The Political Economy of Epidemiology

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dc.contributor.advisorCoyne, Christopher J
dc.contributor.authorCarson, Byron Bernell
dc.creatorCarson, Byron Bernell
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-21T19:17:22Z
dc.date.available2018-10-21T19:17:22Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractThese essays develop an institutional framework to epidemiology that highlights the conditions under which private actors resolve collective action problems associated with the prevention of infectious diseases. This framework is applied to a number of historical and modern cases from the United States and across the world to show that despite the theoretical problems of externalities and free riding, private coordination is more likely than previously thought. This is the case when people can capture the benefits of prevention and lower the cost of coordination. The main conclusion is that private and alternative disease prevention can be important means of mitigating the burden of infectious diseases, especially when people do not have access to functional governmental health institutions.
dc.format.extent134 pages
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/11162
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsCopyright 2017 Byron Bernell Carson
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectEpidemiology
dc.subjectCollective action
dc.subjectDisease prevention
dc.subjectEpidemiology
dc.subjectIncentives
dc.subjectInstitutions
dc.subjectProfit
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Epidemiology
dc.typeDissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorGeorge Mason University
thesis.degree.levelPh.D.

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