EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, AND DC: USING
EXCHANGE THEORY TO IDENTIFY GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT INCENTIVES
AND BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION

by

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the
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of
Doctor of Philosophy
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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my parents, Bertha and Mitchell Jenkins, who valued education as the great equalizer and pushed me to excel in all endeavors.

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I want to thank God, because with Him all things are possible. This was an arduous journey, but along the way God placed people in my life who provided support and guidance.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CPG	Comprehensive Preparedness Guide
COOP	Continuity of Operations
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HSEMA	Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency
ICS	Incident Command System
LEPC	Local Emergency Planning Committee
MEMA	Maryland Emergency Management Agency
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NRF	National Response Framework
NPR	National Preparedness Report
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report
VDEM	Virginia Department of Emergency Management
VOAD	Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters
U.S.C.	United States Code

ABSTRACT

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN VIRGINIA, MARYLAND AND DC: USING EXCHANGE THEORY TO IDENTIFY GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT INCENTIVES AND BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION

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George Mason University, 2016

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The aim of this research is to identify incentives and barriers to government-nonprofit collaboration during emergency preparedness activities in Virginia, Maryland, and DC using exchange theory as the theoretical framework. When conducting emergency response activities, the government needs to capitalize on the unique resources offered by nonprofits, which cannot be accessed elsewhere. Scholarly discussions about government-nonprofit collaborations are typically centered on individual or group dynamics, but this research takes on a broader perspective by analyzing and documenting candid views of over 50 government and nonprofit emergency management professionals covering all regions in these locations. This qualitative analysis highlights major themes of trust, transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure—all of which are key tenets of exchange. A supplemental theme of accountability was also found

during data collection. This research will be of interest to federal, state, and local government officials, as well as nonprofit emergency management professionals.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background on Public Sector and Nonprofit Partnerships in Disaster Planning

Hurricane Katrina is the largest natural disaster in US history, surpassing the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and firestorm in terms of lives and property lost.[1] Federal and local governments were widely criticized for failing to prepare for and adequately respond to Hurricane Katrina's devastation of New Orleans; grave errors included an evacuation order that was issued too late; mismanagement of supply distribution, including food, water, and medicine; and preventable deaths occurred from lack of food and water, exhaustion, sanitary conditions, and violence.

W. Craig Fugate, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), spoke to the United States House of Representatives in October 2015, ten years after Hurricane Katrina; he emphasized that, while our nation has moved forward, "the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina reminds us that we cannot become complacent. There are many lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, and those lessons continue to help reshape, reform, and restructure our agency."[2] It is imperative to identify the lessons

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[1] Waugh, William L., "Political Costs of Failures in the Katrina and Rita Disasters," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 604 no.1 (March 2006), 13.

[2] *Ready and Resilient? Examining Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response Capabilities*: *Hearings before US Department of Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, US House of Representatives* (October 22, 2015) (statement of W. Craig Fugate, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Association).

learned from Hurricane Katrina to ensure the mistakes are not repeated while any

successes are replicated.[3]

One key lesson revealed that government agencies and nonprofits failed to

generate an effective, coordinated response because nonprofits and their unique resources

were not integrated into the overall preparedness and response plans. Yet, ten years later,

the government has still failed to fully incorporate nonprofits into emergency

management plans. The responses to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita provide

examples of failed cross-sector collaborative efforts, such as inadequate planning by local

organizations, sluggish responsiveness, and uncoordinated control and communication by

federal officials.[4] While the government is aware that these gaps exist in public- and

private-sector collaboration and it has taken steps to devise effective solutions, the issue

remains unresolved.

In 2005, the White House issued *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:*

Lessons Learned.[5] The report identified a need to create a "culture of preparedness,"[6]

which has transformed the national emergency response paradigm from focusing solely

on post disaster response to concentrating on efforts that enable and increase

preparedness capabilities. Recent disasters such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and flooding

in South Carolina in 2015 have demonstrated how coordination before a disaster occurs

can be critical to saving lives.

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[3] Waugh, "Political Costs," 13.

[4] Gloria Simo and Angela L. Bies, "The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response: An Expanded Model of Cross-Sector Collaboration," *Public Administration Review* 67 (December 2007), 125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4624690.

[5] The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/.

[6] Ibid.

This research qualitatively articulates the importance of creative and persistent public-sector engagement with private-sector nonprofits, which will ultimately build community resilience, ensure efficient use of resources, and create a culture of continuous communications. Norris et al. defines community resilience as "a process linking a set of adaptive capabilities to a positive trajectory for functioning and adaptation after a disturbance."[7] Government and nonprofits possess the skills and resources necessary to develop community resilience; however, they must define the emergency management process well before a disaster occurs.

This culture of preparedness involves federal, state, and local governments; the private sector (including nonprofits); communities; and individuals working together to develop a shared vision of preparedness that can be translated into a more disaster-resilient community, strengthening the nation's ability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from any natural and manmade disasters that will occur.[8] This was the vision of one of FEMA's early Strategic Plans, which reiterates the need to establish this culture of preparedness to address all hazards events.[9] Later versions of the document continue to address this vision, however this researcher concludes that this shared vision, requires the right leadership—not necessarily management—at all levels of engagement.

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[7] Fran H. Norris, Susan P. Stevens, Betty Pfefferbaum, Karen F. Wyche, and Rose L. Pfefferbaum, "Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and Strategy for Disaster Readiness," *American Journal of Community Psychology* 41 (2008): 130.

[8] Michael D. Selves and Waugh, *Principles, Practice, Philosophy and Doctrine of Emergency Management, Collaborative Emergency Management*, Federal Emergency Management Association Course Session no. 7, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 2.

[9] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Plan: 2008–2013* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008), 9.

The federal government has recognized that the key to achieving a common vision of preparedness and building a disaster-resilient community is to engage and form partnerships with private-sector groups, such as nonprofits. Fischer, in reviewing a book by John Donahue and Richard Zeckhauser on collaborative government, noted that "collaborative arrangements provide more scope for adaptation and innovation, involve volunteer groups and organizations that provide otherwise unavailable resources, and, especially in the United States, private participation may add legitimacy to a state-sponsored endeavor."[10]

Disaster preparedness and response are "bottom-up" propositions, where disasters are handled locally (at the lowest level); if needed, local responders will request state government support, and the state will request federal assistance. The primary role at the national level is to provide guidance, policy, and response. This research starts at the top to identify what guidance is provided to the government and how exchange theory makes it easier to analyze some of the root causes of failure. Emergency management as a discipline is very complex and includes extensive horizontal, vertical, and cross-directional relationships among professionals who are passionate about the mission and the community.

1.1.1 National-Level Policy Documents the Strategy to Incentivize Government Collaboration

In 2010, Congress mandated that FEMA publish the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report* (*QHSR*) to assess the strategy and policies of the Department of

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[10] Ronald Fischer, "Book Reviews," *Journal of Economic Literature* 49, no. 4 (December 2011): 1283, doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1230.r16.

Homeland Security (DHS). The 2010 *QHSR* was the foundation for moving toward a more collaborative environment, and it recommended steps that DHS partner agencies should take to achieve objectives for a variety of homeland security issues,[11] including resilience to natural disasters and attacks.[12] The report stated that "community organizations, including local NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], faith-based groups, and advocacy groups for vulnerable populations—often cornerstones of communities, but not traditionally involved in emergency management—must be integrated into community planning, risk reduction, and preparedness activities."[13] The report also discussed maturing and strengthening partnerships between local governments, nonprofits, and the private sector. [14] The 2014 *QHSR* documented that the challenge of involving community organizations still exists and focused on enhancing the whole community initiative for national preparedness and resilience, as well as the creation of critical prepared partnerships long before disasters occur.[15] Other national-level guidance reinforces the need to collaborate and also supports the concept of transparency, a key tenet of exchange.

FEMA's *Strategic Plan: 2014–2018* is based on the 2014 *QHSR* and demonstrates that federal efforts to improve collaboration with community organizations are still necessary. The plan states, "Over the next few years, FEMA will continue to

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[11] Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2010), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf.

[12] Ibid., 20.

[13] Ibid., 61.

[14] Ibid., 33.

[15] Department of Homeland Security, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, June 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf.

strengthen the whole community approach, further integrating it into Agency programs

through execution of this Strategic Plan and by strengthening partnerships with

stakeholders (volunteer, faith-based and community-based organizations, the private

sector, and the public, including survivors themselves) in order to lead the Nation's

emergency management community."[16]

Stakeholders mentioned in the FEMA strategic plan that are included in the scope

of this research include government and nonprofit organizations at the federal, state, and

local levels. At the federal level, the organizations include the federal government—with

FEMA as the lead organization—and National Volunteer Organizations Associated with

Disasters (NVOADs). At the state and regional levels, organizations include the Virginia

Department of Emergency Management, the Maryland Emergency Management Agency,

the DC Homeland Security Management Agency, multiple VOADs in Virginia, and

single VOADs in Maryland and DC. At the local level, organizations include several

types of nonprofits, including nonprofits engaged in emergency management (typically

faith-based and business groups), nonprofits not engaged in emergency management,

nonprofits who have been approached to provide support but remain nonaffiliated, and

nonprofits with unknown capabilities and relevance to emergency management.

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[16] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Plan: 2014–2018* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 6.

Figure 1: Government and Nonprofit Stakeholders in Emergency Management

summarizes these stakeholders that are involved in emergency management preparedness. The figure does not show arrows, lines, barriers, chain of command, or the type of relationship, because these factors change frequently based on the phase of preparedness and the nature of the relationship.

Figure 1 shows some collaboration, as indicated by the agencies that intersect the borders of collaboration; however, there are still a large number of nonprofits outside the "circle of trust" that need to be engaged. Nonprofits can be instrumental in providing local relief by augmenting or supplementing governmental resources. Given the nation's

current economic climate along with the backdrop of continuous budget cuts, one can surmise that nonprofits play a more critical role in preparedness and implementation of resources—now and in the future—by complementing and supporting the preparedness efforts of local governments.

It is important to note that all stakeholders are not equal in a given situation, and the size and locations of the spheres, roles, and responsibilities will change based on various factors that are cross-dimensional. The ideal diagram for emergency preparedness would show that collaboration is maximized and the services and resources (capabilities) provided align well and are balanced with the services and resources required. This can happen most effectively when all stakeholders are engaged in this "circle of trust."

Disaster planning—a term used interchangeably with preparedness—is designed to anticipate the impacts of any event, using a wide range of scenarios to pinpoint resources and how they will be used to react to and counter the effects of a disaster. However, in the post disaster environment, when resources and services are not available, the negative impact on that community is further intensified by the need to perform impromptu planning, which often results in having to contract services that may not fully meet the need and cost considerably more to secure than necessary. Simply put, more resources are expended for fewer and less effective services in the post disaster environment because the opportunity to negotiate no longer exists. Disaster planning serves as a risk management tool that allows all stakeholders to have the best possible outcomes when executing post event plans and recovery activities.

1.2 Purpose of Proposed Research Project

This qualitative research examines the effectiveness of using exchange theory to identify incentives and barriers to collaboration in emergency management planning, with a focus on government-nonprofit relationships as documented in interviews of professionals in Virginia, Maryland, and DC.

This research focuses on Virginia, Maryland, and DC to determine if exchange theory is the right framework to analyze the problem. The District is unique as the nation's capital, providing a robust federal mission with a state-like organizational structure, and it encompasses diverse demographics not found in Virginia or Maryland. While Virginia and Maryland are located in close proximity, they have significantly different organizational and preparedness structures, allowing the researcher to examine exchange theory from several different geopolitical perspectives and providing a controlled environment to document and analyze major themes: trust, transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure.

1.3 Research Question and Central Argument

Given federal policy and severe resource limitations, it is critical that government emergency planners have a synergistic relationship among all potential stakeholders. When implemented correctly, the combined capacity between local governments and nonprofits will be greater than the sum of their individual efforts, improving both effectiveness and efficiency. While strides have been made since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, some of the same issues exist ten years later because the barriers to collaboration have not been fully identified and mitigated. There is limited research with actual interviews of these professionals. Theories exist as to why, but the research is limited on

bottom-up, face-to-face discussion with these professionals. Gazner and Brudney state,

"The research has not kept pace with the frequency and extent of joint planning efforts.

At present, we have only a weak understanding of the ways in which local jurisdictions

and nonprofits plan proactively to meet future emergencies, or of the scope of joint

planning (for an exception, see Clizbe, 2004)."[17] The need for a more proactive system

of emergency response is described explicitly in congressional reports, which

acknowledge that "80 percent . . . of the problem lies with planning."[18]

In March 2013, the federal government released the 2013 *National Preparedness*

Report (*NPR*) based on data from 2012.[19] The *NPR* is an annual status report on the

nation's progress toward reaching the national preparedness goal of a secure and resilient

nation. The report identified national preparedness gaps, specifically the lack of

collaboration between the public and private sectors. The report said, "Despite

nationwide progress incorporating the private sector into response efforts, many public-

private partnerships in emergency preparedness face challenges with respect to adequate

resourcing and long-term sustainability." The report also states," Despite nationwide

progress incorporating the private sector into response efforts, many public-private

partnerships in emergency preparedness face challenges with respect to adequate

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[17] Jeffrey L. Brudney and Beth Gazley, "Planning to be Prepared: An Empirical Examination of the Role of Voluntary Organizations in County Government Emergency Planning," *Public Performance & Management Review* 32, no. 3 (2009), 375.

[18] Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, *A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*, H. Rept. 109-377 (February 2006).

[19] Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, March 30, 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1916-25045-0015/npr2013_final.pdf.

resourcing and long-term sustainability.[20] Policy and planning efforts emerged in 2013 that focused on addressing these areas; however, the report does not address specific details beyond training and information sharing after an incident has occurred.[21]

The 2015 *NPR* is no longer focused on gaps, and now looks at "the challenges that remain"; however, beyond three specific citations describing collaboration with nonprofits, there are no detailed examples of collaboration during the preparedness phase.[22]

Simo and Bies state that early research on nonprofit collaboration explored structural and resource motivations for collaboration but did not sufficiently consider the constraints on collaboration as a result of a nonprofit's institutional and legal environment.[23] This research will briefly discuss the institutional environment but will not focus on the legal environment.

While the benefits of full collaboration are well-documented, the reasons why the proposed integration has not occurred remain unclear. As a result, this research focuses on a very specific regional planning area—Virginia, Maryland, and DC, also known as the DMV—relevant reviews of emergency preparation documents, and interviews with government and nonprofit professionals. The results will also provide increased regional understanding of the baseline to begin improving relationships at all levels. The goal is to

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[20] Ibid., 46.
[21] Ibid., 8.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Gloria Simo and Angela L. Bies, "The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response: An Expanded Model of Cross-Sector Collaboration" *Public Administration Review* 67, Special Issue on Administrative Failure in the
Wake of Hurricane Katrina (December 2007), 126.

use this data to enhance cross-sector collaboration, initially in these three localities and potentially across the country.

1.4 Definitions of Key Terms

There are several definitions provided in this research that were selected based on a subjective, yet informed, understanding of emergency management terms and operations. This understanding was also informed by researching various academic libraries and databases to provide a solid foundation for discussions with emergency management professionals. This research bridge helped form a working lexicon of terminology reflected in definitions used throughout this research.

Emergency management leadership and policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels define several terms that are relevant; to complement these documents, this research aligns the operational nature of these terms with emergency management preparedness through the lens of exchange theory, which will be used as a filter to explain incentives and barriers. These terms help define and operationalize key concepts associated with emergency management collaboration. Additionally, many terms have multiple definitions and implications based on the reader's frame of reference.

1.4.1. Collaboration and Coordination

Collaboration and coordination have several different definitions. The terms are defined here as they are appropriate to emergency management preparation, based on a review of stakeholder equities defined in the literature review as well as data collected during interviews. Collaboration is defined as "(1) the pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources e.g., information, money, labor, etc. (2) by two or more stakeholders,

(3) to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually."[24] An emergency

management training course highlights difference between collaboration and

coordination: coordination "refers to a process designed to ensure that functions, roles,

and responsibilities are identified and tasks accomplished; collaboration must be viewed

as an attitude or an organizational culture that characterizes the degree of unity and

cooperation that exists within a community."[25]

1.4.2 Partnerships

Sandra A. Waddock identifies social partnerships (for public-private partnership)

as a form of collaborative action in which organizations from multiple sectors interact to

achieve common ends. Waddock defines social partnership as "the voluntary

collaborative efforts of actors from organizations in two or more economic sectors in a

forum in which they cooperatively attempt to solve a problem or issue of mutual concern

that is in some way identified with a public policy agenda item."[26] The researcher

surmises that these social partnerships are the result of voluntary collaborative actions (as

opposed to contractual or forced interaction). This research focuses on voluntary

collaborative actions based on incentives to creating and sustaining these partnerships.

Exchange theory highlights the need to form partnerships to incentivize collaboration.

These partnerships are the key to the creation of an integrated system of stakeholders to

provide the emergency preparedness capability.

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[24] Barbara Gray, "Conditions Facilitating Interorganizational Collaboration," *Human Relations* 38, no. 10 (October 1985): 912.

[25] Selves and Waugh, *Principles, Practice, Philosophy and Doctrine*, 7.

[26] Sandra A. Waddock, "A Typology of Social Partnership Organizations," *Administration & Society* 22, no.4 (February 1991): 482, doi:10.1177/009539979102200405.

1.4.3 Integration

According to a FEMA training course, Fundamentals of Emergency Management, an integrated emergency management system is a conceptual framework to increase capability through networking. "It embodies an all-threats/hazards approach to the direction, control, and coordination of disasters regardless of their location, size, or complexity, and it goes hand-in-hand with the concept of whole community preparedness. Integrated emergency management is more than a methodology; it is a culture to achieve unity of effort—a way of thinking about emergency management as a joint enterprise. It is intended to create an organizational culture that is critical to achieving unity of effort between government, key community partners, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector."[27]

That increased capability would not be readily available, especially in a disaster, without establishing prior networking, coordination, linkages, interoperability, partnerships, and creative thinking about resource shortfalls. The system should address all hazards that threaten the community, be useful in all four phases of emergency management, seek resources from any and all sources that are appropriate, and knit together all partnerships and participants for a mutual goal."[28] For the purposes of this study, integration is more simply defined by the intent to commit resources recorded in the emergency operations plans (EOPs) given the conditions specified. The creation and updating of an emergency operations plan is one of the first ways to engage nonprofits.

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[27] The Emergency Management Institute, "Lesson Summary for Lesson One: Emergency Management Overview," Course content for IS-230.c: Fundamentals of Emergency Management (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency), https://emilms.fema.gov/IS230c/FEM0101summary.htm.

[28] Ibid.

1.4.4 The Nonprofit Sector

The US tax code defines nonprofit organizations in terms of their tax status. Boris and Steuerle define the nonprofit sector as "those entities that are organized for public purposes," are self-governed and do not distribute surplus revenues for profit. Nonprofits are independent of government and business, but may be closely related to both.[29] There are a variety of labels attached to the broad spectrum of the nonprofit sector. Steinberg and Powell note that nonprofits (or not-for-profit organizations) are defined by structure of ownership.[30] In the United States, the term "nonprofit organization" is used more often than the term "nongovernmental organization" (NGO). NGOs are generally associated with the United Nations and that term does not typically refer to US nonprofit organizations, although national-level documents may use it to refer to nonprofits. This paper will use the term nonprofit.

The definitions used in this research are based on nonprofit organizations' independence in choosing to be involved in emergency preparedness activities (with the exception of the Red Cross and Salvation Army, which are defined by Congress), as well as their financial independence for managing funds and critical resources.

1.4.5 Public-Sector (Local Government)

In accordance with 42 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) section 5122, the definition of local government is a county, municipality, city, town, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the

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[29] Elizabeth T. Boris and C. Eugene Steuerle, eds., *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict* (Urban Institute Press, 1999).

[30] Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg, eds., *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook* (Yale University Press, 2006), 3.

council of governments is incorporated as a not-for-profit corporation under state law), regional or interstate government entity, or instrumentality of a local government.[31]

1.4.6 Local Emergency Manager

According to the National Response Framework, the jurisdiction's emergency manager oversees the day-to-day emergency management programs and activities. The emergency manager works with chief elected and appointed officials to establish unified objectives regarding the jurisdiction's emergency plans and activities. Local planners include government and local community leaders who have a formal job or, in the case of local leaders, interest in ensuring members of the community get the appropriate services before, during, and after an incident or disaster. Some receive detailed formal training, while others are already experts in their fields and may or may not be trained but are familiar with the discussion topics.[32] Local emergency managers are at the heart of this research and operations based on the importance of their interaction with nonprofits and government at both the state and local levels. Because of their critical role, the local emergency managers are typically equipped with a diverse set of disaster-response skill sets based on professional experience; they also have access to resources (both government and nongovernment) and detailed information on lessons learned from the national and state levels to assist in execution of their role.

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[31] Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121 (2013).

[32] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), 12.

1.4.7 Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs)

This research and structured interviews focus on the role of the emergency manager in drafting, coordinating and finalizing EOPs. This coordination may or may not include nonprofits; however, this is a critical part of emergency management preparation that will be discussed in upcoming chapters based on interview questions and responses. Smith et al. stated that in a review of Hurricane Katrina lessons learned by nonprofit executive directors, emergency planning was a key item. The research noted that "all respondents stated that they believed their organizations' written emergency plans were adequate prior to Hurricane Katrina, and yet every organization has extensively rewritten their emergency plans since the disaster. Generalizations in emergency plans have given way to specific, detailed plans and procedures.[33] Perry and Lindell also assert that it is important to distinguish the planning process from the plan.[34] This research focuses on the plan as identified in the EOP for a much-focused interview on government-nonprofit inclusion in the plan.

According to the FEMA *Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning*, the "local EOP focuses on the measures that are essential for protection of the public." *The Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101* provides FEMA guidance on the fundamentals of planning and developing EOPs.[35] *CPG 101* demonstrates how EOPs are connected to the planning phases in the areas of prevention, protection, response,

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[33] Steven Lee Smith, "Coping with Disaster: Lessons Learned From Executive Directors of Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) in New Orleans Following Hurricane Katrina," *Administration in Social Work*, 36, no. 4 (2012): 385, doi:10.1080/03643107.2011.604401.

[34] Brudney and Gazley, "Planning to be Prepared," 375.

[35] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101*: *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,* version 2.0 (Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, November 2010).

recovery, and mitigation. The planning process describes an approach for operational

planning that includes the active participation of all stakeholders. According to the guide

when the planning process is used consistently during the preparedness phase, its use

during the operations becomes second nature.[36] The logical conclusion is that a fully

coordinated EOP with input from all stakeholders makes emergency management

preparation more effective.

1.5 Research Significance

1.5.1 Public-Private Significance

In response to Hurricane Katrina, federal directives and policies have evolved,

providing guidance to implement and operationalize efforts to strengthen the National

Preparedness system. According to the White House, national preparedness is

"inextricably intertwined" with national security and homeland security strategies.[37]

The 2008 National Response Framework (NRF)—which supersedes the 2006

National Response Plan—describes key lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. The

NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards response and aligns key roles and

responsibilities to public-private entities in planning and responding to a disaster. The

framework was written especially for government, private-sector, and nonprofit leaders

and emergency management practitioners. The framework charged the federal, state, and

local governments with the responsibility of developing all-hazards EOPs. FEMA

provides state and local emergency management guidelines—such as the *CPG 201*—for

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[36] Ibid, 4-1.
[37] Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Report*.

developing EOPs, including all-hazard emergency support, for integrating key nonprofits into the plan.

Although emergency managers are aware of the benefits of partnering with nonprofits, Kapucu purports that emergency managers are not aware of the benefits of sustaining these collaborative relationships over time, especially in the absence of disasters. He added that they lack the tools and information to enhance the networks they belong to, and he recommends that emergency managers enhance their relationships with nonprofits through sustained contact and interaction for purposes of "synchronization of information, capacity and expectations."[38] This research will explore these networks.

This research is also significant because disasters can occur at any moment, and the level of preparedness at that moment is defined by the coordination that has taken place prior to the event. Despite the existence of some networks and some level of collaboration, there is great urgency in identifying barriers, quickly resolving any issues, and ensuring that this collaboration can be sustained. Efficient planning and preparation have a direct correlation to reducing the number of casualties, impact to the US economy, and increasing community resilience individually and collectively. The lack of integrated disaster planning is felt most at the community level, forcing greater reliance on response and recovery after a disaster has occurred. Fundamental concepts of risk mitigation are embedded in the emergency management culture, which ultimately makes this

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[38] Naim Kapucu, "Designing, Managing, and Sustaining Functionality Collaborative Emergency Management Networks," Paper presented at the Public Management Research Conference for The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse, New York, June 2–4, 2011, 19.

collaboration key to saving lives and managing resources (both government and nonprofit) more effectively.

This research will fill gaps by expanding the body of knowledge beyond what has already been documented by incorporating direct responses from interviews with emergency management professionals. It will also validate or contribute to a theoretical framework and vision of ways to look at emergency management preparation and key components associated with future efforts for collaboration. A third goal is to develop best practices for emergency managers and nonprofits that would improve compliance with national directives or, if not, cause a significant change in policy based on the recommendations of this research.

1.5.2 Policy Significance

This research will impact local, state, and national policy by clearly articulating to the community the collective importance of more effectively implementing a collaborative model. Formal integration of the nonprofit sector would allow localities to delineate roles and responsibilities of nonprofits through each phase of the disaster cycle from planning to execution and recovery. Since this research is considered "bottom-up" based on interviews with practitioners, the conclusions and recommendations will highlight the disparity between written policy and implementation at the lowest level to improve effectiveness in emergency management preparation. The research goal is to significantly increase both government and nonprofit returns on their investments.

In addition, once barriers are identified, issues can be resolved at the lowest levels rather than through a top-down governmental hierarchy that forces new directives and policy down to the lower levels.

1.6 Chapter 1 Summary

This research will reveal the growing importance that nonprofits play in bridging resource and capability gaps in the current constrained fiscal climate in which local governments have limited flexibility and funds, and cannot fully address all the disaster needs of their community.

The research will provide a better understanding of private-public relationships and serve as a guide to model and implement best practices for building sustainable communities. Chapter 2 will discuss detailed institutional and organizational aspects of preparedness in Virginia, DC and Maryland, the literature reviewed on the issue from the national to the lower levels, and exchange as a viable theoretical framework. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodology, leading to chapter 4, which operationalizes the major themes found during the literature review. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 analyze the data collected from very candid interviews of both government and nonprofit professionals. Chapter 9 provides conclusions, recommendations, and suggested research for future analysis.

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND EXCHANGE THEORY

This chapter is divided into two sections: (1) the institutional structure of emergency management in Virginia, Maryland, and DC and how it impacts emergency planning responsibilities and (2) exchange as a viable theoretical tool used in this research, including what is known about the theory and why it is an appropriate framework for understanding government-nonprofit collaboration.

There are a limited number of theories and tools that look specifically at emergency management preparation. This researcher extensively investigated and analyzed several well-known theories related to sociological, organizational, individual, and group behavior, ultimately selecting exchange theory as the ideal lens to examine the relationships of government and nonprofit emergency management professionals and to identify their incentives and barriers to effectively collaborate at the individual, group, and organizational levels. This chapter builds upon the basic emergency management principles and stakeholders discussed in chapter 1.

2.1 Institutional Infrastructure in Virginia, Maryland, and DC

This literature review encompasses a broad study of books, articles, and electronic journals relevant to emergency management, emergency preparation and collaboration, cross-sector collaboration, interorganizational collaboration, partnerships, networks, and nonprofits in emergency management. Specific searches looked at topics on public-

private collaboration, local government and nonprofit collaboration, and emergency managers. The researcher used an Internet-based search of material, moving from the national, state, and local documentation down to regional and community plans for government and nonprofit organizations. The researcher also used bibliographies from each book and journal to further explore additional references. The researcher searched Internet databases for the keywords listed above using George Mason's online libraries and research portals; archives; and search engines such as inPrimo, JSTOR, and multiple university search engine libraries. Simple Internet searches were also used to find documents that were not accessible through academic search engines.

The researcher had a basic knowledge of the organization of emergency management institutions in states based on personal experience as a resident of Virginia and as a state government worker in a nonrelated field. In addition, the researcher had access to many professional emergency management personnel who were able to provide information not readily available on the Internet. The foundational knowledge discovered in the literature review helped the researcher to select exchange as the appropriate theory for viewing government-nonprofit relationships and to create a knowledgebase and lexicon to develop interview questions and hold open discussions with the professionals.

It is important to reiterate that no other regional area in the United States provides the same degree of complexity in looking at government-nonprofit collaboration in emergency management from a policy and implementation perspective. For this reason, the literature review is initially focused on definitions of emergency management terminology specifically used for assessing Virginia, Maryland, and DC; their

institutional infrastructure; and how this organization impacts their collaboration at all levels.

There is an abundance of literature on government policies, plans, and documentation that highlight a desire to collaborate with nonprofits. To begin, the researcher reviewed emergency preparedness definitions, followed by a detailed literature review of the institutions involved in preparedness. The next step was to research appropriate theoretical frameworks to discover the best-suited filter to analyze the issues

There is relevant, yet limited, literature on public-private relationships. This issue is further complicated by extremely limited available information that examines collaboration among state, regional, and local government emergency management staff and nonprofits at those levels. In using various search engines and approaches to this research, the researcher did not find any specific results that matched the search criteria. A librarian was asked to assist; however, no results were found that resulted in any new information. Thus, this research relies solely on data collected from personnel interviews in Virginia, Maryland, and DC when examining the collaboration among state, regional, and local government emergency management staff with nonprofit personnel.

2.1.1 Framework, Definition, and Scope of Emergency Management

Before examining the literature, it is necessary to define a few terms that are central to understanding the lexicon of emergency management. According to FEMA, emergency management during the Cold War was associated with civil defense, and it focused on protecting civilians from a nuclear attack. While this definition continued for

several generations, emergency management has since evolved from its Cold War characterization.

The current training in emergency management addresses planning from the perspective of "an integrated emergency management system, which is a conceptual framework to increase emergency management capability through networking. That increased capability would not be readily available, especially in a disaster, without establishing prior networking, coordination, linkages, interoperability, partnerships, and creative thinking about resource shortfalls. The system should address all hazards that threaten a community, be useful in all four phases of emergency management, seek resources from any and all sources that are appropriate, and knit together all partnerships and participants for a mutual goal."[39] Both government and nonprofits are involved in preparing for these emergencies; however, they each have a different role before, during, and after the emergency occurs.

A hazard is defined as "something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome."[40] This definition is a critical part of the government's all-hazards approach to emergency preparation.

A threat is defined as "any entity, action, or occurrence, whether natural or manmade, that has or indicates the potential to pose violence or danger to life, information, operations and/or property." The extended definition includes "capabilities,

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[39] The Emergency Management Institute, "Unit 2: Overview of the Fundamentals of Emergency Management and the Integrated Emergency Management System," Course content for IS-230.b: Fundamentals of Emergency Management (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 25, 2011), 2-1.
[40] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan*, draft 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 25, 2004), 75; and Department of Homeland Security, *National Infrastructure Protection Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 103.

intentions, and attack methods of adversaries used to exploit and circumstances or occurrences with the intent to cause harm."[41] This definition is important because the preparation phase, which is a key part of the emergency management process, includes identifying the type of threat posed in order to triage the event and determine the best courses of action for use of resources.

The scope and definition of emergency management has been restructured by events such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Waugh describes the transition from collaboration during the early 1990s when "partnerships and less formal links were used to support the adoption of risk-reduction measures when regulatory authority was lacking and consensus was important." He further explained, "Unfortunately, many of the links, particularly those fostered and maintained by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional offices, have been weakened since the agency became part of the US Department of Homeland Security. The change in organizational culture, retirements, and transfers of FEMA personnel; increased centralization of decision processes; and preoccupation with the terrorist threat have not been conducive to close working relationships with local and state emergency management agencies and non-governmental disaster relief organizations."[42] Although written in 2006, these words remain highly relevant in the current threat environment that includes the volatile Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; continued threats of terrorism; and scarce resources and tight budgets at the national, state, and local levels.

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[41] Department of Homeland Security, *Lexicon: Terms and Definitions* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, October 19, 2007), 26.
[42] Waugh, "Mechanisms for Collaboration: EMAC and Katrina," *Public Manager* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 13.

Waugh promoted the success of state-to-state collaboration through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), a state-to-state mutual aid agreement. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005, forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands were members; now, all fifty states are members. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, nearly 66,000 personnel from the EMAC member states deployed to provide assistance; the estimated cost of this aid alone was more than $830 million,[43] which suggests the imperative nature of being prepared for future disasters.

Waugh also states that "collaboration might be facilitated by a more comprehensive national plan that recognizes the roles, functions, and legal authority of state and local officials and mechanisms like EMAC that facilitate those roles and functions. EMAC could be expanded to include more disaster recovery personnel"[44] This organization continues to exist and provides critical support when the governor of a state declares a disaster.

One aspect that is missing in the literature is how collaboration actually occurs in the emergency management preparedness phase, beyond institutional policies. This researcher concluded that, while there is much literature about existing government guidelines, roles, and responsibilities, there is no literature that discusses the enforcement or consequences of noncompliance with these guidelines. In other words, the literature focuses primarily on identifying the theoretical policies without describing the practical experiences.

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[43] Ibid., 14.
[44] Ibid., 14.

Many researchers have attempted to expand the definition of emergency management in part to determine the right theoretical framework to explain activities, including preparedness. Waugh and Streib expound upon the definition of emergency management by adding that emergency management also includes the following: "(1) Hazard mitigation to prevent or lessen the impact of disasters, such as building levees or moving people out of the floodplains; (2) disaster preparedness, such as emergency planning and training; (3) disaster response activities, such as conducting search and rescue activities; (4) disaster recovery, usually meaning the restoring of lifeline and basic services."[45] This definition is more complete in addressing the primary question of this research, but it does not go far enough in embracing the culture and attitude of professionals in moving toward collaboration.

Emergency management has evolved to not only employ an all-hazards model but to also incorporate a collaborative approach. Gabriel, Director of Crisis Management at Walt Disney, contends "Emergency management is really about building relationships, whether you are in the public or private sector."[46] The best definition of emergency management that highlights this importance of collaboration among government, the private sector, and nonprofits describes emergency management as the organization and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. Emergency management involves plans, structures, and arrangements established to engage the normal endeavors of

[45] William L. Waugh and Gregory Streib, "Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management," Public Administration Review 66 (December 2006): 131.
[46] Sally J. Phillips, Ann Knebel, and Kelly J. Johnson, eds., *Mass Medical Care With Scarce Resources: The Essentials*, AHRQ Publication No. 09-0016 (Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2009), 44.

government, volunteer, and private agencies in a comprehensive and coordinated way to

respond to the entire spectrum of emergency needs; this is also known as disaster

management.[47] The researcher selected this definition from the literature review because

it aligns with the need for government-nonprofit collaboration based on written plans

(EOPs) and institutional structures associated with emergency preparation.

2.1.2 Institutional Principles of Emergency Management

FEMA's Emergency Management Higher Education Project developed eight

principles of emergency management, which serve as a guide to develop a doctrine of

emergency management. These principles are included to convey emergency managers'

day-to-day engagement with stakeholders, including nonprofits at several levels. The

eight principles direct emergency managers to be comprehensive, progressive, risk-

driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible, and professional.[48] In addition,

they are encouraged to anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory

measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities. These traits

provide a baseline understanding and provide a platform for the researcher to more

thoroughly examine emergency managers' motivations for collaborative behavior.

2.1.3 Additional Emergency Management Terms Used in this Research

Emergency management personnel are confronted with all types of incidents,

including disasters, emergencies, hazards, and threats. The following definitions are

accepted in the emergency management field and will be used in this paper to form the

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[47] United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, *Terminology: Basic Terms of Disaster Risk Reduction* (United Nations, March 31, 2004).

[48] The Emergency Management Institute, *Principles of Emergency Management Supplement* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 2007), 4.

conceptual baseline as part of this literature review. An understanding of this terminology

is required to focus the research methodology and assist in summarizing the data

collected in this research.

The focus of this research is on disaster planning, which impacts both disasters

and incidents. The term "incident," refers to an occurrence or natural event, caused by

technology or humans that require a response to protect life, property, or the

environment. Incidents may include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks,

terrorist threats, civil unrest, wild land and urban fires, floods, hazardous material spills,

nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms,

tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other

occurrences requiring an emergency response. This definition is often used in national

and state guidelines and planning documents.

FEMA defines disaster as "an occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological

accident, or human-caused event that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths,

and/or multiple injuries." FEMA also states that a "large-scale disaster" is one that

exceeds the response capability of the local jurisdictions and requires state, and

potentially federal, involvement.[49]

As described in the Stafford Act, a "major disaster" refers to "any natural

catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal

wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or

drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United

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[49] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning* (Washington, DC: FEMA, September 1996), GLO-1.

States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity

and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the

efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief

organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby."[50]

2.1.4 Four Phases of Emergency Management

2.1.4.1 The Four Phases Defined

In discussing the day-to-day operations of government and nonprofit emergency

response scenarios, emergency management functions are divided into four phases:

mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. These phases are not distinct, and

activities in each phase may overlap; furthermore, these are government terms and are not

necessarily the words that nonprofit staffs use to describe their involvement. When

conducting interviews with nonprofit personnel, this researcher discovered that those who

have received emergency management training generally accept these terms and

definitions, but they are not typically activated (i.e., called to duty) until notified by the

emergency manager that their support is required.

Mitigation is defined "as a sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk to people

and property from hazards and their effects." Mitigation is unlike any other component of

emergency management because it focuses on long-term solutions to reducing future

risks. Mitigation can be implemented during each phase or all four phases.[51]

Preparedness within the emergency management discipline—which is the focus

of this research—is "a state of readiness to respond to a disaster, crisis, or any other type

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[50] Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 2.
[51] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *CPG 101*.

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of emergency situation." Unlike mitigation, preparedness is focused on enhancing the capability to respond to future incidents.[52]

One of the expectations of this research is that preparedness is a continuous process involving the collaboration of all levels of government and among government and private-sector companies and nonprofits to identify capabilities and resources to facilitate a coordinated response to a disaster. While this is the expectation of the current practice, it is not a reflection of what actually takes place. Preparedness combines the initial traits and principles mentioned in the principles of emergency management above as actions directed by the emergency manager with support by nonprofits when requested. In theory, if all principles are implemented, a collaborative environment will exist during all phases.

The response phase incorporates "the immediate actions taken by first responders to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs."[53] Response entails the implementation of emergency plans. Response, although not a focus of this research, provides a metric as to the effectiveness of the previous phases in preparation for an emergency that requires emergency managers to respond and collaborate with nonprofits. This is a key point in understanding the motivation of many preparedness professionals.

The fourth phase, recovery, begins when the disaster event has ended. The primary focus of this phase is to return the community to normalcy and, in the long term, to reduce "future vulnerability."[54] Ideally, effective management of the previous three

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[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

phases should result in community resiliency and a review of lessons learned to prepare

for the next event.

2.1.4.2 The Preparedness Cycle for Emergency Management

The focus on preparedness is imperative for a successful emergency response.

Chen et al. assert that "coordination in the pre-incident phase established the level of

operational capacity and readiness for resilience during emergency response."[55]

Virginia, Maryland, and DC all implement their emergency management

preparation processes using the cycle illustrated in Figure 2 as guidance for day-to-day

operations. Each state or the District may implement the process in a different manner,

depending how their government structure is set up. For example, the Maryland

Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) is set up under the Maryland Military

Department, unlike Virginia and DC. This organizational structure does not always

impact preparation, but it sets legal and political boundaries that must be recognized at a

very high level when executing the mission. The preparedness cycle commonly used in

all three locations is illustrated in Figure 2, from FEMA's *CPG 101: Developing and*

Maintaining Emergency Operations Plan, version 2.0, which was released in 2010.[56]

This guidance provides emergency management professionals with FEMA's concept of

planning and developing EOPs that are related to planning efforts in the areas of

prevention, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.

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[55] Rui Chen, Raj Sharman, H. Raghav Rao, and Shambhu J. Upadhyaya, "An Exploration of Coordination in Emergency Response Management," (Buffalo, New York: University at Buffalo, SUNY), http://www.som.buffalo.edu/isinterface/ray/cacm.pdf., 5.
[56] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *CPG 101*, ii.

Figure 2: The Preparedness Cycle

According to the *CPG 101*, planning is a major element of the preparedness cycle.[57] The cycle illustrates how plans are developed and continually evaluated and updated through a process that incorporates planning, organizing, training, exercising, and evaluating with the goal of improving all processes. The guide stresses that planning must be community-based, involving all stakeholders, and must integrate the community and nongovernment entities.[58] The preparedness cycle depicted in Figure 2outlines the sequence of events that should be incorporated in pre-disaster planning.

Generally, an EOP describes how the community (or state) will conduct operations in a disaster. This document is critical because it is the primary document at the implementation level that articulates the requirement for government and nonprofit

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[57] Ibid, 1-4.
[58] Ibid.

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collaboration when written in accordance with guidelines. An EOP has several functions.

First, it assigns responsibility to organizations and individuals to carry out specific

actions that exceed the capacity or responsibility of any single agency. Second, it

establishes lines of authority and organizational relationships, and it shows how all the

actions will be coordinated. Third, it describes how people and property will be protected

in major emergencies and disasters. Fourth, it identifies personnel, equipment, facilities,

supplies, and other resources that can be made available—within the jurisdiction or by

agreement with other jurisdictions—for use during response and recovery operations.

Finally, it identifies steps to address mitigation concerns during response and recovery

operations.[59]

Virginia, Maryland, and DC have EOPs that establish the framework within

which local EOPs are created and through which the federal government becomes

involved in response, recovery operations, and mitigation. As such, the state government

acts as the coordinating entity to ensure that all levels of government are able to respond

to safeguard the wellbeing of their people and to protect property. State EOPs serve three

main purposes: to facilitate a state response, to expedite the state in assisting local

jurisdictions during major emergencies and disasters when local response capabilities are

overwhelmed, and to enable the state to appoint liaisons with the federal government in

cases when federal assistance is necessary and authorized.[60]

Local governments are responsible for attending to the public's emergency needs

as the first responders. Therefore, local EOPs focus on measures that are essential for

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[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.

protecting the public, including warning and communications, emergency public

information, mass care and emergency assistance, health and medical services, and public

protection.[61]

2.1.4.3 Collaboration in Emergency Management

Collaboration has become a key element in emergency management. National

policies and guidance embrace the need for collaboration among all stakeholders in

emergency preparedness and response. Author Michael Sampson asserts that

"collaboration does not require leadership and can sometimes bring better results through

decentralization and egalitarianism."[62] The researcher's initial expectation was that this

assertion would not be proved true during the examination because the researcher

expected that teams who work collaboratively can obtain greater resources, recognition,

and reward when facing competition for finite resources. The expectation was that these

teams require leadership.

In other literature, Agranoff defines collaborative management as "a process of

assisting and managing multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems which are

not easily solved by an organization alone."[63] The authors contend that the greater the

interdependencies between players, both vertical and horizontal, the greater the necessity

for coordination and collaboration. While collaborative public management is recognized

as a common and widespread practice, research on the skills necessary to manage and

operate in collaborative settings lags behind practice. Research on the end result of

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Michael Sampson, "Defining Collaboration: Collaboration as "Human Behavior" (Sense 1)," Cultivating Productive Collaboration (blog), htttp://currents.michaelsampson.net/2010/05/collaboration-sense1.html.

[63] Robert Agranoff, "Inside Collaborative Networks: Ten Lessons for Public Managers," *Public Administration Review* 56 (December 2006).

collaboration is also insufficient. In an article by Simo and Bies, they allude to McGuire 2006 stating that the effects of collaboration on program and organizational outcomes need to be better understood.[64] Exchange theory is a good starting point, but this is only the beginning to having results with data that support the findings.

Collaborative management research adds to the body of knowledge for this research; however, this concept is more closely aligned to coordination, described in chapter 1 as a process to ensure functions, roles, and responsibilities are identified and tasks are accomplished. Coordination is not a substitute for collaboration.

Agranoff and McGuire see collaboration as a management process rather than an individual "pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources. e.g., information, money, labor, etc.," which is driven by rewards and incentives. Collaboration must facilitate the management processes by creating an environment for coordination, which will result in mission success.

Henton adds that collaborative relations engage citizens and stakeholders through dialogue and deliberations; community problem-solving activities inform and shape public decisions and policy. These relations refer to citizens, not specifically government emergency managers and nonprofits. If an emergency manager takes the lead for collaboration in community-wide exercises before a disaster occurs, the frequency and exposure of such results could enhance relations and engage citizens, as well as nonprofit organizations.

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[64] Simo and Bies, "The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response."

There are multiple benefits for engaging nonprofits in the state and local

emergency planning and response. Nonprofits usually "arrive first and leave last";

because many are community-based, they are able to mobilize quickly and provide

immediate services.[65] According to Acosta et al. nonprofits are better positioned to assess

their communities "assets" and "deficits."[66] If nonprofits are formally integrated into

EOPs, the plans would identify capabilities, capacities, and appropriate resources that

would be aligned with specific emergency support functions, minimizing redundancy.

Once a nonprofit is integrated into the emergency management environment, regular

meetings and contact will help the different agencies to operate together as a team.

Thomas et al. exemplifies this synergy by conveying that collaboration through

interoperability is the "essential to successful disaster preparedness and response."[67]

Interoperability involves commonality of process and technology facilitation and

interaction between responders, stakeholders, and volunteers, which leads to mutual

benefits.

While the benefit of collaborative disaster planning among the public, private, and

nonprofit sectors is well-documented, coordination between government and nonprofits

has not been formally implemented in state and local EOPs.[68] Thus, the literature review

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[65] The Emergency Management Institute, Course content for IS-0288.a: The Role of Voluntary
Organizations in Emergency Management (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency,
November 2013), 1.2.

[66] Joie Acosta, Anita Chandra, Sally Sleeper, and Benjamin Springgate, *The Nongovernmental Sector in
Disaster Resilience: Conference Recommendations for a Policy Agenda* (Rand Corporation, 2011), 12.

[67] Kevin Thomas, Peter R. Bergethon, and Matthew Reimer, "Interoperability for First Responders and
Emergency Management: Definition, Need, and the Path Forward," *World Medical & Health Policy* 2, no.
3, article 15 (2010), doi:10.2202/1948-4682.1070.

[68] Robert Agranoff, "Inside Collaborative Networks: Ten Lessons for Public Managers," *Public
Administration Review* 66 (December 2006), 56–65.

validates some of the researcher's early expectations: just because a policy is written,

attitudes have not necessarily changed to provide effective implementation.

2.2 Current Policy and Guidance in Emergency Management

2.2.1 The Department of Homeland Security

Presidential and federal guidelines shape the nature of emergency management

preparedness, from the federal government at the top down to local emergency

management professionals. The political and social impacts of 9/11 and the lessons

learned from Hurricane Katrina have guided and directed federal policy to enhance the

country's emergency management architecture. The Homeland Security Act of 2002

created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)[69] to consolidate diverse

organizations with a directive of preventing and responding to natural and manmade

disasters. Key federal agencies work in partnership with state and local governments to

prevent future disasters and, if a disaster does occur, to respond rapidly.

DHS devised a series of national policy statements called Homeland Security

Presidential Directives (HSPDs) to guide and integrate national emergency management

plans. HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Events established the national preparedness

goal and new national planning documents to provide a framework for federal, state, and

local governments and the private and nonprofit sectors to prepare and respond to

emergencies and disasters.[70] HSPD-5 required an all-coordinated, all-hazards approach to

prepare for domestic terrorist attacks, emergencies, and major disasters.[71]

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[69] Homeland Security Act of 2002, H. R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002).
[70] Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents (February 28, 2003).
[71] Ibid.

2.2.2 National Response Plan and National Response Framework

The Secretary of Homeland Security developed and administered a National

Incident Management System (NIMS) and a National Response Plan (NRP).[72] The

system provided a nationwide template to enable federal, state, tribal, and local

governments; nonprofits; and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect

against, respond to, and recover from and mitigate the effects of all incidents.[73] The

directive required state, tribal, and local organizations to adopt NIMS in order to receive

federal funding.[74] The NRP, which was released in 2004, replaced the 1992 Federal

Response Plan (FRP), which focused primarily on federal roles and responsibilities. The

2004 NRP aligned federal coordination and resources into a unified, all-hazards approach

to domestic incidents, and it provided the nation with a common incident management

planning framework.[75] Still, critics asserted the plan remained focused on the national

level and did not clearly identify roles and responsibilities at all levels of government and

stakeholders.

In 2008, the National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the NRP. The NRF

incorporated lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, focusing on how the federal

government can support state, tribal, and local governments and communities in building

their resources and capabilities to manage catastrophic incidents. The framework is based

on 5 principles: engaged partnership; tiered response; scalable, flexible, and adaptable

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[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan*, 2.

operational capabilities; unity of effort through unified command; and readiness to act.[76]

The framework's goal is to engage public sector agencies at all levels, private sector businesses and nonprofits. It uses the premise of engaging the whole community—individuals; families; communities; private and nonprofit sectors; faith-based organizations; and local, state, and federal governments—as full partners to enhance national preparedness, using terms such as "integration" and "interrelationship" to describe the partnerships that should occur.[77] This principle is exemplified in the following: emergency practitioners must "communicate and support engagement with the whole community by developing capabilities to reduce the risk of any jurisdiction being overwhelmed in times of crisis."[78]

The NRF asserts that nonprofit organizations—described as NGOs in the document—have an essential role at the local, state, tribal, and national levels in supplying services associated with the core capabilities of response. The framework identified these organizations as "voluntary, racial, ethnic, faith-based, veteran-based, and nonprofit organizations that provide sheltering, emergency food supplies, and other essential support services."[79] The organizations are also described as independent and committed by specific interests and values that drive their operational priorities and resources they provide.[80] According to the NRF, these organizations should have a "direct link to the emergency managers and be involved in [the] decision-making

[76] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
[77] Ibid.
[78] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed., (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 5.
[79] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed., 9.
[80] Ibid.

process."[81] Nonprofits can provide necessary support—such as resources and personnel—and they can identify assets and deficits in their communities.

2.2.3 Additional Policies and Presidential Directives

Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) after evaluating the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. Congress concluded that the tragic losses from Hurricane Katrina were due to deficiencies such as "questionable leadership, decisions and capabilities, organizational failures, overwhelmed preparation and communications systems, and inadequate statutory authority."[82]

The act specified major amendments and changes within FEMA that have increased its effectiveness; it established new FEMA leadership and positions, defined a new mission, and enhanced FEMA's autonomy within DHS. FEMA's new mission is "to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other manmade disasters." FEMA has become the lead agency in developing a risk-based emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.[83] Under this act, the FEMA administrator reports directly to the Secretary of DHS and is responsible for the DHS Preparedness Directorate, which contains ten regional offices. In addition, the statute established a national integration center, which is responsible for the management and maintenance of

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[81] Ibid., 12.
[82] Keith Bea, "Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2006).
[83] Ibid.,16.

the NIMS and NRP. The act requires provisions for evacuation plans, reunification of families, and addresses the needs of individuals with disabilities.[84]

President George W. Bush issued HSPD-8: National Preparedness in 2003. This directive identified and established the procedures for improved coordination and support of local, state, and federal government emergency response. HSPD-8 outlined polices to strengthen the nation's preparedness to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies requiring a national, all-hazards preparedness response.

In March 2011, President Barack Obama issued the Presidential Policy Directive-8: National Preparedness (PPD-8), which rescinded HSPD-8 but evolved from a series of its policies.[85] The focus of PPD-8 is to "guide how the nation, from federal government to private citizens, can prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the nation.[86] These threats include terrorist acts, natural disasters, and other manmade incidents.[87] PPD-8 systematically requires the involvement of the whole community, not just the government, to develop a national preparedness goal and framework relevant to ensuring "a secure and resilient nation."[88] PPD-8 includes six elements: the national preparedness goal, the national preparedness system, national planning frameworks and Federal

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[84] Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, S.3721, 109th Cong. (2006).
[85] Jared T. Brown, "Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2011), 2.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

Interagency Operational Plans, an annual national preparedness report, and an ongoing

national effort to build and sustain preparedness.[89]

The national preparedness goal is "a secure and resilient nation with the

capabilities required across the whole community to prevent against, protect against,

mitigate, respond, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk"[90]

The goal outlines thirty-one core capabilities to achieve the end results, and each core

capability is aligned with a mission area: prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and

recover.[91] The goal identifies the capabilities that the nation and the engaged partners

must accomplish across all five mission areas to accomplish security and resilience.

The national preparedness system defines an organized process for the whole

community to organize capabilities and resources to achieve the goal. The national

planning frameworks are a part of the national preparedness system. The national

frameworks define the role of each mission in national preparedness and provide

guidance for how the whole community "builds, sustains, and delivers the core

capabilities."[92] The National Disaster Recovery Framework was released in September

2011. The National Prevention Framework, National Mitigation Framework, and a

second edition of the National Response Framework were released in May 2013.

PPD-8 requires an annual national preparedness report that summarizes national

progress toward achieving the national preparedness goal. The 2013 report identified

gaps in preparedness and reflected on progress made by whole community partners—

[89] Ibid.
[90] Presidential Policy Directive-8: National Preparedness (March 30, 2011), 8.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed.

including all levels of government, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, communities, and individuals—in enhancing national preparedness.[93] The 2015 NPR did not mention any gaps associated with preparedness, leading the researcher to assume that all gaps had been filled, or there was a decision to place a positive spin on all preparedness accomplishments without a clear understanding of the remaining issues.

2.3 Definitions and Roles Before, During, and After Disasters and Incidents Occur

For the purpose of this study, a disaster is defined as "a potentially traumatic event that is collectively experienced, has an acute onset, and is time limited; disaster may be attributed to natural, technological or human causes."[94] The nature of the disaster affects the roles taken on by individuals and organizations through all stages of response.

The cost of a disaster varies based on several factors, including the geographical location, population density, wealth or poverty, and the availability of insurance to supplement any financial losses. For example, the total damage from Hurricane Katrina is estimated to be $81 billion (in 2005 US dollars). It also generated the largest single loss in the history of insurance, at $41 billion, according to the Insurance Information Institute. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, Congress appropriated $3.05 billion to FEMA for preparedness grants to strengthen the nation's ability to prevent, protect, and respond to and recover from a terrorist attack or disaster. However, in FY 2012, the amount was reduced to $1.35 billion; similarly, FEMA grants for predisaster mitigation decreased

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[93] Ibid.

[94] Alexander McFarlane and Fran H. Norris, "Definitions and Concepts in Disaster Research," in *Methods for Disaster Mental Health Research*, edited by Fran H. Norris, Sandro Galea, Matthew J. Friedman, and Patricia J. Watson, 3–19, (New York: Guilford Press, 2006), 4.

from $100 million in FY 2010 to $35.5 million in FY 2012.[95] That went down to $35

million in 2013, of which only $25 million was enacted due to sequestration; in FY 2014

FEMA was allotted $25 million.[96] There was no change in 2015; however the 2016

budget request includes $200 million in competitive grants to State, local and tribal

governments through the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program. This program provides grants

for eligible mitigation planning and projects that reduce disaster losses and protect life

and property from future disaster damages.[97]

While national preparedness doctrine exists, a more formal integrated approach

for predisaster planning is required to facilitate communication and collaboration among

nonprofits, states, tribal, and local entities. Recognition of the political constraints and

limitations of leadership affecting disaster preparedness sheds light on the gaps inherent

in bureaucratic, hierarchical approaches to solve local problems.

2.3.1 Role of the President of the United States

The President leads the Federal Government response effort to ensure that the

necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and catastrophic

incidents. When coordination of Federal response activities is required, it is implemented

through the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to Presidential directive except for

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[95] Brian Montopoli, "Experts Lament Cuts in Funds for Disaster Preparedness," *CBS News*, July 10, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57571208/experts-lament-cuts-in-funds-for-disaster-preparedness/.

[96] William L. Painter, "Department of Homeland Security: FY 2013 Appropriations" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 1, 2012), 60; and Painter, "Department of Homeland Security: FY 2014 Appropriations" (Congressional Research Service, March 11, 2014), 16.

[97] Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2016* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 93, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.

those activities that may interfere with the authority of the Attorney General or the FBI

Director, as described in PPD-8.[98]

The president is responsible for making an emergency or disaster declaration

upon a governor's request and making a declaration under unique authority in such

circumstances as events on federal property. The president appoints a federal coordinator

to execute Stafford Act authority. The coordinating officer represents the president in the

field and utilizes the structures outlined in the NRF to manage the response.[99]

2.3.2 Role of the Federal Government

In response to attacks on 9/11, the president issued HSPD-5 and HSPD-8. HSPD-

5 identified steps for improved coordination in response to incidents and requires that

DHS coordinate with other federal departments and agencies as well as state, local, and

tribal governments to establish an NRF and NIMS.

2.3.2.1 The Role of FEMA

FEMA assumes a lead role in national preparedness, response, and recovery for

major incidents. In addition, FEMA provides funding, technical assistance, services,

supplies, equipment, and direct federal support to state and local governments as

necessary. FEMA also provides technical and financial assistance to state and local

governments to upgrade their communications and warning systems. FEMA operates an

emergency information and coordination center that provides a central location for the

collection and management of disaster and emergency information. It also provides

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[98] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed., (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 16.
[99] Ibid

information to the president concerning matters of national interest to help with decisions about disaster declarations.

Its mission is to support US citizens and first responders to ensure that, as a nation, citizens work together to build, sustain, and improve their capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.[100]

2.3.2.2 Role of Emergency Support Function Primary Agencies

The role of the federal government is further defined in the NRF. In the event of an incident, the roles and responsibilities of the government agencies are described in the emergency support functions (ESFs). According to the framework, nonprofits serve "a vital community, state, and national role in an effective response by mitigating potential risks and performing essential service mission within communities in time of need.[101]

The response mission area at the federal level includes fourteen core capabilities that the ESF agencies support: planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, critical transportation, environmental response and health and safety, fatality management services, infrastructure system, mass care and mass search and rescue operations, on-scene security and protection, operational communications, public and private services and resources, public health and medical services, and situational assessments.[102] The framework states that no core capability is the responsibility of one

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[100] The Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication, 1, July 30, 2013, pg. 17.
[101] Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*, 2nd ed., (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 16.
.
[102] Ibid., 24.

organization or level of government, but it is to be an integrated effort of the whole community.[103]

The roles of the ESF primary agency are based on authorities, resources, and capabilities. Support agencies are assigned based on resources and capabilities in a given functional area. The ESF agency that is designated as the coordinator has ongoing responsibilities throughout the four phases of emergency management. The ESF agency may be activated by both Stafford Act and non-Stafford incidents. Non-Stafford incidents apply to a situation in which the "federal entity with primary responsibility and statutory authority for handling an incident (i.e., the requesting agency) that needs support or assistance beyond its normal operations may request DHS coordination and facilitation through the National Response Framework."[104] The resources provided by the ESF agencies reflect the resource typing categories identified in the NIMS. The number of ESF agencies may vary regionally based on the state's particular needs. ESF agencies help focus and separate specific areas of responsibility to more efficiently plan resource allocation before, during, and after a disaster occurs. This includes training exercises and preparation during all phases. The government can engage nonprofits in all ESFs; however, nonprofits typically are not identified in the EOP.

This research provided the fourteen core capabilities at the federal level that ESF agencies support; however, there are fifteen official functions associated with state ESF

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[103] Ibid., 20.
[104] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Financial Management Support Annex* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 2008), FIN-2.

agencies; these official functions are described in Table 1. These functions show where

the government may need nonprofit support to meet the needs of the community.

Table 1: Official Federal Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)[105]

ESF#1	Transportation
ESF#2	Communication
ESF#3	Public Work and Engineering
ESF#4	Fire Fighting
ESF#5	Information and Planning
ESF#6	Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services
ESF#7	Logistics
ESF#8	Public Health and Medical Services
ESF#9	Search and Rescue
ESF#10	Oil and Rescue
ESF#11	Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF#12	Energy
ESF#13	Public Safety
ESF#14	Long-Term Community Recovery
ESF #15	External Affairs

2.3.3 Role of the State

Federal guidelines are provided for use by state and local governments. For the

purposes of this study, a state includes any state of the United States and the District of

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American

Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianna Islands, a Native American tribe or

organization, an Alaska native village or Regional Native Corporation, and any

possession of the United States.

