How to Expect the Portuguese Inquisition
dc.contributor.advisor | Nye, John V.C. | |
dc.contributor.author | Anderson, Robert Warren | |
dc.creator | Anderson, Robert Warren | |
dc.date | 2011-04-29 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-06T21:07:20Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | |
dc.date.available | 2011-05-06T21:07:20Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011-05-06 | |
dc.description.abstract | The Portuguese Inquisition lasted for centuries, sentenced tens of thousands of people and created a global Diaspora. However, an analytical approach to understanding fluctuations in inquisitorial severity is lacking. I use a Public Choice framework of the inquisition by treating it as a power and wealth seeking bureaucracy. I find that economic conditions affected overall sentencing; as well as political. Anti-inquisitorial lobbying is found to be effective. Inquisitors acted to protect their co-religionists, engaged in systematic rent seeking behavior and shifted their focus when it became politically expedient. Far from being a pious Catholic institution intent on keeping religion pure, the inquisition acted as a bureaucracy like any other modern one complete with rent seeking, lobbying and politics. | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1920/6249 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.subject | Economic history | |
dc.subject | Portugal | |
dc.title | How to Expect the Portuguese Inquisition | |
dc.type | Dissertation | |
thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | |
thesis.degree.grantor | George Mason University | |
thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
thesis.degree.name | PhD in Economics |