








IS THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE VALID?: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD MOBILIZATION ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON
TERROR

by

Jill A. Rough
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Public Policy

Committee:

	Jeremy D. Mayer, Chair
	David J. Armor
	Andrew Bickford
	Janine R. Wedel
	Bernard D. Rostker, External Reader
	James P. Pfiffner, Program Director
	Edward Rhodes, Dean

Date: 22 November 2010

Fall Semester 2010
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

Is the Abrams Doctrine Valid?: Exploring the Impact of Army National Guard
Mobilization on Public Support for the War On Terror

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

By

Jill A. Rough
MA International Affairs
The George Washington University, 2004

BS Political Science
United States Naval Academy, 1996

Director: Jeremy D. Mayer, Associate Professor
School of Public Policy

Fall Semester 2010
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

Copyright: 2010 Jill Rough
All Rights Reserved

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wonderful and inspiring children. May you know that all things are possible when you believe in God and believe in yourself.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must first and foremost thank my husband Sean. I could not have done this without you by my side. Thank you for the time, the patience, the encouragement, and the love you have given me each and every day of this journey. When all else fails, I know I can count on your love and support.

I want to thank my dissertation committee: Dr. Jeremy Mayer, Dr. David Armor, Dr. Andrew Bickford, Dr. Janine Wedel, and Dr. Bernard Rostker. I have learned so much from each of you and have truly appreciated your support and guidance as I conceptualized and carried out this research. Special thanks go to Jerry Mayer for first believing in me and my research when I was a first-year looking for an academic advisor.

I would like to thank the School of Public Policy. SPP's financial assistance and collective encouragement and support for my work over the past several years have truly made a difference to me and to this research. Special thanks go to Dr. Catherine Rudder, Beth Eck, and several former and current SPP students for pushing me forward during my time here at George Mason.

Thanks to Caroline, Johanna, and Bill who kept me sane, especially in the early years of coursework and dissertation concept development. There isn't enough guacamole in the world to repay you for babysitting during midterms or brainstorming proposal ideas with me! Thanks to Kristin P. who is always there to support me and my family in so many different ways. You are a beautiful soul and I am so blessed to have you as my friend. Thank you to Pat and Paula who so graciously opened their home to me as I made my way to Wilkes-Barre every month. Our regular visits made my travels that much more enjoyable. And of course, thank you to my family for encouraging me to continue my education in every way possible. I would not have considered a Doctorate had you not raised me to believe I could do anything I put my heart and mind to doing.

Finally, I want to thank the soldiers of the 109th Pennsylvania Army National Guard Field Artillery Battalion in Wilkes-Barre in particular and America's dedicated Reserve Component forces in general. You serve your families, your communities, your employers, and your country. Although your civilian and military responsibilities are ever-increasing, you continue to serve. You are the inspiration for this work. May America understand and appreciate your sacrifices.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of Tables.....	vii
List of Figures.....	viii
Abstract.....	iv
 I. Introduction.....	 1
Exploring the Relationship.....	4
Organization of the Dissertation.....	6
 II. Understanding the Abrams Doctrine.....	 8
U.S. Military Culture, Vietnam, and the All-Volunteer Force.....	8
The Decision and the Debate.....	11
The Abrams Doctrine Today.....	15
Summary.....	19
 III. Insights from Literature.....	 21
Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force.....	21
Beyond Almond-Lippmann: A New Consensus?.....	24
Factors Influencing Public Opinion.....	25
U.S. Civil-Military Relations.....	31
Contributions of the Research.....	41
 IV. Research Design and Methodology.....	 44
Research Questions and Hypotheses.....	44
Research Design.....	46
Qualitative Analysis.....	47
Participant Observation.....	50
Semi-Structured Interviews.....	50
Street-Intercept Surveys.....	51
Document Analysis.....	52
Limitations of Ethnography.....	53
Quantitative Analysis.....	54
Research Design Considerations.....	59
Unit of Analysis.....	59
Quantitative Subset Selection.....	61
Qualitative Case Selection.....	61

V. The Case Introduction.....	63
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.....	63
VI. Qualitative Data Analysis and Findings.....	70
Prologue: Citizen-Soldiers or Soldier-Citizens?.....	70
Perceptions of Military Force.....	73
The Impact of Local Army National Guard Mobilizations.....	80
Factors Influencing Local Public Support for War.....	87
A Closer Examination of the Impact of Local Casualties.....	90
Qualitative Conclusions.....	95
VII. Quantitative Data Analysis and Findings.....	96
Understanding the Key Variables.....	96
Exploring the Basic Relationship: A Bivariate Model.....	99
Expanding the Model.....	101
Controlling for Local Casualties.....	105
Quantitative Conclusions.....	106
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications.....	107
Merging the Results.....	107
Assessing the Findings.....	111
The Influence of Casualties: An Ongoing Exploration.....	112
Policy Implications.....	113
Implications for Army Total Force Policies.....	114
Implications for the National Guard.....	115
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research.....	118
Appendix A: A Historical Review of the American Citizen-Soldier.....	120
Appendix B: Informed Consent Document.....	154
Appendix C: Survey Instrument.....	156
Appendix D: Greater Wilkes-Barre Chamber Service Area.....	157
Appendix E: Statistical Output for All Regressions.....	158
References.....	167

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Summary Statistics of All Variables.....	99
2. Results of 2004 and 2008 Election Year Bivariate Models, Dependent Variable is % Change in Republican Vote.....	100
3. 2004 Election Year Model Results Using Binary Mobilization Variable, Dependent Variable is % Change in Republican Vote.....	101
4. 2008 Election Year Model Results Using Binary Mobilization Variable, Dependent Variable is % Change in Republican Vote.....	103
5. 2008 Election Year Model Results Using # Soldiers Mobilized (2005-2008), Dependent Variable in % Change in Republican Vote.....	104
6. 2008 Election Year Model Results Using Total Mobilization Variable, Dependent Variable is % Change in Republican Vote.....	105

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Thematic Responses to Street-Intercept Survey Question: Does It Matter to You Whether Active or Reserve Soldiers Deploy Overseas?.....	79

ABSTRACT

IS THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE VALID?: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MOBILIZATION ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE WAR ON TERROR

Jill A. Rough. Ph. D.

George Mason University, 2010

Dissertation Chair: Jeremy D. Mayer

The large scale and sustained use of National Guard and Reserve forces in the War on Terror has called for a timely re-examination of the so-called “Abrams Doctrine” that posits a link between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for military operations. This dissertation uses mixed methodologies to determine whether such a relationship exists. Evidence from the ethnographic case study indicates that the public perception of Guard soldiers lacks the necessary nuance to differentiate today’s citizen-soldier from his regular Army counterpart. However, the results of regressions analyses indicate that communities do respond to the mobilization of their local soldiers as evidenced by a statistically significant negative relationship in 2008. These findings suggest that local National Guard mobilizations tend to decrease local public support for war as measured by Republican vote, lending credence to the concepts underlying the Abrams Doctrine.

I. Introduction

General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army from October 1972 to September 1974, reorganized the U.S. Army following Vietnam, moving large numbers of personnel into the Reserve Component¹ and relying on Guard and Reserve units to “round out” Active Component divisions. The consequence of this restructuring was that the Active Army could not fight in any serious or prolonged conflict without mobilizing key Reserve capabilities.

His initiatives have been interpreted by some as a deliberate attempt to ensure that a clear linkage exists between the employment of the Army and public support for military operations. A large-scale mobilization of the Reserves would disrupt communities across America, resulting in the engagement of the American people who will reject or validate the use of force and ultimately provide a check on presidential power.² This interpretation of the intent of his force structuring policies is widely referred to as the “Abrams Doctrine.”

Debate over whether General Abrams intentionally designed the Army force structure to achieve this purpose continues to this day. However, it is less important to

¹The Reserve Component consists of the Army and Air National Guard and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserves, totaling 47 percent of the nation’s military forces.

² Experts debate whether the integrated force structure Abrams designed was intended to stimulate public support or public engagement for military operations. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter II.

confirm or deny the intentions of General Abrams than it is to explore the implications of his decisions.

My research seeks to test the validity of a fundamental assumption of the Abrams Doctrine -- that the mobilization of the citizen-soldiers of the Reserve Component impacts U.S. public support for the use of military force. Although ill-supported by empirical evidence, the connection between Reserve Component mobilization and public support is widely believed to be not only true but unidirectional. The assumption – or perhaps myth – is that Reserve Component mobilizations *increase* public support for the war by engaging communities across America. This could very well be true. Despite a lack of research that has systematically explored the validity of this assumption, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence that illustrates how communities rally around the flag when their hometown heroes are sent off to war. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre stated in 1998:

The Army needs the Guard because the Army doesn't touch America. The Guard touches America... When the Army was sent off on the 7th of August to go to Desert Storm, America didn't go to war on the 7th of August. The Army did, but America didn't. America went to war when all those moms and dads [and] kids down on the courthouse lawn saying good-bye to their Guardsmen [and] putting little yellow ribbons on the trees, went to war (Hamre speech, 1998).

While it remains unclear if rally effects such as what Hamre describes have a lasting impact on public support for military operations, it is possible that “when you call out the Guard, you call out America” as former Chief of the National Guard Bureau Lieutenant General Blum asserted in 2004 (Blum, 2004).

However, one alternative may be that Reserve Component mobilization *decreases* public support for war – particularly in a prolonged conflict such as the current War on Terror which has required lengthy and at times frequent Reserve Component mobilizations in support of combat operations. By disrupting communities across America, the mobilization of National Guard soldiers arguably would remind U.S. citizens of the human costs of fighting a war and force them to evaluate and re-evaluate military operations which may in some cases cause citizens to object to the use of military force. Brian Jones articulates this view well, explaining

Abrams' legacy may not be in preventing [the U.S.] from going into another Vietnam, but in ensuring a mobilized Reserve Component generates political focus commensurate with their representative community basing to prevent [the U.S.] remaining in such actions as a result of congressional inaction...If there is a forcing function imbedded in the design of the force structure engendered by the Abrams Doctrine, this conflict curtailing function may be it." (2004, 10).

Each of the above conceptions of the linkage between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for the war illustrate the importance of the ideas underlying the Abrams Doctrine. Yet which conception is closer to the truth? Or are both notions valid, with the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support shifting direction over time? Or perhaps despite its popularity in theory, there is no relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war. What exactly is the link, if any, between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for the use of military force?

Exploring the Relationship

The main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war and then consider the policy implications that arise from the findings. This agenda is admittedly broad in scope so I have focused my research in several ways.

First, I do not attempt to address the entire Reserve Component. The “Reserve Component” consists of the Army and Air National Guard and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserves. Each portion of the Guard and Reserve is structured, equipped, and employed differently by its parent service and while commonalities exist, it would be inappropriate to generalize across the services. Because I am using General Abrams’ initiatives following Vietnam as a launching point, this research focuses on the Army. The Army’s “total force” includes active duty soldiers, Army National Guardsmen, and Army Reservists. As of fiscal year 2008, the active duty Army consisted of 544,000 soldiers, with the Army National Guard and Army Reserves adding another 351,000 soldiers and 198,000 soldiers respectively (Department of Defense, 2008). In order to manage the scope of this project, this research will focus exclusively on the mobilization(s) of the Army National Guard and its impact on local public support.

The Army National Guard’s size, unique dual-mission status, dispersed community basing, and strong historical link to the citizen-soldier concept in American culture ensures that the Army Guard is a legitimate starting point for exploring the Abrams Doctrine. However the Army Reserve – the other branch of the Army’s Reserve Component -- does play a role in the Abrams Doctrine and future studies should include

this organization, as well as other elements of the Reserve Component, in order to explore additional insights into the Abrams Doctrine.

Second, due to the lack of empirical evidence on the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support, I focus on whether a relationship exists rather than the direction associated with the relationship. This research expects that there is a relationship between Army National Guard mobilizations and public support; however, it does not presume a direction associated with the relationship. Whether Army National Guard mobilizations increase or decrease public support for the use of military force – or perhaps that levels of support fluctuate over time - remains an important research question if the existence of a relationship is first established empirically.

Lastly, I focus my research on the impact of Army National Guard mobilization on public support at the local level. As mentioned earlier, a key assumption of the Abrams Doctrine is that the mobilization of the Reserve Component will impact American society by disrupting the communities from which they deploy. This focus on the local impact of mobilization(s) is central to the Abrams Doctrine and is therefore central to my research.

Having explained these boundaries, I now identify two primary research questions for this study:

- 1) Is there a relationship between the mobilization of community-based Army National Guard units and local public support for the use of military force?

- 2) If so, what factors influence the relationship between the mobilization of community-based Army National Guard units and local public support for the use of military force?

These research questions are designed to determine whether there is a relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and local public support for war and to explore the influences on that relationship, if one exists. While the research is focused in the ways mentioned above, this dissertation remains exploratory in nature. It relies upon the principles of grounded theory, meaning its goal is to develop a theory from data which has been systematically gathered and analyzed, not to verify or disprove an existing theory. While the specifics of the research design will be presented later in this dissertation, it is important to introduce the exploratory nature of this study in order to set the proper context for this research.

Organization of the Dissertation

Following the introductory chapter, this dissertation has seven additional chapters. Chapter II offers background on the influences that led to the Army's reorganization after Vietnam as well as the specific decisions of General Abrams, the debate surrounding his intentions in designing the Army's Total Force policies, and the meaning of the Abrams Doctrine today. Chapter III reviews the relevant scholarly literature from the public opinion on war and civil-military relations fields and outlines the contributions of this research to the literature. Chapter IV details the research design and the methods selected for this study: an ethnographic case study and regression analysis. Chapter V introduces the case and chapter VI provides data and analysis for the case study. Chapter VII

provides the data and analysis for the regression analysis. Chapter VIII offers final conclusions, discusses the policy implications of this research, and offers future research opportunities.

II. Understanding the Abrams Doctrine

Prior to delving into the specifics of this study, it is worthwhile to understand the background of the Abrams Doctrine. This chapter will begin with a review of the influences that led to the Army's reorganization after Vietnam. It will then examine the specific decisions of General Abrams and the debate surrounding his intentions in designing the Army's Total Force policies. Finally, it will review the various meanings associated with the Abrams Doctrine today.

U.S. Military Culture, Vietnam, and the All-Volunteer Force

In August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed the military services to implement a "Total Force" concept as a way to provide sufficient troops for the nation's security needs. Through "increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve," the services could achieve "economies" required by reductions in military spending and an end to conscription (Secretary of Defense, 1970). The subsequent force structure initiatives implemented by General Creighton Abrams fit well with Laird's Total Force concept.

While Laird's Total Force concept and Abrams' reorganization of the Army seemed to be a new and radical shift in policy in 1970, it can be seen as a return to the policies of the past. The United States has a long and proud tradition of reliance upon its citizen-militia. Whether called minutemen, irregulars, reservists, or Guardsmen, these

“part-time” forces have been a significant part of U.S. military history and culture since the American Revolution. This is due in large part to the deep-seated skepticism of the Founding Fathers to standing armies. In 1784 the Continental Congress declared, “...standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into a destructive engine for establishing despotism” (Journals of the Continental Congress 1784, 518). This fear of a standing army was later reflected in the powers granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution. While Congress has the power “to provide and maintain a Navy,” its power with respect to the Army stipulates that it can “raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years” (U.S. Constitution).

In contrast, the Founders granted Congress the power to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” (Ibid.). In lieu of a large standing army, the nation would purposefully rely on citizen-soldiers to rise up and fight when called upon by the federal government. This historical context illustrates not only America’s willing embrace of the role of the citizen-soldiers, but their initially dominant role in defending the nation. Although their role has changed over time, National Guard and Reserve forces have been employed in every major military conflict from the Battle of Lexington in 1775 to the current War on Terror. [See Appendix A for additional information on this history of the U.S. citizen-soldier.] Despite challenges in readiness and training, citizen-soldiers have provided necessary

manpower to contribute significantly to victory in each of the nation's major wars (Heller, 1994).

Vietnam was the major exception to this historical pattern. It is estimated that only three thousand reservists were mobilized and deployed to Vietnam over ten years, representing less than one percent of the total force of six hundred thousand service members who served in Southeast Asia (Sullivan, 2005). Whether the Vietnam conflict could have been "won" even with the full participation of the Reserve Component is debatable; however President Johnson's decision not to employ the Reserves exacerbated the need for military manpower and had a significant negative impact on the Army. As former Lieutenant General Alexander Weyand asserts:

[The] Decision not to call up the Reserves placed even greater reliance on the draft, resulting in an individual replacement system which eroded unit cohesion. The one year rotation policy further hurt unit cohesion and continuity of command. Draw down of personnel from Europe created a paper army there and eventually in the U.S. (2004).

While the ranks of the Reserves filled with those who joined to avoid the draft or had enlisted and were serving mandatory reserve time, the active Army was over-utilized and challenged by poorly-trained conscripts and insufficient resources (Sullivan, 2005). In one officer's opinion, the Army during Vietnam was "demoralized, poorly trained, ineptly led and over-stretched..." (Carafano, 2004). From an institutional perspective, the Army was suffering -- if not broken.

When Nixon made an election-year promise in 1968 to end the draft, the future direction of the Vietnam conflict and U.S. military forces remained unclear. Nixon appointed a commission in 1969 chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates

[Gates Commission] to determine the most practical means of abolishing conscription. The Gates Commission unanimously recommended an all-volunteer force, but at the same time identified the Reserve Forces as a “special” problem (Rostker, 2006). While necessary, its lack of training and resources created reliability concerns. The Commission proposed that a ‘standby’ draft in the form of a reformulated Selective Service system would comprise a significant part of the force structure in times of conflict (Gates Commission, 1970). In its final report in 1970, the Commission recommended a military pay raise to accompany the shift to an all volunteer force, a reduction in reserve billets to trim excess untrained personnel, and the development of a standby draft system to meet national security needs in times of crisis.

Due to budgetary constraints (which did not support the proposed pay raise) and Nixon’s desire to end the draft (standby or otherwise), the Department of Defense focused in the short-term only on minimizing and then eliminating draft calls. However policymakers knew the Army needed to transform and that this transformation would not occur overnight. Although it did not fully embrace the Gates Commission recommendations, Laird’s Total Force concept announced later that year set the stage for the transition from the Army of Vietnam to the modern all-volunteer Army which integrates both active and reserve components.

The Decision and the Debate

By the time General Abrams assumed his duties as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972, all options under consideration by the Defense Department pointed to a mixed Active/Reserve force structure. However it remained unclear exactly what that meant for

the institutionally-damaged Army. Thus it is important to examine the specific reorganization that General Abrams implemented as well as why this arrangement was selected.

Although public and legislative pressure to decrease the active Army mounted following Vietnam, General Abrams believed that downsizing the Army would be detrimental to national security as the U.S. shifted its focus back to the Soviet threat. He argued instead that the number of combat divisions be increased (Jones, 2004). Newly appointed Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger agreed to support Abrams provided that the total end strength of the Active Component did not increase. Schlesinger and Abrams also agreed that the Reserve Component would be resourced and trained in conjunction with its Active Component counterparts.

Abrams' recommended solution was both "simple and brilliant" (Ibid, 2.). He expanded Active Component combat divisions by relying on Reserve Component forces to "round out" the division. This concept aligned Reserve Component combat, combat support, and combat service support elements with Active combat divisions. The augmentation of Active combat divisions with Reserve manpower allowed General Abrams to increase the number of Active combat personnel from existing end strength. He also moved the majority of the Army's combat support and combat service support into the Reserve Component and resourced them according to the level of their accompanying Active combat division (Ibid.). The consequence of this structuring policy was that in order to fight any serious conflict with Active forces, the president would have to call up the Reserve Component units that augmented these Active divisions

(primarily combat support and combat service support forces). In short, Abrams had integrated the force in such a way that the Active Army could not fight without mobilizing key Reserve capabilities.

While the reorganization itself is unambiguous, the question as to why General Abrams designed such a policy is not. Abrams died in 1974 without ever having fully explained his reasoning behind the reorganization; however, proponents of the Abrams Doctrine insist that he intended to design a check on presidential use of military power. A senior officer who worked with General Abrams strongly suggested that the decision had a political element. In an infamous presentation of the reorganization to the Reserve Forces Policy Council, General John Vessey was asked if Abrams's decision to closely integrate the force would make it difficult for the president to deploy any significant force without calling up the reserves. Vessey answered, "That's it. With malice aforethought, the whole exercise" (Sorley 1992, 364). He further opined that Abrams believed the military was an expression of the nation it served. Building an Army "in the corner someplace" or removing the armed forces from its national context would be detrimental to the military and the nation. According to General Vessey, "This was [General Abrams'] lesson from Vietnam. He wasn't going to leave [the Army] in that position ever again" (Ibid.).

Schlesinger also agreed that Abrams incorporated political aspects into his design. "He had the view that the military must defer to the civilians, even to an extraordinary degree. I speculate that the military sought to fix the incentives so that the civilians would act appropriately," stated Schlesinger (Ibid.). However when asked if Abrams

specifically intended to create a ‘forcing function’ on the president, Schlesinger was skeptical, stating “That would not really be like Abe” (Ibid.).

Others had their doubts as well. Major Abrams, the General’s son, analyzed the decision in a 1975 research paper for Command and General Staff College, arguing that the reorganization was based primarily on force structure needs (Abrams, 1975). Major Abrams made no mention of an “Abrams Doctrine” designed to limit presidential power. Scholar James Jay Carafano argues that as frustrated as Abrams may have been with the lack of public support for Vietnam, he came from a generation of officers whose concept of military professionalism included a sharp distinction between political and military decisions (2005). Thus while he may have believed the Army should not go to war without the approval of the American people, it is questionable whether this belief would have driven his decision to integrate the Active and Reserve forces.

Little evidence exists to prove either perspective conclusively. Proponents of the Doctrine rely on interviews of senior officers who worked closely with Abrams, but have no confirmation from Abrams of his intentions due to his untimely death in 1974. Those who argue that Abrams designed the Total Force based on utilitarian terms claim so in part due to the fact that all official documents present the decision in such a manner (Carafano 2005 and Jones 2004). Yet if Abrams had political reasons for his decision, it is highly unlikely that he would have advertised them, particularly in Army documents. In the end, however, it is less important to confirm or deny the intentions of General Abrams than it is to explore the implications of his decisions.

The Abrams Doctrine Today

Despite continued debate over the original intent behind Abrams' reorganization of the Army, the "Abrams Doctrine" has developed a life of its own over the past fifty years. Proponents of the Doctrine have developed varying interpretations of its meaning over the years and today it is associated with two related but different concepts: Reserve Component mobilization and its relationship to public support for war and an intentional limitation on presidential power.

The first interpretation of the Abrams Doctrine, which is the primary focus of this study, is the alleged relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war. As mentioned in Chapter I, it is assumed by many [despite a lack of empirical evidence to confirm or deny it] that mobilization of the Reserves – and specifically the National Guard - results in obtaining or increasing U.S. public support for the use of military force. This assumption is based in large part upon the Guard's geographically dispersed basing and unique dual mission status.

A "community-based force," the National Guard has 3200 facilities present in 2700 communities across all 54 states and territories (Robinson 2002, 19). More importantly perhaps, these citizen-soldiers regularly serve their communities under the command of the Governor. National Guard forces respond to hurricanes, snowstorms, wildfires, floods, and many other state and local emergencies. They can also be called to quell local disturbances and keep the peace, a task that the federal military is prohibited from carrying out (18 USC 1385).³ The National Guard is a state militia force and not

³ 18 USC 1385 is commonly referred to as *Posse Comitatus Act*.

part of the federal military except when mobilized to active duty. These characteristics allegedly serve as a linking mechanism to citizens throughout the country and by extension to their support of the war effort.

Leaders of the National Guard openly advertise a direct linkage between mobilization of its forces and public support for war. As Lieutenant General Blum routinely broadcast during his tenure as Chief of the National Guard Bureau, “any time you call out the Guard, you call out America (Blum, 2006). However, the idea that Reserve mobilization leads to the mobilization of American political will is acknowledged beyond the National Guard Bureau. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, signed by Secretary of Defense Gates on October 29, 2008, explicitly states that “The RCs [Reserve Components] provide connection to and commitment of the American public” (2).

Yet not all scholars and practitioners believe that Reserve mobilization will obtain or increase popular support. Brian Jones argues that the “belief that activating the Reserve Component *ensures* the support of the people may be nothing more than a well-propagated myth [emphasis in original]” (2004). Jones and other scholars and policymakers argue that it is more reasonable that the Abrams Doctrine be understood as a means of engaging the American public in the debate over the use of military force.

The Army National Guard Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2000 explains:

Following the experience of fighting an unpopular war in Vietnam, the 1973 Total Force Policy was designed to involve a large portion of the American public by mobilizing the National Guard from its thousands of locations throughout the United States when needed...A related benefit of this approach is to permit elected officials to have a better sense of public

support or opposition to any major military operation (2000).

Thus, by disrupting communities across America, Reserve mobilization will ensure not the support, but rather the engagement of the American public in debate over the use of military force.

The second and more controversial concept that has become associated with the Abrams Doctrine deals with its possible limitation on presidential powers. This concept is related to the relationship between Reserve mobilization and public support, but its focus is on the implications of Abrams' force restructuring for elected officials. While my dissertation will not directly explore this element of the Abrams Doctrine, my research will potentially support or discredit the use of Reserve mobilization as a check on presidential power. Thus it is essential to understand this concept.

The basic notion is that the integrated force structure designed by General Abrams raises the costs of war, requiring the President to "think twice" about sending troops to war. Because mobilizing the Reserves is an overt political act, presidents would presumably gain the support of the American public *prior* to the use of military force. Yet Jeffrey Record asserts that historically this is simply not true. He points out that military force planning and associated doctrines have had little impact on presidential decision-making on the use of military force, stating

...with the exception of Jimmy Carter, they [recent presidents] have displayed a greater propensity to intervene in foreign civil wars than did their pre-Vietnam predecessors. Reagan sent U.S. forces into Lebanon and Grenada. Bush intervened in Panama, the Philippines, and Somalia. And Clinton has intervened in Haiti and Bosnia. In none of these instances were fundamental U.S. security interests at stake or was a White House full-court press mounted to mobilize congressional support and public opinion

on behalf of the intervention (Record 1998, 10).

Since the integrated Active/Reserve force structure has done little to curtail executive branch powers in the initial use of military force, some scholars argue that the Abrams Doctrine is moot (Record 1998, Carafano 2005).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, this interpretation has another variant: that the integrated force structure designed by General Abrams raises the costs not of going to war, but of staying at war. In this perspective, Reserve Component mobilization may prevent policymakers from committing a large number of military forces to an indefinite and indecisive conflict by stimulating sufficient public activity to compel Congress to act and serve a checking function on the president. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans Janine Davidson argues,

“It is easier to send troops abroad than it is to bring them home. And history shows that Congress rarely has acted against a president to limit the use of force. Thus, the Total Force was designed to compel Congress to scrutinize military operations. As employers give up workers and as families say goodbye to soldiers augmenting active forces, Congress should be pressured by constituents to act. In sum, the sacrifices of waging war – or even keeping peace – are supposed to spread throughout our democratic society to such a degree that our elected officials are forced to debate the wisdom of sending troops abroad” (2003).

This concept that a nationally distributed engaged citizenry (in response to the mobilization of a nationally distributed Reserve force) could force a Congressional reassessment of the use of military power illustrates the conflict-curtailling function described earlier by Brian Jones. Abrams’ legacy may not be in preventing the U.S. from going into another Vietnam, but rather from staying in one.

