in Conakry has raised fears that the influx of Latin Americans with expertise in drug manufacturing may well be collaborating with local Africans – not limited to Guineans but including potentially

⁵⁰⁶ "Guinea Massacre Toll Put at 157," *BBC News*, 29 September 2009.

⁵⁰⁷ "Evidence of Clandestine Drugs Manufacturing in Guinea Concerns UN," *UN News Center*, 5 August 2009. Though traffickers are often poly-criminals, engaging in more than one illicit trade, there is no concrete evidence that those trafficking cocaine and counterfeit medications are the same individuals.

Bissauans – who provide logistical support and protect their operations. Furthermore, some experts claim that DTOs could attempt to grow coca plants in West Africa since it lies on the same line of latitude as many cultivation sites in Latin America.⁵⁰⁸ Others believe that although its climate is not ideal for coca, it may be suitable for the cultivation of poppies to produce heroin and other opiates.⁵⁰⁹

If cultivation of either materializes, or if synthetic drug production indeed persists, this could have a destabilizing impact on the region by further increasing the revenues to be derived by the drug trade and perpetuating other destabilizing factors that have already been observed. In this case, a study of producer countries such as Colombia or Afghanistan would be appropriate to better understand domestic market dynamics associated with illicit crops.

RQ 4: Where does Guinea-Bissau lie on the spectrum of Narco-States?

Though many would argue that a Narco-State *is* a failed state, this assertion is premised on the notion that the drug trade eventually causes the failure of the state, which is true in many instances. The framework presented here, however, recognizes that a functioning state may be severely compromised by the drug trade, but examines how vulnerable a state is to the deleterious effects of the drug trade in the first place. Analysis of the five case studies demonstrates that there is significant variation in the ways in

⁵⁰⁸ Jamie Doward, "Cartel Bosses Eye West Africa as New Base to Grow Cocaine: Intelligence Chiefs Examine Claims That Al-Qaida Is Using Mali Drugs Industry to Fund Terrorism," *The Observer*, 29 November 2009.

⁵⁰⁹ David Blair, "Special Report: West Africa Welcomes Latin America's Drug Barons," *The Telegraph*, 3 December 2008.

which states may be affected by the drug trade. Additionally, there is significant variation in the extent to which they may rightfully be labeled a Narco-State based on the framework described in Chapter three.

Figure 31 illustrates the range of potential effects that the drug trade can have on each of the four components of a state, based on the insights and observations from the case studies examined. They are presented in a manner intended to show the pattern of effects consistent with a failed state on one end of the spectrum and a state with greater capacity and stronger institutions on the other. Effects that were observed across the range of failed and narco-states (i.e. not uniquely associated with one or the other) are located in the center column.



Figure 31. The Impacts of the Drug Trade Across the Spectrum of Narco-Stateness

To put Figure 31 in practical terms, Table 7 attempts to show how deeply each of the cases studied have been affected by the drug trade. These judgments were made by the author based on the empirical evidence presented in Appendices A through D. In this way, one can begin to see where Guinea-Bissau ranks on the spectrum of Narco-States.

Table 7. The Spectrum of Narco States

	Mexico	Jamaica	Turkey	Tajikistan	Guinea-Bissau
Political					
Economic					
Security					
Social					

	Little effect
	Some effect
	Significant effect

This chart confirms that, of the case studies examined, states with greater political will and institutional capacity – while commendable for their strong stance against the drug trade – are generally more vulnerable to the deleterious effects of the drug trade because they have more to lose. This is especially true in Mexico and Jamaica where the integrity of the political institutions have been fundamentally compromised by the drug trade. Although Turkey has also been affected to a certain extent, it has managed to mitigate the impacts of the drug trade by establishing effective counternarcotics institutions. Conversely, in the failed states of Tajikistan and Guinea-Bissau, political systems have been corrupted but have not fundamentally changed the way they do business.

As predicted, Guinea-Bissau – the “most failed” state of those studied – is the least negatively affected by the drug trade. As the evidence in Chapter 5 shows, Guinea-Bissau exhibits only a limited number of features typically associated with a Narco-State. Politically, narco-corruption and the criminalization of state officials have undoubtedly undermined programs to improve good governance and promote the legitimacy of the state. However, research shows that existing endemic corruption and weak state institutions have long characterized the Bissauan state and that these features would have characterized Guinea-Bissau regardless of the presence of the drug trade. Guinea-Bissau has experienced various economic anomalies, but cannot be characterized as a narco-economy wherein the economy is largely driven by and dependent on drug revenues. Similarly, the unstable security situation cannot necessarily be attributed to the drug trade, and the population has been minimally affected by drugs. Ultimately, the characteristics of Guinea-Bissau’s state are most consistent with a failed state, *not* a Narco-State. Some of the other states studied, most notably Mexico, embody these features to a much greater degree, placing them on the high end of the spectrum of Narco-States. Similarly, Jamaica and even Turkey have succumbed, to varying extents, to the forces of narcostatization, even though there is a significant difference in the two states’ ability to govern themselves well and support legitimate economies. Tajikistan’s vulnerability to the effects of the drug trade occurs at the economic and social levels, which while important, are less consequential than the political and security level. This is examined in the next section.

Although Guinea-Bissau clearly occupies the lowest rung in the spectrum of Narco-States, one should not assume that a failed state is altogether immune from the dangers of the drug trade. The most important insight to take from this research is that states – regardless of their political will and institutional capacity – will be affected by the drug trade in many different ways. While some generalizations may be gleaned from this research, a state will assume a different “flavor” of narco-stateness depending on its initial conditions. Guinea-Bissau exemplifies this, where the drug trade has had unique effects due to the presence of a strong military, which has been empowered by narco-revenues. Also, existing cleavages (generational, ethnic, and institutional) have been exacerbated by competition for drug-revenues, which has promoted political factionalism. Moreover, one cannot disregard the potential for Guinea-Bissau to succumb to some of the effects of the drug trade that have impacted other failed states, such as perpetuating a narco-insurgency, the development of a local consumer market, or many of the other impacts noted in Table 8.

RQ 5: How do the impacts of drug trafficking differ in a Transit State with varying institutional strengths and capacities, i.e., a failed state versus a functioning state?

Based on the empirical evidence presented in appendices A-D, Table 8 summarizes how states with varying institutional strengths are impacted by the drug trade.

Table 8. Impacts of the Drug Trade

Strength of State	Impacts of the Drug Trade
Failed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absence of effective state institutions precludes the need for state capture; DTOs are able to operate with impunity by bribing/evading state authorities. • May be some economic anomalies but the narco-economy exists independently of the legitimate economy. • May perpetuate an existing conflict otherwise narco-violence is absent. • Some addiction and threats to a democratic civil society but very minor impact on the population's relationship to the state.
Weak	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DTOs somewhat successfully capture or control weak state institutions (particularly executive and law enforcement functions) through corruption. • DTOs gain favor among the population through social investment where the state is absent. • Results in more extensive influence over politics, economy, society, including coups, undermining of justice and political processes, distortion of economy.
Strong(er)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DTOs in state of war against the state resulting in widespread violence. • State institutions are captured by DTOs – Corruption and/or intimidation tactics assures tacit cooperation of enough government officials. • Strong states implement effective counternarcotics programs that are successful in suppressing much drug trafficking, but cause more violence. • Democratic institutions are undermined and eroded.

The cases of Tajikistan and Guinea-Bissau have shown that weak and failed states are not as affected by the drug trade as stronger states such as Jamaica, Mexico, and Turkey. This is especially true of the political and security aspects of the state and boils down to the existence, or absence, of one critical feature – a state's capacity to control its territory and govern its people, i.e., institutions that ensure a government is accountable to its population and demonstrate genuine political will to enforce the rule of law against criminals such as drug traffickers. While economies and social aspects of civil society are

unquestionably negatively impacted by the drug trade, the greatest distinction between failed and functioning states occurs within the political and security levels.

In a state such as Jamaica, traffickers have been able to use corruption and social investment to distort the existing social contract to their benefit. Yet this can only occur because a social contract *exists*, unlike in a failed state where the absence of an accountable government negates any attempt to capture this institution. Moreover, the stronger the state, and the more robust its counternarcotics capacity and response to the drug trade, the more corruption and violence is necessary. This is why Jamaica and Mexico have experienced the highest levels of narco-violence directed specifically at principled politicians and honest law enforcement personnel who threaten trafficking operations.

In Turkey, narco-corruption is indeed prevalent but the drug trade appears to have had a limited impact on the state, the most obvious example of which has been to perpetuate a conflict by strengthening the PKK, which poses a threat to the legitimate government. There has been some increase in violence and criminality by Turkish organized crime (consistent with functioning states), which could be attributed to the country's recent efforts to increase their capacity in counternarcotics in light of increased opiate outflows from Afghanistan. Coincidentally, this demonstrated political will and state capacity to combat the drug trade has not been met with significant resistance from DTOs, as has been the case in Mexico. There hasn't been the same level of violence against these institutions, which prompts one to ask why Turkey has enjoyed success in this regard while Mexico has not.

As Mexico, Jamaica, and Turkey demonstrate, these countries that assert a stronger stance against the drug trade, including greater political will and technical measures to combat trafficking, in essence, have more to lose. In other words, traffickers encounter greater resistance from these countries where corruption may not be a sufficient incentive to secure the cooperation of public officials. In most cases, this necessitates the use of coercion or violence to achieve their objectives.

Conversely, in weak or failed states, there are few if any political institutions for traffickers to capture or commandeer. This is why the drug trade has had a relatively negligible effect in these countries. That said, drugs have played much bigger roles in the economic, security, and social aspects of these failed states, as epitomized by Tajikistan where drugs are a major employer/revenue source, have perpetuated an existing conflict and have caused an alarming addiction problem accompanied by an HIV epidemic.

In Tajikistan, the already weak state has precluded some of the potentially devastating effects of narco-corruption and organized crime, as seen in Mexico where recent developments in the drug trade have severely damaged many of the state's institutions. However, in Tajikistan the drug trade has severely undermined attempts to improve governance and cultivate accountable politicians since so many are personally invested in the drug trade. That said, the case of Tajikistan begs the question: how would the drug trade have affected the country had it not been for the existing insurgency, if at all? Guinea-Bissau also exemplifies this relationship between the drug trade and a failed state, where very little has changed politically, though the mid- and long-term effects of narco-corruption on the country's political institutions remain to be seen.

The cases of Tajikistan and Guinea-Bissau suggest that although they may have less to lose than states with stronger institutions, trafficking of any kind is still detrimental to a failed state, particularly once public officials become involved. At this point, the agenda of the elite becomes even more disconnected from the interests of the community than it otherwise would have been. A major concern is that attempts to rehabilitate the state and cultivate some sense of government accountability are futile when the political elite are concerned only with serving the interests of the DTOs.

Ultimately, states with strong institutions and law enforcement capacity provide a bulwark against the deleterious effects of the drug trade. However, the existence of these institutional buffers makes these states the most vulnerable to these effects because they have more to lose. Violence such as that in Mexico is typically most prevalent in these strong states to overcome these impediments to trafficking operations. On the other hand, weak or failed states offer relatively hospitable operating environments with such weak state institutions that traffickers can generally rely on corruption alone to carry out their operations. In these already failed states, it is generally not necessary to employ coercive or violent tactics to secure cooperation from public officials.

7. CONCLUSION

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This research reveals several new findings regarding the extent to which the drug trade can inflict damage on a Transit State, and how. While it is possible to make some broad generalizations – such as a certain increase in narco-corruption resulting in the erosion of democratic institutions will inevitably occur – every country is affected differently. That said, the preexisting conditions in a Transit State appear to have the greatest explanatory power vis-à-vis the country's susceptibility to the deleterious effects of the drug trade. Based on the five case studies examined, most variation stems from the initial strength of a country's democratic institutions and its capacity to thwart, confront, or otherwise defend its borders, population, and ultimately its sovereignty from infiltration by DTOs. The capacity of law enforcement officials to detect and monitor drug flows, the ability of the criminal justice sector to investigate and prosecute offenders, and most importantly the political will of national leaders to ensure these activities are carried out with honesty and integrity, are all important determinants of a state's vulnerability to the drug trade. Comparing Mexico with Guinea-Bissau illustrates this, where the relatively strong state of Mexico has been affected extensively while the failed state of Guinea-Bissau has not.

The existence of a large, diverse, and active national economy with ample opportunities for employment is also significant in determining the extent to which the drug trade can pervert a state. Turkey is a prime example of a country whose economy has been minimally affected by drug revenues. On the other hand, the drug trade and the demand for the services that sustain it have significantly undermined legitimate economies in Mexico and Jamaica.

Another important condition that dictates the course of a country's "narcostatization" is a preexisting conflict or insurgency. Where these exist, drug revenues can perpetuate the conflict by strengthening one or both sides, such as in Turkey or Tajikistan. That said, one should never underestimate the potential for new conflict to arise over competition for drug profits, such as has occurred in Mexico. While Guinea-Bissau has neither experienced a narco-insurgency nor been the site of significant narco-violence, it is an example of how preexisting political, ethnic, and even institutional rivalries can be exacerbated by competition for drug revenues.

Perhaps the most surprising finding from this research is that failed states are actually less vulnerable to the deleterious effects of the drug trade because they have very little at stake in terms of state capacity. In these failed states there is no expectation among the population that the state will provide security, the rule of law, an accountable government, let alone economic programs or social services to its citizens. Rather, the drug trade and the criminals associated with it can coexist alongside law makers, politicians, and public servants while not competing with legitimate authorities or significantly interfering in local politics. As such, these states cannot be characterized as

having been “captured” by drug traffickers, since there is very little meaningful capacity to capture in a state such as Guinea-Bissau. These states are more aptly called “zones of impunity” existing within the borders of an already failed state. On the other hand, states with greater capacity and political will to combat the drug trade, such as Mexico, have much more to lose. Seemingly minor increases in narco-corruption can eventually cause a significant erosion of government accountability and the provision of the rule of law. These states are more appropriately labeled Narco-States, since the essence of their state is undeniably tainted by the drug trade.

NARCO-STATE OR FAILED STATE?

To answer this question, it is worth dissecting the state into the four aspects laid out by the Narco-State framework and briefly summarizing the most relevant research findings.

A Narco-Economy

While narco-corruption is certainly present in Guinea-Bissau, the economic effects of drug trafficking are not yet at the level that qualifies as a narco-economy. As a transit hub, the countries of West Africa do not cultivate, refine, or produce cocaine (or any drug for that matter except some cannabis). Thus, local farmers do not generate revenues from the cultivation of coca nor do they rely on this illicit trade for their livelihoods. The Bissauan government does not sustain itself or fulfill the functions of the state with revenues generated from the illicit drug trade. In fact, according to all indications, Guinea-Bissau’s economy is dependent on a combination of its own cashew

exports, foreign aid, and remittances.⁵¹⁰ For this reason, Guinea-Bissau does not have a narco-economy.

However, the potentially distortional effects that such a valuable commodity can have on a very small, fragile economy should not be underestimated. Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that some financial activities typically associated with the drug trade (money laundering, specifically) may actually be beneficial for the local economy, by creating jobs and services. To that end, one avenue for further research may be to examine to what extent drug trafficking-related activities have significantly distorted the local economy, and in what way. Ultimately, policy-makers need to better understand the economic implications of drug-trafficking in the region, which will require analysis over an extended period of time. If drug trafficking and related activities have actually helped to stimulate the local economy, the USG must be cognizant of this fact and prepare to supplant drug-money with another source of revenue. If interdiction efforts succeed in disrupting trafficking through the region, they may also succeed in removing the region's leading source of economic development. There is not yet enough drug money in Guinea-Bissau to qualify as a narco-economy. Whether it ever will may depend on whether it remains a Transit State or begins cultivation. If the latter materializes, one will have to expect a massive rise in local drug revenues.

Narco-Violence

Countries experiencing significant drug trafficking have historically been subject to violent crime, civil unrest, and in some cases bloody insurgencies. In many places,

⁵¹⁰ "Country Analysis for Guinea-Bissau."

governments are essentially forced to obey the will of drug traffickers rather than serve the local population. This was clearly the case in Colombia where thousands of police, judges, and government officials were killed in the “Drug Wars” and increasingly is the case in Mexico where death threats have become common among politicians who reside in particularly strategic trafficking jurisdictions.

In Guinea-Bissau, the absence of a narco-economy that would raise revenues through the cultivation and illicit sale of drugs precludes an insurgency such as in Colombia. The cartel-on-cartel violence occurring in Mexico is not occurring in West Africa where nine Latin American cartels are known to have established operating bases.⁵¹¹ Although there have been a few reports of small arms seized from Latin Americans and similarly a few reports of drug-related shoot-outs in the region, narco-violence is so far not characterizing the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

Societal

Though the lack of hard data on local consumption makes it impossible to state authoritatively whether a local cocaine market is developing, most anecdotal evidence indicates that this is not yet the case. However, the potential for consumption and ultimately addiction to take a hold on the urban population, as has occurred in other Transit States, should not be ruled out as one possible future in Guinea-Bissau.

⁵¹¹ Farah, "Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to Global Stability and U.S. National Security from Southwest Asia, Latin America and West Africa."

Politics

This research endeavor has revealed a fundamental feature of African politics that has allowed drug trafficking to thrive in the region. Namely, that Guinea-Bissau and West African states in general do not enjoy a functioning “social contract” where the government provides security, accountability, the rule of law, and social services to their populations. However, the absence of a social contract is also what has protected Guinea-Bissau from capture by DTOs. Where this expectation exists, such as in Mexico, DTOs are able to supplant the role of the state through the provision of social order and public services, whether through benevolent means or more coercive tactics. In some Narco-States, this has been overt, such as Pablo Escobar’s construction of apartments, sports arenas, and zoos for public consumption in Colombia in return for legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the public.⁵¹² Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, the Yakuza in Japan, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are additional examples of similar “Shadow States” where non-state actors have assumed some of the critical functions of the state.

But this is not the case in Guinea-Bissau, where traditional power structures based on patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism, coupled with poverty, unemployment, perpetual salary arrears of civil servants, and the absence of a robust and legitimate economy are conducive to the proliferation of illicit trade. In Guinea-Bissau, there is a mutually beneficial relationship between government leaders and traffickers. Because of these aforementioned factors, government officials are quite easily bought by drug traffickers who seek to overcome the limits of the law by neutralizing those whose

⁵¹² Strong, *Whitewash: Pablo Escobar and the Cocaine Wars*.

duty it is to enforce it. What this neutralization buys for the trafficker is a government official's willing renouncement of his duty to uphold the rule of law. In some cases, this behavior might be considered treasonous. Indeed, the participation of government officials in the drug trade in neighboring Guinea-Conakry was the justification for the military's seizure of power in 2008, this eventuality should not be downplayed as a potential trajectory for Guinea-Bissau.

Given that public officials provide so little in terms of security and the rule of law to the population in the first place, it would be wrong to characterize the state as having been "captured" by drug traffickers. Rather, Guinea-Bissau reflects an environment in which a few government elites facilitate the activities of traffickers by allowing them to operate freely in the country without fear of being caught. Or, if they are apprehended, they can rely on the fact that they will be released expeditiously. In other words, drug-traffickers in West Africa rely on the cooperation of individuals, not entire institutions.

Once narco-corruption becomes institutionalized, i.e., so well-established that it is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture because it becomes more attractive for the government to serve the interests of the paying criminals rather than its own population, then the integrity of the state and its governing institutions become even more compromised. When a state develops a narco-economy (a state whose GDP is largely dependent on drug revenues) and begins to experience narco-violence (violence either funded by or driven by competition for drug profits), then one might argue a full-scale Narco-State has taken hold. This bleak depiction does not appear to be the case in Guinea-Bissau, yet. However, this research has shown that Narco-States exist on a

spectrum, and at this juncture identifying Guinea-Bissau as one may be premature. Rather it is a failed state, and politically it is even worse off than other failed states since the drug trade has undermined attempts to improve governance and has distanced the country's leaders even further from the population they are supposed to serve. Should Guinea-Bissau begin to exhibit additional "symptoms" of the drug trade that other Transit States have experienced, it may well move up the spectrum of Narco-States.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This research raises several important considerations for policy-makers. First, it is important to recognize that there are actually two problem sets in Guinea-Bissau: 1) drug trafficking and 2) everything else. Pressuring Guinea-Bissau to adopt expensive national counternarcotics programs (ostensibly to satisfy U.S. requirements in order to receive foreign assistance) may not be the most effective policy, particularly since the capacity of the Guinea-Bissauan government to operate and implement these highly technical and complex programs is limited. Moreover, these efforts direct resources into high-profile counternarcotics programs and away from social and development programs that might actually have more success in combating the drug trade in the long run. Thus a multi-track strategy must be employed that addresses not only counternarcotics, but also improving the conditions that have given rise to the drug trade. The following findings derived from this research should be factors when formulating such a strategy for Guinea-Bissau.

i. There is a misguided connection between drugs, corruption, and instability in Guinea-Bissau

One must be careful when speaking about Narco-States not to overestimate the impact of the drug trade on corruption, violence, jobs, or any number of effects commonly associated with the drug trade. As this research shows, these conditions are often pre-existing and often are part of the appeal for traffickers. Moreover, the links many reports draw between remittances, money laundering, and trafficking, for example, are tenuous at best and do not offer clear evidence of a connection to the drug trade. More focused research on these conditions is necessary to authoritatively state how much is attributable to drug trafficking; even then challenges associated with measurement will likely afflict such research.

It is not drugs, the drug trade, or even narco-corruption that has brought Guinea-Bissau to its knees. There is a host of underlying sources of instability that have plagued Guinea-Bissau for years: unemployment, poverty, corruption, the failure of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), not to mention the deeply ingrained internal divisions and power struggles within government, and an inordinately strong military – even by African standards. Nonetheless, in the last five years western donor countries and multinational institutions have consistently characterized instability in Guinea-Bissau as drug-related. This is not surprising as countries offering assistance generally do so with their own national security interests in mind. As a result, the discourse on Guinea-Bissau always seems to revolve around curtailing the flow of drugs through West Africa and consequently, reducing the drugs entering European countries. Though some

development programs are certainly being implemented in Guinea-Bissau, the vast majority of assistance is focused on counternarcotics. That is not to say that donor countries are not well-intentioned in their assistance to Guinea-Bissau. But the misplaced focus on the drug trade seems to be emblematic of how western countries deal with West Africa, assuming counternarcotics assistance will improve the security situation.

