The Blind Lawmaker

dc.contributor.advisor	Axtell, Robert L.
dc.contributor.author	Koehler, Matthew
dc.creator	Koehler, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned	2014-08-28T03:11:23Z
dc.date.available	2014-08-28T03:11:23Z
dc.date.issued	2013-08
dc.description.abstract	Many have written about how the Common Law should evolve. The few attempts to demonstrate this empirically, however, have not found evidence that this evolution takes place. This study uses a representation of the Article III United States Federal Courts and an agent-based model to demonstrate that a judicial system may evolve while simultaneously emitting signals to the contrary by evolving via a punctuated equilibrium dynamic. The study then proceeds to demonstrate that agent-based modeling is a viable method for understanding the performance of judicial institutions. After reviewing concepts of jurisprudence and computational social science, the development of the model is discussed followed by a presentation of the results of the aforementioned experiments.
dc.format.extent	160 pages
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1920/8770
dc.language.iso	en
dc.rights	Copyright 2013 Matthew Koehler
dc.subject	Law
dc.subject	Computer science
dc.subject	Political Science
dc.subject	Agent-Based Modeling
dc.subject	Computational Social Science
dc.subject	Jurisprudence
dc.subject	Legal Institutions
dc.title	The Blind Lawmaker
dc.type	Dissertation
thesis.degree.discipline	Computational Social Science
thesis.degree.grantor	George Mason University
thesis.degree.level	Doctoral

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