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[105] Ibid., 5.10.

Each state has an EOP is written in accordance with federal and state guidelines to ensure its objectives are documented and followed. These EOPs support the state-level ESFs listed in the previous section. The role of the state is to supplement local capabilities and resources during and after a disaster.[106] The state also coordinates with local governments to meet their emergency needs and assists the local government in applying for state and federal resources.[107]

2.3.3.1 Role of the State Governor

Within the state, the governor is responsible for issuing a state or area emergency declaration based on needs and damage estimates; initiates state response actions; activates emergency contingency funds and reallocates the regular budget for emergency activities; and oversees emergency management and requests, disburses, and monitors federal assistance. Only the governor can request the federal aid that comes from a presidential declaration.

2.3.3.2 Role of the State Emergency Management Agency

The state emergency agency carries out statewide emergency management activities.

It identifies response and recovery resources and repairs critical infrastructure. Most relevant to this research, it coordinates the state EOP.[108]

2.3.3.3 The Role of the Local Emergency Manager

The role of the local emergency manager varies by state or jurisdictions. FEMA outlines the role as follows: manages resources before, during, and after a major

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[106] Ibid., 5.4.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid., 5.5.

emergency or disaster and—most important to this research—coordinates with all stakeholders in the emergency management process.[109] The IS230 training course provides a more detailed description of the role of the local emergency manager, including responsibilities to coordinate resources and manage activities related to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The emergency manager ensures that all stakeholders (including nonprofits and first responders) operate effectively in emergency situations. Other duties include coordinating the planning process and working cooperatively with organizations and government agencies; taking inventory of personnel and material resources, to include private-sector sources available in an emergency; establishing and maintaining networks of expert advisors and damage assessors for all hazards; and coordinating a review of all local emergency- and disaster-related authorities and recommending amendments when necessary.

Based on the community's organizational structure, the emergency manager may serve as the head of a separate organization that reports directly to a governing or executive body; as part of a law enforcement agency, located in a police department or sheriff's office; or as part of a fire or rescue department. Regardless of location, the person in this position must devote significant time and energy to coordinating with a variety of people and organizations within and without the community.[110]

The *CPG 101* serves as the foundation for state, tribal, and local emergency planners to develop their EOPs. This plan is a critical part of the emergency managers'

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[109] Ibid.
[110] The Emergency Management Institute, Course content for IS-230.b Fundamentals of Emergency Management, (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 25, 2011), 5.3.

responsibilities, and it involves outlining the roles and responsibilities, tasks, integration, and actions required to take place before and during an emergency.[111] An EOP should adopt NIMS through executive order, proclamation, or legislation as the jurisdiction's official incident response system. The NIMS will integrate all response agencies into a single seamless system—from incident command posts to emergency operation centers (EOCs), which can be local, regional, state, and national.[112]

An EOP will include language that integrates and incorporates nongovernmental elements in the preparedness response and recovery phases; local EOPs should be consistent with state, territorial, and tribal plans. EOPs should address operational response functions and describe the process of providing resources to satisfy unmet needs. These functions focus on actions—such as direction and control, warning, public notification, and evacuations—that the local government must take during the initial phase of response operations.[113]

The EOP format includes the minimum information that a local government must include when writing an EOP.[114] This critical document is an emergency manager's primary tool to communicate and initiate collaboration and coordination with nonprofits to plan resources for an emergency.

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[111] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *CPG 101*.
[112] Acosta et al., *The Nongovernmental Sector in Disaster Resilience*, 12.
[113] Ibid., 13.
[114] Federal Emergency Management Agency, *CPG 101*, 3-4.

Table 2: EOP Format

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION EOP FORMAT

1 Basic Plan
- a) Introductory Material
    - (i) Promulgation Document/Signatures
    - (ii) Approval and Implementation
    - (iii) Record of Changes
    - (iv) Record of Distribution
    - (v) Table of Contents
- b) Purpose, Scope, Situation Overview, and Assumptions
    - (i) Purpose
    - (ii) Scope
    - (iii) Situation Overview
        - (a) Hazard Analysis Summary
        - (b) Capability Assessment
        - (c) Mitigation Overview
    - (iv) Planning Assumptions
- c) Concept of Operations
- d) Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
- e) Direction, Control, and Coordination
- f) Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination
- g) Communications
- h) Administration, Finance, and Logistics
- i) Plan Development and Maintenance
- j) Authorities and References

2 Emergency Support Function Annexes
- a) ESF #1 – Transportation
- b) ESF #2 – Communications
- c) ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering
- d) ESF #4 – Firefighting
- e) ESF #5 – Emergency Management
- f) ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services
- g) ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support
- h) ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services
- i) ESF #9 – Search and Rescue
- j) ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
- k) ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources
- l) ESF #12 – Energy
- m) ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security
- n) ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery
- o) ESF #15 – External Affairs
- p) Other ESFs as defined by the jurisdiction

3 Support Annexes
(Note: This is not a complete list. Each jurisdiction's support functions will vary.)
- a) Continuity of Government/Operations
- b) Warning
- c) Population Protection
- d) Financial Management
- e) Mutual Aid/Multijurisdictional Coordination
- f) Private Sector Coordination
- g) Volunteer and Donations Management
- h) Worker Safety and Health
- i) Prevention and Protection

4 Hazard-, Threat-, or Incident-Specific Annexes
(Note: This is not a complete list. Each jurisdiction's annexes will vary based on their hazard analysis.)
- a) Hurricane/Severe Storm
- b) Earthquake
- c) Tornado
- d) Flood/Dam Failure
- e) Hazardous Materials Incident
- f) Radiological Incident
- g) Biological Incident
- h) Terrorism Incident

2.4 Emergency Preparedness Organizations in Virginia, Maryland, and DC

Emergency management preparation and plans for executing support functions vary from state to state. A wide array of demographics are represented communities throughout Virginia, Maryland, and DC; this variety is reflected in the varied structures of each state's emergency management organization, including infrastructure, funding

profiles, governmental and nongovernmental responsibilities, policies, authorities, and

levels of collaboration. This section will detail the emergency management

organizational structures found in Virginal, Maryland, and DC, while chapter 7 will

analyze the impact of these organizational structures.

2.4.1 Virginia

The Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) is the state's lead

emergency management agency, which works with local government emergency

managers, other state organizations, volunteer organizations, and federal agencies to

provide resources and guidance in four areas: preparedness, response, recovery, and

mitigation.[115] The mission of VDEM is "to protect Virginia and Virginians from the

impact of emergencies and disasters, natural and manmade.[116] VDEM is led by the state

coordinator and the chief deputy coordinator, both appointed by the governor. VDEM is

organized into seven divisions, depicted in figure x, which include the following:

preparedness, operations, technological hazards, finance, finance and grants management,

recovery and mitigation, and local support services. Figure 3 illustrates VDEM's

organizational structure.

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[115] Virginia Department of Emergency Management, *Local Emergency Coordinator's Handbook* (Virginia Department of Emergency Management: October 2008), 1-1.
[116] Ibid.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
FEBRUARY 25, 2015
(W = WAGE POSITION)

JEFFREY STERN
STATE COORDINATOR
00002
State Coord of
Emergency Management

Curtis Brown
Chief Deputy Coordinator
00044
Chief Deputy

Brett Burdick
Deputy of Administration
00172
General Administration Mgr III

Local Support Services Division
Jack King, Director
00154
Emergency Coordinator Mgr II

Bertha Fegans
Administration Staff Assistant
00009
Administrative & Office Spec III

Operations Division
Michael Nelson, Director
00015
Emergency Coordinator Mgr II

Finance Division
Vacant, Director
00076
Financial Services Manager II

Budget & Procurement Office
Kevin Hill, Budget Manager
00146
Financial Services Manager I

Preparedness Division
Ted Costin, Director
00042
Emergency Coordinator Mgr II

Brookie Crawford
Policy Analyst
00175
Policy & Planning Specialist II

Technological Hazards Division
Greg Britt, Director
00034
Emergency Coordinator Mgr II

Finance & Grants Mgmt Div
Cheryl Lee, Acting Director
00007
Financial Services Manager II

Information Technology Office
Rex Pyle, Acting Director
00185
Information Technology Mgr I

Human Resources Office
Linda Earle, Director
00083
Human Resource Manager II

Vacant
Policy Analyst, Northern Virginia
00196
Policy & Planning Specialist II

Training & Exercises Office
Susan Mongold, Director
00204
Training & Instruction Manager II

Recovery and Mitigation Division
George Roarty, Director
00041
Emergency Coordinator Mgr II

External Affairs Office
Dawn Eischen, Director
00082
Public Relations & Mktg Mgr III

Megan Peterson
Special Asst to State Coord
UG001
Confidential Assistant
Policy/Administration

Vacant, Sheltering Coordinator
00230
Policy Planning Specialist III

114 Wage Adjunct Instructors support Operations,
Preparedness, Public Affairs, Recovery & Mitigation,
Technological Hazards, and Training & Exercises.

Details for Divisions and Offices are located on the following page.

Page 1

Figure 3: Virginia Department of Emergency Management, February 2015[117]

Preparedness, which is the focus of this research, is the key to collaboration before a disaster occurs. The Preparedness Division provides guidance to local and state agencies in developing comprehensive and current emergency response plans. The local planning assistance team provides technical support to the jurisdictions, with the development and maintenance of local EOPs and the local capability assessment for readiness required by Virginia.[118] The Preparedness Division also includes the VDEM volunteer coordinator branch, which coordinates emergency-based volunteers and

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[117] "Leadership," Virginia Department of Emergency Management Website, accessed May 2015, http://www.vaemergency.gov/aboutus/leadership.
[118] Virginia Department of Emergency Management, *Local Emergency Coordinator's Handbook*, 3-3.

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manages donations at the state and local levels during the four phases of preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. The branch is also a state voluntary liaison to the Voluntary Organization Active in Disasters (VA VOAD).[119]

The functions of the remaining divisions are critical to the role of collaboration in this very complex environment but are outside the focus of this research; they are briefly described below to highlight internal and external relationships with stakeholders that may or may not be listed in the ESFs, responsibilities required to manage the emergency management mission, and critical support functions.

The Operations Division manages and staffs the Virginia Emergency Operations Center (VEOC), which serves as the operations center for the state prior to, during, and after a disaster or emergency occurs. The VEOC is staffed three-hundred and sixty-five days a year and is prepared to respond to calls for assistance from 141 local governments. During a disaster, representatives from the federal and state governments, along with private and nonprofit agencies, work at the VEOC to form the Virginia Emergency Response Team (VERT), which dispatches resources to disaster areas. The Technological Hazards Division aims to protect human health and the environment of local jurisdictions during a hazardous materials emergency.[120]

The Finance Division is responsible for the agency's accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, and budget and grants accounting functions. It also serves as agency liaison with the Department of Accounts, Payroll Services Bureau, Department of Planning and Budget, and all federal funding agencies. The policies and directives issued

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[119] Ibid., 3-16.
[120] Ibid., 6-2.

by these outside agencies are interpreted, implemented, and enforced by staff within the Finance Division, which works in turn with VDEM personnel to provide training and guidance with all applicable policies.[121] The Finance and Grants Management Division administers the grants that various federal agencies—primarily FEMA—award to the Commonwealth of Virginia for emergency management.[122]

Following a disaster, the Recovery and Mitigation Division coordinates with FEMA and other organizations to administer disaster-assistance programs, such as housing, loan programs, unemployment assistance, crisis counseling, business recovery, and damage reimbursement programs.[123] Nonprofits often contribute resources during this portion of emergency management; however, these tasks are considered part of the recovery phase, not the preparation phase.

The Local Support Services Division was established to improve the Commonwealth's preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities for natural disasters and emergencies. It expands on the work of the agency's former Field Services Activity, which employed three regional coordinators to provide hands-on emergency management support and resources to local jurisdictions.[124] The Local Support Services Division employs regional coordinators who connect localities with the appropriate programs and expertise within VDEM before, during, and after a disaster. The regional coordinators service seven emergency management regions—shown in figure 4—which contain an average of twenty jurisdictions each. A regional coordinator is assigned to each

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[121] Ibid., 10-1.
[122] Ibid., 9-1.
[123] Ibid., 5-1.
[124] Ibid., 2-1.

emergency management region to provide ongoing support and planning in the development and implementation of all-hazard emergency management programs at local and regional levels. This planning is the lowest level of collaboration, and these managers are charged with implementing the emergency support functions "on the ground" with nonprofits and nongovernmental entities.

Regions
Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Figure 4: Virginia Department of Emergency Management Regions

Local governments have vertical links with state and federal agencies, if needed, and horizontal links with social and economic organizations. Local emergency management agencies typically have horizontal links with personnel in police, fire, emergency rescue and medical services, public works, and homeland security departments. At the local municipal level, all these departments report vertically to their jurisdiction chiefs, such as a mayor or city manager who has direct supervisory authority

over them. Cities and counties frequently have vertical links with corresponding agencies

at the state and sometimes federal levels, which sometimes provide technical or financial

assistance. In most cases the cities and counties don't have legal authority to compel

action. Some emergency management agencies have memorandums of agreement with

neighboring jurisdictions to get additional support if needed.

2.4.2 Maryland

It is important to note that emergency management in Maryland is very different,

both organizationally and functionally, from that of Virginia and the District of

Columbia. The Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) is a state agency

organized within the Maryland Military Department, which has a different bureaucratic

foundation than that of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia.

Although MEMA is a part of the Maryland Military Department and is under the

authority of the adjutant general, the governor can assume direct authority over the

agency in emergency situations and the MEMA executive would directly report to the

governor.

MEMA has the primary responsibility and authority for establishing emergency

preparedness policy and for coordinating mitigation, response, and disaster recovery.

MEMA has established the Maryland Emergency Preparedness Program (MEPP) as an

all-hazards approach to preparedness and its four mission areas: prevention/protection,

response, recovery, and mitigation.[125] MEMA is authorized under Article 14 of the Public

Safety Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which establishes MEMA and

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[125] "Maryland Emergency Management Agency," Maryland.gov, accessed May 2014, http://mema.maryland.gov.

authorizes the political subdivision of the state to create emergency management offices.[126] There are 26 local emergency management offices in Maryland; twenty-three represent Maryland's counties, and the other three represent the cities of Annapolis, Baltimore, and Ocean City (see Figure 5).[127]

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[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.

Figure 5: Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Regions

MEMA is organized into three directorates—Preparedness, Operations, and Administration—each under the Office of the Executive Director. In contrast to VDEM's organization, the MEMA directorates are organized according to capabilities and functions. There is no formal MEMA organization chart (by design), and each of the three directorates individually focuses on its specific plans and capabilities.

Coordination is a function within the Preparedness Directorate. MEMA considers preparedness to be a critical element in emergency management, and defines preparation as a "perpetual activity" as represented by the diagram in Figure 6. Maryland emergency managers develop preparedness plans based on guidance from MEMA and reflect the organizational hierarchy as listed in Figure 7.

Figure 6: Maryland Emergency Management Cycle[128]

Figure 7: Structure of Maryland Emergency Preparedness Program

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[128] Maryland Emergency Management Agency, *Maryland Emergency Preparedness Program Strategic Plan*, (Maryland Emergency Management Agency: September 2013), 9.

The Preparedness Directorate is responsible for planning, training, exercises, community outreach, public information, and mitigation programs. This directorate oversees the adaptive planning branch, the active learning and exercises branch, the external outreach branch, and the mitigation unit.

The adaptive planning branch assists emergency managers with the development and preparation of emergency response plans, a key focus of this research. Active learning and exercises provide education, exercises, and training for state and local emergency managers. External outreach encompasses the whole-community approach by providing preparedness resources, tools, and information to Maryland residents, community organizations, faith-based organizations, and the private sector; outreach is conducted before, during, and after disasters occur. The mitigation unit's purpose is to reduce or eliminate the impact of future disasters.

The Operations Directorate includes regional programs, the State Emergency Operations Center, and the Maryland Joint Operations Center (MJOC), which is a key element. The center is staffed around the clock by National Guard and emergency management professionals who coordinate communications for emergency responders and local emergency managers; the center also provides ongoing awareness of events, and it monitors local, state, national, and international events. The MJOC is the first joint civilian-military operations center in the country.[129] Another key element of the operations directorate is the State Emergency Operations Center; in the event of a disaster, the MEMA director can activate the center to support local governments.

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[129] Ibid.

Finally, MEMA's Administrative Directorate manages the agency's budget, grants, and fiscal assistance and coordinates logistics, personnel and technology support.

2.4.3 District of Columbia

The Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) supports and coordinates emergency management in the District of Columbia. The mission of HSEMA is to ensure "the District of Columbia's all-hazards operations are prepared to protect against, plan for, respond to, and recover from natural and manmade hazards." The District of Columbia Code addresses disasters and emergencies through public emergency statutes (7-2201 et seq) and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 (22-3152 et seq). The HSEMA director serves as the homeland security advisor and emergency manager for the District and the mayor of DC is authorized to declare an emergency.

The HSEMA is organized into six divisions: Plans and Preparedness Division, Operations Division, Services Division, Training and Exercise Division, Information Technology and Communications Division, the Grants Division, and the Mayor's Special Event Task Force Group.[130] Figure 8 shows the organization as of July 2014.

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[130] "Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency," DC.gov, accessed May 2015, http://hsema.dc.gov.

**District of Columbia
Homeland Security &
Emergency Management Agency**
Organizational Chart

Figure 8: District of Columbia HSMEA Organizational Chart

The Plans and Preparedness Division conducts all-hazards emergency

management and manages operational plans and programs that support functions to

mitigate, prepare, protect, plan and recover from natural and manmade disasters. This

division will be the primary focus of this research because it creates the plans that

directly impact the government's level of collaboration with nonprofits and other

organizations; however, there are additional functions performed by personnel in other

divisions that also interface with key nonprofit stakeholders. Of the three localities

reviewed in this study, HSEMA is the most flat organizationally due to the nature of the

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capabilities needed in the District and the demographics throughout the city; the impact of this flat hierarchy will be discussed in a later chapter.

The following divisions function in a similar manner to the divisions in VDEM and MEMA, providing necessary operations and support for all stakeholders. The Operations Division operates the District's EOC three-hundred and sixty-five days a year, monitoring regional, federal, and local information and communications. The EOC serves as a hub for information coordination and communications with the national capital region jurisdiction. The EOC also serves as the main operational command and control center for consequence management during any emergencies, disasters, major special events, and national security special events in the District.[131]

The Services Division coordinates all of HSEMA's fiscal and human resources and manages its facilities. The Training and Exercise Division provides disaster preparedness and response training to emergency professionals, government workers, and the general public.[132] The Information Technology and Communications Division provides computer systems, radio and telecommunications, closed-circuit television, and mobile command support. The Grants Division administers grant funds in accordance with the DHS. Finally, the Mayor's Special Event Task Force Group is responsible for planning public safety and managing the activities for events requiring interagency coordination.

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[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.

2.4.4 The Role of Local Planners, Emergency Managers, and the Whole Community

Local government planners and leaders are responsible for managing all four phases of emergency management—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery—at the local level within the scope of their roles and available resources.

For example, the mayor or county official may manage policies and budgets that relate to preparedness and response capabilities. Most emergencies and disasters are first managed by first responders, emergency managers, and local nonprofits if activated. This is important because the emergency plans at the lowest level hold local authorities responsible for both planning and initial response. National policy and guidance, as discussed earlier in this paper, follow the principle that disasters occur locally, thus citizens expect their local government managers and elected officials to lead the immediate response as well as manage the short- and long-term recovery. Only when the local available resources are inadequate, are local leaders then expected to request assistance from regional, state, and federal levels. Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina suggest that the federal response is expected to be immediate and to remain as long as a necessary until local resources are again sufficient to manage the disaster recovery.

The local response is guided by state constitutional and legislative directives. A local government's authority is derived from the state government and reflects how the state grants authority to local governments to coordinate their own affairs. Home rule is a "delegation of power from the state to its subunits of government (including counties,

municipalities, towns, or townships or villages)."[133] Home rule establishes local autonomy and limits the degree of state influence in local affairs.[134] Dillon's rule is "derived from a written decision by Judge John F. Dillon of Iowa in 1868. It maintains that a political subdivision of a state is connected to the state law, as a child is connected to a parent."[135] Dillon's rule is used in interpreting state law when there is a question of whether or not a local government has a certain power.[136] Dillon's rule narrowly defines the power of the local government, and this power is not always matched with resources to implement plans.

Local planners include government and local community leaders who have a formal job or interest in ensuring all members of a community get the appropriate services before, during, and after an incident or disaster. Some receive detailed formal training, while others are already experts in their fields and may or may not be trained but are familiar with emergency management tools and terminology. Personnel at the local level are equipped with a diverse set of disaster-response skills.

2.5 Institutional and Organizational Structure of Nonprofits

While future research may focus on nonprofits in the international community, the scope of this research will be limited to U.S-based nonprofits supporting domestic efforts. According to the Urban Institute, in 2013 there were approximately 1.41 million

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[133] Jesse J. Richardson, "Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of Dillon's Rule on Growth Management," (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 2003).
[134] The Emergency Management Institute, Course content for IS-230.b, 2-2.
[135] Ibid., 2.2.
[136] Ibid., 2.2.

nonprofits registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).[137] The Department of State

reports there are approximately 1.5 million nonprofits operating in the United States;

however, the Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy notes that this number only includes

those who are registered. The total number of nonprofits operating in the country is not

known. The Center documented that the nonprofit sector contributed an estimated $905.9

billion to the US economy in 2013, representing 5.4 percent of the country's gross

domestic product (GDP).[138]

Volunteers are critical assets of nonprofits. The Center estimated that, in 2014,

more than 62.8 million adults (more than one-fifth of the US population) has volunteered

at least once that year, and the number of volunteer hours was estimated at 8.7 billion.[139]

Thus, nonprofits represent a significant capability in assets, number of volunteers, and

resources.[140]

Boris and Steuerle define the nonprofit sector as "those entities that are organized

for public purposes, are self-governed, and do not distribute surplus revenues for profit."

Nonprofits are independent of government and business but may be closely related to

both.[141] Boris and Steuerle also refute a common misperception: that a nonprofit is

"mainly concerned with charity and depends upon donations and volunteers for most of

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[137] Brice S. McKeever, *The Nonprofit Sector in Brief, 2015: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, October 2015).
[138] Ibid., 2.
[139] Ibid, 11.
[140] Lester M. Salamon, *Nonprofit America: An Overview* (Presentation at the National Academy of Sciences Workshop on NSF: Survey of Nonprofit R and D, John Hopkins Center for Civil Studies Reference, Washington, DC, June 30, 2014); and Salamon, *America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer*, 3rd edition (Foundation Center, March 2012).
[141] Boris and Steuerle, "Scope and Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector," In *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, edited by Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg, 65-87. (Yale University Press, 2006).

its resources. In fact, many are not engaged in serving the poor, depend little or not at all on contributions, and pay wages, sometimes substantial, to individuals. The data reveal a vibrant sector, but not all [are] concerned with social welfare and civic engagement."[142]

The U.S. tax code defines nonprofit organization in terms of tax status. According to the IRS, "an organization must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes set forth in section 501(c) (3) and none of its earnings may inure to any private shareholder or individual. In addition, it may not be an action organization, i.e. it may not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities and it may not participate in any campaign activity for or against political candidates."[143] In addition, organizations that wish to acquire a 501(c) (3) designation must list one of the following purposes in their mission statement: charitable, education, religious, scientific, literacy, fostering national or international amateur sports competition, preventing cruelty to animals, or testing for public safety.[144]

Salamon notes that many organizations in nonprofit sector are public service organizations; more than 429,000 of the total 2 million organizations are faith-based organizations, many of which are described as nonaffiliated nonprofits in the terms of this research. Note in our earlier discussion that the number was 1.5 million vs. 2 million. Again, the fact is that there is no precise number. Salamon notes that these faith-based organizations differ from other nonprofits in that they are "member serving," as opposed

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[142] Ibid., 66.
[143] Internal Revenue Service, "Exemption Requirements – 501(c)(3) Organizations," IRS.gov, accessed 13 March 2014, last updated 15 December 2015, https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section-501(c)(3)-Organizations.
[144] Steven Joiner and Meg Busse, *The Idealist Guide to Nonprofits Career for Sector Switchers* (West Hills Press, 2010), 8.

to "public serving."[145] He further asserts that religious organizations hold a privileged

position in American law compared to other nonprofits.[146] Religious entities are protected

by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, extending them tax-exempt status along

with eligibility to receive tax-deductible gifts.[147] Furthermore, religious organizations are

not required to file a tax Form 990, detailing their receipts and expenditures. It should be

noted that this results in an inability to fully account for the number and types of

nonprofits because many churches with less than $50,000 do not file taxes, thus they are

invisible in the system.[148] This is why this research is so important because it helps the

government identify additional nonprofits which may have capabilities that add to

community resilience.

Nonprofits can be grouped according to their mission and vision. The IRS uses

the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities, the nonprofit classification system, to

organize nonprofits into the following major categories: arts, health, human services,

international foreign affairs, and civil and public benefits (including philanthropic

foundations and religion), According to the Urban Institute, there are twelve types of

nonprofits within the United States, including the following: arts, culture, and humanities;

education; higher education; other education; environment and animals; health; hospitals

and primary-care facilities; other healthcare; human services; international and foreign

affairs; public and social benefit; and religion-related.[149] The group most germane to this

research is the human services group. This is a key element of this research in

[145] Salamon, *America's Nonprofit Sector: A Prime*r, 229.
[146] Ibid., 231.
[147] Ibid., 230.
[148] Salamon, *Nonprofit America: An Overview*.
[149] McKeever, *The Nonprofit Sector in Brief*, 2.

understanding the operational aspects of how nonprofits are categorized and where the research focused for obtaining professional emergency management practitioners.

Steinberg and Powell note that nonprofits are defined by their structure of ownership.[150] A study from the Center for Civil Studies at John Hopkins University defines nonprofits by providing a structural-operational description of their key characteristics: organizations (institutionalized to some extent), private (institutionally separate from the government), nonprofit distributing (not returning profits to owners or directors), self-governing (able to control their own activities), and noncompulsory (involving some meaningful degree of voluntary participation).[151] This definition is comprehensive and will be the primary source of relating nonprofit institutional and organizational characteristics in this research.

There are a wide variety of nonprofit organizational structures, which range in size from very large, such as the Red Cross, to very small, having just one or two volunteers.[152] For the purpose of this research, a notional organizational structure of a traditional nonprofit diagram is shown in Figure 9.[153] Journalist Lisa Magloff states, "The exact structure of a nonprofit organization depends partly on where it is incorporated—some states have their own requirements for the number of directors or other officers of the nonprofit. However, the basic structure of a nonprofit is generally the same

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[150] Powell and Steinberg, *The Nonprofit Sector*, 3.
[151] Helen Stone Tice, Lester M. Salamon, and Regina A. List, "Finding a Sacred Bard: Portraying the Global Nonprofit Sector in Official Statistics," Working paper series no. 19 for the John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, Baltimore, Maryland (2001).
[152] Foundation Center, "Foundation Center, How Many Nonprofit Organizations Are There in the United States?," Foundation Center.org, accessed May 2015, http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/faqs/html/howmany.html.
[153] Hurwit & Associates, "Nonprofit Law Resource Library, Traditional Nonprofit Organizational Structure," Hurwit & Associates.com, accessed May 2014, http://www.hurwitassociates.com/l_charts_traditional.php.

everywhere. The structure is divided into three functional areas–governance, programs and administration–and then further subdivided within each area, depending on the purpose and goals of the nonprofit".[154]

Traditional Nonprofit Organizational Structure

Board of Directors

Fundraising Committee

Budget and Finance Committee

Nominating Committee

Other: Ad Hoc or Program Committees

CEO
Executive Director or President

Asst. Director Development (or Vice President)

CFO Asst. Director Finance (or Vice President)

-COO Asst. Director Operations (or Vice President)

Asst. Director Planning/ Marketing (or Vice President)

-COO Asst. Director PR/Community Affairs (or Vice President)

Asst. Director Human Resources (or Vice President)

Figure 9: Notional Organizational Structure of a Nonprofit

Nonprofits are governed by a board of directors; the size of the board can vary from three to more than fifty. Each state has rules that set the minimum size of the board, but the exact size of the board and the number of times that it meets each year changes from one organization to another, depending on the needs of the organization. Board members are generally not paid, but they may receive any compensation that is allowed

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[154] Lisa Magloff, "The Typical Non-Profit Organizational Structure," *Houston Chronicle*, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/typical-non-profit-organizational-structure-4896.html.

by the organization's bylaws. The board is accountable for the policies of the

organization and is given powers by the organizations' articles of incorporation. The

board's work is coordinated by the chair, and the board may organize itself into

committees responsible for carrying out various operations.[155]

The administration is composed of the staff who oversee all the programs.

Nonprofit administration usually includes an executive director or president as well as

office personnel. The executive director is responsible for liaising with the board and for

carrying out their instructions, as well as for overseeing the people who run the

nonprofit's programs.[156]

2.5.1 Role of Nonprofits in Emergency Management Preparation
Stephen Heintz, president of Rockefeller Brothers Fund, observed that nonprofits

played a pivotal role in the recovery after Hurricane Katrina, noting that "the human

suffering caused by the storms would have been far worse without the huge outpouring of

generosity from the American public and the quick response of [nonprofit

organizations]."[157] According to research by Chandra et al., the hurricanes in 2005

illustrated that nonprofit organizations are "instrumental contributors to human recovery

providing social, economic and health services."[158]

Nonprofits adopt a community approach that addresses the needs of vulnerable

groups who otherwise would find it hard to adapt or recover from the impacts of

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[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Stephen Heintz, "The Role of NGOs in Modern Societies and an Increasingly Interdependent World," (presented at the Annual Conference of the Institute for Civil Society, Zhongshan University, Guangzhou, China, January 14, 2006).
[158] Chandra and Acosta, *The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Long-Term Human Recovery After Disaster: Reflections from Louisiana Four Years After Hurricane Katrina* (Rand Corporation, 2009), 1.

disasters; they bridge resource and capacity gaps in communities where budget constraints reduce the disaster services that state and local governments can provide. According to the Center for Disaster Philanthropy, nonprofits in New York State contributed more than $400 million for Hurricane Sandy relief efforts. Examples of nonprofit contributions in New York after Hurricane Sandy include the following: the Salvation Army coordinated the food access plan, distributing food and water to seventeen sites in Staten Island, Queens, Brooklyn, and Manhattan; Feeding American sent 150 truckloads of food and grocery products and 4.9 million meals to local food banks; Blanton-Peale, a mental health counseling center, offered a free, professionally facilitated support group for those affected by the hurricane; Sparkrekuef.org helped feed more than five thousand people; and Americare sponsored a health fair for hurricane survivors, who received free flu shots, dental care, and diabetes and blood pressure screenings.[159]

The NRF is designed to provide a structure for coordinating federal support for disaster response, including support for voluntary organizations providing shelter, food, and other mass care services. These are the areas in which nonprofits typically collaborate with government emergency managers at the state and local levels. Examples include training and managing volunteer resources; identifying accessible shelters and supplies; providing emergency commodities and services such as food, water, shelter, clothing, cleanup supplies, and family reunification; supporting the evacuation, rescue,

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[159] Center for Disaster Philanthropy, "Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Donors Have Geared up for Response to Hurricane Sandy. Disaster Statistics." Center for Disaster Philanthropy, last updated January 17, 2013, accessed November 2014, http://disasterphilanthropy.org/where/curent-disasters/hurricane-sandy.

care, and shelter of animals; and identifying people whose needs have not yet been met.

In addition, nonprofits may provide search and rescue, transportation, and logistics

support; health, medical, mental health, and behavioral resources; disability-related

assistance; and language assistance. Within the NRF, ESFs provide the mechanism for

coordinated federal assistance to state, tribal, and local resources for potential or actual

incidents and events. The ESFs address aspects of emergency management that must be

emphasized because of their uniqueness or impact. This research focuses on ESF #6 the

volunteer donation management support annex. The roles of volunteers interfacing with

government and nonprofits are detailed in and ESF #6.[160]

2.5.2 Anatomy and Transparency of Voluntary Nonprofit Organizations

More information is available now about nonprofits than in the past, but even

though research has expanded significantly over the last decade, researchers Anheier and

Salamon note that "our understanding of the role of these institutions is still limited; data

coverage frequently remains patchy. What is more, despite some significant

breakthroughs, the theoretical challenges remain quite severe and no single theory has

come to dominate the field. Indeed, one of the major consequences of the growth of

knowledge has been to cast doubt on many of the prior theories, which emerged in the

context of Western market economies."[161]

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[160] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Private Sector Coordination Support Annex," *National Response Framework,* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008); and Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Mass Care Emergency, Housing and Human Service Annex," *National Response Framework* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008).
[161] Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg, The Nonprofit Sector A Research Handbook, 2nd Anheier and Salamon, "The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective," 2006; 90

Edward and Hume report that NGOs—in the same manner as domestic nonprofits—do not have to keep accurate records of their progress because they have been established on mission or ideological grounds by donors and supporters. This lack of transparency does not provide the government or any constituents who are not contributors to that specific organization confidence that all information is being provided.[162] Exceptions to this lack of transparency are the Red Cross, which was congressionally chartered, and the Salvation Army, which receives federal funds; a certain amount of transparency is built into both organizations. For example, the Red Cross code of conduct seeks to safeguard high standards and recognizes the requirement to report on its activities, both from a financial and an effectiveness perspective.

A Rand study notes that there is no commonly accepted technological or computer-based infrastructure through which nongovernmental and government sectors can systematically collect, manage, and share data about volunteers, resources, financial reports.[163] FEMA and the Red Cross use the coordinated assistance network software to perform this function. Rand reports that many other nonprofits were using other systems and were reluctant to adapt or finance a new data system. This lack of shared data limits transparency at the technological level, impeding information sharing, which impacts all other barriers encountered during this literature review. Furthermore, Geller et al. found

[162] Michael Edwards, "Are NGOs Overrated? Why and How to Say 'No.'" *Current Issues in Comparative Education* , no. 1 (1998), 55–61.
[163] Chandra and Acosta, *The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Long-Term Human Recovery*, 7.

that "lack of funding, time, and expertise are the major barriers preventing nonprofits from harnessing the full potential of information technologies."[164]

Existing policies centralize lists of the nonprofits via databases and websites. However, these lists may not be current, and they may not fully describe the capabilities, skill levels, and training activities associated with each nonprofit. Thus, nonprofits' lack of visibility to government agencies may preclude their ability to be of service. Simply put, if the government does not know about a nonprofit and the services it provides, the nonprofit cannot be integrated into any emergency management planning activities. Nonprofits such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army do not have this barrier because they rely largely on the public's support and have strong marketing capability.

Although the IRS is charged with recognizing nonprofits' tax-exempt status and determining their compliance with tax laws, the IRS is not responsible for monitoring how well nonprofits spend their funds or meet their charitable missions. Furthermore, nonprofit organizations who do not receive a specified amount in annual gross receipts are not required to register with the IRS;[165] thus, some nonprofits are not even known to the federal government.

At the state level, the primary oversight of nonprofits and charities is the responsibility of the attorney general and charity offices. These officials maintain registries of charities and fundraisers, including financial reports of registrants. They also have oversight of the solicitation and administration of charitable assets. The attorney

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[164] Stephanie Geller, Alan J. Abramson, and Erwin de Leon, "The Nonprofit Technology Gap: Myth or Reality," Communiqué 20, Listening Post Project (Center for Civil Society Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2010).
[165] Boris and Steuerle, *Scope and Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*, 83.

general and state charity officials have legal authority to investigate charities' compliance with state law and can correct any noncompliance via the legal system; however, while district attorneys may assist the state with investigations of charities, they tend to focus instead on prosecuting individuals who defraud charities.[166] Thus, often the level and types of transparency a nonprofit may exhibit to the state are derived from a "need to know" rather than an obligation to provide the information. Both factors could impact the level of collaboration.

2.5.2.1 National and State Voluntary Organizations

This research focuses on collaboration between government and nonprofits, so it is critical to discuss nonprofits at the national, state, and regional levels as well as Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) in Virginia, Maryland, and the District. While the Red Cross and Salvation Army have traditionally been the primary organizations to respond to disasters, growing numbers of nonprofits, such as the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (NVOAD), have begun to play a vital role in emergency preparation and management. National and state VOADs are forums where organizations exchange information and resources throughout the disaster cycle to aid survivors and their communities.[167]

In 1970, seven nonprofit organizations came together to form NVOAD after disaster-relief efforts during Hurricane Camille demonstrated that responses were uncoordinated and haphazard. The founding organization established a commitment to

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[166] Cynthia Maher Fagnoni, "September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters" (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, December 26, 2002).

[167] National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, "Our History," NVOAD.org, accessed March 4, 2015, http://www.nvoad.org/about-us/our-history/.

principles referred to as the four Cs: cooperation, communication, coordination, and collaboration.[168] NVOAD is "a nonprofit, nonpartisan, membership-based organization that builds resiliency in communities nationwide"[169] It serves as an umbrella where IRS tax-exempt, faith-based, and local government organizations can coordinate to provide a network of communications, information, and resources throughout the disaster phases: preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation. It is important to note that NVOAD "is not a service delivery organization. Instead it upholds the privilege of its members to independently provide relief and recovery services."[170]

NVOAD is the primary point of contact for voluntary organizations in the National Response Coordination Center at FEMA headquarters and serves as a primary linkage between FEMA and the nonprofit sector in the NRF. "NVOAD is one of only two nonprofit organizations that is a signatory to the National Response Plan, has a Memorandum of Understanding with FEMA and Citizen Corps and a seat in FEMA's National Resource Coordination Center."[171]

NVOAD has a membership of more than fifty-six national organizations and fifty-six state and territory VOADs, representing local and regional VOADs that share the value that "all sectors of society must work together to foster more resilient, self-reliant communities nationwide."[172]

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[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.
[170] "National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD) and American Red Cross Appraise Diversity," *PR Newswire*, May 10, 2006, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/national-voluntary-organizations-active-in-disaster-national-voad-and-american-red-cross-appraise-diversity-56312942.html.
[171] Ibid.
[172] National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, "Our History."

This research focuses on state and local VOADs in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, which are affiliates of NVOAD and abide by the principles and bylaws of the national organization. Typically the government emergency manager at the lowest level will attempt to collaborate with state-level VOADs and coordinate through the state agency (that is VDEM, MEMA, or HSEMA) before going to NVOAD. This administrative chain of command is typically followed; however, on a day-to-day basis it would be unusual for an emergency manager—sometimes considered the heart of emergency management—to conduct specific collaboration at this level.

2.5.2.1.1 Virginia VOAD

VDEM identifies the Virginia VOAD (VA VOAD) as its primary partner in the services available through Virginia's ESF#17 (volunteer and donations).[173] The VA VOAD is an autonomous statewide coalition of independent voluntary organizations; it is activated at the request of the VDEM as a result of a statewide emergency declaration by the governor or the president.[174] Once activated, VA VOAD will provide volunteers to staff ESF#17 in the VA EOC. Member organizations must be trained and credentialed by VDEM, and they must provide a description of the services and resources they can provide, as well as contact information for those authorized to coordinate their agency activities. Although VA VOAD is not a fundraising organization, member organizations are required to pay annual dues to cover cost of operation.

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[173] Virginia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, *Virginia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VA VOAD) Disaster Response and Recovery Protocols* (Virginia Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, April 2011), 1.
[174] Ibid., 1.

VA VOAD recognizes the importance of local engagement, and it utilizes the

national model to authorize and support regional VOADs, which represent "multiple,

specific geographically adjunct" jurisdictions.[175] Virginia has about nine active regional

VOADs (see figure 10), which are organized for better functionality and response to pool

the resources of a specific region with common attributes and needs. This is particularly

relevant because many small towns only have a small number of nonprofits and perhaps a

single emergency manager. Thus, these regional VOADs expand the footprint of

nonprofits at the lowest level, accommodating more interaction with other nonprofits and

government professionals, which could ultimately enhance collaboration through more

frequent communication.

Figure 10: Virginia Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster Regions

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[175] Ibid., 4.

According to Ivy West, a former president of the VA VOAD, that discussed this with the researcher in May 2014, the regional VOADs are undergoing various levels of reforming and rebuilding. This led the researcher to believe that this reformation is to review the regional areas roles and responsibilities to more efficiently execute missions within the regions. The hope is that this review will continue to look at the establishment of more collaborative relationships with lesser known or less active nonprofits in those regions.

2.5.2.1.2 Maryland VOAD

Like VOADs in Virginia, Maryland VOADs are comprised of IRS tax-exempt nonprofit, faith-based and local government organizations with a parent organization that belongs to the NVOAD. MD VOAD members are required to pay annual dues. The bylaws and membership criteria are modeled after NVOAD guidelines, as they are in Virginia.

Maryland VOAD (MD VOAD) is a single VOAD for the state and does not provide operational support to MEMA.[176] According to Reverend Phillip Huber, the current president of the MD VOAD, the Maryland VOAD is not activated by MEMA; instead, the MD VOAD is activated through and as part of Maryland's ESF#15 (donations and volunteer management), which is led by the Governor's Office of Community Initiatives (GOCI). GOCI coordinates community and volunteer service activities across Maryland, develops and coordinates the governor's policy agenda

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[176] "Maryland VOAD: An Overview," Maryland Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, June 30, 2010, http://www.slideshare.net/mdvoad/marlyand-voad-an-overview.

affecting community programs and initiatives, and advises the governor on policies to enhance and improve the delivery of community and volunteer services. GOCI also oversees the governor's eight ethnic and cultural commissions and the governor's service and volunteerism commission.[177] Maryland also has the Governor's Office of Service and Volunteerism, for individuals who want to volunteer locally, and a very active program for faith-based outreach through an interfaith coordinator.[178]

While the VA VOAD is primarily involved in providing services for one of VA's ESFs (volunteer and donation support), the MD VOAD provides services pertaining to nine of Maryland's fifteen ESFs : transportation; communication; emergency management; mass care, emergency assistance, housing and human services; public health and medical services; search and rescue; agriculture and natural resources; energy; and external affairs.[179]

2.5.2.1.3 The District of Columbia VOAD

The DC VOAD is a chapter of the NVOAD and, like the VOADs in Maryland and Virginia; it consists of tax-exempt, faith-based, and local government organizations active in disaster preparation and response throughout the nation's capital. The DC VOAD is a single entity, like the MD VOAD, and also follows the bylaws, guidelines, and principles of the NVOAD.[180] The DC VOAD has only three active members listed on

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[177] Maryland Governor's Office of Community Initiatives, "Governor's Office of Community Initiatives," Maryland.gov, accessed May 2014, http://goci.maryland.gov/.
[178] Maryland Governor's Office of Community Initiatives, "Interfaith Outreach and Engagement," Maryland.gov, accessed May 2014, http://goci.maryland.gov/interfaith/.
[179] "Maryland VOAD: An Overview," 4.
[180] Washington, DC Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, "About D.C. VOAD," accessed May 2015, Washington, DC VOAD, https://dcvoad.communityos.org/cms/about.

its website (one of which is the Red Cross); in contrast both Virginia and Maryland list at

least forty active VOAD members on their websites.

The DC VOAD relies on the HSEMA for leadership. It was extremely difficult to

get information on the types and frequency of services provided at this level by

nonprofits, although it is clear that there is a great deal of work being performed, based

on mass media and other avenues for getting information. While literature about the DC

VOAD is not as rich as that found for Virginia and Maryland, interviews were conducted

with several nonprofits during the course of this research to uncover how emergency

management preparation is implemented and what levels of collaboration exist at

nonprofits in the District.

2.5.2.2 The Red Cross

The Red Cross is the nation's largest disaster-relief organization and is the only

private nonprofit named as a primary agency in the now-defunct FRP and the current

NRF. Since its founding in 1881, the Red Cross has offered humanitarian care to victims

of war and natural disasters. The organization is unique because it is a nonprofit entity

but it has had a congressional charter since 1905, which means it has emergency

management responsibilities delegated by the federal government. Its role is to manage a

system of domestic and international disaster relief, including mandated responsibility

under the NRF coordinated by FEMA.

The Red Cross must provide volunteer humanitarian support to the armed forces,

serve as a communication medium between the people of the United States and the armed

forces, and provide disaster prevention and relief services. Following an incident of

national significance, the Red Cross serves as the direct provider to disaster victims. In this capacity, the organization provides resources and services including food, shelter, financial assistance, and emergency first aid.[181] In most areas, the Red Cross operates shelters and coordinates with the local volunteer program manager to ensure that shelter needs are met. Additionally, in most areas, the Red Cross and the National Guard, together with other local volunteer agencies, coordinate distribution centers.[182] The American Red Cross is the largest NGO in both domestic and international disaster relief.

2.5.2.3 The Salvation Army

The Salvation Army was founded in London, England, in 1865 and is still headquartered there. The leader is given the honorific title of General and is elected by a high council of international Salvation Army leaders. The mission statement reads "The Salvation Army, an international movement, is an evangelical part of the universal Christian church. Its message is based on the Bible. Its ministry is motivated by the love of God. Its mission is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and to meet human needs in His name without discrimination."[183]

The Salvation Army partners with FEMA at the national level, and it also partners with state and local emergency management agencies. In addition, the Salvation Army partners with other nonprofit organizations, such as Southern Baptist Disaster Relief, and it is an active member in NVOAD. Some of the emergency resources and services that the Salvation Army provides include food, shelter, emergency assistance, donations

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[181] American Red Cross, "Our History," Red Cross.org, accessed October 16, 2013, http://www.redcross.org/about-us/history.
[182] Ibid.
[183] The Salvation Army, "The Salvation Army Emergency Disaster Services," Salvation Army USA.org, accessed February 18, 2016, disaster.salvationarmyusa.org.

management, emotional and spiritual care, emergency communications, disaster case management, and cleanup and reconstruction.[184]

The Salvation Army is organized with a quasi-military command structure. Leadership is provided by commissioned officers (General, Commissioner, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, and Major) who are ordained ministers of religion. In the United States, the activities of the Salvation Army are coordinated by the National Commander, whose office is located at the National Headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. The Salvation Army divides the United States into four geographical territories, with headquarters in Des Plains, Illinois (Central); West Nyack, New York (Eastern); Atlanta, Georgia (Southern); and Long Beach, California (Western). The territories are comprised of smaller units, called divisions. There are forty divisions in the nation, and each is headed by a divisional commander. Divisions consist of corps community centers that provide a variety of local programs, ranging from religious services and evangelistic programs to social services and emergency disaster services.[185]

2.5.2.4 Other Nonprofits

Other nonprofits identified for public emergency management organizations include government-sponsored organizations such as Citizens Corp; Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), and the Medical Corps.[186] Emergencies and disasters impose an extraordinary resource and service drain on local agencies and emergency management. Nonprofits provide support before, during, and after an

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[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid.

[186] Anne Paton, "Collaborative Emergency Management," in *Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government*, 2nd ed., by William L. Waugh and Kathleen Tierney, eds., 71–85 (Washington. DC: International City/County Management Association, 2007).

emergency; they are able to mobilize resources and services far beyond the capacity of local governments. While the benefits of public- and private-sector partnerships in predisaster planning are well documented, coordination between government and nonprofits has not been formally implemented on the state or local levels.

2.6 Social Exchange Theory

2.6.1 The Premise and Major Tenets of Social Exchange

Social exchange theory has roots in research pertaining to anthropology, economics, social psychology and sociology.[187] The premise is that human beings act on the basis of exchange relationships, such as "an exchange of goods, material and nonmaterial."[188] Social behavior is viewed in terms of the pursuit of rewards and the avoidance of punishments and some form of cost.[189]

The major tenets of social exchange are linked to power status, influence, social networks, fairness, coalition formation, solidarity, trust affect, and emotion.[190] Homans defines social exchange as "the exchange of activity, tangible or intangible, and more or less rewarding or costly between at least two persons."[191] His focus explains individual

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[187] Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life (*New York: Wiley, 1964); Karen S. Cook, Linda D. Molm, and Toshio Yamagishi, "Exchange Relations and Exchange Networks: Recent Development in Social Exchange Theory," in *Theoretical Research Programs: Studies in the Growth of Theory* by Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, Jr., eds., 296-322 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Richard M. Emerson, "Social Exchange Theory," *Annual Review of Sociology* 2 (1976): 335–362; Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review* 25 (1960): 161–178; George C. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange," *American Journal of Sociology* 63 (1958): 597–606; Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea* (London: Routledge, 1922); Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (New York: Aldine, 1972); and John W. Thibault and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: Wiley, 1959).
[188] Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange."
[189] Ibid.
[190] Cook and Eric Rice, "Social Exchange Theory," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, edited by John DeLamater, 53–76 (New York: Springer, 2003), 53–54.
[191] Ibid.

behavior of actors (power, conformity, authority, status, leadership, and justice) in the

context of how A's behavior reinforced B's behavior (in dyadic exchange) and how B's

behavior reinforced A's behavior in return.[192]

Homans believes that individual behavior could be explained by propositions

stating that behavior is "the result of frequency of interactions and maintained because of

reinforcements."[193] Social behavior is an exchange of rewards or punishments between at

least two persons and Homan's five propositions evaluate the terms of rewards and

punishments. First, the success proposition suggests that behavior that is rewarded is

more likely to be repeated. Second, the stimulus proposition suggests that behavior that

has been rewarded occasionally in the past will be performed in similar situations. Third,

the value proposition suggests that the more valuable the result of an action is, the more

likely that action will be performed. Fourth, the deprivation proposition suggests that the

more often a person has recently received a particular reward for action, the less valuable

any further units of that reward becomes. Finally, the Fifth proposition suggests that

individuals will react emotionally to different reward situations, becoming angry and

aggressive when they don't receive what they anticipate.[194]

2.6.2 A Macrostructured Theory of Exchange

To complement Homans' propositions, Blau introduces a macrostructured theory

to explain the emergent structure of social systems in the context of an economic and

utilitarian view of behavior. According to Blau, social exchange refers to the voluntary

actions of individuals who are motivated by the return they are expected to bring and

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[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid., 55.
[194] Ibid.

typically do, in fact, bring others.[195] Blau, like Homans addresses rewards and

punishment in relationships and emphasizes the reciprocal and the interdependent nature

of relationships. His perspective on cost and reward on exchange is derived from the

economic utilitarian view of behavior, rather than reinforcement of principles of

interaction.[196] In Blau's macrostructural theory, actors' interactions are influenced by the

anticipation of rewards that might benefit them and they choose the action that

maximizes benefits and minimizes cost.

Blau affirms that social exchange differs from economic exchange. The basic

distinction is that economic exchange includes unspecified obligations and depends on a

formal contract that denotes the exact amount to be exchanged.[197] In today's terminology,

this refers to understanding terms of contracts, conducting a cost-benefit analysis, or

calculating a return on an investment before deciding to collaborate and proceed into a

business deal or relationship. In terms of cost and benefits as an outcome in collaborative

relationships, the cost of the exchange can include the time involved, resources, and

rewards of experience and status. These costs can shape the decision to collaborate. The

cost in providing rewards in an exchange may include investment costs, direct costs, and

opportunity costs.[198] Investment costs could refer to time, for example to gain skills.

Direct costs may be funds or resources. Opportunity costs could judge what potential

gains might be obtained to gain future value and influence.

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[195] Blau, *Exchange and Power,* 91.
[196] Ibid., 91.
[197] Ibid., 88–97.
[198] Ibid., 101.

Blau was very inferential in describing the reciprocal exchange of extrinsic

rewards and the social structure that arises from this type of interaction. He attributes

extrinsic rewards as the value inherent in a relationship itself, mutually regarding each

other.[199] Exchange behavior may be oriented to the pursuit of ultimate value rather than

the pursuit of immediate rewards.[200] Blau acknowledges that there may be some

individuals, though rare, who do not expect any reward in a social exchange; instead,

their incentive maybe the social acknowledgement that they are unselfish.[201] This may

explain the motivations of some nonprofits, such as faith-based organizations, which may

not expect a reward but instead are focused on achieving their mission.

The sustainability of relationships is sometimes characterized by trends on

personal trust that are created by reciprocal benefits.[202] In social exchange theory,

reciprocal exchange is "one that does not include explicit bargaining."[203] Social exchange

proposes that trust is more likely to develop between actors when exchange occurs

without negotiation or contract.[204] Molin et al. suggests that research supports the tenets

of exchange theory that reciprocal exchange produces stronger trust and commitment to

the partner than negotiated exchange. The authors further elaborate that, in reciprocal

exchanges, "choices are made individually [and] benefits can flow unilaterally, while the

flow of benefits in negotiated exchange is bilateral, that is neither actor can benefit

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[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid, 5.

[201] Ibid., 280.

[202] Ibid., 152–156.

[203] Molm, Nobuyuki Takahashi, and Gretchen Peterson, "Risk and Trust in Social Exchange: An Experimental Test of a Classic Proposition," *The American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 5 (March 2000): 1396.

[204] Ibid.

without making an agreement.[205] Blau and Cropanzano et al. posit that reciprocity

encompasses interdependent exchanges, bidirectional transactions in which something is

given and something is returned.

2.6.3 Key Components of Social Exchange: Trust and Reciprocity

A key component of exchange theory is trust. In any exchange, a decision to trust

involves an evaluation of costs and benefits (rewards), including an assessment of the

individual's trustworthiness. Once trust has been established, the decision about the

degree and amount of reciprocity will rest on norms concerning fairness or obligation.[206]

Gouldner recognized that the need to reciprocate for benefits received in order to

continue receiving these services is a "starting mechanism of social interaction."[207]

Throughout the exchange process, norms emerge that will serve as mechanisms for

regulating social interaction by providing incentives for developing new social relations.

The expectation is that, over time, the transaction and collaboration will increase, be

interdependent, and be more likely to be repeated. Interdependence is established when

an individual provides needed services that another individual cannot obtain elsewhere;

others become dependent on and obligated to the first individual, who is equally

dependent.[208]

In addition to identifying reciprocity, trust, and interdependence as part of any

social exchanges, Blau identified several other factors that are present: collective action,

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[205] Ibid., 1399–1400.
[206] Blau, *Exchange and Power*.
[207] Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," 176.
[208] Ibid.

legitimacy, conflict cooperation, and distribution of power.[209] Blau also explained that

low status and power differences develop out of exchange interaction. He defines power

as "the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance

through deterrence, either in the forms of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in

the form of punishment, in as much as the former as well as the latter constitutes in effect

or negative sanction."[210] He posits that interdependence and mutual influences of equal

strength signify lack of power.[211]

Thompson in his work on networks contends that trust is a fundamental norm that

contributes to the development of collaborative partnerships; he adds that trust is an

expected action that cannot be monitored in advance.[212] Blau observed that social

exchanges tend to engender feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust.[213] He

also states that the risk and uncertainty in reciprocal exchanges build trustworthiness and

commitment.

According to Liao, trust in the professional arena arises primarily from three

sources: the personal characteristics of individual team members, the processes that team

members use during interactions, and the overall characteristics of the organization. It is

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[209] Cook, Coye Cheshire, Eric R.W. Rice, and Sandra Nakagawa, "Social Exchange Theory," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed., edited by John DeLamater and Amanda Ward, 61-88 (New York: Springer, 2013).

[210] Blau, *Exchange and Power*, 116.

[211] Ibid., 118.

[212] Grahame Thompson, *Between Hierarchies and Markets: The Logic and Limits of Network Forms of Organization* (Oxford, 2003).

[213] Blau, *Exchange and Power*, 94.

this type of professional trust that facilitates cooperation between nonprofits and governmental entities.[214]

2.6.4 Social Exchange: Organizational and Network Structure

Building on Blau's conceptualization of social structures, Emerson further developed macrolevel analysis by including collective actors and networks into his understanding of social exchanges.[215] Emerson established the importance of networks with an emphasis on the form of social relations among actors rather than on the characteristics of the actors.[216] Molm notes that Emerson is responsible for shifting the exchange approach from the study of actors who exchange to the study of structures that govern exchanges, focusing on size, shape, connectedness, position, and power of such networks.[217] These networks are a collection of nodes, with a collection of links among them that reflect a single social relation; for example, a link between person A and person B stands for communication. Any social or work relationship between pairs of people forms a network.[218] This broader perspective goes beyond the study of social exchanges between individuals as discussed above, instead focusing on exchanges among entire networks or organizations.

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[214] Li-Fen Liao, "Knowledge-Sharing in R&D Departments: A Social Power and Social Exchange Theory Perspective," *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 19, no. 10 (2008): 1881–1895.

[215] Emerson, "Exchange Theory, Part II: Exchange Relations and Networks," In Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson, eds. *Sociological Theories in Progress, Volume 2* (Houghton-Mifflin, 1972).

[216] Ibid., 120.

[217] Molm, "The Structure of Reciprocity," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (June 2010), 120, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25677393.

[218] Stephen P. Borgatti, "Intra-Organizational Networks," Lecture notes for course MB 022: Introduction to Organizational Behavior, 1996, last updated October 8, 2001, accessed June 2014, http://www.analytictech.com/mb021/intranet.htm.

Organizational structure has a huge impact on decision-making and collaboration that could influence the outcome of a successful collaborative partnership. Borgatti observes that an organization "develops based on its size, its technology, and its environmental requirements." He also notes that each organization develops its own structure based on degrees and types of horizontal and vertical differentiation, control and coordination mechanisms, and formalization and centralization of power.[219] Selsky and Parker found that, when two different organizations are collaborating, differences in organizational structure can have an impact on both organizations' willingness to cooperate. Historically, nonprofit organizations have a variety of organizational structures, ranging from dyads to multiparty, local to international, and volunteer-run or incorporated. These many differences may impede partnerships because various levels of authority in different organizations will add complexities to any decision-making process.[220]

2.6.5 Social Exchange: Dependence, Interdependence, and Power

In exchange theory, power is treated as a derivative of unreciprocated exchange transactions in exchange for resources.[221] In power differentiation, there are social structural effects such as asymmetries in relations between members of different groups (for example, government agencies and nonprofits) as superiority in resources is

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[219] Borgatti, "Organizational Theory: Determinants of Structure," Lecture notes for course MB 022: Introduction to Organizational Behavior, 1996, last updated October 8, 2001, accessed June 2014, http://www.analytictech.com/mb021/orgtheory.htm.

[220] John Selsky and Barbara Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships to Address Social Issues: Challenges to Theory and Practice," *Journal of Management* 31, no. 6 (December 2005): 849-873, doi:10.1177/0149206305279601.

[221] Milan Zafirovski, "Social Exchange Theory Under Scrutiny: A Positive Critique of Its Economic-Behaviorist Formulations," *Electronic Journal of Sociology* 2 (2005): 1–40.

transmitted into superior prestige of individuals, accruing to them by membership independent of personal factors.[222] For example, nonprofits are sometimes dependent on volunteers and donors for resources and money; thus, volunteers and donors have the power. In contrast, organizational structure and position typically dictate power dependencies within government, rather than money or volunteer support.

Borgatti proposes that organizations that have power over others are able to impose elements of structure on them.[223] For example, emergency managers have said that if nonprofits want to "play in their sandbox," they need to understand NIMS and become accredited. Collaboration is born of this type of perceived or real power and is driven by the number of shared responsibilities, cooperation in completing tasks, and communication.

Emerson framed the concept that the dependence of one actor on another in a proposition: the dependence of actor A upon actor B is directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and it is inversely proportional to A's ability to achieve those goals outside of the A-B relationship.[224] In this proposition, "goal" refers to qualifications consciously sought and rewards unconsciously obtained through the relation.[225]

Dependence on one actor provides the basis for power of the other. Power is defined as influence in the following proposition: the power of actor A on actor B is the

[222] Blau, *Exchange and Power*146-147.
[223] Borgatti, "Organizational Theory: Determinants of Structure."
[224] Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (February 1962): 32
[225] Ibid.

amount of resistance on the part of B of which can be potentially overcome by A.[226]

Emerson cautions that power as defined may not be observed in every interaction

between actors, but he suggests that it may exist as a potential to be "explored, tested, and

occasionally employed by the actors.[227]

He also addresses reciprocity in power dependency relations. Emerson notes that

equality or balance of power in relations does not mean that power does not exist; since

both are balanced at different levels of dependence, each party may continue to exert

control over the other. For example, just because a nonprofit is not mentioned in an EOP

does not clearly indicate that they have no power in the government-nonprofit

relationship; the nonprofit could exert power because of the government knowing that

they have resources that are needed for response. An imbalance of power is represented

when A is more powerful, partly because B is the more dependent of the two.[228]

Emerson also notes that parties may be controlled by the relationship itself. For

example, some relationships are clearly defined between government and nonprofits

(such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army); however, this may or may not be the

case for other nonprofits not formally recognized in an EOP.