Ultimately there are a multitude of other factors explaining Guinea-Bissau's demise, so examining the country in the context of the drug trade doesn't really help us understand the country's deeper challenges. Drug trafficking is not, as of yet, a significant driver of instability in Guinea-Bissau. This is a critical consideration from a policy perspective because an effective policy must be formulated around a clearly identified problem. The problem that the USG and European donors are currently addressing is drugs transiting West Africa en route to Europe. Though well-intentioned and probably worthwhile, this counternarcotics assistance must be supplemented with major economic and development programs to promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and anti-corruption – the linchpins of many existing programs currently underway around Africa.

ii. A regional counternarcotics strategy must be employed

As described in Chapter 1, Guinea-Bissau is not the only West African nation that has been targeted by Latin American DTOs. All of Guinea-Bissau's coastal neighbors as well as its neighbors to the East in the Sahel (Mali, Niger) have been used by drug traffickers. Lately Ghana has been portrayed as the favored transit point, and recent

revelations that it is also being used as a hub to transport heroin into the U.S. have fueled fears that the drug trade is actually *growing* in West Africa and that traffickers are employing more sophisticated tactics and constantly improving their methods of evasion.⁵¹³ As such, an effective counternarcotics strategy will not focus on building the capabilities in just one country. It must encompass the whole West African region in order to deter and detect a sufficient number of traffickers to make a difference. Regional cooperation that includes intelligence sharing across borders and integrated detection and monitoring systems should be the hallmarks of a West African counternarcotics strategy. ECOWAS and the UNODC have already committed to regional strategies with ECOWAS's "Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in the Region" and the UNODC's "Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014." U.S. counternarcotics assistance to West Africa should support these programs rather than individual countries.

iii. U.S. and European assistance should be in support of existing African programs

Throughout this research a common theme was Guinea-Bissau's sensitivity to outside meddling. History books and experts alike have repeatedly emphasized this aspect of Guinea-Bissau's national identity, stemming from its victory over the Portuguese in 1973. Unlike several of its neighbors whom some experts characterize as

⁵¹³ "Members of Ghana-Based Heroin Smuggling Ring Charged: International Traffickers Used Washington Dulles International Airport as Entry Point for East Coast Distribution of Heroin from West Africa," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency News Release, 14 July 2011).

having “accepted defeat”⁵¹⁴ from their former colonizers, Guinea-Bissau was one of a very few African states to have fought for its own independence. Policy-makers need to be sensitive to the pride Guinea-Bissau has, particularly among the military, which has emerged as the country’s most prestigious and capable institution. Considering the modest improvements that foreign assistance efforts – counternarcotics and otherwise – have had in Guinea-Bissau, those external (non-African) donors and international institutions might consider a different, more African-centric approach.

Encouraging regional institutions such as ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) to lead counternarcotics efforts might be more acceptable to Bissauan authorities, who have already on numerous occasions solicited support from these institutions. President Sanha has repeatedly requested assistance from ECOWAS to reform Guinea-Bissau’s defense and security sector⁵¹⁵ while the AU has already sent lawyers from Angola and Mozambique to Guinea-Bissau to help draft legislation to combat the drug trade.⁵¹⁶ Bissauan authorities have also requested technical and military support from Angola on a bilateral level, specifically citing the need to improve control over Bissauan air, land, and waters to combat drug trafficking.⁵¹⁷ Angola has committed \$30 million to Guinea-Bissau for defense and security sector reforms for this purpose, which not only

⁵¹⁴ Anonymous interview.

⁵¹⁵ "Guinea-Bissau: President Asks ECOWAS to 'Reform' Nation's Defense Sector," *Agence France Presse*, 4 October 2010

⁵¹⁶ "Guinea-Bissau: AU to Send African Lawyers to Help Draft Anti-Drug Legislation," *Bissau Digital in Portuguese*, 7 January 2011.

⁵¹⁷ "Guinea-Bissau Army Chief Asks Angola for Help against Drug Trafficking," *Lusa in Portuguese* 4 September 2010.

demonstrates genuine commitment but is also a solid lead that the USG can support.⁵¹⁸ Bissau has also approached Moroccan authorities to request assistance in combating drug trafficking as well as clandestine migration and money laundering.⁵¹⁹ If the U.S. seeks buy-in from the military, then supporting these programs may be the only way to ensure it. In addition to these intra-African relationships, there are other bi- and multi-lateral partners with whom Guinea-Bissau has a very close, often historical relationship – in particular Portugal and Brazil, but also the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) writ large (whose members include Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor-Leste). Western donors should support these existing relationships and assistance programs to preclude any perception of meddling and to correct the views that their counternarcotics efforts are largely self-serving.

iv. USG assistance to Guinea-Bissau should focus on the reform of its Armed Forces

This research has shown that the military has historically been– and to this day still is – the predominant institution and government force in Guinea-Bissau. This is even true in politics, where a few military leaders exert inordinate influence – some may even

⁵¹⁸ "Angola to Send Team of Experts to Assist Guinea-Bissau Military Reforms," *ANGOP in Portuguese*, 9 September 2010; "Guinea-Bissau: Angola Defense Minister Visits to Assess Army's Needs," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 21 September 2010; "Guinea-Bissau: Parliament Ratifies Military Cooperation Agreement with Angola," *Lusa in Portuguese*, 6 December 2010; "The Situation in Guinea-Bissau: Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the Activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in That Country (S/2011/370)," (New York: United Nations Security Council, 28 June 2011).

⁵¹⁹ "Guinea-Bissau Interior Minister Visits Morocco, Discusses Combat on Crime," *Bissau Jornal No Pintcha Online in Portuguese*, 30 September 2010.

say control – over civilian leaders.⁵²⁰ A particularly revealing comment from one interviewee explained that in order for foreigners to operate in Guinea-Bissau, whether on a humanitarian mission or as part of a foreign delegation discussing Security Sector Reform (SSR), they must engage the military in addition to civilian leadership. This is because no security sector-related program can get off the ground without the support of and a working relationship with the top military brass. While the president and other civilians have nominal control over government policies, they are in practice “puppets” of the military, expected to protect their interests, which range from drug trafficking privileges to ensuring the military is paid first with international aid. The civilian government is, in other words, impotent in the face of the strong Bissauan military.

Admittedly, SSR has always been a focus area for donor countries, particularly the U.S. and E.U. However, these programs have, to date, yielded negligible results, with one interviewee commenting that SSR in Guinea-Bissau has been a “[expletive] farce” and “waste of money.”⁵²¹ However, there is a potential window of opportunity over the next few years as the “old guard” passes on and the younger generation of soldiers climbs the ranks (more than 2,000 of Guinea-Bissau’s total 4,500 military members are over 80 years old).⁵²² It is probably unrealistic to expect to reform the older generation of soldiers who are still obsessed with old rivalries from the Liberation and Civil Wars.

⁵²⁰ This is likely the underlying reason why President Sanha appointed Antonio Ndjai (who had previously led a mutiny against the existing military leadership and briefly detained the prime minister) as the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, despite objections from the international community and risks to his foreign assistance.

⁵²¹ Anonymous interview

⁵²² "ECOWAS Debates Guinea-Bissau Stabilization Force," *Ultima Hora in Portuguese*, 14 September 2010.

Many reject SSR, citing threats on Guinea-Bissau's borders, national emergencies, not to mention the drug trade, all of which justify their continued existence. Thus focusing SSR efforts on the younger cadre of soldiers would allow donor countries to exploit existing generational rivalries while developing a rapport with the next generation of military leadership in Guinea-Bissau.

v. Now is the time to prevent consumption and treat addiction

While there have been reports of increased drug consumption and drug addiction, the lack of hard data leaves this topic debated. As such, it is too early to tell what will be the long-term social implications of drug trafficking through West Africa. However, the experiences of other Transit States tell us that this will eventually become a reality not only in Guinea-Bissau but in West Africa overall. This represents a prime opportunity for the USG, aid agencies, NGOs, and others wishing to prevent addiction in these countries to launch programs that raise awareness among the population regarding the long-term health effects of drug use. One interviewee – a medic for the U.S. military – noted that every time he visits the region to deliver medical assistance or perform an assessment of existing capabilities, local authorities repeatedly cite the need for rehabilitation centers. Given the extensive range of medical assistance required by most African nations, donor nations could consider combining rehabilitation centers with other medical facilities. In any event, raising awareness of the danger of drug use and building rehabilitation centers is an action the USG can take immediately, to stem and hopefully prevent some drug use.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The findings presented here have confirmed, for the most part, the hypotheses tested in this dissertation. Employing a comparative case study methodology produced insightful results, as tracking patterns and accumulating insights from various regions allowed some broad generalizations to be made as well as explaining the causal mechanisms underpinning the more unintuitive and localized research findings. Ultimately, it was the insights and experiences shared by regional experts, particularly anthropologists who spend much of their time in Guinea-Bissau, that offered the greatest validation of this research. Their constant reminders that Guinea-Bissau is unlike any other so-called “Narco-State” due to its unique history that continues to manifest itself today, kept this research on the right track.

While the comparative case study approach coupled with interviews of SMEs sufficed for this project, follow-on research on the drug trade and transnational crime in West Africa will likely benefit from field research. However, there are other research questions that require the attention of academics investigating the drug trade in Africa. Most notably, a detailed examination and analysis of those counternarcotics policies and best practices that have worked in other Transit States and how they might be tailored to a failed state like Guinea-Bissau would be a particularly pertinent line of inquiry. Understanding why Turkey’s counternarcotics programs have enjoyed relative success while Mexico’s have resulted in an all-out war with DTOs, for example, would be an invaluable contribution to this field of research.

Many Africanists believe that in the coming years internal wars of religious and ethnic differences will no longer be the issues that plague Africa. Rather, transnational organized crime syndicates will become the greatest threats to stability on the African continent.⁵²³ As long as Africa continues its integration into the global economy – which everyone hopes it will – natural market forces will facilitate the growth of these illicit markets. As this research shows, the drug trade has destabilized regions by undermining democratic institutions, creating competition for drug revenues or further destabilizing regions where insurgencies already exist. For the sake of the U.S. which has strategic interests in West Africa, but more importantly for the sake of Africans, who deserve good governance and accountable leadership, it is critical that we are proactive in curbing this trade and preventing the region's collapse into complete disarray.

⁵²³ Michelle Sieff, "Africa: Many Hills to Climb," *World Policy Journal* 25, no. 3 (Fall 2008).

ANNEX A: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR JAMAICA

POLITICAL IMPACTS

Listed here are a few ways in which the political stability of Jamaica has been affected by the drug trade.

i. Narco-corruption / Criminalization of the State

Although corruption has always been rampant in Jamaica (as described in Chapter 4), narco-corruption associated with the drug trade has further undermined the rule of law and effectively made criminals out of many of the state's political leaders and government officials. This narco-corruption includes bribes paid to government officials, political parties, law enforcement, and the military as well as members of civil society and the private sector including journalists, banking officials, pilots, airline workers, shippers, etc.⁵²⁴ In addition to the usual impacts of political corruption, i.e. reducing government accountability by servicing criminal elements rather than the population, this has fostered an air of impunity among the political elite in Jamaica, as evidenced, for example, by the 1994 arrest of Brian and Daren Bernal, the sons of the Jamaican

⁵²⁴ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

ambassador to the U.S. and OAS, who attempted to transport 46 kilos of marijuana on a flight to Washington DC.⁵²⁵

In Jamaica, narco-corruption has not only undermined the state's capacity to effectively uphold the law, but it has also compelled many ordinary citizens to resort to vigilante tactics in the face of ineffective national institutions. This erosion of confidence in the state's ability to govern was studied in Jamaica as part of the Report of the National Task Force on Crime. The researchers noted a distinct decline in the information supplied by citizens to police due to a breakdown in trust between the two parties. The report indicates that the population no longer regarded the police as security providers or even as an ally in the community. Rather, there was a significant loss of confidence in the police due to the corruption which characterized their activities, their clear connections with criminal elements, and their abuses of civil rights.⁵²⁶

ii. Erosion of the Criminal Justice Sector

The judicial system in Jamaica has taken a particularly hard hit. Specifically, intimidation and coercion directed toward witnesses so that they do not testify against accused drug traffickers has become commonplace. Not only does this endanger lives, but it severely impedes the fundamental mission of the judiciary, which is to interpret the law and apply justice in the name of the state. For example, the notorious Jamaican drug baron "Lester Coke," leader of one of Jamaica's most powerful gangs, was reportedly responsible for the murder of 68 people including 13 policemen over the course of one

⁵²⁵ Pat Roxborough, "Von Cork Loses Appeal," *Jamaica Observer*, 30 April 2002.

⁵²⁶ Report of the National Task Force on Crime.

six-month period. He was tried on 14 occasions, but was always acquitted when key witnesses conveniently turned up missing or murdered.⁵²⁷ Moreover, witness tampering by drug traffickers in Jamaica has necessitated increased resources dedicated to witness protection programs, representing a diversion of funds away from other public sectors.⁵²⁸

iii. Social Investment

A common thread throughout these surveys of Narco-States is the “Robin Hood Phenomenon” whereby DTOs perform critical public services normally designated to the state. This has certainly occurred in certain areas around Kingston where Jamaican posses have been empowered by the drug trade and cultivated mutually beneficial relationships with members of their communities. In order to maintain influence within their communities, Jamaica’s DTOs and posses have engaged in significant “social investment,” a term coined by Griffiths in his study of drugs and crime in the Caribbean. DTOs in Jamaica have been known to provide medical and school supplies, health-care, sporting equipment and facilities, humanitarian relief, etc. to members of their communities.⁵²⁹ Moreover, since the drug trade brings business and jobs to a region, it is not surprising that the beneficiaries of these services not only welcome these criminal groups but actively disrupt and impede law enforcement efforts at apprehension.

This phenomenon played out most recently in May 2010, when Christopher Coke, who is also referred to affectionately as "President" in his neighborhood, made

⁵²⁷ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁵²⁸ Navarro “Puerto Rico is Sending Many Drug-Case Witnesses to Florida”

⁵²⁹ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

international headlines as the entire city of Kingston was placed under a state of emergency while the police and military launched an operation to apprehend and extradite Coke to the U.S. This effort was thwarted, however, by local citizens who viewed Coke as a successful businessman and a godfather of sorts, whose organization provided public services that the Jamaican government did not.⁵³⁰ For example, the philanthropic Coke and his gang routinely handed out sandwiches in the streets, sent children to school, and built medical and community centers.⁵³¹ As such, residents protested his extradition and built blockades in the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood to protect Coke from government officials. Signs reading "After God, then Dudus," and "Jesus died for us so we will die for Dudus," (see Figure 32) demonstrate just how much influence and loyalty Coke enjoys from local citizens.




Figure 32. Demonstrators During a March in Kingston, May 2010
(Photo: AP Photo/The Jamaica Gleaner, Ian Allen)

⁵³⁰ "Is Jamaica's Most Wanted Man Like Robin Hood?."

⁵³¹ Elliott McLaughlin, "Accused Jamaican Drug Lord Akin to Robin Hood, Pablo Escobar," *CNN World*, 26 May 2019.

This example highlights how drug barons can accumulate sufficient power and money to distort and even reverse the Social Contract, where one exists. Some go so far as to state:

*“Whereas conventional crime must be seen as having had a negative impact on the [Jamaican] economy, the drug trade represents an area of crime where the impact has been mainly positive.”*⁵³²

Despite the violence and killings that ensued following the order for Coke’s extradition, local citizens *still* felt that the services, protection, and other benefits they received from Christopher Coke’s posse were greater than could be expected from the Jamaican government and therefore were worth protecting. Apparently, this sentiment was shared by Prime Minister Bruce Golding, who consented to the extradition orders only when strong U.S. pressure became too much to bear.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Estimates of the value of drugs transiting Jamaica vary greatly. One researcher estimates it to be around US\$3 to \$4.5 billion per year.⁵³³ According to UNODC estimates in 2008, the economic importance of the drug trade in Jamaica was estimated to be equivalent to 7.5% of GDP.⁵³⁴ At times, marijuana cultivation in Jamaica has

⁵³² Stone, "Crime and Violence: Socio-Political Implications."

⁵³³ Williams, Consequences of the War on Drugs for Transit Countries: The Jamaican Experience

⁵³⁴ "A Caribbean Crime Wave: Crime Damages Society and the Economy ", *The Economist*, 20 March 2008.

actually been the largest cash crop, demonstrating its importance in this small economy. Some of the economic impacts of this drug trade are noted here.

i. The Drug Trade is a Significant Source of Employment

The most significant impact of the drug trade, which is true in all Transit States examined, is the opportunities for employment and income generation that it has presented, be it through cultivation, trafficking, or associated activities such as money laundering. During the 1980s, one estimate of the number of Jamaican farmers involved in marijuana production alone was 6,000.⁵³⁵ When one considers *all* those “employed” either directly or indirectly in the drug trade in Jamaica, estimates jump to the tens of thousands.⁵³⁶ Regarding income generation, one Jamaican government report sums up the implications of marijuana production quite succinctly:

*“A number of famers and young people have turned to the farming of marijuana to earn a living. The government’s anti-drug eradication program has succeeded in destroying vast areas planted in marijuana, but the socio-economic problems remain. The small growers in these target communities have been experiencing a worsened situation in generating income or finding suitable employment. Information from a study done prior to the eradication program indicated that the average disposable income was 84% above the national level, but since the program it fell to 18% above the per capita disposable income.”*⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ MacDonald, *Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade*

⁵³⁶ Stone, “Crime and Violence: Socio-Political Implications.”

⁵³⁷ Jamaica, *Alternative Systems for an Illegal Crop* (Kingston: Ministry of Agriculture, September 1994).

When one considers the significantly higher revenues to be gained from the cocaine trade, it is easy to see how the economic opportunities to be realized from that market dwarf those currently associated with marijuana cultivation and related services.

ii. Cost of Crime to the Government

Despite the economic advantages derived from increased employment and an influx of drug revenues into the legitimate economy, the close correlation between the drug trade and violent crime in Jamaica (described in the next section) has contributed to an increased financial burden to the state. In Jamaica, analyses have been performed to quantify these costs. Table 9 shows the costs of crime in Jamaica, as calculated by one research team. They find that the total costs of crime in Jamaica in 2001 amounted to \$12.4 billion, or 3.7 percent of GDP.

Table 9. The Cost of Crime in Jamaica

1) Health Costs	1.3 bn (0.4% of GDP)
Public Health System	995.7 bn
Private Citizens	254.5 bn
2) Lost Production	0.5 bn (0.2% of GDP)
Mortality	194.1 bn
Injury Due to Crime	337.2 bn
3) Public Expenditure on Security	10.5 bn (3.1% of GDP)
Total (1) + (2) + (3)	12.4 bn (3.7% of GDP)

(Source: Alfred Francis et al.)

As a result of mortality, injuries, and declining health due to crime, the Jamaican government has increased its own expenditures on various public sectors such as health-

care and support to victims of drug-related crime.⁵³⁸ Of course, this is as much a humanitarian concern as it is about countering the deleterious effects of the drug trade, but the cost associated with these expanded government programs should not be underestimated either. While it is not clear specifically how much the Jamaican government has spent on health care associated with drug use, some other examples demonstrate just how costly this can be. For example, a study by the University of Southern California calculated an economic cost of drug abuse to be \$44 billion in 1985 and up to \$76 billion in 1991 – a timeframe corresponding to the arrival of cocaine through the Caribbean to the U.S. market.⁵³⁹

In addition to its health-care budget, the Jamaican government has also increased its national security budget in the fight against drugs. Counternarcotics and law enforcement operations are very costly, and while a fraction of drug revenues are taxed once they enter the formal economy where value added, property, sale, or other taxes might be applied, this is insufficient to cover these high costs of government services. As such, it is hard to justify these expenditures from a public relations standpoint, especially since the recipients of these funds – the police and military – are considered by many Jamaicans to be corrupt.⁵⁴⁰

Due to limited resources, the expenditures cited above come at the expense of other public needs such as housing or agriculture. Between 1994 and 1997, Jamaica's

⁵³⁸ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁵³⁹ For one estimate of the cost of organized crime, see for example Roy Godson and William Olson, "International Organized Crime," *Society* 32, no. 2 (1995).

⁵⁴⁰ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

national security budget consistently ranked second only to education – even more than health-care. For a country relatively free from threat of incursion by outside forces, the need for such a high national security budget seems unreasonable, but the rising drug trade has necessitated a significant counternarcotics budget.⁵⁴¹

iii. Lost Productivity and the Cost of Crime in the Private Sector

Despite the opportunities for personal enrichment and economic advancement offered by the drug trade, the flipside is the lost productivity and the cost of crime in other legitimate sectors. Lost productivity may occur when an individual associated with drugs or the drug trade abandons or diverts attention from his legitimate job. Jamaican scholars have noted such lost productivity through addiction, absenteeism, rehabilitation, incarceration, and even death, which has taken a significant financial toll on small businesses as well as government-run operations.⁵⁴²

Costs to the private sector can be manifested in at least two ways. First, when private commercial enterprises become involved in the drug trade, they may incur hefty fines or be forced to cease operations, both of which can have lasting effects on the local economy. For example, Hanes – Jamaica’s largest garment manufacturer (and a major segment of the Jamaican economy) – had its operations suspended when 200 pounds of marijuana was found in a shipment of apparel destined for the U.S. This was a major setback for a company that produces \$200 million worth of garments annually, generated

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

\$570 million in exports in 1995, and provides direct employment for approximately 50,000 people in Jamaica.⁵⁴³

Likewise, the hefty fines levied by U.S. Customs against owners of shipments found to contain drugs has been significant. For example, two Air Jamaica planes in 1986 were impounded in Miami, and the owners were charged \$657,000. Also in 1986, Eastern Airlines was fined \$900,000 after marijuana was found on a cargo flight, then \$1.6 million three weeks later when a similar load was detected. Sea-Land Services was fined \$96 million in 1989 when the U.S. Coast Guard found 12,000 pounds of marijuana on its way to the U.S.⁵⁴⁴ Often these fines are reduced if the company agrees to spend more on security and detection of their conveyances, but these statistics illustrate the high costs incurred to private businesses whose operations are infiltrated by drug traffickers.

