

EVALUATING PEACE IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

by

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Evaluating Peace in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. May they finally know real and all-encompassing peace.

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Writing a thesis is never an easy task and is one that is rarely undertaken alone. Instead an individual banks on the resources of his nearest and dearest and finally comes up with his final product. This has also been the case for me and were it not for my loving parents Marlene and Peter as well as my supportive brother Mark, neither this thesis nor this Master's degree would have been possible. Their unending support has ensured that I have remained relatively sane and humble as I undertook this endeavour. Whilst we don't get to choose family, we do get to choose friends. I cannot therefore fail to mention all those friends who chose to stick by me and believed in me even when I did not. Special mention goes to Ian and Bernice, Chris and Anita, Matt and Van, Sarah and Lara, and Emmanuel and Sarah. A special mention goes out to Sara and Christian who were also writing their thesis and who were a source of accompaniment and entertainment during the long hours of writing. I would also like to thank Dr. Rubenstein and Dr. English whose help was invaluable for the writing of this thesis. My thanks also goes to the University Chaplaincy that provided a friendly environment, with a lot of beer to write this thesis.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.....FBiH
Republika SrpskaRS
Office of the High Representative OHR
International CommunityIC

ABSTRACT

EVALUATING PEACE IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Between 1992-1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina was torn by a civil war between its three constituent ethnicities: the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. The Dayton Accords brought an end to the fighting and created the Bosnian state. Almost twenty years later this thesis will attempt to look at contemporary Bosnian society to try and evaluate whether there is a state of peace. It will do so by looking at two criteria: the presence of violence within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the presence of harmonious relationships within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The presence of violence will be assessed by looking into the phenomena of organized crime and domestic violence, while harmonious relationships are assessed by looking into the political system within Bosnia and Herzegovina and the educational system. Looking at these four criteria the thesis will try and establish whether there is peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and will subsequently try to analyse the role Dayton has played in the situation that can be found within modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In 1992 a war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina claiming between 100,000-260,000 lives (Kaldor 2007). The war lasted for over three years with hostilities ceasing when Slobodan Milosevic the then President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia representing Bosnian Serb interests, Dranjo Tudman the president of Croatia representing the Bosnian Croats and Alija Izetbegovic the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina representing the Bosniaks, signed the provisions of the Dayton Accords brokered by the U.S. assistant secretary of the state Richard Holbrooke (Kaldor 2007). Almost twenty years since the signing of Dayton Accords, this thesis will try to and determine whether the signing of the Dayton Accords actually brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina or how they have impacted the situation within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The thesis will start of by a look at literature dealing with evaluations in order to successfully conduct an evaluation of the situation of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However it will also tackle the underpinnings of what is understood by the concept of peace. The way such concept will be defined will ultimately determine the result of the question asked in the first paragraph.

After establishing that peace is at its very minimum more than an absence of war and overt violence, this thesis will borrow and adapt a framework to measure peace. Using two measures for peace which are the presence or absence of violence and the

presence of harmonious relationships, this thesis will employ a more quantitative and secondary source based approach in order to answer two research questions. The first question will deal with whether there is peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina whilst the second which is contingent on the answer to the first will discuss how responsible is Dayton if it is established that there is no peace.

Lack of violence will be measured by employing two criteria. The first will be the presence of organized crime in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This will allow a more macro outlook of the presence of violence in Bosnia. The second criteria will be that of domestic violence. Domestic violence will allow for a more gendered approach to looking at violence and security on a more micro-level.

Harmonious Relationships will be measured once again by making reference to two criteria. The first criteria will deal with the political system and the constitutional set up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will investigate the alignment and some of the ideas of the political parties that inhabit the political sphere of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will end with an analysis of the different visions the three major ethnic groups have for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The last criterion that will be measured is that of the educational field. An investigation will be carried out as to how education is administered within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some discussion will ensue on the benefits and consequences of taking such an approach towards education. The perspective of the International Community will also be considered when dealing with education.

The thesis will be than take the information gathered and attempt to answer the two research questions outlined previously.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Conflict resolution is a field that encapsulates both a theoretical as well as a practical element. These two facets of the field interact together and through the work of practitioners in the field try to ameliorate situations of conflict. In order to better such situations two things are required: first, a definition of success, what the end goal of conflict resolution looks like; and secondly, a mechanism to evaluate whether the processes that are applied are in fact successful or detrimental.

This thesis will in fact be dealing with these two issues, namely of evaluation and of defining success whilst applying these concepts to the concrete case study of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The research question which emerges from these two concepts is: how effective were the Dayton Accords in bringing peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina? In this section, an analysis of what particular authors had to say about evaluation and success will be conducted. .

Evaluation in Conflict Resolution

Evaluation in conflict resolution processes is an important tool despite having the negative connotation of being synonymous with criticism because it yields important insights on the processes that conflict resolution practitioners put into practice. It tries to capture the essence of what has worked in a process and what didn't, giving practical tips to practitioners as well as forming the basis for theory making. Sometimes evaluation is

not even something that is necessarily undertaken after an intervention takes place but might take place throughout the intervention to assess the situation and try to remedy anything that might be going wrong.

One set of authors claim that one of the major problems in conflict resolution is the identification and the clarification of the different goals that a process might have (D'Estree et. al 2001). D'Estree claims that certain processes are better suited to obtain particular results and that not all the processes available to the conflict resolution practitioner will fit the needs of every situation (D'Estree et. al 2001). Structural change or societal change is not best achieved or even possible by small group dialogue. Early identification of the goal that is to be achieved will not only provide a better idea of the processes that will be required to achieve that goal but also of the identifiers that will be used in evaluation both throughout and after the process is undertaken.

The identifiers of success or otherwise are not unproblematic, and D'Estree claims that practitioners might resist evaluative processes because the criteria used to measure success might not necessarily be context specific and might emerge from a broader comparative perspectives that would not be suited to the particular conflict the practitioners are engaged in (D'Estree et. al 2001). A second difficulty that practitioners had was that of who got to choose the criteria that determine whether a process is deemed a success. A third difficulty was that sometimes the objectives set out for the processes, despite being identified and clear, were contradictory. Success in one objective could be at the cost of success in another. A fourth difficulty which practitioners complained of was that of confidentiality (D'Estree et. al 2001). In order to evaluate effectively a

process, access to information and data about people involved in the process is required. However, this creates problems in its own right, because local participants may have been guaranteed confidentiality as one of the prerequisites for their participation in the process. Another related problem might be that confidentiality may not be merely a ‘perk’ but might actually be an important need, the lack of which might endanger the lives of participants engaged in the process.

One of the greatest hurdles in any evaluative process, however, is the casual link between micro-attitudinal changes to macro-structural alterations. Peace according to D’estree requires changes that start a micro-level and move all the way up to a macro-level; however, the identification of that causal link between the micro and the macro can prove problematic to identify, let alone measure empirically (D’Estree et. al 2001).

D’Estree proposes a framework that would tackle the first two issues mentioned: namely those of criteria and the linking the macro to the micro. Regarding the issue of criteria D’Estree comes up with a four pronged framework that assesses the different criteria for success or otherwise in a process.

D’Estree’s framework consists of:

- 1) Changes in thinking: here what is being assessed is any new type of knowledge that might have emerged through a particular process. This could vary from new options for conflict resolutions and greater understanding of the other within the conflict.
- 2) Changes in Relations: the criteria that will be analysed here are changes within the relationships between the parties. Issues such as trust and reduced tension, the presence of empathy and reconceptualization of security are measured.

- 3) Foundation for transfer: This criterion will try to assess whether there is enough groundwork for the work done with individuals to be transferred to the wider communities.
- 4) Foundation for Outcome/Implementation: The final criteria will assess how workshops and other processes have in fact left an impact on the society of that particular process. Criteria in this category would be reforms in political structures and political input and processes.

D'Estree also identifies three stages of how the micro links up with the macro aspects of a process. The first phase is the promotion phase where the intervention tries to promote certain effects within the room itself. The next phase is the application phase when issues of how the changes are going to be applied back home are discussed. The final phase is the sustainability phase where changes brought about by the first two phases are discussed to see whether they are long-term or not (D'Estree et. al 2001).

Other authors too have given significant contributions on the subject of evaluation of a conflict resolution process (Gurkaynak et al. 2014), (Ross 2001), (Church et. al 2002) (Druckman et. al 2002) but the various authors and the literature that they have come up with share a very subtle pitfall that all these authors have fallen into.

Ross claims that a good evaluation will reveal to us not only what is to be done but also our assumptions when entering the field (Ross 2001). He claims that it is therefore very important to be self-aware of what our assumptions are particularly when this relates to what constitutes a success or failure in an intervention into a particular conflict. He believes it is the evaluative process undertaken prior, during and after an

intervention that will reveal these underlying assumptions that practitioners in the conflict resolution field operate with (Ross 2001). However this claim does not always make sense because it might very well be that it is our definition of success that will influence in the first place the criteria that we will employ and the methodologies that we will choose to start the evaluative process. The underlying assumption in the afore-mentioned authors seems to be that evaluation can be an objective value-free process that will give to some degree standardized results that will be accepted by all.

Evaluation however is not a value free enterprise and even within D'Estree 's frameworks there implicitly exist certain leanings over others. The very fact that D'Estree considers societal transformation in even a minimal degree shows that her definition of success will tend more towards a more comprehensive positive peace rather than a negative peace that is merely the end of violence. Another assumption underlying D'Estree's framework is that peace requires both macro-level action and micro-level action (as well as in between). These three possibilities do not immediately indicate which level D'Estree and the other authors lean towards as being the most effective for conflict resolution, but the very fact that they allow for the possibility of all three means that to some extent they believe all three are somewhat effective in particular circumstances. Someone who would be completely in favour of one level and finds the others completely useless would not even mention them as criteria for a framework because they would deem as simply insignificant.

This proves that before even starting a discussion about evaluation techniques one needs to first initiate a discussion on the meaning of success in conflict resolution. One's

definition of success in conflict resolution is so fundamental that every other facet of theory and practice within the conflict resolution field will be affected by a practitioners or theorist's definition. It is the basis of everything one thinks and perceives about a conflict and therefore it is wiser to direct this discussion towards what is actually success within the conflict resolution field. That conversation will yield much more interesting and far-reaching results because once one has that definition one can then discuss the process of evaluation.

Naturally discussions about evaluation can still take place without a prior definition of what constitutes success and failure but just like a dog chasing his tail, all we would be doing is in fact trying to find ways to validate our definitions of success in the conflict resolution field by using words such as "objective", "measurable" and "identifiable". This would be rather unfortunate as a definition of success should be the product of awareness and contestation and not acted upon and "evaluated" upon without the sufficient reflexivity.

Success in Conflict Resolution

Success in conflict resolution is not easy to define because within the field itself there are various disagreements on what the goal of conflict resolution is. A word which is frequently used or mis-used is the word peace.

An etymological analysis of the word peace finds that the word descends from the latin word "pax" (Anderson 1985). Certainly the way that Roman understood and applied peace, the infamous "Pax Romana" is certainly not what we are looking here, because

such a peace involved the domination of the Roman peoples on the rest of the world, and if the latter resisted war and death were the result (Przetacznik 1999).

Religions have also known to enter the fray for a definition of peace. “Shalom” in the Jewish religion is equated with wholeness, justice and well-being (Anderson 1985). In India the Sanskrit word for peace is “Santi” which refers more to an ordered internal being rather than a political state of affairs (Anderson 1985). An external peace is referred to as “Samdhi” (Anderson 1985). The Chinese word “ho p’ing” or “p’ing ho” refers to a state of nature which matches the cosmic order of things, despite there not being any god (Anderson 1985). Similarly “heiwa” was used both by Samurai warriors and Buddhist monks as a justification of peace, one using a sword to attain that peace whilst the latter renouncing it (Anderson 1985). Christianity also provides a framework for peace particularly in Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount, in which making peace is specifically mentioned as one of the beatitudes and those who subsequently become peacemakers called the sons of God. It is clear that the debate on peace has been an ongoing one for many centuries and therefore it is best to turn to some more contemporary writers.

One of the earliest writers that understood the difficulty in defining peace was Johan Galtung. Galtung claimed that there are three kinds of peace (Galtung 1967). The first idea of peace is one which relates to stability or equilibrium which related both to an external and internal state of affairs. This kind of peace related also to the concept of law and order where the threat and use of violence could be used to bring about a predictive social order (Galtung 1967).

The two most interesting contributions that Galtung gave however to the concept of peace are his definition and discussions on positive and negative peace. Negative peace according to Galtung is the absence of collective violence between groups of people (Galtung 1967). This is not to say that sporadic outbursts and individual homicides are to be included within this concept but rather that peace of this kind ceases to exist when large groups of people engage in violence together (Galtung 1967). Galtung is critical of this particular brand of peace because in order to be sustained one would require or at the very least tolerate the presence of certain systemic structures that propagate severe forms of inequality, subservience and exploitation (Galtung 1967). Such a system would tolerate and accept feudal and colonial systems provided that they prevent outbursts of collective violence (Galtung 1967).

Positive peace on the other hand does not simply consist of the lack of collective violence. Instead such peace would also include within them positive values. Galtung comes up with a list of positive values that should be found within a situation of positive peace. The ten values he comes up with are:

- 1) Presence of cooperation: this would mean that the parties interact on a regular basis and there would be exchange of values, commodities, knowledge and people. This would require interdependence and is the opposite of isolationism.
- 2) Freedom from fear: this would be the absence of a situation wherein people would continuously and consistently live in a situation where they anticipate the occurrence of a major negative event, be it a natural calamity or the outbreak of violence

- 3) Freedom from want: this value refers to the basic needs that all human beings share, namely those of hunger, sex, thirst, shelter and basic security
- 4) Economic growth and development: this is the continuous development of economy and social organization so that the resources available per capita increase and resources are better distributed
- 5) Absence of exploitation: this relates to a situation of equity wherein individuals and states have exchanges at roughly the same value, therefore no nation or state will be able to take more value from a particular exchange than another
- 6) Equality: this value will mean that all individuals and groups will have essentially the same value and that extreme gaps in opportunities and resources are prohibited
- 7) Justice: this would incorporate many of the ideas of equality but at the same time include the notion of fundamental rights
- 8) Freedom of action: this would allow individuals and nations the possibility to conceive a course of action and have the means to carry them out. This concept could be problematic as this would require that different groups have some form of independence and that would go against the first principle.
- 9) Pluralism: this is a value that would allow cultural diversity and this diversity to live side by side.
- 10) Dynamism: Systems should also be built with the change mentioned in the previous value in mind.

Galtung acknowledges that these values can at times be contradictory and that not everyone would include these values as the basis for constructing a society. He believes that positive peace should be the basis on which peace is constructed and by which a situation is measured (Galtung 1967).