Emerson proposes that "power is a property of the social relations; it is not an

attribute of the actor." Emerson contends that dependence is a part of an interconnected

network where power resulted from the structure and position of the social relations.[229] In

power-dependent relations, a party can engage in cost reduction—a process involving

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[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid., 34.
[229] Ibid., 35.

change in personal, social, and economic values—which reduces the person's cost incurred in meeting the demands of the other.[230] This cost reduction reduces the power advantage, similar to Homan's concept of distributed justice.

Emerson defines four types of balancing actions to stabilize the relation. In the first type of action, B—the weaker actor—reduces its motivational investment in goals mediated by A. In the second, B cultivates alternative sources for gratifying its goals. In the third, A increases its motivational investment in goals mediated by B. In the fourth, A is denied alternative sources for achieving its goals. Emerson's notion of a power balancing proposition describes a situation in which, due to scarce resources, a weaker actor may join other organizations with similar functions and positions to form a coalition and gain competitive edge.[231] For example, nonprofits may join other nonprofits rather than coalesce with the government bureaucracy for resource allocation: a faith-based nonprofit may join with another faith-based organization with a similar mission, creating a collaborative environment, nonprofit to nonprofit but not nonprofit to government. The value is nonduplication of services, maintenance of autonomy, and control over resources and costs by not only staying away from the government but also not joining a VOAD. This power balance reflects another aspect of incentives and barriers to collaboration.

These conclusions tend to reinforce the importance of having a relationship in which a balance of power is clear and visible to both parties. Cook & Emerson state in their article "Power, Equity and Commitment" that power inequities lead to mistrust.[232]

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[230] Ibid., 35.
[231] Ibid., 73.
[232] Cook and Emerson, "Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks," *American Sociological Review* (1978): 721–739.

In emergency management, personal and organizational powers are derived from legal, written, or perceived responsibilities.[233] The complicated process of balancing power is magnified when individuals and organizations are trying to unravel legal, written, and perceived responsibilities both horizontally and vertically, even as all stakeholders seek collaboration as a primary goal. An example of power imbalance can be seen in the Rand study of Hurricane Katrina, which found that most of the nonprofits that participated in the aftermath were involved in human services recovery (such as social services, housing, and counseling) rather than infrastructure (such as debris removal and construction). The government interpreted this to mean that the nonprofits' work was not reimbursable under the Stafford Act because it could not be defined as direct services. The government had power over reimbursements but did not reimburse the nonprofits, leading them to have a greater mistrust of the government's power.

Friedkin states that centrality examines the relationship between particular structured features and the sector's behavior or social influence.[234] One method of understanding actors' connectedness is to evaluate the location of the actor in the network. "Measuring centrality (degree, closeness, and betweenness) of an actor determines the position of the actor in terms of their proximity to the center of the action in a network."[235] Borgatti asserts that an actor's position is "by who he or she is connected to when he or she has direct contact."[236]

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[233] Acosta et al., *The Nongovernmental Sector in Disaster Resilience*, 12.
[234] Noah E. Friedkin, "Theoretical Foundations for Centrality Measures," *American Journal of Sociology* 96, no. 6 (May 1991): 1478–1504, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2781908.
[235] Kapucu, "Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: Networks in Emergency Response Management," *Connections* 26, no. 2 (2005): 41.
[236] Borgatti, "Organizational Theory: Determinants of Structure," 6.

The importance of the levels of connectedness among organizations can affect the flow of information and resources, ultimately contributing to a certain level of trust. Kapucu observed that networks which have few connections or where actors are connected only by great lengths may demonstrate slow response.[237] In contrast, networks that have greater and stronger connections with shorter pathways among actors may be more "robust and capable to respond faster."[238] This implies that nonprofits which are closely connected to the central actor, emergency mangers, may be more strategically positioned to respond quicker with resources and volunteers and their capability may be better known due to close line of communication.

Kapucu also notes that organizations with closer ties have more of an opportunity to interact. His findings indicate that actors who have more ties to other actors may have access to be able to coordinate more resources of the network. Borgatti observed that structurally equivalent actors that are connected to exactly the same nodes have centrality and prestige.[239]

Cook uses digraph theory in her analysis of exchange networks illustrating components including centrality, distance, and balance.[240] A diagram can provide a visual of how this theory might apply to emergency management. In figure 11, actor A is the government emergency manager. Actor B1 represents a state government and B2 a state VOAD. Actor C is the Red Cross or Salvation Army, and actor D represents a faith-based

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[237] Kapucu, "Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context," 35.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Borgatti and Martin G. Everett, "Notions of Position in Social Networks Analyses," *Sociological Methodology* 22 (1992) 1–35.
[240] Cook, "Exchange and Power In Networks of InterOrganizational Relations," *The Sociological Quarterly* 18 (Winter 1977): 71.

or an unknown, nonaffiliated nonprofit who is perpetually disconnected. Actors E and F are NVOADs. The arrows represent the flow of information and resources.

"(A-F represent actors in distinct exchange categories. Note that BI and Bz represent alternative exchange relations.)

Figure 11: Cooks Digraph Theory Diagram

According to Kapucu, a more effective emergency management system would "bring more flexibility and horizontally in terms of intraorganizational and interorganizational relationships, as well as a strong emphasis on coordination, collaboration and communication."[241] Kapucu posits that organizations that have received training about or are aware of the NIMS-based structure, guidelines, and operational systems may present a barrier to collaboration. NIMS "is a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector in working together seamlessly and managing incidents involving all threats and hazards—regardless of

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[241] Kapucu, "Designing, Managing, and Sustaining," 8.

cause, size, location, or complexity—in order to reduce loss of life, loss of property, and harm to the environment. NIMS is the essential foundation to the National Preparedness System and provides the template for the management of incidents and operations in support of all five National Planning Frameworks."[242] The NIMS serves as a template for adoption and implementation by local emergency managers. Many emergency managers feel very strongly that nonprofits needed to be able to "speak the language" and "understand the terminology" of the NIMS to be involved in emergency management. However, none of the nonaffiliated nonprofits have NIMS training, nor were they provided the opportunity to receive training. Only local organizations with national ties—such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, VOADs, and some faith based groups—received NIMS training and participated in exercises.

John Harrald in his testimony before Congress asserts that NIMS as a management tool failed in response to Hurricane Katrina. He points out that NIMS is a closed command system that only operates effectively in emergencies in which similar organizations with uniform goals and homogeneous organizational cultures were integrated into a single organization.[243] This implies that NIMS is not a flexible system. Still, Hurricane Katrina occurred more than ten years ago, and there is a great deal of certainty that some of these issues regarding the NIMS have been addressed; however, there has yet not been an event to test the adjustments.

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[242] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "National Incident Management System Background and Overview," FEMA.gov, accessed March 1, 2016, http://www.fema.gov/nims-doctrine-supporting-guides-tools.

[243] John R. Harrald, "Agility & Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 604, (March 2006): 256–272, doi:10.1177/000271620528540.

Selsky and Parker argue that nonprofits may be reluctant to partner with

government agencies because they fear of loss of control over decision-making. They

argue that the intention of the partnership is for each actor to retain organizational

authority. Organizations collaborate because they lack the competencies and resources to

tackle a problem on their own.[244] In a government-nonprofit partnership, large power

imbalances may exist which may lead partners into political or opportunistic behavior

that can serve one or both partners' interest at the expense of the other.[245] Nonprofit

organizations such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army can be seen as extensions of the

government because their relationship with government has been formalized through a

legal basis.

Some researchers suggest that nonprofits are motivated to collaborate with the

government to obtain increased funding, credibility, or legitimacy. While incompatibility

of missions and organizational cultures were obstacles to collaborating,[246] Williamson

contends that "incompatible missions can lead to self-interest and the risk of

opportunistic behavior, creating power imbalances."[247]

2.6.6 Social Exchange: Trust and Transparency

In discussing exchange theory, Iyer contends that successful partnerships form on

the basis of trust, which increases interest in building and sustaining future

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[244] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 858.

[245] Ibid.

[246] Mary K. Foster and Agnes G. Meinhard, "A Regression Model Explaining Predisposition to Collaborate," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 31 (2002): 549–564; George Mitchell, "Collaboration Propensities Among Transnational NGOs Registered in the United States," *American Review of Public Administration* 44, no. 5 (2014): 575–599; and Jessica E. Sowa, "The Collaboration Decision in Nonprofit Organizations: Views from the Front Line," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 38 (2009): 1003–1025.

[247] Oliver E. Williamson, "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," *American Economic Review* 73, no. 4 (1983): 519–540.

collaboration.[248] Selsky and Parker surmise that an entity can increase transparency about its mission by increasing public awareness through social media, which may enhance its reputation or social capital[249] They argue that the nature of this social capital will vary depending on the objective of the entity; for example, "doing good" may help the government gain social respect and trust from the populace. While nonprofits tend to be more protective of their reputation, they may be suspicious of the government's political agenda.[250] This distrust could become a barrier to collaboration if nonprofits fear the government taking missions that they typically manage.

Lack of transparency also occurs through poor communication, when partners fail to clearly express their intentions or concerns, which prevents trust from building in the partnership. Without clear communication, partners may misunderstand the full scope of each partner's motivation or assume a hidden agenda.[251] This holds true in any relationship where communication occurs at many levels, including via technology or face-to-face interaction using commonly upon terminology and professional vernacular. The researcher concludes that clear communication is a key element in forming and maintaining partnerships.

Some argue that power between partners does not need to be equal as long as each actor recognizes the other's influence on the partnership.[252] Young argues that a nonprofit's trustworthiness depends on the credibility of the nondistribution constraint

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[248] Easwar Iyer, "Theory of Alliances: Partnership and Partner Characteristics," *Journal of Nonprofit and Public Sector Marketing* 11, no. 1 (2003): 41–57.
[249] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 858.
[250] Ibid., 858.
[251] Ibid., 857.
[252] Ibid., 858.

and integrity of the nonprofit's governance structure.[253] This researcher surmises that the

government is constantly reviewing nonprofit governance structure (that is, ensuring an

adequate governance structure is in place and functions well and with integrity), a

condition that could be based on the government's mistrust of nonprofits' resource

allocation and provision of a timely and consistent response. This, again, suggests a level

of distrust between the government and nonprofits, which does not bode well for the

creation of a collaborative environment. Hardin, Kapucu, Lawler, and Schoorman

provide additional insight and agree that trust and trustworthiness was a core element in

public-private collaboration.[254]

Selsky and Parker suggest that when actors from different sectors focus on the

same issue, "they are likely to think about it differently, to be motivated by different

goals and use different approaches."[255] Government agencies and nonprofits have

different motivations and processes for making decisions on how and when to use

resources, both organizationally and operationally. The disparity between their objectives

could present communication and trust issues if not resolved early and frequently

reinforced.

Transparency breeds trust for all actors involved in a relationship, thereby

enhancing a collaborative environment. However, Young asserts that nonprofits are

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[253] Dennis R. Young, "Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations: Theoretical
and International Perspectives," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (March 2000): 156.
[254] Russell Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, Vol. 4 (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 2002): 274; Kapucu, "Designing, Managing and Sustaining"; Edward J. Lawler,
Shane R. Thye, and Jeongkoo Yoon, "Emotion and Group Cohesion in Productive Exchange," *American
Journal of Sociology* 106, no. 3 (2000): 616–657; and F. David Schoorman, Roger C. Mayer, and James H.
Davis, "Organizational Trust: Philosophical Perspectives and Conceptual Definitions," *Academy of
Management Review* 21, no. 2 (1996): 337–340.
[255] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 851.

typically not transparent about their true capabilities and resources to anyone but their

board and donors.[256] If this is true, the government is likely to distrust what resources are

actually available, question whether the nonprofit has access to more, and doubt if the

nonprofit actually has definitive control over those resources.

Hodgson contends that the creation of a manufactured civil society group is a

means of controlling the civil society sector.[257] This perception among nonprofits may

cause frustration and mistrust between these entities and other nonprofits, especially if

these entities or nonprofits accept any funding from the government. These structural and

formal relationships between nonprofits and the government can encourage nonprofits to

take part in decision-making and resource allocation.

2.7 Rationale for the Selection of a Theoretical Approach to the Research

The need for emergency preparedness is exemplified in a quote from a spokesman

for New York City emergency management, who said shortly after Hurricane Katrina,

"Most important to the strength of the intergovernmental chain are solid relationships

among those who may be called to work together in times of high stress. You don't want

to meet someone for the first time while you're standing around in the ruble."[258]

Emergency management is characterized by complexity, individual and group behavior,

unique management systems, and relationships that are difficult to unravel. While there is

limited available information about the incentives and barriers to collaboration by

professional emergency management practitioners, the tenets of social exchange theory

can shed light on these incentives and barriers by illuminating the structure of

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[256] Young, "Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations," 156.
[257] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 861.
[258] Selves and Waugh, *Principles, Practice, Philosophy and Doctrine*, 7–9.

collaborative processes and relationships involving government and nonprofit organizations and staff. This relationship is considered horizontal because the government typically has no direct control over nonprofits, except for a few instances with written agreements. The premise of the exchange framework is that social interaction and relationships are driven by a cost-benefit analyses as perceived by each stakeholder. In this case, government and nonprofit emergency management professionals generate their own versions of the costs and benefit associated with each action to maintain control of their operational environment while simultaneously meeting mission objectives. Exchange theory sheds new light on the incentives and barriers as well as the costs and benefits of collaboration.

The government and nonprofits bring different types and amounts of resources, as well as a variety of assets to the table during the planning process. The motivation to collaborate (or not) is sometimes unclear. What is clear is that they each understand the need for collaboration. Each stakeholder will be invested in maximizing their rewards and minimizing their costs. There is risk and uncertainty that is factored and heavily weighted during the cost-benefit analysis on the part of each stakeholder.

Exchange theory is aligned to the NRF's concept of preparedness through collaboration. Gray purports that a key limitation of existing research is that most perspectives look at individual organizations instead of the interorganizational problem. Social exchange is applicable for understanding collaborative alliances as well as interorganizational relationships. Gazley and Brudney state that collaboration involves weighing risks against opportunities and reward. They further elaborate that research on

collaboration must include both factors, risks opportunities, that encourage and constrain collaboration.[259] Exchange theory provides insights into links between risks, opportunities, rewards, and network structure. It also helps identify what factors of the network structure will motivate the government and nonprofits to form collaborative partnerships, as well as what preconditions result in a positive network outcome.

Exchange theory deals with uncertainty in the context of organizations that collaborate in reciprocal exchanges. In the preparation phase of emergency management, emergency managers and nonprofits do not enter into a formal agreement on nonprofit resource inventory. It is only through past performance or demonstration of the nonprofit's capability that these agreements are forged. Many of these government-nonprofit exchanges will occur whether the partner will fulfill that obligation or not. Exchange theory incorporates this uncertainty. An example is a nonprofit stating that they have ten bulldozers and the emergency manager assuming that this is correct because there is no requirement to inventory those resources. Exchange theory helps analyze the uncertainty that is implicit in the relationship when there is no formal agreement.

Cook and Rice state that exchange theory examines independent affects (which translate to variables in this research), which are outside the relational cohesion. Exchange theory provides a starting point for understanding relationships without bias or prejudgments about the degree of collaboration already existing. A new government or nonprofit will not have to make assumptions about the level of power, influence, and amount of collaboration already taking place. Exchange theory makes no assumptions

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[259] Gazley and Brudney, "The Purpose (and Perils) of Government Nonprofit Partnership," *Nonprofit and Volunteer Sector Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (September 2007): 392.

other than at the lowest level; individuals and organizations are driven by various factors that create incentives (rewards) or barriers that influence their behavior.

Based on this analysis, exchange theory is the most appropriate theoretical framework to use as a filter to design the research methodology and approach for discussing government-nonprofit collaboration.

2.8 Chapter 2 Summary

The literature on government-nonprofit collaboration includes both institutional paradigms and a framework that explains this collaboration. There has been a shift in the emergency management paradigm from response to prevention and mitigation. There is a large body of literature covering emergency management concepts, organizations, and detailed phases for implementation in the event that a disaster or incident occurs. There is also a great deal of energy being placed in accelerating collaboration between government and nonprofits; however, there is no concise research to document the barriers and incentives that impede these efforts. The researcher's expectation is that exchange theory will provide the framework to analyze the social relationships and behavior of government agencies and nonprofits.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will provide the research methodology—including the approach, data collection, and survey instruments—used for interviews of government and nonprofit personnel, data analysis, and the strengths and weaknesses of the research design.

Exchange theory provides a framework to begin research design based on a set of themes and concepts that reflect the creation and sustainment of collaborative relations. There are a myriad of explanations as to why these barriers exist. Chapter 2 notes that there is very limited research to explain the motivations for the development of collaborative relationships by active government and nonprofit professionals. Although the literature review provided exchange as the theory that is most aligned with the existing issues, application of this theory is not documented in any study or analysis of scenarios involving government and nonprofits. Thus, this research design was developed to compensate for existing gaps in literature by using a qualitative approach defined as "research using methods such as participant observation or case studies which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a setting or practice" to identify major themes affecting these relationships.[260]

A qualitative methodology was also chosen because it allows the researcher to collect more in-depth data to provide a better understanding of the complex relationships

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[260] *Online Dictionary of the Social Sciences,* s.v. "Qualitative Research," by Gary Parkinson and Robert Drislane, accessed May 2014, http://bitbucket.icaap.org/dict.pl?alpha=Q.

between nonprofits and local government agencies. Quantitative analyses typically treat individuals as variables, rather than humans who by necessity respond to change—both individually and organizationally—and are influenced by multiple internal and external pressures affecting behavior. The "aim is not to explain or discover causes" but "to classify the meaning of phenomena from lived experiences."[261] This strategy allows the researcher to more thoroughly explore the research question because existing literature on the subject is limited in scope and depth. This research is not only qualitative, but it is also exploratory in that it "seeks to investigate an area that has been under researched. The data garnered is preliminary data that helps shape the direction of future research."[262]

A thematic analysis was used to find emerging trends, themes, and inconsistencies from the data collected during interviews. Thematic analysis is a method for "identifying, analyzing and reporting, patterns [themes] within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in [rich] detail."[263] Thematic analysis can be a "method which works both to reflect reality, and to unpick or unravel the surface of "reality".[264] The authors further elaborate that a theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.[265] Using thematic analysis as the approach to analyze the

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[261] Jamie L. Penner and Susan E. McClement, "Using Phenomenology to Examine the Experiences of Family Caregivers of Patients with Advanced Head and Neck Cancer: Reflections of a Novice Researcher," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 7, no. 2 (2008), 92–101.
[262] Uwe Flick, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* (Sage Publications Ltd., 2014).
[263] Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3 (2006): 79.
[264] Ibid., 9
[265] Ibid.,82

data is appropriate because "it is theoretically flexible . . . it suits questions related to people's experiences or people's views and perceptions."[266]

3.1 Six-Phase Process Approach to Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis is a deductive way to approach research using coding and theme development that are directed by existing concepts embedded in exchange theory involving the following steps: familiarizing oneself with the data, coding the data, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and writing up the results.[267] First, familiarizing oneself with the data involves reading and rereading data—including the literature review and interviews—to become immersed and intimately familiar with its content. Second, coding the data involves generating succinct labels, or codes, that identify important features of the data that might be relevant to answering the research question; the researcher must code the entire data set and then collate all the codes and relevant data extracts together for later stages of analysis. Third, searching for themes involves examining the codes and collated data to identify significant broader patterns of meaning, or candidate themes; the researcher must then collate data relevant to each candidate theme in order to determine its visibility. Fourth, reviewing themes involves checking the candidate themes against the data set to determine that they tell a convincing story of the data that answers the research question. In this phase, themes are typically refined, which sometimes means they are split, combined, or discarded. Fifth, defining and naming themes includes developing a detailed analysis of each theme,

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[266] Richard E. Boyatzis, *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*, (Sage Publications, Ltd., 1988).
[267] University of Auckland, "About Thematic Analysis," University of Auckland School of Psychology, accessed May 2015, https://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/our-research/research-groups/thematic-analysis/about-thematic-analysis.html.

determining out the scope and focus of each, and identifying the story of each. It also involves creating an informative name or label for each theme. Finally, writing the results involves integrating the analytical narrative and data extracts, as well as contextualizing the analysis in relation to existing literature.

This research approach follows the six steps listed above. Although these phases are sequential and each builds on the previous, analysis involves movement among the phases.[268] In addition, the research followed Boyatzi's recommendation to search for emergent and latent themes during data collection, making it possible to identify subthemes, associate patterns of thought from different conversations, and document what was captured with direct quotations from the original discussion.

After reviewing the literature, this researcher created a sample survey based on themes encountered during this review. The researcher validated the survey instrument before finalizing the interview questions, which provided confidence that the responses to the questions would provide the necessary qualitative data before initiating the first interview. This early validation also provided the researcher flexibility to adjust to personnel changes or absences to have the right person respond to interview questions at the federal, state, and local levels.[269]

The researcher used coding to identify each interviewee and analyze the responses before the interviews took place. This was a critical part of the methodology due to the need for confidentiality. Tables 5 and 6 show the coding systems used for the government

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[268] Ibid.
[269] Boyatzis, *Transforming Qualitative Information*.

and nonprofit interviews, respectively; specific answers can be viewed in Appendixes C

through G.

Table 3: Coding for Government Agency Interviews

Government Agency	Level	Assigned Code
Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM)	State	GSX*
Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)	State	GSX
Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA)	State	GSX
Regional Emergency Manager	Regional	GRX
Local Emergency Manager	Local city or county	GLX

X denotes a number (1–40) assigned to the respondent.

Table 4: Coding for Nonprofit Interviews

Nonprofit Agency	Level	Assigned Code
Volunteer Organization Associated with Disasters (VOAD)	State	NVX*
The Red Cross	Congressionally mandated	NVX
The Salvation Army	Congressionally mandated	NVX
Affiliated nonprofit	Affiliated with VOAD	NAX
Nonaffiliated nonprofit	No level	NNX

X denotes a number (1–40) assigned to the respondent.

In the initial stage of this research, a purposive criterion was used to identify a

specific pool of experts and stakeholders who plan, coordinate, and collaborate during the

preparedness phase. This pool of experts provided the potential interviewees for this research, including state, district, government, and nonprofit professionals and organizational representatives located in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.

The researcher's goal was to identify as many emergency service organizations as possible to observe a cross-section of relationships to determine how exchange theory could be a viable tool for analyzing these relationships. The researcher conducted an Internet search of the organizational structure of emergency management organizations and professionals currently employed as emergency managers or CEOs of nonprofit organizations involved in emergency preparation and planning. The Internet search provided information on personnel whom the researcher surmised were preparing and coordinating EOPs.

Within Virginia, emergency managers from all seven regions were selected for interviews, including VDEM preparedness coordinators. The ability to cover all seven regions provided the researcher with a cross-section of the knowledge and skill sets available throughout the state, with the professionals demonstrating varying levels of responsibility and experience working with government, nonprofits, and other stakeholders. In Maryland, emergency managers from all six regions were interviewed including the MEMA preparedness coordinators; this again provided a cross-section of knowledge throughout the state. In the District of Columbia, the HSEMA preparedness coordinator was interviewed, noting that this is the center of preparedness and collaboration. State and local nonprofits, including VOAD members and stakeholders,

were interviewed, as well as regional Red Cross members, and the executive director of the National Capital American Red Cross.

The other nonprofits interviewed were identified from a resource list on the Internet. The researcher also contacted social services since they are the primary agency in Virginia for shelter support and the researcher believed they would have a list of supporting nonprofits. The researcher contacted nonprofits who provide ESFs of sheltering and feeding. The researcher found it very difficult to identify nonprofits that provide shelter and food support but whose mission is not disaster related. This is very similar to what an emergency manager experiences when trying to locate nonaffiliated nonprofits.

The researcher also conducted early evaluations of available EOPs found on the Internet. It must be noted that the author or signatories on some EOPs were not available for public release due to security reasons or a lack of "need to know."

Once interviews were started, the research design depended on snowball sampling, a subtype of purposive sampling in which existing respondents recruit future participants. Researcher M. Q. Patton notes that purposive sampling selects respondents who will "best answer the research questions" and "who are information rich persons."[270] Snowball sampling is a nonprobability sampling technique in which existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. Thus, the sample group appears to grow like a rolling snowball. As the sample builds up, enough data are gathered to be useful for research. This sampling technique is often used in hidden

[270] Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*, 3rd edition (Thousand Oaks: International Educational and Professional Publisher, 2002).

populations that are difficult for researchers to access, which applies to emergency

managers and nonprofits interviewed for this researcher.[271]

In discussing snowballing, Merriam suggests that when a researcher interviews

early key participants, he or she should ask each to refer another participant.[272] This

approach creates a network of experts and stakeholders to interview by repeating the

process until data collection reaches the saturation point.[273] This approach was also

selected based on the limited numbers of emergency management professionals in both

government and nonprofits in Virginia, Maryland, and DC. Random selection of

untrained personnel would not have provided results that are consistent with the

responsibilities noted in earlier chapters because these specific locations require specific

skill sets and training on policy, preparation, and response that are unique to these three

areas.

The researcher concluded that data sampling was complete when responses began

to be repeated and recommendations were made to interview professionals who had

already provided input. Stehlik states that "one of the major concerns regarding such an

approach according to the minimal literature found which discusses 'snowball sampling,'

is associated with what is a perceived potential for bias—or lack of capacity for validity.

For example, Reid and Smith actively advocate *not* using snowballing because of such

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[271] "Sampling," ChangingMinds.org, accessed May 8, 2011,
http://changingminds.org/explanations/research/sampling/snowball_sampling.htm.
[272] Sharan Merriam, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation* (Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2009), 479.
[273] Ibid., 139.

potential bias as 'one does not know how typical the sample is of the population of interest.'"[274]

Finally, the researcher consulted the Institutional Review Board and because no demographic information was collected, the board determined that no action was required to move forward in this research.[275]

3.2 Data Collection

During the initial research validation activities, interviews were conducted with the assistant director of operations and planning at the American Red Cross National Capital Region, other emergency planners, and professionals at nonprofit organizations. These interviews afforded the researcher an opportunity to validate the research question and the interview instruments as well as explore other factors that could also help further frame the research question. These activities also provided the first data set to ensure the interviews would result in receipt of required information.

The data was collected by scheduling and documenting the results of interviews. In all cases, the researcher provided local departments and organizations, emergency planners, and nonprofit professionals an introductory telephone call to explain the proposed research; this was followed by an e-mail or letter to further clarify the research project and schedule interviews. The e-mail allowed those contacted to opt out by not responding. If a person did respond, the researcher sent a follow-up e-mail. All the participants declined to be audio recorded.

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[274] Daniela Stehlik, "From 'Snowball' to 'Rhizome': A Rethinking of Method," *Rural Society* 14, no. 1 (2004): 39, doi:10.5172/rsj.351.14.1.36.

[275] George Mason University Institutional Review Board, April 24, 2014.

Emergency planners and nonprofits provided responses to the interview questions presented in this chapter. Before each interview, each respondent was read the same script, which included the purpose of the study, the notion of voluntary participation, and a guarantee of confidentiality. Interviews lasted approximately forty-five minutes. After the interview and upon request, respondents received a summary of their interview to review and ensure that their responses were correctly captured. They were asked to send any changes to the researcher. Also, the results of this study will be provided to those interviewed upon request.

The data was collected at four levels. First was a review of EOPs (when provided) to determine the level of nonprofit integration. Nonprofits identified in provided EOPs were selected for interviews if they had one or more capabilities that parallels the ESFs outlined in the EOP. Second was a review of the data from the structured questionnaires, both written and verbal responses. Third was a review of the data collected from the snowball sampling methodology, using the survey instruments as the baseline to capture more in-depth information. Finally, was a review of archival data, which was accessed electronically and in hard copy.

3.3 Interview Questions

Some of the themes identified in the literature review include trust, transparency, power, interdependence, and the cost and benefits of collaboration. Both government and nonprofit personnel were asked to describe their roles and responsibilities, to explain their perspective on what factors encourage and constrain collaboration, to identify what nonprofits were formally integrated into their EOPs, to specify nonprofits' level of

engagement in creating the preparation plan, and to explain the differences in working

with FEMA-designated disaster assistance organizations—such the Red Cross and

Salvation Army—and faith-based or other lesser-known nonprofits.

3.3.1 Structured Questionnaire

A structured questionnaire (see Appendix A) was designed to elicit either a "yes"

or "no" response to correlate with the presence or absence of nonprofit involvement in

the ESFs designated in the local EOPs.

3.3.2 Emergency Planner Interviews

Red Cross and local emergency management experts from Northern Virginia

assisted in the development of the semi-structured interview questions for emergency

planners and nonprofit personnel. Information gathered from the interviews provided the

researcher an opportunity to adjust the interview questions to better capture information

to focus and guide the research process. These interview questions are available in

Appendix A.

3.3.3 Nonprofit Interviews Questionnaire

Questions for nonprofit personnel were similar to those designed for emergency

managers; however, they focused on collaboration with government emergency

management preparation staff and centered on insights into their existing relationships:

the partnership with the government, the benefits to this partnership (if it exists), and

incentives and barriers to involvement and integration with the government. These

interview questions are available in Appendix B.

3.4 Method of Analysis

This study used an inductive analysis approach to gather and analyze data. Data collection and analysis occurred sequentially. Notes were taken during and after each interview; transcripts from the interviews were reviewed many times to document emerging themes, patterns, and insights. Questions were selected to ascertain the roles and responsibilities of the emergency manager or nonprofit personnel being interviewed; to identify whether nonprofits were listed in the EOP or not and the reasons why; to determine the extent of the interviewees' familiarity with nonprofits, both recognized and not recognized; and to distinguish any incentives and barriers to collaboration. These questions relate directly to the theoretical approach selected for the research design. Exchange theory provides a theoretical framework to examine the factors that could facilitate or constrain collaborative relationships between local government agencies and nonprofits. The factors identified in exchange theory serve to highlight the major themes found in the research; these variables will be operationalized in chapter 4.

In all phases, the data collected were grouped in categories of similar themes and ideas. Those themes and patterns were grouped using conceptual codes framed by the dependent and independent variables. When this process was completed, similar themes and ideas were grouped using conceptual concepts to establish links between research expectations and summary findings—that is, between the research design and what was actually discovered regarding the utility of the framework.

The researcher conducted one major revision of the interview questions after the initial validation with the first three emergency managers and the first two nonprofits. The earlier interviews were valid and, more importantly, were used to ensure there was

no redundancy in the questions and that the objective of each question was consistent. After these initial interviews, the questions were revised to be less redundant and more consistent with the emergent themes found in the literature review. Any qualitative data that was collected and appears to be outliers or contradictory will be noted within the summary.

3.5 Strengths of the Research Design

This study is qualitative and provides rich, in-depth data regarding insights and understanding of the factors that may enhance or constrain the development of collaborative partnerships between nonprofits and local government agencies in the emergency management process. One of the strengths is that this research is not simply a laboratory empirical study; rather, it provides real-time perspectives of participants in emergency management preparation.

Using the snowball sampling method to collect data allowed the researcher flexibility in modifying the research design to include more sampling, if needed, and amend the interview questions to be more introspective on the constructs of the research. Although the sample size was small and not random, it enabled the researcher to gain access to publications and respondents that were deliberately selected for their expertise and experience in understanding how and why collaborative relationships develop or do not develop. The results may not be generalized to the larger population because of the professional skills required to perform the emergency management tasks, but the results will contribute to a deeper understanding of how nonprofits and the government can build

and sustain collaborative partnerships that benefit the community by increasing its capacity for and resilience to disasters.

When attempting to collect information about a particular topic and a limited number of available participants, snowball sampling enabled increased efficiency of data collection. Additionally, there is an increased level of confidence in the data because interviewees reviewed the draft summary of their interviews to ensure their words were not misinterpreted.

An additional strength of this research involves the extensive efforts employed by the researcher to establish contact with emergency managers and nonprofits; the labor-intensive process included mediating scheduling issues, traveling up to five hours for interviews, and balancing interview time with real-world needs that required the attention of many emergency management professionals. This factor provided the researcher a clear understanding of the workloads and responsibilities associated with preparedness activities and provided insight on the attitudes and persistence needed to create a collaborative environment.

Another strength of the research involves the researcher's access to a cross-section of participants; this was aided by the researcher's proximity to the national capital, which has an extensive array of demographics and a combined homeland security mission for federal, state, and local leadership. For this reason, the researcher relied on face-to-face interviews whenever possible; in rare occasions when an emergency manager or nonprofit staff were unavailable to meet in person, telephone interviews were conducted. The labor was most intensive in cases when government personnel did not

respond after several attempts to contact them. In these instances, the researcher

contacted a relevant deputy or decided to interview another emergency management

professional in the same locality. This was also true for nonprofits, who typically

volunteered another person if the initial personnel became unavailable for an interview.

This did not impact the results of the interview because the person "standing in" had

typically coordinated with the key asset before the interview, sometimes skewing the

results but overall resulting in unbiased data.

Another strength is that the data sources existed and were readily available.

Specifically, national and local guidance and related documents are readily available on

the Internet and from local government officials. The EOPs are not as readily available

online; however, all EOPs that could be accessed online or received directly from the

emergency manager were reviewed. This provided a large volume of data for review

early in the research.

A major strength of this research is its documentation of the understanding and

insight on how government and nonprofits can build and sustain collaborative

partnerships that benefit the community. Several factors contributed to this outcome.

First, the researcher worked as a representative of a local department of social services

with emergency disaster planning team in the development/preparedness phase of her

county's EOP. Second, prior to the beginning the study, the researcher interviewed a

program manager providing local planning assistance with the VDEM. The program

manager noted that there were inconsistencies in the level of nonprofit integration in local

EOPs across the state of Virginia, but they could not account for the inconsistencies,

given federal policy that provides guidance on integrating the role and responsibilities of nonprofit in disaster planning. Finally, prior to beginning the study, the researcher met with experts who assisted in the development of the semi-structured interview questions. These prestudy interviews provided the opportunity for experts to validate or refute the researcher's understanding of the research problem and direction of the research. The interviews with the experts also helped reduce the risk of researcher's bias. Their suggestions reflected minor changes, for example reducing redundancy so that the interviewee would not have to repeat information asked in an earlier question.

3.6 Weaknesses of the Research Design

One weakness is that the researcher asked interviewees open-ended questions, which potentially led to digressions or unrelated discussions, increasing the data collected for analysis which was heavily filtered based on how it relates to the primary focus of the research. Open-ended interviews were the main source of data gathering. Additionally, transcribing the written interviews proved to be labor intensive. Problems with external validity and the small, yet robust, sample size limited generalization to the larger population. The researcher ensured that the data collected was not skewed toward preconceived notions of the incentives and barriers surrounding nonprofits' integration or lack thereof into EOPs.

Although the researcher spoke with a number of nonprofits, it was difficult to identify nonprofits whose primary mission was not disaster related but still provided emergency support services. Again, this difficulty reflects the experiences relayed by emergency managers in their own attempts to locate nonprofits.

Another weakness is that the study cannot be replicated. There is not a large body of historical data to draw upon due to the limited research on this topic. Qualitative research is sometimes questioned on scientific standards of inquiry because the methods used do not test hypotheses, assumptions, or expectations but rather generate them. There is a question of internal validity—that is, the observers' bias—that cannot be removed due to the sampling methods.

One key factor involved in this research design was identifying the risk of not acquiring enough data to come up with meaningful lists of incentives and barriers. This risk was mitigated by increasing the number of participants in the interviews and snowballing for secondary professionals who also accomplish the mission. The additional risk was finding completely new information that was not aligned with the theoretical framework. However, the sample size was enough to continuously reveal the same emergent themes throughout the research, achieving saturation. This was based on a wealth of research about guidance to emergency managers at the federal level that provides basic guidance to government managers in Virginia, Maryland, and DC and emergency managers across the country. The risk was much greater at the state and local level because some of the documentation is not available publicly. This risk was much greater for nonprofits than for government emergency managers because of the difficulty in finding information on organizational structures and internal functions of both affiliated and nonaffiliated nonprofits (outside the Red Cross and Salvation Army). The detailed information provided by nonprofits helped clarify their relationships with the government and helped mitigate some of the risk of not having enough data.

3.7 Chapter 3 Summary

The methodology used for this research had a multilayered strategy which (1)

validated then developed the interview questionnaire using both government and

nonprofit professionals, (2) collected data by interviewing emergency management

government and nonprofit experts and stakeholders, and (3) increased the depth of

knowledge using the snowball approach. The research approach was selected due to

difficulty in accessing information online as well as supporting face-to-face contact with

professionals in the field.

CHAPTER FOUR: VARIABLES OPERATIONALIZED

4.0 Introduction

The preceding chapters provide insight into the research question, background on

emergency management found in the literature review, and the methodology for scoping

the project. It is important to conduct a detailed analysis of the qualitative measures

associated with each of the variables: trust, power and autonomy, transparency, and

organizational structure. This chapter will focus on the researcher's approach to defining

each of the variables and how exchange theory is effective in conducting a thematic

analysis based on the responses to interview questions. Additionally, this chapter will set

the stage for chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, which contain the data analysis for each emergent

theme.

4.1 Trust

4.1.1 Trust Defined

In order to define trust, the concept must be placed in the context of this

research's filter, exchange theory, which is a direct application of social and family

sciences devised in the late twentieth century. Sociologists such as Blau, Homans, and

Thibaut and Kelley focused on human relationships, asserting that humans choose

behaviors that maximize their likelihood of meeting self-interest in different situations.

These theories have several underlying assumptions:

(1) individuals are generally rational and engage in calculations of costs and benefits in

social exchanges; (2) individuals engaged in interactions are rationally seeking to maximize both the profits or benefits to be gained from those situations, especially in terms of meeting their basic individual needs; (3) exchange processes that produce payoffs or rewards for individuals lead to patterning of social interactions. These patterns of social interaction not only serve individuals' needs but also constrain individuals in how they may ultimately seek to meet those needs; (4) individuals are goal-oriented; and (5) individuals and their partners will not exploit or take unfair advantage of each other.
[276]

Social exchange theory extends beyond individual relationships to apply to group dynamics. Without diverting into a lengthy discussion of group dynamics, it is important to assert that, according to exchange theory, trust will influence the formation of collaborative relationships. Additionally, the sustainability of relationships is characterized by bonds based on personal trust that is created by reciprocal benefits.[277]

Exchange theory proposes that trust is more likely to develop between actors when exchange occurs without negotiation or contract.[278] The authors further elaborate that in reciprocal exchanges, "choices are made individually [and] benefits can flow unilaterally," while the flow of benefits in negotiated exchanges is "bilateral," that is, neither actor can benefit without making an agreement.[279] While it makes sense for an emergency manager or a nonprofit professional to forge a collaborative relationship

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[276] Thomas R. Chibucos, Randall W. Leite, and David L. Weis, eds., *Readings in Family Theory* (Sage Publications Ltd., 2004), 137.
[277] Blau, *Exchange and Power*, 152–156.
[278] Molm et al. "Risk and Trust in Social Exchange," 1396.
[279] Ibid.

based on trust, the research does not determine what values and mores the professionals bring into the job before any engagement occurs.

Blau affirms that social exchange differs from economic exchange. The basic distinction is that social exchange entails "unspecified obligations"; in contrast, an economic transaction depends on a formal contract that stipulates the exact quantities to be exchanged.[280] Blau also asserts, "Since there is no way to assure an appropriate return for a favor, social exchange requires trusting others to discharge their obligations." He also states that only social exchange tends to engender feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange does not.[281] Large-scale social exchange is not likely to occur without formal agreements unless social bonds rooted in trust have been established.[282]

The researcher's expectation at this phase of the project was that there is no economic exchange between government and nonprofits that could impact trust. The researcher also assumed that normal salaries paid to these professionals, as well as legal and ethical boundaries, prohibit any such exchange.

Cropanzano et al. postulate that reciprocity encompasses interdependent exchanges, bidirectional transactions where something has to be given and something returned. [283] In this exchange transaction, a decision to trust involves an evaluation of costs and benefits, including an assessment of trustworthiness of the individual. After a sense of trust has been established, the decision about the degree and amount of

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[280] Blau, *Exchange and Power*, 88–97.
[281] Ibid., 94.
[282] Ibid., 94.
[283] Russell Cropanzano and Helen Mitchell, "Social Exchange Theory: An Interdisciplinary Review," *Journal of Management* 31, no. 6 (December 2005), 876, doi:10.1177/0149206305279602.

reciprocity depends on norms concerning fairness or obligation. In terms of costs and

benefits as an outcome in collaborative relationships, the cost of exchange can include

punishment experience, the time invested in a relationship, or benefits (rewards) lost as a

result of engaging in that relationship. Satisfaction in the relationship will hinge on the

evaluation of the outcome. The outcomes are equal to the reward obtained from the

relationship minus the costs.[284]

Wilson et al. take a similar, although slightly different, approach to trust, stating

that "a decision to trust involves an evaluation of costs and benefits, including a *strategic*

assessment of the trustworthiness of the trusted person.[285] In other words, the individual

must decide how this relationship may provide benefits or rewards in the future. This

evaluation of trustworthiness is often impacted by the amount of communication between

the individuals. Several studies outside this research have analyzed communication

through information exchange to determine whether or not this exchange incentivizes

trust in relationships. One clear finding is that "communication matters for enhancing

trust and trustworthiness, a finding that is widespread in many bargaining games.[286]

An even more basic approach to determining trustworthiness is based on watching

and observing outward behavior and then weighing risks, as opposed to an individual

performing a purely psychological analysis of trust. Molm et al. define trust as

"expectations that an exchange partner will behave benignly, based on the attribution of

positive dispositions and intentions to the partner in a situation of uncertainty and

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[284] Blau, *Exchange and Power*.
[285] Rick K. Wilson and Catherine C. Eckel, "Trust and Social Exchange," prepared for the *Handbook of Experimental Political Science* (Houston, Texas: Rice University Department of Political Science, September 2009).
[286] Ibid., 14.

risk."[287] This dimension of risk goes beyond individual concerns; it is influenced by degree of transparency, perceived power, and organizational structure—all key ingredients in incentivizing trust and ultimately collaboration. Risk is evident in all transactions, regardless of the goal, and emergency management involves a unique set of risks, including the loss of lives. The researcher's expectation was that risk-averse behavior—that is, no changes outside normal behavior—constrains collaboration due to a lack of trust.

Gouldner recognizes that the need to reciprocate for benefits received in order to continue receiving them serves as a "starting mechanism" of social interaction through the exchange processes. Norms will emerge that will serve as mechanisms for regulating social interactions, providing incentive for developing a network of social relations.[288] This goes beyond Blau's original statements on individuals and extends to larger networks, such as the government and nonprofit agencies examined in this research. The expectation is that, over time, the transactional collaboration will increase, share an interdependence, and more likely to be repeated. [289] This is the ultimate goal for sustainment of government-nonprofit collaboration.

4.1.2 Trust Operationalized

Trust between government and nonprofit professionals will be examined by interviewing emergency managers and nonprofit stakeholders about the conditions and extent to which certain factors influence their willingness or unwillingness to collaborate when confronted with a proposition that involves committing their organizational

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[287] Molm et al., "Risk and Trust in Social Exchange," 1402.
[288] Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," 176.
[289] Blau, *Exchange and Power,* 3.

resources or one or more of the tenets of exchange in the emergency management

planning phase. The following sections will define trust in the context of these factors:

membership, relationship quality, resource reliability, funding sources, communication,

purpose, preparedness capabilities, policy and guidance.

Figure 12: Factors that Affect Trust

4.1.2.1 Membership

Membership at the most basic level is "the state of belonging to or being a part of a group or an organization."[290] Within a single organization, this is typically straightforward because members of the same organization share inherent similarities and perform activities that have direct traceability to their mission. However, the concept of membership in a larger construct, for example an emergency management planning group, is made up of multiple organizations, becoming more complex as the number of entities increases. To further compound the complexity, membership of emergency management planning groups varies based on the needs of each specific community. While this flexibility enables a diverse range of support services, it also adds to the difficulty of identifying and maintaining a consistent relationship with all the group's members and stakeholders.

If an organization doesn't feel like a member or part of the group, this is a barrier to collaboration in terms of trust related to explicit and implicit inclusion and exclusion. The researcher expected to find that the extent to which an organization perceives they are being included relates to their level of trust. An example of this principle could involve an emergency manager inviting nonprofit personnel into a planning meeting; when the nonprofit personnel attend the meeting, they will determine if they are valued and whether the relationship is worth an exchange of expertise and resources to receive prestige, visibility, recognition and they will determine their level of future engagement.

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[290] *Merriam-Webster*. s.v. "Membership," accessed March 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/membership.

The research design included collection of data from a cross-section of stakeholders, both government and nonprofit, to better understand the level of inclusion that each stakeholder perceives. This design included a comprehensive search for nonprofits, including some who decided not to accept membership in an emergency management group. The research design also included an effort to determine the motivations of those organizations that did not attend emergency management meetings to more clearly understand the importance of membership in terms of inclusion and exclusion. The researcher expected to find that those who did not accept membership saw no benefit in joining. The researcher also expected to find that, in defining trust, the relationships developed by nonprofit professionals are far more complex than those of the government professionals and that these significant differences exist between government-affiliated nonprofits (such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army) and nonaffiliated nonprofits.

4.1.2.2 Relationship Quality

The researcher, based on the literature review, expected to find that the quality of government-nonprofit relationships, which is dependent on familiarity, is more easily understood at the individual level, rather than the organizational level. The researcher also expected to find that the level of familiarity has a direct impact on an individual's willingness to exchange information or withhold information. For example, previous experience with individuals and organizations often gives a sense of their attitude or perception toward openness. The length of time that the individuals have been familiar with each other also plays a role in their willingness to trust. Relationships that have been

established for any length of time are typically more stable than those that are new. In the

context of emergency management, benefits are maximized for both governments and

nonprofits when they can build a collaborative relationship before committing resources.

Another relationship quality factor that can influence the level of trust between

government and nonprofit agencies is mutual respect for each other's mission. Chapters 1

and 2 of this research describe the mission focus of each. It is important for government

and nonprofit personnel at the federal, state, and local levels to understand each

organization's mission in order to set boundaries and build upon known goals.

4.1.2.3 Resource Reliability

The researcher expected to find that the more reliable a given partner's service is

perceived to be, the more trust the other party will have, leading to the establishment of a

collaborative relationship. The resource reliability in the context of trust can be viewed

based on an organization's capability and capacity.

4.1.2.3.1 Capability

An organization's capability is the amount of work they can do and how well they

can do that work as promised. Operationalizing capability requires putting trust in the

proper perspective as this research continues to determine which factors incentivize or

become barriers to collaboration between government and nonprofits. Thompson

acknowledges that trust is a fundamental norm that contributes to the development of

collaborative partnerships. He adds that trust implies an expected action which cannot be

monitored in advance or cannot be directly controlled. It discourages the opportunity of

purely opportunistic behavior. [291] Control (or lack thereof) is a factor that is frequently

listed as a constraint for forging new relationships; it is reflected in an attitude that says,

"If I can't control you, I may not need to be around you."

This reflects the nature of emergency management: risk can be mitigated and

planning can occur, but it is impossible to determine what will occur in a disaster because

no one can exert control over a disaster. Emergency managers and nonprofits must

minimize risk to narrow the scope of what can go wrong in an emergency. Thus, both

government and nonprofit emergency management agencies have tried to develop

policies that emphasize collaboration: on knowing individual personnel, their capabilities,

and that of their organizations; conducting exercises to test those capabilities; and

identifying gaps in those capabilities. Although collaboration is now policy, a lack of

trust, driven by individual and institutional attitudes, remains an issue.

Hardin's view of trust is grounded in "encapsulated interest," which can be

colloquially translated as saying, "I trust you because I know that you have my interest at

heart to some extent." [292] This view of trust includes the following elements: (1) trust is a

three-part relation—A trusts B to do X—and (2) trust is a cognitive notion that involves

the knowledge of the other in terms of their trustworthiness. Acting in trust involves risk.

Individuals might start by taking a risk on people who are not known or are in a new

position; however, individuals are not likely to take risks in important situations without a

prior history or experience of trustworthiness and a sense that the trusted will have

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[291] Thompson, *Between Hierarchies and Markets*, 327.
[292] Hardin*, Trust and Trustworthiness,* 1.

incentive to follow through.[293] This has clear implications for collaboration in disaster

response, where the situation is often a matter of life or death, thus both governments and

nonprofits would be less likely to risk trusting an unknown individual or organization.

A major assertion by Pusa is that trust develops over time as a function of the

parties having a history of positive interaction. Information contributes to predictability

of the other party's actions, which in turn contributes to trust.[294]

4.1.2.3.2 Capacity

Capacity is defined as an organization's ability to maintain and execute its

mission with the resources required to accomplish a specific set of tasks over time. While

an organization may be fully capable of responding at a given instance, it may not be able

to sustain this capacity at all times due to simultaneous commitments. In the context of

emergency management, this includes the expectation that an organization maintains

sufficient equipment, training, and volunteers with the required skills. The researcher

expected to find that trust will increase when the government perceives that a nonprofit

organization consistently has sufficient capacity to commit to scenarios (for example,

ESFs and exercises) as planned; conversely, the researcher expected that distrust will

increase when an organization's capacity is proven to be insufficient or is unknown.

4.1.2.4 Funding sources
The researcher expected that government and nonprofit organizations will either

trust or distrust an organization based on a perception or belief that funding is or is not

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[293] Ibid., 9.
[294] Anu Pusa, "Organizational Identity and Trust," *Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies* 11, no. 2 (2006): 31. [294] Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness,* 1.

available. In the context of emergency management, organizations must commit resources during the planning documentation phase, before they are required to be used. As discussed in previous chapters, nonprofits will augment the capability of government for multiple reasons. In fact, one primary mission for nonprofits is to supplement resources when it is known that government funds are insufficient to meet a community's needs. Nonprofit organizations are at times reliant upon the benevolence of public donors; however, because benevolence can rarely be predicted, the government may perceive the nonprofit's resources as unreliable and thus be uncertain that the nonprofit will be able to deliver any promised resources.

In addition, any expectations or requirements levied by the source of funding may impact the level of trust. In both nonprofit and government organizations, there may be restrictions about how funding can be spent, potentially limiting the capability to provide resources for any unknown future disaster. The researcher expected to find that, in the emergency preparedness phase, legal restrictions placed on use of funds by both government and nonprofits may create barriers to collaboration.

4.1.2.5 Communication
Kapucu states that networks that have greater and stronger connections with shorter pathways "among actors may be more robust and capable to respond faster." This suggests that nonprofits that are closely connected to the central actor, the emergency manger, may be more strategically positioned to respond quicker with resources, volunteers, and capability may be better known due to close line of communication.[295]

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[295] Kapucu, "Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context," 35.

The researcher expected to find that fluid communication between stakeholders will

increase trust between organizations; specifically, the ability to get the right information

to the right stakeholders at the right time will incentivize collaboration.

Currently, government and nonprofits are working hard to increase

communication. The government—for example, FEMA and regional and local

emergency managers—have made policies available online with the expectation that the

availability of this information will raise trust among nonprofits as well as promote

compliance by all stakeholders. This openness gives the government legitimacy. In

contrast, nonprofits typically do not issue policy to government, although they typically

explain the ground rules they work under when requested.

A key ingredient of knowledge-based trust relies on information and the ability to

predict another's behavior. In this research, every interview affirmed that nonprofits are

dependent on the government to provide information. The inference is that a lack of

information is a barrier to trust and, in turn, detracts from nonprofits' ability to predict

how government emergency managers will act before and during a disaster. The

government, in contrast, relies on nonprofits to willingly and enthusiastically provide

information to them to develop trust that the nonprofits have necessary capabilities,

certifications, and skills. Trust can suffer if the government perceives that the nonprofit

has not provided accurate information.

The researcher further expected to find that communication—personal,

interpersonal, and organizationally in group settings—lays the foundation for

understanding each stakeholders' perspective as well as their priority of actions required

to perform the emergency management mission. Acronyms, typology, and language—as referenced in the NIMS—cultural variances in communication; and clarity and precision of information transfer all impact an organization's will to be more or less transparent. Communication is also a factor in organizational structure and organizational culture, which will be discussed in chapter 8.

4.1.2.6 Stakeholder Goals

The researcher hypothesized that trust will increase when stakeholders have mutual goals, mutual respect, and the source of the stakeholder's motivation is known. This concept also creates an expectation that, while the projected outcomes of the planning events (potential payoffs) are important, individuals also care about the motivation for reaching a goal or resolution to a problem. Selsky and Parker explain that, when actors from different sectors focus on the same issue, "they are likely to think about it differently, to be motivated by different goals, and use different approaches."[296] The disparity between each organization's objectives could present a communications and trust issue. Thus, this research considered the following questions: do nonprofits share the same goals as government organizations, and does that perception change based on the organization. The researcher expected to find that if both parties believe they are working collectively towards the same goal, then their willingness to commit resources during the preparedness phase will increase because they will trust that the group will operate to maximize the payoff.

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[296] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 858.

In addition, the researcher expected to find that the perception of each stakeholder's motivation is important to the decision to collaborate. For example, trust and collaboration are likely to increase if an organization's motives are perceived as noble; in contrast, distrust will occur if an organization is perceived to be motivated by is self-interest, creating a barrier to collaboration.

4.1.2.7 Preparedness Capabilities

In the absence of historical data to delineate an organization's response capability, the organization's preparedness capability—sometimes referred to as readiness— becomes critical. Thus, based on the literature review and validation of the survey instrument, the researcher chose to consider incentives and barriers trust based on the resources that contribute to an organization's preparedness capabilities. The researcher expected to find that trust will increase when organizations leverage tools such as training, meeting spaces, participation in exercises, and credentialing to maximize benefits and maintain their preparedness capabilities.

4.1.2.7.1 Training

One of the key elements associated with trust in emergency management entails the government having assurance that all nonprofits are trained. In the terms of this research, training is considered a high-value exchange item. To that end, the government provides training for their own personnel, as well as community emergency responders and registered nonprofits. For example, one county provides training four times a year to stakeholders such as the general public, neighborhood groups, businesses, critical infrastructure sectors, faith-based organizations, teens and youth, colleges and

universities, people with disabilities, and the military. Supplemental training is also

conducted, recommended, and/or required for CERT members; these courses could

include such topics as the Incident Command System (ICS), the NIMS, National

Response Framework, amateur radio operation, CPR, basic first aid, and automatic

external defibrillation. [297] The goal of training is help the organizations to speak the same

language and use the same vernacular, which incentivizes trust.

4.1.2.7.2 Meetings

The researcher expected to find that governments and nonprofits who hold

meetings with a joint purpose where missions are aligned will have increased trust.

Interviews indicated that the designated meeting times are important in facilitating

collaboration because volunteers often work full-time elsewhere and have other

obligations; thus, meetings planned outside normal work hours were most likely to

establish trust and facilitate collaboration.

4.1.2.7.3 Exercise Participation

The researcher also expected to find that an organization's ability to participate in

planning exercises will increase stakeholder trust because it allows an opportunity to

assess the organization's projected capabilities. Thus, trust is increased when

stakeholders plan and participate in exercises. It is important that nonprofits be involved

in these exercises because resources must be committed to facilitate engagement from

both a planning and participatory perspective.

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[297] "Community Emergency Response Team," Henrico County, Virginia, accessed on March 2016, http://henrico.us/pdfs/fire/hccert.pdf.

4.1.2.7.4 Credentialing

The public, one of the primary stakeholder groups, relies on the emergency management community to provide a safe living and work environment. As a result, public servants and volunteers that support this mission require credentialing (for example, criminal background checks and conduct investigations) to determine their suitability to serve the public. The researcher expected to find that trust will increase when organizations are able to secure these endorsements; in contrast, trust will decrease when these endorsements have not been established at the time of planning because it increases the government's liability during a disaster.

4.1.2.8 Compliance with Policy and Guidance

Binding contracts are outside the scope of this research because the terms of agreement are negotiated incrementally until both sides reach terms that are optimized. Instead, this research will focus on analyzing trust in terms of organizations' compliance with policy and guidance, as written in emergency planning documents such as EOPs.

The researcher expected to find that organizations will be more likely to trust each other when policy exists with enough detail to support effective planning, such as EOPs. During the interviews the researcher asked individuals from both government and nonprofit organizations questions about the existence of policies. As follow-up, the researcher attempted to identify the organization's intent to comply with any known policies and note the motivations that influenced those decisions.

4.2 Transparency

4.2.1 Transparency Defined

Transparency is a key ingredient to promoting trust and confidence in building collaborative partnerships. Fung et al. assert that transparency is a solution to the problems posed by lack of information.[298] This definition is appropriate for government and nonprofit agencies that collaborate in multiple environments at the national, state, and local levels.

Piotrowsky and Van Ryzin assert that governmental transparency can be defined as the ability to find out what is going on inside a public-sector organization through open meetings, access to records, the proactive posting of information on websites, whistle-blower protections, and even illegally leaked information.[299] While this definition is given in the context of government-to-citizen transparency, it also applies to any relationship where services are exchanged, such as those between government and nonprofits for emergency management preparation. Kapucu et al. state that transparency results when citizens have access to information about how the government functions.[300] Dunn and Miller highlight how it is essential that there be openness in communication and transparency of an organization in serving its public purpose.[301] Again, this concept

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[298] Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil, *Infotopia: Unleashing the Democratic Power of Transparency*, *Politics and Society* 41, no. 2 (June 2013): 184 John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

[299] Suzanne J. Piotrowski and Greg G. Van Ryzin, "Citizen Attitudes Toward Transparency in Local Government," *The American Review of Public Administration* 37, no. 3 (September 2007): 306–323, doi 10.1177/0275074006296777.

[300] Kapucu, Farhod Yuldashev, and Erlan Baikiev, "Collaborative Public Management and Collaborative Governance: Conceptual Similarities and Differences," *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* (2009): 41.

[301] William Dunn and David Miller, "A Critique of the New Public Management and the Neo-Weberian State: Advancing a Critical Theory of Administrative Reform," *Public Organization Review* 7, no. 4, (February 2007): 345–358.

applies to both government and nonprofits involved in emergency management preparation to incentivize collaboration.

Another key concept of transparency involves the level of participation by stakeholders with varying degrees of transparency. Bickerstaff et al. define participation as "the involvement of one or more stakeholders in decision-making or policy in such a way that the stakeholder input is considered during the decision-making process and influences the decision outcome."[302] This is a critical point when discussing the role of government and nonprofits in emergency management preparation and planning due to the levels of authority and, as one interviewee stated, "remaining in your swim lane." Stakeholders are likely to decline or limit involvement if they are not part of the preparation decision-making process.

Transparency is often linked to a more trustworthy, accountable, and open government.[303] When combined with a participatory environment in which all stakeholders are part of the decision-making process, transparency and accountability are often preconditions for molding a more trustworthy and open government. This concept also applies to nonprofits as well as their stakeholders, including the government. Ospina et al. conclude that a participatory mechanism integrating citizens and stakeholders into the decision-making process and requiring greater informative provisions may encourage a more collaborative approach to governance.[304]

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[302] Karen Bickerstaff and Gordon Walker, "Participatory Local Governance and Transport Planning," *Environment and Planning A* 33 no. 3, (March 2001): 431–451.

[303] Ibid., 95.

[304] Sonia Ospina, William Diaz, and James O'Sullivan, "Negotiating Accountability: Managerial Lessons From Identity-Based Nonprofit Organizations," *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (March 2002).

This research identified several factors that can influence transparency: information vulnerability, intellectual property rights, communication infrastructure, information comprehension, and information sharing.

4.2.2 Transparency Operationalized

Figure 13: Factors that Affect Transparency

4.2.2.1 Information Vulnerability

Legal and ethical considerations play a role in sharing preparedness information.

Privacy and security must be balanced, especially because there could be conflict—or

constraint—when an order or request for information exceeds an individual's or an

organization's authority to provide the information in a given situation. For example, the

government clearly articulates an emergency manager's roles, responsibilities, and authorities through the job description and federal, state, and local laws and guidance. These boundaries may extend to the type of information that is permitted to be shared between government and nonprofit personnel. Transparency sometimes refers to information that is not explicitly written or documented and goes beyond information that is typically discussed. Transparency questions considered during this research include the following: do nonprofits believe the government provides all the information they need to make informed decisions; what information is being withheld that government and nonprofits believe makes the citizens vulnerable during the preparedness process; do new cyber vulnerabilities and concerns restrict how much information is provided; and does the government believe nonprofits are fully transparent about the resources that they control.