Secondly, drug-related crime has also been damaging to small Jamaican businesses by increasing near-term costs, such as by necessitating hiring of private security firms to protect ones assets. This increase in near-term costs is a common structural problem in much of the developing world and has the long-term effect of discouraging investment. Yet the World Bank found that in Jamaica specifically, 39 percent of business managers were dissuaded from expanding their business due to increased crime, and that roughly the same number reported that crime had discouraged investment in their business which would have improved productivity.⁵⁴⁵ Figure

⁵⁴³ "Ganja Found in Clothing Shipment," *New York Carib News*, 12 July 1994; "Hats, Blouses, - and a Few Kilos," *Virgin Islands Daily News*, 25 November 1994.

⁵⁴⁴ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁵⁴⁵ Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.

33summarizes these broad impacts of crime on businesses in Jamaica, highlighting how the increased cost of security has been the most significant concern among the respondents surveyed.




Figure 33. Impact of Crime on Various Business Practices in Jamaica
(Source: 2001 Firm Victimization Survey, described in Francis et al.⁵⁴⁶)

iv. Negative Impact on the Tourism Industry

No discussion of economic implications of the drug trade in Jamaica is complete without mentioning its impacts on tourism, which is the largest segment of the Jamaican economy (followed by bauxite and sugar production).⁵⁴⁷ The tourism industry has in general grown consistently over the last four decades and “generates more foreign

⁵⁴⁶ Alfred Francis et al., *Crime and Development: The Jamaican Experience* (Mona Campus: University of the West Indies, 2003).

⁵⁴⁷ Mark Sullivan, "Jamaica: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations," (CRS Report for Congress, 3 February 2006).

exchange and tax revenues per dollar of investment than any other industry.”⁵⁴⁸ The ease of access to drugs, both marijuana and cocaine, is thought to have aided the tourism industry.

However, in 1994 the Jamaica Tourist Board reported a decline in tourists in the country of 5.8 percent in April and 15.1 percent the next month. This decline was attributed to Jamaica’s bad reputation as a country characterized by an inordinately high homicide rate as well as other violent crimes.⁵⁴⁹ Recent studies have examined the relationship between tourism and crime, and found them to be antithetical.⁵⁵⁰ So while the easy availability of drugs may have initially appealed to tourists, its longer-term impact is to drive them away.

v. Increased Remittances and a Source of Foreign Exchange

While it is impossible to ascertain the provenance of one’s remittances, many argue that Jamaican communities in U.S., Canada, and the UK, and specifically the Jamaican posses who control a good amount of the drug trade in those regions, have remitted much of their drug revenues. As such, Jamaican remittances have become important modes of survival for both families and the local economy. In 1994, Errol Ennis, Jamaica’s Minister of State for Finance, stated that Jamaicans living in the U.S.

⁵⁴⁸ Dennis Gayle, "The Evolving Caribbean Business Environment " in *The Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy*, ed. Anthony Bryan (Miami: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1995).

⁵⁴⁹ "Alarm at Downturn in Jamaican Tourism," *Trinidad Guardian*, 4 July 1994.

⁵⁵⁰ Dillon Alleyne and Ian Boxill, "The Impact of Crime on Tourist Arrivals in Jamaica," *International Journal of Tourism Research* 5, no. 5 (September 2003).

alone remitted approximately \$278 million to the Jamaican economy.⁵⁵¹ Likewise, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade, Seymour Mullings, said that the 2.5 million Jamaicans living in New York, Miami, Hartford, Washington D.C., Toronto, London, and Philadelphia remitted \$600 million the same year.⁵⁵² By 2004, Jamaicans living abroad remitted over \$1.5 billion, prompting many to assert that remittances have overtaken tourism as the country's leading source of foreign exchange.⁵⁵³ By 2007, remittances from overseas amounted to about US \$1.9 billion, representing close to 20 percent of its GDP.⁵⁵⁴ Again, it is impossible to authoritatively assert that the drug trade has facilitated this rise in remittances, but given the role of Jamaican ex-patriots in dealing and distribution networks outside of Jamaica, it is not an unreasonable assertion.

As a small island nation, Jamaica is heavily dependent on imports. As such, it requires significant reserves of foreign exchange with which to make these purchases. The foreign exchange crisis of the 1970s greatly impeded many formal economies' ability to pay for imports, which in turn negatively affected local production and consumption in many countries. However, Jamaica was somewhat shielded from this crisis by the drug trade, which provided a steady stream of foreign exchange, which ultimately helped to sustain the flow of imports into Jamaica.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵¹ "US\$278 Million to Local Economy," *New York Carib News*, 28 November 1994.

⁵⁵² "Jamaicans Remitted US\$600 Million," *New York Carib News*, 7 November 1995.

⁵⁵³ Budget for Jamaica, <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/jm.html> (Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development).

⁵⁵⁴ Jamaica, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=346&Itemid=508 (Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace).

⁵⁵⁵ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

Jamaica has traditionally relied on its tourism industry as a source of foreign exchange. In 1997, for instance, tourism accounted for 45 percent of foreign exchange.⁵⁵⁶ However, the drug trade has provided a supplementary source of foreign exchange to importers. Marijuana operations alone contributed between \$1 and \$2 billion to the island's foreign exchange earnings in the 1980s, which was more than all other exports combined.⁵⁵⁷ In a country as import-dependent as Jamaica, this black market in U.S. dollars was a critical factor that allowed it to withstand the foreign exchange deficiency.

vi. Threats of Cessation of Foreign Aid

Although Jamaica has never been decertified under U.S. law, it has been threatened with decertification which would result in the suspension of all U.S. assistance (except for anti-narcotics and humanitarian assistance).⁵⁵⁸ This is a major implication of the drug trade for any Transit State that relies on foreign assistance to conduct counternarcotics operations, though presumably well-intentioned countries are not targeted by this process, only those blatantly participating in or sponsoring the drug trade. Sanctions can be particularly devastating to a country such as Jamaica which is so heavily dependent on access to the U.S. market.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid. P. 186

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid; MacDonald, *Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade*

⁵⁵⁸ Raphael F. Perl, Narcotics Certification of Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations: Questions and Answers, *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 27 March 2000).

SECURITY IMPACTS

“Jamaica over the past few years has experienced, through an upsurge in violent crime, the effects of a combination of drugs and money in the form of the naked display of power, through the use of arms.”⁵⁵⁹

i. Increasing Violence and Criminality

Unlike in Mexico where drug-related insecurity is manifested in competition for trafficking routes, or Turkey and Tajikistan where terrorists have used drugs to finance their extremist insurgencies, the primary security impact of drugs in Jamaica has been the increase in violent crime. In particular, the murder of ordinary citizens, businessmen, journalists, and political elites has become an increasingly common occurrence.

Figure 34 shows the clear rise in homicides that corresponds to the arrival of cocaine in the 1970s and the growth of the market into the 1990s and 2000s.




Figure 34. Police-Recorded Murders in Jamaica

⁵⁵⁹ Vincent Tulloch, "Terrorism/Drugs Combination Threatens Security," *Sunday Gleaner*, 1989.

(Source: Jamaican Constabulary Force)

In terms of actual numbers, there were more than 2,760 murders in Jamaica between 1991 and 2001.⁵⁶⁰ From 2003 to 2005 alone, the homicide rate rose from 36 to 58 per 100,000.⁵⁶¹ This trend culminated in 2005 with more than 1,600 murders that year, qualifying Jamaica for the unenviable title of “Murder Capital of the World” with a rate of almost 60 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.⁵⁶²

Yet even when many of the major DTOs were dismantled in the mid-2000s as a result of heightened U.S. counternarcotics operations and the flow of drugs decreased, homicides continued to persist and even increased (see Figure 35), revealing a new pattern of drug-induced violence in a Transit State.

⁵⁶⁰ Clarke, "Politics, Violence and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica."

⁵⁶¹ Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.

⁵⁶² Ibid; "Jamaica Named Murder Capital of the World," *BBC Monitoring Americas*, 2 January 2006.




Figure 35. Police-Recorded Murders and Cocaine Seizures
(Sources of Data: Jamaican Constabulary Force, 2006; Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean⁵⁶³ and the UNODC Seizures database)

Figure 35 illustrates that not only did the arrival of cocaine into Jamaica cause a significant increase in violence, but instability in the market itself, including a sharp *decline* in the market also may have caused a significant increase in violence, at least temporarily. The reasons for the paradoxical effect are rooted in history, when in the 1980s important Jamaican criminal figures (known as “area dons”) relocated to New York and other large cities to facilitate the trafficking and distribution of cocaine (especially crack) from Jamaica. During the 1980s, there was relative calm in Jamaica as this trade was allowed to continue unimpeded and unchallenged. However, when U.S. interdiction efforts in the Caribbean caused Colombian traffickers to reroute their product through Central America, this created a sudden dearth of business and revenues for

⁵⁶³ Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.

Jamaican criminal groups. As a result of these successful counternarcotics operations, criminals resorted to other illegal means to supplement their declining revenues, including extortion, robbery, kidnapping, etc. Ultimately the sudden decrease in revenues provoked significant street-level competition for what little business was left, causing a further rise in homicide rates.⁵⁶⁴ One analyst reported:

“a disturbingly significant block of opinion in Jamaica holds that the dramatic spike in violent crimes in many communities since 2004 is attributable to the fallout created by the unavailability of financial proceeds from the drug trade.”⁵⁶⁵

However, a 2010 report from the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF – the country’s police force) indicate that this violent crime wave is finally slowing. As of 9 July 2010, a press release from the JCF stated:

“There were dramatic declines in all major crimes (murder, shooting, rape, carnal abuse, robbery, break-in, and larceny) in the month of June (2010) when compared to the same period last year. Overall, there was a 21 per cent decline in major crimes for the period under review, 964 in June 2009 compared to 758 in June 2010 - a difference of 206. The number of recorded murders decreased by twenty nine (29), moving down from 120 in June 2009 to 91 in 2010. This represents an overall twenty four per cent (24%) decrease. The decrease in the murder rate is even more substantial when June (2010) is compared with May 2010. There were eighty seven (87) less murders in June (2010) when

⁵⁶⁴ World Drug Report 2010.

⁵⁶⁵ Williams, Consequences of the War on Drugs for Transit Countries: The Jamaican Experience

compared with May (2010), a decrease of 49 per cent.”⁵⁶⁶

According to many analysts, this reduction can be directly attributed to the government’s newfound resolve following the events of May 2010 to redeem its international reputation by moving security forces into neighborhoods ruled by the posses and criminal gangs.⁵⁶⁷ Though the administration of Bruce Golding was initially perceived to be protective of Christopher Coke, it eventually agreed to his extradition in the face of strong U.S. pressure and took these measures to reduce gang-related crime in the unstable political garrisons such as Tivoli Gardens.

Thus competition over the dwindling drug market in Jamaica ultimately has not caused a lasting increase in violence. The capacity of the Jamaican state has undeniably improved in controlling its territory and protecting its people against criminal gangs – most of who are involved in the drug trade. That said, the extent to which violence, specifically homicides, in Jamaica are drug-related is debatable. Although Table 10 indicates that only 2% of total homicides in Jamaica in 2006 were drug-related, most analysts concur that the proportion of drug-related deaths is much higher. Moreover, “gang-related” homicides may also have some connection to drugs that is not captured by the JCF in this table. Regardless, the fact remains that some of the violence in Jamaica is not drug-related, so to state that the drug trade alone has caused fluctuations in the homicide rate is misleading. It has, however, been a major factor.

⁵⁶⁶ "Major Crimes Down in June."

⁵⁶⁷ "Jamaica's Murder Rate Falling."; Wignall, "Why Has Jamaica's Crime Rate Fallen?."

Table 10. Homicides in Jamaica, by "Murder Motive" (2006)

<i>Murder Motive</i>	Reported	% of total
Drug Related	15	2%
Gang Related	159	22%
Domestic	22	3%
Other Criminal Act	335	47%
Not Yet Established	182	26%
Total	713	100%

(Source: Jamaican Constabulary Force)

It is also worth noting the increase in violent crime perpetrated by Jamaicans *in other countries*. The large Jamaican diaspora in Canada, the U.S. and the U.K. dominate many of the cocaine distribution markets in those regions. They have formed posses similar to their brothers at home that are largely comprised of marginalized youths who find money, protection, and a sense of belonging to the posse.⁵⁶⁸ Between 1993 and 1996, more than 5,000 Jamaicans were deported from the U.S., Canada, and UK to Jamaica, mostly for drug-related crimes.⁵⁶⁹ Upon their arrival home, many of these convicts were perceived as contributing inordinately to domestic crime, having learned criminal behavior in the developed countries.⁵⁷⁰ Thus whether referring to local posses,

⁵⁶⁸ James Jekel et al., "Nince Years of Freebase Cocaine Eipdemic in the Bahamas," *American Journal on Addictions* 3, no. 1 (1994).

⁵⁶⁹ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁵⁷⁰ Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.

deported convicts returning home, or those members of the diaspora residing abroad, the drug trade has undeniably caused these groups to engage in more violent crime than they otherwise would have and is yet another testament to the destabilizing impact of the drug trade.

ii. Increased Access to Small Arms and Sophisticated Equipment

Jamaica's rising drug trade has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the prevalence of arms. Due to their ties with South American DTOs, Jamaican posses and other criminal elements have been able to obtain a range of small arms and light weapons with relative ease. Furthermore, these businesses transactions have at times crossed paths with terrorist groups. For example, ten tons of arms seized in Jamaica in 1988 (worth around \$100,000) was initially thought to be a European-based operation with participants from Jamaica, Germany, the UK, and Panama. It was later learned that the operation was in fact sponsored by Colombian drug dealers who were known financiers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym "FARC").⁵⁷¹

In addition to providing small arms and light weapons, South American DTOs have also facilitated access to sophisticated communications systems and encryption devices that allow Jamaicans to monitor law enforcement activities and maintain constant communications with one another. Because Jamaican DTOs also have their own airplanes, private pilots, and a variety of legitimate businesses that allow them to launder

⁵⁷¹ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

their drug proceeds, some argue that Jamaican DTOs actually enjoy far superior resources and weaponry than the country's national military and police force.⁵⁷² Once again, this undermines the legitimacy of the state when non-state actors are perceived to be better equipped than the government's own security institutions.

iii. Growth of Privatized Security

Rising crime in Jamaica has compelled many businesses, particularly small ones, to adopt measures that reduce their vulnerability to criminal activity. For example, many businesses have invested in security equipment, hired security personnel, and closed before dark to reduce their exposure to crime. Figure 36 shows how this has particularly affected small businesses in Jamaica, who are most vulnerable yet arguably least able to afford these expenditures.

⁵⁷² Ibid.




Figure 36. Private Security Costs for Firms by Size of Enterprise as Percentage of Firm Revenue
(Source: 2001 Firm Victimization Survey, described in Francis et al. (2003))

As a result of this increased demand for enhanced security, Jamaica experienced a steep rise in the number of private security companies. In 1994, 231 private security companies with some 15,000 guards were registered under the Private Security Regulation Authority Act – an act specifically brought into law to address the growing number of private security firms arriving in Jamaica. By mid-1996, this number was up to 20,000.⁵⁷³

The growth of alternative sources of security besides the military and law enforcement of course has implications for a country's sovereignty, rule of law, and other facets of good governance. Not only does it highlight the government's inability to perform that critical function designated to it, but it fundamentally threatens the

⁵⁷³ "Security Industry Regulation Takes Hold," *Jamaica Herald*, 12 August 1996.

government's monopoly on force, if such organizations are allowed to become too powerful.

SOCIAL IMPACTS

i. Increased Consumption/Addiction

Jamaica has a long history of socio-religious use of marijuana associated with the Rastafarian culture.⁵⁷⁴ Though there are certainly negative social implications of marijuana use, the more concerning social impacts of drug consumption are associated with cocaine. That said, many assert that the prevalence of marijuana in Jamaica has acted as a “gateway” drug, encouraging more users to try cocaine who otherwise might not have.⁵⁷⁵ One scholar asserts that “*cocaine addicts often will have begun their drugs experience with ganja use, but not all ganja users progress to cocaine.*”⁵⁷⁶

Cocaine consumption first became a concern in Jamaica when Colombians began to recruit Jamaican couriers, distributors, and other facilitators who were paid for their services in kind. This resulted in a significant volume of “spillover” cocaine coming into circulation for the first time and is why of all the Caribbean countries, Jamaica has experienced some of the highest drug use rates.⁵⁷⁷ Crack cocaine in particular emerged as the drug of choice for many of the country's poorest citizens. Studies show that crack is mainly used by people between 15 and 30 (arguably the most productive segment of

⁵⁷⁴ For more information on this, see: MacDonald, *Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade*

⁵⁷⁵ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

society,) with the 25-26 age range having the most users.⁵⁷⁸ The UNODC has reported increased cocaine consumption in Jamaica as recently as 2009.⁵⁷⁹ The use of Jamaica as a Transit State also spawned a secondary trade in which the Jamaican diaspora in the UK, U.S., and Canada played a critical role as transnational drug couriers.

In addition to consumption by locals, Jamaica has emerged as a popular tourist designation for travelers looking to take advantage of the wide availability of drugs. This is true of marijuana, cocaine, and other illicit substances. A study analyzing the confiscation trends of cocaine and crack indicated that since the 1990s, approximately 25 percent of Jamaica's tourists travelled to the country's major tourist resorts in search of drugs.⁵⁸⁰ In some cases, these tourists were recruited to ingest or otherwise transport the drugs into the U.S.

ii. Erosion of a Democratic Civil Society

Some of the Jamaican laws which have come into effect as a result of the drug trade arguably border on violation of individuals' civil rights, or at least have the potential to do so. For example, section 24(1) of the 1987 amendment to the Dangerous Drugs Act permits any constable to search, seize, and detain any conveyance he or she reasonably suspects of being used to commit any offense under that act – all *without a warrant*. Likewise, the Criminal Justice Administration Amendment Act of 1994, designed to address the deportee problem that arose as a result of the drug trade, has

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ World Drug Report 2010.

⁵⁸⁰ Sharon Earle, "25% of Tourists Flock to J'ca for Drugs," *Gleaner*, 27 February 1992.

serious repercussions for constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of association and movement.⁵⁸¹ As long as the government continues to adopt laws designed to counter the drug trade, it is possible that civil liberties will eventually be sacrificed in the name of combating the drug trade and associated crime, which begs the question – which is the lesser of two evils: the drug trade or the erosion of a democratic civil society?

iii. Targeting Foreigners as Couriers

While Jamaican posses have historically controlled all aspects of the marijuana trade, their entry into the cocaine trade eventually required them to seek out additional local couriers as well as the assistance of additional foreign nationals. With their leaders realizing the potential of a more expansive network of distributors, couriers, and providers of associated “services” (money laundering, document forgery, etc.), they began to augment their manpower base by recruiting non-Jamaicans, including Guyanese, Panamanians, Trinidadians, and even Nigerians.⁵⁸²

Moreover, foreign women were also actively recruited as they were believed to draw less attention from law enforcement officials. In 1995, Jamaican police reported that 60 percent of those arrested at Jamaica’s two international airports for attempting to transport drugs were women from other countries. And between 1993 and 1995, nearly 200 young American women were arrested for attempting to smuggle drugs out of

⁵⁸¹ Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege*.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

Jamaica. Some of these women were paid \$3,000 for one trip – a significant amount of money for many struggling women in the region.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

ANNEX B: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR MEXICO

POLITICAL IMPACTS

Listed here are a few ways in which the political stability of Mexico has been affected by the drug trade.

i. Narco-corruption/Criminalization of State Officials

Although political corruption ran rampant under the PRI, the drug trade has continued to perpetuate and exacerbate this problem, offering little hope that the corruption associated with Mexico's one-party state can be rectified. More significantly, many have argued that Mexico's previous experience with the privatization of state-run enterprises laid the groundwork for subsequent narco-corruption. For example, researchers found that key leaders in PEMEX (the state's oil corporation) reaped the profits of many corrupt arrangements and that following the international oil crisis, "*the oil boom had whetted unsavory appetites in the nation and had spawned a substantial increase in the level of corruption throughout the nation.*"⁵⁸⁴ Whatever its origin, the narco-corruption in Mexico occurs at two levels: the widespread and endemic corruption of law enforcement institutions and the corruption of high-level government elites.

⁵⁸⁴ Judith Gentleman, *Mexican Oil and Dependent Development* (New York: Peter Lang, 1984); Michael Johnston, "The Political Consequences of Corruption," *Comparative Politics* 18, no. 4 (July 1986).

For many years, the modus operandi for drug lords in Mexico was to focus bribes solely on low-level law enforcement officers, not politicians.⁵⁸⁵ In fact, they deliberately kept corruption on a local level so as to not attract too much attention from federal law enforcement and politicians. This level of corruption has become endemic such that by 1996 one notable academic estimated that 70 to 80 percent of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police force was considered to be corrupt.⁵⁸⁶ In return for bribes, the Federal Judicial Police have effectively provided the “brains” for traffickers’ operations, helping drug barons to find safe havens, providing protection through thousands of smuggled automatic weapons,⁵⁸⁷ making introductions to potential business partners, protecting them from higher levels of Mexican law enforcement, equipping them with computers, and even aiding in the purchase of real estate across the border to facilitate trafficking to Latino communities in the U.S.⁵⁸⁸

The Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera, otherwise known as “El Chapo” Guzmán was notorious for such low-level corruption of law enforcement institutions. He successfully evaded law enforcement on numerous occasions through bribes to local police chiefs and on one occasion even gave a police commander \$1 million and five Dodge Ram Chargers to permit two drug-laden cargo planes to land in Jalisco.⁵⁸⁹ But it was his incarceration in federal prison that revealed just how powerful El Chapo’s narco-dollars were. Police reports indicate that while in prison, nearly every

⁵⁸⁵ Jordan, *Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies*.

⁵⁸⁶ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."

⁵⁸⁷ Shannon, *Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can't Win*.