This last interpretation of the Abrams Doctrine rests upon the assumption that Reserve Component mobilization not only engages the public, but that the engagement is sufficiently strong to generate political focus. That the use of the Reserves encourages public awareness of a conflict is generally perceived to be true based on anecdotal evidence, however public awareness does not necessarily translate into active public engagement in the political process. This public engagement, therefore, must reflect a level of concern strong enough to impact national-level voting selections, voting patterns (whether or not a citizen votes), fundraising, media relations, and other forms of tangible political activity to compel Congress to act. Further, since public support for a military conflict can and usually does evolve over time, it is unclear how long it may take for the full impact of total force policies to become apparent. An engaged populace may support a conflict initially then question the continued use of military force due to frequent or lengthy Reserve Component mobilizations. Again, little empirical work has been conducted to confirm or deny this element of the Abrams Doctrine.

Summary

As one can see, the Abrams Doctrine is anything but clear. Scholars and policymakers continue to debate General Abrams' intent in restructuring the Army after Vietnam and use different interpretations of the so-called "Abrams Doctrine" even today.

Despite this lack of clarity or consensus, the ideas underlying the concept of the Abrams Doctrine are clearly important ones for national security. Any possible limitations on presidential powers by U.S. military leaders, embedded designs to compel Congressional action, or potential impact of force structure policies on public support for

military operations should not be dismissed lightly. Indeed, one can easily see the importance of researching the assumptions underlying the Abrams Doctrine.

For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus exclusively on the first concept associated with the Abrams Doctrine: that there is a relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for the use of military force. I will not explore the possibility of a limitation of presidential powers at this time, but my research could potentially support or discredit the validity of using Reserve mobilizations as a check on presidential power.

III. Insights from Literature

The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant scholarly literature on the relationship between public opinion and the use of military force as well as the relationship between the U.S. military and society. In doing so, this literature review offers insights into the primary factors believed to influence public support for military force and why many scholars and policymakers consider Reserve Component forces to be uniquely connected to the American public.

Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force

Representative democracy is founded on the notion that public opinion underpins public policy (Everts, 2001). Whether this is true in reality remains debatable, yet the implications of this notion – perceived or real – have always been controversial. A key reason for this may be the normative debate over the appropriate role of public opinion in foreign policy. Two conflicting traditions or approaches to international affairs have emerged. The liberal-democratic approach, dating back to Kant, argues that the foreign policies of democracies tend to be more peaceful. This is attributed in large part to the fact that democratically-elected leaders are accountable to the general public on issues of war and peace. Since the public bears the human burden of war, the people in a democracy will serve to constrain over-zealous leaders who might otherwise make war for a variety of selfish or ambitious purposes. Indeed, present day research can support

the democratic peace thesis that democracies do not fight one another (Small and Singer, 1976; Doyle, 1983; Ray, 1998). Researchers with a liberal approach also stress that the public has displayed a consistent, rational, and stable opinion on matters of foreign policy (Page and Shapiro, 1982; Jentleson, 1992).

In contrast, realist tradition from the Morgenthau school of thought argues that public opinion is an obstacle to effective diplomacy and coherent foreign policy. Susceptible to every mood and passion of the moment, the public is volatile and therefore hinders efforts to promote policies which favor enduring national interests. Leaders would jeopardize the nation's interests and international standing if they were to permit public opinion to play a strong role in the formation of foreign policy. Realists also argue that the public is uninformed, unable, or unwilling to grasp the complexities of foreign policy. Early researchers such as Gabriel Almond (1950) and journalist Walter Lippmann (1922; 1925) argued that it is simply unacceptable to deal with the nation's vital interests via democratic processes. As Lippmann stated, the public "has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death" (1955, 20).

After centuries of theoretical debate, the inception of scientific public opinion polling during the post-World War II timeframe allowed for a growing body of empirical research from which to draw evidence and insight. A consensus view [known as the "Almond-Lippmann consensus"] closely aligned with the realist (also called traditionalist) approach developed during this time (Holsti, 1992). It centered on three main points. First, public opinion is highly volatile and thus a dubious foundation for

sound foreign policy. Lippmann described the public as, “too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiations or too intransigent” (1955, 20) and Almond similarly argued the public is “apathetic when it should be concerned and panicky when it should be calm” (1956, 376). This pessimistic perspective of the public was only reinforced by consistent and compelling evidence that the public displayed a dismally low level of factual knowledge regarding critical issues of foreign policy. The second main point of the consensus was that public attitudes on foreign affairs lack structure and coherence, and may best be described as “non-attitudes.” Based largely on evidence from Philip Converse’s classic study (1964), the consensus view was that the political beliefs of the public had little if any ideological grounding. Responses to questions varied within surveys and over time randomly, with little indication of any discernible attitudes on foreign policy issues. The final element of the Almond-Lippmann consensus held that at the end of the day, public opinion had a limited impact on the conduct of foreign policy (Holsti, 1992). Research on policymaking showed the limited impact of public opinion on key issues of foreign affairs, particularly given the enormous growth in executive authority following World War II. Scholars presented evidence that policymakers sought to educate the public rather than follow its lead (Cohen, 1973) and that the president had significant leeway to act without constraint on international issues (Lipset, 1966; LaFeber 1977). The Almond-Lippmann consensus dominated scholarly thought until the escalation of the Vietnam conflict when a renewed interest in public opinion and war caused a reevaluation of prevailing views.

Beyond Almond-Lippmann: A New Consensus?

Domestic controversies over the Vietnam conflict fueled a renaissance of interest in public opinion on war and brought evidence which challenged the dominant theories of the scholarly community on public opinion and war. Dissatisfaction with the extent and wording of commercial polling during Vietnam led to independent surveys designed to probe public opinion with more depth than the major polling organizations were routinely offering. Among the first and most famous independent studies was a survey of public opinion on Vietnam policy (Verba, Brody, Parker, Nie, Polsby, Ekman, Black, 1967) which found that the public supported the Administration's policies, but also approved of alternative policies such as negotiated peace. Verba and his colleagues concluded that public opinion was "orderly" as well as "moderate and responsible" (1967, 321-330). They also concluded that the preferences of respondents did have internal structure, although the structure did not correlate to ordinary political groupings such as political party (1967: 331). This work served as a significant challenge to the prevailing realist views on public opinion and war.

Since this time, additional research and reliable data has supported a more liberal perspective. The public, once believed to be emotional and reckless, is now considered by many scholars to be rational, consistent, and in fact "pretty prudent" (Jentleson, 1992) in its views on the use of force (Holsti, 1992; Burk, 1995, Everts, 2001). A comprehensive study by Page and Shapiro (1988) found that public opinion is fairly stable, with reasonable changes resulting from significant economic or political events. This does not mean the public has shown itself well-informed. Polls continue to reflect a

low level of factual information on specific foreign and national security affairs. Despite this, however, the public appears capable of formulating considerate and thoughtful opinion. Indeed a growing body of research offers evidence that public opinion on the use of military force depends on a variety of reasonable and reliable factors, including risk aversion, elite consensus, policy objectives, and measures and expectations of success. It is to this body of research that I will now turn.

Factors Influencing Public Opinion

Amongst the most well known theories in the field comes from John Mueller's groundbreaking research on the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Mueller argues that the public measures the cost of war in simple and explicable terms: U.S. casualties. Mueller found that support for the Vietnam War dropped in proportion to the log of U.S. casualties (1973), leading to the conclusion that the public is risk averse. In more recent research on the 1991 Persian Gulf War as well as the 2003 Iraq war, Mueller again offered evidence that American public support for war has and will inexorably decline as casualties mount (1994; 2005). Mueller's theory of the public's casualty aversion has been increasingly questioned by scholars (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2006; Burk, 1999; Larson, 1996; Kull and Ramsey, 2001), yet the debate seems to focus more on the extent of the role that casualty sensitivity plays in public support for war. Using a cost-benefit metaphor (Larson, 1996), it makes sense in principle that the public would use casualties as a measure of the costs of war. Indeed, it is rarely questioned that casualties can, and reasonably should, impact public support for the use of force over time. Thus, in this sense, there is scholarly consensus that Mueller's thesis has great explanatory value.

However, as Feaver and Gelpi (2004) note, casualty sensitivity differs from casualty phobia – a reflexive opposition to any casualties. This is a key issue of contention among scholars. Mueller has argued that the public is casualty-phobic – that Americans are simply unwilling to accept the loss of U.S. lives. For example, following the death of eighteen U.S. soldiers on a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, Mueller observed, “when Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather close to zero” (1996, 30). Karl Mueller agreed with this perspective, arguing that prior to September 11, 2001 the public saw so little benefit in military missions that it had become in effect casualty intolerant (2000). However, Kull and Ramsey (2001) analyzed polling data following the Somali attack on U.S. service members and found that a majority of Americans actually favored an increase in involvement following the firefight. Contrary to Mueller’s thesis, the public’s immediate reaction was to fight back harder, not withdraw. Similarly, Burk (1999) offers evidence that the decrease in public support for the Somali mission, which began before the fatalities, was due in large part to mission creep - the perceived expansion of the U.S. mandate from peacekeeping to conflict resolution.

Analyzing individual attitudes towards the Vietnam War, Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening (1997) hypothesized that Mueller’s casualty hypothesis could be more explanatory at the local level where interpersonal and community-based networks provide a salience to war casualties. Their research found that county-level losses are important predictors of public support in the early stages of war; however, the impact of

local casualties declines in later years as the national casualty rate increases. They also found evidence to support a “two-war” effect in which explanatory variables performed differently in the latter half of the Vietnam war than they had earlier (1997, 671). Their article provides a more dynamic representation of Mueller’s theories.

Regardless, scholarly debate over the validity of Mueller’s “casualty hypothesis” remains considerable. Researchers concurring with Mueller’s thesis have offered different opinions as to the reason behind the public’s casualty intolerance. Edward Luttwak (1995) asserts that the U.S. public is more intolerant of casualties now than in previous generations due to smaller family size. Charles Moskos (1995) argues that today’s higher casualty sensitivity is due to the fact that children of the elite are not at risk in military missions. Harvey Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro (1996) assert that the lower casualty tolerance is due to changes in technology which have influenced the public’s expectations for low human costs of war. Finally, Johanna Neuman (1996) argues that casualty intolerance is heightened due to the development of near-real time television coverage of military operations, making each and every loss vivid and personalized.

However, others, while acknowledging that casualties can influence public opinion, disagree that the number of wartime deaths is the primary explanatory variable. Scholars have sought to explore different factors that either influence the public’s degree of casualty sensitivity or influence public opinion on the use of force more generally. For example, Feaver and Gelpi argue that the American public is not casualty-phobic, but rather “defeat-phobic” (2004, 97). That is, success matters. Few people will harbor

strong opposition to a successful military operation, even if it involves casualties. (The so-called “halo effect” refers to a surge in public opinion following a successful operation.) Examining the causes of casualty sensitivity during the 2003 war in Iraq, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005) conclude that it was not simply past success, but the public’s expectations of future success that mattered most in determining U.S. tolerance for additional wartime deaths. Their model indicates that “so long as the public believes that the United States will achieve victory,” public opinion will remain in favor of continuing the war effort (2005, 45). They also argue that beliefs over the rightness of the war impact casualty tolerance, though to a lesser extent. Using data from the 2003 invasion of Iraq, they found that those who believed it was the right decision to go to war “in the first place” were much more likely to support additional casualties to achieve success than those who did not support the invasion.

Jentleson (1992) argues that public support for any given military operation is primarily influenced by its principle policy objective. Public support for military force used to constrain an aggressor state would be strong, with the public willing to bear the traditional military costs associated with self-defense or defense of our allies. However, he argues that humanitarian intervention missions would receive public support only if the associated costs (as predominantly measured in casualties) are low. Lastly, support for military force used to impose internal political change in another nation would be weak. His work expands and supports earlier research by Russett and Nincic (1976) that found strong public support for helping nations defend against an aggressor while finding little support for U.S. intervention in civil wars.

Similarly, the extent of public support for military operations can also be linked to the public's perceptions of vital national interest. For example, in a 1969 survey, Russett and Nincic (1976) found that public support for providing military assistance to nations that have been attacked varied with that nation's geographic proximity to and economic interdependence with the United States.

Larson (1996) argues that public support for military force follows elite opinion. Simply put, when political leaders are in consensus behind a mission, support is robust. When the national leadership is divided, the public too becomes divided and support is fragile. Kull, Ramsay, and Destler (1997) assert that public support for the use of force is stronger when the operation is multilateral as opposed to unilateral, yet it is unclear whether this is because of a perception of more evenly distributed burdens of war or a sense that the mission must be (more) important if additional states lend support.

Scholars also acknowledge the role of presidential cues in determining public support for the use of force. Almond (1960) referred to the public's general tendency to support the President on international matters. Mueller (1973) called it "followership" though many popularly refer to it as the "rally-round-the-flag" effect. While other leaders can and do impact public opinion on military force, there is significant scholarship indicating that the public still looks to the President before others on matter of war and peace.

Similarly, many highlight the role of the media in shaping and framing public support during war (Page, 1996; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Mayer, 2008). Dan Rather argued in a 1996 speech that the media tends to "follow the flag" during wartime (Jensen,

2003), meaning that journalists often defer to simple patriotism rather than their professional ethic. He felt the media coverage of the 1991 Persian Gulf War served to boost war efforts by failing to question policies and officials (Jensen, 2003).

Alternatively, ample evidence illustrates the influence of the media in framing Vietnam as unwinnable and hopeless. The impact of Walter Cronkite's on-air conclusions that the U.S. could not win Vietnam proved crushing to President Johnson, who reportedly linked the loss of the media's support to the loss of public support for the war (Mayer, 2008). Cohen (1973) found evidence that other foreign policy officials considered the media to be a *source* of public opinion as well, arguing that reporters are often well-informed members of the public and that the stories they transmit voice the opinions of others in the political system, and arguably the nation at large (Powlick, 1995). While much more has been and can be written on the role of the media in influencing, priming, shaping, and transmitting public opinion, it is important to this research simply to note the interactive role the press plays in public opinion on war.

Finally, researching at the individual level, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) argue that two broad dispositions consistently influence a person's support for policy options: a disposition towards isolationism vs. internationalism and a disposition towards assertiveness vs. accommodation. The authors argue that these two predispositions coupled with features of the geo-political context combine to illustrate how individuals decide whether to support the use of military force abroad. They also present evidence that one's liberal or conservative self-identification is inconsistent in predicting support for the use of military force.

In summary, the literature on public opinion on the use of force offers evidence that a variety of reasonable factors, such as the number of U.S. casualties, the degree of elite consensus, the primary policy objectives, and measures and expectations of success, serve to influence how the public views war. While there is no scholarly consensus as to which of these factors has the strongest impact on public opinion, there is wide agreement that multiple factors may be at work at the same time. What is less clear is whether the mobilization of the Reserve Component has a significant or spurious effect with any or all of these factors.

U.S. Civil-Military Relations

The nature and characteristics of the relationship between the military and society is of fundamental importance to American civil-military relations. Critical to this relationship is an ongoing debate over how best to man the armed forces. Huntington's seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, is central to this discussion. Written in 1957, Huntington's work outlines the concept of subjective and objective civilian control of the military and argues that the modern officer corps is a professional body (Huntington, 1957).⁴

Subjective control – which maximizes civilian power through institutions, constitutional form, or social class – involves not only civil-military power relations but also power relations among civilian groups. It refers to the power of *particular* institutions (such as Congress or the Executive), *particular* social classes (such as the

⁴ Huntington refers to the military as a profession as contrasted with a “trade” or “craft.” He does not mean profession as contrasted with “amateur” nor is he specifically referring to the all-volunteer force developed after his work was published. See Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), chapter 1.

European aristocracy or the bourgeois), and *particular* constitutional forms (such as democracy) to control the military's power and influence. Because there is no single civilian authority, groups define civilian control according to their own interests.

For example, there is a widespread belief that the U.S. Constitution provides for civilian control of the military. Huntington asserts that it is more accurate to say that the Constitution provides for subjective civilian control (1957, 163). Instead of a military limited in scope and subordinated in position to a single civilian head, the Constitution divides responsibility for military affairs among multiple stakeholders. Within the total federal system, the militia clauses divide control between the state and national governments and within the national government, the separation of powers divides control of the national military forces between Congress and the President (1957, 164).⁵ These divisions and others reflect the Founding Fathers' fear of consolidating power in one person or institution. Partly as a result of these power arrangements, tension between civilian groups has arisen throughout history as often as tension between civilian and military leaders. The solution to such tensions, according to Huntington, is objective civilian control.

Objective civilian control, which Huntington advocates, is control of the military through the maximization of military professionalism. Only through a "politically sterile and neutral" military can objective civilian control be achieved and national military

⁵ Within the executive branch, control of the military is divided in practical terms between the President and departmental secretaries. The Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy served on the President's cabinet prior to the establishment of the Secretary of Defense in the National Security Act of 1947.

security attained (1957, 80-86).⁶ The professionalization of the military, notably the officer corps, generated a new relationship between the soldier and the statesman -- that of expert and politician. Whereas subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military and making them “mirrors of the state,” objective civilian control achieves its end by separating the military from civilian/political tensions and making them “tools” of the state (1957, 83). The expert and the politician thus operate in independent, autonomous spheres. The government is free from the threat of military interference that could undermine civilian rule and the military can focus on fighting a war without civilian meddling that could threaten battlefield success. Huntington argues that the professional military will produce a more effective fighting force and lead to national policies that better defend the nation against threats (1957, 20).

Others disagree. Morris Janowitz, the only scholar whose works rival Huntington’s in impact, unequivocally advocates for a strong reliance on the American citizen-soldier (1960). For Janowitz and others that follow in his theoretical perspective, the American citizen-soldier serves as an informal mechanism linking the military and civilian sectors of society. Citizen-soldiers guard against the development of a separate military ethos and strengthen the system of checks of balances by ensuring that civilian values are incorporated into the military (Bachman, Blair, and Segal, 1977). Further, Janowitz adopts a republican view of society focused on engaging citizens in public life – which includes not only the rule, but the defense, of the republic (Burk, 2002). While

⁶Also note that in the American military, “politically neutral” is widely assumed to mean that the military professional does not run for election, advocate for or against a political party, or participate in other party-identifying civic action while in uniform. Service members retain rights to vote and participate in the political process as citizens.

liberalism supports citizen-soldiers only when necessary, republicanism sees military service as an obligation of citizenship and a vehicle for cultivating civic virtue.⁷ Thus, the key challenge is how America can sustain and enhance its democratic values (such as civic participation and civilian control of the military) through the role of the citizen-soldier.

The end of the draft and the rise of the modern all-volunteer force (AVF) in the early 1970s illustrated the importance and pertinence of the issues raised by Huntington and Janowitz. These and other scholars contributed to a lively debate over how best to generate military forces. Among the alternatives was a continuation of the highly unpopular draft, the controversial and potentially costly AVF, and proposals for a comprehensive national service program that included military as well as civil service. Janowitz advocated national service to enhance the nation's sense of civic participation, particularly calling for a revival of the citizen-soldier concept (1983). Similarly, Charles Moskos argued for a multi-variant national service program, claiming that the benefits of sharing the obligation of citizenship would act as "a solvent for most of the differences among the various kinds of national servers" (1988, 179). The debate expanded beyond military sociologists and civil-military scholars. Anthropologist Margaret Mead proposed that a national service system was the proper alternative to the draft, claiming it

⁷ Throughout history, many scholars and policymakers have promoted universal military service, national service programs, and conscription not only to bolster military security, but also to maintain the nation's civic foundation. For a sample, see *Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947); Charles Moskos, *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community*, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1988); Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Williamson Evers, ed., *National Service: Pro and Con*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990). The latter offers a summary of perspectives from both proponents and critics of national service programs.

would provide young adults the opportunity to establish an identity and a stronger sense of self-respect and responsibility (1967). Policy analyst Bruce Chapman argued for the all-volunteer force, stating that compulsory national service would decimate the volunteer sector and was “not true service” because it was not given freely to God (1990, 133-134.). Economist Walter Oi asserted that national service programs would result in significant resources allocated merely to improve the attitude of a minority of Americans (1990). Although these concerns and others fueled a heated debate in the late 1960s and again in the 1990s, national service has never generated sufficient support to become implemented on a large scale.

The draft, on the other hand, has had even less support. While never popular in America because it conflicts with U.S. individualistic tendencies, conscription was particularly unpopular during the closing years of the Vietnam War. Political opposition to the war effort coupled with widespread perceived and real problems of social discrimination led to a consensus that the system must be changed (Barber, Jr., 1972). The Selective Service System tended to “reject those who are most likely to benefit from the experience of military service, to let those in the most privileged strata largely evade service, and to draw the majority portion of military manpower from the broad middle stratum” (Barber 1972, 212). As James Barber declared, “Whatever else such as system may have to recommend it, it falls far short of equity” (Ibid).

Despite the rising unpopularity of the draft, the all-volunteer force was a controversial policy alternative.⁸ Kronenberg argued that the AVF would produce enlisted ranks populated by men and women from the lower socioeconomic strata and an officer corps drawn from ROTC programs on nonelite campuses, thus creating a military “less representative of the general population and perhaps prone to castelike inbreeding” (1974, 323). Janowitz and Moksos speculated that the AVF would result in an increasingly high concentration of black soldiers which would fuel increased racial tensions and result in disproportionately high black casualty rates during war (1974). Barber raised concerns in 1972 that the AVF might be unaffordable, with responsible cost estimates ranging from a low of 3.3 billion dollars to a high of 17 billion annually (1972, 216). Despite social and economic concerns, policymakers eventually decided the all-volunteer force was the best method to constitute U.S. military manpower. The 1970 report of the Presidential Commission on the All-Volunteer Force [Gates Commission] rejected each of the major arguments against the AVF and contributed to Nixon’s eventual abolition of the draft in 1973.

Today the U.S. military has over thirty years of experience under the AVF, yet some of the initial concerns remain relevant. Amongst the key issues of civil-military relations is the ongoing normative debate between Huntington’s desire for an insular, professional military and Janowitz’s ideal of a representative, pluralistic force of citizen-soldiers. Scholars acknowledge that the military requires a degree of homogeneity in

⁸ For a comprehensive review of the research and policy debates surrounding the development of the All-Volunteer force, see Bernard Rostker, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).

values if not demographics or ideological perspectives to be militarily effective. Kohn asserts that the military's individual values--courage, honesty, sacrifice, integrity, loyalty, service--are among the most respected while its institutional values of authority and hierarchy (as opposed to consensus and compromise) allow individuals to act according to the plans and decisions of the commander and "succeed under the very worst of mental and physical circumstances" (Kohn, 2008). However, as Johnson and Metz describe, "The heart of the problem is an enduring tension: to succeed at warfighting, the military must be distinct in values, attitudes, procedures, and organization but must, at the same time, *represent* American society" (1995, 1).

This tension between distinctness and representativeness pervades the literature on the relationship between the military and society. A significant amount of research explores the demographic representativeness of the AVF in terms of race, gender, socioeconomic status, mental aptitude, and sexual orientation. Reflecting the tension described above, much of the recent debate on representativeness has pitted inclusionary policies against military effectiveness. For example, the military has argued that combat effectiveness and unit cohesion are best achieved in homogenous units. Using this claim on the need for 'distinctiveness' in combat, the military has succeeded in limiting the integration of women and homosexuals. (Similar arguments were used in early debates surrounding the integration of African Americans). Yet the concern over maintaining a societal connection is deeper than demographic representativeness. The Janowitzean theory behind doing so is the enduring belief that a broadly representative cross section of individuals will reflect a richer diversity of ideological perspectives. And evidence

suggests that the theory is correct. An extensive attitudinal study conducted by Bachman, Blair and Segal from 1968-1976 found that while military men during the days of conscription reflected the pluralism of American society, the self-selection and informal indoctrination that accompanied the development of the all-volunteer force led to a more homogenous pro-military force (1977).

In addition to desiring ideological diversity, some of those who argue for social and economic representativeness also believe that the military can or should be used as an agent of social change. This concept was frequently demonstrated on an individual basis in previous generations when American judges sentenced delinquent young men [often underclass] to the Army as an alternative to jail – offering discipline and focus to those in need of direction in life. But the military, which is at times viewed as a microcosm of society, might also be used to further broader societal goals such as the integration of minorities, women, or homosexuals. The size and scope of the force as well as its symbolic significance as a fundamental American organization can arguably act as a catalyst for large-scale societal change. For example, many believe that Truman's integration of the armed forces in 1948 sparked the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s.

Other advocates of more inclusionary laws and policies desire to maximize the utilization of available talent and therefore improve military effectiveness. Given the recruiting demands of the AVF, excluding women from combat or homosexuals from service diminishes the resources the nation can pull from to defend itself (Dunivin, 1994). Still others simply believe that the nation's military policies should reflect the core values

of the society it defends – namely equality and civil rights (Ibid). For example, scholars and policymakers in favor of allowing open homosexuals to serve in the military argue predominantly for a change in law based on the equal right to serve (Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, 2008). However, some also advocate homosexual service in the military as a means through which gays and lesbians can attain equal rights in society.

Throughout history, members of groups not recognized as full citizens could improve their social standing by performing military service (Burk, 1995). As Janowitz argues, military service has been a hallmark of citizenship and citizenship is a prerequisite for participation in American political democracy (1983). While details are not presented here, the experiences of and challenges facing minorities, women, homosexuals, and others who use military service to fight for equality under the law have varied widely throughout history. Their narratives illustrate the political and social recognition of the connection between citizenship and military service in America. While this connection has dominated the past, James Burk argues it is less certain that military service will confer citizen status [symbolically or tangibly] in the future. While the military has become a more inclusive organization, the dominant political attitudes in America have become less insistent that citizens ought to perform military service (Burk, 1995). Military service is no longer viewed as an obligation of citizenship. It is not just in America that the connection between military service and citizenship has loosened; comparative research finds that this dynamic may be representative of other post-Cold War industrialized militaries (Boene and Martin, 2000; Sorensen, 2000; Cohen, 1995).

Additional challenges to civil-military relations in industrialized societies, namely changes in force structure and public support for the military, illuminate the similarities and differences of the U.S from other “postmodern” militaries.⁹ For example, fiscal concerns have led Canada to emphasize corporate management practices, particularly in procurement and human resources, and develop a “total force” stance which better incorporates reserve members into the Canadian Forces (Pinch, 2000). The United Kingdom faces constraints on the use of its two-tiered reserve cadre in operations short of major war, particularly in gaining political, public, and employer support for the use of the reserves if no clear threat to national survival exists (Dandeker, 2000).

The Netherlands, on the other hand, have not experienced the apathetic or indifferent public that Moskos et al. theorized as being indicative of postmodern societies. Instead, public support for military operations in Netherlands can be labeled “pragmatic, with an undercurrent of idealism” (Van Der Meulen 2000, 114). Indeed, public attitudes towards the military have remained supportive in most Western industrialized countries (Williams, 2000). Yet this support does not necessarily translate into high levels of commitment to military expenditures, as shown in the U.K. and Canada, nor does it reflect a willingness to serve in the defense forces as in Germany, the United States, and Australia. Most citizens of these and other postmodern nations are

⁹ The term “postmodern”- coined by Moskos, Williams and Segal - refers to a model describing the emerging belief systems and social trends underpinning organizational changes in the militaries of industrialized nations. See chapter 1 in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, eds. Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams and David Segal (New York: Oxford Press, 2000) for additional detail on the term.

generally not interested in military service for themselves or their families despite generally positive attitudes towards the public institution.

As one can see through the examination of the military and society in America -- as well as through observations of civil-military relations in other Western industrialized nations -- the relationship between the military and its society is multifaceted. The civil-military relationship includes how to man the force, balance basic national values with an effective standing military, address military service as a civic duty, determine the degree of representativeness in demographics and values that a military should have of the society it defends, decide the role of the military as an institution in generating social change, and much more. Unsurprisingly, as the prevailing attitudes on these topics change over time, so does the relationship between society and its military.

Contributions of the Research

This chapter has reviewed the relevant scholarly literature on public opinion and the use of military force as well as the relationship between the military and society. The first section detailed changes in scholarly consensus on the role of public opinion during war since World War II. It also summarized the current debate over factors that are believed to influence public support for the use of military force. The lack of consensus on which factors play the strongest role indicates that additional research on the relationship between public support and the use of force is warranted. My dissertation contributes to this need for additional research by focusing on two specific voids in the literature.