Galtung's work is not without its critics however, prominent amongst which is Boulding who initiates his critique by noting the normative tone that Galtung takes in his articles. He claims that at times Galtung's normative stance on issues at times is so strong that his description of reality suffers (Boulding 1977). This is a danger that all normative research suffers from according to Boulding yet Galtung becomes at times fully entrapped within this pitfall (Boulding 1977). The way that Galtung frames his arguments at times tends to be rather idealistic and abstract making it very difficult to criticize. Most writers and thinkers would like greater communication and interdependence between nation states, but how this is to be put into practice within the current state of affairs Galtung refrains from discussing. Neither does Galtung enter into the specifics of providing an alternative system of organizing international affairs, instead merely pointing out that a need for greater interdependence. A proper study of peace would entail a more detailed description of peace and how it is to be attained rather than merely give an abstract and utopian vision.

Another criticism that is put forward by Boulding is that Galtung tends to take a very positivistic outlook of the social world (Boulding 1977). Galtung according to Boulding tends employ taxonomic models on a social world that does not easily fit into these pigeon holes (Boulding 1977). A case in point is his dichotomous

view of positive and negative peace. In identifying two extremes but not providing a model in which the two are bridged and made into a spectrum so as to provide steps how one can move to another, Galtung's ideas of peace tend to be of limited use. It would be much more useful for peace theorists had Galtung given a model that treated negative and positive peace as ends on a spectrum and detailed the steps in the transition between the two with greater detail. Boulding also goes on to criticize the semantics of positive peace and negative peace. He believes that the two are not in fact diametric opposites, positive peace may even after all not deal with the concept of peace but rather with the concept of equality.

The concept of equality and the importance that it is given by Galtung provides the platform for Boulding to launch what is possibly his largest criticism, the values which constitute positive peace. Boulding does not in fact share Galtung's enthusiasm for the concept of equality. Equality according to Boulding can come at a high price to one's individual liberty and to quality within a society. Regarding the cost of equality Boulding uses Galtung himself as an example (Boulding 1977). Galtung being the outstanding thinker in his field participates in inequality simply because he has ideas and an articulation of such ideas which few in this field who are native speakers of English have, much less those who have learnt it as a second language as Galtung has. Had a stringent model of equality been imposed upon him he would not have been able to develop his thoughts and skills in the way he had. Certainly Galtung made much more money than most people within his field and this is justifiable according to Boulding because of the quality and the quantity of writings Galtung has

produced. A completely egalitarian society would have stifled such quality and would not have given it the rewards it deserves.

Boulding however doesn't stop there and claims that Galtung's strive for equality within his positive peace seems to reject hierarchy itself, because it blames the fact that power is concentrated as the reason why certain social evils exist (Boulding 1977). This isn't to say that there isn't a price to pay for hierarchies and that great injustices and social evils do stem from hierarchies themselves but rejecting hierarchies outright is quite impractical for societies with a large number of inhabitants. Boulding fears that getting rid of the top dogs of society indiscriminately can and generally tends to create space for top dogs that are even worse than the previous ones. This process rarely contributes to the necessary development needed in order to better those who are worse off within that society.

Boulding however does give what is probably an alternative to the terms positive and negative peace, which is a stable peace (Boulding 1963). Boulding immediately highlights one of the problems within peace research which is identifying an example of a successful model for peace. He attempts to do this using the Scandinavian countries and the relationship between the United States of America and Canada. However these countries are not without their problems as case studies. Primarily they talk about the relationships between two or more sovereign states. How can a stable peace be abstracted and applied within a state or even within a region of a state? Simply claiming that these sets of states have stable relationships which can be classified as peace, doesn't necessarily make them applicable as models for every kind of peace that is

required. Secondly both sets of countries that Boulding has chosen tend to be classified as “more developed” countries. What about states where poverty is rampant and perhaps respect for human rights is not such an ingrained feature of the way the state works? Will one still be able to apply the same metre and the same techniques? The answer is probably not. Therefore one finds problems even within Boulding’s definition of peace.

Another author who criticizes Galtung positive and negative peace is Bonisch. Bonisch claims that moving beyond the ‘mere absence of war’ as a definition of peace is something that Galtung should be credited for particularly as Galtung links structural power with the concept of positive peace (Bonisch 1981). He however finds a problem with the fact that Galtung does not sufficiently elaborate how the concepts of negative and positive peace relate to existing systems (Bonisch 1981). Bonisch finds that by avoiding the issue of property and production, Galtung’s theories becomes merely utopic and do not really provide a way to address the problem of peace.

Bonisch however does propose his own take on how peace is to be achieved. By following in the Marxist tradition Bonisch claims that inherent within the Capitalist system are such strains and antagonisms that render peace almost unattainable within such a system (Bonisch 1981). Bonisch posits that one needs to relate social progress to peace, because peace cannot be divorced from social laws. Bonisch continues by saying that working classes and workers from all over the world are now working together to ensure that the basic contradictions that cause war within societies all around the world are now resolved in a peaceful manner. This would go against the interests of the bourgeoisie who have managed to capitalize on the booming business of war and

ensured through several means that war is continuously waged in some form or another (Bonisch 1981). It is only when the working classes cooperating around the world can conflict particularly between states be prevented (Bonisch 1981).

Bonisch presents a very interesting Marxist take on the concept of peace. It is extremely refreshing to see that in his research he analyses the economic impacts of the war industry. Certainly any form of peace studies and any definition of peace cannot ignore the fact that war is a major industry that employs a very large number of people and that will touch on many livelihoods. It is not unreasonable to expect therefore a lot of resistance to any concept of peace, because a concept of peace will prejudice the livelihood of those who make a living through a war industry or through some ancillary industry that is heavily linked and dependent to war industries.

Bonisch's critique of Galtung that his concept of positive peace is divorced from the current reality of social systems particularly, by avoiding the issues of property and production, is also a very apt criticism. However Bonisch does not necessarily provide convincing alternatives. Bonisch claims that peace will occur when working classes from different parts of the world will work together to stop conflicts from occurring. This immediately creates some problems because underlying this assumption is the idea that working classes from all over the world have the same needs and identities. This criticism can indeed be passed onto the theories elaborated by Marx in general. By creating this supra identity of working class and workers, Marx seems to think that anyone from these classes will think and perceive the world very similarly simply because they are amongst the lowest classes in that particular society. But in the

real world do a Chinese Marxist and an American Marxist share that much in common? Will they be able to transcend differences in values, norms and at an even more basic level, languages, simply because they are amongst the poorest in their societies? Will they not compare their relative richness and poorness and is it completely inconceivable that another sub-class structure could emerge amongst the working class of different nations? The proposition that working class forces around the world will unite and become a voice for peace is very unlikely. Cultural differences will definitely hamper these relationships, and whilst they might not stop them completely, it is highly unlikely working classes from around the world can mobilize into one world unit that will act as an almighty force for peace.

Another scholar who discusses the concept of peace is Przetacznik. Przetacznik starts off his inquiry into what peace is by discussing a multitude of authors spanning from Roman times into present day authors (Przetacznik 1999). He critically analyses them and finds them to be either erroneous, lacking in practicality or at times merely a work of sophistry.

He however believes that peace is such a fundamental institution that it cannot be allowed to be taken over by impractical theorists that risk endangering peace. As a practitioner and a scholar himself he proposes that peace could be defined as having a dual quality (Przetacznik 1999). The first quality of peace is a sort of internal quality that must exist within the state and relationships between its citizens. The second quality of peace is that between states themselves and this must be a normal relationship based

on mutual recognition and observation of the rights and legal interests of each other (Przetacznik 1999).

As such a peace must have according to Przetacznik several characteristics:

- 1) It must have a strong presence of human rights: Przetacznik mentions the right to life, the right to a living, political freedom, freedom of religion, the right to work, the right to education, equality, freedom of expression, freedom of association, unrestricted freedom of movement within and outside of the country. All these rights need to be guaranteed by the state.
- 2) Any kind of oppression whether it is based on religious, political, economic or ideological must be forbidden by each state.
- 3) The right of self-determination must be guaranteed to all peoples and nations and must be strictly implemented by the state.
- 4) Foreign powers must not be allowed to occupy, subjugate or dominate other peoples
- 5) Disputes between states must be settled in the International Court of Justice

Przetacznik claims that if a peace does not contain these basic prerequisites, while it may stop fighting, it will do so only temporarily. Human rights according to Przetacznik, are the key to ensure a lasting peace (Przetacznik 1999).

Przetacznik's formulation of what an ideal peace looks like is very state-centric. It continuously refers to the state both in internal affairs and in external

affairs as the guarantor of peace. This notion of the state having such an important role can be very discomfoting because there are many instances where the greatest perpetrator of human rights breaches were states themselves. Placing such unmerited trust in the state can easily be a formula for more conflict rather than peace.

Przetacznik's peace is also very Western-centric with a very heavy emphasis on human rights and law. The idea of human rights is not an uncontested one and Eastern and Middle Eastern countries have noted their objections to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Framing the issue of peace in terms of human rights which have been perceived as being Western imposed values on the rest of the world might betray a hint of cultural imperialism that still lurks in the minds of theorists. It certainly does not help foster a dialogue with states that do not like the way human rights are formulated or imposed on them, despite the need to do so because peace is in their best interest.

Another problem present within Przetacznik's formulation peace is that at times the human rights he mentions are more prone to create conflict rather than peace. The one that stands out the most is the right to self-determination of peoples. It does so because this right of self-determination can only be recognized by a State. This presents a problem because if the right of self-determination needs to be recognized by a State, one can immediately see that right is actually going to create more conflict than peace. Few States will be eager and willing to share, limit or completely hand over their power easily.

Przetacznik's formulation takes on a very International Relations and legal tone. Such a tone can be dangerous when one discusses peace because it tends to be at its worst highly imposing and at best proselytizing. It also does not rely on arguments that are fully developed and does not always explain why we should adopt certain values but presumes that through a Western and Legal culture certain values are already adopted. This is not always the case particularly when dealing with different cultures and can therefore be a very grating experience to parties involved in a discussion of peace because they will dialogue past each other instead of with each other. An approach that is more aware of its assumptions and perhaps more eager to discuss and face contestation would be of more use to establish a common definition of peace.

Peace can be looked at in a variety of ways but Groff gives an overview of peace research that uses a classification system that involves starting from the most minimalistic definition of peace and ranges into the widest conception of such peace (Groff 2007). Groff divides conceptions of peace into seven categories:

- 1) Peace as the mere absence of war: this follows Galtung's concept of negative peace. In this conception of peace all that is needed for peace to exist is the subsistence of violence. Groff claims that this definition is most popular where violence is occurring on a daily basis. However this definition would simply stop here whereas the forthcoming definitions would include this criterion but require more.

- 2) Peace as a balance of forces in the international system: This conception of peace takes a very macro outlook of peace and would describe such a peace as being the balance political, economic, cultural and social factors
- 3) Peace as negative and positive peace: This is very much in line with Galtung's conception of negative and positive peace. Such an approach would highlight the need to tackle both the micro instances of overt violence as well as address the underlying structural violence.
- 4) Feminist Peace: this conception of peace extends Galtung's definition of positive peace from structural violence to include eliminating all forms of violence even down to the individual level. This conception of peace would include also micro level unorganized violence such as rape or domestic violence both in war and in outside of war.
- 5) Intercultural peace: This conception of peace focuses more on the notion that different cultures are ways of understanding a particular reality however not the ultimate reality. This understanding in turn will lead to the idea that each and every culture brings something new to the table of humanity, and will allow co-evolution of cultures not domination of one culture or religious experience over another.
- 6) Gaia Peace: This idea of peace focuses on the position of human beings within the natural environment. Peace therefore is not merely when human beings are

at peace with one another but have also come to respect and establish positive relationships with the entire bio-sphere we live in.

- 7) Inner and Outer peace: This conception would include the previous six but would include another dimension, the inner one. This conception of peace claims that the external reality is a mere manifestation of one's inner reality. Without peace in one's reality there therefore cannot be peace in one's external reality (Groff 2007).

Groff concludes that peace ought to be considered a multi-factored process and not limit itself to a particular dimension such as the lack of war (Groff 2007). Similarly the various dimensions operate at different levels and therefore one's conception of peace ought to be both multi-layered as well as multi-dimensional. Such a varied conception requires that peace is not thought of as merely the domain of states but also of a variety of actors (Groff 2007).

Peace also requires a certain reconciliation between opposing yet equally desirable values. Groff gives the example of diversity and unity. Peace according to Groff ought to give peoples the opportunity to develop their own sense of identity and distinctiveness but not do so in a bubble (Groff 2007). Peace requires that distinctiveness is developed whilst also acknowledging the things that as human beings we have in common. Neither homogenized unity nor radicalized diversity will lead to peace. Peace therefore requires the integrating of multiple requirements, often contradictory into one dynamic and coherent whole system.

Groff's idea of peace definitely sounds very good at least in theory, however in practice may be very hard to implement if not impossible. Her idea that peace requires multi-dimensional, multi-layered and contradictory requirements opens up excellent conceptual opportunities for a view on peace that will be more effective in practice. However Groff does not give a lot of indication on how to achieve her often conflicting criteria for peace.

Another very interesting perspective that is rarely mentioned in Western literature is the idea of internal peace affecting external peace. Whilst the idea of internal peace can immediately create a lot of controversy, because it can easily be used to impose an ideology of internal peace over another, it is definitely an interesting idea. Researchers coming from different fields such as psychology and theology might have a lot to contribute to the conflict resolution field which often focuses on interpersonal conflict and at times neglects intra-personal conflict (Hanh 1988).

A school of thought that has given significant contribution to the discussion on peace is undoubtedly the feminist one. Adopting a gendered approach to peace is a necessity because conflict and wars do not affect men and women, as well as boys and girls in the same way. Conflict and wars affect women and girls particularly in five ways (Mckay 2004):

- 1) Violence against women: Violence with a particular emphasis on rape has been used systematically in conflicts as a tool of war. This has not been limited to women only but females have endured the brunt of it more frequently

- 2) Gender inequality over resources: Resources are normally scarcer during conflict and post-conflict situations however women and girls tend to have even less access to said resources
- 3) Gender inequality in power and decision-making: Women constitute over half the population yet both throughout the conflict and in the peace-building efforts, women are continuously excluded from high level talks and negotiations. This leads to half the population being unrepresented during processes which will leave massive impacts on their daily life
- 4) Women as not merely victims but also actors: This is particularly important for post conflict societies where women are not given enough attention in the reintegration process because they are perceived as being merely camp followers or “wives” (Mckay 2004).

Feminist visions of peace vary greatly amongst themselves (Brock-Utne 1989,2003), (Reardon 1990) however they do have several common propositions. Peace for the feminist perspective is a cause of great concern, because the definition of peace as “going back to normal relations” is not a desirable state (Bunch 2003). Male dominance and its institutionalization is maintained by both overt violence and by systemic violence. War and armed conflict exacerbate such violence but do not necessarily create such violence. According to feminists it is the violence of “normal” life which is most concerning because after a conflict the domination and violation becomes normalized once again. Furthermore Bunch argues that when children are exposed to

gender violence on a daily basis, that violence becomes internalized and becomes the standard way of dealing with all social issues (Bunch 2003).

The feminist vision of peace therefore includes a situation where the daily violence that women and girls are subjected to is put to an end. Women are to be more integrated in political processes and have their human rights respected. The feminist perspective however does not simply stop at being more inclusive of women and girls but takes into account other groups which are underprivileged and vulnerable within a given society (Mckay 2004), (Bunch 2003).

