Legislating “Military Entitlements”: A Challenge to the Congressional Abdication Thesis

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dc.contributor.advisorPfiffner, James P.
dc.contributor.authorRoss, Alexis Lasselle
dc.creatorRoss, Alexis Lasselle
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-19T19:29:20Z
dc.date.available2016-04-19T19:29:20Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractThe field of Congress and national security, with few exceptions, describes Congress in the post-World War II era as a secondary player in the development of defense policy. In fact, some scholars argue that Congress’ approach at times is characterized by deference, ambivalence, and even abdication. However, this dissertation argues that by failing to recognize some of the most influential forms of actual congressional power, scholars do not have a comprehensive understanding of the legislative branch’s participation in defense policymaking. In fact, in some areas of defense policy, such as military personnel policy, Congress actually leads.
dc.format.extent209 pages
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/10190
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsCopyright 2015 Alexis Lasselle Ross
dc.subjectPublic policy
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.subjectCongress
dc.subjectEntitlements
dc.subjectLegislative-executive struggle for power
dc.subjectMilitary pay and benefits
dc.subjectMilitary personnel
dc.subjectNational Security
dc.titleLegislating “Military Entitlements”: A Challenge to the Congressional Abdication Thesis
dc.typeDissertation
thesis.degree.disciplinePublic Policy
thesis.degree.grantorGeorge Mason University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral

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