First, this project focuses on local public opinion. Second, it will offer rich data acquired through qualitative research methods. Aside from theoretical work done before the development of statistical polling, the vast majority of opinion research now relies upon national-level poll data. A few exceptions (Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening, 1997; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999) offer either a local analysis or experimental methodologies to explore public opinion and war. However scholars [and inevitably policymakers] rely nearly exclusively upon national survey response data in the public opinion literature. This research is vital and impressive but insufficient. My dissertation will add to the scholarly literature through its local focus and unique research design.

The second section reviewed the scholarly literature on U.S. civil-military relations. It summarized the classic debate between Huntington's ideal of the professional military force and Janowitz's concept of a republican military force grounded by the nation's citizen-soldiers. It also reviewed debates over how to man the force and whether America should have an insular military or one reflective of the society it defends. These concepts and debates are intimately connected to the history and purpose of the National Guard, America's historical relationship with its military, and the implications of modern Total Force policies on both the military and society. Given the many changes in Reserve Component utilization since September 11, 2001 and the renewed policy debates over the benefits and limitations of Total Force policies, such as the extent to which the U.S. should rely upon Reserve Component forces, this research offers timely and relevant contributions to a growing body of knowledge on the connection between today's citizen-

soldiers and society as well as the implications of Reserve Component mobilization on American society.

IV. Research Design and Methodology

A strong research design shapes how the researcher goes about investigating the questions at hand. The purpose of this chapter is to offer detail on the research design, discuss the logic of method selection, and explain how I used various techniques in this study. I also review the benefits and limitations of the methods selected.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

As mentioned previously, the main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between Army National Guard mobilization(s) and public support for the use of military force. It is exploratory in nature, meaning that the research is intended for theory development, not theory verification. Indeed, hardly any theoretical or empirical work has been conducted on this topic.¹⁰ This is in part due to a lack of U.S. involvement in large-scale prolonged conflict (and therefore widespread and prolonged use of the Reserve Component) since General Abrams reorganized the forces in the wake of the Vietnam conflict. For example, while the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War saw large mobilizations of Reserve Component forces, the duration of the conflict was insufficient to distinguish the initial “rally around the flag” effect from the existence of a relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war. Thus the

¹⁰ Jonathan Dahms’ analysis of the Bosnia/Kosovo conflict addressed the long-term implications of Reserve Component involvement on the Army. However it is debatable whether previous conflicts, particularly in the peacekeeping phase, were adequate to test the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war. See Jonathan Dahms, “An Operational Army Reserve: Implications for Organizational Health, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007).

relationship between Reserve mobilization and public support must first be substantiated empirically and then explored.

To review, the specific research questions addressed in this study are:

- 1) Is there a relationship between the mobilization of community-based Army National Guard units and local public support for the use of military force?
- 2) If so, what factors influence the relationship between the mobilization of community-based Army National Guard units and local public support for the use of military force?

The hypotheses developed from the first research question are presented below.

A1: There is a relationship between the mobilization(s) of the Army National Guard units and local public support on the use of U.S. military force.

A0: There is no relationship between the mobilization(s) of the Army National Guard units and local public support on the use of military force.

This research hypothesizes that there is a relationship between Army National Guard mobilizations and public support for the use of military force; however, it does not presume a direction associated with the relationship. Whether Army National Guard mobilizations increase or decrease public support for the use of military force remains an important finding if the existence of a relationship is first established empirically.

I do not develop hypotheses from the second research question. Due to the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the factors that influence public support for the use of force and the absence of scholarly research on the nature of the relationship between mobilizations and public support, this study will rely upon the principles of grounded

theory to assess the factors that influence the relationship between Army National Guard mobilization(s) and public support for war. Grounded theory research is intended to develop theory by allowing data to emerge, informed by theory but not constrained by verifying or disproving previous scholarly research (Goulding, 2000).

Research Design

Broadly speaking, I use the ongoing War on Terror as a timely and relevant opportunity to test the impact of Army National Guard mobilizations on public support for war. Despite political debate over the use of the term “War on Terror” and official changes in how the Department of Defense refers to current military operations, this study uses the term as a general categorization of the use of military force. Two main military operations are associated with the War on Terror: Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. [Both are ongoing at the time of this writing.] Operation Enduring Freedom refers to military deployments to Afghanistan in the wake of September 11, 2001 as well as various deployments of military force within the United States and around the world that support efforts against international terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaida. Operation Iraqi Freedom refers to military deployments in support of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation, stabilization, and counter-insurgency efforts within the country. In addition, the Department of Defense categorized Operation Noble Eagle - military operations in support of homeland security and federal, state, and local authorities immediately following September 11, 2001 - as part of the War on Terror. Use of the term War on Terror in this study refers specifically these three military operations.

Within this examination of the War on Terror, I employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the research questions presented earlier. The use of mixed-methodologies is deliberate as it allows my research to draw on the strengths of each method while minimizing the impact of the limitations. The basic components of the research design are:

1. A single ethnographic case study of a community from which Army National Guard unit(s) have deployed. This method employed the following data collection techniques:
 - a. Participant observation
 - b. Semi-structured interviews
 - c. Street-intercept surveys
 - d. Document/Textual analysis
2. Regression analyses of Army National Guard mobilization(s) and change in percentage of Republican vote by county in the 2004 and 2008 elections, using the 2000 election as a baseline.

Each method is discussed below.

Qualitative Analysis

My research employed an ethnographic case study of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.¹¹ Yin suggests that the case study is an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (2003, 13). The ethnographic

¹¹ The rationale for case selection will be presented later in this section.

case study is one in which the primary techniques used to collect the data and the philosophy under which the data are analyzed are ethnographic in nature.

While ethnographic research emerged from - and remains central to - cultural anthropology, it has since become a widely used qualitative research method. LeCompte and Schensul describe ethnography as a scientific “approach to learning about the social and cultural life of communities, institutions, and other settings” (1999, 1). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) characterizes ethnography as a social science method designed to understand behavior and beliefs from the perspective of a community’s members (2003).¹² Much of the literature on ethnographic research focuses on its distinguishing characteristics, notably participant observation, contextual analysis, and an inductive theoretical foundation.

Participant observation is a technique that requires the researcher to be present at, involved in, and recording field activities. This close-up, first-hand observation of the social or cultural setting is the starting point for ethnographic research (Atkinson et al., 2001) and establishes the researcher as the primary tool for data collection (GAO, 2003). Ethnography may also incorporate open-ended and semi-structured interviewing, surveys, focus groups, document or content analysis, and a variety of other techniques depending on the research question and design. While the techniques used in most cases (including participant observation) are not exclusive to ethnographic research, the intense field observation and participation of the researcher is a fundamental element of ethnography that differentiates it from other qualitative research.

¹² Note that the organization’s name has been changed to U.S. Government Accountability Office since publication of this document.

A second distinguishing feature of ethnographic research is its overarching emphasis on context (Steward, 1998). As Janine Wedel asserts, “the ethnographer’s job is to gather and sort out everyone’s version of the same events” (2004, 160). Once the researcher has grasped the native’s perspective, this data must then be placed in context. Immersion and involvement in the local setting allows the researcher to gain insights into the community as a whole, finding linkages in various strands of data to achieve a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the perspectives of the community.

Lastly, ethnography is characterized as an inductive research method. A core assumption of ethnography is that one must first discover what people do and the reasons they give for doing it before trying to construe the data in light of existing theories (Steward, 1998). In this sense, ethnography can be seen to incorporate elements of grounded theory as it begins with the investigation of an initial question and through an iterative and interactive process continues until the data confirm a stable pattern or theory. By aggregating specific and concrete data, one can create more general and abstract explanations for why events occur (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999). Yet while it relies on grounded theory, ethnographic research cannot be equated with grounded theory any more than it can be equated with participant observation. Ethnography *includes* these methods and approaches as well as many others.

The primary ethnographic techniques I relied upon in this research include participant observation, semi-structured long interviews, street-intercept surveys, and document analysis. How I used each technique is detailed below.

Participant Observation

I used the close-up, first-hand fieldwork technique of participant-observation in several ways. I visited Wilkes-Barre, PA at least once a month for 10 months from April 2009 through December 2009. Each visit lasted three to four days, allowing time for me to become familiar with the community and interact with members of its population in an informal setting. I attended community events such as the Wilkes-Barre Fine Arts Fiesta and the end of summer celebration, “Cool on the Square,” to get a feel for the community and its residents. I also attended several events at the Wilkes-Barre Pennsylvania Army National Guard Armory to witness the interaction between community leaders, community members, and Guardsman. These events included a “Welcome Home” ceremony greeting troops returning home after a recent overseas mobilization and two separate “Freedom Salutes” ceremonies which conferred military awards and other paraphernalia to soldiers who had recently deployed overseas.

Through my regular presence in Wilkes-Barre and my attendance at these events, I was able to observe first-hand many aspects of the community, interact with its residents, and engage representatives of various subgroups within the community through informal interviewing. The data collected during these visits and events became rich sources of analysis.

Semi-Structured Interviews

During my research, I conducted 16 semi-structured long interviews. These interviews involved asking questions in a conversational, yet focused manner in order to gain insight into the logic by which another person sees the world. In contrast to open-

ended interviews, semi-structured interviews rely on an interview guide with pre-determined open-ended questions; however the interviewer is allowed to probe respondents for additional detail, clarification, or focus (GAO, 2003). I often asked respondents to explain their comments further or offer additional detail to ensure I captured their thoughts and logic correctly.

I used purposive sampling to select information-rich informants. I interviewed individuals affiliated with organizations of interest such as the 109th Field Artillery battalion, the Luzerne County Veterans Affairs Department, the two primary local newspapers, the Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Industry and Business as well as local elected officials. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours. With a few exceptions these interviews were held in private offices, although several were held in restaurants or coffee shops. Respondents were given the opportunity to agree to the use of personally identifiable information or to keep their participation confidential [See Appendix B for the Informed Consent document]. Eleven subjects agreed to the use of personal information; five subjects opted to have their identity remain confidential. These interviews provided a depth of understanding and a range of perspectives upon which to draw. Several potential informants failed to respond to my requests for an interview and these individuals/organizations will be noted, if warranted, in the subsequent analysis chapter.

Street-Intercept Surveys

I also used street-intercept surveys, sometimes known as “man-on-the-street” interviews, with open-ended questions to capture a non-probability sample of the

attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts of the common person in Wilkes-Barre, PA. I selected the face-to-face street-intercept method due to its low cost (Spooner and Flaherty, 1993) as well as its high survey response rate and low cognitive burden as compared to other modes of survey administration (Bowling, 2005).

I conducted 43 surveys and achieved a response rate of over 85%. These surveys were conducted at multiple community locations such as the Wyoming Valley Shopping Mall, Wilkes-Barre River walk, Public Square, and along the primary city streets in Wilkes-Barre's downtown area during the hours of 9:00 am and 6:00 pm on weekdays and weekends. The survey consisted of 17 items and required 5-10 minutes to complete on average [See Appendix C for the survey instrument]. These surveys collected data from a cross-section of Wilkes-Barre residents and complimented the information collected from the semi-structured long interviews and participant observation. Although the sample was not random and thus cannot reflect parameters of the larger population, the qualitative data from the surveys illustrates a range of attitudes, thoughts, and beliefs of people in the community.

Document Analysis

Lastly, I analyzed a variety of city documents, statements of local elected officials, newspaper articles from Wilkes-Barre's two local newspapers, and other documents of interest for content, themes, and trends. This technique is often used to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990) or to provide valuable historical/cultural insights over time (Busha and Harter, 1980). However, caution is warranted when using published documents that may

have been edited, censored, or sanitized, so I used this data primarily to confirm and corroborate evidence from other sources. (Yin, 2003).

Limitations of Ethnography

Ethnography is a comprehensive and holistic approach to exploring and analyzing the beliefs and behaviors of a select community. Yet despite much methodological strength, ethnography is sometimes criticized for producing nothing more than “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) of a phenomenon. Goulding (2002, 44) explains:

Most qualitative researchers shy away from identifying causal links, often stopping short of making conceptual links that result in an integrated structure. Furthermore, they seldom provide the setting for identified patterns or themes.

However, the use of grounded theory, which emphasizes theory development and building, can counter the tendency for research to remain descriptive. As Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss - the founders of grounded theory - argue, “Research sociologists in their driving efforts to get the facts tend to forget that, besides methodology, the distinctive offering of sociology to our society is sociological theory, not only researched descriptions” (1967, 30). By systematically obtaining and analyzing the data, a researcher can enter the theoretical discussion (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

Another oft-cited limitation of ethnography is the potential threat to validity and reliability produced by the central role of the researcher. However, a rich professional literature outlines careful procedures that can minimize these risks. For example, conducting prolonged fieldwork, searching for reorienting or disconfirming observations, establishing good participative relationships, paying attention to interactional context,

and designing multiple modes of data collection combine to increase the objectivity of the researcher (Steward, 1998).

While each technique above has its own limitations, the ethnographic case study of Wilkes-Barre was specifically designed to rely upon multiple sources of evidence to allow for triangulation of data and increased construct validity (Yin, 2003). Construct validity was also enhanced during the data analysis by ensuring that themes were analyzed only if they reached the point of saturation – that is, they were repeated to the point that I as the researcher was no longer hearing or seeing new information but rather could reasonably expect the theme to repeat itself. I also used a strict case study protocol during data collection to ensure reliability should another researcher want to repeat the operations of this study (Ibid.). Through this careful research design and the use of rigorous and thorough data collection methods, the ethnographic case study produced scientifically valid and reliable data.

Quantitative Analysis

The second component of the research design is a multiple regression analysis. No known empirical study has explored the potential relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and public support for the use of military force, thus this research offers a starting point for future quantitative work.

Multiple regression analysis provides an opportunity to explore the degree of effect one variable has on another, holding all other variables constant. Most explanatory statistical models describing policy start with one dependent variable and one explanatory variable, with additional explanatory variables added as the analysis develops. In this

study, regression is used to determine whether the mobilization of a local National Guard unit is a statistically significant variable in determining local public support for the War on Terror in the states of Pennsylvania, Georgia, Colorado and Oregon.¹³

The dependent variable is the change in local public support for the War on Terror. As with many complex issues, there is no direct means of capturing local public support for the war on terror, necessitating the use of an imperfect proxy variable. The proxy for local public support for the War on Terror is the change in percentage of a county that voted Republican in the presidential elections of 2004 and 2008, with results from 2000 serving as a baseline for 2004. The percentage of Republican vote can serve as a measure of local public support for the war due to the strong correlation between support for the War on Terror and Presidential approval rating for George W. Bush. Gary Jacobson (2007) explains that overall approval ratings for President Bush after September 11, 2001 remained high due to strong approval of his performance in countering terrorism and the war in Iraq. Although President Bush's approval ratings were certainly influenced by economic concerns and the response to Hurricane Katrina (Jacobson, 2007), his ratings were securely fastened to the public's support for his efforts in the War on Terror generally and the war in Iraq particularly. Thus, the 2004 vote was, not surprisingly, strongly related to opinions on the war (Jacobson 2007, 192). With 34% of the population naming terrorism and Iraq as the most important issues in the election (Jacobson 2007, 191), foreign policy issues dominated the 2004 election. Conventional wisdom from the 2008 election indicates a similar correlation, with many pundits

¹³ Subset selection will be addressed later in this chapter.

referring to the 2008 elections as a referendum on Bush's policies in Iraq.¹⁴ These strong correlations suggest that using the percentage of Republican vote by county for the Presidential elections is a reasonable proxy for public support for war.

Because this analysis is a change analysis, the dependent variable is the change in percent Republican vote between election cycles. For the 2004 analysis, the dependent variable was calculated as the percent Republican vote in 2000 subtracted from the percent Republican vote in 2004. For the 2008 analysis, the dependent variable was calculated as the percent Republican vote in 2004 subtracted from the percent Republican vote in 2008.

The primary explanatory variable of interest in the model is the number of local Title 10 Army National Guard mobilizations in support of the War on Terror. Title 10 refers to laws in the U.S. Code governing mobilizations of the Army National Guard by the federal government. [This is as opposed to Title 32 mobilizations which govern federally-funded National Guard mobilizations or mobilizations by the Governor in support of state emergencies.]¹⁵ The model then controls for several common socio-economic variables. These controls include county population, percentage of the county population that is black, percentage of the county population that is Hispanic or Latino, median household income, percentage of the county population with a bachelors degree or higher, and persons per square mile which is used as an urban-rural indicator. A

¹⁴ While economic concerns played a strong role late in the 2008 campaign season, concerns over Iraq and the War on Terror dominated much of the primaries and the resulting race between Candidates Obama and McCain.

¹⁵ For example, Title 10 mobilizations would support overseas combat missions. Title 32 mobilizations would support large scale (often multi-state) natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina response efforts.

separate analysis of the 2008 election also included the number of local casualties¹⁶ in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Future research should include additional explanatory variables and expand the regression to the national level; however this study is specifically designed to produce a model that is more foundational than comprehensive. That is, the goal of this regression is to serve as a baseline for future research on this topic.

Given this admittedly simple model, omitted variable bias was the primary limitation of this regression analysis. A model will never be able to capture or control for every potential factor that could influence individual voting selections. This limitation should not, however, discourage researchers from building statistical models – even simple ones – that cannot grasp the complexities of the real world. The information gained from the regression, though limited, is extremely useful in exploring the validity of the relationship between Army National Guard mobilizations and public support for war.

Another limitation is that a regression analysis, as with many other methods, is data-reliant, meaning it is only as good as the data being analyzed. The data used for this research come from several sources. The Army National Guard mobilization data was acquired from the Department of Defense. This data include all Title 10 Army National Guard mobilizations in support of the War on Terror from September 11, 2001 through September 31, 2008 [the end of fiscal year 2008]. Over this seven year period, 1,040

¹⁶In military terms, casualties represent those killed in action, wounded in action, missing in action, and prisoners of war. This study uses casualties to refer to those service members killed in action and does not include data on other categories.

units¹⁷ deployed from communities in Colorado, Georgia, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, with the individual activations numbering 30,343 Guardsmen. Although the data captured individual activations, it is important to note that no personally identifiable information was included; some soldiers and units may have deployed more than once in the seven-year period.

A portion [approximately 7%] of these activations was discarded due to inaccuracies in hometown reporting. For example, the dataset lists many Pennsylvania National Guard units as being from the city of Ft. Dix in New Jersey. This is likely a clerical error, naming the unit's mobilization site instead of its hometown. Other units in Pennsylvania and Georgia had the unit's hometown listed as unknown. A very small number of units were listed as being from a city not located in the state of interest or a city that overlaps several counties within the same state. If after cross-referencing the data I was unable to resolve the hometown discrepancy, I eliminated the data from the dataset.

In addition to the Department of Defense dataset, I used county-level elections results from 2000, 2004, and 2008. The 2000 and 2004 datasets were purchased from David Leip (2005) while the 2008 dataset was acquired by compiling state results online. In election years 2000 and 2004, 325 counties exist in the four-state subset. Broomfield County, Colorado was added as a county in the 2008 election cycle however it is not

¹⁷ The Department of Defense data tracked unit-level mobilizations by unit identification code and unit name and included sub-units such as forward detachments and batteries from select units. Thus, the size of a given "unit" could range from one soldier in a detachment to several hundred in a battalion.

captured in the 2008 analysis due to the dependent variable being a change variable. In general, the election data was reliable and no substantive changes were made to this data.

I used data from the U.S. Census Bureau to merge the Department of Defense data identifying the unit's home city and state with the county-based election data. In a small number of observations, the city from which the unit deployed overlapped county boundaries. In such cases, the mobilization data was assigned to the dominant county to which the city belonged.

Explanatory variables capturing basic demographic and socio-economic information were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau via the state and county Quick Facts website. Iraq and Afghanistan casualty data was collected from a major media network website based on killed in action reports by the U.S. government. Casualty data did not include the counties of origin for U.S. casualties; rather, it listed the service member's hometown. Casualties by county were obtained by mapping each of the hometown cities into counties for the 517 men and women from Colorado, Georgia, Oregon, and Pennsylvania who died in Iraq or Afghanistan (calculated through January 2009).

Research Design Considerations

Unit of Analysis

The first consideration regarding this research design is delineating the unit of analysis for each portion of the research as it differs between the qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

In the ethnographic case study, the unit of analysis is the community – in this case, the community of Wilkes-Barre, PA. While observations will be made at the individual and organizational level, the unit of analysis remains the community. It is important to explain how I operationalize the “community” of Wilkes-Barre, PA and why. I defined a resident of the Wilkes-Barre community to be an adult [over 18] who lives in the greater Wilkes-Barre region using the map of the geographic service area of the Greater Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Business and Industry to delineate the greater Wilkes-Barre region [see Appendix D]. This map reflects what the leadership [and arguably the residents] of the greater Wilkes-Barred region feels represents the community. The service area includes the city of Wilkes-Barre, the municipality of Kingston, the village of Bear Creek and many local townships and boroughs. This will differentiate a resident of Wilkes-Barre from a resident of Allentown, Harrisburg, or Scranton for example. I predominantly targeted the city of Wilkes-Barre and the municipality of Kingston as places to engage the population. These localities are geographically located closest to the Wilkes-Barre downtown area to ensure that the population I observed and interacted with was connected with the heart of the community of Wilkes-Barre.

For the purposes of the regression, the unit of analysis is the county. This is first and foremost to focus the research on local public support. It also allowed the use of widely available county-based election data.

Quantitative Subset Selection

The regression analysis was confined to a four-state subset to ensure the successful creation of a baseline model for future research. While future work should expand the model nationally, the subset analysis is a reasonable starting point for the model due to the lack of previous empirical work upon which to build.

The states of Colorado, Georgia, Oregon, and Pennsylvania were selected based on several criteria relevant to the variables of interest and with an overall goal of minimizing regional impact. For example, none of the four states was home to a presidential or vice-presidential candidate running in the 2000, 2004, or 2008 elections that may have influenced voting patterns nor were the selected states distinguished as having the most or fewest total mobilizations or mobilizations per capita in the country. The selected states also had a sufficient number of counties to warrant inclusion in the analysis and minimal state-specific or regional influences that might increase the likelihood of inferring group differences that could be regional in nature.

Qualitative Case Selection

As stated earlier, I selected Wilkes-Barre, PA as the community of interest for the ethnographic case study. This portion of research relies on a single, primary case study chosen using what Schensul et al describe as criterion-based selection (1999). This selection involves choosing a unit to study because it possesses characteristics related to the study's central question (Schensul et al, 1999).

Given my research questions, the primary characteristic of any community chosen for this study is that it be home to an Army National Guard unit or units that have

deployed in support of the War on Terror. While any community meeting this criterion would arguably serve my research purposes, my selection of Wilkes-Barre, PA consisted of several steps. I first developed a list of relevant variables to consider. These variables included characteristics of the Army National Guard unit that might have influenced public support, such as the type of unit(s) deployed [ie, combat, combat support, or combat service support] as well as the number and timing of deployments, and the quality of the National Guard program in each state. I then considered important characteristics of the community from which the unit deployed such as population, demographics, socio-economic status, the primary political affiliation of the community, and state-specific and regional influences that might have influence on public support.

With this list of variables, I used the Title 10 mobilization dataset acquired by the Department of Defense to narrow the site selection search to two primary locations in the state of Pennsylvania. I then conducted preliminary field visits to each location to explore the community and determine the efficacy of conducting ethnographic research in that town. Either community could have provided me with a legitimate site to conduct my research. However, in my final considerations, I selected Wilkes-Barre due to its size, diverse economic base, and strong sense of community. Wilkes-Barre, PA thus serves as what Yin describes as a “critical case” because it represents a critical test of the propositions being tested (2003). .

V. The Case Introduction

The qualitative portion of my research examined the relationship between the mobilization of an Army National Guard unit and local public support for the use of military force in the War on Terror using an ethnographic case study of a single community of interest. This chapter introduces the community.

Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

Wilkes-Barre is a blue collar city in northeastern Pennsylvania located 30 miles south of Scranton in the heart of the Wyoming Valley, an area once well known for its anthracite coal deposits. Established in 1871, Wilkes-Barre was once a key part of the mining, minerals, and metallurgy region of Pennsylvania. It flourished in the late 1800s and early 1900s as an industrial hub for coal, manufacturing, and railroads. A flood of immigrants seeking jobs in the coal mines originally populated the town and the city maintains a sense of its early ethnic ancestries with significant Irish, Polish, German, Italian, Welsh and Slovak populations still residing in Wilkes-Barre (Pennsylvania City Data.com). Indeed, a vast majority of Wilkes-Barre's 43,000 residents are white (non-Hispanic), Roman Catholic, and working or middle class -- a reflection of the city's strong immigrant roots.

Politically, Wilkes-Barre falls predominantly within Pennsylvania's 11th Congressional District (PA-11). While historically a safe Democratic district, PA-11 is

now a swing district in a swing state. Long-time U.S. Representative Paul Kanjorski (D) won (52%-48%) over Republican candidate Lou Barletta in the 2008 election in a race that was pegged and tracked as one of the most competitive in the nation. Neighboring Pennsylvania 10th Congressional District (PA-10) – which leans Republican by 9 percent - serves townships in Luzerne County which fall within the Greater Wilkes-Barre Area. Representative Christopher Carney (D) took control of the seat in 2006 after defeating Republican incumbent Don Sherwood 53%-47%, becoming the first Democrat to represent the District since 1960.

Wilkes-Barre is also the county seat for Luzerne County. While registered Democrats consist of 59% of the Luzerne County population and dominate county-level politics, Luzerne County leans only slightly Democratic in nationwide campaigns. In 2000, Al Gore won 52% of the vote to George W. Bush's 44%; in 2004, John Kerry won 51% to Bush's 48%. In 2008, Barack Obama won 53% to John McCain's 46% (David Leip, 2005).

In addition to being the central and largest city in Luzerne County, Wilkes-Barre remains the central city in the Wyoming Valley. The city's two hospital complexes service not only Wilkes-Barre residents, but residents located throughout the more rural regions of the Wyoming Valley as well. Modern residents of the area flock to Wilkes-Barre to shop at large-scale retail stores such as Walmart and Target or to browse through stores in the Wyoming Valley Shopping Mall – the only mall of its kind for miles around.

Yet despite it being the hub city for the region's many small boroughs and townships, Wilkes-Barre maintains an atmosphere reminiscent of the quintessential

American small-town. Main Street is the primary corridor of downtown Wilkes-Barre and leads to a central gathering area known as Public Square – or “P2” for short. Public Square consists of pedestrian walkways, public benches, plaques and sculptures inspired by city history, and small grassy areas surrounded by a traffic roundabout. It serves as a transportation hub for buses operating between the city and outlying townships and the businesses and organizations immediately surrounding Public Square offer not only services and refreshments for visitors but respectable employment for city residents during the week. It is often a staging area for outdoor city events and can easily be seen as the heart of the city.

Within walking distance from Public Square lie two of Wilkes-Barre’s post-secondary institutions: Wilkes University and Kings College. With over 2,000 students each, these campuses infuse the city with young people and have given rise to several niche businesses such as a rock climbing center and an alternative rock music store on Main Street just off Public Square. In addition, the Luzerne County Community College is just 8 miles from the city in the neighboring township of Nanticoke while Misericordia University in the township of Dallas is merely 10 miles from downtown. While the percentage of the population holding a bachelor’s degree or higher in Wilkes-Barre is just 12.8% (U.S. Census Bureau), these educational facilities and the services that support them offer steady employment for many residents of the Wilkes-Barre area.