4.2.2.2 Intellectual Property Rights

Initial research in the literature review demonstrated that, in terms of transparency, nonprofits do not typically openly share information about their true capability and resources to anyone but their board and donors.[305] Although this is not always the case, most organizations have competitive advantages and proprietary business processes that would harm their company if exposed. The researcher expected to find assumed that some organizations' ability to be only partially transparent is not well understood by the emergency management community, who expect full transparency.

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[305] Young, "Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations," 156.

4.2.2.3 Communications Infrastructure

The researcher assumed that the lack of communication infrastructure, such as a website, is a barrier to collaboration because it prevents transparency from being fully realized. Information can be exchanged using a range of technical means (for example, websites, blogs, and social media) and nontechnical means (for example, a local billboard posting). However, in today's digital age, electronic information exchanges are widely accepted and expected, so organizations typically use websites and other digital means to communicate with stakeholders. In the context of emergency management planning, if information is to be shared on a wide-reaching infrastructure, the organization must build and maintain an effective website or similar media platforms. However, in a resource-constrained environment, organizations may not have the capability or funds to support a significant communication infrastructure. While the government's infrastructure is funded by taxpayers, nonprofits have different sources for their funds and different rules on how these funds can be allocated.

4.2.2.4 Information Comprehension

Just because information is shared, that does not mean that a meaningful exchange has taken place; the information recipient must have the capability to correctly process the information for interpretation. Thus, the researcher expected to find that information transparency increased or decreased based on the language type, language complexity, and format. In the context of emergency management planning, this is critical because one organization must fully understand the needs of other organizations. Sharing for the sake of sharing may not maximize collaborative exchanges.

4.2.2.5 Information Sharing

The researcher expected to find that, in government-nonprofit collaborative efforts, gaps in information, both vertical and horizontal, sometimes occur because an organization does not fully understand that other entities could benefit from having information, ultimately meeting public needs. Further, some organizations may be willing to share information but are uncomfortable in doing so because no one is requesting that specific information. This idea recognizes that these gaps exist and could constrain collaboration.

4.3 Power and Autonomy

4.3.1 Power and Autonomy Defined

This research will discuss the organizational influences to collaboration in more detail in chapter 8, but this section will focus primarily on how the relationships and influences inherent in an organizational structure—in terms of power and autonomy that occur in individual and organizational relationships—can affect trust and thus be a barrier or incentive to collaboration. Chapter 2 detailed the roles and responsibilities of government and nonprofit staff, both from an individual and organizational perspective.

Blau defines power as "the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence, either in the forms of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, in as much as the former as well as the latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction."[306] There are many classifications of power. The most influential framework that is aligned with exchange theory was proposed by French and Raven in an article by Blau and includes five types of power: (1)

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306 Blau, *Exchange and Power*, 117.

reward power is the ability of a manager to control and administer rewards for desired

behavior, (2) *coercive power* is the ability of a manager to control and administer

punishment if the subordinates do not comply, (3) *legitimate power* is a subordinate's

belief that a manager has the right to control and administer his or her behavior, (4)

reference power is a subordinate's desires to admire or identify with a manager and to

gain the manager's approval, and (5) *expert power* is a subordinate's belief that a

manager has knowledge, expertise, skill, or abilities in a given area.[307] This research

considered if any of these definitions of power apply to emergency management

professionals.

Emerson's theory on power relationships and the dependence of actors A and B,

as stated earlier in the literature review, support the operationalization of power and

autonomy as a major component of exchange theory. The two concepts of power and

autonomy are discussed together because exchange theory fuses the two into a cohesive

set of variables that work together within the theoretical framework to more clearly

illuminate the dynamics associated with perceptions and resultant actions leading to

collaboration.

Molm et al. distinguish between reciprocal and negotiated exchange. In negotiated

exchange*,* actors (both government and nonprofit personnel) negotiate the terms of

strictly binding agreements, whereas in a reciprocal exchange*,* there is no explicit

bargaining. It is worthwhile to note that binding agreements, such as memorandums of

agreement (MOAs) or memorandums of understanding (MOUs), do not always exist

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307 Ibid., 1882.

between government and nonprofits. For the purposes of this study, collaboration will be assumed to be a reciprocal exchange in which neither party has a binding obligation. While this research does not address legal contracts and MOAs and MOUs may or may not be legally binding, they are, at a minimum, a statement of informal agreement between the parties.

Molm et al. further state that actors have opportunities to reward one another for previously received goods or services. The norm of reciprocity refers to an expectation that gifts given will be returned in kind. In the context of emergency management planning, this concept does not readily apply because the end recipient is the public; the expectation of reciprocity of in-kind services rendered is not rational. Thus, additional focus is required to fully understand the influence of status in the context of power being a factor that determines an entity's willingness to collaborate.

Dependence results in an unbalanced power relation, which is unstable since it encourages the use of power. This unbalance results in the process of cost reduction and balancing operations.[308] Emerson refers to cost as the amount of the resistance or the cost of one party meeting the demands of the other party. Cost reduction encompasses a change in values (personal, social, or economic), which reduces the "pains incurred in meeting the demands of a powerful other."[309]

Emerson proposes four types of balancing operations in a power-dependence relationship which will move the parties closer to a state of balance:

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[308] Ibid., 34.
[309] Ibid., 35.

1. If B reduces motivational investment in goals, mediated by A (balance maintained through motivations withdraw from B, the weaker member)

2. If B cultivates alternative sources for gratification of those goals (B will cultivate alternative social relations)

3. If A increases motivational investment in goals mediated by B (giving status to A)

4. If A is denied alternative sources for achieving those goals (involves coalition and group formation. Coalitions form among the weak to control the strong).[310]

Guth et al. examined mutual interdependence exchanges, which they define as "relations in which the control over the outcome is shared jointly by two or more individuals."[311] In mutual interdependence relations, each actor values the resources that are under the other's control, providing all actors the benefits of exchanging. The authors conclude that mutual interdependence creates a "sense of groupness" among individuals, resulting in them exchanging more with each other. A situation of mutual inter-dependence is more likely to promote a common focus and a sense of shared responsibility.[312] This more accurately reflects an ideal balance of power and the resulting interdependence for government and nonprofits for collaboration.

Guth also discusses legitimate power, which is usually found in institutional mechanisms or rules for processes that assign the right to enforce a decision or the right to access private information, which grants advantage that is related to status. Along with legitimate power, status significance is gained through control of resources. In looking at

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[310] Ibid., 35.
[311] Werner Guth, M. Vittoria Levati, and Georg von Wangenheim, "Mutual Interdependence Versus Repeated Interaction: An Experiment Studying Voluntary Social Exchange," *Rationality and Society* 22, no. 2 (May 2010).
[312] Ibid., 151.

the types of power—reward, coercive, legitimate, reference, and expert—it is clear that power relationships vary at the national, state, and local levels, which adds to the complexity of understanding the incentives for moving toward a state of "groupness" that will incentivize collaboration.

For the purposes of this research, is important to note that evidence of actions to counter dependence is evidentiary of an imbalance of power. While the imbalance of power can be a systemic design, the researcher aims to determine the extent to which this creates barriers to collaboration.

Farrington and Bebbington's research found that both government and nonprofits failed to plan or think systematically about their relationship in general.[313] As such, there is not a great deal of research to support or refute this assumption. Data collected during interviews for this research indicate that during the planning phase there is some thought given to building these relationships. When operationalized, nonprofits appear to be more aware than their government counterparts of the considerations associated with power levels and amount of interdependence.

Selsky and Parker argue that nonprofits may be reluctant to partner with government agencies because they fear losing control over decisions. They suggest that the intention of the partnership is for each actor to retain organizational authority, or independence in this paper's terminology. This research aimed to discover if nonprofits perceive an imbalance of power and, if so, if that perception constrains collaboration.

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[313] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships ," 862.

Organizations collaborate because they lack the competencies and resources to tackle a problem on their own.[314] While the government has full responsibility and authority at the institutional levels, a capability gap was clearly identified during Hurricane Katrina and other disasters, which resulted in the lesson that nonprofit support is required to fulfill these gaps.

Nonprofits collect and control millions of dollars and numerous volunteers in Virginia, Maryland, and DC. These dollars and resources give nonprofits independence and a need to clearly articulate their capabilities during the emergency preparation phase while simultaneously protecting any scarce resources that are dependent on eliciting large funds from the public. Economic uncertainty impacts their need to protect and manage these resources, which are sometimes viewed as being directly tied to the lifespan and continued existence of the nonprofit. In contrast, the government is perceived to have extensive resources—via taxpayer contributions—furthermore, when the state and local governments run out of funding, they can always obtain it from the national level for a surge capability. Nonprofits and regional VOADs do not have this luxury, so they tend to exert greater control on their resources.

In the literature review, Selsky and Parker—like Emerson—also stated that government-nonprofit partnerships may have large power imbalances that may lead partners into political or opportunistic behavior that serves one or both partner's interest at the expense of the other.[315] Nonprofits such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army may be perceived as extensions of the government because their relationship with

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[314] Ibid.
[315] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 858.

government is legally formalized. As such, the government's relationship with formalized nonprofits may be different than its relationship with nonprofits that are considered stand-alone or independent, based on how they receive authority and funding.

In Selsky and Parker's review of partnerships, they quoted fellow researcher who said "creation of "manufactured civil society group is a means of controlling the civil society sector." [316] This perception among independent nonprofits may cause frustration and mistrust toward other nonprofits that accept any funding or authority from the government, who may be considered a manufactured group whose behavior is influenced government funding.

Thus, structural and formal relationships between nonprofits and government agencies can encourage nonprofits to take part in decision-making and resource allocation based on interdependence. The researcher expected to find that structure can also become a constraint to collaboration when the nonprofit feels the government does not depend on them for resources. This research focused discovering if the data for this research validate or refute some of these power and autonomy concepts in terms of government-nonprofit collaboration.

4.3.2 Power and Autonomy Operationalized

The researcher analyzed power and dependence by asking both nonprofit and governmental organizations questions about their ideal world of engagement to understand their perceived power over or dependence on other organizations.

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[316] Ibid., 861.

In analyzing the relationships between government and nonprofits, Emerson framed the theory of power as a property of the social relation. According to Emerson, a relation can be defined as person to person, group to person, or group to group.[317] To organize the resulting concepts in a logical way, the researcher chose to further organize the results according to the type of power as identified by French and Raven: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, reference power, and expert power. In addition, the researcher uses the data to better understand the levels of dependence that exist between the organizations in the planning phase that either incentivizes or constrains collaboration. Finally, the researcher aims to see power and dependence through the lens of self-awareness where an imbalance exists. Although the following sections describe the factors in the context of government-nonprofit relationships with the expectation that government is the dominant relationship, the same definitions apply for the nonprofit having a dominant relationship in nonprofit-to-nonprofit interactions.

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[317] Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," 32.

Figure 14: Factors that Affect Power and Autonomy

4.3.2.1 Reward Power

Reward power in the context of emergency preparedness is the ability for

government to provide rewards to nonprofits for desired behaviors or vice versa. The

researcher aims to determine, in general, the form of reward that either group would

desire in order to incentivize collaboration. For example, if the government gave funding

to a nonprofit, would that be enough to incentivize nonprofits collaborate? The researcher

also examined what other types of rewards, tangible or intangible, might incentivize

collaboration .

4.3.2.2 Coercive Power
In the context of emergency management planning, coercive power refers to

government agencies' ability to administer punishment if nonprofits do not comply with

any noncontractually agreed upon terms and vice versa. The researcher assumed that

nonprofits gained a good understanding during the planning stage of any consequences

they might suffer for not delivering resources as promised. This knowledge could then

either incentivize or constrain collaboration, depending on the severity and enforceability

of the action. For example, noncompliance with IRS rules and regulations results in

punishment. On the other side, the government emergency manager is liable for safety

and protection of all involved in an emergency response process, so he or she could also

experience punishments. Nonprofits have no known coercive power beyond an ability to

report any violations.

4.3.2.3 Legitimate Power
Legitimate power is exercised when nonprofit organizations believe the

government has a genuine right to control and implement guidance; in other words, the

lines of authority are known and the boundaries of authority are well-defined under a

range of conditions. The researcher expected to find assumed that legitimate power might

encourage collaboration under some conditions, but in other cases the inflexibility might

create barriers. When disagreement arises regarding who has legitimate power, due to

lack of policy or agreement at the working level, barriers occur and can sometimes result in power imbalances. Further, in the real world, the legitimate power can change based on a given situation. The researcher aims to understand the extent to which pre-established lines of authority and boundaries influence collaboration.

4.3.2.4 Reference Power

Reference power exists when the nonprofit organization wants to gain the approval of the government or vice versa. Nonprofits are accountable to their board and donors; government agencies are accountable to their leadership. Both are evaluated by the public and, according to exchange theory, receive benefits or rewards for accomplishing their mission. The researcher aimed to determine which conditions influence exchange costs and benefits, payoffs or rewards. The researcher expected to find assumed that both government and nonprofits seek the approval of the public more so than each other.

4.3.2.5 Expert Power

Expert power is the belief that a nonprofit or government agency has the knowledge or skills required to perform their missions, both individually and organizationally. The researcher assumed that it is difficult to determine level of expertise in the planning phase because no resources have been operationalized yet to respond to an emergency. Further, the larger organizations (for example, the Red Cross and the Salvation Army) have expert power based on their historical accomplishments. The researcher also expected to find assumed that the government perceives expert power of nonprofits based on their past performance.

4.3.2.6 Dependence

As stated earlier, the imbalance of power creates relationships of dependence. The researcher will focus on this dependence to determine factors that would incentivize the dependent or independent organization to collaborate in the preparedness phase. Emerson illustrated this relationship: the power of actor A (the government) over B (nonprofits) is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can potentially overcome by A. He asserts that the power to control or have influence over a party results "implicitly in the other's dependency." [318] He states his premise as follows: the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A. The reciprocity of social relations represents a power-dependence.

Emerson's concept of dependence contains two variables, availability and motivational investment.[319] In social relations, mutual dependence assumes that each party is able to control or influence the other's conduct at the same time each party is in a position to "grant" or "deny," "facilitate" or "hinder" the other gratification.[320] Emerson illustrates the directional relations of dependence: the dependence of actor A upon actor B is directly proportional to A's motivation investment in goals mediated by B, and it is inversely proportional to the availability of those goals and A outside of the relation of the A-B relation.[321] Dependence is very clearly a component of exchange theory, and the researcher will determine how it impacts government-nonprofit relationships in Virginia, Maryland, and DC.

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[318] Ibid., 32.
[319] Ibid., 34.
[320] Ibid., 32.
[321] Ibid., 32.

4.3.2.7 Perception of Power

The researcher expected to find that an organization's perception of its level of power—dependence or independence—has an impact on its willingness to collaborate or not. Initial research indicated that nonprofits will aim to minimize their dependence on governmental organizations by maximizing their types of power (for example, expert or legitimate). A corollary to this is that government has a perception of the nonprofits' level of power and authority which could positively or negatively impact collaboration. This power relationship is further discussed in chapter 8 on organizational structure.

4.4 Organizational Structure

4.4.1 Organizational Structure Defined

This research includes organizational structures for various government emergency management agencies in chapter 2; however, there is only a notional diagram of a nonprofit due to the large number and complexity of internal administrative and governance policies of various nonprofits, as dictated by their missions, legally binding state and local statutory regulations, the IRS, and their own doctrinal approaches.

Scholars rarely define the term "organizational structure" concisely without several sets of conditions because there is a body of theories regarding the many characteristics of structure. One source defines organizational structure as "explicit and implicit institutional rules and policies designed to provide a structure where various work roles and responsibilities are delegated, controlled and coordinated. Organizational structure also determines how information flows from level to level within the company. In a centralized structure, decisions flow from the top down. In a decentralized structure,

the decisions are made at different levels."[322] Still, this definition does not address the complexity of defining the structure and, as Blau noted, "only systematic comparisons of many organizations can establish relationships between characteristics of organizations and stipulate the conditions under which these relationships hold."[323]

Nonprofits typically label government organizations as bureaucratic. Borgatti stated, "The last century saw the perfection of the bureaucracy—a form of organization that has been enormously successful and is the result of thousands of years of trial and error evolution." Max Weber outlined the key characteristics of a bureaucracy: specification of jobs with detailed rights, obligations, responsibilities, scope of authority; system of supervision and subordination; unity of command; extensive use of written documents; training in job requirements and skills; application of consistent and complete rules (a company manual); and assignment of work and hiring of personnel based on competence and experience."[324]

These characteristics may or may not be prevalent in government emergency management; however, there is an overwhelming consensus that this definition is very accurate and that this bureaucracy drives government problem-solving processes and day-to-day implementation of guidance. The structure of emergency management organizations mirror that of the federal government, which is based on clear lines of command and control. An example of this was provided in chapter 2 for the state of Maryland. Typically government organizational structure includes a leadership approach

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[322] *Investopedia*, s. v. "Organizational Structure," accessed May 2015, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/organizational-structure.asp.
[323] Blau, "The Comparative Study of Organizations," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 18 (April 1965): 323–338.
[324] Borgatti, "Intra-Organizational Networks."

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based on command and control. Waugh and Streib assert new leadership strategies are needed that "derive power from effective strategies and the transformational power of compelling vision, rather than from hierarchy, rank or standard operating procedures" [325] This organizational approach does not work in many communities of interest, yet existing concepts of command and control still pervade the system.

In FEMA's training course Comparative Emergency Management Session 21: Command, Control, Coordination, and Disaster Declarations, "command" refers to an authority to make someone or something do something."[326] The course notes that, in general use, the term "control" is similar to "command," in that it refers to the power to direct, determine, or manipulate. However, the term "control" has a slightly different connotation in the emergency management discipline, and these semantic differences are significant due to their functional association to the tasks and actions each term represents. In emergency management, "control" refers to the limits of the command authority of the individual or agency being described. Control may also be referred to as "span of control," indicating there are limits to the people and organizations that fall under the command authority of the emergency manager or management organization.[327] Coordination is quite different than command and control; it involves the mechanisms to ensure that an incident is handled in an appropriate manner and all incident response

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[325] Waugh and Gregory Streib, "Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management," *Public Administration Review* 66 (December 2006): 131.
[326] The Emergency Management Institute, Course slides for "FEMA Comparative Management Session 21, Command, Control, Coordination and Disaster Declarations," (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013.
[327] Ibid., slide 21-4.

requirements are met. The key for disaster planners is to recognize that command and control alone do not solve the problems associated with disaster incidents.[328]

The internal organizational structures of government and nonprofit agencies will change, but both of their structures depend on who is running the organization and the political objectives of leadership. In addition, the organizational culture will impact the behavior of both government and nonprofit personnel. According to Pettigrew, culture is the system of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a given group at a given time.[329] Pettigrew also asserts that organizational culture then acts as a determinant or constraint regarding how internal issues of purpose, integration, and commitment are handled.[330]

The desire or will to collaborate, both at an individual and an organizational level for government or nonprofit emergency management professionals, could be internally driven based on their organization's culture. Table 5 contains examples of organizational culture—including shared beliefs, values, and norms—that may influence the will to collaborate. Because individuals belong to different groups, they participate in several cultures simultaneously that may be in conflict. In addition, some organizations may have a discernable cultural style that derives from the industry. [331]

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[328] Ibid., slide 21-5.
[329] Andrew P. Pettigrew, "On Studying Organizational Cultures," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (December 1979): 574.
[330] Ibid., 576.
[331] Borgatti, "Intra-Organizational Networks."

Table 5: Definitions and Examples of Organizational Culture

Type of Organizational Culture	Definitions and Examples
Cognitive schemas	Scripts and frames that mold expectations and help assign meaning and order to the stream of experience
Shared meanings	Common interpretations of events
Perceptions	Implicit theories of the market, management, politics, and human nature
Prescriptions and preferences	The best way to do a task
Behavioral codes	How to dress and act
Basic values	What is most important
Myths and legends	Stories about past actions
Heroes and heroines	Self-explanatory
Emblems	Objects that have meaning, such as group T-shirts
Rituals	Self-explanatory

The researcher also sought to determine where the emergency manager or nonprofit fits in relationship to other emergency management professionals and stakeholders. Network centrality is an important feature of organizational structure and how collaborative relationships are formed. Centrality indicates how connected actors are to one another and involves looking at the number and length of pathways, which is a sequence of node and lengths that start and end with a node. For example, A and B might not be connected, but there may be a pathway between A——B——C——D.[332]Kapucu and Cook's digraph theory explains distinct positions in relationships. An understanding of the directness and length of a nonprofit organization's pathway to an emergency manager is important in determining their relationship.

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[332] Ibid.

4.4.2 Organizational Structure Operationalized

To understand organizational structure's effect on government-nonprofit collaboration, the researcher interviewed emergency managers and nonprofit stakeholders about the conditions and extent to which certain factors in their organizational structure influence their motivation or unwillingness to collaborate. The following sections will define organizational structure in the context of these factors including organizational framework, organizational culture, and organizational centrality with respect to other organizations.

Figure 15: Factors that Affect Organizational Structure

4.4.2.1 Organizational Framework

Emergency management organizational structures mirror the federal government

bureaucracy and follow a command and control structure with clear lines of authority.

The researcher's expectation was that the emergency managers are not flexible to meet

the exact needs of nonprofits because they are sometimes limited by policy. For example,

government guidelines enforce traceability to the taxpayer; this guideline becomes a

constraint when nontaxpayers (for example, noncitizens) require emergency services.

Nonprofits have the flexibility to meet nontaxpayers' needs and are not constrained as the government is in that situation. Another situation in which government organizations are constrained involves prohibitions from providing funding to faith-based groups due to the roles established by the US Constitution. The researcher expected to find that organizational structures present both barriers and incentives to collaboration; this is closely related to the power balance that a given situation presents. For example, if emergency managers are planning for a locality that has a dense population of noncitizens, they will rely heavily on the expert power of the nonprofits in that situation.

The command and control structure is not limited to government; some nonprofits choose an organizational framework that is also command and control. The researcher will determine the extent to which this impacts collaboration. The command and control structure increases in complexity as the number of stakeholders increases. The researcher's expectation was that even in an organization with clear line of authority, minimizing the number of interfaces will encourage collaboration.

Virginia, Maryland, and DC governments are structured to mirror a command and control framework in compliance with FEMA guidance. However, each is functionally organized differently and each executes preparedness and response operations differently to meet the needs of their respective stakeholders. The researcher's expectation was that each of the organizational frameworks can be optimized to maximize collaboration across a range of structures. The question of how to optimize their configuration is outside the scope of this research, but some best practices that could help to frame future research will be noted in chapter 9.

4.4.2.2 Organizational Culture

Each government-nonprofit professional is guided by the mission and values of their organization. These missions are directly related to public safety and service and are typically rooted in charters derived from founding legislation. Beyond the stated culture are the nonwritten, or implicit, ideals that define an organization's perception about itself and others, such as self-importance, its ranking among competitors, and how it interacts with other entities. Thus, organizational culture has a direct influence on an organization's willingness to collaborate with another entity. The researcher's expectation was that an organization's culture will influence its decisions about which organizations to affiliate itself with and which organizations are likely to affiliate with it based on its perception of how it is viewed externally.

4.4.2.3 Organizational Centrality

The idea of centrality is very closely related to the idea of organizational culture with one key difference: centrality relates to an organization's actual position and connectedness vice its perceived status. The researcher's expectation was that organizations with increased centrality will present more favorable conditions for collaboration because their position in the emergency management process is well understood in the context of many other organizations. The research aims to examine what incentives for collaboration exist, if any, for nonprofits that have less centrality and less sustained involvement with the emergency management process. The researcher will also focus on details related to the differences in how state and local governments may interact with known nonprofits (such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army) as compared to less-known nonprofits.

4.5 Chapter 4 Summary

This chapter used thematic analysis to define detailed qualitative variables of the research data that were illuminated by social exchange theory. Trust, transparency, power and autonomy and organizational structure have been operationalized to provide a perspective on how emergency management preparedness government and nonprofits in Virginia, Maryland, and DC can use social exchange to analyze specific barriers and incentives to collaboration. Detailed subthemes emerged from the major variables in preparation for actual data collection and analysis. This chapter documents the expectations related to incentives and barriers to collaboration; table 6 summarizes these expectations by theme. Chapters 5 through 8 will include highlights of the data collection (that is, the interviews) and a thematic analysis of each theme and subtheme in answering the research question on the viability of social exchange as a framework contributing to this analysis.

Table 6: Research Expectations for Trust, Transparency, Power and Autonomy, and Organizational Structure

Research Expectations Regarding Trust
Being an affiliated or nonaffiliated nonprofit is a constraint or incentive to collaboration.
Trust is based on attitudes and beliefs.
There are no economic exchanges that impact trust.
Risk-averse behavior constrains collaboration..
Trust is increased when organizations are able to secure credentials.
Those who did not accept membership saw no benefit in joining.
The quality of a relationship is more easily understood at the individual versus organizational level familiarity.
The more reliable a given partner's service is perceived to be, the more trust the other party will have.
Trust is increased when the government perceives that the nonprofit organization consistently has sufficient capacity to commit to scenarios.
Legal restrictions on use of funds for both government and nonprofits may create barriers to collaboration An organization's perception of another organization's funding availability affects the level of trust between the two.
Fluid communications among stakeholders increases trust between organizations. Specifically, the ability to get the right information to the right stakeholders at the right time incentivizes collaboration.
Trust is increased when stakeholders have mutual goals, mutual respect, and the source of motivation is known.
If you the government or nonprofit perceives (and believes) that funding is available or not this results in an organizational decision to trust or not trust a given entity.
. Each stakeholder's motivation is important in deciding if they want to collaborate
Trust is increased when organizations leverage tools such as training, meeting spaces, participation in exercises, and credentialing to maximize benefit.
Having a meeting with a joint purpose where missions are aligned increases trust..
The ability to participate in planning exercises increases stakeholder trust because their projected capabilities are assessed
Trust is increased when organizations are able to secure credentials
Organizations are more likely to trust each other when policy exists with enough detail to support effective planning (i.e. EOPs).

Table 6 Continued

Research Expectations Regarding Transparency
Some organizations' ability to be only partially transparent is not well understood because the expectation is for full transparency.
Lacking a communications infrastructure, such as a website, is a barrier to collaboration because transparency is not fully realized.
Information transparency is increased or decreased based on language type, complexity, and format.
Gaps in information, both vertical and horizontal, related to government-nonprofit collaborative efforts, is sometimes based on an organization not fully understanding that other entities could benefit from having that information to meet public needs.
Research Expectations Regarding Power and Autonomy
Structural and formal relationships between nonprofits and government can encourage nonprofits to take part in decision-making and resource allocation based on this interdependence.
When nonprofits feel the government does not depend on them for resources there is no interdependence.
When in the planning stage there is a good understanding of what the consequences are (if any) for not being able to deliver resources as promised.
That for some conditions when legitimate power is established, collaboration is incentivized and for others the inflexibility creates barriers.
When there is disagreement regarding who has legitimate power due to policy or agreement at the working level, barriers occur, sometimes resulting in power imbalances.
Both government and nonprofits seek the approval of the public more so than each other.
It is difficult to determine a nonprofit's level of expertise because no resources have been operationalized to respond to an emergency.
The government perceives expert power based on nonprofit's past performance.
The degree to which the organizations perception of their level of power (dependence or independence) has an impact on their willingness to collaborate.
Power and autonomy would be the biggest constraint to collaboration.
Legitimate power can incentivize collaboration in some instances, but its inflexibility can create barriers to collaboration in other instances.

Table 6 Continued

Research Expectations Regarding Organizational Structure
Even for an organization with clear lines of authority, minimizing the number of interfaces incentivizes collaboration.
Emergency managers are not flexible to meet the exact needs of nonprofits because they are sometimes limited by policy.
Each of the organizational frameworks can be optimized to maximize collaboration across a range of organizational frameworks.
An organizational culture of an entity will both influence government-nonprofit decisions which organizations to affiliate with and which organizations are likely to affiliate with them based on their perception of how they are viewed externally. Initial contact with an emergency manager could be beneficial and this relationship would remain sustainable.
Organizations with increased centrality will present more favorable conditions for collaboration because their position in the emergency management process is well understood in the context of many other organizations.
There are both incentives and barriers that organizational frameworks present to determining each entity's willingness to collaborate; this is closely related to the power balance that a given situation presents.

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS – TRUST

5.0 Foreword to Data Analysis Chapters

The next four chapters will focus on data analysis of central themes identified during very candid interviews of government and nonprofit emergency preparedness professionals. Research questions were developed using exchange theory as the framework to capture important themes during interviews. Responses to interviews provided the data for analysis. Emergent themes include trust, transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure. Each one of the themes identified in chapter 4 create a myriad of interrelationships that either incentivize or hinder collaboration, with trust as the foundation for the other three themes. Chapter 4 also discussed associated subthemes that contributed to the analysis of each theme at a more detailed level.

Overall, the data analysis indicates that social exchange theory enhanced the discussion in directing the researcher to the major themes. The researcher used coding to identify each interviewee and simultaneously protect the confidentiality of respondents; this critical part of the methodology is discussed in chapter 3, which also contains the tables that identify how the interviews were coded. Specific interview responses can be viewed throughout chapters 5 through 8 to support the analysis; the interview responses are categorized by theme and relayed in entirety in appendixes C through G.

5.1 Findings and Interpretations

The themes identified during this research are all tenets of social exchange theory, as discussed in the literature review. This chapter will focus on trust, the most important theme identified in the research. Government and nonprofit emergency management personnel in Virginia, Maryland, and DC overwhelmingly identified trust as their primary motivation and foundation for collaborating with one another. This research examined the theme of trust by interviewing emergency managers and nonprofit stakeholders about the conditions and factors that influence their willingness or unwillingness to collaborate and commit their organizational resources. The data also leads the researcher to conclude that trust is based on past experience and cannot be mandated by policy nor written guidance; it must first be established, then maintained, as a normal outcome of human interaction. Trust is a critical element of that opens to door to collaboration because people use their past experiences and relationships to predict future performance. A great deal of the trust is developed through personal interactions at monthly and quarterly meetings hosted by government; exercises, schedules, and the communications infrastructure—such as websites, email, telephone—are controlled by government as well. Trust helps sustain these relationships. The data suggests that both frequent, quality interactions and a history based on past experience enhance trust. The data also reflects several subthemes within the context of trust: membership, relationship quality, service reliability, funding sources, communication, stakeholder goals, preparedness capabilities, and policy compliance. The data obtained during the interviews are presented according to these subthemes.

The data suggests that nonprofits must be a known, or affiliated, member of the emergency preparedness team to maximize their collaboration with the government; this

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can take place at the national or state level, such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, or at the regional and local levels, such as a state or local VOAD. Furthermore, affiliated nonprofits who have an established relationship with the government—which includes activities such as attending preparedness exercises and training together—enjoy a relational cohesiveness that incentivizes collaboration. Collaboration is also incentivized when the government knows a nonprofit's resource capability and capacity, especially when that knowledge is combined with past experience.

In contrast, collaboration can be constrained if the government does not fully understand a nonprofit's capability or capacity and vice versa. In addition, collaboration is limited in instances when either the government or nonprofits suspect one another of withholding information about resources; this is especially true in a fiscally constrained environment where there is competition for scarce resources. Another major barrier to collaboration occurs when nonprofits choose to be nonaffiliated with the government's emergency preparedness team. Finally, while the public trusts unestablished, grassroots nonprofits, the data does not indicate that nonprofits trust the government for many reasons, including concerns about mission alignment.

5.1.1 Membership
Trust in the context of membership on an emergency preparedness team or as a participant providing input to EOPs can be understood in terms of explicit and implicit inclusion and exclusion. The researcher collected data from a cross-section of stakeholders, both government and nonprofit, to better understand the level of inclusion or exclusion that each stakeholder perceived and how that impacted their trust. A

government emergency manager gains membership to an emergency preparedness team by accepting an assignment to a government position. Nonprofits, on the other hand, attain memberships to an emergency planning team, as well as affiliations, by joining VOADS, as defined in chapter 2. Nonprofits only gain membership if they are affiliated or have been vetted through the emergency manager or VOAD.

5.1.1.1 Inclusion

Emergency managers are included in every situation when coordination is required and, in fact, manage all aspects of emergency preparedness as a function of their roles and responsibilities. This includes being present at all government-sponsored activities and participating in nonprofit activities by invitations on a case-by-case basis.

The data suggests that a nonprofit must be a member of a VOAD, a body created to support emergency management coordination activities, in order to be a trusted and included member of an emergency preparedness team. Specifically, membership in an established VOAD would increase trust for both nonprofits and government personnel, while exclusion would decrease trust. During the interviews, the researcher asked questions about incentives and barriers for being included or excluded from emergency planning based on a nonprofits membership status. Overall the research validated the perception that nonprofits who are affiliated with a VOAD are more trusted by the government than those that are nonaffiliated, although this experience was not universal to every respondent interviewed.

VOADs were established to better enable emergency managers to find resources that would support their ability to build capability in an emergency. Thus, if a nonprofit is

nonaffiliated with a VOAD, its capabilities are not searchable in the VOAD information repository and its government exposure is minimized. When asked about the government's outreach process, a nonprofit VOAD lead (NV1) stated, "There is not much 'reaching out' done by the government, other than beyond the VOAD 'umbrella,' because the level of trust in an organization and the relationships that you have to reach out for are not the best partners for long-term recovery." The implication is that the government is more trusting of the organizations under the VOAD umbrella.

The same nonprofit VOAD lead (NV1) explained, "Nonprofits reach out to us to help achieve a relationship with the state. Having VOAD in a resume will do wonders because [the government has] certain expectations, competitiveness, and comfort to have VOAD mentioned." Thus, from the VOAD manager's perspective—as well as the government emergency manager's perspective—any affiliation with a VOAD increases trust. While membership in a VOAD is not required, nonprofits that choose to not be part of a VOAD can at times encounter mistrust because they lack proximity to known groups.

When asked if the government interacts more with known nonprofits versus lesser known, a nonprofit VOAD lead (NV2) stated,

> VOAD members are more willing, so [the government relies] on them
> more. If you are not a VOAD member, state or national level, you're
> going to be checked out very hard and received very cautiously in the state
> and anywhere else. They are not received since they don't practice ethics
> and values of VOADs. Within each specialty, those who do them have to
> abide by the guidelines. There are some organizations that just can't abide
> by human ethics and values.

Thus, affiliation with a VOAD is an important part of membership and inclusion. Inclusion builds trust, ultimately furthering the prospects of additional collaboration with other nonprofit and government stakeholders.

It should also be noted that nonprofits which are currently affiliated with a VOAD desire other nonprofits to join the VOAD so that nonprofits can also build trust with one another. One nonprofit VOAD member (NV2) offered this advice: "If you want to help, join." This statement discourages nonprofits from operating as a separate entity. Another nonprofit VOAD member (NV6) explained, "Being a member of a VOAD can be compared to pledging a fraternity or sorority: building networks leading to good meetings." Thus, one can surmise that a lack of membership or affiliation to a VOAD is a significant barrier for both government and affiliated nonprofit stakeholders to trust nonaffiliated nonprofits to accomplish emergency planning, preparation, and response tasks for any disaster.

Another important factor related to membership in a VOAD involves training opportunities for the nonprofit. According to many of the interviewees, training that is offered by larger organizations (both government and nonprofits) are advertised through the VOADs to minimize the amount of work required for the training provider. Thus, if a nonprofit is not part of the VOAD, they would have to rely on personal relationships to get invited to the training; this is not an effective way to communicate in an environment where consistent attendance at monthly meetings is important to sustaining collaborative relationships. Furthermore, it is important to note that not all training is offered to all VOAD participants. Some respondents described instances in which government

emergency managers invited nonprofits to participate in training based on their judgment

of who is "deserving" according to previously established relationships. While this

judgment can increase trust between the government and nonprofits that already have an

established relationships, it will decrease trust between the government and any

nonprofits who are not invited to training.

5.1.1.2 Exclusion

The researcher identified nonprofits that chose not to accept membership with the

VOAD and interviewed them to discuss their motivations for not participating. Further,

the researcher requested information about nonprofits that were not attending meetings

and attempted to understand their reasons for not attending. The goal was to determine

why some organizations were excluded from participation and then identify barriers to

collaboration. No conclusive data was found; however, a conflict in the organizations'

missions was the most commonly stated reason why nonprofits chose not to formally

pursue VOAD membership or affiliation. Also, nonprofits operate as individual entities

by design; this organizational attribute and how it affects collaboration will be discussed

in more detail in chapter 8.

5.1.2 Relationship Quality

Relationship quality is a function of the length of time a relationship has been

established and the level of familiarity present in a relationship. Both aspects are

important; the longevity of a relationship cannot be the sole indicator of quality because it

is possible to maintain superficial interactions over an extended period of time. The

researcher found that the presence of solid interpersonal relationships—developed

through high levels of familiarity and frequency of engagement—was a better indicator

of relationship quality than the services and resources each party brought to the

relationship. The data also indicates that the quality of a relationship contributes to the

amount of trust held by both parties, providing either incentives or barriers for

collaboration. Based on themes identified in the literature review, the researcher analyzed

relationship quality by asking interviewees about individual and organizational levels of

familiarity, mutual respect for missions, how often they met and the longevity of the

relationship.

5.1.2.1 Level of Familiarity

Government stakeholders recognize that local and regional nonprofit personnel

will be more familiar with individuals being served in an emergency—that is, the

public—than government staff can be; this familiarity means that the public is more

likely to trust nonprofit personnel than government staff. One government manager

(GS4) stated, "We realize that we can't be in all jurisdictions all the time and, at the same

time, that the public has trust with the nonprofits in that community because they are

established in the community. Government doesn't have the grassroots connection. Our

level is very structured and regulated." As a result, the government has more trust in

nonprofits that have built relationships at the community level because they know they

will be able to leverage that relationship to serve vulnerable populations during a disaster.

Many interviewees encouraged government representatives to acknowledge and leverage

the established trust that the public has in nonprofits to connect more directly with the

public in times of emergency, because the nonprofit-pubic relationship and trust have been established.

The government measures how well a nonprofit is known in the community and with other affiliated nonprofits, which is an important aspect leading to engagement. A local government manager (GL2) stated, "Credibility, liability, and trust issues are a problem dealing with nonprofits not known to [government emergency managers]. The Red Cross and CERT are the only ones with training." Thus, the researcher surmises that the nonprofits with personnel who receive training and participate in exercises become more familiar with government emergency managers through those interactions, increasing trust in those relationships and giving the government incentive to reach out to those nonprofits in an emergency situation.

A similar theme is related to the difficulty that some nonprofits have being able to "get their foot in the door" to become known to the emergency manager. When asked what the benefits are to engaging nonprofits, a local government emergency manager (GL21) stated

> Connections and relationships allow us to get it done, but it's hard to get nonprofits to the table to be able to serve in all their capacities. Nonprofits are quicker [to respond] than the government, but it's hard to get your feet in the door as a nonprofit. People trust the nonprofits more than [the] government—especially non-English speakers, because when the ambulance shows up, they run thinking [the government is] there to deport them. This is why it's hard to get [nonprofits] to the table to serve in all capacities.

When asked what factors contribute to collaboration, a local government emergency manager (GL5) explained, "In emergency management, it's all about relationships; we should not look across the table and see someone we don't know, and the emergency manager knows everyone in the [Emergency Operations Center] by name and known capabilities."

During the interviews, an unattributable theme associated with trust emerged related to inherent human nature. Some groups—despite the well-intentioned objectives of emergency response personnel—do not trust individuals outside of their social, socioeconomic, religious, or ethic circles due to lack of exposure. A local government manager explained how this factor was seen in emergency response to Hurricane George in Key West. According to the local manager (GL24), "Haitians were afraid of the government. The language had so many dialects that it created a communication issue leading to a lack of trust. They were more willing to trust nonprofits with religious affiliations that they could identify with." While this example speaks to communication, it also demonstrates an emerging theme related to an individual's willingness to trust others based on commonality. Thus, the researcher surmises that level of familiarity is increased significantly when individuals let their guard down with others who are more alike than different.

One nonprofit VOAD member (NV7) maintained the importance of "working on relationships, not boundaries, to establish relationships in advance so that when something happens, they would know who I was, [and] how and what I can do and can't

do—setting up a relationship with trust. This type of relationship has nothing to do with boundaries. We need to meet together face to face."

Another recommendation to increase trust in emergency planning is to leverage the public's established relationship and familiarity with nonprofit volunteers. Specifically, a local government respondent (GL18) suggested that emergency response planners should "change the disaster paradigm to rely on volunteers not first responders." The premise is that volunteers have a better relationship with the public and communities trust volunteers in a disaster because they are more active in the community, during both times of peace and emergency. In the context of the emergency management planning phase, this would involve training volunteers to perform functions that supplement those already performed by the government during the initial phase of response rather than waiting to be activated. This new paradigm would have major impacts across emergency management organizational structures as well as infrastructure. The respondent did not make a recommendation for how this new paradigm would be implemented, but the researcher concludes that more thought should be focused on using volunteers in emergency preparedness activities.

Finally, the interviews highlighted a theme related to the professional background of nonprofits and government stakeholder. When asked what would build trust in a relationship, a local emergency manager recommended that government emergency managers ought to have a formalized background in an emergency management function. Specifically, the local government emergency manager (GL7) highlighted the important of a firefighting background. "There is an advantage to having a partner who also has fire

department experience because [he or she would have] a unique point of view and a different perspective when the 'rubber meets the road.' [Now] the emergency manager is hired through HR; the governor appoints the director. A pure emergency manager is a new position, [but] many emergency management functions used to be filled by personnel who were in the fire department or worked in that capacity at some point." Emergency management and experience in a fire department, specifically, are important skills that engender trust within the emergency preparation and response environment. Other interviews noted that this type of experience is not easily obtained by nonprofits. Thus, professional background could be a barrier to establishing a quality relationship.

5.1.2.2 Longevity of Relationship

In addition to leveraging the familiarity that nonprofits have with the public, emergency managers can tap into the longevity of those relationships. This is central to understanding any stakeholder's sustainability because behaviors can be observed over time to discover if the actor is trustworthy. The concept applies best to nonprofits which are members of the community and have strong ties to the public individuals based on the longevity of their relationship. A local emergency manager (GL21) used the following illustration: "[When] dealing with 'John Nonprofit,' the emergency manager must realize that [John is] local and has connections to others: he calls on Bob, who is local, who calls on Lane to take donations. The locals feel more vested, so it's easier for 'John Nonprofit' to leverage and establish trust within the whole network of nonprofits. 'John Nonprofit' . . . says, 'I work with Tim; he's easy to work with' [so] it's not as scary as working with the government."

Another local emergency manager (GL13) explained that "nonprofits are received better than government; there are long-term established relationships with individuals making response more efficient—a force multiplier. For nonprofits, it's about establishing relationships before the emergency; a predetermined relationship is more receptive. Nonprofits break down the walls." This statement further validates the need to leverage pre-established relationships between nonprofits and the public. In the context of emergency management planning, the government and nonprofits should reference this model in establishing sustainable relationships during the emergency planning phase to increase the level of trust when an emergency does occur.

The same concept of longevity leading toward trust in nonprofit-public interactions was apparent with nonprofit and government relationships. In the context of emergency management, a collaborative relationship that is built before organizations commit to sharing emergency resources maximizes the benefits and decreases levels of uncertainty and trust in both government and nonprofit organizations. Many nonprofit respondents noted that when the nonprofits are "invited to the table" early in the emergency planning process, they begin to establish relationships that have sustainability, which improves the relationship quality and creates an environment for collaboration.

Both nonprofit and government interviewees validated the need to build long-term relationships between nonprofits and government organizations. "We learned in emergency management school that you don't want to be exchanging business cards for the first time during a disaster. It's crucial to have trust for the greater good (GL21 and

NA1) and the focus should be on safety, not commitment, undermining, looking over

your back, or taking advantage of the situation." (NA1)

Trust is built on lasting relationships, so that trust is hindered when a nonprofit or

volunteer wants to help in an emergency but has not previously established a relationship

with the emergency management response team. This is due, in part, to concerns that

emergency managers have about legal liability. This issue is discussed further in the

chapter 8, which discusses the factors of power and autonomy.

5.1.3 Resource Reliability

While emergency preparedness is an ongoing cycle, a nonprofit's capability is not

always known at any given time. A nonprofit's capability to respond is contingent on

having the right quantity and quality of necessary resources. The following sections

discuss how resource reliability in terms of capability and capacity can affect the

development of trust and collaboration.

5.1.3.1 Capability

While trust can be established after an event based on capabilities, trust in the emergency

planning cycle is sometimes precluded because past performance or reputation is

unknown. This unknown capability leaves emergency managers looking for indicators

that may or may not be directly tied to the government's future ability to respond with the

right capability. When asked if there is a difference between how state and local

governments interact with known nonprofits versus other nonprofits, a state-level

emergency manager (GS4) stated they "are more willing to interact [with known

nonprofits] because of their past track record and known capability, others don't know

how we [operate]." Another local emergency manager (GL4) validated this mistrust in less-well-known nonprofits: "They've worked with well-known nonprofits for years and don't want to work with new nonprofits. They know the known nonprofits will deliver, not dropping the ball. Small nonprofits don't have the track record. They need to go out and meet the emergency manager and be realistic about what they can provide. Sometimes they promise more than they can deliver." This data confirms that unknown nonprofits face barriers in gaining emergency managers trust.

The researcher surmises that the ability to constructively provide feedback to these less-well-known nonprofits is lacking, further impeding both the government's and other nonprofit's willingness to work with these groups. Specifically, a local emergency manager (GL7) stated, "If a nonprofit does a poor job or there were issues, we will tell the VOAD that we do not want to work with that group and [they should] find the resources elsewhere." The scenario described by that local manager requires the less-well-known nonprofit to be affiliated with the VOAD; if not, there is no direct line of communication that would enable an emergency manager to hold the nonprofit accountable. Thus, working with less-well-known nonprofits is risky because there is no recourse for providing feedback to improve capabilities and services.

In the emergency planning phase, the perceived amount of time it takes for a nonprofit to respond has a direct impact on the amount of trust the nonprofit engenders. Specifically, a local emergency management coordinator (GL19) highlighted how "the Red Cross provides immediate action because these nonprofits have background checks through social services." The implication is that emergency managers are more willing to

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trust that nonprofits are more suitable for emergency response when they respond quickly.

Another important theme related to capability centers around a nonprofit's ability and willingness to prove its capabilities exist and how its output would be effective under emergency conditions. A local emergency manager (GL19) recommended that "nonprofits need to provide capability statement— not that we don't trust them—but provide a statement, then we can have the discussion about if they really have the resources." The data suggests that once the written statement has been formulated, the nonprofit can then be assessed against the stated capability or capacity. For example, if an emergency manager explores a scenario when there is a written statement for 100 volunteers and only seven show up, the emergency manager can then determine the reliability of that organization.

Another theme emerged related to the uniqueness of the capabilities that a nonprofit is able to offer. Trust is increased when government managers recognize and trust in specific skills and expertise that the nonprofit brings. When asked about the benefits of engaging nonprofits, a local government emergency manager (GL22) stated, "The specific benefits include access to knowledge of specific areas like sheltering, access to resources that otherwise wouldn't be available, widespread knowledge of additional contacts, and working with organizations that have a familiarity and experience in supporting and managing challenging situations." Thus, trust is increased when the government manager recognizes the utility of a nonprofit's unique services that the government could not otherwise provide.

In addition, the same local emergency manager (GL22) said, "Nonprofits serve important roles in ways to expand the effectiveness of response and recovery; for example, nonprofits can be valuable partners in running or assisting shelters, shoveling snow for those who are unable, and sharing critical information to the public." Another respondent highlighted an example of a specific organization that consistently provides a known capability to produce trust; that trust transfers to relationships and positive outcomes for a resilient community. Specifically, a VOAD lead (NV1) noted, "Having a nonprofit with a known capability is the key. For example, the Mennonites are known nationally, set up their own camps, have their own housing plans, [and get] their own materials and workers."

Further, knowledge of what a nonprofit's unique skill sets are specifically increases trust. A nonprofit's ability to routinely share capabilities, missions, goals, and limitations at meetings, exercises, tabletops, and other forums with government managers to discuss planning, backup, resources, training, and other issues is paramount to communicating capability. Government interviewees all stressed the importance of creating, maintaining, and updating the nonprofit registries at the state and local levels to facilitate a shared understanding of capabilities; however, there is no registry of nonprofits available to federal nor local government stakeholders.

5.1.3.2 Capacity

Capacity is defined as an organization's ability to maintain and execute its mission with the resources required to accomplish a specific set of tasks over time. While an organization may be fully capable of responding at one given instance, it may not be

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able to sustain this capacity due to simultaneous commitments. In the context of

emergency management, this includes sufficient equipment, training, and volunteers with

required skills.

The researcher validated that trust is increased when the government perceives

that a nonprofit organization has sufficient capacity to commit to scenarios (for example,

ESFs and exercises) as planned. Distrust is increased when the nonprofit's capacity is

proven to be insufficient or is unknown. When asked what factors constrain development

of collaborative relationships, a local emergency manager (GL20) said, "The primary

factor is the inability of nonprofit organizations to 'guarantee' their support during an

event."

In an environment of many uncertainties—for example, when, where, and to what

extent will a disaster strike—the government needs nonprofits to be able to guarantee the

services they can provide. Nonprofits' inability to do so creates distrust between the

organizations and constrains development of collaborative relationships.

5.1.4 Funding Sources
The source of funding was a theme that emerged during the initial interviews and

was validated throughout the research. The reliability of the funding source in terms of

longevity was a factor that determined the amount of trust between nonprofits and

governmental organizations. In the midst of discussions about the reliability of the

funding, an additional factor emerged relating to the source of the funding. These two

themes will be analyzed in the following sections.

5.1.4.1 Resource Reliability

As mentioned earlier in the context of reliability, government managers want some assurance that a nonprofit can provide the agreed-upon services when a disaster strikes. This theme also applies to nonprofits having the required funding to fulfill a projected mission. This theme is reiterated in upcoming chapters on transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure.

When asked about roles and responsibilities in the planning phase, a local emergency manager (GL2) explained, "The Red Cross was not a part of the planning of the EOP, but agreement was made on what they could provide. . . . We can't rely on the Red Cross because it has limited resources and an inability to assist." This example demonstrates the government perception that it cannot always rely on or trust nonprofits to always be able to provide needed capabilities because of resource limitations. While a nonprofit typically does not show up at the table with the knowledge that their resources are scarce and no confidence that they will be replenished, there are times where this is the case. Furthermore, nonprofits operate as a separate entity with a separate mission that may take priority over the government's requests during an emergency. This type of situation decreases trust.

One primary mission area for nonprofits is to supplement resources when it is known that government funds are insufficient to meet the needs of a community. However, most nonprofits rely on donors for funding and, since benevolence can rarely be projected, the government may perceive the nonprofit's funding source as unreliable. This can lead to government uncertainty that the nonprofit will be able to deliver a

promised resource. Furthermore, if shortfalls in nonprofit funding do occur, the government's trust further decreases.

The data suggests that some stakeholders feel that the mission should be central to an emergency planning meeting, rather than being a platform for nonprofits attempting to raise funding based on the capabilities they are projected to provide. This type of mistrust will inevitably occur when a nonprofit is attempting to commit resources but knows its budgetary constraints would not enable that commitment even though the nonprofit would like to support the mission should resources become available. A nonaffiliated nonprofit staff member (NN5) explained, "Mistrust occurs because many nonprofits come to the table with government and want nothing but funding. This constrains collaboration when the focus is on funding rather than the mission of doing what's in the best interest of the community." Thus, sometimes funding shortfalls or uncertainty constrain collaboration because some nonprofits may not be able to sustain their resources in both peacetime and emergencies, giving the government and other nonprofits the impression that funds are more important than the mission. This perception causes a lack of trust and constrains building partnerships.

A local emergency manager (GL13) adds that collaborative relationships are further constrained when nonprofits compete for funding: "Nonprofits competing against each other for dollars and cents is a barrier. . . . We see the same thing in local government, schools, fire departments—[all are] constantly competing. This is a barrier to trust." The constant competition for funding in an economy that has fewer resources

available or where emergency management is a lower priority increases distrust among all stakeholders because competition minimizes transparency.

5.1.4.2 Resource Expectations

Another funding factor that contributes to trust is the expectation of the contributor. The benevolence of an individual contributing to an organization is variable; it can be influenced by a donor's available resources and determination to commit those resources to a specific organization. In simple terms, donors have become consumer-like when determining where to contribute their limited resources. As a result, nonprofits must promote their organization to influence donors to choose their organization over another. Once the funding has been received, the donor may make spending requirements that play a role in the organization's ability to commit resources to specific activities.

A nonprofit staff member (NN4) explained how funding has changed: "Hands are tied at the local level because now Baby Boomers donate to specific causes to control what happens to their dollar to the grave. The Silent Generation says, 'I'm handing the money to you [because] you know best what agency will meet the best capacity.' [Millennials] don't have a lot of money because of hardship but live in the digital age." This comment reflects the public's trust of both nonprofits and the government, as demonstrated by individuals' efforts to dictate what specific charities receive their money. Furthermore, this prevents nonprofits from using donated funds for unknown needs that have not been approved.

There are also constraints on government funding, where the source is taxpayers. In some cases, this creates incentives for the government to collaborate with nonprofits

because the government is fully aware that it has only limited resources, whereas

nonprofits may have more resources because of their unique mission and source of

funding. In other scenarios, this is a barrier to collaboration because the government must

rely heavily on nonprofits, which causes nonprofits trust in the government to decrease

because the nonprofits perceive the government is trying to control their limited

resources.

While public donations to nonprofits prove some level of trust in the

organizations' capability to fulfill their missions, the limitations that come attached with

those donations—for example, funds are earmarked to be spent only cancer research—

demonstrate some level of mistrust that the nonprofit will not spend the donated funds in

the best possible way.

Another theme that emerged among stakeholders is the idea that some nonprofits

are participating in emergency planning with a sole focus on securing additional

resources through marketing themselves to the public. For example, a nonprofit VOAD

lead (NV1) stated, "The Red Cross and Salvation Army are seeking to have news articles

written on them, only cover major events, and are looking for camera time. They leave

when the press leaves. None of the volunteer nonprofits are getting paid. This not only

gives good people a bad name, but [it also] builds distrust." The need for funding must be

balanced with equal marketing efforts to support the overarching mission.

5.1.5 Communication

Communication was analyzed based on three constructs that are the basis for

trustworthy communication: the ability to get the right information to the right

stakeholders at the right time. Communication is critical in the planning stages because

communication channels must be established to generate a successful response during an

emergency.

5.1.5.1 Right Information

Knowledge-based trust relies on information and the ability to predict another's

behavior. It is important to note that every interviewee affirmed that nonprofits are

dependent on the government to provide information. The inference is that a lack of

information is a barrier to trust and, in turn, detracts from nonprofits' ability to predict

how emergency managers will act before and during a disaster. The government, by

exception, relies on nonprofits to willingly and enthusiastically provide information to

them to gain trust that nonprofits have certain capabilities, certifications, and skills.

Another component to having the right information concerns the quality of the

information provided. If an organization is going to use information to predict or

influence another organization's behavior, the recipient organization must have a high

level of confidence that the information it received is the most up-to-date and accurate

information. In a dynamic environment, information becomes stale quickly and the

mechanism to ensure that quality information is being shared must be established. The

ability to quickly reveal information will also build trust.

The data suggests a key factor involves the language in which information is

provided. In the context of emergency management, language refers to the technical

vernacular or professional lexicon shared between stakeholders to ensure that the right

messages are conveyed in a concise and precise manner. Language also refers to the

ability to communicate with beneficiaries that have distinct needs. For example, a translator is required to ensure that information remains intact when exchanged between organizations that have different backgrounds, either professionally or culturally. The researcher is aware that the government publishes and prints material in other languages, but this factor becomes increasingly important as the diversity of the population increases, such as the wide differences in demographics found in Virginia, Maryland, and DC.

Interview respondents suggested that trust could be increased through the presence of a common emergency management lexicon to ensure that the right message is sent and received. Specifically, a local emergency manager (GL6) suggested, "We need to look at 911, at critical responders, firefighters, medical training—all [need to be] able to communicate with no language barriers. It's important that everyone knows the vernacular."

Government collaboration with nonprofits to meet a need for Spanish-speaking emergency personnel was noted as a positive impact for meeting the needs of the public and continuing to work together. A local government emergency manager (GL19) stated, "Nonprofits who speak fluent Spanish involved [engaged]ten times more people coming to the shelter because they don't see the volunteers as immigrants." Another local emergency manager (GL6) further validated the importance of language: "Speaking the language [of a given culture] focuses efforts and responses. For seven years we spread through the Spanish community. We had to recruit for language skills that reflect the community to get rid of the notion that we don't speak from the heart, causing a lack of

trust. We need diversity in the government to increase collaboration before [an emergency]. "

Thus, the overarching theme from the interviews is that both the government and nonprofits should continue to recruit and maintain a body of workers that match the ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of the communities they seek to serve.

5.1.5.2 Right Time
The researcher also analyzed the time frames associated with information provided to support communication. Interview responses highlighted how the timeliness of providing and receiving information in the emergency planning phase impacts the level of trust between entities. Getting information after an event is meaningless; getting the right information to the right stakeholders within the given planning cycle is sufficient to support an effective and coordinated plan.

5.1.5.3 Right Stakeholders
The interviews frequently highlighted the importance of ensuring that the right stakeholders were included in discussions, which validates social exchange as the best way to analyze this data. When asked about how the government reaches out to nonprofits, a local government emergency manager (GL20) noted, "Nonprofits are involved in ESF discussions as well as other programs, such as the local emergency planning committee." This level of involvement demonstrates how continuous dialog with nonprofits increases the government's trust and knowledge of nonprofits' capabilities and expectations.

One issue that emerged focused on how sharing information between organizations is based on trust to ensure that the right stakeholders receive the right information. Without a basis of trust, organizations are not able to share information and thus form a collaborative environment. Specifically, a nonprofit VOAD representative (NV2) described the following scenario:

> nonprofits, social service workers, and emergency managers don't keep up with each other's programmatic changes, which should be easily surmountable. Examples are clients being referred and having to go through the same process for different organizations. We didn't share information. It could be a trust issue. In Hurricane Isabel, the lead supervisor told all their workers, "You can trust them, these guys are good, I'm vouching for them." It was encouragement. The voluntary sector and government keep going back and forth.

5.1.6 Purpose

The interview data confirmed that trust is increased when stakeholders have mutual goals, mutual respect, and known motivation. This concept suggests that, while the projected outcomes of the emergency planning events are important (in terms of potential payoffs), individuals also care about the motivation for reaching a goal or resolving a problem. The disparity between these objectives could present a communications and trust issue; if missions are not aligned, there is no possibility of collaboration.

5.1.6.1 Mutual Goals

Government and nonprofit personnel were asked about the extent to which their organization perceives the other shares the same goal. This was a theme that emerged

early in the interviews because nonprofits and government agencies perceive that they do not have a good understanding of each other's goals.

One respondent shared the perception among some government staff that volunteer participation threatens their job security, creating a lack of trust and an aversion to collaboration. Specifically, the government respondent (GL25) explained, "Some [government] people feel volunteers take away jobs. They have to get beyond this [idea]." This response does not appear reflect the feelings of most government workers; however, this aura of competition decreases trust and leads to an unwillingness to collaborate.

The need to have independent missions with shared goals was repeated often by respondents, both directly and indirectly. A nonprofit VOAD member (NV6) stated,

> Independence constrains collaboration. [Nonprofits] do not want to be tied
> down or "required" by [the] state to do something because they may not
> be able to respond and they won't have "flexibility." They want to do their
> own thing and not join the VOAD. Churches are hesitant when the state
> requires assistance because "big government" will ask a lot of questions
> and criticize [them] for helping illegal immigrants. Even when the Red
> Cross shows up, immigrants run because they associate them with "big
> government" as well.

The data suggests that there is a strong perception that so-called "big government" and the control it may exert over nonprofits is a barrier to collaboration. This lack of trust is founded on a notion that strict adherence to government policies, procedures, and doctrine will ultimately prevent nonaffiliated and faith-based nonprofits from fulfilling their individual mission. Another theme emerged from the data about how nonprofits

perceive some government regulations as having the ability to deter nonprofits from fulfilling their individual missions, leading to mistrust. This theme will be further explored in the context of organizational structure.

