


**PAVING THE WAY FOR VIOLENCE: THE DISCOURSE AROUND DRONES IN  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**


by


Manahat Thomas  
A Thesis  
Submitted to the  
Graduate Faculty  
of  
George Mason University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
The Requirements for the Degree  
of  
Master of Science  
Conflict Analysis and Resolution  
Master of Arts  
Conflict Resolution and Mediterranean Security


Committee:

  
\_\_\_\_\_


Chair of Committee

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
\_\_\_\_\_

Graduate Program Director

  
\_\_\_\_\_

Dean, School for Conflict  
Analysis and Resolution

Date: 12/3/2014

Fall Semester 2014  
George Mason University  
Fairfax, VA  
University of Malta  
Valletta, Malta

Paving the Way for Violence: The Discourse around Drones in the United States of  
America

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Science at George Mason University, and the degree of Master of Arts  
at the University of Malta.

by

Manahat Thomas  
Bachelor of Arts  
George Mason University, 2013

Director: Hirsch, Susan Professor  
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Spring Semester 2015  
George Mason University  
Fairfax, Virginia  
University of Malta  
Valletta, Malta



This work is licensed under a creative commons  
attribution-noncommercial 3.0 unported license.

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my late father, Thomas GebreMichael.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to generally thank the many friends, relatives, and supporters who have made this happen. There was no way I could have done this without my wonderful mother, Yeshihareg, who has been my constant motivation and inspiration throughout. A big thanks goes to Shibru whose worldly-views have encouraged me to open up and experience the world as I see fit. To my siblings Michael, Meklit, Nathan, Bereket, and Fekadu, I couldn't have done it without their support. Dr. Susan Hirsch for being a great guide and support through this experience, a person I hope to learn a lot from. Michael D. English, who has helped me reach a level of understanding that has led me to voice my concerns and thoughts through this project. The CRAMS cohort, thanks for keeping it interesting. Finally, thanks to all the staff, particularly, Mario, Mersia and Adrian, and the faculty of both George Mason University and University of Malta for being a constant support and help.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
<b>LIST OF FIGURES</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....	<b>viii</b>
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>ix</b>
<b>PROLOGUE</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1. A NORMAL LIFE IN PAKISTAN POST- DRONE ATTACK</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>2. “A WEDDING THAT BECAME A FUNERAL”</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>3. THE STORY OF THE REHMAN FAMILY</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>PURPOSE OF STUDY</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>RESEARCH DESIGN</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>CHAPTER I</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>A LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>1.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>16</b>
1.1.1 Why it all matters?.....	17
<b>1.2. Discourse</b> .....	<b>20</b>
1.2.1. Discourse and Language: Critical Discourse Analysis.....	21
1.2.2. Van Dijk’s Discourse Manipulation.....	25
<b>1.3. Dehumanization</b> .....	<b>28</b>
1.3.1 Social Death.....	29
1.3.1.1. Manifestations of Social Death.....	34
1.3.2. Butler’s Apprehension and Grievability of Life.....	34
<b>1.4. Violence</b> .....	<b>36</b>
1.4.1 Structural Violence.....	38
1.4.2. Cultural Violence.....	40
1.4.2.1. Orientalism.....	41
1.4.3. Physical, Direct, or Personal Violence.....	43
<b>CHAPTER II</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>DRONES</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>2.1. “Drone as a Target”</b> .....	<b>46</b>
<b>2.2. “Drone as a Sensor”</b> .....	<b>47</b>
<b>2.3. “Drone as a Weapon”</b> .....	<b>48</b>
2.4.1. “Killer Drones”.....	49
<b>Drone Reports</b> .....	<b>51</b>

Drone Strike Reports Discrepancies .....	52
<b>Official Documents .....</b>	<b>53</b>
U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities.....	54
White Paper .....	56
<b>Extra-Judicial and Arbitrary Killings Through Armed Drones .....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>CHAPTER III .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>3.1. Discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis, Social Death and Grievability .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>3.2. Data Collection Method .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>3.3. Text Analysis: Procedure .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>3.4. Methodological Limitations .....</b>	<b>66</b>
Strengths.....	66
Weakness.....	67
<b>CHAPTER IV.....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>ANALYSIS &amp; DISCUSSION .....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>4.1. Vocabulary Analysis .....</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>4.2. Phrases Analysis .....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>4.3. Sentence Analysis .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>SYNTHESIS .....</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>CHAPTER V .....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>CASE STUDY: ATTACK ON DATTA KHEL,.....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>March 17, 2011 .....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>5.1. The United States Narrative.....</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>5.2 Analysis.....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>CHAPTER VI.....</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>APPENDIX A.....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>APPENDIX B.....</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>APPENDIX C .....</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>BIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>105</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Page</b>
FIGURE 1, RESEARCHER'S ILLUSTRATION OF ARGUMENT.....	17
FIGURE 2, GALTUNG'S MODEL OF VIOLENCE .....	38
FIGURE 3, MAP OF NORTH WAZIRISTAN, PAKISTAN AND VISUAL OF AREA OF TARGET .....	81
FIGURE 4, IMAGE OF DATTA KHEL FORT .....	82



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Authorized Use of Military Force .....	AUMF
Central Intelligence Agency .....	CIA
Critical Discourse Analysis .....	CDA
Critical Linguistics .....	CL
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency .....	DARPA
Department of Defense .....	DOD
Department of Justice .....	DOJ
High Value Targets .....	HVT
Precision Guided- Munitions .....	PGM
Primary Data .....	PD
Public Policy .....	PP
Remotely Piloted Vehicle .....	RPV
Senior Level Officials .....	SLO
United States Air Force .....	USAF
United Nations .....	UN
Unmanned Aerial System .....	UAS
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle .....	UAV

## ABSTRACT

### PAVING THE WAY FOR VIOLENCE: THE DISCOURSE AROUND DRONES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Manahat Thomas, M.S.

George Mason University, 2015

Dissertation Director: Dr. Susan F. Hirsch

The use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles, or *Drones*, has increased in the past few years. The purpose of this study is to assess the official discourse, invoked by the United States government, around drones and analyze them through the frames and theoretical perspectives. Using critical discourse analysis, by examining speeches and remarks given by the White House administration, I analyze those official narratives and develop an understanding of how language is used in these instances. In particular I examine how the official discourse legitimizes the use of violence via social death.

## PROLOGUE

“Before any strike is taken, there must near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured, the highest standard we can set.”

- President Barack Obama<sup>1</sup>

### 1. A NORMAL LIFE IN PAKISTAN POST- DRONE ATTACK

Date – *Exact date unknown 2002-2003*

Attack – *Drone Strike*

Intended Target – *Terrorist Groups*

Actual Target – *Civilian Home*

Casualties – *1 Woman (mother), & 2 children*

I met Roya on my first day while visiting the Pakistan-Afghan border, on a dusty road in Peshawar. It was just weeks after the 2002 United States invasion of Afghanistan, and I was traveling as a representative of the human rights group I co-founded called Global Exchange. A young girl approached me, her head cocked to one side, her hand outstretched, begging for money. With the help of an interpreter, I learned her story. Roya was thirteen years old, the same age as my

---

<sup>1</sup> “Datta Khel Signature Strike Investigation.” War Costs. Accessed August 4, 2014.

youngest daughter. But her life could not have been in starker contrast to that of my San Francisco high schooler and her girlfriends. Roya never had time for sports, or for school. Born into a poor family living on the outskirts of Kabul, her father was a street vendor. Her mother raised five children and baked sweets for him to sell. One day while her father was out selling candies, Roya and her two sisters were trudging home carrying buckets of water. Suddenly, they heard a terrifying whirl and then there was an explosion: something terrible had dropped from the sky, tearing their house apart and sending the body parts of their mother and two brothers flying through the air. The Americans must have thought Roya's home was part of a nearby Taliban housing compound. In the cold vernacular of military-speak, her family had become "collateral damage" in America's war on terror. When Roya's father came home, he carefully collected all the bits and pieces of his pulverized family that he could find, buried them immediately according to Islamic tradition, and then sank into a severe state of shock. Roya became the head of her household. She bundled up her surviving sisters, grabbed her father, and fled. With no money or provisions, they trekked through the Hindu Kush, across the Khyber Pass, and into Pakistan. Once in Peshawar, the family barely survived on the one dollar a day the girls made from begging. Roya took me to their one-room adobe hut to meet her father. A tall, strong man with the calloused hands of a hard worker, he no longer works. He doesn't even walk or

talk. He just sits and stares into space. “Once in a while he smiles,” Roya whispered.<sup>2</sup>

Roya’s family is not the only – to utilize military lingo – collateral damage. In fact, there are many. Just recently, in December of 2013, another drone strike killed 12 civilians partaking in the traditional wedding voyage to the bride’s residence. A survivor shares the events of that day to journalists:

## **2. “A WEDDING THAT BECAME A FUNERAL”<sup>3</sup>**

Date – *December 12, 2013 4:30pm*

Attack – *Drone Strike*

Intended Target – *Al Qaeda Operatives*

Actual Target – *Wedding Party*

Casualties – *12 Civilian Deaths*

Injuries – *15 Civilians*

**ABDULLAH MUHAMMAD AL-TISI:** [translated] We were having a traditional marriage ceremony. According to our traditions, the whole tribe has to go to the bride’s tribe. We were in about 12 to 15 cars with 60 to 70 men on

---

<sup>2</sup> Benjamin, Medea.(2013). Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control. Verso Books. Kindle Edition. This is an excerpt from Medea Benjamin’s books, Drone Warfare: Killing by a Remote Control. This event, which she discusses, was the turning point in her life, where she realized the difference between the realities of drone strikes abroad and the public discourse at home. A life changing moment that resulted in Benjamin vowing to not only get the United States government to compensate the civilians injured, but also to adjust her thinking that high-tech wars were not humane.

<sup>3</sup> Title taken from the Human Rights Report reporting on this same event.

“A Wedding That Became a Funeral: US Drone Attack on Marriage Procession in Yemen.” Accessed August 6, 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/node/123245>.

board. He had lunch at the bride's village at Al Abu Saraimah. Then we left to head back to the groom's village. A drone was hovering overhead all morning. There were one or two of them. One of the missiles hit the car. The car was totally burned. Four other cars were also struck. When we stopped, we heard the drone fire. Blood was everywhere, and the people killed and injured were scattered everywhere. The area was full of blood, dead bodies and injured people. I was injured. I saw the missile hit the vehicle behind the car my son was driving... It was my own car. I went there to check on my son. I found his body thrown from the car. I turned him over, and he was dead. He was already dead. I didn't see any al-Qaeda militants in the procession, and no one from the area is a member of al-Qaeda. The Yemeni government gave United States 100 Kalashnikovs and 34 million Yemeni rituals, nearly \$159,000 U.S., according to tribal tradition. According to tribal tradition, this alone is an admission of guilt, and the money was an admission of guilt. The money was for the burial of the dead and the treatment of the injured. The U.S. government made a big mistake. They killed innocent people. This was a serious crime. They turned many kids into orphans, many wives into widows. Many were killed, and many others were injured, although everyone was innocent.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> "Turning a Wedding Into a Funeral: U.S. Drone Strike in Yemen Killed as Many as 12 Civilians." Democracy Now! Accessed August 6, 2014.  
[http://www.democracynow.org/2014/2/21/turning\\_a\\_wedding\\_into\\_a\\_funeral](http://www.democracynow.org/2014/2/21/turning_a_wedding_into_a_funeral).

### **3. THE STORY OF THE REHMAN FAMILY<sup>5</sup>**

Date – *October 2012*

Attack – *Drone Strike*

Intended Target – *Terrorists*

Actual Target – *Civilian Home*

Casualties – *1 Woman (grandmother)*

Injuries – *4 children were injured*

#### ***Rafiq ur Rehman***

"Nobody has ever told me why my mother was targeted that day... all media reported three, four, five militants were killed. But only one person was killed that day. A mom, grandma, a midwife ... The string that holds the pearls together. That is what my mother was. Since her death, the string has been broken and life has not been the same. We feel alone and we feel lost. As a teacher my job is to educate... but how can I teach this? How can I teach what I don't understand?"

The Rehman family travelled all the way from Pakistan to speak to Congress and share their story and loss with the American people in hopes of urging the government to

---

<sup>5</sup> McVeigh, Karen. "Drone Strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani Family Tells of Mother's Death." *The Guardian*, October 29, 2013, sec. World news.  
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress>.

end the war that has never been waged on the Rehman family. Although, four members of congress attended this occasion, their story has been publicized and is well known.

I would say to President Obama if I had the opportunity to meet with him is: 'What happened to me and my family was wrong'. I would ask him to find an end, a peaceful end, to what is happening.

***Zuabir Rehman (12 year old son of Rafiq ur Rehman)***

"As I helped my grandma in the field, I could see and hear drone overhead but wasn't worried because we're not militants ... I no longer like blue skies. In fact, I prefer gray skies. When sky brightens, drones return and we live in fear. We used to love to play outside. But now people are afraid to leave their houses so we don't play very often. Now I prefer cloudy days when the drones don't fly. When the sky brightens and becomes blue, the drones return and so does the fear. Children don't play so often now, and have stopped going to school. Education isn't possible as long as the drones circle overhead."

***Naila Rehman (9 year old daughter of Rafiq ur Rehman)***

"Everything was dark and I couldn't see anything, but I heard a scream...I was very scared and all I could think of doing was just run."



These are only a few stories of many that have reached the media's attention. There are countless more that have occurred, that due to the sensitivity and classified state of these events and secrecy of either the Central Intelligence Agency or the United States government, they have never seen the light of day.

## INTRODUCTION

What is the first thing that comes to your mind, when you hear “9/11” or “September 11”? The World Trade Center? Twin Towers? Attacks? Terrorism? Is there an emotional response that is also associated with that term? Is it sadness? Grief? Fear? Uncertainty? Or all? Are those feelings always there or do they surface every time you hear the words “September 11”? Go ahead; take a minute to think about it.

I did the same exercise when I first started working on this research. The answer I have now for what the first thing I think about is whenever I hear those words is different from the answer I had six months ago. Then, my answer was along the lines of ‘sadness’, ‘hatred’, and ‘terrorism’. The emotional response of thinking about these things was mostly sadness, fear and hopelessness.

I could never understand why people would take their frustration and anger out on innocent people that had nothing to do with their problems. Every person I associated with, including me, looked down every time “September 11” was mentioned. In addition to looking down and shaking our heads, we all would think about that moment: where we were, what we were doing, and whom we were thinking about. Suddenly, we are no longer in the present; our minds have flown years behind to that day. It is like being teleported through a cognitive time machine that each time takes you to a space of *what-ifs*, where you start re-assessing your life’s decisions – that one different decision,

whether it was a job offer, school, vacation or the like, could have resulted in you living in New York, or driving by the Pentagon at that same moment of impact. This voyage doesn't end here, you think about your loved ones that were hurt or killed, and if you didn't know anyone close, you start thinking about what if I lost someone important? You start asking yourself how you would have endured that pain? And at the end of this cognitive journey there is this tightness you feel in the depth of your abdomen that after this whole journey of 'what ifs', it is almost impossible to imagine others going through this, and you mourn and grieve for them, while simultaneously counting your blessings that you are safe and so are your loved ones.

"September 11" or "9/11" are just two words together that almost mean nothing when apart, but together mean more than what words can express and where context is no longer compulsory. This event, that day, America was attacked and not just anywhere but at a place that was iconic to the American culture; an emblem that stood representing American strength and power. Furthermore, that attack yanked Americans out of the belief that their home was safe, that day it proved it was not. What was known and believed about the world was no longer accurate.

What you feel right now, thinking about the events that transpired that day: the number of people that were killed, the heroes that managed to save others and not themselves, the people that were found under debris and concrete heavily injured or worse, or those that jumped trying to avoid the alternative, can give you mixed feelings. There is a sense of connection one feels with people that have endured what they have on that day, a sense of solidarity towards their countrymen emerges. Because on that day all

the petty problems with neighbors, quarrels with the family, or the insufferable job were no longer troubles on one's radar. In that moment, it didn't matter that you were black, white, democrat, republican, man, woman, child, or adult, the only thing that mattered was that for once people in this nation were cohesive and in sync. By being observers, or victims, of what happened that day, allowed Americans to face that day not alone but with their neighbors, friends and family. In that time, it was not just you and I going through all of this, rather it was the whole nation. It was at this point that a sense of victimhood was embraced and the American solidarity was solidified and strengthened.

It is what Vamik Volkan refers to as *chosen traumas*, a shared mental representation of the event that befell a large group, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defense against unacceptable thoughts.<sup>6</sup> Or in this case an endless mourning that was never grieved properly. This chosen trauma distinguishes Americans from everyone else; this event serves as the criterion for American nationalism.