Wilkes-Barre also serves as a home to several area business parks which form industrial hubs in plastics, food processing, and warehousing for the local population. The Wilkes-Barre area boasts its connection to AEP and HPG plastics processing,

Gatorade, and Mission foods processing among other companies. Due to the location of Wilkes-Barre near the intersection of U.S. highways 80 and 81 which run east-west and north-south respectively, many commercial transportation and logistics operations are based out of or pass through Wilkes-Barre enroute to New York/New Jersey or the west coast. The city also hosts a substantial health care industry with a large presence from Geisinger Health Care, Wyoming Valley Health Care, Blue Cross insurance and the mail-order pharmacy Caremark.

These industries serve as an economic foundation for the community; they do not drive the area to be an economic sensation, but they do keep it from sinking too far into economic despair. A representative from the Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Business and Industry described the economic health of the area as generally stable. “We don’t have the low-lows that other places experience, but we also don’t have the high-highs.”

Indeed, the city has overcome several economic hardships in its struggle to survive. In addition to the ongoing challenges of shifting away from a coal economy and the current recession, Wilkes-Barre has not yet fully recovered from a devastating flood following Hurricane Agnes in 1972. The storm surge pushed the Susquehanna River – which flows through the heart of Wilkes-Barre – four feet over the city levees and flooded downtown with nine feet of water. Estimated damages were one billion and the downtown portion of Wilkes-Barre still shows signs of its impact and the resulting economic malaise that has since plagued the community. Abandoned buildings, closed stores, and deserted homes are interspersed with signs of livelihood as one drives along the main streets and through residential neighborhoods in Wilkes-Barre.

Despite or perhaps because of these circumstances, the population is declining. Between 2000 and 2006, Wilkes-Barre recorded a -4.3% population change (U.S. Census Bureau). Yet Mayor Thomas Leighton has faith that Wilkes-Barre can and will thrive. His “I believe” campaign, initiated in 2005 is intended to revitalize Wilkes-Barre by not only boosting the city’s spirits with a reinvigorated sense of community, but also by opening a downtown theatre complex and completing the Wilkes-Barre Riverwalk area which includes pedestrian trails and open-air auditorium seating along the bank of the Susquehanna River. The Riverwalk, completed in 2009, is intended to attract visitors from the entire Wyoming Valley as does the Wilkes-Barre Fine Arts Festival, the Wyoming Valley Veterans Day parade, and several other community events held throughout the year.

An important contributor to these and other community events in Wilkes-Barre is the 1st Battalion, 109th Field Artillery Regiment of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. The 109th, as it is commonly called, refers to the Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 109th Field Artillery Regiment stationed in the municipality of Kingston as well as Batteries A and B stationed in the neighboring townships of Plymouth and Nanticoke, respectively. Company G (or “Golf”) of the 228th Support Battalion is also considered by some to be part of the unit despite the fact that the Army administratively reassigned it to a different headquarters several years ago. There are approximately 345 soldiers in the 109th Headquarters element and Batteries A and B and another 130 soldiers assigned to Golf Company.

Soldiers from the 109th regularly contribute to the community of Wilkes-Barre, hosting or providing staging areas for city events in their armories, assisting local law enforcement with traffic control during large events, or providing emergency response capabilities after local incidents. These activities are at times coordinated directly with the city and not necessarily authorized by the Governor. For example, the 109th hosted an H1N1 flu clinic in the Wilkes-Barre Armory – one of the largest buildings in town. While run by city health officials, the unit and many of its soldiers assisted in coordinating the event for mass immunization. The Armory also hosts community events such as the circus, wrestling tournaments, and NASCAR publicity events and soldiers from the unit are heavily involved in planning and executing the annual Wyoming Valley Veteran's Day Parade. However, 109th soldiers can also be called upon by the Governor to assist city, county, or regional authorities in state emergencies, such as the winter storms of 2007-2008 or the flooding of the Susquehanna River in 1972 following Hurricane Agnes.

When called upon by the federal government, 109th soldiers perform military-specific roles. Excluding Golf Company, the 109th is a Field Artillery unit. In layman's terms, Field Artillery forces are modern cannoniers. They coordinate and provide for explosive effects on the battlefield through indirect cannon and rocket firepower. This field is considered a combat military occupational specialty along with infantry, armor, and air defense artillery. Combat in this sense is a categorization distinct from combat support or service support specialties such as military police or transportation support. While officially designated as a Field Artillery unit, the 109th has not always performed

these duties. During the 2004 deployment, 109th soldiers were employed overseas as general purpose forces serving in a military police role. However during the 2008 deployment, soldiers from B Battery earned the distinction of being the first Howitzer-equipped National Guard unit to destroy an enemy target with a specially designed precision guided round. By the end of that deployment, the unit had fired nearly 1200 rounds in a combat theatre – an accomplishment the unit proudly publicizes.

The 2008 deployment to Iraq marked the fifth time elements of the 109th have deployed overseas since September 11, 2001. Whether and how these deployments have influenced the community's public support for the War on Terror is the central research question of the next chapter.

VI. Qualitative Data Analysis and Findings

This chapter presents the data analysis and explains the findings associated with my qualitative research in Wilkes-Barre, PA.

Prologue: Citizen-Soldiers or Soldier-Citizens?

I'd been visiting Wilkes-Barre for months and had come to the Kingston Armory several times already for events and interviews with members of the 109th. I arrived early on the cold December evening and walked into the Armory as the soldiers were practicing formations for the "Welcome Home" ceremony that would recognize 89 soldiers who returned from a year-long deployment to Iraq several months earlier. Unit personnel I had interacted with on previous visits recognized me, not necessarily by name – although some could – but as a familiar face who was working on "something" official with the unit. In the beginning, many of the soldiers had assumed I was media since I regularly took notes in my trusty field journal, but by now the leaders understood I was conducting research on the unit and I got the distinct impression they were excited to have someone - anyone - interested in what they do. One of my primary informants in the unit greeted me warmly and told me to make myself at home, that the ceremony would start in about thirty minutes.

As I waited for the ceremony to begin I circled amongst the junior soldiers who congregated in groups awaiting the next orders and mingled with civilian guests as they

trickled in. Most of the guests were family and friends of the returning soldiers, but several elements of the broader community arrived to show their support for the troops. Small groups of men from local veterans groups, proudly wearing military-inspired attire, walked into the Armory confidently, clearly familiar with the setting and friendly with key members of the unit. A group of Italian-American Veterans, donning matching white satin jackets decorated with American flag patches and trimmed with red, white, and green stripes, appeared to have an almost familial bond with the soldiers in charge of the administration/public affairs office - one of whom was of Italian descent. Three representatives from the Wyoming Valley Korean War Veterans Association were also in attendance. Carrying three flags of a traditional color guard, they warmly greeted the Italians and several of the soldiers before posting their colors on the left side of the guest seating area.

A half-dozen members of a local motorcycle rider club “Wheels of Freedom” stealthily came in and stood against the back wall, arms folded across their chests. Their black leather jackets with patriotic patches seemed to serve as an outward sign of who they felt they were. As I spoke to one of the bikers to discern whether they were related to any of the troops, I realized quickly he was a man of few words. They were there “to show support,” he said, and added little else - perhaps because he didn’t want to be bothered, perhaps because he felt it unnecessary to elaborate beyond that.

A handful of local seventh and eighth grade children arrived in a flurry of youthful exuberance. They had made a dozen or so welcome home signs and hurriedly taped them up along the rails bordering the Armory. Their attendance at the event

counted towards mandatory community service hours for their school civics project, but they were clearly excited to be there. None of the five children were directly related to a soldier in the 109th, but two of them had close family members in the service and felt a special connection to the military.

Most of these guests openly exuded or directly expressed pride in their country and gratitude for the troops and their safe return home. However when the ceremony began the soldiers in ranks still outnumbered the guests in the audience.

The ceremony itself consisted of traditional opening elements, such as the singing of the national anthem and invocation, and was followed by several speeches recognizing the superb performance of the soldiers while mobilized with the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Speakers highlighted the technical details of the deployment as the unit became the only cannon battery in the Army that owns and qualified on both the M109A6 Paladin and M777A2 Howitzers and was the first element of the 109th to conduct combat artillery missions since World War II. Following these remarks, the Battalion Commander presented six individual soldiers with Bronze Star medals in recognition of superior performance in a theatre of combat and recognized five wives who were influential leaders of the family readiness group. To conclude, the soldiers conducted several military drill maneuvers which returned the contingent of 89 recently deployed soldiers back to their primary unit in garrison. This essentially made the 109th “whole again.”

To a guest with an untrained eye, the ceremony may have felt foreign, unfamiliar, very “military.” Soldiers in green camouflage uniforms stood in ranks before the

audience, responding diligently to calls to attention, parade rest, and present arms, and being praised with descriptions of valor on a combat battlefield over six thousand miles away from this mid-sized town in northeastern Pennsylvania. These men may have appeared to be the epitome of Army soldiers, representing all that is encompassed by selfless service to country.

On the other hand, a veteran who can pick up on such things may have noticed that several of the soldiers had trouble performing the “about face” maneuver and the narrator was dutifully reading the detailed script for the event, which he was familiar with, but perhaps not used to fully embracing. The men in this unit were clearly citizen-soldiers, operating in but not completely at home in a military world thick with formality, precision, and attention to detail.

In the end, whether these men are more soldier than citizen or more citizen than soldier may depend on who is observing them....

Perceptions of Military Force

Central to the idea that there may be a relationship between the mobilization of Army National Guard soldiers and public support for the use of military force is that Reserve Component soldiers are both citizens of the communities from which they deploy and soldiers of the U.S. military. In order to determine whether this relationship exists, it is first useful to explore whether and how people think about various types of U.S. forces. Do Americans understand the differences between active duty soldiers, reservists, and National Guardsmen and if so, do they consider these differences when evaluating the use of military force?

Generally speaking, the evidence suggests that much of the local population adheres to the perception that those who volunteer for military service – in any way – are first and foremost members of the U.S. military. Many people in the community of Wilkes-Barre do not consider National Guardsmen first as citizens or even as citizen-soldiers. The dominant perception is that they are simply soldiers - not a unique or separate category of troops.

That National Guard soldiers are perceived primarily as soldiers was echoed throughout my research. Jack Cleary, the father of a fallen active duty soldier and active member of the community on veteran's issues, argued that "whether National Guard or active duty, [the people of this area] don't look at them any different. They are either friends and neighbors or people who grew up here and enlisted in the military."

This dynamic was illustrated clearly in an interview I conducted with a middle-aged white-collar city employee who had lived in Wilkes-Barre for most of his life. His understanding of the National Guard was confined to the general perception that they were affiliated with the military. He stated bluntly, "A soldier is a soldier. I don't pick up on those kinds of distinctions," referring to the difference between active, reserve, and Guard forces.

The Commander of the 1st Battalion, 109th Field Artillery Regiment, agreed that most people do not necessarily understand the various categories of military manpower. Although he feels the history of the 109th Field Artillery unit is deeply intertwined with the history of the Wyoming Valley, he described the modern relationship between National Guard units and their hometowns in this way: "The 109th is now just the local

military unit to affiliate with.” As Commander of the 109th, Colonel Miller is among the most prominent military members in the region and he sees his role at times to be “senior military attaché to the Wyoming Valley.” From his perspective, “whenever anyone has a question related to the military, whether it is about the 109th, the Army Reserve unit in Hanover [township], or a son who is on active force stationed in another state, they call us [the Armory].”

To explore this dynamic further, I asked members of the general public their thoughts about local Guard soldiers serving overseas and whether they consider the source of military manpower [active or Guard] important. The results of the street-intercept surveys reinforced data gathered in long interviews and indicate that many people either do not perceive the technical differences between active, reserve, and National Guard soldiers or do not consider such differences relevant.

For example, when asked how they felt about the Pennsylvania Army National Guard fighting overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan, eleven respondents implied they felt that local Guard soldiers are first and foremost members of the U.S. military. Specific comments included:

- “It’s part of the job.”
- “They signed up for it.”
- “That’s what they are there for – they are doing their job.”
- “They are serving their purpose. It’s kind of what they signed up for.”
- “They are doing what they signed up to do and following orders. So long as there is a war overseas, they have no choice but to be there.”
- “It’s not good to have anyone fighting, but the country needs to defend itself, so it doesn’t matter where they come from.”

- “Just like anyone else, they are there to defend our country.”
- “If they need to be there, they need to be there.”

This theme -- that Guardsmen are soldiers who volunteered to serve -- was by far the strongest to emerge in response to how people felt about local Guardsmen fighting overseas. Only one smaller theme emerged, with five respondents indicating an overarching desire for the troops to come home. It is worth noting however that of these, not one respondent specifically mentioned Guard soldiers coming home. Rather, they referred to “the troops” or “all troops.”

Similar results emerged when I asked people if it mattered to them whether active duty or National Guard soldiers deployed overseas. Overall, twenty of forty-three respondents indicated that it did not make a difference to them who deploys and fights overseas during war. One respondent said it didn’t matter but admitted that she didn’t know “too much of what the difference would be.” Another stated that it did not matter to him personally because, “I don’t know people in either [the active duty military or the National Guard].”

More telling however is that of the twenty respondents that indicated it did not matter, twelve respondents directly implied that Guard soldiers are soldiers first, citizens later. Some comments that reflect this opinion include:

- “They [National Guards soldiers] knew what they were signing up for”
- “People who sign up for the National Guard know what they are getting into – or at least they should.”
- “Whoever is called is called.”

- “That’s what the National Guard is for – to back up the troops. They know that when they sign up.”
- “It doesn’t matter. They’re on duty, getting paid.”
- “Troops are troops.”
- “That’s what they are hired to do.”
- “They are all the same, fighting for the same reasons, you know? They’re all soldiers.”
- “If it’s needed, I don’t see a problem with anyone going. That’s what they’re there for – freedom.”

Again, this explicit perception that Guardsmen are simply soldiers was the strongest that arose from the responses to this question during the street-intercept surveys.

Although most survey participants indicated that it did not matter whether active duty or National Guard soldiers deployed, several other smaller themes did arise in response to this question. Five respondents felt the National Guard should deploy only after the active duty soldiers, not ahead of them or instead of them. One man stated “you shouldn’t send the [National Guard] unless it is an all-out battle...Two and three deployments is wrong.”

Four people believed that the National Guard should remain in the United States for domestic emergencies and homeland security. Despite a long history of Guard units fighting overseas, one respondent argued, “The National Guard is supposed to protect the nation on our soil” while another stated that the Guard is “key to the internal security of the United States.”

Seven respondents were broadly classified as providing an antiwar response to the question. These people did not approve of sending soldiers to war regardless of whether the soldier was active, reserve, or National Guard. This category included respondents that indicated pacifist opposition to all war in general such as “Make love, not war” as well as those that made an explicit or oblique reference opposing the War on Terror in particular. For example, one respondent indicated he didn’t think we should have “*any* troops over there” referring to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lastly, seven respondents were grouped into an “other” category that combined unique (singular) responses such as a call for the return of a draft and responses that could not be coded due to a lack of response, a response of “I don’t know”, or a response that displayed sufficient confusion. An example of the type of response in the other category includes “it is hard for everyone I guess.” Another respondent in this category was unclear on what the National Guard was and began asking questions such as “What do [the Guard soldiers] do?” and “What else does the Guard do besides fight overseas?”

The categories and a breakdown of responses are provided below.




Figure 1: Thematic Responses to Street-Intercept Survey Question: Does It Matter to You Whether Active or Reserve Soldiers Deploy Overseas?

As you can see in Figure 1, the largest category and the majority of the respondents indicated indifference to whether the nation deployed National Guard soldiers or active duty forces to fight overseas – with the most common reason provided being that those that join the Pennsylvania National Guard are simply soldiers.

Indeed, even city leaders seemed to view local Guard soldiers as simply another form of available manpower during local emergencies. At the Wyoming Valley Veteran’s Day Parade on November 8th, 2009, the Mayor of Wilkes-Barre described the 109th as always being available when needed. However, his knowledge of the 109th seemed limited to what the organization and its resources did for the city. He had no knowledge of soldiers currently deployed or recently returned from deployment despite a contingent of 89 soldiers having returned from a year in Iraq two months prior. He also admitted to not having regular contact with the commander of the 109th. When asked if

the mobilization of local units impacted the unit's ability to assist the community when needed, he said no, "because they are well stocked." Further questioning clarified that by "well stocked" he meant the unit had sufficient manpower to always help the city. His response and lack of knowledge about the local Guard unit might imply a perception of 109th soldiers not as citizens and constituents of the community, but rather as emergency response resources to call upon when needed.

A city police watch commander and patrol officer at the parade that day also implied a one-way relationship between the city and the 109th. "They [the 109th] are always there when we need them," and referred to the unit's assistance with traffic control for the parade. While the police officers were enthusiastic about the significant contributions of the 109th to the city, their perception of the unit seemed limited to what the 109th provided the city in terms of additional resources.

Overall, there was little evidence that soldiers of the 109th were perceived to be integrated citizens and community members. Instead, many people perceived them first and foremost as members of the U.S. military – despite their part-time status as citizen-soldiers of the National Guard.

The Impact of Local Army National Guard Mobilizations

Having explored how people perceive local Army National Guard forces, it is also worthwhile to examine the impact, if any, of Guard mobilizations on the community from which it mobilizes. While the mobilization of an individual soldier will always have a direct impact on his or her family and friends, this research did not focus on impact at the

personal level. Instead, my research sought to capture the broader impact on the Wilkes-Barre community, to include socio-psychological, economic, or political elements.

I found no evidence of a significant impact to the community since what can be seen as an initial socio-psychological impact to the large-scale mobilization of the 109th in 2004. Nearly 300 Guard soldiers from the 109th were called upon to deploy to Iraq in 2004 – marking the first time the unit had been called upon to deploy overseas during war since World War II. Spouses of several of these soldiers recall an overwhelming amount of community support both at the departure events and at the homecoming events the following year. They described the ceremonies and parades as including multitudes of flags and yellow ribbons, fire engine and helicopter escorts for the soldiers' buses, and the entire local high school coming out in force to show support.

A reporter covering the homecoming ceremony for B Battery in Nanticoke that year described the event as “packed.” “The entire street leading up to the high school gym [event venue] was three to four people deep,” he said. Yet he quickly added that there hasn't been a homecoming parade of that magnitude since.

Others agreed. According to representatives of the Family Readiness Group, hundreds of family members attended the support meetings during that initial 2004 deployment, whereas only a handful showed up to meetings in 2009. This is perhaps in part due to the fact that the number of soldiers mobilized at one time is smaller. Instead of 300 soldiers deploying together, the 109th has more recently mobilized contingents ranging from 20 to 160 soldiers. Also, the more recently deployed soldiers return to their homes individually when redeployed. Official welcome home ceremonies are now

scheduled two to three months after their return to allow soldiers additional time to readjust to their families and civilian lives.

During the December 2009 Welcome Home ceremony for 89 soldiers who returned from Iraq in early September 2009, most of the elements from the community who attended to welcome the troops home [such as the immediate family and friends of soldiers, representatives from various veterans organizations, and the school children who made signs] had an existing connection or affiliation with the military. There were very few guests in attendance who did not have a prior connection to the military. Although local print and television media outlets did cover the event, the Welcome Home ceremony was largely insular to the soldiers themselves and those who are directly related to or affiliated with the military already.

A post-deployment awards ceremony for these same 89 soldiers was held the following day in the smaller Naticoke armory. Known as a Freedom Salutes Ceremony, this ceremony is part of a nation-wide Freedom Salutes Campaign organized by the Army National Guard. The ceremony consists of presenting soldiers and their family members (if applicable) with Army National Guard paraphernalia in recognition of their service. For example, a soldier who had completed his first deployment received a cased American flag, a commemorative coin, and a certificate as well as a pin for his spouse and a military-inspired board game for his children if he has any. Soldiers completing their second and third deployments received additional items such as a ring, a mantel clock, and a Keystone Freedom Medal. While local print and TV news outlets covered this event as well, the December 2009 Freedom Salutes Ceremony was attended by less

than a dozen audience members, including myself and the reporters. Although the ceremony was in part intended to recognize the support of family members, the total number of spouses and other family members in attendance was in the single digits.

I attended a similar awards ceremony held in the larger Kingston armory in June 2009 for 161 troops returning from Afghanistan and Sinai Peninsula peacekeeping operations. Of the 161 soldiers honored in this Freedom Salutes Ceremony, 74 had just completed their second overseas deployment and 3 had completed their third. Several personal awards were also presented; one soldier received the Bronze Star while three others were honored with Meritorious Service Medals. This June 2009 Freedom Salutes ceremony was better attended by family members. Many of the soldiers' spouses and children were in attendance along with the parents and significant others of many of the single soldiers. However, the Ceremony lacked any discernible show of community support from the broader community. No civic organizations or veterans group attended the ceremony and few if any guests were not directly related to a soldier.

Each of the above events was publicized in advance through the local print news and covered by local TV and print media outlets. Yet despite being open to the public, only the Welcome Home Ceremony appeared to draw members of the public to the Armory – and that ceremony only drew in limited numbers. The National Guard soldiers, at times accompanied by their families and friends, were both the honorees as well as the primary audience.

Unlike the descriptions of the widespread support for soldiers mobilized for the 2004 deployment, it appears the more recent deployments had little if any broader socio-

psychological impact on the community. Yet one might ask whether community attendance at such events can truly represent the deeper ties between an Army National Guard unit and its hometown; thus, it is important to explore other sources of evidence.

Indeed, there is a sufficient amount of evidence confirming that ties between the 109th and its hometown do exist. For example, interviews and newspaper articles confirm that soldiers from the 109th regularly participate in community service events to honor local veterans, work with Boy Scout troops, or educate grade school children on the realities of deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, local businesses have a variety of ways in which they show support for the troops, particularly through morale, welfare, and recreation fundraising. The owners of a Nanticoke pizzeria, for example, were recognized by the 109th in December 2009 for outstanding support to the troops through routine care packages to deployed soldiers as well as fundraising assistance for the family readiness group and the donation of a new television for the soldiers' recreation room. The husband and wife business team had been supporting local troops for several years through donations collected in a coin drop at the pizzeria. Although their initial support of the troops began when a close friend of theirs deployed overseas, it persisted well after his return home as their pizzeria patrons continued to contribute funds in the coin drop. Other employers and community organizations contribute in similar ways to efforts that support the troops. The Plymouth Rotary Club and the Kielbasa Festival Committee, for example, donated money to the 109th's Battery A to help offset the costs of a homecoming celebration for returning soldiers. Similarly, a half-dozen organizations such as a local Applebee's franchise and the Pepsi Bottling Company of

Wilkes-Barre, contributed funds or products in support of a reception following the December 2009 homecoming ceremony.

This and other data illustrate that ties exist between the unit and the community, however it is insufficient to illustrate a broad impact of local Army National Guard mobilizations on the community. Overall, while select elements of the community appear intertwined with the unit, the impact of Army National Guard mobilizations on Wilkes-Barre appear to be limited. However the impact of local National Guard mobilizations may take many forms, making it important to explore the possible economic and political impacts as well.

According to a representative from the Greater Wilkes-Barre Chamber of Business and Industry, there was “no significant economic impact” when the 109th mobilized. Considering the unit has approximately 400 people in a town of 43,000, a widespread or significant impact to the workforce seems unlikely even if the entire unit deployed overseas at once.

Amidst multiple national reports of communities facing challenges associated with city first responders deploying as reservists, I also explored whether the mobilization of Guard soldiers has had any such critical impacts on local fire, police, or emergency response elements. No evidence of this kind of small but critical impact in Wilkes-Barre surfaced during my fieldwork.

Lastly, it appeared that the mobilizations of the 109th have made little impact on local politics. According to a representative of the Luzerne County GOP, neither the War on Terror nor the mobilization of local National Guard soldiers was an issue in the

closely contested 2008 election for the 11th Congressional District. A former reporter for the one of the community's primary newspapers, this woman indicated that military issues did not arise as one of the top five concerns in the newspaper voter panels and "wasn't even an issue here." The 2008 Republican candidate for PA-11 Lou Barletta confirmed that wartime-related issues did not play a role in the election. Barletta noted his surprise that Iraq, Afghanistan, and other War on Terror concerns were not a factor in the local 2008 election since such issues were a significant part of the debate at the Presidential level, but he stated that the race centered predominantly on illegal immigration and health care concerns.

In neighboring Pennsylvania 10th District, Representative Chris Carney (D) explained that the War on Terror was an issue in 2006 when he ousted Republican incumbent Don Sherwood, but not as much so in 2008. However he admitted that wartime issues may have been more prominent in his races due to his status as a Navy Reserve Intelligence Officer. According to Carney, his personal experience was compelling to people as an alternative to the usual "mimicking of party lines." Barletta agreed that the war was more of an issue in the 10th District races because of Carney's affiliation with the Navy Reserves.

In short, this evidence suggests that the mobilizations of the 109th have not had a significant impact on the community from which it mobilized since the initial socio-psychological reaction to the deployment of over 300 soldiers in 2004.

Factors Influencing Local Public Support for War

A final step in determining whether a relationship exists between the mobilizations of the 109th Field Artillery unit and local public support for the War on Terror is to explore what factors influence local public support for the War on Terror. Do the mobilizations of the local Guard unit influence public support for the use of military force and if so, how?

In short, there is no evidence that the mobilization of the 109th Field Artillery Battalion influenced public support for the War on Terror. No participant in any portion of this research specifically mentioned or even vaguely indicated that the mobilization of local National Guard soldiers affected his or her support for or against the use of military force in the War on Terror. As a local business owner quipped, “People believe what they believe,” implying that the mobilization of local Guard soldiers has no significant impact on public support for or against military operations.

If the mobilizations of the local Guard unit are not a contributing factor for public support of the War on Terror in the Wilkes-Barre community, the question remains: what is? What do people cite as factors influencing their support for the use of military force in current operations? Perhaps unsurprisingly, the answer to this question is multifaceted. No single theme dominated the research into which factors influence public support for war. Participants indicated a variety of factors that were influential in shaping their opinion on the War on Terror as the lack of consensus in the literature review on public opinion and the use of military force may have predicted.

This is illustrated best by examining the data from the street-intercept surveys. I coded the responses to the open-ended survey questions on one's thoughts regarding Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those responses that offered a rationale underlying their support for the War on Terror, I found four strong themes. The first theme indicated the influence of time on support for military operations. Responses such as "it should have been done a long time ago" and "we've been there too long" highlight the impact that the duration of a military conflict has on some citizens.

The second theme reflected concern over a lack of progress or accomplishment. Responses such as "I'm not sure we've accomplished anything" and "I don't see any progress" indicate support for Feaver and Gelphi's hypothesis that success matters.

The third theme grouped responses that referred to a lack of support for military operations based on a lack of understanding of what purpose the "war" is intended. For example, respondents stated bluntly, "I don't really understand what's going on there" and "I don't understand why we are there" among other comments.

The fourth and final clear theme was a concern over U.S. military casualties. Responses included comments such as "too many people have died," and "all those young boys getting killed is terrible." Responses coded into this theme indicated that the participant specifically mentioned casualties as a factor influencing their opinion regarding Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of the four strong themes above, the first theme - concern over the duration of the conflict – was the strongest, with the three other themes indicating concern over a lack of progress, a lack of understanding, and casualties being equally prevalent. In addition to

these four strong themes, two smaller themes arose during the street-intercept surveys. A small group of participants indicated support for military operations based on a desire to fight terrorism/defend the country and another group indicated a lack of support for military operations based on pacifist inclinations. Each of these themes were present but not as strong as those mentioned earlier.

In addition to the street-intercept surveys, respondents selected for long interviews cited several other factors as influencing public support for military operations. For example, multiple respondents mentioned the role of the President during long interviews. Despite being a self-proclaimed lifelong Republican, one man stated, “We have to go along with the president on [Afghanistan].” Another gentleman indicated that he wanted to “give the president the benefit of the doubt on [Iraq],” and added that the local population was supportive of the president on such matters. Yet another noted that while Americans sometimes “question the mission [of the military], we delegate confidence to the leader.” Each of these gentlemen framed their comments as referring to the presidency as an institution, not as a specific reference to former President Bush or President Obama.