⁵⁸⁸ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁵⁸⁹ Richard Bourdeaux, "Mexico's Master of Elusion," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 July 2005.

prison guard, police officer, and even the director of the prison was on El Chapo's payroll. They gave him preferential treatment, including allowing **conjugal visits and business meetings** so that he could maintain control of his empire. He masterminded his escape plan with the cooperation of 71 prison employees (all of whom were later arrested), who smuggled him out of prison in a laundry truck just a few days before he was due to be extradited to the United States in 2001.⁵⁹⁰ El Chapo remains at large, despite the \$5 million reward for information leading to his arrest. One can assume that those individuals who know his whereabouts (likely law enforcement or military personnel) are either profiting massively from protecting him or are too afraid for their lives to turn him in.

Although political corruption associated with President Salinas lingered on throughout the PRI's rule, there has been a new wave of narco-corruption associated with President Calderon's tough approach to the drug war that has compelled drug lords to engage more politicians in order to secure the safety of their operations. There are countless examples of Mexico's upper echelons of its government being "bought" by DTOs:

- Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos – a highly trusted former Deputy Attorney General, who later became Mexico's "Drug Czar" and the U.S.'s "man" in Mexico, was alleged to have accepted bribes from the Beltran Leyva Cartel in the 2000s.⁵⁹¹
- The Director for Intelligence at the Assistant Attorney General's Office for Special Investigations and Organized Crime (known by its Spanish acronym "SIEDO"), Fernando Rivera, purportedly provided the Beltrán Leyva Cartel

⁵⁹⁰ M.J. Stephey, "Joaquin Guzman Loera: Billionaire Drug Lord," *Time Magazine*, 13 March 2009.

⁵⁹¹ Dane Schiller, "DEA: Bribes Taint Late Mexican Drug Czar," *Chron*, 13 May 2009.

with information on everything from investigations, names, photographs, and dates and times of specific operations in return for a monthly stipend.⁵⁹²

- President Calderon's "Drug Czar" and head of SIEDO, Noé Ramirez, once accepted \$450,000 from the Mochomo cartel.⁵⁹³
- Rodolfo de la Guardia García, ex-director of Mexico's Interpol office, was arrested for accepting bribes from drug traffickers in January 2009.⁵⁹⁴
- Gregorio Sanchez, the mayor of Cancun, was indicted by a federal judge in June 2010 on charges of organized crime and money laundering, claiming he protected two of Mexico's most brutal drug gangs.⁵⁹⁵
- General Jose de Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, President Zedillo's "Drug Czar" and director of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD), was fired in 1997 following reports he had received bribes from the Juárez drug cartel.⁵⁹⁶ Following his arrest, the INCD was dissolved in light of the endemic corruption, and its successor, the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health, was similarly dissolved for being as corrupt as a "dunghill."⁵⁹⁷

Narco-corruption is also a means employed by Mexican DTOs to direct the state's law enforcement efforts and resources toward a particular rival. For example, Carrillo Fuentes of the Juárez Cartel co-opted General Rebollo (President Zedillo's "Drug Czar") so that he would concentrate his efforts against Fuente's primary rival, the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO).⁵⁹⁸ High-level narco-corruption is even commonplace *between* government officials who seek posts in particularly strategic or lucrative trafficking

⁵⁹² Guy Lawson, "The Making of a Narco State: As Mexico Descends into Brutality and Lawlessness, the Government Itself Has Become a Tool of the Drug Lords," *Rolling Stone*, 4 March 2009.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ "Ordenan arrestar a ex mandos de Interpol" (in Spanish). *El Universal*. January 16, 2009. <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/165134.html>. Retrieved 5 August 2010.

⁵⁹⁵ "Cancun mayor charged with ties to drug cartels" Media: AP; Byline: Alexandra Olson; Date: 01 June 2010

⁵⁹⁶ <http://www.ndsn.org/marapr97/drugczar.html>

⁵⁹⁷ "La Corrupción En Corporaciones Antinarco ", *El Universal*, 23 November 2008.

⁵⁹⁸ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

regions, where successful operations rely heavily on the non-enforcement of the law. Along the U.S. border, for example, prosecutors and police commanders allegedly paid \$1 million the Deputy Attorney General for President Carlos Salinas, Mario Ruiz Massieu to be assigned to those positions in 1994.

ii. Distorting Elections

In many parts of Mexico, ties between drug lords and politicians are not only prevalent but overtly collaborative. This phenomenon dates back to the Salinas administration when powerful oligarchs and drug lords alike wielded significant influence over the elections of political figures.⁵⁹⁹ More recently, the USG estimates that DTOs contributed between \$5 and \$10 million to various mayoral and parliamentary races in Mexico in 2006 alone, while the Mexican press estimates that traffickers financed campaigns in more than 10 percent of Mexico's municipalities in 2008.⁶⁰⁰ An intelligence assessment by the FBI in 2007 noted how two state governors (of Veracruz and Michoacan) had brokered a deal with the Gulf Cartel that permitted complete freedom to operate in the region, in return for a reduction in violence as well as financial assistance in the upcoming gubernatorial and municipal campaigns across the states.⁶⁰¹ In this way, funding political campaigns with narco-dollars fundamentally undermines the democratic process by distorting the level of genuine support for a given political

⁵⁹⁹ Oppenheimer, *Bordering on Chaos: Mexico's Roller-Coaster Journey toward Prosperity*.

⁶⁰⁰ Laura Reyes, "Un hecho, infiltración del *narco* en las campañas: Sedena y PGR" *LaJornada*, 16 April 2009. Available at: <http://www.lajornadaguerrero.com.mx/2009/04/16/index.php?section=politica&article=003n1pol>

⁶⁰¹ Joel Millman and Jose de Cordoba, "Drug-Cartel Links Haunt an Election South of Border," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 July 2009.

candidate, and it undermines the rule of law by encouraging politicians to protect the interests of drug traffickers rather than protecting their constituents against their malign influence.

Another serious effect of the drug trade in Mexico has been to deter those honest political candidates who have voiced their desire to crack down on the drug trade from running for political office. Those brave individuals receive death threats or are victims of other types of intimidation which eventually forces them out of various races. DTOs typically focus these types of intimidation tactics on *local* candidates, campaigns, or elections, such as those for state prosecutor, mayor, or governor. It is these positions that can help or hinder DTO's abilities to protect local trafficking routes, storage facilities, and other components of their operations. Calderón campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and as a result received numerous death threats.⁶⁰² While there have been instances of DTOs' support for federal-level candidates, this is typically more of a long-term investment strategy, in case the candidate returned to their home state where those DTOs may have business interests.

iii. Erosion of the Criminal Justice Sector

While corruption has an undeniably corrosive effect on the rule of law and accountability in a given political system, it also contributes to the demise of other political institutions. In Mexico, the integrity and effectiveness of the criminal justice sector has been badly affected by narco-corruption. This includes the police, courts, and

⁶⁰² Steve Fainaru and William Booth, "As Mexico Battles Cartels, the Army Becomes the Law," *Washington Post*, 2 April 2009.

prisons – all of whose missions and functions have been severely compromised in the face of bribes offered by drug traffickers.

During the Salinas years, the high turnover rates in the Attorney General's office (a result of DTOs exerting their influence) meant that there was little continuity of leadership within the justice system. As a result, unwanted cases were often impeded and others were rarely seen to completion.⁶⁰³ Yet nothing highlights the utter failure of Mexican courts to prosecute drug crimes like the refusal of President Zedillo to try Juan Garcia Abrego, head of the Gulf Cartel, in 1996. The concern was that the wealthy drug baron would simply bribe the judge to release him. One senior Mexican official quoted *"There is a better chance that the truth will emerge in the U.S."*⁶⁰⁴ Sure enough, Abrego was extradited to the U.S., where he stood trial eight months after his arrest. He was convicted on 22 counts including money laundering, drug trafficking, intent to distribute, and running an ongoing criminal enterprise. Abrego was found guilty and was sentenced to 11 life terms in a maximum security federal prison in Colorado.

Of course many judges *do* chose to uphold the rule of law and prosecute drug traffickers under Mexican jurisdiction, with deadly consequences. For example, the Oaxaca Cartel's leader Pedro Diaz Parada was incarcerated in 1985 and sentenced for 33 years. At that time, he said to the judge who jailed him, *"I will go and you will die."*⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰³ Shelley, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition."

⁶⁰⁴ Kevin Fedarka, "The Capture of Mexico's Most Wanted," *Time Magazine* 29 January 1996.

⁶⁰⁵ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

Parada escaped from prison just days into his 33-year sentence, and two years later that judge was shot 33 times with a note left on his body reading "a bullet for a year."⁶⁰⁶

For those drug barons who are successfully convicted by the courts and incarcerated, Mexican prisons offer not only a relatively comfortable living environment but also copious opportunities to cultivate business relationships and actually strengthen their operations. For example, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén (leader of the Gulf Cartel following the arrest of Abrego) was imprisoned in La Palma in 2003, where he received such luxuries as satellite TV, air conditioning, liquor, and conjugal visits. Most importantly, he was allowed unlimited cell phone access, which enabled him to oversee the Gulf Cartel's operations within the confines of prison. Moreover, it was in prison where Guillén and Benjamin Arellano Felix of the Tijuana Cartel supposedly agreed to join forces and cooperate with one another.⁶⁰⁷

Thus one can see how narco-corruption has contributed significantly to the demise of Mexico's criminal justice sector. Mexican prisons in effect no longer serve the purpose for which they are intended. Rather than a location where individuals are prevented from imposing further harm on society, many Mexican prisons provide a comfortable environment and many of the resources necessary for criminals to continue their operations, even providing a convenient location from which to settle old scores.

⁶⁰⁶ "Mexico Captures Diaz Parada Drug Cartel Leader," *Reuters*, 17 January 2007.

⁶⁰⁷ "Mexican Army Urged to Take over Prisons," *USA Today*, 1 August 2005.

iv. Social Investment

Mexico is prime example of a country where over time, DTOs have gained such power and influence in certain communities that they have essentially been able to supplant local authorities. While President Calderón refutes the notion that Mexico is a failed state, his administration admits that cartels have blatantly set up a “state within a state” in many areas, levying taxes, implementing roadblocks while also providing essential social services and security, and enforcing their own rules. These “zones of impunity” as of March 2009 numbered 233 - down from 2,204 in 2008.⁶⁰⁸

In essence, this represents a reversal of the social contract, whereby the legitimate authority is undermined and eventually replaced by a “shadow state” run by criminal elements who serve many of the same functions as the state. Whereas other case studies such as Tajikistan illustrate how these criminal elements have at times had to rely on coercion and extortion to exact “taxes” from the local population, Mexico’s DTOs have generally enjoyed popular support among the local population.

There are countless examples of DTOs in Mexico that dispense charity and social services (money, jobs, roads, lighting, parks, schools, churches) to those residents living in their communities, and under their jurisdiction. This has the effect of undermining, if not negating the programs administered by the government such as Oportunidades (the principal anti-poverty program of the Mexican government, which provides cash transfers to households that can demonstrate regular school attendance and health clinic

⁶⁰⁸ Lacey, "29 March 2009."

visits) and Procampo (a program of agricultural subsidies for farmers).⁶⁰⁹ Because assistance from DTOs is typically more generous than government programs drug barons are often venerated for their benevolence, particularly as it is directed toward the community's poor. "El Chapo" Guzmán of the Sinaloa Cartel is famous for his largesse. One reporter recounted an evening when El Chapo entered a restaurant in Culiacan in 2007 and immediately instructed his entourage of ten bodyguards to confiscate every single patron's cell phone so he could safely eat without fear of an ambush. Upon leaving, however, El Chapo shook each patron's hand, thanked them profusely for their cooperation, paid for their meals and returned each cell phone to its proper owner.⁶¹⁰ Coupled with his financing of various construction projects in the Badiraguato area (sidewalks, lighting for the local cemetery, church repairs, and road paving) El Chapo has earned a reputation as a sort of "Robin Hood" figure, connecting with the local population while denouncing the federal government.⁶¹¹

Similarly, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, head of the Gulf Cartel, was able to organize events that portrayed him as a benevolent benefactor and charitable caregiver among his local community. In 2005 he organized a "Children's Day party" in Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila where there was food, games, pony rides, clowns, and toys distributed to 2,000 children from an "Anonymous Altruistic Syndicate." He repeated the celebration in 2006, this time for 18,000 people, where he advertised the following message: "*Constancy,*

⁶⁰⁹ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶¹⁰ Stephey, "Joaquin Guzman Loera: Billionaire Drug Lord.," Tracy Wilkinson, "Mexican Drug Lord Seems Everywhere - and Nowhere," *Richmond Times Dispatch*, 5 November 2008.

⁶¹¹ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

*Discipline, and Effort are the bases of success. Continue studying in order that you become a great example. Happy Children's day 2006. With all my affection for tomorrow's winner, your friend, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén."*⁶¹²



Figure 37. Children's Day 2006

(Source: <http://borderreporter.com/2008/05/happy-childrens-day-love-grandpa-cocaine/>)



Figure 38. Children's Day 2006

⁶¹² Ibid.

(Source: <http://borderreporter.com/2008/05/happy-childrens-day-love-grandpa-cocaine/>)

Other examples abound – Amado Carrillo of the Juarez Cartel built local churches and was known for giving away money, luxury cars, cattle, and presents to hundreds of members of his community. La Familia has secured support among the communities in which it operates by providing financial assistance to the needy, constructing and funding schools, and preventing the sale of unadulterated wine.⁶¹³ Los Zetas – originally the Gulf Cartel’s paramilitary enforcement group which has morphed into its own DTO – is a particularly important entity not only in the Mexican drug trafficking scene but in Mexican society as well. This DTO was founded by a group of Mexican Army Special Forces deserters and now includes corrupt former federal, state, and local police officers, as well as ex-special operations forces from Guatemala. Los Zetas eventually split from the Gulf Cartel and have initiated their own drug trafficking operations, in fact becoming outright enemies of their former employer/partner. Similar to the DTOs mentioned above, Los Zetas have also invested significantly in Mexican society, even assuming some state functions. They treat their members as professionals, much like any national army. They pay benefits to the spouses and children of members who have died in the line of duty and go to great lengths to retrieve the bodies of fallen brothers, honor their dead with impressive funerals, and make surprising attempts to free imprisoned comrades.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹³ Luis Astorga, *Seguridad, Traficantes Y Militares* (Mexico City: Tusquets Editorial, 2007).

⁶¹⁴ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

ECONOMIC IMPACTS

i. The Drug Trade is a Significant Source of Employment

Estimates of the economic impact posed by the drug trade in Mexico vary greatly. One 2010 BBC news report stated that the drug industry in Mexico generates \$20 billion per year and employs anywhere between 150,000 – 450,000 people, rivaling the auto industry as an economic force.⁶¹⁵ This is relatively consistent with the findings of the Mexican Prosecutor General's office, which estimated in 1994 that 200,000 – 300,000 people earned a living by growing drug crops in Mexico, which did not include thousands of jobs created indirectly from the drug business, such as transportation, security, banking, and communications.⁶¹⁶ The UNODC's 2010 World Drug Report estimated that thanks to the approximately 200 metric tons of cocaine that transits Mexico in a given year, Mexican DTOs earn some \$6 billion each year.⁶¹⁷ Some Mexican officials believe that the DTO's budgets are as high as \$10 billion per year, and as far back as 1994 the Mexican Prosecutor General's office estimated that Mexican DTOs accumulated revenues of approximately \$30 billion.⁶¹⁸ Despite these vastly different estimates, it is safe to say that the drug trade in Mexico has been a significant engine of economic growth and has provided livelihoods for many ordinary citizens. Some might go so far as to agree with Eduardo Valle, former personal adviser to the Mexican Attorney General in

⁶¹⁵ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."

⁶¹⁶ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶¹⁷ World Drug Report 2010.

⁶¹⁸ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."

1994, who claimed that Mexico's drug traffickers had become the "driving forces, pillars even, of our economic growth."⁶¹⁹

It is important to appreciate, however, that the drug economy described above is largely driven by various multiplier effects associated with a narcoeconomy. In other words, while the sale of drugs certainly generates revenues that benefit traffickers, there are indirect economic effects of the drug trade that are often advantageous to the population writ large. The services required by participants in any illicit trade include transportation, security, banking, communications, etc, all of which create jobs for the ordinary population. Moreover, front companies established for the purposes of money laundering may also produce jobs.

ii. Negative Impact on the Tourism Industry

Despite the influx of drug revenues into luxurious hotels and resorts, shootings, beheadings, kidnappings, and the general insecurity and violence associated with Mexico's drug war have unarguably contributed to the demise of some regions' tourism industries, much like has occurred in Jamaica. Perhaps the most obvious example is Tijuana, where in June 2008 one news report stated that "*at least 200 people have been killed in drug violence this year, merchants say tourism is down as much as 90 percent compared with 2005, when an estimated 4 million people visited. Half of the downtown businesses -- more than 2,400 -- are shuttered.*"⁶²⁰ One woman interviewed for the report indicated that her craft store which once generated at least \$6,000 a month now

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Roig-Franzia, "Tijuana Strip Turns Ghostly in Wake of Drug Violence."

brings in only about \$300 in monthly sales. As a result, the owner has had to terminate her business relationship with many local artists whose sales keep them out of extreme poverty. Moreover, the decline in Tijuana's tourism industry has also compelled the city's prostitutes to engage in unprotected sex as it is more lucrative.⁶²¹ These examples illustrate just some of the third- and fourth-order consequences of the drug trade in Tijuana.

Similarly, in other popular tourist destinations such as Nuevo Laredo, five hotels shut down during 2009.⁶²² Acapulco, once the preferred vacation spot for celebrities and politicians has been nicknamed "Narcopulco" for all the violence stemming from the battle for control of Pacific entry points.⁶²³

iii. Anomalous Displays of Wealth

In many regions of Mexico there are communities that have clearly been affected by a significant influx of drug revenues, typically manifested in anomalous displays of wealth. One study of a small drug-town in rural Mexico (whose economy was historically dominated by dairy farming and cheese processing) reveals some interesting insights regarding the impacts of a narco-economy in Mexico.⁶²⁴

The construction of new, opulent houses despite a failing local economy immediately signaled to locals the existence of narco-dollars. They claimed that those

⁶²¹ Ibid.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Lakshmanan, "Drug-Related Violence Moves into Acapulco: Area's \$1.35b Tourist Industry May Be at Risk."

⁶²⁴ James H. McDonald, "The Narcoeconomy and Small-Town, Rural Mexico," *Human Organization* 64, no. 2 (2005).

constructing or purchasing these homes were primarily emigrants returning from the U.S. who had worked in the drug economy but also locals who participated in the local drug trade. Moreover, because wealthy participants in the narco-economy had massive sums of cash at their disposal, they would often pay hugely inflated prices for land, thus driving up land costs for more modest farmers while concurrently making it lucrative for farmers owning prime property to sell out. Nonetheless, locals were reluctant to condemn these individuals too harshly, since most operated large farms which provided a source of legitimacy, respectability, and a connection to the local community where relationships and family reside.

Other forms of extravagant behavior have signaled increased participation in the drug trade. A new consumer culture focused on luxurious clothing stores, day spas, expensive electronics, and the use of cybercafés is a clear departure from the traditional activities of ordinary citizens who could not afford the aforementioned luxuries. Locals also reported changes in traditional forms of leisure, such as cockfighting. They claimed that rich individuals who have gained their money from the narco-economy place much higher bets, crowding out the traditional participants.

SECURITY IMPACTS

i. Increasing Violence and Criminality

Nowhere has drug-related violence been more apparent over the last few years than on the U.S.'s own southern border with Mexico. The number of homicides has reached such an alarming rate that it is reminiscent of Colombia in the 1980s, which was

considered at that time to be the most dangerous Narco-State in the world. Since the beginning of Calderon's tenure in December 2006, more than 28,000 people have died in Mexico's drug war.⁶²⁵ In 2008 alone, there were 6,587 drug-related murders in the country.⁶²⁶ Between January 1st and May 2010, drug-related violence in Juarez alone claimed more than 1,000 lives, making it the "murder capital of Mexico."⁶²⁷

The cause of this violence is three-fold: intimidation by DTOs toward those who threaten to expose their violent tactics; elimination of government officials who threaten their operations; and competition for transit routes, local consumption markets, and other strategic locations. Interestingly, whereas drug violence was once limited to individuals associated with organized crime, violence directed toward ordinary citizens, civil servants, and high-profile political figures seems to have increased in recent years. Most agree that this is a result of Calderon's successful counternarcotics efforts, forcing drug lords to adopt more drastic, gruesome, and effective measures.

Vis-à-vis intimidation perpetuated by DTOs, this is most evident with regard to the murder of journalists and other members of the media who expose narco-corruption and the other narco-antics of drug traffickers. This tactic dates as far back as 1984 when Manuel Buendia, a popular syndicated columnist was assassinated in Mexico City for reporting on the nefarious activities of drug traffickers. More recently, 12 journalists were

⁶²⁵ Archibold, "Mexico Paper, a Drug War Victim, Calls for a Voice."

⁶²⁶ "Mexican authorities seize 33 tons of cocaine in 3.5 years" Media: Xinhua Byline: N/A Date: 01 June 2010

⁶²⁷ "6 Gunned down in Mexican border city" Media: EFE; Byline: N/A; Date: 28 May 2010

killed in Mexico in 2008.⁶²⁸ Similarly, innocent women, minors, tourists, and extended family members of drug traffickers have been targeted for intimidation.

With regard to violence directed toward government officials, political assassinations and the murder of civil servants have become commonplace in Mexico. This narco-corruption dates as far back as March 1994, when members of the federal judicial police came under heavy fire from the local judicial police of Baja California as they were carrying out an operation against a cartel.⁶²⁹ Violence directed at civil servants has undoubtedly picked up since that time. For example, while there were no known assassinations of Mexican mayors from 2000 to 2005, more than 20 have been killed since then including six in 2010 alone.⁶³⁰ Similarly, between 2005 and 2008, 6,000 public servants were murdered in Mexico.⁶³¹ For example, in the drug-producing state of Guerrero, a congressional candidate from President Calderón's National Action Party (Jorge Camacho) took a strong stance against the drug trade. For this stance his car was recently blown up with a malicious message attached to the effect of, "next time we'll take your life."⁶³² Law enforcement officials are commonly the target of these assassinations, such as Mexico's federal police chief who was murdered in 2008, or the 12 federal police agents who were tortured and killed in June 2009 after Mexican police arrested several high-level members of La Familia Michoacana.⁶³³

⁶²⁸ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶²⁹ Andreas, "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico."

