Historical Remembering and Attitudes Towards the "Other": A Cross-generational
Inquiry

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

By

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Spring Semester 2010
George Mason University
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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my family, friends, mentors and the people of the former Yugoslavia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There were countless times throughout my studies that I thought of the following questions: What makes people view "Others" as evil? What kind of memories and attitudes are prevalent in defining the "Other" as evil? These questions were especially relevant in the context of the former-Yugoslavia where almost instantaneously neighbors became strangers, friends became enemies and once "good" people were now labeled as "evil" because of their accent, the names they had, or the looks they portrayed. Simple gestures, the way one spoke, even the way one displayed the number three could have at one point been grounds for harassment. This study aims to discover the reasons why certain individuals were and others were not affected by the socio-political and historic constructs created to define "other" individuals as enemies.

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ABSTRACT

HISTORICAL REMEMBERING AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE "OTHER": A CROSS GENERATIONAL INQUIRY

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The main aim of this study is to explore the relationships between historical memories and group attitudes to determine whether the positive or negative ways of remembering actors involved in these events will have an influence on whether one positively or negatively views the actors' group affiliation. Out of the 210 survey participants, 48.6 percent (N=102) came from the non-war affected areas and 51.4 percent (N=108) from conflict affected areas. Finally, this study concludes that the more support one gives to the negative historical figures, the more negative their attitudes will be toward the groups involved in such incidents. Hence, the way we collectively remember a group will dictate the way we will behave towards them. Moreover, viewing a group as negative reinforces the individuals' negative attitudes towards them insofar as peaceful coexistence and/or reconciliation in such situation becomes of limited or no importance.

1. Introduction

"Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoria, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis"

~Marcus Tillius Cicero~

Overview of the Project

The above-mentioned quote reiterates the words of a Roman orator, Marcus Tillius Cicero, who in his discourse on rhetoric *De Oratore*, exemplifies the multifarious role of history as "the true witness of the times, the light of truth, the life of memory, the teacher of life, the messenger of antiquity." If Cicero is correct and history is the teacher of life, then why does humanity constantly fail to learn from past historical events? If history is the life of memory, then why are these memories so easily malleable? If history is the light of truth, then why are human beings willing to die for divergent truths? Finally, if history is the true witness of the times, then in the words of Heaney, how do we "make space in [our] reckoning and imagining for the marvelous as well as for the murderous?"

There are three main concepts comprising this study. The first one is the notion of *Historical Resurrection*, or historical events deeply ingrained in individuals' memories being brought back to life by the current political structures. Oftentimes, these historical

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events tend to be altered or embellished in order to support a group's specific cause. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, historical events were manipulated along ethnic lines for the purposes of inciting ethnonational group violence (Kaufman, 2001). Hence, the aim of this study is to explore historical memories and determine the way such memories shape individuals attitudes. Theoretical evidence postulates that people in the former Yugoslavia shifted from being united in *brotherhood* to engaging in ferocious, barbaric battles that resulted in *bloodshed*.

Therefore, the second aim of this study is to explore the perceptions that Croatian citizens have of the intergroup dynamics within the former Yugoslavia. While deadly ethnonational clashes in the former Yugoslavia have been the focus of the media and researchers for more than a decade, to this day, studies have failed to adequately explain the way processes such as the revival of contending ethnonational histories, the creation of self-perpetuating myths, identity politicization and the construction of mono-ethnic symbolic communities influenced attitudes formation.

The final aim of this study hopes to provide answers to the following questions: What is the role of historical interpretation in constructing enemy images and shaping ethnonational attitudes? In what way(s) are historical knowledge and enemy images transferred (through the state structure of media and educational institutions and/or via socialization with peers/family?) These ambitious research aims, coupled with the cross-generational nature of this study not only hope to enrich the academic areas concerned with conflict manifestation and resolution, but they also intend to enhance the

understanding of attitude formation including individual and group motivations for labeling the "Other" as the enemy.

The next section of this chapter provides a skeleton of this dissertation. The brief chapter summaries that follow include information relevant to the structure and content of the dissertation giving a reader guidance to understand the way in which the study was conceived, designed and carried out. The last part of the dissertation talks about the results, discussing their significance and finally proposing broader recommendations for future research to be carried out in the region and in conflict zones throughout the world.

Chapter Summaries

The first chapter provides a brief introduction to the topic of this dissertation. It also illustrates each of the chapters and gives a reader a clear indication of what is to be covered in this dissertation.

The second chapter explores the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by focusing on the identity dynamics and the management of ethnonational issues by the Communist Party (CP). Throughout this chapter close attention is paid at the state of Serbo-Croatian relations within the former Yugoslavia, as well as, during the period of secession and creation of the independent states throughout the 1990's. Along the same lines, a variety of Titoist rituals are explained. These rituals helped to strengthen the importance of Yugoslav brotherhood and unity, a doctrine that has been ingrained in every Yugoslav citizen from a very early age. Moreover, this chapter explores the nuances of the successes and failures of such federal system along with the causes of the collapse of Yugoslavia. The last part of this chapter aims to explain the creation of the

State of Croatia and explores the contested battles of Oluja (Strom) and Bljesak (Flash). The chapter concludes with an overview of Croatia's political and economic achievements in the last ten years.

The third chapter is focused on the literature review of the concepts used in this study. This chapter starts with an introduction to the theory of collective remembering and presents a model of identity-based-group-interaction. The model explores the notion of intergroup attitude formation and manifestation of violence as being a multifarious phenomenon. The latter parts of this chapter are focused on the psychological and structural factors that through various triggers can lead to negative attitude formation and potentially intergroup violence. The social learning theory indicates that individuals' violent socialization deprives them of being exposed to positive role models. Lack of positive role models prevents individuals from learning the socially appropriate responses to violence and socially acceptable ways of interacting with other people. Images of the enemy, dehumanization and moral exclusion processes preclude individuals from more openly evaluating the other party. Instead, people locked into intergroup conflict see a demonized image of their enemy and refuse to associate, and more so adamantly refute the notion of negotiating with 'evil'. Secondly, by dehumanizing the other, the human aspect of the person is stripped from them; they are demonized; and in practice it is easier to kill demons than human beings. This way the enemy is placed outside of the in-groups moral realm, which automatically makes the out-group immoral, evil and worthless.

Concurrently, the theory of emotion indicates that intergroup conflict is due to the high emotional reactions between the parties in a conflict. Additionally, relative

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deprivation can further cause feelings of anger and rage toward the oppressor. Lastly, social differentiations, introduction of divergent symbols and myths that obstruct the intergroup relationships, engender parties' calcification into their respective positions. In addition, inequitable minority policies are important structural precursors for shaping individuals' attitudes. Understanding the way these processes relate to the notion of collective remembering and attitude formation is critical in order to broaden our knowledge base in these social scientific realms.

The fourth chapter starts with a review of the literature relevant to the study of attitudes in the former Yugoslav territories. Not many studies explored the notion of historical remembering and its relation to attitude formation. Most publications coming out of the field of international relations and other social sciences are theoretical in nature. Such studies, for example, explore the theoretical underpinning of the collapse of Yugoslavia, postulate the relationship between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, and hypothesize about the possibility for reconciliation without exploring these phenomena in an empirical manner. Unlike such studies, this study aims to analyze the socio-psychological consequences of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia by collecting quantitative and qualitative evidence from the respondents who live in the territory. More specifically, this study aims to uncover the relationship between historical remembering of ethno-national relations in Yugoslavia and the conflicts that arose out of the fragmentation of the state; more specifically the way such remembering influences individuals' attitudes toward the "Other." By asking directly the local people about their perception of the current relationship between groups, we have the potential to gain a

greater understanding of the 'in country' conditions. It is one of the aims of this study to determine the cross-generational nuances of remembering; hypothesizing that the individuals who lived under the doctrine of brotherhood and unity will have more favorable attitudes and will be more willing to engage with other ethno-national groups than individuals who were raised in the newly independent states. More specifically, uncovering the attitudes between individuals who remember growing up in Yugoslavia (experiential knowledge) and those who were solely educated about these events (institutional knowledge) has the potential to shed light onto the relationship between experiential and institutionally mediated memories and their influence on attitude formation. The second part of this chapter presents the study's aims and the way this study was designed. Study procedures and the eighteen areas of the study's questionnaire are carefully presented in the third section of this chapter, followed by a description of the processes of data coding, entry and verification. This chapter ends with a presentation of the quantitative research methodology used to analyze the data such as descriptive (frequencies and cross-tabulations) and inferential statistical methods (linear regression models and ordered logistic regression). Subsequently, the qualitative data analysis is presented in a form of thematic analysis which enables us to derive categories from responses to the open-ended questions.

The fifth chapter describes the key demographic statistics of the study's participants such as gender, age, nationality, religious affiliation and educational attainment. Additional demographic characteristics being described in this chapter

include the participants' degree of religiosity, their parents' educational attainment and engagement in interethnic friendships. Four subsequent areas are also explored in this chapter, namely, the participants' use of the media and their intention to visit countries such as Serbia and Bosnia in comparison to Italy and Hungary.

The sixth chapter of this dissertation explored the following questions: What are the predominant attitudes that Croatian citizens have toward the conflicts and their neighbors? Is there hope for reconciliation between the peoples of the former-Yugoslavia? In lieu of these question some of the key findings of the study discovered that respondents who were living in the war zones seemed to rate the Serb entities as culprits for the conflict by approximately 30.0 percent more than in the non-war zones. Additionally, individuals who were living in the war zones were 60.0 percent more likely to agree with the statement; 'I would be willing to die for my country' than people in the non-war zones. Finally, about 30.0 percent more people in the war zones think that the picture of Croatia in the Serbian media was not truthfully portrayed during the 1990's. About 20.0 percent more people in the war zone also disagreed that Serbian policy during the 1990 was mainly defensive and approximately 50.0 percent disagreed that Serb citizens did not pose threat to Croatia during the 1990's. Evidently, the respondents who were affected by the conflicts displayed more negative attitudes towards the members of the out-group and favored slightly more those historical events linked to Croatia's affiliation with the fascist regime during World War II.

The seventh chapter examines the qualitative answers to the open-ended questions collected in this study. The first part of this chapter illustrates the reactions that

respondents had when they heard that Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Josip Broz Tito died. Some of the respondets who cared about these leaders were extremely saddened by their deaths. On the other hand, some of them were quite pleased to have the opportunity to elect into office somebody more appropriate.

The second part of this chapter deals with the question, If you could go back in time and you were hypothetically appointed as a governmental consultant, knowing what you know now, what kind of advice would you give to Presidents Tuđman and Milošević? If anything, what would you have done differently? The responses to these questions varied from proposing the presidential resignation, lauding their actions and supporting the war to commenting on the military actions of Oluja and Bljesak and pleading for peaceful negotiation and resolution of the crises.

The third part of the chapter explores the question, Do you think it is possible to restore ethnic relations in states of the former Yugoslavia? Many different views were presented including those who wished there was a quicker way to restore interethnic relations to those who proposed set ways of how to go about doing that. There were also respondents who were very much hurt by the conflict and were unable to come up with any solutions for restoring such relations. One respondent stated that the reason for his/her inability to answer this question was the fact that too much blood had been spilled and another one mentioned that the wounds are still fresh.

Finally, the last question asked, If you could send a message to the people in Serbia, what would it be? Similarly to the previous question asked about interethnic relations, the respondents' answers were multifarious. Some respondents stated in

politically correct ways their grievances about the Serbs and their politics, while others could not bring themselves to state things in a cordial way in reference to the Serbs.

Chapter eight is the concluding chapter of this dissertation. This chapter presents the integration of the quantitative and qualitative analyses, the case study and the theoretical concepts. The first part of the chapter discusses the major findings of this dissertation and aims to give an explanation to the relationship between historical remembering of the conflicts in the 1990's and respondents' attitudes. The latter part of the chapter investigates the state of relations between Croats and their neighbors' in order to decipher whether there is a future for establishing positive interethnic relations.

The last part of this chapter offers the reader future research recommendations. In order for this study to reach the target goal of having a comprehensive cross-national analysis, it will necessitate future field work in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska as well as in Serbia. It is recommended that this same study be replicated in those countries in order to generate comparative data. Such data would provide for a richness of points of view about the prevalent memories and their relations to attitude formation of the other nationalities in the former-Yugoslavia. Moreover, the data would also serve as a guiding point to establish the current underlying attitudes that Serbs and Bosniaks display towards Croats. Such comprehensive study is necessary in order to thoroughly evaluate the potential for reconciliation and to enrich the area of social science research in the whole territory.

2. Historical and Political Aspects of the Region

> Back in 1991, as the war in Slovenia was drawing to a close, a high-ranking Serbian official remarked that the coming conflict in Croatia would make what had happened in Slovenia look like Disneyland. Of course, picking up the Disneyland motif, one might note that Krajina could, properly enough, be translated as Frontierland, while Kosovo has perhaps earned the sobriquet Adventureland, recalling that most 'adventures' have a desperate character in them. Macedonia might be Neverneverland, at least in the eyes of Greek nationalists who wanted nothing less than to expunge its name and history altogether. I think of Bosnia as Tomorrowland, indicating a sense of foreboding for the future and offering a warning of a possible 'future' to be avoided. Serbia under Milošević figured—dare I say clearly?—as a kind of Fantasyland, where fantasies of national salvation raised Serbian spirits to dizzying heights, only to see their spirits dashed in the course of eight years of war and privation. And dominating Fantasyland is, of course, Sleeping Beauty's Castle, where the slumbering beauty lies in repose until a princely kiss will awaken her. Serbia's Sleeping Beauty's Castle is the so-called House of Flowers, where Tito lies buried. But Yugoslavia's sleeping beauty, unlike Disney's will sleep forever. The only fairy tales still circulating in this Fantasyland are the dangerous ones.

> Sabrina Ramet (Kavalski & Zolkos, 2008, p. 115)

The Yugoslav dissolution marked the return of war to the European stage after the nearly half-a-century-long-peace of the Cold War (Kavalski & Zolkos, 2008; Sandole 2007). This incidence urged the realization that 'while the politics of class has been retreating in the wings [during the communist rule], the politics of ethnicity has been moving in the limelight'. Thus, the dismembering of Yugoslav statehood became a symbol for the destructive potency of discontent and unsatisfied identity groups. The unraveling of Yugoslavia during the 1990's urged commentators to start looking for the tell-tale signs of such collapse. These explorations have ranged from the 'mono-causal' statements of

Susan Woodward to the 'multi-causal' claims of Dejan Jović. Moreover, a number of

them explored the outside/inside dichotomy and the re-conceptualization of post-Cold

War international politics (Kavalski & Zolkos, 2008, p, 115)

This chapter will explore the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia by focusing on the identity dynamics and the management of ethnonational

issues by the Communist Party. Throughout this chapter close attention will be paid at the

state of Serbo-Croatian relations in Yugoslavia as well as during the secession and

creation of the independent states throughout the 1990's. Along the same lines, a variety

of Titoist rituals will be explained. These rituals helped to strengthen the importance of

Yugoslav brotherhood and unity, a doctrine that has been ingrained in every Yugoslav

citizen from a very early age. Moreover, this chapter will also explore the nuances of the

successes and failures of such federal system along with the causes of its collapse.

Finally, this chapter will aim to explain the creation of the State of Croatia and explore

the contested battles of Oluja and Bljesak.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1991)

Born out of the ashes of WWII, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's

(SFRY) foundation was established during the second Anti-Fascist Council of the

National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina on

November 29th 1943. Presupposing the Communist victory, the Yugoslav federation

would consist of six units including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia,

Montenegro and Macedonia. The aforementioned federal divisions were drafted by the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) with the ultimate goal of creating an equitable

balance of ethno-historical groupings (Bennett, 1995). As a result, all of the Yugoslav

federal units except for Slovenia had a population of mixed nationalities and religions.

The creation of ethnically pure federal units was inconceivable given that the ethnic

origin, religious adherence, language spoken and the territories where these groups lived

were highly heterogeneous (Stanovčić, 1988). Interestingly, the CPY believed that

crafting such federal divisions would prevent future territorial quarrels (Bennett, 1995).

Unfortunately, this rather idealistic endeavor proved to be a failure as the conflicts

between ethnonational groups in Yugoslavia ferociously unfolded throughout the 1990's.

Two years after the Jajce meeting convened, and much to the Communists' Party

contentment, the monarchist Yugoslav regime (1918-1941) was abated and the new

Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (later renamed Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia) was formed. Marshal Josip Broz Tito became Yugoslavia's second president

in 1953 and held the same position for 27 years until he died on May 4, 1980. Josip Broz

Tito was considered by many the essence that held the Yugoslav federation together for

such an extended period of time. As exemplified in the Yugoslav patriotic mythology,

Tito was "the creator and the savior, a peacemaker who abolished the religious hatred and

united all of the Yugoslavs and the defender of the truth whose power derived from the

love of the people" (Perica, 2002, p. 103). Even to this day and age, rituals glorifying the

life and accomplishments of the benevolent dictator could be witnessed in various parts

of the former Yugoslavia.

Being cognizant of the fragile relations in the federation (particularly those

between the Serbs and the Croats), Tito made it a priority to constantly reassure the

Yugoslav national groups of their guaranteed constitutional right for national equality. As a result, Tito implemented a change of ideology that would differentiate the new SFRY from the old Kingdom of Yugoslavia. While the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was based on the ideology of national unity "narodno jedinstvo," a concept underlining unitary strength in numbers; the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded on the principle of brotherhood and unity "bratstvo i jedinstvo" or the notion of "relatedness" of all the Yugoslav people. As Judah (2000) points out, the latter concept attempted to consolidate the national interest of Yugoslav citizens in a federal system but it unwittingly failed to address the oscillating character of such interests. In this respect, Yugoslav federalism was a matter of "inter-national relations" or in the words of Tom Emmert, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could be regarded as a "state among the South Slavs which works and satisfies most of the people most of the time" (Rusinow, 1988, p. 2).

After Tito's death the Yugoslav federal units including the two autonomous regions progressed toward a formation of six quasi states, although all of the elements of the communist regime were still present. Nevertheless, the polarizations between ethnonational groups were growing deeper. The Yugoslav crisis arose out of a system that strengthened the ethnic and regional cleavages and produced a looser form of federalism. As a result, Rusinow (1988) noticed an undisputed relation between the rebellion of the Albanian majority in Kosovo, a backlash of Serbian nationalism, constitutional crises over the Serbian autonomous provinces and the grumbling nationalism all over the country. The negative outcome of these events could be attributed to the prohibition of frank discussions of the national question, and by the CPY

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nauseous propagation of the brotherhood and unity doctrine. However, the system collapse was also propagated by the constant fear of the existence of an inside enemy- whose purpose was domination over the other nationalities living in the Yugoslav federation.

Identity

The Yugoslav supranational identity could be regarded as all encompassing of the six seemingly homogenous identities otherwise known as the "ethno-national" identities. In the Yugoslav case, the artificiality of an overarching Yugoslav identity was clearly imposed by the doctrine of brotherhood and unity in order to tame the post-WWII nationalistic orientations. With such artificiality came the strategic revision of the WWII history (Bennett, 1995) in which the actions of the Croat Ustaša and the Serb Četniks were severely reprehended while the Partisan army and their triumphs were continuously lauded. The celebration of accomplishments of the Partisan army was employed for two main purposes. First, the Partisan struggle reunited the Yugoslav peoples into a single nation under the auspices of fraternal unity. The second reason stemmed from the liberational character of the Partisan's struggle against the occupying forces (Đokić, 2003), which succeeded and provided the Yugoslav people with their own nation state. Yugoslavism in Tito's view encompassed both distinct national identities which subsequently co-existed with the supranational identity but in which national identities could never take precedence over the Yugoslav identity. In this regard Tito explained:

> "I have received these days quite a few letters just in connection with this [question of nationality]. And mostly from children. Children understand what I am talking about. One little girl from Macedonia, a student in the fourth or fifth grade, whose father is a Slovenian and mother a

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Macedonian, [wrote to me] saying that she is happy that she can now be called a Yugoslav. Look, Comrades, a little girl wrote that in her own hand. That shows better than anything how absurd it is to force someone to belong to a nationality, Serb, Croat [or] Slovene" (Shoup, 1968, p. 224).

In order to develop a strong sense of communitarian identity among the divided ethnonational groups (and to diminish the Serb and Croat animosities created during WWII), Tito sought to shape the Yugoslav collective identity by adhering to the principle of brotherhood and unity. Tito emphasized the "diversity and distinction of the [ethnonational] groups but taught people through patriotic education and rituals that unity means freedom, pride and prosperity as opposed to ethnic strife which brings all groups back into poverty and humiliation" (Perica, 2002, p. 100). Brotherhood and unity was not just a simple policy of interethnic relations; it was rather a way of life that prescribed the equality of ethnonational groups and their peaceful coexistence. Hence the strength of Yugoslavia rests on these foundations or preconditions for Yugoslav prosperity and survival. Perica (2002, p. 100) further elaborates this point by referring to the words of Vladimir Dedijer who stated:

"…the brotherhood and unity idea gave a profoundly humane element to Tito's political program. In contrast to hatred [rooted in nationalist manipulations with ethnicity and religion], Tito urged love among all Yugoslav peoples…We have eradicated hatred, turned it into dust and ashes, we have eliminated the chauvinism incited and spread among our peoples by various antipeople's elements who have exploited the sensitive nationality problem whenever it suited them."

The doctrine of brotherhood and unity was often coupled with rituals celebrating Tito's various accomplishments both throughout his life and posthumously. One such ritual included children's induction into the Pioneers movement and the celebration of Tito's

birthday, also known as Youth Day. These events were accompanied by performances of songs and praises celebrating the life and legacy of Marshal Tito.

The association of Pioneers of Yugoslavia was modeled upon an earlier Soviet version of such organization. Founded by the Communist-led Partisan movement, the induction into Tito's Pioneers was yet another ritual intended to strengthen the "brotherhood and unity" of the Yugoslav people from an early age. The indoctrination ceremony was conducted during the Republic Day celebration and partaking in the activity was mandatory for all school children seven years of age who were enrolled in the first grade of elementary school. During the process of indoctrination, all pupils wore red scarves, navy blue hats with a red star attached to the front and a white blouse. The boys usually wore navy blue pants while the girls wore navy blue skirts, white knee-high stockings and black shoes. The culmination of such a ceremony was the recital of a pledge in which children declared their commitment to upholding to Titoist principles. In addition to the Pioneers movement, a central iconic celebration of the doctrine took place on Tito's birthday, or Youth Day. Youth Day was celebrated throughout the former Yugoslavia on the 25th of May. The celebration included a relay that took place throughout the whole territory of the SFRY with the zenith being the consignment of the baton containing birthday wishes to Marshal Tito. Initially, two types of baton marked this ceremony, primary (representing the six federal units) and local (representing communities, cities, etc.). During the years preceding 1956, Tito would receive both the local and the primary batons, however from 1957 onwards, he would only be presented with the one primary ("the great baton") carrying a coalesced message from the Yugoslav

youth. Ivan Čolović (2004) commented on the significance of the "great" baton as being "the sacred object which, from the touch of thousands of hands and thousands of kilometers, had drawn the miraculous energy (love, gratitude and hope) which nourished Tito's political power." The transfer of the baton took place at the Yugoslav National Army Stadium in Belgrade. The significance of this celebration has perhaps gained more momentum among the people in SFRY through its widespread media coverage. As Grigorov (2007) notes:

> "[Youth Day] was an ideological event dedicated to one of the few common symbols in the multinational Yugoslav society – Broz himself. Yet this was not all. Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s the ideological celebration was also a kind of spectacle, incorporating many modern features and enjoyed by many Yugoslav citizens at the stadium or at home in front of their TV screens."

As suggested by the aforementioned examples, the Yugoslav identity was deeply shaped by rituals revering the legacy of Josip Broz Tito, who in a very significant way was the embodiment of Yugoslavism. Hence, these types of ritualization provide examples of identity-calcifying symbolic ceremonies that served the purpose of reiterating the importance of the national doctrine.

Management of ethno-national issues

The Yugoslav constitution recognized the existence of five nationalities: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins, although each republic was considered a national state for the main nationality represented in the republic. The Yugoslav constitution also included a provision for minorities; however, it was clear that they would not enjoy analogous rights of the main national groups. The constitution dictated that borders within the federal units could not be altered without previously

negotiating with all the affected parties. To pacify the Croatian fears of forced inclusion

in a Serb dominated state, Tito propagated that the borders between the federal units:

> "are something similar to those white lines on a marble column. The borders of the federal states in federal Yugoslavia are not borders which divide, but borders which unite. What is the meaning of federal units in today's Yugoslavia? We don't consider them a group of small nations; rather they have a more administrative character, the freedom to govern oneself. That is the character of independence of each federal unit, full independence in the sense of free cultural and economic development." (Borba, May 22, 1945, p. 1; Perica 2002)

The republics' right to self-determination was limited by the federal constitution, which

was phrased in such a way as to make it appear that the right had already been exercised

(Shoup, 1968). Nevertheless, a nominal right to secession and self- determination was

given to the federal units, excluding from such rights the autonomous regions of Kosovo

and Vojvodina (Bennett, 1995). Notwithstanding the right to secession and self-

determination were present in writing, Tito made it apparent in one of his speeches that

such right was not to be avowed by the federal units:

> "Let me tell those who say that the present achievements can still change: nothing can be changed anymore. There can be no change because the new federal Yugoslavia has been accepted by the overwhelming majority of all Yugoslav nations. Nothing can be changed because we are all aware that this is a historic necessity. There can be no change because we know that the Yugoslav nations cannot exist without genuine unity" (Judah, 2000, p.140-141).

Such claims were not surprising given Tito's obsession with molding the distinct

ethnonational groups into a common-unitary-supranational identity. This has been often

accomplished by suppressing individuals' determination for development of the distinct

nationalistic tendencies. The last Yugoslav constitution was enshrined in 1974 granting

Tito the status of 'President for Life'. According to Bennett (1995, p.70) the latter

constitution was an "intricate series of checks and balances" primarily intended to

prevent any given individual from acquiring the power Tito himself possessed, and to

avert any ethnonational groups from dominating and controlling the Yugoslav federation.

Although the right of secession and self-determination of the federal units was included

in the constitution, individuals propagating these rights were often accused of conspiring

against state authorities. Hence, individuals displaying dominant nationalistic tendencies

that posed a direct threat to obstructing the sacredness of the brotherhood and unity

doctrine were often severely punished and imprisoned. The punishment for counter-

revolutionary actions endangering the social system was clearly delineated in the Article

114 of the SFRY's criminal code:

> "Whoever commits an act aimed at: restricting or overthrowing the authority of the working class and working people; undermining the constitutionally-established socio-economic system, socio-political system or the self-management system; overthrowing organs of social self-management and authorities, their executive organs or representatives of the highest state authorities in contravention of the Constitution; undermining the economic basis of the country; destroying the brotherhood and unity or violating the equality of nations and nationalities; or changing the federal organization of the country in an unconstitutional way, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year."

Similarly, Articles 133 and 134 of the same code advocated the severe punishment for up

to 10 years in prison for anyone who

> "incited the overthrow of the government of working class and working people, the unconstitutional change of the socialist self-management social system, breaking-up of the brotherhood and unity and equality of nations and nationalities…" as well as anyone who "fan national, racial or

religious hatred or discord between peoples and nationalities living in the SFRY."