Others participants offered a different rationale. Several respondents speculated that a history of military service impacted support for the use of force. A former active and reserve officer and longtime resident of the area asserted that, “people are more lenient of government policies” due to the strong history of military service in the local region. He believed that the high representation of veterans in the area result in more tolerance for the involvement of troops overseas. “They understand war is war.” Another

gentleman agreed as well. “Wilkes-Barre is a blue collar town and people expect and accept [the use of military force] more. Folks understand that we need people to go to war. We always have and we always will.”

Overall, I did not find consensus on the primary factors underlying or even influencing support for military operations. Throughout both the street-intercept surveys and long interviews, a wide variety of factors were cited as important to public support for military operations – but the deployment(s) of local Guard units was not among them. At no point in the study was the mobilization of local National Guard soldiers cited or even alluded to as a factor influencing public support [or lack thereof] for the War on Terror.

A Closer Examination of the Impact of Local Casualties

As indicated in the previous section, one of the four main themes emerging from the street-intercept surveys in response to factors influencing support for war was U.S. military casualties. However the issue of local casualties and their impact on the community arose multiple times and in different contexts during this research and thus is worth addressing separately.

While casualties are not the only cost of war, they do represent the most salient cost of war – and the loss of a family member, friend, neighbor, or colleague is even more salient than a “battle death” in the abstract. What I found in my research however, was that the death of a service member from the local community – regardless of whether that person was a personal acquaintance or not – had a highly salient impact on individuals.

A journalist working for one of the community's main newspapers had the task of covering funeral services for several of the fallen soldiers from the Wilkes-Barre area. While she did not know the deceased personally, the loss of the service members and the ceremonies surrounding their death remained vivid to her. Four years after the funeral of one local soldier, this woman fought back tears as she relayed the experience of covering the event. She described an overwhelming turnout from the community attending the wake and the funeral, with scores of people waiting up to two hours for the ritual viewing the night prior to the funeral. The funeral itself combined not only religious but patriotic symbols and ceremonies. While the journalist knew of the tradition of presenting the folded American flag to the next of kin, she had never before witnessed it in the context of a battle death and was moved to tears. As she walked amongst the crowd gathering information for her story, she asked one of the funeral guests how he knew the soldier and was surprised and overwhelmed to find that he did not know the deceased at all. The man had driven into town from a smaller borough to pay his respects for the loss of a service member who was, in his opinion, a "hero" and one of their own in the community. The fact that this man knew nothing of the soldier other than that he was a killed in action and from the community struck her as both perplexing and inspiring. She became emotional thinking of what the loss of a local hero meant to this man that he would come to the funeral of a complete stranger.

According to several eyewitness reports of the funerals, there were many individuals and groups that likely did not know the deceased personally. Honor guards from local veterans associations regularly attend funeral services for the deceased as do

the Patriot Guard Riders. The Patriot Guard Riders is a motorcycle-rider organization that exists to attend funeral services of fallen American heroes to show respect for the deceased and shield the mourning families from any protestor or group of protestors. Operating across the country via state and at times regional coordinators, members of the Patriot Guard Riders along with the local motorcycle-rider club Wheels of Freedom have attended many of the funerals for deceased service members in the Wilkes-Barre area.

However, in keeping with the finding that many people do not perceive the difference between the various “types” of soldiers (active, Guard, or reserve), there is evidence that the community does not distinguish such differences in the event of a casualty as well. A 2008 newspaper article describing the loss of First Lieutenant Jeffrey DePrimo, a Pennsylvania Army National Guard soldier from West Pittston, noted that “losing any soldier is heartbreaking, but the loss of a local soldier is even harder.” The distinction being made was not specific to the component of the fallen soldier (active, Guard, or reserve) but rather whether the soldier was a member of the community. As the Commander of the 109th poignantly phrased it, the deaths of local service members - regardless of component, branch of service, or manner of death – constitute “lost sons of the [Wyoming] Valley.”

Jack Cleary agreed. His son, First Lieutenant Michael Cleary, was an active Army soldier who was killed by an improvised explosive device in Iraq in 2005. Although he attended college in New York and was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, Mike Cleary had grown up in the township of Dallas [approximately 10 miles from downtown Wilkes-Barre], graduating from Dallas High School in 1999 after being

captain of the tennis and soccer teams. Mike was killed just ten days before his redeployment home and two months prior to marrying his high school sweetheart. Although Mike hadn't lived in Dallas for over six years, the community rallied in support of the Cleary family who had lived and worked in Wilkes-Barre and Dallas for over 40 years. According to Jack Cleary, his son's funeral gathered between 4,000 and 5,000 guests. In fact, the family was required to change the location of the wake and funeral several times because police and funeral home officials expected crowds to overrun the capacity of the selected venues. Originally planned to be in the funeral home, the event was shifted to the Dallas High School gymnasium and later moved again to the larger Misericordia University field house in order to accommodate the expected number of attendees.

Jack Cleary believes the outpouring of support for his son reflected his family's strong ties within the community and argued that "whether National Guard or active duty, they [the people of this area] don't look at them any different." Fallen service members are either friends or neighbors or they are people who grew up here and then joined the military, he explained. An unrelated guest at Mike Cleary's funeral seemed to agree. His wife had known Mike from high school, but he knew only that Mike had died serving his country. The man and his wife waited nearly two hours to get through the viewing line and the experience remained vivid for him. When I asked him his opinions on the war in Iraq, he indicated he supported the initial decision and efforts to stabilize Iraq in order to stabilize the Middle East as a region. However, he followed up by saying "But it's difficult because we've been there so long" and added that he didn't want people from his

community dying. He emphatically noted “I don’t want to go to more viewings.” While the man did not directly admit that casualties influenced his level of support for the war, the loss of a local soldier and his experience attending the funeral was extremely salient to him.

While the mobilization of National Guard soldiers does not appear to influence the level of support for the war, it remains possible that U.S. casualties – particularly local casualties – do have an impact on public support for the use of military force. While my research indicates that the public response to local losses is not limited to local National Guard troops, but rather is similar for all fallen service members, the community-basing structure of the Army National Guard could create “casualty clusters” in unit hometowns. Indeed a male journalist covering the funerals for the other major community newspaper noted with great concern that New Milford, a borough in neighboring Susquehanna County, lost seven soldiers in a single deployment. He said he simply “couldn’t imagine” how to handle such a loss.

Although Wilkes-Barre has not experienced a casualty cluster in this way, such clusters do exist and therefore it is possible that the mobilization of Army National Guard soldiers can influence public support through local casualties. However, because the community response to casualties appears not to distinguish a service member’s component (active, Guard, or reserve), I have insufficient evidence to determine whether a causal relationship exists or could exist. What I can determine with confidence is that future research should further explore the role of local casualties on a community’s level of support for military operations.

Qualitative Conclusions

In summary, I found no evidence of a relationship between the mobilization(s) of National Guard units and public support for the use of military force during the War on Terror using the ethnographic case study method. Fieldwork in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania revealed that the public does not necessarily perceive local National Guard soldiers as uniquely connected to the community, but rather many people view part-time National Guard citizen-soldiers as simply soldiers. Further, I found little evidence that the mobilization of local National Guard soldiers have had a widespread impact on the community at large since 2004 and no evidence of the mobilizations being a factor influencing public support for the War on Terror.

These findings suggest that the National Guard does not necessarily engender a unique connection with the local population and that the consequences of using the National Guard as simply another form of military manpower may not stimulate public engagement as the Abrams Doctrine predicts.

VII. Quantitative Data Analysis and Findings

Chapter VI examined the relationship between the mobilization of an Army National Guard unit and local public support for the use of military force in the War on Terror using qualitative methods in a single community of interest. This chapter presents the data analysis and explains the findings associated with examining the same question using regression analyses¹⁸ of quantitative data from 325 counties in Colorado, Georgia, Oregon, and Pennsylvania for the 2004 and 2008 election cycles.

Understanding the Key Variables

In statistical terms, this research seeks to determine if the mobilizations of local Army National Guard soldiers are a statistically significant factor in determining local public support for the War on Terror as measured through the change in percentage of Republican vote in county election results. Yet before running the series of regression analyses, it is important to understand how each of the key variables is constructed and what it represents.

As discussed in chapter IV, the dependent variable is the change in percent Republican vote between elections. For the 2004 analysis, this variable is calculated as the percent Republican vote in 2000 subtracted from the percent Republican vote in 2004.

¹⁸ Due to heteroskedasticity, all regressions in this chapter use robust standard errors.

For the 2008 analysis, the variable is calculated as the percent Republican vote in 2004 subtracted from the percent Republican vote in 2008.

To explore the relationship between the dependent variables and local Army Guard mobilizations, I created several mobilization variables to be run in separate regressions. The first is a binary mobilization variable that codes counties in two categories: counties that experienced any number ($x > 0$) of Army National Guard soldiers mobilized prior to the election year and counties that did not experience local mobilizations during this time ($x = 0$). In the 2004 analysis, the binary variable coded counties that experienced any level of mobilization between fiscal years 2001 and 2004 as a 1 and counties that did not experience local mobilizations during this time as a 0. The coding was similar for the 2008 analysis, with the binary mobilization variable capturing counties that experienced any level of mobilization prior to the end of fiscal year 2008 as a 1.

Next, I created a mobilization variable using the specific number of local Army National Guard soldiers mobilized prior to the election in question. For the 2004 analysis, the variable is the specific number of soldiers mobilized in each county between fiscal years 2001 and 2004¹⁹. For the 2008 analysis, this variable is the specific number of soldiers mobilized between fiscal years 2005 and 2008. Thus, for the 2008 analysis, this variable captures only the recent mobilizations of the four years prior to the election. I created a separate variable that captured total mobilization for the 2008 analysis. This

¹⁹ Lebanon County, PA includes the city of Annville – home to Fort Indiantown Gap, a large National Guard base and mobilization site. Lebanon County is an outlier in the 2004 data only and was removed from the dataset with no substantial impact on the results of the regression.

total mobilization variable captured the specific number of soldiers mobilized over the duration of the War on Terror to determine if a cumulative effect of mobilizations over time exists separately from more recent mobilizations. Thus, the total mobilization variable specifies the number of local Army National Guard soldiers mobilized between fiscal years 2001 and 2008.

In addition to the mobilization variables of interest, I use several demographic and socio-economic variables in the expanded model, including population, percentage of the county population that is black, percentage of the county population that is Hispanic or Latino, median household income, percentage of the county population with a bachelors degree or higher (education), and persons per square mile (population density) as an urban-rural indicator. The final runs of the regression also include a local casualty variable that tallies all local deaths in the War on Terror, regardless of branch of service, component, or military operation. The casualty variable is a per capita variable to eliminate multicollinearity in the model and is calculated as local casualties per 1000 persons.

Table 1 below offers summary statistics on each of the variables used in the regressions.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of All Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Repchange04_00	326	3.64	3.22	-7.09	12.48
Repchange08_00	326	-2.82	3.73	-15.25	6.95
Binary04	326	30.98		0.00	1.00
Binary08	326	43.56		0.00	1.00
#Mobilized01_04	325	38.10	101.80	0.00	645.00
#Mobilized05_08	326	44.40	118.90	0.00	855.00
Totalmob	326	86.30	212.10	0.00	1,694.00
Population	326	86,476	168,872	558	1,517,550
% Black	326	0.15	0.18	0.00	0.76
% Hispanic	326	0.08	0.10	0.01	0.63
% Bachelors	325	0.17	0.09	0.05	0.57
Popdenisty	325	201.23	669.80	0.70	9,999.90
HHincome	326	\$44,402	\$11,917	\$25,208	\$100,493
Casualties, per capita	326	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.27

Exploring the Basic Relationship: A Bivariate Model

I began my quantitative research by exploring the bivariate relationship between the mobilization of local Army National Guard soldiers and the change in the percent Republican vote in the sample for the 2004 and 2008 election cycles.

I first used the binary variable to examine whether there was a difference in percent Republican vote between counties that had any number ($x > 0$) of Army National Guard soldiers mobilized and counties that did not experience local mobilizations ($x = 0$). The results of the models indicate that the mobilization of local Guard soldiers was significant in the 2004 election ($p < .05$) and 2008 election ($p < .001$), with the sign of the coefficients in both 2004 and 2008 indicating that counties that experienced Guard

mobilizations saw a decrease in percent Republican vote as compared to counties that did not have Guard soldiers mobilized.

I then replaced the binary variable with the variable specifying the actual number of Army National Guard soldiers mobilized from each county between fiscal years 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. Again, the relationship between mobilization and the change in Republican vote proved significant and negative in both the 2004 and 2008 elections ($p < .05$).

Lastly, I re-tested the bivariate model for the 2008 election using the total number of soldiers mobilized per county between fiscal years 2001 and 2008 to determine whether a cumulative effect of mobilizations over time exists. These results were significant and negative as well ($p < .05$). Table 2 below details the results of the five bivariate runs.

Table 2: Results of 2004 and 2008 Election Year Bivariate Models
Dependent Variable is % Change in Republican Vote

Election Year	Mobilization Variable	Coefficient	RSE	Probability	R-square
2004	Binary04	-0.996	0.363	.006**	0.0206
2004	#Mobilized01_04	-0.005	0.002	.003**	0.0281
2008	Binary08	-2.076	0.395	.000*	0.0764
2008	#Mobilized05_08	-0.006	0.0017	.001**	0.0326
2008	Totalmob	-0.004	0.0009	.000*	0.0478

N=325 for all runs

*significant beyond the $p = .001$ level

**significant beyond the $p = .05$ level

As the bivariate results illustrate, the impact of mobilizations on percent change in Republican vote is negative in both 2004 and 2008 despite the fact that Republican vote

on average increased in 2004 and decreased in 2008. While these bivariate models capture the basic relationship between the variables of interest, the models lack controls and thus offer limited explanatory value.

Expanding the Model

Because the effects seen in the bivariate relationships above might be caused by a variety of other influences on the level of Republican voting in a county, I next added the demographic and socio-economic variables to the model.

I again began by using the binary variable indicating whether or not a county experienced a local mobilization. For the 2004 election analysis, the binary mobilization variable was not statistically significant, nor was race, population, or population density. Only household income and education were significant ($p < .001$) in determining the percent change in Republican vote. However the coefficient of the binary mobilization variable remained negative in this analysis. Table 3 offers detail.

Table 3: 2004 Election Year Model Results Using Binary Mobilization Variable
Dependant Variable is % Change in Republican Vote

N=325

R-square: .4163

Independent Variable	Coefficient	RSE	Probability	Standardized Beta
Binary04	-0.466	0.326	0.154	-0.067
Population	5.57e	1.19e	0.963	0.003
% Black	-0.269	1.026	0.793	-0.015
% Hispanic	-0.993	1.335	0.457	-0.03
% Bachelors	-27.592	2.064	.000*	-0.813
Population density	-0.0002	0.0002	0.461	-0.033
HH income	0.0001	1.91e	.000*	0.313

*significant beyond the $p = .001$ level

I then replaced the binary mobilization variable with the specific number of soldiers mobilized between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. These results were similar. Only household income and education proved significant ($p < .001$). The number of soldiers mobilized was not statistically significant, indicating that the mobilization of National Guard soldiers was not a significant factor in determining the change in percent Republican vote by county in the 2004 election when controlling for basic socioeconomic variables. However the coefficient of the specific mobilization variable remained negative, indicating a negative relationship between the mobilization of local Guard soldiers and percent change in Republican vote. [Full results for all regressions are available in Appendix E].

Results differed for the 2008 analysis. In the test of the binary mobilization variable, the presence of Guard mobilizations was significant ($p < .001$) and the direction of the coefficient was consistent with earlier runs. Counties with at least one soldier mobilized saw a nearly two percent decrease in Republican vote in 2008 when compared to counties that did not experience Guard mobilizations. In addition, household income and education proved significant as did the percentage of black persons and the percentage of Hispanic/Latino persons. See Table 4 below.

Table 4: 2008 Election Year Model Results Using Binary Mobilization Variable
Dependant Variable is % Change in Republican Vote

N=325

R-square: .3383

Independent Variable	Coefficient	RSE	Probability	Standardized Beta
Binary08	-1.8883	0.3806	.000*	-0.252
Population	1.02e	1.91e	0.594	0.046
% Black	-4.8266	1.2786	.000*	-0.23
% Hispanic	-10.2636	1.6882	.000*	-0.265
% Bachelors	-13.1055	2.6302	.000*	-0.333
Population density	0.0001	0.0003	0.792	0.015
HH income	-0.0001	0	.018**	-0.189

* significant beyond the p=.001 level

**significant beyond the p=.05 level

When I replaced the binary variable with the exact number of soldiers mobilized between fiscal years 2005-2008, the mobilization variable again proved significant ($p < .05$). For every additional soldier mobilized in a county, there was a .004% decrease in Republican vote in 2008. In other words, a county that experienced 100 soldiers mobilized saw a .4 percent decrease in Republican vote while a county that mobilized 350 soldiers -- roughly the size of a small battalion -- experienced a 1.4 percent drop in Republican vote. Consistent with earlier 2008 results, household income, education, and the percent Black and Hispanic also proved significant. Table 5 details the results of this model.

Table 5: 2008 Election Year Model Results Using # Soldiers Mobilized (2005-2008)
Dependant Variable is % Change in Republican Vote

N=325

R-square: .3028

Independent Variable	Coefficient	RSE	Probability	Standardized Beta
#Mobilized05_08	-0.0044	0.0016	.005**	-0.141
Population	-1.60e	2.12e	0.449	-0.073
% Black	-4.6521	1.2923	.000*	-0.221
% Hispanic	-10.0936	1.6084	.000*	-0.261
% Bachelors	-13.093	2.7166	.000*	-0.333
Popdensity	0.0006	0.0003	0.061	0.11
HH income	-0.0001	0	.035**	-0.173

* significant beyond the p=.001 level

**significant beyond the p=.05 level

Next, I ran the 2008 model using the total number of soldiers mobilized from fiscal years 2001 through 2008 to examine possible cumulative effects. This total mobilization variable proved statistically significant ($p < .001$) and negative as well. For every additional soldier mobilized over the course of the War on Terror, there was a .003% decrease in Republican vote. In other words, a community that mobilized 200 soldiers over the course of the War on Terror saw a decrease in Republican vote of .6 percentage points. As expected, household income, education, and race also proved significant in this 2008 model.

Table 6: 2008 Election Year Model Results Using Total Mobilization Variable
Dependant Variable is % Change in Republican Vote

N=325

R-square: .3059

Independent Variable	Coefficient	RSE	Probability	Standardized Beta
Totalmob	-0.0028	0.0007	.000*	-0.158
Population	-1.60e	2.20e	0.63	-0.048
% Black	-4.6646	1.2888	.000*	-0.222
% Hispanic	-9.9853	1.6081	.000*	-0.258
% Bachelors	-12.9253	2.7192	.000*	-0.329
Population density	0.0005	0.0003	0.107	0.096
HH income	-0.0001	0	.032**	-0.176

* significant beyond the p=.001 level

**significant beyond the p=.05 level

In all three tests of the model for the 2008 election [binary, specific, cumulative], the mobilization variables proved statistically significant and negative. These results offer evidence that a negative relationship did exist between mobilization of Guard soldiers and the change in percent Republican vote in 2008.²⁰

Controlling for Local Casualties

Given the strong consensus in the literature on the influence of casualties on public support for war as well as Gardner, Segura, and Wilkening's (1997) research on the salience of local casualties, I next add controls for local casualties in 2008 to discern whether the local mobilization variables maintain statistical significance as well as to

²⁰Scatter plots of the specific and total mobilization variables indicate a degree of nonlinearity in the data, along with a skewed distribution. As a result, I re-ran the regressions using log transformed mobilization variables. These results illustrate similar outcomes to what is presented above with respect to significance (mobilizations variables are insignificant in 2004; significant in 2008) and direction (negative in all runs). In addition, the relationship between the log transformed variables and percent change in Republican vote appears stronger than in the normal runs. Full statistical results of the logged regressions appear in Appendix E.

determine the relationship, if any, of local casualties to the change in percent Republican vote.

I again ran separate tests with each of the three iterations of the 2008 election model [binary, specific, cumulative]. The local casualty variable proved an insignificant factor in determining the change in percent Republican vote in all three regressions. Results of the three models were consistent with earlier runs of the 2008 election year. The mobilization variables proved significant ($p < .05$) in all three regressions as did education, household income, percent black, and percent Hispanic/Latino. The direction and strength of the coefficients for each mobilization variables remained consistent with earlier regressions. The presence of mobilizations in a county led to a 1.87% decrease in Republican vote using the binary variable while the impact of each additional soldier and the number of cumulative soldiers mobilized was -.004% and -.003% respectively.

Quantitative Conclusions

In summary, while the relationship between the mobilization of Guard soldiers and the change in Republican vote was not significant in 2004, the relationship was significant four years later in 2008. Unlike the findings in Chapter VI, these quantitative results support the hypothesis that a relationship exists between the mobilization of local Army National Guard soldiers and local public support for the War on Terror, lending credence to the concepts underlying the Abrams Doctrine. Furthermore, my data suggests that the relationship is negative, in that mobilization tends to decrease support for the war as measured by the change in Republican vote.

VII. Conclusions and Policy Implications

The data and analysis in chapter VI, based on ethnographic case study methods, demonstrate no evidence of a relationship between the mobilization(s) of Army National Guard units and public support for the use of military force during the War on Terror. The mobilizations of local Guard soldiers have had little if any widespread impact on the community at large. In contrast, the quantitative data and analysis in chapter VII offers evidence that a relationship does exist between Guard mobilizations and public support for war, suggesting that the concepts underlying the Abrams Doctrine are indeed valid. How is one to interpret these seemingly conflicting conclusions? And what does it mean for policymakers?

Merging the Results

As stated previously, the purpose of employing mixed methodologies in this research was to draw on the strengths of each method in order to gain insights that would be unavailable using singular approaches. Using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, this study sought to explore the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war – and in doing so, to test the validity of a fundamental assumption of the Abrams Doctrine. In short, I examined whether a relationship existed between Army National Guard mobilization and local public support

for the use of military force in the War on Terror and what factors influenced that relationship.

Based on my research, I conclude that a relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and local public support for the use of military force did exist. Despite seemingly conflicting findings in chapters VI and VII, I find that the qualitative and quantitative data and analysis in this study do not directly contradict each other, but rather offer complementary insights. For example, data from the ethnographic case study indicates that the public perception of Guard soldiers lacks the necessary nuance to differentiate today's citizen-soldier from his regular Army counterpart. Many if not most members of the community did not understand the specific differences between the Reserve and Active Components of the Armed Forces nor did they consider it relevant when considering who fights in our nation's wars. The military is an all-volunteer force and "whoever is called is called" was the clear and strong theme emanating from my fieldwork in Wilkes-Barre. Despite the beliefs of scholars who argue citizen-soldiers serve as an informal mechanism linking America's civilian and military sectors of society, it is possible the modern Army National Guard does not (or perhaps no longer) stimulate a unique connection with its community due to its citizen-soldier status. Community members who are aware may know only that military forces are present at the local Armory – not necessarily discerning the number, component, or branch of the service members. But the simple presence of these forces may be enough – nothing in the Abrams Doctrine requires the general public to have a detailed understanding of the various kinds or sources of military manpower.

Indeed, based on the results of the linear regressions, communities did appear to respond to the experience of mobilizing its local soldiers as evidenced by the significant relationship of the mobilization variables in the 2008 regression analyses. The presence of National Guard mobilizations in a county as measured through the binary mobilization variable resulted in a nearly 2% decrease in percent Republican vote in 2008 as compared to counties that did not mobilize local Guardsmen. Further, the mobilization of a battalion-sized contingent of 350 soldiers from a community resulted in a nearly 1.5% decrease in Republican vote in 2008.

These qualitative and quantitative results together imply that the population is not responding to the mobilization of National Guard soldiers as Reserve Component soldiers in particular, but rather to their proximity. The presence in or proximity to the community is a key factor encouraging the relationship between Army National Guard mobilizations and local public support for war. However, before one declares that the National Guard's geographically dispersed community-basing model alone supports the theories that Abrams intended, one must remember that quantitative data also illustrated the lack of a significant relationship in 2004. If proximity were the only factor involved, the obvious question is how to explain the lack of a significant relationship in 2004 followed by a significant relationship in 2008?

One plausible explanation consistent with the Abrams Doctrine would be that the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war is or becomes significant only when Reserve mobilization is or becomes widespread. In the 2004 analysis, when only 31% of the sample counties experienced a mobilization of local

soldiers, the relationship between local mobilization and change in Republican vote proved insignificant. However, four years later in 2008, 43% of the sample counties had experienced a mobilization of local soldiers and the relationship proved significant at that time. While the data alone cannot prove this explanation conclusively, the existence of a significant relationship in 2008 lends credence to the concept that a widespread mobilization of community-based Army National Guard forces does encourage the engagement (not support) of the American public on the use of military force.

This overall analysis supports my hypothesis that a relationship exists between Army National Guard mobilization and local public support for the use of military force and suggests that the relationship is influenced by proximity and possibly the degree of local mobilizations. In addition to offering evidence in support of the existence of a relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and public support for war, the data in this study also illustrates that the relationship is negative.

In stark contrast to widespread beliefs that Reserve Component mobilizations *increase* public support for war by engaging communities across America, the quantitative data demonstrate that the mobilization of local Guard soldiers led to a decrease in public support for the war as measured through change in Republican vote in both 2004 and 2008. Although the relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and the change in percent Republican vote proved insignificant in the 2004 analysis, the signs of the coefficients associated with the binary and specific mobilization variables were negative. This indicates that the relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and public support for war was negative despite positive approval

ratings for President Bush (over 50%) and support for the war between 2000 and 2004. The relationship remained negative and gained statistical significance in the 2008 analysis when the war was less popular. That the relationship proved negative in both 2004 and 2008 should force a re-examination of the myth that pervades large portions of the national security establishment which assumes a positive relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war.

Assessing the Findings

Having established that the data presented in this study support the hypothesis that a relationship exists between Army National Guard mobilization and public support for war, one must return to the broader question: Is the Abrams Doctrine valid?

I argue that it is. While the original reorganization of the Army that Abrams undertook following Vietnam has changed -- the U.S. Army no longer uses “round-out” brigades for example – the concepts he institutionalized by so closely integrating the active and reserve force remain valid today. The large-scale mobilization of the Army National Guard for the War on Terror appears to have resulted in the engagement of a notable portion of the American public on the use of military force. In this sense, it appears the Abrams Doctrine worked as it was allegedly intended.

Perhaps more importantly, however, the negative relationship implies that the concepts underlying the Abrams Doctrine may indeed hold the ability to perform a conflict-curtailling function that discourages the United States from staying in a protracted war without the support of the American people. As several scholars have argued, the ability of the Abrams Doctrine to prevent another “Vietnam” may be its greatest value.

However, previous opinions relied heavily on the need for Congressional action to achieve this conflict-curtailling function. Both Jones (2004) and Davidson (2003) argue that constituents impacted by widespread Reserve Component mobilizations would pressure their Congressional leaders to scrutinize military operations and act against the President to limit the use of force. Although this study did not examine Congressional level election results, the dynamic of constituents pressuring their local elected officials certainly is possible. However, it is also possible – and arguably more probable -- the public will hold the President directly responsible for the use of military force and signify any support or disapproval via Presidential election results. While a change of two percentage points may not matter in every county in every election, it *can* matter -- and politicians and policymakers alike should understand and acknowledge this kind of impact.

In short, the Abrams Doctrine is alive and well. This study suggests that Army National Guard mobilization encourages the engagement of the American public on the use of military force, demonstrating a link between mobilization and public support for war. In addition, this research supports the concept that Reserve Component mobilization could serve as a check on Presidential power. While further research is required to explore this element of the Abrams Doctrine, this study suggests that strong active-reserve integration may raise the costs of “staying at war.”