⁶³⁰ Shirk, Strengthening Mexican State Capacity (Draft Council Special Report).

⁶³¹ Video, Steel or silver.

⁶³² Video, Steel or silver

⁶³³ World Drug Report 2010.

Numerous realignments, splits, alliances, and splinter groups have emerged, all of which represent constant shifts in the status quo. Here are several examples:

- The AFO at one point broke with the Sinaloa DTO in an effort to control all of Baja California then began to encroach into Sinaloa's own territory;
- Similarly, the Juarez and Tijuana organizations have aligned themselves with the Gulf Cartel in response to Sinaloa's movement into northern zones historically controlled by the Gulf Cartel;
- In 2005, the Gulf Cartel sought retaliation on the Sinaloa cartel who had encroached on its territory along the Texan border near Nuevo Laredo. It dispatched Los Zetas to terrorize the resort region of Acapulco, which the Sinaloans had long dominated;⁶³⁴
- In 2007, the various cartels purportedly agreed to come together in a "federation" that would guarantee trade routes and stabilize the industry. The Federation was led by representatives from the Sinaloa, Juárez, Milenio, Jalisco, Colima and Valencia cartels with each retaining its own identity as an independent organizations;
- In 2008, the Sinaloa Cartel reignited a long rivalry with the Gulf Cartel for control of the Sonoran-Arizona corridor – a particularly strategic (and therefore lucrative) swath of real estate along the border with the U.S.⁶³⁵

All these examples serve to illustrate the constantly changing alliances and rivalries that exist among Mexico's drug cartels, and explain why there are so many fluctuations in murder rates, as organizations exact revenge on others, or join forces for a more lucrative payday.

Most significantly, it is important to understand that the recent spike in violence is a sign that corruption and financial incentives are no longer inspiring cooperation among Mexico's political elite. This has been demonstrated in Colombia and Italy, where

⁶³⁴ Lakshmanan, "Drug-Related Violence Moves into Acapulco: Area's \$1.35b Tourist Industry May Be at Risk."

⁶³⁵ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

members of organized crime syndicates tended to kill each other when faced with increased government repression.⁶³⁶ Figure 40 shows how after years of gently declining violence (now known to be indicative of a government that tolerated drug trafficking activities), there suddenly was a spike in 2008. It is no coincidence that this spike coincided with Calderon's tenure.




Figure 40. Number of Homicides in Mexico
(Source: UNODC WDR 2010)

Most agree that the violence in Mexico is due more to the Calderon administration's efforts to quell the drug trade rather than the drug trade itself. Calderon

⁶³⁶ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000), 480.

has engaged the Mexican military on unprecedented levels, deploying tens of thousands of troops to establish street patrols, man checkpoints, train local police forces, and generally oversee other domestic law enforcement functions in states with high levels of drug violence.⁶³⁷ Jorge Chabat, a prominent Mexican scholar of the drug war, has noted *“Mexico's drug war has become much more violent in the last year and a half, in some ways because of the government's actions... Before, the government didn't attack cartels, so there was equilibrium. Once they started cracking down and arresting leaders, there was a fight over turf among those who remained.”*⁶³⁸ However, this expanded role of law enforcement that has succeeded in making more arrests and confiscating more drugs has not been accompanied with a corresponding strategy to address the unintended consequences of increased violence. In effect, the government has poked a beehive without the means to exterminate the fleeing insects. For example, the successful arrests of Benjamin Arellano Felix and Osiel Cardenas Guillen – the two barons of the Arellano Felix Cartel and the Gulf Cartel respectively – ignited a bitter war between successors from the two organizations looking to fill the vacuum left by their leaders.

The heinous nature of the violence in Mexico is worthy of mention. While it is certainly not necessary to go into great detail regarding the nature of these acts, it is worth noting the significance of such gruesome acts of violence. These acts are intended to intimidate potential foes and dissuade them from taking any action that might threaten

⁶³⁷ Shirk, Strengthening Mexican State Capacity (Draft Council Special Report).

⁶³⁸ Lakshmanan, "Drug-Related Violence Moves into Acapulco: Area's \$1.35b Tourist Industry May Be at Risk."

their operations.⁶³⁹ As one Mexican law enforcement official noted, "*Criminals earn respect and credibility with creative killing methods... Your status is based on your capacity to commit the most sadistic acts. Burning corpses, using acid, beheading victims. . . . This generation is setting a new standard for savagery.*"⁶⁴⁰

Alongside the dramatic increase in drug-related homicides in Mexico has been the concomitant increase in criminal activity such as kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, immigrant smuggling, and producing and selling counterfeit CDs. These crimes are often performed by DTOs in order to augment their revenues and illustrate how broader organized crime syndicates can evolve from simple drug smuggling networks.⁶⁴¹

Kidnapping has become a critical component of the narco-business model, as evidenced by Los Zetas whose members are explicitly trained for kidnappings. The number of kidnappings jumped 9.1 percent during the first five months of 2008 (1,028) compared with all of 2007 (751). Yet even with numbers like these, researchers at Mexico's National Autonomous University have found that 90 percent of victims do not report their kidnapping incidents for fear of retribution or because they believe that the police are complicit in the crime.⁶⁴² Not only does this result in underestimating crime levels in Mexico, but it hinders effective law enforcement and the prosecution of cases. In Mexico, according to one estimate, only one in every five crimes is reported; only 13

⁶³⁹ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁴⁰ Richard Marosi, "Mystery Man Blamed for Gruesome Tijuana Deaths," *Los Angeles Time*, 18 December 2008.

⁶⁴¹ Millman and Cordoba, "Drug-Cartel Links Haunt an Election South of Border."

⁶⁴² Barnard R. Thompson, "Kidnappings Are out of Control in Mexico," *www.mexidata.info*, 14 June 2004.

percent of these crimes are investigated; and only 5 percent of these are brought before a judge.⁶⁴³ When a crime *is* reported and a suspect *is* identified, a guilty verdict is highly likely if the suspect is poor with little means to bribe prosecutors, which reflects the high levels of corruption.

Besides narcotics, many Mexican DTOs have expanded into a host of other illicit markets. Los Zetas, for example, have facilitated the illegal smuggling of undocumented Cubans into the U.S. While under the protection of Cancun's police chief, Francisco "El Viking" Velasco Delgado, Los Zetas was able to charge \$2,500 per person.⁶⁴⁴ Los Zetas have also been involved in the sale contraband, ordering vendors in Tamaulipas to sell only merchandise provided by them, and even forcing movie theater owners to provide them with films so that they can pirate them. As with any illicit trade, associated crimes are often committed, such as money laundering, extortion, loan-sharking, and even assassinations.

v. Desertions Among the Armed Forces

Mexico has experienced a massive increase in desertions among its armed forces in recent years, averaging approximately 20,000 troops each year.⁶⁴⁵ Between 2000 and 2006, approximately 100,000 soldiers (mostly low-level enlisted personnel but also some officers) left the Mexican armed forces, many of them opting for employment with the

⁶⁴³ Joy Olson, "The Merida Initiative " in *Testimony before the House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs* (Washington DC: 10 March 2009).

⁶⁴⁴ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁴⁵ Shirk, *Strengthening Mexican State Capacity* (Draft Council Special Report). For a number of reasons, the Navy has suffered far fewer desertions than the other military branches, likely because it attracts a higher caliber of applicant and vets each one thoroughly. There are also not as many obstacles to promotion as in the Army.

enforcement arms of various drug cartels.⁶⁴⁶ In fact, many of the paramilitary groups that work for the various DTOs comprise former Mexican soldiers who were trained by U.S. forces. For example, wanting “the best men possible” Osiel Guillen’s operatives courted the Army’s elite Airborne Special Forces Group, ultimately recruiting 30 deserters which became known as Los Zetas and who provided protection and other essential services for the Gulf Cartel.

The significantly higher salaries offered by these DTOs than those offered by the military attract soldiers to these organizations. Since 2007, Calderon has attempted to combat this trend, increasing military salaries by 46 percent (special forces now receive \$1,100 per month) while taking a 10 percent pay cut himself. However, in response the cartels quickly doubled the amount they paid their own “troops.”⁶⁴⁷ Besides salary increases, Calderon has made additional strides to increase the prestige and attractiveness of the Mexican military. He has underscored his solidarity with the troops on many occasions by visiting “no-go” zones with them, commending them in television commercials, and reassigning generals threatened by drug cartels to safer positions (many overseas).

vi. Growth of Privatized Security

Mexico has witnessed the proliferation of private armies – mercenaries organized into paramilitary enforcement groups – as tools employed by each DTO not only to

⁶⁴⁶ Stephanie Hanson, Background: Mexico's Drug War (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 28 June 2007).

⁶⁴⁷ Sam Enriquez and Hector Tobar, "Mexican Army Faces Tough War with Drug Cartels," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 May 2007.

protect its own territory but to expand operations onto others' territories, to collect debts, and to execute their foes with such violence as to serve as a deterrent to others. The most notorious example is Los Zetas, which until recently was the Gulf Cartel's paramilitary group. There are also La Gente Nueva, Los Pelones, Las Fuerzas Especiales de Arturo.⁶⁴⁸ Perhaps most concerning is the excellent access these organizations have to small arms and sophisticated equipment. Their involvement in the drug trade facilitates access to these types of weapons, particularly as payment for drugs trafficked to the U.S. Los Zetas have an extremely sophisticated arsenal of assault rifles, submachine guns, grenade launchers, ground-to-air missiles, dynamite, bazookas, and even helicopters. In the largest seizure by Mexican law enforcement to date (of a Zeta stronghold), soldiers in 2008 found: 540 rifles, 165 grenades, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, and 14 sticks of dynamite.⁶⁴⁹ The ease with which Los Zetas and other DTOs can acquire these weapons is attributed to lax gun regulations in the U.S. Between 2004 and 2008, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) tracked a significant portion of the 23,000 firearms recovered by Mexican Authorities. They found that 87 percent of the arms originated in the U.S. and that between 2006 and 2008, this figure increased to 90 percent.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁸ Hal Brands, Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2009).

⁶⁴⁹ Lacey, "29 March 2009."

⁶⁵⁰ Devin Parsons, "In Wrong Hands: Los Zetas and Gun Laws That Help Them Thrive " *Eurasia Review*, 8 August 2010.

vii. Globalization of Criminal Networks

Mexican DTOs have traditionally limited their operations to Mexico and the U.S. Not only is the U.S. the primary market for their products, but here they can leverage the massive Mexican immigrant population (particularly the criminal gangs among them) as distribution networks in more than 200 major U.S. cities. However, the globalization of the drug trade and particularly the cocaine market has encouraged these DTOs to expand their operations worldwide. For example, Los Zetas have expanded into various countries where it has pursued collaborative relationships with criminal networks, gangs, and the like. Since mid-2006, they have been active in Guatemala where police apprehended the group's second in command and received reports of at least 78 additional members in the country.⁶⁵¹ Their objective purportedly is to expand their reach and "supplant" local narco-traffickers. Likewise, Los Zetas have reportedly recruited members of the Salvadoran criminal group Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) among other Hispanic gangs in the U.S. to assist in retail sales of cocaine in their various areas of operation throughout the north and Central American region. Even Italy's anti-drug prosecutor, Nicola Gratteri, claimed in 2008 that Los Zetas had been collaborating with the Calabrian Mafia for two years.⁶⁵² Similarly, several Mexican DTOs, particularly the Sinaloa cartel, are known to have established operating bases in West Africa and to be engaging with local criminal groups to move their product northward.⁶⁵³ This globalization of Mexican DTOs has

⁶⁵¹ "Cae Otro Presunto Zeta En Guatemala Con Arsenal," *El Universal*, 19 December 2008.

⁶⁵² Irene Savio, "Confirman Nexo 'Zetas' E Italianos," *Reforma*, 19 September 2008.

⁶⁵³ Farah, "Transnational Drug Enterprises: Threats to Global Stability and U.S. National Security from Southwest Asia, Latin America and West Africa."

clearly had the effect of not only strengthening smaller, regional criminal groups but concomitantly destabilizing those regions by empowering those organizations that are most responsible for criminal activity.

viii. Loss of Control over Critical Transportation Infrastructure

Major and minor hubs of Mexico's critical transportation infrastructure have been compromised by drug traffickers. Various regional airports such as the Mariano Matamoros Airport in Temixco, Morelos, are purportedly controlled by the Beltran Leyvas brothers.⁶⁵⁴ Amado Carrillo, now deceased but formerly the head of the Juárez Cartel, was famous for his use of a fleet of 27 private Boeing 727 jet airliners to transport Colombian cocaine to municipal airports and dirt airstrips around Mexico.⁶⁵⁵ Of course, any trafficking organization that uses 727s to transport their product are most likely benefiting from the cooperation of airport officials, since there simply are not that many places where one can discreetly land a Boeing 727.

More significantly, the Benito Juarez International Airport in Mexico City has long been known as a "plaza" or a transit point for cocaine trafficked by criminal groups from Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. It is also commonplace for couriers smuggling drugs in and out of Mexico to embark or depart from this airport, where federal police, airport security, and customs inspectors have all proven to be vulnerable to narco-corruption. Recently, control over Benito Juarez International Airport has been

⁶⁵⁴ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁵⁵ Thomas Constantine, "International Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico," in *The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations* (Washington DC: 8 August 1995).

contested by several of Mexico's largest DTOs, resulting in several instances of gruesome violence including the beheadings of two mid-level operators for a drug gang and employees of a freight forwarding outfit. Moreover, drug cartels have been able to use the airport's post office as the delivery address for an arsenal of guns.⁶⁵⁶

Even Mexico's railway system, particularly the lines linking Lazaro Cardenas, Veracruz, Tampico, and other seaports to connections on the U.S. border are common routes for drug traffickers. In 2009, for example, 800 kilograms of cocaine was seized from a train bound for Mexicali.⁶⁵⁷

SOCIAL IMPACTS

i. Increased Consumption/Addiction

Mexico serves as a prime example where addiction has plagued those regions through which cocaine is trafficked. Though consumption statistics are not always available by region, anecdotal evidence abounds describing how certain regions have become infested with drugs and addicts. Consider the following:

- Tijuana has 200,000 addicts – the largest per-capital number in the country. Moreover, prostitutes desperate for their next “fix” are purportedly more willing to engage in risky, unprotected sex.⁶⁵⁸
- In Michoacan, of the 4.7 million residents, 224,270 people aged 12 – 25 are addicts, most of whom consume cocaine as their drug of choice. There are at

⁶⁵⁶ John Ross, "Flying Heads at Mexico City Airport: Drug War Mayhem Boils over from Border to Border," *Counter Punch*, 14 February 2008.

⁶⁵⁷ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁵⁸ Pedro, "In the Shadow of the Cartels."

least 2,100 known drug outlets in 113 municipalities in the town of Morelia, whose earnings amount to approximately \$38,000 a day.⁶⁵⁹

· Even in the countryside, the Attorney General Medina Mora reported that addiction had increased from 15 percent to 30 percent in recent years.⁶⁶⁰

Moreover, cocaine and other drugs are widely availability in Mexican prisons. 167.7 kilograms of marijuana was confiscated in 2008 – eight times the amount found in 2007. The number of psychotropic pills confiscated was 8,449 (50 percent more than in 2007).⁶⁶¹ Due to the ease with which prison guards are bribed, drugs are essentially allowed to flow freely inside many Mexican prisons, feeding a shocking number of incarcerated addicts (25,900 of Mexico City's 37,000 inmates.) Attempts to clamp down on the availability of drugs, many believe, would incite violent riots that would be far worse than the effects of drugs themselves.⁶⁶²

ii. Erosion of a Democratic Civil Society

Since the 1990s, self-censorship among journalists and other would-be whistleblowers who have been intimidated by DTO tactics has undermined the growth of a vibrant media in Mexico. Honest and frank discussion of drug trafficking and related corruption has been severely curtailed due to fear of reprisals. Many publishers will not even allow their staff members the freedom to pursue some of these topics, for fear of

⁶⁵⁹ "Mil 200 Negocios Pagan Renta Al Narco En Morelia," *Milenio.com*, 24 September 2008.

⁶⁶⁰ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁶¹ Antonio Baranda, "Rompe Record Droga Decomisada En Penales," *Reforma*, 25 December 2008.

⁶⁶² Henia Prado, "Toleran Autoridades Drogas En Penales," *Reforma*, 16 November 2008.

retaliation.⁶⁶³ This threat to a vocal and active civil society is a significant concern for Mexicans, given that the mobilization of civil society has been one of the most effective means to combat corruption and organized crime in other countries.⁶⁶⁴

Another aspect of a democratic civil society that has suffered in Mexico is the use of the military. In some parts of Mexico, conventional law enforcement institutions have been unable to provide the level of resources required to combat the powerful DTOs. As a result, the Mexican government has turned to the military to perform many law enforcement functions, since it has the training, equipment, and endurance required to meet these challenges. In general, the military's role in combating the drug trade, as well as providing disaster relief, has generated significant support among the majority of the population – particularly in regions where the military is not deployed.⁶⁶⁵

However, a large military footprint has generated some negative backlash in many Mexican communities. Despite a general national feeling of support for the military's campaign against the drug trade, some citizens in communities that have hosted federal forces have been critical of their presence, noting their disrespect for personal freedoms and human rights, and their general harsh treatment of citizens. Since Calderon came to power, Mexico's National Human Rights Commission has recorded 1,230 accusations of abuses at the hands of the military.⁶⁶⁶ For example, soldiers at a checkpoint in the

⁶⁶³ Shelley, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition."

⁶⁶⁴ Jane Schneider, "Educating against the Mafira: A Report from Sicily.," *Trends in Organized Crime* 4, no. 2 (Winter 1998).

⁶⁶⁵ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁶⁶ La Justicia Militar Propicia Impunidad, (Boletín de Prensa: Centro de Derechos Humanos Prodh, 9 March 2009).

mountains of Sinaloa fired more than 12 rounds into a car, killing three children and two unarmed women.⁶⁶⁷ Los Zetas have played on this grievance, providing cell phones, school supplies, and toys to children who are in contact with the military day to day, promoting themselves as a friendlier alternative to the Mexican military.

Despite general support for the military's involvement in countering powerful DTOs, signs that it may be committing human rights abuses in the name of ousting drug lords prove that the use of the military for law enforcement purposes is a slippery slope. Trained soldiers are generally more inclined to use lethal force, and in a worst-case scenario, an empowered military (such as that in Guinea-Bissau) that does not respect civilian authority could lay the groundwork for the unconstitutional seizure of power. In any event, relying on the military as the primary domestic law enforcement agency is a significant departure from the preferred situation whereby the military's role is confined to the defense of a country and its sovereignty.

iii. Facilitating Church-Narco Ties

Mexico is a devoutly religious country, where Catholicism plays an integral role in everyday life. It appears as though Mexican DTOs are not only themselves devoutly religious, but have also cultivated ties with the Catholic Church that serve to support their activities and exonerate them from any notions of impropriety.

Interestingly, the worship of Santisima Muerte or the "Saint of Death" seems to have grown in popularity alongside the rise of the drug trade in Mexico. Santisima

⁶⁶⁷ "Mexico to Try 19 Soldiers in Civilian Shootings," *Reuters*, 11 June 2007.

Muerte worship (a superstitious and cultish practice which is discouraged and barely recognized by the Catholic Church) is focused primarily in and around Mexico City and the tough Tepito neighborhood where one journalist reasoned she (Santísima Muerte) gained popularity as the savior for the growing criminal element in a community where violence, corruption, and drugs are a daily reality.⁶⁶⁸ Santísima Muerte worship is most commonly practiced among Mexico's lower classes and criminal worlds, perhaps symbolizing the widespread belief that life and death are closely intertwined.



Figure 41. Raising of Santa Muerte in the Tepito neighborhood of Mexico City
(Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dec1Romero14.JPG>)

Given the connection between Santísima Muerte and criminality, it is not altogether surprising that drug traffickers are attracted to her, given fears they might have regarding their own afterlives, particularly the consequences they might endure for their nefarious activities while alive. This, as well as the practical benefits to be derived by

⁶⁶⁸ Reed Johnson, "A 'Saint' of Last Resort," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 March 2004.

being associated with the Catholic Church has supposedly fostered a particularly close relationship between the drug barons and the church, wherein the church sanctions, either outright or indirectly, the activities of drug traffickers in exchange for significant narco-financing. Several examples of collaboration include:

- In 1990, Amado Carrillo Fuentes of the Juárez Cartel accompanied two catholic priests to the Holy Land. The church defended the action by claiming it was in appreciation of the orphanage Carillo built in Sinaloa's state capital.⁶⁶⁹
- In 1997, the Priest of the Basilica of Guadalupe said in his sermon that Mexicans could learn from the example set by drug kingpins Rafael Caro Quintero and Amado Carrillo Fuentes, who had offered the church millions of pesos.⁶⁷⁰ When called out by politicians for sanctioning drug traffickers, he merely pointed to the fact that he was in no way equipped to investigate the source of funds, only to receive them and put them to good use.
- In 2006, the bishop of Piedras Negras praised the drug baron Osiel Cardenas Guillen for donating massive quantities of food to the victims of floods that afflicted Coahuila.⁶⁷¹

iv. Deleterious Effect on Children

The drug trade and its associated activities have also taken its toll on Mexico's children. Having grown up in environments where drug barons flaunt their wealth and are lauded for their generosity and the protections they offer, many children glamorize the "narco-lifestyle." One child stated "*Here the narcos enjoy respect because they help the people and have a great deal of power. Not even mayors help as much when someone*

⁶⁶⁹ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁷⁰ Carlos Fazio, "Polemica Con La Iglesia En Mexico Por Narcolimosnas," *Clarín.com*, 25 September 1997.