Greater Freedom vs. Loss of Power

Decentralization was yet another attempt to restructure the Yugoslav federal system. Unfortunately, such decentralization did not mean an increased freedom for the republics or greater rights for the different nationalities; as the focal political power mainly remained rooted in the CPY (Burg, 1983). Since, it has been a common belief in the ranks of the Communist Party that excessive decentralization will lead to increased expression of nationalism; their fears were soon confirmed as the relaxation of totalitarian controls preceded the rise of nationalistic emotion in the Communist Party itself (Shoup, 1968). Despite all of the indoctrination efforts aimed at creating a cohesive and diverse union, the CPY along with Tito were unable to generate enough support from the Yugoslav people. In Shoup's view (1968) such difficulties were not surprising given the temperamental nature of the Yugoslav people who did not view Yugoslavia as a suitable arrangement for accommodating diverse ethnonational groups' interests. Furthermore, he blames mainly the Communist Party for not being able to create new patterns of attitudes and relationships that would pacify the nationalistic sentiments arising from a deep dissatisfaction with the Communist Party's half-way reforms and failed democratic experimentation.

As witnessed throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's, despite enforcing severe punishment for counter-revolutionary activities (meant to corrode the sacrosanct ideology), the mere narrative and laws protecting "brotherhood and unity" could not by

itself serve as a cohesive force. Subsequently, the constant experimentation and failure with system reforms such as the ones embodied in the efforts of decentralization only exacerbated the tension among the Yugoslav ethnonational groups. Furthermore, the lack of representation and freedom of speech not only managed to aggravate the ethnonational group dynamics, but the failure to introduce such democratic principles also created disequilibrium of power after Tito's death. As a result, the leadership's decision-making processes were considered to be inefficient because of longstanding tension between the central authority (responsible for implementation of the all-Yugoslav policies) and the regional power's opposition towards implementation of the same policies (Rusinow, 1988). All of these conditions eventuated to the rise of nationalistic sentiments that callously putrefied the essence of Tito's Yugoslavism.

Collapse

As I have mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, the birth of the SFRY was marked by the Partisan's national liberation struggle aimed at reuniting the Yugoslav peoples in a single state. Most importantly, it was only presumed but never articulated that the Yugoslav people had the desire to be clumped together in a single state. In other words, the creation of Yugoslavia was "irreversible, the decision of Yugoslavia's peoples irrevocable, and the right to secede and to create a separate state neither permanent nor inalienable" (Đilas, 1991, p. 165). While the CPY aided the development of a multinational party which was seemingly able to redress the longstanding historical grievances harbored by the ethnonational groups, the ethnonational relations between the Yugoslav groups were not based on firm foundations.

Ultimately, the conditions underlining the Yugoslav federalist collapse could be explained by several key factors. First, the Titoist system was marked by policies intended to "encourage rapprochement among the nationalities of Yugoslavia, contrived to lead Yugoslavia into a situation in which misunderstandings among the nationalities became more serious, and less easy to resolve." Second, the administrative powers of the republics were limited in the federal system as all of the federal republics except Bosnia and Herzegovina had one predominant ethnonational group. The federation was constituted of republics, each of which was committed to a policy of integrating the republic around the dominant nationality.

Tito's Yugoslavia was built on principles of both centralization and decentralization, on tight party control and desire for competing with the Western democracies; however, ultimately the single greatest failure of totalitarian and quasi-totalitarian regimes such as Yugoslavia, lies in the rigidity of their ideologies, and the concomitant inability of these systems to influence underlying emotions and attachments (Shoup, 1988) The Communists' success in manipulating the national question - resolving issues behind closed doors at the elite level - was also a major failure, making the system vulnerable to populist appeals, and leaving the mass of the Yugoslav public completely in the dark over the most basic facts concerning national relations.

In conclusion, while federalism in Yugoslavia seemed to have been imposed through a lack of referendums or other political forums where the Yugoslav people could have voiced their preferences for being included in or excluded from such a state, it is also true that the SFRY owes its existence to the Communist Party. The focal point of

such argument is the fact that the Yugoslav federalism was only able to be sustained by adherence to the CPY doctrine and power monopoly or in words of Aleksa Đilas (1991, p. 161): "As long as the CPY was one, united, monolithic, all-Yugoslav force, with a complete monopoly of power, no disintegrative nationalist forces could come to prominence, and the federal structure remained strong." After Tito's death, the unaddressed, infectious nationalistic sentiments spread all over Yugoslavia enabling the rise of three power-hungry patriarchs who led each of their respective nations into war, poverty and misery. Hence, Tito's prediction was lastly confirmed.

Causes of Conflicts

Wilmer (2002) proposed several hypotheses that engender the prime conditions that might have caused the beginning of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. These conditions Wilmer proposed include the following:

- The state of Yugoslavia was not universally regarded by people living in it as a legitimate state and so was doomed from the start.

- Economic and political instability precipitated a crisis that led leaders to revert to their nationalistic rather than multinational pan-Yugoslav basis for political support.

- Faced with the imminent breakdown of the Yugoslav state, political leaders at the republican level sought to maximize their gains under a reconfigured system of successor states.

- The end of the cold war created a level of uncertainty in the international system, a power transition from bipolar to unipolar/hegemonies.

- Historical memories of the Yugoslav civil war during World War II left unresolved and irreconciled grievances that were at least unaddressed under the Tito regime and at worse exacerbated by Tito's policies.

- Ancient hatreds-conflict in the Balkans resulted from the "habit of fighting".

- Individual's psychological inclination toward exclusionary processes won over a collaborative problem solving environment.

In order to better understand the reasoning behind the Serbo-Croatian conflicts that arose during the 1990's we must explore the historical underpinning of such relations.

Brief history of Serbo-Croatian Relations: 1941-1945

The identities of the Yugoslav people were shaped throughout history by various conquerors (the Ottoman Empire in the eastern and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy in the western parts of Yugoslavia) that adorned with distinctive symbolism the natives' cultural nuances. The divergence of cultures became particularly apparent during WWII when the northern parts of Croatia succumbed to the fascist dictatorship that created a Nazi puppet state (Independent State of Croatia) under the auspices of the Ustaše movement led by Ante Pavelić. The Nazi leadership was cognizant of the Croats Slav heritage [deemed "inferior" by Nazi standards], hence, the Ustaša ideologues created a theory about a pseudo-Gothic origin of the Croats in order to raise their standing on the Aryan ladder. Jews and Serbs who were family members of Ustaše leadership were granted titles of "honorary Aryans". Ustaše of lesser rank proved their loyalty by killing their Serb wives and children. Thus, the dehumanization of the Serbian population in Croatia begun in 1941 and continued until the fascist regime ceased to exist in 1945.

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Ustaše aimed for an ethnically "pure" Croatia, and saw the Serbs that lived in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as their biggest obstacle. Therefore, the Ustaše ministers Mile Budak and Milovan Žanic declared in May 1941 that the goals of their movement were the following:

- One third of the Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) to be catholicized;

- One third of the Serbs to be expelled out of the ISC;

- One third of the Serbs in the ISC to be liquidated (Tanner, 2002).

The ISC was also responsible for enacting racial laws against Jews and Roma. During the period of 1941-1942, the ISC established several concentration camps in which 300,000 to 500,000 Jews, Serbs and Gypsies lost their lives (USHMM, 2005). At the same time the anti-fascist Partisans (comprising a wide, all-Yugoslav membership) and the Četniks (Serbian) movement fought for the liberalization of the territory from the occupying forces.

The Partisan army was also involved in various atrocities such as the Bleiburg massacre (Marović, 1995), a term encompassing events that took place around May 13th 1945 where approximately 60,000 soldiers fled from Yugoslavia to Austria hoping to surrender and gain the protection of the British forces. However, the British forces mandated that they return south where the Partisan army was located. As a result many people were executed on suspicion of being members or supporters of collaborationist forces, or for suspected collaboration with the fascist regime as part of the Ustaše movement. It is estimated that approximately 30,000 people perished in Bleiburg.

Although these events took place in the 1940's, the powerful memories of these events lingered in people's consciousness for 40 years before they erupted again in the 1990's. Today, a problem deeply ingrained in the Croatian consciousness regards dealing with the past atrocities of the Partisans (Bleiburg) and the Independent State of Croatia (Jasenovac). Throughout the years the Croatian government has continuously been more sympathetic to the Bleiburg victims.

For example, Croatia's Parliament has allocated some € 69,000 for the annual honor of Croatian fascist forces killed in Bleiburg, Austria in May 1945 while the money for the commemoration of the victims at the Jasenovac concentration camp amounted to just € 14,000. Croatian President Stijepan Mesić commented that the excessive allocation to the Bleiburg fund was unfortunate because it is true that no one killed in Jasenovac was guilty for the death of anyone at Bleiburg, but many who died at Bleiburg are responsible for a number of those murdered in Jasenovac. It is estimated that between the years of 1941-1945, up to 80,000 Serbs, Jews, Roma and anti-fascist Croatians were killed at Jasenovac. In Bleiburg, Austria, some 30,000 mostly Croatian fascist troops, from the wartime Ustaša regime were killed when their independent state was crushed by the Yugoslav communists. Despite the lack of commemoration funds for Jasenovac, Croatian President Mesić avowed that the crimes committed against the innocent civilians will never be forgotten by stating:

> "Citizens, ladies and gentlemen, comrades, we do not forget. [The] former US president Dwight Eisenhower asked the crime that was going on to be recorded because one day some bastard will come and say it was all made up. There are bastards today who say it was all made up. We want a world in which people will not be differentiated, especially in the realms of religious affiliation, nationality or race!"

Croatia's path toward Independence

As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter in 1990 both Slovenia and Croatia began to seek greater autonomy within the Yugoslav Federation. Requests included that the two republics be presented with a confederative status and in case this was not negotiable the two would revert to asking for full independence. The 14th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was held on January 20th 1990 when turmoil arose due to the republican representatives being unable to reach an agreement on the future of Yugoslavia. During this meeting it was apparent that the collapse of Yugoslavian federation was inevitable.

Nationalistic tendencies throughout the territory increased and succession driven parties started to flourish. In 1989, a number of political parties were founded in Croatia. Among the succession driven parties, the most prominent was the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ - Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica), led by Croatian nationalist Franjo Tuđman. The basis of the HDZ campaign was an aspiration to the higher sovereignty of Croatia. Franjo Tuđman was able to fuel the anti-Yugoslav, anti-Serb rhetoric and win the elections by promising independence and assure the Croatian people the defeat of Milošević's pro-Serbian aspirations. The HDZ was also able to draw wide support from the Croatians all over the world, particularly in Australia, United States and Canada. The Diaspora later proved to be the key financing body of the HDZ and Croatian Army. The elections in Croatia were held on the 22nd of April and 6th of May 1990 with the majority of the Croatian people voicing their desire for independence (Tanner, 2002).

Tension among the Croats and Serbs were continuously mounting. One of the first incidents involving the citizens of the two nations happened at a football game between Dinamo Zagreb and Crvena Zvezda (Red Star) Belgrade where violence erupted between the two groups and the police. This incident led to a series of events that further changed the Croatian rhetoric toward the Serbs. After the elections, Tuđman ratified the new Croatian Constitution stating that Croatia was a nation of the Croatian people automatically degrading the status of any other group to a national minority.

Meanwhile, in the predominately Serbian part of Croatia-Eastern Slavonia and Lika, a referendum was held about the future of Serbian people living in Croatia. With the introduction of the checkerboard flag, the kuna and the constitutional statement defining 'Croatia as the State for Croatians', it stands to reason why the Serbs living in Croatia were worried about their future. Historically, all of the symbols, rhetoric and tension created by Tuđman resembled significantly those of Ante Pavelić, the leader of the Independent State of Croatia.

While the Serbs in what was to become Krajina held the referendum, the Croatian government tried to stop it by sending the police into those areas in order to seize the weapons and block the referendum. The Serbs, on the contrary, blocked the roads with logs of wood to the popular tourist destinations of Dalmacija. This incident was named the Balvan Revolucija or the Log Revolution which marked the beginning of the formation of SAO Krajina. While in Krajina, those Croats who refused to succumb to the Serbian rule fled the territory, many Serbs in Croatia were losing their jobs. Needless to say all of these incidents just further fueled tension between these two groups.

Once Yugoslavia was on the verge of dissolution and with Croatia and Slovenia declaring their independence, the Yugoslav National Army fell under the leadership of Belgrade. The army was very well equipped counting 2000 tanks and 300 jet aircraft purchased from the Soviet Union. However, the army was composed of soldiers from all over the former Yugoslavia. After the succession the army experienced a high level of desertion which incapacitated it from being as effective as it could have been. The Yugoslav National Army was not the only fighting force present in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

During 1991, many paramilitary groups made up of criminals arose. The most notorious ones were the Serbian Beli Orlovi (White Eagles) and the Srpski Četnički Pokret (Serbian Četnik's Movement). These groups committed numerous massacres against Croats and other non-Serb civilians. Along with the creation of the Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska), the Croats were also forming paramilitary units intended to fight the Serbian rebels in Krajina. In August 1991, the Croat Army had fewer than 20 brigades, which would later grow to 60 by the end of the year through general mobilization. Despite counting lesser numbers of soldiers, the Croatian Army was exceptionally motivated to reclaim the occupied Croatian territories.

The onset of war in Croatia

It has been claimed that one of the first buildings destroyed in the Serbo-Croatian war was that of a Water Tower in Vukovar. Throughout the 1990's ethnic hatred spiraled out of control. The media in both countries propagated fictitious information that further fueled the conflicts. One of the most notorious incidents that marked the war in Croatia

was the Plitvice Lake incident where Serbs carried out a series of attacks against Croatian police units. However, in a recent interview with Josip Boljikovac, Tuđman's former minister of the interior, the following was said of the aforementioned incident:

> "Back then, in 1991, Serbs and Yugoslavia were under attack, not Croatia. Gojko Šušak, Branimir Glavaš and Vice Vukojević launched antitank rockets on Borovo Selo in order to provoke a war. The bridge in Osijek was destroyed for the same reason. [Franjo Tuđman] wanted the war at any cost. The war was not a necessity — it was an intention. According to Tuđman's concept, Serbs had to disappear from Croatia."

The conflicts in Croatia further escalated when the Serbs proclaimed Krajina as their autonomous territory. Although controversies on who started the conflicts in Vukovar are still present, it is a known fact that Vukovar underwent a three month siege during which most of the city was destroyed and a majority of the population was forced to flee. The city fell to the Serbian forces on November 18, 1991 and the Vukovar massacre occurred. Some historians believe that the city could have been spared and defended, but was left to "fend for itself" to gain sympathy from the west. Allegedly, as the Croatian authorities mentioned at the time, the Vukovar surrender was an attempt to prevent further devastation of Dubrovnik and other cities.

As the war progressed, the cities of Dubrovnik, Šibenik, Zadar, Gospić, Karlovac, Sisak, Slavonski Brod, Osijek, Vinkovci all came under attack by the Serbian forces. In many places, large numbers of civilians were forced out by the military. As a result of ethnic cleansing various mass graves were found throughout Croatia and Bosnia with the most prominent one being Ovčara nearby Vukovar. Throughout the war President Tuđman called upon the whole population to mobilize and defend against what he

deemed "Greater-Serbian imperialism" pursued by the Serb-led JNA, Serbian paramilitary formations and the rebel Serb forces.

Operation Flash and Storm

By 1995, the Croats in Eastern Slavonia under the direction of their leadership took up arms and started a counter attack on the Serbian forces as part of the Operations Storm (Oluja) and Flash (Bljesak). Nevertheless, there were many UN resolutions that required Croatia to retreat to previous positions indicating that it must restrain from military operations. President Tuđman was not worried about respecting these resolutions partly because he was aware that the United States was behind him.

Operation Flash: On May 1st, the Croatian Army forces and special police units began their advance into the occupied territories. Over 7,200 soldiers and policemen participated in the operation. By May 2nd all rebel forces were evacuated and the Croatian Army had achieved all of its initial aims. One large group of rebel soldiers and civilians failed to evacuate and had to surrender near Pakrac (Tanner, 2002). The operation produced a total of around 1,500 Serb prisoners of war, the largest capturing of an enemy force to date in the war. As retaliation, Serb forces attacked Zagreb with rockets, killing seven and wounding over 175 civilians. The operation Flash served as a precursor to the Operation Storm.

Operation Storm was the code name given to a large-scale military operation carried out by Croatian Armed Forces, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to retake the Krajina region, which had been controlled by separatist Serbs since early 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1996).

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The operation was described as the largest European land offensive since World War II (Sisk, 1995). A statement released at 5 a.m. on August 4, 1995 by President Franjo Tuđman publically authorized the attack. In this statement Tuđman invited the Serb army to lay down their weapons and surrender and to the Serbian people to remain in their homes and trust that their properties and rights would be guaranteed. Tuđman could be defined as a power-hungry person, a person who valued money, obedience, and importance. He thought Operation Storm would bring him acclaim and respect from the Western leaders. Stating that Serbs should have no fear was a big masking of what was just around the corner. As a soldier involved in the operation Storm explained in a personal interview: "Once we were ordered to enter the Serb houses, we found warm meals on the table or meals that were still cooking on the stove. We were ordered to burn down the houses, sometime whole villages." In another account depicting the safety of Serbs and their property a soldier explained:

> "We entered a village in Krajina and noticed an older lady in her nineties and her fifty year old son in front of their home. The son did not have his lower extremities as it appeared that they have been blown up by a grenade. We told them to surrender which they peacefully did. We were about to take them to the United Nations Protectorate when a member of the elite squad of the Croatian Army came. He angrily asked: "What are you doing with these Serbs?" and further shouted: "You are taking them to the UN? No, you kill these bastards right here!" I turned to them and said you kill them! I won't have them on my conscience!"

As a result of the Operation Storm, thousands of homes were burned and destroyed and approximately 200,000 to 250,000 Croat Serbs (Amnesty International, 2005) fled to the Serb-held parts of Bosnia and Serbia. Tuđman's promise to keep Serbs safe seemed like a planned intention to kill as many of them as possible. Operation Oluja ended in the

reclaim of the territory on August 8th 1995 when Chief of the Croatian General Staff Zvonimir Červenko announced: "The territory of the Republic of Croatia occupied by so-called Republic of Serb Krajina has been completely liberated. There are only two areas where there are still encircled formations of the former army and the population who have fled these territories" (Tanner, 2002, p. 289).

Tuđman on the other hand associated Serbs with cancer in the speech given on the freedom train after the so called liberation of Knin:

> "There can be no return to the past, to the times when they the Serbs were spreading cancer in the heart of Croatia, cancer which was destroying the Croatian national being and which did not allow the Croatian people to be the master in its own house and did not allow Croatia to lead an independent and sovereign life under this wide, blue sky and within the world community of sovereign nations…This also means that we will know how to value what we conquered at the price of Croatian blood and we shall never allow anyone to jeopardize our freedom, our democracy, our beautiful Croatian land in which there must be room not only for all Croatian people here, but also for all those expelled Croats whom I invited to return."

As a result of Operation Storm, approximately 300,000 Croatian Serbs were displaced during the entire war, only a third of which (or about 117,000) are officially registered as having returned as of 2005. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 200,000 Croatian refugees, mostly Croatian Serbs, are still displaced in neighboring countries and elsewhere. Moreover, many Croatian Serbs could not return to their homes because they lost their tenancy rights and may be under constant threats of intimidation. Additionally, Croatian Serbs were victims of discrimination in access to employment and with regard to other economic and social rights. Some cases of violence and harassment against Croatian Serbs were reported (Amnesty International 2005).

As a result of being involved in the Operation Storm, General Commander of the Croatian Army, Ante Gotovina is currently on trial in The Hague. Foreign journalists such as those from the BBC reported that the once heavily Serb-populated city of Knin was almost completely abandoned. It was also discovered that some Croatian army forces were burning down abandoned Serb property and those Serbs who remained in the territory reported looting by Croatian armed forces. The nature of this exodus is still disputed among Serbs and Croats: the former tend to claim the ethnic cleansing was planned by the Croatian government, while the latter pinpoint Tuđman's promise not to attack civilians and attribute the cases of killing of the Serb civilians that remained, to revenge by those groups and individuals outside of the Croatian Army's control. A few months later, the war ended with the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement in Dayton, Ohio. This was later signed in Paris in December 1995.

Croatia: 1995-Present

Croatia became a member of the Council of Europe on November 6, 1996. The territory of Krajina was formally re-integrated into Croatia on January 15, 1998. Tuđman died in 1999 and in the early 2000 parliamentary elections, the nationalist HDZ government was replaced by a center-left coalition with the elected President Stjepan Mesić. At that time the Croatian government put extra efforts in order to rebuild the destroyed homes and infrastructure in the war affected areas, proposed incentives for the return of refugees. Croatia became a World Trade Organization (WTO) member on November 30, 2000. The country signed an association agreement with the European Union in October 2001, and applied for membership in 2003 when HDZ' new established leadership under Ivo

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Sanader won and he became Croatia's new Prime Minister. To today's date President Mesić holds the same position however former-Prime Minister Ivo Sanader resigned in July 2009. After the capture of General Ante Gotovina in 2004 Croatia opened the accession negotiation with the European Union. On April 1st 2009, Croatia took the eminent step and became the 27th member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Further issues notwithstanding, the Croatian government and the European Union expect Croatia to become a member of the EU by 2012.

This chapter explored the creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia. It also sheds light on the Serbo-Croatian relations in both the Yugoslav context as well as within the realms of Croatia's independence. This chapter discussed the two major operations carried out by the Croatian Army, Operation Flash and Storm and the repercussions of such actions. Finally, the end of the chapter mentions the significant progress Croatia has made to restore ethnonational relations with the Serb refugees. Most notably, today's Croatia turned away from the nationalistically oriented rhetoric and is working towards becoming the 28th member of the European Union. In the next chapter I will explore the theoretical constructs of institutional and individual remembering and the way such remembering has the potential to shape individuals/group attitudes toward the "Other".

3. Theoretical Constructs

"I come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where are the treasuries of innumerable images of all kinds of objects brought in by sense-perception. Hidden there is whatever we think about...and whatever else has been deposited and placed on reserve and has not been swallowed up and buried in oblivion. When I am in this storehouse, I ask that it produce what I want to recall, and immediately certain things come out; some things require a longer search, and have to be drawn out as it were from more recondite receptacles...until what I want is freed of mist and emerges from its hiding places."
(Augustine (12); 1991: 185)

Memory

As Saint Augustine stated above, memory serves as a reservoir for our experiences, a container in which we keep all of the events that happened to us, from early childhood onwards. If researchers were to ask Americans to remember exactly what they were doing on the morning of September 11th 2001, most of them will remember the events of the day and the majority of the people could also remember the exact things they were doing when they found out about the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Hence, memory not only serves as a storage device, but it also categorizes these events, evoking appropriate socially constructed emotions to emerge every time these events are being recalled. In the fields such as sociology and history the area of memory has been relatively well explored. From Durkheim (1912), who introduced the idea of 'collective representations' and wrote about commemorative rituals in his book *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* to Halbwachs (1925), who wrote about social

or collective memory in the book *The Social Frameworks of Memory*, numerous writers have correlated social memory with major historical events and most recently, with conflicts. According to Halbwachs (1992, p. 38) studying memory should take place in a social context. He states: "it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize and localize their memories." Hence in Halbwachs' (1950) view collective memories are shaped by individuals' interaction with others partly because of the fact that collective memories tend to be associated with membership in different social groups and/or generations (Olick, 1998).

Group membership provides the materials for memory and individuals recollection of certain events and forgetting of others. Although collective memory does seem to take on a life of its own, Halbwachs reminds us that it is only the individuals' who remember, even if they do much of this remembering together (Olick, 1998). Halbwachs also stressed how strongly social processes influence not only people's personal memories of their own lifetimes, but also a community's shared memories of the past (Shils, 1981, 50). Halbwachs makes a distinction between history and collective memory in as far as history could be considered as "dead" and collective memory as still "living". In his seminal study, *The Collective Memory* (1980), Halbwachs contrasted memory and history as two contradictory ways of dealing with the past. In Halbwachs's view, history starts when social memory and continuous tradition stop operating and dissolve. Furthermore, history is scholarship and as such only for very few, while the collective memory of the past is shared by the whole community. There is only one history, but there are as many collective memories as there are human communities. Nora

(1989, p. 8), on the other hand, distinguished true memory from artificial history: "Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name...history, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer." It would, in principle, be possible to distill accurate memories of the past by removing the social layers of individual accounts, thus bringing to light the originally archived item (Thompson 1988, p. 150). However, other authors suggest that it becomes fruitless to discuss whether or not a particular event or process remembered corresponds to the actual past because all that matters are the specific conditions under which such memory is constructed.

Halbwachs points out that there are three kinds of memories: autobiographical, historical and collective. The first kind of memory involves events that we experience firsthand. Historical memory on the other hand involves those events that are being recalled in historical records. Collective memory thus is the "living" past, the history that is still alive; the history that shapes each individual's identity. In contemporary scholarship, a term of "collective psychology" is being pursued; an approach to cultural history, seeing images of the past as the whole complex of ideas, aspirations and feelings which links, together the memories of a social group. Another area of memory being explored is called *mnemohistory* and it is concerned with "the past as it's remembered through the ongoing work of reconstructive imagination" as opposed to the past as it happened. Thus, mnemohistory investigates the history of cultural memory (Assman, 1997). Assman also talked about the concept of cultural memory and defines it with two concepts: "memory culture" and "reference to the past." Assman states:

"Memory culture is the way a society ensures cultural continuity by preserving, with the help of cultural mnemonics, its collective knowledge from one generation to the next, rendering it possible for later generations to reconstruct their cultural identity. References to the past, on the other hand, reassure the members of a society of their collective identity and supply them with an awareness of their unity and singularity in time and space—i.e. an historical consciousness—by creating a shared past" (Assmann 1992, p. 30).

Hence, cultural memory is not about giving testimony of past events, as accurately and truthfully as possible, nor is it necessarily about ensuring cultural continuity: it is about making meaningful statements about the past in a given cultural context of the present. Cultural memory thus, refuses to support Saint Augustine's notion of memory being a container from which experiences are brought forth but instead it proposes that the past is actively constructed and reconstructed by the members of various groups. John Elsner clarifies this proposition by stating (1994, p. 226):

"What matters ... is not that [a particular account of the past] be correct by our standards or anyone else's, but that it be convincing to the particular group of individuals ... for whom it serves as an explanation of the world they inhabit. ... [W]hat matters about any particular version of history is that it be meaningful to the collective subjectivities and self-identities of the specific group which it addresses. In other words, we are not concerned with 'real facts' or even a coherent methodology, but rather with the consensus of assumptions and prejudices shared by the historian ... and his audience".

Along with cultural memory, a term history culture also arises. The term refers to the fact that there is no fundamental split between memory and history because the past and the present are united, and exact dating is of little relevance. 'Old is old, it doesn't matter how old' is probably the most widespread attitude in our society, and this is reflected in its history culture (Lowenthal 1985, p. 219). Rüsen (1994) argues that by expressing cultural

memory and supplying the members of a society with collective memories, history culture assists people in finding historical identities and temporal orientation for their actions. Therefore, we should not only try to understand the various ways of thinking which underlie such different perceptions, but also study their aesthetics and politics.

