The Outcomes of Iranian Civil Unrest Over the Next Four Years
| dc.contributor.author | Afzal, Solaiman | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-29T18:39:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-29T18:39:03Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-12 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Based on the analysis of open source intelligence (OSINT), the following six outcomes are possible within the next 4 years: 1. The current Iranian regime will agree to compromise with the reformers, leading to the election of a moderate democratic regime that is unfriendly toward the United States. 2. The current regime, unwilling to make concessions to the reformers, crumbles due to a coup d’état or the death of the supreme leader, leading to the election of a moderate democratic regime that is friendly toward the United States. 3. The current regime, unwilling to negotiate with the reformers, crumbles due to a coup d'état or the death of the supreme leader, leading to a take-over by a secular authoritarian regime with low hostility toward the United States. 4. The current regime, unwilling to cooperate with the reformers, crumbles due to a coup d'état or the death of the supreme leader, producing a takeover by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with increased hostility toward the United States. 5. The current regime, unwilling to compromise with the reformers, is able to stay in power through the continued rule of Ali Hossein Khamenei or his son Mojtaba Khamenei, retaining a hostile stance toward the United States. 6. The current regime, unwilling to compromise with the reformers, chooses Ali Ardashir Larijani as its chief, leading to low hostility toward the United States. | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1947-2633 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1920/6564 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.subject | Iran | |
| dc.subject | Civil Unrest | |
| dc.title | The Outcomes of Iranian Civil Unrest Over the Next Four Years | |
| dc.type | Article |