The Ongoing Exploration of Casualties

Although discussions surrounding the Abrams Doctrine lack any mention of the possible impact of casualties or local casualties, the consensus surrounding Mueller’s

thesis made local casualties worth exploring in this study. Unfortunately, the results were inconclusive. The quantitative data illustrated an insignificant relationship between local casualties and percent change in Republican vote in 2004 and 2008. Further, the data from the ethnographic case study suggest only that local casualties are highly salient to many in the population. While responses to the street-intercept surveys offer some evidence linking overall casualties (as opposed to local casualties) to public support for war, insufficient evidence exists to draw any legitimate conclusions regarding the impact of local casualties. As a result, this study can only suggest that additional research be undertaken to explore whether local casualties are a factor in shaping local public support for the War on Terror.

Policy Implications

The constant state of Reserve mobilization since 9/11 has created an “operational reserve” integrated in unprecedented ways with the active force. Over 600,000 reservists have been mobilized in support of the War on Terror in the past nine years (Commission on National Guard and Reserves, 2008) and some have been called to deploy multiple times (GAO, 2004). Given this reality, it is crucial for policymakers to understand the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war and base policies on empirical evidence, not widely held assumptions.

Despite questions that remain regarding the nature of the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and public support for war, the results of this study can offer guidance to policymakers on how to think about and apply the concepts underlying the Abrams Doctrine.

Implications for Army Total Force Policies

The results of this study recommend caution to those that advertise a positive relationship between the mobilization of Army National Guard soldiers and public support for war. Based on this research, policymakers should re-examine any existing policies that assume Army Reserve Component mobilizations generate the support of the American people for the use of military force. Policies declaring a link between Reserve Component forces and the positive support of the American public are suspect and should be re-evaluated so as to not inaccurately bias policy decisions in a variety of ways.

In addition, while this research did not examine Army Total Force Policies from the perspective of the active or Guard soldier or Department of Defense planning, training or equipment programs, it did collect and analyze data on Active-Reserve integration from the perspective of the U.S. citizen. Without extrapolating the results of the qualitative data from the community of Wilkes-Barre to other populations, this study can state that there is limited evidence that suggests citizens perceive one integrated Army force. Remember the quote “they are all the same, fighting for the same reasons, you know? They’re all soldiers.” This and many similar comments imply that the respondents believe soldiers today are first and foremost members of the all volunteer force.

Although additional research is required to document the extent of these beliefs, if this public perception of “one Army” is widespread, it would mark a major shift in attitude from the days of Vietnam when portions of the American public perceived a sharp difference between National Guard soldiers who joined to escape the war and

active duty service members or draftees. Widespread perceptions of an integrated force would also offer evidence that the Army's Total Force Policies are succeeding – at least from the citizen's perception.

Implications for the National Guard

This research offers evidence that a tension exists between the National Guard's desire and necessity to become an integrated part of the Army Total Force and its desire to have its units cultivate and maintain a strong link with their hometown communities. As National Guard forces settle into a five year operational tempo (meaning units can expect four years at home and one year on active duty for every five year cycle), the Guard has and will continue to become increasingly professionalized. It is proud of its soldiers, many of whom are combat veterans - some with multiple deployments – that have performed to the same standards and earned the same cultural credentials as their active duty counterparts. After a decade of fighting for equality in the 1990s when the active Army essentially blocked Guard deployments to the 1991 Gulf War and resisted their deployments to Kosovo, Bosnia, and Sinai because they deemed the Guard not ready or combat-capable, National Guard brigades are recognized today as interchangeable with regular Army brigades in the "Army Force Generation" scheme that plans Total Force training and mobilization. In this sense, the Guard has seemingly come into its own as an equal partner with the active Army in the War on Terror.

However, the National Guard also prides itself on being unique. Its historical ties to the U.S. citizen-soldier tradition as well as the professed connection of each unit to its

state and hometown are as much a declaration of its own self image as it is a selling point. Indeed, the leaders of the National Guard assert,

The United States is a militia nation founded on the principle of citizen-soldiers safeguarding our national security. This construct is as essential and relevant at the dawn of the 21st century as it was when citizen-soldiers mustered at the Massachusetts Bay Colony more than 365 years ago. The National Guard remains a critical component of our national military structure. The Guard is fully integrated with civilian officials and emergency responders in every state and territory. The Guard is also a fully integrated component of the United States Army and Air Force, capable of performing, with our active duty partners, the full spectrum of Army and Air Force foreign and domestic missions. The National Guard uniquely connects every police station and firehouse to the Department of Defense and every State House to the White House.” (Adjutant General Association of the United States, 2008)

Yet today’s integrated total force may be mutually exclusive with the unique militia culture of a National Guard deeply connected to its community. As the National Guard continues to look and act more like active duty, it is possible the connection of the Guard to its hometown will dissipate and its units will become, as the Commander of the 109th put it, nothing more than “the local military unit to affiliate with.” Whether this tension is mutually exclusive remains to be seen, however, the National Guard should recognize that as its soldiers become professionalized and integrate in a variety of ways, the implications of total force policies may have unintended consequences. For example, promotion policies which discourage homesteading for officer and non-commissioned officer career advancement can develop a more transient cadre of leadership in the National Guard that lacks a personal connection to the communities served.

In addition, National Guard recruiting policies now must necessarily seek to attract young people with an expectation of routine federal service. As a result, the

Guard is attracting fewer recruits with military experience and has more unmarried soldiers than married soldiers for the first time in modern history (National Journal, 2007). Such changes will undoubtedly influence the Guard and add to the tensions that pull the institution in seemingly opposite directions. Accordingly, the National Guard should carefully consider its priorities and examine second and third order effects when devising a wide variety of broad and specific policies.

Lastly, based on the fieldwork in Wilkes-Barre, the National Guard should be aware that changes in remobilization policies that allow individual soldiers to return home immediately after completing the required training and re-adjustment period after an overseas mobilization may have an impact on the level of community support for the Guard soldiers returning home. The communal return of the 109th soldiers to the Wilkes-Barre Armory in 2004 garnered a robust show of community support for the welcome home ceremony; however the more recent Welcome Home ceremonies held 3 months after the soldiers return home garner little community involvement.

Whether such remobilization policies are the primary reason for the lack of community involvement in more recent Welcome Home ceremonies is debatable. However, it is worth noting that individual remobilization policies may reduce community involvement and support as compared to unit-based, coordinated remobilizations. Because changes to the remobilization process were made based on a variety of reasons, including the mental health of soldiers as well as family reintegration and readjustment considerations, I will not enter the normative debate over which policies are better, only point out that a trade-off of National Guard priorities may exist.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

That the first known empirical test of the Abrams Doctrine demonstrated a significant negative relationship between the mobilization of community-based Army National Guard units and local public support for war is an important finding for and a considerable contribution to the debate surrounding the Abrams Doctrine. However, this dissertation has several limitations that should be considered when applying these results in practice or designing future research.

First, despite the explanation offered above for the seemingly contradictory results of the qualitative and quantitative approaches, it is possible that the reason I found no evidence of a relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and public support for war in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania is an unidentified factor unique to Wilkes-Barre. On the other hand, it is also possible that a relationship did exist and I simply did not capture the perceptions of the affected population of Wilkes-Barre using ethnographic research. These methodological concerns are valid and should encourage additional research on this topic using both the qualitative and quantitative methods.

Second, the qualitative research was obviously limited to the single case of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. While the selection of a single in-depth case study offered important insights, the findings of this portion of the study cannot be generalized to other populations without additional research. Therefore I encourage scholars to duplicate and expand the qualitative research in additional communities of interest.

The quantitative analysis was likewise limited to a four state subset. Now that the initial dataset has been created, future research should expand the dataset nationally.

Scholars should also include additional explanatory variables to counter omitted variable bias and explore future election year results to determine the variations in the relationship between Army National Guard mobilization and local public support for war over time. I also encourage the use of alternative proxy variables to explore the relationship between Reserve Component mobilization and local public support for war, particularly the use of change in percent Republican vote in Congressional districts during the 2006 mid-term elections.

Lastly, this dissertation focused exclusively on the Army National Guard. Scholars should also examine the role of the Army Reserve as well as Air National Guard, and the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves to gain further insights into the relationship between Reserve Component forces and local public support for war. A related but separate field of study is the increased numbers and roles of defense contractors in the War on Terror and how that may (or may not) relate to military force structure policies, the mobilization of the Reserve Component, and the future of the Abrams Doctrine.

By exploring these research opportunities, scholars can continue the work this study began and expand the base of empirical evidence for policymakers to draw upon when making decisions regarding the use of military force and the true impact of Reserve Component mobilization on the American people.

Appendix A: A Historical Review of the American Citizen-Soldier

Whether called minutemen, irregulars, reservists, or Guardsmen, “part-time” military forces have been a significant part of U.S. history and culture since the establishment of the American colonies. In order to understand the impact of the mobilization of Army Guardsmen on communities across America, it is crucial that one have a deeper understanding of the political and cultural heritage of the citizen-soldier in America.

This appendix offers additional detail on the history of the U.S. citizen-soldier, from the early days of the American republic through the current use of National Guard and Reserve forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to understand the complexities of and interaction between the active and reserve components of the modern U.S. military. It also explores the development of Army Reserve Component institutions along with major policies and legislation related to active and reserve forces. In the end, one can see that despite a checkered battlefield record, the citizen-soldier force is deeply embedded in America’s political and cultural heritage.

America’s First Army

As with many others aspects of American society, the cultural roots of the U.S. militia are British. Britain, employing a defensive posture dating back to the Middle Ages, required all male citizens to arm and train themselves and be available to serve the King when called. The colonists brought this concept of “universal service” to America and relied upon it to meet their security needs (Doubler 2003, 6). All qualified able-

bodied men²¹ were required to possess a musket and bayonet, attend periodic training, and serve in units under local authority.²² The system worked well and proved especially effective when militiamen served in defense of their own town or settlement for a limited time. Yet as colonies matured and established local security, colonial officials employed alternative methods of creating military forces to meet their security needs.

Instead of relying on the militia to establish permanent patrols or defend the frontier, colonies would recruit volunteers who were excluded from universal service by race, servitude, or poverty. Enticed with decent pay, land grants, and enlistment bounty, these volunteers conducted expeditionary campaigns, fought Native Americans, and met the manpower demands of the British wars (Cooper 1997, 2-3). For example, half the forces from South Carolina during the Yamasee War (1715-1716) were African American slaves and Massachusetts recruited volunteers from poor farming regions to make up the force that captured Fort Louisbourg during King George's War (1744-48) (Ferling 1993, 105-108 and 133-135).

Despite a growing preference for organizing volunteer militiamen to fight distant threats or prolonged conflicts, states nonetheless retained the compulsory militia system. Universal service served a variety of political and social functions, but its primary military purpose was as a base mobilization system from which to recruit, organize, train, and equip the obligated or volunteer forces. This occurred with varying degrees of success. In general, the colonial system of volunteer militia was fragmented and often

²¹ In theory, service applied universally, however in practice African-Americans, Native Americans, and servants were often excluded. Also, it should be noted that Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania did not embrace the militia system in these early years.

²² The Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress, Session I (May 2, 1792). The Militia Act institutionalized this concept though it was employed as early as 1607 at the Jamestown settlement.

inefficient. Yet the British rarely meddled in local militia policies, allowing colonial officials to gain valuable experience in organizing, financing, and directing military forces. Unfortunately, however, the preference for using short-term volunteers led the colonies to disband militias immediately upon completion of the expedition or mission – meaning little to no institutional knowledge of military practices existed in the years prior to the American Revolution (Cooper 1997, 3).

By the time of the Revolution, the American militia system was the primary defensive system of the colonies. As has been well described by historians, the system had its benefits and challenges during the war. In 1775, it was truly the citizen soldiers that made the rebellion possible, ousting royal Governors, laying siege to cities, and seizing forts and battlefields (Ibid., 4). These actions established colonists' control of local and state governments early in the war -- a condition that the British were never able to overcome. However, as the war endured, colonial militiamen proved unreliable in efforts to field an organized and functional army. State militiamen often failed to arm and equip themselves, decamped in the face of enemy forces when their enlistments expired, and squabbled with each other over relative rank and command (Ibid). As early as 1776, General Washington's actual forces fell well short of his expectations and aspirations.

Despite military and political challenges during the American Revolution, the fledgling colonies eventually gained independence – but concerns over the militia system persisted. Amongst the major debates facing the colonies after the war was the proper role of the military in a republic. While Federalists such as George Washington

advocated for a strong federal government with a centrally-controlled national military, supporters of radical Whig theory held a deep-seated skepticism of centralized power and standing armies. The Whig proponents prevailed. In 1784 the Continental Congress declared, "...standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into a destructive engine for establishing despotism" (Continental Congress 1784, 518).

The fear of a standing army was later reflected in the powers granted to the Congress by the U.S. Constitution. While Congress has the power "to provide and maintain a Navy," its power with respect to the Army stipulates that it can "raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years" (U.S. Constitution). Yet the Founders also granted Congress the power to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" (Ibid.). In lieu of a large standing army, the nation would purposefully rely on citizen-soldiers to rise up and fight when called upon by the federal government. Given its tradition of universal service and the protection provided by the Atlantic, the nation rested primarily upon the colonial militia systems as the first line of land defense. Congress institutionalized universal service in the Militia Act of 1792. Despite outlining tactical organization for states and specific equipment for individuals, the law failed to ensure that states followed such guidelines and provided no federal funding for militia activities, leaving the states to perpetuate pre-Revolution militia practices through 1815.

The Standing Army, the Volunteer Militia, and the First Draft

As the nation matured, so too did its military policy. Despite honorable service and notable actions by individual soldiers, the militia's overall performance during the War of 1812 was dismal (Cooper 1997, 10). Some units flatly refused to carry out orders while others simply performed poorly (Crossland 1984, 7; Cooper 1997, 10). The challenges faced during the mobilization and employment of the militia illustrated the failure of the Militia Act to develop or sustain a formidable national militia which could be mobilized effectively for war. In subsequent years, the once-dominant militia system became secondary to the standing army in national defense planning. While Whig suspicions remained, the nation came to accept the standing army and the active duty force entered a period of "gradual growth and institutional maturation" (Cooper 1997, 11). Reforms instituted by Secretary of War John Calhoun dramatically improved the operations of the standing army by providing a commanding general and bureaucracies to support efficient administration and logistics. These improvements strengthened the effectiveness and institutional sense of purpose of the Army, however financial limitations necessarily kept the force small. Further, Calhoun's reforms did not solve the major military problem of how to augment the standing army with well-trained soldiers during times of war.

Without an adequate alternative to reliance upon citizen-soldiers, the nation continued its militia system in the years leading up the Civil War. Due to variations between regions and among states, however, it is important to note that the militia was comprised of distinct *systems* rather than a uniform national militia (Cooper 1997, 13).

Yet a major change occurred throughout these state-based systems during this time: a shift from compulsory universal militia service to voluntary and exclusive uniformed organizations (Ibid., 14).²³ As one historian notes, the militia became an “institution which existed because its members chose to create and sustain it” (Berthoff 1971, 254).

Despite a few elite social units which existed east of the Mississippi, the new militia organizations drew from urban middle and skilled working classes. Unlike the poor, these men had sufficient leisure time and money to afford participation in part-time military activity. Because state funding for militia units was limited or nonexistent, members were required to pay dues and promote unit activities that would earn money and recruit additional dues-paying members.²⁴ Some units collapsed due to inadequate fund-raising but others thrived. Despite being chartered by the state and subject to the call of state service, the volunteer units governed themselves as they saw fit. These voluntary units functioned much like fraternal societies and their club-like activities included balls, dinners, and theatre (Cooper 1997, 15-18). Unsurprisingly, the volunteer militia units were by and large militarily ineffective. The failure of states to spend money on their militia systems crippled the effectiveness of their military systems, regardless of whether it was comprised of compulsory or voluntary units (Ibid., 1-22).

The states reluctance to invest in their militia systems dissipated after the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860. Largely as a response to the growing threat of

²³This shift was due in part to broader societal changes such as increasing mobility, expanded ethnic diversity, economic specialization, and the rise of capitalism that fostered individualism and downplayed communal obligations to the state.

²⁴Federal support to state militias during this period was limited to a standard distribution of arms and equipment and did not include pay for soldiers or discretionary funds. See Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard*.

civil war, state legislatures in both the North and South began appropriating funds to reinvigorate their militias and governors - with money to spend - organized, trained, and equipped volunteer companies (Ibid., 19-20). Throughout 1861, it was via the states that both the Union and the Confederacy recruited, armed, and equipped its armies. However the changing nature of the U.S. Civil War led the Confederacy in March 1862 (and the Union shortly thereafter) to adopt conscription. The requirement for mass armies and centralized allocation of manpower had overwhelmed state capabilities and, for the first time, made the federal government(s) the dominant player in military manpower mobilization.

Despite the loss of exclusive control over raising military manpower, some states retained state-based militia forces during the war. For example, Wisconsin approved the establishment of a separate state-supported home front force of three thousand men following draft riots in Milwaukee in 1862 (Ibid., 21). California, New York, and Ohio, among others, established and funded “National Guard” forces while Missouri reactivated their compulsory militia system (Ibid.). While these militia systems disappeared after the Civil War, their existence amidst a war marked by national conscription and large-scale, prolonged fighting illustrates the entrenched nature and tradition of the state-based militia systems. Though no longer the principal form of national land defense (a position ceded to the standing army) and no longer dominated by compulsory service (with minor exceptions), the state militia institutions survived the Civil War years and entered the most transformative period of their history.

The Rise of the National Guard

Despite challenges faced by Reconstruction in the South (and associated disestablishment of the southern state militias) and lingering preferences and practices of local militia control, the state militias shifted from disparate disorganized forces following the Civil War to an organized, funded, and well regulated institution by the early twentieth century. Two primary factors influenced this change: the increasing requirement for a state constabulary force and reforms following the Spanish-American war in 1898.

In the years following the Civil War, each state sought to establish a permanent military force supported by state funding and subject to some level of state control beyond local authority. This effort proceeded unevenly, with states achieving varying degrees of success. Several states, notably Massachusetts, had a well-funded and regulated militia soon after the Civil War while others, such as Indiana, had no National Guard soldiers as late as 1875 (Ibid., 29-30). However, the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 prompted state leaders to recognize an increased need for a posse comitatus. Fifteen states collectively mobilized 45,000 militiamen forces to quell civil disorder during the railroad strike (Doubler 2003, 111). When most of the soldiers lacked the training and ability to keep the peace, militia supporters – notably the adjutant generals – seized the opportunity to lobby state legislatures for additional funding to create a force capable of suppressing future civil disorders (Cooper 1997, 50). Some states acted immediately following the 1877 Railroad Strike, funding militia units at unprecedented levels. Others waited until the need for a constabulary force arose in their state – and it inevitably did.

The passage of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, prohibiting the Army from aiding civil authorities unless ordered by the President, only reinforced the perceived need for state troops. Over the next few decades, states employed their militia forces in labor wars, prison disorders, race riots and other racial incidents, election disorders, and in recovery efforts following natural disasters (Cooper 1997, 44-64). The continuous occurrence of various incidents of civil disorder galvanized state legislatures across the nation to increase funding of the state militias. As a result of steady funding, the militia forces - many of which had begun to use the term “National Guard” – grew in effectiveness. Guard units enjoyed state-funded arms and equipment, armory facilities, and transportation and subsistence costs for summer training (though very few provided a stipend for soldiers). Variation existed as state funding levels were closely tied to militia tradition, regional wealth, urbanization, and population growth; however no state failed to fund the Guard as had occurred previously (Ibid., 27, 39-40). Accompanying this financial support was state oversight. State executives felt justified in demanding more discipline, military training, and inspections from the historically independent militia units (Ibid., 38-39). These developments caused the nature of Guard units to change from a club-like association to a military force that could aid state authorities in response to a variety of civil disorders and natural disasters.

The rise of the National Guard at the state level led to renewed debate in the 1880s and 1890s over the proper role of the state militias in national military policy. Skeptics of the Guard’s military effectiveness, notably scholar and Army officer Emory Upton, focused on the militia’s checkered wartime performance and advocated a robust

national reserve under direct federal control (Doubler 2003, 140). In contrast, Guardsmen emphasized the institution's historic function as a wartime reserve and argued that the militia could do more than just play state "policemen" (Cooper 1997, 89). Despite much rhetoric, Congress took no action to institutionalize change so the debate remained unresolved by the time the U.S. declared war on Spain in 1898.

The Spanish-American War provided the Guard an opportunity to demonstrate its effectiveness as part of the nation's fighting force, but the results were ambiguous. In the eyes of active Army soldiers, the part-time soldiers served with honor but not distinction (Cooper 1997, 97). The chaotic call for volunteer forces led to a mass of hastily mobilized, poor-equipped, and untrained men joining the professional Army. However, the militia's achievements during the war increased their standing in the eyes of the American people. Although they played only a minor role in Cuba, militia forces made possible the occupation of Puerto Rico and the suppression of the Filipino insurrection. State units formed the majority of land forces in these campaigns and performed admirably (Herron 2004, 40). In addition, media reports of the poor conditions Guard units faced – disease-ridden camps, improper uniforms, antiquated weapons, etc – increased the tradition and lore of noble citizen-soldiers answering their nation's call to serve.²⁵ Upon their return home in 1899, enthusiastic crowds greeted the part-time soldiers (Doubler 2003, 135).

²⁵Stories surrounding the actions of specific units such as Theodore Roosevelt's 'Rough Riders' resonated with the American people. While some aspects of these stories were true, others were based more on grandiosity than factual accuracy.

Following the war, militia forces immediately reconstituted their state units and renewed their campaign for federal recognition as a military reserve during times of war. Newly-appointed Secretary of War Elihu Root sought to address Guard concerns and redefine the state militia's relationship with the federal government. His proposal which eventually became the Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act), increased federal funding and equipment for the National Guard, authorized personal pay to soldiers for annual summer training, and provided training assistance and inspections from the active Army. In return, the National Guard was required to conform to federal training and organizational standards within five years and was subject to federal mobilization for up to nine months. Through Root's careful cultivation of support, Congress passed the proposal easily and the Dick Act became law on January 21, 1903 (Cooper 1997, 109).

Federal financial aid represented the most significant tangible element of this reform. By 1908, Congress had increased federal expenditures nearly tenfold from what had been allocated to the militias in 1898 (Doubler 2003, 145). These funds proved invaluable in improving National Guard preparedness and effectiveness. Additionally, the Militia Act of 1903 marked two intangible but crucial changes. First, it gave the National Guard a statutory place in national military policy by officially designating the militia as a federal manpower reserve in times of war. Second, because participation in national call-ups was no longer discretionary, it changed the culture of citizen-soldier service. Since the demise of compulsory militia service, volunteering for war had been "an act of conscience and patriotism, not an obligation" (Cooper 1997, 106). Many

soldiers had volunteered willingly and regularly, but the government had backed away from the unpopular idea of obligated service to the state. The Dick Act reinstated this notion, albeit in a narrow and limited forum.

Additional reforms occurred during this time and over the next few years. Amendments to the Dick Act in 1908 created a Division of Militia Affairs (predecessor to the modern National Guard Bureau) to administer the National Guard and a federally-controlled Medical Reserve Corps (predecessor to the modern U.S. Army Reserve) to enhance health care and disease prevention during war. In addition to reforming the National Guard, Secretary Root revamped military education, created a modern general staff system, and increased the size of the active Army – reforms which eventually impacted both Active and Guard soldiers. In short, however, it is most important to note simply that the fifty years between the end of the Civil War and the early twentieth century were the most significant in National Guard history. The state militias went from being disorganized post-Civil War forces to forming the core of a national militia institution under dual state and federal control. The experiences of and reforms to the state militia system during this timeframe dramatically influenced the framework under which the modern National Guard still operates.

The World Wars: Citizen-Soldiers and Mass Mobilization

Having establishing itself firmly as a national institution, the Guard entered the twentieth century stronger than ever before. However, the challenges of the World Wars tested the role and duties of the citizen-soldier in new and different ways. The primary

question at the dawn of World War I and again in World War II was what the role of the Guard was amidst mass mobilization.

Despite the amended Militia Act, debate continued over the specifics of how the Guard would perform its reserve role. The active Army sought increased federal control over the Guard, continuing to view the militia as ineffective state forces. In 1915, the War Department even released plans for a million-man total force army which all but ignored the 129,000 Guardsmen serving across the country and instead relied upon a large federally-controlled reserve (Doubler 2003, 156). Unsurprisingly, Congress flatly rejected such a plan. As an alternative, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916 which created a more thoroughly federalized National Guard and established a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Organized Reserve Corps -- additional predecessors to the U.S. Army Reserve. Significantly increased federal monies were allocated to the Guard in exchange for the loss of even more of its autonomy and the legislation clarified the role of the Guard in wartime planning. Unfortunately, the war on the horizon was unlike any in the past.

In April 1917 conditions overseas deteriorated and President Wilson asked Congress to declare war against Germany. A month later, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 and within four weeks, nearly 9.5 million men had complied with the conscription bill and registered for the draft (Ibid., 169). As the mobilization pace quickened, the War Department built its plans on the availability of three manpower

sources: active duty, Guardsmen, and draftees.²⁶ While the draftees would take months to be converted into soldiers, the Guardsmen were a more immediate source of manpower. Beginning in July 1917, President Wilson mobilized the nearly 400,000 Guardsmen in increments; however he did so as individuals – not units. The move sought to remove any questions pertaining to the Guard’s loyalties and location or length of service (Doubler 2003, 171). While some Guardsmen managed to stay together, most units were reorganized, designated to perform new functions, or saw its personnel dispersed around the country and world. Although the Guardsmen were resentful of this practice, it provided flexibility in organizing various types of forces to send overseas and led to the creation of the so-called “surplus” division made up of personnel from Guard units across the nation.

In general, the performance of Guard units, portions of units, and individuals was on par with the active Army during World War I (Ibid., 183). Guardsmen performed well and served with distinction in combat; however by the end of the war, it consisted of a mere ten percent of the Army’s total strength (Ibid., 186). After the armistice, Guardsmen returned home as individuals free of federal or state obligation. The method of discharging men complicated the reconstitution of National Guard units that had existed before the war, leaving the Guard struggling to recapture the gains it had made following the Root reforms.

²⁶ Though units existed, the Organized Reserve forces generally served as individual officer replacements during this time as most held skilled specialties such as physicians. See Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War*, 170 and Robert Jackle, presentation on “The History of the U.S. Army Reserve, April 23, 2008, Washington DC.

As the nation entered the inter-war years, the Guard had fallen to a mere 37,210 troops and was under a cloud of confusion over its future (Ibid., 189). Fortunately, Congress clarified the nation's military force structure strategy by passing the National Defense Act of 1920. This legislation rejected War Department proposals for a large standing army and created instead a layered force structure consisting of the active forces, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves. The Act authorized the reorganization of the National Guard, designated the Guard as the primary federal reserve force, and set its maximum strength at 435,000 soldiers (National Defense Act, 1920). As a concession to Department of War planners, the law also expanded the Organized Reserves to form a pool of federally-controlled citizen-soldiers who would absorb and train conscripts in future wars (Doubler 2003, 188).

The passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 initiated a recruiting boom for the Guard, which quickly refilled its ranks. Beginning with the stock market crash of 1929 and throughout the subsequent economic depression, Guard attendance was at historically high levels as paid military service provided much-needed income to unemployed men throughout the country. The Guard also benefited from federal programs during the Great Depression as the Works Progress Administration built and improved Guard armories and facilities across America. As the nation recovered economically, the Guard recovered from the chaos of mobilization for World War I. With a renewed federal mission, a steady flow of state and federal funding, and an inflow of recruits, the National Guard regained its institutional strength just in time for a second global conflict.