Bartlett (1932, p. 255) first suggested a connection between group membership and remembering, an idea that has recently begun to attract theoretical attention. One interesting subset of memory is the notion of flashbulb memories-a mix of personal circumstance and historical events (Pennebaker, Paez, Rime, 1997). Flashbulb memories are not established at the moment of the event, we consider them as such only after the significance of the event within a given society has been recognized. Flashbulb memories have a vivid, long lasting effect because they allow individuals to "place themselves in the historical context" (Pennebaker, Paez, Rime, 1997, p. 5). Multitudes of studies have dealt with the question of remembering, commemoration, and nostalgia almost to the point that studying memory has become an academic trend. Pierre Nora claimed: "Where we earlier lived lives suffused with pastness-the continuation of a habit and custom-we now live disconnected from our past, seeing ourselves different than our forbearers (Olick, 2008).

Various studies have shown that people are more likely to remember events that concern their group affiliation. However, human memory can fail completely or it can be influenced by a variety of different factors, and the past can thus be altered. McKeever, Joseph & McCormack (1993) asked Northern Irish university students to free recall incidents related to the 'troubles' and to date 14 specific political events. Catholics were

able to recall, and date accurately, incidents resulting in Protestant deaths, but Protestants were not as likely to recall or date accurately incidents that resulted in Catholic deaths (Cairns, 1999). In another study, Cairns, Lewis, Mumcu & Waddell (1998), asked Northern Irish university students, in both 1984 and 1995, to date video clips of political events in Northern Ireland. Results indicated that events connected with the political violence in Northern Ireland were relatively well remembered (and dated) by both Catholics and Protestants (Cairns, 1999). With more emphasis on local cultures in the nation-building process, Confino (1997) shows how German nation building in the nineteenth century "required assimilating diverse regional memories into one coherent national identity, which was successful only when the national [identity] was mediated through local categories" (Confino, 1997).

Volkan (1997) considered historical "chosen traumas" being the key ingredient that makes up the nations' collective memories. In one of Dennis Sandole's accounts, he remembers the remarks of Richard Holbrooke (who was at that time appointed by the Clinton administration to be the US intermediary in Cyprus) as basically being infuriated because "these people cannot forget the history, the Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots say that is who they are, they are what their history is, and they are that" (Sandole, 2005). Take, for example, the Kosovo conflict where the Serbs go back to June 28, 1389, when the Ottoman Empire claimed Kosovo as their territory. For Serbs, identity and history mean everything; it is at the core of their existence. Importantly, there are many versions of history implicated in world events, such as those of the winners, losers, perpetuators and victims. The oppressed usually adopt a stance of victimization and redemption.

Redemption usually happens when a group has been put down, defeated or humiliated causing a collective mood of despair. As Volkan (1998) mentions chosen traumas, Audergone (2005) corroborates this terminology by proposing that groups have a common history that usually takes a form of mythic proportions and binds people together around a tragedy that occurred in the past. Stories of loss and heroism become the main points of the narrative causing a strong desire for revenge and correction of history. In 1989 Milošević spoke on the battlefield of Gazimestan, reminding the Serbian people that they were defeated by the Ottoman Empire because of indecisive politicians of that time, claiming that only unity can bring back their dignity. Milošević stated:

> "In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire won because of good fortune. The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing. Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. If we (Serbia) cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at is tail."

Finally, Pennebaker et al (1997) state that there are several factors enabling the creation and maintenance of collective memories. First, collective memories are most likely to be formed and maintained about events that have a significant long term change in individuals' lives. Institutions can, however, mold the way individuals remember an event. Secondly, memories are most likely to be formed if individuals recall the events and talk about them. Social sharing helps shape people's perception and attitudes about

an event. Thirdly, prohibition of conversing about an emotionally charged event has the potential to foster and maintain negative emotions about the event and the people involved in it. Fourthly, events that have a collective psychological impact are more likely to produce collective individual behaviors such as changes in crime rates, health status etc. Fifth, generational groups do not experience the same event in the same manner. Individuals between ages 12-25 are the ones who are most affected by the event, hence their memory of the event becomes more pronounced. Lastly, commemoration of events helps to keep history alive. Historical memories have significant impact on the way individuals remember and through social sharing learn about an event. As a result, learning shapes individuals' perception which leads to internalization of attitudes and their behavioral manifestation. These processes will be further elaborated in the next section of this chapter where a model of intergroup interaction will be proposed.

Psychological and Structural Factors: Key processes in shaping intergroup attitudes

The following model examines the psychological and structural factors that may play a role in the shaping group attitudes. Each respective factor in the model will be explained separately in order to gain a greater understanding of the key concepts aiding the social identity polarization in a given group.

Psychological Factors

The psychological factors are usually transferred through the process of socialization and include social learning, development of emotions and the scope of justice. Socialization is, in essence, learning (Charon, 1987). In every group one has to learn the rules, expectations, and knowledge of that group, whether the group is your family, the army, or

the State. Therefore, socialization is the process whereby people acquire a social identity and learn the way of life within their society. The polarizing psychological factors described in this model are the following: the development of the social learning and creation of enemy images, negative emotions and the limitations of a group's scope of justice.

Before I begin explaining the psychological and structural factors depicted in the Illustration I, I deem as important to carefully examine the area of social identity development, social categorization and identity polarization.

Figure 1. Intergroup Violence: Psychological and Structural Factors

Identity

Social identity is characterized as "the part of the individuals' self concept that derives from their knowledge of their membership in a social group (or groups) with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). From the individual point of view, social identity might be seen as a set of shared rules of behavior and shared attitudes towards various experiences differentiating one member of the society from another (Turner, 1975). Social identity is referred to as a group phenomenon. Turner (1982) defines a group as two or more individuals who are in some ways socially or psychologically interdependent. The interdependence allows for the individuals' satisfaction of needs, attainment of goals or consensual validation of attitudes and values. There are two models that explain group formation, namely, the social cohesion model and the social identification model.

The social cohesion model tends to assert that group belongingness has an affective bias, namely individuals are bound together by their cohesiveness. However, groups can also form as long as they develop mutual and positive emotional bonds; what matters for group belongingness is how individuals feel about each other, and, in particular, whether they like each other (Lott & Lott, 1965). Conversely, the social identification model assumes that psychological group membership has primarily a perceptual or cognitive bias. This model considers that individuals structure their perception of themselves and others by means of abstract social categories that they internalize as their aspects of self concept. Also, the social cognitive processes relating to these forms of self conception produce group behavior. Moreover, social identification

can refer to a process of locating oneself or another person within a system of social categorizations.

The development of a positive group identity requires several factors: 1) the perceived similarity of members; 2) mutual attraction between members or social cohesion; 3) mutual esteem; 4) emotional empathy or contagion; 5) altruism and cooperation; and 6) attitudinal and behavioral uniformity (Hensley and Duval, 1976, Turner, 1978). Furthermore, this model considers that individuals structure perceptions of themselves and others by means of abstract social categories which they internalize as aspects of their self concept. Therefore, social cognitive processes relating to these forms of self conception produce group behavior. For example, throughout the contemporary Yugoslav history Serbs and Croats have enjoyed privileged positions within the government while the Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians were suffering from unfair treatment as well as a disadvantageous and marginalized position in society. These disparate dynamics shaped the feeling of "empowerment" and the building of a strong self concept for the Serbs and Croats who conglomerated around the power bearing positions. Conversely, the Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians who lived in substandard and unprivileged conditions developed a feeling of "alienation" from state power and a sense of victimization. These very different formations of self concept guide the sometime "righteous" Serbian and Croatian attitudes and the understandably "retaliatory" behaviors of the Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians.

As Tajfel (1981) explains, social identification is a necessary but not sufficient factor for the development of group identity. The meaning of the group cannot be

understood merely as a face-to-face relation between individuals; it is also a cognitive entity meaningful to the individual at a particular point in time. In order to form a collective identity, members of a group join the collectivity they find most aligned with the characteristics they possess, a process also known as social categorization.

According to Tajfel (1959, 1972), social categorization is the process of bringing together social objects or events in groups with regard to individuals' actions, intentions and system of values and beliefs. Social categorization, thus, represents a system of orientation that helps to create and define the individual's place in society. Once a group acquires a given social category, and members of the group identify with the same category, those members of the group are further classified as the in-group, while all of the individuals who do not identify with the same categories are classified as the out-group.

For example, due to the different cultural influences among its populace, Yugoslavia implemented three official languages, namely, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. Serbo-Croatian was a twofold language. The Croats adopted the Latin alphabet and their pronunciation of words involved the use of such syllabi as ije, je; a linguistic style called "ijekavica". On the other hand, the Serbs embraced the Cyrillic alphabet, and the linguistic style called "ekavica". The Ekavica style emphasized the syllabi 'e' instead of the 'ije' and 'je' of the Ijekavica style.

* This is a Model constructed using Tajfel & Turner (1979) Social categorization and Deutsch's Cooperation vs. Competition theories (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).

Figure 2. Model of Social Categorization and Inter-Group Behavior

For example, the verb "to understand" would be translated in Croatian as razum*ij*eti and in Serbia as razum*e*ti, two words that have the same meaning and almost the same pronunciation. Although these differences may seem insignificant, they indeed dictate different socio-linguistic styles which differentiate people into social categories: in-group, those who speak Ekavica (Serbs) and out-group, and those who speak Ijekavica (Croats). Moreover, these linguistic differences would be less pronounced in the case where the same were not linked to a religious or an ethnic category. For example, to speak Ekavica means to be a Serb and an Orthodox Christian. Conversely, to speak

Ijekavica means to be a Croat and a Catholic. In the times of ethnic strife, the pronunciation of a word in the "enemy" language was met by severe rapprochement or expulsion from ones in-group. When these identity differences become so distinct, everything related to the out-group becomes evil, censured or destroyed. In the aforementioned cases identities became problematic because major incompatibilities within identity groupings occurred. In such circumstances, actors attempting to politicize group identities engender social polarization based on loyalty toward the dominant group. Identity politics involves the prioritization of one particular facet of identity over others in a manner that influences political choices and potentially provides a bias for political action (Jeong, 1999).

After the groups become polarized, a phenomenon known as *social comparison* is often employed as a means of evaluation between the in-group and out-group. Social comparison is a process in which individuals or groups learn about and assess themselves by comparison with other people. According to Festinger (1954) people tend to move into groups of similar opinions and abilities, and they move out of groups that fail to satisfy their drive for self-evaluation. When group membership becomes salient, perceived intra-group similarities and liking tends to be enhanced; self and others are evaluated favorably in terms of common group membership (Hensley and Duval, 1976, Turner, 1978). The main empirical finding of social identity theory refers to in-group biases. This observed pattern refers to the tendency to favor the in-group subject over the out-group subject in evaluating behavior of others. The mere *perception* of being a member of two distinct groups (social categorization) is sufficient to generate the discrimination. Status relations

are determined mainly by the consistency of the reference group boundaries and by the relative position of the groups in terms of stability and legitimacy (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The perceived compatibilities between the ethnonational groups in the former Yugoslavia could be attributed to Tito's prohibition of openly voicing grievances that could potentially disharmonize intergroup relations. For example, the Bosniak's and Kosovo Albanian self concept was grounded in a peasant identity which was oftentimes ridiculed by the more privileged groups. It is important to understand that the process of social comparison is not transient; it can last for a given period of time. That is, the grievances could be suppressed until a trigger allows for their reemergence. It is possible that Bosniaks and Kosovo Albanians did not have the necessary power or legitimacy to mobilize their respective groups around those issues until they received clear signs of serious threat to their in-group on the eve of the Yugoslav state collapse. After the Yugoslav collapse, the dehumanization of these two groups became immediately apparent. The prejudices and stereotypes held against both of these groups helped to pave the ground for the genocidal violence that occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo. Likewise the grievances between Serbs and Croats reemerged in a more ferocious fashion after years of prohibition of open discussion about historical wrongdoings between the two groups.

It is safe to say that if individuals in a group consider the "out-group" as part of their moral community they will be more likely to form amicable relations with them. Hence it is also necessary that we consider a moral component to intergroup engagement. The first factor of intergroup engagement is related to the moral considerations that guide group behavior. According to Deutsch (2000) individuals and groups who are outside the

boundary in which considerations of fairness apply may be treated in ways that would be considered immoral if people within the boundary were so treated. For example, consider the situation in Bosnia. Prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats were more or less part of one moral community and treated one another with some degree of civility. After the start of civil strife (initiated by power-hungry political leaders), vilification of other ethnic groups became a political tool, and it led to excluding others from one's moral community. As a consequence, the various ethnic groups committed the most barbaric atrocities against one another (Deutsch, 2000). Ad jointly, the process of moral exclusion also took place and exacerbated the intergroup relations. Moral exclusion deems altruistic, cooperative inter-group behavior as irrelevant and views those excluded groups as outside their normative community and therefore as expendable, undeserving and eligible targets of exploitation, aggression and violence. In its most virulent and widespread form, moral exclusion justifies institutionalizing such actions as torture and genocide (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).

As we noted in the Yugoslav conflicts, the malignancy of inter-group relations managed to place these groups in converse positions in which the enemy perception of the other has been created. As a result in-groups formed their own scope of justice encouraging the exclusion of the out-groups. This process may shape the formation of out-group prejudice where the out-groups are considered evil and harm can be a cause for celebrations instead of grief. Moreover, by dehumanizing the other, the human aspect of the person is stripped from them; they are demonized. Excluding somebody from ones moral universe, coupled up by negative group evaluation and a zero sum aimed

competition could have detrimental effects on intergroup relations. The next section of this chapter will explore the social learning factor and the way negative attitudes toward a group could produce the end result of delegitimizing and labeling a group as the "enemy."

Social learning and attitude development

According to Bandura (1973), the causes of human nature stem from peoples' behavioral and learning predispositions; one such is the fundamental principle of the way attitudes are acquired -- modeling. The premise for this statement is that attitudes seem to be largely socially transmitted through behavioral examples provided by influential models. According to Fazio (1990), attitudes are important guiding principles that influence individuals' behaviors. An attitude is usually directed to existing objects (issues, people); it is evaluative (positive or negative), enduring, and dispositional (Fazio, 1990). As such, attitudes must be stored somewhere, and the specific indicators of the attitude must be caused by something. An attitude is thought of as a schema, that is, a network of representations. Thus, it integrates all components of attitudes because it represents (and can cause) beliefs, emotions, physiological reactions as well as behavioral tendencies. The network can be "activated" through any one aspect (e.g., seeing the attitude object) and, in turn, activates the other aspects (e.g., the emotion, beliefs about the object, a tendency to approach the object). Hallorah (1967) states that people are always adopting, modifying, and relinquishing attitudes in order to fit their ever-changing needs and interests. Attitudes cannot be changed by simple education. According to Triandis (1971), acceptance of new attitudes depends on the following conditions: the

person presenting the knowledge; the presentation; perception and credibility of the presenter; and the conditions under which the knowledge was received. The probability of change towards an advocated position is greater when the number of feasible alternative interpretations exists.

Apart from what we learn from our parents and family, school life provides a great deal of influence on a child's outlook on the world; ideally, ideas of how we are 'supposed to behave,' the difference between right and wrong, values of mutual respect and understanding, etc. are all reinforced via a school curriculum, lessons, activities, projects, and one's interaction with teachers, and fellow students. Furthermore, modeling influences can produce three kinds of effects. First, observers acquire new patterns of behavior through mere observation. Secondly, modeling strengthens or weakens inhibitions of behavior that have been previously learned. For example, the observer will react to the way the model is treated and mimic the model's behavior. When the model's behavior is rewarded, the observer is more likely to reproduce the rewarded behavior. When the model is punished, an example of vicarious punishment, the observer is less likely to reproduce the same behavior. Thirdly, a distinction exists between an observer's acquiring a behavior and performing a behavior. Through observation, the observer can acquire the behavior without performing it at the time the individual acquires such (Bandura, 1973, Berkowitz, 1962). The following illustration depicts Bandura's (1973) four-step pattern (a combination of cognitive and operant views of learning through observations) applied to an event; which in this case is derogatory behavior toward the members of the out-group (Monte, 1995).

Further explanation of these four concepts depicted in the previous illustration is necessary for understanding the process through which attitudes and/or behaviors are formed. Given that an individual cannot learn from merely being exposed to the stimuli, the attention processes, including the person's association preferences, become an integral part of social learning. The group that an individual is frequenting on a regular basis becomes his or her point of reference; therefore, mimicking the group behavior becomes an imperative. Moreover, an individual who has the qualities of a charismatic, charming leader will undoubtedly have more followers than somebody with dull and uninteresting qualities. This is particularly evident in television shows where the models display a behavior the audience is likely to imitate.

According to Bandura (1973), observational learning is not a passive process. Daily exposure to various modeling behaviors makes individuals prone to select multiple learning objects, enabling them to pick and choose from a multitude of behaviors. Research indicates that modeling is a continuous process, in which new behaviors are acquired and existing behaviors are modified (Bandura, 1973). After being exposed to the various models, individuals tend to memorize and retain the displayed behaviors. For example, past events can be regarded as guides for reproducing such behaviors. In order to keep the behaviors vivid, individuals engage in behavior rehearsal. That is, individuals who mentally rehearse the desired behaviors are less likely to forget them.

Figure 3: Social Learning Model

Bandura (1973) states that the most violent behaviors are usually mentally rehearsed because of the social prohibition placed upon explicitly engaging in these. After the actions become memorized, the reproduction processes take place in forms of exhibition of the same behaviors. Finally, observed, memorized and reproduced behaviors are not sufficient for their continuous exhibition. In order to engage in a given behavior, the individual needs to be motivated to repeat such behaviors. That is, if a person receives positive reinforcement after engaging in certain behaviors, the same are likely to be learned and repeated. Contrarily, upon receiving negative reinforcement the behavior tends to be eradicated (Bandura, 1973; Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Monte, 1995; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Learned behavior could be manifested violently or nonviolently. Fifteen years after the Serbo-Croatian conflict ended, the Serbian people residing in Croatia are still suffering mental, material and sometimes physical maltreatment from the Croats. The prime example of dehumanization relating to identity is the case of a Serb refugee who was born in Croatia and needed to renew his passport.

When asked by the administrative assistant about his nationality he replied his nationality was SERBIAN. The clerk just placed seven dashes (- - - - - - -) explaining that she did not want to write 'Serbian' in the person's passport. Being Serbian thus became categorized as a vulgar word, a nationality that does not even deserve to be formally acknowledged. Although, no physical violence was committed against the individual by the Croatian clerk, the psychological burden of being classified as belonging to an unworthy nationality had a deep impact on this individual.

A violent example of social learning could be attributed to the many cases of school shooting. From Barry Loukaitis, who killed two students and one teacher on February 2, 1996, to a 23 year old Seung Hui Cho who unleashed 170 rounds from his two pistols, killing 32 students and faculty as well as himself on April 16, 2007, there were another 48 incidents of school shootings in the world. By applying the social learning theory to incidents of school shooting, one could argue that the perturbed students pay attention to the violent acts (violence on TV, for example) and retain the information by conceptualizing ways to enact it. Then, motivated by humiliation and dehumanization they carry out the act of violence.

As we mentioned before people are social creatures, creatures capable of learning and imitating models' behaviors. The social learning theory provides a very valuable lens in helping to uncover the processes behind violent socialization. This theory also serves as an indispensable ground for understanding intergroup interactions as well as the malignant group processes of delegitimization, polarization and social exclusion. We can also apply the social learning model to the case of Serbo-Croatian relations during the

war. As a nation enters into a conflict, group polarization among the population happens almost instantly. During the pre-conflict period of 1989 the Serbian population living in Croatia dropped from 12.4% to nearly 4.5% in 1991, when the conflict was in the beginning stages (Economist, 2005). As the Croatian population watched the occupation of Vukovar by the Krajina Serbs, while the Serbian population watched the Croatian Army battling and destroying the predominately Serbian villages, the divide between the two factions promulgated and further intensified. By applying the social learning theory to these incidents we can deduce that as both populations were being aggravated by the atrocities they were personally experiencing (attention), forced them to drastically shift their perceptions about each other. This situation led to feelings of righteousness, solidarity and sympathy for the in-groups and virulent, dehumanizing and malignant actions toward the out-groups. Statements like "Good Serb = Dead Serb" and vice versa, only reinforced the hate and divide between them.

Furthermore, the unilateral projection of information about the conflict buttressed the hostilities between the groups (retention). As both groups experienced instances of property destruction and killings of their in-group members, the automatic response was to reciprocate by engaging in these same behaviors (motivation) (Sternberg, 2005). Finally, engaging in these kinds of deeds on daily basis, namely, seeing the State elites, such as generals being rewarded for killing the members of the out-group; idolizing the war heroes; reclaiming lost territories at all costs; presidents kissing their respective flags and the population revering their behavior, are all factors that reinforce peoples' behaviors (learning). As a result of the socially constructed images of enemy and group

polarization along identity lines, the out-groups usually become marginalized, humiliated, and dehumanized, leading to their victimization and delegitimation. The in-group, conversely, enjoys a supportive, cohesive and morally superior stance that usually creates the in-group's dominant and legitimate position in society.

Emotions play a crucial role in both escalating and deescalating conflicts. In terms of psychological implications of emotions in intergroup relations it is important to mention that negative emotions such as humiliation, hostility and contempt are closely associated with intergroup interactions. On the other hand, the positive emotions, such as love and joy are usually associated with the intra-group relations. I will further explain these processes in the next section of the paper.

