The Agency Problem of Empire: British Bureaucracy and Institutional Path Dependence
| dc.contributor.author | Hill, Joshua Peter | |
| dc.creator | Hill, Joshua Peter | |
| dc.date | 2009-12-07 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-11T20:10:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | |
| dc.date.available | 2010-01-11T20:10:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-01-11T20:10:07Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | The bureaucratic structure of European empires is central to an understanding of institutional origin and durability. This paper provides a theory of why the institutional structures established by Europeans in their empires were what they were, and of how they were instantiated and rendered durable. These predictions are then compared to the historical record in the case of the British Empire. The result is a discovery of systematic variation, according to European mortality rates in a region, in pay structure for and information gathering capacity about governors. Moreover, this variation is found to be resilient to changing local conditions, explaining why institutions proved durable despite converging mortality rates. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1920/5668 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.subject | Institutions | |
| dc.subject | Agency problem | |
| dc.subject | Empire | |
| dc.subject | Path dependence | |
| dc.subject | Economic development | |
| dc.subject | Britain | |
| dc.title | The Agency Problem of Empire: British Bureaucracy and Institutional Path Dependence | |
| dc.type | Dissertation | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | George Mason University | |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy in Economics |