Sigmund Freud was able to distinguish mourning from melancholia. Mourning, he claims, is the acting out of some kind, like using ceremonies and rituals, which enables people to move past the traumatic event. He describes the "complex of melancholia" as behaving like the "open wound drawing to itself cathectic energies... from all directions and emptying the ego until it is totally impoverished."<sup>7</sup> He elaborates that in mourning, it

---

<sup>6</sup> Volkan, Vamik. (1997). "Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism". New York: Farrar Strauss, and Giroux.

<sup>7</sup> Freud, Sigmund. (1914). "Mourning and Melancholia," in *On The History of he Psycho-Analytic Movement papers on Metapsychology and Other Works*. London: The Hogarth Press. p. 253.

is the world that is impoverished and empty, but in melancholia it is the ego.<sup>8</sup> Unless dealt with, we are stuck in a never-ending state of social melancholia.

I agree with Richard Gray's assessment that with September 11 the time of ceremony and ritual was hijacked by vengeful events that followed; "the war on terror", the Patriot Act, the Afghan and Iraq war, extraordinary renditions,<sup>9</sup> and targeted killings, to name a few. There was no time to grieve, mourn, and heal those "open wounds" which is why we go through all that brief mourning period every time we hear those words, "September 11". Freud also states that with melancholia the [victim] will unconsciously identify and firmly attach itself with the hated object (which in this case are the 9/11 attackers) and the only way the victim could be free is by either degrading them or declaring them dead.

So when asked what I think about whenever I hear about that day, or if it is brought up, right now, I would say something along the lines of 'control' or 'manipulation' because that is what I see every time I hear those two words together. That day left most of people filled with uncertainty, fear, and hopelessness, and it took the lives of many and I strongly believe justice should be served. As I will explain in future chapters, the use or the mention of "September 11" has become a means of containing and controlling public outcry, in hopes of gaining acceptance to government policies.

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>9</sup> Gray, Richard. (2011). *After the Fall: American Literature Since 9/11*. Massachusetts: Wiley Blackwell. p. 8.

This study illustrates how the government exploits *chosen traumas* time and time again for public support or acceptance on policies and agendas it wants to pursue. It is the control and manipulation of discourse. By controlling their speech and ways of approaching the public, and utilizing and incorporating key terms that is barely tolerable with the citizenry, they control the result and minimize the blowback. They control how and when they inform the public, therefore controlling the discourse.

Politicians to further their goals on foreign and national policy utilize this “open wound” as a maneuver, or a discursive strategy. For example, when privacy rights<sup>10</sup> were being violated, all they have to do to calm the public is remind them of September 11 and mention a few words like “terrorism” and “national security” and then the calamity is not as severe. Such schemes don’t always keep the entire population from asking questions and demanding their rights not be violated, but it does put things into perspective for those against it.

Another example is when President Obama gave a speech on United States Drone and Counterterror Policy at the National Defense University in Fort McNair on May 23<sup>rd</sup> 2013. In his almost hour-long speech, he mentioned the attack on the World Trade Center, by actually mentioning “9/11” nine times, and referencing to that event by using words like “attack” over five times in his entire speech.

---

<sup>10</sup> In June 2013, it is was made known (through the Snowden Leaks) that National Security Agency (NSA) was conducting domestic surveillance, spying on citizens both in the United States and abroad. This surveillance was later known as ‘data mining’. It was discovered that in a matter of a one-month period between February and March of 2013, the NSA collected about 124.8 billion telephone data items and 97.1 billion computer data items from around the globe. For further reading see, “France in the NSA’s crosshair : phone networks under surveillance.” Le Monde.fr. Accessed September 15, 2014. [http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance\\_3499741\\_651865.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html)

What was the reason for the attacks on 9/11? I guess it depends on who one asks. But lets look at what the mastermind who orchestrated the attack in the first place, Osama bin Laden, had to say. Shortly after the attack on the World Trade Center, Aljazeera journalist Tayseer Allouni interviewed bin Laden. The following is the response he gave when asked about what he thought about the allegations of him being responsible for the attacks on September 11.

As to the description of these acts were terroristic, then that description is wrong. These young men, whom Allah has cleared the way for, they have shifted the battle to the heart of America and they have destroyed its most outstanding landmarks, their economic landmarks and their military landmarks, that being the grace of Allah Glorious and Exalted is He. And they have done this from what we understand, and we have incited and roused for this before, and it is in self-defense, defense of our brothers and sons in Palestine and for freeing our holy sites. And if inciting for this is terrorism, and if killing the ones that kill our sons is terrorism, then let history witness that we are terrorists.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Interview of Osama Bin Laden by Tayseer Allouni with English Subtitles, 2012. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Rwo-Oicj8&feature=youtu.be\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Rwo-Oicj8&feature=youtu.be_gdata_player) Important to note that the interview was conducted in Arabic and the referenced text is a translation, (translator unknown).

Well, to answer the question from the answer Bin Laden has given, it is obvious as to why America was attacked. Bin Laden mentions the United States' unwavering support of Israel as the reason for targeting the United States. He also explains the reasons for targeting the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as important landmarks to the American culture. Although his response to the reason of these attacks was attributed to the alliance the United States has with Israel<sup>12</sup>. As such, it is important to note that many scholars have analyzed Bin Laden's speeches and most have concluded that his main sorrow with the United States emanates from the occupation in Saudi Arabia, a complaint he fully states in his first and second fatwas<sup>13</sup> (Legal opinions/letters).

These attacks did not distinguish American combatant from non-combatants, it did not even try as it attacked a civilian area. It purposefully attacked civilians, or as George W. Bush phrased it signified "acts of mass murder". The attackers did not see American children, the disable or the elderly any different from the adults or the politicians that are functional to this country. These generalizations that all Americans are the same, and couldn't possibly know or understand the attackers' cause allowed the space for all Americans to be dehumanized or demonized as immoral. As a result the American people were held accountable for all United States policies, which created the framework for justifying violence towards them. Because there is almost never an

---

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> "Al Qaeda's Second Fatwa." PBS NewsHour. Accessed September 21, 2014. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-jan-june98-fatwa\\_1998/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-jan-june98-fatwa_1998/).

"Bin Laden's Fatwa." PBS NewsHour. Accessed September 21, 2014. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa\\_1996/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/). In both these 'fatwas' he explains his grievances and complaints in detail.



instance in which people see themselves or their beliefs as wrong or misguided, it ends up producing this notion that *'if people do not believe in the things I believe (which is moral), then that means they are immoral'*, which facilitates the 'us' vs. 'them' or 'good' vs. 'evil' narrative.

Civilians were not the only targets of these assaults, attacking the American system and ideology were also the objectives. They hoped that the attacks would create destruction to the system, that actions taken by the United States government will undermine what Americans have always stood for, which is freedom, democracy and human rights. Bin Laden continues adds,

But I mention that there are also other events that took place, much bigger, greater and more dangerous than the collapse of the towers. It is that this Western civilization, which is backed by America, has lots [lost] its values and appeal. The immense materialistic towers were destroyed, which preach Freedom, and Human Rights, and Equality. It became a total mockery and that clearly appeared when the American Government interfered and banned the media outlets from airing our words which don't exceed a few minutes, because they felt the that the truth started to appear to the American people, that we truly aren't terrorists by the definition they want, but because we are being violated in Palestine, ... in every place ... Therefore, they declared what they declared, and they ordered what they ordered and they forgot everything they mentioned about free Speech, and Unbiased Opinion and all those matters. So I say that Freedom and rights in

America, and Human Rights have been sent forward to the guillotine with no return ... [T]he government will take the American people and the West in general will enter into a choking life into an unsupportable hell.<sup>14</sup>

The United States drone policy was a counterterror strategy that was put into action shortly after the attacks on September 11. The initial plan was to help find terrorist groups, mainly Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and if the probability of their capture produced risks, the drones would fire missiles taking them out. Such actions were taken when President Bush was in office.

The Bush administration and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted their killings in one of two ways<sup>15</sup>. During the Bush era the targeted killings conducted were called “personality strikes”. Basically the government issues these strikes because the “targets” are suspected to be terrorists. However, these suspected terrorists are on a list, which the government calls and considers the people on this list to be High Valued Targets (HTVs). With this type of strikes, there is a specific target; the government knows their names, what they look like, what they are involved in, and where they are. The respective agencies conduct research and collect intelligence on these people and

---

<sup>14</sup> Interview of Osama Bin Laden by Tayseer Allouni with English Subtitles, 2012. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Rwo-Oicj8&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Rwo-Oicj8&feature=youtube_gdata_player) Important to note that the interview was conducted in Arabic and the referenced text is a translation, (translator unknown).

<sup>15</sup> Engel, Richard, Robert Windrem, and N. B. C. News. “CIA Didn’t Always Know Who It Was Killing in Drone Strikes, Classified Documents Show.” NBC News. Accessed July 31, 2014. <http://investigations.nbcnews.com/news/2013/06/05/18781930-cia-didnt-always-know-who-it-was-killing-in-drone-strikes-classified-documents-show>

only then, if they are perceived to be threats and are qualified to fit the HTV criteria, are they targeted and killed.

The other way of conducting these drone strikes, which were put into effect right before President Obama took office are called the “signature strikes”. Unlike the personality strikes, these strikes do not know whom exactly they are targeting and killing. If people in regions like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, carry characteristics and show suspicious behavioral patterns they are eliminated. Although some may argue, this procedure is not based on facts or intelligence gathered about individuals rather it is based on generalizations that people from this region breed terrorists because the other known terrorists have come from such areas. Although to be fair, this program was initiated to discontinue and discourage terrorist training camps and to seek out and stop new terrorist hiding grounds. However, its continuous use, and increase in casualties have had the counter effect.

The existence of signature strikes indicate that even in the government there generalizations made regarding people that are geographically, culturally, and physically different from Americans. Through these unceasing strikes the United States government is alleging that there are no clear distinction between terrorists and people from this region, thus demonizing the civilians of this region and making them, in the eyes of Americans and the West, terrorists. And isn't this by association, ascribing all Arabs or Muslims of the region a terrorist identity? Using the *duck test* of inductive reasoning, ‘*If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck*’. Does the same reasoning apply for such instances? That if they do or enjoy certain things,

dress a certain way, and conduct themselves in the same way as what is perceived to be terrorist-like, they are terrorist? How is this generalization any different from what happened to Americans on September 11?

### **PURPOSE OF STUDY**

My intention in studying this topic was to investigate the justifications for violence, in cases of drone strikes. I was captivated with drone technology and couldn't understand why in a democracy like the United States where the government works for the people, the country that stands for all things freedom and rights, how the American population was able to stand idly by and let the government rationalize and justify killing civilians abroad in the name of Americans.

After conducting some research, I was acquainted with discourse, and studying how discourse works has led me to ask the important question, which I hope this paper attempt to give perspective and empower other researchers to question and conduct further studies. I would like to emphasize that although the following questions are very broad and general, and most are too intricate to pin down, they are questions that have guided me to pursue this research.

### GUIDING RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How has language influenced discourse?
  - a. What types of vocabularies are used in the data collected?
  - b. What values and context do these vocabularies carry?

- i. What experiential values do the words have?
  - ii. What relational values do the words have?
  - iii. What expressive values do the words have?
- c. Is the language in the data informational or persuasive?
  - d. What strategies are implemented?
2. How has discourse aided the social death process?
  3. Can discourse be controlled?
  4. How does dehumanization allow the use of violence, indiscriminately, on targets whose identities have been constructed for the justification of such actions?
  5. Which forms of violence are present in this study?
  6. It is no question that the United States government has been going after terrorist groups through the use of drone strikes. My question is by utilizing those drone strikes and going after terrorists, has the United States government equated non-terrorists to the characters of the terrorist they are pursuing?
    - a. Are they justifying these indiscriminant killings to killing terrorists?
    - b. Have they been targeting and killing civilians, through their “signature strike” approach, because they no longer see the difference between a terrorist and a non-terrorist? Or does the distinction no longer matter?

The purpose of this study is to assess the official discourse, invoked by the United States government, around drones and analyze them through the frames and theoretical perspectives that will be presented in the next chapter. Through critical discourse

analysis, by examining speeches and remarks given by the White House administration, I analyze those official narratives and develop an understanding of how language is used in these instances. In particular I examine how the official discourse legitimizes the use of violence.

Although, there are a variety of approaches and studies in Critical Discourse Analysis, of which I will introduce and discuss, my particular interest and focus will be on discursive strategies.

### **RESEARCH DESIGN**

This study has five chapters. In chapter I will introduce and discuss the three main elements of which this study is divided into, discourse, social death and drones. I define these elements and the importance of studying them. This chapter is devoted to illustrating how these three different elements can actually work together to produce violence. I will investigate and discuss how and why discourse can be manipulated by using Critical Discourse Analysis, and how through this discourse different manifestations of social death can be applied, and later how this application can often lead to violence. It also discusses the significance of these three key subjects both in their own element and in association to the others. This chapter also examines the work of other scholars in this field.

In chapter II I will introduce and describe my entire research design. I have approached this study by utilizing the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) introduced by Van Dijk on manipulation, ideology and prejudice to analyze the data

collected. In addition, I will also be employing Waller's concept of social death in determining Butler's apprehension and grievability of life. The data collected consist of speeches, remarks, press releases, and interviews given by White House officials, and I will explain why those documents and texts were chosen. The President and his press secretaries made the majority of the speeches and the remarks obtained which were gathered from government websites, popular newspapers and media outlets.

In chapter III I also discuss the strength and weakness of this study and the challenges and limitations I have encountered in this research.

The next two chapters, III and IV, are my data analysis chapters. In chapter III I will break down the structures of those speeches and conduct close text analysis by examining vocabularies, phrases, clauses and sentences by utilizing Critical Discourse Analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight certain key patterns and discursive strategies often used in influencing the public discourse. The presence of such patterns and themes will establish the existence of language manipulation.

Chapter IV is a case study. It presents the attack on Datta Khel in North Waziristan, in the mountainous hinterlands in northwest Pakistan, killing 42 tribal leaders of the region, and no terrorists. It examines the narratives published by the government and narratives reported by the media and various human rights organizations. This chapter looks to find similar patterns and themes investigated in chapter three, to illustrate that discourse could be manipulated to fit a political agenda.

The last chapter is a discussion of my findings and synthesizes this study. This chapter will take into considerations the whole entire study together, bringing together

the theories I have provided in the beginning and the end products of my data analysis. It also provides room for the researcher to reflect. It also contains ideas and suggestions for policy changes and further research.



**CHAPTER I**  
**A LITERATURE REVIEW**

*“Without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves.”<sup>16</sup>*


**1.1 Introduction**

The objective of this project is to explain and trace the relationship between discourse, social death, and violence. The main goal of this study is to track and explain how these three are key in explaining the rationalization that happens during wars or armed conflict. For my study I will be focusing on the discourse United States Executive branch sets for the public, specifically the Obama administration, around the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (*drones*) by illustrating the techniques and discursive strategies that generate public acceptance and justification for violent actions. I will argue that it is such discursive strategies implemented in the **official discourse** that produces the “Other” identity group, through the process of social death, which I argue leads to violence towards them. By framing this group as different from one’s own apprehension

---

<sup>16</sup> Phillips, Nelson and Hardy, Cynthia. (2002). “Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction”. p. 2. London. SAGE Publications Inc.

of life, this process portrays this new group as un-grievable, as in not worthy enough to be grieved or experiencing consistent social death.



**Figure 1, Researcher's Illustration of Argument**

It should go without saying, however, that the United States government and its diverse administrations are the not the only one that operate and utilize armed drones. Other countries also use drones for surveillance and defense purposes; however, it is nations like the United States, United Kingdom, France and Israel that have used them in armed conflicts around the globe.

### **1.1.1 Why it all matters?**

The study of discourse matters because it is vital for people to be aware of the various types of frameworks that are present everyday. Everything affects our cognitive buildup, it changes and alters our perception and discourse can be a powerful controlling

mechanism. Through it, people are programmed and conditioned to think in a certain way, which fit the society and norm they live in, unaware. For example, discourse is often the reason why societies differ from each other. Culture, tradition, customs, history and the very essence and buildup of one community or society shapes and creates discourse, which can explain why all communities are not the identical. Teun Van Dijk explains this process in most of his various publications in his peer-reviewed bimonthly journals, *Discourse & Society*. The process of this study will examine how certain frameworks are implemented and portrayed through text and talk; in order to fulfill the criteria needed to further a personal or public agenda.