Negative Emotions

According to the theory of emotions, human nature is entirely instinctual, in the case of basic emotions, and socially constructed in the case of subordinate emotions. According to Shaver et al. (1987), the categorization of emotions can be divided into two spectrums, namely, positive and negative. That is, the superordinate groupings of emotions abstractly categorize events that either produce beneficial gains or noxious loses. In behavioral terminology, these events describe positive and negative reinforcers (Christianson, 1992). Various studies have shown that children learn very early in life about the categorization of different emotions into *good, nice, like* and *bad, mean, don't like* emotions. The subordinate or socially constructed emotions such as *pride, jealousy, resentment* and *guilt* develop later in life. Below you can see the categorization of emotions, with emphasis added to negative emotions (Christianson, 1992).

```
                    EMOTIONS


POSITIVE              NEGATIVE                          ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                                                        │ Superordinate Categories    │
                                                        └─────────────────────────────┘

    Love      Joy    Anger    Sadness    Fear           ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                                                        │ Basic Categories            │
                                                        └─────────────────────────────┘


      Hostility  Jealousy  Contempt   Horror   Worry    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                                                        │ Subordinate Categories      │
                                                        └─────────────────────────────┘
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
* This is a simplified version of the Model replicated from Fisher, Shaver, Carnochan (1990)

Figure 4. Categorization of Emotions Model

If we pay close attention to the processes taking place in intergroup conflicts we may notice that the predominate emotions involved in these conflicts fall into the category of negative emotions. While positive emotions can help structure an amicable climate that might aid in moving the conflict toward resolution, the essence of negative group interactions is the notion of emotional fossilization and malignancy. According to Coleman (2003, p. 38), intergroup conflicts have a "boiling emotional core, replete with humiliation, frustration, rage, threat, and resentment between groups and deep feelings of pride, esteem, dignity, and identification within groups. Here, indignation, rage, and righteousness are reasons enough for retributive action."

60

This is the essential dimension of human suffering and pain, of blood and sorrow, which in a large part defines the domain of integroup conflict. Finally, emotions such as fear, hate, and anger are hardly dealt with while the conflict is ongoing, and are equally difficult to remedy after the conflict has supposedly been resolved. Sometimes emotional outburst can be productive, such as individuals venting their aggression as opposed to them displacing it onto other human beings, animals or property. Various conflict resolution programs use this technique to get highly aggravated participants to calm down, partly because emotions that have been repressed for a long time tend to be the most dangerous ones, as their outbursts are often very destructive.

The Economist, recently reported a story named *Tales of crime and shame*, describing the life of Mr. Suljagić, a Srebrenica (Bosnian city where Ratko Mladić and his army killed nearly 8000 Bosnian Muslims) survivor. Although the events described in this story are both very emotional and disturbing, the survivor apparently did not retaliate against his perpetrators. The story depicts Mr. Suljagić's living "side by side with the ripped flesh of the dead family and friends sometimes left hanging from the trees and wire fences to which they had been dispatched by exploding shells. Mr Suljagić is angry at the world which neither prevented the Serbs from seizing this UN-declared "safe area" nor saved the lives of his family, friends and people living in Srebrenica" (Economist, 2005).

This demonstrates the prime evidence that the experience of the most horrific emotional events does not always have to lead to retaliatory episodes. This vignette does, however, depict a monstrous instance of humiliation, an emotion that is often used for the

purposes of exerting power onto a less powerful party. Humiliation is a prevalent feeling

that arises out of malignant intergroup interactions. Coleman & Goldman (2005, p. 11),

define humiliation as

> "an emotion, triggered by public events, which evokes a sense of
> inferiority resulting from a realization that one is being or has been treated
> in a way that departs from the normal expectations for fair and equal
> human treatment. The experience for humiliation has the potential to serve
> as a formatting, guiding force in a person's life and can significantly
> impact one's individual and collective identity. Finally, the experience of
> humiliation can motivate behavioral responses that may serve to extend or
> to re-define previously existing moral boundaries, leading individuals to
> perceive otherwise socially impermissible behavior to be permissible."

The process of humiliation tends to further exacerbate intergroup relations and create a

profound polarization between the in-groups and out-groups, which may lead to what

Gurr (1970) refers to as relative deprivation. Another phenomenon that arises from the

malignant social processes is the notion of autistic hostility (breaking off any forms of

interaction between the in-groups and out-groups) and moral exclusion (groups tend to

exclude each other from their moral scope of justice). All of the aforementioned actions

tend to limit the out-group's scope of justice.

Scope of justice

Gurr (1970, p. 24), defines relative deprivation as an "actors' perception of

discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities." It is the gap

between that to which "people believe they are rightfully entitled" and that which "they

think they are capable of getting and keeping." Gurr (1970) relates the level of frustration

that an individual is likely to feel to three factors: 1) the degree of effort an individual

feels he or she has invested in the goal that has not been attained, 2) the extent that the

goal is perceived as being attainable and 3) the perceived legitimacy of the deprivation. Therefore, frustration, according to Gurr (1970) results from inability to gratify just wants. Whether this frustration boils over into anger and violence depends at least in part on the extent of mass frustration within society (Gurr, 1970). In intergroup conflicts, the out-group is usually treated as morally inferior and undeserving of the same treatment that the in-group is enjoying. The out-group's social status is jeopardized by the discriminating state structures that limit the preservation of societal normalcy and deprives the out-group of their basic human needs (Burton, 1990).

Secondly, Morton Deutsch's notion of autistic hostility is very prevalent in malignant inter-group interactions. Deutsch describes this process as the breaking off of contact and communication with the other, creating a perpetuation of hostilities due to the lack of opportunity to learn whether the hostility is based on misunderstandings or misjudgments or others' willingness to change their position and recommence the conversation (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000, p. 26). For example, a simplified version of this process can be described as "you think you've been hurt by the other, you're angry, you break off communication with the other, you don't talk about it with the other, you ignore the other. You maintain your hostility autistically, within yourself, without any necessary reactor" (Deutsch & Coleman, 2002).

Finally, according to Opotow, moral considerations guide our behavior with those individuals and groups who are inside our scope of justice or moral community (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000). Two processes dictate moral engagements between groups. The first process is moral inclusion; where considerations of fairness apply to others; in-groups are

entitled to a share of community resources and they are helped in achieving those resources sometimes even at ones' personal cost. The second process is moral exclusion. For example, during the Serbo-Croatian conflict Croats (in-groups) had a tendency toward helping their fellow Croats through acts of solidarity and support. However, when the Croats (in-groups) interacted with the Serbs (out-groups) their behavior turned virulent, dehumanizing and malignant. We can conclude that the norms surrounding in-group and out-group encounters are facilitated by the construction of different moral categories. Such a process facilitates moral disengagement and intergroup discrimination that pave the way for the development of both direct as well as structural violence. Moreover, as the groups renounce interacting with each other, the polarization process further develops in the social system into the paradigms of domination and victimization.

Structural Factors

The structural factors tend to be constructed and manipulated by the State elites. Such structural factors are divergent symbols/myths, social differentiation, inequitable policies and laws that promote the in-group advantage and advocate out-group deprivation. As shown in the model, there is interdependency between the psychological and structural factors, partly due to the unequivocal connection between human socialization and the local culture dictated by the State elites.

Divergent Symbols/Myths

The central assumption of symbolic politics theory is the notion that people make political choices based on emotion and in response to various symbols. Cohen (1985), states that there are many types of symbols that can mark the boundaries of communities

such as flags, badges, dances and languages. Some of the symbols that mark community boundaries are words; words like 'freedom', 'democracy', and 'brotherhood'. Patriotism, duty, love, and peace, are almost impossible to define, precisely because these symbols allow adherents to attach their own meanings to them. As a symbol is held in common by all the members, its meaning varies with its members' unique orientation to it. People construct their communities symbolically, making communities a resource and a repository of meaning that becomes the ground for social identity. The State elites' introduction of controversial symbols into their political campaigns could generate fear in the minority groups but it could also mobilize the rest of the population for collective action by providing them with a greater purpose such as fighting for independence, freedom or democracy.

In the Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990's, the leaders introduced the Ustaše and the Četniks group classification. During the WWII Ustaše (the army of the Croatian Independent State (CIS)) targeted and killed the Serbian Četniks who fought along with the Partisan army. Tuđman's political campaign was funded in part by Ustaša émigrés, therefore he felt compelled to rehabilitate the old CIS symbols, sometimes in name but more often in fact. During the formation of the new independent state of Croatia in the 1990's Tuđman managed to establish the same name of the currency introduced by the CIS in 1940's – the Kuna. The flag of the Independent State of Croatia was a red-white-blue horizontal tricolor. Most criticism has focused on Tuđman's reintroduction of the checkerboard flag, but a far worse offense has been the resurrection of CIS-era vocabulary (Tanner, 2002, Wilmer, 2002). Croatia's defense minister even adopted CIS's

vocabulary as the official salute of the Croatian Army, "Za dom - Spremni": Salute: Za dom! For home (land)! Reply: Spremni! (We are) ready!

The transfer of symbols is relatively easy. It can happen through the process of human socialization. On the other hand it can also be constructed and manipulated by the State elites. One such method of transferring symbols is through the media, especially the State regulated media. For example, in order to reinforce the hostilities between the Serbian and Croatian enclaves, the countries' respective elites and the state controlled media often broadcasted unilateral information about the conflict. In 1989 Milošević made sure that all of the media including the liberal weekly NIN and Radio-Television Belgrade were brought firmly under his immediate command, placing his crew on the significant positions and demoting those that showed lack of loyalty toward his regime (Bennett, 1995). The Serb national psyche has not been cultivated for centuries to be such, instead in 1987 the media started to portray a picture of the Serbian victimhood, mainly Serbs being exploited and even threatened with genocide on all fronts. Milošević was able to beam the Serbian nationalism into every home in Serbia by saturating the television and newspapers with the coverage of the conflict.

Conversely, Tuđman and the members of his party managed to manipulate the public view of the conflict by showing footages of dead Croatian soldiers supposedly killed by the Serbian controlled Yugoslavian National Army (YNA). Since the Croatian radio and television programs were state run, there was a massive amount of censorship. All of the programming commenced and finished with the Croatian national anthem along with the background display of the Croatian flag (Tanner, 2002). The Croatian

radio and television were in charge of the constant repetition of nationalistically oriented

music, ornamented with symbols of the Independent Croatia, with highly offensive and

inciting lyrics.

Elites on both sides modeled the hateful behaviors toward the other through harsh,

degrading rhetoric and by giving high state rewards for killing the members of the out-

group (the Serbs or the Croats). Both Serbian and Croatian elites idolized and accolade

the war heroes, kissed the nation's respective flags and encouraged the public to engage

in the same behaviors. For the public this behavior was not hard to emulate given that

they revered and unquestionably modeled the elites' behaviors. The creation of national

symbols can by itself polarize the population of a country into groups that accept the

symbols as part of their identity and groups that reject the symbols due to fear of

historical repression. This kind of societal polarization based on a salient identity

differentiation factor tends to be explained by social differentiation theory.

Social Differentiation

Social differentiation is common to most facets of human social life. Social

stratification, the "systematic ranking of categories of people, especially in their access to

livelihood and power" is, according to Berreman (1981, p. 4), both "pernicious" and

"pervasive". "Categories become imbued with specific, negotiated cultural meanings, and

tend to become powerful forces in social life. These meanings are embedded within

specific historical contexts, and are subject to the dynamics of change."

According to researchers such as Fallers (1973) and Rosaldo (1980, p. 396) social

differentiation "often takes the form of asymmetrical relationships, or relations of social

inequality". Fallers (1973) points out that social inequality is both a moral and a structural phenomenon; Berreman (1981, p. 4) adds that such inequalities have behavioral, existential, and material aspects as well.

For the purposes of this study, I will look at the impact of social categorization on such construction as the national identity. A commonly used definition of an ethnic group is a collectivity of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry, language, and culture. Ethnicity then refers to the behavior and feeling (about oneself and others) that supposedly emanates from membership of an ethnic group (Assefa, 2007).

On the other hand, national identity according to Isaacs (1975, p.171)"comes dressed up in its national colors, marching under its national flags, wearing its nation's tag." Nationality therefore appears as the ultimate, the most inclusive, even the "terminal" form of basic group identity. Carlton Hayes furthers this statement by claiming [nationality] " has been a mark of nature, if not nurture for human beings since the dawn of history to posses some consciousness of nationality, some feeling that the linguistic, historical and cultural peculiarities of a group makes its members akin among themselves and alien from all other groups (Isaacs, 1975, p.172). Isaacs explains that a family has always been a primary source of identity attachment and hence *patria*, the homeland only recently became a significant category for both individual and collective (social) identification. Most nations in the world have some sort of categorization and identification of their population embedded in their structure.

According to Fussell (2001), the State identification card (ID) is a form of official classification of the population by groups using one or more of categories such as national origin, race, ethnicity or religion. Such classification schemes treat group difference in overly simplified ways treating group identity as an unchanging constant not subject to ongoing changes in society. What classification on national ID cards does is take group classification schemes one step further - from the classification of populations as a whole (in aggregate) - to the classification of individual persons by group. This process categorizes a group social identity as a rigid and permanent construct. For example, making a social affiliation such as ethnicity or religious affiliation explicit in an authoritarian or tyrannical governmental structure is very conducive to discrimination and further group polarization.

Moreover, Identity cards can be controversial, depending on the way they are used by the government. In the circumstances where ID's must be produced and where enough information about individuals is stored on databases, makes government surveillance of citizens an easy process. Furthermore, through an obvious classification of groups according to their identity, the nation's elites can easily label the out-groups and manufacture the image of the enemy with a clear purpose of defeating them. Therefore, individuals modeled the appropriate behaviors when engaging with "the enemy" through modeling of the elites' behavior.

However, group classification on national ID cards does not indicate that a government will engage in massive human rights violations. Classifications on ID cards are instead a facilitating factor, making it more possible for governments, local

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authorities or non-state actors such as militias to more readily engage in violations based on ethnicity, nationality or religion. ID cards are not a precondition for intergroup conflict, but have been a facilitating factor in the commission of genocide. Additionally the presence of group categories on ID cards, used constantly in routine official and business transactions, can contribute to polarization that can lead to genocide or related crimes (Fussell, 2001). For example, in Nazi Germany in July 1938, only a few months before Kristallnacht, the infamous "J-stamp" was introduced on ID cards and later on passports. The use of specially marked "J-stamp" ID cards by Nazi Germany preceded the yellow Star of David badges. In Norway, where yellow cloth badges were not introduced, the stamped ID card was used in the identification of more than 750 Jews deported to death camps in Poland (Fussell, 2001).

Ethnic classification on ID Cards in Rwanda instituted by the Belgian colonial government and retained after independence was central in shaping, defining and perpetuating ethnic divides (Power, 2001). Social differentiation, therefore, can also be a precursor for the implementation of inequitable policies and laws in societies where the percentage of minorities is deemed significant for their social mobilization and revolutionary actions.

Inequitable Policies and Laws

To polarize different factions of one's society, the State leaders adapt existing administrative structures to advance their agendas or create new structures. In order for leaders to adopt the State structures to promote their own agenda, they must lobby (in a democratic state) for the parliamentary support of the leader's propositions. On the other

hand, in a tyrannical state structure where the dominant party holds the ultimate decision implementing power, it is easier to develop exclusionary policies toward a specific faction of the population. For example, the emergence of the Croatian Independence was marked by the reinvention of the Croatian flag, currency, language as well as policies and laws toward minorities, especially those that identified as Serbian. Additionally, ethnic cleansing can be used as a tacit policy for expulsion of the unwanted minority members in ones society. Such perpetrators may claim to be engaging in relocation, resettlement or deportations and use the claim to disguise acts of genocide. However, the conditions under which a population is moved during the course of relocation may actually have the characteristics described in Article II, section 3 of the Genocide Convention: "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."

According to the Serbian newspaper Vreme, "Tuđman managed to gauge a war that resulted in almost-complete expulsion of Serbs who lived in territories claimed by Croatia." The attack, which began on August 4th 1995, triggered the flight of as many as 200,000 Croatian Serbs. Within hours vast convoys of Serb refugees were choking the roads of northern Bosnia. Franjo Tuđman, Croatia's then president exulted that Croatia's Serbs had "disappeared ignominiously, as if they had never populated this land. We urged them to stay, but they did not listen to us. Well then, bon voyage!"

Manifestation of violence

Thus far I have been arguing that intergroup violence such as ethnic conflicts do not necessarily manifest when the psychological and structural factors have transpired in

a given society. Although the psychological and structural factors are precursors for violence and serve as means for attitude formation, I argue that the presence of triggers is necessary for its manifestation. Therefore, we can condition people to think of a certain group as their enemy; they can even develop strong negative emotions toward certain factions of the populous and even exclude them from the dominant group scope of justice without the escalation to violence. Furthermore, the same group of people can develop separate symbols and myths, have strict national identification policies as well as inequitable minority laws without having the occurrence of revolt and violence.

While all of these scenarios are arguably worrisome and conductive to ethnic conflict, they may not lead to the escalation of intergroup violence without specific triggers. Pruitt and Kim (2004) describe the process of conflict escalation as going from Light (arguments, gentle tactics, anger) to Heavy (threats, coercive commitments, outrage, sometimes violence); a proliferative force going from Small (general suspicion, complaints) to Large (alliance formation (demonization) and moral exclusion); Specific (small concerns) to General (opposition about concrete issues, lack of tolerance); Doing well → Winning→ Hurting Other (Deutsch's notion of individuals' self serving behavior marked by competition); Few (small number of participants) that proliferate to Many (group polarization, rivalry, conflict spillover from one country/region to another). What triggers violence?

According to Kaufman (2001), the necessary triggers for violence include the myths extenuating the majority power over the minority population, fear and opportunism. Hostility and fear rise as a result of symbolic events that activate the myths

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such as violent episodes that appeal to ethnic stereotypes, a leader explicitly manipulating symbols, or a threatening shift in political power. Intergroup violence, therefore, can be manifested because the in-groups are frightened and convinced that their group dominance is essential for group survival. Such thinking according to Kaufman (2001) justifies killing and even massacres in extreme cases. If the point of ethnic symbolism is to engage the supporters' emotions and the point of such symbolism in violent conflicts is to encourage aggressive emotions, it stands to reason that a certain faction of the population will in fact express those negative emotions by engaging in violent actions. The key for ethnic violence is the proposition in which "ethnic violence is always defined defensively, by the claim that the other group is trying to take away what is "rightfully ours"; atrocities have to be justified by the claim that committing them is a legitimate way to defend what is "rightfully ours" (Kaufman, 2001, p.38).

For example, Milošević clearly evoked the shortcomings in the past behaviors of the Serbs, in order to make a clear statement that if battles occur in the near future, the population should remember to stay united, support the Serbian government and emulate those behaviors (resolve, bravery, sacrifice) the Serbian army possessed during the Kosovo battle of 1389. Concurrently, Franjo Tuđman, the former president of Croatia, polarized the Croatian and Serbian enclaves by issuing a call for defense of the homeland document where he stated that the Yugoslavian National Army, at that time under the Serbian control, needed to be defeated in Croatia. These are both direct examples of openly advocating intergroup violence, which was manifested several months after the statements have been made.

Conclusion

The notion of intergroup violence is a multifarious phenomenon. In this chapter, I mainly focused on the psychological and structural factors that lead to attitude formation and may pave the way for intergroup violence. The social learning theory indicates that individuals' violent socialization deprives them of being exposed to positive role models. Lack of positive role models prevents individuals from learning the socially appropriate responses to violence and socially acceptable ways of interacting with other people.

Images of the enemy, dehumanization and moral exclusion processes preclude individuals from more openly evaluating the other party. Instead, people locked into intergroup conflict see a demonized image of their enemy and refuse to associate, and more so adamantly refute the notion of negotiating with the devil. Usually, the people outside of the scope of justice are viewed as evil, and harm can be a cause for celebration instead of grief. Secondly, by dehumanizing the other, the human aspect of the person is stripped from them; they are demonized; and in practice it is easier to kill demons than human beings. This way the enemy is placed outside of the in-groups moral realm, which automatically makes the out-group immoral, evil and worthless.

Concurrently, the theory of emotion indicates that intergroup conflict is due to the high emotional reactions between the parties in a conflict. These conflicts have a boiling emotional core, replete with humiliation, frustration, rage, threat, and resentment between groups and deep feelings of pride, esteem, dignity, and identification within groups. Additionally, for individuals lacking fulfillment of their basic human needs, relative deprivation can further cause feelings of anger and rage toward the oppressor.

Finally, autistic hostility not only produces hurt on oneself, but it also engenders group polarization by refusing to engage with the other. Lastly, social differentiations via the ID system, introduction of separate symbols and myths that obstruct the intergroup relationships and engender parties' calcification into their respective position as well as inequitable minority policies are important structural precursors for intergroup violence. In numerous occasions, humanity had witnessed greedy, predatory leaders and other members of the government reshaping national identities and symbols in order to promote their selfish agenda. Stories of loss and heroism become the main points of the elite narrative, which can engender a strong desire for revenge and correction of history.

Audergon (2005) mentions that Serb nationalists in late 1980's and early 1990's used this strategy to promote their notion of the Greater Serbia. In 1989 Milošević spoke on the battlefield of Gazimestan, reminding the Serbian people that they were defeated by the Ottoman Empire because of indecisive politicians of that time, claiming that only unity can bring back their dignity in the formation of the Great Serbian Empire. Tuđman, the Croatian president reminded his nation to never again be submissive and to preserve the Croatian roots, even if this means dying for it. The Serbian and Croatian enclaves were further divided by the constant evocation of past grievances, ancient hatreds, ghostly heroes of the past and chosen traumas.

The next chapter describes the backgrounds of the study, including how the study was conceived with a brief review of what kinds of studies have been conducted in the territory. The design of the study including the way participants were selected and recruited becomes the focal point of the next chapter. Finally, it will also describe all of

the scales and concepts measured by the questionnaire. Lastly, this chapter presents a

description of the methodology used for data collection and analysis.

4. Background and Methodology

This chapter introduces the background and methodology used in this dissertation. The first part of the chapter explains the previous studies conducted in the region and the rational and innovative aspects of the study proposed herein. The second part of the chapter explains the significance and aims of this study. The third part will illuminate the methodological aspects of the study by providing a view of the data structure and analysis. The description of the qualitative and quantitative data analysis used in this study will conclude this chapter. Finally, this chapter will lead to the subsequent chapter in this dissertation discussing the characteristics of the participants, descriptive statistics and quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

Previous attitudinal studies conducted in the former Yugoslavia

A multitude of theoretical literature exists about the former Yugoslavia and the newly-formed independent states. The theoretical literature predominantly explored the causes of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Various theories have been proposed on the state of ethno-national relations between the various groups. However, to this day, no study seemed to have explored the relationship between remembering and attitude formation.

Let us first review the most recent studies completed in the area of attitude formation and manifestation in the former Yugoslavia. An example of the theoretical

study of the Yugoslav dissolution was presented by Vladislav Sotirović. Sotirović's research entitled, *Emigration, Refugees and Ethnic Cleansing During Yugoslavia's Disintegration in the 1990s: Ethnic Nationalism and Creation of the National States* deals with the forceful decomposition of former Yugoslavia and the wars of the Yugoslav succession. Narration in both cases tells us about the decline and the final collapse of the central (federal) Yugoslav political power, creation of new nation states in the Balkans and the changes in balance within the regional security system. The article postulates that problems such as national self-determination, historical and ethnic rights to the territories and states could emerge once again at any time among the Balkan nations and lead them to ethnic conflicts, national animosities and new wars. This research suggests that the ideological constructs of the borders of national states in the nineteenth century fostered the practical policies in the twentieth century, hence setting the ground for contention (Sotirović, 2009).

Similarly Andrei Šimić's study *A Field Study of Serbian Refugees from Croatia and Bosnia: Implications for Domestic and Foreign Relations Policy,* talks about the perspectives of Serbian refugees from both Bosnia and Croatia. In Šimić's words: "Informed opinion seems to indicate that the Serbian public is sharply divided between those favorably oriented toward the West and the United States and those often labeled as traditionalists: who are profoundly nationalistic and anti-Western." To support this claim Šimić refers to the poll taken on June 25, 2005, in Belgrade, where 63.0 percent of callers expressed opposition to Serbian President Tadić's implicit recognition of Serbian guilt in the alleged Srebrenica genocide. His study shows that there is a negative collective

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attitude expressed by the refugees about returning to original homes in either Croatia or in the Muslim-Croat dominated part of Bosnia. The refugees cited their fear stemming from the numerous reports in the press regarding discrimination against Serbs in these areas in respect to the return of property, jobs and social benefits.

Šimić also found that there is a very high level of anger regarding the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. Likewise, there is a sentiment stating that "the Balkans have become a colony of the West…all the West wants from us is cheap labor and raw materials." Clearly the work of the ICTY is not viewed very positively by the groups whose members of the political elites have been placed on trial.

A similar study exploring the work of ICTY conducted in 2007 by Craig and Fariss called *No Evil? The Influence of Attitudes on Decision Making at the ICTY* explored the *"traditional models of judicial decision making with the developing body of law at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia."* The study's aim was to investigate sentencing patterns of the 36 judges who have sat on the bench at the ICTY. Craig and Fariss further state: "We expect certain individual characteristics that will result in a judge voting for harsher or more lenient sentences across multiple rulings. Political behaviorists suggest that an individual's environment informs their attitudes and their beliefs and, therefore, is integral in forming their political ideologies. If a particular judge is from a country that has seen high levels of conflict or other human rights violations, then that judge is more likely to deliver a harsher sentence to one found guilty of perpetrating similar violence in the former Yugoslavia compared with judges who have not witnessed such atrocities." The study also found that certain measures from the

attitudinal model (change in the level of respect for human rights in the judge's home country) exerted a significant substantive effect on each judge's overall behavior in addition to the legal model (severity of the crime of the accused, mitigating factors, aggravating factors etc), which explains most of the variance in sentence length (Craig and Fariss, 2007).

Other studies, more similar to the one I am proposing deal with attitudes, social distance between the Croat and the Serbs and studies of ethnicity and nationalism. Maja Kandido-Jakšić explored the *Social Distance and Attitudes Toward Ethnically Mixed Marriages.* This study presents the results of a survey that was designed to examine ethnic distance of graduating high school students towards seven nations from the former-Yugoslavia. The research included the use of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale to investigate the respondents' readiness to establish various degrees of closeness with the citizens of the other nations. The study found that ethnically mixed marriages were not as prominent as compared to the pre-conflict years. This is not to say that in the future the potential for mixed marriages does not exist.

Furthermore Malešević and Uzelac conducted a study called *Ethnic Distance, Power and War: The Case of Croatian Students* in which they examined the dimensions of ethnic distance in two wartime surveys of university students in Croatia. Malešević and Uzelac came to the conclusion that striking similarities between the media's depiction of various ethnic groups and the dimensions of ethnic distance towards these groups were present. For example, in 1992 the prime targets of ethnic distance were Serbs and Montenegrins, while in 1993 Bosnian Muslims received similar attention. They state:

"Since the majority of respondents had no war experience the authors conclude that the media's influence on popular attitudes was a crucial determinant of ethnic distance. Considering that most of the media is government-controlled, it is argued that changes observed within these two years can be primarily attributed to the concrete political goals of power possessors."

Finally, *Mutual Stereotypes of Croats, Bosnjaks and Serbs in the Light of Two Factors Theory of Prejudice* a study conducted by Nebojsa Petrović with 617 Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian subjects, state that stereotypes should not be treated as uni-dimensional constructs. Instead he proposed a two-factor theory of stereotypes. Petrović states: "The first dimension is competence (superior-inferior), and second is beneficence or morality (good-bad). Only the second one has high correlation with prejudices." He concludes his study by showing that negative stereotypes among the subjects of his study are still present.

The aforementioned studies explored just one dimension of attitudes that individuals in groups might have about each other. However no study contributed to developing a greater understanding of the relationship between historical remembering of the conflicts in the 1990's and the way such remembering influences the attitudes towards their neighbors in a cross-generational population. Neglecting the way we learn and remember certain events will preclude us from evaluating attitudes that might be formed as a result of the "narratives" surrounding such events. Therefore, understanding the relationship between historical remembering and group enmity is of utmost

importance for shading the light onto new theoretical approaches of studying enemy images.

Most importantly, the study hopes to determine whether the historical memory of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the causes of the wars differ between the three generational groupings of respondents. Additionally, a closer look into the societal level might determine whether we would find discrepancies between individuals that were solely educated about the war in Yugoslavia as opposed to those that personally lived in Yugoslavia and lived in the region during the conflict. Finally, this study presents the current attitude toward the Serbs and Bosniaks prevalent in Croatia with a glance to the future of inter-ethnic relations in this troubled region.

Aims of the Study

This study has several aims which will be addressed by the following objectives:

(a) to explain the relationship between historical remembering of the

conflicts in the 1990 and the respondents' attitudes;

(b) to illustrate the way participants' remember what life was like in

Yugoslavia and the way such remembering influences the attitudes toward

the "Other",

(c) to explore the historical memory of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the

causes of the wars

(d) to discover whether the aforementioned memories and causes of the

conflicts differ between the three main levels;

(d) to determine if there are discrepancies between individuals that were solely educated about the war and Yugoslavia as opposed to those who personally lived in Yugoslavia and have resided in the region during the conflict; and finally

(e) to investigate the state of relations between Croatians and their neighbors with a view toward the future of such relations.

These aims will be explored by using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies for data analysis. These methodologies will be thoroughly explained in the forthcoming parts of this chapter.

Study Design

The study design encapsulated several key components. First, for cross-comparative purposes this study required a multi-regional sample. Such a sample was derived for the purposes of evaluating the responses across the conflict affected and conflict averted zones. A conflict affected zone is defined as an area where combat forces operated during the 1990's or an area with more than 200 casualties. Conversely, the conflict averted zone is an area where combat did not take place or had fewer than 10 casualties. In order to come up with a list of randomly selected areas I used the current regional breakdown of Croatia by counties. Out of the 20 Croatian counties, 12 of them were affected by the war. Only eight counties were not directly affected. The conflict affected counties randomly selected for this study included: Splitsko-dalmatinska, Osječko-baranjska, Vukovarsko-srijemska, and Bijelovarsko-bilogorska. For the conflict averted zones the following counties were selected: Istarska, Primorsko-goranska and

Zagrebačka. A total number of questionnaires distributed to the respondents across these areas totaled 300. Out of the 300 questionnaires distributed, 90 of the questionnaires returned were blank. The remaining 210 questionnaires were entered in excel and then transferred to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The response rate of 70.0 percent was acceptable for the purpose of this study. The cross-generational component evaluated the responses from the three age defined groups: 35 and below, 35-49, and 50 and above. The three generational groups included the following:

(a) individuals born after 1973 who learned about the war mostly through education, however they were too young to understand the ethno-national dynamics in Yugoslavia;

(b) individuals born between 1973 and 1959 who lived during the war and understand the ethno-national dynamics in Yugoslavia;

(c) individuals born before 1959 who experienced the war and have lived most of their adult life in Yugoslavia.

Procedures of the Study

All of the 210 participants were over the age of 18 with an equal distribution of males and females, and a varied distribution across educational and cultural backgrounds. Written instructions stated that the questionnaire involved the assessment of attitudes toward current events regarding the participants' country. The participants were told that the survey was not a test and that there was not a right or a wrong answer to the questions posed in the questionnaire. The participants were advised to answer all the questions as honestly as possible, however if they did not wish to answer a specific question they were

not obligated to do so. They were also informed that their participation in this study is voluntary and their confidentiality will be protected. As part of this study the participants were asked to respond to statements about themselves, the world, society, social groups and the future.

The respondents were recruited through various clubs and organizations as well as through a snowballing procedure. In order to successfully and expeditiously recruit respondents, approximately ten research assistants were hired. Their main tasks were to recruit, administer and return the completed questionnaire to the Principal Investigator (PI). The questionnaire was administered by bringing together a sample of respondents which were asked to answer a structured sequence of questions. Traditionally, questionnaires were administered in group settings for convenience. The research assistants gave the questionnaire to all those who were present which ensured for a relatively high response rate. If the respondents had any questions or were unclear about the meaning of a question they asked for clarification. The next section of this chapter will include a description of all of the instruments used to develop the study questionnaire.

Research Instrument

In developing the study questionnaire there are various details that necessitate careful attention. In crafting these questions the Principal Investigator (PI) must:

(a) determine the question content, scope and purpose;

(b) select the response format most appropriate for collecting information

from the respondents and

(c)   determine how to word the question to get at the issue of interest.

All of the questions included in the questionnaire had a strictly structured format.

Approximately 90.0 percent of the questions followed a Likert type response pattern of:

Strongly Disagree, *Disagree*, *Neutral*, *Agree* and *Strongly Agree*. The questionnaire

involved the use of closed and open ended questions. Eighteen different areas were

represented in this questionnaire. The questionnaire was originally developed in the

English language. The same questionnaire was translated into Croatian and back

translated into English to determine the accuracy and suitability of the translation. Each

area will be explained in the subsequent pages of this chapter.

The first set of questions developed by the Principal Investigator involved a free

recall of various global and national events including an explanation of the significance

of such events. As mentioned earlier, through the process of free association the

participants were asked to think of the three most important events that happened in the

history of a) the world and b) their country. They were asked to explain the importance of

these events and the way they have learned about them. The purpose of these questions

was to test participants' remembering and ranking of historically important events.

The second set of questions developed by the Principal Investigator involved the

use of various true and false statements about the *military operations of Oluja (Storm)*

and Bljesak (Flash). These sets of questions were used to test attitudes towards the two

major operations carried by the Croatian Army. These questions examined whether

participants envisioned these military actions as having a liberational or occupational

character. There were ten statements in this section ranging from a five point Likert scale

of Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. The eleventh question assessed the way participants learned about these events. Examples of questions in this section included: "Operations Oluja and Bljesak resulted in the displacement of many Croat Serbs" and "Operations Oluja and Bljesak were legitimate and necessary."

The third set of questions developed by the Principal Investigator regarded respondents' *attitudes about the conflicts in the 1990's.* These questions assessed participants' attitudes towards the:

(a) institutions that helped exacerbate the conflict such as the Croatian Army, the Orthodox Church, the Croatian and Serb Paramilitary Units etc. (8 statements);

(b) support for the war in specific circumstances such as revenge, economic gain, territorial expansion, etc. (5 statements);

(c) justifications for killing the "other", such as fear, anger, opportunism etc. (6 statements);

(d) future, assessing their vision of Croatia entry into NATO and the EU (6 statements). Examples of statements in this section included: "The future will be bright for my country" and "The future looks bright for the whole region."

(e) Collective versus Individual responsibility for keeping peace between ethnic groups (2 statements);

f) Pride and honor in the Croatian culture (14 statements) such as: "I am eager to pass the Croatian culture to the next generation" and "I honor the soldiers who died in defense of my country."

All of the statements in this section were rated on a five point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Two additional open ended questions were asked of participants. One had to do with naming the aggressors in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia and the other one assessed their opinions of which nation started the conflicts in Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia.

The fourth set of questions developed by the Principal Investigator explored the pre-war and current levels of *interethnic friendships*. These questions assessed the level of contact between participants and their peers from the neighboring countries. Questions included the number of Serb friends the respondents' have, how many times have they visited the neighboring countries and whether they intended to visit these countries in the future.

The fifth area of study involved questions related to the *Collapse of Yugoslavia* as predicated by Frank Wilmer (2002). These set of questions included items delineating the most cited causes of the collapse of Yugoslavia proposed by Wilmer (2002). Some of the causes included ancient hatreds, economic collapse, manipulative leadership, territorial conquest. This scale was comprised of nine Likert type statements which were rated on a five point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Examples of questions include: "The end of the cold war created a level of uncertainty in the international system, a power transition from bipolar to unipolar hegemonies" and "Historical memories of the Yugoslav civil war during World War II left unresolved and irreconciled grievances that were at least unaddressed under the Tito regime and at worse exacerbated by Tito's policies."

The sixth area of study involved the use of the *Coexistence Scale.* The coexistence scale, developed by Westaby for use in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was composed of nine statements and measures attitudes toward coexistence between the three ethno-national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the purposes of this study we have identified three constructs: attitudes supporting coexistence, opposed to coexistence and unifying civic identity, each comprised of three statements. Examples of statements found in this section are the following: 'The best way to promote peace in our country is to keep different ethnic groups separate' and 'the idea of coexistence and simply tolerating other ethnic groups is sufficient for preventing serious interethnic conflicts in my country.' Respondents rated the items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.

The seventh area of the survey assessed *Associations about Events and Leadership Figures.* Developed by the Principal Investigator and similar to the first set of questions, through the process of free association the participants were asked to think of the first three associations that came to mind when they heard words like:
a) Serb, Croat, Yugoslavia, Brotherhood and Unity, Ustaše, Cetnici and leadership figures like: Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević, Ante Pavelić, Josip Broz Tito and Thompson (a Croat nationalist singer). The participants were also asked whether hearing each of these words or names brought about positive or negative memories. As part of this set of questions the participants had to define and date the following holidays: Croatian Thanksgiving Day, Youth Day, and Operation Storm and to state how much their family influenced their knowledge about these events.

The eighth section of the questionnaire involved the use of the *Social Distance Scale.* The social distance scale is a psychometric scale developed by Bogardus (1933) to empirically measure people's willingness to participate in social contacts of varying degrees of closeness with members of diverse social groups. The scale is composed of seven items to which participants have to respond in a 'Yes' or 'No' fashion. Items included phrases such as 'How would you feel about having members of each ethno-national group as 'close kin by marriage?' or 'citizens in my country?'

The ninth section of the questionnaire included the *Conflict Impact Scale.* The scale, developed by Šušnjić et al (2007), was composed of four statements assessing the damage of conflict through personal violence, violence against one's immediate family, or through destruction of property and relocation. Statements ranged from 'I was not impacted by the conflict in any way' to 'I was impacted as a direct victim of violence committed against me personally'. Respondents rated the items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.

The tenth section of the questionnaire included the use of the *Generativity Scale* developed by McAdams and de St. Aubin. Generativity is a complex psychosocial construct that can be expressed through societal demand, inner desires, conscious concerns, beliefs, commitments, behaviors, and the overall way in which an adult makes narrative sense of his or her life. The scale is composed of six questions rated on a scale of 'Not like me' to 'A lot like me'. Examples of statements include: "Others would say that you have made unique contributions to society" and "You have had a good influence on the lives of many people".

The eleventh area of the questionnaire included the use of the *Feeling Thermometer*. Originally developed for polling studies, the feeling thermometer is a standardized measure of affect concerning personal views in relation to certain issues. Consisting of a scale of 0-100, the feeling thermometer asks respondents to rate their *sympathy, favorable feelings* and *admiration* toward specific groups. The numerical meaning is the following: 0 means having extremely negative, 50 having neutral and 100 extremely positive feelings.

The twelfth area of the questionnaire is very significant as it dealt with the respondents' perceptions of the *Past Presidents*. Taken from a study of group differences in memory by Gaskell and Wright (1997) this set of questions tested the flashbulb memories of the deaths of the three presidential figures. The participants were asked to think of the moment when they heard that the following presidential figures had died: Franjo Tuđman (Croatia), Slobodan Milošević (Serbia) and Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia). Conway and colleagues (Conway et al, 1994) found about 85.0 percent of a sample of British students had remarkable "flashbulblike" memories of what they were doing when they heard the news of Margaret Thatcher's resignation. The questions asked the participants to select how clearly they remember the deaths of each president, how important they deemed the event at that time, and how strong of an emotional reaction they had when they heard the news. Additional questions asked in this section regard the following: the degree of respect they had for the past presidents, whether they had a positive or negative reaction to their deaths and what kind of changes they expected from the deaths of the presidents.

The thirteenth section of the questionnaire spoke to the *perceived bias*

respondents have about the Serbs. Taken from the work of Andrei Meleville, these

questions assess the perceived bias participants have toward the Serbs and their

government during the 1990's. The participants had to either agree or disagree with the

following statements: "Do you agree or disagree that the Serbian policy during the

1990's was mainly defensive?" as well as "Do you agree or disagree that the Croat

citizens posed no threat to Serb's security during the 1990's?"

The fourteenth area of the questionnaire dealt with the way *knowledge acquisition*

took place. These questions, developed by the Principal Investigator explored the

participants' knowledge acquisition. The questions were formulated in order to test for

the following variables: knowledge acquired through socialization with peers, with

family, institutional learning and the media.

The fifteenth area of the questionnaire explored the respondents' *knowledge of*

World War II and Yugoslavia in general. Developed by the Principal Investigator, a total

of eight statements tested the participants' knowledge about the events and figures from

WWII and Yugoslav history. The statements were rated on a five point Likert scale

ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Sample questions included "I highly

regard Ante Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia" and "The crimes in Bleiberg

are much worse than the ones committed in Jasenovac."

Commemoration of events was the sixteenth area represented in the questionnaire.

The participants were asked the following question: If you had 300,000 Euros to allocate

to the three museums in order to help remember what they represent, how much would

you allocate to each museum: Jasenovac, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bleiburg? The different amounts allocated for the three museums will indicate whether respondents have a particular predilection for any of the three events.

The seventeenth area of the questionnaire included the *Demographic information.* The demographic information included the standard questions regarding participants' gender, age, marital status, religious affiliation, media used for obtaining information about current events, ethnic group and their preferred political party.

Lastly, four *open-ended questions* were asked of the respondents:

(1) If you could go back in time knowing what you know now and witness the breakup of Yugoslavia would you vote for your country's independence?   Yes   No

(2) If you could go back in time and you were hypothetically appointed as a governmental consultant knowing what you know now, what kind of advice would you give to Presidents Tuđman and Milošević? If anything, what would you have done differently? Explain.

