Asset Specificity and Network Control of Television Programs

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dc.contributor.authorLin, Daniel
dc.creatorLin, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-19T20:54:55Z
dc.date.available2007-12-19T20:54:55Z
dc.date.issued2007-12-19T20:54:55Z
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation uses transaction-cost theories to explain the shift from advertiser control to network control of programs in the 1950s television industry. In the late 1940s, ratings data revealed that the audience for one program tended to flow into neighboring programs. This paper proposes that the threat of ex-post opportunism discouraged advertisers from making the necessary ex-ante investments to exploit audience flow. The networks were better positioned to constrain the opportunism by consolidating the control rights to production and scheduling, increasing the contract duration with key production personnel, and placing more contractual
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/2955
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectTelevision
dc.subjectAdvertising
dc.subjectAsset Specificity
dc.subjectTransaction Cost
dc.subjectGolden Age
dc.titleAsset Specificity and Network Control of Television Programs
dc.typeDissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorGeorge Mason University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy in Economics

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