The critique that is often forwarded towards feminists and which both McKay and Bunch acknowledge is that gendered outlooks are not static across cultures. On the contrary female experiences of conflict vary according to nationality, class, skin colour and culture. McKay herself goes on to argue that she has little experience of a conflict being herself a white female from America. However this critique is widely acknowledged within the feminist school of thought and a greater sensitivity to a particular context is pervading such literature.

Another criticism one can forward towards the feminist critique is the link that is drawn between violence within and between states and in public life and the one witnessed within the confines of the home. Undoubtedly witnessing such violence leaves an impact on one's perceptions as well as values particularly if one is a child but drawing such a broad link between state violence and domestic and gender violence seems to be a bit tenuous. The problems with this line of arguments are twofold. Feminists argue that gender violence in some form or another is ubiquitous and almost

pervades every culture, if that is so, what hope is there for any form of conflict resolution since so many of the participants have been exposed to this form of violence? If gender violence has indeed such an immediate causal effect on public violence then resolution is impossible because participants and interveners have all been exposed to this violence and cannot stop the cycle as it were. The second problem is that such a framing seems to underestimate the presence of other factors that can lead to violence, such as identity issues, security issues as well as economic issues. Gender violence is undoubtedly a negative phenomenon which needs to be addressed, however the feminist claim and framing that it is almost one of the sole causal factors of violence needs to be highly qualified.

A final critique one can put towards the feminist vision of peace is that it is perhaps too ambitious. This is not to say that gender inequality is a just and desirable phenomenon, it is not. However to change gender roles that have pervaded the history of mankind for generations should not be put under the umbrella of peace but should be a struggle in its own right. Adding the re-adjustment of gender roles may be a burden which could be too onerous to be achieved within a peace framework. This however does not invalidate the feminist claim that peace ought to be achieved even within the walls of the home and that gender violence is part of the problem.

Conclusion

It is clear from this literature review that an evaluation of peace is intrinsically linked with one's definition of peace, however an all-encompassing yet practical and empirically measurable definition of peace is hard to come by. What is

immediately clear is that all the authors agree that peace constitutes more than the absence of war. However different authors have given different formulas such as human rights, states as benevolent guardians, elimination of inequality and discrimination, democracy and interdependence of parties concerned.

The objective of this thesis is to ascertain whether there is such a peace within post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first theoretical understanding that need to be applied to this project is that measuring peace therefore requires more than simply ascertaining whether there is overt violence or not. Violence in and of itself is also a difficult concept to define. Violence in its simpler form is when a party physically harms another party. However harm can also go beyond the physical aspect as well as one can see in the concept of gender violence. Male domination is a form of violence because it creates a sense of inequality between the sexes, yet it is not enforced solely by physical harm and threats to such harm, but it is enforced through societal structures that allow such domination to exist. This form of systemic violence will also be explored in this thesis as domestic violence will be one of the measures for the presence of peace or otherwise.

Apart from overt violence or negative peace, one also requires that relationships between the parties at conflict are harmonious. This thesis will bank heavily on Galtung's idea of positive peace and whether this exists or not in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This dimension of peace will utilize Groff's idea of distinctiveness in giving the three major groups within Bosnia and Herzegovina the possibility of expressing and developing their own identity whilst at the same time ensuring that this

identity is not developed in isolation and that contact, interdependence and even integration is present within the Bosnian state. Harmonious relationships will therefore be measured with the level of autonomy each of the three ethnic groups has as suggested by Przetacznik whilst at the same time monitoring for integration as suggested by Galtung and Groff.

These two theoretic ideas of violence or lack thereof as well as harmonious relationships will form the basis for measurement of peace within this thesis. Whilst one can note the heavy influence that Galtung has on these theoretic underpinnings, these have not been implemented lock, stock and barrel but instead have been somewhat modified so that violence can also be understood to be systemic violence, whilst the understanding of positive peace is more or less the same.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The methodological approach chosen in this thesis has been that of a secondary sourced based analytical thesis. It has utilized statistical data whenever this was possible in order to make a qualitative judgement.

Measuring Peace

Measuring peace within a state is no mean feat particularly because as was seen in the literature review, each author brings on their own particular flavour and ideas to what peace exactly constitutes. Developing a framework to measure and analyze peace is not an easier task because inherent within such a framework will be theoretical underpinnings of the idea of peace.

Looking at the different literature on the nature of peace, one idea that seemed to be pervasive was the idea that there was more to peace than the absence of war. Authors differed on how many states there were and what was the nature of each state but at the very least most would have agreed that lack of violence and some sort of harmonious interactions between the people of a particular area would be a very rudimentary definition of peace.

In this thesis the framework used to measure peace bases itself on these two ideas but utilizes the definitions and ideas that were flesh out by Royce Anderson. Anderson claims that there are at least two dimensions to peace, violence or rather the lack thereof

which is highly analogous to Galtung's idea of negative peace and the building of sustainable and harmonious relationships between the parties involved in a conflict (Anderson 2004).

Absence of Violence

This criteria of measuring peace prima facie looks like it is very obvious and easy to define, however once one starts delving into what exactly is violence, it is clear that such a concept is not as clear as one thought. Very obvious examples of violence such as killing and war are very easy to categorize as falling within the definition of violence so a reduction of these phenomena would amount to some measure of peace, however violence can be a much more complicated and multi-faceted issue. Galtung's own definitions of cultural or systemic violence did not necessarily amount to deaths which is a more visible and overt form of violence although transition into this form of violence is not precluded either (Anderson 2004).

In this section a theoretical discussion of what is violence will not be undertaken because that would not be the scope of such a section. Instead while accepting that violence is a phenomenon that exists and that is harmful, the discussion shall center on how to operationalize the definition of violence into one which is measurable and discussable.

Anderson suggests that one ought to take as a measure of reduction of violence the amount of deaths caused through war and other forms of collective violence (Anderson 2004). This very narrow statistical approach was seen as not conducive to the broad aims of analysis and discussion of this thesis. Using the concept of the reduction of

violence this thesis has used a much broader idea of violence than Anderson would have to measure peace.

The first criteria utilized is that of organized crime. When looking at statistics by the World Health Organization for deaths caused by war or crime, the number was relatively low, yet many authors agreed that crime particularly organized crime was pervasive phenomenon within Bosnian and Herzegovinian society. Organized crime was deemed to be a kind of violence because primarily it is illegal and also the act of running some sort of illegal business or racket when one has the opportunity to search for profit within legal means (at least in theory) is an act of violence against the state and the values the states stands for. Apart from that organized crime prone to use highly coercive and violent means in order to promote and maintain its business interests. It seemed therefore that conducting a study and looking at organized crime allowed for an understanding into a phenomenon that was both a producer of overt violence such as murder, kidnappings and human trafficking, as well as looking at a macro level phenomenon that could possibly be a form of ideological violence aimed at the idea and creation of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter reason makes much more sense when one sees the great link between the fighting and organized criminality during the war years.

The second criterion that was used as a measure of violence was that of domestic violence. The idea to use this criterion emerged from the feminist literature that was presented in the literature review chapter of this thesis. Feminist literature is highly aware that violence is not experienced equally by everyone across the human race and that there is a gendered dimension to violence. Women do not tend to experience violence the same

way that men do and it therefore made sense to look at violence in a very micro perspective in a way that happened between individuals and within the same household.

This particular form of violence was particularly relevant in Bosnia and Herzegovina because many of the men were involved in the war effort on some front, which essentially meant two things. The first was that many of the men returned with a host of psychological problems such as Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome as well as the proliferation of arms from the war period was great. Both these factors meant that there was a higher incidence that men particularly soldiers returning from the war were prone to domestic violence.

Domestic violence was therefore the more individual measure of violence that was experienced directly by the individuals and complemented well the organized crime which was more a macro perspective phenomenon. Together these two criteria would give an indication of the success of post-war reconciliation process that ought to occur within a post-conflict society.

Harmonious Relationships

The next section of the thesis will measure peace by trying to measure harmonious relationships. Given Bosnia and Herzegovina's past one of the key ways to measure whether there are harmonious relationships is to try and look out for integration. With three major ethnicities and a score of minorities, it is evident that issues of identity are going to be very salient. This thesis has not tried to deal with issues of identity on a purely theoretic level but has instead concentrated how such issues are manifest through integration or further fragmentation in the fields of political systems and education.

The field of political systems was chosen because it is perhaps the most formal demonstration of the relationships between the constituent people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Understanding the way the political system works and the kind of parties that operate within this system is important in order to measure the level of integration and harmonious relationships that exist within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whilst politics and political systems should not be the sole measure of harmony and integration within a post-conflict state and do not always accurately measure what is happening at grass roots level, it is undeniable that politics has a very influential role in determining harmonious relationships. Good law and good governance as well as a fair and impartial judiciary go a long way to establish the social cohesiveness of a country.

The next criterion to be examined is that of education. Whilst looking at the political systems that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina makes sense in order to try and get a current picture of the situation within the country, education is extremely important because the future citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to pass through this system. The kind of citizens and the values that are being passed on within the Bosnian educational system will undoubtedly affect the harmonious relationships both in the present between the student population itself and in the future, when these students will be the current citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this section a particular choice had to be undertaken because there are many indicators that can be used to indicate the level of harmonious relationships. Two other factors were in fact seriously considered for examination. The first factor that was considered being explored was cultural integration. The idea behind this factor was to

explore in the field of drama, art, music and other artistic enterprises whether there had been any form of crossover between the ethnicities. The problem with this criterion of measuring harmonious relationships was that in order to better understand and fully assess the data at hand, a certain level of proficiency would be required in the native languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately this is not a skill set that the author has.

The next criterion that was being considered was that regarding the economic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At first glance one might consider that the economy is not immediately related to harmonious relationships within a post-war country, however in order to have a strong economy with high levels of employment and development a post-war country needs to work together. The problems with these criteria were twofold. On the one hand the abundance of literature and data would have required an entire thesis rather than a section of chapter to do it justice. On the other really understanding and interpreting certain data on the economy require that one has a certain knowledge and understanding of economics which the author does not have.

Another consideration that was made was whether the section on harmonious relationships would look into four criteria briefly or rather delve into two in further depth. The decision to look into two criteria in greater detail was preferred. In this way I could limit the scope of this study in order to ascertain as much as possible the accuracy of the information used for the analysis section and subsequently the conclusions derived therefrom.

Sources

This thesis has been conducted using secondary sources as the data which is subsequently to be analyzed. The reason for this methodological decision is that studying the nature of peace within Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very broad and generic area of study, even if this is subsequently narrowed down to four areas of study. This means that in order to get as broad an idea as possible, it was more feasible to look at documents of authors and agencies that had done fieldwork within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conducting fieldwork myself and bringing original data into the thesis to be analyzed would have required sacrificing the scope of the thesis and narrow the area of study even further. This would not have been an adequate research strategy because as indicated in the peace literature, peace is such a multi-faceted reality that one needs as broad a picture as is possible to measure and analyze the quality of such peace.

Another decision which had to be made regarding the nature of sources I would be analysing was whether the focus would be mainly on quantitative data gathered from the field or qualitative. In this thesis I chose to focus mainly on quantitative sources rather than qualitative sources as this was more conducive to the kind of macro-level approach employed in this thesis.

Another reason why quantitative studies were in generally preferred as sources of data for analysis over qualitative relates to the nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. Within the Bosnian state and as a result of the war a climate of extreme ethno-politicization exists. Issues such as education and crime which normally fall out of the ambit of political arena become highly sensitized political issues generally relating to the power struggles and political elbowing of the three main ethnicities. This meant that

when dealing with qualitative data one had to be even more appreciative of the fact that trying to ascertain facts through interviews or discussions with individuals everything had to be filtered and understood through a political lens. This would have made the data obtained very useful if one is gauging and measuring individual or perhaps group perception of a situation but for a more objective and balanced view of the macro situation, such data would have been less adequate.

In each section an attempt was made to use local data, so when statistics and figures were given preference was given to those published by a local agency or author over those given by international authors or agencies. This was done in an attempt to get data that was as close to the ground as possible. However it is clear that most who conduct a study and subsequently publish it, have a reason and an agenda in mind for doing so. In this thesis it was attempted as much as possible to avoid the analyses of such authors and organizations and instead use solely the data they had gathered. This is not to say that biases and political leanings have been completely rooted out and the data used is completely objective. However whenever using particularly statistical data, this was done with an awareness that it could be biased and refrained as much as possible from taking on board without critical reflection of the conclusions of author or organization who published the study.

Weaknesses of the Research Undertaken

One of the weaknesses of this thesis is the scope of the study undertaken.

Answering questions on the nature of peace within Bosnia and Herzegovina looking only at four criteria lessens the generalizability of certain of the conclusions arrived to in the

section on analysis. This weakness in the research design whilst acknowledged is hard to eliminate because in order to undertake studies of harmony and violence across various fields within Bosnia and Herzegovina requires resources that few individual researchers possess.

Another problem within the research is the fact that secondary sources are used. Whilst earlier on within this section, this choice has been justified because of a lack of resources and because of the scope of the thesis itself is quite macro in nature rather than micro, one has to accept that at least some of the sources have biases. This is especially true when using sources of local authors and organizations. Provision has been made whenever possible through a critical reading of such data and resources, however it is not entirely possible to ensure that all biases particularly those ingrained not within the conclusions but within the research designs of the studies mentioned.

Another flaw within the research relates to the usage of secondary sources. Whenever possible an attempt was made to use the most recent statistics and studies available, however this was not always possible. Certain areas did not always have data and statistics that were recent some reaching back to well over a decade. This problem was unavoidable however because when one uses secondary sources, one is subjected to what one finds and the prerogative of choice is not always possible.

Conclusions

Despite some of the flaws mentioned in the previous subsection, this thesis endeavours to look at violence and harmonious relationships using unique criteria that are not often analysed together in studies. Taking mostly a macro approach but also inserting

some micro perspectives by adding some qualitative studies, this thesis will endeavour to look at the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and try to see whether systemic peace is present throughout this state. The results of such research will be then be discussed in the light of Dayton Accords to see whether the current state of affairs within Bosnia and Herzegovina is due to the constitutional set up imposed by the Dayton Accords or whether they are problems inherent to a post-conflict society that is still in recovery. Wherever possible the most recent research was used so that the most current picture of the situation in Bosnia can be obtained.

CHAPTER 4: VIOLENCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In this chapter the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be reviewed in regards to the violence criterion as explained in the methods section. The first and most obvious form of violence that would come to mind would be the political violence that led to the war. In this thesis however the analysis has been narrowed down to phenomena occurring within the time period after the signing of the Dayton Accords. In that way one can then proceed to analyse the role Dayton has played within Bosnian society.

The approach taken in this chapter has been to focus on two particular aspects of violence: a particular phenomenon that is treated with a macro-perspective lens and one that is treat with a micro-perspective lens. The phenomenon that will be investigated is using a macro-perspective is that of organized crime. Organized crime plays a special role within the Bosnian Society especially during the war. This chapter will try to analyse the state of organized crime particularly after Dayton and review how and to what degree this phenomenon has been contained.