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 spurred a preparedness movement within the U.S. and President Roosevelt authorized increases in active and Guard manpower and training. A year later, having witnessed Hitler's blitzkrieg across Western Europe, Congress authorized the federalization of the National Guard and implemented the first peacetime draft -- The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (Ibid., 197). As with previous mobilizations, the mobilization of 1940-1941 faced logistical challenges as the War Department was unprepared to expand its ranks so rapidly. Yet it was Congressional restrictions placed on the scope of the mobilization for both Guardsmen and draftees that had the most significant impact on the Guard at this time. For example, men with dependents were not to be induced into federal service; men with critical jobs in agriculture or wartime factory production were similarly excluded.²⁷ These regulations degraded the quality of the Guard as it saw many of its experienced soldiers from World War I released from duty while new, untrained recruits filled its ranks. Nonetheless, nearly 200,000 National Guardsmen entered federal service to augment the approximately 250,000 member regular Army (Flynn, 1993, 9-10).

In addition to the Guard, over 100,000 Organized Reserve Corps members (predominantly students who had participated in the ROTC program) stood ready to serve (Doubler 2003, 196). They would eventually be tasked with training the 400,000 conscripts the Army originally sought from the peacetime draft (Flynn 1993, 10). Yet the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 dramatically altered the dynamics of America's

²⁷ Eventually the manpower needs of the nation conflicted with early attempt to defer fathers and critical workers from service. See Bernie Rostker, *America Goes to War: Managing the Force During Times of Stress and Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 21 and Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War*, 197-198.

involvement in the war -- America adopted a total war mentality and embarked upon a massive wartime effort to achieve victory. Between 1941-1945, nearly 16 million U.S. men and women served in the armed forces (Department of Defense 2008).

Given such total numbers, the clear burden of fighting in World War II – just as in World War I -- fell upon draftees. However Guardsmen and Reservists played a crucial role amidst mass mobilizations. Although they performed well in combat (as did many active army and draftee units), the real value of the Guard was in “buying precious time for draftee units to form and train” (Doubler 2003, 212). While regular Army officers complained that some Guard units were poorly equipped and required additional training post-mobilization, the manpower (which was at least minimally trained) provided by the Guard on short notice cannot be discarded lightly. As Secretary of War Robert Patterson stated after World War II, the Guard “doubled the strength of the Army at once” (Ibid.)

While the Organized Reserve Corps was minimally functional in World War I, the federally-controlled reserve proved valuable in World War II as the cadre of citizen-soldiers assumed initial duties of training men drafted into national service. Again, challenges in readiness existed within the Organized Reserve, however from an institutional perspective, the tiered force structure designed by the National Defense Act of 1920 - regular, Guard, and reserve - worked well. By establishing a trained professional cadre of soldiers from both the active and reserve components, the National Defense Act of 1920 laid the foundation upon which America could build a mass Army.

The Early Cold War and Vietnam

If the World Wars tested the role of the Guard and Organized Reserves amidst mass mobilization, the Cold War tested the role of the Guard and Reserves during limited mobilizations. Following the demobilization of the Guard and Reserve after World War II (again, predominantly as individuals, not in units (Ibid, 225)), citizen-soldiers returned home with a focus on their families and employers. Just as had happened in the interwar years, the Guard – and now the Organized Reserves as well - rebuilt and reorganized themselves. Due to the National Security Act of 1947, the active Army did as well. The legislation dramatically realigned the military and intelligence communities, created the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council, and established the Air Force from the Army Air Corps -- among other changes (National Security Act, 1947).

This wholesale reorganization of the military establishment after the War led to renewed debates over the adequacy of the reserve forces to meet the nation's now-expanded security needs. In 1947, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed a board headed by Gordon Gray [Gray Board] to examine the best use of the country's reserve forces. The Gray Board recommended merging the National Guard and the Organized Reserves into a larger federally-controlled reserve to achieve fiscal and military efficiencies. Congress quickly rejected the Board's findings which failed to fully appreciate the tradition of the Guard, its utility during state emergencies, and its powerful lobbies on Capitol Hill. It was sooner than expected, however, that the reserve forces would again be tested.

Just weeks after the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, President Truman announced a partial mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. While the bulk of the soldiers came from only four infantry divisions, hundreds of smaller support units were mobilized and by 1951, 30 percent of the Army Guard (110,000 men) was on active duty (Binkin and Koffmann 1989, 42; Doubler 2003, 232). Many of these forces deployed quickly to Korea; others were sent to Germany to bolster the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against feared Soviet aggression; still others were mobilized as a strategic reserve and used to train individual soldiers going to Korea (Doubler 2003, 232-235). While the Guard and Reserve again played important roles, the continuing draft remained the primary source of manpower for the Korean War and decreased the reliance of the Army on the Guard as a combat reserve.

The Korean conflict raised Congressional awareness of the reserve system. Congress consolidated its reserve regulations in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. This legislation renamed the Organized Reserves as the U.S. Army Reserve and detailed the composition and responsibilities of the federally-controlled reserve force as well as the Army and Air National Guard (Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952).²⁸ Aside from name changes and additional detail, the three-tiered conceptual system as laid out in the 1920 National Defense Act remained intact.

A second limited mobilization of the Guard and Reserve occurred during the Berlin airlift crisis in 1961. Non-combat support units provided direct assistance to U.S.

²⁸This law identifies the five service reserves as well as the Air and Army National Guard as part of the Reserve Component. It also details branches of the reserve, such as the inactive, ready, and standby reserve, and what each means.

airlift efforts while two infantry divisions were mobilized to backfill active divisions in the U.S.-based strategic reserve (Doubler 2003, 251). However, in an effort to deter the Soviets, more units were called up than were required, causing discontent within the reserve ranks and political grumblings of inefficiency. While the mobilization of the Reserve Component was successful in demonstrating national resolve, the reserve forces did not appreciate being pulled from their jobs for an operation that was not war (Binkin and Kauffmann 1989, 43-45; Doubler 2003, 250-253). Overall, the total force was more capable than ever before, but it was perhaps not “as available” as political leaders had hoped. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara sought an alternative force that could be used for a range of Cold War activities short of major mobilizations for total war (Binkin and Kauffmann 1989, 45).

In 1964 Secretary McNamara unveiled a plan to reduce significantly Reserve manpower in an effort to increase readiness. To implement its national strategy of “flexible response”, the U.S. needed a smaller reserve force of ready, efficient, and more responsive units (Doubler 2003, 255). McNamara failed in a second effort to merge the Guard and Reserve, yet he did succeed in reducing Guard manpower. Between 1964 and 1968, the National Guard disestablished over 1000 units and reduced its ranks by 18,500 personnel (Ibid., 256). In the end, the Guard retained only 8 divisions nationwide along with a variety of support units such as police, medical, and logistics that state Governors demanded be maintained in light of the Guard disaster response mission and its highly visible role in the civil disturbances of the early 1960s (Ibid.).

Despite having reorganized the Reserve Component, McNamara did not see it employed during Vietnam. Against the recommendations of his top advisors, President Johnson refused to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves in significant number.²⁹ He strongly believed that mobilizing the Reserves would send an escalatory political signal to domestic and international audiences that could provoke negative public opinion or push the Soviets or Chinese to enter the conflict (Johnson 1971, 146-146, 149).³⁰ Adamantly maintaining his position throughout years of fighting, President Johnson instead fought the war with regular Army forces and draftees.

It is estimated that only three thousand reservists were mobilized and deployed to Vietnam over ten years, representing less than one percent of the total force of six hundred thousand servicemembers who served in Southeast Asia (Sullivan 2005, 2). Whether the Vietnam conflict could have been “won” even with the full participation of the Reserve Component is debatable; however President Johnson’s decision not to employ the Reserves exacerbated the need for military manpower and had a significant negative impact on the active and reserve Army.

In stark contrast to their reaction to mobilization in support of the Berlin airlift, the Guard grumbled about non-mobilization in the early years of Vietnam. Better trained and ready to fight, the Guard felt underappreciated by the Army and banned from serving their country. Guardsmen watched in dismay as the ranks of the reserves filled with

²⁹ Overall, the reserve component was not a player in Vietnam. Although approximately 25,000 Guard and Reserves soldiers were mobilized in 1968 following the Pueblo and Tet incidents, the vast majority did not serve overseas and the utility of this mobilization was called into question by inadequate tasking. See Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War*, 259-260.

³⁰ Many scholars speculate on other possible reasons that may have contributed to Johnson’s thinking. See Binkin and Kauffmann, *U.S. Army Guard & Reserve : Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks*, 48-59 for a decent summary.

those who joined to avoid the draft or had enlisted and were serving mandatory reserve time. As the war dragged on, Guard and Reserve funding was reduced to support operations overseas, unit training degraded, and reserve combat competency evaporated. Further, America came to see National Guardsmen as “draft-dodgers” – a reputation that did not serve them well as they participated in operations to control antiwar demonstrations and racial civil disturbances across the country.

The war took a toll on the regular Army as well. By the end of Vietnam, the Army was over-utilized and challenged by poorly-trained conscripts and insufficient resources (Ibid., 4). Annual personnel rotations, social issues, fiscal challenges, and the growing unpopularity of the war contributed to systemic problems. In one officer’s opinion, the Army was plagued by challenges related to drugs, race, discipline, professionalism, and anti-establishment dissent (Hauser 1973). Another described the Army of Vietnam as “demoralized, poorly trained, ineptly led and over-stretched...” (Carafano 2004). From an institutional perspective, both the active and reserve components of the Army were suffering – if not broken. Unlike the manpower policies of the World Wars which offered an appropriate role for the Guard and Reserve amidst mass mobilization, the partial mobilization policies of the early Cold War were limited in ability to satisfy the nation’s security needs and contributed to problems in both the active and reserve components.

Total Force Policy and the All-Volunteer Force

When Nixon made an election-year promise in 1968 to end the draft, the future direction of the Vietnam conflict and the military forces remained unclear. Few would

have predicted that the next few years would set the stage for the transition from the Army of Vietnam to the modern all-volunteer Army which integrates both active and reserve components.

Upon entering office in 1969, President Nixon appointed a commission chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates [Gates Commission] to determine the most practical means of abolishing conscription. The Gates Commission unanimously recommended an all-volunteer force, but at the same time identified the Reserve Forces as a “special” problem (Rostker 2006). While necessary, its lack of training and resources created reliability concerns. The Commission proposed that a ‘standby’ draft – in the form of a reinvigorated Selective Service system - would comprise a significant part of the force structure in times of conflict (Gates Commission 1970). In its final report in 1970, the Commission recommended a military pay raise to accompany the shift to an all volunteer force, a reduction in reserve billets to trim excess untrained personnel, and the development of a standby draft system to meet national security needs in times of crisis.

Due to budgetary constraints (which did not support the proposed pay raise) and Nixon’s desire to end the draft (standby or otherwise), the Department of Defense focused in the short-term only on minimizing - and then eliminating - the “peacetime” draft calls that had waxed and waned under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. However policymakers knew that with the end of the draft the Army needed to transform from its conscript-based wartime setting to a professional, disciplined, volunteer force. Although he did not fully embrace the Gates Commission

recommendations, Secretary of Defense Laird offered clear guidance on the issue of military manpower:

Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the armed forces (Secretary of Defense 1971).

Laird's "Total Force" concept returned the Reserve Component to its traditional place in public policy: the Guard would provide ready combat troops while the Army Reserve would offer support units to augment the active force. Yet the policy went beyond simply promoting the Reserve Component as a pool of potential manpower. It called for an equal partnership between active and reserve forces. Given two centuries of tension - if not animosity - between the components, Laird's policy required major cultural and institutional challenges be overcome if it was to be successful.

Fortunately, the Army had a strong and visionary leader in General Creighton Abrams. By the time General Abrams assumed duties as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972, all options under consideration by the Defense Department pointed to a mixed Active/Reserve force structure. However it remained unclear exactly what that meant for the institutionally-damaged Army. Public and legislative pressure to decrease the size of the active Army mounted following Vietnam; however, General Abrams believed that downsizing the Army would be detrimental to national security as the Army shifted its focus back to the Soviet threat. He argued instead that the number of combat divisions be increased (Jones 2004, 2). Newly appointed Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

agreed to support Abrams provided that the total end strength of the Active Component did not increase.

Abrams' recommended solution was both "simple and brilliant" (Ibid.). He expanded the Active Component combat divisions by relying on Reserve Component forces to "round out" the division. This concept aligned Reserve Component combat, combat support, and combat service support elements with Active combat divisions. The augmentation of Active combat divisions with Reserve manpower allowed General Abrams to increase the number of Active *combat* personnel from existing end strength. He also moved the majority of the Army's combat support and combat service support into the Reserve Component (Ibid., 3). In addition, Schlesinger and Abrams agreed that the Reserve Component would be equipped and trained in conjunction with its Active Component counterparts.

In essence, Abrams reorganized the Army by moving large numbers of personnel authorizations into the Reserve Component and relying on Guard and Reserve units to support or "round out" Active Component divisions (Carafano 2005). The consequence of this structuring policy was that in order to fight any serious conflict with Active forces, the president would have to call up the Reserve Component units that augmented these Active divisions (primarily combat support and combat service support). Abrams had integrated the force in such a way that the Active Army could not fight without mobilizing key Reserve capabilities.³¹

³¹ His initiatives have been interpreted by some as an attempt to ensure a clear linkage existed between the employment of the Army and public support for military operations. A large-scale mobilization of the Reserves would affect communities across the country, engaging the public and arguably serving as an

The Army flourished in the decades following Abrams' reorganization, due in large part to the extraordinary budget increases during the Reagan years. But Laird's Total Force Policy and Abrams reorganization also contributed to reinvigorating the force. Closer ties between active and reserve units developed as a result of the Roundout program, increasing Guard effectiveness and morale (Doubler 2003, 299) while the active Army used the program to generate a sixteen division force in the wake of Vietnam, contributing significantly to a renewed sense of purpose in the active force. Tension between the active and reserve components did not evaporate completely but the development of integrated active/reserve policies in conjunction with the rise of the all-volunteer force was moderately successful in creating a new "total force" Army. Unfortunately, it had yet to be tested during war.

Recovering From Vietnam: Gulf War I and its Aftermath

Throughout the buildup of the 1980s, the Army increased the quality and quantity of Guard and Reserve equipment and training. Total Force policies produced a Reserve Component that was better trained, equipped, and ready for service by 1990 than ever before in its history. Unfortunately, some misinterpreted this to mean that active, career soldiers and "part-time" reserve soldiers could serve as mirror images of each other. The 1990 Gulf War illustrated that they could not; however contingency operations around the globe throughout the following decade demonstrated the utility of a well trained and

extra-constitutional tripwire on presidential use of military power. This interpretation of the intent of the Army's post-Vietnam reorganization is widely acknowledged as the "Abrams Doctrine."

ready Reserve Component – and started the transition from a strategic to an operational Army reserve.

As soon as the active Army deployed units to the Persian Gulf in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the wartime Commander (Central Command) realized it would need Reserve support to establish a functional logistical system in the desert. President Bush decided to implement an incremental mobilization using his authority under U.S. law to call up 200,000 reservists for 180 days.³² He chose initially to call up only reserve support units, not combat forces. In August 1990, an Alabama National Guard postal unit and water purification detachment received the first two involuntary mobilization orders of the war (Doubler 2003, 307). As hundreds of support units were mobilized to support active forces, the combat brigades that formed the core of General Abrams' Roundout program awaited orders. Meanwhile, two of the active Army division counterparts to the Roundout brigades deployed to Saudi Arabia, substituting active Army brigades in lieu of Georgia's 48th Brigade and Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade.

Concerns over the fate of the Roundout brigades arose from both the active and reserve component. The active Army believed the units were not combat ready. Further, the Army argued that the 180 day mobilization was insufficient to train the brigade to standards and then transport them overseas before the mobilization time limit expired. Guard leaders and Congressional supporters argued that the brigades should be used as

³² *10 USC 673b* is commonly referred to as the "200K call up authority" or the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). The president is required to notify Congress and explain the reasons for his action. Mobilizations beyond 200K or 180 days require Congressional approval.

called for in the war plans and that the brigade should be allowed to perform based on its merits, not a predetermined assessment of warfighting capability that excluded Guard units. In a calculated move, Congress unilaterally authorized the President to mobilize reserves for 365 days, removing one of the primary rationales for not using the brigades. Debate continued until November when President Bush decided to double the size of the force in the Persian Gulf. Needing reinforcements, the active Army finally mobilized the Roundout brigades. Georgia's 48th Brigade - arguably the most prepared Guard combat unit – spent three months in pre-deployment training, finishing its workups and being declared “combat ready” by the Army the same day the Gulf War ended. [Two other brigades were also at the end of their training as the war ended.]

Despite notable challenges in readiness such as subordinate unit leadership and vehicle maintenance, the Roundout brigades performed as they were intended to perform and very close to the unit's own readiness estimates. Unrealistic expectations by the active Army hid the fact that Georgia's 48th estimated it would take forty-two days following mobilization to achieve combat readiness. Excluding administration and unit movements, it took forty-six. Though the combat units never deployed overseas, the Guard extolled their virtues and chastised the Army for allegedly trying to discredit Guard forces in order to reduce Guard endstrength. In contrast, the Army's main lesson from the Gulf War was that the Roundout program failed – part-time forces were not capable of immediate deployment to a combat zone.

The heated debate over the Roundout brigades continues to color the larger Reserve mobilization story of the Gulf War. Overall, the mobilization proceeded

smoothly. Concerns over dental readiness and active/reserve pay integration arose, but 97% of the Reserve soldiers showed up and met or exceeded deployment standards – debunking a popular myth that many would not serve or were not physically ready (Duncan 1997, 49-92). Further, the nation quickly mobilized and deployed over 62,000 Reservists in 398 units across the globe – the largest activation since the Korean conflict and arguably the smoothest in U.S. history (Doubler 2003, 307).

The end of the Gulf War brought a wave of force reductions in active and reserve personnel as President Bush downsized the military to a minimum “base force.” President Bush called for a 25% reduction in military forces, taking the active-duty Army from 16 divisions and 1,000,000 personnel to 10 divisions and 495,000 soldiers (Herron 2004, 4). The Army told the Guard to plan for downward “adjustments” of about 137,000 troops. By building strong support in Congress, the National Guard managed to limit its losses to 90,000 soldiers, leaving over 350,000 Guardsmen serving across the nation (Doubler 2003, 344). Combining the Guard with over 100,000 U.S. Army Reserve, nearly half of the Army’s personnel now resided in the Reserve Component.

Over the next decade, these forces served in both traditional and new roles. Reserve Component soldiers supported operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq [Operation Desert Fox] while also serving as peacekeepers in Haiti, Sinai, and Bosnia (Jackle 2008). Guardsmen fought a war against drugs, responded to the 1995 terrorist attack in Oklahoma City, secured the Atlanta Olympic Games in 1996, and continued to provide state [and in some cases regional] support to natural disasters and civil disturbances. Yet as the 1990s came to a close, many active and Reserve members

remained uncertain about the future of the Reserve Component. The active Army, vividly recalling the challenges of the Roundout brigades during the Gulf War, viewed the Guard combat divisions as relics which were unlikely to adapt to modern combat and proposed eliminating them in order to create additional support forces.³³ As late as the summer of 2001, one scholar noted the “twilight of the citizen-soldier” as the professional all-volunteer force thoroughly dominated national military policy and few would predict a need for thousands of reserve infantry troops (Cohen 2001, 23-28). They did not know of course that September 11th, 2001 would soon change everything.

“Twice the Citizen”: The Operational Reserve

Laird’s Total Force Policy promoted the use of the Reserves as a way to offer a significant number of units at an acceptably degraded level of readiness and at a cost the taxpayer could agree to. If nothing else, the total force was a practical way to approach the economics of force structure policy. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11th transformed the concept of the “Total Force” from one of pragmatism to necessity.

September 11th ushered in a new and different era for the U.S. Its sense of protection by two oceans and weak but friendly neighbors evaporated instantly. America now confronted a non-state chameleon-like enemy and a low-tech war of ideology while facing challenges associated with how to employ an effective homeland security strategy and an aggressive national security strategy. The U.S. military found itself amidst a self-

³³ Many of the divisions were in fact eliminated at this time. Others were reorganized into separate brigades but maintained their occupational specialty as infantry soldiers. See John Brinkerhoff, “The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power”, *Parameters* (Autumn 1996): 4-16.

proclaimed transformation and the unraveling of international events beyond its control. The Army soon realized its “total force” was required to meet this challenge.

Within hours of the attacks, Reserve forces were called upon to perform a variety of state and federal security missions, from protecting seaports and critical infrastructure to providing engineering support at the attack sites. Days later, the President authorized Governors to use approximately 9,000 Guardsmen to provide security at commercial airports across the nation (Duncan 2008). On September 14th, the President declared a national emergency and authorized a partial mobilization of up to a million reservists for up to two years. Six months after the attacks, nearly 80,000 reservists from all fifty states were activated (Ibid.).³⁴

Since 9/11, additional mobilizations in support of operations at home and overseas have followed. As of February 2008, nearly 600,000 reservists have been mobilized in support of the war on terror [including Gulf War II in Iraq] (Statement of Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 2008). Without these forces, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would be unsustainable at the force levels requested by the commanders without implementing a draft. In 2005, the Army’s Reserve Component forces made up approximately 55% of Army forces in Iraq (Duncan 2008). Soldiers in support specialties as well as combat infantry continuously cycle through the Army’s mobilization, training, and deployment process for overseas missions. In addition, federal and state authorities have ordered Reservists to serve as border patrol, protect nuclear power plants, and respond to domestic terrorism such as the anthrax

³⁴This does not include the 9K activated for airport security under Title 32 regulations.

attacks in Washington, D.C. In 2005, over 80,000 National Guard troops responded to Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Mississippi (Davis et al 2007). The combination of state missions and federal domestic and overseas operations have necessitated frequent, lengthy, and repeated deployments – and there is no end in sight (GAO 2004 and Carroll 2008).

This constant state of Reserve mobilization since 9/11 has created an “operational reserve” fully integrated with the active force. Instead of the traditional reliance on the Guard and Reserves as a strategic manpower pool to be used only in times of war, today’s citizen-soldiers are being called to bear more of the military’s burden than ever before. Well over half of the Reserve Component has been activated for federal missions, and some have been called to deploy multiple times (GAO 2004, 1). While all occupational communities have provided trained soldiers, some have provided more than a fair share. For example, ninety-eight percent of Army civil affairs units reside in the U.S. Army Reserve while over sixty-three percent of total artillery units reside in the National Guard (Herron 2004, 5).

Steady deployments coupled with increased training have led to more experienced, capable Reserve Component personnel; however other challenges have surfaced. The transfer of equipment from units that have not been activated to those preparing for deployment has raised readiness concerns (GAO 2004, 1). Additionally, concerns over worn equipment, equipment destroyed in theatre, ever-increasing training and mobilization time, and the continued use of a peacetime operational budget have emerged. Additionally, the high operational tempo of the Reserve Component has raised

anxiety over its sustainability, soldier-employer relations, the impact of mobilizations on communities, and the availability of Guard units for state missions. Congress chartered a Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) in 2005 to identify changes in law or policy regarding the Reserve Component. Its final report contained 95 recommendations designed to ensure the Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and compensated appropriately to meet the changing national security requirements of the nation.

Whether or how Congress implements these recommendations remains to be seen; however, the reality is that America has developed an operational reserve “by default” as more forces are regularly needed than are available in the active component (Statement of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve 2008). With the Reserves no longer “in reserve”, the nation must reconsider its force structure, military policies, and national strategy to ensure that America has and maintains the military means to achieve its desired strategic ends.

Conclusion

Having reviewed the development of compulsory and volunteer militia service in early America, the rise of the National Guard as an institution, the role of reserve forces in the World Wars and limited conflicts of the early Cold War, and the creation and maturity of the total force amidst an all-volunteer army, one can see that the citizen-soldier, despite many challenges, has maintained a unique role in American history. Because the military relies heavily upon its reserve components, understanding this role

of the citizen-soldier in the past is vital to understanding U.S. national security and military policy today and in the future.

Appendix B: Informed Consent Document

Is the Abrams Doctrine Valid?: Exploring the Impact of Army National Guard Mobilization on Public Opinion on War

Jill Rough, George Mason University

Informed Consent Form

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

This research is being conducted to explore certain aspects of the impact of National Guard mobilizations on local public opinion and behavior with regard to the use of military force. The primary methodology is a case study of the war on terror. If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked to answer questions for a period of no longer than one hour. With your permission, I may contact you via email or telephone with follow-up questions at a later time.

BENEFITS

There are no benefits to you as a participant.

RISKS

There are no foreseeable risks associated with participating in this research.

CONFIDENTIALITY

The data in this study will remain confidential unless you grant permission otherwise. Your real name and other personally-identifying information will not be included on the collected data. I will code all data and use an identification key to link your data with your identity. I will be the only person with access to this identification key. The data and the identification key will be stored in separate computer flash drives which will be stored in separate file cabinets in my secure home. Should the interview be audio-taped, all audio and text data will be coded by me and will comply with the above procedures. Any audio files will be destroyed upon completion of the project.

The final report will not use your real name or other personally-identifying information such as job, position in the community, etc unless you affirmatively grant permission otherwise. For example, information will be reported using broad classification of subjects. Using "one man" or "one woman" would be acceptable whereas an identifier such as "the head of the community civic association" would not be used unless you give me permission.

Please indicate whether you agree to the use of potentially personally-identifying information by checking the appropriate line at the bottom of this form.

PARTICIPATION

Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study, there is no penalty. There are no costs to you or any other party.

Approval for the use
of this document
EXPIRES

MAY 03 2010

Revised 03/2009

1 of 2

Protocol # 6360
George Mason University

CONTACT

This research is being conducted by Jill Rough at George Mason University. She may be reached at 703-981-9216 for questions or to report a research-related problem. Professors Janine Wedel and Jeremy Mayer are supervising this research and can be reached at 703-993-8200. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research.

CONSENT

I have read this form and agree to participate in this study.

Name

Date of Signature

____ I agree to the use of personally identifiable information.

____ I request that my participation remain confidential.

And

____ I agree to the use of audio-tape.

____ I do not agree to the use of audio-tape.

Version date:

Approval for the use
of this document
EXPIRES

MAY 03 2010


Protocol # 16360
George Mason University

Appendix C: Survey Instrument

Street-Intercept Survey

1. Gender:
2. Race:
3. Age bracket:
4. Class:
5. Do you know anyone in the Guard or military?
6. (if yes) What is your relationship with that person/people?
7. (if yes) Did you follow anything about how his/her deployment went?
8. Are you aware that the Pennsylvania National Guard (PANG) has sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan?
9. Have you followed the news regarding local National Guard deployments overseas?
10. How do you feel about the PANG fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan?
11. What do you think about the current war in Iraq?
12. Did you agree with the proposed invasion of Iraq in 2003?
13. What do you think now?
14. (if applicable) What do you think made you change your mind?
15. Did you attend any rallies for/against the war as a result of your opinions?
16. How do you feel about the current war in Afghanistan?
17. Does it matter to you whether we deploy National Guard soldiers or active duty military forces overseas?