How is this tied to drone strikes and violence? Well, for one, it hurts and disrupts the livelihoods of people.<sup>17</sup> More seriously, however, it is through rhetoric and discursive strategies politicians, media, and other influencing groups can influence people and shape their perspectives. Moreover, such people in power have the means abilities to do so. For example: Politicians, can use such approaches to further their individual or group interest. “Within a society, the most important bearers of the general conversation are its institutions,” explains the Holocaust historian, Daniel Goldhagen<sup>18</sup>, who has written extensively on the power of societal perspectives and actions. In his book, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, he argues that it wasn’t only the officials or, even, Adolf Hitler that was solely responsible for the tragedies of the Holocaust, rather it was also German community that allowed such massacres to occur. Although he does not mention it, his

---

<sup>17</sup> “Strategic Considerations.” 2014. Living Under Drones. Accessed June 16.  
<http://www.livingunderdrones.org/report-strategy/>

<sup>18</sup> Goldhagen, Daniel. (1996). “Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust”. New York:

whole book seems to be explaining the concept and process of social death, which will be explained thoroughly in the next section.

In the following few pages, I will introduce some theories, concepts, and different perspectives formed by scholars on the subjects of discourse and dehumanization and how those two concepts create a space for violence to be used and justified.

## 1.2. Discourse

What is discourse? The father of discourse, Michel Foucault defines it as the “ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them”.<sup>19</sup> Foucault’s life work was dedicated in understanding the power of discourse; how it originates, and how it can manifest and be accepted into “truths”. Not actual “truths”, but ones constructed as a result of historical and social forces. Foucault explained discourse through the use of language, in that language is not a neutral instrument, rather a means by which it is intricately related to history. Language’s creation basically, influences how we think and carry ourselves. “Foucault’s idea of an archaeology of thought is closely linked to the modernist literary idea that language is a source of thought in its own right, not merely an instrument for expressing the ideas of those who use it”.<sup>20</sup>

This type of study is difficult because it pushes us to think, re-think and even doubt the ways of our thinking sometimes, because discourse is an individually, and socially constructed truth, in which each and every one of us is a participant. Gary Gutting explains how Foucault “thinks that individuals operate in a conceptual environment that determines and limits them in ways of which they cannot be aware” and that at anytime “in a given domain, there are substantial constraints on how people are able to think.”<sup>21</sup> An example of these so-called constraints can be such as grammar and logic, but what

---

<sup>19</sup> Weedon, C. (1987). “Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory”. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

<sup>20</sup> Gutting, Gary (2005). “Foucault: A Very Short Introduction.” p. 32. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Foucault is referring to goes beyond the rules of language to a set of rules that materially restrict the range of thought.

In his book, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault explains the attributes of his study on discourse as the excavation of unconsciously organized sediments of thought.<sup>22</sup> Focusing on the work of famous philosophers and scientists, he emphasizes that his interest was not in the product of the thought process, rather the “general structure of the system in which they thought”.<sup>23</sup> He claims that each historical period has its own, what he calls the “underground network”, or *episteme*, which allows the organization of thought.<sup>24</sup> For example, when we think of madness, now, we associate such conditions with mental illness. However, Foucault explains that our ancestors, like Descartes, saw madness as a completely different phenomenon.<sup>25</sup> As a result, the way in which we think, our ideas are not a result of originality rather the product of a constructed framework or a disciplined way of thinking in which the society we inhabit has required, assigned, and directed it as acceptable. Slavery was once an accepted truth. It was socially justified through different outlets, namely through institutions like religion and government. Racism and discrimination can also be explained through this notion.

### **1.2.1. Discourse and Language: Critical Discourse Analysis**

---

<sup>22</sup> Foucault, Michel. (1982). “The Archeology of Knowledge.” UK: Routledge. 1990.

<sup>23</sup> Gutting, “Foucault: A Very Short Introduction,” 34.

<sup>24</sup> Horrocks, Chris and Jevtic, Zoran. (2004). “Foucault: A Graphic Guide”. p. 65. UK: Icon Books Ltd. 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Foucault, Michel. (1988). “Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason”. USA: Random. (1988).

For the purposes of this study, the field of discourse we will be focusing on is where language and its use is concerned. When studying the manipulation of discourse, in this case, we are going to be examining the manipulation of language. One way to do this, as Van Dijk has done, is to examine the properties of manipulation within the framework that links discourse, cognition and society.<sup>26</sup> He argues that the reasons for his selections of these three frameworks is because, he explains, that manipulation happens on the minds of human beings via talk and text and that manipulation involves some form of mental influence. He also argues a social approach is important because manipulation “implies power and power abuse.”<sup>27</sup>

While Van Dijk focuses on the minds, or social and personal cognitions, that are influenced and organized by ideologies, Norman Fairclough supplements that language is the form in which “ideologies” are conveyed and the interactions flourished are products of power because in the modern society power is achieved through ideology. “Ideology is the prime means of manufacturing consent.”<sup>28</sup> Fairclough’s point is that certain ideologies go through a “naturalization” process in which, the once believed notion and perspective of a person or a group becomes apart of the shared “common-sense” ways of the whole society. Language, which he views as a social practice that is determined by social structures, is the means in which the ideology is spread and discourse produced.<sup>29</sup>

Both scholars believe that in order to analyze these powers and influences upon which discourse is constructed, a thorough examination of language use is required. By

---

<sup>26</sup> Van Dijk, Teun A. (2006). “Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation”. London. SAGE Publications. 364.

<sup>27</sup> Van Dijk, “Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation”.

<sup>28</sup> Fairclough, Norman. (1989). “Language and Power.” New York. Longman Inc. p4.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p 17.

further developing Critical Linguistics (CL), a study in which ideology is isolated in discourse to illustrate how ideology or its processes manifest as systems of linguistic characteristics and processes.<sup>30</sup>

To Fairclough, CL focuses too much on the lexical aspect of the text and not at all on the audiences' interpretation of the text, an approach he claims necessary. For him and Van Dijk the study of CL is too limiting, but Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), on the other hand, does not have a unitary theoretical framework, rather a "shared perspective encompassing a range of approaches rather than as just one school."<sup>31</sup> CDA is

Discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.<sup>32</sup>

To him, aside for the meanings and context that are added to words historically, culturally, and socially, he reminds his readers to go back to the basics, where language was used as a socially defining factor. Back to the feudal times to assert that language has always been a power based entity. He explains that dialect and language were used to define status once upon a time, to determine social class systems, who the commoner and

---

<sup>30</sup> Fowler, R. and B. Hodge (1979). "Critical Linguistics". In R. Fowler et al (Eds.). "Language and Control". London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

<sup>31</sup> Fairclough, Norman (1995b). *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold. p 7.

<sup>32</sup> Fairclough, Norman. (1980). "Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language". New York. Routledge. p 135.



the royal was. There was – is – such a thing as “correct English”, which he refers to as “Standard English”, which he adds that if one excels in would serve as “a passport to good jobs and positions of influence and power in nationals and local communities,” the “culture capital” as he calls it.<sup>33</sup>

When analyzing language, Fairclough usually looks for three distinct values in the text: experiential, relational and expressive features. The experiential feature is when a trace of the text producer’s natural or social world is represented, mostly in the form of knowledge or beliefs. The relational feature is when there is “a trace of and a cue to the social relationships enacted via text in the discourse.” Finally the third feature, the expressive, has to do with subjects and social identities.

Although, both scholars focus on similar frameworks, Van Dijk pays more attention to influence, power, dominance, bias, and inequality. He builds his concept a little further and studies the power behind these “influences” and “constructed truths” through the critical discourse analytical theory.

According to Van Dijk, CDA studies the role of social power abuse, dominance and inequality enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.<sup>34</sup> He sees such reproduction as oppressive and an abuse of social power, which he defines as the access to and control of resources such as information, knowledge, money, status, and force, and concludes such exercises of power as manipulation of the masses. His framework of analyses is particularly helpful in this study because, it does

---

<sup>33</sup> Fairclough, Norman. (1989). “Language and Power.” New York. Longman Inc. p 58.

<sup>34</sup> Van Dijk, Teun A. (1993). “Discourse & Society: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis”. London. SAGE Publications.

not only cover textual and structural levels of discourse but also analyzes the “comprehension process”.

Discourse is not simply an isolated textual or dialogic structure. Rather it is a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants as well as production and reception processes.<sup>35</sup>

He builds on Foucault’s “domination and enslavements”<sup>36</sup> traits words carry by circling around the concept of manipulation, which he relates as the “abuse of power” which, he explains, is a strategy in which influences and constructed truths are solidified.

### **1.2.2. Van Dijk’s Discourse Manipulation**

Specifically, looking at the macro-level categories of social groups, forms of communications that result in favoring one group over the other are seen as illegitimate forms of interactions. These communications, however, have to take place in space where the supplier of information and the recipient of such information are not on the same economic level. Van Dijk argues for manipulation to work one side has to have the resources and access to information generators and outlets to stream it to the other side. Manipulation, he explains, is a discursive form of elite power reproduction that is against the best interests of the dominated groups and it produces social inequality.<sup>37</sup> He identifies three types of manipulation as social, cognitive and discursive.

---

<sup>35</sup> Van Dijk (1988). “News as Discourse”. New Jersey. Erlbaum. p 2.

<sup>36</sup> Foucault, Michel. (1982). “The Archeology of Knowledge.” UK: Routledge. 1990.

<sup>37</sup> Van Dijk, Teun A. “Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation”.

Although, I will go in detail on how these forms of manipulation are present in our day-to-day lives, this study focuses more on the discursive manipulation. Studying this topic through discourse analysis will allow me to explain by re-examining and de-contextualizing the rhetoric or discourse I have collected in the form of data in future chapters.

*Social manipulation* is the illegitimate domination confirming social inequality. Illegitimate in the sense that it violates the rights of those manipulated, especially in a democratic society. For example, institutions, like church, government, media and schools can manipulate their recipients to further a goal or believe in an ideology by controlling the information and strategically publicizing it. In contrast, however, the dynamics of a family hierarchical power can be one example of this form of manipulation that might not necessarily violate the recipient's rights. Parents are portrayed and seen as the authority figure in their household, such power can enable them to influence their children, perhaps by instilling belief, values and practices, which indirectly will assist them to control their actions.

*Cognitive manipulation* is mind control involving the interference with formation of biased mental models and social representations, such as knowledge and ideologies. One aspect of this process basically regulates how information is relayed, in the sense that it targets and controls what information needs to be remembered and what doesn't. For example, controlling visual representations in newspapers, such as making the fonts and headlines of a print bigger and bolder, so it can be recalled easily. Another intention and meaning for the 'bigger and bolder' texts or headlines are that such representations

require a sense of urgency and importance, while other types of news are discarded as non-important or not worthy of anyone's attention. In addition to having recipients focus more attention on the visually exposed text, it also reduces and devalues other texts.

Another aspect of cognitive manipulation is the interference of understanding, which requires, not only associating meanings to words, but also associating our own personal experiences and emotions to the event we read or hear about.<sup>38</sup> This personal association is called our mental model, which is specific and unique for every individual. "Mental models not only define our understanding of talk and text itself but also the understanding of the whole communicative event."<sup>39</sup> Through the strategic regulation of information, *usually highlighting 'our good deeds' and devaluing 'our bad deeds'*, it is probable that manipulators can form the specific mental model that is 'preferred' on recipients. For example, the immigration discourse in the United States holds immigrants responsible for the rise in unemployment and bad economy, when in fact the blame should be on government policies. Such preferential use of mental models is evidence of discourse manipulation.

*Discursive manipulation* involves emphasizing the usual forms and formats of ideology; like focusing on the **Their** bad things and **Our** good things.<sup>40</sup> It deals with influencing how the recipients understand and process an event, focusing on social cognition, attitudes and ideologies, called *social mental models*. For example, after the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11 – a vulnerable moment for the

---

<sup>38</sup> Van Dijk, "Discourse & Society: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis".

<sup>39</sup> Van Dijk, "Discourse & Society: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis".

<sup>40</sup> Van Dijk, "Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation".

American people – legislations, like the Patriot Act, were passed as a cautionary procedure to prevent further attacks against the American people. Actions taken by the government and the media so swiftly after this event may have contributed or exacerbated the Us vs. Them mentality, which frames the American military interventions and actions as anti-terrorist movements and just actions. The implementation of these policies may have also created polarized structures presenting ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ categories and denigrating or dehumanizing the ‘other’, *or them*.

In short, manipulative discourse occurs in public communication, in the form of talk and text –often including non-verbal communication, as well – in which the dominant influential groups, or elites control the domains of communication. Analyzing these discursive strategies requires critically analyzing such discourse in terms of context categories.<sup>41</sup>

### **1.3. Dehumanization**

De-legitimizing, demonizing, marginalizing, disenfranchising, satanizing, othering, de-individualizing and dehumanizing are all methods and processes in which groups of people are rendered to be less than human, or in plain terms, less than ‘us’. Now while all these terms are used to represent some kind of denigrated form of human beings, it is important to point out that they don’t all mean or stand for the same thing. They are rather indications of similar to same process of the degradation aspect and use. Any individual or group that has been delegitimized, demonized, marginalized,

---

<sup>41</sup> Van Dijk, “Discourse & Society: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis”.

disenfranchised, satanized, othered, de-individualized or dehumanized has undergone some type of transformation that has made that individual or group less than the average human being, usually degrading them to non-human qualities. “Denying uniquely human attributes to others represents them as animal-like, and denying human nature to others represents them as objects,”<sup>42</sup> agrees dehumanization expert Nick Haslam. I argue that these terms and processes of degrading human attributes and characteristics are different manifestations of what Orlando Patterson calls the *social death*.

### **1.3.1 Social Death**

Patterson first introduced social death in his book, Slavery and Social Death defining slavery as one of the most extreme forms of domination in which the master exercised total power, and the slave demonstrated total powerlessness. Patterson argued that since the slave cannot exist without the master, and is not socially recognized by the society, that slave is a “social nonperson”, or socially dead. Social death influenced and changed the way slaves viewed themselves and how they were seen by the society.<sup>43</sup> James Waller embraces this concept in his book, Becoming Evil, to assert that it is through such techniques ordinary people are able commit genocide and mass killing.

Waller elaborates that social death produces room for the creation and legitimization of the ‘other’ as the enemy, and thus, rationalizes using violence towards them. Marion Kaplan describes this as a group’s excommunication from the legitimate

---

<sup>42</sup> Haslam, Nick. (2006). “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review”. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. Vol. 10, No. 3, 252–264. Accessed 7 July, 2014.

<sup>43</sup> Patterson, Orlando. (1982). “Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study”. Harvard University Press; 1st edition.

social and moral community.<sup>44</sup> Kaplan discusses the concept of social death, in the sense that this phenomenon was a key element into the violent anti-Semitism implementation and action that led to the Holocaust. Kaplan argues that social death was the prerequisite for the physical death of Jews at that time. Her description of the social death process not only referred to the institutional disenfranchisement Jews faced but also the day to day sufferings Jews endured by the “ordinary Germans” on the street or in their lives. Waller’s argument consists of three mechanisms of social death; “us-them thinking, dehumanization of the victims, and blaming the victims.”<sup>45</sup>

Note the different terminology used by different scholars when referring to victims, victimizers, and in-groups and out-groups. For the sake of this paper, I will be utilizing the terms ‘in-groups’ when referring to the ‘victimizers’ and ‘out-groups’, or the ‘other’ to refer to the ‘victims’ or groups that have been marginalized and characterized or equated to less than human qualities.

It is also vital to emphasize that such occurrences of excluding and degrading of the others does not just manifest within societies, rather it is through other contributing factors and outside impositions that help facilitate such process. Impositions such as inequality, economic and political factors, all affect how the society is able to manage or carry on. Karina Korostelina argues that once social identity becomes involved in interest-based or instrumental conflict, it then changes the nature of political or economic

---

<sup>44</sup> Marion, Kaplan A. (1999). “Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany”. Oxford University Press; Studies in Jewish History edition: 3-5.

<sup>45</sup> Waller, James. (2002). *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*. Kindle Edition. p 3199.

conflict in particular ways, making conflict protracted and deep-rooted (Korostelina 2008).

These three mechanisms employed by Waller work by first distinguishing “*them*” as completely different from “*us*” through the use of the “Us vs. Them” rhetoric or thinking. This polarization begins with the social categorizations of in-groups and out-groups, as a necessary distinction to magnify their *minor differences*.<sup>46</sup> “Social categorizations systematize our social world; they also create and define our place in it.”<sup>47</sup> By categorizing ourselves as different from them, or ‘*others*’, we relieve or distance ourselves away from the bad traits and attributes we perceive the other group to have, depriving them of their original identity and assigning them a new one.

According to Volkan, there is a tendency to cast negative features and goals to an out-group. He explains that this is due to the difficulty members face in integrating both positive and negative qualities of their group image. By utilizing Henri Tajfel’s argument about the need for people to have a positive identity, *and image*, Volkan asserts that the in-group internalizes their positive qualities and externalizes the negative qualities by projecting those features on to the out-group.<sup>48</sup> Such thinking slowly metamorphoses into designating the in-group with good and positive qualities and the other, or out-group, with bad and negative qualities,<sup>49</sup> often resulting in *social exclusion*.<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> Volkan, Vamik. (1997). *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*. New York: Farrar Straus, and Giroux.