The next phenomenon that will be reviewed is domestic violence. In order to establish the presence and degree of violence within Bosnian society, one also needs to look at the micro-perspective. No place is better to start than from the familial household. Looking at certain statistics and studies which have taken place will show to what degree

violence still forms part of the daily interactions of individuals particularly women and girls.

A bunch of text that says something profound will soon appear in this document.

Organized Crime

The first criterion that will be investigated to measure violence in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is that of organized crime. Stating that there is at the very least a correlation between the presence of crime, particularly organized crime, and violence is nothing more than a tautology. However using the criterion of organized crime to measure the violence is not as straight-forward. Organized crime has become a transnational reality and with the improvement of communications technology this is even more so. The question that arises is therefore, why should organized crime be used to measure peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina when even “peaceful” states such as the United States, Switzerland or even Germany have many instances and many examples of organized crime? The answer to this question can be found within the war period in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the early days of the Bosnian War the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats did not have much of an army and therefore required the quick mustering of an armed force of some sort. In order to meet with this rapid demand both sides made extensive use of paramilitary groups that were in fact made up of criminal elements (Donais 2010). The Bosnian Serbs also made extensive use of paramilitary organizations made up criminal elements. A U.N. Commission of Experts identified some eighty-six paramilitary organizations. Some fifty-six were Serbian containing forces between 20,000-40,000

members, thirteen were Croatian containing between 12,00-14,000 and fourteen were Bosnian containing between 4000-6,000 members. All in all there were between 36,000-60,000 members of paramilitary organization mostly established out of criminal organizations (Kaldor2007).

These paramilitary organizations thrived throughout the war because with the lack of appropriate state structures, most were free to do what they pleased without any form of control. They were also used by the three sides to commit acts of war and to carry out their “dirty work” (Donais 2010). Payment for the services offered often came in the form of the right to loot first and this created a dynamic where parties in the war were not necessarily interested in political gain or military conquest but rather created a self-sustaining economy that thrived because of the war and therefore had an interest in prolonging it as much as it could (Kaldor2007). Despite the major role that organized crime played throughout the war, it would be misleading to think that this phenomenon started to exist during the war. Criminal organizations have had an important role within the region much before the onset of the war (Glenny 2001).

The end of the war with regards to organized crime effectively meant two things. Firstly that this was an important means of survival, since the shadow economy supported those whom the formal economy had allowed to fall beneath the poverty line and secondly, the war had fostered important relationships between political elites and the criminal underworld. Naturally after the war these relationships and this position of power both political and economic did not simply disappear and as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Bosnia reported in 2000, ‘war-time underground

networks have turned into [political] criminal networks involved in massive smuggling, tax evasion, and trafficking in women and stolen cars'.

The presence of organized crime is therefore a very important indicator and measurement of peace because of the important role that it played throughout the Bosnian War.

The next issue one needs to address is why organized crime is being tackled within the violence aspect rather than the harmony aspect. The first and most obvious answer is expediency. Measuring harmonious relationships has so many dimensions that adding the dimension of organized crime would simply be looking at another facet of a very complicated issue, whereas analysing it under the aspect of violence would do it more justice. The second and more important reason is that while crime and violence has already been discussed in this chapter and an argument can be made for the psychological effects of war on individuals and how this leads to violence within a society. It is much more interesting to look at violence that is committed with an end in mind and in a somewhat organized way. This is made even more relevant when the extent of possibility to commit this violence is a result of the war itself. An analysis of organized crime as a measure of violence that is still present within Bosnia and Herzegovina therefore becomes an important indicator of violence because of its strong relationship with the war itself and because of the higher destructive potential of organized violence than a series of individual acts of violence.

Organized Crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war

The post-war era that was ushered in by the Dayton Accord created many opportunities for organized crime to flourish. The highly decentralized nature of the cantons allowed for ineffective institutions that would have stemmed the tide of organized crime, which instead are rendered ineffective because the power-sharing mechanism is not clear (Brady 2012).

The relationships that were formed during the war also came into play with the political elites having strong relationships with organized crime. This symbiosis of the criminal element with political elite is said to have contributed to the slow application of Rule of Law in the post-war period in Bosnia. In particular the porous borders and the lack of rule of law aided greatly the trafficking of illegal weapons to other conflict zones such as Iran (Azinovic et. 2011). Former soldiers and middlemen quickly adapted to the “peace” and became involved in multi-ethnic criminal networks (Andreas 2004). Ironically the criminal underworld had achieved a level of integration that the official state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not.

The routes that had previously been used throughout the war to smuggle heroin now were no longer used for that purpose. Instead the routes were expanded to smuggle people (Montanaro-Jankowski 2005). Men were forced into labour, women were forced into prostitution and Roma children were used for begging (Anastasijevic 2006). The lack of Rule of Law as well as a very strong presence of internationals equated for 70% of the traffickers profits (Schroeder et. 2009).

Another lucrative enterprise that organized crime partook in was cigarette smuggling. The Italian Guardia de Finanza compiled a report which linked multinational

tobacco companies and Balkan government in cigarette smuggling rings (Brady 2012). From 1995-1999 Bosnia and Herzegovina remained a warehouse facility for smuggled cigarettes. In 1998 the E.U. Anti-Fraud office estimated that members states were offset by 4.7 billion euros in tax revenue owed on cigarettes (Brady 2012). Each container was worth a million euro in tax revenue and was therefore a very profitable enterprise for organized crime (Brady 2012).

Between 2000 and 2005 the High Representative Paddy Ashdown a number of new agencies were set up to combat organized crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These included several intelligence agencies, a court with specialized chambers dealing with organized crime and a ministry of defence as well as a unified defence force of Bosnia (Asinovic 2011). During these five years five billion dollars were spent on restructuring (Asinovic et. 2011). These attempts were complemented by the European Union Police Mission as well as EUFOR which was established in 2004. These attempts by the E.U. were unfortunately ineffective in implementation and at times there was an overlapping of portfolios (Brady 2012).

Organized crime during these five years saw significant increases. The latter were in highly intertwined relationships with political structures, the police and the secret service (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). The gangs and organizations themselves saw a great networking with some forming instrumental links with Italian and Russian gangs in order to traffic counterfeit dollar, arms and migrants (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). In the area of vehicle theft Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian groups cooperated together, resulting in Bosnia and Herzegovina being known for its major market in stolen cars (Donais

2003). It has been suggested that this could only take place with the cooperation of high and low level officials and politicians. The state of corruption was not simply something that existed at higher levels but existed even at every day levels bribes paid to police officers and other service providers would avoid one prosecution (Brady 2012). Bribes were also used to speed up slow and bureaucratic processes. Corruption was held not as simple a phenomenon but as a state of mind held by the vast majority of people (Brady 2012).

The Republika Srpska lost five hundred million KM because of excise and tax evasion (Donais 2003). This amount is nearly equivalent to its entire annual budget (Donais 2003). Another study reported that 10% of total business expenses were dedicated to bribes (Donais 2003). Corruption of this nature and degree was attributed to factors such as low wages, inefficient penal policies, poor human resources and unaudited powers of customs authorities as well as no rigid trade policies and commercial protectionism (Donais 2003).

During this period the intelligence services had several problems including; outdated equipment and undertrained officers (Brady 2012). The forces were highly decentralized which led to very little cooperation and several cross jurisdictional issues (Muehlmann 2008). The situation was made worse because of the ties that organized crime had with political elites, this in effect guaranteed that legal, political and economic reform was slow.

Despite the establishment of the Border Police in 2003 an increase of human trafficking into and through Bosnia was registered (Muehlmann 2008). The trade of

women produced high revenues each month and was largely related to sex and prostitution. The groups managing this enterprise seemed to be very well organized and well-connected enough to avoid prosecution (Donais 2003). It was alleged that there were strong indications of collusions between the authorities and groups who were involved in human smuggling and trafficking, even at the highest tiers (Donais 2003). Some have argued that the presence of international bolstered the demand for the sex trade whilst others have gone as far as saying that there was direct involvement in this sex trade from the part of internationals (Brady 2012).

Illegal arms also continued being sold and supplied during this period of time. Some of the weapons made their way to Kosovo in an operation that was allegedly organized by Agencija za Istrazivanja Dokumentacija (AID) and which also included top officials from the Ministry of Defence (Curtis et. 2002). The weapons operations were becoming so organized at a point that several intelligence agencies found links between the IRA and ETA and weapons originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia (Curtis et. 2002). The weapons were allegedly paid for with Colombian cocaine (Curtis et. 2002). Weapons were however not only imported out of Bosnia and Herzegovina but also into it. Reports claim that almost all the murder and suicides in which firearms were involved in Canton Sarajevo in 2003 were using weapons that were not licensed (Brady 2012). Other crimes such rapes, robbers and drug related crimes were also committed with illegally held weapons (Brady 2012). Despite U.S. sponsored programmes to destroy surplus weapons of national armies in the Western Balkans many

remained in the hands of civilians or in poorly guarded army stockpiles (Anastasijevic 2006).

During the period of the early 2000's the southern branch of the Balkan drug route had a re-emergence (Anastasijevic 2006). Despite dominance from the Kosovo Albanians who still imported 80% of Europe's Heroin a shift in the importation of Colombian cocaine was made, which shifted the route from Spain to the West Balkans (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). Whilst Serbia played a significant role in the heroin and synthetic drug market, Macedonia in its production of precursor chemicals, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a haven for drug trafficking and became known as a significant opiate and marijuana transit point (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). It is reported that of the drugs that passed through Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 20% were retained for domestic purposes (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). These facts show clearly that the problem of organized crime and in particular narcotics go beyond the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina but are part of a wider regional problem plaguing the Balkans.

In the period between 2000 and 2005 a great increase in corrupt practices was registered. Two particular examples of corruption that stood out in this period were relating to tax evasion and conflict of interest. In the first example a minister was forced to resign over a customs scandal in which textile imports were being evaluated at figure of around 90% less and which therefore meant that less tax had to be paid, in return of km14000 bribe per shipment (Brady 2012). This scandal allegedly cost the Republika Srpska around 30 million KM (Brady 2012). The other example related to mismanagement of state hydro electric utilities in the Republika Srpska and western

Herzegovina which through an international audit was found to be losing upward of 166 million KM annual through mismanagement, conflict of interest, theft and neglect (Brady 2012).

The lack of rule of law and implementation of new legislation allowed a breeding ground for money laundering. It is estimated that 3 billion KM was laundered through Bosnia and Herzegovina (Donais 2003). Reports by the Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office claimed that on high excise goods such as fuel, tobacco and alcohol no more than 40% of tax was paid on them (Donais 2003). Cigarette smuggling remained a problem with Swiss Banks and Institutions aiding such smuggling because smuggling cigarettes was not a crime in cigarettes providing they were not sold in Switzerland. Using shell companies in Switzerland groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina would buy large quantities of duty free cigarettes from multi-national tobacco companies (Brady 2012). However by the end of 2005 the practice of cigarette smuggling was greatly diminished because legal and civil action was taken on a more serious and consistent level and therefore the practice was not as risk free as it used to be (Brady 2012).

One of the major problems in the fight with organized crimes was that the Dayton process had left a very fragmented Bosnia that was despite some small parties run by three major factions. This meant that within the different cantons existed different laws which could be used by criminals to their advantage. Moves towards harmonization between the cantons insisted upon by the E.U., were resisted as local politicians (Muehlmann 2008). On the other hand organized crime was extremely efficient, multi-ethnic and cross border (Anastasijevic 2006). The complacency by the political elites to

create legislation and initiatives to improve the fight on organized crime meant that most initiatives to fight organized crime were not driven locally but internationally (Anastasijevic 2006). This meant that money and energy that could have been used to target other areas became targeted at organized crime.

The link between weapons and narcotics was still very evident even in the latter part of the noughties, where weapon cargoes were often also found to contain drugs (Anastasijevic 2006). In Bosnia and Herzegovina there was no specific agency to target narcotics. Police on the local level were not equipped to deal with organized crime. In Kosovo it was alleged that criminals had more power than politicians and Bosnian Herzegovinian groups were deeply involved within the Balkan drug rings (Brady 2012).

Despite some minor improvements in the last few years, it is claimed that the Dayton approach and the 'soft power' approach to implementing Dayton has created an environment where organized crime can thrive (Brady 2012). It is held that the ethnic divides as well as the diversity of regulations amongst the cantons and the lack of political will due to corruption, keeps organized crime flourishing. The decision taken in 2009 not to extend the mandate for international judges and prosecutors to work on cases of organized crime seems to have made the level of political interference worse (Brady 2012). Popular fears seem to claim that organized violence on a level different from the present may yet be seen again (Brady 2012).

Organized Crime therefore seems to be still plaguing Bosnia and Herzegovina and creates an environment of instability and lack of security. As some of the authors that have been mentioned here have contended, the Dayton agreement with its decentralized

nature along ethnic lines seems to have amplified and created a space for organized crime to flourish. Despite being mentioned previously in this chapter it is an astounding irony that while the official state structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina have seemingly not fully been integrated and are still maintained along ethnic lines, organized crime seems to have transcended these ethnic lines and has developed into an organized, hierarchical and multi-ethnic system. It seems that whilst these desirable results were not achieved through Dayton in the official organs of the state, Dayton has managed to bring together the different ethnicities in the pursuit of organized crime.

The prevalence of organized crime within Bosnia and Herzegovina raises worrying questions that spill over to the political fora. The presence of organized crime and the level of cooperation it finds within the political system raises questions as to whether the majority of Bosnian and Herzegovinian society recognize the legitimacy of the state and the subsequent rule of law that emanates from the machinery of the state. Opportunism would definitely explain why organized crime has such a foothold within Bosnia and Herzegovina, many who would find a chance to become richer in a quicker manner than in a legal way would at the very least consider if not commit crime. However there could be deeper reasons as to why organized crime is so prevalent. Issues such as a stagnant economy and political discontent with legitimacy and constitutional set up of the Bosnian state could also play a role in motivating people to participate in organized crime. It is not easy to draw such causal links without looking at other phenomena within Bosnian society, yet these questions will remain lurking all throughout this thesis.

Gender-Based Violence

Gender-Based Violence is a complex phenomenon that describes harmful acts that are perpetrated against a person's will and which are based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between males and females. As a result of historical subordination of women and girls to men and boys, women and girls have traditionally been more frequently the targets of such violence. However this form of violence has not and is not exclusively targeted towards women and girls and at certain points men and boys have also been targeted.

In this particular sub-chapter while the whole of gender violence will be mentioned and explored in the context of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, special attention will be given to particular kind of gender violence which is known as domestic violence.

As stated in gender violence most victims of such violence are normally women and girls however not exclusively. Children of either sex and older members of the family have also been victims of domestic violence perpetrated by females. Although less common males too have been the subject of female domestic violence however demographics show that it is more common for males to be perpetrators of such violence.