(3) Do you think it is possible to restore ethnic relations in states of the former Yugoslavia? Explain.

(4) If you could send a message to the people in Serbia what would it be?

Data Coding, Entry and Verification

The database structure is the manner in which data are stored and accessed in subsequent data analyses. The databases usually provide a greater ability to store, access and manipulate the data. The data for this study were stored in an excel file which was subsequently transferred to an SPSS file. A codebook was also designed and printed. The

codebook describes the variable name, variable description, variable format, method of collection, respondent or group and notes. The codebook and the database provide a comprehensive way of organizing the data for the later ease of manipulation and analysis. The data entry process were completed in excel by typing in the data directly into the program. After data entry was completed the data were verified by randomly picking 50.0 percent of the items in the questionnaires. As far as data transformation is concerned, the missing variables were left as such. That is, no data were imputed for missing values.

Certain variables were phrased in the opposite (negative) way as compared to others. These variables were back-coded or reversed. When analyzing the data, it is important that all scores for scale items are in the same direction where both high scores and low scores mean the same thing. Similarly, in certain instances we need to know the total score for a scale. In that instance, we need to add up the variables and then divide them by the number of added variables in order to get a unique score for the scale itself. The next section of the chapter will closely examine the quantitative (including both descriptive and inferential) and qualitative analysis of the collected survey data.

Quantitative Data Analysis

In this section of the chapter I will explain the main data analysis tools I used in analyzing the data in this study. There are two kinds of analysis I want to talk about namely, descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. The former are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. Together with simple graphics, such analysis forms the basis of virtually every quantitative aspect of the data. Conversely, the latter is used to make

judgments of the probability that an observed difference between groups is a dependable one or one that might have happened by chance.

The subsequent chapter explores the study's descriptive statistic results in more detail; however in order to understand the results presented several concepts need to be explained. Univariate analysis involves the examination across cases of one variable at a time. There are three major characteristics of a single variable that we tend to look at: (a) the distribution, (b) the central tendency and (c) the dispersion.

The distribution is a summary of the frequency of individual values or ranges of values for a variable. The simplest distribution would list every value of a variable and the number of persons who had each value. One example of distribution is the number of males versus females who participated in the study. I also refer to distributions as 'frequencies.' Central tendency on the other hand describes an estimate of the "center" of a distribution of values. There are three major types of estimates of central tendency: (a) Mean – is a number derived from adding up all of the values and dividing them by the number of values previously added.

(b) Median -- is the score found at the exact middle of the set of values. One way to compute the median is to list all scores in numerical order, and then locate the score in the center of the sample.

(c) Mode -- is the most frequently occurring value in the set of scores.

Dispersion refers to the spread of the values around the central tendency. There are two common measures of dispersion: (a) the range and (b) the standard deviation.

The range is simply the highest value minus the lowest value. On the other hand the standard deviation shows the relation that the set of scores has to the mean of the sample. The sample standard deviation (S) measures the variability of data in a sample.

Another statistical technique used in the data analysis of the study is cross-tabulation. Cross-tabulation is a statistical technique that establishes an interdependent relationship between two variables, but does not identify a causal relationship between these variables. We can use the chi-square statistic to determine whether the relationship between these two variables is significant. At that point we step into the realm of inferential statistics.

Statistical inference comprises the use of statistics and random sampling to make inferences concerning some unknown aspect of a population and it is distinguished from descriptive statistics. Unlike descriptive statistics, inferential statistics provide us with information about the relationship between variables in select populations. In this study, along with measuring differences between groups, I also used one of the most common methods of data analysis or multiple regression analysis and logistic regression analysis.

The general purpose of multiple regressions is to learn more about the relationship between several independent or predictor variables and a dependent or criterion variable. In general, multiple regressions allow the researcher to ask the general question "what is the best predictor of A". A line in a two dimensional or two-variable space is defined by the equation $Y=a+b*X$; in full text: the **Y** variable can be expressed in terms of a constant **(a)** and a slope **(b)** times the **X** variable. The constant is also referred to as the intercept, and the slope as the regression coefficient or **B** coefficient. Furthermore, in the

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multivariate case, when there is more than one independent variable, the regression line cannot be visualized in the two dimensional space. In general then, multiple regression procedures will estimate a linear equation of the form: **Y = a + b1*X1 + b2*X2 + ... + bp*Xp.** In this equation, the regression coefficients represent the independent contributions of each independent variable to the prediction of the dependent variable after the others have explained all that they could. Another way to express this fact is to say that, for example, variable **X1** is correlated with the **Y** variable, after controlling for all other independent variables.

Given that a variety of questions in this study had a dichotomous character, a logistic regression was also used in analyzing such data. Logistic regression is used for prediction of the probability of occurrence of an event by fitting data to a logistic curve. It is a generalized linear model used for binomial regression. Like many forms of regression analysis, it makes use of several predictor variables that may be either numerical or categorical. An explanation of logistic regression begins with an explanation of the logistic function: $f(z) = \dfrac{1}{1 + e^{-z}}$ where the "input" is **z** and the "output" is **f(z)**. The variable **z** represents the exposure to some set of risk factors, while **f(z)** represents the probability of a particular outcome, given that set of risk factors. The variable z is usually defined as $z = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_3 + \cdots + \beta_k x_k,$ where **β0** is called the "intercept" and **β1, β2, β3,** and so on, are called the "regression coefficients" of **x1, x2, x3,** respectively. A positive regression coefficient means that that risk factor increases the probability of the outcome, while a negative regression

coefficient means that that risk factor decreases the probability of that outcome; a large

regression coefficient means that the risk factor strongly influences the probability of that

outcome; while a near-zero regression coefficient means that that risk factor has little

influence on the probability of that outcome.

For the purposes of this study I will be using ordered logistical regression. The

ordered logit model is a regression model for dichotomous dependent variables. The odds

ratio for being in a chosen category compared to being in a lower category is the same

regardless of which category is chosen. For example even if we do not opt to collapse the

data into two categories, the odd ratio would remain the same.

Not all of the data collected in this study fall into the category of numerical data.

There were a few sections of the questionnaire that included open ended qualitative data

that necessitates a way of analysis that differs from the quantitative (numerical) data

types. Hence the next section of this chapter will describe the analysis of the answers

given to the open-ended questions as well as the ones in which participants were asked to

free-associate about events and political figures.

Qualitative Data Analysis

The qualitative data call for a different, more complex way of analysis. Since the

theory has already been generated, the use of grounded theory for qualitative data

analysis did not meet my requirements. Likewise, the standard narrative analysis did not

provide for a wide enough spectrum of categories to be generated from the data I had

collected. Hence, I decided to use thematic analysis in order to come up with those

categories I deemed important and which would complement well my previously set

hypotheses. Thematic analysis can be an essentialist or realist method, which reports experiences, meanings and the reality of participants, or it can be a constructionist method, which examines the ways in which events, realities, meanings, experiences and so on are the effects of a range of discourses operating within society.

What is thematic analysis? Thematic analysis involves analyzing and reporting patterns within the data. Thematic analysis is widely used, but there is no clear agreement about what thematic analysis is and how you go about doing it. An account of themes 'emerging' or being 'discovered' is a passive account of the process of analysis, and it denies the active role the researcher always plays such as indentifying patterns, selecting the ones of interest, and reporting them to the readers (Taylor and Bogdan, 1989). Most importantly, one must ensure that the theoretical framework and methods match what the researcher wants to know. Thematic analysis can also be a 'contextualist' method, sitting between the two poles of essentialism and constructionism, and characterized by theories, such as critical realism, which acknowledge the ways individuals make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, the ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings, while retaining focus on the material and other limits of 'reality.'

To conduct this analysis it is important to have the answers clearly written up. The transcripts [the set of answers provided to the questions posed] were coded into broad themes based on the research objectives. Each broad theme was then subjected to a more detailed manual analysis which led to the formation of more specific categories within each theme. Dey (1993) explains that codes must be meaningful with regards to the data but also meaningful in relation to other categories. The next step to a thematic

analysis is to combine and catalogue related patterns into sub-themes. Themes are defined as units derived from patterns such as "conversation topics, vocabulary, recurring activities, meanings, feelings, or folk sayings and proverbs" (Taylor & Bogdan, 1989, p.131). Themes are identified by bringing together ideas which often are meaningless when viewed alone. When gathering sub-themes to obtain a comprehensive view of the information, it is easy to see a pattern emerging. When patterns emerge it is best to obtain feedback from the informants about them. A developed story line helps the reader to comprehend the process, understanding, and motivation of the interviewer (Aaronson, 1994).

Carefully selecting relevant themes from the answers provided could be a challenging task if the questions are not posed in a clear and systematic way. However, in this study's case, several categories emerged for each of the question posed. For example, when the participants were asked to give advice to Presidents Milošević and Tuđman, several categories emerged out of their answer. The categories had a range from more positive advice given to other negative ones. The same can be stated for the other open-ended questions posed in this survey. A comprehensive view of the qualitative data will be presented in the subsequent chapters.

This chapter started with a review of the literature relevant to the study of attitudes in the former Yugoslav territories. We noticed that there were not very many studies completed that explored the notion of historical remembering and its relation to attitude formation. Hence the importance of such a study was discussed.

The second part of this chapter presented the study's aims and the way this study was designed. Study procedures and the eighteen areas of the study questionnaire were carefully presented in the third section of this chapter, followed by a description of the processes of data coding, entry and verification. This chapter ended with a presentation of the quantitative research methodology used to analyze the data such as descriptive (frequencies and cross tabulations) and inferential statistical methods (linear regression models and logistic regressions). Subsequently, the qualitative data analysis has been presented in a form of thematic analysis which enables us to derive categories from responses to the open-ended questions.

5. The Survey: Demographics

Demographics of the Respondents to the Survey

Of the 303 survey instruments distributed in both conflict and non-conflict zones 210 or 69.3 percent were returned. Out of the 210 survey participants, 48.6 percent (N=102) came from the non-conflict areas and 51.4 percent (N=108) from conflict affected areas. Approximately, 82.4 (N=159) of respondents came from an urban area and 17.6 percent (N=34) came from a rural area.

Gender, Age, and Marital Status of the Respondents

The gender and age division for the sample showed that there was almost an identical distribution between males and females and the three age groups. There was a 2.0 percentage difference between the female and the male distribution, with female and male respondents equaling to 99 and 94 respectively. The age groups were divided by the three categories represented in the survey: a) individuals born after 1974 who learned about the war solely through education and experience as youth, b) individuals born between 1958 and 1974 who lived during the war, however they were too young to remember what life was like in Yugoslavia and c) individuals born before 1958 who experienced the war and have lived most of their adult life in Yugoslavia. There was an close distribution between the age groups: *'35 and below'* and *'35-49'*. The former group consisted of 59 participants while the latter included 56. The most significant group

represented in the sample was *'50 and above'* with 68 respondents, and resulted in being 15.0 percent larger than the other two groups. About 50.0 percent of the respondents were married (N=100). One out of three respondents identified as single and roughly one in 10 respondents reported that they were divorced. Only, one in 20 respondents identified themselves as being widowed.

Nationality and Religious Affiliation of Respondents

The demographics indicate that if a respondent identified as a Croat, he or she was more likely to identify as a Roman Catholic. However, we cannot assume that every Croat will identify with the Roman Catholic religious affiliation. The majority of the sample respondents identified as Croats (N=160) and Roman Catholic (N=146). However, there was a discrepancy of 14 Croats who did not identify with the Roman Catholic religious affiliation. Serbs in this sample were represented by only 2.6 percent of the total respondents (N=5) while Bosniaks amounted to 4.1 percent or 8 respondents. There were 4 respondents who identified themselves as Orthodox and 3 who identified as Muslim. Approximately 1 in 7 respondents identified themselves as atheists. About five percent of the respondents identified themselves as 'mixed' or as belonging to more than one nationality. An additional 4.0 percent identified as 'others' including Hungarian and Italian minorities. A few of the respondents opted to identify with their regional identity and referred to themselves as Istrian. One in two respondents or 45.8 percent felt that they were somewhat religious. In comparison, one in three respondents (N=58) were not religious and only one in four regarded themselves as very religious (N=46). Overall, we

can conclude that the sample falls in the margins of a sample with moderate degrees of religiosity.

Other Characteristics of Respondents

About four in 10 respondents identified themselves as belonging to one of the regional parties. The most prevalent regional party in this sample was the *Istraski Demokratski Savez* or the Istrian Democratic Party. Three in 10 respondents were affiliated with the *Socijalisticka Demokratska Partija* or Social-Democratic Party and two in 10 with Tuđman's *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* or Croatian Democratic Party. It is important to note that only one in two participants disclosed their political party affiliation.

Additionally the majority of respondents or 51.3 percent have high school as their highest educational attainment. There were identical numbers of respondents that had completed the Bachelor's degrees or attended but they had not completed college. One in 20 respondents completed a Masters degree. A very small fraction of the sample completed the Doctorate degree which equated to 1.6 percent. A similar percentage of respondents completed only Elementary school or 2.6 percent.

When asked about their parents' education, five in 10 mothers and approximately three in 10 fathers had elementary education as their highest educational attainment. Conversely, three out of 10 mothers and roughly five in 10 fathers had completed high school. Slightly more fathers than mothers attended college, 10.9 and 7.5 percent, respectively. There was not much of a difference in percentage of parents with completed

Bachelor degrees, although 2.0 percentage more fathers had attained the degree. Finally,

an equal number of mothers and fathers had attained a Masters or Doctoral Degrees.

News Outlets

Figure 5. Learning about events at home and abroad: Agreement

Figure 5 shows the media through which the respondents learned about world events.

The most frequent media through which the respondents frequently learned about events

at home and abroad was television (*Figure 6*). Through watching television 71.0 percent

of all respondents gained an insight about the most important events happening at home

and aboard. The second most common source of information came from newspapers,

totaling 57.0 percent. Friends and family did not seem to be very influential in terms of

respondents' learning about the world events from them.

Figure 6. Learning about events at home and abroad through Television: Agreement

However, when asked whether they learned from family and friends, approximately 65.0
and 78.0 percent of respondents stated that they *Sometime* learned about world events
from them.   Approximately two in 10 respondents learned from their family and friends
as compared to seven out of 10 respondents who learned from watching television. Three
out of 10 respondents always got their news from the internet and radio shows. Forums
seemed to be the least frequent way from which respondents gathered information.
Roughly, one in two people never read forums in order to gain insight about current
events happening around the world

Friendships

The respondents were also asked: "How many friends from the following countries do
you have?" The countries in question were Serbia, Bosnia, Italy and Hungary. Note that
all of the countries are in close proximity with Croatia, three of which also border with
Croatia. In the case of Serbia, the majority of the respondents or 51.8 percent said they

have between 1 to 5 friends from Serbia. When ask how often they interact with people

from Serbia regardless whether they are friends or business partners: 62.8 percent of

respondents stated that they "*Sometime*" interact with people from Serbia. Only one in 10

people stated that they *"Always"* interact with people from Serbia. For comparative

purposes, Tables 2 through 4 show the respondents interaction with the other

nationalities.

Table 1. SERB FRIENDS

	Frequency	Percent
No friends	36	21.2
From 1 to 5	**88**	**51.8**
From 6-19	26	15.3
From 20 +	20	11.8
Total	**170**	**100.0**

Table 2. BOSNIAN FRIENDS

	Frequency	Percent
No friends	32	19.2
From 1 to 5	**59**	**35.3**
From 6-19	41	24.6
From 20 +	35	21.0
Total	**167**	**100.0**

In the Bosnian case, a similar scenario occurred. Almost four in 10 respondents reported

to have between 1 to 5 friends from Bosnia. This is slightly less than in the Serbian case;

however these two cases have a similar dynamic. When we look at the case of how many

of them have Italian and Hungarian friends, in both cases we notice that the majority of

the respondents have no friends from these two countries. In the Italian case, four out of

10 respondents claimed they don't have a friend from Italy. Even more astonishing seven

out of 10 claimed they don't have a friend from Hungary, despite the country bordering with Croatia.

Table 3. ITALIAN FRIENDS

	Frequency	Percent
No friends	**65**	**39.6**
From 1 to 5	54	32.9
From 6-19	19	11.6
From 20 +	26	15.9
Total	**164**	**100.0**

Table 4. HUNGARIAN FRIENDS

	Frequency	Percent
No friends	**109**	**72.2**
From 1 to 5	32	21.2
From 6-19	8	5.3
From 20 +	2	1.3
Total	**151**	**100.0**

Respondents were also asked whether they have ever visited these four countries. One notes that the majority of people or eight in 10 respondents have visited Bosnia and Italy, while six out of 10 visited Serbia and Hungary. A similar question asking the respondents' intent to visit the four aforementioned countries provided the following illustration: Visiting Serbia seemed to be the lowest priority. Nine out of 10 respondents stated that they intended to visit Italy. Almost eight out of 10 respondents intended to visit Hungary and Bosnia.

This chapter described the key demographic statistics of the study's participants such as their gender, age, nationality, religious affiliation and educational attainment. Additional demographic characteristics described in this chapter include the participants' degree of religiosity, their parents' educational attainment and the participants'

willingness to engage in interethnic friendships. Four subsequent areas were also explored in this chapter, namely: a) the participants' use of the media; b) their perception of the conflict, and c) their intention to visit countries such as Serbia and Bosnia in comparison to Italy and Hungary.

6 . Quantitative Analysis

In this chapter I will discuss the quantitative results of the study. This chapter will present the results in the form of both the descriptive and inferential statistics. The descriptive results will be presented for each of the concepts in the study in form of cross-tabulations and frequencies, followed by an in-depth inferential analysis of the data.

History

The respondents were asked: "If you had 300,000 Euros to allocate to the three museums listed below in order to help remember what they represent, how much would you allocate to each museum?" The amounts are represented in thousands of Euros. For the commemoration of all of the museums the minimum allocated amount was 0 and the maximum was 300.000 Euros. The average amount allocated to Jasenovac was 125.000, followed by Bleiburg at 107.000. The average allocated amount to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 69.000. The mode for all of the museums was 100.000 Euros. The closer the allocated amount was to 300,000 Euros, the more support respondents' showed to the commemoration and historical significance of that particular issue. The commemoration of the former Yugoslav state was not given much importance. This was partly due to the fact that respondents were split in their opinions of the SFRY's effectiveness as a legitimate State structure.

General perceptions about the war

In order to assess their approval of Croatian independence, the respondents were asked

the following question: If you could go back in time knowing what you know now and

witness the breakup of Yugoslavia would you still vote for Croatia's independence? The

majority of the respondents or 81.3 percent would support Croatia's Independence again.

Roughly 18.7 percent of respondents were against it. Respondents were also asked the

following question in regards to the overall support of the war in Croatia: "What was in

your opinion the percentage of the population who supported the war?" The minimum

percentage cited was 1.0 percent and the maximum was 100.0 percent. The average

percentage cited was 49.0 percent and the mode was 50.0 percent indicating that there is

a perception that approximately half of the population in Croatia supported the war. They

were also asked about their perception of the actors that started the conflicts and

identified the 'aggressors' in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia.

Figure 7. Actors responsible for the war in Croatia

From looking at *Figure 7* it is evident that the majority of the respondents, 92.1 percent

believed Serbs started the war in Croatia. Similarly when asked about the conflict in

Bosnia, nine out of 10 respondents claimed that Serbs started the conflict (*Figure 8*).

Almost nine percent of the respondents claimed that Croats started the conflict in Bosnia.

Figure 9 shows the actors who are believed to have started the conflicts in Serbia. The

majority of the respondents believed that there was no conflict in Serbia as they failed to

remember the 1990's air strikes carried out by NATO.

Figure 8. Actors responsible for the war in Bosnia

Figure 9. Actors responsible for the war in Bosnia

A similar distribution is noted when they were asked who the aggressors were in the three

countries as indicated in Tables 5 through 7.

Table 5.	Aggressors in Bosnia were:			Table 6.	Aggressors in Croatia were:			Table 7.	Aggressors in Serbia were:		
		Frequency	Percent			Frequency	Percent			Frequency	Percent
	Croats	28	14		Croats	11	5.9		Croats	2	1.2
	Serbs	**165**	**82.5**		**Serbs**	**167**	**90.3**		EU	1	0.6
	Bosniaks	2	1		JNA	7	3.8		NATO	5	2.9
	JNA	4	2						**Nobody**	**160**	**94.1**
	Muslims	1	0.5						USA	2	1.2

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Conflict Damage

Table. 8 I was impacted via violence committed against my immediate family or friends		Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	Completely Disagree	37	18.7
	Disagree	39	19.7
	Neutral	25	12.6
	Agree	46	23.2
	Completely Agree	51	25.8
	Total	198	100.0

As we note in Table 8 when participants were asked whether they were impacted by the conflict via violence that was committed against their immediate family or friends, 25.8 percent of the respondents *Completely Agreed* and 23.2 percent *Agreed* with this statement. This indicates that almost 50.0 percent of the respondents' families and friends were impacted by the conflict. Table 9 indicates the responses to the statement: "I was impacted due to relocation, loss of home and livelihood."

Table 9. I was impacted due to relocation, loss of home, or livelihood		Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	Completely Disagree	61	30.5
	Disagree	47	23.5
	Neutral	27	13.5
	Agree	22	11.0
	Completely Agree	43	21.5
	Total	200	100.0

One notes that 54.0 percent of respondents were not impacted by the conflict due to relocation, loss of home or livelihood. Conversely, 32.5 percent of the respondents agreed with this statement indicating that they have to a certain degree experienced the aforementioned conditions due to the conflict.

Finally, Table 10 illustrates the statement: "I was impacted as a direct victim of violence committed against me personally." One notes that 20.6 percent of respondents agreed with this statement, demonstrating that roughly two out of 10 respondents were directly affected by the conflict. On the other hand, 64.4 percent were not personally affected by the conflict while the rest of the respondents were neutral.

Table 10. I was impacted as a direct victim of violence committed against me personally

		Frequency	Valid Percent
Valid	Completely Disagree	67	33.7
	Disagree	61	30.7
	Neutral	30	15.1
	Agree	17	8.5
	Completely Agree	24	12.1
	Total	199	100.0

Operations Flash (Bljesak) and Storm (Oluja)

Figure 10. As a result of Operations Oluja and Bljesak: Agreement

Figure 10 illustrates the agreement to the statements regarding respondents' attitudes

toward Operations Oluja (Storm) and Bljesak (Flash). As we note, the statement that

elicited the most agreement among all of the nine statements was "Operations Oluja and

Bljesak were fought to reclaim the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia" with

an overall 82.9 percent agreement. When comparing the attitudes toward this statement

among the conflict affected areas and non-affected areas, it was noted that almost all of

the former and 80.0 percent of the latter agreed with this statement. When comparing the

three age groups an almost identical distribution is found, with a slight decrease in agreement in the group '50 and Above.'

Another statement that elicited significant support was the one speaking of Operations Oluja and Bljesak being legitimate and necessary. A total of 69.3 percent or seven out of 10 respondents agreed with this statement. About 9 out of 10 respondents in the conflict affected areas and 7 out of 10 in the non-conflict affected areas agreed with this statement. Again, the respondents in the conflict affected areas were slightly more favorable to the operations carried out by the Croatian Army. As indicated in the previous statement, the respondents in the age group '50 and above' were the ones who displayed more disagreement with this statement than the respondents in the two other age groups.

When asked whether the ethnic makeup of Croatia changed due to the war 62.4 percent or six out of 10 people agreed with this statement. An equal number agreed in both conflict and non-conflict affected areas. The group 'less than 35' agreed with this statement the most. While the majority of respondents agreed that the ethnic makeup changed as a result of the war, approximately one in two respondents still agreed that people of different ethnic groups got along during the war. Interestingly respondents in conflict affected areas seemed to think that more people got along during the war than in the non-conflict areas. The difference between the two groups amounts to 16.2 percent. The statement 'I feel a strong desire for vengeance' elicited little support. Only one out of 10 respondents in both areas responded favorably to this statement. Likewise all of the three age groups represented in this study strongly disagreed with this statement. However, 14.0 percent of respondents 'under 35 years of age' agreed with this statement.

Although the statement "As a result of Oluja and Bljesak many Croat Serbs were killed' solicited an overall 49.3 percent of agreement, four in 10 people in the conflict affected areas and eight in 10 people in the non-conflict areas agreed with this statement. This result is not surprising because of the disparate support for the notion that these two operations were necessary for liberating the occupied territory of Croatia under control of Croat-Serbs. Nevertheless, there is a debate about whether the Generals responsible for these two actions were guilty of killing and displacing the Croat-Serbs. However, the Generals' guilt would also demonstrate the governmental involvement in the conflict and refute their arguments in support of the waged war (*Figure 11*).

Similarly the same trend is present with the three age groups represented in this study whereas the group 'less than 35 years of age' agreed the most with this statement. Approximately four in 10 respondents from '50 and above' and '35-49' agreed with his statement. Realizing that Croat-Serbs were in fact killed and displaced during the war might bring about the greater level of justice and possibly positively influence their desire for reconciliation.

Finally, when asked whether as a result of Operations Oluja and Bljesak many Croats were killed, 67.4 percent of respondents in the conflict affected areas agreed with this statement. Approximately 80.0 percent of the respondents in the non-conflict areas also agreed with this statement. A similar distribution of respondents was prevalent when asked whether as a result of the two operations both Croats and Croat-Serbs were displaced (*Figure 11).*

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
Figure 11. Perception of the displacement of Croat-Serbs and Croats during Oluja

Conflict Attitudes

Respondents were asked to identify which of the institutions in their opinion exacerbated the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. *Figure 12* shows the percentages of the respondents who agreed with each of the statements. Some of the most interesting results include: Almost nine out of 10 respondents thought that the Serb Paramilitary exacerbated the conflicts, followed by the seven out of 10 who identified as culprits the Yugoslav National Army and the Serb Governmental Elite. Interestingly enough, very low scores were given to the Croatian Army as only two out of 10 respondents identified them as an exacerbating factor of the conflicts. This further supports the Croats' notion of the war being fought to reclaim the occupied Croatian territories.

Figure 12. The following institutions helped exacerbate the conflict in Croatia: Agreement

Figure 12 shows that six out of 10 respondents thought that the Orthodox church played a role in exacerbating the conflicts compared to the four out of 10 respondents who deemed the Catholic Church as the one responsible for these acts. Five out of 10 respondents or 48.3 percent thought that the Croatian Paramilitary Units played a role in the conflicts. This is 50.0 percent less than their agreement with the fact that Serb Paramilitary Units exacerbated the conflicts. Not surprisingly, the respondents' identified the out-group related entities to be the culprits of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Another question posed to the respondents regarded the situation in which conflict might be an acceptable mean for solving the 'problem' at hand. Only in one particular situation did the respondents agree that war should be supported.

Figure 13. I support the war in the following circumstances: Agreement

Almost nine of out 10 respondents or 86.8 percent would support war in an instance of

self-defense (*Figure 13*). War waged in the name of revenge (3.4), economic gain (2.9),

expansion of territory (3.4) and gain of territory (2.0) all equated to less than 5.0 percent

support from the respondents. One can confidently state that a higher level of moral

reasoning is present within this sample as the respondents seemed to think that only when

personally threatened individuals have the right to wage war.

When asked why were the people in the former Yugoslavia waging war, seven out

of 10 respondents or 75.1 percent identified hate to be the main factor (*Figure 14*). Hate

was followed by anger (63.8) and fear (60.0). Six out of 10 respondents agreed that these

two factors have played a key role in the conflicts. Only four out of 10 respondents

identified opportunism (42.2) and obedience (37.8) as being key factors for the violent

rampage in the former-Yugoslavia. Finally, the least cited factor was obedience with only

three out of 10 respondents agreeing with this being a relevant factor for violence

manifestation.

Figure 14: People in the former Yugoslavia were killing each other because of: Agreement

Political Attitudes

Respondents were also asked to think about the present and future developments in the

region in terms of what kind of support they would give to the socio-political activities

happening in Croatia (*Figure 15*). Interestingly, the respondents support for the work of

the International Tribunal Court for the Former Yugoslavia was the highest scoring item

and amounted to 50.0 percent. Although five out of 10 people support the work of the

court, this item surpassed the Croat support for joining the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) as well as the European Union (EU). The former was supported with 41.3 percent as compared to the 46.2 percent of the latter. In addition to being suspicious about joining these two organizations, the respondents displayed negative feelings about the future of Croatia and the region in general. Roughly three out of 10 respondents thought that the future will be better for Croatia and only two out of 10 respondents thought the future will be better for the whole region. This dissatisfaction may be due to the slow progress of the negotiations with the European Union, the Slovenian blockade of such negotiations, the tensions in Bosnia and a variety of other socio-economic factors.

Figure 15. Political Aspirations: Agreement

Historical Attitudes

When asked about historical events, respondents displayed an average confidence in the

accuracy of defining such events (*Figure 16*). Six out of 10 respondents or 62.9 percent

agreed that the Četnici were a royalist and nationalist organization during World War

Two. Roughly, half of the respondents or 56.6 percent believed that Jasenovac was the

camp where Serbs were exterminated. Furthermore, 54.6 percent thought that the

Partisans were positive historical figures and 51.7 percent agreed with the fact that

'Brotherhood and Unity' was a positive doctrine. Only approximately one out of 10

respondents or 11.2 percent showed admiration for Ante Pavelić and the Independent

State of Croatia (NDH). The same frequency of responses or 7.8 percent was shown

when asking whether they deemed Pavelić and Ustaše to be positive historical figures.

Figure 16. Attitudes toward historical events/figures: Agreement

Attitudes Towards the Homeland and Serbs

The following section covers the respondents' perceptions of their homeland, including a variety of statements that can be considered either patriotic or nationalistic (*Figure 17*).

Figure 17. General Attitudes toward the Homeland

Out of all of the items presented in this graph the single item that received the most favorable rating was speaking of the importance of preserving ones national and cultural traditions with 89.0 percent agreement. Two other items that elicited strong agreement among the respondents spoke of the collective responsibility of preserving peace among ethnic groups. "It is everybody's responsibility to keep peace among ethnic groups" and "It is the government's responsibility to keep peace among ethnic groups" eight out of 10 respondents or 84.2 of the former and 84.1 percent for the latter agreed with these

statements. About eight out of 10 respondents agreed that they pay respect to the fallen

soldiers. Interestingly only half of the respondents or 55.6 percent state that they are

proud of their country's history. However, an almost identical amount or 51.0 percent of

respondents thought that Brotherhood and Unity was a positive doctrine. When asked

whether they were willing to die in defense of their family a stunning 85.9 percent gave

positive responses, however when asked whether they would be willing to die for the

defense of their country only 31.6 percent agreed with this statement.

Table 11. Do you think that the picture of Croatia
portrayed in the Serbian media during the 1990's was:

		Frequency	Valid Percent
	Definitely True	2	1.1
	Neutral	12	6.4
	Somewhat True	43	22.9
	Untrue	**131**	**69.7**
	Total	188	100.0
Missing		22	
Total		210	

Table 12. Do you think that the picture of Serbia
portrayed in the Croatian media during the 1990's was:

		Frequency	Valid Percent
	Definitely True	6	3.2
	True	51	27.0
	Neutral	10	5.3
	Somewhat True	**82**	**43.4**
	Untrue	40	21.2
	Total	189	100.0
Missing		21	
Total		210	

From Tables 11 and 12 we note that the perception of the impartiality of the media seems

to be quite distorted. The bias lays in the perception that the Croat media portrayed a

somewhat true picture of Serbia while the Serbian media portrayed an untrue picture of

Croatia during the 1990's. Furthermore when asked "Do you agree or disagree that the

Serbian politics during the 1990's was predominantly defensive?" 84.4 percent of Croats

agreed with this statement (See Table 13, and the blue columns in the graph below).

Conversely, when asked whether the Croatian politics during the 1990's was

predominantly defensive a 65.8 percent of respondents' agreed with this question (See

Table 14, and the black columns in the graph below).

Table 13. Do you agree or disagree that the Serbian politics during the 1990's was predominantly defensive?

		Frequency	Valid Percent
	Agree	29	15.6
	Disagree	**157**	**84.4**
	Total	186	100.0
Missing		24	
Total		210	

Table 14. Do you agree or disagree that the Croatian politics during the 1990's was predominantly defensive?

	Frequency	Valid Percent
Agree	**125**	**65.8**
Disagree	65	34.2
Total	190	100.0
Missing	20	
Total	210	

Finally, the respondents were also asked whether they agree or disagree that the a) Serbian and b) Croatian citizens did not pose any threat to each other's security in the 1990's. Approximately 69.0 percent of respondents disagreed that the Serbs did not pose threat to Croatia (See Table 15 and the black columns in the graph below). Conversely, 64.5 percent of respondents agreed that Croatian citizens did not pose a threat to Serbian security (See Table 16 and the red columns in the graph below). This graph clearly demonstrates a sharp dichotomy in their answers to these two questions.

Table 15. Do you agree or disagree that Serbian citizens DID NOT pose any threat to Croatian security during the 1990's?

		Frequency	Valid Percent
	Agree	58	31.0
	Disagree	**129**	**69.0**
	Total	187	100.0
Missing		23	
Total		210	

Table 16. Do you agree or disagree that Croatian citizens DID NOT pose any threat to Serbian security during the 1990's?

		Frequency	Valid Percent
	Agree	**120**	**64.5**
	Disagree	66	35.5
	Total	186	100.0
Missing		24	
Total		210	

In general, one notes when the respondents were asked to think of the out-group, the responses they provided had a negative connotation. The respondents thought the Croatian media painted a correct picture of the Serbs; however the Serbian media was deceitfully portraying the Croats during the 1990's. Furthermore, the Serbs posed threat to Croatia and their politics was not defensive, confirming the previous statements of Serbia being the aggressor and the main culprit for the war. In *Figure 18,* the respondents were asked of their opinions about the Serbs. They were also asked to rate how the Serbs in their opinion view Croats. We note that in the case of Croatians perception of the

Serbs, 66.0 percent of them had a neutral, 15.2 percent a negative and 18.8 percent

positive opinion. However, in the case where the same was asked of the out-group,

namely, what were the opinions that Serbs had toward Croats, the respondents thought

that 46.3 percent had a neutral opinion. However an extraordinary 43.2 percent stated

they thought the Serbs had a negative opinion while only a 10.5 percent rated the opinion

as positive. From the aforementioned examples we note that there is a strong in-group

bias present in the ranking of Serbo-Croatian relations.

Figure 18. Opinions of Serbs/Croats of each other

Social Distance

Figure 19. Being linked to the members of these groups by Marriage (blue), Friendship (red), Neighbors (green).

Figure 20. Have members of these groups as Coworkers (purple), Visitors (yellow), Citizens in your country (orange).

From *Figures 19* and *20* one notes that the in-group is almost 100 percent willing to marry, befriend, work and live with their fellow Croats as opposed to other groups. In the case of marriage, only 35.9 percent would marry a Kosovo Albanian and 54.2 and 58.2 percent a Serb or a Bosniak. Disregarding the ratings of the in-groups (Croats), we note that for each event that produces more social distance between groups, the respondents were more willing to agree with it. For example, in relations to the Serbs the respondents were willing to marry at 54.2 percent, have them as friends at 68.1 percent, have them as neighbors at 77.4 percent and have them as coworkers at 78.4 percent. The greater the social distance between the in-groups and out-groups, the more willing they are to support interethnic interactions.

Perception fo theYugoslav Collapse

The respondents were asked to rate the statements about the causes of the Yugoslav State collapse. The statement that received the most agreement was the 'Yugoslavs did not consider Yugoslavia as a legitimate state, hence the State was doomed to collapse' where nearly 75.0 percent of the respondents agreed with this statement. Six out of 10 respondents were willing to support the notion that the Yugoslav State Collapse could be attributed to the greedy political leaders who were working on maximizing their gains as well as to the post-cold war period in which state collapse was not uncommon. Only half of the respondents agreed that the historical memories of World War II were the culprits for the conflicts in the 1990's. Interestingly, only three out of 10 respondents thought nationalism was the cause of the Yugoslav State collapse and four out of 10

indicated that the State collapsed due to a wide civilizational and cultural divides within

Yugoslavia.

Perceptions of the Presidents

Figure 21. Clearly remember the deaths by age groups

Figure 22. Clearly remember the deaths by zones

Respondents were asked a number of questions in regards to the deaths of the three

presidents. *Figure 21* shows the three age groups and their reactions to the presidential

deaths. In the case of President Tito, it is clearly demonstrated that the respondents in the

category 'over 35 and below' were the ones with little recollection of this event. Respondents in the war zone seemed to have a better recollection of the event than the respondents in the non-conflict affected zones (*Figure 22*).

Figure 23. Respect for the leaders by age

Figure 24. Respect for the leaders by zones

Along the same lines, *Figure 23* shows respondents'' respect for the Presidents by age groups. Respondents 'over 35 years of age' seem to have greater respect for Tito than the ones 'under 35 years of age' who showed more respect for President Tuđman. Note that President Milošević did not have a single positive response in this category. *Figure 24* clearly shows that Tuđman did not have a strong base of supporters in the non-conflict

affected zones as only 22.6 percent of people declared that they respected him. Tito on the other hand had strong supporters in both zones.

Figure 25. Positive changes resulting from leaders death by age

Figure 26. Positive changes resulting from leaders death by zones

Furthermore, by looking at *Figures 25* and *26* one notes that when asked whether the presidential death was going to bring about positive or negative changes in both Tuđman's and Milošević's cases respondents expected positive changes. Conversely, in Tito's case, the respondents expected negative consequences.

Inferential Statistics

Multiple Regressions

The remainder of this chapter will elaborate on the multiple regression models developed
to test the various hypothesis of this study. The models examine the variables that
correspond to greater or lesser support for the military operations Oluja and Bljesak,
Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia and the variables that might help engender a
smoother process of interethnic coexistence. In the model one should pay attention to the
proportion of variance in the dependent variable by looking at the R-square values as well
as at the coefficients also known as parameter estimates within the variables, Beta scores.
In this regard, by standardizing the variables before running the regression, hence putting
all of the variables on the same scale, one can easily compare the magnitude of the
coefficients to see which one has more of an effect.

Table 17. Positively remembering Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia

Variables	Beta	p
Brotherhood and Unity	-0.278	0.003
Age	-0.251	0.002
War Croatia	-0.216	0.023
Gain of territory	0.256	0.001
Partisans Positive	-0.22	0.018

Table 17 represents the regression model where the dependent variable is positively
remembering Ante Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia. Five variables were
statistically significant. As we note from the model, Gain of territory, Brotherhood and

Unity, and Age were the statistically significant at p< 0.01 level. The R-square value

indicates that 52.9% of the variance in the dependent variable can be predicted from the

independent variables presented in the model. For example when we look at the

coefficient (parameter estimate) of Gain of terriroty B= .256, indicating that for every

unit increase in *Gain of territory*, a .256 unit increase in the dependent variable is

predicted, when holding all of the other variables constant.

The negative correlation indicates the more one thinks the partisans were positive

historical figures, or that brotherhood and unity was a positive doctrine the less support

they would show for Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia. Similarly those who

blamed the Croatian government and military for exacerbating the conflict will have less

positive attitudes toward Pavelić. An interesting fact is the notion that the younger the

age of the sample was, the more they supported Pavelić. This is not surprising as similar

results also emerged from previous cross-tabulations.

18. Positively remembering Operations Storm (Oluja) and Bljesak (Flash)

Variables	Beta	p
Nationalistic Attitudes	0.445	0.000
War Serbia	0.173	0.021
Serbs threat to Croatia	0.135	0.058
Conformity	-0.393	0.001
Opportunism	0.369	0.001

One notes that Nationalistic Attitudes, Opportunism and Conformity were significant at

p<0.01. We note that the more one supports the notion of opportunism as a reason for

killing the enemy the more support is given to the operation of Oluja and Bljesak.

Likewise, a higher one scored on nationalistic attitudes, the more support for Oluja was

displayed. Moreover when the greater degree of blame for the exacerbation of war was

placed on the Serbian entities, the more one supported operations Oluja and Bljesak.

Conformity on the other hand was negatively correlated with the support for Oluja and

Bljesak. This means that the more one thought conformity played a part in killing the

enemy the less they supported operations Oluja and Bljesak.

Table 19. Factors influencing Nationalistic Attitudes

Variables	Beta	p
Self Defense	0.13	0.022
Pos. Rem. Oluja	0.271	0.000
War Serbia	0.23	0.000
War Croatia	-0.491	0.000
Gain of territory	0.194	0.000

The model represented by Table 19 indicates that all of the five variables in the model

were statistically significant, four of them at the $p<0.01$ level. One notes that Self-

Defense, Positively remembering Oluja, Gain of Territory, War Serbia were positively

correlated, meaning the more one supported Oluja, the gain of territory as a legitimate

cause for war, the killing in the name of self-defense, or the more blame was placed on

the Serbian entities for exacerbating the war, the greater was the likelihood of them

having more nationalistic attitudes. The War Croatia variable is negatively correlated

with the Nationalistic Attitudes indicating the more one supported the notion that the

Croatian entities were responsible for exacerbating the conflicts the lower scores on

nationalistic attitudes were displayed. This notion also supported the theoretical part by

indicating that a person who tends to be more open-minded about assessing the overall

culprits for the conflicts displayed less nationalistic attitudes.

Table 20. What are the factors supporting ethno-national segregation?

Variables	Beta	p
Age	0.23	0.010
Fear	0.287	0.000
Pos. Rem. Oluja	0.193	0.014
Neg. Rem. Oluja	-0.199	0.020
War Serbia	-0.156	0.054
Pavelić Positive	0.309	0.001

Table 20 presents a model of regression where the dependent variable is Segregation and

independent variables are Age, Fear, Positively remembering Oluja, Negatively

remembering Oluja, War Serbia and Pavelić Positive figure. Out of the five variables four

of them were positively correlated indicating the more support ones gave to each one of

the four items, the more they supported segregation. For example the more one justified

fear as a legitimate reason to kill the enemy the more one would support segregation. The

only item negatively correlated in this model was attitudes negatively remembering

operation Oluja and Bljesak indicating the more one negatively remembered operations

Oluja and Bljesak the less they would support segregation as means of solving the conflict.

Table 21. Serb Elites were responsible for the conflicts

Variables	Beta	p
Nationalistic Attitudes	0.532	0.000
Coexistence	0.145	0.052
Expansion of territory	-0.236	0.043
Economic Gain	-0.25	0.036
Revenge	0.241	0.015
Hate	0.233	0.004
Conformity	0.263	0.036
Opportunism	-0.448	0.000

Table 21 represent a regression model in which variables were examined to determine the correlates of assessing blame to the Serb government and military leaders for exacerbating the conflicts during the 1990's. Nationalistic attitudes, hate and revenge seem to be the most significant of the eight variables presented in this model. The more one supported the notion that hate and revenge played a role in the Yugoslav conflicts, and the more one seemed to display nationalistic attitudes, the more he or she would agree with the notion that the Serb entities were the culprits for the conflicts. Expansion of territory, economic gain and opportunism in this model were not factors that respondents' were supporting as causes worth battling for.

Table 22. Coexsistance

Variables	Beta	p
Economic Gain	-0.672	0.007
Hate	-0.299	0.006
War Serbia	0.264	0.010
Gain of territory	0.765	0.003
Patriotic Attitudes	0.365	0.006
Nationalistic Attitudes	-0.434	0.003
Opportunism	0.233	0.015

In terms of running a regression model in which correlates of coexistence are explored, Table 22 shows that seven variables were statistically significant. The more one thought that economic gain was a justifiable cause for war, or the more one believed that hate was the just reason for killing the other in the former Yugoslavia the less they were willing to coexist in an interethnic environment. Additionally, the greater the degree of nationalistic attitudes was displayed, the less the respondents were willing to coexist. Furthermore, patriotic attitudes, viewing opportunism as a cause for killing, thinking that gain of additional territories was a just reason for fighting the war were regarded as correlates of behavior prone to support for coexistence. Interestingly enough, thinking that the Serbs institutions exacerbated the conflict also correlated positively with coexistence. These sets of attitudes also require looking at the former Yugoslav conflicts more broadly and openly, in the sense that both sides were evaluated and culprits were assessed based on a more evenhanded and objective picture of the conflict.

Table 23. Remembering Operations Storm (Oluja) and Flash (Bljesak) as negative events

Variables	Beta	p
War Croatia	0.644	0.000
Territorial Gain	0.34	0.009
Economic Gain	-0.444	0.001

Table 23 represents a regression model depicting the correlates of negatively remembering operations Oluja and Bljesak. The most significant predictor of negatively remembering Oluja was support for the notion that the Croatian entities played a part in exacerbating the conflicts during the 1990's. Thinking that territorial gain played a part in the war was also one of the strong correlates of negatively remembering Oluja. However, the more one believed that economic gain was a cause for the wars the more one would negatively remember Oluja.

Table 24. Remembering the Croat Elites as responsible for conflicts

Variables	Beta	p
Hate	-0.142	0.010
Conformity	-0.189	0.028
Opportunism	0.244	0.007
Picture of Serbia in Croatian Press	0.211	0.001
Serbian Policy Defensive	0.102	0.054
Age	-0.159	0.008
Against Oluja	0.321	0.000
War Serbia	0.232	0.000
Gain of territory	0.222	0.000
Pavelić Positive	-0.146	0.030
Partisans Positive	0.154	0.012
Nationalistic Attitudes	-0.333	0.000

Finally, Table 24 represents the regression model in which the belief of Croat entities holding responsibility for the conflicts was examined. For example, high nationalistic attitudes or thinking that Pavelić was a positive figure; elicited a low support for the fact that the Croat entities were responsible for the conflicts. However, the more one thought that the Partisans were positive figures, and thought that Oluja was a negative military operation the more they implicated the Croatian military forces and government in the conflicts of the 1990's.

Ordered Logistic Regression

Table 25. Actors and Coexistence

Ordered logistic regression

Number of obs	=	168
LR chi2(4)	=	23.80
Prob > chi2	=	**0.0001**
Pseudo R2	=	0.0372

Log likelihood = -308.01446