The data also suggests that nonprofit and government relationships at the local level do not indicate a strong sense of mutual trust. This statement is based on an observation by a nonprofit that the government's mission and policy implementation policies sometimes changes at the state, regional, and city levels based on the situation and personalities of key players. This lack of mission alignment at different levels can sometimes create a barrier to trust and, ultimately, collaboration. For example, a nonprofit staff member (NV1), when asked if he or she trusted that the government's mission is fully aligned with the nonprofit's mission to support the community, responded as follows: "It depends on who is elected and who is in the seat at the state, regional, and city levels."

Another theme that emerged is that of the proverbial "sandbox," where the government determines which individuals are allowed to play. Trust is decreased when the government determines that a nonprofit does not have anything to do with operating in a specific sandbox. A local government manager (GL18) explained, "We not only need a new paradigm [for emergency management], but we need to manage the expectation of volunteers and local government. The issue is more than trust; it is government attitude that no one else can 'play in their sandbox.'" This is a major constraint to collaboration, which fails to acknowledge that the nonprofit has a mutual goal to effectively prepare and respond to meet the needs of the public.

5.1.6.2 Mutual Respect

A local government respondent (GL18) reflected that collaboration is best when government managers have an "open-mindedness to receive [the] value [that nonprofits] bring to the table." This comment reflects how trust and respect are fostered when nonprofits perceive that government emergency managers understand the values and benefits that nonprofits can provide.

In contrast, distrust permeates interactions when nonprofits perceive a lack of respect from the government. A local government emergency manager (GL18) shared the following example: "Nonprofits and volunteers who participated in exercises are used as 'victims,' or [government] pushed to use them to man traffic stops, utilized at shelters [for trivial jobs], EOC [sometimes], but when there's a full-scale exercise, there is a totally different crew [of nonprofits]." This comment suggests that government managers don't always use the capabilities of nonprofits, and nonprofits feel disrespected when they are put in noncritical positions, such as being pushed to shelters, in lieu of holding decision-making roles. This situation does not produce trust on either side and is a barrier to collaboration.

To build trust, nonprofits desire an environment where their value is well understood and communicated. For example, nonprofits provide direct access to knowledge about specific emergency function, including sheltering, feeding, and sharing critical information with the public and government that would not otherwise be available. The researcher concluded that the way that information is shared factors into how much a nonprofit feels respected. When asked what constrains collaboration, a local emergency manager (GL21) stated,

> Government entities are "standing on the mountain, preaching." Their
> motives are in the right purpose, spreading the word, believing that all
> who hear have to respond and are compelled to act. Government does a
> good job delivering the mission about safety and preparedness before the
> disaster [and] are great for reaching out after a disaster, but if they haven't
> been involved with nonprofits who are able to get into the front door of
> people in need, there's not a lot going on if the right [government] person
> is not on board.

This comment suggests that nonprofits perceive the government to be dictating events

from their mountaintop while the nonprofits are required to merely respond, in lieu of

establishing trust before an emergency and treating nonprofits as team members. A

situation like this would be personality-driven, reflecting the government manager's

leadership (not management) skills. If leadership is good, there is trust on the team; if it is

not good, trust and collaboration will not be present.

Along the same lines, a lack of perceived mutual respect between emergency managers

and nonprofits can lead to fear. Emergency management is an individual, group, and

cultural experience in building trust. Some organizations—for example, faith-based

organizations—may not trust personnel from other nonprofits or the government to

accomplish their specific mission. A nonprofit VOAD representative (NV1) explained,

"In some instances, nonprofits 'fear' emergency management personnel because they are

nonreligious. The emergency manager wants to know why you are there, and nonprofits

don't have a level of comfort [because they] can't see [the government's] hand and they

weren't 'baptized in the Jordan.' Nonprofits are there in their homes for area

emergencies. We're rural, not professional, not an emergency manager or fire chief. I'm

not sure the government understands this. " If government managers take the sentiments of this quote into consideration when engaging nonprofits and the public, mutual respect can be established, in turn, leading to trust.

5.1.6.3 Purpose – Motivation

The data suggests that each stakeholder's motivation is important affects their decision to collaborate. Trust will increase if organizations perceive each other's motivations as noble; distrust will occur if organizations perceive each other's motivations as being based purely on self-interest.

For example, distrust is increased when government agencies and nonprofits perceive that the other organization is using the emergency planning platform for marketing purposes rather than to achieve the mission. While the services that are provided by organizations such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army are appreciated, many perceive their intentions are only to market their capabilities leading to distrust amongst stakeholders.

An organization's motivation is also called into question if the nonprofit organization has a perceived for-profit mindset. One local government emergency manager (GL18) explained, "The Red Cross has canteens and trailers; however, the lesser-known nonprofits, like the megachurches, have the same equipment but the churches have a 'for-profit' mindset." This creates mistrust about an organization's motivations: are they offering their services to increase their own bottom line or are truly interested in supporting the mission? There is a government perception that they cannot trust some less-well-known nonprofits because their mission is to profit from rather than

serve the public mission in an emergency. During the emergency preparedness phase, the question of motivation is often unclear, so stakeholders must rely on the trust that has been established to date.

Finally, while local government officials are elected by a citizen majority, local officials can be distrusted due to the political climate and a perceived lack of mission alignment with regard to emergency management planning.

5.1.7 Preparedness Process

5.1.7.1 Efficiency
The Red Cross and the VOADs are trusted by many emergency managers and are preferred because of this trust. A local government manager (G11) explained, "The Red Cross and VOAD have credibility because they work with government before the disaster." The government can achieve major planning efficiency when it uses VOADs to find nonprofits to perform necessary tasks. This creates an incentive to collaborate with both known and less-well-known nonprofits through the VOADs. Both nonprofits and the government benefit because qualified workers are vetted through the Red Cross.

5.1.7.2 Effectiveness
The researcher analyzed the effectiveness of the emergency planning process by asking nonprofits why or why not they were engaged in the preparation and planning phases. One of the government perceptions is that there are certain functions that nonprofits can effectively accomplish, but involvement in ESFs and EOPs does not necessarily fit that list. One local emergency manager (GL21) explained, "The Red Cross is integral to sheltering, getting the community involved in the neighborhood service center, volunteer fire department, chamber of commerce, humane society for pet

protection, church community, a list of local emergency planning council members and VOAD representatives. The ESF is good for planning but not operational."

Another recommendation to increase effectiveness is to form county working groups for strategic vision as well as planning an operational problem solving session or meetings with some available funding to solidify planning efforts. When asked how to engage nonprofits in an ideal world of emergency management, a local government emergency manager (GL21) suggested, "Each county could form a working group of nonprofits with the county agencies and certain parts of county government, merging the different missions and discuss vision and form partnerships to solve problems for preparation, have access to funds to implement it, and have regular interaction to know each other." If this suggestion were put into action, it would enable a community to build a countywide team of experts to work with government, building trust in capabilities.

5.1.7.3 Resources

The resources that contribute to an organization's proficiency level were analyzed based on available training, meeting spaces, exercises, and credentialing to maximize benefit. One of the resources deemed important in facilitating trust was a state registry of volunteers, which helps nonprofits to conduct preparedness and outreach tasks. A local government manager (GL20) explained, "Under ESF-17, Volunteer/Donation Management, the State of Maryland has a volunteer registry program. They are recognized especially in the mass care/health environment, and we otherwise use volunteers in our EOC environments, outreach, and community programs."

The data indicates that participation in training creates an environment in which government and nonprofits speak the same language and use the same vernacular, which is one of the incentives to building relationships based on trust. However, for a nonprofit to be invited to the training, an initial amount of trust is required. A nonprofit VOAD representative (NV1) explained, "If you don't have a relationship with the emergency manager [that is, he or she trusts you], you will not get training or be invited to the exercise." Thus, the conclusion is that nonprofits who have no relationship with an emergency manager will not receive training. Furthermore, the nonprofit will not be able to build trust or any relationship unless it makes a valiant effort to engage.

5.1.7.4 Meetings

Another theme that emerged is participation in emergency planning meetings to build trust. One government representative asserts that nonprofits must come to the location of the emergency manager to have face-to-face discussions about their capability and engage in scenario planning on the spot. The implication is that face-to-face meetings—preferred over phone calls, teleconferences, and other communications—have real value that would build the government's trust that nonprofits can deliver. One local government manager (GL4) explained, "I'm not searching the Internet for nonprofits; nonprofits need to approach emergency management offices, need to have [schedule] five minutes or less time across the board [to meet with government], trust word of mouth, i.e. Bob's group, we can do this, there's a lot of inquiry about what their resources are, give [nonprofits] them scenarios to work through." Another local emergency manager (GL15) said, "A lot of our people rely on technology; the emergency manager develops face-to-

face relationships standing in the hall talking, and then emailing. We are human services; face-to-face [interactions have] real value."

It is equally important for nonprofits to invite and engage with emergency managers. A nonprofit respondent validated the need for meetings in building trust when asked about incentives for collaboration. Specifically, a nonprofit VOAD representative (NV1) said, "We have monthly meetings of our team of faith-based and local nonprofits. We invite the government from MEMA, and if members of the local Chamber of Commerce want to come, we invite them to each one of our meetings. This has helped build trust and greater relationships." When nonprofits invite government personnel to meetings, trust and transparency result.

The data suggests that participation in planning exercises also significantly increases trust. A local government manager (GL11) stated, "Nonprofits frequently work with middle and upper management, which is not a problem. . . . Nonprofits do not work with the 'boots on the ground' frequently. [nonprofits do better if they follow] Rules of the game, [involvement in] exercises, [have been trained on] NIMS 700 to roll into response easier for boots on the ground. Meeting first in exercises [helps]. The county offers NIMS and ICS training to the VOADs twice a year." This comment implies that if nonprofits first participate in exercises and NIMS, their participation would increase the trust of first responders.

Having a requirement for and enforcing background checks for nonprofit volunteers forms a foundation for trust between nonprofits and government. This trust also sensitizes stakeholders to the variety of sensitivities needed for different ESFs during

emergencies; having the correct credentials to serve the public is important to building

trust. A nonprofit VOAD representative (NV6) provided the following example: "The

VOAD can put 'Jim Chainsaw Brigade' together because they know the capability of the

new volunteers because they all have had background checks, making the nonprofits and

government happy that there is no liability. This is completely different if 'Jim' is

volunteering to take care of children under a different ESF or . . . taking care of mentally

deficient [people under] ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services."

5.8 Policy and Guidance

Binding contracts are outside the scope of this research because the terms of

agreement are negotiated incrementally until both sides reach terms that are optimized.

Instead, compliance with policy and guidance written in emergency planning documents,

such as EOPs, in the will be analyzed in the context of trust.

The research shows that organizations are more likely to trust each other when

policy exists with enough detail to support effective planning, such as EOPs. During

interviews, the researcher asked individuals from both government and nonprofit

organizations questions about the existence of policy. If the respondents were aware of

existing policies, the researcher determined their organization's intent to comply and

noted the motivations that influenced their decision.

5.8.1 Policy Existence

The data suggests that the existence of policy was not a significant factor in

building trust between stakeholders in the emergency management planning phase.

5.8.2 Policy Compliance

While adherence to some government regulations is required to maintain the public's safety, nonprofits perceive that some regulations could deter them from fulfilling their individual missions, which leads to mistrust. When asked if the roles and responsibilities of nonprofits are formalized in the EOP, a local government emergency manager (GL22) explained, "Several nonprofits have become essential partners in certain areas of the EOP, such as Annex H, Natural Disaster Response, and Annex K, Volunteers and Donations. We are currently in the process of revising the EOP, and we will augment the discussions of these organizations' capabilities." Nonprofits should be involved in the EOP process. It is up to government to invite them in.

5.2 Summary

Nonprofits are essential to emergency operations planning, and government emergency managers' trust in nonprofits has led to continuing discussion of their capabilities throughout the preparedness response. Trust is the foundation for forming collaborative relationships between government and nonprofits.

Data collection during interviews and the resulting analysis of trust indicates that several subthemes further illuminate how trust is developed and leads to collaboration. These subthemes include VOAD membership; quality of the relationship; resource reliability; funding sources; communication with all stakeholders; organizational purpose; how stakeholders support the planning process; and the impact of applicable emergency management policy. The goal is to build long-term relationships based on trust while simultaneously encouraging the government to engage nonprofits to collaborate in all preparedness activities. Trust is a major part of an intricate social exchange network, with

transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure playing the role of important, but less passionate, themes that combine to clarify the reasons that government and nonprofit organizations collaborate in the preparedness phase.

Trust is the foundation for establishing collaborative relationships between the government and nonprofits. Emergency managers and nonprofits who have not established trust-based relationships must, at a minimum, continue to associate with other stakeholders to create a sustainable culture of trust. Like any relationship, it will take work to sustain this trust throughout the emergency preparedness phase. This "marriage," unlike other marriages, is typically more successful when it is based on past experience, but it is easily broken when stakeholders do not live up to expectations, especially in a fiscally constrained economy in which managers must compete for trust based on control of resources. Trust cannot be mandated by policy and cannot be negotiated. Trust should also be viewed in a complex working environment that is more clearly illustrated by the interactions of other major themes discovered in this research: transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure.

CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS – TRANSPARENCY

6.1 Findings and Interpretations

Chapter 5 discussed trust as the most important foundation for developing and sustaining collaborative relationships. Trust is a key attribute that is influenced by the amount and level of transparency. Transparency leads to trust. The researcher's thematic analysis of the data suggests that a discussion on transparency deserves a major role in the research because a number of constraints to government-nonprofit collaboration are associated with this single factor.

Government and nonprofit organizations define transparency as the flow of information vertically and horizontally. Emergency preparedness policy and guidance does not discuss transparency as a requirement. The data suggests it is critical for nonprofits to understand that the government will never provide information on every operational aspect of preparedness due to vulnerability, privacy, and security. Interviews highlighted that need-to-know mandates are considered a security measure in the emergency planning process. Too much transparency violates the government's written mandates to protect information via need-to-know mandates, but this written guidance is not always explained to nonprofits.

In light of this constraint, government emergency managers must be transparent with any and all information not restricted by need-to-know mandates. The researcher concluded that the government's attitude toward implementing this variable will heavily

influence the level of transparency and, thus, the amount of support that nonprofits are willing to provide. Transparency is not easily negotiated; it is dependent on a government emergency manager's skills to elicit trust in the nonprofit stakeholder. This level of transparency is dictated by social exchange principles.

Research also showed that nonprofits typically protect information. Sometimes this based on privacy and security like the government, but most often nonprofits are protecting their intellectual property, which gives them an advantage when operating as a business that must receive donations during a time of constrained resources. Although the government sometimes provides funding to nonprofits, nonprofits' best approach for managing their funds is to share as little information as possible outside their board of directors.

Fears based on a lack of trust, protection of assets, and control will deter communication. By the very nature of their organizational structures, nonprofits and government agencies face imbedded barriers to transparency and collaboration. The government controls a massive communications infrastructure and has ready access to leading technologies. This is not always the case for nonprofits, which use their funding based on strict guidelines and are sometimes prevented from spending money on communications infrastructure that uses the best technology. Although a communications infrastructure—a means of communicating on a regular basis for monthly and quarterly meetings or exercises—exists to incentivize communications, nonprofits' demographics and motivation for working with emergency managers has changed in the fiscally constrained and competitive environment. The data suggests that the communications

process is well established at the state level, but communication on the ground is dictated by a local emergency manager where the emergency occurs. Because transparency is not a policy-driven variable, local emergency managers are given leverage to determine their own communication best practices in accordance with procedures that have worked well in the past but need to be adjusted to any change in demographics.

The demographics and emergency preparedness environment—as well as funding and organizational structure—in Washington DC are drastically different than in Virginia and Maryland because it is the nation's capital. The HSEMA Director is typically on the ground, face-to-face with residents and responders, for many major emergency planning activities because of DC's connection with the homeland security mission. Transparency is even more critical in this role than it is for a local emergency manager in rural Virginia or Maryland. These differences have not yet resulted in a common process for communication at all levels of preparedness. This is drastically different than emergency response capabilities, which mandates common rules for engagement.

Despite the fact that government information is disseminated widely, there is no guarantee that nonaffiliated nonprofits are able to interpret the government's message due to a lack of comprehension, format, language, and the overwhelming bureaucracy typically found in government. For example, a nonprofit that is attempting to discover where it fits in the national preparedness landscape is likely to struggle to understand the federal emergency management guidelines listed in the National Response Framework, ESFs, and EOPs. In fact, the research design included extensive time just to understand the basic federal, state and local emergency management directives. Nonprofits and

nongovernment stakeholders are constrained because the information is communicated in a way that makes it hard to comprehend.

The data also suggests that it is important for nonprofits to know their position in the emergency management landscape, not only from the perspective of a chain of command but also as it relates to preparedness activities. Centrality and connectedness to the government emergency manager affects the availability and flow of information in the network of stakeholders. Emergency managers do not always know what nonprofit organizations exist outside the realm of members in the VOAD, which is typically an emergency manager's single point of nonprofit contact. Outside the VOAD, there is no requirement for nonprofits to be registered, which results in a group of nonaffiliated nonprofits who are not part of emergency preparedness activities for various reasons. Some nonaffiliated nonprofits are aware, to some extent, of the government's emergency management needs, but if the government does not clearly articulate those needs directly to an appropriate nonprofit, the need will likely be unmet. These nonaffiliated nonprofits are not typically invited to emergency planning meetings because they effectively do not exist in the eyes of the government unless they offer assistance.

Transparency is the product of several relational attributes among organizations engaged in emergency response. The researcher considered many definitions of transparency and selected the Dunn and Miller definition, which highlights how openness in communication and transparency of an organization are essential in serving its public purpose.[333] In this research, transparency supports the theme of trust but must be

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[333] Dunn and Miller, "A Critique of the New Public Management and the Neo-Weberian State."

recognized as an important theme of equal significance in explaining social exchange mechanisms.

Government agencies are expected to be transparent with nonprofits, although need-to-know mandates can hinder government efforts to share information. Nonprofits, on the other hand, have a different customer that demands transparency: the public and their board of directors. Nonprofits fear that sharing information could expose scarce resources to government personnel and that these assets cannot be easily replaced. These types of transparency issues constrain communication and trust between government and nonprofit emergency management professionals, ultimately impacting collaboration.

This chapter will discuss the data collected during interviews with both government and emergency managers in the context of transparency as a major theme in building relationships. Chapter 4 operationalized transparency into the following key subthemes: information vulnerability, asset protection, communications infrastructure, information comprehension, and information-sharing gaps. Within each subtheme, the researcher analyzed both the incentives and barriers to collaboration for government and nonprofit entities at varying levels of impact and intensity.

6.1.1 Information Vulnerability

The research suggests that transparency, openness, and sharing information are commonly agreed on practices for both the government and nonprofits in the emergency preparedness phase. The data also indicates both government and nonprofit personnel have specific concerns about the legal and ethical boundaries of sharing information and

how this influences greater or less transparency. These boundaries are typically established early and reinforced often.

A local government manager (GL11) noted an important boundary, stating, "Nonprofits can accept cash donations, the government cannot." This difference in operations is positive because it expands the overall available funding when implemented properly. Emergency managers recognize this as a positive factor that leads to greater transparency; however, nonprofits must still control information about the amount, type, and source of their donations to allow greater flexibility in spending these resources.

Emergency managers also see the benefit of engaging nonprofits to promote collaborative communication with other stakeholders. This communication provides the government with credibility in the planning process by having the nonprofit vouch for the government lead with local community and government leaders.

Transparency must be balanced with the needs of privacy and security; a conflict may occur when an order or request for information exceeds the authority to provide the information in a given situation. The government clearly articulates an emergency manager's roles, responsibilities, and authorities in the state or local job description, laws, and guidance. This guidance includes the type of information that can be shared with nonprofits. Transparency is sometimes interpreted to mean that the information shared is not explicitly written or documented and goes beyond what is typically discussed; this level of openness promotes collaboration when it does not cross any legal or ethical boundaries and instantiates trust as reflected in the exchange theory.

The government has a clear incentive toward transparency when it can validate that a nonprofit's workers have been trained and vetted. A local government manager (GL7) explained that the government "reaches out to the Red Cross because they have federal, qualified workers vetted through the organization [and they] have the qualifications, skill sets, and trained people. They will not accept untrained, nonaffiliated [volunteers]." Several government interviewees echoed the local government manager's perception of "recognized nonprofits" and reiterated their willingness to collaborate with these vetted organizations. One nonprofit VOAD representative (NV7) explained, "If you are a known entity—[such as the] Red Cross, Salvation Army, or VOAD—you receive information and training and [are] invited to meetings and into the EOC in the planning process."

Several nonprofits highlighted the fact that the government is transparent only with known nonprofits, including both access to information and involvement in emergency planning activities. This barrier is very difficult to overcome, forcing some level of compliance by less-well-known nonprofits if they wish to become part of the emergency management team. The researcher's perception is that the government will not share information with a nonprofit unless it can provide the government with a predetermined level of information and resources. Thus, the government's policies regarding information sharing create a barrier to collaboration for nonprofits who want to retain control over certain aspects of their information. This means that there are likely untapped emergency management resources that could be available from these nonprofits.

Another important aspect that influences the level of transparency involves not only less-well-known nonprofits but also the nonprofits that are not affiliated with a VOAD. A state emergency manager (GS1) explained, "There are no roles and responsibilities for individual nonprofits. State VOAD has a role. When the VOAD is activated, we contact the leader, that person from the VOAD is at the EOC. We don't recognize anyone else." This statement illustrates an inflexible boundary that precludes association with nonprofits that are not part of a VOAD.

When discussing why nonprofits don't want to be part of a VOAD, several respondents explained that nonprofits are apprehensive that VOAD membership would subject their organization to rules and regulations that are not consistent nor would they aid a desire to be more transparent. The data indicates that transparency is not a one-way street; rather, the probability that a nonprofit will increase its transparency is influenced by the extent and level of government openness and energy beyond VOAD participation.

Some emergency managers recognize that nonprofits and VOADs are relevant in emergency management preparation. One nonprofit representative (NA2) recalled an incident in which "the state-level emergency manager hosted a meeting to try and attract members to the VOAD. Local emergency managers were not there." The nonprofit surmised that local emergency managers do not always participate in meetings to encourage collaboration with nonprofits because they assume their role does not include collaboration at meetings with VOADs. This strict interpretation of roles and responsibilities constrains collaboration.

There are also nonprofits who do attempt to collaborate with the government. For example, one nonprofit representative (NV1) explained, "We have monthly meetings and invite government emergency managers, project managers and local government to attend if they are available." In this instance, the nonprofit indicates a desire for more open communication with the government for future collaboration and team building. Most nonprofits, both affiliated and nonaffiliated, are familiar with government emergency management staff's roles, responsibilities, and authorities. Hosting meetings allows nonprofits to initiate collaborative activities while also controlling information flow, which gives them option to transparently provide information about their capabilities on their own terms. This also provides government emergency managers the option to meet face-to-face and increase the level of trust for both entities, showing that attendance is valuable.

Transparency is also a factor that relates to nonprofits' access to government documents, such as EOPs, which provide insight into the government's mission and emergency response actions. EOPs are often not published online for security reasons. One local government emergency manager (GL2) explained, "There is a new FEMA template for EOPs, and only part of the EOP will be placed online. The ESFs will not be posted at all." The manager explained that the ESFs were not posted because sharing them would increase the city's vulnerability. This comment reflects the government's fear that transparency in written plans can result in operational vulnerability. Thus, the government's lack of transparency is not necessarily designed to prevent nonprofits from being involved in the emergency response process, but it is to protect perceived

vulnerabilities from being openly communicated to the public. This highlights an area where a face-to-face venue could incentivize collaboration by getting nonprofit and government personnel into the same room so that written guidance and documents are not misinterpreted, an even more fundamental barrier to collaboration.

Transparency is sometimes the cause as well as the reason for continuous collaboration between government and nonprofits. One of the highlights of this research was the following response from a nonprofit representative (NV7) when asked what incentivizes collaboration:

> I was invited to sit with emergency managers, as well as other national
> nonprofits, in a meeting to discuss preparedness and the EOP. Because of
> the line of communication, the VOAD has a place in the EOC during
> disasters. Two VOADs man the EOC when activated. Communication is
> ongoing and formalized. One of the benefits of this ongoing
> communication with the government is that [VOAD members] are able to
> participate in simulation exercises with the government and [are] able to
> give their input, creating a two-way learning street.

This scenario reflects a high level of motivation for continued collaboration based on government acknowledgement that nonprofits should be part of a continuous communications process that exercises nonprofits' full capability while simultaneously building trust. This nonprofit was invited with full recognition by the emergency manager of formal and informal relations, authorities, boundaries resulting in transparently sharing necessary information for joint mission accomplishment.

Emergency management preparation is critical, however, in identifying barriers to collaboration. Some respondents noted the difficulty of being transparent at the federal

level when there are no guidelines as to how this transparency can occur with FEMA.

One state level emergency manager (GS7) explained, "All disasters start at the local level with the emergency manager, who has layers of support, i.e. local, state, then FEMA." The barrier results because there is no guidance about how to operate and communicate with FEMA. The creation of a more collaborative mechanism or process to operate and communicate with FEMA would provide greater transparency for both emergency managers and nonprofits. This implies a standard approach that details full knowledge of what and who to communicate with based on authorities. This would leave several options for upward communication, but downward communication—both oral and written—must be formal and informal during emergency management preparation. This suggestion also applies to organizational structure and illustrates how large federal-level entities can be an incentive but is more often a barrier to collaboration.

The same state emergency manager (GS7) stated that when new guidelines are put into place, it is important that all [government and nonprofits] understand where these new procedures fit into the operational foundation. For example, he explained that "ESF-17 is new, and not all states have volunteers to handle ESF-17 [which was previously defined as ESF-6, Volunteers and Donations]. There is another barrier [when all stakeholders do not] understand the importance of sharing the information on [the new] ESF-17."

6.1.2 Asset Protection
A second subtheme of transparency involves the protection of assets—information and resources—for both government and nonprofit stakeholders. The data

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suggests that nonprofits do not openly share information about their true capacity and that

the government protects information it feels is available strictly on a need-to-know basis.

A great deal of this information is vetted based on command and control concepts

discussed in earlier chapters.

One of the major themes of this research in relation to transparency and asset

protection revolves around funding and budget constraints. Nonprofits highlight this as

their largest concern, as exemplified by this statement from a nonaffiliated nonprofit

representative (NN4): "Due to the government's funding issue, nonprofits get pushed to

do more, taking on roles the government had previously taken on. This is a transparency

issue because the government feels the nonprofits can raise the money. This is at a time

when nonprofits have their own financial issues. They are asking the nonprofits more and

more to supply resources." This statement was reinforced by another nonprofit

representative (NN4), who stated, "Nonprofits do not necessarily share their capabilities

and resources because it is clear, with government budget cuts, that the government is

planning [its] budgets incorporating nonprofit capabilities. [The government is becoming]

more heavily reliant on nonprofits that don't necessarily have the capacity to augment

government budgets." This comment suggests that there is a perception by nonprofits that

government relies more heavily on them due to budget constraints.

The data suggests that the government is increasingly involved in emergency

management preparation at the federal level, and the government has noticed rising

amounts of donor funding becoming available to large nonprofits, thus government

agencies at all levels are being encouraged to cut their budgets to amounts below what is

necessary to provide adequate emergency preparation, response, and recovery; the assumption is that nonprofits will be able to fill the funding gaps. This level of transparency about nonprofits' funding does not entice them to collaborate with the government, knowing their resources could be depleted early in a disaster.

Government workers also appear to perceive that nonprofits can easily raise money, thus the government is eager to shift some of the financial burden to nonprofits. The research data suggests that nonprofits are not fully transparent about their capabilities and resources because the government is trying to use nonprofits' funds to compensate for shortfalls in government funding. This is a major constraint to asset transparency.

A majority of government emergency managers saw the need to reach out to nonprofit stakeholders to understand their assets and capabilities. A state government emergency manager (GS2) provided a typical response: "Emergency Managers need to reach out to 501(c)(3) organizations in addition to VOADs, Red Cross, and Salvation Army. Emergency managers need to reach out to different groups to learn capabilities." The reflected an overwhelming response from emergency managers that this action improves the planning process and allows emergency managers a better understanding of the capabilities that nonprofits possess.

However, when emergency managers reach out to nonprofits, they do not always respond. This is a barrier to collaboration. One local emergency manager (GL16) who sees the value of collaboration with nonprofits shared, "I was reaching out to nonprofits; [I] did two mailings to faith-based [nonprofits] to establish a VOAD. No responses." The faith-based groups mentioned did not respond to requests to be interviewed for this

research, but the researcher talked to other faith-based groups, who revealed that they did not want to share the information that is required to become part of the VOAD (and thus reveal their resources or make their organization susceptible to scrutiny).

Nonprofits also indicated a concern to protect their assets not only from the government but also from other nonprofits. Full transparency does not exist horizontally across some nonprofits because of competition for resources, thus protection of assets remains a key concern. For example, one nonprofit representative (NV5) explained, "When [faith-based nonprofits work] with other faith-based nonprofits, they became 'siloed' in their mission, and even though they were working on the same project, they would not share information."

Nonprofits also demonstrate concern in working with VOADs. The research identified incidents in which nonprofits are not fully transparent with VOADs, who the nonprofits perceive to be aligned with the government and only want involvement by certain nonprofit entities. One nonprofit representative (NA2) explained the following perception: "The VOAD wants to pull key people and prefer specific tasks." The implication is that VOADs don't just want nonaffiliated nonprofits; they are interested in people who will increase their span of control and net worth in the preparedness network. Exchange theory illuminates this concern.

Another key finding is that many volunteers and nonprofits are committed across several different nonprofit entities. The previous quotation highlights the perception that VOADs are not interested in all nonprofits. This creates a situation in which some VOADs may not be equally transparent with all nonprofits; as a result, nonprofits do not

want to become involved in the VOAD because they want to protect their assets. Thus, transparency is not open to all, but only specific organizations as selected by the VOAD.

While many emergency managers see the need to collaborate with a variety of nonprofits, boundaries still exist; sometimes this appears to be not a matter of policy but of perceptions that constrain government managers to working exclusively with VOADs. A state government emergency manager (GS1) said, "I'm hesitant to favor one over the other [that is, VOAD-affiliated nonprofits over nonaffiliated nonprofits]. There is an untapped faith base; denominations often serve their own congregation. We need to break the barrier down. We are 'reluctant to open to strangers.] Nonprofits are not always listed on [emergency operations] plans, but this may change. Not [being] connected to VOAD makes you a stranger."

Personal preferences and judgment by government personnel keep information closely held for a variety of reasons, resulting in less transparency. For example, one local government emergency manager (GL15) explained, "The EOP is not online . . . because of anticipation of endless questions [and] FOIA request[s]; [the responsible party does] not [want to solicit] input." Unlike other emergency managers who do not share information due to concerns about information vulnerability, this example reflects a personal preference that is not driven by any written guidance found in the literature review.

On a similar note, other emergency managers do not believe collaboration is important. For example, one local government emergency manager (GL2) stated,

It was not necessary for nonprofits to participate in disaster planning, not necessarily in the EOC, and we should keep only essential services. We don't need the Red Cross in planning either. They need to be out there helping people. There is no list of nonprofits that I know of in the area. There was a list of Department of Social Services, a family service resource. If there's a real emergency and I needed help with sheltering, I would call a church and I hope they would say yes.

The researcher surmises that this emergency manager considers both the emergency management preparation process and the manager's domain to be assets that must be protected from nonprofits. Another local government emergency manager (GL25) simply said, "Outreach [to nonprofits] is not done." While the manager did not explain his or her reasoning to the researcher, the perception is that sometimes government managers do not need or value nonprofit input.

Another local emergency manager (GL1) maintained that nonprofits need to come to him "to let [him] know what services and resources they can provide in a disaster." This comment provides another example of one-way communication and reflects the responses of several local emergency managers who have no plans to be more transparent with nonprofits because they expect nonprofits to must market their capabilities to the VOAD as opposed to the emergency manager. The implication is that some managers are too busy to make time to reach out to nonaffiliated nonprofits. This alludes to organizational and cultural aspects of management discussed in other sections of this dissertation.

When asked what would encourage nonprofit collaboration, a state government emergency manager said,

The VOAD is a known entity, and they do their own assessment of

capabilities. The advantage to nonprofits is that [the VOAD] is a good

marketing tool. The emergency manager wears so many hats—nonprofits

need to market to [the emergency manager], given [the emergency

manager's lack of] time and resources. Emergency managers don't have

time to market [to the nonprofits]. Government attitude is that there's a

value to nonprofit marketing, not to the government. But government is

not marketing to them.

The response shows that nonaffiliated nonprofits cannot be engaged unless they market

their capabilities to the VOAD, whose purpose is to market on the nonprofits' behalf.

This is essentially a one-way street because it is the nonprofit's responsibility to market,

or transparently communicate, it capabilities to the VOAD and thus the government; the

government has no such communication responsibilities. The government perspective is

that emergency managers do not have only limited time and resources, thus they prefer to

only engage in meetings and communications with the VOAD and its affiliated

nonprofits because it is a known entity with transparent capabilities.

6.1.3 Communications Infrastructure

A critical part of operationalizing transparency involves the presence of a resilient

communications infrastructure, including technical—such as websites, blogs, and social

media—and nontechnical approaches. Both government and nonprofit organizations must

have the capability to build and support this type of infrastructure.

The government publishes many documents and guidelines that are easily

accessible online, which illustrates a commitment to transparency with citizens and

nonprofits. However, the government only publishes those documents that it believes are

necessary to share with stakeholders at the state and local level; this varies from state to state (including the District).

States have designed additional structures for communicating. For example, a state emergency manager (GS4) explained, "The governor has set up the Governor's Office Community Initiative to interact and communicate with nonprofits, having this committee act as a liaison to help work out difficulties with government, not knowing another mechanism to interact with them before something happens. This brings the nonprofit "into the mix" to help us before something happens." This creation of a forum to discuss government-nonprofit issues incentivizes collaboration by exposing issues to leadership teams that have the power to resolve issues and avoiding bureaucratic red tape by presenting issues at the highest level so that proper guidance can be issued to all stakeholders. This communication increases transparency.

Meetings are a primary venue for government-nonprofit communications. A local government emergency manager (GL8) explained, "I have monthly standing disaster preparation meetings for emergency managers, and nonprofits are invited once a month in each of the ESF areas to discuss and address concerns. I also have a follow-up meeting. We also had a bus trip with 70 people including nonprofits to work on simulating a disaster in a city." Regularly scheduled meetings build lasting partnerships.

In fact, several emergency managers stated that face-to-face contact is critical and there is no substitute for this type of communication, despite strides made in use of digital media. One local emergency manager (GL15) explained, "In emergency management, we are human services. Face-to-face communication has real value." In-person conversations

can preclude misinterpretation and facial responses indicate understanding, lack thereof, or confusion about intentions and motivations.

Government must also attempt to communicate with nonaffiliated nonprofits and are well aware that the United States is composed of a blend of cultures, races, and ethnicities. A new approach to contacting nonaffiliated nonprofits is to first start with local populations to spread the word about the work being done by emergency managers with the hope that some of these organizations will come forward through transparency. As such, one local emergency manager (GL8) maintained the importance of creating "emergency management guides in Spanish and other languages, [as well as providing other languages for] training flyers, social media, radio, and newspapers." This comment reflects the need to provide information via all types of media in different languages, and then reinforcing these messages through face-to-face forums with local people who could be part of a nonaffiliated nonprofit. This process could be supported by local and state communications infrastructures. This practice is already being done because it communicates to nonprofits and all stakeholders about government expectations for actions made before, during, and after a disaster using language that is clear and understandable. The research also indicates that this approach could also provide meaningful ways to nonprofits to communicate with government given the diversity evident in our society.

When face-to-face contact between government and nonprofits is not possible, direct communication is still preferred. For example, one local emergency manager (GL18) said, "There are two ways [to] notify me directly: text or email me. We have also

trained on specific radios to help communications." This comment suggests that government managers rely on specific types of communications, which nonprofits and other stakeholders may not use. This response represents a two-way communications architecture as opposed to multiple venues and approaches, such as face-to-face meetings, personal contact, and larger forums. This traditional approach also leaves emergency managers in control of the communications venue, which reflects a hierarchy typically found in government.

Nonprofits sometimes view the development of communications infrastructure as a barrier to communications and collaboration. One nonprofit representative (NN4) explained, "Some nonprofits do not handle digital media, social media, and other [media to reach] the Millenniums. This causes an information and communication issue, because many nonprofits are not on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram." Social media can present a technical and philosophical challenge to nonprofits and the government because it presents vulnerabilities, both from a security perspective and regarding the need to be more transparent. Funding is often cited as an issue in maintaining this communications infrastructure, which requires expertise in managing information technology. The government typically has easy access to this type of expertise; in contrast, nonprofits must consider the costs and benefits of engaging in this sometimes time-consuming and costly endeavor.

One of the most critical communications infrastructure and transparency issues cited by emergency managers is the need for published lists of local and faith-based nonprofits beyond what is available through the VOADs. A local emergency manager

(GL23) noted, "It's difficult to identify nonprofit organizations beyond the national level groups." The researcher's experience, in addition to comments from both government and nonprofits, validates this lack of information, despite vast amount and types of information available on the Internet. It is clear that even if emergency managers desire to identify and reach out to nonprofits other than the known entities or to look for nonprofit capabilities beyond those already available, there is no directory or easily accessible website that contains the information needed. This is a constraint to collaboration; however, nonprofits may not want to publish their information or be involved in emergency management activities.

6.1.4 Information Comprehension

One of the key tenets of transparency in collaboration is having a meaningful exchange of information, which does not always result from simply sharing and communicating. Information comprehension increases or decreases based on the type of language and its complexity and format. Collaboration is maximized when information is comprehended and well understood.. While the previous section on communication infrastructure recommended that information be published and disseminated in multiple languages, this section focuses on the potential for lack of comprehension of disseminated information, which could constrain transparency and collaboration.

The data suggests that one of the overarching constraints to information comprehension is the different missions for government and nonprofit agencies. This theme not only reflects a hierarchical command and control influence, but it was

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identified as one of the major barriers where government and nonprofit organizations have not been able to make any progress.

Government and nonprofits use some of the same guidance, but detailed preparation, planning, and implementation actions must be coordinated well in advance of an emergency to fully execute the mission when required. A local emergency manager (GL11) stated, "In order to speak the same language, we need to get on the same song, not only in the same hymnal." Local emergency manager GL19 shared those sentiments.

Another local emergency manager (GL17) suggested there are constraints to collaboration because "nonprofits and [the] government are separate disciplines with different perspectives that look through different lenses. If you're a hammer, everything looks like a nail. [To enhance collaboration, one should] be a bridge to change that perspective and develop experience and holistic views of the problem before trying to solve the issues."

Both the government and nonprofits must try to understand the other The previous quotation highlights how the government and nonprofits are two different disciplines, looking through different lenses. Sensitivity to these differences could help bridge the gap. The more one respects the other's missions, the greater the transparency that will occur.

Nonprofits also share the notion that there are two different perspectives and thoughts on how to execute emergency management preparation. A local nonprofit VOAD representative (NV2) stated, "We have to be brave enough to realize government has their own expectation. It's a different philosophy and a different language." The

difference alluded to in this comment refers to the overarching dialog between the government and nonprofits; this is often a structured, hierarchal, one-way communication that is usually dispersed downward from the top, rather than upward or horizontal.

Another nonprofit representative (NV5) explained, "When we believe that the government mission is aligned with ours, then the probability of collaboration is increased. The government's mission is enacted at the time of crisis, but [nonprofits] are there through recovery." When missions are aligned, nonprofits can openly and transparently share information with the government. Furthermore, the government must understand that nonprofit missions go beyond preparation to fully cover the entire disaster preparedness cycle, including response and recovery. Thus, nonprofits may need to conserve their resources, which can stifle transparency with the government in the preparedness phase.

Comprehension of mission space and the context of how government and nonprofit personnel perceive motives impact the level of collaboration. Negative perceptions about motivation often lead to misunderstanding and a lack of trust. For example, one local emergency manager (GL15) relayed an instance when a nonprofit was perceived as having a hidden agenda: "You have a group that comes to the government looking for support [from other stakeholders] rather than participating [in the task at hand]. So what you have is "in your face"—the red banners and red jackets. It's their marketing strategy to get more members and funding; they are there for the recognition. Then there are nonprofit groups that do not need the recognition; they just do it. This is a hidden agenda." Another local government manager (GL10) shared the following

perception: "The Red Cross is out there just to be seen—to get visibility and more money for their organization. This nonprofit's capability has drastically gone down in recent years." Another government manager (GL15) theorized, "The volunteers and Red Cross have shifted from community services to raising money. This money doesn't stay locally." Less-well-known nonprofits are also perceived to have suspicious motivations and intentions for their involvement emergency planning and response. This constraint impacts the level of openness and transparency between government and nonprofits. If the government perceives a disconnect between its mission and intent and that of a nonprofit, the government will maintain that the two organizations do not speak the same language, even if the two use the same terminology, systems, and processes.

The issue of funding not staying locally but rather being spent at the national level forces stakeholders to question some nonprofit's motivations, just as the government may be questioned for funding large staffs rather than keeping funds in a local area. In fact, the government emergency manager said he or she had no idea where the nonprofit's money is going in the absence of an emergency. This lack of transparency—which may even be publicized in the media—can cause the public, the government, and other nonprofits a certain level of uneasiness in collaborating with the nonprofit because their goal is to protect their own assets when large sums of money are being spent on administrative and government-like endeavors.

Finally, one interviewee highlighted an issue concerning sensitivity to mission and a lack of understanding. The nonprofit representative (NV3) stated, "Government meetings are during work days. Volunteers have to use leave time to attend." Volunteers

who wish to attend government-sponsored planning meetings would have to leave their day jobs to attend the government meeting, which suggests a lack of understanding and respect for nonprofit volunteer's schedules. The research indicated that government emergency managers do attempt to accommodate schedules as much as possible; however, an increasing number of volunteers represent multiple organizations, so this constraint requires additional options for accommodation.

6.1.5 Information Sharing

Transparency results from sharing information both vertically and horizontally between government and nonprofits. In some cases, the stakeholder does not fully comprehend how other entities could benefit from information shared among in different forums and venues. Although there are some vulnerabilities to sharing certain information, this section highlights the data collected regarding incentives and barriers to sharing information that can either encourage or constrain collaboration.

One of the key interview questions asked about information sharing and the formal integration of nonprofits into the planning process, as seen by collaboration on EOPs. The interview responses varied; some localities collaborated with nonprofits, while others did not. Two local government managers (GL12 and GL14) agreed that nonprofits were formally integrated into the planning process to discuss the details of EOP requirements. This formal documentation of nonprofits' roles and responsibilities during the preparation phase assists in building teams and ensuring better collaboration before a disaster occurs.

Communications can still exist, even without a formal documentation or process, as another local government emergency manager (GL2) shared: "The Red Cross was not part of the EOP planning process, but there was an agreement made as to what they could provide. The Red Cross has limited resources available for specific needs upon request." This suggests benefits for government emergency managers who know how to contact the right nonprofit, individual, or group, even when they are not involved in the early stages of preparation.

However, nonprofits are not always involved in planning, as evidenced by a state emergency manager (GS1), who said, "Nonprofits were not engaged in the planning process of state EOPs, nor ESF-17." Typically, nonprofits are engaged early in the development of EOPs and ESFs. It is not clear in the above situation whether the EOPs and ESFs were already approved at the state level, but the government had adequate time to discuss the information with nonprofits before the EOPs and ESFs were published. The researcher cannot assume that nonprofits were consulted before the plans were published, nor whether this would have been required due to potential concerns about information vulnerability. It should be noted, however, that the data from this research indicates that early involvement increases collaboration at levels.

The government continues to provide information and be transparent to the extent deemed necessary. The government shares information through several different venues and believes this is important to the emergency preparation effort. Several government emergency managers agreed with local government manager GL10, who highlighted the importance of "taking the first step to understand the community needs and ensure that all

relevant stakeholders have access to that information." This manager also stated that each emergency manager should be familiar with a baseline of community needs before a disaster occurs. This baseline helps in the next step of identifying what nonprofits and other resources are required to respond.

Emergency managers recognize the need to collaborate by sharing information face-to-face at different forums to build a more robust ability to as a baseline for future work. One emergency manager (GS6) recalled a recommendation "to host a roundtable for nonprofits to talk about planning, backup [COOP], resources, and training, with the emergency manager calling the [nonprofit] leads individually to see if they could attend." A local manager (GL18) explained, "The government continues to host meetings and forums for discussion with nonprofits, such as different scenarios [and] practice[s] . . . [to] learn shortcomings on both sides." Another local manager (GL11) explained, "Emergency managers and nonprofits work together in joint exercises; [for example, the] fire department conducted full-scale hazard exercise to partner with nonprofits. . . . This allows nonprofits to practice mass care and results in better coordination." A third local manager (GL5) explained, "We have monthly emergency management meetings where I reach out to the VOADs, send invitations to the VOAD leader and volunteers. We also have tabletop training where we work together. It's all about relationships. You shouldn't be looking across the table with someone you don't know. I know everyone in the EOC by name and what capabilities they have because I encourage meetings, training, and exercises with all the partners." The only issue

involved funding for these exercises, but participation was recommended at all levels when funding was available.

Nonprofits also frequently reach out to their government counterparts. For example, one nonprofit representative (NA1) said, "We have continuous meetings and training forums that we use all year. The goal is to form relationships." The nonprofit also indicated that communication and training are continuous, creating an environment for information sharing with the government.

One of the keys to effective communication and information dissemination, particularly among government managers, involves sharing and embracing a common language. When asked what incentivizes collaboration, several local emergency managers (GL18 and GL19) highlighted the importance of nonprofits "having the background checks and training, incident command systems (ICS) training for the nonprofits, and learning the language of ICS allows for seamless transfer of information." It has been noted earlier that knowledge of these items are routine for VOAD-affiliated nonprofits, but a lack of knowledge in these areas is sometimes considered a collaboration constraint for nonaffiliated nonprofits. The research indicates that most of the nonprofit interviewees were not overly concerned with having a shared language, but government emergency managers consider this lexicon to be of primary importance in collaboration.

There is another perspective that information sharing is sometimes constrained by the government's knowledge that all stakeholders, not just nonprofits, rely on the government to dissemination information from the top down. A state emergency manager

(GS3) stated, "Emergency managers are supposed to formalize communications with nonprofits. Nonprofits depend on communication, but [a plan] to get [nonprofits and emergency managers] to communicate still needs work. What happens if there's no communication?"

Emergency managers know that nonprofits are dependent on them for communication about what is required in the emergency management cycle. Outside of this government input, the researcher surmises that this top-down communication style results in an operational mode that sometimes translates to the concept of "speak when spoken to," which suggests that all aspects of communication are based on the needs of the emergency manager, rather than the nonprofits. This may result in information not being shared and a lack of comprehension even if it is shared.

A government manager is at the center of emergency operations in Virginia, Maryland, and the District. To share information with that those government managers, nonprofits anticipate and expect to participate in important meetings where large numbers of people congregate to fulfill expectations and gain answers to questions. However, this ideal vision of collaboration is not always realized. One local emergency manager (GL3) gave the following example: "Just last week, there was a meeting with faith-based nonprofits discussing disaster mission issues. [There were] thirty or forty churches, [but] there were only two emergency managers at the meeting. I was surprised [they didn't come]. They were invited." Lack of government participation in high-value meetings with nonprofits creates the impression that government emergency managers are not interested in attending the meetings and nonprofits are not valued. Thus, emergency

managers can lose potential volunteer organizations' trust by not recognizing the importance of being present at meetings with nonprofits.

Emergency managers sometimes cannot communicate with nonprofits because they simply do not know who the nonprofits are, even if they have some knowledge of the nonprofits' capabilities. This point was highlighted by a nonprofit representative (NV7), who stated:

> There are nonprofits out there like the Lion's Club and civic associations that want to be involved, but no one knows how to get involved. This can be compared to a three-legged stool, two legs are working together but don't know how to get the third to work with the other two. They're trying to figure out what to do with the one leg, which is the third leg. It's better if everyone works together but we haven't figured that out yet.

This lack of communication exists not only between the government and nonprofit organizations, but it also exists among nonprofits who don't know how to get in touch with each other. This lack of ability to contact one another is a barrier to sharing information, ultimately impacting the level and extent of collaboration.

In conclusion, transparency is important to understanding how the government can incentivize nonprofits to build trust, with the ultimate goal of establishing long-lasting, sustainable working relationships for conducting emergency preparedness activities. Although transparency, like trust, cannot be mandated and is not discussed in policy, it is a key theme of this research that demonstrates an incentive or barrier to collaboration. Need-to-know is considered part of transparency, as well as the goal to protect scarce resources. Both technical and leadership (as opposed to management) skills

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are required to navigate the vast number of nonprofits that are not members of the VOAD. Management skills can be learned through training and are routinely perceived as a mechanical process for tracking and analyzing costs and benefits associated with transparency. Leadership, in contrast, requires people skills, motivation, and the capability to accomplish the mission enthusiastically using available assets. The data indicates that there is a great deal of management occurring in the emergency management arena, but very little leadership occurs at the local level in determining a common approach to being more transparent while still protecting valuable assets.

6.2 Chapter 6 Summary

Trust is a key attribute that influences the amount and level of transparency. Transparency leads to trust. The data revealed that transparency was a major subtheme of trust, so much so that it mandated a creation of a separate chapter. The comments from the interviews included a fear described by both government and nonprofit personnel that only a limited amount of information should be provided to other entities, due to concerns about creating a vulnerability or risk associated with resource protection.

Although the government has a robust communications infrastructure, the data does not show that the right information is getting out to nonaffiliated nonprofits. Information that might encourage more nonprofit engagement is not available. Nonprofits ultimately are concerned that transparency about their budgets and resources will prevent them from being able to protect their resources from being depleted by the government, which would render the nonprofits unable to meet future potential needs as mandated by their board of directors and constituents.

Chapter 7 will provide the thematic analysis of the role of power and autonomy through the lens of exchange theory. The data analysis on trust and transparency provided very candid comments about what government and nonprofit personnel perceive to be incentives and barriers to collaboration in the context of emergency management planning. The next chapter adds yet another variable to the research's data regarding these incentives and barriers to collaboration to emergency management planning in Virginia, Maryland, and DC.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DATA ANALYSIS THEME – POWER AND AUTONOMY

7.1 Findings and Interpretations

This chapter will focus on the role of power and autonomy as the third primary theme identified during interviews of government and nonprofits emergency preparedness professionals. The researcher used social exchange theory to examine how reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, reference power, and expert power impact the willingness of government and nonprofits to collaborate. In addition, the data will divulge if independence and interdependence as well as the perception of power are incentives or barriers to collaboration.

The data on this topic suggests that legitimate and expert power had the greatest influence on whether collaborative relationships developed. Local emergency managers exercise legitimate power because they have legal responsibility and authority in coordinating preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The emergency managers have the power to decide which nonprofits get to "play in their sandbox." This type of power is a major constraint to collaboration for nonprofits, especially when they are not allowed to engage. Often nonprofits are given menial tasks, perceive they are not being valued for their skills, and have no desire to engage in such an environment.

Legitimate power is also afforded to VOADs and known nonprofits by the emergency manager. Nonprofits are invited to the planning table and the EOC, which serves as an incentive to nonprofits to reach out to emergency managers in order to be

included. In turn, the data suggest that less-well-known, nonaffiliated nonprofits perceive that there is a great deal of legitimate power in being associated with a VOAD.

The data also suggests that the emergency manager acknowledges the expert power of known nonprofits such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army due to their long history of accomplishments and delivery of committed resources and skill sets. The recognition of a balanced interdependent power relationship based on mutual respect and successful past experience is an incentive to collaboration.

Some nonprofits perceive the government as independent from nonprofits, because it obtains needed resources from other government entities. The government's perceived lack of sharing and interdependent relationships with nonprofits is a barrier to collaboration. On the other hand, nonprofits—especially nonaffiliated nonprofits— perceive themselves as being independent of the government, not sharing information and resources, which frustrates emergency managers because they cannot control nonprofit resources.

The interviews conducted in the research provide the data for the analysis of practices during implementation of preparedness functions that incentivize or hinder collaboration at state and local levels. These themes enhance the engagement of nonprofits and government. Research questions were designed to capture the important aspects of collaboration during the interview process.

Power and autonomy are defined and included in the interview responses of government and nonprofit representatives at the state and local levels. Broad themes such as trust and transparency, which were discussed in the previous two chapters of this

research, are intertwined with the types of power (actual and perceived) and the amount of independence or interdependence exhibited in the collaborative relationships that are established between government and nonprofits during the emergency management preparedness phase.

To plan a coordinated response, government entities and nonprofits both individually and organizationally control resources in proportion to an expected disaster. There is a question, however, regarding the government's dependence on nonprofits to meet the overall mission goals in contrast to the interdependence exhibited by the nonprofit board and the public, as this relates to role and amount of power exhibited by the emergency manager.

As discussed in previous chapters, nonprofits collect and control millions of dollars and numerous volunteers in the states of Virginia, Maryland, and DC. These dollars and resources give nonprofits a sense of independence and a reluctance to share information about their capabilities with the government during the emergency preparation phase. Nonprofits protect resources they perceive as scarce because nonprofits depend on the public for funds, and they have no certainty that these resources will be replenished.

As stated in Chapter 4, which operationalized the theme of power and autonomy, Blau defines power as "the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the forms of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment, in as much as the former as well as the

latter constitute, in effect, a negative sanction." [334] This definition enhanced the researcher's data collection and analysis in the creation of questions for emergency managers and nonprofits that resulted in this major theme. These questions focused on an ideal world of engagement to understand interviewees' perceived power over or dependence on other stakeholders and organizations. Additional contributions to this data analysis came from Emerson's discussion of relationships being defined "as person to person, group to person or group to group."[335] As noted earlier, exchange theory enhanced the research by providing a framework for analyzing the data by looking through an additional filter of the type of power exerted and the level of dependence or interdependence.

Like trust and transparency, power and autonomy are the product of several relational attributes among professionals and organizations engaged in emergency preparedness. There is a common theme that both government and nonprofits understand the boundaries to this power in general terms, but there is a distinct difference between what these legal boundaries are versus the perceptions and ability to clearly articulate these roles.

The researcher attempted to discover if there was a common understanding of these boundaries as they relates to the overarching dependence or interdependence required to accomplish the mission. The government attempts to articulate these boundaries in the form of written roles and responsibilities and national and state level policies. Emergency managers and nonprofits should work together to enhance the

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334 Blau, *Exchange and Power*, 117.
335 Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," 32.

policies regarding ESFs and EOPs at the local level; however, the dynamics of interaction between national, state, and local politics determines how this power (actual or perceived) is implemented during the emergency preparedness phase.

The previous chapter on transparency discussed how a communications infrastructure exists to distribute information both vertically and horizontally, but there are still gaps in this process. These gaps are further complicated by perceptions of power that may or may not exist.

The researcher also investigated whether or not there is a common understanding of these power and interdependence relationships. The data indicates that this understanding is quite clear at the state level in Virginia, Maryland, and DC, but a different set of variables are at play at the local level where emergencies occur. As noted earlier, the power appears to be in the hands of the government, which creates a barrier to collaboration at times when the skills of the emergency manager require a different, yet more submissive, relationship with nonprofits. The fear is typically liability, sometimes resulting in a lack of transparency and trust and ultimately creating a barrier to collaboration.

The themes of power and autonomy are discussed using the following major subthemes, which were operationalized in Chapter 4: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, reference power, dependence and interdependence, and the perception of power.

7.1.1 Reward Power

The research suggests that the government is the only entity that can provide reward power. In light of exchange theory, the results of the data collection indicate that there are only a small number of cases in which nonprofits exert reward power, and typically this is associated with their desire to invite emergency managers to meetings. The research also indicates that government and nonprofits are not designed to have a formal reward structure between them that would exemplify one entity having reward power over the other; however, an informal reward structure is very powerful in this exchange relationship.

The research shows that government rewards to nonprofits could be information, which is directly related to other types of power such as coercive or reference power. The creation of more informal relationships based on reward-based power is the result of legal, organizational, philosophical, and governance structures that define each entity.

One could surmise that a nonprofit being "allowed" to participate in training and exercises is a reward allotted to them from an emergency manager. This cannot be confused with the goal of building a collaborative relationship based on safety and liability concerns because interviews illustrate that not all nonprofits are given the same training and exercise opportunities. This is especially true in the emergency management planning phase, where nonprofits negotiate to establish their roles and responsibilities for a response plan when exchanging ideas on resource allocation in the event of an emergency. One could also suppose nonprofits provide rewards to government, in the exchange calculus, by offering resources; however, the reward is only provided during the response phase, rather than the planning plan.

7.1.2 Coercive Power

Coercive power is the ability for government agencies to administer punishment if nonprofit entities do not comply with noncontractually agreed-upon terms and vice versa. The researcher did not find any mechanisms for punishing defaults of agreed-upon delivery of services. It is clear that if a nonprofit does not deliver what is promised and expected during an emergency, then an emergency manager will not invest time or energy toward engaging this organization in future plans for emergency response. This is a natural reaction; however, a bad reputation becomes a barrier to collaboration. The government must ensure compliance with rules—such as IRS regulations—which is one of the few available examples of coercive power based on the interviews. This function is inherently governmental and cannot be divorced from the roles and responsibilities of fellow government entities.

Nonprofits have no coercive power to administer punishment to the government, other than in their role as citizens relying on government implementation of emergency management principals.

The researcher investigated how government-nonprofit relationships are formed and if there is, in fact, any coercive power that influences the will to collaborate. One local government emergency manager (GL16) provided the following example:

> An emergency manager, for the first time, sent out a mass mailing to doctors, organizations, and nonprofits (including faith-based) and only received one to two responses. A second mailing was sent with prepaid postcards, thinking that agencies and individuals did not want to spend money on stamps. This second mailing focused on nonprofits and faith-based groups to get together to talk about community disaster planning.

After sending out over 100 [postcards], there was a response from some

churches. There was no follow-up done by the emergency manager and, in

fact, she was disappointed with the response. A VOAD has not yet been

established in this region for over 3 years.

Consistent with research by Molm et al., the expectations of reciprocated response in the

situations above are unknown. The government's attempts to reach out and establish

collaborative relationships are not always met with positive nonprofit response. The

perception is that nonprofits wonder what the government is up to and what the

individual nonprofits have to gain by responding and engaging in planning activities.

This is a barrier to collaboration. There is no coercive power because there are no rules

that enforce collaboration in a formal contractual sense.

The same local government manager (GL16) gave another example of a failure to

initiate communication between the government and nonprofits:

Emergency managers need to find out what nonprofits can do—get a list

[of capabilities they can provide]. But the emergency manager's office did

not follow up on the list of what each nonprofit could provide. They just

happened to see Christ in Action on Facebook [who had not contacted the

emergency manager, but they did contact the councilman]. The

councilman did not provide the nonprofit's contact information to the

emergency manager [which would be the right thing to do].

The data suggests that the entire development of the government-nonprofit relationship is

based on nonprofit action, not the government. In this case, a nonprofit's slight interest to

engage with the government received no follow-up from the government. Thus, the

researcher concludes there is no coercive power to administer formal nor informal punishment that impacts the willingness to collaborate.

7.1.3 Legitimate Power

Legitimate power is exercised when government or nonprofits believe they have a genuine right to control and implement guidance. Under this power, lines of authority are known and the boundaries of authority are well defined under a range of conditions. Sometimes legitimate power encourages collaboration; other times, legitimate power's inflexibility creates barriers to collaboration. Barriers—and sometimes power imbalances—occur when the organizations disagree over who has the legitimate power, due to lack of policy or agreement at the working level. Who holds legitimate power can change based on how responsibilities are delegated and a command and control hierarchy. The research data indicates that nonprofits exhibit frustration when government authorities' legitimate power is complicated by negative attitudes.

There are clear lines of delineation when discussing legitimate power. In terms of emergency preparedness situations, the government has sole responsibility and authority for disaster planning; in contrast, nonprofits are called upon as needed and must play their specific, assigned role before, during, and after a disaster occurs. The government's legitimate power, authority, and independence are sometimes reflected in conversations and meetings with nonprofits, resulting in a barrier to collaboration.