Domestic violence has in general one aim in general, that of controlling the behaviours of other members of the family using a variety of means. Whilst physical violence can leave more visible effects at times one of the most dangerous and debilitating forms of domestic violence is emotional abuse. Acts of emotional abuse can comprise

- 1) Insults that can undermine and injure a person's image and self-confidence and can take a variety of forms
- 2) Rejection can take direct or indirect form which tries to elicit in the victim feelings of unworthiness
- 3) Emotional threats or blackmail: statements that trap victims into confusion which gives power to the abuser over them
- 4) Possessive and punitive behaviour: this involves treating the other person as personal property and denying the other person the possibility of development
- 5) Basing relationships on unrealistic expectations
- 6) Threats to harm or take away the children
- 7) Financial extortion and/or blackmail

Physical violence on the other hand need not always include bodily harm, damage to property and shows of force also send a clear message to victims that the abuser is stronger and not afraid to use that strength against them. Examples of physical violence include:

- 1) Damaging property when angry
- 2) Pushing ,slapping ,biting and kicking
- 3) Strangulation
- 4) Abandoning partner in a dangerous or unfamiliar place
- 5) Scaring by driving recklessly
- 6) Use of weapon to threaten or hurt

- 7) Forcing to leave home
- 8) Trapping partner in the home or keeping from leaving
- 9) Preventing the victim from calling police or seeking medical attention
- 10) Hurting children
- 11) Withholding or limiting food and water
- 12) Using physical force in sexual situations

Another form of domestic violence takes place in the form of sexual violence. As in physical abuse the nature of the violence can take very direct forms such as rape but may also vary to other abusive acts with the intent to control the partner that have a sexual nature or element. Some can involve:

- 1) accusations of cheating
- 2) Being overly jealous of outside relationships with friends, family, etc
- 3) coercion or forcing to dress in a sexual way
- 4) sexual insults or using unwanted sexual names
- 5) forced or pressured sex or performance of sexual acts
- 6) threats to cheat or get sex elsewhere (prostitutes, affairs)
- 7) demeaning comments about a person's sexual performance
- 8) guilt or coercion to get sex
- 9) holding down during sex
- 10) demanding sex when partner is sick, tired or after physical violence
- 11) hurting with weapons or objects during sex

12) involving other people in sexual activities without consent (Judicial Benchbook 2014)

Domestic violence is not unproblematic as a marker of violence or lack thereof in a post-conflict state because, one could argue that domestic violence takes place in every country in the world and is more pertinent to a discussion about gender roles and identities than a discussion about peace. However while the commonplace nature of domestic violence is hardly disputable fact, domestic violence can play a very particular role in post-conflict situations. A qualitative study of domestic violence found that the general characteristic of domestic violence that was studied, had as a point of origin the return of soldiers from the war (Nikolic-Ristanovic 1996), (Banjoo 2013).

Soldiers returning from the war brought with them guns and other weapons and used them to molest or threaten partners or relatives (Banjoo 2013). Substance abuse in particular alcohol started becoming more common and made matter worse. The politicization of ethnicity during the war became a point of contention particularly in inter-ethnic marriages, where the ethnicity was used as a justification for the abuse (Nikolic-Ristanovic 1996). In the period between 1971-1991 between 9-12% of all the married couples were inter-ethnic. In the period after the war the highest rate of interethnic marriages was of 7% (Ahmic 2014). This clearly shows that ethnicity became a very salient factor in the choice of partners (Ahmic 2013). This raises a host of questions about the nature of the relationship between inter-ethnic couples who were married before the war, and how they subsequently handled the politicization of ethnic identity.

The economic situation that occurred at the end of the war also contributed to the rise in domestic violence. Men in particular did not have a job and frequently resorted to substance abuse and domestic violence as alternatives. Women on the other hand found it much harder to find jobs and gain economic independence. This in turn exacerbated the situation of domestic violence because women who were being abused could not leave the household because they were dependant on males for income and shelter.

Domestic violence therefore is an important indicator in the Bosnian case study for violence within the society particularly because it has special links with the war time due to the affects of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, but also is related to the state of the economy that came into effect post-Dayton. Measuring Domestic violence and seeing the state of affairs for this unfortunate phenomenon therefore allows one to measure how the effects of the war as well as the Daytonian peace are being lived out in the day to day lives of Bosnian men, women and children.

The Extent of Domestic Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Looking at facts and statistics prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and comparing them to the post-war period would have been the ideal exercise. This would have allowed one to measure the effect of the war on domestic violence and whether the newly established peace was being effective to diminish this phenomenon possibly to even less than pre-war levels. Unfortunately such data is not present as statistics were not kept on this phenomenon prior to the war (Avdibegovic et. 2006).

A study published by the Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2013 that took samples from of the Agency for Statistics of B&H, Republic Institute of

Statistics of Republika Srpska and the Federal Institute of Statistics using a methodology established by the United Nation Economic Commission for Europe. The survey was conducted over 3300 households in appropriate representative subsamples of for the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This study will be the only source used for statistics for several reasons; firstly it is carried out by a government agency that has wider access to statistics than most other NGO's who issue studies with statistics. Secondly the reason that no comparative research is being shown is because unless a standard methodological approach has been used, it is useless comparing studies. Different research techniques and samples would mean that one would not be necessarily be talking on the exact same phenomena. Differing definitions and sampling choices would give results that would not be comparable and would be comparing apples to oranges. For this reason it has been decided that this comprehensive study will be the sole source of statistics for domestic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in this thesis.

The research found that almost half the women that were surveyed had experienced at least one form of violence from the age of 15, this amounted to 47.2 % in the Federation and 47.3% in Republika Srpska (Pg 13). During the 12 months preceding the study it was found that 12.7% had experienced some form of violence in the Federation whilst 10.6 % had experienced some form of violence in the Republika Srpska (Babovic pg.13).

The most common form of violence would fall under the category of psychological violence with 41.9% of the participants claiming that they had suffered some form of psychological violence throughout their lives from the age of 15 whereas 10.8% had

experienced some form of psychological violence within the last year (pg 13). The second most common form of violence is physical with 24.3% claiming that they had been subjected to physical violence at some point in their life over the age of 15 whilst 2.4% claiming that they had experienced this within the last year (pg 13). Sexual violence had been reported as occurring to 6% of women in their adult life above the age of 15 and to 1.3 % of the women had experienced this within the last year of their life (pg 13).

The most common perpetrators of such violence tended to be in the case of women as victims former or current partners (pg 13). Results show that 71.5% of the violence committed against women tended to be perpetrated from current or former partners. The studies concluded that women are in greater danger of being exposed to violence from intimate relationships or domestic relationships rather than being subjected from the wider community (pg 13).

Demographically younger women were subjected more frequently to domestic violence than older women (pg 13). Women aged between 18-24 had a prevalence rate of 56.38% of domestic violence whereas in the case of older women aged over 65 years of age the prevalency rate was around 44.2% (pg 13). Younger women tended to be more exposed to physical violence rather than older women in the past year, however using the lifetime criteria it was older women who endured more of this form of violence (pg 13). The exception to this being in the Republika Srpska that saw rates of physical violence remain highest both within the year and the lifetime category for younger women (pg 13). In addition women who suffered from disabilities or poor health were also subjected to

the violence. The prevalence rates compare well as with the sample of healthy women. The data on violence indicates one alarming pattern, the violence is not a matter of individual incidents but a series of practices that are systematically repeated.

Domestic violence took place more frequently in rural areas with 49.2% of the incidents taking place in rural areas as opposed to the 44.3% in urban areas (pg 13). Economic factors such as material deprivation increased significantly the chances of domestic violence taking place (pg 13). 19.7 % of the women who experienced domestic violence lived in non-deprived households whereas 26.3% of those women lived in deprived households (pg 13). Cultural values that tended towards patriarchy and very fixed gender roles also tended to be very predominant in households that experienced domestic violence (pg 13).

Other factors which seemed to affect the prevalence of domestic violence was the presence of various problems such as sick or immobile family members, alcoholism and violent behaviour by family members (pg 13). Findings indicated that 33.4 % of the households where one of the members was seriously ill or immobile tended to experience domestic violence against women (pg 13). In families where such a factor was not present the rate of the domestic violence tended to be around 19% (pg 14). Whenever alcoholism was identified as a problem almost 60% of the women tended to experience domestic violence whereas the problem was markedly less significant in households without such a problem (pg 14).

The effects of domestic violence are numerous and could be both easy to detect or much harder. The span of the effect could also vary greatly. The results of this studies

indicated that those who had experienced domestic violence within the last year tended to experience sadness and bad moods almost twice as likely as those who had not experienced abuse (pg 14). The statistics indicate that 50.9% of those abused within the last year tended to exhibit such symptoms whereas only 24.7 % tended to exhibit the same symptoms (pg 14). Other symptoms included anxiety and fear with once again the double-the-likelihood occurring with 46.1% in the case of victims as oppose to 22.4% in the case of women who were not victims (pg 14). In the case of anorexia 24.4% of the victims experienced it whilst 17.8% of women experienced anorexia but not domestic abuse (pg 14). Finally women who were subjected to abuse had in 28.9% of the cases difficulties in concentration, clear thinking and learning whereas 12.8% experienced these effects but were not victims of domestic violence (pg 14).

When the form of domestic violence takes a physical bent such as in the case of physical or sexual abuse, 11.4% reported to have some form of physical injury however when the abuse was experienced over a lifetime the rate increased dramatically to 96% (pg 14). The most frequent forms of injuries were scratches, bruises, undetermined physical pain. However a good amount of women reported experiencing loss of consciousness, severe bruising and inflation (Pg 14). Those women who were subjected to even more sever forms of violence suffered from fractures and even wounds inflicted by weapons (pg 14). Perpetrators in this category tended to be current or former partners as well as fathers (Pg 14).

One of the major problems with this kind of violence is that most women did not identify themselves as being subjected to domestic violence. Despite reporting a large

number of individual experiences of violence, these women did not often perceive themselves to be victims of domestic violence. The study found that 58.4 % of the women who reported experiencing physical violence in the past year did not view themselves as victims of physical violence (Pg 14). The number of women who viewed themselves as victims of economic and sexual violence was even lower.

Very few of the women consulted took steps in order to get out of the situation. Only 17% who experienced violence tried separation, divorce or leaving the household as solution (Pg 14). The number of women who actually seek support is very low with only 5.5% of the women who experienced domestic violence actually seeking support. The women who did not contact institutions generally did so because they did not think they needed help but other reasons included fear, shame and low trust in institutions (Pg 15). On the other hand those who did seek support were not always given the full support they should have been given. Police and health care workers treated women as the instigators of the violence not as the victims (Pg 15). However most women who sought help had a positive experience, receiving from the appropriate authorities help, that helped solve at least in part their exposure to violence (Pg 15).

The study interestingly enough did not find an increase in prevalence of domestic violence to those households that were somehow involved in the war. This is however not a surprising characteristic since the common prevalence of households with connection to the war all throughout Bosnia meant that this variable became statistically irrelevant. This does not mean that the connection between the war and domestic violence does not exist,

but that it is difficult to measure statistically because there is no corresponding data prior to the war to compare it to.

This problem can however be countered by comparing the statistical data of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a regional, European and world perspective. Whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina the rate of women who have experienced some form of domestic violence since the age of 15 is 47.2% for the Federation and 47.3% for the Republika Srpska whilst in Europe the figure is of 25.4% (WHO 2013). On a worldwide perspective domestic violence within the life time of women 36.6% within Africa, 29.8% within the Americas, 37.7% within the South-East Asia, 37% within Eastern Mediterranean region, and 24.6 % within the Western Pacific (WHO 2013). Measuring domestic violence within the Balkan Region is harder since there has not been a standard methodological approach used to gather data (Nikolic-Ristanovic 2006). However some basic statistics indicate within Serbia 30.6% have suffered from physical violence, 46.1% have suffered psychological violence whilst 8.7% were sexually abused (Nikolic-Ristanovic 2006). In Croatia 21% of women experienced physical violence, whilst 34% of the respondents reported forced sex. These statistics compare well with Bosnia and Herzegovina where 41.9% of women have experienced some form of psychological violence, 24.3% have experienced physical abuse, and 6% has experienced sexual violence.

The conclusions that one can arrive to following these figures is that definitely on an international and world-wide scale, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a much higher prevalence of domestic violence. On a regional level within the Balkans, it seems to

compare well having a higher rate of physical violence than Croatia but less than Serbia. In terms of psychological abuse it has less than Serbia but only marginally so by a measure of 4.2%. In terms of sexual violence once again Bosnia and Herzegovina comes in between Croatia and Serbia.

It is clear that whilst Bosnia and Herzegovina has a much higher rate of domestic violence than Europe and the rest of the world, it however compares quite well with two other countries within the Balkan region. This could mean that the problem of domestic violence has more of a regional nature rather than a post-war nature. Undoubtedly the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did ameliorate the situation, however measuring its impact and the impact of the subsequent Dayton Accords can prove statistically impossible. Within Bosnia itself too many were involved in the war to allow for statistical computation of how the war affected families. Within the Balkan region the numbers are firstly, difficult to compare as no unified methodology is used and secondly, overlooking the first difficulty the numbers remain too similar for an interpretation of the role of the war and Dayton on Bosnian domestic violence. Despite these findings the rate of domestic violence still remains alarmingly high and whilst the impact of war and Dayton cannot be measured empirically, one thing remains certain, post-Dayton Bosnia has not done enough to tackle the problem of gender violence. Whether the reason for the existence for such high rates of domestic violence is cultural, regional or due to post-war violence and instability one can say that there is still not a complete absence of violence within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Conclusion

As one can see despite having nowhere near the 100,000 – 260,000 deaths that occurred in the three years of the Bosnian war, violence is still an integral part of Bosnian society. Domestic violence has affected the lives of nearly half the women living within Bosnia and Herzegovina, whilst organized crime still operates with relatively few restrictions.

Whilst in the case of organized crime, the link between the war, Daytonian peace and the flourishing of organized crime are easy to trace, domestic violence is more elusive. Statistically it is hard to measure the effects of the war on domestic violence because when a variable is found so commonly it stops being a variable and becomes a constant and regional comparisons do not feature wide discrepancies. Lack of data regarding domestic violence before the war also prohibits any comparative studies. However some qualitative studies have given insight into how men returning from war tended to be more violent and also have more access to weapons, whilst international statistical comparisons show that the level of domestic violence is much higher than in Europe and many parts of the world.

The state of the economy post-Dayton in Bosnia and Herzegovina also meant that many men were unemployed which meant that there was a high presence of substance abuse which aggravated the situation of domestic abuse. Women on the other hand also found it harder to find jobs particularly if they were from a low education background, which meant they were economically dependent on men and could not leave the house when the latter were abusive.

Despite not always being traceable back to the war and to the Dayton Accords, violence still pervades Bosnian society. This violence indicates that despite the absence of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is still much left to be done in order for peace to be achieved. Regarding the role of Dayton in achieving peace or lack thereof, organized crime was found to have strong links with the constitutional arrangements of Dayton. Complicated legal setups, disgruntled and/or opportunistic politicians and ineffective policing have all contributed to the proliferation of organized crime. On the other hand the link between Dayton and domestic violence is more difficult to prove. Cultural practices prior to the war, lack of comparable data before the war and comparable statistics regionally do not allow for a clear identification of the war and Dayton's role in domestic violence. One thing is however certain, the "peace" achieved by Dayton through its constitutional setup has not yet done enough to tackle both organized crime and domestic violence.