<sup>47</sup> Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, 3214.

<sup>48</sup> Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*, 42.

<sup>49</sup> This is also discussed in Van Dijk’s “Discourse and Manipulation,” as ways of manipulating discourse by assigning positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

<sup>50</sup> Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, 3281.



However, social exclusion, or “moral exclusion” as Susan Opatow phrases it, is not always a product the social death process, but, Opatow emphasizes, can differ in range of intensity from genocide to mere indifference.<sup>51</sup>

Second, rationalizing why these groups are socially secluded takes place through the form of dehumanization, which is crucial to the social death process. In this step the secluded and dehumanized group is no longer seen as a person capable of thinking, feeling, or acting. Rather this stage re-categorizes these groups into subhuman, nonhuman or animalistic groups. Social identity expert Korostelina asserts, “in the perception of in-group members, the out-group is devalued, dehumanized, and turned into a homogenous evil,”<sup>52</sup> transforming the out-group into an image of the enemy. The process of dehumanization is not one that happens over night, or over short amount of time, rather it manifests in different forms and stages.

Volkan discusses that the dehumanization of an enemy group is done in different stages. First, he explains, that the enemy is demonized, but not to the extent where the enemy loses all human qualities. Then in time the second phase dehumanization is implemented by rendering the enemy group as animals, insects, and so on, thus completely dehumanizing them.<sup>53</sup> For example in Nazi Germany, Jewish people were referred to as cowards because they allegedly never served in the German military to defend their country, or were called opportunists or exploiters because they, supposedly, exploited Germans and profited from the black market in wartime. Such descriptions and

---

<sup>51</sup> Opatow, Susan. (2010). “Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction”. *Journal of Social Issues*, 46, 1–20.

<sup>52</sup> Korostelina, Karina. (2008). “Identity Conflicts: Models of Dynamics and Early Warning”. In Sandole, Dennis. (ed). *A Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. Routledge.

<sup>53</sup> Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, 113.

characterizations of Jews were harsh, nonetheless were features of human qualities. It was not till later they were referred to as vermin, which completed the dehumanization process. Volkan concludes that it at this stage that “hurting or killing” vermin “does not induce the guilt feelings that hurting other human beings would.”<sup>54</sup>

The third mechanism of social death Waller discusses is the blaming of victims, or the in-group blaming or believing that the enemy deserves being socially excommunicated, and dehumanized. He explains that this type of thinking is driven by the fact that human beings seek to rationalize their surroundings, actions and interactions. Tajfel’s claim about people needing to associate themselves with positive imagery makes it nearly impossible for groups or members to doubt their rationale when it comes to the treatment of the out-group. This notion of “victims earning their suffering,” stems from the belief that we live in a *just world*, “a world where people get what they deserve.”<sup>55</sup> By blaming the victims, or the enemy group, for their own suffering, the in-group reduces any guilt it might feel, preserving their just world faith. Because the out-group is responsible for its own suffering, the blame is attributed to the actions of its members, which become associated with deviant, evil, and dangerous behaviors that can be linked to a higher power (for example: religious beliefs). Such association further escalates the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, making the ‘us’ group morally right, transforming the in-group to represent righteous actions taken, and the ‘them’ group as morally corrupted and a force of evil.

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, 3367.

### **1.3.1.1. Manifestations of Social Death**

As mentioned above, I argue that terms used to lessen the value of human beings are different manifestations of social death. It is important to emphasize, however, that while the purpose of using these terms maybe similar – to devalue human life and importance – they are and can be used in different contexts. For example, the use of terms like “demonization” and “satanization” are, normally, used in the religious contexts, to evoke a moral stature and emphasize the social boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Equating people or groups to demons and Satan is a form of enacting the social death on those people or social group via the use of religious beliefs. By referring to them as Satans and demons not only solidifies the in-group’s identity as morally right and equipped, but transforms the conflict into a moral battle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, creating a space for violence.

### **1.3.2. Butler’s Apprehension and Grievability of Life**

In her book, *Frames of War*, Judith Butler seeks to “draw attention to the epistemological problem raised by the issue of framing: the frames through which we apprehend or, indeed, fail to apprehend the lives of others as lost or injured.”<sup>56</sup> When war is waged, Butler observes that the subject is constantly moving back and forth between modes of protecting life, and modes of destroying life. She hopes to give an explanation

---

<sup>56</sup> Butler, Judith. (2009). “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” New York: Verso, p. 1.

for that justification by studying “why and how it becomes easier, or more difficult, to wage” war.<sup>57</sup>

Butler’s main argument is that there cannot be any apprehension of life as livable or grievable if that life is not apprehended as living in the first place, in which the notion of being and recognizability are examined. How are certain lives recognized as living and grieved, whilst others are not? Note that the *apprehension* of a life is an acknowledgement of the existence of life not the recognition. She explains that *intelligibility*, the “historical schema that establishes domains of the knowable,”<sup>58</sup> conditions and produces *recognizability*, the traits responsible for making a subject recognizable, which allows for *recognition* to take place. “If certain lives do not qualify as live or are, from the start, not conceivable, as live within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense.”<sup>59</sup>

Butler argues that grievability is intimately linked to precariousness, making the lives that are considered living, precarious. She defines precariousness,

Thus, the conclusion is not that everything that can die or is subject to destruction (i.e., all life processes) imposes an obligation to preserve life. But an obligation does emerge from the fact that we are, as it were, social beings from

---

<sup>57</sup> Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” p. 1.

the start, dependent on what is outside ourselves, on others, on institutions, and on sustained and sustainable environments, and so are, in this sense, precarious.<sup>60</sup>

She declares that war divides populations into those grievable and those that are not. Adding, “grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters.”<sup>61</sup> She asks who “we” are in times of war, which group we belong to. And if we died would our deaths be mourned?

In her public lecture at the Humanities and Arts Research Centre of Royal Holloway in London, Butler discusses the selective coverage of the media in their differential grieving, which has influenced and changed the ways of war. She acknowledges that there are populations that have not conformed to modernity and that are not understood, which are often seen as threats. These populations, which have never been perceived as living, are targets of destruction.<sup>62</sup>

#### **1.4. Violence**

Johan Galtung defines violence as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. “Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.”<sup>63</sup> For example, using Galtung’s

---

<sup>60</sup> Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” p. 23.

<sup>61</sup> Butler, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” p. 14.

<sup>62</sup> “Judith Butler – Frames of War: The Politics of Ungrievable Life | Backdoor Broadcasting Company.” Accessed July 4, 2014. <http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2009/02/harc-frames-of-war-the-politics-of-ungrievable-life/>.

<sup>63</sup> Yves Winter. (2012). “Violence and Visibility,” *New Political Science*. 34:2. p 168.

example, dying from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century would have been unavoidable, however, dying from the same illness, now, despite all the medical resources is avoidable and signifies that some form of violence is present, according to his definition. To sum up, when the potential is higher than the actual, which is by definition avoidable, then violence is present.<sup>64</sup>

Violence is a “needs-deprivation”, and one reaction can result into direct violence, however, that is not the only reaction. There are many forms of violence, one that is commonly accepted, as violence is usually direct violence, also known as physical or personal violence, usually resulting in death. The types of violence Galtung regards important to distinguish are structural violence and physical or direct violence, which he emphasizes is important to know the “basic distinction between violence that works on the body, and violence that works on the soul; where the latter would include lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, threats, etc. that serve to decrease mental potentialities.”<sup>65</sup> In another article he differentiates direct violence, as violence that has an author, from structural violence, as violence that is anonymous.<sup>66</sup> He also believes a third type of violence, one that enables both structural and physical violence, is crucial to the study of violence. This third type of violence is called cultural violence. “Direct violence is an *event*; structural violence is a *process* with ups and downs; cultural violence is an

---

Galtung, Johan. (1969). “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”. *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol.6(3), p 167-191. Accessed July 7, 2014. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301>


<sup>64</sup> Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”. p 169.

<sup>65</sup> Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”. p 169.

<sup>66</sup> Johan Galtung and Tord Hovik. (1971). “Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization”. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1 pp. 73-76. Sage Publications. p 73.

*invariant*, a 'permanence', remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformations of basic culture."<sup>67</sup>

Since this study is on the use of weapons, the focus will dominantly be on the physical aspects of violence, but forms of structural and cultural violence are also important to understand in this study. As violence studies attempt to uncover and understand not the only the use of violence but also the legitimization that authorizes that use.



**Figure 2, Galtung's Model of Violence**

#### **1.4.1 Structural Violence**

Structural Violence is the indirect form of violence that occurs when social structures prevent people from reaching their potential realizations. It is also referred to as *social injustice*. It is not usually apparent and obvious like personal violence, because personal violence manifest, registers, indicates some form of change, and can often be visible. Structural violence, on the other hand, Galtung argues, is silent, static, it does not

---

<sup>67</sup> Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research". p 294.

show, can even be seen as part of the natural order of things and sometimes “the object of structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all”.<sup>68</sup>

There are different forms of structural violence (economic, political, hierarchical) that basically exist because social structures fail to provide basic needs. The concept of basic human needs is culturally subjective one, in the sense that there are scholars that argue that the necessities for life tend to be different across all cultures, and there others that argue that this necessities and universal. Those arguments are not necessary to disclose in this project. For the purpose of this study, let us adopt John Burton’s theory of basic human needs in which security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institution and economic participation are the essential human needs. And let us assume that those privileges are universal. Only then can we begin to attempt to understand structural violence. For example, Woman and Labor Movement in the United States advocate for fair wages among the sexes, or the Woman Suffrage Movement that fought for women’s right to vote. Both these movements reveal the existence of a structural inefficiency and problem when dealing gender and the sexes.

However, as Galtung has explained, structural violence is a consequence of other type of violence. Slavery may have been initiated through ethnocentric ideologies, and then adopted into institutions. Referring African Americans as three fourths of a human, Jim Crow Laws, or segregation were all institutionalized at one point, but they originated from society, from social culture. Thus, institutionalizing them only solidified the legitimization already provided by the society.

---

<sup>68</sup> Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”. p 173.



### 1.4.2. Cultural Violence

In this platform of violence, the role of structural violence departs from state based institutions and takes on social institutions, such as religion, ideology, language, science and so forth. Galtung defines cultural violence as “the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society.”<sup>69</sup>

Similar to the discussion before about discourse and its control, which Galtung refers to as a “violent structure”, he declares that the centerpiece for structural violence is *exploitation*. He explains that such unequal exchange and distribution will disadvantage the exploited and allow the space for some deprivation of basic needs.<sup>70</sup> There are four terms that embody exploitation by impeding consciousness formation and mobilization.

*Penetration*, implanting the topdog [the exploiter] inside the underdog so to speak, combined with *segmentation*, giving the underdog [the exploited] only a very partial view of what goes on, will do the first job. And *marginalization*, keeping the underdogs on the outside, combined with *fragmentation*, keeping the underdogs away from each other, will do the second job.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Galtung, Johan. (1990). “Cultural Violence”. *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 27, No. 3. 291-305. p 291. Accessed 7 July, 2014.  
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/423472?uid=3739936&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104256832431>

<sup>70</sup> Galtung, “Cultural Violence”. p 293.

<sup>71</sup> Galtung, “Cultural Violence”. p 294.

Galtung's concept and explanation of violence has a Marxist essence to it. His whole understanding is circled around the division of class; having an elite community that he calls the "topdogs", who regulate the state and economy, and the proletariat who he refers to as the "underdogs", who are the regulated.

#### **1.4.2.1. Orientalism**

The concept of Orientalism, founded and theorized by literary theorist Edward Said, attempts to explain why in the West there is a preconceived notion of what the East, or the Orient, is like.<sup>72</sup> He asserts that researches, books, and arts based on the Orient culture only reflected what the Imperialist societies produced, which fantasized and presented an exotic version rather than the actual culture. Said has dedicated many of his works to understanding why the public discourse of the Orient, or the Arab world, remains to be seen as an inferior civilization. He attributes this cause, in the case of the United States and the Arab world, to, 1) Distance and lack of awareness, 2) to the politicization of the United States relationship to Israel, 3) the portrayal of the Arab world by the media and Hollywood, and 4) the dependency of Arab nations on the West, on states like the United States, for patronage.<sup>73</sup>

Said explains that American Orientalism is different from British or French Orientalism because perceptions of the Orient in the United States are abstractions and generalizations fueled by the media, not necessarily informed ones. 'Informed' in the sense that the British and French have occupied some Arab nation in the past, basically

---

<sup>72</sup> Said, Edward. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

<sup>73</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, p

coming into contact with their norms, traditions, and way of life, an experience the United States lacks.<sup>74</sup>

The portrayal of Arabs in Hollywood as the bad guys that cannot be reasoned with, and media coverage further facilitates this perception of Arabs as “fanatics”, “extreme”, and “violent”<sup>75 76</sup>. These kinds of impressions, Said argues, take away the human aspect and narrowly suppress the true and diverse reality of the Orient.<sup>77</sup> This problem is further fueled by the United States alliance to Israel, in which Said believes that anti-Arab sentiment that exists in Israel is imported into to the United States.<sup>78</sup> Said argues that, as a result, there is almost no humanness quality that is assigned to portraying the Orient.

The position the United States holds in the global community makes it a target for aid seeking nations to be allies with, even if it means compromising their images and securities of their own nations and cultures,<sup>79</sup> a reality that Said is repulsed by.

Orientalism enables cultural violence by providing the justification of violence with an enemy mark or a scapegoat. Much like the Oklahoma City Bombing of 1995, in which in the initial stages of the investigations majority of the allegations were on people from the Middle East, when in fact it was an American that committed that brutality. The Orient is perceived to be as completely different, as the ‘other’.

---

<sup>74</sup> Edward Said On Orientalism, 2012.

[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd\\_Z\\_g&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd_Z_g&feature=youtube_gdata_player).

<sup>75</sup> Said, Edward. (1977). *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. New York: Vintage Books.

<sup>76</sup> Edward Said On Orientalism, 2012.

<sup>77</sup> Said, Orientalism, p 347.

<sup>78</sup> Edward Said On Orientalism, 2012.

<sup>79</sup> Edward Said On Orientalism, 2012.

### **1.4.3. Physical, Direct, or Personal Violence**

Direct violence “is [the] somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence.”<sup>80</sup> Examples of this kind of violence range from war, rape, assault, torture, murder to verbal attacks, as it is a type of violence that is physically perceived. Unlike the other types of violence, in direct violence there is a perpetrator and a purpose,<sup>81</sup> and it usually measured by the number of deaths or injuries.

Direct violence does not require forms of social or state institutions to interpose. It is exclusively an action-based occurrence. It encompasses the types of violence we experience and perceive to experience everyday, such as quarreling or fighting, bra brawls, hate crimes, rapes, gang shootings, territory disputes, war, and so on. it is basically what we see, being covered by the media everyday.

These three types of violence are intricately tied to one another. They are basically different forms of manifestations of each other. As it is indicated in Galtung’s Model of Violence, each holds a corner on the triangle, meaning that each type of violence can lead to either the others or just one. For example, in the case of Gay Marriage, members of the LGBTQ community have been pursuing movements to gain acceptance and equality in societies around the world. Although, the institution of marriage is, in most states, a

---

<sup>80</sup> Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”. p 170.

<sup>81</sup> Kaufman, Asher. (2014). “Thinking Beyond Direct Violence”. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 46. pp 441-444. p 441.

secular matter, much of the prejudice often comes from religious institutions, which inevitably penetrates state matters. This is evident even in secular states, like the United States. Having a lifestyle that is not widely accepted in any society can often lead to all forms of violence. Hate crimes are indications of personal violence, and passing policies that permit “civil unions” (not marriages) are the result of structural violence.

There are elements of all types of violence in this study. The reason for my focus on the direct and physical aspect of violence is, obviously, due to the destruction and devastation drones cause. That aspect, of course, needs no explanation as it is vividly captured in the media, and I am confident that the reader has some grasp in the gruesome effects of modern warfare, how much havoc a bomb dropped from the sky would create. By that I am alluding to the obliteration aspect of war, the demolition of cities and the images of human remains and scattered limbs, and the hopelessness and despair that follow (*insert memories of the 9/11 occurrences here*). Structural violence would have also been applicable if I was approaching this study from an international point of view, in which case the separations and borders of nations will diminish and instead would have presented a global community, not just the Middle East. But that is not what I am doing. I am focusing particular in the United States use of drones on other nations, with the majority residing in the Middle East. There are remnants of cultural violence in this study, which have allowed the legitimization of drone use, and supplemented the “every war has collateral damage” rhetoric in the public discourse.

