Rules In Crisis
| dc.contributor.author | Adams, Mark | |
| dc.creator | Adams, Mark | |
| dc.date | 2009-07-23 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z | |
| dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | Societies exist where individuals agree to live together and abide by a common set of rules. These rules seek to limit, but to not eliminate, predation. When a community is struck by a disaster the environment changes but rules frequently do not adapt; discouraging investment and repopulation and hindering recovery. The laws governing private contracts have evolved mechanism for avoiding harmful rigidity during times of crisis. This thesis proposes a means of applying a similar mechanism to the binding constraints in social interactions with the aim of increasing the likelihood of the community surviving and rebuilding. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1920/5606 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.subject | Public choice | |
| dc.subject | Tiebout | |
| dc.subject | Disaster | |
| dc.subject | Constitution | |
| dc.subject | Law | |
| dc.subject | Crisis | |
| dc.title | Rules In Crisis | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | George Mason University | |
| thesis.degree.level | Master's | |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts in Economics |