Chapter 5: Harmonious Relationships In Bosnia And Herzegovina

In this section the concept of harmonious relationships will be discussed using two criteria as a form of measurement. The first criterion will be that of the political system within Bosnia and Herzegovina. This criterion has been chosen because political systems are perhaps the most formalized form of relationships particularly between the three ethnic groups. Analysing the way the political system works by looking at the way the three organs of the state are organized and how the parties have aligned themselves will give an insight as to whether there are harmonious relationships between the three major ethnic groups and the minorities that inhabit Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The next criterion that will be examined is that of education. This particular criteria has been chosen because whilst the political system is a good measure of the relationships between ethnicities in the present, education and the way this is conducted will indicate the kind of future citizens Bosnia and Herzegovina will have. Future harmonious relationships or lack thereof depend greatly on whether the educational system promotes peace and integration or conflict and ethno-politicization.

Using these two criteria an attempt will be made to understand the relationships that exist between the three main ethnicities and the minorities that inhabit Bosnia and Herzegovina. The key value that is being assessed is integration and this section will try to establish whether political and educational systems brought the three ethnicities closer

together, at the very least fostering a working relationship, or if on the contrary these two criteria have fragmented relationships between the ethnicities further. This chapter will not attempt to discuss harmonious relationships between the ethnicities in a generic way; instead it will focus more on the two criteria of political and educational systems and draw conclusions on the kind of relationships these two criteria foster between the ethnicities.

Bosnian Political System

The Dayton Accord signed in 1995 brokered a power sharing arrangement where the three different ethnic groups came to an agreement regarding the future political set up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of the Dayton Accords was to allow the three warring parties to express themselves politically whilst living peacefully in the same territory. The Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were represented by the Entity called the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Bosnian Serbs by the Republika Srpska (RS), with the district of Brcko being run conjointly by the Federation and the Republika Srpska (Lyon 2006).

Each entity enjoyed almost complete autonomy and had its own constitution. Bosnia and Herzegovina operates under an international protectorate which supervises the implementation of the Peace Accord through the use of a High Representative who enjoys wide ranging powers to intervene in all matters and is not subject to local parliamentary overview. The external borders of Bosnia were retained and a pluri-ethnic national government established (Lyon 2006). The new national government was based on proportional representation- a reincarnation, in a modified form, of the old Socialist

model- and is responsible for the management of its foreign, economic, and fiscal policy (Bojkov 2003).

The Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina is a parliamentary democracy. The Council of Ministers is in charge of the government. The usual arrangements for executive powers (government) and law making powers (government and parliament) have been implemented in this democracy.

Office of the high Representative

The High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the ultimate authority in the country with powers to overrule parliament and remove elected officials. He is the highest ranking civilian official operating on behalf of the international community cooperation (Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014). The mandate of the High Representative derives from the Dayton Agreement, as confirmed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The PIC is run by representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the United States, the presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014).

The office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to provide oversight for the implementation process of the agreement. The OHR employs around 200 local and international members Cooperation (Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014).

Executive Branch

The Head of State is vested in the Office of the Presidency whose Chairmanship rotates among the three members (Bosniak, Serb, Croat). The members are elected for a four year term and rotation occurs every eight months. FBiH voters elect both the Bosniak and the Croat members, RS voters elect the Serb member. The Presidency is responsible for setting foreign policy and proposing the budget (Bosnian Political System 2014).

The presidency nominates The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is approved by Parliament (Bosnian Political System 2014). The Chairman appoints the Foreign Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade, and other ministers. The conduct of diplomatic affairs and the management of international relations, discussions with other falls under the duties of the Council. Internal matters are dealt with by a special Council of Ministers, which is separate and distinct from the state Council (Bosnian Political System 2014).

Legislative Branch

The main legislative body is bicameral:

1. The Upper House or the House of Peoples: The House of Peoples includes 15 delegates who serve two-year terms. Two-thirds of them come from the Federation (5 Croats and 5 Bosniaks) and one-third from the RS (5 Serbs). Nine members of the House of Peoples constitutes a quorum, provided that at least three delegates from each group are present (Bosnian Political System 2014).

Federation representatives are selected by the House of Peoples of the Federation, which has 58 seats (17 Bosniak, 17 Croat, 17 Serb, 7 others) and whose members are delegated by cantonal assemblies to serve 4-year terms (Bosnian Political System 2014). RS representatives are selected by the 28-member Republika Srpska Council of Peoples which was established in the Republika Srpska National Assembly; each constituent nation has eight delegates, "others" have four delegates (Bosnian Political System 2014).

2. The Lower House or the House of Representatives comprises 42 members elected by the people under a system of proportional representation (PR) for a four-year term. Two-thirds of the members are elected from the Federation (14 Croats and 14 Bosniaks) and one-third elected from the RS (14 Serbs) (Bosnian Political System 2014).

The Parliamentary Assembly is responsible for:

1. Legislating the decisions of the Presidency or to carry out Constitutional obligations.
2. Taking decisions on the funding of institutional activity in the region and international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3. Approving the budget.
4. Ratifying treaties and agreements
5. other matters as are necessary (Bosnian Political System 2014)

Until 2001 there was no law which governed the electoral system. In this period reference was made to draft legislation which set out that the state and first-order administrative division entity legislatures had a maximum of four years (Sahadzic 2009). This arrangement clearly demonstrates the complex system that is in place within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The complexity of the system is however only overshadowed by its potential for inertia since a disagreement at any one of the levels of government by any of the three different ethnicities could lead to stalling of the political process.

Judicial system

The Judicial System of Bosnia Herzegovina is once again a reflection of the complex administrative setup of the region, with many courts creating overlaps in jurisdiction and implementing different laws. The state of Bosnia Herzegovina has two courts– the Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Court of Bosnia Herzegovina (Ferizovic).

Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

This court is governed by the constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina and is composed of 9 judges, 4 are chosen by the House of Representatives (Lower House) of FBH and 2 by the National Assembly of the RS (Ferizovic). 3 other judges are chosen by the European Court of Human Rights in consultation with the Presidency of the Bosnia and Herzegovina and must not be citizens of Bosnia Herzegovina and or any neighbouring state (Ferizovic). The international element was introduced to guarantee

freedom from ethnically based pressure (Ferizovic). Its business deals with federal and state disputes, hears appeals and has control over matters of constitutionality (Ferizovic). Disputes may only be referred by a member of the Presidency, by the Chair of the Council Of Ministers or by the Chair or Deputy Chair of either house of the Parliamentary Assembly (Ferizovic).

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The court consists of the Plenum and three divisions Criminal, Courts of Appeal and Administrative (Ferizovic). This Court also has an international element among its judges The Criminal Court is further subdivided into sections for War Crimes, Organised Crime and Economic Crime (Ferizovic). The Administrative section deals with complaints regarding final administrative acts and their legality, property disputes between the State and the Entities and conflict of jurisdiction issues between Entity Courts (Ferizovic). The Courts of Appeal are similarly subdivided and provide remedies for the decisions taken in the other sections (Ferizovic).

Entity-level Courts

Such systems are defined and regulated by the constitution of each Entity. Each Entity has its own Constitutional Court with very similar powers and jurisdiction. The members of this body are nominated by the President of the Entity with the approval of the House of Peoples in the case of FBiH and the National Assembly in the case of the RS (Ferizovic).

Jurisdiction covers decisions on constitutional matters, resolving disputes between the various administrative entities and jurisdictional disputes, deciding on the

constitutionality and legality of enacted laws and regulations, deciding on matters of vital national interest (Ferizovic). In both the FBiH and the RS this court has nine judges (Ferizovic).

Each Entity has a Supreme Court which is the highest court of law in the Entity, additionally the RS has the High Commercial Court. Furthermore below this level operate the District (RS) or Cantonal Courts (FBH) .The lowest level courts are the Municipal (FBiH) or the Basic Courts (RS) (Ferizovic).

Political Parties

The political Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina have unsurprisingly established themselves along ethnic lines, clearly demonstrating the fragmentation that can be found within the political system. This section will analyse some of the main parties according to their ethnic alignment.

Serbian

1. SRS and SRS-VS

The Serbian Radical Party "Dr. Vojislav Seselj" (SRS-VS) is a product of a splitting off from the Serbian Radical Party of Republika Srpska (SRS RS) in 2002. These two parties have strong ties with Serbia particularly the SRS has had so since the beginning of the war in 1992. The main competitor of this party representing Bosnian Serb interests is the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) (Caspersen, 2010, p. 33; 141; 150).

2. SNSD

The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) is a predominantly Serb party that started attaining a measure of importance in 2002 (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity 2014).

3. SDS

In the first few years after the war the SDS was the main party within the Republika Srpska. The party has a very nationalistic outlook and is concerned solely with the Republika Srpska. This party supported and was led by the war criminal Radovan Karadzic, however he was forced to resign because of a particular provision within the Dayton Accords. This was done to ensure a political future to the SDS particularly after strong international pressure. (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity 2014).

4. SPRS

This party was originally made of members of the Bosnian Serb Army. In the beginning it upheld very radical Serbian views but over time became a more moderate democratic party. The original party leadership was made up of officers of the Bosnian Serb army. (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity 2014).

Croatian

1. HDZ and HDZ 1990

The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) and the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990) are parties representing Croat interests. The two parties split from each other with subsequent creation of HDZ 1990 in 2006. The dividing issue were long disagreements over the way certain ministerial positions should be distributed. Both parties have strong ties with HDZ Croatia. (Pejic 2013).

2. HSP BiH

HSP BiH is a Croatian party which also has strong links with the party of the same name based in Croatia. (Pejic 2013).

Bosniak

1. SDA

The Party for Democratic Action (SDA) is a party that upholds Bosniak nationalistic interests. It was one of the wartime parties. (Pejic 2013).

2. SDP B&H

The SDP BiH is the party with the greatest multi-ethnic appeal and operates in both entities. It receives much of its support from the more urban areas of the Federation. Its multi-ethnic credentials have been brought into doubt recently because during the constitutional talks in 2008 it sided with the SDA and SDP which are both parties that support Bosniak interests. (Pejic 2013).

Comments on the current political system

One of the striking features of the political system within Bosnia and Herzegovina is undoubtedly its complexity. Competencies overlap and it is not always clear which entity and at which level decisions need to be taken. This means that two complimentary phenomena occur. The first is political inertia where the various mechanisms can be employed by various ethno-political entrepreneurs to stall the system from ever making any significant changes. The second phenomenon is that of political clientelism particularly based on ethnicity.

It has been suggested that this clientelism is so ingrained within the system of Bosnian and Herzegovina as set up by Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords that some authors

have contended that even the electoral law itself encourages inequality and discrimination (Arapovic et.). The way that the constitution is set up and the various organs and entities of the state ensure that rights are more linked to ethnicity and territorial belonging. This goes against the theory of human which the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based upon. Such human rights should be guaranteed to anyone regardless of their ethnicity. However the current situation in Bosnia guarantees rights in a collective fashion rather than in an individual way (Arapovic et.). The populations that belong to the three major groups namely the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks are more likely to be guaranteed group rights than other minority groups (Arapovic et.).

By limiting the right of candidature to those who belong to one ethnicity and territory and by limiting the right to vote for certain candidates because of provenance of a different ethnicity and territory establishes a system where not all have equal rights of voting and of candidature, which are the very basis of a democratic system. An example of this is the lack of possibility of the certain citizens of Brcko to vote for those who would represent them in the cantonal assemblies, therefore implicitly limiting certain voters from participating in choosing those who would represent them in the higher house (Arapovic et.). This inequality, it is contended fuels lack of integration and could possibly pre-empt a new eruption of violence (Arapovic et.).

The complex system and the clear trend of parties within Bosnia and Herzegovina to rally around ethnicity gives many opportunities to political entrepreneurs to profit from this situation. The Bosnian political class tends to benefit because its position of power allows them privileges and opportunities for corruptions that would otherwise would not

be available to them under a more unitary system (Woehrel 2013). Political inertia becomes therefore in the interest of the political class who continue to maintain the status quo whilst trying to carve up bigger profits, at the expense of the entire country which is going through severe unemployment and poverty (Woehrel 2013). A poll conducted in 2010 found that 87% of the citizens believed that the country was moving in the wrong direction, with only 12% of the respondents claiming that their life had improved in the past four years (Woehrel 2013).

It is clear that the issue of statehood is a major problem within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The current political structure is one that has been imposed by the international community through the Dayton Accords and is not necessarily born out of social contract. The three major groups have differing visions on the way the state of Bosnia is to be formed.

The Bosnian Croats would like to carve the Federation into two entities. In this way they would be able to get a much greater representation since numerically within the Federation the Bosniaks outnumber the Bosnian Croats. This idea would be unlikely to gain much traction within the international community (Woehrel 2013).

The Bosniaks on the other hand have a more unitary vision of the Bosnian state, because should the territory of Bosnia be further divided the Bosniaks would stand to lose a large number of territories (Savanovic 2013).

The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand are happy to keep their strong ties with Serbia whilst retaining a large measure of independence from the Bosnian Croats and the

Bosniaks. This ethnic group does not want to a more unitary state as it fears that it will lose influence and territory with such a move (Savanovic 2013).

These three different visions create a lot of political stalemate because very few of the actors agree on what the Bosnian state should look like. Moves towards greater streamlining of the system were resisted particularly in 2006 where an amendment to the constitution was narrowly voted down (Felberbauer et. 2014). A troubling aspect of this conflict is that there is no public discussion about these issues which means that political entrepreneurs get to frame the issue as is most beneficial to them, particularly when dealing with the international community (Felberbauer et. 2014).

The Bosnian Spring disturbances protesting against high unemployment, earlier this year is an indication of the political inertia generated by the system. The cumbersome political system made it possible to stop hostilities but did nothing to coalesce the region into a nation with one flag. The prevailing political tension and poor economic conditions indicate the need for further political reform to promote further integration.

Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton Accords and the annexes that were signed at the Paris Conference did not make explicit mention of the issue of education. Understandably with issues such as territorial disputes and the setting up of constitutional frameworks, education was not given the importance other issues were (Burmeister 2013).

This however led to a situation where the composition educational institutions and curricula was dictated by political institutions, who would argue that education would fall under the umbrella of cultural autonomy guaranteed to them by the Dayton Accords..

Pedagogy had to give way to politics and it was clear that each of the ethnic groups had their very own distinct vision of what the post-war educational sphere was to look like. Each of the ethnic groups demanded that the education offered would respect the composition of the student population, with each three of the political units offering their own educational curricula (Burmeister 2013).

Education is tackled within Bosnia and Herzegovina through several legal instruments. Article two of the constitution of the Bosnia and Herzegovina states that all citizens have a right to education but does not specify exactly what this right entails.

However in article three the constitution states :

c) The Entities shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for the internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to in Article II above, and by taking such other measures as appropriate.

The constitution for the Federation provides in Section III article 4(b) that:

The Cantons shall have all responsibility not expressly granted to the Federation Government. They shall have, in particular, responsibility for:
(b) Making education policy, including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of education.