```
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Coex|    Coef.  Std. Err.    z   P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
Impo Tito |  .2712794  .1187876   2.28  0.022    .03846      .5040989
Emo Tudj  |  .5804584  .176789    3.28  0.001    .2339583    .9269585
Emo Milo  | -.4688585  .2156724  -2.17  0.030   -.8915686   -.0461484
Feel Inter|  .4898714  .2040134   2.40  0.016    .0900125    .8897303
```

Since the previous regression models does not completely provide an answer to the posed question, a more appropriate model to test the various correlates of coexistence is the ordered logistic regression. From Table 25, the dependent variable was Coexistence

and the independent variables were Importance of Tuđman's death, Emotions toward Tuđman, Emotions toward Milošević and Feelings towards the International Community. The model was statistically significant at p >0.01 level. This model tells us that for every unit increase in importance of Feelings toward the International Community, one can expect a 0.49 increase in the log of odds of coexistence, given all of the variables in the model are held constant. There was a negative correlation between Emotions for Milošević and coexistence indicating the decrease in emotions for Milošević results in an increase in coexistence.

Table 26. News Sources and Coexistence

Ordered logistic regression

					Number of obs	=	161
					LR chi2(3)	=	15.98
					Prob > chi2	=	**0.0011**
Log likelihood = -292.21769					Pseudo R2	=	0.0266

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     v318 |    Coef.  Std. Err.    z   P>|z|    [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Newspap |  .9457558  .2844644  3.32  0.001    .3882159    1.503296
Friends  | -.8231844  .3612565 -2.28  0.023   -1.531234   -.1151347
```

Likewise from this ordered logistical regression model in which we tested the relationship between coexistence and media sources, where coexistence was the dependent variable and newspapers, family and friends were the independent variables. We note the following relationships: For every one unit increase in selecting the newspapers as a source of information, an increase of 0.95 is expected in coexistence

given that all of the other variables remain constant.

