Elected vs. Appointed School Boards

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dc.contributor.advisorCoyne, Christopher J.
dc.contributor.authorAnderson, Jerrod F.
dc.creatorAnderson, Jerrod F.
dc.date2011-05-04
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-24T16:42:11Z
dc.date.availableNO_RESTRICTION
dc.date.available2011-05-24T16:42:11Z
dc.date.issued2011-05-24
dc.description.abstractEducational governance has garnered attention recently in school reform literature. One main question is whether appointed school boards can improve education performance where elected school boards have failed to produce good outcomes. This is essentially a question of regulatory control. Economic theory suggests that how public officials and regulators are chosen will affect the outcomes within the regulated industry. Using demographic and school finance data from 1992 to 2008, I show that while there are some differences in resource allocation between school districts governed by boards with appointed members and those governed by wholly elected boards, these governance structures do not have an observable impact on education quality, as measured by the school district’s market share.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/6331
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectRegulation
dc.subjectEducation
dc.subjectElected
dc.subjectGovernance
dc.subjectAppointed
dc.subjectSchool boards
dc.titleElected vs. Appointed School Boards
dc.typeThesis
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorGeorge Mason University
thesis.degree.levelMaster's
thesis.degree.nameMaster's in Economics

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