## CHAPTER II

### DRONES

*“Every struggle has its heroes, but even more fundamentally, the struggle must have a foe.”*<sup>82</sup>

A *drone* is the common name used to refer to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPAs), or Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), and the program or combined ground stations and data links are called Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)<sup>83</sup>. Or as Rod Powers defines it, “A Drone is a collective name from a pilotless aircraft.”<sup>84</sup> The name ‘drone’ is associated with the buzzing-bee-like-noise this aerial vehicle emits when airborne.

Drones have been used for anti-aircraft target exercises and surveillance purposes dating back to the 1930s. However, with the escalation of armed conflict drones are being equipped with missiles transforming a once neutral, Intel gathering aircraft into a loaded offensive weapon. According to drone expert Ian Shaw, the evolution of drones can

---

<sup>82</sup> Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2003). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. University of California Press. Kindle Edition.

<sup>83</sup> Jeremiah Gertler. (2012). “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems.” Congressional Research Service. p.1.

<sup>84</sup> Powers, Rod. “Military Word/ Phrase Origins,” United States Military Information.

understood in their use as target exercises in the early 1900s, as “sensors” or for the purpose of surveillance after the 1960s, and as weapons from the 2000s to now<sup>85</sup>.

### 2.1. “Drone as a Target”

The use of drones for target exercises assisted in training aircraft-combat pilots, missile men and anti-aircraft gunners to target them as enemy marks. Soon the notion of using a pilotless aircraft was very popular and even encouraged creativity in building such types of aircrafts, to utilize them not only as targets but to operationalize them in times of armed conflict. Several attempts were put into action, and even produced unmanned Torpedo’s as “smart weapons” or “precision guided- munitions (PGM)” that would be controlled from the base or the ‘mothership’, but none were ever very successful.<sup>86</sup>

The problem was that these aircrafts (*referred to as then “baby”, “robots” or “drone”*), like the Boeing B17, could not take off on their own, so the resolution to that dilemma was having a pilot take off, activate the remote control system, arming the detonators and parachuting out before reaching the intended targets. These aircrafts were packed with explosives and had cameras installed into them, which made it easier to target enemy boats and bases. Once the target is in sight, the aircraft is deliberately crashed into these areas.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup> Shaw, Ian. (2013). “The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones.” Understanding Empire. <http://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2-0-a-brief-history-of-u-s-drones/>

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> [Sorensen, Theodore](#). (1966). “Kennedy”. New York: Bantam. p. 37.

During World War II, Operation Aphrodite sent two pilots, Sr. Lieutenants Joseph P. Kennedy and Wilford Johnny Willy, on a mission to fly the BQ-8 aircraft, which was jam-packed with over 21,000 lbs. of explosives. The target was a fortress in northern France, an underground military complex built by Nazi Germany, believed to house V-3 cannons.<sup>88</sup> Unfortunately, the aircraft prematurely detonated before both pilots could exit, killing them instantly.

ATTEMPTED FIRST APHRODITE ATTACK TWELVE AUGUST WITH ROBOT TAKING OFF FROM FERSFIELD AT ONE EIGHT ZERO FIVE HOURS PD ROBOT EXPLODED IN THE AIR AT APPROXIMATELY TWO THOUSAND FEET EIGHT MILES SOUTHEAST OF HALESWORTH AT ONE EIGHT TWO ZERO HOURS PD WILFORD J. WILLY CMA SR GRADE LIEUTENANT AND JOSEPH P. KENNEDY SR GRADE LIEUTENANT CMA BOTH USNR CMA WERE KILLED PD COMMANDER SMITH CMA IN COMMAND OF THIS UNIT CMA IS MAKING FULL REPORT TO US NAVAL OPERATIONS PD A MORE DETAILED REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU WHEN INTERROGATION IS COMPLETED.<sup>89</sup>

## 2.2. “Drone as a Sensor”

Even with constant failures to operationalize these RPVs, the United States military never gave up. One of the crucial, or “game changing,” moments to drone evolution, Shaw claims, was when unmanned systems bested manned systems in a

---

<sup>88</sup> ["US Navy and US Marine Corps Bureau Numbers, Third Series \(30147 to 839998\)".](#) Joseph F. Baugher. Retrieved 2014-04-10.

<sup>89</sup> [Renehan, Jr., Edward J.](#) (2002). *The Kennedys at War, 1937–1945*. New York: [Doubleday](#). p. 304. Correspondence claimed to be a top Secret telegram sent to General [Carl Andrew Spaatz](#) from General [Jimmy Doolittle](#), on August 1944.



simulated battle as part of the United States military exercises. Such capabilities were put to work and proved efficient in reconnaissance. For example, drones were used for reconnaissance in Cuba in 1962, and the “Lightening Bug” or Ryan-147 was used for surveillance in Vietnam and China in 1963.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, the cameras installed into these UAVs proved to be productive as they monitor and document damages done by bombs and other weapons. “About 85 percent of the photos taken to assess bomb damage during the period were brought home by these automated craft.”<sup>91</sup>

In addition to drone surveillance, other enhancements were being tested and developed. As Shaw mentions, “electronic listening devices” and relay signals were being developed and tested to integrate them into these UAVs. However, no such thing was developed and the United States Air Force (USAF) National Museum reasoned by saying that even though the QU-22B performed well as a signal relay, due to equipment reliability issues all operational flights in Southeast Asia carried a pilot onboard and that after the loss of several aircraft in 1972, the USAF cancelled the QU-22 program.<sup>92</sup>

### **2.3. “Drone as a Weapon”**

#### **Predator Drones**

Abraham Karem built the prototype for the most popular killer drone, the Predator. Karem and his family migrated to California in the 1980s, where he built his first

---

<sup>90</sup> Shaw, Ian. “The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones.”

<sup>91</sup> Dickson, Paul. (1976). “The Electronic Battlefield”. Indiana University Press. p. 188.

<sup>92</sup> “Factsheets : Beech QU-22B.” Accessed June 30, 2014.

<http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=317>

unmanned aircraft, which he named Albatross, in his Los Angeles garage.<sup>93</sup> Karem had been developing unmanned aircrafts for the Israeli defense contractors in the 70s, before he moved to the United States and was funded by the United States military and CIA.<sup>94</sup> Karem later sold his company to General Atomics, but was still kept on as a consultant.

Unlike any of its time the Albatross, could stay airborne for over 50 hours without needing to refuel. Before such technology, the drones that were utilized as sensors could only stay airborne for a couple of hours and could only take still photos. This new cutting-edge technology attracted many on the defense sectors and led to the funding of DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,<sup>95</sup> producing a newer version of Albatross called Amber. Because Amber was unable to perform prolonged surveillance of more than 40 hours and carry large quantities of fuel, it was recalled and improved in 1989 producing a newer, more able unmanned aircraft, GNAT-750.

The GNAT-750 was powered by the same Rotax 582 engine used to power the Amber, but rather than the Amber's high pylon mounted wing, had a more conventional low mounted wing and a much larger fuselage. The GNAT-750 was equipped with a GPS navigation system, allowing fully autonomous missions of up to 48hrs and was equipped with a stabilized FLIR camera, as well as daylight and a low-light camera in a movable sensor turret under the nose.<sup>96</sup>

#### **2.4.1. "Killer Drones"**

---

<sup>93</sup> Shaw, Ian. "The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones."

<sup>94</sup> Benjamin, Medea. (2012). "Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control". New York: Verso books. Kindle Edition 196-197.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> "General Atomics Predator." Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://spyflight.co.uk/Predator.htm>.

Through various improvements and consultation with Karem and other experts, the CIA was able to install munitions on to the Predator. A laser guided Hellfire missile was the installed on each wing,<sup>97</sup> weaponizing the aircraft. However, neither the CIA nor any of the military branches were authorized to use drones as weapons.

After the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress approved the Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF) just a few days after the attack, empowering President George W. Bush and future presidents to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against perpetrators of the attack.<sup>98</sup>

It was shortly then that President Bush signed the directive allowing the CIA to kill “High Value Targets (HVTs)” without further presidential approval. Only months after the United States Ambassador to Israel scolded Israel’s targeted killings, “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations ... They are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.”<sup>99</sup>

The first CIA targeted drone strike occurred on February 2002 in Afghanistan. The CIA Predator drone fired on a group of people, one of who was believed to be Osama bin Laden,<sup>100</sup> a faulty premise. The targets all killed were later found to be civilians gathering scrap metals. A successful known targeted drone strike was carried out against a

---

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Brunstetter, Daniel and Braun, Megan. (2013). “State of the Union: A Decade of Armed Drones:”. The Brown Journal.

<sup>99</sup> Mayer, Jane. “The Predator War.” The New Yorker, October 19, 2009. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war>

<sup>100</sup> “Drones - ProCon.org.” Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://drones.procon.org/#background>

suspected USS Cole bombing mastermind, Qead Salim Sinan al-Harethi in Yemen in November 2002.<sup>101</sup>

The CIA conducts its killings in one of two ways. There are the “personality” strikes performed under the Bush administration, and the “signature” strikes started after President Barack Obama took office. The “personality” strikes have an identified target, “known terrorists whose identities had been firmly established through intelligence, including visual surveillance and electronic and human intelligence.”<sup>102</sup> The “signature” strikes are all about following and studying patterns and behaviors of *possible* suspected terrorists.<sup>103</sup> Meaning that that these *unidentified suspects* are not targeted because of their associations and work, but because they fit the “signature” of what other terrorists look like.

### **Drone Reports**

The lack of transparency from the United States government on its drone operations makes it difficult to determine, or have an exact estimate of the number of militants targeted and killed, number of casualties or injuries. This secrecy also impedes on Human Rights organizations to conduct further research in the matter. The federal government has rarely admitted or denied killing civilians or bystanders, but has no problem articulating that every war has risks, or collateral damage.

---

<sup>101</sup> Shaw, Ian. “The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones.”

<sup>102</sup> Engel, Richard, Robert Windrem, and N. B. C. News. “CIA Didn’t Always Know Who It Was Killing in Drone Strikes, Classified Documents Show.” NBC News. Accessed July 3, 2014.

<http://investigations.nbcnews.com/news/2013/06/05/18781930-cia-didnt-always-know-who-it-was-killing-in-drone-strikes-classified-documents-show>

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

### **Drone Strike Reports Discrepancies**

According to Out of Sight, Out of Mind<sup>104</sup>, a website solely dedicated to reporting drone attacks and casualties, there have been over 3,000 casualties since 2004 in Pakistan, alone. Within that figure only 1.6% are HVTs, the rest consist of 5.4% children, 6.7% Civilians, and 76.3% ‘others’. One peculiar thing about this ‘others’ category is that it is never constant. It is reported in many places that the government classifies people in this ‘other’ category because it regards able-bodied men of certain age and build, as militants. Conversely, it can be argued that the government also allocates this category to either persons that were not accounted for, or animals that were vicinity of the drone strikes. However, such ambiguous categorization and argument does allude to the government’s obliviousness on whom it is targeting and attacking. The rationale and criticism in the community is that if the government is indeed conducting surveillance and attacking terrorist operators, it should be aware of who is in this ‘others’ category.<sup>105</sup> When arguing this however, it is very crucial to keep in mind that the government has not actually acknowledged the victims of drone attacks as casualties, yet.

According to another source, Amnesty International, the Pakistani government and NGOs have estimated that the United States government has launched over 350 drone

---

<sup>104</sup> “Out of Sight, Out of Mind.” Accessed September 6, 2014. <http://drones.pitchinteractive.com>.

<sup>105</sup> “Out of Sight, Out of Mind.”

strikes in the past decade. The numbers of casualties are between 400 and 900 people, while also heavily injuring about 600 people in the process.<sup>106</sup>

This is just one example of the huge disparity in the discrepancies of such reports. Both articles and investigations covered drone strikes in Pakistan over the past decade, and there is a huge variation in the number casualties and injured each reports. There are numerous sites and media outlets dedicated to uncovering such truths, and most often they all report on the same events, however, when it comes to the actual data there some that report higher, *often criticized for being anti-government or being unrealistic*, and there are some that report low numbers, *also often criticized for being Republicans, capitalist, Pro-violence, and so on*. Within such frameworks, it makes it impossible for anyone to trust one source.

### **Official Documents**

As I have stated before, there are not a lot of official documents the government has provided on the drone policy and program. However, after the speech on May 23<sup>rd</sup> 2013, President Obama promised the American public that it would be more transparent in such situations and would try to share information about drone strikes appropriately. That same day the White House published an official document entailing United States policies and procedures for counterterrorism efforts.

---

<sup>106</sup> “‘Will I Be Next?’ US Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Amnesty International USA. Accessed September 6, 2014. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/will-i-be-next-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan>.

A few months before the President's promise, another document was leaked, although not official, both the President and his administration have confirmed its existence. In fact the President's speech, which he made on May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2013 at the National Defense University (NDU), and the policy and procedural strategy, which was published by the White House, reference this "non-existent" paper.<sup>107</sup>

I will include these papers as part of my data that I will analyze with the rest of the data in the next chapter.

### **U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities**

This document was issued and released for public perusal on May 23, 2013, just after the President promised the public that his administration would be transparent about their counterterror strategies and actions. It is basically a document that was authorized by the President stating the "policy standards and procedures that formalize and strengthen the Administration's rigorous process for reviewing and approving operations

---

<sup>107</sup> As stated both the President of the United States and his administration have acknowledged this document, and although have reiterated that the document is not official and that it was produced to explain to Congress the type of guidelines the administration uses to conduct and proceed with attacks. For reference please see, "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 2/6/2013 | The White House." Accessed October 4, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-262013>.

to capture or employ lethal force against terrorist targets outside the United States and outside areas of active hostilities.”<sup>108</sup>

The purpose of the document is to 1) imply that the policy and procedures of counterterrorism is an ongoing process which the administration is continually working on refining, clarifying and strengthening,<sup>109</sup> 2) To emphasize that the administration prefers capturing the adversaries over killing, and 3) To illustrate the standards of lethal force, which are as follows,

*First*, there must be a legal basis for using lethal force, whether it is against a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks.

*Second*, the United States will use lethal force only against a target that poses a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons. It is simply not the case that all terrorists pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons; if a terrorist does not pose such a threat, the United States will not use lethal force.

*Third*, the following criteria must be met before lethal action may be taken:

1. Near certainty that the terrorist target is present;
2. Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed;
3. An assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation;

---

<sup>108</sup> “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities | The White House.” Accessed August 4, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism>.

<sup>109</sup> “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities | The White House.”



4. An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and
5. An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

*Finally*, whenever the United States uses force in foreign territories, international legal principles, including respect for sovereignty and the law of armed conflict, impose important constraints on the ability of the United States to act unilaterally – and on the way in which the United States can use force. The United States respects national sovereignty and international law.<sup>110</sup>

The document also states that the administration will keep a dialogue and review with the key senior level officials, taking their perspectives and expertise into account. It also implies that only the “appropriate Members of Congress” have been and will be kept in the loop when such occasions arise.

This document also touches upon the issue of American citizens, in which it states that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will conduct a “legal analysis” and thorough review before proceeding with lethal force.

### **White Paper<sup>111</sup>**

---

<sup>110</sup> “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities | The White House.”

<sup>111</sup> Isikoff, Michael, National Investigative Correspondent, and N. B. C. News. “Justice Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes on Americans.” NBC News. Accessed July 4, 2014. <http://investigations.nbcnews.com/news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans>. Please note that this document is a leak, and cannot be found anywhere else. The document is on this site in PDF form.

This is a 16-page memo that was leaked by the DOJ in early February 2013. This document not only justifies the killings of terrorists by drones, it also sanctions and justifies the killings of American citizens who pose a threat to the United States national security. It states that, “the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force of al-Qa’ida – that is an al-Qa’ida leader actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.”

The following is the basis of the document, summarized. Only certain conditions make using lethal force against a United States citizen on foreign soil lawful: 1) If the United States government has determined the individual poses imminent threat of a violent attack against the United States, 2) if capture is not feasible, and 3) operations would be carried out accordingly to the principles of war. This document also serves as a vague power extension on the side of the government in authorizing its own ability to use lethal action. It states that the United States government does not need to have clear evidence of an attack taking place on United States’ assets, giving the reason that doing so might distract actions being taken to defend an attack.<sup>112</sup>

The constitution of the United States, basically, does not protect an American citizen, from its own government, while abroad. As a result, even the privilege of belonging to one of the most powerful nations won’t even risk giving a person the benefit of the doubt; a speedy trial, a right to a lawyer, an opportunity to defend themselves, or clear their names.

---

<sup>112</sup> Isikoff, National Investigative Correspondent, *White Paper*, p 1.