One of the objectives of this study was to explain the relationship between historical remembering of events and the respondents' attitudes. More specifically, by looking at the respondents' beliefs towards specific historical events (negative or positive) one might get an indication of the Croats' attitudes towards their neighbors. In this context if the operations Oluja and Bljesak were remembered as being 'liberational,' individuals were more likely support the notion that the territory at the time was occupied by the Serbs, hence the crimes committed against them were necessary in order to liberate the occupied territory. Conversely, if the predominant belief states that Oluja and Bljesak were operations aimed to ethnically cleanse the Serb populated territories, individuals will tend to be more inclined to disprove the two military operations. These two dichotomous beliefs had an impact on the way respondents' perceived the Serbs, more negatively in the former, and more positively in the latter case.

As mentioned before in the multiple regression analysis it is evident that there were several key factors framing one's support for these two operations. For example, from the regression we noted that an increase in nationalistic attitudes also indicates an increase in support for these two military operations. Indicative of rather negative attitudes towards the Serbs by Croats scoring high on nationalistic sentiments was the notion of blaming the Serb entities for exacerbating the conflicts. In other words, the greater the degree of blame for the exacerbation of the conflict is placed upon the Serbian government and military, the more one was more likely to have supported the operations Oluja and Bljesak.

Overall, Serbs were thought to be the aggressors in the conflicts in both Croatia and Bosnia. However, respondents failed to remember the NATO air-strikes on Serbia during the 1990's. Perhaps the air-strikes were remembered as a NATO offensive towards the "aggressors" hence punishing the "enemies" for their actions.

Attitudes towards Ante Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia provided greater understanding of the respondents' stance towards the Serbs. Insofar as there was support and admiration for Pavelić we could expect that the attitudes towards the Serbs would be more negative than if there was lack of such support.

Furthermore, the knowledge the respondents displayed of the historical events that happened during World War II could be considered average. Approximately one-quarter of the respondents seemed to think that the crimes committed in Bleiburg were worse than the crimes committed in Jasenovac. This is another example of group bias where the extermination of one's enemy is perceived less relevant than the murder of one's in-groups no matter how long ago the events took place. As stated before, the younger respondents to the survey seemed to have a more positive view of Ante Pavelić. The support might be due to the controversy surrounding this event or the indecisiveness of the Croatian government to take a stand and openly discuss their views of Ante Pavelić as either a negative or positive historical figure in Croatian history.

In terms of the Partisans and the brotherhood and unity doctrine, roughly half of the respondents viewed them as positive. Hence the negative correlation between supporting Ante Pavelić and the Partisans makes sense given that they were in the opposite spectrums during the World War II. "One's enemy is another one's freedom

fighter" is the best way to illustrate this set of dynamics within the way Croatians remember both Ante Pavelić and the Partisans. However, it should also be indicated that the individuals who showed support for Ante Pavelić were also likely to show support for the military operations of Oluja and Bljesak.

7. Qualitative Results

This chapter proposes a qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions asked in the survey. The analysis was conducted using principles of ethnographic interviewing that involves grouping comments into categorical areas. The next step to a thematic analysis is to identify all data that relate to the already classified patterns. All of the statements that fit under a specific pattern are identified and placed in the corresponding category (Aronson, 1992). Themes are identified by "bringing together components or fragments of ideas or experiences, which often are meaningless when viewed alone" (Leininger, 1985, p. 60). Themes that emerge from the informants' stories are pieced together to form a comprehensive picture of their collective experience. The first part of this chapter explores the reactions respondents had to the death of Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Josip Broz Tito. The latter part of the chapter is concerned with the analysis of the following questions:

A) If you could go back in time and you were hypothetically appointed as a governmental consultant knowing what you know now, what kind of advice would you give to Presidents Tuđman and Milošević? If anything, what would you have done differently? Explain.

B) Do you think it is possible to restore ethnic relations in states of the former Yugoslavia? Explain.

C) If you could send a message to the people in Serbia what would it be?

Analysis of attitudes toward Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Josip Broz Tito

PRESIDENT FRANJO TUĐMAN

"*Great man in war, no man in peace!*"

The respondents in the survey were asked to comment what, if any, reaction they had when they heard of the death of President Tuđman. The responses could be categorized in three main areas:

a) Sadness due to immense respect for the President

b) Indifference

c) Lack of respect for the President due to a variety of reasons such as bad governance, lack of leadership etc.

The first set of responses that illuminated the respondents' sadness for the death of the president due to having an immense respect for him included:

- I was sad because he was the *first Croatian President*

- I was sad because *he was the symbol of a strong Croatian nation* and Croatian defense.

- I was sad for the man; *he did a lot for Croatia's independence.*

- The death of the *creator of the Croatian nation*.

- The person who *united all Croats in the defense of the sovereignty* of the country.

- *A good man* died.

- He was *a statesman*, that's why I respect him.

- I was sad for the man and a *very important one in our history*.

- *My* first Croatian *president and military leader*.

The second set of responses gave the impression of respondents being indifferent to President Tuđman's death. Statements speaking of his illness and death in general were prevalent in this category.

- It *did not make* any *difference*

- *Ended another not very shiny epoch*, the only positive thing was the independence.

- *Perhaps* it will be better.

- *All death is a loss.* Somebody loved this person. Somebody is mourning because of this person.

- As a result *Croatia would have a better president*, life would get better.

- I was sad for the man and his family, but *I don't think he was a great leader.*

The third category speaks of President Tuđman's death with the end results being better times for Croatia. Most of these statements characterize Tuđman as a bad leader; a leader responsible for the "mess" Croatia found itself in. The responses to his death had a predominantly positive intonation.

- It was the *only way to move forward from the mess*.

- *Thank God*!

- *He stole*. Karma got him back.

- I *could not stand him*.

- He *was not a leader anymore*.

- This was the *only way for good changes in society to occur*.

- The *tyrant* disappeared.

- *It is sad that he didn't die 15 years earlier*.

- The first Croatian president *died and left his bad governance*.

- Another *dictator is gone*.

- *Just in time* (if he could not have died before).

- *Great man in war, no man in peace*.

PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ

"*He took advantage of everybody yet again!*"

The respondents were also asked what their reactions were when they heard that President Milošević died. The responses may be grouped into two categories: a) disappointment because he was not sentenced and b) general happiness that a tyrant was gone. Some of the statement prevalent in the first category spoke of the respondents' sadness with the fact that President Milošević was not brought to justice. Some of the statements included:

- I wanted him to *be tried for his doing.*

- It would be *better if he was in jail, this was his salvation.*

- He was *never accused for his crimes.*

- Good for him but we *didn't get justice and him to stay in jail.*

- *He took advantage of everybody yet again!*

- He *got what he wanted.*

- I was sad because he *was not tried* and *sentenced* nor *adequately punished.*

The second set of comments portrayed Milošević as a bad leader, a leader who should have never been born or should have died earlier. One must note that the greater majority of the respondents were Croats, hence one would not expect to have positive comments about President Milošević's death given that most of the memories Croats hold of him were shaped by the conflict and this was supported when one respondent stated: "he was the biggest fault for the war."

- He *deserved a worse death.*

- He was the *biggest criminal after the WWII.*

- Thank God!

- *Without any emotions*, I thought Serbia could develop after this.

- One *torturer* less. One *criminal* less. One *lunatic* less.

- The *death of a fascist*, who brought a lot of bad things to the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

- The *tyrant* disappeared.

- A *dictator* died

- *He stopped hurting people.*

- Too bad he *didn't die before.*

- *It is good when a bad person dies.*

- A negative person died but *his bad vibrations are still present.*

- *Open space for changes* in the Balkans.

- It would have been *better for the people* in these territories that *he was never born.*

- The *instigator of the war* died.

- A *monster* died.

- *Aggressor and he deserved it!*

- *One criminal, psychopath* less in the world and one *war* less in the world.

- *The criminal should have been killed before.*

- Tyrant and *killer of non Serbs.*

JOSIP BROZ TITO

"A *great man that kept together something unconnected.*"

Respondents were also asked to rate their reaction to Josip Broz Tito's death. Tito was the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. President Josip Broz Tito was remembered by the majority as a benevolent leader, one who kept all of the Yugoslav ethnic groups in harmony. He believed that brotherhood and unity was the key and the only remedy that would prevent the war between the different nationalities in

Yugoslavia. He tends to be remembered as a key figure, a true definition of a leader, despite the fact that he was self-appointed as the president for life.

Concurrent with the literature and the general feelings, the survey respondents also rated Josip Broz Tito quite favorably. The comments regarding his death could be grouped into a) the death of a dictator or b) death of a savior.

Some of the comments indicating Tito being viewed as a dictator who did more harm than good for Yugoslavia were the following:

- The *dictator died* who is *guilty for the death of many Croats*.

- Thank God there were *no more human made statues, the great batons, and the celebration of Youth Day.*

- *We were indoctrinated* that we were all sad, but I was in elementary school then.

- *Good for the citizens, bad for the country*.

The more negative reactions to his death came from the older generations, those who lived under Tito's presidency and those who remember what life was like in Yugoslavia. Some of these comments embody the spirit of brotherhood and unity that with Tito's loss was forever gone. Many respondents view President Tito as a key figure, a statesman, and a hero. Quite a few respondents associated Tito's death like a death in their own family. The following are some selected comments from this category:

- *It was a loss similar to a loss within my family.*

- Tito was a *figure.*

- *Unfortunately, age and illness got the best of him.*

- We were all sad; *depressed, we lost a great man*.

- *Premonition* for something *bad.*

- We were much *discomforted because life was better*.

- Sad for the man who has *greatly unified all nationals in the Balkans and created a great nation.*

- We enjoyed living in that time, what will we do next?

- *The death of a great leader!*

- He had a *strong personality, everybody respected him*.

- *The destruction of a whole.*

- The *fear* for the possible war.

- *He kept everything in order.*

- For me like a *loss of a very good person*.

- *His death brought fascism to Croatia.*

- Sadness for the *person who managed to keep peace in the Balkans.*

- A *big statesman* is gone.

- We were afraid that with the death of Tito a *period of security was over.*

- *Fear of insecurity and possible conflicts-state collapse*

- We were *all in shock.*

- Besides sadness I was *very worried.*

- *Everybody cried, in school we watched the funeral on TV*.

- *Tito died!*

- *I grew up with him* and it was *better than today*.

- *Hurt and timeless remembrance!*

- *The greatest and the most charismatic leader* in this territory.

- *Great man that kept together something unconnected.*

- *Since he had a great charisma*, we were *all sad for him.*

Advice for Presidents Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević

"I would definitely state that in the greatest possible way they have to make sure that their nation has freedom and prosperity. Don't become the victims of the international centers of power. The manufacturing of weapons, commerce, banking, and other international elements should not be prioritized before ensuring the livelihood of the people in their respective nations."

"I would tell *Tuđman to* immediately have a trial for the crimes that happened during Oluja. Do not go into Bosnia and Herzegovina! Do not support and partake in the corruption and bad privatization in Croatia! After Oluja, stop the authoritative leadership and resign from politics and government. I would tell *Milošević* to forget the politics of all Serbs in one State! Do not propagate and generate hate toward other nations! Get out of the leadership position right away!"

The respondents' were asked the following open ended question: If you could go back in time and you were hypothetically appointed as a governmental consultant knowing what you know now, what kind of advice would you give to Presidents Tuđman and Milošević? If anything, what would you have done differently? Out of all of the advice the respondents would have given to the two Presidents, we can identify seven major

themes: a) peaceful breakup of Yugoslavia, b) keep Yugoslavia together, c) advise them both to resign/could not advise them, d) stop torturing people, e) war was the only way, f) negotiation and learning from history, and g) other factors.

One of the major recurring themes throughout the respondents' answers is the notion of a peaceful breakup of Yugoslavia. A respondent explained that this should have been done "without wars, without killing, [by] dividing everything in realistic and truthful values" and that such division of goods and territories should have happened without war. Another respondent stated that the two leaders should "communicate as much as possible, because war is the worst option, where innocent people die and a new generation of wealthy individuals are created that [eventually] do not have a vision for social politics." Some respondents even suggested soliciting help from the international community.

The second category of responses voiced the notion that Yugoslavia as a state should have been kept together. As one respondent stated I would advise them "to keep Yugoslavia together, to deemphasize the differences, increase tolerance, to stop the opportunism and generate amicable discussions!" Clearly the emphasis here is on negotiation and coming up with mutually rewarding solutions. Another vision for a Yugoslav confederation was proposed by stating: "accept the confederation; negotiations on the division of the nations should happen throughout a longer time period." Similarly a sentiment of containing the groups in a single Yugoslav state under the doctrine of brotherhood and unity was expressed by another respondent. "They should have agreed and together move forward with the building of Yugoslavia. The groups should still live

under the brotherhood and unity. Today we would all together move toward setting a better position for the whole country. The war set us all back and divided us. The people wanted [togetherness] but today hate won. Is this a good result?" Some respondents went as far as stating that the leaders should have kept Yugoslavia together at all cost. This was emphasized in the following statement: "At all cost I would keep Yugoslavia together. I would introduce drastic changes especially in the realm of economics and in relations toward work. Our health, education, social and housing arrangements were the best in the world." While the responses were predominately focused on Croatia and Serbia, there were a few instances in which respondents gave advice pertaining to the situation in Bosnia by referring to the fact that they should have left Bosnia alone and have determined the borders according to the republic's borders within the former Yugoslavia. One respondent further stated: "Tuđman: Work only on a peaceful dissolution without going into Bosnia and without a deal with Milošević! Build a country based on community and not on nationalistic rhetoric."

There were respondents' who felt helpless about the whole situation and the only way they deemed a solution could be generated was though the resignation of both Tuđman and Milošević. Statements such I would advise them to "resign from their positions. If they had done so we would not have had a war and we would split peacefully," and more directly "I don't think that they were people whom one could influence", speak of respondents unhappiness with the leadership. Some respondents even angrily mentioned: "You can't advise stupid people!" however the best summary of this section is embodied in the following statement: "They knew very well what they

were doing. The innocent people suffered and were killed because of their ill ambitions. Governmental consultant would have worked for the governmental leaders and if the person did not follow orders in the 1990's that person would have been killed immediately."

The fourth area prevalent in their narratives was a plea to stop torturing people. Statements such as "Stop torturing the people and let them live in peace" and "I don't want to think about those monsters" were quite prevalent. Still one respondent suggested that the presidents should have taken up a hobby by saying: "Instead of messing up with politics, start to fish! With fishing you could only hurt the fish and not all of us."

Still some respondents voiced their opinion that war was the only way to gain Croatia's independence. In these statements Serbia and Milošević are referred as the key culprits for the conflict. "Ideally, we should have had a peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia, without the homeland war, but the biggest mistake was the Serbian aggression on Croatia. Yet the best option would have been the peaceful solution to the problem, a solution that would make both sides happy. Another sentiment coupled with the notion of peaceful resolution was voiced by a respondent who also advised that in the case such a resolution failed then force should ensue. The respondent stated: "To President Tuđman I would suggest to at all cost resolve the situation without war. If this would not be possible, I would put the military and police forces on the internationally recognized borders and defend the territorial integrity. At all cost I would disallow all meetings of national minority groups and disarm everyone who is not in the military and police forces. Another respondent had a more idealistic picture of Tuđman's action by

stating: "President Tuđman was right. He did everything right. It would have been better if there was no war, but it seems that this was the only way," and "Tuđman did not attack Milošević or Serbia, but he fought for Croatian independence. Serbia can't be where one Serb lives, like it's not America where one American lives." Furthermore, one respondent believed that Serbs are 'bloodthirsty people' by stating "Tuđman: Defend Vukovar at all costs! Milošević was a person who liked blood so I don't think any suggestion would have work. If the Croats trusted less other people it would have been less painful; like Slovenians, we would have saved lots of lives."

A respondent doubted the sole involvement of Tuđman and Milošević by stating that there was a greater power [United States of America] which manufactured the conflict. He states "I don't think that anything could have been done differently, because I think this was all staged before Tito died and I think that a greater power caused the collapse of Yugoslavia." Similarly a respondent notes: "They were American slaves and I can't give them any suggestions. They should have been eliminated from the political and public life."

Another prevalent area of advice giving to the two presidents was that of negotiation and learning from history. A comical account of a proposed negotiation was the following: "I would lock them up in a room, without food and water and I would not let them out until they reach an agreement." While this respondent would take the basic human needs away from them as they did to thousands of people throughout the territory, others suggested that "everything could have been worked out in a peaceful way, through negotiation and understanding, for mutual satisfaction and for mutual gain." This

Burtonian notion was very prevalent in the respondents' comments. Words such as

compromise and tolerance were also well represented. Yet some respondents' also

mentioned that the two presidents should have learned from their counterparts the Czech

and Slovak Presidents. However the focal point of this discussion was embodied in the

following advice: "Do not incite hate, do not lie to the people, and stop the media from

creating misperceptions!"

There were several other factors that could not have been easily categorized but

are worth mentioning. These comments deal with the use of economic principles to divert

the conflict. One respondent mentioned: "I would suggest to both of them to increase the

manufacturing and economic sectors and increase the standard of living but to forget the

war rhetoric and nationalistic hate." Similarly, another account mentioned was to

"increase the economic standards and forget hate. Solve the collapse of Yugoslavia and

the transition to capitalism peacefully (like the Czech and Slovaks) because blood should

not have been spilled and hate should not have been generated. In that case the possibility

of theft and destruction of the economic system would have been minimized."

Other respondents referred to the Yugoslav right to secession but also warned

against Serbian politics by stating: "In all cases avoid war! Every nation at that time had

the option according to the governmental regulations and the right to secede and gain

independence. Unfortunately, Greater Serb politics with Milošević on top was not

agreeing with these terms, and played games with the votes. Because of this the Serbs

had more votes than the other nations and republics in the governmental system." This

sentiment was also present in another account: "I would never let war happen, I would

suggest negotiations and if not, then peaceful move of the population, with all of the necessary preparations with the help of the international community and informing the public beforehand. I would never let privatization happen, not during the war years, I would wait for the right moment [after the war ended] and I would let all of the workers have a say because they were the victims during the 1990's."

There were few respondents who would have counseled them to think about the number of victims the war would cause, the notion that violence would put the country behind for centuries. Others suggested to invest in education rather than hate and to introduce better privatization laws, better employment, complete security of employees, and a better status for retirees.

Finally, there were those respondents' who negated that any advice would have helped in statements such as "If anyone at that time said anything that would be regarded as good for mankind, it would have been taken down and forced to resign. We don't even know how many people have died because of Tuđman and Milošević!" Similarly, two respondents refused to give their advice because "I think that no President would have accepted a suggestion from anyone else. I think that both were looking for their own interests. This was a life-long fight between two faiths and cultures. I would resign from the place of counselor." Ultimately, as one respondent put it: "I would never be their counselor because they would never be my Presidents!"

Is restoring ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia possible?

"*It is possible,* but a long time needs to pass by, with the condition that the new generations are socialized in the spirit of tolerance and mutual respect, which is lacking in the newly independent states. It is possible that the increase of the standard of living would have a positive impact on the amelioration of ethnic relations. I think that all of the former countries joining the EU would not be a solution, because Europe will never be united, especially since there are so many extreme differences between countries and standards of living in the various countries. Socialism like a social system would have possibly succeeded if it was not tried out in the poorest countries (Russia, Balkans, China)."

"*I think it is happening as we speak.* We don't have to love each other but we must respect each other because we live nearby. I think that the politics of 'clean bills' and economic independence could ameliorate these relations given a certain amount of time. We need to learn so much about ourselves, admit we made mistakes toward ourselves and toward others. Nations and people in these territories don't know anything about themselves, their history, roots, identity and faith. They never had the chance to hear this truth from somebody, their visions are not directed toward the future, and instead they are living in the past, in their myths, legends, most likely dreaming of revenge."

"*No!* The war divided us, it strengthened the hate and this is what we became. It is hard to expect especially from the people who suffered the loss of their relatives and their homes, to today live together in harmony and to forget what had happened."

Respondents were asked whether they thought it would be possible to restore ethnic relations in the states of the former Yugoslavia. Their responses were as varied as was their reasoning behind the possibility or inability of such relations to improve with time. The two major areas of division between respondents dealt with the ones who a) thought the improvement in Serbo-Croatian relations is possible, and b) the ones who were adamantly against the notion of having successful interethnic relations between the two nations. The main propositions focusing on the betterment of interethnic relations had to do with the following factors: a) economic and social development, b) life in Yugoslavia without ethnic hatred, c) tolerance and communication, d) the politicians always sabotage the process, e) other factors. Conversely, the areas of contention and disagreement with the possibility of improvement in the realms of ethnic relations had to do with a variety of factors most notably a) the Serbs admitting they wronged Croatia and b) there not being a possibility at all because too much pain and suffering had already taken place.

The first group of responses dealt with the economic and social factors that could influence good ethno-national group relations. A respondent described this process as "the relations could improve by the exchange of cultural, sporting, and other events, intellectual and academic forums, mutual investments in educational and academic projects which will enhance the betterment of lives in Croatia and the territory of the former Yugoslavia." Sporting and music events, good economic collaboration and restitution of goods are the key factors cited in this category. Some respondents think that relations could be restored through a greater degree of education and information and by creating a community which would foster respect for all the people and would not evoke

the past. Finally, as one respondent stated: It could be done by having better standards of living, by giving people a chance to live like 'people'!"

The second category refers to those respondents who remember life in Yugoslavia marked by lack of ethnic tensions. These respondents think that if people managed to act civilly in Yugoslavia, then they are able to replicate this behavior today. As one respondent stated, "Yes we can, because before the collapse of Yugoslavia we all lived free of nationalistic troubles. I think that with a little tolerance and understanding it is possible to restore mutual respect. Another respondent voiced his opinion by stating: "Relations among ethnic groups before the war were good. Those Serbs who respected the Republic of Croatia like their own homeland were fighting along with Croats. Together we have endured hardships from the Serbian aggression; they always are and were welcome in Croatia. Between them and the Croats were, are, and will be marriages. The ones who joined the Četniks armadas, who waged war against Croatia, killed our soldiers and citizens and then ran off to Serbia, let them be found and let them never again return to Croatia because for them there is no forgiveness." Along these lines a respondent evoked the need for people to "stop spreading hate and blaming other people for our misery." Furthermore, it was stated: "Every ethnic group has their own beliefs and their own habits which get transferred from generation to generation. Some things such as hate are ingrained in individuals from childhood. People who strictly keep in their communities have ideas that are hard to change. When one extremist starts, everybody else follows, but they don't see the negative picture of what they are doing." Finally,

many respondents think that there were no big differences that would have prevented individuals to respect and collaborate together during the war.

The third category is the one with the majority of input from respondents and dealt with fostering tolerance and improving communication between the two groups. "To make peace with what had happened in the past, to expend the horizons of our imagination it will be possible for our kids to play with one another" and "I think it could be done, it is necessary to have more understanding and tolerance, especially through a greater role of the media." Other respondents have expressed the feeling that there is no prosperity without cooperation with ones neighbors. It seems that the major sentiment in favor for improving those relations lays in people's willingness to do this and through tolerance, without always turning back to the past. A respondent stated: "Yes it is possible. Every individual should be oriented toward the good. We need to build cooperation and socialize the young people in this spirit. Every person is worth and deserves respect. We should sentence evil deeds. The family, school and religious institutions should play a key role in all of this." This category of responses also implores people to educate their children to respect all nationalities.

While some think that collaboration and tolerance are enough, others think that history should also be discussed by saying: "It is extremely needed and definitely possible. With a true view of the historical events everybody needs to take responsibility for that what has happened (historical and material faults). When this will be discovered, we will be following the contemporary rules in Europe" and also "we just need to have

hope and faith in a better tomorrow, and not to always turn back to history, what happened, happened."

The fifth category of answers had to deal with the negativities the politicians are constantly spreading. In the words of one respondent: "It is possible, but not very quickly because the political elite is still holding the national question and regards it as very important. Hence they know how to instrumentalize it, especially in the times before the elections for the gain of votes; they are playing the nationalistic game." From the responses it seems that there is agreement that the political parties bring up nationalistically oriented rhetoric every time they can. Some respondents even suggested to get rid of the carriers of hate such as "political figures, and all churches." Most of the sentiments also speak of this process lasting for a long period of time as stated in this response: "It is possible, but unfortunately it will be very hard. A lot of time and will is needed because unfortunately among all of the people of the former Yugoslavia exist some retrograding, and conservative, nationalistic-chauvinistic powers. Another 40-50 years (or 2-3 generations) will be necessary from the ones born in the 1990's. The shadow of hate has been long present especially from the Diaspora and the Western world." A similar sentiment is also expressed about the media. "The media and politicians should stop spreading hate. Citizens should get educated. Church should not get involved in politics and should work according to the religious commandments. Develop the culture, literacy, religious and ethnic tolerance; regenerate the economy because a weak economy and unemployment are fertile grounds for engendering ethnic and religious tensions."

The vast majority of respondents seem to think that for ethnic relations to get better we need to have responsible governments, without territorial interests; governments which are respecting equally all people regardless of their nationality, gender or faith. Others see the European Union to be the savior: "Yes we can, however only if the EU does not let the nationalistically oriented leaders gain power. We need to bring healthy (moral) young people, those who are not obsessed with the past." In summary the fifth category of responses deems that the changes of rhetoric of the ruling parties and building a country based on the community of citizens but most importantly a functioning legal system will improve ethnic relations in the former Yugoslav territory. However there is still a majority of people who claim that only the political top is creating the fears and tensions between nations, hence "people would get along better without politicians." Finally, everything will be possible "if all of the responsible are tried for their crimes, if all of the territorial and economic issues get resolved, if we eradicate extreme nationalism, if the victims forgive their perpetrators and forget part of history etc. It is impossible from a global perspective to expect a total collaboration other then on economic grounds like it is in a capitalist society."