⁶⁷¹ Leopoldo Ramos, "Rechazan Qui El Narco Financie a La Iglesia," *El Siglo de Torreon*, 21 October 2006.

dies or doesn't have a job.”⁶⁷² Perhaps more disturbingly, in one survey of school children, 20 percent of respondents knew classmates who brought weapons, including guns, to school.⁶⁷³ Moreover, due to the violence and criminal activity in many regions, some concerns have been raised over the increasing truancy among students in these areas and the difficulty in retaining teachers in these positions.⁶⁷⁴

v. Proliferation of Narco “Pop” Culture

A unique impact of the drug trade in Mexico has been the “narco-culture” that it has created. A whole genre of literature, music, and theater has emerged, glamorizing Mexican narcos in much of the same way as Italian mobsters have been portrayed in movies such as *The Godfather*, but without depicting the broader costs of narco-culture for Mexican society.⁶⁷⁵ Lavish narco-lifestyles have also become commonplace, where drug barons throw parties replete with cocaine, high-end prostitutes, and expensive alcohol, in homes where assault rifles are decorated with diamonds and gold, and wild animals live in in-house zoos.⁶⁷⁶ Examples of “Narco-literature” include Elmer Mendoza’s *El Amante de Janis Joplin*, Leonardo Alfaro’s *Tierra Blanca*, Eduardo Antonio Parra’s *Nostalgia de la sobra*, Juan Jose Rodriquez’s *Mi nombre es Casablanca*, or Martin Solares *Los minutos negros*.⁶⁷⁷ “Narcocorridos” – or pop songs about drug

⁶⁷² Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁴ Nurit Martinez, "Prometen Dar Clase Y 'No Oir O Ver Nada,' En Area De Narcos," *El Universal*, 25 March 2009.

⁶⁷⁵ Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*.

⁶⁷⁶ Tracy Wilkinson, "Lions and Tigers and Drugs," *Los Angeles Times*, 31 October 2008.

⁶⁷⁷ Sergio Gonazlez Rodrigues, "Narcoliteratura Mexicana," *Reforma*, 25 March 2009.

traffickers – have become a common way to venerate drug lords or serve as a propaganda tool for a particular DTO. El Chapo Guzman has become a popular subject of these "Narcocorridos," in which he is compared to Elvis and Osama bin Laden. This type of notoriety telling of one's exploits has been perceived as a marker for success in the drug underworld. One song, by Los Buitres (The Vultures), describes his life as a fugitive: "He sleeps at times in homes/ At times in tents/ Radio and rifle at the foot/ Of the bed/ Sometimes his roof is a cave/ Guzman does seem to be everywhere."⁶⁷⁸ In this way drug lords are portrayed as the victims of unfair and authoritarian governments, whose only option for survival is to enter the illicit underworld of drug trafficking.⁶⁷⁹ In one case, a musician was allegedly murdered for singing a song that delivered a threatening message between two DTOs.⁶⁸⁰

Narco-messages in the form of banners called "narcobanderas" or "narcomantas" are often found in Mexico. Their purpose is three-fold: first, to intimidate rivals; second, to reveal the names of corrupt government officials working for rival cartels (and in doing so turn the public against law enforcement and government officials); and third, as a recruiting tool to encourage soldiers to defect. For the latter, banners will often emphasize the better care they would receive from the narcos, who would never feed them "sopa marucha" – the instant noodles boiled in a cup.⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁸ Stephey, "Joaquin Guzman Loera: Billionaire Drug Lord."

⁶⁷⁹ Jose Pablo Villalobos and Juan Carlos Ramírez-Pimienta, "Corridos and La Pura Verdad: Myths and Realities of the Mexican Ballad," *South Central Review* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004).

⁶⁸⁰ Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

ANNEX C: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR TAJIKISTAN

POLITICAL IMPACTS

Listed here are a few ways in which the political stability of Tajikistan has been affected by the drug trade.

i. Narco-Corruption and Criminalization of State Officials

“The culture of corruption fueled by the huge amount of drugs passing through the country poses a significant threat to Tajikistan’s stability and prosperity.”⁶⁸²

Once again, one of the most prevalent impacts of the drug trade in Tajikistan has been the corruption that it facilitates and thus the criminalization of state officials. As explained previously, drug trafficking was born out of Tajikistan’s five-year civil war, during which time drug trafficking came to be an important source of revenue for opposition forces as well as the government. This appears to have had an incredibly significant impact on the subsequent regime, having laid the foundation for a corrupt political system in which warlords – many of whom were active traffickers – were integrated into the new government.⁶⁸³ Moreover, when these warlords became legitimate government officials, they did not cease their roles in the drug trade, rather continued

⁶⁸² International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

⁶⁸³ International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

them from their positions of power, effectively shrouding themselves in immunity. Perhaps the most notorious example of a corrupted state official in Tajikistan was the arrest in May 2000 of the Tajik Ambassador to Kazakhstan who was caught *twice* trafficking drugs, the second time carrying 63 kilos of heroin and \$1 million in bulk cash in his car.⁶⁸⁴ Similarly, Tajikistan's trade representative to Kazakhstan was arrested when found with 24 kilos of heroin.⁶⁸⁵ These examples highlight that corruption is not limited to the top echelons of the government. Moving such massive quantities of drugs would invariably have to involve the knowledge of law enforcement, reflecting an entire system that is corrupt.

The complicity of senior-level government officials in the drug trade has had an effect on the Tajik political system that cannot be overestimated – it has allowed organized crime to penetrate the institutions of the state with extremely little resistance. Perhaps this is best summarized by Johan Engvall who, in reference to the peace agreement that established the integrated government, stated most succinctly “[*the peace agreement*] has simply changed organized crime's role in Tajikistan from being a natural component under anarchic conditions to becoming a legitimate part of what is, at least formally, a settled system.”⁶⁸⁶

In addition to criminalizing elements of its leadership, Tajikistan's government apparatus have become equally as corrupted. While it appears to be endemic, corruption

⁶⁸⁴ "Tajik Leadership Implicated in Drug Smuggling," *Radio Free Europe*, 20 May 2000.

⁶⁸⁵ Svante Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005).

⁶⁸⁶ Johan Engvall, *Stability and Security in Tajikistan: Drug Trafficking as a Threat to National Security, Working Papers No. 86* (Uppsala: Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, January 2005).

seems to be most rampant at the level of local law enforcement, i.e., police, customs officers, and border guards.⁶⁸⁷ The State Department has noted that Tajik border guards and police are “*not motivated to interdict smugglers or traffickers due to systematic corruption, low income, conscripted service, and lack of support from senior Tajik government officials.*”⁶⁸⁸ When these law enforcement officials accept a bribe, they are in effect willingly renouncing their duty to uphold the rule of law – a duty which has been arguably designated to them by the citizens they protect through the election of public officials and paying taxes. Instead, they are protecting the trafficker – the enemy of the state which contributes nothing in return for the favor, except of course cash in the hands of the law enforcement officer he bribes. In this way, Tajikistan’s law enforcement institutions have become corrupted – significantly more so than they may otherwise have been from “ordinary” petty corruption that occurs in many developing states around the world. If law enforcement officers refuse to accept bribes, opting rather to uphold the rule of law and arrest the culprit, they risk becoming victims of intimidation, coercion, or death.⁶⁸⁹ In this way the drug trade has cultivated an environment of violence and intimidation in Tajikistan whereby law enforcement officers are deterred from carrying out their duty for fear of exposing themselves to grave danger. Moreover, reports that enforcement personnel who *have* rightfully apprehended traffickers and claimed to have

⁶⁸⁷ Fenopetov, "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the 'Silk Road'."

⁶⁸⁸ Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview, vol. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122434.htm> (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 2008).

⁶⁸⁹ 2008 Human Rights Report: Tajikistan, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, 11 March 2008).

burned confiscated drugs while actually selling the drugs for their own profit demonstrates blatant disregard for the rule of law.⁶⁹⁰

Other critical parts of Tajikistan's state apparatus have also been corrupted by the drug trade. The Tajik State Security Ministry (the government's intelligence arm that replaced the former Tajik KGB) is thought to be deeply complicit in the trade of drugs as well as arms. As one report theorizes, the president's Kulob clan (inhabitants of the southwest area of Tajikistan) are heavily over-represented in the Security Ministry. This region also happens to be a hot spot for drugs entering the country from Afghanistan and thus it is logical to assume that some of these individuals may be involved in the drug trade.⁶⁹¹ Furthermore, the State Department's 2008 Human Rights Report for Tajikistan indicates that judges are often pressured by the executive branch and criminal networks, and that corruption and inefficiency were significant problems in Tajikistan.⁶⁹²

ii. Social Investment

In the summer of 2008, the Tajik government announced it was deploying paramilitary police units to Khorog, the capital of the Gorno-Badakhshan province, to arrest opposition military commanders – many of whom were believed to be involved in the drug trade. Upon the arrival of these government forces, however, hundreds of people demonstrated against their presence. Several reports indicate that the local citizens supported the drug kingpins, claiming they were more interested in their security than the

⁶⁹⁰ "Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace."

⁶⁹¹ Drug Trade Engulfs Tajikistan, Spills into Russia.

⁶⁹² Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

central government.⁶⁹³ Many believe that it was actually the local drug kingpins who organized these protests as a sign of the strength they wielded even in the face of oncoming government forces.⁶⁹⁴ While this type of occurrence, i.e. demonstrations of public support for drug barons, does not seem to be commonplace throughout Tajikistan, it does represent a reversal of the social contract in at least one region, and presumably the potential to replicate itself in other regions.

iii. Difficulty in Establishing Honest Institutions

Per an agreement with the UNODC and amid significant international pressure, Tajikistan established a national Drug Control Agency (DCA) on 27 April 1999 which began operations in 2000. Despite a rigorous vetting process of potential employees, the DCA ultimately stood up an agency that was staffed with 99 percent former law-enforcement officers. In response to considerable apprehension among the West that the majority of law enforcement officers were corrupt, the Tajik government opted to pay staff of the DCA significantly higher salaries than their law enforcement counterparts (\$100-\$600 per month versus \$60 per month).⁶⁹⁵ Nonetheless, rumors that some in the DCA were complicit in the drug trade quickly emerged, helped in part by the apprehension of Lt. Gen. Gafor Mirzoyev, the former head of the DCA, in August 2004 for having more than 3,000 weapons, including a Stinger anti-aircraft missile in his

⁶⁹³ "Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure."

⁶⁹⁴ 2008 World Report: Tajikistan.

⁶⁹⁵ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

possession.⁶⁹⁶ Most news reports imply that he had always been involved in the drug and arms trade, even while heading the DCA.

This anecdote highlights the challenge that Tajikistan experienced in trying to address its own drug trafficking problem. Identifying honest, qualified personnel to staff the DCA was difficult, but without such an institution, attacking the drug trade is impossible. In essence, it illustrates a catch-22 whereby the problem was so far gone that the one solution – law enforcement – had already been so corrupted that it could not ameliorate the situation. That said, the progress that the DCA has made in recent years should not be overlooked. Since 2005, Tajikistan has cooperated with its neighbors in 82 investigations, resulting in the seizure of 785 kilograms of narcotics and the arrest of 192 individuals.⁶⁹⁷ This bodes well for the future of the DCA, though narco-corruption among the regular police forces remains a significant challenge.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS

As was previously mentioned, the Tajik economy is highly dependent on remittances, which in 2008 accounted for nearly 50 percent of the country's GDP.⁶⁹⁸ However, income linked to the illicit opiate industry is growing in importance, with some estimating its share approaching 30 to 50 percent of the Tajik economy.⁶⁹⁹ Some statistics

⁶⁹⁶ "Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan's New War: Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide."

⁶⁹⁷ Ravshanbek Nazarov, The Drug Control Agency under the President of Tajikistan, *The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners* (Arlington: Remarks made at George Mason University, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, 3 May 2009).

⁶⁹⁸ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx>

⁶⁹⁹ Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State."; "Tajikistan: Poverty Pushes People to Drug Trafficking." Svante Cornell also came to this conclusion using Tajikistan's GDP for 2003 which was

from 2003 offer a similar analysis. Tajikistan's GDP for 2003 is estimated at \$1.2 billion. Meanwhile, the production of opiates in neighboring northeastern Afghanistan, which are smuggled mainly through Tajikistan, stood at 5,400 metric tons of opium—roughly equivalent to 60 tons of heroin. High-quality heroin was priced at \$7,000 a kilogram in Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital, hence a value of \$378 million. Of course, all of this income is not generated in Tajikistan, but this calculation shows the value of the drug trafficking business as compared to the economic production in the country.⁷⁰⁰ With such an influx of cash into the region, it is hardly surprising that there have been some anomalies in the banking systems and other economic distortions.

i. The Drug Trade is a Significant Source of Employment

Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent devastation of the legitimate economy, many impoverished Tajiks resorted to drug trafficking to supplement their meager legitimate revenue with opium income.⁷⁰¹ Today, some experts believe that trafficking may be the most lucrative form of work in Tajikistan. Moreover, second- and third-order jobs are generated by this trade, including jobs in legitimate companies funded with drug money and jobs supplying goods and services to wholesale drug traffickers and their families. This of course has implications for counterdrug

\$1.2 billion. Meanwhile the production of opiates in neighboring northeastern Afghanistan, which are mainly smuggled through Tajikistan, stood at 5,400 MT of opium – roughly equivalent to 60 tons of heroin. High-quality heroin was priced at \$7,000 a kilogram in Dushanbe, hence a total value of \$378 million. He admits that this was not all income generated in Tajikistan, but shows the value of the drug trade as compared to the economic production in the country.

⁷⁰⁰ Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan."

⁷⁰¹ Fenopetov, "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the 'Silk Road'."

efforts, i.e. unintended consequences of removing a large portion of revenues for many citizens, and according to some may explain the government's reluctance to clamp down too much on these activities.⁷⁰²

ii. Increase in Money Laundering

Historically, Tajikistan has not been a major destination for laundered money due to the country's isolation and its underdeveloped banking system with minimal international links.⁷⁰³ However, with the increase in drug trafficking, widespread corruption, and remittances from abroad, a "shadow economy" has emerged with significant amounts of undocumented wealth. This has been exacerbated by peoples' reluctance to deposit their money into Tajik banks, particularly due to the paltry interest rates they pay which barely exceed inflation.⁷⁰⁴ As a result, money laundering has become more prevalent. In an effort to encourage citizens who hold foreign currencies or illegally-attained funds to repatriate their wealth back into Tajikistan, the government called a "Capital Amnesty" in 2003. Under this, the president vowed to pardon all those possessing illegally-gotten gains, so long as they deposited them into Tajik banks. This amnesty legalized \$187 million, RUB71.7 million and TJS55 million worth of unofficial currency which most experts agree was derived primarily from the sale of heroin but also remittances.⁷⁰⁵ While this may have been an effective measure to shrink the shadow

⁷⁰² Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

⁷⁰³ "Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan's New War: Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide."

⁷⁰⁴ Abdullayev, "Tajikistan's Capital Amnesty Barely Dents Shadow Economy."

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

economy, it also allowed drug dealers and corrupt officials to legalize their unlawful gains.⁷⁰⁶

iii. Anomalous Displays of Wealth

Perhaps the most visible impact of the drug trade in Tajikistan has been the sudden rise in wealth among a certain strata of the population. Numerous reports from the region indicate the rise in luxury items such as European cars (referred to as “Drug Mobiles,” see Figure 42), flashy jewelry, and the construction of extravagant new homes at European prices.⁷⁰⁷ Simply put, “*there is certainly a striking discrepancy between the extravagant lifestyles of some senior officials and their nominal government salaries.*”⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁶ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Tajikistan," (2009).

⁷⁰⁷ David Lewis, "High Times on the Silk Road: The Central Asian Paradox," *World Policy Journal* 27, no. 1 (Spring 2010).

⁷⁰⁸ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.



Figure 42. "Drug Mobile"
(Source: IRIN/David Swanson)

SECURITY IMPACTS

i. Drug-Fueled Insurgency

*"Organized crime groups rarely cooperated with terrorist groups, or engaged in their activities as their goals were most often at odds... yet many of today's terrorist groups have not only lost most of their more comprehensible ideals, but are increasingly turning to smuggling and other criminal activities to fund their operations."*⁷⁰⁹

In Tajikistan, the most notable security impact of the drug trade has been manifested in the merging of crime and terror. Specifically, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which operated out of bases in Tajikistan and Taliban-controlled areas of northern Afghanistan, rose to prominence due in large part to the funding it derived

⁷⁰⁹ Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling through the Cracks?."

from the sale of opiates.⁷¹⁰ (That is not to imply, however, that drugs were the only source of the IMU's funding – they also engaged in hostage-taking and benefited from the Uzbek Diaspora in Afghanistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as well as Islamic charitable organizations.⁷¹¹) While the IMU's stated objective was to overthrow President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and create an Islamic state under Sharia law, some experts believe that it has been equally motivated by obtaining criminal profits as the ideology it claims to represent.⁷¹²

By way of background, the IMU in Tajikistan can be traced back to 1992, when the Uzbek government banned the Uzbek branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) because they sought to incite an Islamic revolution in Uzbekistan. The government drove its leaders, Tohir Yoldash and Jumaboi Khojaev, into exile in Tajikistan. There, they teamed up with the Tajik branch of the IRP – the United Tajik Opposition party (UTO), which was fully engaged in civil war with the Tajik government. From this point on, Yoldash and Khojaev (the latter of whom assumed the alias Namangan after his hometown) followed slightly divergent paths, with the former touring the Islamic world and taking an ideological approach while the latter fought with the UTO in Tajikistan. By 1998, the two reunited to form the IMU and tried to supplant the Karimov regime with an Islamic state. Tajikistan was the most obvious base for operations, and the group quickly established bases in Karategin and Tavildara, from which they launched attacks in

⁷¹⁰ Makarenko, "Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade." Cornell, 2004; INTERPOL, Testimony on International Crime, 23 December 2000

⁷¹¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 272.

⁷¹² For an excellent discussion of the Crime-Terror Continuum, see Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism."

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, taking hostages, demanding ransoms, and coordinating the lion's share of drug trafficking through Central Asia.⁷¹³ While these activities in and of themselves were destabilizing to Tajikistan, even more directly affecting the Tajik state were the relationships being cultivated between the terrorist-IMU and the UTO.⁷¹⁴

At first, the IMU's objectives indeed appeared to be ideologically motivated. But soon, the questionable performance of the soldiers and their inability to effect any political change, compounded by their curious tactics led many to believe that they were not as concerned with their political ambitions as destabilizing key transportation routes for narcotics trafficking.⁷¹⁵ There were two indications that this was the case: (1) incursions were always carried out near known trafficking routes where instability would make it easier for the IMU to control the trade or where the incursions would allow cover for the group to explore further routes; and (2) the timing of IMU incursions were conveniently carried out approximately one month following the summer harvest and before the closure of the mountainous transit route in 1999 and 2000. Moreover, the IMU did not launch any attacks in 2001 when the Taliban banned opium cultivation, a

⁷¹³ Makarenko, "Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade.", Cornell, 2004; INTERPOL, Testimony on International Crime, 23 December 2000

⁷¹⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "Imu Insurgency Threatens Tajikistani Political Reconciliation," *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst* www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=127 (September 2000).

⁷¹⁵ By curious tactics, Svante Cornell notes "As the militants hardly could have expected to take control over the Ferghana valley with their numeric strength, nor tried to do so, makes the argument that the IMU sought to force the Uzbek government into negotiations implausible ... had the IMU desired to either destabilize Central Asia and/or establish itself in southwestern Kyrgyzstan, why would it have agreed so easily to accept a ransom for the hostages it had taken, and be flown back to Afghanistan to bide its time to once again come back to the area, with a much higher alert and readiness by local military forces?"

seemingly obvious indicator that there was no opium to traffic.⁷¹⁶ During “downtime,” i.e., when they weren’t fighting, the IMU set up labs to refine opium into heroin for transportation to its final market. The fact that the IMU was refining the opium itself indicates a level of sophistication reflective of the desire to increase their revenues, rather than simply to “tax” a local trade.⁷¹⁷ In any event, the IMU dominated trafficking not only in Tajikistan but all of Central Asia for several years with Ralf Mutschke, assistant director of Interpol’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, estimating that the IMU was probably responsible for 70 percent of the heroin and opium transiting the region.

The drug trade in Tajikistan appears to lend credence to those “Resource Curse” theorists who assert that a lootable resource (defined as natural resources that can easily be extracted and transported by individuals or other unregulated groups) can prolong the duration of a conflict if resource wealth is funding the weaker party, thus creating a more level-playing field and reducing the stronger party’s advantage.⁷¹⁸ Conversely, a lootable resource could shorten the conflict if the wealth is funding the stronger party by increasing its advantage and securing a faster victory. In the case of Tajikistan, the opposition forces benefited tremendously from the drug trade, using revenues to sustain operations as well as motive to control certain strategic transit routes. Engvall’s analysis

⁷¹⁶ Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.”

⁷¹⁷ Makarenko, “Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade.”

⁷¹⁸ James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004). Several authors have written about resources and conflict, see for example Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, *Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War* (International Peace Academy, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2005); Brian Carlson, “Yuseyin Baybasin: Europe’s Pablo Escobar,” *SAIS Review* 25, no. 1 (2005); Ross, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*; Snyder, “Does Lutable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework.”

of Tajikistan's civil war supports this notion, noting that while the fighting was most intense the first year (most combat had ended by February 1993),⁷¹⁹ the conflict persisted nonetheless until 1997. He observes how, during that time, the conflict appeared to morph from an ideologically-motivated one to one motivated by greed. For example, he cites the case of Mahmud Khudoberdiev who attacked an area in northern Tajikistan *after* the end of the war, in order to protect the strategic drug transit route he had effectively "governed" during the civil war.⁷²⁰

The most significant insight to take away from this example is that the conflict in Tajikistan lasted as long as it did due to the presence of drugs and the revenues that they generated for the rebel forces, allowing a crime-terror nexus to thrive, thus prolonging the conflict. It shows how a once ideologically-driven conflict can quickly morph into a criminally-driven conflict when the wealth to be attained proves too much to resist.

ii. Increasing Violence and Criminality

It is widely accepted that drug traffickers are responsible for the murder of numerous journalists and politicians in Tajikistan.⁷²¹ For example, a shoot-out in Garm in February 2008 of one of Tajikistan's most decorated officers, Colonel Oleg Zakharchenko, was believed by most to have been motivated by competition for drug proceeds.⁷²² Others contend it was a continuation of civil war hostilities – cracking down

⁷¹⁹ "Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace."