[W]hen a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a swat team.<sup>113</sup>

This policy originates from previous precedents set by the court and the administration regarding legal processes between the government and individuals. It especially emphasizes that the United States would step in under any circumstances to protect its national borders but first giving the chance to the sovereign nation to deal with the problem themselves on their own soil.

This document also cites United Nations Charter Article 51 that advocates for a sovereign nations' self-defense, stating that

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it

---

<sup>113</sup> "Remarks by the President at the National Defense University | The White House." Accessed July 4, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.

deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>114</sup>

Supplementing the President's "use of force against al-Qa'ida and associated forces is lawful".

### **Extra-Judicial and Arbitrary Killings Through Armed Drones**

The United Nations Special Rapporteur, Christof Heynes carried out a study regarding the conflict between using armed Drones and protecting the right to life. Although, the document began recognizing that drones are "not illegal weapons,"<sup>115</sup> it also recognizes that people's rights are being affected.

It emphasizes that states who utilize armed drones abide by the Principles of War, bearing in mind the rules of distinction, proportionality, and taking necessary caution. It announces that in the event that such rules are broken, and international humanitarian law is violated, states should disclose their operations. It concludes by saying,

The legal framework for maintaining international peace and the protection of human rights is a coherent and well-established system, reflecting norms that have been developed over the centuries and have withstood the test of time. Even though drones are not illegal weapons, they can easily be abused. The central norms of international law need not, and should not, be abandoned to meet the

---

<sup>114</sup> "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Agression." Accessed August 4, 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

<sup>115</sup> "UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism: Drone Strike Inquiry." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed September 6, 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/drones/un-special-rapporteur-human-rights-countering-terrorism-drone-strike-inquiry/p31684>.

new challenges posed by terrorism. On the contrary, that drones make targeted killing so much easier should serve as a prompt to ensure a diligent application of these standards, especially in view of the likely expansion in the number of States with access to this technology in the future.<sup>116</sup>

It ends with a few recommendations stating that all states 1) that utilize such weapons be endorsed by the Security Council, 2) that they must be transparent both to their nations and internationally, and 3) that they exhaust other non-threatening measures, like capture, before they resort to armed drones.

---

<sup>116</sup> “UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism: Drone Strike Inquiry.”

## **CHAPTER III**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **Contributions to Research**

This research brings together three different concepts and disciplines to try and understand how discourse can subjugate language and use it to create differences among societies, which later serves as a justification for violence. It was apparent in the initial stages of this research that literature linking language, discourse and violence was lacking and it is the hope of this study to open a dialogue and encourage further research on this subject.

#### **3.1. Discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis, Social Death and Grievability**

Discourse assumes that ideas shape our social structure, affecting historical transformation. The study of discourse is not only on how those ideas are conceived but also how they are relayed through language. The object of a discourse study, then, is language itself. “Discourse is a social language created by particular cultural conditions at a particular time and place, and it expresses a particular way of understanding human experience.”<sup>117</sup> Such discursive formations cannot be isolated or be contained to mean or be one thing. The effects of discourse infiltrates our thought process and is important to

---

<sup>117</sup> Tyson, Lois. (1999). “Critical Theory Today: A User-Friendly Guide”. New York: Garland Publishing. p.281.

how we think that it cannot be confined to one area of our lives. Foucault explains in many of his writings that discourse spills over to our other parts of life. His whole book on *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception* suggests how certain transformations in medical discourse resulted in affecting on a whole system of medical institutions.

The study of CDA in this case specifically focuses on the analysis of language and how it is used to justify violence towards those that the public discourse views as less than human or not worthy of being grieved. Using Van Dijk's concept of social power abuse, I will analyze the official discourse; mainly comprised of White House correspondence and communications on drone matters. The primary objective of such an analysis is to highlight the discursive strategies used by public officials in what Van Dijk refers to as manipulating the masses. In addition to looking for the justifications of violence in the data, I will also be using the concepts of social death to discuss Butler's grievability standards in my analysis.

As discussed in the previous chapter social death is a form of death an individual or social group undergoes, socially, through repetitive devaluation of peoples' 'humanness' qualities. As a result, degrading the subject as less than human, often equating them to nonhuman qualities so as to be perceived as different from society. Social death has many forms of manifestations all with similar goals of reducing the human aspect of the subject. For the purpose of this study I will be examining the different manifestations of social death equally. Because they all involve distinguishing, what Butler refers to, the living from the "living", the first being the "lose-able", or "un-

grievable” form of living and the latter following western norms of “living” and being human.<sup>118</sup>

### **3.2. Data Collection Method**

I divide my data collection in to two chapters because my methodology in how I obtained it differs. In the first collection, Data I, the data consist mostly of speeches given by White House Officials, focusing, dominantly, on the Presidents speeches in matters of national security and counterterror strategies. I had the intention of looking at the wide range of talks that the president gave to see how he positioned the ‘other’ and I did so by focusing on White House dialogues and communications. My reason for focusing mainly on these subjects was because it covered the type of discourse I wanted to study. This type of discourse dealt with the on going war on terror, and with people other than people from the West.

The second type of data discussed in chapter four is in the form of a case study. This chapter first introduces the case study, the Datta Khel Drone Attack on March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011 in North Waziristan, Pakistan, obtained from a documentary produced by Brave New Films. This case study comes in two forms; the introduction is the first form, narrative obtained from the Pakistani community that explains what happened and how it affected them. The second form is a compilation of official media articles that covered the occurrence. I say, “official” in the sense that the articles compiled entail some aspect of politician remarks and “clarifications”. Although, the documentary did cover the

---

<sup>118</sup> Butler, Judith. (2009). “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” New York: Verso, p. 193.



United States narrative on the incident, I did further research to confirm that such stories were indeed covered by the media, and that such articles did exist.

The list of the data collected can be found at the end of this study in the Appendix section,

#### Data I

Data collected is in the form of press releases, press briefings, speeches, remarks, correspondences, and interviews conducted by other media. This section will first analyze two of the official documents presented in relation to the drone policy. Then I will conduct a textual and linguistic analysis words, phrases and sentences commonly used by the United States government. In addition to analyzing what is said, I also look at what is not said, or implied in this section. I would be utilizing discourse theory in the form of Critical Discourse Analysis to decontextualize and highlight the objectives of such discursive strategies.

Drones have been present for decades, and their utilization as weapons was present before President Obama took office. My reasoning for focusing on the Obama era of drones and not on former President George W. Bush is because the latter accumulated 46 total drone strikes in his entire 8 year term in office, while the current president managed to sextuple his predecessor, accumulating a total number 294 strike in just four years.<sup>119</sup> Another reason for my choice is that even though the President's administration is not the

---

<sup>119</sup> Brunstetter, Daniel and Braun, Megan. (2013). "State of the Union: A Decade of Armed Drones" . The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Issue 19.2.

only office that utilizes the use of drones, his office is the only one that has showed transparency to the public.

Furthermore, the data I have collected for this section are primary forms of data given by the President Obama, his press secretaries (PS), and the White House senior level officials (SLO).

### **3.3. Text Analysis: Procedure**

The data collection involved a qualitative content analysis approach, which is a method utilized for researching the subjective interpretations of the context of the text data through the systemic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns.<sup>120</sup> This approach goes beyond using word counts; it allows the researcher to examine the meanings of such uses, themes and patterns.

For this purpose I have coded the data PD for primary data, which consist of speeches, remarks and interviews; PP for official policy and procedural documents that were made available by the White house administration; and SLO for speeches, remarks and interviews given by the senior level officials of the administration.

I will be using CDA to illustrate the type of discourse manipulation that is present in the data. Focusing on discursive manipulation, to construct ideologies through exercising positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation as discursive strategies. Van Dijk calls this type of manipulation ideological because they are

---

<sup>120</sup> Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon. (2005). "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis" *Qual Health Res.* 15: 1277-1288

represented in the sociopolitical arena, which exercises ideological domination.<sup>121</sup> After 9/11 governmental actions that were taken were fundamentally ideological, by emphasizing ‘our’ values and ‘their’ evil doing.

## Data II

This section of data analysis presents a case study in which justifications of drone strikes that hit civilians were rationalized and publicly acknowledged as legitimate elimination of terrorists. In this chapter I hope to illustrate how much discourse influences how we think and allow the justifications of violent actions to occur. The process is going to be similar to what was done in chapter 3. I will conduct textual analysis, this time not on vocabularies, but on sentences, comments and remarks.

### **3.4. Methodological Limitations**

#### **Strengths**

Although no interviews were conducted, the speeches and remarks I have gathered for my data analysis are considered as my primary data. These data are transcripts of speeches and interviews conducted (by others), quotes, and remarks the Obama administration and White House officials have made, reducing the chances of any alterations or misinformation.

---

<sup>121</sup> Van Dijk, “Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation”.

This study is also first of its kind, in that it intends to draw and illustrate the relationship between three different areas of social life, namely discourse, social death and violence. It is my intention to help the reader understand that these three key elements of my topic are no longer that different rather prerequisites for violence.

### **Weakness**

The bulk of this study is dependent on speeches, remarks and commentaries given by the White House or the Obama Administration. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, there are almost no official documents or policies released for public perusal, with the exception of maybe one or two public acknowledgements and policies. As a result, most of what is incorporated in this study is what these officials have been documented saying, which basically is different every year.

As a result, my initial intent was to gather data from the two entities, the White House administration and the CIA, to compare and contrast the data gathered in hopes that my findings would shed light into finding key patterns that are presently being used in the public rhetoric around discussions on drones in the Middle East.

Additionally, some of the information is often found to be inconclusive as the actions of these administrations reach the public's ear through media. For example, different media outlets have documented different numbers of civilians affected, injured, or dead in drone strikes, as well as different numbers between CIA and White House counts. However, I have tried to focus this study by using numbers gathered from

organizations established for that purpose, like Amnesty International or the Human Rights Watch.

**CHAPTER IV**  
**ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION**

*“Words are pale shadows of forgotten names. As names have power, words have power. Words can light fires in the minds of men. Words can wring tears from the hardest hearts.”*

- Patrick Rothfuss

-

The importance of this type of study in this chapter is to examine and understand how the violent drone strikes conducted are justified as part of the United States counterterror strategy by looking at the type of language used. The type of words and phrases we choose to use indicates our intended goal in the communication process. For example, if Person A walks into a professional job interview and says, “Hey, what’s up my man?” to Person B, this is indicative that either Person A does not know how to carry himself in a professional manner, or that Person A is not as serious in acquiring such a job.

Nonverbal behavior is also significant in such communications. From the example above, if Person A was dressed professionally and said all the right things that could have been said in that professional setting but went in for a fist bump instead of a hand shake, that too also says a lot about Person A. This is not to assume that all or most individuals

won't acquire such jobs if they don't conduct themselves in a professional manner, this example's purpose is simply to illustrate that forms of communications matter, and inform, influence and affect our thought processes.

Each section is divided into multiple categories due to the variety of objectives pursued by the officials.

#### **4.1. Vocabulary Analysis**

In this section I will be looking closely at vocabularies and their linguistic projections. The data I have collected and analyzed showed that there were some patterns that not only emphasized the "us vs. them" rhetoric, but also played on the public's uncertainty and fear of what happened on September 11, 2001.

##### Vocabulary terms that Project Fear

These words are found almost in all of the data gathered, so I have labeled them with either as 'PD', 'PP', or 'SLO' (located in Appendix A, B, and C) and have listed the frequency (f) of their usage in the texts respectively. For the purpose of analysis, I will be referring to the outgroup (Al Qaida, terrorists etc) as the 'Y' group and the ingroup (The US, or the West) as the 'X' group.

1. Enemy (PD 4, f 3)
2. Terrorist (PD 3, f 8)
3. Al Qaida (PP 2, f 29)

4. Threat (PD 1, f 2)
5. Extremists (PD 10, f 4)

The adversaries (Y) of the United States (X) is referred in these texts in multiple ways, they are referred as the ‘enemy’, the ‘terrorist’, the ‘threat’, and as ‘extremist’, all of these words used in different ways, referring to Al Qaida or its known affiliates. All of these words are used to depict Y in an antagonistic way that promotes the government’s “no-negotiation-with-terrorist” policy.

The term ‘enemy’ carries a significant amount of meaning all on its own, by referring to someone as the ‘enemy’ it is implicating the fact that that person or group is completely against this group. The usage of the term ‘enemy’ also has a solidarity impression to it. When president Obama says, “the enemy”, he is not referring to his personal enemy, but rather, as a person in power and authoritative figure, he is talking about the nation’s enemy, America’s enemy. His position in the nation, which is to protect and serve the United States and to uphold the American constitution, can easily be used as a persuasive force, because after all, he is the president and he works for the people.

The use of the term ‘terrorist’ in the United States is subjective and very dependent on the discourse that is utilized. In the West, calling someone a terrorist paints this picture of a fundamentalist that hates the whole concept of the West. However, in other parts of the world that same terrorist can be labeled or depicted as a freedom fighter. For example, bin Laden calls the Americans terrorists. Just because in his mind the United



States is a terrorist does not make them so, the whole basis of the word is one-sided. In addition to the subjectivity of the term it is also descriptive. It is descriptive in the sense that is applicable through geography and time. For example in the US, when one refers Y as terrorists, it might not be possible to know geneses of Y, however, Americans assume, and to some extent know, that the Y that is referred to is a jihadist that has been influenced by the same type of ideology that is responsible for 9/11. If one were in Ireland a decade ago, any references of terrorists would be referring to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Such conclusions may not produce the same outcome every time, but it is there to demonstrate that people are bound by and influenced by their surrounding and experience, or what they think they've experienced.

Each of these terms is also a noun that refers to an opposition, or adversary. Note that, these words do not only serve the purpose of referring to the adversaries, it also labels and depicts their characters. Even a name like Al Qaida, is no longer only a name of a terrorist group, the name has contents. These contents tell the story that Al Qaida is a terrorist group, Osama bin Laden was one their leaders, they do not like Americans or the West, they are Muslim fundamentalists, and they caused 9/11. One can get all this information just from the name, words that invoke a sense of fear, uncertainty and melancholia.

When using the term 'threat' to refer to Y it escalates the sense of urgency and deepens the role that is assigned to Y. It concludes that not only is Y the adversary, the enemy, the terrorist, and the extremist, but a combination of all of these makes Y. It is also a tactical term to use, especially when one is in an authoritative position in the

nation. The mention of the term basically implies that the ‘threat’ needs to be addressed, or taken care off. ‘Threat’ adds and influences the use of the other terms, it invokes a sense of imminence and implies that if not dealt with it would bring violence and destruction to X. Further generating a sense of collective danger and developing meanings for each term, to be used independently within the discourse.

These people, in addition to being the enemy are also called ‘extremist’, which represents a religious and ideological characteristic. It refers to a radicalization of some sort. There are so many types of extremism, in which the United States has experienced, often dealing with cults and sects, in many different occasions, however, most of the time some people are referred to radicals and not ‘extremist’. This term also facilitates this whole notion of not being able to rationalize with Y, because extremism is past the point of rational thinking or reason, laying the ground work for policies like the ‘no-negotiation with terrorists’ to emanate from.

In the context of counterterrorism strategies, which is what most of the data was based on, all of these terms are associated with another. These terms are used for the purposes of controlling the recipients mind and controlling the context,<sup>122</sup> in which a person – or rather the manipulator – in a position of power, authority and who is dependable and can exert that type of influence (discourse in the form of knowledge and opinion) which the public would find as reliable. Obama says, “There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure ... make no mistake, our nation is still threatened,” (PD 10). Then using vocabularies like ‘enemy’, ‘terrorist’,

---

<sup>122</sup> Van Dijk, Teun A. (1998). “Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Study”. London: Sage.

‘Al Qaida’, ‘threat’, and ‘extremist’ directs the focus on to these words as the definitive features for Americas’ adversaries by associating them to national security traits. Context control is also evident in this maneuver, which preyed upon America’s insecurities of past breaches of security, a blow that America hasn’t yet recovered from.

#### **4.2. Phrases Analysis**

##### Events that Invoke Fear

Another pattern I found was the use of these events incorporated into the arguments of officials. I list more mentions and frequency in this section because one or more of these events were used in 90% of the primary data I had collected on the White House administration. Such use and incorporation of these traumatic events seem to emerge when the government’s national security strategies were put into question or when doubts about the government’s ability to fight the bad guys surfaced.

1. September 11, 2001 (PP2 f 4), (PD10 f 8), (PD4 f3), (PD5 f 1)
2. USS Cole (SLO 2 f 2), (PD10 f1)
3. Attacks on Embassies Abroad (PD10 f2), (f 7)
4. Home (- land) (PD 10 f 4), (f 38)
5. Boston Marathon Bombing (PD 10 f 6)

My approach in this section is slightly different from the previous sections in this chapter. Due to the popularity and ample publicity these events had received, I will be

assuming that the readers are acquainted with these occurrences. Therefore, rather than supply descriptions of what transpired I will jump straight into my analysis of the discursive strategies utilized by their use. I will state the sentences in which these events are mentioned.

