Incentives Matter: Examining the Problematic Nature of Public Aid in the United States

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dc.contributor.advisorWagner, Richard E.
dc.contributor.authorTuszynski, Meg Patrick
dc.creatorTuszynski, Meg Patrick
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-29T01:13:05Z
dc.date.available2017-01-29T01:13:05Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractIn chapter 1, I argue that the institutional and constitutional context within which order emerges has a strong impact on the structure of that order. I examine the evolution of public-assistance policy in the United States to understand key dynamics of a perverse emergent order. Traditionally, studies of spontaneous social orders have not examined how order emerges within a framework that includes significant government actors (Hebert and Wagner 2013 is a notable exception). I argue that the public-assistance system as it exists in the United States is a perverse emergent order, with both public and private actors playing key roles in the creation of this system.
dc.format.extent76 pages
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/10551
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsCopyright 2016 Meg Patrick Tuszynski
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectAustrian Economics
dc.subjectEmergent order
dc.subjectPolycentricity
dc.subjectPublic aid
dc.subjectPublic Choice
dc.subjectRedistribution
dc.titleIncentives Matter: Examining the Problematic Nature of Public Aid in the United States
dc.typeDissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorGeorge Mason University
thesis.degree.levelPh.D.

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