Government and nonprofit relationships are more easily balanced when an MOU is in place to manage participation based on mutually beneficial interdependencies. This MOU also establishes legitimate power for both the government and nonprofit

stakeholder so that there is no question or misperception about these roles and responsibilities. A nonprofit representative (NA1) gave the following example: "We have an MOU with the government, a seat at the EOC when activated by the emergency manager, and our organization is mentioned in the EOP." This written agreement incentivizes communication and ultimately leads to frequent and structured collaboration.

It is important to note that exchange theory postulates that trust is not developed when there is a contract. The data indicates that negotiated contract only exist between government and affiliated nonprofits. Yet government and nonprofit interviewees revealed that MOUs and MOAs are similar to contracts because they clearly define roles and responsibilities that can be made legally binding. Nonaffiliated nonprofits and smaller or medium-sized nonprofits typically do not negotiate a contract with the government because they may not be willing to commit resources given their unpredictable funding streams. Thus, a negotiated contract may be an incentive to collaboration for the government, but it is a constraint for some nonprofits.

Interviews reveal that many emergency managers believe they have the authority and responsibility to control nonprofits based on legitimate power, but collaboration barriers are erected due to negative attitudes. For example, a local emergency manager (GL18) stated, "We need to change the paradigm. The highest elected official is not the problem. They get it. The problem is the attitude of the boots on the ground—[the] first responders who don't want anyone to play in their sandbox." The implication is that some first responders believe they have legitimate power to control who participates in emergency response.

Some government emergency managers at the lower levels have a negative attitude toward nonprofits, reflecting a belief that the emergency response plan is theirs to control and that nonprofits should ask permission to be in the relationship and contribute to the response. This is a major constraint to collaboration. One local government emergency manager (GL6) explained his perception of the roles of emergency managers and nonprofits as follows: "The emergency manager is the center. The [nonprofits who provide the] ESFs [are] in the middle, and the emergency manager is the 'facilitator,'[only hosts the meetings] not there to tell them what to do. The emergency manager brings them together to 'herd the cats.'" Another local emergency manager (GL2) explained that she did not feel it was necessary for nonprofits to participate in disaster planning or spend time working in the EOC; rather, "they need to be out there helping people."

This negative attitude is also reflected some government managers' perception that, based on legitimate power, they do not need to reach out to nonprofits; instead, they believe the onus for establishing communication is on nonprofits. For example, one local government manager (GL4) explained, "I'm not searching the Internet for nonprofits. Nonprofits need to approach EM offices—give them 5 minutes and give them scenarios to see what their resources really are. We may not need what they have." This attitude reflects a classic demonstration of Emerson's description of A and B power, in which A's perception is that they are in a superior role. This attitude does not encourage collaboration.

Government emergency managers also use their legitimate power to establish roles and responsibilities during an emergency response exercise; however, sometimes emergency managers will indicate a lack of respect for nonprofit volunteers by assigned them to play seemingly menial roles, such as disaster victims, in an emergency exercise. One nonprofit representative (NV2) recalled, "Nonprofits and volunteers who participate in CERT are used as victims in exercises, and it's a push to let some of them man traffic stops." The resulting perception is that government is in total control and nonprofits and volunteers are not valued for their skills. Nonprofits are in a dependent role in which the government has both legitimate and expert power and is in position to grant or deny expansion of nonprofits' roles in disaster planning. Nonprofits' perception that they are subservient to the government constrains collaboration.

Local emergency managers are aware of the legitimate power they hold. For example, one local government emergency manager (GL20) explained his role as follows: "Each agency or group has their own individual rules of engagement. Obviously by not being a direct state or local government-controlled entity, I can only ask them to provide certain services versus maybe requiring them [to provide services, as I would require] other direct-controlled internal county departments or agencies." Rules governing nonprofit-government relationships constrain collaboration when these lines of authority interfere with providing and controlling resources before, during, and after an emergency occurs. There is very little power that can be used to influence government or nonprofit counterparts when these lines appear to be unbreakable and nonnegotiable.

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Some emergency managers try to establish collaboration with nonprofits through VOADs, but this can sometimes lead to frustration because nonprofits use the VOADs to exercise their own legitimate power to ensure independence from government involvement and influence in nonprofits' affairs. A local emergency manager (GL10) shared about a difficult experience collaborating with a VOAD:

> Jurisdictions were attempting to set up a VOAD. Three leaders had three different ideas that led to conflict about who could and couldn't participate in the meetings. The result was that the emergency manager, nor anyone in government, had a place with the VOADs and could not attend meetings. I made myself available, but the interpretation of their bylaws turned into turf issues between state, federal, nonprofits and the local Red Cross. It's difficult getting organizations functioning and working together.

In this case, bureaucracy, red tape, and nonprofits' desire to avoid government involvement was a barrier to collaboration.

Nonprofits can exercise legitimate power by participating in the planning process. One nonprofit VOAD representative (NV1) revealed VOAD officers "review and comment on changes to the Volunteer and Donation ESF." Nonprofits' participation in the planning and preparation of EOPs incentivizes them to reach out to the state and government and offer resources and services, as opposed to waiting for the government to contact them. As another VOAD representative (NV3) explained, "Nonprofits reach out to the VOAD to help achieve relationships with state and local government." This reflects the power relationship of B reaching out to A, assuming nonprofits' decision to reach out to the government is based on legitimate power and, in turn, provides nonprofits with reference power to influence the emergency management process and outcomes. This

interdependency incentivizes nonprofit collaboration with the VOAD and the government.

Nonprofits also recognize the legitimate power of the VOAD. A VOAD leader (NV1) explained, "The VOAD is nationally recognized as the primary coordinator to play in the disaster arena. Having VOAD on the resume will do wonders." There is a great deal of legitimate power associated with being a member of the VOAD, from the perspectives of both the government and nonprofits. This interdependence has not yet extended to nonaffiliated nonprofits, which still require a great deal of independence. Some nonaffiliated nonprofits—for example faith-based groups—are required to be separate from VOADs and government control. It is important to note that this legitimate VOAD power is for nonprofits, not for VOAD to government relations.

Nonprofit and government roles and responsibilities are not set in stone and may change based on an organization's use of power. For example, a nonprofit representative (NA2) explained, "The Red Cross used to be in charge of sheltering, but the government made a decision that they can't tell people or volunteers what to do. . . . All sheltering was shifted to the Department of Social Services based on a state decision." This nonprofit asserts that the government continues to exert legitimate power by making decisions about roles and responsibilities without nonprofits' input, which results in an imbalance of power. The researcher is uncertain as to whether these decisions are based on legitimate power or bureaucratic processes; however, the implication is that nonprofits' inability to influence outcomes constrains collaboration.

Finally, perceptions of the government's attitude during an actual emergency response situation can shape nonprofits' willingness to collaborate in the planning phase. A nonprofit representative (NV2) expressed frustration over government response during an emergency: "A person says 'We're in charge; get out of the way,' during a disaster response situation. The government must understand that they can't do it alone. We can do more together." The statement "We're in charge; get out of the way" implies a perception of complete legitimate power over the entire circumstance. Although this statement might include legal or other types of authority, it also reflects an attitude that does not encourage collaboration. Nonprofits have no incentive to collaborate with the government if they feel powerless or are not encouraged to share their expertise and resources.

7.1.4 Reference Power

Emergency management preparation also includes reference power, which could exist if a nonprofit organization wants to gain the approval of the government or vice versa. Nonprofit personnel are accountable to their board of directors and donors, while government workers are accountable to their leadership and taxpayers. Both are being evaluated by the public and in exchange theory, receiving benefits or rewards for accomplishing their mission.

Reference power is a key component of building meaningful relationships that lead to collaboration. A local emergency manager (GL21) gave the following example:

> 'John Nonprofit' comes to the table and says I work with Tim, who is easy
> to work with, lives in the community, can get in the door, and is not a part
> of a scary government organization. John and Tim have a mutually

beneficial relationship that also benefits the government, who is 'standing

on the mountain preaching,' spreading the word and delivering the safety

and preparedness mission before the disaster. After the disaster, he must

look at other resources, including nonprofits, but if not involved before

and after, there's not a lot going on. Everyone must be on board to feel

they are part of the resilience movement.

Government and nonprofit power relationships change during different phases of a

disaster, from preparation through recovery. This includes both a real and perceived

imbalance of power based on resources available from the highest government or

nonprofit official down to the citizen who needs assistance. These changes in power

relationships constrain collaboration at different levels and during different phases of

emergency management. In the above example, the emergency manager recognizes the

value of reference power as a tool that could lead to collaboration.

7.1.5 Expert Power
Expert power is the belief that a nonprofit or government entity has the

knowledge or skills required to perform their missions individually or organizationally. It

is difficult to determine and assess an organization's level of expertise during the

preparedness phase. Thus, the government's perception of a nonprofit's expert power is

often built on historical evidence of expertise. This can hinder nonprofits who have not

previously responded to an emergency and thus have a limited list of accomplishments

that would support their establishment of expert power with an emergency manager. The

Red Cross and Salvation Army, known nonprofits, have a long history of

accomplishments; however, they suffer from perceived missteps that are published

widely through the media, which can impact the government's perception of their expert

power. Often these missteps are not based on past performance but questions regarding these organizations' leadership and resource allocation.

Nonprofits' participation in exercises with emergency managers contributes to their expert power. A local emergency manager (GL11) gave the following example: "Emergency managers focus on exercises with volunteers and businesses, conducting joint exercises. For example, the fire department spent time for a full-scale hazard exercise, partnering with [nonprofits] to do the feeding. This allows [nonprofits] to practice mass care and results in better coordination." This recognition of the mutually beneficial interdependent relationships that are developed by executing joint exercises incentivizes collaboration.

Many government emergency managers made statements during the interviews that overwhelmingly recognized nonprofits' expert power. These examples demonstrate how the recognition of a mutually beneficial and balanced power relationship based on capability and past experience can be an incentive to collaboration. Several government managers at the state and local levels asserted that there is no way to handle incidents without nonprofits and that they benefit the entire community. The researcher has captured the actual statements in the Appendix D. The essence of these statements allude to the fact that nonprofits are robust and manage a large task. They must be included in all planning and preparedness activities. The benefits vary related to the service they provide. The outreach of their network is a value and benefit that speaks for itself; however, it is sometimes underappreciated and underutilized." Finally, one government manager (GL10) sums up sentiment very clearly, "Our approach is to ensure we are not

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an island and need to work together to the best interest of the community. . . . We need to develop strong relationships and partnerships."

Emergency managers also recognize their need to engage nonprofits based on how the local public perceives the expert power of nonprofits. One local emergency manager (GL13) explained, "Nonprofits break down the walls and are better received than government [workers] because they've established relationships with individuals in the community." In this example, the emergency manager values the nonprofit in a three-part collaborative relationship that includes the government, nonprofits, and citizens. The nonprofit's roles in these relationships are to provide resources and a personal liaison role at the ground level. The expectation is that citizens recognize nonprofits' expert power and that this recognition can enhance the public's view of the government, such that if the government has a relationship with the expert nonprofits, they must also have expert power. An understanding of this dynamic encourages the government to collaborate with nonprofits.

Emergency managers acknowledge other factors that encourage them to collaborate with nonprofits. For example, one local government manager (GL6) cited the importance of "good collaboration skills and good people skills, knowing what to say in the situation, awareness, leadership, and trust like in 9/11." Leadership, people skills, and knowing what to say in any situation level power and role imbalances to achieve the mission. Trust is a critical factor in this relationship and it is often based on previous experience, such as response to 9/11.

Local government emergency managers must also recognize nonprofits' expert power during the disaster planning phase. For example, a local government emergency manager (GL4) stated, "Nonprofits serve on the city local emergency planning committee, showing they have value, a big asset, and they become a resource." In this situation, nonprofits have a seat at the table to alleviate any perception of an imbalance of power or influence. This continuous involvement and recognition of nonprofits' expert power incentivizes collaboration.

Although expert power often builds collaborative relationships, it can sometimes be a hindrance to collaboration if an organization loses its expertise. A local emergency manager (GL12) provided the following example:

> Currently state and local governments are experiencing a significant "brain drain." We are losing institutional knowledge at a very rapid rate due to the Baby Boomers retiring, and some vital positions are not being filled at the rate of the retirements. Points of contacts, relationships, and knowledge of how nonprofits can work to the advantage of state and local governments are all being diluted.

Government-nonprofit relationships based on mutual recognition of expert power are significantly impacted by what this manager described as a "brain drain" because government organizations are losing institutional knowledge about the value nonprofits bring to emergency preparedness response. This ultimately constrains collaboration when new employees don't have the necessary skills and knowledge acquired through experience and have not yet formed working relationships with counterparts. Newer

employees may also being inclined to "reinvent the wheel" without an institutional knowledge of lessons learned.

Nonprofits also revealed their perception of how expert power can constrain collaboration. A nonprofit representative (NA2) explained, "[The] local government is not romancing nonprofits. It's not the government way to cultivate or train them. [Government employees] don't have time to cultivate the relationship, don't have the church [involved in emergency response] , and don't have time to put training into their schedule. It's hard to establish resources with nonprofits [if these tasks are not done]." In this example, the nonaffiliated nonprofit representative perceives that the local government is not engaging nonprofits, cultivating relationships with them, nor training them if they are not known organizations, such as the Red Cross or Salvation Army. The government's perceived lack of outreach could be due to time constrains; however it hinders collaboration. The government appears to assume nonaffiliated nonprofits have no expert power; therefore the government and affiliated nonprofits feel no need to engage with them.

A nonprofit VOAD leader (NV2) offered a different perspective: "Volunteers are more than nice people carrying casseroles. They come with experience and specific skills. The more the government realizes this, [the] better. I keep hearing that 'they are just volunteers.' [A volunteer may have] specific skills in the real world, but when they find out those skills, she is still just a volunteer. There is a lack of respect by government." This VOAD lead asserted that the government disrespects the expert power of nonprofit volunteers when it does not recognize the skills and experience that volunteers bring.

Thus, the government's perception that volunteers are not experts and should not be placed in decision-making roles is a constraint to collaboration.

7.1.6 Dependence and Interdependence

Dependence and interdependence can shape the power relationship between government and nonprofits, incentivizing or constraining collaboration in the preparedness phase. Emergency managers are dependent upon nonprofits and other stakeholders to perform their mission. When asked about the roles and responsibilities, a local emergency manager (GL11) gave the following example: "The footprint for local preparation formerly included federal funding, but once the funding was lost, the emphasis [became] on partnership with government and [nonprofits]." Funding shortfalls make collaborative relationships more likely to occur because organizations understanding the need to forge partnerships to fill capability gaps and creatively achieve mission goals. These funding shortfalls are a major subtheme directly related to the level of dependence or interdependence among all emergency management stakeholders, specifically those involved in the preparation phase.

However, funding shortfalls can also constrain collaboration among nonprofits. One local government emergency manager (GL6) explained there are "competing disciplines between nonprofits and for-profits to get charitable donations, [which constrains collaboration]. . . . You have Walmart vs. the Red Cross trying to provide resources. Nonprofits are totally impacted by the economy." Another local government manager (GL22) identified a "lack of resources in either the government or nonprofit organizations" as a main factor that hinders collaboration.

Scarce resources also result in changes to roles and responsibilities. Nonprofits are taking on roles that used to be assigned to government organizations; this causes a shift in power in which the government is now dependent on nonprofits in some areas because it is overwhelmed with other duties. A local emergency manager (GL25) noted, "The government is now dependent on nonprofits and their manpower for 'heavy lifting' since we lost some of our resources." This shift in resource allocation makes local government agencies more dependent on nonprofits as well, but this scarcity in some cases constrains collaboration due to a newly perceived power imbalance.

Competition for scarce resources creates interdependence; however it may sometimes also constrain collaboration. The economy can drive organizations to have competing roles in providing emergency management services. This complicated power imbalance is based on resources controlled or promised, which begins at the federal level. A scarcity of resources—such as funds or personnel, etc.—impacts state and local governments, nonprofits, and individual and organizational charitable donations. This imbalance in power and resources constrains collaboration purely based on the competition for scarce resources.

Nonprofits assert that collaboration is constrained by scarce resources, but some perceive there is no real scarcity of resources in government. One nonprofit representative (NA4) suggested that state and federal government agencies "have so many resources and flexibility to do things themselves, they don't look externally. They find ways to supplement themselves. They meet their needs internally. It's not that they

are opposed to [collaborating], it's just not part of their DNA. . . . The government will

only reach out if there is a crisis."

Nonprofits and government agencies must collaborate to efficiently conduct

emergency response planning in light of budget and resource shortfalls. Even in a fiscally

constrained environment, government and nonprofit emergency response budgets

together provide billions of dollars and resources, but the organizations must agree on

how to prioritize the resources to provide the most effective response. Mutually

beneficial collaboration must occur to allocate scarce resources, especially when

nonprofit resources are used to supplement those of the government. In many cases, a

government emergency manager cannot fund certain items needed for emergency

response due to laws, scarcity, or an inability to get reimbursed for expenses. This

interdependence typically leads to collaboration.

Many state and local emergency managers overwhelmingly agreed that they can

best meet the emergency response mission when they collaborate and partner with

nonprofit agencies. One state government manager (GS4) extolled the benefits of having

nonprofits as "equal partners, sitting at the table." A local government manager (GL11)

stated, "I am open to anyone who wants to come help." Another local government

manager (GL8) highlighted the benefits of "investing in nonprofits, [which] increases the

amount of dollars [available for emergency response] because more resources are

available to citizens." The same manager continued, "Nonprofits provide volunteer hours,

staffing, resources, funding . . . , and blankets. . . . [These items] are no cost to me."

Government investment in nonprofits is critical to obtaining a return on investment that places the citizen first, rather than the government process. This investment requires time—which is an invaluable resource—but pays dividends by creating a collaborative environment where the power and missions of the government and nonprofits are balanced to meet the needs of citizens. However, government emergency managers often choose not invest their time in reaching out to nonprofits. One local emergency manager (GL24) explained, "Each of the emergency managers and nonprofits don't know how to reach out to each other. If the emergency manager is not spending more than half of their time outside the office, they are missing out." In the absence of knowing which nonprofits to reach out to, the emergency manager admitted reaching to "other emergency managers who may have other ideas." The researcher concluded that there is an internal interdependence among emergency managers, and nonprofits are not part of this relationship. The perception is that government workers talk to other government workers, sharing an interdependent relationship that nonprofits are not privy to. This constrains collaboration.

Continuous personal connections that are established among nonprofits creates an interdependent relationship that helps support underserved citizens using resources from both the government and nonprofits. One local government manager (GL6) said, "I have to stay connected personally and focus my work on [the underserved] people who truly need us to use resources and focus our efforts." This mutually beneficial and balanced power relationship provides a united front when dealing with the customer, the public. In this instance, the government and nonprofit missions are aligned.

Many nonprofits also recognize their interdependence and need to collaborate with government. For example, a nonprofit VOAD representative (NA5) said, "It's about capacity. We do not have the resources so, philosophically, we're better together than separate." An affiliated nonprofit representative (NA3) also noted a high level of collaboration with the government: "We know each other; we see each other at the same meetings. For the last year and a half, we've been proactive in forming relationships. My place is in the middle, pulling over 200 different ecumenical groups together. We're putting a warming shelter together for the homeless. We have worked more with local government [social services than with emergency managers]."

However, some nonprofits have expressed that government emergency managers have not attempted to contact them. The same nonprofit representative (NA3) said, "We have over 200 ecumenical organizations, looking at long range issues as well as crisis, but we've never been called by the local emergency manager. Other local government organizations [e.g. social services] know about us. Local government is outside. They don't call anymore." The research data indicated that some local and state government emergency managers do not contact nonprofits because they can't locate them or find them on the Internet; others simply refuse to reach out. In addition, nonaffiliated nonprofits are not as easy to contact as getting in touch with a VOAD and the nonprofits that exist under its membership umbrella. This is a barrier to collaboration when the government appears to have no concept of dependence on nonprofits nor does it have a need to communicate with them.

Nonprofits require a certain level of independence and are adverse to government-initiated red tape that seems unnecessary to nonprofit staff. This red tape can be a constraint that hinders nonprofits' desire to be involved in government emergency preparedness and ultimately response activities. Two government managers (GL4, GL21) explained, "Some nonprofits do not want to work with local government because they wrap them in red tape. They would rather support the community outside the red tape." This comment reflects nonprofits' perception that the government imposes power and influence—which they may or may not have the authority to exercise—over nonprofits in areas that could be streamlined and negotiated. This constrains building collaboration.

Nonprofits have to weigh the constraints of administrative costs versus what they can legally do with funds administered by the government. The impact is that nonprofits lose independence in decision-making in return for obtaining government resources; this creates a power imbalance that constrains collaboration. For example, a nonaffiliated nonprofit representative (NN5) explained, "Sixty percent of my budget is government funded, and even though the programs are diverse and help the community . . . there are strings attached in having the government as a partner. I have to constantly repurpose and renegotiate with the government on funding."

In contrast, other nonprofits do not reach out to the government because they do not need access to government resources. For example, many faith-based groups are independently funded by members and donors. Furthermore, the missions of government and nonprofits do not always align. For example, some faith-based nonprofits are more apt to take care of their congregants rather than the general public during disaster

response. The fact that some nonprofits do not reach out to government is a constraint to collaboration. Nonprofits may have a mutual interdependence among other nonprofits to address local problems; however, this collaboration may not include government stakeholders.

Nonprofits are very mission-focused, which can sometimes lead to a dependent relationship and power imbalance with the government. A nonprofit representative (NA4) explained, "A lot of nonprofits are more concerned about what they are giving than what they are going to get out of a collaborative relationship. They are more focused on giving and not worried about what they will get out of it." This comment reflects how nonprofits are always giving whatever resources they gather, while the government funds operational costs through taxes. This creates an imbalance in the relationship because the organization doing the giving is not certain what the return on investment will be since there is no reciprocity. This imbalance constrains collaboration because it diminishes the nonprofits' desire to release valuable resources.

Finally, it is important to note the interdependence of government, nonprofits, and volunteers. A local emergency manager (GL20) explained, "Nonprofits are very dependent on volunteers. . . . [However,] people who volunteer are involved in more than one organization. If you have 20 people in 5 organizations, you may not have 20 resources when you call." Nonprofits have no type of inherent power—expert, legitimate, or otherwise—to influence volunteers to come when called or needed. Thus, the government cannot complete trust nonprofits' commitment to the mission and forces the government to depend more on its own resources and avoid reaching out to nonprofits,

especially if it does not have a proven track record of providing volunteers and resources in an emergency. This lack of power or influence over volunteers constrains collaboration.

7.1.7 Perception of Power
Both the government and nonprofits have roles and responsibilities that are sometimes unclear in light of the lack of a mechanism to promote collaboration without violating internal rules and guidelines. Each individual and organization culturally adapts to requirements embedded in national, state, and local guidelines; however, exchange theory explains only some of the rationale for behaviors but cannot explain all scenarios in which collaboration will or will not occur. Outside the clear rules and boundaries, it is natural for both government and nonprofit organizations to perceive their level of power (including dependence or independence), which will impact their willingness to collaborate or not. Initial research and data collected indicates that nonprofits minimize their dependence on governmental organizations by maximizing their access to the various types of power discussed in this chapter. A corollary to this is that the government perceives its own level of power and authority, which could positively or negatively impact collaboration.

Some nonprofits do not know the full scope of the legitimate power that the government can exercise in emergency management preparation. When asked what constrains collaboration, an affiliated nonprofit (NA4) stated, "Although government is not a member of [my] organization, if the government would call [my organization and] would share the information with them about resources and capabilities. All they have to

do is contact me." Some nonprofits expect government emergency managers to contact them because they are in control of resources (power). These nonprofits do not typically reach out to the government, which constrains collaboration.

Finally, nonprofits report frustration over a perception that the government wants to control areas which it does not have authority to control. A nonprofit VOAD representative (NV1), when asked about constraints to collaboration, shared frustrations about working with emergency managers: "Ask me, don't task me. Emergency managers can't tell me what to do. For the emergency manager this is the hardest [thing to understand]—that [VOADs] are resources and not employees." Lack of government control over nonprofits and their resources is a major source of frustration for emergency managers because they have no power over these organizations. Nonprofits are empowered, independent, and do not rely totally on government for resources; however, this conflict of interests constrains collaboration.

In conclusion, power and interdependence are major themes, in addition to transparency and organizational structure, that incentivize or hinder the building of a collaborative relationship based on trust. The types of power discussed in this chapter— reward, coercive, legitimate, reference, and expert—contribute to the research by validating the attitudes of government and nonprofit stakeholders and where they fit in the myriad of dependent and interdependent relationships. As such, the researcher concludes that power and interdependence—especially in a resource-constrained and resource-competitive environment—create fear on the part of those who are not

empowered to act. We must create a new paradigm for emergency management in which all stakeholders can come to the table equally to provide needed resources.

7.2 Chapter 7 Summary

Exchange theory directly reflects key aspects of this chapter on power and autonomy, reward, punishments, and costs and benefits associated with power-based relationships, independence, and interdependence. Collaborative relationships cannot be established without recognition that these factors influence the attitudes of professionals as they conduct their day-to-day preparation for emergencies.

Government reward power includes allowing nonprofits to "play in their sandbox," a descriptive example of a barrier to collaboration inherent in legitimate and reward power. Nonprofits do not have the same level of authority and are told to market their capabilities to the emergency manager if they want to be part of the sandbox. This "sandbox," by design, includes affiliated nonprofits; however, nonaffiliated nonprofits may not see the benefits of participating in meetings, exercises, the EOC, and recognition by the community that they are contributing to recovery and resiliency. These benefits are not enough to bring them into the preparedness planning process.

Some emergency managers suggest there must be a new paradigm for inclusion that overcomes existing attitudes and frameworks that detract from nonprofits wanting to be part of the team. Emergency managers recognize the expert power of affiliated nonprofits and VOADs, but they need time to attract and build alliances with less-well-known and nonaffiliated nonprofits. Nonprofits tend to be independent, but they can

become interdependent on the government when a relationship is established that supports the whole-of-nation preparedness environment.

This research has provided very candid responses from emergency management professionals concerning the barriers and incentives to collaboration as they relate to the themes of trust, transparency, and power and autonomy. Chapter eight will discuss the fourth theme, organizational structure, which is highlighted in the analysis as the largest constraint to collaboration.

CHAPTER EIGHT: DATA ANALYSIS – ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

8.1 Findings and Interpretations

Chapter 2 of this research discussed the organizational structures of emergency preparedness agencies in the federal, state, and local governments, focusing on Virginia, Maryland, and DC and detailing specific roles and responsibilities for each. The chapter also discussed the structures of nonprofits, affiliated nonprofits (that is, the Red Cross and Salvation Army), and VOADs. This chapter will focus on the fourth theme identified from the interview data that impacts collaboration during the preparedness phase of emergency management: organizational structure.

Organizational structure is highlighted as a major theme through analysis of exchange relationships based on where emergency managers and nonprofits fit in effectively planning emergency response capabilities. The research already described the roles of trust, transparency, power and autonomy as they relate to building relationships; second to trust, organizational structure impacts the other variables more than any single factor influencing collaboration. For this research, organizational structure as seen through the lens of exchange theory has been operationalized to include organizational framework, organizational culture, and the organizational centrality in respect to other organizations.

The data strongly suggests that, while trust is the most important factor in collaboration, organizational structure creates the greatest barrier to nonprofit

collaboration. This very critical finding is based on two overarching factors: (1) the government's command and control structure and (2) the multitude of different nonprofit structures in terms of governance, board composition, and public sentiment. The data indicates that emergency preparedness organizations that have similar structure tend to collaborate more frequently and more effectively. An additional finding is that this collaboration occurs most often when missions are aligned and all personnel place this mission as a first priority.

Government structure is dictated by national directives, and state and local organizations use this guidance to draft internal policy and strategies to implement this guidance at all levels. This chapter will not attempt to provide details on various organizational structures due to their complex nature but instead will focus on how these structures impact emergency preparedness activities in Virginia, Maryland, and DC. The data indicates that there are certain attributes of particular organizational structures that incentivize or constrain collaboration. Specific recommendations on possible changes are identified in chapter 9.

The researcher aimed to discover if efforts have been made to adapt organizational structures to more efficiently plan for emergencies, One example from the data concerned a new requirement several years ago to field government emergency managers when the positions were first being written. There was no existing pool of professionals outside of first responders who took on the job of shaping this new endeavor. The first responders were typically firefighters and response personnel who accepted and excelled in emergency management positions. Many emergency managers

today are former first responders as noted by the data who have the necessary skills, but

the old "mentality" in dealing with stakeholders. This example shows both incentives as

well as barriers to the idea of designing new paradigms on local organizational dynamics

that could incentivize nonprofit engagement. At the state level, new organizations have

been created to incentivize collaboration; however, there is not enough data available to

assess the success and impact of these initiatives. This analysis should also be considered

for future research.

An ideal organization would include a streamlined, nonbureaucratic, mission-

oriented structure that would alleviate many of the barriers associated with the

bureaucratic practices inherent in government, as well as funding sources that are

adequate, accountable and responsive to the need. This ideal does not currently exist. As

noted in Chapter 2, the organizational structures of Virginia and Maryland emergency

preparedness entities are very segmented and layered, with numerous managerial levels.

This is because federal guidance allows states the autonomy to choose how to be

organized to meet the mission. Maryland's structure is more militaristic, by design and by

law. DC has more of a flat organizational structure, with HSEMA being the primary

emergency preparedness agent. Organizational structure was operationalized in Chapter 4

to identify which aspects of this theme influence government and nonprofit's motivation

to collaborate; identified subthemes include organizational framework, organizational

culture, and organizational centrality.

The data suggests that the government is bureaucratic by design, and it has

expanded the size and scope of the bureaucracy, earning the descriptor of "big

government" with "red tape" from nonprofits interviewed during the course of this research. Nonprofits are overwhelmed by the nature and complexity of the government, and they are not capable of dealing only with local emergency managers without also understanding their role as it relates to state and federal guidance. This complexity constrains collaboration.

Another major issue that affects collaboration involves nonprofits' reluctance to engage with command and control authorities for fear of losing control over their existing resources. This fear is further heightened by budget constraints that impact government and nonprofit capabilities, which increases risk and causes each organization to protect their information and resources. Budget constraints severely impact emergency managers who frequently stated that they have too many responsibilities and not enough resources to do their jobs, asserting that they don't have time to go out and market to nonaffiliated nonprofits.

One state-level emergency manager (GS7) asserted that his own authority is what constrains collaboration; he explained that he has either too much or not enough, depending on the circumstances. Legal, political, formal, and informal barriers exist from the federal level down to the local level, which adds to the complexity of engaging nonprofits. Conversely, a local government manager (GL5) explained that nonprofits "do many things the government can't do—legally, financially, morally, and politically— [and they are] not always spending taxpayer money," which allows nonprofits much greater freedom than the government.

As mentioned earlier in this research, it is critical that nonprofits are trained and speak the same language as the government personnel. Nonprofits do not always have the organizational framework to provide this training to volunteers, so they rely heavily on the government to provide needed training. Many courses are available online, but nonprofits will only find this information if they seek to engage with the government.

The data also suggests that the government culture reflects persistent attitudes that nonprofits have no authority, are not valued, and have no power to influence outcomes other than the application of their resources during response and recovery, when resources go directly to the community rather than being vetted through government approval. Additionally, nonaffiliated nonprofits appear to have no incentive to work closely with emergency managers. The data suggests that only affiliated nonprofits see benefits to engagement, while many faith-based and other nonaffiliated nonprofits do not market themselves to the government, nor do they appear to want to be found.

The ideas of centrality and connectedness provide potential that nonaffiliated nonprofits will find value in networking within the community and share information about their resources to local officials who may or may not be emergency managers. Exchange theory highlights the importance of being close to the central figure, the emergency manager, but the data suggests that it is also important for nonprofits to be part of a VOAD or, if not, to connect with other entities involved in emergency preparedness that the nonprofit can trust because those entities are transparent in sharing information, and see value in the nonprofit's mission and resources. Nonaffiliated

nonprofits might start with the person they trust in the community and work up, rather

than down, the existing bureaucratic, command and control structure.

8.2 Organizational Framework

Policy dictates guidance for emergency management from the national level to the

local level. Typically organizational structures are developed to efficiently execute

mission objectives while balancing the numbers and types of skills required at each level

to smoothly coordinate and communicate required actions both vertically and

horizontally. It is also important to work well with other organizations and stakeholders.

Emergency management is a government function and, as such, mirrors the

federal government and follows the command and control structure with clear lines of

authority in Virginia, Maryland, and DC. FEMA training defines command as "the

authority to make someone or someone do something"; the same document describes

control as "a span of control which has limitations."[336] Virginia, Maryland, and DC

government emergency managers are structured to mirror this command and control

framework to efficiently perform their mission. Each state and the District are

functionally organized differently to execute preparedness and response operations and

meet the needs of their respective jurisdictions. This command and control structure has a

large effect on emergency management planning.

One frequently cited organizational constraint that affects the willingness of both

government and nonprofits to collaborate involves the constitutional laws separating

church and state. One affiliated nonprofit representative (NA4) summarized the issue,

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[336] Emergency Management Institute, "Comparative Management Session 21."

"The government is not to fund any religious group; no church receives funding from local government because of separation of church and state."

Another key aspect of the data analysis is that not all government or nonprofit personnel are familiar with, understand, and appreciate the constraints that organizational structures impose in preparedness activities. The implication is that more education, training, and information sharing should occur at the lowest bureaucracy levels to ensure stakeholders are familiar with the structures of the organizations they work with. This change could incentivize collaboration and create a sense of trust based on transparency.

Emergency managers at the local level play a collaborative role with nonprofits in education and training. There is no standard or documentation about how this should occur, and continued efforts to engage with nonprofits will help to build trust. One local emergency manager (GL12) advocated the importance of "educating nonprofits on the nuances of state and local government as it relates to the process for councils and commissions" to break down barriers to collaboration.

When asked what encourages collaboration, a state-level emergency manager (GS4) explained that the government needs to recognize that nonprofits have established trust in communities because they are grassroots organizations. In contrast, the government "is very structured with statutes and regulations," according to the manager. The implication is that the local community already trusts nonprofits because they are available at the grassroots level, but the government is structured and difficult for community members to access. If the government recognizes what nonprofits can bring

to the table, then they will more readily collaborate to obtain the benefits of working with nonprofits.

The data suggests that the existing government command and control style of leadership is a huge challenge and constraint to collaboration for many nonprofits. A VOAD leader (NV2) provided the following explanation: "It all boils down to locals. Sometimes they will say, 'This is so far over your head that we need to take the lead.' It doesn't work that way with government. They say 'We are in charge; get out of the way.'"

A state-level emergency manager (GS7) identified his own authority as the main factor that constrains collaboration. This authority does not extend to nonprofits, so emergency managers have boundaries that must be adhered to, regardless of the internal governance structure at the federal, state, and local levels. This is a source of frustration for some emergency managers based on keen insight into the legal aspects associated with their job and function.

Another local emergency manager (NV7), when asked what constrains collaboration, stated very simply: "Structure. [Government and nonprofits are] … not organized for most efficient use of people. " The notion is that organizational structure must be geared to recognize and incorporate individual and group skill sets through a sustainable capability that is responsive when needed. This is not always possible due to the nature of emergencies and funding shortfalls, which do not allow continuously exercising processes to validate availability of resources when needed. When times are quiet, these professionals still need to make a living and keep their skills intact in

preparation for the next disaster. The data does not present any proposed solutions to this issue.

There is also a difference in the existence and application of state and local performance standards for known nonprofits, such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, as opposed to less-well-known nonprofits. When asked how state and local emergency managers interact differently with known nonprofits, a local emergency manager (GL23) explained, "An organization with state-level resources will not be held to the standard of supplying those resources to the local level on a given day, while local response requires the resource to be available at any given time." The implication is that performance expectations would change the organizational behavior of both government and nonprofits and become an incentive to collaboration.

Nonprofits also recognize the lack of similar organizational structures to be a constraint. One nonprofit VOAD representative (NV7) explained, "Nonprofits or [the] public at large don't have an organizational structure. Some nonprofits and local government are used to structure. Red Cross and Salvation Army have different boards [who think in a different way]. If I show up with 500 people, I create a disaster; but if they are structured, I have a real asset." This response suggests that some nonprofits' lack of structure hinders collaboration because the government does not perceive that the nonprofit has the necessary stability to provide consistent resources in an emergency. This constrains collaboration.

In a command and control hierarchy, decisions are made at the top, sometimes without regard to the impact to nonprofits and their desire to trust or collaborate with

VOADs or government. The data indicates that some government-controlled information flows up, down, and across multiple organizations simultaneously. This environment is further complicated by frequent organizational changes, even when there is no disaster to cause internal restructuring. These frequent changes constrain collaboration because the perception is that the changes occur continuously and without warning until the government is satisfied; furthermore, organizational changes can be driven by personalities rather than mission objectives. One nonprofit representative (NA2) explained, "There was an [organizational] shift of a major responsibility to the Department of Social Services as the primary shelter. The nonprofit has no control over organizational changes that could impact relationships." The interviewee further explained that there are continually "new people in leadership. VOADs, in general, used to be active, but that's gone by the wayside; even when they recruit, the people don't stay. This is especially hard when there is no disaster." This response suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a sense of stability in an environment of changing organizational structures and personnel.

The researcher also concludes that, while the government is somewhat stable organizationally, it does not have a clear understanding of how frequent organizational changes can impact government-nonprofit collaboration. Frequent changes and constant reorganization impact the willingness to collaborate when they impact the ability to trust. A nonprofit VOAD manager (NV7) explained the situation: "The Red Cross restructured in July, then another nonprofit restructured. They are all doing what they want to do."

The researcher asserts that this lack of a stable and consistent organizational structure makes it difficult to build sustainable relationships.

There are also other constraints to collaboration, such as the authority or control over resources outside the purview of the emergency manager. A local emergency manager (GL20) stated, "Obviously each agency or group has their own individual rules of engagement. Obviously by not being a direct state or local government controlled entity, I can only ask [nonprofits] to provide certain services, versus maybe requiring [those services from] other direct-controlled internal county departments or agencies."

Collaboration can be hindered when available resources are outside of organizational control but do not meet organizational standards. A local emergency manager (GL24) provided the following example: "[Based on Red Cross standards,] you can't have shelters without backup generators, like a church. This limits the number of nonprofits that have facilities that we can engage that meet the standard."

Organizational limits to the span of control also constrain collaboration. There is a sense of frustration because emergency managers don't have control of all facilities. Other state and local government organizations, such as school systems, control these assets. The same local government emergency manager (GL24) explained, "In Virginia, neither emergency managers nor nonprofits have control over facilities for sheltering. . . . This limits the emergency manager to those nonprofits who have facilities that they control." Nonprofits control other assets that could be used, but the emergency manager does not directly control those assets, causing frustration. There is a standard (sometimes bureaucratic) that limits use of these facilities by the emergency manager

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who might need it, even if the governance board of the church desires to make the church available as a shelter.

One of the major benefits of a command and control organizational framework is that the directives, roles, and responsibilities are very clear, as well as the required training for emergency responders. The government considers training to be an incentive to collaboration. Many government emergency managers at the state and local levels maintained that speaking the same language is a critical part of collaboration. One local manager (GL11) stated, "If nonprofits have NIMS training, the emergency manager is more likely to contact them." Local government manager GL19 agreed: "When managing VOADs, they also need NIMS. We can all then 'speak the same language' across all organizations." A third local manager (GL24) explained, "For two and a half years we've been giving nonprofits [training; for example, we have introduced] VOADs [to] the NIMS class [so we can] speak the same language." Local government manager GL11 also emphasized the importance of getting "nonprofits hooked up with VOADs for training and background checks. " Finally, a state emergency manager (GS7) stressed the importance that "VOADs understand NIMs terminology and write and communicate according to these guidelines."

Training is a key factor in collaboration, often due to liability and policies, which are not consistent among government and nonprofit organizations. A local emergency manager (GL2) asserted, "Nonprofits would have to have the necessary training already—i.e., Red Cross certification, the fire and rescue class, first aid, CPR, and NIMS—[before they can be] covered by insurance." The same manager also confirmed

that a lack of training prevented nonprofits from being able to use a specific website "like other government people." Thus, collaboration is hindered when the organizational framework cannot provide equivalent training to government and nonprofit personnel.

Nonprofits depend on the government to provide training. A VOAD representative (NV7) explained, "Neither VOADs nor the Latter Day Saint Church offer training." Yet, despite the government's emphasis on training as a primary advantage of collaboration, only a few nonprofit representatives considered NIMS training a benefit. Instead, many identified a greater benefit in being part of a VOAD. This sense of being connected to other organizations is important to understanding how collaborative relationships are built; in contrast, bureaucratic organizational structures constrain collaboration.

Organizational mission alignment is a critical factor in understanding incentives and barriers to collaboration. A key aspect of this involves high-level managers expressing an appreciation for nonprofits' capabilities. A state-level emergency manager (GS4) explained the state's perspective on reaching out to nonprofits early: "Before something happens, bring them into the mix." This reflects an appreciation for nonprofits' value in the emergency planning process. The government's command and control structure has advantages in aligning organizational missions as well. A nonprofit representative (NA2) explained, "There was a push to target low income areas for fire alarms. Initially, the Red Cross and fire department did not want to partner, but 'higher ups' made the decision to partner at the federal level and national level of the Red Cross. Both fought the decision. . . . Now they feel good about it. It was about the mission."

MOUs and MOAs can enhance nonprofits' efforts to build collaborative

relationships with government because they offer structure that is sometimes necessary to

accomplish the mission. A state-level emergency manager (GS1) asserted, "There is an

agreement with the Red Cross and FEMA recommended by the government because the

Red Cross understands the planning process." Even though the Red Cross is

congressionally mandated to be a part of the emergency preparedness process,

government and nonprofit leadership must have a detailed understanding of the policies

as well as processes involved in planning for disasters. This understanding encourages

collaboration.

Nonprofits recognize the value of having an organizational framework that

supports collaboration at all levels. AVOAD representative (NA1) gave the following

example:

> This volunteer organization is mentioned in the EOP and the [ESF] Annex
> and has a seat on the EOC. What is unique is that the VOAD falls under
> the organization which has tasking authority and is also responsible for
> recovery and response. This volunteer organization conducts conferences,
> seminars, exercises, e-mails, [and] meetings, is also a member of the
> VOAD, and is working with a new source for getting nonprofits in
> Northern Virginia. So they are organized for better collaboration.

This example illustrates how an organization can support a variety of structures—

including conferences, seminars, meetings, exercises, e-mails, and VOAD membership—

that are designed to encourage collaboration and make it more likely to occur.

In contrast, collaboration can suffer when organizations have different missions

and perspectives. A local emergency manager (GL5) suggested that there are two schools

of thought on emergency management: militaristic (favored by the government) and sociological-psychological (favored by nonprofit organizations). The manager asserted, "There has to be a happy marriage of military and social skills." This so-called marriage achieves results in terms of the mission because both parties bring different skills to the table; the manager explained, "Nonprofits do all the things I can't do legally, financially, morally, and politically [because they are] not always spending taxpayer money." The government has developed structures such as ESFs and local EOPs to guide emergency preparation activities. The process for developing these EOPs has remained consistent from state to state and is solely dependent on the local emergency manager's desire to collaborate and share information with nonprofits to build a more collaborative environment. One local emergency manager (GL3) identified EOP guidance as a constraint to collaboration; he said, "EOP guidance needs a major overhaul to align with the structure of the state and mirror the federal government." The researcher strongly agrees with the idea that guidance for emergency preparedness would benefit from an independent, cross-functional review to determine the effectiveness of EOP implementation, focusing on outcomes rather than going through the motions of tasking local emergency managers to generate another document. As noted in another chapter of this research, the EOP has no "teeth" to enforce or require specific actions that result in greater nonprofit collaboration. Exchange theory postulates that there is neither reward nor punishment for ineffective outcomes without a standard of performance.

Several emergency managers and nonprofits contend that the biggest structural constraint to collaboration is the government's bureaucratic red tape. A local emergency

manager (GL4) stated, "Some nonprofits don't want to work with the local government because they wrap them up in red tape. Nonprofits would rather support the community outside the red tape." Another local emergency manager (GL21) explained, "Nonprofits [are] less bureaucratic and [have] less red tape [than] the government. I can go straight to 'Joe Nonprofit' and not always get [the] bureaucratic layers [that] are involved [when working with the government, which are] convoluted [and difficult to] get around. [Nonprofits] have to understand the [government's] structure."

Governance is dictated by organizational structure. The data suggests that it would be beneficial for government to have an in-depth policy discussion with nonprofits to simplify the process of how the government operates. One nonprofit representative (NV2) explained that sometimes nonprofits choose not to join the VOAD because of a "fear of liability, which often times can be overcome. . . . A lot of time the fear is not factually based. . . . It's fear of the unknown. "

Budget constraints have also impacted the structural roles of emergency managers and nonprofits during the preparedness phase. These constraints overshadow organizational roles and responsibilities, causing a change in what is considered necessary and forcing both government and nonprofits to prioritize the use of available assets. Many of these budget cuts forced organizational realignment of roles, and also time and asset distribution throughout the preparedness phase. For example, due to budget cuts several government organizations changed the physical and relational location of where the emergency manager works. These changes occurred in Virginia and Maryland; however DC's flat emergency management structure prevented it from being

impacted as heavily by budget cuts. The District was also saved from budget cuts due to its demographics and security priority as the nation's capital.

Some results of changes to organizational structures can be positive. For example, one local emergency manager (GL17) explained that organizational change created "a unique setting where the emergency manager is under the fire department , with a direct chief and an associate chief and a matrix organizational structure. The emergency manager does administrative planning as part of the fire department." This change is considered positive because it provides the emergency manager with different perspective: a first-responder point of view. Another local manager (GL10) provided the following example: "Emergency management is a stand-alone department, independent under the city manager. This was done after Katrina [because] the emergency manager had outgrown the part-time position." This structural change provides the emergency manager with independence. Another local manager (GL24) suggested that these structural changes helped the emergency manager to become "more focused and more professional."

Organizational restructuring that occurs due to budget constraints is not always positive. There may be fewer resources available, including time. A state government manager (GS4) explained that cuts require the government to heavily lean on nonprofits to "fill the gaps and provide the services the government doesn't or can't provide what government and state can do or don't do." A local government manager further explained, "The government is relying more on volunteers to do [the] heavy lifting, roles [the government] used to do." Local government manager GL10 agreed, stating,

"Nonprofits and emergency managers have the same message: with budget cuts, the emergency manager is not able to do outreach. [Personnel were] cut, and volunteers now do the outreach." These new responsibilities can easily overwhelm small nonprofits, especially if they are given fewer donations. As a result, nonprofits are likely to lose volunteers who feel overworked.

Several emergency managers identified time as a key constraint to collaboration. One local emergency manager (GL7) explained that lack of both money and time work together to affect the availability of volunteers: "The economy is down, [the] volunteer rate is down, and volunteers are getting second jobs. Time is the biggest issue beyond this." Another local government manager (GL1) identified a lack of time as his reason for not collaborating: "My primary job is fire marshal. I'm the only one. [There is] no time in [my] schedule to collaborate. I don't have any staff. I spend a lot of time trying to get government to allocate money for a disaster." A third manager (GL15) said that emergency managers don't have time to "ramp up relationships." A nonprofit representative (NV2) agreed, identifying money and time as the largest obstacles. "We have way too much we're responsible for without [adequate] money and resources [to meet our missions]."

Nonprofits must fight for scarce resources and on many occasions attempt to obtain resources by applying for federal and local grants. The organizations who can apply for these grants are often limited by their size, which creates competition for funding among nonprofits. One affiliated nonprofit (NA2) explained, "As a nonprofit, only [those in] larger counties [who already have access to affluent donors and a large tax

base] are eligible to apply for large grants [to get more resources]. [The VOAD doesn't] have the population to be eligible. This controls our access to resources." Many of these eligibility restrictions are attributed to an organizational bureaucracy that ultimately constrains collaboration based on a fiercely competitive and what is seen as an unfair environment.

A nonaffiliated nonprofit representative (NN4) further explained the difficulties in the bureaucratic grant process when asked what constrains collaboration: "The reporting process for grants requires reporting lots of information for a little bit of money. There is a [fundraising] increase every year, while the amounts offered are down every year. "

When budgets are a constraint, emergency managers believe nonprofits can rely more heavily on their expert power, skills, and organizational flexibility in funding critical items in the community. A state-level emergency manager (GS7) explained, "Nonprofits and volunteers can help and are not restricted by government law such as use of tax dollars." The government has organizational and legal constraints that nonprofits do not have. For example, government emergency management organizations are prohibited from spending money on certain faith-based groups because of the separation of church and state that is established by the US Constitution.

8.3 Organizational Culture

State and local emergency management organizations, as well as nonprofits, have cultures that embody both written and informal ideals, values, and mores that reflect their expectations for dealing with internal stakeholders. They also have expectations for behavior conducted outside their organizations, including how they interact with other

individuals and entities. This culture influences internal and external expectations, resulting in behavior that indicates the degree of power, transparency, and trust and ultimately influences levels of collaboration.

The organizational levels and locations of individuals involved in emergency preparedness are not controlled by their actions, but rather are typically handed down from senior leaders, who help define organizational culture from the highest levels. When asked what incentivizes collaboration, a state-level emergency manager (GS4) said, "Everyone (including nonprofits) need to understand that homeland security is a concept, not an agency; it is a vision for openness where all organizations play a fully integrated role." This implies that a main incentive of government-nonprofit collaboration involves a major change to the emergency preparedness culture regarding the direct role that emergency preparedness plays in homeland security, both from a structural and organizational perspective, by forming values and beliefs that help form more lasting relationships to build a stronger team. This culture must pervade both the government and nonprofits, based on mission alignment and a continued desire to protect the health and safety of the population without allowing their alternative motives to impact this mission.

One local emergency manager (GL3) explained how organizational culture constrains collaboration: "Emergency managers have traditionally been firemen, [and I'm] not sure if they think integration [with nonprofits is necessary]. [For] example, in the EOC, the present chief of fire and rescue meet with police to make a joint decision informally, then they make a decision [about] how bad [the situation] is, and then contact city manager. There is no nonprofit involvement at the EOC." The suggestion is that

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firemen have not engaged nonprofits in emergency management because it is not part of their culture, nor do they view nonprofits as valued assets in an emergency response situation. This may or may not be based on roles or perceptions, but it appears the emergency managers are more comfortable engaging another government entity (such as the police) to provide input to decisions before contacting yet another government official, in this case the city manager. Furthermore, nonaffiliated nonprofits are not involved at the EOC, which further demonstrates the emergency manager's lack of desire to engage nonprofits. It is clear that firemen have experience in handling emergencies; however, their perceived lack of respect toward nonprofits as demonstrated in this example is a barrier to collaboration.

This cultural attitude that favors experienced first responders over nonprofit volunteers has developed over time and was identified as a constraint to collaboration by several local emergency managers as well as nonprofits. Another local government emergency manager (GL18) described similar cultural issues which resulted in a narrow interpretation of who should be involved in the emergency planning and response process. The manager explained:

> There's a "public safety mindset" [that the government has]. In DC, [the] fire department had nonprofits and volunteers who participated in [an] exercise used as "victims," [although we] pushed to let some man traffic stops [or be utilized] at shelters. [In a real emergency,] volunteers [go] door to door and touch citizens way before first responders [can get there]. We need to change the disaster paradigm to rely on volunteers, not first responders. The problem is deeper than trust, its attitude. [The government thinks] no one can play in their sandbox.

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A nonprofit representative (NA4) further discussed how the government's cultural reliance on itself presents barriers to collaboration, stating, "The government has so many resources that they are flexible to do something themselves and don't look externally [to nonprofits]; they find a way to stipend themselves. To partner [with nonprofits] is not a natural part of their DNA. Nonprofits compete with each other for the pie. [The government does not] need us, and this is the way they behave." This nonprofit representative's perception is that the government is self-sufficient and this core value, or DNA, reflects a culture that goes to the very heart of why nonprofits and the government struggle to collaborate.

Nonprofits' perception that the government's culture and value systems constrain collaboration can sometimes lead nonprofits to behave in a similar manner when given the opportunity to have control over processes and organizations. A local emergency manager (GL10) explained, "There are turf issues with state, federal, and local people. When the nonprofits were creating a VOAD, they decided there was no place for a government person when they met." This suggests that nonprofits do not always want to collaborate with government, perhaps based on the perception that the government will attempt to take over relationships and resources, due to its command and control philosophy. Thus, in this example, the nonprofits may have chosen to exclude the government to avoid the risk of disrupting the VOAD's capability to build relationships among nonprofits. This overt action to exclude the government ultimately constrains collaboration.

The VOAD plays a critical role in "bridging the gap" between nonprofits and government. Several nonprofit VOAD members mentioned that government emergency managers' culturally negative response to volunteers makes it more difficult to get nonaffiliated nonprofits and faith-based groups involved. One VOAD leader (NV2) shared:

> In the Commonwealth, there is a growing movement where government and nonprofits work together to do preparedness. The more that occurs, the more people realize that volunteers are more than just nice people carrying casseroles. They are trained [and] they have skills that [should be] utilized, but they may not be utilized. They have specific experience and backgrounds. A volunteer is not a volunteer is not a volunteer. The more government realizes this, the more [nonprofits] can be utilized.

Some nonprofits perceive that the government does not culturally value volunteers as skilled partners in preparation and preparedness. In addition, nonprofits perceive that the government's informal ideals, values, and mores reflect its expectations for dealing with nonprofits in a manner that constrains collaboration.

This perception of an attitude of arrogance towards volunteers was further verbalized the same VOAD lead, who stated,

> Just because [a person has] a certification, doesn't mean [they] have all the answers. . . . [The government perceives] a great barrier between professionals [for hire] and volunteers. [The government] is negative toward volunteers [who may have experience, but not certification]. When [the government] gets stressed [during an emergency response situation] those biases come out ten times stronger.

This comment reflects the negative aspects of credentialing because it impacts the government's willingness to collaborate and influences the perception of expectations for stakeholders who are involved in planning and response. This is not to say that training, experience and skills are not critical to success; they are essential. In fact, some nonprofits' volunteers have credentials, training, and even experience equivalent to that of a government emergency manager. Many don't advertise their credentials so the government does not feel threatened by nonprofit skill sets. There is no benefit to advertising these credentials, nor attempting to form a collaborative relationship, if the government feels threatened.

A final cultural concern in emergency management preparation is the maintenance of a culture of excellence based on experience, education, training, and acquired skills. The existing core group of government and emergency management professionals who have responded to major emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina have developed a culture of connectedness and institutional knowledge. The data reflects a concern from both government and nonprofits that a loss of this institutional knowledge is a constraint to collaboration. A local emergency manager (GL12) explained, "State and local government are experiencing 'brain drain,' losing institutional knowledge at a rapid rate due to Baby Boomers retiring; points of contact, relationships, and [knowledge of] how nonprofits can work to the advantage of the state and local governments are being diluted." A nonprofit VOAD (NV2) echoed these concerns, stating, "We are having a tough time at the state level because of the 'graying' of our workforce, so we're losing institutional knowledge."

8.4 Organizational Centrality

As noted in Chapter 4, organizational centrality relates to the actual position and connectedness of an organization versus its perceived status. The emergency manager is in a critically central position. The concept of centrality implies one is in a position organizationally as well as individually to influence and encourage or hinder collaboration. Emergency managers are assigned to government organizations, while nonprofits—both affiliated and nonaffiliated—are typically managed by boards. Using the public as one end of the spectrum of stakeholders involved in emergency management and the federal government at the opposite end, both emergency managers and nonprofits are centrally located organizationally without direct authority until activated for an emergency. This leaves organizations at a loss when trying to determine roles and responsibilities outside of what is documented in the ESFs and EOPs. The closer an organization is to the center of the action—for example, the author of the EOP or attendance at meetings, training, and exercises—the more influence the organization has to impact planning in the preparedness phase.

Both government and nonprofits appreciate the importance of centrality as it relates to planning. They also recognize that organizational constraints affect both the mission and the ability to collaborate even at the highest levels. When asked about how to engage nonprofits in an ideal world, a state-level emergency manager (GS4) said the state should "treat nonprofits as equal partners, [then we will] not have to find ways to interact with them and them with us."

This comment reveals that nonprofits are not currently treated as equal partners, and the government continually has to find new approaches for interacting with them. This

statement also indicates that the government is at the center of all preparedness activities and, despite a desire for equality, full collaboration has not yet occurred.

When asked about an ideal world for working with nonprofits, a state emergency manager (GS4) asserted that nonprofits "would be sitting at the table like any other jurisdiction." This suggests that, while all jurisdictions are represented at state-level planning meetings, nonprofits are not present in the same capacity and frequency of attendance.

A local emergency manager (GL23) suggested that an ideal way of working with nonprofits would involve the development of a new state entity. The manager explained, "We would identify our needs, and there would be a 'clearing house' which identifies the [nonprofit] organizations which would be able to help in the area desired." The implication is that the state is not organized to efficiently assist local governments to collaborate with nonprofits and that this clearing house needs to be added to the organizational structure. This type of clearing house does not exist today; if created, it would be a major incentive to collaboration as well as a means of centrally locating nonprofits to increase participation.

The data suggest that that the government has become too large and bureaucratic, discouraging nonprofits' desire to form collaborative relationships at all levels. At the federal and state levels, government doctrine dictates that emergency managers should collaborate with nonprofits; however, the actual hands-on relationships are built at the local level, through emergency managers' organizational and interpersonal skills rather than written policies. A local emergency manager (GL4) explained that the closer a

manager is to the federal bureaucracies, the more aligned he or she must be to its

extensive rules and regulations; thus , "[local] emergency managers have more

operational relationships with nonprofits." This comment represents the concept of

centrality: nonprofits have the best chance of collaboration when working directly with

local-level emergency managers, rather than through bureaucratic organizational

structures that sometimes hinder collaboration. The implication is also that the issues

related to collaboration are not as visible at the local level because collaboration is most

likely to occur there, due to an understanding of the need to work together and the insight

that working together toward the same goals is in the best interest of the community.

As we move from the federal to the state level, VOADs believe they are centrally

connected to government at the state and local levels. When asked what incentivizes

collaboration, a VOAD representative (NV6) stated, "VDEM is involved at the state

level, and it's important that they care about what we do and that we exist." This

comment reflects the importance of feeling valued and connected as an organization but

also implies a concern that sometimes the value, position, and importance of the VOAD

is not always recognized.

The data reveals that VOADs are centrally located and are a critical agent

involved in emergency preparedness and response. VOAD representative NV6 explained,

"The government benefits by having a single VOAD to encompass dealing with one

organization vs. thirty-six efficiently. This allows flexibility in the region." The VOAD

adds incredible value being centrally located with state and local emergency management

agencies. This flexibility expands existing government capability well beyond current

levels, resulting in greater support to the public. Another VOAD representative (NV7) explained, "The EOP does not formally list [State VOADs], but they have a seat at the table in the EOC; two VOAD reps man the EOC 24/7 when activated by a disaster. State can formally ask you to do something with a phone call." Being directly connected to the EOC is critical to executing emergency preparedness and response activities.

Organizational centrality is implemented in different manners in different states. One local emergency manager (GL24) explained that he works in an organizationally independent city that has requirements and responsibilities different from those of the county. This is unique in Virginia. The manager further noted, "In this [organizational] structure, nonprofits have a limited role. A separate organization, not a VOAD, is contracted to perform coordination." There is no data to indicate whether this particular organizational structure is an incentive or barrier to collaboration, but the researcher believes that this type of structure is based on a deliberate attempt to surpass current VOAD capabilities due to the demographic, legal, and jurisdictional requirements evaluated in making the decision to create a volunteer center. This response is specified in this research because this type of organizational structuring, which limits the role of nonprofits and engages contractors to perform the VOAD mission, must be closely monitored to determine the impact to efficiency and forming lasting organizational and personal relationships.

One of the most difficult tasks for emergency managers who do not have assistance from a VOAD or volunteer organization is determining how to engage nonprofits. One local government manager who does not have access to a VOAD that

identifies nonprofits (GL10) specifically highlighted difficulty connecting with faith-based groups. This emergency manager often has to contact each church individually, while managers who can call on a VOAD can just go through the coalition to engage several faith-based groups at once. The manager explained, "The organizational structure forces some barriers collaboration. It's the way they are internally structured [and] depends on staff [and] resources." There are several faith-based nonprofits who are not engaged in emergency preparedness. We have discussed the reasons in other chapters, but the result is that many are not connected nor centrally located in a way that makes it easy for government managers to contact them; this is a barrier to collaboration.