September 11, 2011

1. “**Al-Qa’ida** has murdered thousands of our citizens, including on 9/11.”

PP 2

2. “Throughout our history, no issue has united this country more than our security. Sadly, some of the unity we felt after 9/11 has dissipated.”

PD 5

USS Cole

1. “It is al-Qa’ida, the core group founded by Usama bin Laden, that has murdered our citizens, from the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole to the attacks of September 11th, which also killed citizens of more than 90 other countries.” SLO 2

Embassy

1. “In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our embassy in Beirut,”

PD 10

2. “We lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center, at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia, and at our embassy in Kenya.” PD 10

Homeland, *or Home*

1. “There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure.” PD 10

2. “We've made substantial investments in our homeland security and disrupted plots that threatened to take American lives.” PP 2

#### Boston Marathon

1. “From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth.” PD 10

2. “... that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.” PD 10

I argue that these events and are the go-to references officials use, to put the public in check: to remind them of how they felt when they heard about these events for the first time and how it affected them. It is what Van Dijk calls “manipulative prototypes” which is the distinctive strategy preferred in the manipulation process. Because public officials utilize these terms, this discursive strategy applies to what he calls as the “Authoritative Fallacy” in which fallacies are used to persuade people to believe or do something.<sup>123</sup> A form of power abuse, in which the recipients of this manipulation are considered as the victims, because this type of influence can only be exerted when these victims lack the resources to “resist, detect or avoid” this type of manipulation.<sup>124</sup>

This form of manipulation involves the process of context manipulation. Basically urging the public to think and assess the information that is given – mostly by the

---

<sup>123</sup> Van Dijk, “Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation”.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

manipulator – through the lens of these events. From the discourse spread it is also the case that these officials have a mental model of their intended target or audience.

President Obama almost always humanizes the situation to fit the “average-Joe” types of people. In his National Security address in 2013, he talks about the resilience of the American people and talks about a specific<sup>125</sup> person to compliment his statement and arguments. “I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, ‘That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.’” This type of maneuver also enhances the image of the speaker, by alluding that the speaker is well aware of the people’s needs and problems, making him a good and devoted politician.

It is also crucial to this analysis to point that not all public recipients are manipulated. Van Dijk asserts that it is not necessary for all recipients to be the target of manipulation, in fact there are people that are impervious to manipulation but these people do not appear in the mainstream, which reduces the chances of counter-discourses.

### **4.3. Sentence Analysis**

“No Negotiation with Terrorists”

The United States follows a strict no-negotiation-with-terrorist policy. This policy on its own has so many undertones without associating it with other types of discourse. It

---

<sup>125</sup> The story of this person is not confirmed. Manning could be a real person with the same story. Or it could be a political tactic, in which politicians have been known to create stories to misinform the public to enhance their public image.

emphasizes the difference between X and Y. In addition to Y being described as a negative adversary, this policy further enhances the qualities of X, in the sense that X is the civilized, the educated and the rational group, whilst Y is not. Hence, the reason that the intellectual X does not try and waste its time reasoning with the irrational, the unintelligible, backward-thinking and savage-like Y.

This policy works in dehumanizing the adversary, in such that it also works by assigning positive qualities to the self, or the ingroup so that the distinctions are clear as black and white. It not only enhances the image of X, it also elevates the intellectual level in which X perceives to have, further declining the level of Y, almost depriving Y of the distinct characteristic that differentiates humans from animals, the ability to think. Asserting that the capacity to converse, discuss and negotiate matters of importance cannot possibly be left to Y, because Y not only lacks the formality and professionalism such “talks” require, but can’t possibly have anything of substantial to say or be heard.

The discursive strategy utilized in this instance is what Van Dijk calls *positive self-presentation* and *negative other-presentation*. Furthermore, when the whole notion of the United States not negotiating with terrorists is seen through the *negative other-presentation* structure, it advances and confirms that Y is indeed in the ‘other’ category. A category reserved for people with none or less human qualities.

The effect of discursive manipulation is evident in this policy, further highlighting ‘our’ good things and ‘their’ bad things. The wording for one does not utilize ‘adversary’ or ‘opponent’, or even ‘enemy’, for that matter. It explicitly says terrorist. The use of the

term ‘terrorist’ is definitive, like ‘enemy’, which can only apply when subjectively interpreted.

It is crucial to remember that we are only discussing such policy in the context of the United States. As I have mentioned before, terms used to refer to Y are subjective in the sense that referring to a group or someone as a ‘terrorist’ in other parts of the world can produce other effects, even similar ones but not the same. But regardless of what geographical place we are discussing, the use of such a sentence, “no negotiating with terrorist” and further approving it by making it a policy, severely implies that whoever the adversary is, they are completely different from us, in which a space is created to rationalize why we can't negotiate with them.

### **SYNTHESIS**

Social cognitive manipulation is a strategy used in the use of the linguistic strategies discussed above. A huge part of our ability to understand and apprehend anything and everything is when we associate it with our own personal experiences and emotions. Such implementation of manipulative linguistic strategy interrupts our cognitive process and interferes with our mental model's independence. Controlling language and evoking traumatic events controls the mental model our mind associates with, thus influencing the process of thinking and acting, in a sense, controlling most of the output.

It also emphasizes the differences between X and Y, by basically assigning each side not only positive and negative qualities, but also good and bad characteristics on



different plains. For example, the use of the word 'extremism' indicates their religions side, in which it implies that their belief is irrational and perhaps not modern enough. Such discursive strategy disenfranchises beliefs of Y, not just them. It is important to note that by calling anyone 'extremist', the speaker is implying that he or she is not. So, in the end the means of discovering the intent of the speaker also involves reading between the lines and understanding what is not said, in addition to what i

## CHAPTER V

### CASE STUDY: ATTACK ON DATTA KHEL,

March 17, 2011



Figure 3, Map of North Waziristan, Pakistan and Visual of Area of Target<sup>126</sup>



<sup>126</sup> Masood, Salman, and Pir Zubair Shah. "C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan." The New York Times, March 17, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html>.

#### **Figure 4, Image of Datta Khel Fort**

*One man's combatant is another man's chump who went to a meeting."*

-Former United States Ambassador for Pakistan Cameron Munter

On March 17, 2011 a Jirga<sup>127</sup> was held in Datta Khel, North Waziristan to resolve a dispute over a chromite mine. The assembly was held in a bus terminal at Datta Khel Fort in open space at around 10am. Jirga is a democratic practice that allows everyone to be heard and ensures stability in society.<sup>128</sup> At approximately 10:45 am, a United States drone fired missiles at this assembly killing 42 people at this assembly.

"There were more than forty people sitting in two groups," says tribal elder Ahmed Jan. "We were talking about chromite and cutting of wood from the mountains," he continues "I was sitting on the ground." About 20 or so minutes into the Jirga, "Four missiles attacked us at 10:45 am on March 17, 2011. Two missiles targeted the group where I was sitting, while two more targeted the other group," recalls Jan.

The tribal elders had informed the Pakistani military, who were only 10 km away from where the event, about the Jirga 10 days in advance. This assembly was as open-public event that everyone in the society and region knew about.

---

<sup>127</sup> A Jirga is a gathering in which all the elders and tribe leaders gather to discuss regional conflicts and disputes. It is considered as the regional dispute resolution mechanism.

<sup>128</sup> "Datta Khel Signature Strike Investigation." War Costs. Accessed August 4, 2014. [http://www.warcosts.com/datta\\_khel\\_signature\\_strike\\_investigation](http://www.warcosts.com/datta_khel_signature_strike_investigation). Quote from Ambassador Akbar Ahmed.

“I was two miles away from the scene and was clearly seeing the drones roaming in the air,” says Jalal Manzar Khail, a tribal leader from Miransha, North Waziristan. People from near by shops and residences raced over to help the injured. “I rushed there and found pieces of dead bodies all around,” Khail adds.

Noor Khan, son of a deceased Tribal Malik Daud Khan, explains that he was five hours away and by the time he reached his father, he found him in a coffin. “It was hard to recognize him,” he says, “his body was completely burnt.”

Another man, Khalil Khan, that also lost his father, a Waziri tribesman, says, “We saw fire when we reached ... the fire lasted for two days.” He adds that the clothes his father was wearing that day were completely burnt off. Khan said that he knew most of the elders, and that 15 of them were actually from his tribe.

“In one morning forty important leaders all eliminated,” says Stanford Law Professor James Cavallaro. “The loss of forty leaders on a single day is devastating for that community, it is devastating in terms of leadership, it is devastating in terms of moral compass and it devastating in economic terms as well,” explains Cavallaro.

Noor Khan explains what a great loss his father’s death was for him and the community. He says that his father “had many contributions for the welfare and happiness of the people in our area, because he was a councilor, a well known elder.” His father was also the tribe leader for the community and the main income provider for the family, an outcome that affected and disrupted his family dynamic.

For the people that survived the attacks, the injuries they sustained were severe. Jan says that he still feels pain in his legs, the bones that were broken ache and that he has

to have surgery again. He also speaks about his pain, “ I have severe pain in my ears,” and adds that he also suffers from the effects of these attacks, psychologically.

Khalil Khan admits that the result did not only affect them psychologically but affected them economically as well. He says, “we face chaos and depression and we have no proper source of income.” He is dumbfounded at the fact that they can’t even sit together in groups and discuss their important issues.

When one resident<sup>129</sup> was asked if the men that gathered were Taliban, he answered, “The Taliban will never gather in such a large number in broad daylight to be targeted by the drones.”<sup>130</sup>

### **5.1. The United States Narrative**

A few months after the drone attacks on Datta Khel, which killed 42 civilians, who were mostly elderly tribal leaders, the counterterrorism advisor to the President, then<sup>131</sup>, John Brennan gave a speech at John Hopkins University on the President’s counterterrorism and strategy. In his speech to rally more supporters and delegitimize critics of this counterterrorism program he stated that for the past year “there hasn’t been

---

<sup>129</sup> The resident did not want to identify himself because of the sensitive information he believed he would divulge.

<sup>130</sup> “Wanted: More Light, Less Heat about Drone Attacks.” The Huffington Post. Accessed August 4, 2014. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-first/wanted-more-light-less-he\\_b\\_837651.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-first/wanted-more-light-less-he_b_837651.html).

<sup>131</sup> I say “then” because John Brennan is currently the head of the CIA in the present time. Brennan was sworn in in March of 2013. Before that he was the advisor of counterterrorism strategy to the incumbent president.

a single collateral death” due to the “precision in the capabilities we were able to develop,” (SLO 2).<sup>132</sup> Not a single collateral damage or civilian hurt.

When the story about the attack on March surfaced, mostly after Pakistani leaders and officials publicly criticized and condemned United States actions. Pakistan’s foreign ministry called it a “flagrant violation of all humanitarian rules and norms,” and asked for an explanation and an apology from the United States ambassador Cameron Munter.<sup>133</sup>

Every attempt that was made by journalist to question the White House administration about this event was shot down. In fact there were some cases in which the whole operation was denied, calling it “alleged drone strikes”<sup>134</sup>.

Pakistani military chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani also went on the record to express his shock and disappointment, “It is highly regrettable that a Jirga of peaceful citizens, including elders of the area, was carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard for human life.”<sup>135</sup> United States officials initially denied such attacks.

---

<sup>132</sup> Shane. Scott. “C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes”. The New York Times, August 11, 2011. Accessed August 11, 2014.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html?pagewanted=all>.

<sup>133</sup> Mehsud, Tom Wright And Rehmat. “Pakistan Slams U.S. Drone Strike.” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2011, sec. World News.

<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703818204576206873567985708>

<sup>134</sup> Elliott, Justin. (2012). “Obama Administration’s Drone Death Figures Don’t Add Up.” ProPublica. Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-drone-death-figures-dont-add-up>.

<sup>135</sup> Masood, Salman, and Pir Zubair Shah. “C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan.” The New York Times, March 17, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html>.

“Newly revealed details of the drone strikes were provided by United States and Pakistani officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the program,”<sup>136</sup> declares Associated Press Kathy Gannon.

Shortly after that one United States official admitted to the attacks and disputed the accounts of the Pakistani government and the killings of civilians, proclaiming that all the people killed were insurgents. He added, “These people were not gathering for a bake sale, they were terrorists.”<sup>137</sup>

Another United States official went to say, “There's every indication that this was a group of terrorists, not a charity car wash in the Pakistani hinterlands.”<sup>138</sup>

Yet again, another United States official publicly dismissed the allegations of these attacks by stating, “These guys were terrorists, not the local men's glee club.”<sup>139</sup>

After constant denial of the accounts that a United States Predator drone killed 40 to 42 civilians, articles published after showed some changes in the number. The number of civilian casualties started to shift, mostly declining.

Other reports also started emerging declaring that among the civilians that were killed, the United States was monitoring Taliban leaders in the community, and that they were the ones that were targeted, they were the ones the missiles were for. One source

---

<sup>136</sup> “AP Exclusive: Timing of US Drone Strike Questioned.” Yahoo News. Accessed August 4, 2014. <http://news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-timing-us-drone-strike-questioned-161145779.html>.

<sup>137</sup> Masood and Shah, “C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan.”

<sup>138</sup> Elliott, “Obama Administration’s Drone Death Figures Don’t Add Up.”

<sup>139</sup> Mehsud and Rehmat “Pakistan Slams U.S. Drone Strike.”

says, “Although up to 11 Taliban were said by some to be among the dead, up to 38 civilians were also reported killed, including tribal elders and local policemen.”<sup>140</sup>

## 5.2 Analysis

It is my intention to analyze the remarks given by politicians when the incident in Datta Khel was brought up. Although, the focus of this entire study has been on the White House administration, and the anonymity of the politicians that were cited in the compiled article prevents us from knowing who they are, it is nonetheless, still important to pursue in this analysis. Their affiliation with the central government can prove to a certain extent the type of discourse they 1) spread, and 2) operate under.

1. “These people were not gathering for a bake sale, they were terrorists.”<sup>141</sup> – Anonymous Government Official
2. “There's every indication that this was a group of terrorists, not a charity car wash in the Pakistani hinterlands.”<sup>142</sup> – Anonymous Government Official
3. “These guys were terrorists, not the local men's glee club.”<sup>143</sup> - Anonymous Government Official.

---

<sup>140</sup> “Obama 2011 Pakistan Strikes | The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.” Accessed August 5, 2014. <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/obama-2011-strikes/>.

<sup>141</sup> Masood and Shah, “C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan.”

<sup>142</sup> Elliott, “Obama Administration’s Drone Death Figures Don’t Add Up.”

<sup>143</sup> Mehsud And Rehmat, “Pakistan Slams U.S. Drone Strike.”



To analyze such a statement 1 we have to begin by defining and describing what a bake sale is first. What is a bake sale? A bake sale is an activity in which people bake goods at home and sell them to others, often organized by schools, communities and different groups and organizations in an effort to raise money for a cause, and usually hosted all over the United States. We have already covered *the where*, schools, charities and communities, now let us answer the *by who*. Since it is a fundraising scheme, people trying to raise money for a cause host it. For example, in high school, students host many events to raise money for their senior class prom and graduation party, and some of the events they host are often bake sales.

The purpose of type of remark, or sentence, is to differentiate them, the victims, from us, people who have bake sales. Bake sales are hosted, as stated above by schools, and communities to raise money for cause. The point of this statement is to assert that “these people” are nothing like us “the Americans”, also by using the “bake sale” scenario, it is not only saying that we are charitable people that host such events for causes, *positive self-representation*, it is directly contrasting terrorists from human beings that host such things. In fact the use of the word “terrorist” in this statement almost takes its own form of describing a creature, that is unable to comprehend the whole notion of charity of bake sales.

It can also be argued from this statement that bake sales are hosted in places like the United States. Or we can even describe the United States as a modern nation and argue that this statement is attacking the lack of modernity in the community of those “terrorists”. In Butler’s argument of waging war, she indirectly asks the reader if we, *in*

*the modern world*, have equated “living” life to modernity, and to a certain extent that is exactly what this statement does. It laughs at the idea that such communities can fathom hosting bake sales.

The other statements do the same thing; they imply that there is a blatant difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, using values and American ways to contrast the differences, like “car wash”. Using such definite examples of American values when contrasting two groups is a discursive strategy that says a lot not only to the speaker but to the audience as well. I

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

*“The means we use for a cause will also be the end we see in the end.”*

- Martin Luther King Jr.

This research set out to discover how violence is legitimized, and even to study how any society rationalizes violent actions taken in the name of their country. In the past decade alone there have been 400 drone strikes operationalized in the Middle East. These strikes have been happening since 2001 but with more frequency after 2009.