In the Constitution of Republika Srpska mention of education is made in article 68 which states:

The Republic shall regulate and ensure:
12. work relations, safety at work, employment, social insurance and other forms of social care, health care, soldiers and invalid protection, child and youth care, education, culture and cultural resources protection, physical culture;

Education within Republika Srpska

The educational system within the Republika Srpska is much more centralised than is the case within the Federation. This is made easier since there is a predominance of one ethnic group, the Bosnian Serbs. The curriculum has strong ethno-political influences and is maintained even in the way the system itself is set up (Burmeister 2013).

In the Republika Srpska the Ministry of Education defines the law and policies that will affect educational issues whilst the government holds the power to allow or disallow the creation of new educational institutions (Pasalic-Kreso et. 2000). The management of educational institutions is delegated within the Republika Srpska to school boards that are composed of founding representatives and parents of the student body (Pasalic-Kreso et. 2000). The aforementioned boards nominate candidates for the post of head teachers but the final decision is taken by the Ministry of Education (Pasalic-Kreso et. 2000). Such a stranglehold over the educational field means that there is scarce opportunity for change in political discourse.

The District of Brcko which is jointly administered by the Republika Srpska and the Federation is one of the few places within Bosnia and Herzegovina which enables students from different ethnic backgrounds to follow roughly the same curriculum and attend the same school (Burmeister 2013). The only moment in which the students are separated is when they attend language and culture classes. The school system within the district of Brcko also allows for students to express themselves in their own language, whilst providing documents in the language and alphabet that is requested (Burmeister 2013).

The system seems to be a success and it has been argued that it was so because of the support given by external agents (Perry 2003). Teachers in the district of Brcko are given higher salaries and more incentives to cooperate with this new arrangement (Mcgill 2010). It has been alleged that the fact that Brcko enjoys protectorate status allowed for more foreign intervention into the educational system and therefore local actors who resisted such moves could be over ruled (Perry 2003). This being said, it is however unlikely that the situation in Brcko can be replicated on a national level within the Federation and the Republika Srpska (Burmeister 2013).

Education in the Federation

The Federation's multi-ethnic reality presents a greater challenge for its educational setup. From its inception the Federation had to deal with two competing ethnic claims to cultural autonomy that was also transferred to the educational sphere. Since the ratio of Bosniaks to Bosnian Croats varies across the different locations, provision needed to be made at canton or even at municipality level. Laws on subsidiarity meant that educational issues could be decided at lower levels within the bureaucratic frameworks of the Federation, particularly when solutions were not found at higher administrative levels (Burmeister 2013). This has allowed the educational system within the Federation to be extremely fragmented and piecemeal. The situation was made worse when the Office of the High Representative started promoting a policy of returning internally displaced persons and refugees back to their original homes (Fischer 2006). This meant that once again the ethnic ratio's that had previously existed had once again

became skewed, rendering obsolete the educational setups that were enacted immediately after the war (Fischer 2006).

This new demographic led to an agreement between the Ministers of Education in March of 2003 which allowed all those who had returned an opportunity of studying the curriculum offered by their ethnic group. When students amassed at numbers of eighteen or greater they had the right to ask that a separate class is set up. All the students had the right to be taught the core subjects in their curriculum (Magill 2010).

The change in ethnic constitution of the resident populations within the Federation required that new solutions be found. Whenever it was possible separate schools for ethnic groups were created. Students that belonged to a local minority would gather together and would join the school of the closest community where the curriculum of their ethnic background was taught (Burmeister 2013).

However when this was not entirely possible a phenomenon called the “two schools under one roof” was set up (Clark 2010). Over fifty-four schools are set up according to this style of schooling. This organizational setup essentially means that students from a Bosnian Croat ethnic background and a Bosniak background both attend the same schools. The interesting aspect of this arrangement is that the two ethnicities never meet because they are taught under different administrations utilizing differing teaching staffs whilst at the same time teaching a different curriculum. Such a curriculum sometimes offers competing views on historical background of the country, as well the geographic and political conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tveit et. 2014).

The students who attend these schools feel very distant from each other and at times refer to students from the other ethnic group as pertaining to a different nationality despite, living within the same geographic area and having many commonalities (Tveit et. 2014). Certain authors claim that the schools are an institutionalised form of segregation and that it resulted in polarisation of youth and entrenching of the separate ethnic tensions that exist (Hromadzic 2008). Polls held in the beginning of the noughties' found that much of the population had mixed feelings about this educational approach. As much as 79% of the parents were not happy with the separate schooling arrangement (Pasalic Kreso 2008)

The International Community and Education within Bosnia and Herzegovina

As mentioned previously the Dayton accords did not mention education or tackle the issue at great length, however it did give a large amount of cultural autonomy to the constituent ethnicities of the agreement. This allowed the educational process to be decided at entity level, however using the law of subsidiarity which allows certain decisions that would normally taken in a more uniform manner at higher levels of the organization to be taken in an ad hoc fashion according to needs and ideas of the relevant lower authority. This in turn created the space for a lot of diversity with multiple actors influencing the educational process and entrenching the ethnic separations that existed during the war.

Despite its small role during the Dayton Accords the International Community was soon to realize the importance of education for post-conflict transformation. The United States alone have invested over 3.8 billion dollars in investment money in the

educational sector (Perry 2003). The money was mostly directed towards reconstruction work and covering teachers salaries so that educational institutions could start working again (Perry 2003).

Unfortunately the way the money was allocated was not done in a coordinated and organized fashion with rural areas often ending up without the necessary funds (Fischer 2006). The monies invested in education have been slowly decreasing, which is also due to the fact that development money being poured into Bosnia and Herzegovina is also decreasing (Burmeister 2013).

The Office of the High Representative in line with a Communique of the Peace Implementation Council released in 1997 recognized the importance of reform in the educational sector. The Office of the High Representative started procedures in order to have educational reform and textbook review (Burmeister 2013). Other international actors also tried their hand at tackling the educational issue, with many having different means of obtaining their objectives (Stabback 2008). Some prescribed a more immediate and imposed approach while others focused on sustained and locally developed solutions (Stabback 2008).

However the lack of financial aid as well as the unwillingness and apathy of the Bosnian officials meant most of these initiatives were not as effective as they could be (Burmeister 2013). It was to become clear to the International Community that it was ethno-politics that drove education rather than pedagogy. Education has therefore moved from being a technical matter to being one of the key areas for integration if a Bosnian identity is to one day exist.

Comments on the Educational System within Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Educational system within Bosnia and Herzegovina is a fragmented system that lacks cohesion and integration. The war dynamic of the entrenching of ethnic identities without considerations of a new Bosnian identity, or at least of social cohesion has not only continued within the educational sector but has become essential to the survival of this ethno-political rhetoric. Subjects such as language, literature and geography are used by the different ethnicities to ensure the survival of ethnic interests. The dynamic observed is that while the interests of Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs are underlined in educational discourses, the rights and interests of other groups are not given enough importance (Burmeister 2013). A preliminary view of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina would identify at least eighteen minorities apart from the three major ethnicities. The subsidiarization of education to lower levels of administration ensures that it is rare that these other minorities are mentioned (Musa 2006). Those students who form part of the three major ethnicities but do not live in an area which is predominantly inhabited by their ethnicity also suffer from the same problems as the other minorities (Pasalic Kreso 2008). This would not be so had educational decisions been on a higher level.

On a practical level education that is so diverse and not integrated creates a set of logistical problems. One such problem arises in the development of curricula which is a highly specialized task that requires professional expertise (Burmeister 2013). Administrative bodies at lower levels might not always have access to such specialized professionals and therefore the quality of education given, even in non-contentious subjects will suffer, creating sub-par students. This problem is exacerbated by the high

rate of unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina which requires that students are given the best education in order to make them as employable as possible. Another technical consideration that needs to be made is that with such high specialization and fragmentation of syllabi as much as 80% of the budgets allocated to education are used in order to pay for teachers' salaries (Burmeister 2013). A figure, which could be drastically decreased with a greater streamlining of the system.

Integration and Harmony require that the educational system is not as fragmented as it currently is. Such fragmentation serves to ensure that ethno-politics remains viable and going in the generations to come, even for those who might not have lived through the war themselves. A multi-ethnic state requires an educational system that whilst giving space for diversity focuses on creating a common identity. It would also recognize that other minorities are being discriminated and not represented within the educational system. However at the moment the educational system will only perpetuate the entrenchment of the different ethnic identities whilst trampling on the rights of minorities.

Conclusion

In this section the level of harmonious relationships particularly through integration has been analysed. In the case of the political system one can note a highly fragmented system that is appropriated by the political elite to maintain their self-interest as well as the interests of their particular ethnicity as a whole. The educational sphere is not much different with pedagogy making way for ethnic-politics. Harmonious

relationships particularly through integration have a long way to go within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to answer two questions regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first question it has attempted to answer deal with is whether after the Dayton Accords of 1995 one can truly say that there is a state of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second question comes as a result of answering the first. Should one conclude there is not a state of peace or a low state of peace, how much of this lack of peace is attributable to the Dayton Accords.

At first glance these questions seem simple but a deeper look into answering these questions quickly reveals that they raise a host of other questions that need to be answered before one can attempt to discuss the two research questions that are the centre point of this thesis. One of the main questions that arises deals with what definition of peace one is to use. In order to determine whether there is peace or not in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one is required to have a definition of peace, because the answer to that question will depend greatly on what definition of peace one has.

A look at the literature immediately shows that such a definition is not easy to come by. Many authors bring in differing elements to their definition of peace, elements that have good theoretic underpinnings as well as value to the more practical element of the field of conflict resolution, yet elements that can at times be highly contrasting. After looking through the diversity of definitions, the one point that all authors seem to agree

upon is that peace is more than the mere absence of an overt form of violence such as warfare.

Starting off from such a limited base one can therefore conclude that peace has at the very least a dual dimension, the lack of war or violence and something more. Inspired by the ideas of Galtung on positive peace and negative peace, this thesis has employed two concepts; violence and lack thereof as well as harmonious relationships (Anderson 2004).

Violence and its absence is a concept that is not easy to define because anything from a slap on a naughty child's hand to genocide could potentially be justified as a form of violence. In this thesis two forms of violence have been explored. The first form of violence is that of organized crime. Organized crime is a source of violence in many ways, in an obvious sense it is so because the maintenance and creation of illicit business interests generally require overt violence both intra and inter the different groups. Organized crime also deals in activities which of their very nature are very violent such as prostitution and human trafficking. However organized crime is also an expression of systemic violence, particularly within the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is because in many ways organized crime can be considered a rejection of the state and licit means of making a living.

The other form of violence which was analysed in this thesis was that of domestic violence. Looking at domestic violence allows for a more individual perspective of violence and a particularly gendered one. Any society that is recovering from a war will struggle with not only the macro-political and economic consequences of the war but also the psychological aspects. Investigating the extent of domestic violence will allow a

clearer understanding of the day to day lives of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the women.

The other criteria that is being measured is that of harmonious relationships. With three ethnicities that are at loggerheads, harmonious relationships were taken to mean integration within this thesis. Integration in this context would mean that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina manage to create a supra-identity which allows for some loss of salience of their ethnic identity. An investigation was undertaken into the workings of the political system and the organs of the state. The political parties and the way the ethnicities have interacted by means of the political system and whether these have created greater integration or greater fragmentation.

The second criterion that was explored was that of education. The rationale behind looking at this particular criterion is that by looking at education and the way that the state is handling education, one can predict the kind of citizenry of the future. Integration and harmonious relationships cannot be expected unless they are consciously and deliberately instilled into the minds of the student population from a young age.

Using harmonious relationships and violence and lack thereof and researching the criteria chosen, this thesis will attempt to establish whether there is peace or not in Bosnia and Herzegovina and if there isn't, whether the Dayton Accords have contributed or not to the current state of affairs or whether they are an inevitable happening of a post-conflict society.

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Using an adaptation of Anderson's formula, peace is the result of a lack of violence and harmonious relationships (Anderson 2004). Applying this formula to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina one already starts to see a rather bleak picture of the situation. In this section each of the criteria used to measure peace will be examined in detail.

Organized Crime

The first criterion that was examined was that of organized crime. Organized crime was not a new reality that formed during the war period but is said to have existed also throughout the communist regime in ex-Yugoslavia (Brady 2012). It is important to realize this fact in order to gain some perspective on the issue at hand, because at times certain literature portrays organized crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a an entirely war and post-war phenomena.

What is interesting however is the role that organized crime did actually play during the war itself. The extensive use of paramilitaries from all three parties was perhaps one of the features that made this war is particular (Kaldor 2007). One must also mention the very important role that organized crime played particularly in the siege of Sarajevo, where were it not for elements of organized crime the city would have fallen and would not have withstood the attack (Kaldor 2007). This reality of cooperation during the war fostered strong relationships with the leadership of the three parties. These strong ties would not dissolve once the war was over, on the contrary, the link with the political elite would become vital for the continuation and proliferation of organized crime (Kaldor 2007).

Such a strong presence of organized crime is a clear sign of systemic violence. In a system where the political elite, which one would think would be the most powerful actors within that system have such strong links with entities whose very existence is illegal to the state which gives politicians power, one sees a certain sense of contradiction. When politicians who supposedly represent and symbolize the political system are found to be very often corrupt and cooperating with entities that are undermining the state with its laws, one realizes that these politicians might not really believe in the state at all. Politicians who are supposedly better off financially than the generic population and are given access to power by legitimate means in the state would in theory not need to collude with criminal elements within that society. One obviously needs to take into account that some measure of corruption is always going to exist, but when the corruption is so widespread one needs to question whether there is an underlying issue of legitimacy. Do the politicians who cooperate with organized crime on such a widespread basis actually recognize the legitimacy of the state? The proliferation of corruption on such a wide scale would seem to indicate that at least some of the politicians may not fully accept or feel part of the state but instead look out for their personal and possibly ethnic interests. This naturally gives a lot of opportunity for organized crime to flourish.

Another reality which allowed organized crime to flourish and at times become necessary for the survival of some Bosnians, is the state of the economy and the high rate of unemployment. When the economy of a country is in a very bad state and its rate of unemployment are very high (Unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014), one can

see that the legitimate means of making a living start becoming restricted and insufficient for the survival and flourishing of a population. In such a circumstance it is only natural that many who are unemployed would resort to organized crime in order to make a living. However the process is unfortunately not linear but cyclical because organized crime contributes highly to tax evasion therefore reducing the coffers of the state even further, which propagates the poverty and unemployment.

What is interesting in both the political ties which make organized crime so successful in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the economic situation is that organized crime is not the root cause or at least the sole cause of the systemic violence. It definitely does have a very active role in overt violence but what is interesting is that the presence to such a high degree of organized crime is an indicator of systemic tensions that exist a priori to organized crime. The state of the economy is not something that organized crime has created although it has certainly made the situation worse (Brady 2012). It also has not made politicians corrupt, although it worsens the situation. Going a level deeper, what both a bad economy and corrupt politicians have in common is that both represent a group of peoples who have a system imposed on them by the International Community that they do not fully accept and endorse, and three groups of people who are not willing to work and cooperate together. Organized crime is unlikely to be fully eradicated because of its flexible nature it manages to rear its head in almost every country in the world, even stable democracies with a good policing force. However were politicians to stop cooperating with organized crime and cooperated amongst themselves in the interests of a unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as work

together to improve the economic situation, organized crime would find a lot less avenues to operate in. This would become even more so if an effective policing force is raised and allowed to conduct its work without bureaucratic hampering from the complicated legal systems that co-exist side by side within the same state.