⁷²⁰ Engvall, *Stability and Security in Tajikistan: Drug Trafficking as a Threat to National Security*.

⁷²¹ Ibid. Torgny Hinnemo "Centralasien – gamla kulturer i ny förpackning" *världspolitikens dagsfrågor*, Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska institutet, nr. 7, 2002

⁷²² "Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure."

on mid-level commanders from the UTO who still wielded some authority where the government had been weak. In any event, it is typical of the sort of assassinations that we have seen in other Transit States.

In addition to such security impacts directly threatening the Tajik state, there has also been a concomitant rise in criminality which directly affects the Tajik population. While it may be difficult to attribute some crimes to the drug trade, government sources indicate that in 2000, drug-related crime in Tajikistan grew by 40 percent from the previous year and in 2001 by over 70 percent.⁷²³ More recent reporting from the U.S. State Department indicates that the crime rating in Dushanbe is currently “high,” having been elevated from “medium” in 2005.⁷²⁴ It attributes the increase in criminality not only to the drug trade but also to the large influx of Russian migrants as a result of the global financial crisis.⁷²⁵

Many drug traffickers have become poly-criminals, expanding their operations into other illicit markets. Trafficking in humans has been a common activity of drug traffickers, since women serve as good couriers, thereby increasing revenues for the trafficker.⁷²⁶ The trade in arms is also common, which can be particularly destabilizing in

⁷²³ Konstantin Parshin, "Anti-Drug Trafficking Efforts Could Help Fight Terrorism," *Eurasia Insight*, 20 September 2001.

⁷²⁴ Overall Crime and Safety Situation vol. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=62092>, *Tajikistan 2007 Crime & Safety Report* (Washington DC: Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State, 17 Jan 2007).

⁷²⁵ Overall Crime and Safety Situation vol. Available at: <https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=114650>, *Tajikistan 2010 Crime & Safety Report* (Washington DC: Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State, 5 Mar 2010).

⁷²⁶ Madi, "Drug Trade in Kyrgyzstan: Structure, Implications and Countermeasures "; Erica Marat, "Labor Migration in Central Asia," (Washington DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, May 2009).

a country recovering from conflict and already faced with instability.⁷²⁷ Drug-trafficking has also created new security concerns in border regions where shoot-outs between border guards and drug traffickers periodically take place.⁷²⁸ Moreover, traffickers have been known to coerce villagers residing near borders to traffic drugs into the neighboring country, while they take “collateral” to ensure the villagers do not alert authorities to the traffickers’ activity. Livestock, and sometimes family members, are held while a Tajik villager is forced to transport drugs further north. When the villager returns with payment, the animals or relatives are returned.⁷²⁹

Another important effect of the drug trade in Tajikistan has been the reluctance of local residents near common transit routes to cooperate with law enforcement. The reason for this can be one of two things. First, local residents may fear retribution from criminal elements if they provide information to law enforcement. Or, it is even possible that locals may stand to lose from the successful apprehension of traffickers. As one Tajik described, when border guards seize drugs, traffickers and dealers will often steal cattle and other assets from local farmers to compensate for their lost revenue.⁷³⁰ This represents a fundamental failure of the state, when its citizens do not trust the state to provide an environment in which they can report illegal activities.

Some law enforcement officers including border and customs police purportedly allow trafficking activities to continue even if they are not accepting bribes for doing so.

⁷²⁷ Fenopetov, "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the 'Silk Road'."

⁷²⁸ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Tajikistan."

⁷²⁹ Ibid.

⁷³⁰ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

They realize that behind every load of drugs is a powerful drug baron whose only interest is seeing that shipment's delivery to its final market. By interdicting it, law enforcement officers are fully aware that they are angering someone who might be willing to retaliate by taking revenge on his family. This has the effect of rendering even honest officials reluctant to enforce the law.⁷³¹

SOCIAL IMPACTS

i. Increased Consumption/Addiction

Marijuana consumption in Tajikistan has long been a popular pastime, thanks in part to large-scale cultivation in both Kazakhstan⁷³² and Afghanistan.⁷³³ However, around 1996 heroin addiction emerged as a significant problem, with opiate abuse rates estimated at 2 percent of the population. This rate was higher than those in Georgia (which was 1.2 percent), Kazakhstan (0.9 percent) and Uzbekistan (0.7 percent).⁷³⁴ This scourge has affected many segments of the population, including IMU soldiers, as was discovered when investigators found used syringes in cleared areas after the civil war.⁷³⁵ The following quote illustrates just how prevalent this little-known drug became, replacing many other drugs of choice:

"We didn't have it before. We didn't know anything about heroin. And there were fewer drug consumers. All drug consumers in the city [Dushanbe] knew each other. Many of us smoked cannabis. But

⁷³¹ Ibid.

⁷³² Ibid.

⁷³³ "Afghanistan Now World's Top Cannabis Source," *Reuters*, 31 March 2010.

⁷³⁴ UNODCCP, *Global Illicit Drug Trends* (New York: United Nations, 2001). pp. 211, 231-233.

⁷³⁵ Uzbek newspaper Halq So'zi, 17 August, 2000

*everything has changed during the last ten years. You could buy any drug you wanted. Then heroin appeared and it nearly replaced all other drugs. I suppose that they did it on purpose so that all of us would start using heroin. If you have no job or money, you have no choice left but to deal with drugs. That is why there are so many drug consumers now.*⁷³⁶

In addition to its widespread availability, heroin in Tajikistan is cheap – in 2000, a single dose cost less than a bottle of vodka.⁷³⁷ For this reason many users substituted their alcohol addictions with opiates, resulting in reports of numerous accidental overdoses.⁷³⁸ The prevalence of heroin or opium use was so great that by 2000, a survey of drug users in Dushanbe indicated that the vast majority used opiates (heroin or opium) over the traditional choice of hashish (see Figure 43).




Figure 43. Drug of Choice in Dushanbe (January 2000)
(Source: Drug Law and Health Policy Resource Network)

⁷³⁶ Khamonov, 2005, p. 22

⁷³⁷ Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State."

⁷³⁸ Drug Policy and Health in Tajikistan.

The rapid increase in heroin consumption among Tajiks is a well-documented fact, yet it has proven to be extremely difficult to attain a reliable estimate of the number of Tajikistan's drug addicts.⁷³⁹ For example, the Tajik Ministry of Health tracks drug addicts registered in Tajik narcology centers, as shown in Figure 44.




Figure 44. Drug Addicts Registered by Tajik Narcology Centers, 1994 - 2003
(Source: Tajik Ministry of Health)

However, counting only registered users distorts the larger picture as it only accounts for those seeking treatment and neglects those individuals who prefer to remain addicted. Furthermore, in a developing country like Tajikistan, poor record-keeping at

⁷³⁹ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut*; Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State."

health-care facilities and the scarcity of resources to collect these data have been an impediment to an accurate count.⁷⁴⁰

There have been other attempts to estimate the number of addicts in Tajikistan. After completing field research in Dushanbe and Kurgan Tube in 2001, the UNODC estimated that there were as many as 75,000 addicts.⁷⁴¹ In 2002, it reported a range of 65,000 to 90,000 addicts.⁷⁴² In 2003, the Tajik Drug Control Agency surveyed its population and reported 55,000 to 75,000 heroin users.⁷⁴³ The same year, the UNODC reported that of a population of 6.3 million, there were approximately 100,000 drug users, or 1.59 percent of the population. This is compared to the average abuse rates in Western Europe which is 0.42 percent of the population.⁷⁴⁴ Thus while official statistics from Tajikistan indicate that there are over 4,600 registered drug users, popular opinion holds the number to exceed 100,000.⁷⁴⁵

Given the extremely limited capacity and available resources of the Tajik government to execute treatment, prevention, and other addiction programs, this would seem to be an extremely debilitating affect not only on the country's public health sector, but its workforce, its economy, and potentially (eventually) the country's long-term social fabric.

⁷⁴⁰ Madi, *Drug Trafficking in Weak States: The Case of Central Asia*.

⁷⁴¹ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."; Farangis Najibullah, "Tajikistan: En Route to West, Trafficked Drugs Leave Social Crisis in Their Wake," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* 18 June 2003.

⁷⁴² Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?* p. 27

⁷⁴³ Khamonov, 2005

⁷⁴⁴ *Global Illicit Drug Trends* vol. 108 (Vienna: UNODC, 2003).

⁷⁴⁵ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

ii. Rise in HIV/AIDS

Ample evidence from other studies demonstrates that drug trafficking, injecting drug use, and HIV infections are closely related.⁷⁴⁶ Throughout Central Asia, the total number of registered HIV cases (not including unregistered cases, which would increase this number drastically) increased 19-fold between 2000 and late 2008, which corresponds with the increase in heroin consumption over the same timeframe.⁷⁴⁷ Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that of the total number of injecting drug users in Central Asia, 70 to 80 percent will likely become infected with HIV.⁷⁴⁸

Nowhere does this trend appear stronger than in Tajikistan, where needle-sharing is common due to poverty and lack of awareness, causing HIV prevalence to grow rapidly for the last decade. Once again, however, it has been difficult for Tajikistan to ascertain its true number of HIV/AIDS patients. For example, in 2004 the director of Tajikistan's Republican Centre for AIDS Prevention and Control noted that of the total 152 officially registered cases in the country, 33 were just recorded in January 2004. He attributed this sudden spike in reported cases to a previous lack of expertise, testing equipment, and unsuitable labs until 2003. Moreover, he estimated the real number to be at least 20 times the official figure.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁶ Julie Stachowiak and Chris Beyrer, HIV Follows Heroin Trafficking Routes, vol. http://www.eurasianet.org/health.security/presentations/hiv_trafficking.shtml (Eurasianet: Presented at the Conference on Health Security in Central Asia: Drug use, HIV and AIDS, 9 July 2003).

⁷⁴⁷ "Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict."

⁷⁴⁸ "Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation," (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 31 October 2003), Asia Report No 66.

⁷⁴⁹ "Tajikistan: Drug Use, Migration and Ignorance Fuel Rise in HIV Infections ", *IRIN News*, 24 February 2004.

As with the treatment of drug addicts, the treatment of HIV/AIDs patients will also entail a huge burden on Tajikistan's health-care budget. Given Tajikistan's per capita health-care expenditure of \$13, and that the average cost of treating an AIDS patient is \$10,000 annually, a diagnosis of HIV/AIDs could well be a death sentence for Tajiks and a potential time bomb for the Tajik state.⁷⁵⁰ From the evidence presented here, it is logical to predict that Tajikistan, with its growing number of drug addicts, will soon face an HIV/AIDS epidemic that threatens a large segment of the population, particularly considering the limited capacity of the Tajik government to address such a harmful public health issue.

Due to the nature of cocaine delivery, Guinea-Bissau does not have to contend with intravenous drug users which could cause a massive spike in HIV/AIDs rates. However, the costs involved with treating cocaine addicts, the impact that drugs have on the social fabric of life, and the crime that surrounds the drug trade all indicate trouble for Guinea-Bissauan society.

iii. Undermines the Development of a Democratic Civil Society

Threats to journalists who report on incidents involving corrupt politicians are common in Tajikistan. For example, Konstantin Parshin of the National Association for an Independent Media of Tajikistan, noted "*the president and his family, the speaker of the Parliament, the activities of the State Committee for National Security, customs, corruption in the supreme government bodies, and drug trafficking are taboo subjects for*

⁷⁵⁰ Ali Buzurukov, "HIV/Aids Epidemic: Time Is Running out for Central Asia," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst* (2002).

mass media of Tajikistan.”⁷⁵¹ This is certainly a security impact as the lives of journalists are threatened, but it is also important to appreciate the impact that such an action has on civil society. Freedom of political expression, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press are essential institutions for the existence of a democracy since they inform citizens and provide them with the information they need to vote for their preferred candidates. Threatening journalists or controlling the media is essentially depriving citizens of this information and represents an authoritarian regime that excludes potential challengers. As illustrated in the example above, the authoritarian regime of Emomalii Rahmon – president for almost 20 years – is known to have cracked down on the freedom of speech of individuals wishing to expose the corrupt practices of various Tajik government officials involved in the drug trade. Furthermore, Rahmonov has used accusations of drug crimes to justify the repression of domestic political opponents. By these actions, the drug trade in Tajikistan has provided the impetus for further consolidating an already authoritarian regime.

iv. Targeting women

The use of women to traffic opiates out of Tajikistan has become an increasingly concerning phenomenon. In 1993, women constituted 10 percent of those prosecuted for drug trafficking; in 2000 they constituted 20 percent; and in 2002 they constituted at least

⁷⁵¹ Media Sustainability Index (Msi) - Tajikistan, (Available at: http://www.irex.org/programs/MSI_EUR/2009/tajikistan.asp#1: International Research and Exchanges Board, 2009).

30 percent and rising.⁷⁵² This development has occurred for several reasons. Women initially became involved in the drug trade during the civil war when their husbands either left for war or died fighting, leaving them in the overwhelming position of being the sole provider for their families with no reliable source of income.⁷⁵³ More recent reports indicate that women specifically have been targeted by traffickers and coerced into trafficking. For example, according to a survey among female inmates in a Tajik prison, two-thirds stated that they trafficked drugs because of their dire economic situation. Some stated their husbands coerced them into it or that their children had been kidnapped and held hostage until they agreed to carry narcotics.⁷⁵⁴ The survey also found that women are attractive couriers for the simple physiological fact that they can smuggle more drugs ingested or hidden in their bodies. Some reports indicate that if they are caught, they are treated with more leniency than men and are therefore preferable couriers. Others stated that they were essentially planted as traps – intended to be caught by customs officials while the larger parcels carried by someone else are able to get through.⁷⁵⁵

However they became involved in the drug trade, the impact this has had on Tajik women ranges from addiction (from coming into contact with the drug) to harming

⁷⁵² Nancy Lubin, Alex Klaitis, and Igor Barsegian, *Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Challenges for International Assistance* (New York: A Report to the Open Society Institute, 29 March 2002).

⁷⁵³ Paoli et al., "Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State."

⁷⁵⁴ Tatiana Bozrikova, *Women and Drugs in Tajikistan*, vol. http://www.eurasianet.org/policy_forum/osi022001_print.html (Eurasia Policy Forum: Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation, February 2001).

⁷⁵⁵ Lubin, Klaitis, and Barsegian, *Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Challenges for International Assistance*.

reproductive organs and consequently endangering pregnancies, all of which arguably contribute to the erosion of the community's social fabric. Sadly, most social workers have agreed that even raising awareness among women will not deter them from trafficking, since they see it as their only option given very limited employment prospects.⁷⁵⁶ This is a particularly useful insight to keep in mind when examining Guinea-Bissau, as many of the same conditions that have prompted the use of women traffickers in Tajikistan also exist in Guinea-Bissau.

⁷⁵⁶ "Tajikistan: Poverty Pushes People to Drug Trafficking."

ANNEX D: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR TURKEY

POLITICAL IMPACTS

Listed here are a few ways in which the political stability of Turkey has been affected by the drug trade.

i. Narco-corruption/Criminalization of State Officials

It is important to recognize that Turkey suffers from a wide range of latent corruption, i.e. corruption not associated with narcotics, rather petty corruption, nepotism, and corruption within the bureaucracies governing the areas of public procurement, customs, taxes, law enforcement, and banking. Turkey has come a long way in combating petty corruption such as bribes paid in public to avoid fines for minor traffic offenses. Technology and automated computer programs have helped to reduce this by removing the opportunities to solicit bribes.⁷⁵⁷ However, latent high-level corruption in the aforementioned sectors is still prevalent. Several national laws have been implemented to combat this, though convictions, especially of high-level officials, are quite rare.⁷⁵⁸

The pervasiveness of latent corruption has not only established a precedent for narco-corruption, but facilitates much of it, particularly where the PKK is involved. On

⁷⁵⁷ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

⁷⁵⁸ "Country Factsheet for Turkey: General Information," *Eurasian Narcotics Silk Road Studies Program* (2004).

several occasions, state officials have employed ultranationalist gangsters and pro-government Kurdish gang leaders to fight the PKK. In return, they allow many of the illicit activities of these criminals to flourish, such as drug trafficking, casino gambling, money laundering activities, etc. Interestingly, the Turkish military has historically been relatively less affected by corruption than other state institutions (though by no means immune), possibly leading some to deduce that the military has less direct ties with the drug trade.

This latent corruption reflects the tendency for Turkish state officials to passively partake in the drug trade by accepting – and enjoying – the proceeds of drug sales and in doing so, neglecting their duty to uphold the rule of law. However, there have been numerous reports of Turkish government authorities actively collaborating with and initiating illicit activities with organized crime networks associated with drug trafficking.⁷⁵⁹ Whereas the former implies tacit and perhaps reluctant support for drug trafficking activities, the latter demonstrates the existence of a concerted and calculated relationship among the government, the armed forces, and organized crime.

Perhaps the most infamous example of this relationship in Turkey was the Susurluk scandal which surfaced with a car crash on 3 November 1996, revealing a close relationship between the country's politicians, police, and mafia.⁷⁶⁰ Among the three

⁷⁵⁹ Frank Bovenkert and Yücel Yeşilgöz, "The Turkish Mafia and the State," ed. Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004); Kelly Couturier, "Security Forces Allegedly Involved in Turkish Criminal Gang," *Washington Post*, 27 November 1996; Stephen Kinzer, "Turkish Inquiry Links Government Agents to Assassinations," *New York Times*, 26 January 1998.

⁷⁶⁰ "Turkey's Most Shocking Scandal Back on Agenda with Ergenekon," *Hurriyet Daily News*, 10 October 2009.

killed was Husseiyin Kocadog, the deputy chief of the Istanbul police who commanded Turkish counter-insurgency units; Abdullah Çatlı, a convicted fugitive and rightist militant wanted by Interpol for drug trafficking and murder; and Gonca Us, Çatlı's lover and a former beauty queen. A fourth occupant who survived the crash was Sedat Bucak, a parliamentarian of the Prime Minister's political party and Kurdish warlord whose militia had been armed and financed by the Turkish government to fight Kurdish separatists. Given the unlikely chance that these individuals would ever have reason to travel together, Turkish officials immediately began a cover-up operation in which they claimed that the police were transporting the two captured criminals. But several items seized at the scene supported the argument that Kocadog, Çatlı, and Bucak were actually in cahoots, particularly items in Çatlı's possession such as diplomatic credentials, a government-approved weapons permit, a fake passport, and six other ID cards. In addition to these items, numerous handguns, two listening devices, thousands of U.S. dollars, and a cache of narcotics were also found. The media immediately implicated Kocadog and Bucak in Çatlı's criminal activities and interpreted the accident as proof of criminal links between the country's state institutions and the Turkish Mafia.⁷⁶¹ Other reports of Turkish authorities collaborating with organized crime groups abound. Drug barons such as Huseyin Baybasin have stated publicly, on Turkish television and in the West, that they have been working under the protection of the Turkish government and to

⁷⁶¹ Ibid.

its financial benefit, even traveling themselves on diplomatic passports and noting that military helicopters have transported drugs from the Iranian border.⁷⁶²

The scope and sophistication of Turkish organized crime cannot be summarized in a few short paragraphs, and admittedly a complete description of the events cited above ideally warrants a more detailed explanation. However, for the purpose of this research, the most important insight to note is that the drug trade in Turkey has facilitated a mutually beneficial working relationship between some politicians, government officials, and Turkish organized crime networks – in other words, a “state-mafia nexus.”

ii. Demonstrated Political Will and State Capacity to Combat the Drug Trade

While most governments in Transit States recognize the drug problem they face and may even demonstrate genuine political will to address it, few have the actual capacity to implement effective measures to combat it. Of those cases examined, Turkey appears to have been most introspective and effective in this regard, recognizing the severity of the problem within its borders and the threat it represents to the stability of the state. Even the UN and the U.S. Department of State agree that Turkish law enforcement agencies are far more professional and effective than those in other Transit States and applaud their initiative in leading the regional fight against the drug trade.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶² Kendal Nezan, "Turkey's Pivotal Role in the International Drug Trade," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 1998.

⁷⁶³ International Narcotics Control Board Report; International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

In addition to its active support for and adherence to many European laws and conventions against the trafficking of illicit drugs,⁷⁶⁴ Turkey has adopted many new policies and has undertaken simple measures to address its drug trafficking problem, such as installing more x-ray machines at border gates and increasing the number of drug-sniffing dogs.⁷⁶⁵ Moreover, Turkey has many existing anti-corruption law enforcement institutions in place to combat the drug trade, including the Ministry of Finance's Financial Crimes Investigation Bureau, the National Police's Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM), and the Gendarmerie's Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime.⁷⁶⁶ More reflective of its desire to crack down on its drug problem, however, was the decision to augment the aforementioned law enforcement institutions with a specially-designed organization to provide training for law enforcement personnel to counter and detect drug trafficking as well as transnational organized crime.⁷⁶⁷ The Turkish International Academy Against Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC) was established in 2000 with support from the UN, U.S., and some EU countries.⁷⁶⁸ It was designed to be a forum to exchange expertise and as a regional

⁷⁶⁴ Summaries of EU Legislations; Justice and Security for Turkey, (Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/enlargement/e22113a_en.htm: EUROPA, 2009).

⁷⁶⁵ Ahmet Donmez, "Intensive Struggle against Drug Trafficking in Turkey Increases Narcotic Prices in Europe," *Mafia News*, 26 April 2007.