The United States government claims to be the victim of indiscriminate mass killing when the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were hit on September 11, 2001. A day the world never forgets, and in some parts of the world a daily reality people are paying for even 13 years later.

The accepted narrative is that the United States is in the Middle East fighting terrorism, however, at what cost? It is not until recently, that through the advance use of technology –like the internet – has the public become more and more aware of these violations of human rights and international laws.

When complaints and these drone strikes started being the focus of media and international organizations' attention, more and more similar cases started emerging. The CIA made it absolutely clear that it would never comment on their operations regarding drone usage. The White House, however, never admitted to civilian casualties, initially. Now that more and more people abroad are witnessing these attacks, and speaking to the media, the government still denies the status of these civilian casualties and actually declares that they are indeed militants that were purposefully targeted.

Now that the administration has promised to be transparent, *since 2013*, about their counterterrorism strategies, more critics have emerged, although, there has not been any evidence of actions keeping up with that promise, as of yet. Unfortunately, the government's argument is attributed to the fact that there is collateral damage in every war.

The official discourse, President Obama, speaks about terrorists and their networks to "have the capacity to be destabilizing and disruptive in countries where the security apparatus is weak." That type of argument is not contested in this study, nor will it be, but it does not shy away from stating that the only power that has been causing destabilization and disruption in that region, recently, has been the US drone program.

When I first started this project, I knew it would be difficult to find official document, stances, and opinions given by the White House administration. In the first review of my data, I assumed that at the end of the road I would find the US

denying claims of attacks, which I did find, and I knew I would find some form of de-legitimization going on to accounts of narratives provided by critics of such policies. What I did not expect to find was the constant undermining and disputing of news sources that covered stories of these attacks (US media). Undermining the media covering the stories and narratives of villagers and people that were maimed by the strikes. Undermining foreign politicians that publicly admit and criticize US's actions. Undermining the reports of international humanitarian and human rights agencies that work in the areas affected.

When I first started thinking and researching this study, I wanted to focus on civilian casualties and how the official discourse frames them. I argued that discourse was manipulated into constructing the public narrative that gives them no reason to care, or focus on these issues. And then I tied social death, or the degrading of human life to nonhuman or animalistic qualities, as the product of manipulative discourse in this case. When a group is created solely on the distinction that they are different from 'us', then through time, that distinction manifests into a moral one. Basically, creating a space in which this group – which is perceived to be immoral – can and should be a victim of violence by our moral standards. It is not that we wake up one day and realize that a group is evil; there are breadcrumbs that are created and left to follow into that mentality.

The reality of my research findings was very different than what I expected it to be. Of course the scarcity of data is one factor, however, I wanted to focus on the Obama administration primarily because there was so much ignorance in the Bush

administration, and there would have been abundant sources. The type of discovery I wanted to make after studying speeches and any primary data on my topic, I assumed I would find the administration's verbal justifications for the civilian casualties in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The kind of incidents and stories, I have covered in past chapters. However, that kind of information was unavailable, most of the time, due to the not-so transparency of the government, and its – unlike the previous administration's – politically correct verbal usage.

Although, what I did find was not the administration dehumanizing the civilian casualties to justify its killings, rather it was the likening and treating these same casualties to terrorist or radical militants, who are already demonized. So this research indirectly studies the dehumanization of civilian casualties in which they have been equated to terrorists, who are already being demonized and hunted. The administration through its use of “signature strikes” is indiscriminately killing people based on behavioral patterns a terrorists is perceived to have. So, as the examples I have provided in previous chapters are proof of the fact that the administration no longer knows or specifically targets individuals that are perceived to be threats. Instead they target places “terrorist-like-people” frequent, and people that act “suspicious”.

Regardless of the suspicious activities these casualties seem to be doing, the President specifically said multiple times, that the use of the hellfire missiles are a last resort, a case in which capturing is not possible or appears more dangerous in doing so. He also added and emphasized multiple times, that in conducting drone

strikes there needs to be a “near certainty” that no civilians will be hurt. The stories of villagers and victims of these drone strikes shared in the beginning and in chapter five say otherwise.

The administration’s arguments that it would be putting their military in danger if they send in troops, because, apparently, these militants or terrorists might carry weapons, might have slight traction in the Datta Khel or the Yemeni Wedding occurrence, predominantly, because the people were in large groups. But how does one explain the rest? What was so dangerous in capturing an old woman working in her garden? What about the mother at home with her children? How does the administration justify those killings? Machine malfunction? Faulty intelligence? Are any of these reasons significant enough to justify the murder of one human life? If so, perhaps the US should be combatting radical beliefs and actions at home first!

## APPENDIX A

### **DATA COLLECTED FROM SPEECHES AND PRESS BRIEFINGS BY WHITE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION<sup>144</sup>**

- PD 1. Election Night Victory Speech Grant Park, Illinois 4<sup>th</sup> November 2008
- PD 2. President Obama's Inaugural Address 20th January 2009
- PD 3. "Protecting Our Security and Our Values" Delivered at the National Archives Museum, Washington, D.C. 21 May 2009<sup>145</sup>
- PD 4. Remarks by the President on National Security National Archives 21<sup>st</sup> May 2009
- PD 5. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address 27<sup>th</sup> January 2010
- PD 6. Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa 19<sup>th</sup> May 2011
- PD 7. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address United States Capitol 24 January 2012

---

<sup>144</sup> All information and data were gathered from the White House website, [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov)

<sup>145</sup> "Transcript Of President Obama's Speech About Guantánamo And Terrorism, May 21, 2009 | Andy Worthington." Accessed August 2, 2014. <http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/05/21/transcript-of-president-obamas-speech-about-guantanamo-and-terrorism-may-21-2009/>.



PD 8. Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan 1<sup>st</sup> May 2012

PD 9. Press Briefing by PS Jay Carney's response to question asked by Associated Press (AP) 5 February 2013

PD 10. President Obama's Speech on Drone Policy at National Defense University at Fort McNair 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2013.

**APPENDIX B**

**DATA COLLECTED FROM POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (PP) FOR  
THE USE OF FORCE  
RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE<sup>146</sup>**

PP1. U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities **May 23, 2013.**

PP2. Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Counterterrorism **June 29, 2011.**

---

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

## APPENDIX C

### DATA COLLECTED FROM SENIOR LEVEL OFFICIALS (SLO) WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE CABINET

SLO 1. Department of Justice: Law-fulness of Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida of An Associated Force *Drafted* 8<sup>th</sup> November 2011, *released (or leaked)* 4<sup>th</sup> February 2013.<sup>147</sup>

SLO 2. White House Counterterrorism Adviser John Brennan: "Ensuring al-Qa'ida's Demise" John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies 29<sup>th</sup> June 2011.<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>147</sup> This document is referred to as the White Paper, which was leaked after and American citizen, Anwar al Awlaki was killed through the direct orders of the executive government on the basis that he was a suspected operational leader in the AQAP. The purpose of this paper is to state that the targeted killings of American citizens who pose as threats to the security of the United States are lawful and abide by the constitution. The paper was created and drafted for Congress. Press Secretary Jay Carney and President Obama later confirmed the existence of this paper. When this paper was leaked, it shows that this document was drafted a little over a month after the death Awlaki, however this paper did not see the light of day until February 4<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

<sup>148</sup> White House Counterterrorism Adviser John Brennan: "Ensuring Al-Qa'ida's Demise," 2011. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLhCCYZZ3Ds&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLhCCYZZ3Ds&feature=youtube_gdata_player).

## REFERENCES

“A Wedding That Became a Funeral: US Drone Attack on Marriage Procession in Yemen.” Accessed August 6, 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/node/123245>.

“Al Qaeda’s Second Fatwa.” PBS NewsHour. Accessed September 21, 2014. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-jan-june98-fatwa\\_1998/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-jan-june98-fatwa_1998/).

“AP Exclusive: Timing of US Drone Strike Questioned.” Yahoo News. Accessed August 4, 2014. <http://news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-timing-us-drone-strike-questioned-161145779.html>.

Benjamin, Medea.(2013). Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control. Verso Books. Kindle Edition.

“Bin Laden’s Fatwa.” PBS NewsHour. Accessed September 21, 2014. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa\\_1996/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996/).

Brunstetter, Daniel and Braun, Megan. (2013). “State of the Union: A Decade of Armed Drones”. The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Issue 19.2.

Butler, Judith. (2009). Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? New York: Verso, p. 193.

“Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Agression.” Accessed August 4, 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

“Datta Khel Signature Strike Investigation.” War Costs. Accessed August 4, 2014. [http://www.warcosts.com/datta\\_khel\\_signature\\_strike\\_investigation](http://www.warcosts.com/datta_khel_signature_strike_investigation)

Dickson, Paul. (1976). The Electronic Battlefield. Indiana University Press. p. 188.

“Drones - ProCon.org.” Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://drones.procon.org/#background>

Edward Said On Orientalism, 2012. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd\\_Z\\_g&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd_Z_g&feature=youtube_gdata_player).

Elliott, Justin. (2012). "Obama Administration's Drone Deaths Don't Add Up." ProPublica. Accessed July 3, 2014. <http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-drone-death-figures-dont-add-up>.

Engel, Richard, Robert Windrem, and N. B. C. News. "CIA Didn't Always Know Who It Was Killing in Drone Strikes, Classified Documents Show." NBC News. Accessed July 3, 2014. [http://investigations.nbcnews.com/\\_news/2013/06/05/18781930-cia-didnt-always-know-who-it-was-killing-in-drone-strikes-classified-documents-show](http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/05/18781930-cia-didnt-always-know-who-it-was-killing-in-drone-strikes-classified-documents-show)

"Factsheets : Beech QU-22B." Accessed June 30, 2014. <http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=317>

"Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities | The White House." Accessed August 4, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism>.

Fairclough, Norman (1995b). *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold. p 7.

Fairclough, Norman. (1980). "Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language". New York. Routledge. p 135.

Fairclough, Norman. (1989). "Language and Power." New York. Longman Inc. p4.

Foucault, Michel. (1988). "Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason". USA: Random. (1988).

Fowler, R. and B. Hodge (1979). "Critical Linguistics". In R. Fowler et al (Eds.).

Freud, Sigmund. (1914). "Mourning and Melancholia," in *On The History of the Psycho- Analytic Movement papers on Metapsychology and Other Works*. London: The Hogarth Press. p. 253.

Galtung, Johan. (1969). "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research". *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol.6(3). p 167-191. Accessed July 7, 2014. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301>

Galtung, Johan. (1990). "Cultural Violence". *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 27, No. 3. 291-305. p 291. Accessed 7 July, 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/423472?uid=3739936&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104256832431>

“General Atomics Predator.” Accessed July 3, 2014.  
<http://spyflight.co.uk/Predator.htm>.

Goldhagen, Daniel. (1996). *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. New York:

Gray, Richard. (2011). *After the Fall: American Literature Since 9/11*. Massachusetts: Wiley Blackwell. p. 8.

Gutting, Gary (2005). *Foucault: A Very Short Introduction*. p. 32. Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

Haslam, Nick. (2006). “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review”. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. Vol. 10, No. 3, 252–264. Accessed 7 July, 2014.

Horrocks, Chris and Jevtic, Zoran. (2004). *Foucault: A Graphic Guide*. p. 65. UK: Icon Books Ltd. 2004.

Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon. (2005). “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis” *Qual Health Res*. 15: 1277-1288

Interview of Osama Bin Laden by Tayseer Allouni with English Subtitles, 2012.  
[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Rwo-Oicj8&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Rwo-Oicj8&feature=youtube_gdata_player)

Isikoff, Michael, National Investigative Correspondent, and N. B. C. News. “Justice Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes on Americans.” *NBC News*. Accessed July 4, 2014.  
[http://investigations.nbcnews.com/\\_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice](http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice)

Jeremiah Gertler. (2012). “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems.” *Congressional Research Service*. p.1.

Johan Galtung and Tord Hovik. (1971). “Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization”. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, No. 1 pp. 73-76. Sage Publications. p 73.

“Judith Butler – Frames of War: The Politics of Ungrievable Life | Backdoor Broadcasting Company.” Accessed July 4, 2014.  
<http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2009/02/harc-frames-of-war-the-politics-of-ungrievable-life/>.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2003). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. University of California Press. Kindle Edition.

Kaufman, Asher. (2014). "Thinking Beyond Direct Violence". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 46. pp 441-444. p 441.

Korostelina, Karina. (2008). "Identity Conflicts: Models of Dynamics and Early Warning". In Sandole, Dennis. (ed). *A Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. Routledge.

"Language and Control". London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

Marion, Kaplan A. (1999). "Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany". Oxford University Press; *Studies in Jewish History* edition: 3-5.

Masood, Salman, and Pir Zubair Shah. "C.I.A. Drones Kill Civilians in Pakistan." *The New York Times*, March 17, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html>.

Mayer, Jane. "The Predator War." *The New Yorker*, October 19, 2009. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war>

McVeigh, Karen. "Drone Strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani Family Tells of Mother's Death." *The Guardian*, October 29, 2013, sec. World news. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress>.

Mehsud, Tom Wright And Rehmat. "Pakistan Slams U.S. Drone Strike." *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 2011, sec. World News. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703818204576206873567985708>

"Obama 2011 Pakistan Strikes | The Bureau of Investigative Journalism." Accessed August 5, 2014. <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/obama-2011-strikes/>

Opotow, Susan. (2010). "Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction". *Journal of Social Issues*, 46, 1–20.

"Out of Sight, Out of Mind." Accessed September 6, 2014. <http://drones.pitchinteractive.com>.

Patterson, Orlando. (1982). *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*. Harvard University Press; 1st edition.

Phillips, Nelson and Hardy, Cynthia. (2002). "Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction". p. 2. London. SAGE Publications Inc.

Powers, Rod. "Military Word/ Phrase Origins," United States Military Information.

"Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 2/6/2013 | The White House." Accessed October 4, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-262013>.

"Remarks by the President at the National Defense University | The White House." Accessed July 4, 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university>.

Renehan, Jr., Edward J. (2002). *The Kennedys at War, 1937–1945*. New York: Doubleday. p. 304.

Said, Edward. (1977). *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. New York: Vintage Books.

Said, Edward. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.

Shane. Scott. "C.I.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes". *The New York Times*, August 11, 2011. Accessed August 11, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html?pagewanted=all>.

Shaw, Ian. (2013). "The Rise of the Predator Empire: Tracing the History of U.S. Drones." *Understanding Empire*. <http://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2-0-a-brief-history-of-u-s-drones/>

Sorensen, Theodore. (1966). "Kennedy". New York: Bantam. p. 37.

"Strategic Considerations." 2014. *Living Under Drones*. Accessed June 16. <http://www.livingunderdrones.org/report-strategy/>

"Turning a Wedding Into a Funeral: U.S. Drone Strike in Yemen Killed as Many as 12 Civilians." *Democracy Now!* Accessed August 6, 2014. [http://www.democracynow.org/2014/2/21/turning\\_a\\_wedding\\_into\\_a\\_funeral](http://www.democracynow.org/2014/2/21/turning_a_wedding_into_a_funeral).

Tyson, Lois. (1999). "Critical Theory Today: A User-Friendly Guide". New York: Garland Publishing. p.281.

"UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Countering Terrorism: Drone Strike Inquiry." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed September 6, 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/drones/un-special-rapporteur-human-rights-countering-terrorism-drone-strike-inquiry/p31684>.



"US Navy and US Marine Corps Bureau Numbers, Third Series (30147 to 839998)". Joseph F. Baugher. Retrieved 2014-04-10.

Van Dijk, Teun A. (1988). "News as Discourse". New Jersey. Erlbaum. p 2.

Van Dijk, Teun A. (1993). "Discourse & Society: Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis". London. SAGE Publications.

Van Dijk, Teun A. (1998). "Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Study". London: Sage.

Van Dijk, Teun A. (2006). "Discourse & Society: Discourse and Manipulation".

Volkan, Vamik. (1997). Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Farrar Strauss, and Giroux.

Waller, James. (2002). Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing. Kindle Edition.

"Wanted: More Light, Less Heat about Drone Attacks." The Huffington Post. Accessed August 4, 2014. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-first/wanted-more-light-less-he\\_b\\_837651.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-first/wanted-more-light-less-he_b_837651.html).

Weedon, C. (1987). "Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory". Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

"'Will I Be Next?' US Drone Strikes in Pakistan." Amnesty International USA. Accessed September 6, 2014. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/will-i-be-next-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan>.

Yves Winter. (2012). "Violence and Visibility," New Political Science. 34:2. p 168.

## **BIOGRAPHY**

Manahat Thomas moved to the United States in 2006 from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to complete high school. She graduated from West Potomac High School in Alexandria, Virginia, in 2008. She then received her Bachelor of Arts in English from George Mason University in 2013.