Organized crime is in most instances not the cause of the systemic violence but merely an opportunistic phenomenon that makes use of the fragmentation and lack of legitimacy within the state to run, maintain and expand its business interests. The systemic violence which exists lies in three groups who exist within the boundaries of a same state but who for the most part do not share such unitary visions. With the different groups all trying to impose their visions, important decisions that need to be taken as a single entity in order to be effective become scraps for bickering. The inertia that this produces makes the Bosnian state incapable of dealing with challenges and issues all states face and allows for the thriving of certain harmful entities such as organized crime.

Domestic Violence

Post-conflict societies tend to have two features that would be found in abundance. The first is weapons and the second is individuals who have been traumatized by the war experience. Discussing domestic violence allows one to look at reduction of violence from a gendered micro-approach.

Whilst peace for many refers to a status quo ante, many of the feminist tradition remind us that the peace present before the war might have been an unjust peace that did not respect women and girls and give them equal human rights. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not present a pretty picture, with almost 50% of the women who

were interviewed claiming that they had at least suffered through one instance of domestic violence (Babovic et. 2013). The situation is made even worse because the conception of domestic violence of the women interviewed is quite narrow, meaning that many of the instances would go unreported.

However unlike the rest of this thesis, this area is actually reporting some sort of improvement. Within both the Federation and the Republika Srpska laws have been passed that criminalize and sanction domestic violence (Babovic et 2013). Judges too are encouraged to broaden their view of domestic violence and how to tackle such situations that might arise in front of them (Judicial Benchbook 2014).

Despite this improvement particularly within the field of institutional response to domestic violence, one of the major problems is still not being tackled sufficiently. Women who are subjected to domestic violence and who are ready and willing to leave the household tend to find that they are not financially independent enough to survive on their own and will often have to return to the abusive household they were in. This is made worse particularly for women who have a low level of education and cannot find jobs easily to sustain themselves.

Cultural barriers also exist for women to gain full equality. The three ethnicities all have a patriarchal society that believes that women's place is in the household whilst the primary bread winners should be the males. Within the three ethnicities women are pressured to be submissive to men and not integrate into the work force.

This phenomenon betrays a lack of underlying culture of equality. Another instance where this can be seen is when dealing with the ethnicities. Whilst the main

three ethnicities are in a continuous struggle to ensure that their rights and privileges are maintained and not trampled upon, little or no mention is made of the 17 other minorities that live within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This lack of equality can also be seen within the gender relations which across both entities do not enforce fundamental human rights enough particularly of women and do not do enough to promote women's rights within the political systems.

Another issue that belies the phenomenon of domestic violence is once again the economy linked deeply with the ethnic tensions. Due to the bad economy many women are not self-sufficient and rely on their families to be able to survive. This however is very harmful when the women are suffering abuse at the hands of a family member and do not have the resources to be able to move out and live independently. Here one can once again see that systemic violence in the form of a bad economy helps maintain unequal gender relations which make women dependent on men.

As one can see domestic violence is the product of the war but is also maintained by cultural practices and the bad state of the economy. It is good to see however that some initiatives are taking place to decrease this worrying phenomenon.

Political Systems

The second element of Anderson's framework for peace is harmonious relationships. Within the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina, perhaps one of the best indicators of harmonious relationships is integration. Throughout the war the three ethnicities fought each other although the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats joined forces towards the ends against the Bosnian Serbs. By the end of the war the Dayton Accords

provided that Bosnia and Herzegovina would retain its external borders but split the state into two entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The political system that was subsequently set up is a complex one with many overlapping competencies between the different cantons and the federation and at a higher level the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The problem however does not lie solely in the system but also in the way it is run. Most parties split along ethnic lines which some authors have claimed allow for the war to be fought but by different means. The three different ethnicities have very different visions for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniaks would prefer a more unitary state as their numerical majority would guarantee them more land and more power, than if Bosnia had to be split up. The Bosnian Croats want an entity in their own right such as the Federation and the Republika Srpska in order to be able to pursue their own interests and policies, since they are outnumbered within the Federation by the Bosniaks so they do not always feel adequately represented. The Bosnian Serbs on the other hand seem at present to be the most content but would rather have more independence. These three extremely differing visions mean that on many decisions that need to be taken on a governmental level that require a certain level of centralization in order to be effective are normally impossible to arrive to. Such divergences mean that important issues such as economy, policing and legal systems are left inadequately catered for under the excuse of subsidiarity. The issue whether the Dayton Accords caused the fragmentation or whether it is the behaviour of the three ethnicities which promotes the fragmentation will be discussed in another section.

The political elite also play a large role in the fragmentation of the political system. The system provides many astute political leaders the ability to rally support through the ethno-politicization of issues, a tactic which is used consistently and successfully but which only creates stagnation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Opportunism is rife within the political class who through their well-placed maneuvers in a very fragmented, and therefore more difficultly accountable, system allow them to make great profits by being corrupt (Woehrel 2013). The amount of corruption and cooperation with organized crime begs the question whether the political elite do in fact believe in a state of Bosnia itself. As repeated previously, every system is going to have a certain amount of corruption, this is after all an inevitable part of human nature. However at these staggering amounts the questions that arises is whether the politicians do in fact they form part of something that is greater than themselves. One is not here referring to blind patriotism or fanatical nationalism, but some sense of national pride where one feels honoured to occupy a position of power and responsibility should prevent certain corruption. The fact that it seems that this is not there is perhaps proof that the state and its organs is not seen as a legitimate instrument of managing power, but rather as a means to self-enrichment and to those of one's same ethnicity.

These internal struggles between the ethnicities create an environment of mistrust and political stagnation. The effects of a corrupt and inadequate political system are felt throughout the country starting from the economy. It hinders development and it hinders entry into the European Union, which is not the ultimate panacea but definitely an

important step for the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its European neighbours and ultimately the rest of the International Community.

Education

Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is administered separately by the different entities as declared by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Republika Srpska this is administered by the Ministry of Education and is the most centralized system within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Within the Federation a variety of options are present. Whenever possible, children are sent to a school which is taught, administered and attended by members of the same ethnicity. However the return of refugees after the war distorted the population ratios and the school system had to be rethought. One of the predominant ways this is tackled is in the famous or infamous “two schools under one roof” system. Under this system students would attend the same building but at different times and the same would apply to the teachers and administration (Burmeister 2013).

Whilst it is clear that there is no form of integration in the mode of school attendance, this is once again also the case when it comes to syllabi. Syllabi in the federation are sometimes not even drawn up at cantonal level but at municipal level. This approach leads to poor schooling because not all municipalities would be able to afford or have at their disposal professionals with the necessary expertise to draw UP a syllabus. This creates a precarious position that makes students less employable because of the quality of their education.

The lack of integration however is most predominantly evident in the content of the syllabi. The syllabi do not even match on a common history of what happened in the wars. Instead history is taught according to the particular ethnicities interpretation of such history (Burmeister 2013). This leads to a very dangerous dynamic, because certain hatreds and justifications which lead to the war instead of being tackled and reconciled with a culture of peace and of remembrance of the horrible reality of war can instead be passed onto the next generation who would remember the ‘chosen traumas’ but do not necessarily have the intimate knowledge of their ancestors of the horrible realities of war. Such a situation can easily lead to a re-escalation of hostilities by a new generation that is far removed from the previous war.

It is clear that even in this field there is a lack of integration. Pedagogy has to make way to ethno-politics. Rallying under the cry of subsidiarity and cultural rights, education is being appropriated by the ethnicities in order to safeguard the salience of ethnic identity. Without such salience many political actors and parties would lose their justification for existence and for exerting power and it is therefore in their interest to maintain such a power base by not reforming the educational sector.

Is there peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Using Anderson’s framework for measuring peace which involves reduction of violence and harmonious relationships, one can conclude that there is an absence of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina but not a peace.

Whilst some may argue that the number of deaths has decreased dramatically from the war period which claimed between 100,000 to 260,000 lives (Kaldor 2007), the

overt violence of war has not stopped, it has changed form. What was before an overt battlefield with violence being employed upon the others almost indiscriminately has now changed to a more systemic employment of violence. The three ethnicities have not integrated and do not have harmonious relationships between them, instead they are caught in a continuous struggle that appropriates the political system in order to stall the other ethnicities and give advantage to one's own. The result of this incessant struggle is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dysfunctional state that has rampant organized crime, whose economy is stalled creating a situation where a large portion of the population is unemployed, and in which development has been slowed down tremendously.

The future unfortunately does not look too promising either. Remembering the proverb 'You cannot teach an old dog new tricks', one would accept that the current generation, most of which lived through the war would be a tough audience to change their attitudes. Unfortunately through the hijacking of the educational system using ethnic politics means that attitudes which needed to be learnt in order to promote peace and integration are not only not being learnt, but instead attitudes of intolerance and readings of history that are sympathetic to a particular ethnicity are being taught. Apart from the major struggle between the three main ethnicities, little or no mention is made of the seventeen other minorities that inhabit the same space as the three other ethnicities. This does not bode well for a culture of integration, respect for cultural differences and human rights.

Violence has therefore changed form and moved from a more overt form to a more systemic one, where the battlefield is economy, politics and education to name but a

few. Harmonious relationships have improved because at least the hostilities are employed for the most part on a systemic level not in a direct and overt way. However this is far from the idea of harmonious relationships that Anderson had in mind in his framework. The irony of the entire situation lies in the fact that whilst the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not succeeded in fostering cooperation and integration between the different ethnicities, reports claim that organized criminal groups are in fact comprised of multi-ethnic membership, and work and cooperate between multi-ethnic gangs (Brady 2012). It seems that organized crime with its nefarious intentions realized that the best future is one of integration and cooperation before the legitimate state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has.

The Dayton Accords and Peace in Bosnia

The issue that remains to be tackled is to determine therefore the role that the Dayton Accords played in creating the lack of peace described in the previous section. This thesis has not managed to conclusively establish the precise role that Dayton has played in creating the situation of peace or lack thereof in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is because in certain instance it was not always possible to compare data prior to the war with data after the war, such as in the case of domestic violence. In other cases such as in organized crime measuring the impact of Dayton is not a precise science since there has never been a comparable period of time after the war when Dayton did not apply. This discussion that will ensue in this section is therefore more speculative than evidence based.

In order to discuss this issue one must take a look at the situation in which Dayton was signed. A war which claimed between 100,000 -260,000 lives was going on. The Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats had an uneasy alliance which could break at any time. Both the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs seemed to have no outright winner and both were determined to slug it out till the bitter end. Not only was the situation not bettering some entrepreneurs actually were making huge profits off of the war effort and whose interest it was to maintain the state of lawlessness and continuous arms supply and requirements. Ambassador Holbrooke during the Dayton Accords was not facing some of the easiest negotiation sessions, on the contrary they were amongst the hardest at the time. In bringing an end to the immediate bloodshed the Dayton Accords is therefore to be praised, because it stopped overt violence that could have continued indefinitely from continuing to occur.

However the Dayton Accords did set up a system that was extremely liable to be abused. The complicated constitutional setup of entities, cantons and municipalities which gave so many powers to lower level bureaucratic officials was gave ample opportunities for abuse. This abuse would have many motivations but would include both self-gain and in pushing the interests of the three major ethnicities. Having said that without such a complicated constitutional setup, one that would respect the identities and to some extent the wishes to the three different groups, it is very unlikely that the three groups would have come to any form of agreement. Such lack of agreement would have meant continuous bloodshed and warfare. In the short run an agreement that would give

quasi-independence to the Bosnian Serbs and great powers of autonomy to the Federation was necessary to stop the bloodshed.

What was arguably short sighted about the Dayton Accords was that this constitutional setup was not instituted with the idea of it being a short term solution. The text of the Dayton Accords does not set itself up to be completely replaced within a period of time by a new system and this is where the Dayton Accords may have attempted to over reach. The provisions and constitutional setup of the Dayton Accords were somewhat a half way step between complete secession and carving of the Bosnian territory into three states and a unitary state where the three ethnic groups would work together and live together and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While this was ideal in the short run in order to stop the fighting that was going on and be able to create a more suitable environment for dialogue and negotiations, this half-hearted approach has resulted in a situation high corruption, inertia within the political system and a stagnant economy.

Some might argue that creating a situation where the three groups have enough power to stop any significant progress from developing but at the same time have no means of successfully imposing a centralized plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move forward, has resulted in the current lack of peace one find presently.

States cannot be run simply on consensus, because when diversion of opinion arises discussion is important, but if someone or some group is not empowered to take a decision, ultimately no decision will get taken and that can be an even worse evil than a group not having access to power. The Dayton Accords with its complicated

constitutional setup creates this kind of environment, where endless debates mean that nothing of significance gets done by the government. In my opinion the Office of the High Representative was a good initiative but if one works within a faulty system, in which parties do not want to work together, then there is little that the Office of the High Representative can do.

In the opinion of this researcher Dayton should have been a transitional set up to stop the war. Ten years after it was signed a decision should have been taken, whether by negotiations or by referendum or by both to decide whether the three groups would try to co-exist within one state under a much less complicated constitutional framework or the possibility for independence and carving up of the territory into three pieces. This would have been preferable to what is arguably a dysfunctional state. Perhaps it would have been better to present these options rather than try accommodating the ideas of co-existence and cultural autonomy at the expense of the basic needs of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Whilst the Dayton Accords have played a role in the negative developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there however is also another group of people who have also played an important role, namely the political elite of the three groups. Whilst the system that was set up by the Dayton Accords is far from perfect, it was not one within which there was no room to work, had there been the political will to do so. Politicians who hang on to nationalist rhetoric and who make every issue about ethnic politics have also played a role in creating the state Bosnia and Herzegovina finds itself in.

Ethno-politicization creates a power base for the parties and the politicians. Ethnicity is much easier banner to rally around rather than development and the politicians have used this cry ruthlessly. Moreover politicians do not do this merely for ideological and political interests but also for personal financial gain. Stalling a system that allows politicians to have their personal fiefdoms and in which there exists such complications that politicians' behaviour is easily unaccountable allows such politicians to amass great fortunes. This is not to say that politicians are alone because corruption is only possible with a string of actors, however politicians who are meant to represent the state and the interests of all of its citizens are held to a higher standard. Politicians therefore are just as responsible if not more for the current state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Conclusion

The current state of affairs within Bosnia and Herzegovina does not amount to peace. Whereas the instances of overt violence have decreased dramatically since the Dayton Accords, the violence has simply shifted to a more systemic level. The systemic violence ensures that the political system never progresses and that any decision of import becomes ethno-politicized at the expense of the common citizen.

Whilst the Dayton Accords have arguably contributed to this situation by creating a system that is an in-between complete independence for the three groups and a unitary state. One must also mention that the three ethnic groups, particularly as represented by their politicians have not made any great effort to function effectively as a one sovereign state. Bosnia and Herzegovina's present looks bleak indeed, but most worryingly so does

its future because these patterns of behaviours and these attitudes are being passed on to the next generation through an educational system where pedagogy has to make way for politics.

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BIOGRAPHY

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