Appendix D: Greater Wilkes-Barre Chamber Service Area



Appendix E: Statistical Output for all Regressions (STATA format)

1. 2004 Bivariate model (binary variable)

reg change04_00 binary04,r

Linear regression	Number of obs = 325
	F(1, 323) = 7.55
	Prob > F = 0.0064
	R-squared = 0.0206
	Root MSE = 3.1915
change04_00	Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----	
binary04	-.99603 .3625971 -2.75 0.006 -1.70938 -.2826799
_cons	3.954287 .2219423 17.82 0.000 3.517652 4.390922
-----+-----	

2. 2008 Bivariate model (binary variable)

reg change08_04 binary08,r

Linear regression	Number of obs = 326
	F(1, 324) = 27.65
	Prob > F = 0.0000
	R-squared = 0.0764
	Root MSE = 3.5899
change08_04	Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----	
binary08	-2.07554 .3947125 -5.26 0.000 -2.852063 -1.299017
_cons	-1.9159 .2781963 -6.89 0.000 -2.463199 -1.3686
-----+-----	

3. 2004 Bivariate model (# Soldiers mobilized)

reg change04_00 mob01_04noannville,r

Linear regression	Number of obs = 324
	F(1, 322) = 9.00
	Prob > F = 0.0029
	R-squared = 0.0281
	Root MSE = 3.1838

change04_00	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mob01_04no~e	-.0052999	.0017662	-3.00	0.003	-.0087747	-.0018251
_cons	3.844883	.1894902	20.29	0.000	3.472088	4.217678

4. 2008 Bivariate model (# soldiers mobilized)

reg change08_04 mob05_08,r

Linear regression

Number of obs = 326

F(1, 324) = 10.77

Prob > F = 0.0011

R-squared = 0.0326

Root MSE = 3.674

change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
mob05_08	-.0056585	.0017242	-3.28	0.001	-.0090505	-.0022666
_cons	-2.568772	.220049	-11.67	0.000	-3.001678	-2.135867

5. 2008 Bivariate model (total soldiers mobilized)

reg change08_04 totalmob,r

Linear regression

Number of obs = 326

F(1, 324) = 19.50

Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.0478

Root MSE = 3.645

change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
totalmob	-.0038434	.0008703	-4.42	0.000	-.0055554	-.0021313
_cons	-2.488308	.2233281	-11.14	0.000	-2.927664	-2.048952

6. 2004 Expanded model (binary variable)

reg change04_00 binary04 population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity,r b

Linear regression

Number of obs = 325

F(7, 317) = 46.15

Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.4138

Root MSE = 2.4922

change04_00	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
binary04	-.4661338	.3259424	-1.43	0.154	-.0671042
population	5.57e-08	1.19e-06	0.05	0.963	.0029256
black	-.2694882	1.026467	-0.26	0.793	-.01484
Hispanic	-.993407	1.335363	-0.74	0.457	-.0297133
bachelors	-27.59219	2.06351	-13.37	0.000	-.8125439
HHincome	.0000855	.0000191	4.48	0.000	.3130549
popdensity	-.000159	.0002153	-0.74	0.461	-.0330832
_cons	4.963095	.7848856	6.32	0.000	.

7. 2004 Expanded model (#soldiers mobilized)

reg change04_00 mob01_04noannville population black Hispanic bachelors
HHincome popdensity,r b

Linear regression

Number of obs = 324

F(7, 316) = 45.80

Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.4104

Root MSE = 2.5032

change04_00	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
mob01_04no~e	-.0005159	.0019415	-0.27	0.791	-.0163121
population	-5.92e-07	1.41e-06	-0.42	0.674	-.0311185
black	-.1057972	.9962347	-0.11	0.915	-.0058216
Hispanic	-.8725062	1.331407	-0.66	0.513	-.0260994
bachelors	-27.50824	2.088615	-13.17	0.000	-.8100885
HHincome	.0000871	.0000195	4.47	0.000	.3187322
popdensity	-.0000902	.0002262	-0.40	0.690	-.0187676
_cons	4.76194	.7724506	6.16	0.000	.

8. 2008 Expanded Mode (binary variable)

reg change08_04 binary08 population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity, r b

Linear regression					Number of obs = 325
					F(7, 317) = 27.04
					Prob > F = 0.0000
					R-squared = 0.3383
					Root MSE = 3.0643
change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
<hr/>					
binary08	-1.888313	.3807526	-4.96	0.000	-.2517495
population	1.02e-06	1.91e-06	0.53	0.594	.0463252
black	-4.82655	1.278621	-3.77	0.000	-.2296689
Hispanic	-10.26356	1.68823	-6.08	0.000	-.265273
bachelors	-13.10545	2.630183	-4.98	0.000	-.3334904
HHincome	-0.0000598	.0000252	-2.37	0.018	-.189119
popdensity	.0000815	.0003096	0.26	0.792	.0146555
_cons	4.371433	1.069275	4.09	0.000	.
<hr/>					

9. 2008 Expanded Model (#soldiers mobilized)

reg change08_04 mob05_08 population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity, r b

Linear regression					Number of obs = 325
					F(7, 317) = 24.79
					Prob > F = 0.0000
					R-squared = 0.3028
					Root MSE = 3.1455
change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
<hr/>					
mob05_08	-0.0044264	.0015699	-2.82	0.005	-.1414658
population	-1.60e-06	2.12e-06	-0.76	0.449	-.072772
black	-4.652093	1.292396	-3.60	0.000	-.2213674
Hispanic	-10.09364	1.60844	-6.28	0.000	-.260881

bachelors		-13.093	2.716591	-4.82	0.000	-.3331737
HHincome		-.0000548	.0000259	-2.11	0.035	-.1733976
popdensity		.0006116	.0003256	1.88	0.061	.1099433
_cons		3.602411	1.056364	3.41	0.001	.

10. 2008 Expanded Model (total mobilization variable)

reg change08_04 totalmob population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity, r b

Linear regression					Number of obs = 325	
					F(7, 317) = 25.34	
					Prob > F = 0.0000	
					R-squared = 0.3059	
					Root MSE = 3.1384	
change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta	
<hr/>						
totalmob	-0.0027641	.0007344	-3.76	0.000	-.1575093	
population	-1.06e-06	2.20e-06	-0.48	0.630	-.0481941	
black	-4.664585	1.288764	-3.62	0.000	-.2219618	
Hispanic	-9.985294	1.608047	-6.21	0.000	-.2580808	
Bachelors	-12.9253	2.719233	-4.75	0.000	-.3289061	
HHincome	-0.0000556	.0000258	-2.16	0.032	-.1760245	
popdensity	.000532	.0003289	1.62	0.107	.0956358	
_cons	3.614676	1.051493	3.44	0.001	.	

11. 2008 Expanded Model (binary variable) plus casualties per capita

reg change08_04 binary08 population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity GWOT_allKIApc, r b

Linear regression					Number of obs = 325	
					F(8, 316) = 23.66	
					Prob > F = 0.0000	
					R-squared = 0.3385	
					Root MSE = 3.0686	
change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta	
<hr/>						
binary08	-1.871343	.3877886	-4.83	0.000	-.249487	

population		9.83e-07	1.92e-06	0.51	0.610		.0446039
black		-4.839771	1.285178	-3.77	0.000		-.230298
Hispanic		-10.29921	1.690266	-6.09	0.000		-.2661942
bachelors		-13.09274	2.62635	-4.99	0.000		-.333167
HHincome		-.0000601	.0000253	-2.37	0.018		-.1900252
Popdensity		.0000838	.0003109	0.27	0.788		.0150716
GWOT_allKIA		-1.565908	5.042041	-0.31	0.756		-.0142293
_cons		4.415645	1.09655	4.03	0.000		.

12. 2008 Expanded Model (#soldiers mobilized) plus casualties per capita

reg change08_04 mob05_08 population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity GWOT_allKIApc,r b

Linear regression		Number of obs =	325
		F(8, 316) =	21.82
		Prob > F =	0.0000
		R-squared =	0.3045
		Root MSE =	3.1465
change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t P>t Beta

mob05_08		-.0043702	.0015768 -2.77 0.006 -.1396693
population		-1.63e-06	2.13e-06 -0.77 0.444 -.0740731
black		-4.696087	1.300087 -3.61 0.000 -.2234608
Hispanic		-10.20597	1.609162 -6.34 0.000 -.2637843
bachelors		-13.05649	2.68787 -4.86 0.000 -.3322446
HHincome		-.0000558	.000026 -2.15 0.033 -.1766272
popdensity		.0006064	.000327 1.85 0.065 .1089959
GWOT_allKIA		-4.618848	5.463941 -0.85 0.399 -.0419713
_cons		3.75669	1.095638 3.43 0.001 .

13. 2008 Expanded Model (total mobilization variable) plus casualties per capita

reg change08_04 totalmob population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity GWOT_allKIApc,r b

Linear regression		Number of obs =	325
		F(8, 316) =	22.26
		Prob > F =	0.0000

					R-squared = 0.3078
					Root MSE = 3.1391
change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta

Totalmob	-.0027435	.0007364	-3.73	0.000	-.1563355
Population	-1.09e-06	2.21e-06	-0.49	0.623	-.0494699
black	-4.710248	1.296199	-3.63	0.000	-.2241347
Hispanic	-10.10365	1.608534	-6.28	0.000	-.2611398
Bachelors	-12.88897	2.690037	-4.79	0.000	-.3279817
HHincome	-.0000567	.0000259	-2.19	0.029	-.1794104
Popdensity	.000528	.0003302	1.60	0.111	.0949056
GWOT_allKIA	-4.787619	5.465702	-0.88	0.382	-.0435049
_cons	3.775942	1.091638	3.46	0.001	.

14. 2004 Expanded Model using log transformed #soldiers

reg change04_00 lmob01_04noannville population black Hispanic bachelors
HHincome popdensity,r b

Linear regression					Number of obs = 324
					F(7, 316) = 45.90
					Prob > F = 0.0000
					R-squared = 0.4117
					Root MSE = 2.5004
change04_00	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta

lmob01_04n~e	-0.0722529	.0841565	-0.86	0.391	-.0444072
population	-2.38e-07	1.32e-06	-0.18	0.857	-.0124912
black	-0.1530665	1.010065	-0.15	0.880	-.0084227
Hispanic	-0.8960128	1.327	-0.68	0.500	-.0268025
bachelors	-27.42888	2.089432	-13.13	0.000	-.8077515
HHincome	.0000858	.0000193	4.45	0.000	.3140048
popdensity	-0.0001197	.000225	-0.53	0.595	-.0249042
_cons	4.849875	.7755791	6.25	0.000	.

15. 2008 Expanded Model using log transformed #soldiers

reg change08_04 lmob05_08 population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity,r b

Linear regression

Number of obs = 325

F(7, 317) = 27.06

Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.3260

Root MSE = 3.0927

change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
lmob05_08	-.4124109	.0891185	-4.63	0.000	-.2261854
population	5.05e-07	1.97e-06	0.26	0.798	.022914
black	-4.352174	1.272077	-3.42	0.001	-.2070959
Hispanic	-10.08102	1.620978	-6.22	0.000	-.2605549
bachelors	-13.43861	2.712097	-4.96	0.000	-.3419682
HHincome	-.0000526	.0000257	-2.05	0.042	-.1663107
popdensity	.0002642	.0003132	0.84	0.400	.0474918
_cons	3.777506	1.046735	3.61	0.000	.

16. 2008 Expanded Model using log transformed total mobilization variable.

reg change08_04 ltotalmob population black Hispanic bachelors HHincome
popdensity, r b

Linear regression

Number of obs = 325

F(7, 317) = 27.46

Prob > F = 0.0000

R-squared = 0.3361

Root MSE = 3.0694

change08_04	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P>t	Beta
ltotalmob	-4.404345	.0754657	-5.36	0.000	-.2573881
population	1.30e-06	1.96e-06	0.66	0.510	.0588071
black	-4.624378	1.265255	-3.65	0.000	-.2200486
Hispanic	-10.23626	1.639292	-6.24	0.000	-.2645674
bachelors	-13.05693	2.71636	-4.81	0.000	-.3322557
HHincome	-.0000571	.0000255	-2.23	0.026	-.1805739
popdensity	.0001565	.0003125	0.50	0.617	.0281307
_cons	4.058619	1.044371	3.89	0.000	.

References

References

- Abrams, Creighton W. Jr. "*The Sixteen Division Force, Anatomy of a Decision.*" Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.
- Abrams, Elliott and Andrew Bacevich. "A Symposium on Citizenship and Military Service." *Parameters* (2001): 18-22.
- Adjutant General's Association of the United States. "AGAUS Principles for a New National Security Strategy" <http://www.agaus.org/about.asp> (accessed 18 September 2010).
- Agar, Michael. *The Professional Stranger*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1996.
- Almond, Gabriel. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1960.
- Ambrose, Stephen and James A. Barber, Jr., eds. *The Military and American Society: Essays and Readings*. New York: Free Press, 1972.
- Atkinson, Paul et al, (eds.), *Handbook of Ethnography*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001.
- Avant, Deborah. "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 24 (1998): 375-388.
- Bachman, Gerald, John Blair, and David Segal. *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977.
- Berinsky, Adam and James Druckman. "The Polls-Review: Public Opinion Research and Support for the Iraq War." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71 (2007): 126-141.
- Berthoff, Rowland. *An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History*. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- Binkin, Martin and William Kauffmann, *U.S. Army Guard & Reserve : Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1989.
- Bletz, Donald. *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1972.

- Boene, Bernard and Michel Louis Martin. "France: In the throes of Epoch-Making Change." In *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, 51-79. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Brayton, Abbott. "American Reserve Policies Since World War II," *Military Affairs* 36 (1972): 139-144.
- Brinkerhoff, John. "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power." *Parameters* (1996): 4-16.
- Burk, James. "Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious Objectors." *Armed Forces and Society* 21 (1995): 503-529.
- _____. "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis." *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (1999): 53-78.
- _____. "The Military Obligation of Citizens Since Vietnam." *Parameters* (2001): 48-60.
- _____. "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 29 (2002): 7-29.
- Carafano, James Jay. "Shutting Out the Draft." *The Heritage Foundation*. July 8, 2004. <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070804b.cfm> (accessed October 12, 2007).
- _____. "Shaping the 21st Century Role of the National Guard and Reserves." Testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 4 May 2006.
- _____. "The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future." *The Heritage Foundation*. April 18, 2005. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl869.cfm#pgfId-1133776> (accessed October 22, 2007).
- Carroll, Les [Colonel]. "Current Operations: US Army Reserve", Washington DC, April 23, 2008.
- Chapman, Bruce. "Politics and National Service: A Virus Attack on the Volunteer Sector." In *National Service: Pro and Con*, edited by Williamson Evers, 133-144. Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1990.
- Clark, Wesley. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.

- Cochran, Charles, ed. *Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Free Press, 1974.
- Cohen, Bernard. *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*. New York: University Press of America, 1973.
- Cohen, Eliot. "Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier." *Parameters*, Summer 2001: 23-28.
- Cohen, Stuart. "The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a "People's Army" to a "Professional Military"—Causes and Implications." *Armed Forces and Society* 21 (1995): 237-254.
- Commission on the National Guard and Reserve. *Executive Summary, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense*. January 31, 2008.
- Continental Congress, "A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates 1774-1875," *Journals of the Continental Congress* 27 (2 June 1784), 518
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=027/lljc027.db&recNum=155&itemLink=D?hlaw:2:./temp/~ammem_SbvK::%230270156&linkText=1
 (accessed November 15, 2007).
- Converse, Philip. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, eds. D.E. Apter. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- Cooper, Jerry. *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia 1865-1920*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.
- Crossland, Richard. *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983*. Washington DC: Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, 1984.
- Dahms, Jonathan. "An Operational Army Reserve: Implications for Organizational Health." Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007.
- Dandeker, Christopher. "The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military." In *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, 32-50. New York: Oxford Press, 2000.
- Davis, Lynn et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.
- Department of Defense, "A Grateful Nation Remembers."
<http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/gratefulnation/p20040526a1.html>
 (accessed online April 23, 2008).

- Desch, Michael. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Division of Instructional Innovation and Assessment at University of Texas, Austin. 2007 <http://www.utexas.edu/academic/diia/assessment/iar/research/plan/method/focus.php> (accessed April 11, 2008).
- Doubler, Michael. *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
- Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (1983): 205-235.
- Duncan, Stephan, *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997.
- _____. *A War of A Different Kind: Military Force and America's Search for Homeland Security*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004.
- _____. "A 'War of a Different Kind' and the Reconstruction of U.S. Reserve Forces." Keynote address at Foreign Policy Research institute's conference on "The Future of the National Guard and Reserves." December 6, 2004. <http://www.fpri.org/transcripts/lecture.20041206.duncan.wardifferentkindreserves.html> (accessed April 3, 2008).
- Dunivin, Karen. "Military Culture: Change and Continuity." *Armed Forces and Society* 20 (1994): 531-547.
- Dunlap, Charles, Jr. "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." *Parameters* 22 (1992-93): 2-20
- Eichenberg, Richard. "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005." *International Security* 30 (2005): 140-177.
- Evers, Williamson, ed. *National Service: Pro and Con*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990.
- Everts, Philip and Pierangelo Isernia, eds. *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- _____. "The Polls-Trends: The War in Iraq." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (2005): 264-323.

- Fautua, David. "How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025." *Parameters*, Spring 199: 127-149.
- Feaver, Peter and Christopher Gelpi. *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Feaver, Peter and Richard Kohn, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
- Ferling, John. *Struggle for a Continent: The Wars of Early America*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1993.
- Flynn, George Q. *The Draft: 1940-1973*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993.
- Freedburg Jr., Sydney. "The Guard's Turn to Surge." *National Journal*. December 14, 2007. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2007/1214nj1.htm> (accessed September 20, 2010).
- Gartner, Scott, Gary Segura, and Michael Wilkening. "All Politics are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes towards the Vietnam War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1997): 669-694.
- Garrison, John. "The Political Dimension of Military Professionalism." In *American Defense Policy* (6th edition), ed. Schuyler Foerster and Edward Wright. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990: 606-613.
- Geertz, Clifford. "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture". In *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, 3-30. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Gelpi, Christopher, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler. "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq." *International Security* 30 (2006): 7-46.
- General Accounting Office. *Federal Programs: Ethnographic Studies Can Inform Agencies' Actions*. Washington D.C., March 2003.
- General Accounting Office. *Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges*. Washington D.C., April 29, 2004.
- Glaser, Barney and Anselm Strauss. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine Publishing, 1967.

Glenn, John as quoted in Michael Ross, "Pre-Election Battle Over Haiti Shaping Up in Congress Politics." *Los Angeles Times*, September 24, 1994.

Goldich, Robert. "Military Manpower Policy and the All-Volunteer Force." Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB77032, Archived 9/81.

Gorden, Raymond. *Basic Interviewing Skills*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1992.

Goulding, Christina. *Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide for Management, Business, and Market Researchers*. London: Sage Publications, 2002.

Hamre, John. "Changing Role of the Guard." *US Department of Defense*. February 3, 1998. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=652> (accessed November 3, 2007).

Hauser, William. *America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Heller, Charles Harris. *Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards*. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.

Herrmann, Richard, Philip Tetlock, and Penny Visser. "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework." *The American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 553-573.

Herron, Sean. *Twice the Citizen: The New Challenges of Serving in the Army Reserve and National Guard*. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2004.

Holsti, Ole. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus." *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 439-466.

Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder. *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Jackle, Robert. "The History of the U.S. Army Reserve." Washington D.C., April 23, 2008.

Jacobson, Gary. *A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People*. New York: Pearson Education, 2007.

- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. New York: The Free Press, 1964.
- _____. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Janowitz, Morris and Charles Moskos, "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force: Policy Alternatives." *Armed Forces and Society* 1 (1974): 109-123.
- Jensen, Robert. "Dan Rather and the Problem with Patriotism: Steps Toward the Redemption of American Journalism and Democracy." *Global Media Journal* 2 (2003): 1.
- Jentleson, Bruce. "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 49-73.
- Johnson, Douglas and Stephen Metz. "American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems." Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1995.
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines. *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969*. Austin, TX: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
- Jones, Brian. *The Abrams Doctrine: Total Force Foundation or Enduring Fallacy?* Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.
- Just, Ward. *Military Men*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970.
- Karsten, Peter. "The US Citizen-Soldier's Past, Present, and Likely Future." *Parameters* (2001): 61-73.
- Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Key, V.O. *Public Opinion and American Democracy*. New York: Knopf, 1964.
- Keyssar, Alexander. *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Kohn, Richard. "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations." *The National Interest* 35 (1994): 3-17.
- _____. "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military."
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html (accessed

August 18, 2008.)

Kronenberg, Philip. "The Greening of the Brass: Emerging Civil-Military Relations." In *New Civil-Military Relations*, ed. John Lovell and Philip Kronenberg. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc, 1974.

Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis. "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War." *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (2004): 569-598.

Kull, Steven, I.M. Destler, and Clay Ramsay. *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997.

Kull, Steven and Clay Ramsay. "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the post-Cold War Period." In *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*, eds. Everts, Philip and Pierangelo Isernia. New York: Routledge, 2001

LaFeber, Walter. "American Policy-Makers, Public Opinion, and the Outbreak of the Cold War. 1945-1950." In *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, eds. Y. Nagai and A. Iriye. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Larson, Eric. *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996.

LeCompte, Margaret and Jean Schensul. *Ethnographer's Toolkit: Designing and Conducting Ethnographic Research*. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira, 1999.

Leip, David. 2000 Election Results by county dataset, 2005.

_____. 2004 Election Results by county dataset, 2005.

Levantrosser, William. "The Army Reserve Merger Proposal." *Military Affairs* 30 (1966): 135-147.

Lian, Bradley and John Oneal. "Presidents, the Use of Force, and Public Opinion." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (1993): 277-300.

Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion*. New York: Macmillan, 1922.

_____. *The Phantom Public*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1925.

_____. *Essays in the Public Philosophy*. New York: The Free Press, 1955.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. *The President, the Polls, and Vietnam*. Transaction (1966): 19-24.

Luttwak, Edward. "Towards Post-heroic Warfare." *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 109-122.

_____. "A Post-heroic Military Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996):33-44.

Marsh, John O., Jr. "Personnel: Active and Reserve Forces." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 517 (1991): 94-105.

Matthews, William. "Changing of the Guard." *Military Officer*, August 2006
http://www.moaa.org/momstory.aspx?pagename=pubs_mom_060801_Guard
(accessed November, 15, 2007).

_____. "No Longer in Reserve." *Military Officer*, August 2007
http://www.moaa.org/momstory.aspx?pagename=pubs_mom_070901_guard
(accessed November 15, 2007).

Mayer, Jeremy. *American Media Politics in Transition*. New York: McGraw Hill, 2008.

McQuinston, I.M. "History of the Reserves Since the Second World War," *Military Affairs* 17 (1953): 23-27.

Mead, Margaret. "A National Service System as a Solution to a Variety of National Problems." In Sol Tax, ed., *The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967: 99-109.

Merton, Robert, Majorie Fiske and Patricia Kendall. *The Focused Interview: A Manual of Problems and Procedures*. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956.

Miller, Warren and Donald Stokes. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57 (1963): 45-46.

Moskos, Charles. *A Call to Civic Service: National Service for Country and Community*. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1988.

_____. "Grave Decisions: When Americans Accept Casualties." *Chicago Tribune*. December 12, 1995.

_____. "National Service and its Enemies." In *National Service: Pro and Con*, edited by Williamson Evers, 191-208. Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1990.

_____. *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971.

- _____. *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.
- Moskos, Charles, John Allen Williams and David Segal, eds. *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Mueller, John. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973.
- _____. "The Iraq Syndrome." *Foreign Affairs* 84 (2005): 44-54.
- Mueller, Karl. "Politics, Death, and Morality in U.S. Foreign Policy," *Aerospace Power Journal* 14 (2000): 12-16.
- National Defense Act of 1920*, Sixty-sixth Congress, Session II (June 4, 1920.)
- Neuman, Johanna. *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Nincic, Miroslav. "A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1992): 772-789.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. "The Need to Increase the Size of the Deployable Army." *Parameters* (2004): 4-17.
- Oi, Walter. "National Service: Who Bears the Costs and Who Reaps the Gains?" In *National Service Pro and Con*, edited by Williamson Evers, 81-103. Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1990.
- Oneal, John, Brad Lian, and James Joyner, Jr. "Are the American People 'Pretty Prudent'? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950-1988." *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996): 261-279.
- Page, Benjamin and Robert Shapiro. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *American Political Science Review* 77 (1983): 175-190.
- Page, Benjamin. *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- _____. "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (1988): 211-247.

- Philpott, Thomas. "High Demand." *Military Officer*, November 2006
http://www.moaa.org/momstory.aspx?pagename=pubs_mom_061101_high (accessed November 17, 2007).
- Pinch, Franklin. "Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources." *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, 156-181. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Powlick, Philip. "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (1995): 427-451.
- Rangel, Charles. "War's Burden Must be Shared." January 7, 2003.
http://www.house.gov/list/hearing/ny15_rangel/sharedsacrifice010703.html (accessed November 19, 2007).
- Ray, James Lee. "Does Democracy Cause Peace?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 27-46.
- Record, Jeffrey. *Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning*. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998.
- _____. "Force Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions." *Aerospace Power Journal* 14 (2000): 4-11.
- Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.
- Rice, S. A., ed. *Methods in Social Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931.
- Robinson, Spencer. *The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century: Peacekeeping vs. Homeland Security*. Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, 2002.
- Rostker, Bernard. *America Goes to War: Managing the Force During Times of Stress and Uncertainty*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2007.
- _____. *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Army*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2006.
- Roth, Arthur. "Development of the Army Reserve Forces." *Military Affairs* 17: 3-7.
- Rubin, Herbert and Irene Rubin. *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995.

- Russett, Bruce. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Sapolsky, Harvey and Jeremy Shapiro, "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars," *Parameters* 26 (1996): 119-127.
- Sarkesian, Sam. "Political Soldiers: Perspectives on Professionalism in the U.S. Military." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 16 (1972): 239-258.
- Schein, Edgar. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. NJ: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997.
- Scott, Richard. *Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems*. NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998.
- Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments," August 21, 1970.
- Segal, David. *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989.
- Servicemembers Legal Defense Network. <http://www.sldn.org/> (accessed April 1, 2008).
- Slater, Jerome. "Apolitical Warrior or Soldier-Statesman: The Military and the Foreign Policy Process in the Post-Vietnam Era." *Armed Forces and Society* 4 (1977): 101-118.
- Small, Melvin, and David Singer. "The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965." *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (1976): 50-69.
- Smith, Michael. "Going International: Presidential Activity in the Post-Modern Presidency." *Journal of American Studies* 31 (1997): 219-233.
- Snider, Don, ed. *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?* Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995.
- Sorensen, Henning. "Denmark: From Obligation to Option." In *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, 121-136. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Sorley, Lewis. *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Time*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Spradley, James P. *The Ethnographic Interview*. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979.

Statement of Commission on the National Guard and Reserves on the Final Report to Congress: Transforming the National Guard into a 21st-Century Operational Force before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 7, 2008

Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the FY 1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, March 9, 1971.

Steward, Alex. *The Ethnographer's Method*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998.

Sullivan, Timothy. *The Abrams Doctrine: Is it Viable and Enduring in the 21st Century?* Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.

The Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress, Session I (May 2, 1792).

The Report of the President's Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force. Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1970.

Verba, Sidney, Richard Brody, Edwin Parker, Norman Nie, Nelson Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon Black. "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam." *The American Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 317-333.

Von Clausewitz, Karl. *On War*. In *The Book of War*, ed. Caleb Carr. New York, NY: The Modern Library, 2000.

U.S. Code

U.S. Constitution

Van der Meulen, Jan. "The Netherlands: The Final Professionalization of the Military." In *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, 101-120. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Vinson, Mark. "Structuring the Army for Full Spectrum Readiness." *Parameters*, Summer 2000: 19-32.

Wedel, Janine. *Ethnographies of Aid: Exploring development texts and encounters*. Denmark, Roskilde University, 2004.

Williams, John Allen. "The Post-Modern Military Reconsidered." In *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, edited by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David Segal, 265-278. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Zaller, John and Stanley Feldman. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (1992): 579-616.

CURRICULM VITAE

Jill A. Rough graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a Bachelor of Science in political science in 1996. Upon graduation, she was commissioned as an Ensign in the U.S. Navy and served as a Surface Warfare Officer at a variety of commands. She transitioned from active duty into the U.S. Navy Reserve as an Intelligence Officer in 2003 and remains an actively drilling reservist in the Washington DC area.

Jill received her Master of Arts in International Affairs from The George Washington University in 2004. Her professional experiences include national security and defense policy work at the Rand Corporation, homeland security and terrorism analysis in the private sector, and a national security internship on Capitol Hill.