On the opposite side of this spectrum are faith-based nonprofits who are engaged with government emergency managers. A local VOAD representative (NV7) explained how these relationships are established: "Pre-established relationships help cross-sectional cooperation. [The Church of the Latter Day Saints] might not have day care, someone else does. The Methodists has a different structure, [and] VOAD recruits other nonprofits, [such as the] board of directors from DuPont. This helps collaboration by exercising these cross-organizational relationships before a disaster."

A pre-established relationship at the local level incentivizes collaboration, even if its nonprofit-to-nonprofit, without involving the government. For example, one faith-based nonprofit representative (NA2) cited partnerships with other faith denominations when asked what incentivizes collaboration. Although not centrally connected to the government emergency manager, partnerships that are forged between nonprofits incentivizes collaboration at the lowest level, creating a grassroots foundation for future

structural changes that could more effectively meet the needs of the public without creating more government bureaucracy.

Nonprofits have also attempted to develop creative approaches to being more centrally involved with local emergency managers by developing a functional requirement for creation of a network. A nonaffiliated nonprofit representative (NN4) explained that his volunteer organization is a member of the regional VOAD but not for the purpose of emergency planning. Instead the nonprofit's goal is to develop a hands-on network to work with local nonaffiliated volunteers and nonprofits if an emergency occurs. The representative explained, "We are looking at being a 'convener'—[the] one place who knows what is going on where there are 7,500 nonprofits. We can't do this [yet] due to funding shortfalls; [we] have to meet special requirements for grants. . . . We keep hearing, 'Do more with less.'" This recommendation for a "convener" organization that can identify and communicate with thousands of nonprofits would greatly improve connectedness and collaboration in the region; however, connectedness and centrality are sometimes constrained by funding shortfalls.

Emergency managers also consider organizational funding shortfalls to be a hindrance to collaboration. A local emergency manager (GL13) explained how funding is related to other management functions in government organizations: "Department heads have to be marketing gurus for our agencies. [They] have to study the board of supervisors [funding & politics]." Government and nonprofits must be tied to people and organizations that control funding lines outside emergency management. This type of activity consumes time, resources, and energy that could be more focused on engaging

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nonprofits—especially less-well-known and nonaffiliated nonprofits—in emergency preparedness activities.

Nonprofits also highlighted how organizational boundaries affect the issue of centrality. AVOAD representative (NV7) explained that one of the biggest ways to incentivize collaboration is to "[work] on relationships, not [organizational] boundaries. Local government has the boundaries, not the Red Cross and other nonprofits." This statement demonstrates that this nonprofit believes the local government focuses more on creating boundaries rather than building and maintaining relationships with nonprofits, which are not perceived to have as many boundaries as the government. The implication is that the government surrounds itself in an "iron fence," and nonprofits are only allowed to enter when asked. Thus, nonprofits will find it is difficult to connect or collaborate in a bureaucratic organizational structure that is so centralized that personnel only talk to each other.

Local emergency managers view known nonprofits, such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, from a different perspective than less-well-known nonprofits. When asked about the difference, a local emergency manager (GL14) explained, "Nonprofits like the Red Cross and Salvation Army have structures and less flexible in larger operations like business and government policies and procedures. Smaller nonprofits are less constrained, less restricted and more specific to those being helped." The implication is that smaller nonprofits are not saddled with the bureaucracy of the known nonprofits, whose structures are more closely aligned with the government. These smaller nonprofits can focus on the specific needs of the community, making it more important to invest in

building relationships at that level since there are no bureaucratic constraints to hinder

this alliance. The issue is that these smaller nonprofits need to be more closely aligned

with the local emergency manager to ensure collaboration, which is essential to meeting

the needs of the public.

8.5 Chapter 8 Summary
This chapter focused on the fourth theme uncovered during the research,

organizational structure, and how it impacts collaboration during the preparedness phase

of emergency management. This theme was analyzed using exchange theory, focusing on

the organizational framework, culture, and centrality with respect to other stakeholders.

The data indicates that organizational structure is by far the biggest constraint to

collaboration, especially during a fiscally constrained, competitive environment in which

legal, ethical, and governance nuances shape the motivations of emergency preparedness

professionals to more creatively share resources. Organizational structure impacts

personal and organizational power dynamics, dependencies and interdependencies, and

willingness to be transparent, ultimately resulting in a trust-based collaborative

relationship. The government and nonprofits must consider creating a new paradigm to

establish sustainable relationships because the public is dependent on them getting this

relationship right in the interest of saving lives.

Table 7 includes a summary of the expectations and findings based data analysis

in chapters 5–8. Chapter 9 includes research conclusions, recommendations, and

suggestions for future research. It also includes thematic analysis of a new finding,

accountability, as a factor that impacts government-nonprofit desire to collaborate.

Table 7: Summary of Expectations and Findings

Theme	Expectation	Finding
Research Question	Exchange Theory is a viable theoretical framework to analyze emergency preparedness.	Exchange theory provides a framework to analyze themes that include trust, transparency, power and autonomy and organizational structure that were consistent in the data analysis based on responses to interviews in Maryland, Virginia and D.C. Accountability was a supplemental theme voiced by preparedness professionals.
Trust	Being an affiliated or nonaffiliated nonprofit is a constraint or incentive to collaboration.	The major constraint to collaboration is purely for nonaffiliated nonprofits. Affiliated nonprofits are typically trusted based on training, previous experience working with emergency managers and delivering resources as promised.
	Trust is based on attitudes and beliefs.	Some negatives attitudes were noted by emergency managers toward nonprofits based on existing attitudes and beliefs. Government attitude that no one else can "play in their sandbox" constrains building sustainable relationships.
	There are no economic exchanges that impact trust.	Blau states economic exchange is based on formal contracts (MOAs, MOUs). Some emergency managers stated that these agreements incentivize collaboration. This may not be true for nonprofits because they may not want to commit resources based on operational funding constraints.
	Risk averse behavior constrains collaboration	Emergency managers typically did not have the time or resources to expand outreach beyond day to day routines to establish new relationships.
	Those who did not accept membership saw no benefit in joining.	Nonaffiliated nonprofits that did not join saw some benefit to joining, but sometimes their missions are not aligned with government emergency preparedness activities.
	The quality of the relationship is more easily understood at the individual versus organizational level of familiarity.	Length of relationship and familiarity builds trust at the individual level since local emergency managers must know the nonprofit to trust them and build upon the trust they have established in the community. Individual familiarity is the foundation for establishing organizational trust.

	The more reliable a given partner's service is perceived to be, the more trust the other party will have.	Resource (funding) reliability based on past experience incentivizes trust leading to collaboration in Virginia, Maryland and D.C.
	Trust is increased when the government perceives that the nonprofit organization consistently has sufficient capacity to commit to scenarios.	Trust leads to transparency (and ultimately collaboration) when government sees delivery of acceptable capacity during exercises and real world events.
	Legal restrictions placed on use of funds by both government and nonprofits may create barriers to collaboration.	Legal restrictions are sometimes a barrier because the government must rely on the nonprofit heavily in scenarios where nonprofits have more flexibility. Data suggests that government is happy that nonprofits have this flexibility and the process builds trust if a relationship exists. This situations can sometimes cause the nonprofit to decrease trust because of the perception that their limited resources are being "controlled" by government
	Fluid communications between stakeholders increases trust between organizations. Specifically, the ability to get the right information to the right stakeholders, at the right time incentivizes collaboration	Getting the right information to the right stakeholders within the given planning cycle is critical to support an effective and coordinated plan. Frequent and fluid communications helps to build trust.
	Trust is increased when stakeholders have mutual goals, mutual respect, and the source of motivation is known.	The data confirmed that trust is increased when stakeholders have mutual goals, mutual respect, and the source of motivation is known. This concept also creates a suggestion that while the projected outcomes of the planning events (potential payoffs) are important; individuals also care about the motivation for reaching a goal or resolution to a problem
	If you the government or nonprofit perceives (and believes) that funding is available (or not) this results in an organizational decision to either trust or distrust a given entity.	There is a perception that government funding sources have been relatively consistent despite budget cuts. Government perception of some nonprofits is that these sources must be reliable to build trust.

	Each stakeholder's motivation is important in deciding if they want to collaborate.	A motivation that the other entity perceives to be noble will increase trust; distrust occurs if the perception is that the motivation is purely based on self-interest, creating a barrier to collaboration. There is no trust when government believes that the nonprofit is using the planning platform for marketing purposes vice legitimately wanting to participate as a partner that shares the mission. Nonprofits may not trust other nonprofits (affiliated or nonaffiliated) if they are competing for funds. The data confirmed that trust is increased when stakeholders have mutual goals, mutual respect, and the source of motivation is known.
	Trust is increased when organizations leverage tools such as training, meeting spaces, participation in exercises, and credentialing to maximize benefit.	The data indicates that participating in training creates an environment where government and nonprofits speak the same language and use the same vernacular; which is one of the incentives to building relationships based on trust. There is no way to build trust or any relationship unless the nonprofit makes a valiant effort to engage with government. Many government professionals believe nonprofits need to approach them. Meetings, exercises and credentialing are opportunities to create trust based relationships.
	Having a meeting with a joint purpose where missions are aligned increases trust.	Nonprofits are organized for a public purpose and their mission must be aligned with that of government to build trust. Meetings can reinforce the joint purpose of these missions.

	The ability to participate in exercises increases stakeholder trust because the projected capabilities are assessed.	Capacity includes sufficient equipment, training, number of volunteers, volunteers with required skills. When the government knows your resource capability and capacity, married with past experience, collaboration is incentivized. Exercises are opportunities to create trust based relationships, especially when nonprofits do not always fully understand government capability nor capacity and in many cases believe the government could be withholding information to make them use their own resources. This is especially true in our fiscally constrained environment where there is competition for scarce resources. This distrust constrains collaboration.
	Trust is increased when organizations are able to secure credentials	This only applies to government, who sees high value in credentials without always recognizing that both nonprofit and volunteers have extensive credentials that may not be advertised. Nonprofit collaboration is constrained when credentials outweigh the mission.
	Organizations are more likely to trust each other when policy exists with enough detail to support effective planning (i.e. EOPs).	The data suggests that policy is an attribute of transparency that leads to trustworthiness. Trust can lead to forming collaborative relationships. EOPs are more associated with transparency than trust.
Transparency	Some organizations' ability to be partially transparent is not well understood by the emergency management community because the expectation is for full transparency.	It is critical for nonprofits to understand that government will never provide information on every operational aspect of preparedness based on vulnerability, privacy and security. The need to know as a security measure in the planning process has been highlighted during interviews by government and nonprofits. Protecting intellectual property gives nonprofits an advantage when operating as a business to get donations during a time of constrained resources. The perception is that nonprofits are not fully transparent about capabilities and resources because the government is trying to get them to fund items to compensate for shortfalls in government funding. Some VOADs may not be transparent with all nonprofits and in turn, those nonprofits do not want to become involved in the VOAD to protect their assets This is a major constraint to asset transparency.

	Lacking a communications infrastructure such as a website is a barrier to collaboration because transparency is not fully realized.	Government controls a massive communications infrastructure and has ready access to leading edge technologies. This is not always the case for nonprofits that use their funding based on strict guidelines, sometimes preventing them from spending money on communications infrastructure using the best technology. The government only publishes those documents that they feel are necessary to share with various stakeholders at the state and local level, however this varies from state to state (and the District). The communications infrastructure and processes are well established at the state level, but at the local level where emergencies occur, these processes are dictated by the local emergency manager. Since transparency is not a policy driven variable, emergency managers are given the leverage to determine best practices in accordance with procedures that have worked well in the past, but need to be adjusted to the change in demographics.
	Information transparency is increased or decreased based on the language type, language complexity, and format.	Information transparency includes a need for comprehension which increases or decreases based on the type of language, complexity and format. When the information is comprehended and well understood, this maximizes collaboration of both government and nonprofits. The overarching constraint is misalignment of government-nonprofit missions. Hidden agendas related to these missions are a constraint.
	Gaps in information, both vertical and horizontal related to government-nonprofit collaborative efforts, is sometimes based on an organization not fully understanding that other entities could benefit from having that information to meet public needs.	Information gaps occur due to the downward flow from government to nonprofit. Perception of dependence on government constrains collaboration when information is not shared. This information flow is impossible when attempting to communicate with an organization that you never heard of; especially if the information on their location and capability is not readily available when you begin the search.

Power and Interdependence	Structural and formal relationships between nonprofits and government can encourage nonprofits to take part in decision-making and resource allocation based on this interdependence.	Creation of more informal relationships based on a reward-based power, is the result of legal, organizational, philosophical, and governance structures that define each entity. The government perception is that relationships are more easily balanced when an MOU is in place to manage participation based on mutually beneficial interdependencies. This MOU also re-establishes legitimate power for both the government and nonprofit stakeholder so that there is no question or misperception about these roles and responsibilities. The MOU typically incentivizes communication and ultimately leads to frequent and structured collaboration.
	When nonprofits feels the government does not depend on them for resources, there is no interdependence.	Even with an MOU, some government assert that based on legitimate power, he or she is not responsible for reaching out to nonprofits and if they "pass the test", then they will be considered. This approach constrains collaboration, sometimes causing nonprofits to exercise what they believe to be legitimate power. Many nonprofits still want independence from government involvement and influence in their affairs.
	When in the planning stage there is a good understanding of what the consequences are (if any) for not being able to deliver resources as promised.	Data suggests that the only real consequence of non-delivery of resources is the government decision not to communicate or collaborate with that specific nonprofit for future meetings, exercises or events.
	That for some conditions when legitimate power is established, collaboration is incentivized and for others the inflexibility creates barriers.	Government and nonprofit relationships are more easily balanced when nonprofits are mentioned in the EOP, showing mutually beneficial interdependencies. There is no question or misperception about these roles and responsibilities; it provides a mechanism to support execution of legitimate power both by government and nonprofit managers and incentivizes communications ultimately leading to frequent and structured collaboration.

	When there is disagreement regarding who has the legitimate power due to lack of policy or agreement at the working level, barriers occur, sometimes resulting in power imbalances.	It is clear that many emergency managers believe they have the authority and responsibility to control nonprofits based on legitimate power but the problem is related to attitudes. Nonprofits exhibit frustration when power is complicated by negative attitudes of government authorities.
	Both government and nonprofits seek the approval of the public more so than each other.	Emergency management preparation also includes reference power, which is to gain the approval of the government or another stakeholder. Nonprofits are accountable to their board and donors. Government is accountable to their leadership and the taxpayer. Both are being "evaluated" by the public and in exchange theory, receive benefits or rewards for accomplishing their mission. This creates a barrier during times of constrained resources where one cannot exercise control over the other.
	It is difficult to determine the level of expertise because no resources have been operationalized to respond to an emergency	Expert power is the belief that the nonprofit or government entity has knowledge or skills required to perform their missions individually or organizationally. The data suggests that when technical expertise is exhibited during preparedness activities (i.e. exercise, training), interdependence could lead to collaboration.
	The government perceives expert power based on nonprofit past performance	Expert power is built based on historical accomplishments and many nonprofits that have not responded to an emergency and expended promised resources have a limited list of accomplishments to support establishment of expert power with the emergency manager. This is the basis of any perception the government has when deciding to collaborate (or not)
	The degree to which the organization's perception of their level of power (dependence or independence) has an impact on their willingness to collaborate	Exchange theory explains some of the rationale for this behavior, but cannot explain all scenarios where collaboration will or will not occur. Nonprofits minimize their dependence on government by maximizing their various types of power (e.g., expert, legitimate or building coalitions with other nonprofits. Some nonprofits do not know the full scope of the legitimate power that the government can exercise in emergency management preparation, a constraint to collaboration. Another major constraint is

		the nonprofit notion that government wants to control areas that they have no legal or other authority to control. Findings are that the government perceives that they have all power until response is required and nonprofit resources are activated. Lack of government control over nonprofits and their resources is a major source of frustration for emergency managers because they have no power over these organizations. This frustration constrains collaboration.
	Power and autonomy would be the biggest constraint to collaboration.	Findings indicate that this is not the case. Organizational structure appears to be the most damaging constraint to future collaboration.
Organizational Structure	Even for an organization with clear lines of authority minimizing the number of interfaces incentivizes collaboration	Exchange theory highlights the importance of being close to the central figure, the emergency manager. If not directly connected, it is important to be part of a VOAD and if not part of a VOAD, there is no connection. The nonaffiliated nonprofit has no interface unless they take the initiative to establish one,
	Emergency managers are not flexible to meet exact needs of nonprofits or the public because they are sometimes limited by policy and legal constraints.	Policy & legal doctrine dictates guidance for emergency management from the national level to the local level. In addition, internal governance structures at the Federal, State and local level influences actions by emergency managers, which is a source of frustration based on keen insight and understanding of the legal and ethical aspects associated with their job and function. Nonprofits have their own set of policy and legal doctrine which could constrain their actions as well.
	Each of the organizational frameworks can be optimized to maximize collaboration across a range of organizational frameworks	Each state and the District are functionally organized differently and execute preparedness and response operations to meet the needs of their respective jurisdictions. Not all government nor nonprofit understand and appreciate the constraints imposed by the organizational structure of all stakeholders in preparedness activities. More education, training and information sharing are required at the lowest level to incentivize collaboration and create a sense of trust based on transparency. Local

		communities trust nonprofits because they are at the grassroots level. Government command and control styles of leadership in the existing organizational structure is a challenge for many nonprofits. Structure must be geared to recognize and incorporate individual and group skill sets through a sustainable capability that is responsive when needed. This is not always possible due to the nature of disasters and funding shortfalls which do not allow continuously exercising processes to validate availability of resources when needed. Performance standards would change the organizational behavior of both government and nonprofits.
	The organizational culture of an entity will both influence government-nonprofit decisions which organizations to affiliate with and which organizations are likely to affiliate with them based on their perceptions of how they are viewed externally.	Culture embodies ideals, values and mores that reflect expectations for dealing with stakeholders. Culture influences internal and external expectations resulting in behavior that indicates the degree of power, transparency and trust. A perception that firemen have not engaged nonprofits in emergency management because it is not part of their culture or see nonprofits as valued assets for response constrains collaboration. There's a "public safety mindset" (that the government has). In D.C. fire department had nonprofits & volunteers who participated in the exercise used as "victims", pushed to let some man traffic stops, utilize at shelters. The problem is deeper than trust, its attitude, no one can "play in their (government) sandbox. One nonprofit's perception is that the government is self-sufficient and this DNA (core value) reflects a culture that goes to the very heart of why there is no collaboration. On the contrary, nonprofits do not always want to collaborate with government. There are also negative aspects of credentialing because it impacts the willingness to collaborate (or not) and influences perception of government expectations for stakeholders who are involved in planning and response. State/local government are experiencing "brain drain", losing institutional knowledge at a rapid rate due to baby boomers retiring, points of contact, relationships and how nonprofits can

		work to the advantage of the state/local government are being diluted.
	Organizations with increased centrality will present more favorable conditions for collaboration because their position in the emergency management is well understood in the context of many other organizations	Emergency managers and nonprofits are centrally located organizationally. The closer you are to the author of the EOP, the emergency manager (i.e. the center of the action), attend meetings and are involved in training and exercises, the more influence you have to impact planning in the preparedness phase. working directly with the emergency manager at the local level rather than through bureaucratic organizational structures that sometimes hinder collaboration. The VOAD is centrally located and is a critical agent involved in emergency preparedness and response. There are several faith based nonprofits who are not engaged in emergency preparedness. Government has become too large and bureaucratic, discouraging the desire to form relationships at all levels. This is a barrier to collaboration.
	There are both incentives and barriers that organizational frameworks present to determining each entity's willingness to collaborate; this is closely related to the power balance that a given situation presents.	Government and nonprofits must be tied to people and organizations that control funding outside emergency management. Organizational structure can influence power and the willingness to reach out or remain centrally focused. Organizations like the Red Cross, Salvation Army and Government have similar hierarchical organizational structures which encourages collaboration.

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**CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

9.1 Conclusions

The aim of this research was to explore what factors incentivize or constrain

collaboration between government and nonprofits involved in emergency management

preparedness activities in Virginia, Maryland, and DC using the social exchange theory

as the most applicable theoretical framework. Chapters 5–8 contain the data analyses,

which discuss the major themes identified during interview: trust, transparency, power

and autonomy, and organizational structure. For those practitioners who went directly to

this chapter to review a list of incentives and barriers, the researcher highly recommends

reading the candid comments contained in the data analysis provided by government and

nonprofit preparedness personnel. These comments are the heart of this research and

provide great insight—both real and perceived—into the state of emergency preparedness

in the national capital region.

Chapter 9 will focus on research conclusions and recommendations related to the

four key themes of trust, transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational

structure. It will also briefly examine the additional theme of accountability, which

emerged from the interviews as a relevant factor that requires an in-depth examination to

fully understand its implications in the context of emergency management planning.

Research findings in chapters 5–8 validated the tenets of exchange theory, as discussed in the literature review, as the most appropriate filter to analyze government and nonprofit collaborative relationships. This conclusion was based on mapping these tenets to the themes found during interviews. There was almost a one-for-one match, with the outliers relating to the supplemental theme of accountability. The researcher also operationalized the themes into more detailed subthemes to more clearly articulate the rationale for incentives and constraints to collaboration.

Chapters 5–8 demonstrated that trust is the largest incentive to collaboration. A major finding under trust is that both government and nonprofits recognize the benefits and value of collaboration; however, the data suggests that the costs outweigh the benefits in terms of risk, liability, time, and resources. The researcher also concludes that emergency managers should reach out to small and medium-sized nonprofits to gain their trust because these grassroots nonprofits know the community members well—especially the most vulnerable members, who are often the most affected during an emergency or disaster.

Regarding barriers to collaboration, the researcher's expectation at the beginning of this project was that power and autonomy were the largest barriers to collaboration. This was not supported by the data. Instead, the researcher found that organizational structure appears to be the most damaging constraint to collaboration.

A critical part of the analysis shows how budgets and competition for scarce resources force each entity to "retreat to their corners" to protect their assets, typically moving in and out of collaborative relationships for the appearance of adhering to policy

and guidance. This competition is not productive, nor is it a positive incentive to stabilizing a relationship suitable for ongoing collaboration. The data shows a sincere ongoing effort to collaborate and build lasting relationships, but the data also indicates that the government is at "the helm of this ship," from the federal level down to the local levels. While emergency managers exhibit strong management skills, they lack overall leadership skills to quickly escalating the relationships to the next level, which would result in full collaboration. This is a very difficult endeavor for a local manager, particularly in regard to preparedness activities, because there are only so many preparedness exercises and meetings that one can host, and all of these activities require resource allocation of time and energy. The real issue is that there is no way to evaluate the outcome of emergency preparation until an event occurs, at which point it is too late to nurture collaborative relationships.

Budgets and competition were discussed in the literature review. Young asserted that "Nonprofits can compensate for government failure because they are self-governing and have access to resources through voluntary donations to provide these services."[337] This statement does not reflect the current fiscal reality. While nonprofits collect billions of dollars, the research indicates that nonprofits, both affiliated and nonaffiliated, have shortfalls in resources that no longer allow them to compensate for the government's lack of resources; these shortfalls are based on organizational and legal aspects associated with nonprofits' existence.

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[337] Young, "Alternative Models of Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations," 35.

Budget constraints are not new to emergency preparedness stakeholders, but one new phenomenon is increased competition for resources from the very generous Millennial generation, who want the government and nonprofits to provide more services in an economy where information sharing, social media, and increased social consciousness should have a greater influence the outcome of preparedness activities rather than bureaucratic red tape. When budgets are constrained, nonprofits perceive the government relies more heavily on their expert power to induce nonprofits to act.

9.1.1 Trust

Trust is the major incentive to collaboration. The research indicates that this theme reflects the greatest number of comments made during interviews and is the foundation for all other variables that have been operationalized, including transparency, power and autonomy, organizational structure and the additional element of accountability.

The research data validated Selsky and Parker's conclusion that, while nonprofits tend to be more protective of their reputation, they may be suspicious of government's political agenda.[338] The difference noted in this research is that nonprofits are in fact more than suspicious of the agenda, believing the government fully intends, and even plans, to control nonprofits' resources. This perception goes well beyond the researcher's original expectation concerning nonprofit fears and rationale for not wanting to collaborate with the government. This distrust, which is likely amplified in a fiscally constrained environment, has become a barrier to collaboration and leads to another fear

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[338] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 858.

that the government will ultimately try to takeover missions typically managed by nonprofits.

Literature from Hardin, Kapucu, Lawler, and Schoorman provides additional insight and highlights how trust and trustworthiness are core elements in public-private collaboration; [339] the research data indicates that this is true for government-nonprofit collaborative relationships as well. The researcher also asserts that, without trust, none of the other themes have a meaningful operational impact in encouraging or hindering the development of sustainable relationships.

Exchange theory reflects upon certain rewards and punishments associated with building relationships. Farrington and Bebbington's research surmises that both government and nonprofit agencies fail to plan or think systematically about their relationships, in general.[340] This assertion was validated by the data collected in this research, with a caveat that the National Response Framework and EOPs do provide a level of consideration in the process with inclusion of roles and responsibilities. However, roles and responsibilities are the technical basis for establishing a relationship, not the actual relationship. The real issue in beginning the planning or systematic thinking about these relationships is to first agree to mission goals, then establish trust in "people who don't look like us and sound like us." This is where systematic thinking should begin.

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[339] Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, 274; Kapucu, "Designing, Managing and Sustaining"; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, "Emotion and Group Cohesion"; and Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, "Organizational Trust: Philosophical Perspectives and Conceptual Definitions."
[340] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 862.

Thompson, in his work on networks, contends that trust is a fundamental norm that contributes to the development of collaborative partnerships. He adds that trust is an expected action which cannot be monitored in advance of the circumstances.[341] The researcher concludes that trust can be openly monitored based on prior experience as a way to predict future collaboration. This research analyzed long-term collaborative relationships of participants who were involved in emergency response during 9/11, which required resources from Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. In that particular event, the emergency response was extremely effective based on earlier establishment of collaborative relationships prior to the event in the planning phases of the emergency response process.

Trust is fundamental, but the other themes discussed in this research—transparency, power and autonomy, organizational structure and accountability—impact the level of trust. A high level of trust reduces government and nonprofit uncertainty and mitigates the risk that resources will not be available when needed. The research suggests that volunteers may not want to invest the time or resources in training to obtain skills the government feels are necessary; exchange theory explains the rationale for this behavior. This issue is further complicated by a perception that emergency managers do not value volunteers, who are treated as "crowd control" or "victims" during emergency preparedness exercises, rather than treated as experts and assets to the government's efforts. This perceived attitude constrains collaboration and sends nonprofits a signal that they cannot "play in the sandbox" created by emergency managers.

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[341] Thompson, *Between Hierarchies and Markets.*

9.1.2 Transparency

Transparency is a key theme in this research that supports building a collaborative relationship based on trust. Young states, "Nonprofit organizations appear to be caught in the middle of this perplexing uncertainty over the pending social contract. Contemporary government policy toward the nonprofit sector is inconsistent, at once encouraging the growth of voluntarism and private initiative and at the same time limiting its resource base."[342] The research consistently supports the idea that transparency is constrained when control of information and other assets is at risk.

Transparency is enhanced by a higher degree of mutual planning and management based on open information flow among all stakeholders. Alignment of goals and resources engenders commitment of capabilities and capacities and allows sharing of benefits and risks. Emergency managers need to be sensitized to this approach.

Transparency is an important theme in understanding how the government can incentivize nonprofits to build trust, with the ultimate goal of establishing sustainable relationships. Although transparency, like trust, cannot be mandated and is not discussed in policy, it is a key theme of this research that becomes an incentive or barrier to collaboration, depending on the how well it is managed by leadership. The data revealed a few reasons that personnel are not fully transparent, including need-to-know and protection of scarce resources.

The researcher concludes that MOUs and MOAs further cement the ability to manage expectations for government and some affiliated nonprofits. Some of the small and medium nonprofits may not be able to sign an MOU or MOA if they cannot commit

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[342] Ibid., 63.

due to limited assets and an unstable funding stream, making this document a constraint to collaboration. Some government stakeholders perceive that nonprofits (affiliated and nonaffiliated) are seeking media attention to help bolster their budgets and stimulate charitable donations. If validated, this diminishes trust, but the data does not fully support this assertion.

In alignment with seeking media attention, some emergency managers perceive that nonprofits market their organizations for their own benefit. Conversely, nonprofits understand that the government doesn't need to market its capabilities because it is self-sufficient. These perceptions constrain collaboration when nonprofits must publicly file tax forms each year (which can be accessed easily on the Internet), but the government does not demonstrate the same level of transparency in government-managed EOP review cycles—including a review of the government budget—which is a periodic event performed at the discretion of the emergency manager. Many times government budget information is only released publicly in general terms that do not show detailed planning for execution of all funds. Nonprofits, on the other hand, have a different perspective of transparency and the implications associated with its implementation. This lack of government transparency impacts nonprofits' willingness to share when the government counterpart can hide behind need-to-know mandates based on a personal judgment.

The researcher concludes that transparency impacts trust, and both transparency and the newly found variable of accountability are critical to forging a relationship that is mutually sustainable.

9.1.3 Power and Autonomy

The researcher expected power and autonomy to be the biggest constraint to collaboration. Findings indicate that this is not the case relative to the other tenets of the exchange theory. The dependencies and interdependencies in power-based relationships embedded in this theme are an important aspect of collaboration, but analysis indicates this factor has the least impact of any of the themes.

Data collected during nonprofit interviews validated the article by Selsky and Parker, who argue that nonprofits may be reluctant to partner with government because they fear losing control over decision-making. Selsky and Parker argue that the intention of the partnership is for each actor to retain organizational authority, which equates to independence in this research. The researcher concludes that nonprofits live through an imbalance of power and are frustrated by government command and control mindsets. The researcher also concludes that nonprofits fear losing control over their assets as well as decision-making. This is an even greater threat to independence. Nonprofits do not necessarily have a clear understanding of legal authority and boundaries, making them question the government's demonstrations of legitimate and coercive power unless its authority has been clearly documented. Nonaffiliated nonprofits have asserted that they have even less understanding of these authorities and do not see the benefits of engaging with the government.

The researcher also concludes that nonprofits focus on giving and are not as concerned about what they get out of a collaborative relationship. There is no reciprocity in the government-nonprofit relationship, resulting in imbalanced relationships that ultimately constrain the nonprofits' motivation to collaborate.

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The researcher further concludes that nonaffiliated nonprofits are impacted by a feeling of an imbalance of power; based on Emerson's theory of cost reduction, this will drive nonaffiliated nonprofits to create new coalitions with VOADs rather than reaching out to government emergency managers. This theory also reflects a level of centrality and the associated power that the VOADs have. The researcher suggests that outreach by VOADs to nonaffiliated nonprofits has a greater probability of success than outreach performed by emergency managers. The researcher also believes that the government must help VOADs continue to focus on the need to recruit nonaffiliated nonprofits. It is clear that VOADs need help due to internal limitations on time and funding, the same constraints that impact emergency managers.

Relationships between the state and local government and nonprofits that are based on expert power are being diluted because of a "brain drain," in which Baby Boomers are retiring and taking with them the institutional knowledge about the value of working with nonprofits to support the emergency management mission. Many emergency managers had a previous career in fire and rescue or a related field and began second careers as emergency managers. The researcher concludes that technical skills are very relevant to the mission, but the same mentality and attitude toward nonprofits continues to be quietly perpetuated. These professionals are on a second career and will eventually retire. When they retire, this causes an even more severe loss of knowledge in regard to the skills required to manage the next disaster. Many personnel do not, and cannot, write information down in the form of standard operating procedures, due to the complexity of the mission and decision-making required. This loss of knowledge

ultimately constrains collaboration when new employees do not reach out to more experienced employees for lessons learned and insights on risk mitigation.

Uncertainty of resource capability and capacity is a major concern of emergency managers. Although emergency managers acknowledge the benefits of engaging nonprofits, the risk of nondelivery, coupled with uncertainty, sometimes results in distrust of nonprofits. Many emergency managers perceive nonprofits as a resource challenge, making collaboration another risk that they need to deal with. The risk is taking a chance that a nonprofit will deliver; if they do not, the emergency manager will have to provide last-minute resources, which typically cost significantly more than resources that have been planned for well ahead of schedule and are under the emergency managers' control until needed. This uncertainty is sometimes mitigated when the government can get nonprofits to sign an MOA or MOU. Although the MOUs and MOAs minimize the uncertainty for emergency managers, the repeated and historical evidence of positive outcome (that is, when the nonprofit provides what it promised) builds trust. Leadership skills can supplement management skills where the risk-mitigation plan consists of early collaboration and sustainment of these relationships.

The researcher also noted changing roles and responsibilities; nonprofits are taking on roles that used to be assigned to government. These changing roles cause a shift in power in which A (the government) is now dependent on B (nonprofits) because it is overwhelmed with other duties. This shift in the balance of power makes local emergency managers more dependent on nonprofits, and this imbalance sometimes constrains

collaboration when working with senior professionals who have to adapt to a new approach to meeting mission goals.

VOAD-affiliated nonprofits appear to have a more balanced power relationship with emergency managers than nonaffiliated nonprofits. This is seen in light of their ability to be part of the EOC—nonprofits are normally formally invited to participate in the EOC when their VOAD membership is activated—their participation in the preparation of the ESFs and EOPs, and having their roles formalized. These participations are considered a reward in the sense that the nonprofits' position has been validated and because they add value. This relationship between the government and affiliated nonprofits becomes interdependent, a key factor that incentivizes collaboration. There are also more frequent communications in this trust-based relationship, and many affiliated nonprofits are listed in annexes to the EOPs and planning documents in the Virginia, Maryland, and the District. Nonaffiliated nonprofits are a source of frustration in these three localities because neither emergency managers nor VOADs can contact them, especially if the nonprofit does not want to engage with either party.

Finally, the researcher concludes that if government and nonprofits exercise reward power during emergency preparedness activities, the data only supports rewards through meeting attendance, presence in the EOC, and regular communications with the emergency manager. The only evidence of a reward initiated by a nonprofit was a meeting invitation issued to emergency managers on a case-by-case basis.

9.1.4 Organizational Structure

The researcher concludes that a solid infrastructure exists to form collaborative government-nonprofit relationships by making policy, guidance, and doctrine available. The issue is that there are no "teeth" to enforce compliance with these guidelines, nor any punishment for a lack of execution by local emergency managers. The researcher concludes that the National Response Framework and guidance documents adequately describe the need for collaboration with the whole community, and guidance at the state and local reflect the goals. These documents, although adequate, are simply words that, in the opinion of nonprofits, cannot force a change in attitude.

What is missing in this literature review is an examination of how collaboration should occur in the emergency management preparedness phase beyond documented institutional policy. The Stafford Act, sections 402 and 403, generally explains pre- and post-disaster preparations, but there is nothing documented about the predisaster planning activities that details how this portion of emergency management activities must be conducted. The focus appears to be on response and recovery activities, rather than preparedness activities and how they are funded and managed.[343]

Waugh states, "Collaboration might be facilitated by a more comprehensive national plan that recognizes the roles, functions, and legal authority of state and local officials and mechanisms like EMAC [Emergency Management Assistance Compact] that facilitate those roles and functions. EMAC could be expanded to include more disaster recovery personnel"[344] The researcher also concludes that, based on a

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[343] Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, sections 402 and 403.
[344] Waugh, "Mechanisms for Collaboration."

comprehensive review of documentation, there is no requirement for a more comprehensive plan nor additional guidelines. Policy has been written, rewritten, absorbed, divided and subdivided to such an extent that, if every detail was explicitly followed, the emergency manager at the local level would have to be a Senior Executive Service employee—the government's most-senior managerial level—to manage the duties and responsibilities.

The researcher strongly agrees with suggestions in the data that all stakeholders would benefit from an independent, cross-functional at all guidance analysis of preparedness to assess the effectiveness of implementation, focusing on outcomes rather than just going through the motions of tasking local emergency managers to generate another document.

The data also suggests that the EOP coordination process has no authority to enforce requirements or compel specific actions that would result in greater nonprofit collaboration. Exchange theory postulates that there is neither reward nor punishment for ineffective outcomes without a standard of performance. The EOP is a planning document that provides one of the first opportunities to engage nonprofits. If a nonprofit misses a single review cycle, it could be months or years before the opportunity to engage comes around again.

The researcher again recommends simplifying guidelines into more easily achievable goals and associated metrics, as well as making access to them more user-friendly. It is because of this complexity that state and local emergency managers are overwhelmed with government-generated red tape to do their jobs. Nonaffiliated

nonprofits (those outside the national VOAD, regional VOAD, the Red Cross, and the

Salvation Army) are extremely unlikely to desire to engage in these complicated

processes, given the perceived benefit of engagement beyond supporting response and

recovery activities, which are very familiar to them and align with their missions.

As noted in the first phase of the literature review, preparedness cycles at the

federal and state levels all have a major process entitled "evaluation." This process

should ensure that lessons learned are captured to better implement the intentions of all

guidance. Discussions during interviews reveal that this evaluation is not effective,

because the same types of constraints found in earlier evaluations continues to exist. A

major change in the disaster preparedness paradigm is required.

Leaders at the federal level in FEMA, the Virginia Department of Emergency

Management (VDEM), the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), and

the District Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) are working

hard to encourage collaborative relationships. The tactics employed to date, such as

Maryland's creation of the Governor's Council, to support greater transparency and trust

certainly moves these efforts forward; however, research findings suggest that this slow-

moving process to ensure better collaboration will not create game-changing progress

without a major shift in how nonprofits are integrated into emergency preparedness

activities. Selsky and Parker stated in the literature review on organizational structure that

the presence of an "enabling structure," or mediating organization, is viewed as a key

factor facilitating collective action.[345] The enabling structure would encourage

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[345] Selsky and Parker, "Cross-Sector Partnerships," 857.

partnership between smaller nonprofits. There was not a great deal of data on small and medium-sized nonprofits (affiliated and nonaffiliated), but this enabling structure would have focus its efforts on where these entities can engage and flourish in the current preparedness environment. To this end, Selsky and Parker alluded to a statement by Siebel and Anheier 1990 0 who argue that" nonprofits are more likely to use informal coordination mechanisms and fewer formal controls than businesses or governmental entities..[346]

More data is required on the Maryland governor's initiative—a more formal approach that is gaining momentum because it shows the critical importance of engaging nonprofits—but the researcher agrees with Siebel and Anheier that informal coordination mechanisms appear to offer the best chance for future collaboration, especially when combined with more formal attempts such as Maryland's initiative to engage grassroots nonprofits. One nonprofit representative suggested the creation of an informal partnership organization that could bring together nonaffiliated faith-based nonprofits—such as Baptist, Episcopalian, and Methodist churches—to meet the public needs.

This hybrid approach that uses formal and informal mechanisms to encourage collaboration takes advantage of connectedness and leverages the value of nonprofits in the community, the most important stakeholder in the emergency preparedness process. There is no complementary structure that has been created at the federal or local level, and data will have to be collected on success rates for this hybrid model. The government should be incentivized to develop such a hybrid, starting from the ground up, as a way

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[346] Selsky and Parker, Cross-Sector Partnerships,"857

forward in gaining the trust of nonprofits. The researcher surmises that a change to the

enabling structure may be good, but a new paradigm is required that requires not a shift

in budgets but a shift in approaches that will ultimately change attitudes.

Sampson contends, "Human behavior that incentivizes collaboration does not

require leadership and can sometimes bring better results through decentralization and

egalitarianism."[347] The researcher strongly disagrees with this assertion, because

leadership is critical to collaboration. FEMA's *CPG 101* includes eight principles of

emergency management which directs emergency managers to be comprehensive,

progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, and flexible. In the

context of these responsibilities, collaboration was selected as the focus of this research;

collaboration is defined as the act of creating and sustaining broad and sincere

relationships among individuals and organization to encourage trust, advocate a team

atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communications.

Agranoff and McGuire view collaboration as a management process rather than

individual acts of "pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., information,

money, labor, etc.," which is driven by rewards and incentives. Management looks at

cost, schedule, performance, and risk; leadership, in contrast, incorporates those learned

skills but is further enhanced by a relational element that motivates stakeholders to

embrace roles that go beyond their assigned duties and responsibilities. These relational

"people skills" cannot be learned through a training course, such as NIMS, CPR, or other

basic principles supporting preparedness activities. The local emergency manager is in a

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[347] Sampson, "Defining Collaboration."

position where he or she has to fight for resources and must have the collaborative skills and personality to expand capability at a moment's notice without engaging state and federal level resources. As the manager on the ground, he or she is most concerned with liability and legal implications, despite reassurances from state and federal stakeholders. If the emergency manager treats these responsibilities as a management process rather than a leadership challenge to motivate people to engage, critical mission gaps will continue to exist.

The data suggests that emergency managers perceive nonprofit collaboration as a risk, especially if more and more nonprofits are involved and expected to come on board. This risk is accentuated when the government attempts to budget for resources to train, contact, and participate in exercises. Exchange theory suggests that the cost of collaboration could exceed the benefits, especially if the time resource is constrained, which is the case for many emergency managers who do not have support staff. The researcher encountered several outstanding government and nonprofit leaders who have formed highly collaborative relationships in all three localities. These leaders provided candid responses and stand out as validation that great leaders can be trained technical management skills, but the opposite is not always true. These leaders must continue to build a culture of collaborative attitudes.

After a review of representative EOPs and planning documents for Virginia, Maryland, and DC, the researcher concluded that the structure of EOPs and planning documents are adequate to execute the preparedness mission. EOPs assign responsibility to organizations and individuals for carrying out specific actions that exceed the capacity

or responsibility of any single agency; establish lines of authority and organizational relationships, and show how all actions will be coordinated; describe how people and property will be protected in major emergencies and disasters; and identify personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources that can be made available—within the jurisdiction or by agreement with other jurisdictions—for use during response and recovery operations. ESFs define the responsibilities necessary to ensure adequate emergency response and are used as the foundation for EOPs. Nonaffiliated nonprofits, such as faith-based groups that provide services related to human wellbeing, do not easily fit into the ESF categories, and their human services approach is difficult for government managers to assimilate into a command and control model. Any attempt to "fit a round peg into a square hole" constrains collaboration. A new paradigm is required to more closely mirror organizations that supply human services.

Organizationally, the District embraces a flat structure under HSEMA, which providing easier coordination for day-to-day operations. DC is a large city with federal responsibilities, requiring a careful balance of legal and jurisdictional responsibilities for emergency manager and nonprofits. Virginia and Maryland are more geographically dispersed and have significantly different demographics, requiring a different organizational structure. The researcher noted that the District and Maryland have a single VOAD, while Virginia has multiple regional VOADs to meet mission needs. All VOADs in all three locations exhibited an organizational structure with a high level of connectedness to state leadership. The researcher was not able to talk directly to

nonaffiliated nonprofits in the District because they did not respond to requests for

interviews; this resulted in a lack of sufficient data on DC nonaffiliated nonprofits.

The researcher concludes that the main factor restricting collaboration is not one

of unclear guidance nor nonfunctional organizational structures; the main barrier to

collaboration is found in the government's coordination process and motivation to trust

and involve nonprofits outside the familiar faces worked with on a regular basis.

Furthermore, there are still several emergency managers who do not want to collaborate

with nonprofits until needed, a judgment that can be easily made without the "teeth" of

enforcement. This is an expected outcome; however, a new paradigm that uses creative

ways to conduct outreach is required immediately to meet the mission of ensuring public

health and safety.

9.1.5 Emergent Theme: Accountability
The researcher's methodology and design for answering the research question

included the use of "snowballing" to increase the level of detail provided, which involved

having key stakeholders recommend for interview other experts familiar with the

preparedness phase of emergency management. During the course of these interviews,

several respondents suggested the researcher should add the theme of accountability to

the research analysis, even though it is not part of exchange theory.

The data indicates that accountability was often cited by many government and

nonprofit interviewees. Guidance at the federal and state levels provides emergency

managers a great deal of flexibility in how to implement programs during the

preparedness phase. Responses to interview questions often centered on government

liability during training and response activities. Accountability goes well beyond legal, financial, and ethical definitions of expectation by both government and nonprofit emergency management practitioners. Based on these responses, the researcher collected data to provide this additional theme as part of the analysis to illuminate how long-term collaborative relationships are initiated and maintained.

9.1.5.1 Accountability Defined

Koliba et al. defines accountability as "the obligation to give an account of one's actions to someone else, balanced by a responsibility of that offer to seek an account."[348] Ospina et al. explain how, within the "negotiated accountability framework," nonprofits have to respond to upward and downward accountability.[349] Upward accountability comes from board members, major donors, government regulations, and other authorities. Downward accountability requires nonprofits to be responsive and accountable to partner organizations, clients, staff, volunteers, and founders.[350] Ospina et al. subsequently found that transparency and participation are two different approaches to government accountability that provide two different mechanisms by which government and nonprofit stakeholders can interact.[351] Accountability was briefly mentioned in an earlier reference from Bickerstaff and Walker, who noted that transparency and accountability go hand in hand. The data suggested that transparency supports trust, and the same is true of accountability. This theme can be operationalized to incorporate several key elements:

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[348] Christopher Koliba, Russell M. Mills, and Asim Zia, "Accountability in Governance Networks: An Assessment of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Emergency Management Practices Following Hurricane Katrina," *Public Administration Review* 71, no. 2 (March 2011) 211.

[349] Ospina, Diaz, and O'Sullivan, "Negotiating Accountability," 9.

[350] Ibid., 9.

[351] Ibid., 108.

professional relationships based on MOUs or MOAs and the resultant desire to collaborate without the risk of being concerned about detailed accounts or commitment.

Zadek et al. conclude that governance and accountability influence collaboration and performance. Accountability drives decisions, which drives performance and outcomes, implying that partnerships governed by clear accountability structures, processes, and norms aligned to their mission will have enhanced performance and outcomes.[352] The Partnership, Governance and Accountability Framework also identify the benefits of accountability: it fosters trust; includes stakeholders in partnership decision-making; ensures appropriate representation of stakeholders; helps to meet individual goals of partner organizations; assembles the necessary competencies to meet own goals through the mix of partners; assigns clear roles, responsibilities, and rights at individual, partner, and partnership levels; benefits from collective knowledge; and fosters communication in an open, accurate, and timely manner.[353]

During the literature review, the researcher discussed social interdependence. According to Johnson et al., "While the basic theoretical premise focuses on three variables (interdependence, interaction, outcomes), the operationalization of the positive interdependence and promotive interaction have resulted in five variables of emphasis (i.e., interdependence, individual accountability, interaction pattern, social skills, and group processing).[354] The first two variables deal with collaboration between government

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[352] Simon Zadek, and Sasha Radovich, "Governing Collaborative Governance, Enhancing Development Outcomes by Improving Partnership Governance and Accountability." (Working paper no. 23 for the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2006), 15.
[353] Ibid., 18.
[354] Ibid., 312.

and nonprofits, given the critical nature of interdependence established through trust, as well as the need for both government and nonprofits to be accountable at the individual and organizational level. Accountability is another risk factor that emergency managers must be concerned with and is a key element in discussing incentives and barriers to collaboration for accelerating trust-based relationships.

This research identified several major themes related to collaboration, including trust, transparency, power and autonomy, and organizational structure. Accountability has attributes that are intertwined with all these themes, but it is most closely related to transparency. Table 8 and Table 9 list the incentives and barriers, respectively, to collaboration that are specifically linked to accountability.

Table 8: Accountability Incentives to Collaboration

Accountability Incentives to Collaboration
Published guidance and guidelines result in greater accountability to provide existing services and expand services as required by evolving needs.
If nonprofits publish capability statements or inventories, then government perceives those resources as accessible and the nonprofits as more accountable.
Nonprofits provide flexibility in services based on a different set of legal, financial, moral, and political accountability guidelines. The government is accountable to taxpayers, while nonprofits are accountable to the community.
The government is obligated (accountable) to protect citizens. When all stakeholders understand this accountability, collaboration is more likely to occur.
If nonprofits are licensed and vetted, the government perceives fewer risks associated with planning and response, which results in increased reliability and accountability. The government primarily collaborates with nonprofits that have a 501(c)(3) tax status because that provides additional layers of oversight, increasing accountability and reducing the risk of encountering fraudulent behavior.
Nonprofits that receive state and federal funds are required to be accountable and provide outcome data validating expenditures.
Nonprofits are perceived to be most accountable to the community in which they live.

The data suggests that the major focus is on having accountability for nonprofits. The government asserts that it is incumbent upon nonprofits to publish capabilities and inventories that can easily be assessed. The government is also glad that nonprofits can expand support beyond typical government boundaries in the community. The government prefers to work with nonprofits that have a 501(c)(3) tax status, because their financial information can be more easily searched, so government oversight is guaranteed.

Nonprofit accountability of government actions can only be viewed through publicly available information, including general funding information; self-imposed, government-created metrics; or what is written in the EOP. VOADs hold the government accountable for sharing information (transparency) during meetings and being part of the planning process. In terms of accountability, nonaffiliated nonprofits have access to the same amount of information as typical citizens and can use similar mechanisms to ensure government accountability.

Table 9: Accountability Barriers to Collaboration

Accountability Barriers to Collaboration
A lack of formal documentation recognized by both parties results in lack of accountability for actions and use of resources.
While some EOPs are published at the discretion of the emergency manager, most are not publicly reviewed by nonprofits, impacting nonprofit expectations of the degree of government accountability.
In order to fully engage with the government during emergency planning and response, nonprofits are required to obtain and maintain certifications and training. While this requirement improves accountability, the resources required may not be readily accessible.
Nonprofits are accountable to government; however, there is no mandate that requires the government be accountable to nonprofits.
There is a perception among local stakeholders that national and state nonprofits are not accountable to the local community in terms of distributing resources.
While emergency planning collaboration is mutually beneficial, the accountability for the outcome of the emergency is singularly the responsibility of the government.
According to an emergency manager, accountability would be increased if nonprofits provided performance and capacity metrics.
Government processes for accountability are overly burdensome, given the amount of time required for reporting and measuring the outputs.
According to an emergency manager, if the relationships between emergency managers and nonprofits were more analogous to employer-employee relationships, then accountability would be increased and risk decreased.
Some nonprofits' mission limits them to providing available resources to their constituents first before branching out to serve the needs of the community. This internal accountability could reduce the availability of resources and accountability to other stakeholders.
Due to the inherent uncertainty of emergencies, the resources required are largely unknown. As a result, nonprofits do not want to be obligated (accountable) or tied down to provide unknown quantities of resources and services.
Nonprofits are not accountable to any stakeholder when there is not a disaster. Thus, there is no requirement for nonprofits to be engaged during the preparedness planning phase.

The data suggests that the government requires nonprofits to meet expectations of

certification, credentialing, and strict adherence to accounting to stay connected. Without

written agreements and understanding, collaboration is constrained. Some government

stakeholders believe that nonprofits are not accountable at the national or state level,

providing too much flexibility in how resources are managed. Salamon identifies a major

challenge of nonprofits is the public growing demand for greater accountability to their

tax-exempt status and questioning the salaries of chief executives.[355] This constrains

collaboration by creating an environment where they feel they are not trusted by the

public and sit quietly rather than proactively moving throughout the community.

One of the major issues that nonprofit representatives identified during the

interviews is that government considers itself as singly accountable for the outcome of

disasters, despite support from nonprofits. Nonprofits assert that this is a shared

responsibility, once they are engaged, but they perceive the government doesn't

recognize this due to legal mandates and its command and control mentality. Some

nonprofits perceive government rules mandating accountability as overly burdensome,

and sometimes nonprofits do not have the extra resources necessary to provide the level

of accountability required. The researcher concludes that the government should not hold

nonprofits to a high level of accountability while simultaneously dismissing their

contributions to preparedness and response activities; this attitude constrains

collaboration.

When not responding to an emergency, nonprofits are accountable to the

community and their board. Nonprofits' involvement with government stakeholders

during emergency preparedness and response activities adds another layer of

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[355] Salamon, "*America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer*," 26.

responsibility requiring a cost-benefit analysis as mentioned in exchange theory. Some nonprofits do not want to be tied down and committed to providing unknown quantities or services because the availability of these resources could change before a disaster occurs. Homans asserts in exchange theory that anger occurs when people don't get what they anticipate.[356] This source of frustration for emergency managers requires further research to determine the relationship between accountability and transparency and their resulting impact on building trust-based relationships. Overall, this research provided limited data on accountability, and the researcher suggests conducting future research to determine if the relationship between accountability and transparency contributes to trust or is a major theme equal to trust.

9.2 Research Recommendations

The purpose of this research was to determine incentives and barriers to government-nonprofit collaboration during the emergency management process using social exchange as the theoretical framework. The researcher used a structured, repeatable process that incorporated a literature review, methodology, operationalization of each variable, and collection of data from interviews on major themes. After data analysis, the researcher added a supplemental theme of accountability, which was identified by many government and nonprofits but not a major tenet of exchange. The following recommendations are provided as overarching approaches to mitigate some of the issues discussed in this research.

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[356] Homans, 13.

(1) FEMA, VDEM, MEMA, and HSEMA should immediately create and adopt a new paradigm for emergency management preparedness that implements Maryland's preparedness cycle, in which preparedness encircles all other emergency management functions. This modification of the FEMA-recommended cycle from Figure 2captures the essential elements to build a culture of preparedness and adds value by getting rid of the singular public safety mindset.

(2) VDEM, MEMA, and HSEMA should immediately forge and implement a recommendation to put accountability and metrics for success into the enforcement of written national and state-level guidance on government collaboration, with a focus on whole-of-nation nonaffiliated nonprofit outreach. This accountability is not to punish but to promote and provide positive motivation and examples of working collaborative relationships that show leadership in this area.

(3) FEMA should conduct a review of existing collaborative aspects of preparedness to develop a streamlined pilot program to encourage nonprofit involvement in guaranteeing availability of prepositioned assets, reimbursable to nonprofits in a timely manner in the event a disaster occurs. The impetus is to get rid of as much bureaucratic red tape as possible, while building in flexibility that benefits both the government and nonprofits. This concept improves the process already defined in the Stafford Act.

(4) FEMA, MEMA, VEMA, and HSEMA should assist local emergency managers in developing simple, achievable goals and performance metrics for soliciting and sustaining nonaffiliated nonprofit involvement. Current guidance tells them what to do but not how to do it. Recent attempts to use social media to discuss more creative,

efficient ways to engage nonprofits by being more transparent are encouraging, but

emergency managers do not have time to look at social media all day. Success is based

on face-to-face contact, not e-mail or websites. This type of support is already in process,

but metrics may be as simple as a goal to engage one new nonaffiliated nonprofit a year.

The research indicates that it is highly unlikely that nonaffiliated faith-based groups will

join VOADs, because their main mission is not for specific disaster services. The

researcher suggests that if these faith-based groups are provided examples of success—

such as Hurricane Katrina, which demonstrates how faith-based organizations that were

not certified by the Red Cross provided extensive sheltering for victims—this would shed

a new light on opportunities. This also opens the door for continued discussion on

flexible and creative approaches to talk about nonprofits' role in building a resilient

community, starting with preparedness.

(5) FEMA, VDEM, MEMA, and HSEMA should continue to increase

preparedness activities that utilize social media and major changes to technology that

increase collaborative efforts. New changes to technology for teleconferencing—such as

Twitter, Skype, and Go-To-Meeting—and new computer and cell phone technology

provide a platform that can be used to not only warn the public of an impending or

ongoing disaster but also in preparedness efforts to complement face-to-face discussions

if funding impedes the frequency of this type of contact. Also, the government and other

industries have successfully used social media challenges to reward new ideas with small

monetary incentives ($1,000 and up), exhibiting flexible approaches and models that can

be applied to preparedness. Local media and news coverage incentivizes sharing these ideas and successes.

(6) FEMA should conduct analysis and lead development of new risk models that include metrics focused on outcomes proposed by an emergency manager to capture, document, and analyze risks associated with collaboration to determine financial and operational impacts. The creation of this risk model could then be evaluated to determine applicability in other states and regions to train emergency managers on the benefits (and costs) of collaboration. The next phase of this endeavor would be to incorporate a tool—in the form of a checklist or software application that can easily be adapted—which emergency managers at the local level can use to evaluate risks and opportunities of changes to funding and the addition of newly available or the loss of assets owned by nonprofits. This recommendation aligns with current business risk-based processes that allow the manager to see opportunity in risk analysis. This is important because emergency managers cannot control nonprofit resources nor the reliability of having access to these resources when needed.

(7) VDEM, MEMA, and HSEMA should conduct analysis and audits of time and responsibilities allotted to the emergency manager to fulfill required collaborative activities in light of other activities that may have a higher priority. Collaboration may increase efficiency in ways the emergency manager has not imagined. If so, after the state and local managers coordinate the restructured tasks, this may provide new insights into proper roles and responsibilities that are aligned with available time and resources. .

(8) State-level emergency managers should develop a strategic plan to organize, build, and sustain collaborative networks, incorporating community leaders and nonprofits (affiliated and nonaffiliated) in this process. This would add to the value proposition and build trust supporting sustainable, resilient communities.

(9) VDEM, MEMA, and HSEMA should assess new city offices of public and private partnerships which could act as a clearinghouse and point of contact for public agencies, nonprofits, organizations, and businesses to work together. These types of organizations do exist, and it is worth assessing if their value could be applied on a regional or national level.

(10) FEMA should provide financial incentives through the state for building membership in state, regional, or local VOADs which pays personnel (existing or added) for marketing outreach. This will result in more contact with grassroots nonprofits that are threatened by government red tape.

9.3 Researcher Reflections

The researcher was biased in conducting this analysis based on preconceived notions of the role and level of authority exercised by emergency managers, whose responsibilities at the state and local levels are tremendous when compared to other jobs that are not as closely tied to first responders. The researcher has a greater appreciation of the role of nonprofits in the preparedness phase after visiting a work camp in Crisfield, Maryland. During this experience, the researcher saw firsthand the dedication of nonprofits fully aligned with a government and community mission. This visit allowed

the researcher to assess the full emergency management cycle from preparedness to recovery.

The researcher was surprised to learn that power and autonomy was not largest constraint to collaboration, instead finding that organizational structure was, in fact, the largest impediment. The researcher was also surprised to learn the critical role of centrality and connectedness, which present incentives and barriers to collaboration. The closer an organization is to the emergency manager, the more power exists in forming collaborative relationships. This was best exhibited in the District, where there are fewer organizational layers and the lines of connectedness between HSEMA, FEMA, and the mayor are very short. The HSEMA director has been given more authority in this dual role with homeland security. In Virginia and Maryland, government and nonprofit stakeholders appeared to feel less valued, due to a layered organizational structure and widely dispersed geographic locations. Connectedness turned out to be a major factor in the government's confidence in nonprofits' ability to deliver services.

9.4 Suggestions for Future Research

The researcher recognizes that this qualitative research was conducted due to a lack of available statistical evidence on incentives and constraints to collaboration between emergency management government and nonprofits in Virginia, Maryland, and DC. The researcher concluded that exchange theory is a viable framework for analyzing incentives and barriers to government-nonprofit collaboration. Based on this conclusion, the researcher recommends the results of this research should be expanded to collect data on a larger number of states and regions that are not so closely aligned with the nation's

capital, which would provide data on a larger cross-section of states, regions, demographics, and management structures that were not covered in this project.

The supplemental theme of accountability also requires further research. One of the research's key findings is that accountability and transparency are important in building trust, but there is limited research to show if accountability and transparency are equal to trust and other themes promulgated by exchange theory.

While collaborative public management is recognized as a common and widespread practice, research on the skills necessary to manage and operate in collaborative settings lags practice. Research on the end result of collaboration is also insufficient. According to McGuire, the effects of collaboration on program and organizational outcomes needs to be better understood.[357] The researcher suggests that there are skill sets well beyond the existing portfolio that will enhance existing capabilities. A great deal of research has been done on the costs and benefits to building collaborative relationships, but outcomes have not been quantified. This requires further research.

Additional research should focus on small and medium nonprofits and the associated incentives and barriers to collaboration. This research should look at grassroots approaches based on lessons learned with a strategic vision for next-generation concepts.

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[357] Simo and Bies, "The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response," 126.