⁷⁶⁶ Turkey's Anti-Corruption Institutions, *Anti-Corruption Practitioners Network* (Available at: <http://europeandcis.undp.org/anticorruption/show/CA33A53E-F203-1EE9-BB3375246A444005>: United Nations Development Programme

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ Critical Links between Crime, Illicit Drugs, Corruption, Terrorist Revealed by 11 September Events, Third Committee Told, *UNODC Press Release GA/SHC/3690* (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 1 October 2002).

training center to support the whole region on issues of money laundering, controlled deliveries, and financial crimes. It has already trained counternarcotics officials from the Balkans, Central Asia, and Afghanistan⁷⁶⁹ and has an excellent international reputation for the quality of its training.⁷⁷⁰ Additionally, the growth of the trade since the 1970s has resulted in the establishment of drug units in all the police directorates throughout the country.⁷⁷¹

ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Vague estimates of the street value of drugs passing through Turkey are thought to be around 10 percent of the country's total GNP.⁷⁷² In 2008, this would have been around \$73.5 billion. Previous estimates put the value of Turkey's heroin trafficking at \$25 billion in 1995 (14 percent of GDP) and \$37.5 billion in 1996 (21 percent of GDP).⁷⁷³ Based on either calculation, it is not hard to see how the drug trade is the largest source of illegal proceeds in Turkey. Following that, bid-rigging for state and municipal contracts, the smuggling of cigarettes, immigrants, weapons and explosives, and historical artifacts are also significant sources of illicit revenues.⁷⁷⁴ As in Tajikistan, trafficking in some of Turkey's poorest regions is an important source of revenues for

⁷⁶⁹ *Turkey's Efforts against the Drug Problem* (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed September 22 2010).

⁷⁷⁰ Ian Oliver, *Strengthening of Capacity for the Interdiction of Drugs in Rural Areas: Turkey*, vol. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/evaluation/ProEvals-2009/Terminal_Evaluation_Report_Turkey_J65.pdf (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2009).

⁷⁷¹ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ Nezan, "Turkey's Pivotal Role in the International Drug Trade."

⁷⁷⁴ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

some people where other economic opportunities are next to non-existent.⁷⁷⁵ However, given Turkey's relatively thriving licit economy – the world's 17th largest in terms of GDP in 2009⁷⁷⁶ – it is not the primary source of income for most, or even a large segment, of Turkish citizens. Drugs have had, however, some significant economic impacts in Turkey which are discussed in the following subsections.

i. Increase in Money Laundering

Turkey has long been an important regional financial center due to its active commerce. However, it has also become an important destination for laundered money, particularly since the 1960s when drug smuggling became a major issue.⁷⁷⁷ Since then, Turkish banks, nonbank financial institutions (hawalas), gold couriers, and the underground economy writ large have become important vehicles not only for laundered narcotics revenues, but also illegally-derived gains from fraud, tax evasion, counterfeit goods, forgery, robbery, and kidnapping. Common methods for money laundering in Turkey include mass smuggling of currency across borders, bank transfers into and out of the country, trade fraud, the construction industry, tourism, and the purchase of high-value commodities such as gold, cars, and real estate. When they were declared illegal in 1998, many of Turkey's casinos relocated to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

⁷⁷⁵ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

⁷⁷⁶ World Development Indicators Database: Gross Domestic Product 2009, (Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf>: World Bank, 27 September 2010).

⁷⁷⁷ "Country Factsheet for Turkey: General Information."

where they are a commonly-used venue for money laundering activities.⁷⁷⁸ Even many of Turkey's football clubs have been associated with drug traffickers and organized crime.⁷⁷⁹ In fact, the Department of State estimates that as much as 40 to 50 percent of Turkey's economic activity is derived from unregistered businesses.⁷⁸⁰

Not all of that activity deals with drug proceeds, but the Department of State estimate highlights the importance of the informal and illicit economies in Turkey. As such, it is difficult to attribute these economic features of Turkey entirely to the drug trade, though one must admit that drugs have certainly perpetuated money laundering and deceptive economic activities in Turkey.

ii. State Capacity to Counter the Deleterious Economic Impacts of the Drug Trade (and Other Illicit Markets)

Turkey has a number of laws in place to prosecute money laundering and other financial crimes, such as the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering (Law 4208 of November 19, 1996). It also formed the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (known by its Turkish acronym, MASAK), in 1997 to regulate, investigate, and analyze financial crimes committed in Turkey, thus playing a critical role bridging the financial and law enforcement communities. MASAK is compliant with the Financial Action Task Force

⁷⁷⁸ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁰ International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

(FATF),⁷⁸¹ though some have noted its weakness in addressing certain critical aspects of money laundering in Turkey, such as that through the hotel sector. Recognizing the increasing severity of its money laundering and illegal financial activities, the Turkish government in 2005 demonstrated significant political will and state capacity as it undertook tax reform. This was intended to improve tax collection, and subsequent initiatives have been discussed to address the unregistered economy by ensuring all businesses are legitimately registered with the federal government. Interestingly, Turkey is considering an approach similar to that of Tajikistan, whereby it may offer, for a limited time, the ability for individuals to transfer funds held in off-shore accounts to Turkish banks with no questions asked. Of course this is essentially a one-time amnesty for money launderers, tax evaders, and other financial criminals, but its intent is for the Turkish government to repatriate funds held by Turks and Turkish businesses in an attempt to improve tax collection. Similarly, in 2007, the Ministry of Finance attempted to crack down on suspicious financial transactions by requiring all financial institutions to record identity information for all new customers and that tax identity numbers be used in all financial transactions.⁷⁸² Laws and institutions like these demonstrate the capacity and will of the Turkish state to counter the drug trade by attacking those practices such as money laundering that facilitate criminal activity. This is a significant difference from failed states which lack even the most basic capabilities to undermine the drug trade.

⁷⁸¹ The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 by the G7. The purpose of the FATF is to develop policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

⁷⁸² International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

The economic impacts of the drug trade in Turkey have affected not only financial institutions, but NGOs and media outlets as well. Although the nonprofit sector is well regulated, it is not well audited, so NGOs and other “charitable organizations” have been targeted by money launders since their funding sources are not always disclosed to Turkish authorities.⁷⁸³ Operation “Spoutnik” in 1996 is a good example of how media outlets are also vulnerable to money laundering by terrorist organizations. Launched by law enforcement officials in Luxembourg, Belgium, and the UK, Operation “Spoutnik” was an effort to expose the PKK front company MED TV Broadcasting Ltd, which was suspected of money laundering. Claiming to be funded by donations, MED TV was eventually found to be guilty of money laundering when authorities found \$8 million in a Luxembourg bank. This money was found to be generated from the illicit drug trade, as well as sales of arms and humans.⁷⁸⁴ The operation also revealed the very sophisticated financial network that the PKK had developed through MED TV, with 15 front companies and activities around Europe and Canada designed to finance political propaganda activities.⁷⁸⁵ This goes to show how, after time, organizations funded by drugs will likely grow in strength and sophistication, requiring a way to generate revenues licitly.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Pek and Ekici, "Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-Kongra Gel from Illicit Drug Business."; "Pro-PKK TV Charged with Money Laundering," (Turks.US Daily World EU News: <http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20030729170814127>, 29 July 2003).

⁷⁸⁵ Ozgur Nikbay and Suleyman Hancerli, eds., *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective* (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series: IOS Press, 2007).

SECURITY IMPACTS

i. Drug-Fueled Insurgency

The most notable security impact of the drug trade in Turkey has been the Islamic insurgency that has killed more than 40,000 Turkish citizens to date.⁷⁸⁶ Specifically, drug revenues have financed this form of terrorism. The PKK now relies on drug proceeds as its primary source of financing for its operations. In fact, some estimate that revenues raised from trafficking and “taxing” other traffickers have likely sustained the PKK’s operations for three decades,⁷⁸⁷ while the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff estimates that the PKK’s budget is made up of 50 to 60 percent drug revenues.⁷⁸⁸ In 2008, one report estimated that this portion of its budget (drug revenues) amounted to €500 million that year.⁷⁸⁹ However, it was not always this way. A brief examination of the history of the PKK reveals that a once politically- and ideologically-motivated terrorist organization has in recent years declined militarily. It is now much weaker than it was in the early 1990s and no longer poses a military threat to the Turkish state. Rather, it seems to have morphed into a major DTO, while generating sufficient supplies and personnel to maintain a low-level insurgency. As in Tajikistan, one can see how drug revenues have arguably prolonged the life of this terrorist organization, and hence

⁷⁸⁶ Curtis and Karacan, *The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*.

⁷⁸⁷ “The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners.”

⁷⁸⁸ “Drug Smuggling as the Main Financial Source for the PKK Terrorism.”

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

the conflict it represents. Financing for any non-state actor essentially has the effect of strengthening and emboldening that organization. This represents a clear destabilizing force in the region as the PKK challenges the rule of law and legitimate government.

The PKK is a paramilitary organization that was initially launched in 1978 with the goal to create an independent Kurdish state in the region that includes southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria, and northwestern Iran. It recruited combatants among the lower class of Kurdish peasants – those who had few prospects for the future and who could be persuaded through ideology and promises of a better life.⁷⁹⁰ Since 1984, the PKK has launched a military campaign, challenging the Turkish government for control of a number of Kurdish-dominated provinces in the southeastern part of the country. The size of the PKK's force is debated, but estimates range from 2,000⁷⁹¹ to 40,000.⁷⁹² While it was founded in an ideology based on revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism, the PKK in recent years has abandoned some of its revolutionary aspirations, vying now simply for cultural and political rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey.⁷⁹³ That said, in May and June 2010, 37 Turkish soldiers were killed by the PKK, demonstrating that this conflict is far from a non-military threat.⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁹⁰ Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party."

⁷⁹¹ Michael Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 194.

⁷⁹² "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

⁷⁹³ Jonathan White, *Terrorism: An Introduction* (Belmont: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 1998), 352.

⁷⁹⁴ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

The PKK initially received financial support from Syria, then Iraq and other neighbors who wanted to weaken Turkey. When these funding sources abated, the PKK began to explore the financial opportunities associated with the drug trade.⁷⁹⁵ It already had some involvement in producing hemp and poppy crops in the Lebanese (though Syrian-controlled) regions of Baalbek and Herman in the early 1980s. The PKK began to force pro-PKK farmers to cultivate cannabis on behalf of the organization. Realizing the massive wealth to be gained from the illicit drug trade, the PKK began taxing heroin traffickers (mainly Kurdish organized crime syndicates) and cannabis cultivators in Southeastern Turkey and the surrounding region.⁷⁹⁶ By 1995, the DEA reported that the PKK was involved with all aspects of the drug trade and that 80 percent of the drugs seized in Europe have a PKK connection.⁷⁹⁷ The PKK trafficked, delivered, and distributed drugs in Europe, cooperating with Turkish organized crime groups where necessary and coercing Kurdish refugees into trafficking morphine, heroin, liquid hashish, and other drug materials.⁷⁹⁸ As described in the previous section, the PKK even established NGOs and front companies in Western Europe in order to launder their illicitly-earned revenues – a classic feature of a full-fledged DTO. Not only was the

⁷⁹⁵ Arsovska, *Fueling Nationalism through Organized Crime*.

⁷⁹⁶ Rand Beers, "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection between Drugs and Terror " in *The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information* (Washington DC: 12 March 2002).

⁷⁹⁷ "Drug Smuggling as the Main Financial Source for the PKK Terrorism."; Michael Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 184.

⁷⁹⁸ Pek and Ekici, "Narcoterrorism in Turkey: The Financing of PKK-Kongra Gel from Illicit Drug Business."

PKK-founded MED TV Broadcasting charged with money laundering, but it also disseminated anti-state propaganda intended to destabilize the Turkish state.⁷⁹⁹

While drug revenues have certainly sustained the PKK in recent years, it is important to note that the PKK enjoys other sources of revenue as well. Kidnapping, bank and jewelry store robbing,⁸⁰⁰ human trafficking (mainly from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan⁸⁰¹), oil smuggling, fundraising through Kurdish cultural centers in Europe, and through sales of propaganda publications in said cultural centers have all contributed to the PKK's budget. However, it is the money extorted from Kurdish communities in Europe that follow drug trafficking in importance of raising revenues.⁸⁰²

As alluded to in the previous discussion on the Turkish diaspora, these migrants represent a valuable source of revenues for the PKK. One researcher has even estimated that a half of the PKK revenue's comes from Kurdish diaspora in Europe.⁸⁰³ In addition to the "donations" extracted in return for the PKK's services in smuggling Kurdish refugees to Western Europe, the PKK has also engaged in pure and simple extortion from the Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe. The "revolutionary taxes," as they are called,

⁷⁹⁹ Nikbay and Hancerli, eds., *Understanding and Responding to the Terrorism Phenomenon: A Multi-Dimensional Perspective*

⁸⁰⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, "The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey " *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18, no. 1 (1995).

⁸⁰¹ Mahmut Cengiz, *The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners* (Arlington: Remarks made at George Mason University, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, 3 May 2009).

⁸⁰² Drugs and Terrorism: A New Perspective, (Drug Intelligence Brief: Drug Enforcement Agency, 2002); International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington D.C.: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, 1998).

⁸⁰³ Mitchel Roth, Countering the PKK's Fundraising in the 21st Century: Some Lessons and Recommendations, *The Crime-Terror Nexus: Perspectives and Lessons Learned from International Researchers and Practitioners* (Arlington: Remarks made at George Mason University, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, 3 May 2009).

essentially comprise a racket whereby the PKK extorts money from the estimated 500,000 Kurds living in Europe who are running businesses. Interestingly, some report that local Kurds actually favor this alliance of convenience, noting the businesses contacts provided by the PKK outweigh the costs of being extorted.⁸⁰⁴ In 1993, the PKK extorted £2.5 million from Kurdish immigrants and Turkish businesses in the UK alone.⁸⁰⁵ These taxes can also come from individuals residing in Europe (who would typically “donate” 20 to 50 deutschmarks per month in 1993) or larger front organizations (which were estimated to pay 80,000 deutschmarks a month in 1993). By 1995, the contribution of the latter exceeded 466,500 deutschmarks, reflecting a five-fold increase.⁸⁰⁶ However, the means employed by the PKK to extort funds are becoming increasingly coercive. In 1997, for example, of the 79 cases reported to the German police, 46 percent involved some element of physical force.⁸⁰⁷ This would appear to indicate declining Kurdish support for the PKK and an increase in complaints to European authorities.

ii. Increasing Violence and Criminality

Turkish organized and domestic crime have undoubtedly increased in tandem with the rise of the drug trade. The drug-crime nexus is so widespread that the UNODC reported in 2009 that 50 to 70 percent of domestic and organized crimes in Turkey are in

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁵ Criss, "The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey ".

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

some way drug-related, including housebreaking, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, etc.⁸⁰⁸ Turkish organized crime groups have become increasingly involved with international human trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering.

Moreover, the PKK is blamed for killing more than 40,000 Turkish citizens over two decades.⁸⁰⁹ It is important to note, however, that 5,000 of these are Turkish civilians (the vast majority of the remaining deaths are of PKK militants with approximately 5,000 Turkish security forces deaths).⁸¹⁰ The PKK has committed random killings of tourists, teachers, imams, priests, village officials, village guards, and other noncombatants either intentionally or inadvertently through the use of landmines. Some have argued that the purpose of these killings has been to demonstrate their power, while others have noted that intimidation of civil servants plays a role, particularly to weaken the ability of the state to provide basic public services by removing those public officials designated to do so.⁸¹¹ The PKK has also engaged in extra judicial killings, kidnappings, extortion, and destruction of property.⁸¹² Moreover, the aforementioned MED TV (now Roj TV) is a well-documented vehicle used by the PKK to “encourage or incite crime or lead to disorder,” according to British regulators who revoked the station’s broadcasting license

⁸⁰⁸ Oliver, Strengthening of Capacity for the Interdiction of Drugs in Rural Areas: Turkey.

⁸⁰⁹ Curtis and Karacan, The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe.

⁸¹⁰ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."

⁸¹¹ Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1997), 256.

⁸¹² Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party."

in 1999.⁸¹³ These tactics may be employed to achieve political and ideological objectives or to enable their drug-trafficking operations. Often, differentiating between these two objectives is difficult, if not impossible, which illustrates the criminal-terrorist nexus that so often arises where drugs and an ideologically-motivated insurgency exist.

SOCIAL IMPACTS

i. Increased Consumption/Addiction

Reports vary widely with regard to heroin addiction in Turkey, and hard data are difficult to find, but most research institutions agree that drug use and addiction rates in Turkey have historically been quite low.⁸¹⁴ Although the apparent will of law enforcement agencies to interdict heroin and other drug shipments seems to be quite strong, some believe that the low addiction rates in Turkey justify lax enforcement by some law enforcement agencies, or why the appearance of benign neglect may sometimes exist.⁸¹⁵ That said, other government sources assert that since 1996, drug use has becoming an increasingly serious problem, especially in areas around the major cities such as Istanbul.⁸¹⁶ In any event, Turkey represents a notable difference from the other cases examined, where the drug trade has posed a major public health issue due to its tendency to increase addicts. While Turkey still suffers from low levels of drug

⁸¹³ Yigal Schleifer, "Denmark, Again? Now It's under Fire for Hosting Kurdish TV Station," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 April 2006.

⁸¹⁴ Atasoy, "The Opiate Trade in Turkey"; "Drug Use by Young People on the Rise."; Fenopetov, "The Drug Crime Threat to Countries Located on the 'Silk Road'."

⁸¹⁵ Paoli, Greenfield, and Reuter, *The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut?*

⁸¹⁶ "Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Turkey."; Özgü, "Country Factsheet on Eurasian Narcotics: Turkey."

addiction, the capacity of the state not only to remove more drugs off the streets but also to invest in public health appears to mitigate this impact when compared to a country such as Tajikistan. A more detailed explanation for Turkey's relative success in stemming heroin addiction would certainly be a valuable contribution to this area of research. Yet for the time being, the most relevant insight for Guinea-Bissau is that the government must assume that drug use and addiction will eventually become a major public health issue, given the government's extremely limited capacity to address it.

ii. Rise in Local Production

Following the emergence of Turkey as a Transit State in the 1980s, authorities soon discovered that Turkey had also become a significant producer of heroin. Seizures of morphine base and raw opium, coupled with the discovery of numerous heroin refineries and other production facilities in Turkey throughout the 1990s serve as sufficient evidence that these substances were transported into Turkey where they underwent production into heroin before being sold on the European market.⁸¹⁷ According to some reports, this practice actually dates back to the late 1980s, when heroin processing in Turkey was quite common, particularly in Istanbul where it was easy to hide large laboratory activities. The PKK and other Turkish organized crime groups would purchase morphine base and acetic anhydride from the Golden Crescent region and convert it into heroin in clandestine labs throughout Turkey, then traffic it to Europe.

⁸¹⁷ Chouvy, *Opiate Smuggling Routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia*; Solinge, "Drug Use and Drug Trafficking in Europe."

Cutting out the middle-man increased profits drastically while also allowing Turks the ability to reduce purity levels, thus increasing supply and revenues even more.⁸¹⁸

Since 2000, however, there has been a sharp decline in the number of heroin processing labs discovered. This is due to several factors, not the least of which was a concerted effort from Turkish law enforcement to crack down on these labs. This high risk of detection has encouraged Turkish traffickers to purchase heroin directly, rather than run the risk of converting it themselves and having authorities discover their labs. Moreover, in recent years Afghan traffickers have begun to import (illicitly) more precursor chemicals from Europe, China, and Central Asia, allowing them to convert the opium into heroin themselves, thus increasing their revenues.⁸¹⁹

iii. Expansion into Other Drug Markets

Recent seizures of captagon and ecstasy pills in Turkey have provided sufficient evidence that Turkey has become not just a Transit State for heroin, but now also for synthetic drugs.⁸²⁰ For example, the number of individuals detained in connection with captagon increased by 111.1 percent in 2009 from 2008. Likewise, there was an increase of 73 percent in the detention of individuals in connection with trafficking ecstasy from 2008 to 2009. Furthermore, Turkey saw its first seizure of methamphetamine (76 kilograms) in 2009.⁸²¹ The movement of these drugs is due to the existing Turkish

⁸¹⁸ Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party."

⁸¹⁹ International Narcotics Control Board Report.

⁸²⁰ World Drug Report 2010.

⁸²¹ Ercan Yavuz, "Drug Trafficking Via Turkey on the Rise," *Today's Zaman*, 12 June 2010.

trafficking networks already in place that have simply expanded into this new market in response to global demand. This is a common phenomenon that has appeared in each of the case studies examined. One must never think for a moment that any given trafficking network is reliant on revenues from one source. DTOs are diversified not only within other drug markets, but other illicit commodities such as arms, humans, and counterfeit goods.

iv. Erosion of a Democratic Civil Society

The growing insecurity caused by the PKK prompted the Turkish government to adopt harsher tactics than it had before. In 1987, a state of emergency was declared in six southeastern provinces, which allowed regional governors to exercise quasi-military martial law.⁸²² While the security situation may well have necessitated such drastic measures, and those provinces have since returned to order, the imposition of martial law is a clear indicator that civilian authorities could not maintain order. The use of the military for this purpose is a slippery slope, concerning some that a democratic rule of law based on governance by civil authorities could be compromised by the presence of terrorists-turned-drug traffickers.

Another way in which a democratic civil society has been compromised is through the misuse of certain civil society organizations. The PKK has been known to use Kurdish socio-cultural associations or other NGOs as front companies to raise revenues for their illicit activities. These organizations provide a legitimate structure

⁸²² Sahin, "Chapter 3: The Kurdistan Workers' Party."

which rallies political, moral and financial support for the PKK. Often criminal elements, including drug traffickers, reside within the ranks of these organizations and use their revenues to sustain their operations.⁸²³ In this way, the drug trade compromises at least some of Turkey's civil society organizations which would otherwise contribute to a vibrant, democratic Turkish society.

⁸²³ Ibid.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Ashley Neese Bybee attended Sir William Borlase's Grammar School in Marlow, UK, between 1992 and 1997. She received her Bachelor of Arts in Foreign Affairs with a Minor in French from the University of Virginia in 2001. She received her Masters of Public Policy from George Mason University in 2006. She has been a research analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses since 2002, during which time she has worked on a wide range of international security issues, including US-Russia relations, cooperative security exchanges with the countries of the Former Soviet Union, joint and interagency cooperation in complex contingency operations, interagency methodologies to assess instability and conflict, and intra-agency inputs for DoD's contingency planning process. For the last five years, Bybee has narrowed her regional focus to Africa, with a specific focus on transnational security threats, criminal networks, counternarcotics, counter threat resourcing, and the role of various extremist elements including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) and Hezbollah.