Finally, there were other factors mentioned in this section that could not necessarily be placed in their own bracket. Such comments shared the sentiment that everything will be restored with the passage of time. Others believe that "other than another war, to worsen the situation would be impossible, everything else could get better." Respondents also evoked the fact that the newly-formed states and identities could play a positive role in this process: "It is possible, now that we have independent

states, people are happy with their national identity. The improvement of inter-ethnic relations could be developed with everyday compromise, mutual cooperation and support" as well as "without putting people down, recognize the bad things that occurred in your own garden, to get rid of leaders appointed by the West."

The respondents who were opposed to the idea of improving interethnic relations were concerned about Serbs admitting their crimes. Subsequently, those who opposed the improvement of inter-ethnic relations also disagreed that the process can happen, mostly because too much pain was already inflicted upon them. The first category of responses deals with the notion that Serbs need to admit they harmed the Croatian people. A respondent posed the following question: "How could we respect somebody who would now come back to live normally and find work in Croatia when this same person during the 1990's destroyed his workplace, and failed to think where his/her children would go to school?" Another stated that it is possible only if that happens to Serbia as well. Other respondents thought that it would be possible under the condition that "the aggressor admits aggression (Serbia) and that the Serbs become aware of the crimes committed in the name of Serbian politics. It is possible when Serbia lets go of the idea of conquering territories outside of the Serbian borders." Still there are ingrained beliefs that "perhaps, not all are interested. The Serbs are still living in their beliefs. It is possible if the Serbian minority in Croatia finally admits that they are the minority and that Croatia needs to be their homeland, they accept the Latin alphabet and the Croatian nation. They should see Croatia as their homeland."

Finally, the last sets of responses have little or no hope for the improvement of ethnic relations. In the words of one respondent: "It will be hard. The war left a big scar on the people, although for the new generations these scars are smaller. The socialization of new generations is the most important and it will have an effect on the attitudes they will have towards the Serbs and other neighbors" but it is also hard "for the sole reason as some individuals harbor hate which they do not want to eradicate, instead they transfer the same to the next generation. They are not ready to look toward the future and they fail to see humans for what they are 'just humans' instead of belonging to a specific nationality."

There were some respondents who personally experienced the conflict and stated: "Hard, I suffered too much but also due to primitivism which automatically goes along with me being unable to regard the person due to their differences in every sense. Yes, we should be tolerant toward everybody like in a marriage." Certain respondents claimed that the wounds were still fresh by stating: "I don't think so. People lost their close friends and family and it would be hard to overcome that" and "not even hypothetically, I could not go back to that time no matter how long the time has gone by, wounds are still fresh." Finally, some respondents think that it is impossible to coexist together, especially within the territories which were affected by the destruction throughout the conflict. Some think that only the European Union could help heal the wounds given that the territory's political leadership advocated hate and intolerance for a long time. Unfortunately the most common response in the 'no' category deals with the direct war experience in which one respondent stated:

"It will be very hard, because too much blood has been split. A long time will need to pass before this happens. The war wounds are still bleeding."

I would like to end this part of the chapter on a positive note by quoting two respondents who have a clear vision of what inter-ethnic cooperation means:

"Even the worse neighbors [in terms of nations], after horrible things happen, they still border with you. Time cures the wounds…until we have options, all differences should be solved with negotiations. For this we need to have a good will and common regard. Ethnic relations on these territories will get better. I believe in this. We need to forgive, but not forget for all those who gave their lives, in the name of the families who sought refuge and whose families have been destroyed."

"It is possible to achieve this through mutual understanding, respecting different views, and respecting our mutual differences. *In the end what does it mean to be a Croat, Serb or European when we believe in A Jew, use Arabic numbers, and wear products made in China?"*

Message for the Serbian people

"I hope that you share my opinion when I say that the war destroyed everything that our relatives had built. Perhaps one day somebody will build it up again, but for now, I am very afraid it would be hard. The problem is not among the common people but in the heads of our politicians, and we let them do this to us by voting for them. Do not go to vote, do not show them any support."

"Firstly, humans are humans, nationality is secondary and out of this we should not have created a big deal. We all need to do more, look at the

others as our brothers and not look at people according to what country they come from or what president they have."

"Do not let those leaders who brought us in isolation from everything to gain power again. Find the responsible and strictly punish those who poisoned the nations."

The respondents were asked the following question: *If you could send a message to the people in Serbia what would it be?* There were a myriad of answers from politically correct ones to derogatory ones. A collection of messages are presented in the subsequent pages. The first set of messages sent to the Serbian people is in regards to the notion of collaboration and thinking for themselves, including exterminating the extremist view imposed on them by their politicians. One of such messages states: "Have more understanding and tolerance and don't foster extremism nor revere Četniks too much. Focus instead on peace and goodness."

Along these lines a respondent stated: "Start telling the truth, look up to the West and disassociate from the politics of the radical Party." "Sit in peace and analyze what happened and think of your faults due to the events that happened during the 1990's" was another message sent to the Serbian people. Some messages exuded words of humility and cooperation such as the following statement: "Not all people are bad or good, only the "little" people [not the politicians] can bring about a better future for us and them." Similarly, one respondent stated: "Take care of your national and other interests, cooperate with your neighbors, and spread positive vibrations, love yourself but don't

hate others, respect others and solve the economic and political [Kosovo] problems and let the "little" people have better lives."

Along the same lines, two respondents acknowledged the humanity of all parties involved: "You love your child, you love yourself, therefore build peace, cooperation and friendship. Let's build bridges of closeness, not distance and let's build bridges of togetherness, not separation" and "All of us are just humans, and as such we need to respect ourselves without regards for language, nationality or the past. It does not matter what the person is called, Croat, Serb, it is important that the person is a human." Some messages were geared toward the youth such as "I would tell them that war was not necessary and the youth should forget the past and start interacting with one another."

Certain others expressed the notion that the time of war has gone by, hence people need to get closer, condemn the war crimes and forget the horrible history. Some evoked the doctrine of brotherhood and unity by saying that the Yugoslavs have a common history. As stated in the introduction of this dissertation *tempus sunat vulnera,* one respondent referred to it by the following words "time heals and time is necessary for becoming mature. In the end, every fertilizer stinks, but because of it we grow beautiful flowers." Finally one person rather than sending the Serbian people a message; preferred to say something to the Croatian people. The message stated: "I would rather send a message to my fellow Croatian to calm down their passions and more rationally consider the inter-ethnic relations, without fostering hate and exclusion."

However, not all of the messages the respondents sent had a positive undertone.

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It was evident that some of the respondents were harboring pain and suffering from the conflict. Understandably then, their comments would reflect the same underlying attitudes. One such example is the following statement: "Start thinking with your own head and start respecting your neighbors. Try to look back in history, the wars, since you have not won one and you did not have one leader die naturally so you should wonder why" or "I think that every message to the people in Serbia is unnecessary." Others included: "Be humans, not like in Srebrenica," "Go as far as you can from us and from the other neighbors, so you can see that you are not welcomed" and "Get better informed, take the responsibility, stop pretending that you are the victims and realize that you were the aggressors, surrender all of the war criminals, apologize, help create a peaceful coexistence in Bosnia, and give up the idea that Milošević, Karadžić and Mladić are war heroes."

There were also a number of emotionally charged comments that are worth mentioning including: "I don't want to think of them, for me they are dead, they hurt me a lot" and "Do not except that the horse which you beat, stepped on, cheated, killed, shamed and discriminated you for 50 years, tried to exterminate through waging a war, that in 15 years all of a sudden starts to love you and respect you." Certain comments specifically reminded them that they stepped into "our" house by saying:" You came to our house and took everything and we were trying to defend what was ours" and "Do not forget in which house you entered! Who was defending and who was killing…"Some comments were also geared toward the notion of Serbian politicians wanted to create a "Greater Serbia".

In this regards there are two messages worth noting: "Forget the dream of the Greater Serbia, and affinity toward other territories where Serbian people are living. Accept the country in which you live like your own and the culture of the hosts. Let go of the saying: Serbia is where one Serb lives." Similarly another respondent stated: "It is time to realize where Milošević's politics, his idea of a greater Serbia, took you. Look at what the Greater Serbia amounted to be. The only thing left is the Belgrade's Pašaluk where there is no space for such great leader's burial. I do think that one part of the Serbs did not accept this politics but apparently they were the minority because they were unable to have an effect on the politics. Let God help them and to the others, everything will come to daylight…everything will be billed sooner or later."

Additional comments were made about politicians cooking up false promises, deceiving people into thinking that one's nationality should precede all humanity. Respondents were also mentioning that it is important to fight for a more democratic state with more emphasis on social politics, but also to be intelligent in ones choice of governmental officials. One respondent stated: "Do not let them lead you like sheep. Open your eyes!"Another one explained: "Be true to yourself, do not fall under media and political influences, and don't forget that we are all equal, with the same rights, and we are all expecting the same faith: being buried six feet under." Respondents also reminded the Serbian people to focus on their families and their nation. One suggested to get away from the 'American politics of conquest,' to turn toward the future and economic prosperity of their citizens and to ameliorate the relations toward national minority groups and neighboring countries.

I would like to end this part of the chapter by remarking a comment from one respondent who emphasized the notion of closeness or Tito's brotherhood between the people inhabiting the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The respondent stated:

"I could tell them one of the truths and that is the following: Historically speaking, either we or they don't have anyone who would be closer to us or them in this world than each other. We are actually a part of the same tragic story like the Israeli and Palestinians, and Austrians and Germans.. A question needs to be asked: Who will be the one to explain to the people on both sides that we were historically speaking one nation [with similar languages] that was divided in the old habitat from which the later on departed? This separation was marked in both nations by different religions (Catholics, Orthodox, and Constantinople) and cultural differences. Bosniaks are the last sad derivate of this separation."

This chapter examined the qualitative answers to the open ended questions collected for this study. The first part of this chapter illustrated the reactions respondents had when they heard that Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Josip Broz Tito had died. Some of the respondents who cared about these leaders were extremely saddened by their deaths, however some of them were quite pleased to have the opportunity to elect into office somebody more appropriate.

The second part of this chapter dealt with the question: *If you could go back in time and you were hypothetically appointed as a governmental consultant knowing what you know now, what kind of advice would you give to Presidents Tuđman and Milošević? If anything, what would you have done differently?* The responses to this question varied from proposing the presidential resignation, lauding their actions and supporting the war

to commenting on the military actions of Oluja and Bljesak and pleading for a peaceful

negotiation and resolution of the crises. The third part of the chapter dealt with the

question: *Do you think it is possible to restore ethnic relations in states of the former*

Yugoslavia? Many different views were presented herein including those who wished

there was a quicker way to restore interethnic relations to those who proposed set ways of

how to go about doing that. There were also respondents who were extremely hurt by the

conflict and who were unable to come up with any way for restoring inter-ethnic

relations. One respondent stated that too much blood has been spilled and another one

mentioned that the wounds are still fresh. Finally the last question asked in this chapter

was: *If you could send a message to the people in Serbia what would it be?* Similarly to

the previous question asked about interethnic relations, the respondents' answers were

multifarious. Some respondents stated in politically correct ways their grievances about

the Serbs and their politics while others could not bring themselves to state things in a

cordial way in reference to the Serbs. In this chapter I selected only a fraction of the

comments. A complete list of comments can be found in the Appendix section of the

dissertation.

8. Conclusion

"What is tolerance? It is the consequence of humanity. We are all formed of frailty and error; let us pardon reciprocally each other's folly - that is the first law of nature."

~Voltaire~

"In the practice of tolerance, one's enemy is the best teacher."

~The Dalai Lama~

As Voltaire deciphers the definition of tolerance as a "consequence of humanity" depicting its fallibility and human imperfectness, it begs for a wider specification. Tolerance is the art of acceptance of another's point of view, or in the words of The Dalai Lama, tolerance is the 'practice of accepting our enemies as our teachers'. This very notion gives away the power of competition that usually fuels conflicts. When individuals become engulfed in hate and righteousness it is hard to see the "Other" as one's teacher, especially if individuals and/or their families have experienced harm by the other party.

Will Croats ever view Serbs as their teachers or vice versa? Is it possible to have severed relationships re-established? Do memories of past wrongdoings still linger among the Croatian people? One thought still lingers in my mind: Had we been more

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tolerant toward each other, would we still blindly follow the leaders who with their strategic rhetoric made us believe that our neighbors were our enemies, and that the brotherhood and unity we once supported was now worth destroying?

Chapter 6 and 7 presented the quantitative and qualitative results of the survey that was conducted in Croatia's war and non-war zones. This chapter will serve as an integration of the theory, case study and results in order to answer the initial questions and hypotheses of this study.

The first section of this chapter will describe the underlying attitudes and their influences on the social differentiation of ethnonational relations between the Serbs and the Croats. The second section of this chapter will evaluate the remembering of historical events and the presidents. The third section of this chapter will evaluate the possibility for ethnonational coexistence. In the conclusion section recommendations will be given for additional studies that might be worthwhile conducting in the region and in other conflict zones.

One of the objectives of this study was to explain the relationship between historical remembering of events and the respondents' attitudes toward the "Other". More specifically, by looking at the respondents' beliefs towards specific historical events (as either negative or positive) one might get an indication of the respondents' attitudes towards different groups of people.

Relevance to Social Identity

As mentioned earlier in the third chapter of this dissertation, in order to form a collective identity, members of a group join the collectivity they find most aligned with the characteristics they possess, a process also known as social categorization. Social categorization represents a system of orientation that helps to create and define the individual's place in society. It is evident for the data presented that the notion of social differentiation takes place between groups in conflict. The belief that one's in-group is innocent while the out-group is to blame for whatever mishaps the in-group is experiencing is also evident in this study's results.

Once a group acquires a given social category, and members of the group identify with the same category, those members of the group are further classified as the in-group, while all of the individuals who do not identify with the same categories are classified as the out-group. These distinctions are especially polarizing in conflict situations where even the insignificant differences between groups become grounds for battles. For example the ethnonational polarization between the Serbs and Croats was known to have been reinforced by stereotypes the media promulgated to the public.

For instance, in the study the respondents were asked to rate the level of truth of the media reports from both Serb and Croat sources during the 1990's. The Croats thought that their national media reports about Serbia were relatively true; failing to question the accuracy of the information they received. On the other hand, when they were asked what kind of a picture of Croatia was the out-groups media portraying during

the 1990's, their response seemed to indicate that the picture was untrue; hence Serb governmental media was manipulating Serb perceptions of Croatia.

These two examples indicate the distortion that might happen in people's perceptions of the other. It is not surprising then, that certain individuals have a picture of Serbs as enemies ingrained in their minds. Moreover, a majority of the Croats thought that Serbs did pose significant threat to Croatian security during the 1990's. However, they also thought that the Croats themselves did not pose any threat to the Serbian security during the same period. While this fact might be true for Serbia proper, when looking at the Krajina region one might beg to differ.

Additionally, Croats agreed that the Serbs politics during the 1990's was not defensive. This fact coincides with the view of Serbs being regarded as aggressors. Conversely, when asked whether the Croatian politics during the 1990's was predominantly defensive, a significant agreement was present in their responses. As previously mentioned, everything related to the out-groups was evaluated more negatively than the matters relative to one's in-groups.

Finally, when the respondents were asked what their perception of the Serbs was, more than half of them had a neutral opinion. Equally, a small fraction of them had positive and negative opinions respectively. However, in the case where the same was asked of the out-group, namely, what were the opinions that Serbs might have toward Croats, the respondents thought that less than 50.0 percent would have a neutral opinion. However an extraordinary 43.2 percent stated they thought the Serbs had a negative opinion of the Croats while only a 10.5 percent rated the opinion as positive.

Likewise, in the context whereas the operations Oluja and Bljesak are remembered as being 'liberational,' individuals will more likely support the notion that the territory at the time was occupied by the Serbs, hence the "crimes" committed against them were necessary in order to liberate the occupied territory. Conversely, if the predominant belief states that Oluja and Bljesak were operations aimed to ethnically cleanse the Serb populated territories, individuals will tend to be more inclined to disprove the two military operations carried out by the Croatian Army and supported by the Croatian government. These two dichotomous beliefs had an impact on the way respondents' perceived the Serbs, more negatively in the former, and more positively in the latter case.

Another relevant example that supports the theoretical underpinning of the social identity theory is the notion of social distance or in this case the Croats' willingness to interact with the Serbs. In relations to the Serbs, the respondents were willing to marry at 54.2 percent, have them as friends at 68.1 percent, have them as neighbors at 77.4 percent and have them as coworkers at 78.4 percent. It is safe to assume that for each event that produced more social distance between groups, the respondents were more willing to agree to it. As supported by the social identity theory and the various concepts presented in the field of group dynamics, even in this study, it is evident that the greater the social distance between the in-groups and out-groups exists, the more willing they are to support interethnic interactions.

When asked about the sympathy they feel toward the Serbs half of the respondents' claimed they have no sympathy whatsoever. About 40.0 percent of them felt

some sympathy for the Serbs. Additionally, when asked how favorably they would rate

the Serbs, 41.0 percent of respondents rated them as highly unfavorably while 43.0

percent as neither favorable nor unfavorable. Lastly, when asked to rate their admiration

towards the Serbs, a stunning 68.0 percent stated that they have no admiration for them.

Only 22.0 percent felt some admiration for the Serbs. The results illustrated in this

section just support the notion that more time is needed to shift these calcified

perceptions respondents display toward the Serbs.

From the demographic questions it can be noted that the most prevalent form of

media used among the survey respondents to inform themselves of the current events

happening in their country and the rest of the world was through television and

newspapers. Given that the Croatian television and newspapers were strictly controlled

by the State for the most part of the 1990's, it is not surprising that a significant part of

the sample has strong views about the war and the Serbs. In the non-conflict zones the

prevalence of both Croatian and Italian TV stations perhaps enabled the respondents' to

be informed by more than one source, hence giving them a more objective picture of the

situation in the 1990's.

Relevance to Remembering and Leadership

It is widely known that the Serbo-Croatian relations have been strenuous

throughout history, but animosities became particularly apparent during WWII when the

northern parts of Croatia succumbed to the fascist dictatorship that created a Nazi puppet

state (Independent State of Croatia) under the auspices of the Ustaše movement led by

Ante Pavelić. Jews and Serbs who were family members of Ustaše leadership were granted titles of "honorary Aryans". Ustaše of lesser rank proved their loyalty by killing their Serb wives and children. Thus, the dehumanization of the Serbian population in Croatia begun in 1941 and continued until the fascist regime ceased to exist in 1945. As I have mentioned in the second chapter of the dissertation, Ustaše aimed for an ethnically "pure" Croatia, and saw the Serbs that lived in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as their biggest obstacle.

During the period of 1941-1942, the ISC established several concentration camps in which 300,000 to 500,000 Jews, Serbs and Gypsies lost their lives (USHMM, 2005). At the same time the anti-fascist Partisans (comprising a wide, all-Yugoslav membership) and the Četniks (Serbian) movement fought for the liberalization of the territory from the occupying forces.

Looking at attitudes toward Ante Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia provide us with an additional guide towards understanding the respondents historical remembering and their attitudes toward the key historical figures. Insofar as there is support and admiration for Pavelić we can expect that the attitudes towards the Serbs will be more negative than if there was a lack of support. In this regard, the war zone sample seems to display around 50.0 more support for the NDH and Ante Pavelić than people in the non-war zones.

The knowledge the respondents have of the historical events that happened during World War II could be considered average. It is surprising that a fourth of the respondents did not know that the Četniks were a royalist organization or the fact that

half of the respondents did not show knowledge regarding Jasenovac as a camp were Serbs and other minorities were exterminated. This may be due to the fact that they did not see Jasenovac's existence at that time as problematic or just because of a lack of general knowledge of the events that happened in Jasenovac. It is important to note that the genocide in Jasenovac is a controversial issue that the Croatian government is still contesting.

Approximately one-quarter of the respondents seem to think that the crimes committed in Bleiburg were worse than the crimes committed in Jasenovac. This is another example of group bias where the extermination of one's enemy is perceived as less relevant than the murder of one's in-groups no matter how long ago the events took place.

When assessing the support for Pavelić in the regression model one notes that the more one supports the gain of territory as a legitimate factor for starting a war, the more support the same will show for Pavelić and the Independent State of Croatia. As stated before, the younger respondents to the survey seem to have a more positive view of Ante Pavelić. This can have a variety of explanations. The support might be due to the controversy surrounding this event or the indecisiveness of the Croatian government to take a stand and openly discuss their views of Pavelić as either a negative or positive historical figure in Croatian history. In terms of the partisans and the brotherhood and unity doctrine roughly half of the respondents view them as positive. Hence, the negative correlation between supporting Ante Pavelić and the Partisans makes perfect sense given that they were in the opposite spectrums during World War II. "One's enemy is another

one's freedom fighter" is the best way to illustrate this set of dynamics within the way Croatians remember both Pavelić and the Partisans.

Another variable important to examine when dealing with the topic of Croats' memories is the notion of leadership, namely, the way Croats remember past political figures. In order to recognize a good leader we usually examine ones character, communication and listening skills, and ability to form and sustain relationships with the stakeholders. We also look for a person with a vision, passion, attitude and initiative. Perhaps, the leaders mentioned below had all of these qualities that people recognized, however, most of all they were all able to move people toward a specific goal. Sometime the best leaders are only recognized after their deaths. Hence, in order to assess the degree of respect and achievement of the leaders the respondents were asked to think of the reactions they had when they heard the news of each president's death.

When asked whether they remember when they heard that the three presidents have died, an almost identical distribution of responses was expected among the age groups and war zones. The cross-tabulations indicated that only in the case of Josip Broz Tito's death, there was significant decrease in remembering in the group 'below 35 years of age'. Respondents in the war-zones seemed to have a better recollection of the event than the respondents in the non-war zones.

Respondents 'over 35 years of age' seem to have greater respect for Tito than the ones 'under 35 years of age' who showed more respect for President Tuđman. Tuđman did not have a strong base of supporters in the non-conflict zones as only one-quarter of people declared that they respected him. Tito, on the other hand, had strong supporters in

both zones. Furthermore, when asked whether the presidential deaths were going to bring about positive or negative changes in both Tuđman's and Milošević's cases, respondents expected positive changes. Conversely, in Tito's case, the respondents expected more negative events to unfold.

The aforementioned results should not be surprising given that both Tuđman and Milošević were not viewed as exemplary leaders. Towards the end of their terms, especially after the documentation of their planned division of Bosnia came forth, they were labeled as opportunists and thieves or in the word of one respondent; they were two men without any conscience. While each of them had a different leadership style, ultimately Josip Broz Tito seemed to have left a greater impact on the country as a whole than the other two leaders during the 1990's. This might be an indication that after all the preaching of brotherhood and unity along with the promotion of positive interethnic relations earned Tito much greater respect across the board.

What are the factors that might bring people closer towards coexistence?

The regression model previously discussed might help us to understand the factors or variables that positively influence interethnic coexistence. One of the most important factors in supporting the notion of interethnic coexistence is the degree of nationalistic tendencies of individuals. For example, the greater the degree of nationalistic attitudes one has, the less they will be willing to coexist with others.

In the qualitative analysis section an open-ended question was posed asking the respondents to think whether reconciliation between the groups is possible. A wide range

of responses was given, some supporting and other refuting this possibility. Although the

data presented here are not as supportive of the Serbs and the consideration of

coexistence is a shaky matter, I believe that with time the Croatian people will overcome

their passions and losses due to war and will start looking toward the future of such

relations. I would like to put an emphasis on this quote from a respondent who

exemplified the notion of reconciliation as not having to love one another but the need to

display a higher degree of tolerance which greatly increases the possibility for mutual

coexistence and ethnonational reconciliation:

> "[Reconciliation] is happening as we speak. We don't have to love each
> other but we must respect each other because we live nearby. I think that
> the politics of 'clean bills' and economic independence could ameliorate
> these relations given a certain amount of time. We need to learn so much
> about ourselves, admit we made mistakes toward ourselves and toward
> others. Nations and people in these territories don't know anything about
> themselves, their history, roots, identity and faith. They never had the
> chance to hear this truth from somebody, their visions are not directed
> toward the future, and instead they are living in the past, in their myths,
> legends, most likely dreaming of revenge."

Recommendations

The purpose of this dissertation was to conduct a comprehensive study of the

historical remembering of events and current attitudes people have toward the "Others"

as a result of the conflicts that occurred during the 1990's. A variety of issues were

explored in this study: from the attitudes respondents have toward the military operations

of Oluja and Bljesak to their reasoning about the war and the potential of future

interethnic relations. This study also identified respondents' beliefs about historical

events such as their regard for Ante Pavelić or whether they have knowledge of what the

Četnik and Partisan movements were about. Clearly, the study's final purpose was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the ethnonational dynamics and relations among groups in the former Yugoslav state of Croatia.

While the results of this study are very relevant in informing the reader of the state of interethnic relations in Croatia, it is also evident that similar comprehensive studies should be conducted in the neighboring countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The original study did take into consideration surveying individuals in these two countries, however due to limited time constraints and financial viability, it was decided that one single study be conducted in the conflict and non-conflict zones within Croatia.

Nevertheless, for comparative purposes it would be imperative to take this study one step further and collect the data in other countries. This could be a good start for an attitudinal data base or a monitoring center where changes in perceptions of the "Other" could be tracked and the relationships between ethnonational groups could be monitored.

In terms of theory building, this study supports the theoretical underpinning of the social identity as well as the social learning theory. The results of this study strongly supported the following phenomena:

- The manner I which people remember an event or group has an impact on individuals' attitudes toward that event/group.

- Direct war experiences tend to be the main obstacle for individuals' attitudinal changes.

- The more distance individuals have toward the out-group, the more they are willing to interact with them.

- Direct war experiences tend to preclude individuals from supporting ethno-national coexistence.

Along with the study's relevance to social and political psychology, we also note that the findings of this undertaking have wide implication for policy-making in an international arena.

Conflict practitioners may find this study's relevance to their work by exploring the underlying attitudes people have about groups and historical events in order to better understand the conflict dynamics. The results of this study can also serve as a platform for Early Warning, especially pertaining to identity based conflicts. Although Tito's idea of bringing people together under this all encompassing medley of nationalities, under the auspices of brotherhood and unity was positive, after Tito's death and the nationalists came to power and emphasized and rallied the people over the differences rather than the similarities. This process helped the social differentiation of people and rose the level of nationalism in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Peacebuilding is another area that might benefit from this study's findings. Peacebuilding programs should slowly target the moderate base of the population; however it also needs to be tactical. Peacebuilding will fail if it is imposed as people cannot be forced to forgive and forget. There is an innate tendency in people to look for culprits and assign blame. It is through time that the wounds can be healed. Conflict practitioners tend to be key actors needed to foster inclusive ethno-national environments. Once amicable relations become established in a post-conflict setting, peacebuilding and

reconciliation efforts will have a better chance of success than in chronically divided communities.

Finally, it was my hope to portray an objective picture of the current intergroup attitudes, mainly between the Croats and the Serbs in Croatia. I can only hope that the hardened attitudes become more malleable, that the people become more open-minded to interacting with each other, that the kids stop looking at the "Other" as the enemy, and finally that we remember where we came from in terms of relating to each other in a fraternal way through a high degree of tolerance and endless hope for a better future.

As old Romans avowed, tempus sunat vulnera, I hope that this dissertation will bring about a greater understanding of the Serbo-Croatian dynamics and in turn, help to heal the unfathomable cicatrix of history that callously shattered that fraternal unity people once cherished.

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