9.5 Research Summary and Conclusion

This qualitative research presented findings and recommendations about incentives and barriers to government-nonprofit collaboration using social exchange theory as the framework for analysis. The researcher developed questions to determine themes using a "snowball" methodology to get a more detailed view of managers in Virginia, Maryland, and the District. The results indicate a continued need to change government paradigms to bring nonprofits to the table and incorporate a capability to encourage more participation by nonaffiliated nonprofits in the preparedness phase of emergency management. There is still a great deal of work that needs to be done. This work starts in government, from the national level down to the local level, with an emphasis on leadership in enhancement of skills to bring nonprofits and the government to one table where together they can achieve the goal of protecting public health and safety.

APPENDIX A: EMERGENCY PLANNER INTERVIEWS

Red Cross and local emergency management experts assisted in the development of the semi structured interview questions for emergency planners and nonprofits. Information gathered from the interviews provided the researcher an opportunity to adjust the interview questions to better capture information that focused and guided the research process.

Interview Questions for Emergency Managers

Date:

Name:

Job Title:

City:

County:

State:

Address:

Telephone Number:

Email Address:

Q1- What is your role and relationship to local/state government in development of emergency operations plans (EOPs)?

Q2- Are nonprofits engaged in the preparedness and planning process of emergency operations plan, does the EOP have ESF-17 (Volunteers and Donation)?

Q3- Are the roles and responsibilities of nonprofits formalized in the local EOP?

Q4- In your view, what are benefits in engaging the nonprofit sector in emergency management?

Q5- How do you reach out to the nonprofits?

Q6- In an ideal world of emergency management, how would you engage and use nonprofits?

Q7- In your view, what factors contribute and encourage developing collaborative relationships between nonprofits and State/local government?

Q8- In your view, what factors constrain development of collaborative relationships between nonprofits and State/local government?

Q9- Is there a difference in how State/local government may interact with known nonprofits (Red Cross, Salvation Army) and less known nonprofits?

APPENDIX B: <u>NONPROFIT INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE</u>

Questions for nonprofits centered on insights into their existing relationships, the partnership with the government, benefits to this partnership (if it exists), and barriers and incentives to their involvement and integration.

Interview Questions for Nonprofits

Date:

Name:

Job Title:

City:

County:

State:

Address:

Telephone Number:

Email Address:

Q1. What is your role and relationship to local government in the planning and preparation of the local/state government's Emergency Operations Plan (EOPs)?

Q2. Are the roles and responsibilities of nonprofits formalized in the local EOP? What EOPs are you responsible for? (i.e. Emergency Support Function (ESF) 17 (Volunteers and Donations,)

Q3. In your view what are the benefits in engaging the nonprofit sector in emergency management.

Q4. How does your organization reach out to both local/state government and other nonprofits? How do local/state government and other nonprofits reach out to your organization?

Q5. In an ideal world of emergency management, how would your organization engage and utilize other nonprofits?

Q6. Does the local/state government provide your organization training (i.e. National Incident Management System (NIMS)?

Q7. Does your organization provide volunteers/nonprofits training; credentialing? Are you required to maintain a disaster resource inventory?

Q8. In your view, what factors contribute and encourage developing collaborative relationships between state/local governments and/or other nonprofits?

Q9. In your view, what factors constrain development of collaborative relationships between state/local governments and/or other nonprofits?

Q10. Is there a difference in how state/local government may interact with known nonprofits (i.e. Red Cross; Salvation Army) and less known nonprofits?

Q11. Do you trust that the government mission is fully aligned with yours to support the people?

APPENDIX C: TRUST

Government Incentives to Collaboration for Trust
Source of Interview	Comment
GS4	When asked about factors that contribute to collaboration, the response was that we realize that we can't be in all jurisdictions all the time and at the same time and that the public has trust with the nonprofits in that community because they are established in the community. Government doesn't have the "grassroots" connection. Our level is very structured and regulated.
GL19	When asked if nonprofits are engaged in the preparedness phase, the response was that the Red Cross provides immediate action and there is some familiarization with VOADs. These nonprofits have background checks through social services.
GL19	When asked about nonprofit engagement, the response was that nonprofits who speak fluent Spanish involved ten times more the number of people coming to the shelter because they don't see the volunteers as immigration (government). This impacts a positive response that we noticed.
GL24	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was an example encountered during his career for Hurricane George in Key West. Haitians were afraid of the government. The language had so many dialects that it created a communication issue leading to a lack of trust. They were more willing to trust nonprofits with religious affiliations that they could identify with.
GL18	When asked what factors contribute to collaboration, the response was open-mindedness to receive value they (nonprofits) bring to the table.
GL19	When asked about factors that contribute to collaboration, the response was that nonprofits need to provide capability statements, not that we don't trust them, but provide a statement, then we have the discussion and then if they really have the resources- i.e. they say we have 100 volunteers, but only seven show up, we can see during preparation prior to a situation. Come and tell the resource capabilities at meetings.

GL18	When asked about factors that contribute to collaboration, the response was that we need to change the disaster paradigm to rely on volunteers not first responders.
GL20	When asked about whether nonprofits are engaged in preparedness, the response was that under ESF-17 Volunteer/Donation Management, the State of Maryland has a volunteer registry program. They are recognized especially in the Mass Care/Health environment and we otherwise use volunteers in our EOC environments, outreach, and community programs.
GL20	When asked how to you reach out to nonprofits, the response was that nonprofits are involved in ESF discussions as well as participate in other programs such as the Local Emergency Planning Committee.
GL21	When asked if nonprofits are engaged in preparation and planning , the response was that nonprofits, the Red Cross are "integral" to sheltering, getting the community involved in the neighborhood service center, volunteer fire department, chamber of commerce, humane society for pet protection, church community, a list of local emergency planning council members and VOAD representatives. The ESF is good for planning but not operational.
GL21	When asked how to engage nonprofits in an ideal world of emergency management, the response was that each county could form a working group of nonprofits with the county agencies and certain parts of county government, merging the different missions and discuss vision & form partnerships to solve problems for preparation, have access to funds to implement it and have regular interaction to know each other.
GL21	When asked about incentives to collaboration, the response was when dealing with "John nonprofit," EM must realize that he's local and has connections to others, he calls on Bob who is local who calls on Lane to take donations. The locals feel more vested so it's easier for "John nonprofit" to leverage and establish trust within the whole network of nonprofits. It's snowballing, i.e. John nonprofit as an individual says I work with Tim, he's easy to work with and it's not as scary as working with the government.
GL22	When asked if the roles and responsibilities of nonprofits are formalized in the EOP, the response was that several nonprofits have become "essential" partners in certain areas of the EOP, such as Annex H: Natural Disaster Response and Annex K: Volunteers and Donations. We are currently in the process of revising the EOP and we will augment the discussions of these organizations' capabilities.

GL22	When asked about the benefits of engaging nonprofits, the response was that specific benefits include access to knowledge of specific areas like sheltering, access to resources that otherwise wouldn't be available, widespread knowledge of additional contacts and working with organizations that have a familiarity and experience in supporting and managing challenging situations.
GL22	When asked how to engage nonprofits in an ideal world, the response was that nonprofits serve important roles in ways to expand the effectiveness of response and recovery, for example, nonprofits can be valuable partners in running/assisting shelters, shoveling snow for those who are unable, and by sharing critical information to the public.
GL7, GL11	When asked are the roles and responsibilities of nonprofits formalized in the EOP, the response was that the Red Cross and VOAD groups are "preferred" when we need feeding. The VOAD is "preferred" to be contacted and organized to contact many nonprofits, churches, and tell them when to come in, i.e. Bethel Baptist do home repairs, Liberty Baptist do other missions. When asked about the benefits, it was stated that nonprofits and government benefit because qualified workers are vetted through the Red Cross. These same couple of groups see each other at the meetings. Another comment from G11 is that the Red Cross and VOAD have credibility because they work with government before the disaster.
GL13	When asked what the benefits are of engaging nonprofits, the response was that nonprofits are received better than government; there are established relationships with individuals making response more efficient- a force multiplier. For nonprofits it's about establishing relationships before the emergency, a predetermined relationship is more receptive. Nonprofits break down the walls.
GL4, GL15	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that "I'm not searching the Internet for nonprofits, nonprofits need to approach EM offices, need to have 5 minutes or less time across the board, trust word of mouth, i.e. Bob's group, we can do this, there's a lot of inquiry about what their resources are, give them scenarios to work through." The other EM stated that a lot of our people rely on technology; the EM develops face to face relationships standing in the hall talking, and then emailing. We are human services, face to face has real value.

GL5	When asked what factors contribute to collaboration, the response was "in EM, it's all about relationships, we should not look across the table and see someone we don't know, and the EM knows everyone in the EOC by name and known capabilities."
GL6	When asked what factors encourage collaboration, the response was that we need to look at 911, at critical responders, fire fighters, medical training, all able to communicate with no language barriers. It's important that everyone knew the "vernacular." Medics had been trained in military operations and understand Pentagon and local responders. Speaking the language (culture) focuses efforts and responses. For 7 years we spread through the Spanish community speaking 169 different languages. We had to recruit for language skills that reflect the community to get rid of the notion that we don't speak from the heart, causing a lack of trust. We need diversity in the government to increase collaboration before the storm.

Government Barriers to Collaboration for Trust	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the Red Cross was not a part of the planning of the EOP, but agreement was made on what they could provide. We can't rely on the Red Cross because it has limited resources and an inability to assist.
GL2	When asked about collaboration with lesser known nonprofits, the response was that "credibility, liability and trust issues are a problem dealing with nonprofits not known to them. The Red Cross and Citizen's Emergency Response Teams (CERT) are the only ones with training."
GS4	When asked if there is a difference between how state/local government interacts with known nonprofits vs. other nonprofits, the response was that they are more willing to interact because of their past track record and known capability, others don't know how we do it.
GL17	When asked about responsibilities, the response was that there is "an advantage" to having an emergency manager who also has fire department experience because of a unique point of view and a different perspective when the "rubber meets the road." The EM is hired through HR, the Governor appoints the Director. A pure EM is a new position, since many EM functions used to be filled by personnel who were in the fire department or worked in that capacity

Government Barriers to Collaboration for Trust	
Source of Interview	Comment
	at some point.

GL18	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that nonprofits and volunteers who participated in exercises are used as "victims," or pushed to use them to man traffic stops, utilized at shelters, EOC, but when there's a full scale exercise, there is a totally different crew (of nonprofits).
GL18	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that we not only need a new paradigm (for emergency management) but we need to manage the expectation of volunteers and local government. The issue is more than trust, it's government attitude that no one else can "play in their sandbox."
GL18	When asked if there is a difference in how state and local governments interact with known nonprofits, the response was that the Red Cross has canteens and trailers, however the lesser known nonprofits like the "mega churches" have the same equipment, but the churches have a "for profit" mindset.
GL20	When asked what factors constrain development of collaborative relationships, the response was that the primary factor is the inability of nonprofit organizations to "guarantee" their support during an event.
GL21	When asked what the benefits are to engaging nonprofits, the response was that connections and relationships allow us to get it done, but it's hard to get them (nonprofits) to the table to be able to serve in all their capacities. They (nonprofits) are quicker than the government, but it's hard to get your feet in the door as a nonprofit. People trust the nonprofits more than government especially non-English speaking because when the ambulance shows up, they run thinking we (government) are there to deport them. This is why it's hard to get them to the table to serve in all capacities.
GL21, NA1	When asked what factors encourage developing collaborative relationships, the response was that we learned in EM school that you don't want to be exchanging business cards for the first time during a disaster. It's crucial to have trust for the greater good and the focus should be on safety, not commitment, undermining, looking over your back or taking advantage of the situation.
GL21	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that government EM or ES or Agency are "standing on the mountain, preaching." Motives are in the right purpose, spreading the Word, believing that all who hear have to respond and are compelled to act. Government does a good job delivering the mission about safety and preparedness before the disaster, are great for reaching out after a disaster, but if they haven't been involved with nonprofits who are

	able to get into the front door of people in need, there's not a lot going on if the right (government) person is not on board.

GL7	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that if a nonprofit does a poor job or there were issues, we will tell the VOAD that we do not want to work with that group and find the resources elsewhere. This requires an open relationship.
GL25	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that some (government) people feel volunteers take away jobs. They have to get beyond this (idea)
GL13	When asked what constrains development of collaborative relationships, the response was that the larger constraints mirror society, where people don't want to get out and engage with people of different skin color, economic, religious differences. This interferes with the ability to be effective. Nonprofits competing against each other for dollars and cents is a barrier, while still trying to carry on missions and building relationships all the same time. We see the same thing in local government, schools, fire departments, constantly competing. This is a barrier to trust.
GL4	When asked about lesser known nonprofits, the response was that they've worked with well-known nonprofits for years and don't want to work with new nonprofits. They know the known nonprofits will deliver, not dropping the ball. Small nonprofits don't have the track record. They need to go out and meet the EM and be realistic about what they can provide. Sometimes they promise more than they can deliver.

Nonprofit Incentives to Collaboration for Trust	
Source of Interview	Comment
NV1	When asked about the outreach process for finding partners and nonprofits, the response was that nonprofits reach out to us to help achieve a relationship with the State. Having VOAD in a resume will do wonders because of certain expectations, competitiveness and comfort to have VOAD mentioned.
NV6	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the VOAD can put 'Jim chain saw brigade together" because they know the capability of the new volunteers because they all have background checks making the nonprofits and government happy that there is no liability. This is completely different if Jim is volunteering to take care of children under a different ESF or one for taking care of mentally deficient ESF 8- Public Health and Medical Services.

NV7	When asked what factors contribute to developing collaborative relationships, the response was that working on relationships not boundaries to establish relationships in advance so that when something happens, they would know who I was, how and what I can do and can't do, setting up a relationship with trust. This type of relationship has nothing to do with boundaries. We need to meet together face to face.
NV1	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that having a nonprofit with a known capability is the key. For example, the Mennonites are known nationally, set up their own camps, have their own housing plans, get their own materials and workers.
NV1	When asked about incentives for collaboration, the response was that "We have monthly meetings of our team of faith based and local nonprofits. We invite the government from MEMA and if members of the local Chamber of Commerce want to come, we invite them to each one of our meetings. This has helped build trust and greater relationships.

Nonprofit Barriers to Collaboration for Trust	
Source of Interview	Comment
NV1	When asked about the outreach process, the response was that there is not much "reaching out" done by the government, other than beyond the VOAD "umbrella" because the level of trust in an organization and the relationships that you have to reach out for are not the best partners for long term recovery.
NV1	When asked if the local/state government provides training, the response was that his organization is invited to training, but if you don't have a relationship with the EM (i.e. he or she trusts you), you will not get training or be invited to the exercise or EOC.
NV1	When asked what factors constrain development of collaboration, the response was that nonprofits "fear" emergency management personnel because they are non-religious. The EM wants to know why you are there, and nonprofit don't have a level of comfort, can't see their hand and they weren't "baptized in the Jordan." Nonprofits are there in their homes for area emergencies, we're rural, not professional, not an EM or fire chief. Not sure the government understands this.

NV1	When asked if there is a difference in how state/local government may interact with known nonprofits, the response was that the Red Cross and Salvation Army are seeking to have news articles written on them, only cover major events and are looking for camera time. They leave when the press leaves. None of the volunteer nonprofits are getting paid. This not only gives good people a bad name, but builds distrust.
NV1	When asked if you trust that the government mission is fully aligned with your organization's to support the community, the response was that it depends on who is elected and who is in the seat at the State and Regional/City levels. Nonprofits are not as interested in these changes at the lowest levels.
NV2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that nonprofits, social service workers and emergency managers don't keep up with each other's programmatic changes which should be easily surmountable. Examples are clients being referred and having to go through the same process for different organizations. We didn't share information. It could be a trust issue. In Isabel, the lead supervisor told all their workers, "you can trust them, these guys are good, I'm vouching for them. It was encouragement. The voluntary sector and government keep going back and forth.
NV2, NV6	When asked if the government interacts with known nonprofits vs. lesser known, the response was that VOAD members are more willing, so they (government) rely on them more. If you are not a VOAD member, state or national level, you're going to be checked out very hard and received very cautiously in the state and anywhere else. They are not received since they don't practice ethics and values of VOADs. Within each specialty, those who do them have to abide by the guidelines. There are some organizations that just can't abide by human ethics and values. Another comment was "if you want to help, join someone." "Being a member of a VOAD can be compared to pledging a fraternity or sorority, building networks leading to good meetings."
NV6	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was independence. Organizations (nonprofits) do not want to be tied down or "required" by state to do something because they may not be able to respond and they won't have "flexibility." They want to do their own thing and not join the VOAD. Churches are hesitant when the state requires assistance because "big government" will ask a lot of questions, and criticize for helping illegal immigrants. Even when the Red Cross shows up immigrants run because they associate them with "big government" as well.

NN4	When asked what factors contribute to collaboration, the response was that "hands are tied" at the local level because now Baby Boomers donate to specific causes, to control what happens to their dollar to the grave. The Silent generation says I'm handing the money to you (because) you know best what Agency will meet the best capacity. Millenniums don't have a lot of money because of hardship but live in the digital age.
NN5	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that mistrust occurs because many nonprofits come to the table with government and want nothing but funding. This constrains collaboration when the focus is on funding rather than the mission of doing what's in the best interest of the community.

APPENDIX D: TRANSPARENCY

Government Incentives to Collaboration for Transparency	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL11, GL19	When asked about incentives for collaboration, the response was that in order to speak the same language, we need to get on the same song, not only in the same hymnal.
GS4	Government publishes guidance and guidelines which supports transparency
GL8	When asked how nonprofits are engaged, the response was that I have monthly standing disaster preparation meetings for emergency managers and nonprofits are invited once a month in each of the ESF areas to discuss and address concerns. I also have a follow up meeting. We also had a bus trip with 70 people including nonprofits to work on simulating a disaster in a city.
GL7	When asked the benefits of engaging nonprofits, the response was that their organization reaches out to the Red Cross because they have federal, qualified workers vetted through the organization, have the qualifications, skill sets, trained people. They will not accept untrained, nonaffiliated people.
GL8	Creation of EM guides in Spanish and other languages, training flyers, social media, radio and newspaper
GS2	Emergency Managers need to reach out to 501(c)(3) organizations in addition to VOADs, Red Cross and Salvation Army. Emergency managers need to reach out to different groups to learn capabilities.
GL18	Government continues to hosts meetings and forums for discussion with nonprofits (such as different scenarios, practice with nonprofits, learn shortcomings on both sides).
GL2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the Red Cross was not part of the EOP planning process, but there was an agreement made as to what they could provide. The Red Cross has limited resources available for specific needs upon request.
GL11	When asked how you reach out to nonprofits, the response was that EM and nonprofits work together in joint exercises, i.e. fire department conducted full scale hazard exercise to partner with nonprofits to do the feeding. Allows nonprofits to practice mass care and results in better coordination.

GL5	When asked how they reach out, response was that we have monthly emergency management meetings where he reaches out to the VOADs, sends invitations to the VOAD leader and volunteers. We also have tabletop training where we work together. It's all about relationships. You shouldn't be looking across the table with someone you don't know. I know everyone in the EOC by name and what capabilities they have because I encourage meetings, training, and exercises with all the partners.
GL12, GL14	When asked if roles and responsibilities of nonprofits are formalized in the local EOP, the response was yes and the EOP requirements were discussed in detail
GL10	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was taking the first step to understand the community needs and ensure that all relevant stakeholders have access to that information
GL17	When asked what factors constrain development of collaboration, response was that nonprofits and government are separate disciplines with different perspectives that look through different lenses. If you're a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Be a bridge to that perspective and develop experience and holistic views of the problem before trying to solve the issues.
GS6, GL19	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, there was a recommendation to host a roundtable for nonprofits to talk about planning, backup (COOP), resources, and training with the emergency manager calling the leads individually to see if they could attend. This was mentioned after saying "I need to pay more attention to this"
GS4	When asked how you reach out to nonprofits, the response was that the Governor has set up the Governor's Office Community Initiative to interact and communicate with nonprofits, having this committee act as a liaison to help work out difficulties with government, not knowing another mechanism to interact with them before something happens. This brings the nonprofit "into the mix" to help us before something happens.
GL18, GL19	When asked about incentives to collaboration, what was mentioned was having the background checks and training, incident command systems (ICS) training for the nonprofits, and learning the language of ICS allows for seamless transfer of information.
GL18	When asked about how to reach out to nonprofits, the response was that there are two ways, notify me directly, text or email me. We have also trained on specific radios to help communications.
GL11	When asked about benefits of engaging nonprofits, the response that nonprofits can accept cash donations, the government cannot. I see nonprofits as transparent because this can be very tricky for the government.
GL15	In Emergency Management we are human services. Face to face

communication has real value.

Government Barriers to Collaboration for Transparency	
Source of Interview	Comment
GS7	When asked what constrains collaboration, response was that "All disasters start at the local level with the Emergency Manager who has layers of support, i.e. local, state, then FEMA. The barrier is that there is no mandate on how to operate and communicate with FEMA. ESF-17 is new and not all states have volunteers to handle ESF-17 (originally ESF-6). There is another barrier as to understanding the importance of and sharing the information on ESF-17.
GS1	When asked if nonprofits are involved in ESF-17 (Volunteers and donations) the answer was "No. Nonprofits were not engaged in the planning process of State EOPs, nor ESF-17. ESF-17 came about because the NRF had attached volunteers and donations to ESF-6. A person was just hired to manage ESF-17 about a year old.
GS1	When asked about roles and responsibilities for nonprofits, the response was that "there are no roles & responsibilities for individual nonprofits. State VOAD has a role. When the VOAD is activated, we contact the leader- that person from the VOAD is at the Emergency Ops Center. We don't recognize anyone else.
GL2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that there is a new FEMA template for EOPs and only part of the EOP will be placed online. The ESFs will not be posted at all. Felt that posting the ESF with primary support functions increased the city's vulnerability.
GL15	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the EOP is not online. The last update was in January 2014 and the next revision is due in 2018. The reason the EOP is not online is his personal bias, because of anticipation of endless questions, FOIA request, he's not soliciting input.
GL10	The Red Cross is out there just to be seen to get visibility and more money for their organization. This nonprofit's capability has drastically gone down in recent years.
GS1	When asked what would encourage or discourage nonprofit collaboration, response was that the VOAD is a known entity and they do their own assessment of capabilities. The advantage to nonprofits is that this is a good "marketing tool." The Emergency Manager wears so many hats- nonprofits need to market to them, given (the EMs) time and resources- EM don't have time to market them. Government attitude is that there's a value to nonprofit marketing, not to the government. But government is not marketing to them.

GS1	When asked what constrains collaboration between government and nonprofits, the response was that "I'm hesitant to favor one over the other." There is an untapped faith base; denominations often serve their own congregation. We need to break the barrier down. We are "reluctant to open to strangers." Nonprofits are not always listed on (Emergency Operations) plans, but this may change. Not (being) connected to VOAD makes you a stranger.
GS3	When asked about constraints to collaboration, response was that Emergency Managers are supposed to formalize communication with nonprofits. Nonprofits depend on communication, but (how) to get them to communicate (nonprofit and EM) still needs work. - What happens if there's no communication?
GL15	When asked about things that constrain collaboration, the response was that you have a group that comes to the government looking for support (from other stakeholders) rather than participating (in the task at hand). So what you have is "in your face" the red banners and red jackets. It's their marketing strategy to get more members and funding. They are there for the recognition. Then there are nonprofit groups that do not need the recognition, they just do it. This is a hidden agenda.
GL2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the manager did not feel that it was necessary for nonprofits to participate in disaster planning, not necessarily in the EOC, and that we should keep only essential services. We don't need the Red Cross in planning either. They need to be out there helping people. There is no list of nonprofits that I know of in the area. There was a list of Department of Social Services, a family service resource. If there's a real emergency and I needed help with sheltering, I would call a church and I hope they would say yes.
GL3	When asked about barriers to collaboration response was that "just last week, there was a meeting with faith based nonprofits discussing disaster mission issues, 30 or 40 churches. There were only two (2) emergency managers at the meeting. I was surprised. They were invited.
GL15	When asked if nonprofits are engaged in the preparedness planning process, the response was that outreach is not done.
GL1	When asked how you reach out to nonprofits, the answer was that the nonprofits need to come to him, to let them know what services and resources they can provide in a disaster.
GL25	When asked how you outreach to nonprofits, the response was that the Salvation Army representative told him that this was not their mission to come to meetings, it is their mission to help people.

GL10, GL15	When asked about how government views known entities, the response was that the volunteers and Red Cross have shifted from community services to raising money. This money doesn't stay locally.
GL23	When asked about nonprofits other than known (Red Cross, Salvation Army), the response was that it's difficult to identify nonprofit organizations beyond the national level groups.
GL16	When asked how she reaches out to nonprofits, the response was that I was reaching out to nonprofits, did 2 mailings to faith based to establish a VOAD. No responses

Nonprofit Incentives to Collaboration for Transparency	
Source of Interview	Comment
NV7	When asked about incentives to collaboration, the response was that. "I was invited to sit with mercy managers as well as other national nonprofits in a meeting to discuss preparedness and the EOP. Because of the line of communication, the VOAD has a place in the EOC during disasters. Two VOADs man the EOC when activated. Communication is ongoing and formalized. One of the benefits of this ongoing communication with the government is that they are able to participate in simulation exercises with the government and able to give their input, creating a two-way learning street."
NV1	When asked about incentives to collaboration, the response was that we have monthly meetings and invite government emergency managers, project managers and local government to attend if they are available.
NV5	When asked if the government and nonprofit missions are aligned, the response was that "When we believe that the government mission is aligned with ours, then the probability of collaboration is increased. The government's mission is enacted at the time of crisis, but we (nonprofits) are there through recovery.
NA1	When asked how you reach out to the government, response was that "We have continuous meetings and training forums that we use all year. The goal is to form relationships."
NV2	When asked how you reach out to the government, response was that "We have to be brave enough to realize government has their own expectation. It's a different philosophy and a different language.

Nonprofit Barriers to Collaboration for Transparency	
Source of Interview	Comment
NN4	When asked about barriers to collaboration, the response was that nonprofits do not necessarily share their capabilities and resources because it is clear with government budget cuts, that the government is planning budgets incorporating nonprofit capabilities. They are more heavily reliant on nonprofits that don't necessarily have the capacity to augment government budgets.
NV7	When asked about barriers to collaboration, the response was that "there are nonprofits out there like the Lion's Club and civic associations that want to be involved, but no one knows how to get involved. This can be compared to a three-legged stool, two legs are working together but don't know how to get the third to work with the other two. They're trying to figure out what to do with the one leg, which is the third leg. It's better if everyone works together but we haven't figured that out yet.
NN4	When asked about more constraints, the response was that some nonprofits do not handle digital media, social media and other aspects of the Millenniums. This causes an information/communication issue because many nonprofits are not on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram
NN4	When asked about constraints, due to the governments funding issue, nonprofits get pushed to do more, taking on roles the government had previously taken on. This is a transparency issue because the government feels the nonprofits can raise the money. This is at a time when nonprofits have their own financial issues. They are asking the nonprofits more and more to supply resources.
NV5	When asked about barriers to collaboration, it was noted that when working with other faith based nonprofits, they became "siloed" in their mission and even though they were working on the same project, they would not share information.
NV3	When asked about constraints, the response was that government meetings are during work days. Volunteers have to use leave time to attend.
NA2	When asked about constraints, the response was that VOAD wants to pull key people and prefer specific tasks.
NA2	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that emergency management representatives at the state level had a meeting to try and attract members to the VOAD. Local emergency managers were not there.
NV7	When asked about recognizing "lesser known nonprofits, the response was that if you are a known entity, Red Cross, Salvation Army or VOAD, you receive information and training and invited to meetings and into the EOC in the planning process.

APPENDIX E: POWER AND AUTONOMY

Government Incentives to Collaboration for Power & Autonomy	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL11	When asked if there in interacting with known vs. less known nonprofits, the response was that "I am open to anyone who wants to come help"
GL11	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the footprint for local preparation formerly included federal funding, but once the funding was lost, the emphasis is on partnership with government and NGOs.
GL11	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that emergency managers focus on exercises with volunteers and businesses, conducting joint exercises for example the fire department spent time for a full scale hazard exercise, partnering with NGOs to do the feeding. This allows NGOs to practice mass care and results in better coordination.
GL8	When asked what the benefits are to engaging nonprofits, the response was that "nonprofits provide volunteer hours, staffing, resources, funding because their funds are not associated with the locality for example meals, and blankets provided by them are no cost to me, things that I'm not reimbursed for."
GL8	When asked about an ideal world of engaging nonprofits, the response was that "a holistic process of government not doing everything by ourselves, but together, investing in nonprofits increases the amount of dollars in return because more resources are available to citizens."
GL6	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the emergency manager is the "center," the ESF is in the middle, and the emergency manager is the "facilitator" not there to tell them what to do. The EM brings them together to "herd the cats."

GL6, GL4, GL25, GS4	When asked what the benefits are to engaging nonprofits, the response was that "there is no way to handle an incident without them. I know the power of nonprofits in Katrina, Operation Blessing with them helping people. Nonprofits benefit the entire community to rebuild and respond." Another response was that "we couldn't do this without them, managing the CERT is a big job in itself, trying to handle the nonaffiliated, nonprofits are robust and manage a large task, a need the city can't do. They are a significant piece of the puzzle." Another response was that "I can't do it without nonprofits, not the government alone."
GL6	When asked how do you reach out to nonprofits, the response was that "I have to stay connected personally and focus my work on people who truly need us, (the underserved) to use resources and focus our efforts"
GS4	When asked about an ideal world how you would engage and use nonprofits, the response was that "they would be equal partners, sitting at the table."
GL6	When asked what factors contribute to collaboration between state, local governments and nonprofits, the response was "good collaboration skills and good people skills, knowing what to say in the situation, awareness, leadership and trust like in 9/11"
GL4	When asked what factors contribute to collaboration, the response was that nonprofits serve on the city local emergency planning committee showing they have value, a big asset and they become a resource.
GL10	When asked what the benefits are to reaching out to nonprofits, the response was that "our approach is to ensure we are not an island and need to work together to the best interest of the community and understanding what the day to day roles are in nonprofits and emergency manager. We need to develop strong relationships and partnerships.
GL12, GL18	When asked what the benefits are to engaging nonprofits, the response was that "nonprofits are an essential resource that must be included relative to community planning and preparedness. The benefits vary related to the service they provide. The outreach of their network is a value and benefit that speaks for itself. However, it is sometimes underappreciated and underutilized."

Government Barriers for Collaboration for Power & Autonomy	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL16	When asked what factors encourage collaboration, the response was that Emergency managers need to find out what nonprofits can do, get a list but the EM office did not follow up on the list of what each nonprofit could provide. They just happened to see Christ in Action on Facebook, who had not contacted the EM, but did contact the councilman who did not provide the nonprofits contact information.
GL16	When asked about how you reach out to nonprofits, the response was that the EM for the first time sent out a mass mailing to doctors, organizations and nonprofits (including faith based) and only received 1-2 responses. A second mailing was sent with pre-paid post cards thinking that agencies and individuals did not want to spend money on stamps. This 2nd mailing focused on nonprofits and faith based groups to get together to talk about community disaster planning. After sending out over 100, there was a response from some churches. There was no follow up done by the EM and in fact she was disappointed with the response. A VOAD has not yet been established in this region for over 3 years.
GL2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that she did not feel that it was necessary for NGOs to participate in disaster planning and not necessarily in the EOC. "They need to be out there helping people."
GL6, GL22	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "competing disciplines between nonprofits and for profits to get charitable donations, how do you reconcile this and keep the "supply chain" open? You have Walmart vs. the Red Cross trying to provide resources. Nonprofits are totally impacted by the economy." An additional comment was "the inability to maintain relationships over extended periods and lack of resources in either the government or nonprofit organizations."
GL4	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "I'm not searching the Internet for nonprofits. Nonprofits need to approach EM offices. Give them 5 minutes and give them scenarios to see what their resources really are. We may not need what they have.
GL4	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "some nonprofits do not want to work with local government because they wrap them in red tape. They would rather support the community outside the red tape.

GL10	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that nonprofits are very dependent on volunteers. What is the commitment? People who volunteer are involved in more than one organization. If you have 20 people in 5 organizations, you may not have 20 resources when you call.
GL10	When asked about barriers to collaboration, the response was that "jurisdictions were attempting to set up a VOAD. Three leaders had three different ideas that lead to conflict about who could and couldn't participate in the meetings. The result was that the emergency manager, nor anyone in government had a place with the VOADs and could not attend meetings. I made myself available, but the interpretation of their by-laws turned into turf issues between state, federal, nonprofits and the local Red Cross. It's difficult getting organized functioning and working together."
GL13	When asked what the benefits of engaging nonprofits are, the response was that "nonprofits break down the walls and are better received than government because they've established relationships with individuals in the community.
GL12	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "currently State/local governments are experiencing a significant "brain drain." We are losing institutional knowledge at a very rapid rate due to the baby-boomers retiring and some vital positions are not being filled at the rate of the retirements. Points of contacts, relationships, and knowledge of how nonprofits can work to the advantage of State/local governments are all being diluted."
GL25	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that the government is now dependent on nonprofits and their manpower for "heavy lifting" since we lost some of our resources."
GL24	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that each of the EM and nonprofits don't know how to reach out to each other. If the EM is not spending more than half of their time outside the office, they are missing out. When further discussing who EM is reaching out to, it's to other EM who may have other ideas.
GL18, NV2	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that the government's public safety mindset where nonprofits and volunteers who participate in CERT are used as victims in exercises and it's a push to let some of them man traffic stops.
GL18	When asked about what constrains collaboration, the response was that we need to change the paradigm. The highest elected official is not the problem. They get it. The problem is the attitude of the "boots on the ground" first responders who don't want anyone to play in their sandbox."

GL21	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that "John nonprofit comes to the table and says I work with Tim, who is easy to work with, lives in the community, can get in the door and is not a part of a scary government organization. John and Tim have a mutually beneficial relationship that also benefits the government who is "standing on the mountain preaching, spreading the word and delivering the safety and preparedness mission before the disaster. After the disaster he must look at other resources including nonprofits, but if not involved before and after, there's not a lot going on. Everyone must be on board to feel they are part of the resilience movement."
GL20	When asked if there is a difference in how you interact with known nonprofits, the response was that "each agency or group has their own individual rules of engagement. Obviously by not being a direct state or local government controlled entity, I can only ask them to provide certain services versus maybe requiring them similar to other direct controlled internal county departments or agencies.

Nonprofit Incentives to Collaboration for Power & Autonomy	
Source of Interview	Comment
NA3	When asked how you reach out, the response was that "we know each other, we see each other at the same meetings for the last year and a half we've been proactive in forming relationships. My place is in the middle, pulling over 200 different ecumenical groups together. We're putting a warming shelter together for the homeless. We have worked more with local government (social services).
NA5	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that "It's about capacity. We do not have the resources so philosophically, we're better together than separate."
NV1, NV3	When asked if you participate in the planning and preparation of the EOP, the response was that "as an officer of the VOAD, he reviews and comments on changes to the Volunteer and Donation ESF. Nonprofits reach out to the VOAD to help achieve relationships with state and local government.
NV1	When asked how the VOAD engages nonprofits, the response was that "the VOAD is nationally recognized as the primary coordinator to play in the disaster arena. Having VOAD on the resume will do wonders. "
NA1	When asked if the organization is involved in the planning process, the response was that "we have an MOU with the government, a seat at the EOC when activated by the EM and our organization is mentioned in the EOP.

Nonprofit Barriers to Collaboration for Power & Autonomy	
Source of Interview	Comment
NA3	When asked about how you engage with government, the response was that we have over 200 ecumenical organizations, looking at long range issues as well as crisis, but we've never been called by the local emergency manager. Other local government organizations know about us (i.e. social services). Local government is outside. They don't call any more.
NA3	When asked about how you engage with government, the response was that we host other nonprofits; we are in the middle with over 200 organizations.
NA4	When asked about barriers to collaboration, the response was that her experience with local government is that they have so many resources and flexibility to do things themselves, they don't look externally. They find ways to supplement themselves. They meet their needs internally. It's not that they are opposed to it, it's just not part of their DNA." Government will only reach out if there is a crisis.
NA4	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that although government is not a member of her organization, but if the government would call they would share the information with them about resources and capabilities. All they have to do is contact me.
NA4	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "A lot of nonprofits are more concerned about what they are giving than what they are going to get out of a collaborative relationship. They are more focused on giving and not worried about what they will get out of it."
NN5	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "60% of my budget is government funded and even though the programs are diverse and help the community… there are strings attached in having the government as a partner. I have to constantly repurpose and renegotiate with the government on funding"
NA2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the Red Cross used to be in charge of sheltering, but the government made a decision that they can't tell people or volunteers what to do, but all sheltering was shifted to the Department of Social Services based on a State decision.

NA2	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that there was a push to target low income areas for fire alarms. Initially the Red Cross and Fire Department did not want to partner, but "higher ups" at made the decision to partner at the Federal level and National level of the Red Cross. Both fought the decision. It was a sizeable grant… now they feel good about it. It was about the mission."
NA2	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that "local government is not romancing nonprofits. It's not the government way to cultivate or train them. (They) don't have time to cultivate the relationship, don't have the church (at the table) who knows how to do the feeding, and don't have time to put training into their schedule. It's hard to establish resources with nonprofits (if you can't do this).
NV2	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that volunteers are more than nice people carrying casseroles. They come with experience and specific skills. The more the government realizes this better. I keep hearing that they are just volunteers. She has specific skills in the real world, but when they find out those skills, she is still just a volunteer. There is a lack of respect by government.
NV2	When asked what constrains collaboration, her response was that "a person says we're in charge, get out of the way during a disaster response situation. The government must understand that they can't do it alone. We can do more together.
NV1	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was "ask me, don't task me." Emergency managers can't tell me what to do. For the Emergency Manager this is the hardest (thing to deal with) is that we (VOADs) are resources and not employees."

APPENDIX F: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Government Incentives to Collaboration for Organizational Structure	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL24	When asked how do you reach out to nonprofits, the response it is much better because the under the independent city concept (unique to Virginia), the EM department is administered under the fire department, it's a new duty, EM became more focused and more professional.
GL24, GL11	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that if nonprofits have NIMS training, the EM is more likely to contact them. When managing VOADs they also need NIMS. We can all then "speak the same language" across all organizations. Another response was that for two and a half years we've been giving nonprofits, VOADs to NIMS class to speak the same language, get on the same song, not only in the same hymnal. Get nonprofits hooked up with VOADs for training and background checks helps. .
GS1	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that there is an agreement with the Red Cross and FEMA recommended by the government because the Red Cross understands the planning process (at the organizational level)
GS7	When asked what contributes to collaboration, the response was that nonprofits and volunteers can help and are not restricted by government law such as use of tax dollars.
GS7	When asked what contributes to collaboration the response was that VOADs understand NIMs terminology and write and communicate according to these guidelines.
GL2	When asked what incentives nonprofits, the response was that nonprofits would have to have the necessary training already (i.e. Red Cross certification, the Fire and Rescue Class, First Aid, CPR & NIMS) , then they are covered by insurance.

GS4	When asked about benefits of engaging nonprofits in preparedness, the response was that they fill the gaps and provide the services the government doesn't or can't provide what government and state can do or don't do. Example, the Adventist community serves as warehouse management, Lutheran ministry helps locals to recovery, provide mechanisms to take small donations to be distributed. Hurricane Sandy, Alleghany & Washington Counties, nonprofits provided mechanisms to take cash donations and supplies and distribute to local citizens, state is not able to set up cash donations. Good on a small scale to bridge that gap.
GS4	When asked how you reach out to nonprofits, the response was 1) common & faith based coordinator 2) private sector through MVOAD, 3) Governor's Office of Community Initiative to interact as liaison with nonprofit. Before something happens, bring them into the mix.
GS4	When asked about an ideal world of EM how you would engage nonprofits, the response was to treat nonprofits as "equal partners" not have to find ways to interact with them and they with us. They would be sitting at the table like any other jurisdiction.
GS4	When asked about incentives to collaboration, the response was government is more willing to interact with organizations that have a past "track record as a known capability" and "know how we do it." Everyone (including nonprofits) need to understand that homeland security is a concept, not an agency, a vision for openness where all organizations play a fully integrated role.
GL23	When asked about an ideal world, the response was that "we would identify our needs and there would be a "clearing house" which identifies the organizations which would be able to help in the area desired.
GL23	When asked about differences in how state/local interacts with known nonprofits, the response was that "I believe the arrangements which are made at the state government level and state level players in an organization do not have a "real" performance requirement. An organization with state level resources will not be held to the standard of supplying those resources to the local level on a given day, while local response requires the resource to be available at any given time. (there are no performance standards organizationally) which constrains collaboration.
GL17	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that this is a unique setting where the emergency manager is under the fire department with a direct chief and an associate chief and a matrix organizational structure. The EM does administrative planning as part of the fire department. This is positive because EM is from a first responder point of view providing a different perspective. New position is purely EM experience (assuming more collaboration)

GL10, GL14	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that as the emergency coordinator, emergency management is a standalone department independent under the city manager. This was done after Katrina. The EM had outgrown the part time position. (This provides independence, doesn't place you under the fire marshal and report directly to civilians vs. the command and control military model) Another response was that the EM is stand alone, but works closely with the fire department.
GL14	When asked how to work with known nonprofits, the response was that nonprofits like the Red Cross and Salvation Army have structures and less flexible in larger operations like business and government policies and procedures. Smaller nonprofits are less constrained, less restricted and more specific to those being helped.

Government Barriers to Collaboration for Organizational Structure	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL10	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the emergency manager is under the fire department. This forces them to wear many hats
GL10	When asked if nonprofits are engaged in the planning process, the response was that they are included, but the emergency manager does not have a full time staff and is not always able to engage. There is only funding for one staff member, managed and paid by CERT to handle affiliated and nonaffiliated nonprofits.
GL10	When asked about benefits to engaging the nonprofit, the response was that nonprofits and emergency managers have the same message: with budget cuts the emergency manager is not able to do outreach, the person was cut, and volunteers now do the outreach.
GL10	When asked how you reach out to nonprofits, the response was that they have difficulty connecting with faith based groups, unlike other counties who have a volunteer organization that is the conduit to maintain the list. Some counties have formalized/structured processes, others do not. In some cases the EM has to deal with each church individually when others just go through the coalition to engage several faith based groups.
GL10	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that decreases in staff, the emergency manager and other positions, the question is how much risk the city, community and individual will accept with these organizational cuts.

GL10	When asked about constraints, the response was that the government is relying more on volunteers to do "my heavy lifting," roles we used to do. Even when the "population is more dense," small nonprofits can be easily overwhelmed when given less donations and in turn lose volunteers. This situation constrains collaboration when the EM knows they can't depend on these nonprofits due to scarcity.
GL24	When asked about barriers of engaging nonprofits, the response was that in Virginia, the emergency managers nor nonprofits have control over facilities for sheltering because they don't want to close the government nor schools down. This limits the EM to those nonprofits who have facilities that they control.
GL24	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that he works in an independent city organizationally which has a set of different requirements and responsibilities different from the county. This is unique in Virginia. In this structure nonprofits have a limited role. A separate organization, not a VOAD is contracted to perform coordination.
GL24	When asked about benefits to engaging nonprofits, the response was that "The Red Cross is going through the hard times because of the economy. All volunteers now have full time jobs. They no longer have the capacity to do as much from an organizational perspective.
GL24	When asked how you reach out to nonprofits, the response was the EM has a local list.
GL24	When asked about barriers to collaboration, the response was that you can't have shelters with backup generators like a church (making it an unofficial shelter) based on Red Cross standards. This limits the number of nonprofits that have facilities that we can engage that meet the standard.
GS7	When asked about barriers, the response was "my authority" (which does not cross the line for nonprofits).
GS7	When asked about barriers, the response was "different missions of government vs. nonprofits" (organizationally). VOADs have an umbrella agreement on how to behave; nonprofits constrained by not having radio, language or know all government acronyms.
GL2	When asked about barriers, the response not having the necessary training (i.e. Red Cross certification, the Fire and Rescue Class, First Aid, CPR & NIMS) ,so they can be covered by insurance.
GL6	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was "look at critical responders- firefighters who have medical training, able to communicate, no language barriers, knows the vernacular, medic had been in military, understood each other from Pentagon and local responders, not speaking the language (culture), EOC not command post, technical operations, set up command post in the field, unified command and incident command operations and planning, fusion of logistics, search and rescue, law enforcement and FBI relations. If you don't have these it's a constraint.

GL3	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that there is a liability for local government to ensure accreditation of volunteers.

GL3	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that emergency managers have traditionally been firemen, not sure if they think integration (i.e. that nonprofits are necessary). Example in the EOC, the present chief of fire & rescue meet with police to make a joint decision informally, then "they" make a decision "how bad is it," then contact city manager. There is no nonprofit involvement at the EOC.
GL3	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was the "EOP" guidance needs a major overhaul to align with the structure of the state and mirror the Federal government.
GL5	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that organizationally there are "two schools of thought on emergency management 1) very militaristic, Washington, Alaska, Montana, Colorado, offices under national guard 2) sociological psychological, EM to go help people. EM does not fall under sociology. There has to be a happy marriage of military and social skills. Nonprofits do all the things I can't do legally, financially, morally and politically, not always spending taxpayer money. The displaced people may not be in the country legally. VOAD catches these people, (it's a) safety net to help those EM can't help publicly. FEMA is slow to reimburse. (These organizational factors make it hard to collaborate because of different missions and perspectives).
GS4	When asked what factors constrain collaboration, the response was that if you are not a part of government, people are unwilling to take part in government operations. Being in government we are employee of local jurisdictions or state, uphold statutes and laws of state and jurisdiction. Nonprofits not within the "protected envelope" because there's an artificial wall and government office representatives are not (ready to cross that wall).
GS4	When asked what factors encourage collaboration, the response was having government recognize that nonprofits have trust in that community already established are "grassroots" organizations. Our (government) level is very structured with statutes and regulations (making collaboration more difficult at the grassroots level).
GL20	When asked what constrains collaborations, the response was that "obviously each agency or group has their own individual rules of engagement. Obviously by not being a direct state or local government controlled entity, I can only ask them to provide certain services versus maybe requiring them similar to other direct controlled internal county departments or agencies.

GL18	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that there's a "public safety mindset" (that the government has). In DC fire department had nonprofits & volunteers who participated in the exercise used as "victims," pushed to let some man traffic stops, utilize at shelters. Volunteers went door to door and touch citizens way before first responders. We need to "change the disaster paradigm" to rely on volunteers, not first responders. The problem is deeper than trust, its attitude, no one can "play in their (government) sandbox.
GL7	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that the economy is down, volunteer rate is down, and volunteers are getting second jobs. Time is the biggest issue beyond this.
GL4, GL21	When asked about constraints, the response was that some nonprofits don't want to work with the local government, because they wrap them up in red tape. Nonprofits would rather support the community outside the red tape. Another response was that nonprofits less bureaucratic and less red tape like the government. I can go straight to Joe Nonprofit and not always get bureaucratic layers are involved, convoluted & can't get around. Have to understand the structure.
GL4	When asked what constrains collaboration an EM made a comment to another EM that you "have to follow the rules, closer to federal bureaucracies, Ems have more operational relationships with nonprofit.
GL1	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that my primary job is fire marshal. I'm the only one. No time in schedule to collaborate. I don't have any staff. I spend a lot of time trying to get government to allocated money for a disaster.
GL2	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was not having training for disadvantaged nonprofits and she's not able to use Web EOC like other government people are.
GL10	When asked what constrains collaboration, there are "turf issues" with state federal and local people. When the nonprofits were creating a VOAD they decided there was no place for a government person when they met. This behavior constrains collaboration.
GL13	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that Department heads have to be marketing gurus for our agencies. Have to study the board of supervisors (funding & politics). Nonprofits have connections with each other.
GL12	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that state/local government are experiencing "brain drain" losing institutional knowledge at a rapid rate due to baby boomers retiring, points of contact, relationships and how nonprofits can work to the advantage of the state/local government are being diluted.

GL12	When asked about constraints, the response was educating nonprofits on the nuances of state/local government as it relates to the process for councils/commissions to agree what needs to happen, how it should happen and approval for it to happen. (bureaucracy education)

Nonprofit Incentives to Collaboration for Organizational Structure	
Source of Interview	Comment
NV7	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that as a State VOAD, the EOP does not formally list them but they have a seat at the table in the EOC, two VOAD reps man the 24/7 when activated by a disaster. State can formally ask you to do something with a phone call.
NV7	When asked about benefits of engaging nonprofits, response was that each group has their own resources, works both ways, NP and local government don't have all the resources to deal with things, county has to go, if too big to handle, talk to state, if too big, talk to Feds, take a look if it's a disaster, now process takes 3 days, process at FEMA takes longer, advantage of nonprofits is that local people don't need a decision, VOAD is going in to help, local government can't get in due to liability, can't work on a house, but Southern Baptist have ability to cross over artificial (organizational) boundaries, more ability to help a homeowner. It's not that way with the government. For example, Sandy hit and Latter Day Saints got 60,000 volunteers over a couple of months, untrained, but controlled and said "show me where to go" government can't do this.
NV7	When asked about how you reach out, the response was that pre-established relationships help cross sectional LDS might not have day care, someone else does, Methodist has a different structure, VOAD recruits other nonprofits, might be board of Directors from DuPont. This helps collaboration by exercising these cross organizational relationships before a disaster.
NV7	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was "working on relationships, not (organizational) boundaries" Local government has the boundaries, not the Red Cross and other nonprofits.

NV2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that the Red Cross is organized functionally and depends on the level of authority and training. As the link with Red Cross for disasters and voluntary faith based nonprofits and community partners, I focus on the VOAD network and work to "translate" what those organizations do. You're in between volunteers and local government. In the Commonwealth there is a growing movement where government and nonprofits work together to do preparedness. The more that occurs, the more people realize that volunteers are more than just nice people carrying casseroles. They are trained, they have skills that are utilized, but they may not be utilized. They have specific experience and backgrounds. A volunteer is not a volunteer is not a volunteer. The more government realizes this more they can be utilized.
NA1	When asked how your organization reaches out to nonprofits, the response was that this volunteer organization is mentioned in the EOP and the Annex and has a seat on the EOC. What is unique is that the VOAD falls under the organization which has tasking authority and is also responsible for recovery and response. This volunteer organization conducts conferences, seminars, exercises, emails, meetings, is also a member of the VOAD and is working with a new source for getting nonprofits in Northern Virginia. So they are organizing for better collaboration
NV6	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that the government benefits by having a single VOAD to encompass dealing with 1 organization vs. 36 efficiently. This allows flexibility in the region
NV6	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response was that VDEM is involved at the state level and it's important that they care about what we do and that we exist.
NA2	When asked what incentivizes collaboration, the response is that partnering with Baptists, Episcopalian and Methodist, an ecumenical thing.

Nonprofit Barriers to Collaboration for Organizational Structure	
Source of Interview	Comment
NA4	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was that the government has so many resources that they are flexible to so something themselves and don't look externally (to nonprofits) They find a way to stipend themselves. To partner (with nonprofits) is not a natural part of their DNA. Nonprofits compete with each other for the pie.

NA4	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was that the government is not to fund any religious group, no church receives funding from local government because of separation of church and state.
NA2	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that there was an (organizational) shift of a major responsibility to the Department of Social Services as the primary shelter. The nonprofit has no control over organizational changes that could impact relationships.
NA2	When asked about an ideal world for EM, the response was that as nonprofit, only larger counties (who already have affluence and a large tax base) are eligible to apply for large grants (to get more resources). We (VOAD) don't have the population to be eligible. This controls our access to resources.
NA2	When asked about barriers to collaboration, the response was that they continually see new people in leadership. VOADs in general used to be active, but that's gone by the wayside, even when they recruit the people don't stay. This is especially hard when there is no disaster.
NA2	When asked if the government mission is fully aligned, the response was that there's not a lot that has happened in the last 20 years. The churches take care of their needs. (i.e. there's no real need to collaborate.
NV7	When asked about training, the response was that neither VOADs nor LDS church offer training. The expectation is that they depend on the government to offer this training.
NV7	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was "structure," nonprofits or public at large don't have an organizational structure. Some nonprofits and local government are used to structure. Red Cross and Salvation Army have different boards (who think in a different way) If I show up with 500 people I create a disaster, but if they are structured, I have a real asset. (If you don't understand the organizational structure and boundaries, this constrains collaboration.
NV7	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that the Red Cross restructured in July, then another nonprofit restructured, they are all doing what they want to do.
NV3	When asked about roles and responsibilities, the response was that "we are named but totally voluntary, as available and wanting to participate" Voluntary not assigned. Note that he is the only volunteer (a one person office) limits organizational capability.

NV2	When asked about benefits of nonprofits, the response was that "we don't have full time practicing emergency managers, for example VA Beach does, but go to Southside county the fire chief and emergency manager support the town council. It's a very low priority for him until something happens. You might have a lack of training. Within the national office and faith based sector, the government realized they don't have anything. It was CYA thinking.
NV2	When asked about nonprofits, the response was that "We are having a tough time at the State level because of "graying "of our workforce, so we're losing institutional knowledge.
NV2	When asked about benefits of nonprofits, the response was that VOADs are affective because not a single one has the same hierarchy or structure. In the Catholic Church the higher you go, they call the shots. It's not that way in the Baptist Church.
NV2	When asked about benefits of nonprofits, the response was that "it all boils down to locals. Sometimes they will say this is so far over your head that we need to take the lead. It doesn't work that way with government. They say "we are in charge, get out of the way."
NV2, GL15	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was money and time. We have way too much we're responsible for without money and resources. Another manager responded that emergency managers don't have time to ramp up relationships, just to consider staffing, wear multiple hats.
NV2	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that just because you have a certification, doesn't mean you have all the answers. Government got crazy with the requirements. Focused on KSAs the bigger the degree, the bigger the certification, there's a great barrier between professionals (for hire) and volunteers. (Government) is negative toward volunteers (who may have the experience). When they get stressed those biases come out 10 times stronger.
NV2	When asked what constrains collaboration and why some nonprofits don't join, the response was that "some said flat out that we don't want to do disasters. We're focused on minority health. Some companies only do certain things and made a choice, but no is not forever.
NV2	When asked why nonprofits that have capabilities don't join the VOAD, the response was "a lot of times its fear of liability, which often times can be overcome. The Minister is all for it, but his board of deacons are too nervous. A lot of time the fear is not factually based. For example some thought they had to give the Red Cross their building for 2 years if they worked in disaster. It's fear of the unknown.

NN4	When asked about roles and responsibilities the response was that this volunteer organization is a member of the Regional VOAD but does not sit at the table together with the VOAD. They are not involved in disaster management, but are used to develop a "hands on network" if there is an emergency in the area to work with local nonaffiliated volunteers and nonprofits, looking at being a "convener" one place who knows what is going on where there are 7500 nonprofits. We can't do this due to funding shortfalls. Have to meet special requirements for grants. Government only budgets for so much, but trying to give responsibilities to nonprofits that are also short on funding. When people are homeless we can only provide a meal. We keep hearing "do more with less." Our hands are tied at the local level.
NN4	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that the reporting process for grants requires reporting lots of information for a little bit of money. There is a match (fundraising) increase every year while the amounts offered are down every year. Can't have one size fit all. Start measuring output.
NV6, GL10	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was a lack of commitment by selected individuals (in the organizational structure that makes government believe everyone operates that way) A second respondent stated that it's difficult to understand nonprofit volunteer commitment if you have 20 volunteers in 5 organizations, you may not really have 20, may only have 5.

APPENDIX G: EMERGING THEME (ACCOUNTABILITY)

Government Incentives to Collaboration for Accountability	
Source of Interview	Comment
GS4	Government publishes guidance and guidelines which makes them accountable for your advertised services
GL11, GL5, GL18, and GL8	Government continues to hosts meetings and forums for discussion with nonprofits.
GL18	When asked for incentives, the response was that nonprofits should submit a capability statement to the EM.
GL5, GS7	When asked about the benefits of nonprofits, the response was that nonprofits do all the things I can't do legally, financially, morally and politically. If there are displaced individuals from a disaster, these individual may or may not be in the country legally. Government cannot spend a single dime on helping these people, but the nonprofit can come in to help these people.
GL22	When asked about incentives, the response was that nonprofits have to be accountable for resources. If you know capability, their accountability can be determined.
GL2, GL8	When asked about incentives to collaboration, the response was that she has no problem with collaboration, but protecting citizens is the obligation of the emergency manager.
GL4	When asked about incentives to collaboration, the response was that emergency managers ask for licensure and proper vetting of nonprofits.

Government Barriers to Collaboration for Accountability	
Source of Interview	Comment
GL8, GL1	When asked about barriers to collaboration, response "There are not always MOUs in place with nonprofits." This causes concerns about accountability (obligations) and transparency (openness) concerning communication on capability.
GL18, GL8, and GL5	When asked if EOPs are available to nonprofits, response was that EOPs are available most times, but Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are not for public view (includes nonprofits). Nonprofits are listed in State EOPs but not in SOPs.

GL2	Nonprofits require training and certification (i.e. first aid, CPR), this is important because at that time they are covered by the insurance.
GL5	When asked about roles and responsibilities, response was that FEMA is very slow with reimbursements. The State hasn't been reimbursed for snowstorms from 2009-2010.
GL15	When asked about use of nonprofits, the response was that his bias was that the Red Cross brings red banners, red coats and it is offensive and not in the interest of the community because the money goes national.
GS4	When asked what constrains collaboration, the response was that nonprofits are not part of the government and have people who are sometimes unwilling to take part in government operations. Being in government we are employees of local jurisdictions or state to uphold statutes and laws. Nonprofits are not within that "protected envelope" because there's an artificial wall and government office representatives are not on the same side of this wall.
GL23	When asked about what constrains collaboration, the response was that the primary factor was the inability of the nonprofit to "guarantee" their support during an event.
GL23	When asked about known nonprofits and collaboration, the response was that you have chartered the Red Cross and known entities across the state, but an organization accountable at the state level will not be accountable for supplying resources at the local level.
GL12	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was that nonprofits should be accountable for their performance and capacity which would have to be measured against the demographics and social economic conditions of the community. Most nonprofits don't have this.

Nonprofit Incentives to Collaboration for Accountability	
Source of Interview	Comment
GS2	When asked which items incentivize collaboration, response was that to reach out to nonprofits she would target nonprofits that have been designated as 501(c)(3).
NV5	When asked which items incentivize collaboration, response was that nonprofit are required to be accountable to the last dime when receiving State and Federal Funds down to the last penny.

NV1	When asked about incentives for collaboration, the response was that nonprofits are more accountable to the community in which they live. When the "boots hit the ground" its local nonprofits you see… you don't see the National Guard swinging hammers (even though that's not their mission). It's good to see government, but my perception is that the volunteers have the mission vs. the government who has a paid job to do this.

Nonprofit Barriers to Collaboration for Accountability	
Source of Interview	Comment
NN4	When asked about other constraints, the response was that when discussing government grants and Request for Proposals (RFPs), the accounting and reporting piece is just so cumbersome for just a little bit of money. The big thing under these grants is that you can't fund raise, because a lot of them require a match.
NV1	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was that the hardest thing for the government emergency manager is that the nonprofits are not accountable to them (like an employee).
NV7	When ask about constraints to collaboration, the response was that government and nonprofit managers have to control their resources and cannot turn them over to anyone. We can coordinate, but cannot give up accountability for these resources to government or other nonprofits. The example is that Southern Baptists don't turn resources over to the Red Cross or Salvation Army, but leaders work together to coordinate. All maintain control of their resources and budgets.
NN1	When asked about constraints to collaboration, the response was that faith based churches have to respond to the needs of their contributors and may not have the resources to provide for the community.
NV6	When asked about barriers to collaboration and joining VOAD, the response was that nonprofits don't want to be accountable to the state for something they don't have the capability to respond.
NA2	When asked about constraints, the response was that nonprofits are not accountable during non-disaster times. Preparedness is not as pretty as feet on the ground.

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Mittie Wallace is a graduate of Fauquier High School in Warrenton Virginia. She completed her undergraduate work at the University of Virginia earning a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology in 1978. She completed a Master's of Science in Gerontology from Central Missouri State University in 1984 and a Bachelor of Science in Nursing from George Mason University in 1996. She has worked extensively in Missouri, California, New Mexico and Virginia across multiple disciplines and agencies, requiring trust in her ability to solve very complex human issues. This dissertation reflects a drive to work with grassroots professionals help tell the story until a culture of preparedness lives beyond mere words.